Proper names

Abstract

Traditionally, the conflict over the question what is the role of proper names in ordinary language has centred around two proposals: a sense-reference account, where the meaning of a name is given by some favoured description of the bearer, or a designatory account, where the bearer is the meaning of the name. There is a predisposition towards the former account. largely apparent ease in dealing with a supposedly central question: what is the role of "Pegasus" in the sentence "Pegasus does not exist". If we consider sane more standard cases of proper names two facts are clear: speakers use a name from one occasion to the next with one and the same meaning, and what two men may know of a particular individual may not be the same thing. These facts not only undermine the traditional accounts but they also prohibit a uniform account of all names, bearerless or otherwise, in terms of the bare intentions of speakers irrespective of what populates the universe. These failures indicate the need for a different approach to the issue. The search for a direct answer to the question "what is the meaning of a name", prescribed by a sense-reference approach, should be replaced by seeking the conditions which must be satisfied by someone who knows the contribution a name makes to determining the truth grounds of statements. The role of standard proper names can then be explained without appeal to something which is the meaning; and further an account of why "Pegasus" is still with us can be given, which explains our intentions on the matter without unduly detracting from an ontology of middle sized hardware.