The Impact of the Termination Rule in Cooperation Experiments

Hans-Theo Normann and Brian Wallace

(2004)

Hans-Theo Normann and Brian Wallace (2004) The Impact of the Termination Rule in Cooperation Experiments.

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Abstract

This paper analyzes the impact of three termination rules for repeated-game experiments. We compare treatments with a known finite end, an unknown end and two variants with a random termination rule. The termination rules do not significantly effect cooperation rates.

Information about this Version

This is a Accepted version
This version's date is: 2004
This item is not peer reviewed

Link to this Version

https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/024414c1-ab52-3e54-2425-b87865762667/1/

Item TypeMonograph (Working Paper)
TitleThe Impact of the Termination Rule in Cooperation Experiments
AuthorsNormann, Hans-Theo
Wallace, Brian
Uncontrolled KeywordsTermination rule, end-game effect, infinite horizon, repeated games
DepartmentsFaculty of History and Social Science\Economics

Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 12-Oct-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 12-Oct-2012

Notes

©2004 Hans Normann and Brian Wallace. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.

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