Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication

Mitchell, Chris

(1989)

Mitchell, Chris (1989) Limitations of challenge-response entity authentication. Electronics Letters, 25 (17).

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Abstract

We consider two basic versions of the challenge-response authentication protocol, and exhibit both a method of attack and a simple modification preventing such attacks. We go on to consider three variants of the basic protocols and show that one of them is completely insecure.

Information about this Version

This is a Submitted version
This version's date is: 8/1989
This item is not peer reviewed

Link to this Version

https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/c2121a5c-5521-6c26-1ef4-312ddf0ad688/2/

Item TypeJournal Article
TitleLimitations of challenge-response entity authentication
AuthorsMitchell, Chris
Uncontrolled Keywordschallenge-response protocol, attack, modification
DepartmentsFaculty of Science\Mathematics

Identifiers

doihttp://dx.doi.org/10.1049/el:19890801

Deposited by Research Information System (atira) on 24-May-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 24-May-2012

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