Wieland Muller and Hans-Theo Normann (2002) Conjectural Variations and Evolutionary Stability: A New Rationale for Consistency.
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Adopting an evolutionary approach, we explain the conjectural variations Þrms may hold in duopoly. Given conjectures, Þrms play the market game rationally. Success in the market game determines Þtness in the evolutionary game. We show that the unique conjectures which are evolutionarily stable are consistent in that they anticipate rivals' behavior correctly.
This is a Accepted version This version's date is: 2002 This item is not peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/467cb28a-a3d8-4fb0-031c-36c41db2dadb/1/
Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 02-Nov-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 02-Nov-2012
©2002 Hans-Theo Normann, Jonathan Wadsworth. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.