Behaviour in a Two-Stage Public Goods Experiment

Massimo Finocchiaro Castro

(2005)

Massimo Finocchiaro Castro (2005) Behaviour in a Two-Stage Public Goods Experiment.

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Abstract

In a two-stage public goods experiment, we study the effect that subjects’ possibility of contributing to a public good in the first stage of the game has on the voluntary contributions to the second public good. Our results show that subjects do not follow either the Nash strategy or the Pareto efficient strategy and that they perceive the two public goods as substitutes.

Information about this Version

This is a Accepted version
This version's date is: 2005
This item is not peer reviewed

Link to this Version

https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/b6380ecb-5c91-c0a2-d88f-fefa0d69064d/1/

Item TypeMonograph (Working Paper)
Title Behaviour in a Two-Stage Public Goods Experiment
AuthorsCastro, Massimo
Uncontrolled Keywordspublic goods, experiments, voluntary provision.
DepartmentsFaculty of History and Social Science\Economics

Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 12-Oct-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 12-Oct-2012

Notes

©2005 Massimo Finocchiaro Castro. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.

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