S P E E C H – A C T S
A N D
C O N V E N T I O N S

PETER A. AYRTON

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ABSTRACT

In both parts of the paper it is argued that Austin has by grouping together words in some important way dissimilar made possible criticisms which further distinctions would allow him to deal with. The division of illocutionary verbs into those relying on essentially linguistic conventions and those not essentially linguistic is an attempt to remove certain obvious difficulties in the locutionary/illocutionary distinction. Grice's theory of intention-recognition is used to consolidate the locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary distinction. But Austin's attempts to justify his distinction between locutionary/illocutionary/perlocutionary were only a part of his philosophy of language. In "A Plea for excuses" his analysis of certain adjectives seems to rely on certain principles of linguistic propriety which remain implicit. As in his analysis of illocutionary force, he is concerned here with the many ways actions can fail to be carried off. Thus, in the second part, I try to show what are the principles that are implicit and claim that some but not all of the linguistic facts Austin started from might be better explained by principles different from the ones he had in mind. Nevertheless it does seem that the behaviour of some of the adjectives Austin discusses cannot be explained in the way his critics would like. I conclude that no one theory will explain the different adjectives Austin listed.

DETAILED SYNOPSIS

Section I. The way in which Austin's distinction between demonstrative and

descriptive conventions made in "Truth" is connected with the

later distinctions he makes in "How to do things with words".

2. How conventions operate in separating illocutionary from locutionary

and perlocutionary force.

3. A distinction is drawn between essentially linguistic and inessen-

tially linguistic conventions to mark off more clearly illocutionary

force as dependent on inessentially linguistic conventions.

4. Another criterion by which to delimit the class of illocutionary

verbs is introduced by using Grice's analysis of intention-recognition

Illocutionaries are then seen to be the class of verbs for which

intention-recognition is necessary.

5. Certain difficulties which an attempt to mark off illocutionary

force faces are considered and an attempt to deal with them is

made.

6. It is argued that the distinctions made so far may not exactly

match those made by Austin but that this in itself may not be

excessively damaging since Austin was not entirely happy with the

way his own distinctions were drawn.

7. The relationship between semantic meaning and both illocutionary

and perlocutionary force is discussed.

8. It is suggested that an analysis of "he promised" rather than "I promised" will be more likely to lead to a set of <u>linguistic</u> rules constitutive of the speech-act of promising; although it is doubted whether such an undertaking is feasible.

9. The rules governing "what he said constituted a promise (he promised)" are compared with those governing "he has checkmated" in order to show how in both cases the institution allows for (or disallows) a given occurrence of the linguistic form.

10. The scope of linguistic rules is discussed. It is doubted whether they alone can account for illocutionary force.

11. It is not quite clear how that which I do when I say (e.g.) "I warn" is to be accounted for. An explanation in terms of legitimate expectations is advanced.

12. Objections to the claim that intention-recognition is a necessary feature of an analysis of illocutionary force are met by distinguishing between "A warned B", "A was warned by what happened": only the former is an occurrence of illocutionary force.

13. A distinction between "warning" and "uttering a warning" is argued for in the hope of finding another way of separating I/illocutionary force from E/illocutionary and perlocutionary force.

14. It is claimed that the adjectives grouped together by Austin in "A Plea for Excuses" as falling under his principle "No modification without aberration" are too diverse to warrant uniform treatment.

15. The problem is further complicated by the fact that what may be described as done "intentionally" under one action-description may be described as done "not intentionally" under another action-description.

16. Part of the difficulty with voluntary resides in the fact that two different distinctions can be drawn:
    (i) between voluntary and non-voluntary
    (ii) between voluntary$_2$ and involuntary.

17. The suggestion that "voluntary " is restricted to untoward actions in the same way as "snub" is to noses is considered and found insufficiently explanatory.

18. An attempt to uncover what seems to be the linguistic principle underlying the Austin/Cavell position is made. This position is shown to be ambiguous, allowing a strong and a weak interpretation.

19. In an attempt to find just what is meant by the claim that a certain utterance is "inappropriate" diverse examples of linguistic inappropriateness are considered.

20. Two linguistic principles are mentioned which might help to explain some of the "inappropriate" examples.

21. It is claimed that the principles might explain Austin's arguments concerning the correct applications of certain utterances if the weak interpretation is accepted.

22. A distinction between aberrant actions and when an action goes wrong is made : it is asserted that Austin was interested in the latter not the former.

23. A similarity between Austin's views and Hart's analysis of defeasible concepts is noted.

24. The attack on Austin/Cavell made by Searle is examined and found wanting. It is claimed that one of the points it makes cannot even be substantiated against certain philosophical arguments which Searle claims (erroneously) to be similar to Austin's.

25. Neither of the linguistic principles manage to distinguish two types of inappropriateness : an argument against Austin/Cavell would have to distinguish between the two types.

26. It is further argued that Searle has too quickly accused Austin of using an erroneous method of linguistic analysis. Searle's claim that the key-role in linguistic analysis falls to the speech-

-act must remain of indeterminate value until we know just what

are the criteria for distinguishing speech-acts (and why certain

words can appear in certain speech-acts but not in others).

27.   It is further argued against Searle that he cannot use against

Austin the same argument he has elsewhere used about the meaning

of "good".

28.   It is concluded that no one single principle will be able to account

for the behaviour of the different adjectives grouped by Austin

under his "No modification without aberration" heading.

I.   I want to begin by showing that the main objections to Austin's distinction between constatives and performatives (most of the same objections are also made against his later distinction between locutionary/ illocutionary/perlocutionary verbs) are a development of the objections made against a distinction drawn by Austin in his article on "Truth": it seems plausible to suggest that it was the view about how language operates that led Austin to formulate these two distinctions which are vulnerable in the same way: crudely that they exaggerate the possibility of distinguishing between meaning and context.

The objection that Austin himself and his critics[1] make to the performative/constative distinction is that every constative has a performative dimension (one can say: 1) performatives have a dimension of truth 2) constatives can be unhappy 3) every constative is a performative since when I utter the paradigm "The cat is on the mat" I am doing something: namely, stating, making a statement; these are all formulations of the same general objection.)   The parallel objection[2] to the view put forward in "Truth" is that you cannot distinguish between demonstrative and descriptive conventions in a search for truth since demonstrative conventions in language rely for their functioning at least

1   Black, Philosophy '63; Lemmon, Analysis '62 etc.
2   Strawson, Philosophical Quarterly '65

in part on their semantic meaning (in virtue of descriptive conventions).

There is in "Truth" an attack on the isolated importance of 'truth' itself: "like freedom, truth is a bare minimum or an illusory ideal"[4] .... "There are numerous other adjectives which are in the same class as 'true' and 'false', which are concerned with the relations between the words (as uttered with reference to a historic situation)*... We say, for example, that a certain statement is exaggerated or vague or bald, a description somewhat rough or misleading .... In cases like these it is pointless to insist on deciding in simple terms whether the statement is 'true or false' ... There are various degrees and dimensions of success in making statements: the statements fit the facts more or less loosely, in different ways on different occasions for different intents and purposes ...... What, moreover, of the large class of cases where a statement is not so much false (or true) as out of place, inept* ('All the signs of bread' said when the bread is before us)?" In this article Austin draws a distinction which he believes will contribute to a solution of the problem of 'truth' and thus help show us what it is when a statement corresponds to the facts, is accurate, is to the point etc., the distinction between descriptive and demonstrative conventions:

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4   PP pp. 91-8
* An example of the ambiguity discussed in Part 2. "Not so much false" (false?) as "inept". Inappropriate? Misleading?

"Descriptive conventions correlating the words (= sentences) with the types of situation, thing, event etc. to be found in the world.

Demonstrative conventions correlating the words (= statements) with the historic situations & co. to be found in the world.

A statement is said to be true when the historic state of affairs to which it is correlated by the demonstrative conventions is of a type with which the sentence used in making it is correlated by the descriptive conventions."[5]

I want to avoid entering into the multi-sided cross-fire this definition has aroused. Yet Austin's demonstrative/descriptive distinction seems unduly neglected in the foray, for even if one questions its validity, it makes easier to understand the later distinctions in "How to do things with words". In a footnote to "Truth" Austin, explaining his distinction, writes: "The trouble is that sentences contain words or verbal devices to serve both descriptive and demonstrative purposes often both at once... A sentence as normally distinguished from a mere word or phrase is characterised by its containing a minimum of verbal demonstrative devices (Aristotle's reference to time); but many demonstrative conventions are verbal (pointing and co.) and using these we can make a statement in a single word which is not a 'sentence'. Thus 'languages' like that of traffic signs use quite distinct media for their descriptive and demonstrative

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5   op. cit. pp. 89-90

elements (the sign on the post, the site of the post). And however many verbal demonstrative devices we use as auxiliaries, there must always be a non-verbal origin for these co-ordinates which is the point of utterance of the statement."[6] Suppose we are at the zoo and see the sign GNU fixed onto a specific cage: demonstrative conventions (the site of the sign etc.) tell us that the sign is a name-of-animal-in-cage sign, descriptive conventions inform us about the particular animal to be found. In short, demonstrative conventions indicate to us where the gnu is, descriptives what's in the cage. The sign is correct when a gnu is in the cage. An interesting point is that the sign is wrong (what it states is false) either if (1) an okapi is in the cage (the descriptive conventions fail to correlate) or (2) the sign falls to the ground (here the fault is with the demonstrative conventions). This example is comforting for Austin's theory since:

(1) it shows how the different conventions function and how together they can yield truth

(2) it shows how given any two out of demonstrative conventions, descriptive conventions and truth you can pick out the third (e.g. if you know the sign is right and what the demonstrative conventions are, then, by inspecting the cage you know that what you come face to face with is a gnu.)

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6 op. cit. pp. 89-90

To the example (optimum for the theory) important objections can be made. It will be asked: how do I know if not by descriptive conventions that the sign GNU is a name-of-animal-in-cage sign, since if I see NO LITTER on the cage I don't search around for a clean-shaven government official behind the bars (one could speculate about the possible confusion EGRESS may cause to the uninitiated, or a man who wants to cross the cage marked PANDA). It will be objected in the same way that I must know what CUL DE SAC means before I can see how the demonstrative correlations are to work. Whether or not these objections can be dealt with, Austin's distinction is even less tenable when we try to apply it to a language like English (as opposed to traffic signs etc.) for those words which establish demonstrative correlations (e.g. "now", "there" which replace the site of the sign etc.) do so in virtue of their meaning (descriptive correlation).

It seems to me that if one wants to defend a position more favourable to Austin than claiming a total collapse of the distinction[7], some use may be made of the fact that reference may be made to the Chilean crossing the road by "The Italian over there!" A distinction might then be drawn between intrinsically semantic conventions and non-intrinsically semantic conventions like the occasion when a word is uttered, for instance. (The intrinsically semantic conventions will correspond to the descriptive conventions of the "gnu" example; the non-intrinsically semantic (e.g. the

7   As has been done by Strawson in Phil. Quart. '65

context of an utterance) to the demonstrative.)

That such a distinction exists in language can be seen from the fact that the sergeant-major's command "Jackson, Clark, Smith!" is ful- filled by the three men falling into line in the order their names are yelled out. The order their names are yelled out is tied by non-intrin- sically semantic conventions to the order they are to stand on parade.[8]

Whatever the ultimate fate of the demonstrative/descriptive con- vention distinction, I hope to have shown that it is not unrelated to Austin's later locutionary/illocutionary force distinction. My point was that locutionary force inherits the semantic (sense and reference) qualities of descriptive conventions: whereas with illocutionary force there is the stress on context, on time of utterance etc." .... for some years we have been realizing more and more clearly that the occasion of an utterance matters seriously, and that the words used are to some extent to be 'explained' by the 'context' in which they are designed to be or have been spoken in a linguistic interchange. Yet we are still perhaps too prone to give these explanations in terms of 'the meaning of words'. Admittedly we can use 'meaning' also with reference to illocutionary force - 'He meant it as an order'. But I want to distin? guish <u>force</u> and meaning in the sense in which meaning is equivalent to sense and reference, just as it has become essential to distinguish sense

8 Picture theory of language? It may well be that such an example brings out to best advantage what is being claimed by the defenders of a picture theory of language.

and reference within meaning".[9] And of course the same moves as before

are open to critics since in both cases there is the assumption that one

can clearly distinguish in analysis between meaning and context (force).

Austin himself remarks that there do not seem to be occurrences of locu-

tionary acts which are not also illocutionary acts (the problem with

"I state"); it has even been doubted whether any value whatsoever can

be given to the notion of illocutionary force.[10]

2.   But, of course, the notion of illocutionary force does not

stand exactly to locutionary force as demonstrative conventions to des-

criptive since whereas in the latter distinction the two components are

of equal complexity, in the former, illocutionary force comes into play

at a more sophisticated level of linguistic analysis.* What allows

illocutionary force to come into its own are conventions, but Austin

could have said more about the role they play in its determination. In

"Performative Utterances"[11] he writes "First of all, it is obvious that

the conventional procedure which by our utterances we are purporting to

use must actually exist. In the examples given here this procedure will

be a verbal one, a verbal procedure for marrying or giving or whatever

it may be; but it should be borne in mind that there are many non-verbal

9 "How to do things with words" p.100
10 Jonathan Cohen Phil. Quart. '63   11 Reprinted in PPP pp. 220-239
* That is over and above considerations of the meanings of words. Crudely
illocutionary is concerned with not only the semantics but also the pragmatics
of language. (The point is discussed below.)

procedures by which we can perform exactly the same acts as we perform
by these verbal means .... The first rule is, then, that the convention
invoked must exist and be accepted. And the second rule, also a very
obvious one, is that the circumstances in which we purport to invoke
this procedure must be appropriate for its invocation." In 'How to do
things with words", Austin is even less explicit in claiming that the
performance of an illocutionary act "may be said to be conventional in
the sense that at least it could be made explicit by the performative
formula."[12]

Now if the latter remark is taken to have no connection with the
former (if one does not believe that there is an intimate connection
between there existing a convention in the world and there being a
performative formula in language) then Austin may well be open to Strawson's
criticism[13] that there are occasions when "the illocutionary act itself
is not essentially a conventional act, an act done as conforming to a
convention, it may be that the act is conventional, done as conforming to
a convention, only in so far as the means used to perform it are con-
ventional. To speak only of those conventional means which are also
linguistic means, the extent to which the act is one done as conforming
to conventions may depend solely on the extent to which conventional
linguistic meaning exhausts illocutionary force." But it seems likely
that Austin must have held views as to why it was that to perform only

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12   HDW p.103
13   Phil. Review '64

certain human activities there existed first person verbal forms which had special characteristics; his remark about illocutionaries being conventional "in the sense that it could be made explicit by the performative formula" can then be seen as standing for a more general theory about the relation between certain linguistic acts and conventions.

In my attempt to refute Strawson's criticisms I will take a circuitous route. I will argue (a) that a distinction between two types of conventions can be made;(b) that if one claims that Austin can only mean conventional in the sense that "it is a conventional matter what words stand for what objects", one is unable to distinguish between certain illocutionaries and certain other verbs; (c) that to make the distinction a stronger sense of conventional is required; (d) that anyway Strawson's examples are not damaging to Austin's distinction since a strong definition of illocutionary force can exclude that category of verbs which Strawson's verb "object" belongs to.

I begin by distinguishing two types of conventions which I will call (1) essentially linguistic conventions (2) inessentially linguistic conventions. Two possible confusions must be explained: 1) I am using "convention" in a strong sense so as not to allow that it is a matter of convention that a given word in English has a given meaning: if this were to be allowed, as when a weaker sense of "convention" is used, all linguistic acts would depend upon conventions and the points Austin put forward could never be made. Of course it has to be argued that illocution-

-ary acts are conventional in the strong sense. 2) In my examples
of illocutionary acts I will sometimes use (as Austin did) what were
under the performative/constative distinction called implicit performatives
as opposed to explicit performatives. It does seem to me that Austin
underestimated the complications the inclusion of implicit performatives
would bring to his theory:[14] these complications stem in the main from
the fact that (a) I can make a promise without uttering the canonical
formula "I hereby promise you ..." (b) I can utter the formula and not
make a promise.

3.　　　I will take inessentially linguistic conventions (I/ con-
ventions for short) to be conventions in the world, (conventions of
etiquette, ceremonies etc.); essentially linguistic conventions (E/ con-
ventions for short) to be conventions about language. I will distinguish
I/conventions and E/conventions as follows. If an action is performed
under an I/convention it does not follow that anything was said (although
this may be the case) and so under I/conventions (i) he X'd $\nrightarrow$ he said
something. If an action is performed under an E/convention, it follows
that something was said and that which was done was done in saying some-
thing. So under E/conventions (i) he X'd $\longrightarrow$ he said something.
I/illocutionaries are verbs whose illocutionary force depends on I/conventions
E/illocutionaries are verbs whose illocutionary force depends on E/conven-
tions. (It may be objected here that it cannot be any stronger sense of

14　for the same underestimation see Searle "What is a Speech Act?"in
'Philosophy in America' ed. Max Black.

"convention" that E-conventions than that which makes all verbs con-
ventional. But if we take an example of implicit E/illocutionary force,
say, "Our production is diminishing" used as a contradiction, it is clear
that it cannot have the force of a contradiction <u>solely in virtue of the
meaning of words</u> ("conventional" in weak sense), since "Our production
is diminishing" can be uttered on occasions when it does not count as a
a contradiciton. And now it may well be a question of terminology whether
one accepts that E/illocutionaries are conventional in a strong sense
as long as one recognizes that they are not solely conventional in
virtue of semantic meaning: (see below).

However useful it may prove to mark off the locutionary/illocution-
ary distinction, the distinction between I/conventions and E/conventions
will not by itself support the full weight of the illocutionary/perlocu-
tionary distinction because (a) the remark "Your mother comes from New
Orleans " which relies for its effect on I/conventions has the <u>perlocu-
tionary</u> force of insulting, whereas (b) "The red flag is up" said as
a warning also relies on I/conventions for its illocutionary force.

4.　　　　　In order to explain the illocutionary/perlocutionary
distinction, I will use the requirement developed by Grice[15], that the
person addressed realize that the speaker wanted his intention (the speakers)'
to be recognized. This is Grice's (i_2) intention that A, the hearer,

15　　"Meaning" Philosophical Review '57

shall recognize S's (the speaker's) intention (i_1) that S intends to
produce a certain response (r) in A by uttering X. (For a much more
complete account of this intention-escalation see Grice-Strawson opcit.)
And it is the case that for (a) to be successful as an insult it is not
necessary that the person insulted recognize the speaker's intention for
it to be so taken; whereas in the case of (b) the person addressed must
see why the person speaking to him has said "The red flag is up" for
the utterance to have the force of warning.

So it seems that intention recognition which is essential for
illocutionary force (I must see the purpose of the red flag you wave
in front of me) is not necessary for perlocutionary force: I get
excited about, am insulted by something you say without needing to see
that what you said was to be taken as an insult or a stimulant. It
even seems intuitively probable that intention recognition may impede
perlocutionary force: I may not be annoyed by a remark if I see that
that is its aim;* the awaited insult may well be stingless, no-one
was impressed by the Bourgeois Gentilhomme.[16] It is true that the differ-
ence here is not enormous, for we do have a verb similar to 'insult',
namely'provoke'. In hidebound duelling circles it is probably still the
case that a glove thrown at a man's feet acts as a provocation . The
gesture is equivalent to his saying "I hereby provoke you" etc., and

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* It is of course true that I may be all the more annoyed by a remark if I
realize that its aim is to annoy me. Although this seems to less likely
than being less annoyed, it does not affect my argument which is that
intention recognition is not essential for perlocutionary force.
16 Strawson op. cit.

of course intention-recognition is essential. (See, for instance, "The
Marx Brothers go West", where much humour derives from challenges not
being recognised). Whatever truth there is in Austin's remark about
the German students who _formally_ insulted each other[17], it would still
be peculiar if every time the formula was used the person addressed
foamed at the mouth (and indeed, there does seem something odd about
perlocutionary force being _habitually_ employed: as people do not normally
laugh at the same joke, so to upset, humiliate, alarm, arouse, excite,
one must vary one's methods of (verbal) approach). It is also true that
intention-recognition is not necessary for E/illocutionary force. In
a conversation A says "It will be an hour's drive to London tomorrow".
B says "The roads are flooded." A continues to talk about his trip to
London. Later on C describing the converstion says "B's saying 'The
roads are flooded' contradicted A, although the latter did not realize
it (at the time).

So far the following has been claimed:

(i) I/conventions may contribute to an utterance having either
illocutionary or perlocutionary force.

(ii) for illocutionary force, intention-recognition is required
in addition to I/conventions.

(iii) intention-recognition is not necessary for perlocutionary
force, even sometimes inhibiting

(iv) I/conventions are not necessary for a remark to have perlocu-
tionary force.

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17 HDW p.30

(v) intention-recognition is <u>not</u> necessary for a remark to have E/illocutionary force.

5.   I want to argue further that:

(vi) although it seems t at either I/conventions of E/conventions are necessary to illocutionary force,

(vii) that those examples of illocutionaru force to which E/conventions are necessary form a specific category which a strong definition of illocutionary force can rule out and thus combining (vi) and (vii) I will claim that:

(viii) I/conventions ~~are~~ and not E/conventions are necessary to illocutionary force.

        Certain conventional behaviour can be linguistic or non-linguistic.

(a) when I sto at red lights my behaviour is in accordance with non-linguistic conventions

(b) a policeman who wants to stopa car can either blow his whistle or shout 'Halt!': in doing either of these things he acts in accordance with an <u>I/convention</u>. But

(c) for what A did to count as a contradiction, a disagreement, a rejoinder, a report of B's utterance (he contradicted etc.), appeals must be made to conventions tjat are essentially linguistic; the act

which is described <u>must</u> be carried out by language.* And of course there
is no alternative non-linguistic way in which these acts can be carried
out. However it is the case that there are relations utterances can
have between them without there being a non-linguistic alternative which
are not examples of E/illocutionary force (e.g. rhyming with, appearing
five pages later, rendering inaudible). So an utterance B can do X to
an utterance A without having the illocutionary force of X-ing : my
remark can close the conversation (as when I say "that will be all")
without having the illocutionary force of closing a conversation.

Before trying to deal with this problem I want, hopefully, to
claim that whilst heeding to be met, it does show a weakness in Strawson's
attack on Austin, for it does seem that Strawson's position does not
distinguish between "close the conversation" and "contradict": Strawson
says "In the course of a philosophical discussion (or, for that matter,
a debate on policy) one speaker <u>raises</u> an <u>objection</u> to what the previous
speaker has just said. X says or proposes that p and Y <u>objects</u> that q.

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* It may be objected that if I claim (as I want to) that a nod etc. which
counts as agreement is part of a language (e.g. English), then why not
also include the whistle of the policeman, the glove thrown down as a
challenge. So it may be that the argument must be amended to claim that
since to say that X is a contradiction of Y is to postulate a relation
between <u>two</u> events, it is necessary that, <u>at least</u>, Y was <u>said</u> (if Y
is an objection and X a counter-objection to W, then at least W must
be said etc.)

But where is the <u>convention</u> that constitutes it an objection? That
Y's utterance has the force of an objection may lie partly in the charac-
ter of the dispute and of X's contention (or proposal) and it certainly
lies partly in Y's view of these things, in the bearing which he takes
the proposition that q to have on the doctrine or proposal that p. But
although there may be, there does not have to be any convention involved
other than those linguistic conventions which help to fix the meanings
of the utterances". If this were the case one would have to treat in
this way a situation in which Y's utterance "closed the conversation",
and one certainly wouldn't want to say that this is an example of illo-
cutionary force. The difficulty of Strawson's position is that it can-
not explain the difference between "close the conversation" and "contradict".*
Furthermore, the difference between them cannot be one of intention-recog-
nition, for Y's utterance counts as an objection whether or not X takes
it as such (cf the delight tutors get out of forcing a student to a
recognition of a faulty argument out of which he (the student) had been
hoping to make much capital.) Importantly, that "contradiction" etc. do
not need intention-recognition is an indication of their peculiarity as

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* Which a theory which seeks to explain illocutionary force must do. So
it seems that if one argues as Strawson does that some illocutionaries are
conventional only in the sense in which linguistic meanings are conventional,
one will not be able to explain why it is that "being an objection" is an
example of illocutionary force whereas "closes the conversation"is not. His
attempt to explain "having the force of an objection" in terms of the way Y
views the situation cannot be right since another person could describe the
situation "Y <u>thought</u> what he said constituted an objection, but it didn't
really". ("Being an objection" is a <u>formal</u> quality.)

as examples of illocutionary force.

Now a promising move to help distinguish between "close the con-
versation"/"contradict" is to insist that for X to be an occasion of
illocutionary force the utterance (a) <u>must stand in relation X to
utterance (b) in virtue of semantic meaning</u>. This requirement will not
quite do since it may be in virtue of semantic meaning that the English
sentence "The cat is white" <u>is the translation</u> of the French sentence
"Le chat est blanc" , without "is the translation of" being an example
of illocutionary force. So it seems that the claim that E/illocutionary
force depends on a relation between utterances must be improved upon:
perhaps something like "utterance (a) has the illocutionary force of X
if its truth-value stands in a relation R to the truth-value of utterance
(b) (which precedes it)" will do. The model for this is that -P is a
negation of P irrespective of what is inserted for P (<u>in a way</u> irres-
pective of the meanings of words). Of course when we have a situation
where (a) is a negation (generic term) of (b), we will sometimes way
(a) is a denial of (b), sometimes an objection to (b), sometimes contra-
dicts (b) etc.; likewise when (a) and (b) have the same truth-values
we will sometimes say (a) affirms (b), agrees with (b) etc.: which one
we use in a given situation will depend on I/ and E/conventions. The
following example may help: if after a tumultuous 4.30 at Kempton Park,
the jockey of the horse that <u>passed the line</u> second says (in a specific
place) to the stewards "Piggot beat me by foul means", he has made an
<u>objection</u>, which would not be the case if he said the same thing to his

wife at home. His objedtion may be overruled or sustained. ~~Although~~ the E/conventions which make a given remark an objectiòn to another may not be as rigid as the I/conventions which make the jockey's remark (his move need not be a verbal one, it may be sufficient to raise a hand) at Kempton Park an objection. And of course there is not always for every E/convention a corresponding I/convention: there is no extra-linguistic occurrence of a contradiction.

6. It may be thought that to have any value the distinction between E/illocutionaries and I/illocutionaries will have to reflect Austin's locutioṇary/illocutionary distinction but the trouble with this demand is that (a) the new classification would suffer from the same defects as the old: though its only justification is my separating off the troubling expositives*to reinforce the old distinctions.

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* Austin in his classification of illocutionaries says this about expositives (p.160): "Expositives are used in acts of exposition involving the expounding of views, the conducting of arguments, and the clarifying of usages and of references. We have said repeatedly that we may dispute as to whether these are not vendicative, exercitive, behabitive or commissive acts as well .... For good value, I shall give you some lists to indicate the extent of the field. Most central are such examples as "state", "affirm", "deny", "emphasize"; "illustrate", "amswer". An enormous number such as "question", "ask", "deny" seem naturally to refer to <u>conversational interchange</u>: but this is no longer necessarily so, and all, of course, have reference to the <u>communicational situation</u>". (my italics)

(b) I am not at all sure how the distinction bet ween E/convention illocutionaries (nearly all Austin's expositives) and I/conventions illocutionaries does reflect Austin's locutionary/illocutionary distinction: this is in part because of the baffling way in which Austin himself makes the distinction: "To perform a locutionary act is in general, we may say also and _eo ipso_ to perform an illocutionary act, as I propose to call it. To determine what illocutionary act is so performed we must determine in what way we are using the locution:

asking or answering a question

giving some information or an assurance or a warning

There is nothing mysterious about our eo ipso here. The trouble rather is the number of different senses of so vague an expression as "in what way we are using it - this may _refer_ even to a locutionary act ..." Once again we seem to reach a situation where the distinction breaks down (" surely to state is every bit as much to perform an illocu-tionary act as, say, to warn or to pronounce"). Austin does try to deal with this difficulty by claiming that "we could distinguish the perfor-mative opening part (I state that) which makes clear how the utterance is to be taken; that it is a statement (as distinct from a prediction) from the bit in the that-clause which is required to be true or false. The difficulty with this argument is that "I say that ", "I state that", "I utter X as a contradiction" etc. are often left out (in a court of law what a man says becomes his _statement_ without his having to begin with "I state"). So if "I state that X" has illocutionary force, so

does "X" and the locutionary distinction collapses (see Austin's footnote of despair about his attempts to mark off the locutionary/illocutionary/ perlocutionary distinction "(1) All this is not clear (2) and in all senses relevant (won't all utterances be performative?"[18])

7.   In order to make workable the locutionary/illocutionary distinction, I want to try to sharpen the E/convention/I/convention illocutionary distinction: this will _{also} help to separate I/illocutionary force and perlocutionary force. We have seen that intention-recognition is a necessary feature of I/illocutionaries: I want to reinforce the claim made earlier that this is not so of E/illocutionaries. Let us take:

(i) he contradicted her although she didn't realize it

(ii) he warned her although she didn't realize it

(iii) he persuaded her although she didn't realize it.

It does seem reasonable to suggest that (ii) alone seems odd (why this is so I will begin to explain later), for I can be persuaded and contra-
dicted unawares. Another interesting point seems to follow: from the fact that there are many things I could say during the minute of silence for General X at the Albert Hall which would count as an insult (to his memory and his widow) it might be thought that perlocutionary force is unaffected by the meaning of words. Now this cannot be true since although there is a prima facie assumption that anything said is an insult (since a minute of silence has been asked for), if I said truthfully "There is a

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fire in the balcony!", I can hardly be accused of insulting. None the
less Austin (or anyone else) has not suggested a way of distinguishing
between perlocutionary force and the causal properties of an utterance.
If,following Austin,we allow that a remark can have the perlocutionary
force of annoying, does a remark that makes me jump have the perlocutionary
force of startling? Does a pop-song (because of its rhythm) have the
perlocutionary force of making me dance? In order to answer in the negative
(as presumably Austin would want to) it will have to be argued that
if an utterance is to have perlocutionary force at all it must have/in
virtue of its semantic meaning but this seems difficult to reconcile with
the fact that almost anything I say during the minute of silence will
count as an insult.

That a remark has I/illocutionary force (e.g. is a warning) depends
in some way on the meanings of words. (I will later discuss a possible
counter-example, after having distinguished between "what he did warned
me" and "what he said warned me"). Searle[19] has constructed a situation
which he considers damaging to Grice's analysis of non-natural meaning.
"Suppose that I am an American soldier in the second world war and that
I am captured by Italian troops. And suppose also that I wish to get
these troops to believe that I am a German in order to get them to release
me ...I, as it were, attempt to put on a show of telling them that I
am a German officer by reciting those few bits of German that I know......

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19 Phil. in America op.cit.

Therefore I, a captured American, address my Italian captors with the following sentence: "Kennst du das land, wo die Zitronen bluhen?" Let us describe the situation in Gricean terms. I intend to produce a certain effect in them, namely, the effect of believing that I am a German officer, and I intend to produce this effect by means of their recognition of my intention. I intend that they should think that what I am trying to tell them is that I am a German officer. But does it follow from this account that when I say "Kennst du das Land ..." what I mean is 'I am a German officer'? Not only does it not follow, but in this case it seems plainly false that when I utter the German sentence what I mean is 'I am a German officer', or even 'Ich bin ein deutscher offizier', because what the words mean is "Knowest thou the land where the lemon trees bloom?" Of course, I want my captors to be deceived into thinking that what I mean is 'I am a German officer', but part of what is involved in the deception is getting them to think that that is what the words which I utter mean in German"[20]. But it seems to me that this criticism of Grice is wrong, if revealing: wrong because Grice does not want to limit non-natural meaning to semantic meaning. Searle begins that part of his paper entitled 'Meaning' by asking the questions[21] "But what is it for one to mean something by what one says, and what is it for something to have a meaning?" But these are two very different questions, though Searle in his criticism of Grice tends to forget this fact. It is true that Grice

20 Searle op.cit. p.230
21 Searle op.cit. p.228

does write[22] " If we can elucidate the meaning of:

" X meant NN something (on a particular occasion)" and

"X meant $_{NN}$ that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)"

and of

"A meant $_{NN}$ something by X (on a particular occasion)" and

"A meant$_{NN}$ by X that so-and-so (on a particular occasion)",

this might reasonably be expected to help us with

"X means $_{NN}$ (<u>timeless</u>[+]) something (that so-and-so)

"A means$_{NN}$ (<u>timeless</u>[+]) by X something (that so-and-so)"

but nowhere in the paper does he argue for why answering the one might reasonably be expected to help us in answering the other. And clearly enough from Grice's own examples of non-natural meaning we can see why it may not help.

(1) "I draw a picture of Mr Y behaving in this manner and show it to Mr X. I want to assert that the picture (or my drawing and showing it) meant$_{NN}$ something (that Mr Y had been unduly unfamiliar), or at least that I had meant$_{NN}$ by it that Mr Y had been unduly unfamiliar."

(2) I have an avaricious man in my room, and I want him to go ....
I point to the door or give him a little push, then my behaviour might well be held to constitute a meaningful utterance, just because the recognition of my intention would be intended by me to be effective in speeding his departure.

22   Grice op. cit. p. 381
+   my italics

Now these non-linguistic examples show that (a) at best cases of

linguistic meaning must be a sub-class of cases of non-natural meaning

(b) the analysis cannot distinguish between my asserting Mr Y was unduly
     and my _pretending_ to assert that Mr Y was unduly familiar,
familiar, between meaning that the man should leave, and pretending t

to mean that the man should leave.

..   In Searle's example the man would be doing what he is described

as doing either if he were a German officer of if he were pretending to

be a German officer. But a similar dual description is not correct

in cases of linguistic meaning: one cannot claim that Olivier in

"Othello" is pretending to say 'I am jealous', he _is_ saying 'I am jealous'

although he is only pretending to be jealous[23].   (c) One could go

through exactly the same routine on a different occasion and it would

mean$_{NN}$ something different.

     This last point is well-demonstrated by a linguistic example of

non-natural meaning[24].   Suppose as a remark on a pupil 's philosophy

collections, I say 'Jones has beautiful handwriting', I imply that his

philosophy is rather poor.   The implication is easily 'cancellable' if

I add 'and he is a good philosopher' (there may be no pejorative implication

if I am talking about say, Plato.) It does seem correct

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23 In the case of the thief Window-cleaner Austin discusses in
'Pretending', it seems right to argue that he is cleaning the window but
pretending to be a window-cleaner.
24 Taken from Grice's 'Causal Theory of Perception'. His remarks on
implication are more fully discussed in the second part (pp 64)

that my remark meant$_{NN}$ that he was a bad philosopher (on this occasion), but clearly "he has beautiful handwriting " cannot mean$_{NN}$(timeless) "he is a bad philosopher " if "mean$_{NN}$ (timeless)" is claimed to be at all similar to "means in English". (If it isn't, then "meaning$_{NN}$" will not be much help in explaining linguistic meaning).

If this is so, the criticism is revealing in showing us just why the Gricean analysis is so useful in explaining illocutionary force; just because it operates at a level different from linguistic meaning. Suppose I am mountain-climbing in a foreign country: I hear in a certain tone a shout; seconds later the avalanche just misses me. I take the shout to have meant "Watch out!" (I don't have to know the German for "Thin Ice" to be warned by the acrobatic show-off who has just fallen in and out of kindness bids me not to follow suit). So we want to say that what illocutionary force, if any, a remark has, depends on what meaning the words are taken to have* by the person spoken to and not what meaning the words actually have.

(iii) With E/illocutionaries it is certainly not the case that their force depends on what meaning the words are taken to have; a denial of what you say is a denial no matter how you take it (this goes hand in hand with the fact that no intention-recognition is necessary). However, presumably everything I say is a statement of mine (or at least

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* Difficulties about this formulation are discussed below.

a saying) no matter what; but clearly not everything I say is a contra-
diction etc. So we want to say with qualifications that E/illocutionary
force does depend on the meaning of words or, more precisely in the
relation between meanings of words in different sentences.

To complete the distinction between E/illocutionaries and
I/illocutionaries I will argue that with the latter a distinction can
always be drawn between e.g. 'he uttered a warning' and 'he warned',
whereas with the former no such distinction can be made (to utter a
contradiction of his utterance is to contradict him); it is also true
that this will help to distinguish perlocutionary force from illocutionary
since you do not utter an exhortation or an arousal — you exhort, you
arouse[25]: As an I/illocutionary I shall use 'warn' and 'promise' and
hope that they can stand as representative of the group, although realizing
that analysis of individual verbs would be preferable.

8.   It does seem fair to suggest that writers on illocutionary
force have been slightly unclear as to whether they were analysing the
rules for/speech-act of promising occurring or the rules for 'I promise'
being used. What should be given are the semantical rules for 'X promised'
('X will only have promised if'), since when we say the semantical rules

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25   This is connected with the point made above that there can hardly

be formulae for perlocutionary force.

for the speech-act of promising, we could mean rules for:

 (1) 'he promised'

 (2) use of the utterance 'I promise'

 (3) the institution of making a promise being evoked

(1) and (3) become identical (are the same) though there could be a society where promises were made and the expression 'he made a promise' not used, but, hopefully, this is not our situation. What we want are semantic rules for the correct application of 'he made a promise'. But of course part of the difficulty with such an enterprise will be the attempt to convert into <u>semantic</u> rules a group of conditions required for the performance of an I/illocutionary act (in this case a promise).

 The problem can be seen when an I/illocutionary 'I promise to brush my teeth' misfires (say because it was never in question that what was promised would not be done as a matter of course). If one tries to find rules for the use of a function-indicating device for e.g. promising[26], one faces the difficulty already mentioned that given the cannonical formula 'I hereby promise you',

 (A) I can promise without using the cannonical formula (either by a handshake, by saying 'count on me!' or by saying 'I'll be right over"on the telephone.)

 (B) I can use the formula without promising (as in the case of

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26 as does Searle op.cit.

promising to brush my teeth, or promising you something you don't want).

9. It may be helpful at this point to compare the distinction between (a) the conditions required for a promise to be possible and (b) the rules governing the uses of 'what X said constituted a promise' with (a_1) the rules of chess, and (b_1) the rules of the expression 'he was checkmated'. It is clear that in a society which didn't know what chess was, the expression 'he was checkmated' would have a use, if use it had, totally different from that which it has in ours. So we can say that the game, as it were, gives the expression 'he was checkmated' sense. In the same way the conditions constitutive of the institution of promising give 'what X said constituted a promise (X promised)' sense.

It cannot be the case that 'he was checkmated' just describes the position of the pieces because its correct application requires (a) that it was not open to the person so described to make an effective move, after which his king would not be taken (b) that 'check!' had been said by his opponent. However the game, as it were, cannot guard against misinvocations. For 'he was checkmated' to be used correctly: (1) a game must have been played and ended (2) it cannot be used correctly if there has been an infraction of the rules of the game - a difficult problem arises when the person cheated fails to notice his opponent's duplicity - (3) the only temporal requirement of 'he was checkmated' is that it be said

<u>after</u> the game , which is not the case for 'check!', which has **very** strict temporal requirements regulating its correct use. It does seem tempting to push the analogy by indicating the similarity between 'check' and 'I promise':

(1) both can be used correctly if certain conditions hold - in the one case that the pieces are in a certain position, in the other that the promiser can fulfil his promise, that he intends that which he promises.

(2) both can be misinvoked (of course there does not seem much point in trying to deceive someone into believing that he is in check (and any- way it cannonly be done against a beginner) but presumably there would be situations where it could be **very** much to the advantage of a player to convince his opponent that he must move his king.

(3) both can only be correctly used whilst a game is in process

(4) It is almost the case that like 'I promise', 'Check!' is a perfor- mative utterance. Of course you don't put a man in check by saying 'CHeck!' (you do that by moving your knight), you do however <u>confirm</u>[27] that your opponent is in check by saying 'Check!'; and of course a man <u>cannot</u> be checkmated unless you have said 'Check!'; you do not win the game,if, as it were, you surreptitiously and without saying 'check!' block your opponent's king (cf the great disputes at the turn of the century between grand masters as to whether 'Check!' to the Queen ('Dame!') had to be

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27   This may help to explain why it has been mistakenly thought that 'I know' is a performative.

announced: it is still done out of courtesy in middle-European café-chess circles)[28]

A final similarity in the analogy is that whilst 'I promise', 'check!' are limited in their application (they must be within the space-time of the game), 'he was checkmated', 'he promised' are not so limited. The analogy fails on two important points: (1) whereas a game must be in process for 'Check!' to have application, 'I promise', as it were, creates its own game*, it announces that a game is on. This is largely because of the important role 'I promise' (and to a lesser extent its implicit forms:'count on me' etc) plays in the promising-game; its role is important enough for it to guarantee that all the other necessary requirements for the game are present (this is why deceivers can operate: their intentions are presupposed by their using 'I promise'). There is for instance something misleading about Austin's statement.[29] "Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the part of a participant, then a person participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those thoughts or feelings and the participants must intend so to conduct themselves.... If we sin against any one or more of these six rules, our performative utterance

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28   Max Black in Phil. '63 remarks that when a move is announced in blindfold chess, words are used to do other than make an assertion. With 'E_2-E_1' in blindfold chess you <u>do</u> something.
29   HDW p. 15
* token not type use.

will be unhappy': for it seems more correct to say that in these cases

the infelicity results from the presence of a contrary thought or

intention and not from the lack of some required thought or feeling.

It is not necessary to have a certain intention, because of part of using

'I promise' is to express (conventionally) and intention, and a man can

invoke a convention of which he is unaware. Anyway, Austin has complicated

the issue by lumping together (under 'infelicities') very different ways

in which a performative can go wrong*. It might be thought that I couldn't

perform an illocutionary act unintentionally: but this does not seem

to be the case. Something I say may well be a promise (count as a promise),

a warning (count as a warning) without this being my intention. The

conditions which must apply for 'check!' (or 'he was checkmated) to be

applicable are, more or less, on a par with each other: they consist

in the main in a list of moves etc. But the conditions for 'he promised'

to be applicable are much more varied, they consist in the situation of

the two people involved, their desires, capabilities and so on and one of

these, that 'I promise' or an implicit equivalent was uttered, is much

more important than the others.

10.   A problem which I find difficult to deal with is the Austin/Searle

requirement that we concentrate on the speech-act in our analysis ("we

must consider the total situation in which the utterance is issued - the

total speech-act [30] etc.) Since speech-acts do not occur in a void,

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30 HDW p. 52

* His discussion on how performative utterances can, as all actions, go wrong
is closely linked to similar points in 'A Plea for Excuses', discussed in Pt 2
of this paper.

since they operate in the world and establish relations between individuals, it seems that it will be difficult to analyse how they operate in exclusively semantic (linguistic) rules. The following quote from Searle[31] expresses the view that it will be possible to do this: "To put this point more precisely, the production of the sentence-token under certain conditions is the illocutionary act, and the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication ... To perform illocutionary acts is to engage in a rule-governed form of behaviour ... I intend therefore to explicate the notion of an illocutionary act by stating a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the performance of a particular kind of illocutionary act, and extracting from it a set of semantical rules for the use of the expression (or syntactic device) which marks the utterance as an illocutionary act of that kind". Suppose we accept that the illocutionary act is the minimal unit of linguistic communication (which may well be a circular way of putting things): it then follows that his constitutive rules of language are constitutive rules of linguistic communication. It may be objected that his conditions for the performance of a particular kind of illocutionary act cannot lead to semantic rules, since illocutionary acts are not locutionary acts . (Suppose I am a potentate of an Eastern kingdom; just as I am about to have my brother's head chopped off he falls at my feet and garbles God knows what; his utterance (whatever he says) is, I suppose, an illocutionary act of beseeching and his communication linguistic. And it has the meaning$_{NN}$(force)

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31 Phil. in America op.cit. p.222

it has not solely in virtue of semantic meanings. This again brings
up the difficulties with non-natural meaning discussed above (e.g. my
brother might be pretending).

Now Searle would object and argue that it is just because of
examples like this that he has emended Grice's analysis ("We must there-
fore reformulate the Gricean account of meaning in such a way as to make
it clear that one's meaning something when one says something is more
than just contingently related to what the sentence means in the language
one is speaking. In our analysis of illocutionary acts, we must capture
both the intentional and the conventional aspects and especially the
relationship between them. In the performance of an illocutionary act
the speaker intends to produce a certain effect by means of getting the
hearer to recognize his intention to produce that effect, and furthermore,
if he is using words literally, he intends this recognition to be achieved
in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the expressions he utters
associate the expressions with the production of that effect". So the
emendation will enable us to differentiate non-natural meaning (red flags,etc)
from non-natural linguistic meaning, since Searle claims that only in the
second case does the hearer recognize the speaker's interntion to produce
the desired illocutionary effect in virtue of the fact that the lexical
and syntactical character of what he utters conventionally associates it
with producing that effect; however, two things must be remembered:

(1) a theory of illocutionary acts cannot only deal with explicit performatives of the form 'I promise you', 'I warn you'. (Searle in analysing 'I promise', and not 'What X said counted as a promise'* (X promised') has done just this.) It must also take into consideration implicit performatives.

(2) Austin certainly intended his theory of illocutionary force to cover non-linguistic cases (the umpire pointing to the pavilion, indicating that the batsman is out etc.)

(3) Illocutionary acts have non-linguistic equivalents (the handshake for the promise, the flag for 'warning' etc.), so it seems odd to want to explain illocutionary force in terms of semantic and syntactic notions. The following example may help:in a given context (because of reasons like notoriety of the chef etc.) the utterance 'The cake came from Luigi's' will count as a warning, but it seems misleading to say that this is so because of the meaning of words. My point is that language cannot be analysed outside the contexts in which it is used; in what roles it is used to regulate human behaviour. Whilst we could set up semantic/syntactic rules to define the speech-act of asserting, that which the speech-act of warning does over and above asserting cannot be so analysed. Language varies between people, linguistic usage varies as do the people who use it. This is all the more so when we use language to engage in institutional

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* not 'what he said was counted as a promise ' which seems similar to 'what he said was taken as a promise', which is not what one is looking for.

activities like marrying, promising, lending etc. whose existence rests
on extra-linguistic conventions which vary (e.g. it is said of Pritchard
that he never used 'I promise', only 'I fully intend').

11.   If 'The cake came from Luigi's' is not a warning solely
because of the meaning of words, then why is it? Given that to warn
is to do something more than to say, it is not exactly clear how Austin's
description of an illocutionaru act 'he Y'ed in saying X' is to be taken.
This would allow for the following cases:-

[32] (a) Ying is a kind of saying

(b) Y'ing is not a kind of saying

(b₁) Y'ing is not a kind of saying but necessarily includes saying

(b_1) Y'ing is not a kind of saying but necessarily includes saying

(b_2) Y'ing is not a kind of saying and does not necessarily include
          saying (not even the possibility of being translated into saying).

(a) cannot be right since it requires that Y'ing (warning) were just a
certain species of discourse (an E/illocutionary like asserting), that
is if warning were a species of saying just as waltzing is a species of
dancing. (b_2) would be correct if the act in question were the sort of
thing which could be done without saying anything (as for perlocutionaries
'surprising', 'exciting'). But in warning some sort of communication
between the parties is involved (of coutse , not necessarily linguistic,
but necessarily conventional). If it is argued that for the intention-
recognition procedure to be possible the conventiohal behaviour used could

32 Schema adapted from a seminar of Max Black's.

be transposed into a linguistic framework (in what way does the use of non-linguistic conventions depend on there existing a language proper?), then we are left with (b_1) but of course more work must be done on 'saying', 'doing' etc. before we know just what is the force of the conclusion reached.

Whether the statement 'The cake came from Luigi's' is taken as a warning depends not on whether I say it with the intention that it be so taken but rather whether the person to whom it was addressed realizes that I had such an intention. In other words, what counts is how it affects his legitimate expectations.[33] Of course, as Geach points out in 'Mental Acts' one cannot argue that the meaning of 'it is raining' depends on the reaction of the hearer, for it may make him put on or take off his rain-coat depending on what he wants out of life. Still we are dealing here with illocutionary force. We are dealing with institutions, the point of which is to affect human behaviour ('I will go to the theatre since he promised to meet me there'); I want to say that the criterion for the existence of a promise or a warning is that the hearer's expectations are affected: now this clearly won't do, for not just any affecting of the hearer's expectations will count. We will also have to deal with the very difficult cases where the expectations are not affected and yet we want to say that a promise, a warning has been made (see below). The point is that if under certain conditions A says to B 'I promise that X', then the expectations B forms about A's

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behaviour are legitimate (he has a right to form them); _they_ _will_
_take_place_ whatever A's intentions are (in a similar way one can say
that A's ignorance of the rule that traffic coming from the right at
a roundabout has right of way does not in the least affect the legitimacy
of B's expectation that A would give him his due priority (it does
however cause the ensuing accident!)

Strawson's analysis of 'understanding' brings out this point [34]
'I suggest, then, that for A to understand _something_ by utterance X,
it is necessary, and perhaps sufficient that there should be _some_
complex (i_2) form [35], described above, _whichA_takes_ S _to_have_ * , and
that for A to understand the utterance correctly, it is necessary that
A should take S to have the complex intention of the (i_2) form which S
does have. In other words, if A is to understand the utterance correctly,
S (i_4) intention and hence his (i_2) intention must be fulfilled. _Of_
course it does not follow from the fulfilment of these intentions that
his (i_1) intention is fulfilled; nor consequently that his (i_3) intention
is fulfilled'. So in order for A to understand that S is promising X,
nothing follows logically about S's _real_ intentions (this must be so for
these to be insincere promises etc.). It can be noted that as long as
the person addressed understands English some form or uptake (the recog-
nition of (i_2) (i_4) intentions) should not fail to occur when I use the
canonical formula 'I warn you that ....etc.' (this may well be because

34 PR '64 pp448
35 op. cit. pp 447
* my italics

the paradigm way of saying I have such an intention is just to appeal to the linguistic convention), but clearly things get much more complicated when implicit forms are used.

12.   Now an objection to the claim that for speech-act S to be a warning the listener must realize the 'warning-intention' of the speaker could take the form of the three following examples: (1) Lorrenne Gordon in a recent Analysis[36] argues 'If I am driving with you down the A 40 and scream on seeing a car approaching fast from a side-road, thereby warning you of impending disaster, I have warned you though my scream was certainly (though not, of course, necessarily) intentional'. This is a thoroughly misguided argument, for it assumes that what I did was to 'warn', that my scream was 'a warning'. I am warned by the clouds that it will rain, but the clouds don't warn me intentionally or unintentionally. Although a distinction must be drawn between 'warning' and 'taken as a warning' we cannot insist on intentionality for illocutionary acts if the distinctions we have to make to do so become purely ad hoc, but this need not be the case. It seems likely that a careful analysis of 'warning' would reveal that all cases one wants to describe as examples of 'A warned B' are cases where B supposes A's utterance to be intentional; admittedly the supposition may be misguided (A may be reciting a play etc.), but in these cases the situation is totally different

36 April 1966

from Miss Gordon's where A's exclamation is involuntary (or at least outside A's control.)

(2) A is sitting opposite B. B sees C enter the room. She knows C has come to kill A; with the money they (B and C) will steal, the first down-payment on their illicit honeymoon is to be made. Inadvertently, she gasps 'C!'. Because of her gasp, A turns round and avoids being murdered. Later on, he explains to the police 'I was warned (of C's presence) by her gasp.' (i) Did B warn A? (ii) Was B's gasp a warning? Here we have a situation where recognition of intention is not necessary for <u>A to be warned</u>. What has to be shown is that in this example A is warned by what B says but that this is not a case of B warning A; as I am warned by clouds of rain, so I can be warned of a burglar by his grunts as he stumbles over the safe. I can be similarly warned by linguistic means (a burglar's curses) but in none of these cases does any~~thing~~ One warn me.

(3) Let us suppose that in a community the impending arrival of a notorious assassin is recognized by a red handkerchief being tied to the victim's door. A knows the murderer has designs on his friend B; in order to warn B he ties a red kerchief on B's door: B finds the kerchief and flees. Later on he finds out what had happened. It must, I think, be admitted/<u>in retrospect</u> that (safe by the fire etc) he can say 'I was warned by B' or 'B warned me', but it is also true that he could not say this

at the time of warning (assuming he thought as the community did that it was the murderer himself who placed the kerchief on his door). So what I want to claim is that for a description of the form 'A warned B' to be appropriate, correct intention-recognition must take place at the time of warning.

We can be misled by the similarity between:

(i) He warned me of his presence by swearing, by grunting

(ii) He warned me of the danger by saying 'Thin Ice!'

But whereas (ii) is a case of telling me[37] (he told me that the ice was thin), (i) is not. The clouds do not tell me of rain, though people do say of their dog 'By wagging its tail he is telling me that he is hungry.', but there might be something excessively anthropomorphic about such a remark. When tell occurs in 'I am told by the dog wagging its tail that it is hungry', 'I can tell by the crackling in the radio that there will be a storm', 'I could tell by what he said that he was angry', there is always an obvious causal story that can be told which is not the case with 'telling that'. It is also true that in these cases I cannot disbelieve what I am being 'told', whereas I can in cases of 'telling that'; it may well be objected that we can say "The dog is telling me that he is hungry by wagging his tail". This is true and shows that the analysis is far from complete. A further move is to show

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37 It may well be the case that 'tell' is too vague to be of much use. A move towards clarity is made by Macintyre in 'Journal of Philosophy' 1965 in distinguishing between 'telling 'to', 'telling how', 'telling that'. But such a move can only be made to sort out forms of linguistic communication which a grunt is not.

that whereas in the example given above it is a physical characteristic (a part of the dog - his tail) which 'tells', it is not so in cases like 'he told me he would go to Bristol'.

Although it may be true that what are taken to be warnings must on most occasions influence people's behaviour, (expectations etc.) a person's behaviour can fail to be influenced because

(1) he doesn't believe what the warning tells him (e.g. The Spartans are coming' or 'Wolf! wolf!')

(2) He just fails to respond (he says 'what will be, will be' etc.)

(3) A man says to him as a warning 'The cake is from Luigi's' but he knows that Luigi's is now under new management, that the food is OK.

(3a) A man says to him 'The milk's three weeks old', but he knows it is the new long-life milk. What is common to all these situations is that the person concerned will say in describing them 'I was warned, but .....'

  in (1) he will say 'I was warned but I didn't believe it'

  in (2)'I was warned but I didn't care'

  in (3) (3a) 'I was warned but I knew that the situation had changed'
This is not the case when:

(4) he does not hear the 'warning'

(5) he does not take it to be a warning (is misled by the tone of voice etc)

(6) he doesn't understand what he is told (because it is in a foreign language)

(7) he doesn't realize the significance of what he is told (someone might not know that the food was bad at Luigi's, he may even believe it to be reasonable).

in these cases A (the person involved) will deny that he has
been warned, his line of argument will be 'how was I to know what "X!"
meant, I'm not a Serbo-Croat'. (Of course I am not here interested to
find out just where ignorance is culpable: it may well be the case
that a court will fine a man for sticking his head out of the train
window, its argument being that he ought to have read the blurb: but
of course if he didn't read it , he can't be said to have been warned.
It is the latter problem (when a man can be said to have been warned)
that is in question.)

In the cases where a man says 'I was warned, but ....(1) (2) (3)
(3a)', we see that whether or not he physically responds to the warning
will depend on his desires (e.g. he will go on eating the cake if he
wnats indigestion): there is always the possibility for him not to act
once he has been warned, but this possibility does not seem open to
him in cases of unintentional warning; where the criterion of there
having been a warning is that there was a response. If in the A-40
car case my behaviour is not affected by the shout, then I was not warned.
This point may well be valid elsewhere: although one doesn't want to
make the notion of a promise rest on the creation of expectations (if
this were so the liar could never lie), it does seem to be the case
that in marginal cases the scrupulous man will judge whether he promised
or not by wheter expectaions were aroused in the person he made a promise*
to.   Clearly, if I am warned of the rattlesnake's presence by the sound
of its rattle, it does not follow that the rattlesnake warned me (an

!* said 'I promise' or implicit form is more correct.

interesting parallel here is that whilst I cannot disbelieve what the sky tells me, I can disbelieve what the radio tells me. It may be objected here that these are different senses of 'tell',*and I am willing to accept this since it would follow that if we used 'the rattle-snake warned me' it would be a different sense of 'warn').

So I want to argue that for 'A warned B' to be a correct description of a situation it must have been possible for B to have fully understood the force of what A said and yet (because of B's beliefs and/or desires) not to have acted upon it.

Let us place in diminishing order of specificity:

(1) B was warned by what happened

(2) B was warned by what A did

(3) B was warned by what A said

(4) A warned B

What makes A's utterance a warning in the full-blown sense is B's recognition of A's intention to warn; if B fails to respond it is still not a case of A's trying to warn B. What I am trying to do here is to find what minimum conditions must exist for an illocutionary act to exist; for Austin, the condition was the 'securing of uptake'; is this fully explained by intention-recognition?

Take: (1) I tried to convince him

(2) I tried to warn him

(3) I tried to order him

* See above p. 47

(1) means something like I failed to make him change his views, to come over to my side etc.

(3) is different from (1). It could be used, for instance, when my order gets lost in the post, when I am not heard etc.

(2) seems to fall somewhere in between (1) and (3) since like an order a warning can get lost in the post (since 'a convincing', 'a persuading' don't exist, they cannot get lost in the post); on the other hand 'I tried to warn him by telling him the cake was from Luigi's but he didn't understand' seems to indicate the affinities (2) has with (1).

13.   At this stage it seems useful to introduce a distinction between (a) uttering a warning and (b) warning someone. Since I utter a warning _to_ someone but warn someone (direct object), it seems intuitively right ot suggest that I can utter a warning and no-one hear but that I cannot warn someone if he doesn't hear. So it follows that there are occasions of 'uttering a warning' which will not be occasions of 'warning someone'. (I am using 'uttering' in a wide sense here, like communicating). This is correct because one will include under 'uttered a warning' cases like (4) the warning is not heard, (5) the warning is not taken seriously (6) the warning is given in a foreign language. (7) presents a problem since it cannot be said that in saying 'The cake came from Luigi's, I uttered a _warning just because_ I wanted it to be taken as such. It must be known about and around that "Luigi's" is a by-word for bad cake,

although it needn't be known by the person to whom 1 spoke (if one argues that there must be a convention which makes my remark a warning, one is not committed to arguing that everyone need be in the know about the convention).

Having found occasions of 'utter a warning' (or utter a promise, utter an order etc.) which are not occasions of 'warning', 'ordering' etc. we might try to look for occasions of 'warning' which are not occasions of 'uttering a warning'. In an article* which argues for a similar distinction between 'uttering a lie' and 'lying', F. Siegler takes an example from Sarte's story "The Wall" where a man in an attempt to deceive his questioners inadvertently gives the correct answer when asked of the whereabouts of his friend. Now clearly, as Siegler argues, since what he says turned out to be true, it seems bizarre to claim that he told a lie, but since he says what he believed to be false, we can, with less hesitation, say he lied. This type of move does not seem open to us in the case of warning since there does not seem to be such a clearcut distinction between what was said (a warning) and what was done (someone was warned). This is, crudely, because a lie is a deliberate mistruth, whereas a warning is that which warns and has no such formal characterization. But take the situation in which, during the war, someone, in order to warn his neighbour of a German patrol says 'it must be bad weather in Frankfurt today'. If he succeeds we will say he warned his neighbour, what he said counted as a warning etc, but not, 1 think, 'he uttered a warning'. (I am not at all sure about this point: it may

gain any plausibility it has from the oddness of 'utter'. Perhaps we could describe this case as 'he gave a warning' (which seems to stand between 'utter a warning' and 'warned'). Certainly not all cases of 'warned' are cases of 'shout a warning' but this is because of the specific nature of shouts. Still the point is not vital to the argument)

The distinction between 'he uttered a warning' and 'he warned' is not quite the same as that between "he said 'I warn'" and 'he warned' (discussed above), since ' he uttered a warning' includes implicit performative uses. And of course that there is such a thing as 'uttering a <u>warning</u>', 'issuing an <u>order</u>' shows that conventionally the utterance of certain forms of words perform certain actions. However the fact that such a division can be made cannot be a sufficient condition of I/illocutionary force since the division can be made with e.g. lying, which is not an example of illocutionary force. But it may be a necesary condition (I think this point might show how to make invalid Strawson's puzzling example of a specific utterance of the words 'don't go', which would be correctly described as an entreaty. One argument might be to claim that the utterance has the <u>form</u> of an entreaty but not the force (and of course from the fact that an utterance has the form of a prayer of an elegy, it does not follow that there exists illocutionary force of imprecation, of being an elegy (even less speech-acts)). Still I am too confused by beseech, request, beg, pray, implore, entreat to see exactly what is being said when one alone is singled out. (Are all entreaties requests? etc.)

The distinction between "uttering a warning" and "warning" will however provide with another indicator for separating I/illocutionaries from E/illocutionaries and perlocutionaries, since in the case of E/illocutionaries the distinction cannot be made (you cannot utter a denial <u>and not</u> deny), nor can it in the case of perlocutionaries since you cannot utter a convincing etc.

I have tried in this section to indicate what differences may underlie Austin's classification of verbs into locutionary/illocutionary/ perlocutionary. I have also tried to show that certain criticisms may not be as damaging as they seem to be, since they are concerned with a group of verbs dissimilar in important respects from Austin's paradigm illocutionaries; it doesn't seem to matter whether we call I/illocutionaries illocutionaries or not as long as we remember their differences from E/illocutionaries.

PART II

14.   Underlying Austin's writings on language are views as to how language works which are not always made explicit. In his discussion about how actions can be "muffed", Austin often makes the point that a certain utterance is "inappropriate". In this section 1 will discuss some of the difficulties a theory of the inappropriate in language will have to face.

The doctrine of "no modification without aberration" is put forward by Austin in "A Plea for Excuses"[38] and defended by Cavell in "Must we mean what we say"[39].(I will take Cavell's article to be a defence of Austin's position even though the former sometimes takes a more radical view: in these cases 1 will note the difference*)

Austin and his critics have taken the doctrine to apply to the following adjectives amongst others:

(1) "voluntary" and "involuntary"

(2) "intentionally" and "unintentionally"

(3) "inadvertently"

but are (1) (2) (3) that much of a muchness?

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38   Phil. Papers pp. 123-153   39   Inquiry 1958 pp. 172-212
* Certainly one of the differences between them is their amount of linguistic tolerance. Austin is concerned with utterances in good English; an utterance grammatically below board just 'won't do' and that's that; Cavell on the other hand is prepared to try a slightly bizarre utterance, inthe hope that it might show something about correct utterances, about how language works, about different societies etc.(cf"if someone talks bosh, imagine a case in which it is not bosh. The moment you imagine it,you see at once it is not like that in our case". Wittgenstein'Noteson Aesthetics')

Recent literature (including Austin) has tended to accept the fact that 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' are not an exhaustive classification. And thus there has been an adoption of Aristotle's division of actions into the voluntary/non-voluntary/involuntary; making distinctions* between my fully-fledged actions for which I am responsible ("voluntary"), those actions which I carry out under duress ('non-voluntary') and the uncontrollable spasms of my inner parts ('voluntary'). Although there seems no reason to suppose that Austin might not have accepted this three-fold classification of actions (though only of untoward occurrences); it has been argued that even if he had he was mistaken about the application of "voluntary": since the reason why we don't qualify the great majority of our everyday actions is not because, as he thought it won't do to say they are voluntary ('it is fundamental to Austin's account to emphasize that we cannot always say of actions that they were voluntary, even when they obviously were not involuntary either. Although we can (sometimes) say 'The gift was made voluntarily', it is specifically not something we can say about ordinary, unremarkable cases of making gifts. Only when the action of making the gift is in some way unusual or extraordinary or untoward can the question whether it is voluntary intelligibly arise'[40]) but that they are so obviously voluntary(what else could they be?) And this criticism seems to me well-founded: there seems to be no point in asserting that I brushed my teeth this morning voluntarily, just because it is obviously true

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* this is no longer following Aristotle

40 Cavell op.cit.

that I did. The tripartite division (voluntary/non-voluntary/involuntary) might affect the argument if one supposed that Austin meant by "voluntary", "deliberate", in which case he could be taken to be saying that everyday actions were "non-voluntary", but this interpretaion seems to me to be highly implausible since it is clearly true that our everyday actions are not non-voluntary.[41]

(2) Under one interpretaion 'intentionally' and 'unintentionally' are clearly not exhaustive; for if one takes 'unintentionally' to mean 'without wanting to', 'accidentally', it does not seem to be the case that everything I do not do unintentionally, I do intentionally: things I do habitually (light a cigarettes, rub my eyes) or do without thinking seem to cause a difficulty for an exhaustive dichotomy. One wants to agree with Anscombe[42] that perhaps it is thoroughly misleading that the word 'intentional' should be connected with the word 'intention', for an action can be intentional without having any intention in it'. But this doesn't help very much, especially since it might also be the case that not all intentional actions are done 'intentionally' which seems close, but not that close, to deliberately. It seems right to claim that not all action not done accidentally (unintentionally) is done deliberately ('intentionally'), in which case the argument against Austin

41   It is however difficult to accept both the claim that everyday actions remains unqualified because obviously voluntary and Miss Gordon's (Analysis 1966) point that some everyday actions are non-voluntary. Austin's critics cannot have it both ways.
42   'Intention' p. 1

here is a different one: namely that the reason why "it will not do
to say either that I sit in my chair intentionally or that I did not
sit in it "intentionally" is because "unintentionaly"/"intentionally"
are not exhaustive.[43]

15.   This way of dealing with the problem, however, neglects the
complication that when I intend (it is my intention to do) an action
under one description it is not the case that I intend it (the same
action? event?) under another description.* For example a sailor may
intend to tie a complicated knot but cannot be said to intend every
motion the tying of the knot requires since he may well not be able to
predict/describe them (or again, I intend to lift a suitcase but I don't
intend to flex the muscles lifting the suitcase requires). So there do

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[43]   see note   on following page
*   This is also true of "voluntary". I may do X "voluntarily" under
one description, but non-voluntarily under another, However this point
brings out a possible insufficiency of the voluntary/non-voluntary/involun-
tary division. For in the case when I sign a paper voluntarily but un-
knowingly sign a contract at the same time (because the paper is a deed
of contract); it doesn't seem correct to say I signed the contract non-
voluntarily (if 'non-voluntarily' means 'under duress'), nor is it right
that I signed the contract 'voluntarily'. So we may need a further term
to mark off actions done voluntarily but in ignorance, unknowingly.

seem to be cases where something I do can be intentional under one

action-of-mine description but unintentional* under another: thus

one wants to say that (waiving difficulties which the move 'I intend'

to 'intentionally' may cause) intentionality of action-descriptions

can be non-transitive. It seems to me that the sailor could be described

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* Further work on the subject may make it necessary to, as with
"voluntary", distinguish between the "non-intentional" and the
"unintentional". If this is the case it may demand that "unintentional"
in this occurrence be changed to 'non-intentional'. However, the
point would stand, an action would still be 'intentional' under one
description, "not intentional " under another (the 'non-intentional'
and the "unintentional" together would make up the 'not-intentional').
This difficulty occurs when "unintentional" is used in other parts
of the paper. Austin writes in "Three ways of Spilling Ink" (Phil.
Review '66 p. 429): " But it's hard to see how I could have done
such a thing unintentionally, or even (what is not the same) not done
it intentionally." So he must have envisaged at least a threefold
classification: but it seems extremely implausible to suggest that
Austin, or anyone else, would want to argue that everyday actions
were non-intentional (the middle class). Especially as this would
be a direct contradiction of the redundancy theory about the use of
'intentional' (note 5 p.437 of same article)

as, in a given situation, tying the knot intentionally but doing the specific movements unintentionally (he _is_ doing them automatically[*], and in the same way, I lift my suitcase intentionally, but I flex my dorseopeds unintentionally). The point can be better shown in an example taken from Wollheim.[**]

A man decides to count aloud a series of numbers beginning at 2 and adding 7 each time; his argument here is:"I could not say beforehand, short of sitting down with paper and calculating, what number I would come out with at, for example, the eighth place. It was indeed only when I heard the number quite correctly, that I even knew what number I was saying. But surely there is nothing in all this that could conceivably give us reason to say that, whereas counting in accordance with the progression was something I _did_ intentionally, coming out with the number 51 was something that merely happened. On the contrary, what seems right to say here, and anything else absurd, is that if the counting in general was intentional, then so also _must_ have been the coming out

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[*] Habitually? That he ties the knot may not be something decided automatically (he may deliberate as to whether it is worth while , seeing that the time for his slippers is close at hand) but once he has decided to tie the knot his movements are automatic; they are also habitual (as _may_ be his deciding to tie the knot), they may also be mechanical (though the word seems to have a pejorative aura). For a discussion of these concepts see A. R. White 'Attention' (Basil Blackwell 1964, especially pp. 123-6.

[**] 'On Drawing an Object' p.18. It is of course the case that I use the example to show something Wollheim would disagree with, but then I do not think he has proved what he wants, namely the transitivity of intentionality.

with this particular number." But now, let us take a mathematician
with feet of clay. Suppose that, saying the series aloud, he comes
out with '53' as his eighth term. Now the man has made a mistake, he
has come out with the wrong number, so altough he said_the_eighth_term
intentionally, he made a mistake, came out with_the_wrong_number unin-
tentionally. (I assume he didn't mean to do it). It is true that if
he hadn't made a mistake (there is no mistake when he says 51) it seems
bizarre (wrong?) to say that he came out with the right number uninten-
tionally[44] (although we can note that to say 51 was in no way part of
his plan, his intention was to_voice_the_series): but if this is so,
we are now in a better position to see what might be the force of Austin's
argument that we only use 'unintentionally' when a mistake has been
made, when something untoward has occurred. (3) 'Inadvertently',
'recklessly' have to be treated differently since they have no positive
form ('reckful' etc.) "Above all it will not do to assume that the
'positive' word must be around to wear the trousers: commonly enough
the 'negative'-looking word marks the (positive) abnormality, while
the 'positive' word, if it exists, merely serves to rule out the

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44 Perhaps he comes out with the eighth number intentionally, but says
'51' unintentionally. This is clearly a wrong description of a situation
although it is the case that to say the right number is part of his plan
before he sets off, whereas to say '51' is not (he doesn't know what
the eighth term is). Thus it must be that the meaning of 'intentionally'
can only in_part be explained by 'part of a plan'. 'It is my intention to'
is much more intimately linked with 'part of my plan'. This is what is
wrong with Austin's example (quoted in Zink 'The Concepts of Ethics') of
smashing the impeding go-cart on my way to put out a fire. Rather than say
as Austin does, that I do not smash the go-cart intentionally, it seems more
correct to say 'I smashed the go-cart intentionally but it was not part of
my intention to do so (although I did not intend to)"

suggestion of abnormality.*   It is natural enough in view of what

was said above, for the positive word not be found in all cases ...

By claiming that A_1 was inadvertent we place it ... in a class of

incidental happenings which must occur in the doing of any physical

act.   To lift the act out of this class, we need and possess the expression

"not inadvertently": "advertently" if used for this purpose would

suggest that, if the act was not done inadvertently, then it must have

been done noticing what I was doing, which is far from necessarily the

case ... Again there is no use for "advertently" at the same level as

"inadvertently": in passing the butter I do not knock over the cream

jug, though I do (inadvertently) knock over the tea-cup - yet, I do

not by-pass the cream-jug advertently, anything that we do is, if you

like, inadvertent, though we only call it something we have done, if

there is something untoward about it".   Two arguments could be used

against Austin here.

(1) It could rightly be claimed that, even if "advertently"

existed, it need not follow that any action need be performed either

'advertently' or 'inadvertently'. Since it would be argued that the

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*   This is just what Austin denies about 'intentionally' in an article
I have had little time to assimilate (misconstrue!): he writes in P.R 66
pp. 438 "What would be wholly untrue is to suggest that 'unintentionally'
is the word that 'wears the trousers' ... in the present case there is the
verb 'intend' to take into account, and it must have a highly 'positive'
sense; it must just be used to rule out 'don't or didn't intend'." This
does seem to confirm the view that the adjectives being discussed cannot
be treated in a similar way.

two adjectives need not be exhaustive. So Austin is making the
situation too favourable for himself again by arguing that if
'advertently' existed it would suggest 'that there is something in
common to the ways of doing all acts not done inadvertently', it
needn't so suggest. However if such an argument is used (non-
exhaustive dichotomy argument) it shows that the situation with
'advertently - inadvertently' is not at all the same as the 'voluntarily-
involuntarily' situation where the argument against Austin relied on
an exhaustive dichotomy (or trichotomy): 'it is just because our
everyday actions are in the large majority done voluntarily that we
don't so qualify them'. It can be noted here that certainly Austin
didn't think that 'voluntarily' and 'involuntarily' formed an
exhaustive dichotomy, for he writes[45] ' "Voluntarily" and "involuntarily",
then, are not opposed in the obvious sort of way that they are made to
be in philosophy or jurisprudence. The "opposite" or rather "opposites"
of "voluntarily " might be "under constraint" of some sort, duress of
obligation or influence; the opposite of "involuntarily" might be
"deliberately" or "on purpose" or the like. Such divergences in opposites
indicate that "voluntarily" and "involuntarily", in spite of their
apparent connexion, are fish from very different kettles.'

16.   I think that Austin is right here and I would like to
suggest (but not defend) what I think to be part of the problem: there

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45   op. cit. p. 139

is a certain ambiguity in the word 'voluntarily' which enables at least two distinctions to be made (a) voluntarily - non-voluntarily. An action is done voluntarily if done freely, but non-voluntarily if one is forced to perform it by someone else (the compulsion being in the nature of a threat and not, for example, of another person holding your hand and moving it: for in this latter situation there would not be an action of <u>yours</u> (this distinction cannot be that easily made since there will be cases where it is not clear whether X is an action of mine or something that happens to me. 'I was pushed' and 'I stumbled' seem very close to each other. And the similarity between 'I tripped' and 'I was tripped' shows that an active/passive verb distinction will not be as useful as it might intuitively seem to mark the distinction between actions of mine and what happens to me. There might be cases where one accepted responsibility for things that happenend to us (though 'I did it <u>but</u> i was pushed' and 'I did it because I slipped' are more common) in the way one does when one is agent. It definitely is the case that one can be held responsible for cases of non-voluntary actions, for cases of culpable ignorance and cases where one 'voluntarily' fails to predict certain consequences of one's actions.)[46] Importantly, in both cases (the free and the 'under threat'), the actual performance is under the agent's control.

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46 Anscombe:Journal of Philosophy 1963

(b) Voluntarily$_2$- involuntarily

An action is done 'voluntarily'$_2$ if it is under the agent's control, 'involuntarily' if it is not. This makes a distinction between actions such as holding a pen and those like belching, blinking one's eyes etc. Under this distinction __all__ actions described under (1) would be voluntary$_2$. But of course we still have to classify actions into those which are and are not under the agent's control: all those things people do idiosyncratically, but which they can at a pinch, prevent themselves from doing: e.g. blinking, rubbing their forehead, certain cases of nervous stammering, yawning. It is the case that I can for a time, say during a guest speaker's peroration, refrain from yawning, but it is also true that if, as it were, a yawn gets up momentum there is nothing I can do to stop it (it is also true that if the peroration delays into the night my restraint will indubitably be vanquished). I am in the position of the foul-mouthed student who sooner or later will __unwittingly__ say, as the tea-party lingers on, words not taught to him by his parents. And this classification is by no means complete since a further distinction would have to be made between those actions which the agent can come to control by being informed of their causes (certain cases of stammering , nervous tics etc.) and those where causal knowledge is of no use (case of stammering where there is a physical defect). Over the former group the agent has control in the sense that he can remove himself from the environment where they occur, over the latter he has no such control.

Are we to say that I yawned voluntarily or involuntarily? That
we may reproach ourselves in these situations is inconclusive since,
as remarked above, we blame ourselves for tripping which is hardly a
paradigm of voluntary$_2$ action. (I do not believe that the person
who blames himself for the horrors of Nazi Germany and yet admits that
there was nothing much he could do about it is necessarily well on the
way to being mentally defective. This is not to deny such a thing as
excessive remorse but only to wish for an anlysis which does not eliminate
it is a moral phenomenon by making it a clinical one.) With these difficulties
at hand, I think that at least, if one argues against Austin that a large
majority of everday actions are voluntary, one must make it quite clear
what one is claiming.

17.   (2) The second argument against Austin on 'inadvertently!
would run something like this:'inadvertent' is restricted to untoward
(or at least, supposedly untoward) actions just, as Aristotle saw,
'snub' is restricted to noses. It is just part of the use of the word
that it is restricted to untoward actions (I don't think much hinges
on whether we say 'use' or 'meaning' here: nor will an appeal to the
dictionary help since dictionaries are extremely generous in the information
they provide). The argument cannot claim that 'he did it inadvertently'
means 'he did an untoward thing X-ly' because then it would be the case

the case that 'he did an untoward thing inadvertently' would mean
'he did an untoward, untoward thing Xly' which won't do. If it is
claimed that snubness is about a concavity peculiar to noses then the
point can be made using fetlock (why only of a horse?) or gaggle (why
only of geese?) etc.

Against this argument one wants to ask why this is the case.
Just why is there an adjective to qualify untoward actions? And it
may be that at this stage, an answer of the 'no modification without
aberration' form will have to be given to explain the existence of
'inadvertently' (no similar argument will explain 'snub', but luckily
this is beyond my brief). Furthermore an argument of the form : we
don't say of everyday actions that they are 'voluntary, intentional,
etc. because it would be pointless[47], makes unnecessary an argument of
the form: we only say 'so and so' of so and soes (a restricted use
argument). The first-type argument claims we could say of everyday
actions that they are 'voluntary' etc, but that there is no point in
so doing, the second claims we can't say of everyday actions 'voluntary'
'inadvertent' because their use is restricted to untoward actions (just
as it is argued that we cannot use 'snub' of concave mirrors.)

18.   Having tried to prove that the 'no modification without
aberration' argument has been applied in three types of case which must
be distinguished and that this has led to confusions, I now want to show

47 Searle, 'British Analytical Philosophy' pp 41-65

at least part of what lies behind the argument ('no modification without

aberration'). I will first quote from Austin's and Cavell's papers.

"The natural economy of language dictates that, for the standard

case covered by any normal vern, no modifying expression is required

or even permissible. I sit in my chair: here it will not do to say that

I sit in it intentionally or that I do not sit in it intentionally ......

It is bedtime, I am alone, I yawn, but I do not yawn involuntarily, (or

voluntarily)* or (voluntarily!) ..." "You can ask 'Was your action

voluntary' and say to yourself 'All I mean to ask is whether he had a

sensation of effort just before he moved', but that will not be finding

out whether the action was voluntary". ....   "You (must) mean (imply),

in speaking English, that something about an action is fishy when you

say 'The action is voluntary'.

"This is another instance of the principle that actions which are normal

will not tolerate any special description.

"But you will never find out what voluntary action is if you

fail to see when we should say of an action that it is voluntary ...

One may feel the need to say 'Some actions are voluntary and some are

involuntary. It would be convenient (for what?) to call actions

voluntary which are not involuntary. Surely I can call them anything

I like? Surely what I call them doesn't affect what they are? Now,

how will you tell me what'they' are?"

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* Austin has clearly cheated here, since as we discussed above this
problem is due to the very tricky kind of thing a yawn is (Austin may
well answer that that was just what he was on about: still, he could
have been more explicit.)

Perhaps another occurrence of this line of argument is to be found in the Investigations (para 623): '"At all costs I will get to that house." But if there is no difficulty about it - can I try at all costs to get to the house?'

These quotes with their use of 'required or even permissible', 'will not do to say', 'will not tolerate' show the ambiguity of what is being argued. It makes all the difference in the world whether something is not required or not permissible; what type of an offence is made by someone who says it 'won't do to say', 'what won't be tolerated'? (It won't do to light your cigar before the toast: it's bad form: are utterances that 'won't do' ungrammatical or 'not true' or 'false' or just 'bad form'?) Now clearly Cavell cannot be arguing that for an action to be voluntary it must be called so (the oddness of his remark 'surely what I call them doesn't affect what they are ?' Now, how will you tell me what 'they' are?'). What he is arguing is that you only have the right to raise the question of 'voluntary' or 'involuntary' if there is at least a suspicion of untowardness. But now one wants to know more about untowardness; this cannot simply be a question about an action being muffed (failing to come off) since this interpretation would make it impossible to ask 'was X voluntary'?, since you would have to know whether it was muffed or not to be entitled to raise the question (this can't be the case).   So untowardness

must be at least partially analysed in terms of socially (morally)
undesirable; I am entitled to ask 'was it voluntary?' when something
morally undesirable has occurred. The reason why, as Austin noticed,
murder cannot be dealt with by his 'no modification principle' is
because murder has voluntariness built into it. An involuntary murder
is a manslaughter. It is thus possible to interpret the Austin/Cavell
doctrine in two ways (1) in a weak way in which 'won't do', 'inappropriate'
are cashed in for 'pointless' (It is 'pointless' to say that which is
'inappropriate'). Under this interpretaion their doctrine is open to
Searle's objections: it is also open to the objection that it fails
to distinguish between the two types of inappropriateness discussed
below. (2) in a strong way which interprets 'won't do etc. to mean
'not true' ('false' may well be too strong if one accepts that a
statement can have an indeterminate truth-value), so to say what is
'inappropriate' is to say what is 'not true'. Under this interpretaion
Searle's objections fall wide of the mark and the two types of inappro-
priateness are distinguished. I will therefore try to show that Austin/Cavell
should be saying that if you say something that it 'won't do to say',
you are saying something not true since a weaker interpretaion would
make their thesis uninteresting; if I am right the form of argument
to be found in these quotes is something like: "if it is inappropriate
to attribute quality X to a Y at time T, then Y does not have X at T.

Is this argument valid?

19.   Take the following cases. (1) He and she have been having difficult times of late. He feels he still loves her, but realizes that he can't say 'I love you' because she might take this to imply that he didn't love her before or loved her less (she might think his pronouncement of love was an indication of the waning of the feeling, on the grounds that saying and doing are incompatible: suffice it to say that the interpretations an over-sensitive person could give to the coming out with the expression are innumerable).

(2) I promise to come to tea at 4 tomorrow. Neither 'I intend to keep my promise' nor 'I intend to come' are usually appropriate.

(3) After most utterances (except those that might be ironic) 'I mean what I say' is inappropriate.

(4) It may well be inappropriate to compliment the duchess' cuisine with 'damn fine nosh, luv'.

(5) When I shall do something it may be inappropriate to say 'I may do P' rather than 'I shall do P'. (Perhaps 'I know' and 'I believe' might be a similar example)

(6) Sometimes when I know that P, it is inappropriate to come out with 'I know P' instead of 'P'.

Before I discuss the difference between (1) - (6), I want to suggest that they all have in common the following: there are situations where to say something would be inappropriate but where, nevertheless, what I said which caused the inappropriateness would not be false. Looking at the cases of inappropriateness may help one to see just what Austin-Cavell are claiming.

(4) is straightfowardly <u>soc</u>ially inappropriate. In certain circles, certain words, accents, grammatical constructions are taboo; to use them is soc ially inappropriate. This is a case where it is the words which are inappropriate, but there may be cases when it is the <u>con</u>tent of what I say which causes the trouble: as when I, as best man, remind the familial gathering of the delightful week-ends I used to spend with the bride (this like (4) and (1) is a case of tactlessness, which shows that the distinction is not that violent).

(1) Here the inappropriateness (which springs from the implications to which the utterance of the words 'I love you' gives rise) lies not so much in the nature of the utterance but in its timing.* That this is so can be seen from the following reasons: (i) I can attempt to 'cancel' the implication by saying 'I loved you now as I loved you before'. (ii) the same words said in a different situation (when the love was new) would not have the implication they have <u>here</u> (which is the case in Grice's example of saying of a pupil after a philosophy collection 'Jones has beautiful handwriting'):' The utterance of the sentence

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* For this and other distinctions in this field see H.P. Grice 'The causal Theory of Perception', pp 126-132 PASSV XXXV (1961)

does not _standardly_ involve the implication here attributed to it;
it requires a special context to attach the implication to its
utterance.'[49]

(iii) In a similar situation the same implication could be attributed
to my _not_ coming out with a given utterance (where remarks like
'Hamlet's _not_ wishing Claudius a good morning show that not all is in
order in the land of Denmark' are made).

20.   (5) and (6) are examples of the Gricean principle 'one should
not make a weaker statement rather than a stronger one unless there
is a good reason for so doing.'[50] Since "I shall" is stronger than
"I may" (the latter is entailed by the former), when I say "I may do
P", I imply that there are reasons for not saying "I shall", which
is misleading when I shall do P. And of course that which implies
something which is not the case is linguistically inappropriate.
That this is so may be made to follow from an argument which asserts
that the aim of assertoric linguistic communication is to inform;
assertoric linguistic communication which violates this aim is
in some way tarnished, inappropriate. (This is of course all much
too sketchy but it is true that a language could not exist where every
utterance was a lie.) (6) differs from (5), however, since it is not

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49   Grice op. cit. p.130
50   Grice op.cit. p. 132

obvious that 'P' is stronger than 'I know that P'. (P certainly does not <u>entail</u> 'I know that P!') Now there does seem to be a case for saying that 'P' is stronger than 'I know that P'. I think that another linguistic principle will have to be appealed to (or invented) here: the principle of economy of effort: if a part of an utterance is idle, then the use of the idle part is inappropriate. In order to back up the (intuitive) hunch that 'P' is stronger than 'I know that P' (isn't in a similar way 'P is true' stronger than 'P must be true') one could begin to look at contexts where 'I know that P' is used.

(1) It can be used in cases where what is in doubt is that <u>the speaker</u> knows: 'I know that John is hiding in the closet (although you don't think I do').

(11) in cases where 'I just know' is the sense e.g. 'I know he'll bring back the fireman' (I feel it in my bones)

(111) less happily when a question has been asked: 'who knows X is in the park? ' - 'I know he's in the park (but this is odd since (a) it is a case of knowing whether (b) there is no doubt in the questioner's mind as to X's whereabouts (the question implies X is in the park) ; what the question seeks to find out is <u>who</u> knows).

What these examples might tentatively show is that that which makes 'p' stronger than 'I know that P' is the fact that 'I know that P' is only uttered in circumstances of uncertainty, when a question has

to be answered etc.: in these circumstances p tends to be a disputable
item .

All this is much too hit-and-miss to be of much help, but
perhaps a combination of 'economy of effort' and 'make the strongest
assertion available' will help explain why certain phrases like (3)
'I mean what I say' imply 'I might not have meant what I said'. By
economy of effort, 'I mean what I say' is idle if used at its face-value,
therefore when it is used, the presumption is that it is being used
for a purpose (that purpose being to imply that the contrary could
have been the case).

The principles will help us to see the oddness of "I promise
to come at 4 tomorrow and I intend to come", for "I promise" implies
"I intend" and hence "I intend" is idle.   I used to think that the
principles might help to to explain the oddness of "I have decided
to come at 4 tomorrow and I predict that I will come at 4 tomorrow",
on the grounds that saying "I decide" makes "I predict" idle, this
being supported by the strangeness of very precise predictions: (whereas
"I have decided to be in London on the 25th March 1968" is all right,
"I predict I'll be in London on the 25th March 1968" is definitely odd),
but I am now less enthusiastic about this argument.

The principle of economy of effort can be applied to utterances as well as to parts of utterances, the point being that an utterance which serves no purpose in a discourse is inappropriate. Since Searle uses this argument extensively against Austin-Cavell[51], I will first state what I take to be their position.

21.   When Austin-Cavell claim that it is inappropriate to modify a description of an action which is not in some way untoward they are not (i) claiming that the inappropriateness is social nor (ii) that it is inappropriate because tactless, nor are they claiming (iii) that you can only so qualify untoward actions because it is redundant to qualify above-board ones (this is the argument used against them in the case of 'voluntary'). However there is little doubt that the linguistic oddity of 'I brushed my teeth voluntarily this morning' is idle here, which makes it the case that its use implies that the occasion was somehow out of the ordinary. It is also the case that 'I brushed my teeth' is a stronger claim than 'I brushed my teeth voluntarily'. If this is so then what remains to be seen is whether Austin-Cavell have an argument which does not depend on considering certain utterances linguistically inappropriate(since we have seen that this may be due to other factors such as the existence of the two principles).

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51 British Analytic Philosophy op. cit.

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This means that only the strong interpretation of their position can be correct, since the weak one takes their thesis to be founded upon linguistic inappropriateness which we have seen will not suffice to establish that that which is 'inappropriate' is 'not true', (only 'pointless' or 'misleading'). it must be remembered that Austin is concerned here with excuses for actions: excuses as used to diminish responsibility. He is talking about aberrant situations (when an action goes wrong), not about aberrant actions as Searle seems to interpret him:[52] "Or again consider the sentence 'He tied his shoes on purpose'. It is not easy to imagine a situation where this would be in order. But try 'He stepped on the dog on purpose'. Here it is easy to imagine a situation where this would be appropriate, and the reason seems to be that stepping on dogs is aberrant in some way that tying shoes is not'. It is not part of Austin's doctrine that rare actions can be modified,("did the scientist extrapolate voluntarily?") is just as strange) any more than common ones; rather it is that modification can only take place when something has gone wrong, when someone is accused, when the question of responsibility is raised. (It may weel be that an Austin living in vendetta-full 18th-Century Sicily would have considered "He murdered his mother's murderer voluntarily" odd.) So it is not a question of the type of action which

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52   Searle op. cit p.43

which matters, but what hinges (legally, morally?) on the given

performance of an individual action.   But this is too strong a claim

since it assumes that there is no connection between the attribution

of responsibility and the action being an aberrant one: there is.

Whenever a criminal action is detected the question of agent-responsibility

is raised;   only in some cases of ordinary everyday actions is the question

raised (when something unforeseen has happened: when in reaching for

the milk I knock over the jam).   So Austin cannot be dealing with

aberrant actions since they are always open to modification: as Austin

admits with reference to murder.   It is worth noting that I can only

do action X* inadvertently if I am at the same time doing something

else (Y).   It is not surprising that I don't usually notice what I

am not meaning to do unless something unpleasant happens.   But if

reaching for the milk he touches her hand and she says overjoyed

"You touched my hand, you wicked thing" it seems to me he can perhaps

reply "I did it inadvertently", though this may do little to further

his amorous intentions.

23.   Put crudely, it seems to be the case that Austin/Cavell

are trying to show by appeal to linguistic inappropriateness the

correctness of Hart's "defeasibility" analysis of the concepts being

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* I think that X, Y, needn't be two different actions but only two different
descriptions of the same what? (action, event). The solution of this
problem is of overriding importance. See, for instance, Davidson , Journal
of Phil. 1963 for how it affects the argument that reasons for acting
cannot be causes of action.

discussed. But the linguistic theory which lies behind such an
attempt is never made explicit. Hart's point[53] is that the
'positive-looking doctrine"consent must be true, full and free"' is
only accurate as a statement of the law if it is treated as a compendious
reference to the defences with which claims in contract may be weakened
or met, whereas it suggests that there are certain psychological elements
required by the law as necessary conditions of contract and that the
defences are merely admitted as negative evidence of these ... But in
pursuit of the will-o'-the-wisp of a general formula legal theorists
have sought to impose a spurious unity upon these heterogeneous defences
and exceptions, suggesting that they are admitted as merely evidence
of the absence ... of two elements ("foresight" and "voluntariness") ...
This is because the logical character of words like "voluntary" is
anomalous and ill-understood. They are treated in such definitions
as words having positive force, yet, as can be seen from Aristotle's
discussion in Book lll of the Ethics the word "voluntary" in fact serves
to exclude a heterogeneous range of cases such as physical compulsion,
coercion by threats, accidents, mistakes etc, and not to designate a
mental element or state: nor does "involuntary" signify this mental
element or state". Now it could be argued that granted that there is
no one common factor in all cases of "he did it voluntarily", invariably

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53   "The Ascription of Responsibility and Rights" reprinted by Flew
in Logic and Language l

the point of passing such a judgement is to see the extent of the agent's responsibility (full, diminished); and it must be conceded that cases of everyday actions where nothing goes wrong are paradigms of the agent being fully responsible. So why are Austin/Cavell intent on denying it? Put this way Austin/Cavell are claiming more than Hart for their argument is not only that it is not the case that all cases of voluntary action have anything in common, but also that to raise the question of whether an action was voluntary is to suggest that the opposite might have been the case.

24.   I will now discuss in detail Searle's arguments against "No modification without aberration". Searle writes "Thus there seems to be a serious assymmetry[54] between A-words and their opposites or negations. That is to justify fully an utterance of an A-word we need, first, evidence of an aberration and secondly, evidence for the truth of the utterance. But for the opposite or negative we need only evidence of the truth of the utterance. This, I should note, is my first flat disagreement with Austin. He says that they both require an aberration".

Firstly it must be remembered that one of the points which interested Austin was just why certain A-words did not have an opposite. There are many ways in which we can "muff" what we are doing, it is

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54   A-words are what Searle calls those adjectives which Austin was concerned with: unfortunately Searle has included in this category other words which seem to live unhappily with 'inadvertently' etc.

not surprising that the ways in which we succeed are less numerous.
So an important characteristic of some of <u>Austin</u>'s words (not all
A-words) are that they have no opposite (e.g. inadvertently); if
they did have one it would be misleading: ("advertently" suggests
that there is something in common to the ways of doing all acts not
done inadvertently, which is not the case); Those that seem to have
an opposite (e.g. "voluntary") are really masquerading.*   If I am
right in thinking that Searle is mistaken, it will be because his
A-words do not always correspond to the excusing adjectives Austin
was concerned with. Certainly the fourth argument Searle uses to
define his A-words "An aberration or A-condition for a sentence is
in general a reason for supposing that the assertion made in
uttering the opposite or negation of that sentence is or might have
been true" indicates that this may well be the case.

I want not only to claim that Searle's argument gains plausi-
bility by treating alike (under the heading A-words) Austin's examples
and those of other philosophers, but also that the latter should not
be treated in the manner he(Searle) would like. One of the examples
Searle uses to define A-words is the verb 'know'.   "Some of the things
Wittgenstein said about the verb 'know' suggest a similar view.
Wittgenstein objects to saying "I know that I am in pain", or "I know
what I am thinking" " .... And then Searle goes on to argue that

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*   In the sense that 'voluntary' has no opposite.

Wittgenstein cannot be right since "the negations of the statements (e.g. 'I don't know whether I am in pain') are not neither true nor false but in standard conditions simply false. But it seems to me that the argument in the Investigations goes something like: we are misled by grammar into thinking that 'I know I am In pain' is like ' I know how far London is from Canterbury'; if we were to look closely we would see there is no difference between 'I know I am in pain' and 'I am in pain'. So this cannot be a case of knowledge, and 'I don't know whether I am in pain" is equally nonsensical* (underlying this argument is a view that knowledge cannot be incorrigible and that since I cannot be mistaken about my own pain we cannot here be dealing with a case of knowledge - (the oddness of knowledge without observation). Wittgenstein writes[55]: "In what sense are any sensations private? - Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain , another person can only surmise it. In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word 'to know' as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.- Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself! It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean - except perhaps that I am in pain.

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55   op. cit. para 246
*   There have of course been arguments where 'I don't know that I am in pain' was considered nonsensical but not 'I know that I am in pain': these arguments relied on the fact that my knowledge of my pains was incorrigible, but did not object to that which was incorrigible being called knowledge. What is particular to Wittgenstein's argument is the calim that 'I know that I am in pain' and 'I don't know that I am in pain'are equally nonsensical.

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour - for I cannot be said to learn of them: I have them.

The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself." Now if Wittgenstein is right here (though I am not asserting that he is) then "I don't know whether I am in pain" is as inappropriate as 'I know that/whether I am in pain" (hence not an A-word): if Wittgenstein is wrong, if there is nothing inappropriate about 'I know that I am in pain' then also it is not an A-word. I think it could be shown that all the philosophical examples Searle uses will not fit his description of A- words (for instance, presumably what Benjamin is saying in "Remembering" is that to remember one's name is not a paradigm of forgetting) and that you could not teach people how to use 'remembering' by asking them to imagine what it would be like to remember their name; since it is very difficult to imagine what forgetting one's name would be like (as it were, remembering one's name is equivalent to having a memory in the sense that if I can't remember my name, I can't remember anything.) However, Benjamin is not arguing that 'I don't remember my name' cannot have a use, since it clearly has: (it is often an indication of a person's having lost his memory); however there remain his every-day examples.

25.   (a) The president is <u>sober</u> today

             (b) The man at the next table is <u>not</u> <u>lighting his cigarette</u> <u>with a 20-dollar bill.</u>

             (c) Jones is breathing

"Now what I am suggesting is that these sentences are like the previous examples (the philosophical ones) in that their utterance is only appropriate under certain aberrant or fishy conditions". Searle in the positive part of his paper suggests that we will find the correct explanation of the problem about A-words by "distinguishing the proposition that P and the act which I perform when I <u>assert</u> that P". And he further says "So I can only make an assertion if there is some reason for supposing the state of affairs asserted is worthy of note or in some respect remarkable". This is an important point but I do not think it will differentiate what seems to me to be two importantly different cases:

(1) When what I say is true but pointless. For instance, I am quietly sitting with you in Hyde Park and I say 'I am sitting with you in Hyde Park", or when the bowl of soup is brought to the table, I say "A bowl of soup" etc. Now in these cases there does not seem to be a strong temptation to suppose that the situation was (could have been) in anyway aberrant, that it might not have been a bowl of soup. Of course someone who continually utters obviously true statements may be lacking in intellectual powers, but what kind of mistake (linguistic) would Searle take him to be making?

I am quite sure that there are many heads of family who say 'a nice bowl of soup' twice a day with diurnal regularity without in any way wanting to suggest (or suggesting) that anything is amiss (and it doesn't explain much to say that this is a ritualistic use of language).

(2) Where what I say is "true?" but misleading in that it suggests that something else might have been the case e.g. "I came into this room of my own free will". Almost certainly Austin/Cavell would make a difference between (1) and (2) and claim that examples of (2) were not only pointless but also inappropriate (with which they should be taken to imply 'not true'). Remembering our two linguistic principles we can see that the principle of 'economy of effort' will rather explain the peculiarity of type(1) situations, whereas the 'always make the strongest claim" principle is better fitted to explain the inappropriateness of type (2) situations (but this is only at best sometimes the case since there is no obvious reason to suppose that 'I came here' is stronger than 'I came here voluntarily'). It may be the case that what Austin should have discussed is why in certain situations (type 2), saying what seems to be true statements has implications which are not present in type 1 situations and then if he were able to uncover a general linguistic principle, have proceeded to explain why 'excuses' for actions belonged to type 2, but in any case it does seem to be true that any repudiation of the Austin/Cavell

thesis will have to recognize a difference between type 1 and 2
situations which Searle's does not.

26.   The mistake that Searle[56] accuses Austin/Cavell of having
made is of attributing to certain words qualities which should be
attributed to the speech-acts the words occur in:[57] "Austin 's point,
then, is not properly speaking about words or even sentences. It is
a point about what it is to make an assertion. To make an assertion is
to commit oneself to something's being the case as opposed to things
not being the case. But if the possibility of its not being the
case is not even under consideration, or if its being the case is one
of the assumptions of the discourse, then the remark that it is the
case is just pointless". And'Austin has made this mistake through
failing to distinguish between propositions which form as it were the
contents of assertions (and other speech-acts) and the speech-acts
themselves. I distinguish between the propositions that P and the acts
which I perform when I assert that P. That there is a distinction is
shown by the fact that the same proposition can be a common content of
such different speech-acts as questioning whether p, commanding thatp,
warning that p, expressing doubts as to whether p, etc. as well as asserting
that p. Finally Searle claims[58] that Austin has fallen into error

56 See also his "Meaning and Speech-acts". Here other offenders are
on trial.
57 op.cit. p.48
58 Searle op.cit. p. 54

through using a "the meaning is the use" argument and thus making

the general methodological error of supposing that the conditions

in which it is correct to assert that p are identical with the conditions

in which it is the case that p. "But there is no reason at all to

suppose that these are identical, since assertion in only one kind

of speech-act among many, with its own special conditions of performance".

I will make two points which may show Searle's argument to be not that

damaging for Austin.

(1) It may be useful (and I hope not unduly perverse) to
remember that when the 'meaning is use' standard was raised it claimed
'for a <u>large</u> class of cases - though not for all - in which we <u>employ</u>
the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is
its use in the language'. Now at least a possible interpretation of
the claim is that the best way to <u>show</u> (to <u>teach</u>) a person the
meaning of a word is to look at its use. Suppose I want to   teach
someone the meaning of 'red': I begin by pointing to red objects and
saying "That is red" etc.;   in speech-act language I perform a speech-
act of assertion. I could not hope to teach anybody much by a series
of questions, (Is this red?), orders ('fetch me a red object'), warnings
('Beware the red light district') etc. So we have a sense in which asser-
tions have primary place in the teaching of meaning. At best we have
shown that assertions have primacy in <u>teaching</u> the meaning of a word,

not in <u>determining</u> the meaning of a word: still the meaning of a word
must reside in its possibilities of combination with other words (it
is part of the meaning of 'red' that I can say 'red friut' but not
'red calculation') and of course, the more specific a combination,
the more informative it is about meaning (that I can qualify 'boy'
with 'rough' tells me more about 'boy' than the fact that I can

qualify 'boy' with 'good', since there are fewer things I can qualify
with 'rough' than with 'good'). I think the same point could be made
about the role of speech-acts in determining meaning: it tells me nothing
about the meaning of a word that it can appear in the speech-act of
questioning, since all words can, but it does tell me something about
the word 'voluntary' that it can only be used in a speech-act (that is of
assertion) that suggests that the opposite to what is asserted might
have been the case. (Of course part of the difficulty in arguing against
Searle is that one is not sure just what kind of speech-acts can exist
(are they all and only all those acts for which there is a first-person
performative?) Taking Searle's point in 'Meaning and Speech-Acts' that
good is only commendatory when it occurs in speech-acts of commendation,
but not in speech-acts of questioning, I would want to argue that the
fact that a word can occur in and contribute to the effect of a speech- act

* Such vague language is required by my ignorance as to the relationship
between (i) meanings of words and (ii) effects of speech-acts.

of commendation (not all words do) tells us more about its meaning
than that it can appear in speech-acts of questioning, asserting,
(all words can) and it seems likely that an opponent of Searle wwould
make much out of the fact tthat only certain words can occur in more
than a role of 'extra' in speech-acts of commendation. It seems very
plausible to suggest that this possibility must be made to derive from
their meaning. So now even if we accept that a <u>word</u> cannot have
commendatory meaning we want to claim that it is because of a word's
meaning that it can (or cannot) occur in speech-acts of commendation.
(2) Whatever may be the force of these arguments there is another point
a supporter of Austin could make: roughly, Searle's argument against
Hare's claim that 'good' has commendatory meaning was as follows:

(i) It is assumed that in all its occurrences 'good' has the
same meaning.

(ii) when 'good' occurs in speech-acts of commendation, it
has commendatory meaning.

(iii) But when 'good' occurs in other speech-acts (of questioning)
it is not any longer the case that there is a speech-act of commendation,
not even 'in the offing'.

Therefore (iv) it is concluded that on those occasions when 'good' has
commendatory meaning (all indicative sentences) this is due to the fact
that a speech-act of commendation has taken place and is not due to the

meaning of 'good'.   An important claim of the argument is that
when 'good' occurs in other speech-acts there is not even a speech-
act of commendation 'in the offing' (e.g. 'If this is a good electric
blanket' cannot mean 'if I commend this blanket'), but take and
apparently similar argument: (1) Let us assume the meaning of 'I warn
him' constant (11) in indicative present uses of 'I warn'him' the speaker
warns (111) but in 'should I warn him?' the speaker doesn't warn.
Therefore (1V) the fact that the speaker warns in present indicative
uses derives not from the meaning of 'I warn'but from the fact that a
speech-act of warning is being undertaken: which clearly is an insufficient
argument since one wants to know why 'I warn' can occur in speech-acts
of warning (which is not given to all verbs). Still this argument
differs from Searle's 'argument about good, since when"I warn" occurs
in "Should I warn him" it does seem to be the case that a speech-act
of warning is in the offing, and importantly I think that this difference
is also to be found in Searle's argument against Austin on "voluntary"
which is as follows:

(1) let us assume the meaning of 'voluntary' constant in all its
uses

(11) when 'voluntary' is used in a speech-act of assertion it
implies that the action has in some way been 'muffed' (this because the
pointfulness argument suggests the opposite could have been the case)

but (lll) it does not perform this function when it appears in other speech-acts.

Therefore (lV) this function derives from the way assertions work, not from the meaning of 'voluntary'. But is (lll) right here? If Austin is correct in claiming that 'inadvertently' can only be used if untowardness has occurred, will he not also want to argue that the same must be true for its use in questions, in orders, in conditionals. And I certainly cannot see any difference in implication between 'he did it inadvertently' and 'Did he do it inadvertently?' (It would make no difference to rephrase Austin's argument as follows: "I sit in my chair in the usual way ... it will not do to ask whether I sat in it intentionally, not yet whether I sat in it from habit or automatically or what you will ...." (Of course there is the problem about asking that which I am supposed to know about in order to be "entitled" to ask. (see above) Still, the point is valid, Austin would not have claimed a different implication for "if he did X voluntarily, then ....") It is also the case that if Wittgenstein is right in saying that "I know I am in pain" is nonsensical (in his sense of the word), then "Do you know whether you are in pain?" and "I order you to / know whether you are in pain" are equally nonsensical. So it does not seem that the peculiarity of Austin's adjectives come from the properties the speech-act of assertion possesses, since they occur in other speech-acts.

It is of course open to Searle to argue that all this shows is that
certain speech-acts have certain properties in common (namely, that
questions, orders, assertions etc. have the common property of making
some adjectives carry with their use certain implications) but this
could only be done at great cost to his argument ("I distinguish
between the propositions that p and the acts which I perform when
I _assert_ that p. That there is a distinction is shown by the fact
that the same proposition can be a common content of such speech-acts
as questioning whether p, commanding that p, warning that p, expressing
doubt as to whether p, as well as asserting that p"). However it is
not the case that this move can be made against Searle's argument
about the meaning of "good", because speech-acts of commendation are on
a different level from speech-acts of assertion . This is because I
perform a speech-act of commendation whilst I perform a speech-act
of assertion (we are back to what bothered Austin: that when I warn,
I also make a statement). Searle has not taken this into consideration
but having done so, he could then argue that whereas in indicative uses
of 'good' I make a commendation at the same time as making an assertion,
this is not the case in interrogative uses (I make no commendation).
He could then go on to claim that this was not to do with the meaning
of 'good' but it was because of the characteristics of assertions which
allowed commendations to be performed simultaneously , whereas questions

do not. it does seem , however, that any analysis of meaning in terms of speech-acts will have to resort to speech-acts of warning, ordering, promising etc, rather than speech-acts of questioning, asserting etc. At the very least, the exact nature of our inquiry will determine what class of speech-acts we investigate: if we want to elicit the meaning of a particular word ('good') we must list those speech-acts it alone appears in; if we want to elicit a theory about language (A-words) we will have to examine speech-acts of a less specific kind: this is seen by the fact that it would be of little use to examine, in search of the meaning of 'good', speech-acts of assertion, qua assertions, alone.

28.   if anything at all has emerged from this section it is the negative-looking point that there cannot be any one theory which will explain the importantly dissimilar examples Austin used. A theory which tries to explain the inappropriateness of 'voluntary' when applied to ordinary, everyday actions will not explain why there is no such word as "inadvertently": on the other hand a theory which explains the use of 'involuntary' on grounds of utility (what it is for an action to go wrong, why we are more concerned with actions going wrong than with actions going right etc.) seems to be unable to account for the fact that ordinary, everyday actions are performed voluntarily. 'Intentionally' is different again: a beginning in showing the difference would be

to see what type of inquiry an analysis of 'intentionally' will be.
And there does seem to be a difference here: since clearly an analysis
of 'voluntarily' will have to take into consideration what 'voluntarily'
is used for; since it is used to attribute responsibility, one would
have to see why it is sometimes important to attribute responsibility
(its connection with being 'blameworthy' etc.) but an analysis of
'intentionally' starts with no need to disentangle such a crossing
of concepts, since we do not have any preconceived ideas about what
particular sub-class of actions(events?) intentional actions will be.
As Anscombe says 'When we are tempted to speak of 'different senses'
of a word which is clearly not equivocal, we may infer that we are in
fact pretty much in the dark about the character of the concepts which
it represents'. It is for this reason that the 'implication of unto-
wardness' is much less strong with 'intentionally' than with 'voluntary',
for when I say 'he did it intentionally' it is difficult to see just
what is claimed to be amiss (perhaps it is the case that 'intentionally'
lacks a strong implication of untowardness because it is a technical
(philosophically technical) word: but one has no criteria for
technicality). It may be that the strength of a word's implication
depends not on how many people know and use it, but rather on how deeply
it is embedded in the way we look at things, but this is no more than
a wild guess.

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