An empiricist tradition on the subject of miracles

Abstract

This work is an attempt at a critical study of 'an empiricist tradition on the subject of miracles'. This tradition is the one that began with David Hume's argument against miracles and was then carried on by J. S. Mill and some contemporary empiricists. The views of these thinkers are discussed not with a view to developing any explanatory theory of miracles, but with the intention of estimating how far the tradition as a whole has succeeded in establishing its claim against miracles. The discussions begin with a very brief reproduction of the opinions that had been maintained by some eminent philosophers prior to the development of this empiricist tradition. This is done in Chapter I. The views of Hume, Mill and some present-day empiricists are then taken up separately in three successive chapters for somewhat detailed considerations. Finally, it is maintained in conclusion that these empiricists have not been able to produce any decisive argument against miracles and that the tradition has thus failed to establish its case against miracles.