Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia

Oeindrila Dube and Juan F. Vargas

(2006)

Oeindrila Dube and Juan F. Vargas (2006) Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia.

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Abstract

This paper explores how commodity price shocks in the international market affect armed conflict. Using a new dataset on civil war in Colombia, we find that exogenous price shocks in the coffee and oil markets affect coflict in opposite directions, and through separate channels. A sharp fall in coffee prices during the late 1990s increased violence dispro- portionately in coffee-intensive municipalities, by lowering wages and the opportunity cost of recruitment into armed groups. In contrast, a rise in oil prices increased conflict in the oil region, by expanding local government budgets and raising potential gains from rapacity and predation on these resources. Our analysis suggests that the price of labor intensive goods affect conflict primarily through the opportunity cost effect, while the price of capital intensive goods affect conflict through the rapacity channel.

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This is a Accepted version
This version's date is: 2006
This item is not peer reviewed

Link to this Version

https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/9a353bf7-2280-dcfa-a902-b74a899138fc/1/

Item TypeMonograph (Working Paper)
TitleCommodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia
AuthorsDube, Oeindrila
Vargas, Juan
DepartmentsFaculty of History and Social Science\Economics

Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 12-Oct-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 12-Oct-2012

Notes

 

©2006 Juan F. Vargas. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.

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