Spagat, M and Mandler, M (2005) Human Rights Conditions on Foreign Aid can Backfire.
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A domestic power faces an enemy and commits terrorist atrocities to increase its likelihood of victory. A foreign patron can grant aid tothe power but prefers fewer or no atrocities. To avoid the need to compromise with the foreign patron, the domestic power may create (or stop supressing) independent paramilitaries that commit even more atrocities. Once "atrocity overshooting" is reached, the domestic power shifts gears and tries to restrict the atrocity level that paramilitaries are committing. Case studies of Colombia and Northern Ireland illustrate the model.
This is a Submitted version This version's date is: 4/2005 This item is not peer reviewed
https://repository.royalholloway.ac.uk/items/d41646e4-a624-48a2-6374-3547e6ead986/9/
Deposited by Research Information System (atira) on 18-Nov-2014 in Royal Holloway Research Online.Last modified on 18-Nov-2014