Nicole Bouchez (2000) What Learning Models Tell Us to Expect in Three-by-Three Bimatrix Games.
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This paper extends several existing learning models to investigate their fixed points (their long run predictions of play). The fixed points of the model are not necessarily at the Nash equilibria of the payoff matrices but are a function of both the Nash equilibria and the parameters of the model. The stability of these fixed points also depends on both the characteristics of payoff matrix used and the parameters of the model. These new findings indicate that behaviour previously thought to be inconsistent with theory may not necessarily be so.
This is a Accepted version This version's date is: 2000 This item is not peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/2db3e7ff-8583-7fda-8d21-a978c6f796ab/1/
Deposited by Leanne Workman (UXYL007) on 02-Nov-2012 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 02-Nov-2012
©2000 Nicole Bouchez, Daniel Friedman. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit including © notice, is given to the source.