Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games

Nicole Bouchez and Daniel Friedman

(2000)

Nicole Bouchez and Daniel Friedman (2000) Equilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games.

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Abstract

In this chapter, we examine convergence behavior in simple bimatrix games. We classify the possible types of simple games, pick interesting examples of each type, and summarize convergence behavior under various information and player matching protocols.

Information about this Version

This is a Accepted version
This version's date is: 2000
This item is not peer reviewed

Link to this Version

https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/59fc8a4f-e522-910c-1155-4ab9a026872c/1/

Item TypeMonograph (Working Paper)
TitleEquilibrium Convergence in Normal Form Games
AuthorsBouchez, Nicole
Friedman, Daniel
DepartmentsFaculty of History and Social Science\Economics

Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 02-Nov-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 02-Nov-2012

Notes

©2000 Nicole Bouchez, Daniel Friedman. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.

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