Speech-acts and convention

Abstract

In both parts of the paper it is argued that Austin has by grouping together words in some important way dissimilar made possible criticisms which further distinctions would allow him to deal with. The division of illocutionary verbs into those relying on essentially linguistic conventions and those not essentially linguistic is an attempt to remove certain obvious difficulties in the locutionary/illocutionary distinction. Grice's theory of intention-recognition is used to consolidate the locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. But Austin's attempts to justify his distinction between locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary were only a part of his philosophy of language. In "A Plea for excuses" his analysis of certain adjectives seems to rely on certain principles of linguistic propriety which remain implicit. As in his analysis of illocutionary force, he is concerned here with the many ways actions can fail to be carried off. Thus, in the second part, I try to show what are the principles that are implicit and claim that some but not all of the linguistic facts Austin started from might be better explained by principles different from the ones he had in mind. Nevertheless it does seem that the behaviour of some of the adjectives Austin discusses cannot be explained in the way his critics would like. I conclude that no one theory will explain the different adjectives Austin listed.