CHANNING

Abstract: The Influence of Other Philosophies on Later Stoicism

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THESIS

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

THE INFLUENCE OF OTHER PHILOSOPHIES ON LATER STOICISM

I. Introduction

The world which saw the birth of the post-Aristotelian philosophies was a very different one from that in which Plato and his successor had developed their great systems. The age of the sovereign city state was over; by the conquests of Alexander the old barriers between cities and peoples were broken down and political life as hitherto understood was at an end. There followed a period of recurring struggles in which Greece tried to regain her independence from the Macedonians: when she was finally released from this yoke by the Romans, it was only to exchange one conqueror for another. This was the background against which the new systems of philosophy arose, and the spirit of that philosophy, 'though it had many points of contact with the old, was correspondingly new. Aristotle had played his part in separating science from philosophy: in the post-Aristotlean systems, subordination of all sciences to ethical ends, individualism in morals and a materialistic realism were conspicuous common features, however bitterly their essential doctrines may have been opposed.

The Stoic and the Epicurean were the two great new schools of this Hellenistic period. They were contemporaneous in their foundation, but, while the doctrines of Epicureanism were fixed once and for all by their founder, Stoicism had a longer and more vigorous life, and a long

development in doctrine. Three chief periods may be noted in its history. From the foundation of the school of Zeno in about 300 B.C. Stoic doctrine continued to be developed and elaborated, until by the death of Chrysippus in 206 B.C. it had received as a result of his efforts a strengthened and systematized form. The two centuries following marked what has been called the transition period of the Middle Stoic. Panaetius and Posidonius are its most celebrated representatives, and in their hands the older doctrines underwent a modification and not infrequent relaxation which resulted in the questioning and even abandonment of some of the leading Stoic dogmas. This period also saw the introduction of the Stoic philosophy to Rome, where of all systems, it appealed most successfully to the minds of men who played a leading part in the affairs of the world capital. Then began the third and latest act in the drama of the Porch.

With the shifting of the centre of the school from Athens to Rome, and the resulting difference of circumstances and spirit, Stoicism underwent another change: new tendencies developed which led to the final almost total concentration on practical ethics, to the exclusion of the other parts of the system as built up by the founders. From its beginnings as one of the dogmatic philosophies to which the new Greece gave rise, Stoicism, by its general acceptance in the Roman world, had begun to assume the features of a religion: but it was a Stoicism which was by no means identical with that of Zeno and Chrysippus.

What were the reasons for this change in the character of Stoicism? There are several factors which must be considered as contributory. In the first place, the important part played by the changing tendencies and spirit of the times, the new needs which the philosophy of the Porch was called upon to meet - and had to meet if it was to survive - must not be under-rated. Its introduction into, and acceptance in the Roman world necessitated simplifications and adaptations to the new atmosphere and mentality with which it found itself in contact. Life under the Emperors brought forth new problems and fresh needs which had to be answered, and as it is not in the nature of things to stand still, philosophy had to progress with man's ever increasing demands.

The personal inclinations and convictions of its chief representatives affect not a little the shape which a philosophical system is to assume, the paths which it is to follow. So it was that through the years, the original doctrines of Stoicism received in turn the stamp of the character of Panaetius and Posidonius, of Seneca, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, and were coloured by their personal leanings and preferences.

It is a third factor to which the two already mentioned were largely and directly contributory, that is to concern us here. This is the influence of other philosophies many of whose doctrines for one reason or another found their way into the original Stoic teaching of Zeno and Chrysippus.

We must examine the extent of this influence, the reasons for it, and the periods at which it became strong enough to produce material changes in the Stoic philosophy.

II. Stoicism: itself largely derived from older philosophies, but distinctive.

The philosophical systems that the great minds of the old Greece had already produced, had indeed given much to Stoicism in its original form. It was not an isolated innovation, nor again was it a simple continuation of any Socratic school. Zeno was something of an Eclectic: he conceived the idea of liberating men from the degeneracy of the age by means of a philosophy, the object of which was to procure by the purity and force of its morals, independence of things external and an untroubled inner peace. To build that philosophy, he worked up all previous materials and appropriated and absorbed all elements, - that agreed with the best of his own mind. From his Cynic master Crates, the indirect disciple of Socrates, he drew the greater part of his ethics; from Heraclitus his physics. From the Pythagoreans probably came the conception of the "Great Year" and from the Megarian Stilpo the taste for dry and abstract dialectic characteristic of early Stoic teaching. In logic Zeno adhered closely to Aristotle; to the latter, too, was partly due such modifications of the Heraclitean theory of nature, as the conception of the reason which ruled the world as an intelligence working with a purpose rather than a natural power. His

period of study under Polemo and Xenocrates undoubtedly influenced Zeno's moral science; such points in the Platonism of the old Academy as the doctrine of the self-sufficiency of virtue and the definition of the perfect life by Polemo as life according to nature, agreed with the principles that it was Zeno's aim to establish in his own philosophy. With these and other borrowings from earlier philosophies, may perhaps be coupled the influence of the medical schools of the C.4. Brehier (Histoire de la Philosophie I, p.296) finds that it is to these medical theories concerning the structure of the universe and the soul, and to the tradition of the Ionian physicists with which they had an affinity, that the Stoic conception of an animate world approached. It was, then, by bringing to an ethical basis of Cynicism, the scientific ideas and aims he had learned with Polemo and Stilpo and by the study of ancient philosophy, that Zeno became the founder of a new school. But it was a new school: the elements he borrowed, with modifications and additions were worked up together to produce by their combination a completely new result - the distinctive Stoic system.

It has been questioned, in connection with the probable Phoenician extraction of Zeno, whether Semitic influence played any part in giving to Stoicism the character which distinguished it from the Greek philosophies from which it was so largely drawn. 'Though little is known of Semitic tradition, it may be possible to trace such an influence in the manner, if not the matter, of Zeno's exposition. It has been noted by

Bevan in "Stoics and Sceptics" that while most Greek philosophy had been characterized by "apparent tentativeness of assertion" Zeno's tone was essentially dogmatic and authoritative; it was the tone of the prophet. Truths were not elicited by rational argument, but dogmas, often paradoxical, asserted, which demanded instant acceptance. Zeno's method was, at all events, certainly a change from the dialectical methods of the Academy and Lyceum; though it may be asked whether the Stoics did not to some extent inherit their dogmatic manner from Heraclitus.

However that may be, the point to be established is that by the death of Chrysippus, the body of Stoic doctrine was complete; any elements introduced after that date, though from the philosophies from which Stoicism itself was ultimately largely derived, must be regarded as foreign, and the growing effect of their influence as a modification of strict Stoic doctrine.

III. Beginnings of Influence of other Systems.

Although the results of the influence of foreign elements are most noticeable in the later Stoic philosophers, it must not be thought that Stoicism remained entirely unaffected until that time. This is in the main true; but the beginnings of compromise and of slight modification under the influence of rival schools can already be seen in Chrysippus himself. The influence here at work was that of Arcesilaus, with whom began a great change in the position of the Academy derived from Plato. This philosopher took over and further

developed the scepticism of Pyrrho, and directed his attacks against the Stoic dogmas, chiefly against that of the certainty of knowledge and the criterion καταληπτικὴ φαντασία. Although Chrysippus defended this dogma with the utmost energy, it is probable that the teaching of Arcesilaus was not without its effect on him, and was ultimately allowed a place in the Stoic system. If the evidence can be relied upon, we may fairly assume that in ethical doctrine there was to some extent an approach to the Academic view and a sacrifice of the old strictness. According to Diog: L., when defining the supremely good, and consequently supremely happy life, as a life according to nature, Chrysippus distinguished both the nature of the whole and individual human nature. D.L. VII 89 φύσιν δὲ Χρύσιππος μὲν ἑξακούει ἢ ἀκολούθως δεῖ ζῆν, τήν τε κοινὴν καὶ ἰδίως τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην--- μέρη γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ἡμέτεραι φύσεις τῆς τοῦ ὅλου.

τέλος

This would seem to approach the doctrine of οἰκεία ἀρετή — virtue appropriate to the individual as taught by the Academies. Xenocrates defined happiness thus: Clem: Strom: II 22 ≒ ξενοκράτης -- τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἀπεδίδωσι κτῆσιν τῆς οἰκείας ἀρετῆς --- καὶ τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς αὐτῇ δυνάμεως.

Cleanthes apparently had not given this double significance to φύσις: D.L. VII. 89. ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης τὴν κοινὴν μόνην ἐκδέχεται φύσιν---.

τὸ ἀγαθόν

A second point in which it is possible to see a concession to the Academies, is Chrysippus' slight modification of the orthodox Stoic conception of τὸ ἀγαθόν, — a name hitherto reserved strictly for virtue alone. It

appears that Chrysippus allowed the term ἀγαθά to be applied to ἀδιάφορα προηγμένα by men engaged in practical affairs, provided that these were carefully distinguished from the supreme good. Plut: Stoic: reb. 30.4. δίδωσι Χρύσιππος τοῖς βουλομένοις τὰ προηγμένα καλεῖν ἀγαθά.

Cicero also refers to this modification on the part of Chrysippus De Fin: V.29.89 bonum appello quidquid secundum naturam est, quod contra, malum: nec ego solus, sed tu etiam, Chrysippe, in foro, domi; in schola desinis." That this extended application of the term bonum belonged to the Academics is indicated by Seneca in Ep. 85.18. Xenocrates et Speusippus putant beatum vel sola virtute fieri posse, non tamen unum bonum esse, quod honestum est.

1) Boëthus

Boëthus, the contemporary of Chrysippus, yielded in more essential points to the criticisms of the adversaries of his school, and seems to have inclined towards Peripatetic views. It was an essential part of the Stoic theory borrowed from Heraclitus, that as the whole universe had proceeded from creative fire, so it must in due course be re-absorbed into it. This became the important Stoic doctrine of the periodical ἐκπύρωσις, and against it many arguments were directed.

α) ἐκπύρωσις

Influenced by these, Boëthus seems to have abandoned altogether the Stoic theory on this subject and to have tended rather to the Peripatetic view which placed God and the universe in eternal contrast and held both to be immortal. Philo de aet: mund: 15. Βόηθος γοῦν ὁ Σιδώνιος καὶ Παναίτιος -- τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας καταλιπόντες πρὸς θειότερον δόγμα τὸ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου πάντως ὑπετράλησαν.

Following his critics he himself formed a series of arguments against the doctrine of conflagration: whether he concluded from this, that the world was also without a beginning, cannot be ascertained.

)κόσμος

This was not Boëthus' sole deviation from orthodoxy. One other departure may be mentioned, where the tendency is again an approach to the Peripatetic standpoint. Though Stoic in his materialistic conception of the deity, he would not admit that God dwelt in the world as its soul, and thus for him the world was not a living being. For this we have to rely, it is true, on the not always trustworthy evidence of D.L.VII.143. Βόηθος δὲ φήσιν οὐκ εἶναι ζῷον τὸν κόσμον. He assigned the abode of the deity to the highest sphere of the fixed stars from where it worked on the universe. D.L.VII.148 Βόηθος δὲ ἐν τῇ Περὶ φύσεως οὐσίαν θεοῦ τὴν τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαῖραν (φησιν).

Aristotle had assigned to his prime mover a position not dissimilar; although this 'God' is external to the whole world-system. Met.XII.7 1072^{a} 23 ff.

Zeno of Tarsus

The adverse criticisms of the Peripatetics and the new Sceptical Academy were not without their effect on the successor of Chrysippus, Zeno of Tarsus. Although not as definite in his concessions as Boëthus, it appears that he too felt doubts with regard to the Stoic ἐκπύρωσις and was so far influenced as to suspend judgement on the question. Arius Did. epit. phys: frag. 36. Ζήνωνά φασιν ἐπισχεῖν περὶ τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως τῶν ὅλων.

With the succession of Carneades, about whom a great deal more will have to be said later, to the headship of the Academy, the then heads of the Stoic school Diogenes and Antipater, found themselves matched against criticisms far more forceful and damaging than any hitherto. How far they modified their doctrines as a result of this criticism remains doubtful, but there may perhaps be seen in them the first traces of the great influence that the polemic of Carneades was to have on Stoicism in the hands of their successors. Opinions and evidence vary as to the extent of Diogenes and Antipater's departures from orthodoxy. Philo states that Diogenes in later life doubted the conflagration of the cosmos. De Incorr. mund. 15. λέγεται δὲ καὶ Διογένης ἡνίκα νέος ἦν συνεπιγραφόμενος τῷ δόγματι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, ὀψὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἐνδοιάσας ἐπισχεῖν.

Furthermore, according to Cicero De Off. III. xii.51, where the differences and arguments of Diogenes and Antipater on questions concerning the duty of the honest man are discussed, Diogenes held a broader view of honestum and utile than his stricter predecessors, but he probably remained faithful to the old formula of τὸ τέλος . Evidence indeed seems to point to new definitions of τέλος which earlier Stoics would not have sanctioned. Thus, we find ascribed to Diogenes the definition of the end as εὐλογιστεῖν ἐν τῇ τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐκλογῇ καὶ ἀπεκλογῇ. Stob ed. II. 75,11 w. and to Antipater - ἐκλεγομένους μὲν τὰ κατὰ φύσιν, ἀπεκλεγομένους δὲ τὰ παρὰ φύσιν Stob ib. These indicate a concession extorted by the attack

of Carneades against Stoic indifferentism, in the allowance of value to τὰ κατὰ φύσιν , and the emphasis on choice and refutation of certain things. The explanation is probably that Diogenes and his pupils answered their critics by giving a place to τὰ κατὰ φύσιν , but were influenced only so far as to change their definition. They did not accept Carneades' point of view, but maintained the old Stoic view of things indifferent, which was the special object of attack: τυγχάνειν τῶν κατὰ φύσιν remained ἀδιάφορον. . Cicero, De Fin:V.7.20 "at vero omnia facere, ut adipiscamur, quae secundum naturam sunt, etiam si ea non assequamur, id esse et honestum et solum per se expetendum, et solum bonum Stoici dicunt." This was the opinion of Diogenes and Antipater.

Ἀδιάφορα

Antipater would seem to have gone further than Chrysippus in his compromise with regard to the value of ἀδιάφορα προηγμένα, and if not to have abandoned the Socratic doctrine of the self-sufficiency of virtue, at least to have held that external goods are a part, though a very small part, of the supreme good. See Seneca. Ep.9.25. In this he approximated to the Peripatetics who always insisted on a supply of external goods as necessary for the active exercise of virtue. Aristotle. Nic. Ethic I.9.1099^{a}31 says ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα.

A similar modification of Stoic indifferentism lies in Antipater's ultimate allowance of positive value and a place among τὰ προηγμένα to εὐδοξία which down to Diogenes had been regarded as wholly indifferent. This compromise is attested by

Cicero. De Fin. III. 57. De bona autem fama ... Chrysippus quidem et Diogenes detracta utilitate ne digitum quidem eius causa porrigendum esse dicebant. Qui autem post eos fuerunt, cum Carneadem sustinere non possent, hanc bonam famam ipsam propter se praepositam, et sumendam esse dixerunt. Among the later Stoics, Seneca was keenly sensitive to the judgement of posterity.

κριτήριον

As a final point in which the Stoic position seems to have been weakened by Carneades' criticism, we may mention the inclination of some of the Stoics of this period, Antipater included, to accept probability - εὔλογον ἢ πιθανόν - as their guide, thus assimilating their doctrine to that of the Sceptics. According to Sextus Cont. Math.VII.253, they further qualified their criterion of truth by adding to καταληπτικὴ φαντασία - which has no obstacles. They admitted that some καταληπτικαὶ φαντασίαι do not entail belief, for example in the case of Admetus when Alcestis was brought back from the dead, and that what makes for certainty is not so much the φαντασία itself as its connection with the whole of which it is a part, - a principle maintained by Carneades.

It may fairly be assumed then, from this survey, that soon after the death of Chrysippus, which marked the end of the first stage in the history of the Porch, relations with other schools of philosophy were already influencing the Stoic representatives to reconsider some of their main dogmas. It is also true, however, that in no essential point was any

substantial sacrifice made, with the exception of Boëthus' abandonment of the periodic conflagration - in which he anticipated Panaetius. The Stoics, while feeling the pressure of criticism to an uncomfortable extent, remained true in the main to the doctrines of their founder. It is for this reason that many see in Panaetius the beginning of a new period in Stoic history. It is true that he was the first to depart in many essential points from the orthodoxy of his school; to introduce elements from other philosophies to a very large extent; and to initiate the career and development of Stoicism in the Roman world. Much of his eclectic character may have been due to his personal leanings, much to the new milieu in which his philosophy found itself, but it is surely permissible to say that in one sense his innovations were the logical outcome of the beginnings made by his predecessors. Criticism had to be met, Stoicism had to be re-examined and to justify itself if it was to continue to be authoritative. In this light Panaetius is seen, not as marking a beginning, but as a logical continuation. On the other hand, that the philosophy justified itself and developed in the way it did, was due to him, and to the following of his precedent by his successors. As the first in whom the influence of other philosophies was so strong as to result in considerable borrowing and assimilation of alien elements, he marked the beginning of a long development in doctrine which continued until the end of Stoic history. With him Stoicism became the philosophy of

Rome, and it is from this point that the results of other philosophical influences must be systematically examined.

IV The Influence of The New Academy: Scepticism.

It may be said that the philosophy which had the greatest influence on the development of later Stoicism was the Scepticism of the New Academy, the beginnings of which have been noted. It may be as well to examine briefly the nature of this new Scepticism which found its greatest and most dangerous representative in Carneades. It has been seen how the school founded by Plato had taken a new direction under Arcesilaus. Eighty years after his death, the headship of the school passed to Carneades. Of Semitic origin, he had learned logic under Diogenes; he had a passion for argument and delighted in tearing to pieces all dogmatic systems. His principles do not seem to have been different essentially from those of Arcesilaus, but his importance lies in the fact that the Sceptical arguments were given a greater and more wide-spread popularity by the rhetorical cleverness with which he enunciated his criticisms. The Stoics were the main object of Carneades' fierce attacks. He made the writings of Chrysippus his chief philosophical study and acknowledged his obligations to this great Stoic whose constructive work it became the task of his life time to overthrow.

He denied the possibility of any standard of truth; he pointed to many inconsistencies in Stoic ethics; against the reasoning of Zeno and Chrysippus, he argued that the universe could not be rational and of divine nature; he questioned and logically disproved the existence of the gods and allowed no force to divination. His criticisms were thus directed against some of the cardinal dogmas of Stoicism, and though many of his objections were little better than fallacies, there was also much that was true, much that brought to light, and would not allow to remain unrevised, the weaknesses and inconsistences of the Stoic system. Here, then, lies one of the factors which make for the importance of the Sceptical influence on Stoicism: as a result of Carneades' vigorous polemics against their dogmatism the Stoics were forced to examine anew, and in the course of defending, reform, some of their most essential doctrines. The approximations made by them to actual Academic views are of less importance; the main point is that it was the influence of Scepticism which occasioned the modification of Stoicism by Panaetius and his successors, in the process of which many elements from other philosophies were borrowed.

Resulting Eclecticism

It was Scepticism too, which largely paved the way for the era of eclecticism which began at about the time of Panaetius, when Stoics, and after them, other systems, became less rigorously adherent to orthodoxy and more favourably disposed to incorporate into their own system doctrines

from various schools which had hitherto been considered completely antagonistic. It did not indeed originate the movement; the conditions which tend to produce an eclecticism were present in the circumstances of the period and in the growth and character of its philosophy. For in the nature of things, mental tendencies sprung from the same source - and the post-Aristotelian schools were all, more or less, a continuation of Socratic principles - cannot continue for long to hold mutually exclusive positions. The first founders and their immediate successors lay excessive weight on what is peculiar to their mode of thought and see in opponents only deviations from the truth of their own docrtines; but later representatives who have nor originated the features which distinguish their system, are more able and ready to see even in adverse teachings much that is common to their own. Furthermore, strife between schools tends to oblige the members of each to repel unfounded accusations and criticisms by bringing out more clearly the points of coincidence, to give up untenable positions and to modify the most glaring contrasts. Thus after the conflict of schools, oppositions lose much of their original force, and when the common principles which underlie them all are in time recognized, mediation and approximation are attempted. The greater the dispute, the more this eventual mutual appreciation and exchange of ideas seem to result. This may account for the

greater influence of the Platonic Academy on Panaetius and the later Stoics, for, as has been seen, in the C.2. B.C. the quarrel of the Porch with the Academy was much more active and violent than that with the Peripatetics. The approximation will naturally not take place until after the clash, and in this connection it is significant that the greater part of Panaetius' philosophical career lies after the period of Carneades' attacks, and thus perhaps at the time when a drawing together and mutual contact were possible.

The post-Aristotelian philosophies had already largely lost their purely theoretical interest and confined themselves to the life of man. The schools, in these last centuries B.C., occupied themselves with discussion: philosophic production had for the most part ceased: the scientific sense could not fail to be dulled still more, until a tendency to question the possibility of scientific knowledge in general, would arise. Of this tendency Scepticism was the proper expression. But the Scepticism maintained in the C.2 B.C. by Carneades and the Academy was not absolutely negative and destructive: it owned to a belief in attaining knowledge that was probable — τὸ πιθανόν — . The degrees of probability constituted the positive teaching of Carneades: in it he applied the τὸ εὔλογον of Arcesilaus to a certain extent to the sphere of knowledge as well as conduct. His successor Clitomachus showed a more active interest in other systems, and while opposing them, seems to have sought a positive

relation to them and to have insisted on the mutual rapport between them. This belief in τὸ πιθανόν is the causal connection with eclecticism, to which, from one-sided dogmatism, Scepticism formed the bridge. For the aim of this form of Scepticism was finding the probable: its fundamental law was that no one system can boast of knowing the truth. The search for probability is, therefore, conducted in all sorts of schools, the individual reserving the right to make his own decisions regarding the degree of probability.

How far the external cause of the introduction of Greek philosophy to the Roman world contributed to the eclectic tendency is debatable. Dr. Van Straaten (Panétius p.53) holds that the influence was rather on the external form of the doctrine than on its internal development, and shewed itself in the practical tendency of the presentation. It is, however, reasonable to suppose that in addition to this outward determination, the spirit of the Roman pupils should influence their Greek teachers. It was consistent with this spirit to estimate the worth of philosophy, as of all else, primarily by the standard of practical utility: to this standpoint the selection from various systems of what seemed serviceable would especially appeal. When the internal conditions of the philosophical schools had already led to eclecticism, it is natural to assume that it necessarily developed more speedily and successfully when those conditions were re-inforced by external influences.

These factors, then, all contributed to the new spread of eclecticism in the first centuries B.C. The tendency seems indeed in one sense but the reverse side of Scepticism: instead of the "neither one nor the other" directed against the dogmatic schools, we now have "both one and the other" - the ability to see truths in other systems and to incorporate those truths, which from Panaetius onwards, to a greater or less extent, remained a characteristic of the Stoic philosophy. When, in its latest Roman period, the chief Stoic representatives had renounced most of the alien doctrines introduced by Panaetius and Posidonius, and returned to the orthodoxy of Zeno, eclecticism continued to exhibit its influence in another direction. For this period is marked, as will be seen, by the tendency to concentrate on one particular part of the system and to develop it more fully than ever before. It is true indeed, that when Stoicism emerged from the conflict with the Academy, original research and a lively interest in the department of natural science, for the most part ceased; but it was with Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius that these studies were most completely excluded from the scope of philosophy.

V. Direct Influence of Scepticism.

As might be expected, it is above all, if not solely, in Panaetius that the direct influence of Carneades' Scepticism is manifest. He was active at the period when from the causes mentioned above, (pp. 15.16), this criticism was

most likely to achieve a positive result, and several of his departures from orthodoxy can be attributed to no other influence.

dubitatio

The dubitative with-holding of assent which our evidence attributes to Panaetius in many points, may best be considered in the light of Carneades' principle of the individual's right to judge the probability of any doctrine. Cicero. De Nat. Deor: II. 46.118. "Panaetius addubitavit ~~est~~ ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret." Acad.II. XXXIII.107 where Panaetius is said "addubitare" that oracles have any validity.

That Panaetius with-held his assent on these particular questions, in opposition to essential points of Stoic doctrine, and further that he denied any authority to divination and astrology, to which Zeno and Chrysippus had given a high value, may also be supposed to have been the direct result of Sceptical criticism. It has been noted (p.15) with what force Carneades attacked these Stoic beliefs. Authorities differ as to the extent of Panaetius' unorthodoxy in this matter. We may, however, conclude from Cicero's testimony, De Div. I. 3. §6, "sed a Stoicis vel princeps eius disciplinae ... degenerauit, Panaetius, nec tamen ausus est negare vim esse divinandi, sed dubitare se dixit", that he did not unconditionally deny the value of divination. He completely rejected only the power of astrology, with arguments expressed by Cicero in De Div:II.42 and this rejection was extended to all divination by some authorities.-D.L.VII.149 ὁ μὲν γὰρ Παναίτιος ἀνυπόστατον αὐτὴν (μαντικὴν) φησιν.

The real basis of all divination - especially in the case of astrology, where causal connections were postulated between the positions of the stars and the fate of man - was the doctrine of συμπάθεια τοῦ ὅλου Panaetius' rejection of astrology does not imply a total rejection of this doctrine. Although he cannot have held it in the absolute and universal sense of the earliest Stoics, he may quite probably have accepted it apart from its causal implications.

Roman Stoics

It is interesting to note in connection with "dubitare", that in the Roman imperial period, suspension of judgement tended to become the rule rather than the exception. A growing spirit of pessimism led to grave doubt as to the certainty of human knowledge; a doubt which expressed itself in attacks on the trustworthiness of the senses. Seneca N.Q.I.2.3. - "visus noster solita imbecillitate deceptus." Marcus Aurelius V.33 τὰ δὲ αἰσθητήρια ἀμυδρὰ καὶ εὐπαρατύπωτα. The earlier confidence that the difficulty of errors of sense could be overcome, no longer persisted. Epictetus alone seems to have upheld the view that certainty in some respects is attainable. Diss. 1. 27.17. πῶς μὲν αἰσθησις γίγνεται -- ἴσως οὐκ οἶδα ἀπολογίσασθαι - ὅτι δ'ἐγὼ καὶ σὺ οὐκ ἐσμὲν οἱ αὐτοὶ λίαν ἀκριβῶς οἶδα.

Similarly, in contrast with his most infrequent dogmatism, Seneca occasionally asserts the uncertainty of all speculation. N.Q.IV.5.1. immo si omnia argumenta ad obrussam coeperimus

exigere, silentium indicetur, pauca enim admodum sunt sine adversario. Again in Ep.65, he says that man must be content to choose the most probable view, and in N.Q.VII.25.2 , quid tamen sit animus ... non magis tibi quisquam expediet, quam ubi sit: alius ... alius ...: adeo anime non potest liquere de ceteris rebus, ut adhuc ipse se quaerat. Marcus Aurelius, see V.10, cannot countenance the claim of any philosopher to certainty. To keep a constant opinion about things is not in the power of man.

d) Psychology

Some have seen in Panaetius' psychology the influence of Carneades. While it is not improbable that the arguments of the latter to prove the presence of air in the soul, may have resulted in, see Cicero T.D. I.18-42, ut potissimum videtur Panaetie that the soul "ex inflammata anima constat;" it would seem probable on the other hand, that this view had been held by the Stoics from the beginning. According to Cicero indeed, T.D.I.9-19, "Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur"; but D.L.VII.156 is probably right in attributing to Zeno, as well as to Antipater and Posidonius, the view that πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν , and not ordinary fire. There may however be the difference that for Panaetius there were two distinct "genera" as Cicero indicates - aer and ignis - while the πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον of the earlier Stoics was single and uncompounded. It is most improbable that, even if there are two distinct elements, any attempt is being made to distinguish a rational and irrational part of the soul, 'though

some scholars have tried to promote this view.

It has seemed to Schmekel, p. 309, that it follows from T.D.I.18-42 that Panaetius added to his arguments against the immortality of the soul, that the soul being thus composite (aer and ignis) must suffer dissolution of its parts in death. This does not follow from the passage, but such a view had already been suggested by Carneades in his polemics against the indestructability of the divine and of every ζῷον, and Panaetius had on the whole yielded to this argument.

Epistemology

From the evidence of Sextus Empiricus already noted (p. 12), we may assume that Panaetius joined his predecessors in the modification of καταληπτικὴ φαντασία. This was no longer a sufficient criterion, without anything else, to produce a conviction of truth. The qualification μηδὲν ἔχουσα ἐνστημα was therefore added to the earlier definition: whether or not there is an obstacle, only the intelligent process of reasoning can determine. The early Stoics had given to reason a part in the formation of φαντασίαι but when once the φαντασία was καταληπτικὴ the guarantee of truth lay in this κατ: φαν: itself. Panaetius' innovation was in the importance assigned to reason in the process of sensation, and it may be compared with Carneades' view that the activity of reason was necessary to make an image πιθανόν in the highest degree. Thus Carneades' influence is revealed in the fact that what he found necessary for the realization of the greatest possible probability, Panaetius thought

indispensable for a conviction of truth.

ethics
τέλος

The Sceptical objections to the Stoic definition of τέλος have already been indicated (p. 10 ff.). It has been seen that while the contemporary Stoic leaders were so far influenced as to expand their definition, they did not modify their conception of the end. Panaetius was the first to take full account of the objection that Stoic ethics neglected the nature of man and the appetites and ambitions proper to that nature, and to deviate accordingly in the content he gave to τέλος, 'though his definition would seem to be almost identical with the old terms. A place had already been given to human as well as cosmic nature in the definition of Chrysippus (above - p. ~~III, b.~~ IV). Panaetius however transferred the emphasis almost entirely from the latter to the former, and his attitude to ὁμολογία with the cosmic nature, while still accepted in theory, is almost negative: Cicero. De Off. I.XXXI.110-111, sic est enim faciendum ut contra universam naturam nihil contendamus, ea tamen conservata, propriam naturam sequamur ut ... studia nostra, nostrae naturae regula metiamur. The first and principal standard for human action thus lies in the nature of each individual: this is what ultimately determines the object of happiness. Clement of Alexandria (Strom: II, 21) gives as Panaetius' definition of τέλος. - ζῆν κατὰ τὰς δεδομένας ἡμῖν ἐκ φύσεως ἁρμάς. We see from Cic: De Off. I.iv.11-14 what these ἁρμαί are. Life cannot be good or happy unless it is in harmony with these ἁρμαί which are peculiar to

human nature, and are further coloured by individual character and circumstances of life. It is the individual qualities which Panaetius brings to the foreground, by thus giving a personal note to τέλος as it exists for each man. See also De Off. I.xxx.107, intellegendum etiam ut duabus quasi nos a natura inclutos esse personis, quarum una communis est ex eo, quod omnes participes sumus rationis ... altera autem quae proprie singulis est tributa.

An essential difference, then, from the earlier conception of τέλος was brought about by the attention Panaetius gave to Carneades' objections. ὁμολογία τῇ φύσει had been above all things a state of mind possessed especially by the σοφός - complete resignation to εἱμαρμένη φύσις and an equally complete indifference to whatever is, or is not, achieved by one's actions. This attitude is expressed by Seneca. De Benif. 1.6.1 itaque non quid fiat aut quid datur refert, sed qua mente. The same λόγος which urges man to aim at this state of mind, also urges him to choose τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀδιάφορα προηγμένα ; but the attainment of these remains a matter of complete indifference. The subjective state of mind was all important: it was this which constituted the harmony with nature, and this which gave the happiness which resulted from that harmony. While the validity of D.L.'s statement has been most strongly called in question - VII.128 δμέντοι Παναίτιος καὶ Ποσειδώνιος οὐκ αὐτάρκη λέγουσι τὴν ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ χρείαν εἶναί φασι καὶ ὑγιείας καὶ χορηγίας καὶ ἰσχύος,

it is probable that Panaetius may have

considered the actual possession of τὰ κατὰ φύσιν as necessary for happiness. This is indicated in Cicero, De Off. I.xxxi.10., neque enim attinet ... quinquam sequi quod assequi non queas. While the end is still to live in harmony with nature, this means one's own individual nature and it would certainly seem that the realization and satisfaction of the aspirations and appetites appropriate to that nature are not to remain "indifferent."

The centre of ὁμολογία appears therefore to have moved from the purely subjective element. Furthermore the rule according to which is determined the content of human happiness is found in the individual man. The indifference to τὰ κατὰ φύσιν becomes the wish and intention to acquire them, while of the state of mind, there remains the fact - as indicated in the last quoted passage - that with the character and circumstances with which nature has endowed him a man must be content, and accordingly resigned to the limit imposed on τὰ κατὰ φύσιν in his case.

τὸ ἀγαθόν If Panaetius' conception of the "end" has been rightly interpreted, it would follow that his conception of the "good" would similarly be expanded: for ἀγαθόν constitutes εὐδαιμονία . To the older Stoics virtue alone was ἀγαθόν, the objects of human action indifferent. If however Panaetius included τὰ κατὰ φύσιν as a condition of happiness and judged the possession of them necessary for happiness, he must have considered that possession ἀγαθόν , and therefore apparently καλόν . Whether he termed as ἀγαθά the

objects themselves we cannot know, since the evidence of D.L. quoted above cannot be relied upon.

τὸ σύμφερον

Earlier Stoic opinion considered τὸ συμφέρον entirely in the light of τὸ καλόν ; only this could be considered συμφέρον . Chrysippus in his vigorous maintenance of this tenet held that there could be no συμφέρον for the φαῦλοι , that is, for any except the σοφός and that they could not in fact be anything but κακοί in every action and thought: utile and honestum are thus identical. It is not clear what modifications Panaetius may have made in his conception of utile. Cicero De Off. II.3.10 urges the principle, (ut) quidquid honestum sit idem sit utile: it may be assumed that in this he was following Panaetius and that the latter agreed fundamentally with the original Stoic view. On the other hand, as the question of utile is connected with that of καλόν and τέλος , it is reasonable to suppose that the conception of συμφέρον underwent a similar modification dependent on, and corresponding to, that noted in these former points. It would be in accordance too, with Panaetius' aim in expounding his philosophy to be guided in all these questions by considerations of how he could adapt the strict Stoic conceptions so as to be workable for and applicable to the ordinary man and not primarily the σοφός.

d) σοφός

It is interesting to note that in the period following Carneades' criticism, the Stoic ideal of the wise man is drawn into the background. The founders of the Porch

never doubted the existence of the perfect sage, though Chrysippus admitted that very few had ever existed. Panaetius and Posidonius however avoided the subject as troublesome. There does not seem to be any reference to the ideal σοφός in the former, while the latter only defended his possible existence in the future. These philosophers concerned themselves more with ὁ προκόπτων who is making some progress towards virtue and wisdom by the performance of the καθήκοντα of the ordinary, good citizen. This tendency was probably the result of Sceptical criticism of Stoic extremism. It was not permanent, however, for the Stoics of the Roman principate vigorously reaffirmed the existence of the sage. Epictetus in particular continually urges his pupils never to give up the hope of reaching perfection, and paints an ideal picture of the σοφός . In this connection also, it would seem that Panaetius did not rigorously adhere to the ἀπάθεια of the σοφός . Aul. Gell. N.A. XII.5.10 ἀναλγησία enim atque ἀπαθεία non meo tantum inquit (Taurus) sed quorundam etiam ex eadem porticu prudentiorum hominum, sicuti ~~recieti~~ iudicio Panaetii, gravis atque docti viri, improbata abiectaque est.

Theology

The almost total absence of the name of God in all we possess of Panaetius seems to indicate that he was strongly influenced by Carneades' attacks on Stoic theology in all its applications. It is probable that here his departures from orthodoxy were considerable, though one cannot go so far as to say with Epiphanius in his De Fide (9.45) τὰ περὶ θεῶν λεγόμενα ληρεῖ· ἔλεγε γὰρ φλήναφον εἶναι τὸν περὶ θεῶν λόγον.

One authority (B.N. Tatakis) suggests that Panaetius refused to consider the active principle - πῦρ τεχνικόν - as divine (which belief was the basis of the traditional Stoic pantheism) basing this hypothesis on de Off.II.3.11-12. This is in the highest degree improbable and the tenor of the passage in question is rather Peripatetic and Academic. What can be said almost with certainty is that Panaetius did not attribute divinity to the stars, where for earlier Stoics the activity of the divine principle was strongest. This is in accordance with his refusal of value and importance to astrology. With regard to popular religion and the allegorical interpretation of it favoured by the Stoics, there is no reason to suppose that Panaetius condemned them: if we may assume that it is his views that are put forward by Scaevola - St. Aug. de Civ.Dei. IV.27, popular religion was to be regarded as a convenient public institution in the service of order.

It should be noted that if in these modifications and expansions Panaetius approximated to the Academic and Peripatetic views, already indicated in connection with his predecessors' supposed deviations in that direction (see Sect.III) these influences must be considered as secondary. It was without doubt the Sceptical criticism of Carneades that was the prime influence in Panaetius' reconstruction of the doctrines in question. Posidonius, his virtual successor, reverted in many points to the earlier Stoic teaching.

Note Before considering the influence on these

later Stoics, of the older philosophies that had been systematized long before the time of Carneades, it will be as well to repeat a few points which should be kept in mind during the following discussion. In the first place the indirect part played by Sceptical criticism in leading to alien borrowings must not be overlooked, especially perhaps in the case of Panaetius and to a lesser extent Posidonius. Secondly it must be remembered that eclecticism largely aided the tendency, and thirdly that the personal element conditioned to no small extent the borrowing of different elements by different Stoic representatives in different periods of the philosophy's history. In the following sections attention will be mostly confined to tracing the actual influences.

VI. The influence of Platonism

The philosophical system which most largely and directly lent its colour to later Stoic doctrine was that of Plato. Stoics both Greek and Roman found in his teaching much that seemed preferable to, and much that helped to supplement, the theories of their own school.

Panaetius

There is ample testimony to Panaetius' great admiration for Plato. In the Index Herculaneum (col.61) he is described as ἰσχυρῶς φιλοπλάτων καὶ φιλαριστοτέλης; while from Cicero T.D.1.32.79 it is clear that his manifest consideration for Aristotle, Xenocrates and Theophrastus (see De Fin:IV.28.79) was far surpassed by his regard for Plato - credamus igitur Panaetio a Platone suo dissentienti? quem enim omnibus locis divinum, quem sapientissimum,

sapientissimum, quem sanctissimum, quem Homerum philosophorum appellat. The fact that in Pro Murena 31.66 Cicero maintains that Scipio by the teaching of Panaetius did not become "asperior" like Cato - a Stoic of the old school but "lenissimus," may also be accounted for in part by the softening influence of Platonism. Finally it would seem that Proclus Diadochus actually counted him among the Platonists: — In Plat. Timaeum 50 B:he was however essentially a Stoic and was so considered by the rigorous Roman Stoics - De Div.1.36.

Ethics

It is from the Ethics of Panaetius that most information is available. It must be remembered in assessing the value of Cicero's testimony, that he was a professed Academic, and that from the Academics of his time, who had themselves incorporated many Stoic doctrines into their system, he may have taken much of his data. On the other hand, it is generally assumed that the first book of De Officiis is a more or less faithful reproduction of Panaetius' περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος The main substances of this book therefore will be taken as expressing Panaetius' views, as it has been already in Section V above. It was to the field of Ethics that Panaetius devoted most of his attention, and here, we find, as might be expected, no slight evidence of Platonic borrowings. It may indeed be said that Panaetius took a great deal of his inspiration for the tendencies of his ethics from Plato, while echoes of this philosopher are especially clear in the discussion of the virtues and their application to life. In this Panaetius was not

diverging from orthodoxy as much as is sometimes thought: the early Stoics had taken much from Platonism in their conception of the virtues, and maintained rigorously the Platonic-Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge. The four cardinal virtues were thus defined as knowledge, the distinction in each case being in the object. 'Though for the development of these special virtues the Stoics appealed to the natural ἀφορμαί in man, the intellectual conception continued to dominate their doctrine, and wisdom was the primary virtue. This conception still holds in Panaetius, but there is more emphasis on the necessity for practising virtue than the possibility of learning it, and much attention is given to the man who is merely making progress towards virtue.

There is strong evidence that for the earlier Stoics ὁ προκόπτων had little or no importance, though the term was recognized. This at least would seem to follow from the sharp division made in accordance with strict orthodoxy between virtue and vice, the wise man and the fool. We see from D.L.VII.125 τὰς δὲ ἀρετὰς λέγουσιν ἀντακολουθεῖν ἀλλήλαις καὶ τὸν μίαν ἔχοντα πάσας ἔχειν.
compare Plut. de Stoic repugn: 27 p.1046 E. This would be the state of the wise man: the fool in all that he said or did could show nothing but vice. Between these two extremes the early Stoics would allow no intermediate state. All sins or vices were equal as were all "recte facta." D.L.VII.120 and Stob: ecl.II.113.18.W. πάντων τε τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων ἴσων ὄντων καὶ τῶν κατορθωμάτων, καὶ τοὺς ἄφρονας ἐπίσης πάντας ἄφρονας εἶναι.

It further appears from D.L.VII.127 that the intermediate state of moral improvement belonged to the Peripatetics. From Cicero and Plutarch it seems clear that in such a conception of virtue and vice, there was little, if any, encouragement offered to ὁ προκόπτων. De Fin.III.14.48 Ut enim qui demersi sunt in aqua nihilo magis respirare possunt si non longe absunt a summo, ut iam iamque possint emergere, quam si etiamtum essent in profondo ... item qui processit aliquantum ad virtutis habitum nihilo minus in miseria est quam ille qui nihil processit. Plut: de comm. not: cp.10 1063a (fragment from Chrysippus). After a similar analogy concludes οὕτως οἱ προκόπτοντες ἄχρις οὗ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀναλάβωσιν ἀνόητοι καὶ μοχθηροὶ διαμένουσιν.

It was on this field, hitherto neglected, that Panaetius concentrated, emphasizing the part of τὸ καθῆκον rather than τὸ κατόρθωμα, the duties of ὁ προκόπτων rather than of ὁ σοφός.

'Though for him, too, the distinction between virtue and vice is just as final as that of the Stoics; 'though virtue in its fullest sense can belong to the true philosopher alone, and is the result of true knowledge, see Rep.VI, 487A, Plato realized that it is for very few to attain to this height. He continually insists on the necessity for practising that virtue which is in the power of all, while ever looking upwards to that ideal which should be the ultimate goal. Consequently the civic or popular virtues are not neglected, and in Republic IV it is this aspect of ἀρετή which is

emphasized, that is, the virtue that can be achieved by the ordinary man by the proper regulation of his natural instincts and qualities, in all his actions and his whole mode of life. This is substantially the attitude adopted by Panaetius as represented in Cicero. Being first and foremost a practical philosopher, he would naturally find attraction and satisfaction in such a point of view: in his treatment of the cardinal virtues there are frequent echoes of Plato's teaching.

Virtue for Panaetius is defined as the object of the natural impulses in man, and the central point of his teaching is that for the attainment of ἀρετή in any of its manifestations, the supremacy of reason over the lower impulses is essential. De Off. I.xxix.102, Efficiendum autem est ut appetitus rationi oboediant. Compare as one instance in Plato, Rep. IV.441E. τῷ μὲν λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει.

λόγος had of course always been of prime importance to the Stoics, but Panaetius' conception of its role would seem to echo quite clearly particular Platonic passages. Thus, if the expansion of the idea as it appears in Cicero may be taken as more or less faithfully reproducing Panaetius, it is tempting to see behind the expressions used in I.xxix.102, "exultantis" and "retinentis", Plato's image of reason ruling the appetites as a charioteer driving his steeds. Phaedrus, 246 B. Further instances of close similarity will appear in the course of a consideration of Panaetius' treatment of the separate virtues.

δικαιοσύνη

The early Stoic definition of justice was ἐπιστήμη ἀπονεμητικὴ τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ — Stob. ecl.II,59, 4 w. This is one aspect of the Platonic equivalent, that each should have what properly belongs to him. Panætius, however, would seem to have expanded it, again after the manner of Plato. Besides the general statement that it is in the nature of justice to do no wrong, and that this consideration must hold even with regard to enemies (compare Georgias & Rep.I) It is interesting to note that Panaetius lays great stress, as does Plato, on the inter-dependence of men and on that aspect of justice which has to do with the preservation of the wellbeing and unity of society as a whole. De off I.vii.22. Ut hominum causa esse generatos, ut ipsi inter se alius alii prodesse possent, in hoc naturam debemus ducem sequi, communes utilitates in medium afferre ... With this compare Rep.VII.519E μεταδιδόναι ἀλλήλοις τῆς ὠφελείας ἣν ἂν ἕκαστοι τὸ κοινὸν δύνωνται ὦσιν ὠφελεῖν.

This is the principle in which Plato finds justice in the state in Rep. V. when each individual and each class does its own work for the good of the whole. It is to be noted however that justice as specialization of function does not appear in the Stoic conception, except in so far as it may be implicit in the original definition.

Again, where Panaetius describes injustice as being above all the result of a desire for riches, power and

glory, I.viii.24-25, Maximam autem partem ad iniuriam faciendam aggrediuntur, ut adipiscantur ea quae concupiverunt, in quo vitio latissime patet avaritia, one is reminded of Plato's insistence on the same point. To him injustice is essentially the satisfaction of some such irregular desire, avarice is emphasized, and in outlining the life to be led by his Guardians, Rep.III.416-417, he states the same thing in a more negative way. The Guardians are to have no property, no wealth: the possession of these and the resulting desire to increase them, are what make for injustice, for hatred, intrigue and disaster. Panaetius would seem also to have felt with Plato that the danger of such injustice lies in the best natures. De Off.I.viii.26, est autem in hoc genere molestum, quod in maximis animis splendissimisque ingeniis plerumque existunt honoris, imperii, potentiae, gloriae, cupiditates: quo magis cavendum est ne quid in eo genere peccetur. In book VI of the Republic, Plato emphasized his deep conviction that it is great natures that are capable of working the greatest evils, and of exhibiting the greatest vices as well as virtues. VI, 495A - B, and cf: καὶ ἐκ τούτων δὴ τῶν ἀνδρῶν καὶ οἱ τὰ μέγιστα κακὰ ἐργαζόμενοι τὰς πόλεις γίγνονται καὶ τοὺς ἰδιώτας, καὶ οἱ τἀγαθά.... Finally with Rep.II 361A ἐσχάτη γὰρ ἀδικία δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι μὴ ὄντα, —

— and the same sentiment frequently expressed, we may compare Panaetius' statement De off: I.xiii.41, totius autem iniustitiae nulla capitalior est quam eorum, qui tum cum maxime

fallunt, id agunt ut viri boni esse videantur.

ἀνδρεία With regard to courage, the old Stoic definition would appear to be substantially the same as that given by Plato in Rep.IV. Stob: ecl.II,59,few. - ἐπιστήμη δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. —
But was it understood in a more passive or negative sense - dealing with ὑπομοναί ? Stob: ecl.II.609.W. It probably included Plato's idea that a man will never be influenced by men or πάθη to give up this convictions of what is right. However that may be, all that may have been implicit in the early definition, was made explicit by Panaetius, if we are to accept Cicero's account of this virtue in De off.I.xx.66-67.

Under the general heading of ἀνδρεία Cicero deals with the primary duties of the true statesman. In this he expressly follows Plato. It is true that Cicero may here be giving his own preference, but on the other hand it is not unreasonable to suppose that Panaetius himself may have quoted Plato in this respect. There is ample testimony that "Platonem semper in ore habuit", and, moreover, the principles to be observed here by the true ruler, are in accordance with Panaetius' view of the necessity of working for the unity and good of the whole community. With De Off I.xxv-85, then, compare Rep.I.342E, οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμιᾷ ἀρχῇ. καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, τὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρον σκοπεῖ --- ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ -- καὶ πρὸς ἐκεῖνο βλέπων --- καὶ λέγει ἃ λέγει καὶ ποιεῖ ἃ ποιεῖ ἅπαντα.

and IV 420 B οὐ μὴν πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες τὴν πόλιν οἰκίζομεν, ὅπως ἔν τι ἡμῖν ἔθνος ἔσται διαφέροντως εὐδαίμον ἀλλ' ὅπως ὅτι μάλιστα ὅλη ἡ πόλις; —

and also the further point that freedom from all selfish pursuit of wealth and power would follow from this principle.

σωφροσύνη It is in his conception of σωφροσύνη to which he gave a totally new significance in Stoicism, that Panaetius' debt to Plato is most manifest. For the earlier Stoics this virtue consisted in ἐπιστήμη αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων. Stob: ecl.II.59, 4 w. Panaetius seems to have included this in the object of ἀνδρεία , and to have defined σωφροσύνη as that "in qua verecundia et quasi quidem ornatus vitae , temperantia et modestia omnisque sedatio perturbationum animi et rerum modus cernitur. De Off. I.xxvii. Ch.3. Compare Republic IV 430E. κόσμος πού τις ἡ σωφροσύνη ἐστιν, καὶ ἡδονῶν τινῶν καὶ ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐγκράτεια; and also Gorgias 506E where the σωφροσύνη of the soul is deduced from its κόσμος.

This virtue is for Panaetius essentially a tendency to create a beauty, order and harmony in human action and life. It is with it, therefore, that he most closely associated τὸ πρέπον . This decorum is indeed a part of all virtue, from which cogitatione magis potest quam re separari, De Off.I.xxvii.95: it would seem, 'though inseparable from it, to be rather the exterior aspect of τὸ καλόν, in accordance with which, justice, wisdom and courage are manifested, I.xxvii,94-95. Whether as the object of σωφροσύνη, or in its bearing on all virtues, the result of τὸ πρεπόν a) is harmony. In the former sense it shows itself above all, as that which creates order among all the tendencies of human nature. The several appetites all have their proper object:

between them an equilibrium must be effected by the rule of reason, the subjugation of the passions and the absence of conflict between the desires. I.xxix.102. efficiendum ... ex quo elucebit omnis constantia omnisque moderatio. The result will be a healthy state of mind which is essentially the same as that described by Plato (Rep.IV.441E - 442A and 442D) as resulting τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τῇ αὐτῶν τούτων (i.e., elements in soul) ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν καὶ μὴ στασιάζωσιν αὐτῷ.

It must be remembered however that for Panaetius there was no question of any irrational parts of the soul, so that the significance of this principle was not the same as it was for Plato.

b) In the second instance this harmony shows itself in the creation of an order and proportion in human actions, and the whole tenor of a man's life. De Off.I.xxxi.III , omnino si quiequam est decorum nihil est profecto magis quam aequabilitas universae vitae. The man who makes it his aim will do what is fitting in great matters and in small. We may compare for the idea of conscientiousness in the performance of positive duties, Plato Gorgias 507A ὅ γε σώφρων ἃ προσήκοντα πράττοι ἄν — which entails what is just, brave and wise. The idea contained herein is quite foreign to our idea of temperance: so it was to the earlier Stoics (see definition p. 38.) who did not include in it the positive significance which Panaetius took from Plato. Again, as Plato insists that when the reasonable and harmonious state of soul has

been attained, attention to what is fitting in outward demeanour and deportment will naturally follow. Rep.425.A.B., so Panaetius dwells on the similar results of due observance of τὸ πρέπον - soberness and propriety in word and deed. De Off.I.xxxv.xxxvi. In this there is a sharp conflict between the cultured Platonizing Stoics like Panaetius, and the general feeling of the old Stoic school, which almost approached Cynicism in a contempt of ordinary propriety., I.xxxiv, 128.nec vero audiendi sunt ... si qui fuerunt Stoici paene Cynici qui reprehendunt et irrident ... nominibus appellemus suis. The contrast is also expressed in Cic: Fam: IX.22-5, habes scholam Stoicam, ὁ σοφὸς εὐθυρρήμονήσει, ego servo et servabo Platonis verecundiam.

Panaetius' σωφροσύνη then, is broadly Platonic, and with his new conception of this virtue he introduced into Stoicism that idea of the moral life as a representation of beauty and harmony which essentially at least, is that of Plato. To express this moral beauty or propriety Panaetius (in Cicero) makes a comparison between it and physical beauty. Before beginning the discussion of the virtues he shows how nature and reason transfer the idea of beauty and symmetry which man alone can perceive in the objects of sense, to the attributes of the soul, which in turn preserves these qualities in its thoughts and in the actions which are their outward expression, De Off. I.iv.14, quèm similitudinem natura ratioque ab oculis ad animum transferens, multo etiam magis pulchritudinem ... in

consiliis factisque conservandam putat ... (Compare I.xxviii 98). The idea is familiar in Plato: we may note that part of Diotima's discourse in the Symposium, which describes the effect of outward beauty in its various aspects on the soul of its lover, and also the passage in Rep.III 401 B - D where with poetic imagery, Plato emphasizes the need for surrounding the soul with objects of beauty and grace, the influence of which εὐθὺς ἐκ παίδων λανθάνῃ εἰς ὁμοιότητά τε καὶ φιλίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν τῷ καλῷ λόγῳ ἀφοῦσα.

The grounds for tracing these Platonic influences in Panaetius' ethics are by no means sure. It has been assumed throughout that De Officiis I gives a fair representation of his views. At all events abundant evidence testifies that Panaetius took much from Plato, and from the fact that in other fields other influences are manifest, one may fairly suppose that the Platonic borrowings in Ethics indicated above are not improbable. While there was much in Plato's ethics that Panaetius could not and did not approach, it was in large part to the former's teaching that he owed his achievement of turning the stricter and narrow Stoic system of ethics to practical use as a guide for all men.

Posidonius.

Posidonius was the virtual successor of Panaetius: he was at least the next great Stoic representative. Although this philosopher renounced some of the deviations made by Panaetius in respect of important Stoic doctrines, and re-asserted, for instance, the value of divination and the theory of ἐκπύρωσις , he was none the less himself

subject to influences from other quarters and in other directions. The Stoic teaching in several points failed to satisfy him, and in Plato he too found the answer to many of his problems. That he was a devoted student of Plato is borne out by the fact that he is reputed to have written a commentary on the Timaeus - Sextus Math: VII.9 and Plut: Procl: An.22 p.1023. His divergencies from Stoic orthodoxy and tendency to follow Plato took however a different direction from those of Panaetius: whereas the latter had accepted the Stoic unity of the soul, Posidonius more completely than anyone, broke with the psychology of his school and declared himself a follower of the Platonic doctrine.

Psychology

According to the orthodox Stoic doctrine, the soul was absolutely simple and a unity, being a fragment of the Universal Reason or deity which contained no ἄλογον. All its impulses must therefore be rational, and inasmuch as they are part of the divinity they must also be good, and determined by the all-embracing laws of that divinity. Yet the Stoics maintained that the soul had the power of irrational choice and could resolve on what was evil. Ethical interests moreover demanded that the freedom of the will in overcoming or yielding to its lower impulses should be recognized. This independence was in conflict with the essential principle of Stoic metaphysics. There were no means of reconciling with the absolute rationality of the soul the occurrence of wrong judgements or evil impulses, or the freedom of the moral personality with the all-powerful universal law of the world.

Nature of the soul.

Posidonius, 'though he also could not recognize an anti-rational principle in the world, did feel strongly the inadequacy and contradiction of the Stoic psychology and abandoned the rational unity of the soul, in favour of the Platonic theory, finding with Plato that it is inconceivable that reason should be the cause of the passions and of what is contrary to reason. The fact of the frequent strife between the affections and the will can only be explained by an original opposition of faculties working in man, because, as Plato states in Rep.IV, 436B, δῆλον ὅτι αὐτὸν ταναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθελήσει ἅμα ---: and irrational impulses could only arise from an irrational principle in the soul. Posidonius therefore postulated with Plato Rep.IV 434D-441C: Phaedrus 246A and Timaeus 69C ff: three faculties of soul, the rational principle and the spirited and appetitive elements which together form the irrational. Galen. de Hipp: et Plat: IV 7 p.421K αὐτός τε (ὁ Ποσειδώνιος) δείκνυσιν ὡς ὑπὸ θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας γίνεται τὰ πάθη. cb:424: οὐδὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐναργές ἐστιν ὡς τὸ δυνάμεις τινὰς ἐν ταῖς ἡμετέραις εἶναι ψυχαῖς ἐφιεμένας φύσει, τὴν μὲν ἡδονῆς, τὴν δὲ κράτους καὶ νίκης.--The cause of the passions , therefore, that is, of disharmony and a life of misery, as Galen again indicates (v.469) lies in not following in everything the δαίμων (reason) within us, which is συγγενὴς τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι, but in being led away by the ἄλογον καὶ ἄθεον element. This is pure Platonism, an avowed dualism of rational and irrational

as opposed to the orthodox Stoic monism. It would further appear from Alexander that Posidonius defined the end of life "to live in contemplation of the truth and order of the universe, promoting it to the best of our power, and never to be led astray by the irrational parts of the soul," thus extending the dualism into the sphere of ethics. A dualism is indeed inevitable in any system of morals, but had been concealed by the orthodox Stoics: Posidonius dragged it into the light, remarking that if the soul contained only the rational faculty, all virtues except abstract reason are abolished. It is quite impossible to reduce human nature to reason pure and simple in spite of the Stoics, and Galen rightly observes that he had met with none among the Stoics of his time who had known how to answer the objections of Posidonius against the old psychological theory.

b) Origin + Destiny of the Soul

In Posidonius' view of the origin and destiny of the soul there is again much evidence of Platonic influence. Orthodox Stoicism, as were most systems after Plato, was essentially a philosophy of this world: in the fate of the soul after death little or no interest was taken, and the hope of immortality had little importance in any system, as it had little effect on the educated people of the age. For the Stoics therefore, the soul was material; though of divine origin, it came into being among the elements of the body when that body is conceived. A fiery breath is transmitted to the offspring by the father, which gives to the embryo a life like that of a plant – φύσις – : at the moment of

birth, the breath is cooled by the air and becomes the ψυχή of an animal. At death, the soul is separated from the body and carried upwards as a result of its lightness into the pure air under the moon: there it may linger, if it is the soul of a good man, until the next world conflagration, when with everything else it is re-absorbed into the primal fire. The conception of this existence after death was vague and indistinct and had no importance, least of all for Stoic ethics, the essence of whose teaching was that here on earth only can the purpose of human endeavour be fulfilled.

Posidonius on the other hand laid great stress on the immortality of the soul, and there is good reason to believe that he also followed Plato in asserting its pre-existance. In conjunction with the Platonic influence here, must be considered that of Pythagoreanism of which there was a fresh outburst just at this time, and much of which had, of course, been incorporated by Plato in his teaching. Mention may be made also of the mysterious Orphics, the forerunners of the Pythagoreans in much of their psychological doctrine. In the first place, however, Posidonius adhered to the Stoic theory of the materialism of the soul and to that of the periodic conflagration. This conception of the pre-existence and immortality of the soul must therefore necessarily be taken as applying only to the periods in between the conflagrations. Scholars have come to believe that Posidonius is very inadequately represented by the fragments expressly attributed

to him, and to see in him the authority for much in Cicero, Philo, Seneca and Plutarch. But it is perhaps safer to confine oneself to those passages where Posidonius is mentioned or where there is every reason for considering him as the authority followed.

As to the origin of the soul, then, it seems probable that Posidonius could not hold the earlier Stoic view. In De Div: I.xxx.64, after quoting Posidonius as his authority, Cicero states that the air is full of immortales animi. This and other indications have been interpreted in the sense that Posidonius held that souls οἱ δαίμονες dwell in the air from all time, and from this pre-existent life, as it were, each soul enters man at birth. The Pythagoreans had fancies about souls hovering in and filling the air: D.L.VIII.32 εἶναί τε πάντα τὸν ἀέρα ψυχῶν ἐμπλεων καὶ ταύτας δαίμονάς τε καὶ ἥρωας ὀνομάζεσθαι. It is to these souls that all divination has reference: ib: in this, as in many points, Posidonius may have elaborated their views. One may mention, too, Hesiod's δαίμονες, - ως D:122. It is certain, at least, that Posidonius did believe in these δαίμονες, for in their existence, he too, found a support for belief in divination and prophecy. De Div: I § 64.

Similarly, after death, the soul passes back into the air whence it has come; residence in the body therefore would seem to be but a transient episode in its life. As for the arguments by which Posidonius may have supported his belief in the soul's immortality, it has been thought highly probable

that Cicero substantially reproduces them in Tusculan Disputations I §53-81 (for support of this view in various authorities see T.W.Dougan's Introduction to T.D.I.II, pp.XX ff.). Several of these arguments are drawn from Plato, notably the Phaedo, Phaedrus and Meno, but one authority (Heine) finds in the fact that they are so interwoven with Stoic views and expressions, support for his contention that they are likely to have been taken not directly from Plato, but rather from a Platonizing Stoic such as Posidonius. This does not seem improbable. Among these arguments then, may be mentioned that of the necessary eternity of the soul as a self-mover. T.D.I. § 53-55 with which compare Phaedrus 245 c-e; that from the indivisible and simple nature of the soul ib:§56 and § 71: compare Phaedo 78c. ἆρ' οὖν τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι πῇ ἅπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὂν ἀσύνθετον τοῦτο μόνῳ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα εἴπερ τῷ ἄλλῳ; and finally the argument from ἀνάμνησις put forward in Meno 82 ff. and Phaedo 73a f., 'though this is not accurately grasped by Cicero, - § 57 ff., and may not have been fully accepted by Posidonius himself. From this it seems clear that though by his acceptance of ἐκπύρωσις Posidonius could not actually go beyond the limited immortality of the Stoics, he attached far greater importance to the fact and would seem to have developed it in the Platonic manner.

It would seem also that Posidonius worked

out the life of disembodied souls in the air to a further extent, making use of the Pythagorean ideas already mentioned, and more especially, if he is really the source of Cicero's Somnium Sapionis, of the imaginative vision of the souls dwelling in the Milky Way described by Heraclides of Pontus (see Rohde: Psyche: section on Posidonius). This philosopher was certainly a Platonist in his general point of view, but differed from his master in several theories, chiefly as a result of Pythagorean influences. It is, however, quite impossible to be sure whether we are to see Posidonius' teaching here, for the fact that similar ideas are found in widely different writers at, and after the time of Posidonius, does not mean that one can say that he was the common source from which they all derive. All that can safely be said is that Posidonius adulterated Stoic teaching on these matters with Platonism, and gave wide currency to this sort of philosophy. In the further incorporation of Platonic ideas into orthodox Stoic teaching by his successors, and by writers not themselves professing Stoics, may be seen the continuation of his tendency to a further extent than he had himself approached.

The "flesh"

In this connection may be mentioned the fact that the introduction into Stoicism of the strongly dualistic conception of the soul and the "flesh" is traced by some (Schmekel) to Posidonius. This conception was extremely popular in all Roman literature of this and the next period. Cicero may be referring to Posidonius' view when he says,

De Div.I.49.110 "animi vitae necessitatibus serviunt disiunguntque se a societate divina, vinctis corporis impedite" - a statement which suggests this dualism. Seneca in Ep.92.10 attributes directly to Posidonius this condemnation of the flesh. "inutilis caro et fluida, receptandis tantum cibis habilis, ut ait Posidonius." As this conception however became far more prominent in Seneca, it may more fittingly be considered in a later section.

Although Von Straaten (p.226) sees in Posidonius' ready acceptance of the dualist conception in his psychology a trace of Eastern influence, it is most probable that he did not incorporate anything more than was already found in the Platonic-Pythagorean tradition. Cumont in his "Astrology and Religion among the Greeks and Romans" also holds the view that Posidonius contaminated Stoicism with the religion and mystic tradition of the Syrians. But although of Syrian birth Posidonius would seem to have left his homeland early in life, and there does not appear to be anything in his extant remains to support this theory.

Creation: The Philosopher King

The teaching of the founders of Stoicism on the creation of the world was monistic, and was based on the principle of Heraclitus that in the beginning all was creative fire, which was the creator as well as the material of creation. In later forms of Stoicism however a dualist conception becomes familiar and the view that "God made the world" is based on the idea of an original chaos into which the Deity brought life, order and light, and thus formed the

cosmos. It is the writings of Seneca which are chiefly penetrated with this conception which will accordingly be dealt with later. With views directly dependent on this idea, however, the name of Posidonius is expressly associated. The universe so created was at first happy and innocent, and men lived willingly together under the rule of the wisest and best. In his development of this "golden age" theme, as given by Seneca in the first part of Ep. 90, Posidonius would seem to share with Plato the view expressed in Rep.V.473D, ἐὰν μὴ ἢ οἱ φιλόσοφοι βασιλεύσωσιν ἐν τῖς πόλεσιν ἢ οἱ βασιλῆς τε νῦν λεγόμενοι καὶ δυνάσται φιλοσοφήσωσι --- οὐκ ἔστι κακῶν παῦλα, τῖς πόλεσι δοκῶ, οὐδὲ τῷ ἀνθρωπίνῳ γένει ---.

Cf., Ep. 90.5. illo ergo saeculo, quod aurium perhibent, penes sapientes fuisse regnum, Posidonius iudicat, and it was then that men reached the highest degree of happiness, Ep.90.4. ... ideoque summa felicitas erat gentium, in quibus non poterat potentia esse nisi melior. With the account of the rule of the philosophers which follows in Seneca, one might also compare Plato's description of the duties of the ruler. The conception of this society over which the philosopher would rule, was not, however, the Platonic ideal. Indeed it would appear from Strabo VII.29.6 that in the Mysians of his day who lived in peace on milk and honey, Posidonius thought he could still trace the manners of this happy age.

Note: Period between Posidonius & Seneca

The next great Stoic representative was Seneca but before considering the Platonic influences in his exposition of the Stoic doctrine, some tendencies of the era

separating him from Posidonius may be noted. The spread of the Stoic school is attested to by the great number of its members with whom we are acquainted; few, however, occupied themselves independently with philosophy, and there was no-one to compare with Panaetius or Posidonius in importance or influence. As a practical way of life Stoicism was adopted by many staunch Republicans among whom may be mentioned Cato - a firm Stoic of the old school. Under the early emperors Stoicism continued to be associated with republican sentiments and many Stoics like Paetus Thrasea died for their belief. It is most probable that in this period Stoicism followed the direction given by Panaetius and Posidonius; while the school held in the main to the original doctrine, the spirit of eclecticism prevailed and grew increasingly evident among the Stoics as among the Academics and Peripatetics. Areius Didymus may be quoted as one illustration. Though a professed Stoic he approximated very closely to the views of the eclectic Academic Antiochus, and was likewise disposed to bring the Peripatetic doctrine into close alliance with Stoicism.

Virgil Stoic - Platonism

Some attention may be given to the type of Stoicism found in Virgil, notably in the eschatology of the 6th Aeneid, 724 ff. For in the first place it is probable that we may see here the influence of the mixture of Stoicism and Platonism popularized by Posidonius, and secondly, Seneca to a lesser degree exhibits the same tendencies. Virgil had

inherited the Stoic tradition from Aratus, and 'though not a professed Stoic he expresses in his works many of the orthodox Stoic principles - the all pervading fiery aether which is the source of all life, ll. 724-27, and the final re-absorption of all into the primitive fire, ll. 745-7. The

urgatory doctrine of purgatory, however, is essentially Platonic and cannot square with the usual vague Stoic notions of the after death existence of souls in the air. 'Though Stoics were attracted to the idea, they were not orthodox in so being. Virgil represents souls as being hampered by the vesture of mortality, ll. 731-32:-

corpora noxia tardant
terrenique hebetant artus, moribundaque membra."

When they are released from the body in death, they have to undergo a period of purification from mortal taints, ll. 739-47.

"ergo exercentur poenis veterumque malorum
supplicia expendunt . . . . . .
donec longa dies perfecto temporis orbe
concretam exemit labem, purumque relinquit
aetherium sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem."

The perfecto temporis orbe is explained below by:-

"has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos,
Lethaeum ad fluvium deus evocat agmine magno,
scilicet immemores supera ut convexa revisant
rursus, et incipiant in corpora velle reverti."

This is all purely Platonic and may be compared with the description of the purification after death, and the going

forth into a new life in the Myth of Er and in the Phaedrus Myth. In the last four lines may be seen a reference to Phaedrus, 249B, τῷ δὲ χιλιοστῷ ἀφ᾽ ἑκατέρᾳ ἀφικνούμεναι ἐπὶ κλήρωσίν τε καὶ αἵρεσιν τοῦ δευτέρου βίου αἱροῦνται - - - Compare also Republic, 615A ... ἀναμιμνησκομένας, ὅσα τε καὶ οἷα ἐπάθοιεν καὶ ἴδοιεν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ γῆς πορείᾳ - εἶναι δὲ τὴν πορείαν χιλιετῆ. - - - and 621B for τὸν Ἀμέλητα ποταμόν - There is little doubt that the figure 1000 years was taken from some Orphic or Pythagorean source.

There are traces of the same contamination in Cicero. In T.D.I.44 when the preceding arguments may quite probably have been drawn from Stoic writers, Cicero writes, profecto beati erimus, cum corporibus relictis et cupiditatum et aemulationum erimus expertes, - after describing how souls fly upwards through their natural likeness to their natural home, - the Stoic view. There seems little doubt therefore that whether or not Posidonius was directly responsible, doctrines of this nature had a great appeal for the Stoics, and it will not be surprising to find them appearing in Seneca.

Seneca

In the person of Seneca we meet with Stoicism as it was expounded by a Roman of great wealth and official position in the imperial era. It must be remembered that this fact in itself contributed to no small extent to the character of his philosophy. Of that character more will have to be said later; here it is the question of the Platonic elements he incorporated that is to be considered. It is pertinent however to mention one or two factors which apply no less to this particular point. Seneca was as great an

eclectic as any Stoic; but as the influence of his position and of the period in which he lived resulted in vacillation and contradiction in his character, so these in turn showed themselves in a certain lack of logical consistency in his views. Thus, while in some passages he freely departs from the orthodox Stoic tradition in the direction of any doctrine to which he is attracted, in others he states and adheres to that tradition with great care. It will be seen, therefore, that side by side with utterances which seem to suggest a definite preference for Platonic ideas, there occur others which revert to older Stoic opinions.

Creation

The tendency of the later Stoics to alter the orthodox conception of the creation of the world has already been noted (p. 47 ff.). In Seneca are found many expressions of the view of the deity working a dark shapeless chaos into order, and giving to things their distinctive form. Ep.65.19. In Dial:XI 1.§2, the same idea is suggested by "hoc universum .. deus aliquis dissipabit et in confusionem veterem tenabrasque demerget." There would seem here to be an echo of Plato's mythical description of the Demiurgos bringing order and shape into the world, of the chaos that would exist apart from his action. Timaeus, 53B. 69B-C.

sychology, nthropology.) The Nature f the soul

For Seneca, as for all the Stoics, the soul was body, Ep.106.4, quod facit corpus est ... nam et hoc (animus) corpus est; and where he is making clear his allegiance to his school he upholds its esssential unity. Above all, however, he is possessed by the thought of the divine nature and

and dignity of the human spirit. This was of course always insisted upon by the Stoics, but in Seneca this idea takes a direction which tends to make him follow Posidonius and to accept more and more the Platonic destinations. Reason alone is divine in man; from this error and sin cannot be derived; there must therefore be an element not divine in conflict with reason. Furthermore it is from outside influences that error and vice are forced upon us, for "nulli nos vitio natura conciliat: illa integros ac liberos genuit." Ep.94.55. Seneca is thus forced to assume a plurality of original faculties, opposing the passions to the reason. Ep.71.27. "memini ex duabus illum (sapientem) partibus esse compositum: altera est irrationalis: haec morditur, uritur, dolet: altera rationalis. haec inconcussas opiniones habet, intrepida est et indomita. in hac positum est summum illud hominis bonum." Although it is not clearly stated here that this plurality of faculties exists within the soul itself, it would seem that Seneca could not escape this influence. Thus, from Ep.92.1 and more from ib.8, it is clear that the irrational is in fact in the soul and is further divided into courage and desire. "Irrationalis pars animi duas habet partes, alteram animosam, ambitiosam - alteram ... voluptatibus deditam." From this evidence there is little reason to doubt that Seneca did accept the Platonic division of the soul into λογιστικόν, θυμοειδές and ἐπιθυμητικόν.

the flesh.'

It is the anthropological opposition of soul and body, however, the beginnings of which have been noted in

Posidonius, to which most emphasis is given in Seneca. In the body - or the flesh - he found primarily the element which was the cause of all man's weakness and wickedness, the existence of which as implanted in all men, was one of his deepest convictions. It is seen in the evil and corruption of society - non licet ire recta via. Ep.94.54. -"nemo erat uni sibi, sed dementiam spargit in proximos accepitque invicem..." This strongly marked dualism based on the feeling of dissatisfaction with all that is of the body, and of conviction that the divine spirit yearns for the perfection whence it came, had been expressed in one form or another by the Orphics, Pythagoreans and Plato. - σῶμα σῆμα - was the key-note, and the body as the source of all evils. We find this expressed in Plato. Phaedo 66B, μυρίας μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν ἀσχολίας παρέχει τὸ σῶμα. 66C, all wars and strife are the result of the body and its desires. Again, 67C, death is τὸ χωρίζειν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος τὴν ψυχήν.... ἐκλυομένην ὥσπερ δεσμῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος. In Cratylus 400C, the same teaching is attributed to the Orphics καὶ μνῆμά τινές φασιν αὐτὸ (σῶμα) εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς ὡς τεθαμμένης ἐν τῷ νῦν παρόντι ... δοκοῦσί μοι μάλιστα θέσθαι οἱ ἀμφὶ Ὀρφέα τοῦτο τὸ ὄνομα ... δεσμωτηρίου εἰκόνα. See again Gorgias, 493A, where Socrates says that he has heard from τῶν σοφῶν that the body is a tomb, probably attributing the doctrine to some Orphic or Pythagorean teacher.

Of the flesh, Seneca speaks in countless

passages with all the contempt of the Phaedo. It is something so worthless that we cannot think meanly enough of it. Ep.65.22, "nunquam me caro ista compellat ad metum ... numquam in honorem huius corpusculi mentior ... contemptus corporis sui certa libertas est." Compare Ep.92.13, body is a mere "velamentum" of the soul. ib.33, an "onus necessarium;" and 65.16 "nam corpus hoc animi pondus ac poena est, premente illo urgetur, in vinculis est, nisi accessit philosophia. (cf. Phaedo 83 - for part of philosophy.)

The soul, on the other hand, is pure and invulnerable, ever in conflict with the corrupting influence of the body, ad Helv: c.XI.7, "corpusculum hoc, custodia et vinculum animi huc atque illuc iactatur ... animus quidem ipse sacer et aeternus est et cui non possit inici manus." It is exalted above the body as God above matter. Ep.65.24, "quem in hoc mundo locum Deus obtinet, hunc in homine animus."

Destiny of soul

What then is to be the destiny of this divine element when it is at last freed from all its chains? In many passages Seneca seems to make it clear that for him as for Plato - and for the Orphics and Pythagoreans - the true life of the soul will only begin when its unequal partnership with the body is dissolved. Ep.79.12, "tunc animus noster habebit, quod gratuletur sibi, cum emissus his tenebris, in quibus volutatur, non tenui visu clara prospexerit, sed totum diem admiserit et caelo redditus suo fuerit." Compare Plato, Phaedo 79C: when the soul is in the body τότε μὲν ἕλκεται ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὰ οὐδέποτε κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἔχοντα καὶ αὐτὴ πλανᾶται καὶ ταράττεται ---- but when it is apart ἐκεῖσε οἴχεται εἰς τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ ἀεὶ ὂν καὶ

ἀθάνατον ------ ὡς συγγενὴς οὖσα. and 81.A. --- οἳ ἀφικομένη
ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαίμονι εἶναι --- ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον
μετὰ τῶν θεῶν διαγούσῃ.

i) Immor-
tality

As to whether this true existence is to be everlasting, Seneca is not steady or consistent. There are, however, not infrequent indications that his own hopes lay in the direction of the soul's immortality. In considering the possibility in Ep.57.9, he uses expressions which a strict Stoic would not employ. "hoc quidem certum habe: si superstes est corpori praeter (illud) illum nullo genere (perire) posse, propter quod non perit, quoniam nulla immortalitas cum exceptione est nec quicquam noxium aeterno est." In other passages, notably in Ep.102, he seems to have a hope more clear than any felt even by the Platonic Socrates, as expressed in the Phaedo. Here, death is the gateway to eternal life and peace. We may note especially Ep.102 § 23, "per has mortalis aevi moras illi meliori vitae longiorique proluditur ... sic per hoc spatium, quod ab infantia patet in senectutem, in alium maturessimus partum. § 24. proinde intrepidus horam illam decretoriam prospice: non est animo suprema, sed corpori ... transeundum est. § 26. dies iste, quem tanquam extremum reformidas, aeterni natalis est." The life beyond is described in equally glowing terms. § 28. aliquando naturae tibi arcana retigentur, discutietur ista caligo et lux undique clara percutiet ... nulla serenum umbra turbabit." Compare as one

instance in Plato, Phaedo 81A, when the soul on its release εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀειδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον καὶ φρόνιμον. Moreover the moral connection and close relationship between the present and future life, which Plato stresses, for example, in the Myth of Er, appears to be upheld in Ep.102, 29 ff. The thought of immortality urges us to make ourselves ready to meet the gods, who are the witnesses of our every act, and to set up eternity as our goal. The man who has this before his eyes will be courageous and honourable in this life on earth.

Pre-existence

To the theory of the pre-existence of the soul, Seneca would also seem to subscribe in passages where he bids the soul recollect its high descent, and predicts its elevation to heaven, its return to its original home. Ad Marc: XXIV.5, haec quae vides ossa ... vincula animorum sunt. obruitur his animus -..... nititur illo, unde dimissus est, ibi illum aeterna requies manet ..." Compare Ep.79.12, already quoted, "caelo suo", and "sursum illum vocant initia sua;" and Ep.92.30.[illegible], "illo tendit originis suae memor (the soul of the virtuous man) non aliena via ad summa nititur. magnus erat labor ire in caelum: redit."

Purgatory

Finally there are in Seneca some passages which echo, more faintly, yet surely, the Platonic idea of purgatory so clearly expressed in Virgil. There are references to purification from the stains of mortality. Ad Marc: XIII.1 facillimum ad superos iter est animis cito ab humana conversatione

dimissis, minimum enim faecis pondus traxerunt ... leviores ad originem suam revolant et facilius quidquid est illud obsoleti illitique eluunt." A little later he quotes Plato by name. Compare also ib.XXV.1, "... paulumque supra nos commoratus dum expurgatur et inhaerentia vitia situmque omnem mortalis aevi excutit, dein ad excelsa sublatus inter felices currit animas."

Contrary views

In all this Seneca manifestly followed the teaching of Plato. The fact remains, however, that elsewhere he adheres to the old Stoic theories or goes even further than they, in the indifference with which he regards the fate of the soul after death, for example. Thus we find in an occasional passage the strict view of the dignity of the body as the dwelling place of the divine spirit which penetrates into its humblest parts: as such the body deserves respect. Ep.92.1. Similarly, in complete contrast to the passages quoted above, in many others, Seneca does not even express any firm hope that the soul may have any sort of existence until the periodic conflagration. He is inclined rather to regard death as the end of all sensation and of all things for man, after which, Ad. Marc., he will be for ever at peace. Ep.54.4, "mors est non esse. id quale sit, iam scio: hoc erit postea quod ante me fuit." Compare Ep.24.18. The intermediate stage of the soul's life is wholly overlooked: Seneca dwells solely on the final re-absorption. Any hope of immortality may be a "bellum somnium." Ep.102.2.

It has been maintained by Rohde (Psyche, section on Roman Stoics) that wherever Seneca admits a positive conception of the life after death, he never goes beyond a "fortasse si modo vera sapientium fama est." Ep.63,16; a concession to the general views of mankind, 117.6, or "opinionibus magnorum virorum rem gratissimam, promittentium magis quam probantium, 102.2; that furthermore that it is in consolatory epistles that the conception is expressed most vividly - a convention; and that in these same epistles death is also regarded as being merely the end of all things. The same authority concludes that at bottom Seneca subscribes to the latter view, and that his final word was that no opposible opinion with regard to the fate of the soul should distort the calm of the virtuous mind. Whatever that fate it is equally welcome to him who has made the most of his life. All this has no doubt much truth, and where Seneca adopts the Platonic view he may have been under some immediate influence which led him to defend a view that was not truly his own. But the fervour and even rapture of his language, the glowing vision which he paints of the future life, as well as the frequency with which the Platonic ideal is repeated, cannot fail to lead some, at least, to the belief that whatever the doctrine of his school, however great the consolation in the idea of death as mere nothingness for men under the tyranny of Nero, Seneca in his highest moments was a true follower of Plato: this was the direction in which his own deepest hopes and faith made him turn. Indeed it would not be surprising if his vision of a Heaven should be one of the factors

that made the early Christians claim Seneca as their own.

Musonius: Epictetus Aurelius

The last of the great Stoics, Musonius, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius had little room in their doctrine for anything the teaching of Plato could give. Indeed in some respects they exceeded even the bounds of Stoicism in the rigour with which they re-asserted the original principles of Zeno.

e soul

For a parallel to the devout language and emotional tone with which they not infrequently influenced their doctrines, we must look to an other teaching than that of Plato. In accordance with this general orthodoxy, the enthusiastic view of Seneca with regard to the soul and its destiny, disappears in these latest Stoics. The old indifference, the confining of all interest and effort to this life, the idea of the soul as reason, one indivisible portion of the pure reason of God, regain all their former strength. It is remarkable that Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, the most profoundly religious minds perhaps produced by heathendom, should not have considered immortality a necessity of their religion, and should even have ignored the larger views taken on the subject in varying degrees by many Stoics up to Seneca. But this is manifestly the case. Death is merely a natural operation like any other thing in life. M.A.IX.3. Though the desire for continued life may be instinctive it is an irrational appetite which must be overcome and brought into submission to the universal law. Marcus Aurelius, indeed, occasionally doubtfully allows the possibility of a limited survival for the soul until it is merged into the whole, IV.21; but his favourite conception of

death is a transformation into the original elements, IV.14. There is no doubt that even the noblest of mankind must be completely extinguished, XII.5. Epictetus insists even more strongly that it is inevitable that man, like everything else, must cease to exist because τὸ γενόμενον καὶ φθαρῆναι δεῖ. D.II.5.13. For him, too, death is a transformation into something else of which the world has need, III.24.93; although it brings οὐκ ἀπώλεσαν but τῶν προτέρων εἰς ἕτερα μεταβολάς, the personality of the individual completely perishes.

There are nevertheless some passages in Epictetus where one might be tempted to detect an echo of the hopes expressed by Seneca. Epictetus certainly seems to treat the soul as an essence which is from the beginning alien to the body: it longs to leave the corrupting influence of the flesh and to return to its original state. Diss.I.3.5. What am I, a poor miserable man with my wretched bit of flesh. Compare ἐν τῷ σωματίῳ τούτῳ τῷ νεκρῷ — D.II.19.27, and Marcus Aurelius, IV.41. We may note especially Diss.I.9.141 S99, where Epictetus speaking to his disciples, expresses the thought that they, conscious of their Kinship with God and that the body is a prison, might wish to shake off this burden and to return to the God whence they came. They might say to him ἄφες ἡμᾶς ἀπελθεῖν ὅθεν ἐληλύθαμεν· ἄφες λυθῆναί ποτε τῶν δεσμῶν τούτων----. But he would say to them that they must wait for God: ποτ' ἀπολύεσθε πρὸς αὐτόν. From these utterances we should have supposed that Epictetus believed with Plato and Seneca that the soul

after death is transferred to a better life with God. Yet, any hope of individual immortality is very probably not implied. It was enough for Epictetus that God should call him: with regard to the question "whither?" his last word would seem to be - εἰς οὐδὲν δεινόν· ἀλλ' ὅθεν ἐρχόμεθα, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγενῆ, εἰς τὰ στοιχεῖα. Diss.III.13.14. The elements then, and not the Platonic ideal world, would seem to be whence the soul, like all else, came, to which it is akin, and to which it must return. Of Epictetus, as well as of Marcus Aurelius, one might say in the words of Sir Samuel Dill, "This intensely devout and religious spirit seems to have no conception such as sometimes flashes on the mind of Seneca, of a future beatitude in the full vision of God." This is certainly true, and the reason is that in this they were true Stoics untouched by Platonism.

In other respects, however, one may see in several of Marcus Aurelius' utterances evidence of the fact that he was acquainted with the works of Plato, and not entirely uninfluenced by him. In II.2 of the "Thoughts," he speaks of the "flesh" almost in the tone of Plato, as Seneca and Epictetus had done before him. Compare X.38. Here also, it is not impossible to see in the conception of soul as the controlling and motive cause, the view of Plato as expressed in *Laws*. X, where the relation of the intellectual soul to the body is as a motive cause to that which is moved, Leg.892A and 896A. Again, in X.I, where Marcus describes the universe as a perfect living creature, good, just and beautiful, one

is reminded of the similar description in Timaeus 30b. There are, then, such traces as these of Platonic influence in Marcus Aurelius; but of considerable borrowing, or of the continued maintenance of the elements already borrowed, there is no evidence.

thics. usonius

We may note a point in the ethical doctrine of Musonius Rufus which seems to reflect a point of view stressed by Plato. Musonius gave all the old Stoic emphasis to the doctrine that happiness lies in virtue alone - a disposition of the will which is in our power -/and that man must aim at elevation above all externals and maintain complete indifference towards them. To attain the strength of mind necessary for this, man needs not only continued moral effort and practice, but also bodily training and hardening. The reason Musonius gives for this precept is that the body must be made to serve the mind, and that with it the soul too will be strengthened. ap. Stob: Flor. 29.78. With this aim he urges the endurance of bodily hardships and exertions. Plato's attitude to the place of physical training and endurance appears in the discussion of his elementary education in the Republic. In III.410.B:D. he enlarges upon the view: κινδυνεύουσιν ἀμφότερα (γυμναστικὴ + μουσικὴ) τῆς ψυχῆς ἕνεκα τὸ μέριστον καθιστάναι.

The aim of all education, both physical and cultural, is to bring the soul into that state which Plato regards as the ideal. That state of soul or mind is far from being the same as Musonius', but there is this much similarity, that Musonius

echoes this theory of physical training's being for the sake of the soul, though the goal was very different from Plato's.

The debt, then, which the Stoics from Panaetius onwards, owed to Plato, was considerable. It is interesting to consider what result was achieved in Stoicism by the numerous Platonic borrowings noted above. It is clear at once that, immediately after the attacks of the Sceptics on the vulnerable points in their doctrine, it was in an effort to fortify their position that the Stoic leaders turned to Plato, as to other systems. The result was not logically consistent. For Panaetius and Posidonius still held to the physical monism and determinism of Zeno, and with this, the dualist conception of the soul (in the case of Posidonius that of Plato) with which they sought to combine it, was hardly compatible. On the other hand, in the sphere of psychology itself, Posidonius' adoption of the Platonic conception could not be but a gain: he rid Stoicism of the absolute rationalism which so totally contradicted the facts of human nature that it could not hope to satisfy. Similarly Panaetius' modifications in ethics, in the Platonic manner, though achieved perhaps by some lack of consistency, made for the humanizing of the Stoic ethical teaching without which it could not have been practically acceptable. It was with a different attitude that Seneca turned to Plato: Stoicism was his accepted creed, and it was perhaps not so much his concerned, for all his exhortations, to extend it to others, as to make it a religion

that satisfied his own longings. That he found so much in Plato that more completely answered his aspirations says not a little for his own nature that refused to be confined within the rigid limits of orthodoxy. In the fact that Epictetus and his successors renounced the Platonic borrowings and returned to the earlier authentic doctrine, one might not be wholly wrong in seeing, apart from considerations of inclination and historical circumstances, an effort to restore some of the consistency of the system, which the Platonic additions had so largely confounded. It is interesting to speculate as to what would have been the result if, on the contrary, he had sought to bring the Stoic metaphysics into harmony with the Platonic dualism.

VII. Peripatetic Influence.

The influence of Aristotle and his school on the later Stoics is not as considerable as that of Plato, and for that reason has not been remarked upon with such emphasis by various authorities. The fact remains, however, that in many points Panaetius and his successors were indebted to the Peripatetics, 'though that debt is perhaps not of a character that necessitated such large departures from orthodoxy as, for example, the adoption of the Platonic theory of the soul.

The evidence of Panaetius' admiration for Aristotle, reference may be made to the passages quoted to illustrate his regard for Plato (p.XXX); and it is to be noted that in his most considerable divergencies, he was influenced by the former philosopher rather than the latter. This was his unconditional

denial of one of the cardinal doctrines of Stoicism - that of the general conflagration. Although Cicero represents Panaetius as merely "doubting" "ut ad extremum omnis mundus ignesceret." De Nat. Deor: II.46.118, and according to Stobaeus he expressed the rather guarded opinion that τὴν ἀϊδιότητα τοῦ κόσμου was πιθανώτεραν than its final conflagration. Ecl.I.414. Other evidence makes it most probable that he denied ἐκπύρωσις altogether, and was convinced of the indestructibility of the cosmos. Thus Philo, De Aet: Mund: C.15, p.248 Bern: Βοηθὸς μὲν οὖν καὶ Παναίτιος -- τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας καταλιπόντες πρὸς θειότερον δόγμα τὸ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας τοῦ κόσμου πάντως ἠὐτομόλησαν : compare D.L.VII.142. Apart from Carneades, whose attacks strongly influenced Panaetius' conviction in this matter, the Peripatetics were the chief opponents of the Stoic doctrine of the conflagration of the universe. For the arguments by which Critolaus defended the eternity of the cosmos, see Philo. de Aet. Mund. c.11-15. The Peripatetic theory was at that period generally the next alternative, and the Stoic dogma once abandoned, it was to this that Panaetius went over. The Aristotelian doctrine entailed belief not only in the indestructibility of the world, but also in its existence from all time. In De Caelo 279b, 12 ff., Aristotle expressly argues against a creation of the world: τὸ μὲν οὖν γενέσθαι μὲν ἀΐδιον δοκοῦσι εἶναι φάναι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. if the world is imperishable it must also be ungenerated. Similarly in Met: Λ. 1072a ff., he says that the same things

have always existed: there was no chaos and night out of which the world proceeded. It is true that our evidence attributes to Panaetius no statement as to the beginning of the universe: such words as ἄφθαρτος and ἀίδιος indicate rather only an uninterrupted survival. In J.D.I.32.79 however, Cicero ascribes to Panaetius the tenet that all that is born or created must perish - the Aristotelian doctrine. Here it is used as a proof that the soul is mortal, but mutatis mutandis, it would follow that the universe inasmuch as it is indestructible, must also have existed from all eternity, without a beginning. This would be true only of its elements: individual things and beings would be created from combinations of those elements, and therefore also be subject to death.

This important departure from orthodoxy in the direction of the Peripatetic doctrine suggests several other divergencies which would probably result. In the

1) first place, if the cosmos is eternal, the Stoic doctrine of world cycles and identical repetition must also be discarded; the cosmic process becomes instead progressive - one of eternal development. Note how Seneca, though adhering to the conflagration doctrine, is drawn to the idea of progress in the successive world cycles. N.Q.III.28.7, "conflagratio

2) fit, cum deo visum ordine meliora, vetera finire." Secondly, the earlier Stoic anthropomorphic interpretation of the cosmos suffered a blow. There could no longer be a conception of

the universe as a living organism parallel to man. The characteristic Stoic συμπάθεια τοῦ ὅλου was also shaken in the same way, as it had been, too, by the rejection of astrology.

3) Thirdly, whereas the existence of τὸ κενόν was essential for the conflagration doctrine, it became unnecessary when the latter was denied. It does not follow, however, that Panaetius could not give a place in his system to τὸ κενόν on other grounds, and this consequence of his divergence can not be pressed.

thropol-
y

The orthodox Stoic anthropology was monistic. Though it recognized different manifestations of the primal fire, ἕξις in inorganic things, φύσις in plants, and ψυχή – as the power of sensation and movement in animals, in man, the rational ψυχή - the highest and purest manifestation, was the sole principle at work. To it, all activities were referred as different functions. Panaetius accepted the various "parts" of the soul in this sense, though differed, it would seem, as to their number. He diverged however in an important respect - by refusing to attribute to the soul all the manifestations of life in man, thus introducing a dualist tendency. This second principle of action was φύσις, the vegetative principle already ascribed by the Stoics to plants, and in fact to the human embryo. (see p. 44-45. But when once this was transformed into the human ψυχή, the latter became the sole active principle.) To φύσις Panaetius assigned the powers of

reproduction as well as those of nutrition and growth.

Nemes: De Nat. Hom: C.15, p.96 Παναίτιος ... τὸ σπερματικὸν οὐ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος ἀλλὰ τῆς φύσεως. For Panætius φύσις would seem to be not a vegetative "part" of the soul in the sense of the Platonic divisions, but a separate principle; what the relation was, cannot be ascertained, but from the kind of functions attributed to it, φύσις would seem to have been the active principle of the body.

In making this change in Stoic anthropology, Panaetius may have been influenced by Carneades, who did not want to attribute to the soul these corporeal functions, but to an inferior principle. Aristotle had already made this distinction in his theory of faculties of soul; φύσις for him was the primary or minimal faculty of the soul itself, to which the powers of growth, nutrition and reproduction were similarly attributed. In de gen: animalium, II.740b 37, he identifies the nutritive with the generative soul. εἰ οὖν αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ θρεπτικὴ ψυχή, αὕτη ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ γεννῶσα. and this he calls ἡ φύσις ἡ ἑκάστου. Compare De Anima 415a, 25 where its function is γεννῆσαι καὶ πυρὶ χρῆσθαι, and 416a 19. It may be wondered why, as the soul was for Aristotle too, essentially a unity, the faculties being only the several activities of the soul at different levels of development, Panaetius could not adopt the same conception. Moreover the possession by man of the three lower manifestations of the primal fire must have been as implicit in the Stoic view of

of the rational ψυχή as it was explicit in Aristotle's theory. The Stoics however gave little attention to the inferior beings, and like them Panaetius was primarily concerned with the soul of man: its unity according to the Stoics lay in the fact that it was wholly a part of the pure and divine reason. This may have been the cause of Panaetius' preferring to assign the vegetative powers to a distinct principle, thus introducing into his anthropology a division not present in the Aristotelian theory.

ychology

It has often been wondered at that Panaetius, for all his regard for Plato, in his theory of the soul and its destiny, unquestionably denies the views of that philosopher. Cicero, T.D.I.32-79, "credamus igitur Panaetio a Platoni suo dissentienti? huius hanc unam sententiam de immortalitate animorum non probat." He maintained the Stoic doctrine that the soul is born with the body, though in view of his acceptance of both φύσις and ψυχή in men, he must have accounted for its birth by some means other than the Stoic "transformation." In the birth of the soul he found an argument to deny its immortality. In the above quoted passage, Cicero proceeds to give the reasons for Panaetius' rejection: he accepted the Aristotelean principle already noted (p. 69. 70.) ἅπαντα τὰ γινόμενα καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται. de Cael: 279b, 20. The soul having come into being at a particular point in past time, must also perish in time. Furthermore he yielded to the argument of

Carneades that what can feel pain must become diseased and what is diseased must perish; - holding that this is true of the soul, against Plato's contention, Rep.X.609D, that moral evil which makes the soul κακή , has not the power to destroy it. The soul therefore according to Panaetius, is mortal, and meets its death simultaneously with the body. There is no question of its further existence. This view would indeed follow naturally from the denial of ἐκπύρωσις ; there would be no motive for the limited existence accepted by the Stoics, and there remained only the choice between absolute denial and unlimited existence. Whereas Plato was the exponent of the latter theory, Aristotle may be said to encourage the former. Though it would indeed appear that he held the permanance of the ἁπλοῦς νοῦς ποιητικός , the pure thinking principle, after death, De Animo 430a,23: Met: 1070a, 26, it is not possible to see how he could countenance any hope of a continuation of a separate conscious personality. The future of the soul apart from the body did not really interest him. The later Peripatetics went further than their master in the complete denial of immortality.

Panaetius may, then, have been influenced by the little importance attached to the soul as such by Aristotle and his successors, in his decision to follow this direction rather than that of his admired Plato. But after all, perhaps the greatest support for the argument against immortality lay in the general Stoic doctrine itself: the soul is material, even if composed of the finest conceivable matter, and in the

last resort, there is no real reason why it should last any longer than any other "body."

thics

In Ethics Panaetius shows himself influenced by Aristotle as well as Plato. In addition to his close approximation to the latter in his treatment of the cardinal virtues, he made another classification of virtue into practical and theoretical. D.L.VII, 92, Παναίτιος μὲν δύο φησὶν ἀρετάς, θεωρητικὴν καὶ πρακτικήν. There is no contradiction, φρόνησις being classed as theoretical and the other three traditional virtues as practical. Thus Cicero, De Off.I.5,15-16,-the function of prudentia and sapientia is "indagatio atque inventio veri." This is its "proprium munus." veritas is "quasi materia quam tractet et in qua versetur." In this,one is reminded of the Aristotelian division of virtue into διανοητική and ἠθική. — Eth: Nic.I.1103a, 20ff. διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ ---- ὡς μὲν διανοητικὰς ὡς δὲ ἠθικάς -- σοφίαν μὲν καὶ σύνεσιν καὶ φρόνησιν διανοητικάς ---

---- the other virtues are ἠθικάς . Similarly, in Aristotle the οἰκείου ἔργον ψυχῆς διανοητικοῦ is the apprehension of truth, Nic. Eth: VI.1139a, 25ff.

dom
ic:Eth.)

Furthermore, intellectual virtue is divided by Aristotle into φρόνησις and σοφία . The former is a true rational state of mind which is active in the field of human goods, 1140b,20. It deals with particular cases as well as general, and aims at the good life, 1140a,25ff. With this we may compare in Panaetius, from Cicero, De Off.I.6-19, the object of prudentia which is concerned in "consiliis

capiendis de rebus honestis et pertinentibus ad bene beateque vivendum." The Aristotelian σοφία on the other hand is a combination of νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη : it must possess the truth about first principles and have perfect ἀκρίβεια. 1141a, 9-19. One may see the same conception, on a lower scale, in the second object which Panaetius attributes to wisdom,-the tendency to purely theoretical science. De Off.I.6.19, "in studiis scientiae cognitionisque." Compare De Off.I,43,153. for the same distinction. Panaetius thus gave a much broader extension to the object of "wisdom" than the earlier Stoics, whose definition was ἐπιστήμη ὧν πρακτέον καὶ οὐδετέρων, Stob. ecl.II.59, 4 w; which took account only of its function of "consilia capienda." It is not improbable that Panaetius was influenced by the Aristotelian theory,'though it is to be noted that whereas Aristotle considers σοφία as something far greater than the more practical φρόνησις, and in its activity - the contemplation of truth - places man's greatest happiness. Eth. Nic.X.1178bff, Panaetius, according to Cicero; De Off. I.6,19, urges that speculative studies must not supersede active duties. That he held this is very probable: both as a Stoic, and as dealing with the mentality of the Roman, he was essentially concemed with practice.

he "mean" There are several indications in Cicero's exposition of Panaetius' Ethics, that he was not uninfluenced by the Aristotelian doctrine of virtue as a "mean." Thus,

in dealing with liberality, De Off. I.14-42 ff., he warns against prodigality, against being liberal beyond one's means or from the wrong motive; against taking from one to give to another, and not proportioning one's liberality to the merit of the receiver. The truly liberal man is free from all these defects and excesses. These same distinctions are made by Aristotle in his discussion of liberality, Eth. Nic. IV.c.1. Similarly in the passage treating of the character of the ideal statesman, De Off.I.25, 88-89, the mean of the Peripatetics is praised, whether by Cicero or Panaetius, as the true guide in action. The importance of avoiding being angry in excess, with the wrong people, at the wrong times, is stressed in very much the same way as by Aristotle, Nic. Eth: IV.cV, sullenness is likewise censured, good temper and forgiveness, rather than vengeance, commended.

Several parallels for particular statements in De Off.I can be found in Aristotle's Ethics: one might mention the insistence in both, that to be really just, a right action must be "voluntarium." De Off.I.9,28, in other words, the agent must be in the state of προαιρούμενος his actions δι' αὐτά: Nic Eth.II.1105a,32: again the limiting of laxiocum or παιδιά to moderate relaxation: - De Off.I.29, 103. Nic. Eth.VII.1150b,17. It would not be profitable however to press such points, as one can not be sure to what extent lesser remarks of this nature are Cicero's own; and indeed if Panaetius expressed such views it is not

necessary that he should be following Aristotle to arrive at these sentiments. One concludes, however, that the Ethics of Aristotle were not without their influence on Panaetius' conceptions.

Posidonius

terest in sitive ience

If it was as a result of Peripatetic influence that Panaetius gave a place to scientific and theoretical knowledge, with much more certainty can this be said of Posidonius. With regard to his comprehensive learning there is one voice among ancient authorities. He was the last Stoic to take any great interest in physics, and his spirit of energetic inquiry in the field of natural science was remarked upon by his contemporary Strabo, who deemed it alien to Stoicism and rather Peripatetic. Geog.II.3.8

πόλυ γάρ ἐστι τὸ αἰτιολογικὸν παρ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ Ἀριστοτελίζον, ὅπερ ἐκκλίνουσιν οἱ ἡμέτεροι (the Stoics) διὰ τὴν ἐπικρυψιν τῶν αἰτιῶν.

Simplicius:-Phys. 64b m. and de Caelo 309b 2K, gives some particulars borrowed by Posidonius from Aristotle. Mayer, in his introduction to De Nat. Deor: II (p. XVII) convincingly supports the view that a work of Posidonius was the original of Cicero's treatise. If this be the case, several indications of the author's large debt to Aristotle can be noted. In particular may be mentioned the section on zoology, §121-29 and much of that on anatomy, §134-46 - sciences to which Aristotle had given much attention, and the Stoics very little. These passages provide a further illustration of what Strabo implied in his censure of Posidonius' ἀριστοτελίζον.

Similarly the quotation from Aristotle's last dialogue De Philosophia,- in De Nat. De.II ʃ 95, if Mayer is right in supposing that Cicero took it from the source he was following, rather than from Aristotle himself, testifies to Posidonius' admiration for the latter philosopher.

ychology

From Natura Deorum also, evidence arises of Posidonius' approximation to Aristotle's psychology, which finds support in the testimony of Galen. It has already been noted (p. 71 72. ff.) that Panaetius had to some extent adopted the Aristotelian distinction of the vegetative principle: Posidonius went further. He is classed by Galen with Aristotle as having preferred the name "faculties" to "parts" of the soul. De Hipp: et Plat: VI,2, p.515K ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος εἰδὴ μὲν ἢ μόρια ψυχῆς οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν, δυνάμεις δ' εἶναί φασι μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης.

They are all of the same essence, but τῷ δὲ λόγῳ ἕτερα:— De Anim: II.413b29. Moreover, as to the nature of these faculties and the place of each in the scale of existence, Posidonius was at one with Aristotle. The psychology of the latter was closely connected with biology; the continuity of life was constantly present to his mind:- De Part: Anim: IV.681a 12ff., where he remarks that nature proceeds from inanimate to animate, through all stages of being, without interruption. In contrast to this, Chrysippus had drawn a strong dividing line between the kingdoms of nature (see above p. 71-2). From this view Posidonius departed, holding

explicitly, with Aristotle, that the vital principle manifests itself in an ascending scale of functions, and that each higher function of soul involves the lower. The lower faculties, therefore, which may exist separately in other organisms, are all found combined with rationality in man. This appears clearly from De N.D.II.12.33, "prima enim animadvertimus a natura sustineri ea quae gignantur e terra ... alendo atque augendo tueretur. Bestiis autem sensum et motum dedit ...; hoc homini amplius quod addidit rationem..." Compare Aristotle, De Anima, II.414a, 29ff. & 415aff.; and also Cicero, De Fin. IV.37. Moreover, that in applying the Platonic distinction between appetite, courage and reason, Posidonius was influenced by Aristotle's theory, appears from Galen, de Hipp. et Plat. V.6, 476 K,

ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν ῥώων δυσκίνητ' ἐστὶ καὶ προσπεφυκόα δίκην φυτῶν τῖς πέτρῖς ἢ τισιν ἑτέροις τοιούτοις, ἐπιθυμίᾳ μόνῃ διοικεῖσθαι λέγει αὐτὰ, τὰ δ' ἄλλα σύμπαντα τῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμφοτέραις χρῆσθαι τῇ τ' ἐπιθυμητικῇ καὶ τῇ θυμοειδεῖ τὸν δ' ἄνθρωπον δὲ μόνον τῖς τρισὶ, προσειληφέναι γὰρ τὴν λογιστικὴν ἀρχήν.

Here he adopts the distinction between animals which are capable of motion and those that are not, together with the observation that even the latter must have sensation and appetite, which is first met with in Aristotle, De Anima II, 413b, 2 ff. 415a6. It is to be noted that Timaeus, 77Bff, proves that Plato too maintained the unity of all life, the manifestation of one and the same essence through the grades of existence. He differs from Aristotle, however, in ascribing sensation to plants, whereas the latter

ascribed to them nutritive soul only. De An.II.410b,23: when the stage of sensation is reached the organism becomes an animal, 413b1. There can be little doubt nevertheless, that it was Aristotle's detailed treatment of the subject that influenced Posidonius.

thics

That the testimony of D.L. with regard to Panaetius and Posidonius' denial of the self-sufficiency of virtue is highly doubtful has already been noted (p. 25). The same authority states further, VII.103, Ποσειδώνιος καὶ αὐτὸ ἀγαθῶν εἶναι. (health and wealth) There is no support for Posidonius having thus assented to the Peripatetic doctrine of external goods. It may be questioned whether he inclined to that doctrine as much as did Panaetius. Indeed for evidence contrary to that of D.L. we may turn to Seneca who in Ep.87.35 states "Posidonius sic interrogandum ait: quae neque magnitudinem animae dant nec fiduciam nec securitatem, non sunt bona: divitiae autem et bona valetudo et similia his nihil horum faciunt: ergo non sunt bona."

Seneca

When we come to Seneca, however, this aspect of Peripaticism et comes more to the fore, as might be expected in

Ethics

an exponent of the Stoic philosophy who was also for the greater part of his life a man of great wealth, and high official position. These two aspects are indeed not infrequently found difficult to reconcile and Seneca's admirable precepts are contrasted with his more dubious practice. There is no occasion here, however, to discuss this question; though the

inevitable influence of circumstances must be borne in mind. Nor is Senca any more consistent in his tendency to adopt the Peripatetic view of "goods." than he is in many of his other deviations from orthodoxy. Thus he declares in innumerable places the leading thoughts of Stoic ethical doctrine, Ep.74.1, "unum bonum esse quod honestum est: nam qui alia bona iudicat in fortunae venit potestatem ... qui omne bonum honesto circumscripsit inter se felix est." Similarly he glories in the triumph of the sapiens, in the supremacy of his virtue challenging Fortune, Ep.64.4; who "ad utrosque casus aptus est bonorum rector et malorum victor:" Ep.85, 38ff., who is equal with God, and indeed "est aliquid quo sapiens antecedat deum," Ep.53.11. But in other passages it appears that Seneca realized that the virtue demanded of the Stoic wise man is not in the actual world sufficient for happiness. That the ordinary man cannot maintain the ideal contempt for all external evils, appears from Seneca's own lamentations in exile - see Ad Polybium. Similarly the strict Stoic indifferentism must give way to a Peripatetic recognition of the value of some external things for a virtuous as well as happy life. Seneca is compelled to admit with Aristotle, ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥᾴδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα. Eth. Nic. I.1099a 32. In De Vit: Beat., 21, I, 599, his opinion is that the wise man is a worthy steward of fortune's gifts, since riches can give the opportunity for exercising a number of virtues, and he can use them for higher moral ends. They have "aliquid in se pretii,"

but one must remember that they are subordinate. Nor indeed are external goods to be identified with happiness in Aristotle, Eth.Nic.I.1100b8ff., they are rather the necessary instruments, or things without whichtrue happiness, the essence of which lies in virtuous activity , is marred. 1099 b,ff. This is substantially the view of Seneca. In Benef: V.13. 1, he distinguishes bona animi, bona corporis and bona fortunae, the headings under which one might class Aristotle's list of external goods in Eth. Nic: 1099b and Rhetor : 1360b18, goods also implied in Xenocrates the Academic's inclusion of τῆς ὑπηρετικῆς ἀρετῆ (οἰκείᾳ ἀρετῆ) συνάρεως (Clem Strom.11,22,) in his definition of happiness. As a result of more value being attached to some of the external objects of desire, there appears, beside the ideal of perfect conformity to the law of reason, a class of conditional duties, as in Panaetius; and although at times Seneca speaks as if nothing were easier than to lead a life according to reason (Ep.41.9 and 116.8), if we use the will Nature has given us, it ultimately appears that man must be content to do this only in so far as human weakness allows. De Benef: I.1.9, "hoc (deos) sequamur duces, quantum humana imbecillitas patitur" and of the extent of this weakness Seneca is only too conscious, Ep.59.9, where in contrast with the "sapiens" "Nos multa alligant multa debilitant."

There is a real deviation here from the spirit of earlier Stoicism. 'Though, as has been noted (p.[illegible]) as far back as Chrysippus, slight concessions in this direction had been made, in Seneca the strength and forcefulness that

came from perfect confidence in the power of the will and of reason is considerably weakened. He is earnest in the strict Stoic principles he often upholds, but he is moved by his deep consciousness of the innate weakness of men, to urge not infrequently the modification of those principles in their practical application. Of these concessions, the approach to the Peripatetic viewpoint here in question was one result. Yet it may be noted that there was another important factor which would force Seneca once more from the broader views he was inclined to take, to the opposite standpoint. It was an age of corruption and tyranny; fortunes changed with terrible suddenness from day to day; the teaching, therefore, that all such externals are wholly indifferent, that happiness is to be found purely and entirely in oneself, offered the only refuge from despair. See De Prov. 2.9.199, De Const: 3. 5. Ad Helv: V.

ision of losophy

In Ep.95.10, Seneca would seem to adopt the Peripatetic division of philosophy into practical and theoretical. "Philosophia autem et contemptiva est et activa." Moreover in the expansion of this statement in this epistle, one is frequently reminded of Aristotle's remarks on what is necessary to become virtuous, in Eth.Nic.Bk.II. It is no good, says Seneca, that philosophy should merely give precepts for particular actions: a man may do what he ought, when prompted §40; he may do what is noble, but from the wrong motives, §43. The merit is not in the bare act, therefore, but in its being done in the right manner and as the result

of a consistent conviction that it is the right thing to do: ∫ 44. Such a consistent conviction it is the part of the theory of philosophy to supply, as it is also to investigate and formulate general principles and study the whole universe, ∫ 10, 11, 12. Aristotle similarly stresses the need for knowledge and choice of what one is doing, of being consistent in such action and in performing it from the right motives, Eth. Nic.II.1105a 26 - b18. It is true however that Aristotle is insisting on the need for practice, and thus, as it were, considering the question from the opposite position: theory alone will never make anyone virtuous. There is not, then, a direct parallel, but one is tempted to see an Aristotelian basis here in Seneca's statements, especially in the emphasis laid on the conditions, apart from the actual aspect of an act itself, necessary to make that act truly good.

Virtue

Similarly in Ep. 94, Seneca divides virtue - with the Peripatetics and Panaetius, into practical and theoretical. Seneca's treatment of this division comes to very much the same thing as his discussion of the corresponding division of philosophy. There would seem to be a certain resemblance of thought and language, though again not a parallel, between Seneca Ep.94,45, "In duas partes virtus dividitur, in contemplationem veri et actionem: contemplationem institutionem tradit, actionem admonitio," and Aristotle, Eth.Nic.II 1103a 14, διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης, τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς, ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν --- ἡ δ' ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται.

The idea expressed in Seneca ib: "virtutem et exercet et ostendit recta actio," is also contained, if not directly expressed in this form, in the same chapter of the Ethics.

test toics

The teachings of Musonius, Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius do not contain any considerable traces of Peripatetic influence any more than they exhibit any marked debt to Platonism. There are, however, in Marcus Aurelius, some passages where one may see a connection with Aristotelianism. Thus, as Farquharson suggests (M.A. Vol.I, p.399) it seems very probable that in writing III.2, urging that everything in the Universe has its charm for him who can appreciate it, Marcus Aurelius had in mind Aristotle's defence of the study of the whole animal kingdom. De Part: Anim: I.V.645a, 5 ff. He mentions, as does Aristotle, that artistic representations should give no more pleasure than the natural originals. Again, in V.16, Marcus strongly maintains the Aristotelian principle that man is born for fellowship: in this lies his benefit and his good. Compare Eth. Nic. I.1097b 11 -- ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος. and Pol: 1253a 2. Finally we may mention X.2, where Marcus seems to affirm implicitly the continuity of life, in the manner of Aristotle, (see p. 79-80). In this passage, his reference would seem to be to this scale of Nature as it is exhibited also in man. Some of his activities resemble plant life, ἡ φύσις - merely physical nature, and some animal life, ὡς ζῴου φύσις. finally there is the activity of reason which is his alone - ὡς λογικοῦ ζῴου φύσις . All these "natures" are present in

in man; and it is his duty to subordinate the claims of the lower to the higher.

The reason for the difference between the Stoicism of Zeno and the philosophy as expounded by these latest Roman Stoics, cannot be sought, however, in a modification of original doctrine due to the influence, conscious or otherwise, of other great philosophical systems. The form that Stoicism took at this period - a form which it had indeed begun to take to no small extent in Seneca - was the result, rather, of a different spirit and a different aim. The new character thus brought to philosophy, and the means whereby it arose, may most appropriately be treated in the next section.

VIII. Eclecticism in the Roman Stoics

The growth, character and spread of Eclecticism has been discussed above (pp. 16 & 19.). It was there indicated also, that the influence of this tendency would be seen to continue in the latest age of Stoicism with an effect different from that traced in the period immediately following its development. What this effect was may most conveniently be summed up as complete concentration on practical ethics to the almost total neglect of all other parts of the system. The conditions which gave its new character to the original Stoicism were becoming even more pronounced. In a widely extended empire like that of Imperial Rome, to a less degree than ever, could morals, politics and religion be linked together: the great and all-engrossing problem of philosophy

became more and more to provide the standard of morals, the ideal and guide in life which before had been the subject of "Politics". Speculative questions and general theory which even in the professedly practical philosophy of the Porch, had engaged not a small part of the interests of its earliest exponents, were completely set on one side as diverting attention from the all-important task of moral improvement. The creative power in philosophy had gone, and the one craving was for some cure for the maladies of the soul, some rule to make the individual ever more independent and self-sufficing. The lowering of the moral tone in the Imperial era, and the moral corruption which followed on comparative material prosperity, made ever greater the need for some inner law to give a purpose in life; it resulted in the inner life of the spirit becoming all in all to philosophy, and the philosopher "generis humani paedagogus." Seneca, Ep.89, 13.

eoretical udies
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Interest in practical ethics had indeed long been absorbing more and more of the philosophers' attention; but Panaetius and Posidonius had still thought questions of cosmology, psychology and other more scientific studies, worthy of investigation. The Roman Stoics for the most part acquiesced in the general doctrines of the founders, stressed those which had a bearing on their aim, but were indifferent to exact scientific theory. Their Stoicism took the form of moral catechisms,- Musonius; letters of spiritual direction, - Seneca; discourses which aimed at spiritual training, —

eneca

Epictetus; examination of conscience,—Marcus Aurelius. It took the place rather of a religion. Seneca, it is true, touches more on the theoretical side than his successors: he is the last Roman who appears to have made a systematic study of his philosophy: but frequently he expresses the opinion that many things held by the older Stoics to be essential constituents of philosophy are unnecessary and useless, as contributing nothing to the ultimate moral end. Thus Ep.88(20) where he shows "ad virtutem nihil conferunt liberalia studia." In Brevet: vit: 13, after citing numerous examples of antiquarian inquiries, he concludes "cuius ista errores minuent ... quem fortiorem quem iustiorem ... facient?" and in Ep.106.11, after a discussion of "good is a body" "Latrunculis ludimus, in supervacuis subtilitas teritur; non faciunt bonos ista sed doctos." Similarly he considered that the sphere of Logic lay too far from the moral problems of man to interest him: physical inquiries are ultimately justified by their moral effect on men.

sonius & ictetus

Musonius confined himself even more to moral problems, though conforming in general to Stoic theory. His view of philosophy may best be seen in a quotation from Plutarch. Coh: Irad. 2 p.453. καὶ μὴν ὧν γε μεμνήμεθα Μουσωνίου καλῶν ἔν ἐστι τὸ δεῖν ἀεὶ θεραπευομένους βιοῦν τοὺς μέλλοντας σώφρεσθαι. This continual medical treatment philosophy must supply. Epictetus followed in the steps of Musonius, by whose teaching

he had been profoundly impressed. For him theoretical knowledge had a very inferior value. 'Though logic may be useful it cannot be an end in itself, and dialectic must be used as an aid to virtuous conduct. Diss.I.7. That Epictetus would appear to have agreed with Socrates with regard to natural philosophy is clear from Stob: Flor.80,14, τί μοι μέλει --- πότερον ἐξ ἀτόμων ἢ ἐξ ὁμοιομερῶν ἢ ἐκ πυρὸς καὶ γῆς συνέστηκε τὰ ὄντα; οὐ γὰρ ἀρκεῖ μαθεῖν τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ - - ;

If he accepted generally therefore the theory of his school, there were very few points in it that could attract his attention. Philosophy to him was to learn what to desire, and what to avoid, Diss.II.14.10, and as with Musonius ἰατρεῖόν ἐστι τὸ τοῦ φιλοσόφου σχολεῖον. III.23,30, he deals with the morally sick.

rcus relius

Similarly Marcus Aurelius approximated very closely to Epictetus in his interpretation of Stoicism. Only those aspects of the Stoic doctrines which had a bearing on the moral and religious life held any interest for him. 'Though he may admit the value of physics and dialectic, man may attain to the true life without them; as for himself, VII.67, καὶ μὴ, ὅτι ἀπήλπισας διαλεκτικὸς καὶ φυσικὸς ἐσεσθαι, διὰ τοῦτο ἀπορρῶς καὶ ἐλεύθερος καὶ αἰδήμων καὶ κοινωνικὸς καὶ εὐπειθὴς θεῷ.

Philosophy is the one thing that can guide man through life: — τοῦτο δὲ ἐν τῷ τηρεῖν τὸν ἔνδον δαίμονα ἀνύβριστον καὶ ἀσινῆ --εἴτ' ἥδοι δὲ τὸν θάνατον ἴλεῳ τῇ γνώμῃ περιμένοντα. —

II.17. Compare II.13. To give man the strength of character and calmness of mind to do this, is the problem of philosophy.

ractical
thics of:-
eneca,
sonius,
ictetus.

The Stoic philosophers of this age, then, were moralists: practical ethics was the aspect of philosophy of which the men of the times had need, and in accordance with this was judged the value of all other branches. Were the doctrines by which serious "physicians of souls" like Musonius and Epictetus set out to achieve these practical ends, the original ethical teachings of the Porch? For the most part they were. The conflicting viewpoints found in Seneca have already been discussed. Musonius declared firmly with his school that virtue is the only good, vice the only evil: the cure for the morally sick is first the consciousness of their sickness, then the effort to attain that strength of mind whereby to hold to this doctrine and achieve elevation above all externals. Epictetus similarly shows none of Seneca's wavering; he states in uncompromising language the leading tenets of his school: good, happiness and freedom for man lie in his own will. When he has made himself inwardly independent he will be satisfied with his destiny; his happiness will not be disturbed by the harshest misfortunes: he will preserve the ἀπάθεια of the Stoic sage.

rcus
relius

The attitude of Marcus Aurelius was necessarily different. As has been said by Arnold (Roman Stoicism § 136), his attitude to Stoicism was that of a judge rather than an advocate. He did not seek to exhort others by his moral reflections, but to comfort and encourage himself. He is not therefore an exponent of Stoicism but rather an example of how

it affected a man of high character. The main Stoic ethical principles are, however, clearly stated in his "Thoughts." Firmness of character that can retain its happiness above what are commonly called evils, is to him the supreme good, IV.49. All things that make men neither morally better nor worse are strictly indifferant, II.11. With the self-sufficienty that comes from confining oneself to one's inner nature, as with Epictetus, will follow resignation to all that life brings.

lectic
irit

Yet for all this conformity to orthodox ethical doctrine, the tone of these latest Stoics is not that of Zeno. Of this more will be said in Section X. Moreover, they combined with their orthodoxy a certain eclectic spirit which manifested itself in two ways. In the first place we may consider the actual treatment of the ethical doctrines. The theoretical side was treated with great freedom: there was no strict ethical system, and the older paradoxes which this had entailed were ignored; there were no detailed theories of virtues and vices; to be adopted teaching had to be practically useful. It followed that some parts of the doctrine were stressed, others modified, others left altogether in the background. These philosophers were guided by the needs of their hearers and concerned with presenting their teaching in the form that would most be a help to ordinary men. Thus Epictetus, who gave much attention to ὁ προκόπτων, and

regarded all men as having the potential germ of perfection, would appear to have introduced three stages in the course of discipline, concerned with desires and aversions, impulse and action, judgement and assent. This differed from the ordinary inclusion of desire under impulse, and was designed for practical and educational purposes;—to stress the importance of right attitude (stage 1) from which all subsequent improvement started. In Marcus Aurelius the tendency resulted in his eliminating much of the old rigour of the less pleasing features of Stoic ethics.

b) This same undoubted tendency to subordinate dogma to edification is seen in the readiness of the Stoics from Seneca onwards to accept good moral teaching from any

Seneca quarter. Of Seneca's borrowings from Plato and the Peripatetics mention has already been made: for direct quotation from Plato see, for example, De Ira, 1.6.5. It may have been as a result of his early Pythagorean leanings that he preserved his practice of daily self-examination. He expressly claims to be an independent thinker, Dial: VIII.3(30)1, and what is perhaps most surprising is the fairness with which he judges the much abused Epicurus. 'Though one may take into account the predilection of his friend Lucilius for Epicurus, Seneca's own appreciation is doubtless genuine. Thus in De Vit: Beat: 12.4, he defends Epicurus against the vulgar misunderstanding of his theory of pleasure. In ib.13.1, he says "in ea quidem ipsa sententia sum, invitis hoc nostris popularibus dicam,

sancta Epicurum et recta praecipere et si propius accesseris tristia." Compare Ep.33,2 and Ep.6.6, where Epicurus is named with Socrates as one whose society and example made great men of his followers. In the letters to Lucilius epigrams from Epicurus are constantly quoted, Ep.18.14, 22.13. On the other hand, he will make use of a Cynic paradox to point a moral. It would seem indeed that Seneca's enthusiasm was frequently roused by many a moral doctrine he had just met,

Musonius whatever the source. Musonius approximated partly to the simplicity of the Cynics, partly to the asceticism of the Pythagoreans; with the latter and Sextus - founder of a Stoic-Pythagorean school,- he counselled the avoidance of flesh eating because it engenders thick cloudy evaporations which weaken the power of thought. With the former he held that true wisdom can be attained by moral endeavour, without

Epictetus much knowledge. Epictetus was perhaps the most consistently and rigorously Stoic in his teaching. Epicurus and his doctrines he examines and opposes at some length. Diss.II.20, III.7. His leanings, as will be seen, were towards a revived

Marcus Aurelius Cynicism. Marcus Aurelius is not averse from appealing both to the example of Epicurus and to the teaching of Plato. For instances of the latter see VII 35, 44, 45, 46, and for praise of Epicurus IX.41. Similarly a saying of the Cynic Antisthenes is quoted as being worth remembering, VII.36. To sum up then, Eclecticism in the Roman Stoic manifested itself in the concentration upon practical ethics, in the freedom

with which ethical principles were treated in their application, and in the appreciation and acceptance of good moral teaching from very various sources.

A. IX. The Approximiation of Epictetus to Cynicism.

Two features in the form of Stoicism expounded and adhered to in its last age may be treated separately. They were not the result of influence from other distinct systems, but rather of a fresh emphasis on some of the elements which had gone into the markings of the Stoicism of Zeno, and which in the course of time had lost to a large extent their old force. The first of these is the approximation of Epictetus to Cynicism - a tendency also observed in Musonius. It was not with the teaching of the popular Cynics of the day that Epictetus strengthened his Stoic principles, but with that of the older Cynicism of Antisthenes and Diogenes. Thus it is in true Cynic spirit that he maintains that virtue is attainable with little or no theoretical knowledge. (Compare, "if you are fascinated by speculative ideas sit still and meditate, but do not call yourself a philosopher") and carriexs indifference to externals so far, that things according and contrary to nature almost cease to be distinguished at all, Diss.II.5,6. One should confine oneself to what is in one's power, and the will alone is one's own. One can indeed use externals well or ill, but in themselves they are to be disregarded. Epictetus points out that for man as part of the whole, everything is according to nature inasmuch as it

is necessary. This fatalism had not deterred the Stoics from insisting on the power of choice and action: there was a danger that if stressed too much, as Epictetus tended to do, it would turn to inactive sufferance rather than submission which yet permitted action. In similar spirit Epictetus forbids the feeling of compassion and sympathy for fellowmen, in regard at least to their outward condition. Man.16; 'though the expression of sympathy is permitted, in his exaltation above inward feeling, he seems to approach insensibility. (Diss.III.12.10, and contrast Seneca Ep.99, 15 ff.); he dissuades man from participation in political life because in comparison with the ideal cosmopolis every state is small and imperfect, Diss.III.22.83. Finally he holds up the true Cynic as his philosophical ideal: and in Diss.III.22, he paints the picture of the true Cynic life. He will abstain from marriage and children because they will draw him from his higher vocation as a teacher of all humanity. All things of the world will be put aside by one who is a messenger of God, relying on his reason alone. In Socrates and above all in Diogenes the Cynic, the Stoic sage has proved himself xxxxxxx a possibility as one whose life is an example for all.

B. Influence of Heraclitus on Marcus Aurelius.

Secondly, although the doctrines of Heraclitus had from the first formed the greater part of Stoic physical theories, one cannot but notice how strongly the Heraditean element appears in, and influences, the philosophy of

Marcus Aurelius. The flux of all things had not such an overwhelming importance for the Stoics generally as for Heraclitus: the matter composing the universe, 'though always changing into new forms, was still for them the more or less permanent essence of things. It is this doctrine of flux,
1) however, that coloured many of the meditations of Marcus. To the theme of the transitoriness and ceaseless transmutation of all things, he returns again and again. VI.15 ἐν δὴ τούτῳ τῷ πόρῳ τί ἂν τις τούτων ὑπερθέοιτο ἐκτιμήσειεν ἐφ' ᾧ σπᾶν οὐκ ἔξεστιν; — compare VII.19, IX.19, 32, and IV.46, where he reminds himself of the saying of Heraclitus that the death of earth is to become water and so on through the elements. It is indeed the central point round which his
2) philosophy revolves. From such reflections he sees what an unimportant and transitory thing is man, and how foolish and wrong it is to concern oneself with the perishable, V.23, II,12; He realizes that only philosophy can give a support in the
3) flux of phenomena; only the inner self is important, II.17. It is his consciousness of the changeableness of the finite that makes him certain that change is governed by the highest reason. Compare the universal or common which lay at the back of Heraclitus' world process of change; in accordance with which all things happen, and which man must obey to be in harmony with the rest of nature; "we must follow the universal" frags. 91b and 92. (Bywater). Marcus similarly urges, V.3, "walk the straight way, follow your own and the

common nature, for the path of them both is one." For him it is the providence of God that governs all, on this, and the perfection of the world, he is constantly insisting;
4) this is the second of his leading thoughts, II.3, 11, VI.44. Finally this doctrine of flux coloured Marcus' thoughts of the soul and death. Soul and body alike are swept along the stream of perpetual transformation. It is inconceivable that in the continuous change of all things the human personality should survive unchanged. Thus it is, that he supports so strongly the view of death as the dissolution of the elements of soul as well as body, VIII.25, VI.24, and the re-absorption of the soul into the infinite spirit pervading the universe, of which it is an emanation, IV.14, 21. From this it is clear also, that this idea of death as a necessary dispersion of the component elements of the soul and annihilation of the personality, was not peculiar to the atomists. The prospect of an utter end to existence, was to many a welcome hope of unending rest. As to immortality, Marcus could have said with Aristotle, "Study to be immortal, so far as may be" explaining this as "living in accordance with what is highest in us", Eth. Nic. X.1177b33 - what is highest, is Marcus' δαίμων. How far one is to see the influence of circumstances in these tendencies of Marcus Aurelius, how far it was through Plato that he had renewed his acquaintance with the doctrines of Heraclitus, cannot be surely ascertained: it is possible that both played their part: the point to be noted is that in Marcus Aurelius the Heraclitean element in Stoicism became so

strong as to give their character to a large extent to his reflections.

X. Stoicism and Christianity

The question of the relation of Stoicism, the chief and most widely spread philosophy of the age, and Christianity, the religion that from small beginnings was destined to break down all barriers of race and country and to achieve the cosmopolis of which the Stoics had dreamed, cannot fail to be of interest. This is not the place to discuss the unquestionable debt of the early Christian teachers to the Stoics; it was no doubt inevitable that the former should tend to absorb some elements of Stoicism, which in expression at least were not so far from their own. But are there any grounds for supposing that the Stoics of the first centuries of our era, felt in turn the influence of the Christian teaching? Some, with Arnold (Roman Stoicism, § 455), deny the possibility of any such influence or even contact: but on the other hand, Christianity was a form of devotion that was already spreading widely, and in the Roman capital itself gaining adherents. We have already noticed the tendency towards the meeting and mingling of all currents of moral thought, and it may be asked whether Stoicism, which itself had close affinities with the East, was likely to remain entirely untouched by the new and distinctive Christian teaching. There is no direct evidence, it is true, of any

such contact: but the resemblances, often striking, found in Stoic and Christian writings, call for some explanation; so too does the new, almost religious tone and feeling which undoubtedly make themselves felt not infrequently in the Stoicism of the imperial era.

It may seem that with the Stoic principles expressed with all their original rigour, nothing could be more irreconcilable than the peculiar graces of Christianity. Could there be room for humility in a Stoic who held that God surpasses the wise man only in that he is longer good, or for aspiration in a system which looked forward to nothing more than a final conflagration and recurring world cycles? Yet this view perhaps does not take sufficient account of the humility that Seneca often expresses (how genuinely is debatable) and the emotional fervour with which the latest Stoics suffused their doctrine. For 'though if questioned, Seneca and Epictetus would undoubtedly have reduced their most rapturous experiences to the cold terms of orthodoxy, the emotional tone, it may be in spite of their creed, is no less undoubtedly there.

It is in Seneca that echoes of Christian thought and feeling are heard most frequently. It is true that some of the striking parallels that occur in him, belong not to Stoicism, but to the earlier thinkers from whom he so freely borrowed, to Plato, the Pythagoreans and to the long-misunderstood Epicurus who held that "initium

salutus est notitia peccati," (Ep.28,9). But allowing for all these influences, for the humanizing tendency of the age, there remains much that cannot be explained in this way. It may be as well to consider first some facts that make a connection between Seneca and Christianity, and especially St. Paul, historically possible. That Christianity had already, before the death of Claudius in 54 A.D., taken firm root in Rome, would appear certain. St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans assumes the existence of several Christian groups in the city, groups, moreover, numerous enough to have elicited from Paul, this, the most important letter he ever wrote; the one too in which he greets more persons than in any other. On his arrival in Rome in 61 or the beginning of 62 A.D., Paul was welcomed by his many brethren (Acts XXVIII), while the rapid growth of the Christian community is testified to by the great numbers who fell victim to Nero's persecution in 64 A.D. It is true that few, if any, of the upper classes were Christian at this date; the converts belonged to the lower orders and the slave population, including slaves of the imperial household. Seneca, however, himself tells us that it was his practice to dine with his slaves, to engage in familiar conversation with them, Ep.47; thus the avenues of information open to him, at least with regard to the Oral Gospel, were manifold. Moreover, there were several ways in which it was possible for Seneca's attention to be drawn

to St. Paul himself, with whom he was strictly contemporary. At Corinth, the apostle was brought before Seneca's brother Gallio, to whom Seneca dedicated more than one work, and of whom he spoke in tones of affection, N.Q.IV, praef: ∫10. At Rome, St. Paul was lodged in the custody of Burrus, Seneca's intimate friend, and finally tried before Nero.

Seneca may well have become interested in so remarkable a prisoner. Boissier (Religion Romaine II, 54) states, on the authority of Chrysostom, that Acte, the first love of Nero, had been converted to Christianity. That Seneca was personally acquainted with Acte, appears from the part he played in this affair of Nero's. Here, then, is another circumstance which may possibly have led to the teaching of St. Paul becoming known to the philosopher.

'Though resemblances to Christian writings occur in some of the earlier works of Seneca, and some of these resemblances are to passages in those books of the New Testament written after his death, it is still true that the most numerous and striking parallels occur in the works of his latest years, after the Epistle to the Romans in 58-59 A.D. and at a time when Seneca might quite possibly have become acquainted at least verbally with the teaching of the Gospels. To these last years we may probably assign the bulk of the Epistles to Lucilius, De Beneficiis, DeOtio, N.Q. and perhaps not much earlier, De Vit. Beat: It may be mentioned that Seneca's eclectic nature would not have hesitated to incorporate any Christian doctrine he had met, if it would further his

moral aims. Add, too, the fact of his supposed correspondence with St. Paul, which though a clear forgery, may quite probably have been an attempt to substantiate a prevalent belief. This belief could not have been wholly without some grounds, while the correspondence led Tertullian to say, De An. 20, "Seneca saepe noster," and St. Augustine, Ep.153, "cuius etiam ad Paulam apostolum leguntur epistolae."

ttitude
o God

We may now turn to the consideration of some of the parallels with Christian thought and writings that can be found in Seneca. With regard to his attitude to God and the divine spark within us, we find that in many passages Seneca departs from the conception of the materialistic "anima mundi" of Stoic pantheism, and approaches the idea of a more spiritual and personal Being. In De Benef:II,29,4, He is "pater noster;" in Ep.95,48, He is described as "omnia habentem, omnia tribuentem gratis;" the source of all benefits who can do only good to all men alike, De Benef, 4, 26. He comes to men - and "adscendentibus manum porrigunt (dei)," Ep.73,15. Men are his children: He hardens and chastizes those He loves, De Prov.IV.7. Moreover, He is within us, "sacer intra nos spiritus sedet," Ep.41,2; and as nothing is hidden from Him, Ep.83,1, Seneca enjoins "sic vivere cum hominibus tanquam deus videat," Ep.10.5. The true worship of a God such as this, is imitation of his goodness, Ep.95, 47 and 50, "primus est deorum cultus deos credere; deinde reddere illis maiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem ... satis illos coluit quisquis imitatus est." Compare Ep.41.

niversal Sin

Similarly of the universal sinfulness of man, and of the severe struggle necessary to win the victory over his inclination to evil, Seneca is as strongly convinced as St. Paul. Thus in De Benef: I.10,3, he feels bound to "pronounce, malos esse nos, malos fuisse, invictus adiciam et futuros esse." Ep.96,5, "atque vivere Lucili, militare est." (Compare Epictetus Diss.III.24, στρατεία τίς ἐστιν ὁ βίος ἑκάστου). Of his own imperfection Seneca is likewise conscious, Ep. 57,3, "multum ab hominis tolerabili nedum a perfecto absum." Compare "in alto vitiorum omnium sum." De Vit. Beat: XVII, 4. In his eagerness to promote the moral improvement of Lucilius, he is not infrequently preaching to himself. Hence follows the rule of taking oneself to account, Ep.28.10, the practice of self-examination which Seneca describes in De Ira, III, 36, 1-4, Whether this dissatisfaction with self ever led to anything approaching Christian penitence is, however, doubtful. cf.Epictetus, III,10.

rgiveness ove of thers

No-one in the Pagan world perhaps has insisted so strongly as Seneca on the obligation to live for others, and the duty of love and forgiveness. With the faults of others we must bear, for we are guilty ourselves. He enjoins in almost Scriptural language, "cum esuriente panem suum dividat," Ep.95,51, and "alteri vivas oportet si vis tibi vivere," Ep.48, 2. We are all brothers by nature; we must therefore love one another, Ep.95, 52. So Seneca echoes the Christian return "good for evil," — When in De Benef: III,xxvi, he says,

"da et ingratis beneficia (si deos imitaris)." These duties extend to all classes, slave and free: Ep.47, All men are slaves of God. Finally, to enemies, no less, must love and forgiveness be tendered. De Otio, 28 (1)4, non desinimus .... opem ferre etiam inimicis.

arallel pressions

In addition to these general similarities many actual parallels might be quoted, especially with St. Paul. Suffice it to note the remarkable passage in Ep.6.1, "intellego non emendari me tantum sed transfigurari;" - Compare 2 Corinth.III,18; - "deo parere libertas est," - De Vit. Beat: XV.7; - Compare 2 Corinth.III.17, "where the spirit of the Lord is there is liberty" and "whose service is perfect freedom" of the Liturgy. The coincidence of language and precept do call for some explanation: there is a difficulty in many cases in determining the relative chronology and it is true that there is a danger in detaching phrases or maxims which in their context might have a wholly different bearing. One must not be tempted moreover to read into some of Seneca's words too much of the significance with which Christianity has invested them: one must remember how often Seneca speaks of God in language that would sound blasphemous to Christian ears, and that in the last resort his enthusiastic expressions could be interpreted purely in the light of orthodox Stoic pantheism. That he should use monotheistic terms is no more surprising than that Cleanthes should have done so in his Hymn to ~~Love~~ Zeus; this latter Stoic too had expressed the sentiment of St. Paul, "we too His

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offspring are." Nevertheless, there remains what Zeller calls the crown of his moral doctrine, his gentle and humane temper, his universal love of man bestowed on all without distinction, extended more fully than ever before, and no longer in a spirit of duty, but by natural human affection and benevolence, to include the meanest slaves. Whatever one may conclude from the historical possibility of Christian influence noted above, one is impressed by Seneca's frequent approximation to Christian teaching, and one is tempted to believe that his fervent language cannot always be addressed to a God who is merely a Universal Law. One remembers his expansion of the Platonic hope of immortality into an almost Christian vision, Ep.102, and even if from the coincidences mentioned, no more can be deduced than that similar circumstances and temperaments can, without any direct contact, produce in two writers a similar kind of exposition, one can surely go part if not all the way with Sir Samuel Dill, when he finds in De Otio IV, 1, an indication that however much be held against him, and perhaps inconsistently with his professed creed, Seneca, at his best, had a vision of the City of God, "duas respublicas animo complectamur - alteram magnam et verè publicam qua di atque homines continentur - alteram cui nos adscripsit conditio nascendi."

ictetus

Although in Epictetus parallels with Christian writings are far less striking, the tone of piety and genuine

earnestness is more pronounced and more consistent than in Seneca. The pantheistic doctrine whereby God was identified with the universe is not brought to the fore. One feels that his reverence and fervour cannot but be addressed to a God who whatever he should have been logically, and at whatever cost of consistency, was no cold abstraction. In his consciousness of the divine nearness he comes ~~near~~ *close* to Christianity, Diss. I.14, 13,"never say you are alone; you are not alone, God is within ...and to this God you ought to swear allegiance from the first." So Diss.I, 30, 1, II.8, "you bear God about with you, wretched man, and know it not." ib.16,42, "Use me henceforth as Thou wilt: I am one with Thee; I am Thine." The passage in III,22, 2 *sqq* bears a marked resemblance to Christ's parable in Matt: XXIV, 45 *sqq.* , which surely cannot be wholly accidental. Similarly ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ , which for Epictetus no less than Seneca is the true worship of God, though a conception which had existed in Greek thought from earliest times, is here accompanied by a note of devotion never sounded so clearly before. The noblest examples of Epictetus' piety cannot be left unquoted. Diss.I,16, 15 *sqq.* "What else can I, a lame old man, do but sing the praise of God? Were I indeed a nightingale, I should sing as a nightingale, were I a swan, as a swan: but as I am a rational creature, I must praise God. This is my task, and I do it; and I shall not abandon this duty so far as in me lies, and I invite you all to join in this same song."

We have already noted the harshness and austerity which remained to a very large extent in the moral teaching of Epictetus. Reason is the centre of his doctrines and reason cannot make a religion. There is, however, in him also, some of that milder, gentler temper which coloured the teaching of Seneca. He sympathizes with, rather than accuses or condemns, the erring, - Diss, I, 18; he calls all men, even if they are slaves, brothers, as being equally descended from God, I.13; and urges that even to those who ill-treat us we should not refuse the love of a father or brother, III,22,54.

Marcus Aurelius

It is for his humane and sensitive sympathies, his tenderness, that Marcus Aurelius has been most admired. It is these qualities that Matthew Arnold speaks when he says."What an affinity with Christianity had this persecutor of the Christians." In his attitude to God we have seen that he reverted more to the conception of Universal Reason. He may say, IV, 23, "For Thee are all things, in Thee are all things, to Thee all things return. The poet says Dear City of Cecrops, and wilt thou not say Dear City of Zeus?", but for him there is no living centre of faith; compare Romans XI,36. But his moral reflections one cannot read entirely without emotion, and it is just this ability to kindle and inspire the emotions to response from which Christianity draws its best power. To the precepts he gives in a tone of gentleness, he himself lived up consistently. That we should bestow love, compassion and

forgiveness on all, his life showed to have been the true creed. Yet it must be admitted that this last of the Stoics who in an age of moral degradation could reach such a level of purity, falls far short of the Christian grace of charity and the spirit of "Father forgive them for they know not what they do." Contrast with this, VII,22, which has been thought to be the best statement of the Stoic "love your enemy" in the Meditations.

One leaves Marcus Aurelius with the impression that for all his lovingkindness he did too much follow his own precept, "Live as on a mountain," X.15.

nclusion

It has not been possible to treat adequately the relations of Stoicism to Christianity. Some of the points where influence might be detected have been briefly noted and some indication given of the great gulf which yet separated the pagan philosophy from the Christian religion. With an estimate of the value and achievement of the Stoic philosophy we are not here concerned. That it could produce as its last representatives an Epictetus and a Marcus Aurelius says much for its greatness. But the works of these two philosophers show too, most clearly, what Stoicism could not give, and what made inevitable its failure to secure a lasting hold on men.

For Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius cut themselves off completely from any hope of an after life. This hope and the moral connection between this life and the next, together with a Personal God who works and is worshipped by love not reason, were what the world needed, and these were Christianity's to give.

Thus we may say that Stoicism experienced its last influence, and by that influence it was overcome. Until now, men had found in this philosophy a foundation for life: it had inspired nearly all the great characters of the early Roman Empire, but it had not touched the masses. This Christianity was able to do. It invaded the Roman world and supplied all men's needs as no other creed or practice had hitherto supplied them. It destroyed the need for Stoicism; it satisfied that instinct which made men demand immortality for themselves and seek personality in the divine: it was centred in a Person - the example which the Stoic wise man had sought but failed to give. History cannot find causes sufficient to account for the triumph of the religion which at this time could offer in the immediate present nothing but danger and persecution. That Stoicism to some extent shared in that triumph it is possible to believe: its principles had been inculcated into many of those who were converted to Christianity; they brought to the new religion all that was best and noblest in their philosophy. It is surely not too much, then, to say with Arnold, that with the Christian church, Stoicism began a new history.

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