Anouk Riviere (2003) Moderation in Proportional Systems: Coalitions Matter.
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This paper examines the role of the coalition formation process in a proportional system. It models its impact on the voters (who maximize their expected utilities) and the parties (who choose their platforms in a Nash game). In contrast with the intuitive idea that proportional systems represent “proportionally”, I show that a proportional system with minimal range coalitions leads to party convergence towards the median of the political spectrum. Indeed, a political party’s prospects of power are better when it is more likely to find ideological partners, i.e. when it is not ideologically isolated. In contrast, if coalitions are formed according to a minimum winning coalition rule a la Riker, any policy can be implemented in equilibrium.
This is a Accepted version This version's date is: 2003 This item is peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/e7f790a2-a945-013c-fe4a-bf2e3e533c85/1/
Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 24-Oct-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 24-Oct-2012
©2003 Anouk Riviere. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.