Koch, A K and Peyrache, E (2005) Aligning Ambition and Incentives.
Full text access: Open
In many economic situations, several principals contract with the same agents sequentially. From observing agents' performance the first principal obtains information regarding their abilities that is not directly available to outsiders. This has profound implications for the design of incentive contracts. We show that the principal always strategically distorts information revelation to future principals about the performance of her agents. The second main result is that she can limit her search for optimal incentive schemes to the class of relative performance contracts that cannot be replicated by contracts based on individual performance only. This provides a new rationale for the optimality of such compensation schemes.
This is a Submitted version This version's date is: 17/10/2005 This item is not peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/ec3b3391-0da9-0975-af01-4879a67c1c0c/4/
Deposited by Research Information System (atira) on 26-Jan-2013 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 26-Jan-2013