Mitchell, Chris J (2003) Key recovery attack on ANSI retail MAC. Electronics Letters, 39 (4).
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A new type of attack is introduced which takes advantage of MAC truncation to simplify key recovery attacks based on MAC verifications. One example of the attack is described which, in certain circumstances, enables a more efficient attack than was previously known to be launched against the ANSI retail MAC. The existence of this attack means that truncation for this MAC scheme should be used with greater care than was previously believed, and very short MACs should be avoided altogether.
This is a Submitted version This version's date is: 2/2003 This item is not peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/d66c65c3-cd6a-ddd6-e136-ad8c99125292/4/
Deposited by Research Information System (atira) on 24-May-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 24-May-2012
This is the final draft version of the paper that appeared in 'Electronics Letters', 39(4) February 2003.