

**Meaningful Work and Workplace Democracy**

**By**

**Ruth Yeoman**

**This thesis is submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy**

**Royal Holloway College, University of London  
Department of Politics and International Relations**

**Supervisor: Dr. Jonathan Seglow**

**Declaration**

I hereby declare that all the work presented in this thesis is my own

.....

Ruth Heather Yeoman

**I dedicate this thesis to the memory of my husband  
Jonathan Chenoweth**

**And to the future of my daughters  
Hannah and Abigail**

**Contents**

|   | <b>Page Number</b> |
|---|--------------------|
| <b>Abstract</b>   | <b>8</b>           |
| <b>Introduction</b>   | <b>9</b>           |
| <b>Chapter One</b>  |                    |
| <b>Meaningful Work as a Fundamental Human Need</b>  |                    |
| 1.0.0 Introduction  | 28                 |
| 2.0.0 Meaningfulness in Work: Preference or Need?   | 29                 |
| 2.1.0 The Argument for Meaningful Work as a Preference  | 29                 |
| 2.1.1 <i>The Compensation Argument</i>  | 31                 |
| 2.2.0 The Need for Meaningfulness Argument  | 37                 |
| 2.2.1 <i>A Fundamental Human Need</i>   | 40                 |
| 2.2.2 <i>Liberal Perfectionism and a Politics of Meaningfulness</i>   | 42                 |
| 3.0.0 The Value of Meaningfulness   | 44                 |
| 3.1.0 Structuring the Value of Meaningfulness   | 45                 |
| 3.2.0 Worthy Objects in the Objective Dimension   | 49                 |
| 3.2.1 <i>Purposes</i>   | 50                 |
| 3.2.2 <i>Projects</i>   | 52                 |
| 3.3.0 Affective Appropriation in the Subjective Dimension   | 55                 |
| 3.3.1 <i>Appropriation and Affective Attachment</i>   | 56                 |
| 3.4.0 Equal Co-Authorities in the Realm of Value  | 59                 |
| 4.0.0 Ethic of Care: Fulfilling our Responsibilities Towards Worthy Objects   | 61                 |
| 5.0.0 Conclusion  | 67                 |
| <b>Chapter Two</b>  |                    |
| <b>Meaningful Work in Critical Social Theory and Liberal Political Theory: Worthy Objects and Intersubjective Relations</b> |                    |
| 1.0.0 Introduction  | 69                 |
| 2.0.0 A Positive Critical Conception of Meaningful Work   | 70                 |
| 3.0.0 The Standard Economic Conception of Work  | 71                 |
| 3.1.0 <i>Neglecting the Interior Content of Work</i>  | 71                 |
| 4.0.0 The Feminist Challenge  | 72                 |
| 4.1.0 <i>Pluralising Values in Work</i>   | 74                 |
| 4.2.0 <i>Re-Envisioning Economics</i>   | 76                 |

|       |   |     |
|-------|---|-----|
| 4.3.0 | <i>Collapsing Public/Private Distinctions</i>                           | 79  |
| 5.0.0 | Resisting Conceptual Closure by Pluralising Values                      | 81  |
| 6.0.0 | Objective Dimension: Worthy Objects and Critical Social Theory          | 84  |
| 6.1.0 | <i>Arendt – Retrieving the Political Mode of Being in Work</i>          | 85  |
| 6.2.0 | <i>Habermas – Challenging the Separate Spheres Thesis</i>               | 88  |
| 6.3.0 | <i>Honneth – Retrieving the Material Dimension of Intersubjectivity</i> | 93  |
| 7.0.0 | Subjective Dimension: Intersubjectivity and Liberal Political Theory    | 96  |
| 7.1.0 | <i>Elster and Rawls – Meaningful Work as Complex Activity</i>           | 96  |
| 7.2.0 | <i>Arneson – Meaningful Work as Variety</i>                             | 102 |
| 7.3.0 | <i>Walsh – Meaningful Work as Structured Occupations</i>                | 106 |
| 8.0.0 | Conclusion  | 111 |

### **Chapter Three**

#### **Overcoming Alienation: Irreducible Autonomy and Authority over Meaning Making**

|       |   |     |
|-------|---|-----|
| 1.0.0 | Introduction  | 113 |
| 2.0.0 | Alienated Work and the Craft Ideal                              | 113 |
| 3.0.0 | The Loss of Autonomy Argument                                   | 121 |
| 3.1.0 | <i>Objective Alienation in the Interior Content of Work</i>     | 121 |
| 3.2.0 | <i>Subjective Alienation in the Formation of Subjectivities</i> | 124 |
| 4.0.0 | Challenging the Loss of Autonomy Argument                       | 127 |
| 4.1.0 | Theorising Irreducible Autonomy                                 | 131 |
| 4.1.1 | <i>Skill and Relations to Material Objects</i>                  | 134 |
| 4.1.2 | <i>Subjectivities and Relations to Others</i>                   | 139 |
| 5.0.0 | Rationality of Caring in the Value of Meaningfulness            | 143 |
| 5.1.0 | A Practical Rationality of Caring                               | 144 |
| 6.0.0 | Conclusion  | 148 |

## **Chapter Four**

### **Confronting Domination: Freedom and Democratic Authority**

|       |   |     |
|-------|---|-----|
| 1.0.0 | Introduction  | 150 |
| 2.0.0 | Non-Domination and the Value of Meaningfulness        | 150 |
| 3.0.0 | Simone Weil: The Potential for Freedom in Work        | 152 |
| 3.1.0 | Domination  | 155 |
| 3.2.0 | Free Work   | 157 |
| 4.0.0 | Freedom as Non-Domination                             | 159 |
| 4.1.0 | Personal Freedom                                      | 160 |
| 4.2.0 | Political Freedom                                     | 163 |
| 4.3.0 | The Organisation of Work                              | 164 |
| 4.4.0 | Meaningfulness in an Infrastructure of Non-Domination | 167 |
| 5.0.0 | Cooperation, Coordination and Authority Relations     | 170 |
| 5.1.0 | Cooperation and Coordination                          | 171 |
| 5.2.0 | Authority Relations                                   | 175 |
| 5.3.0 | Democratic Authority                                  | 178 |
| 6.0.0 | Conclusion  | 181 |

## **Chapter Five**

### **Restoring Dignity: The Need for Social Recognition and Practical Identity Formation**

|       |  |     |
|-------|--|-----|
| 1.0.0 | Introduction   | 183 |
| 2.0.0 | Our Need for Social Recognition                                      | 184 |
| 2.1.0 | Self-Esteem: The Subjective Dimension of Social Recognition          | 188 |
| 2.2.0 | Self-Respect: The Objective Dimension of Social Recognition          | 190 |
| 3.0.0 | Rawls's Respect Recognition and Honneth's Esteem Recognition         | 194 |
| 3.1.0 | The Limits of the Rawlsian Concept of Self-Respect                   | 194 |
| 3.1.1 | <i>The Aim of Social Recognition</i>                                 | 195 |
| 3.1.2 | <i>Mediators of Social Recognition: Achievement and Associations</i> | 198 |
| 3.2.0 | The Limits of Honneth's Concept of Self-Esteem                       | 202 |
| 3.2.1 | <i>The Achievement Principle</i>                                     | 205 |
| 4.0.0 | A Sense of Dignity   | 209 |
| 4.1.0 | Forming a Practical Identity   | 213 |

|       |            |     |
|-------|------------|-----|
| 5.0.0 | Conclusion | 219 |
|-------|------------|-----|

## **Chapter Six**

### **‘The Inner Workshop of Democracy’: Realising the Emancipatory Potential of Meaningful Work through Agonistic Workplace Democracy**

|       |   |     |
|-------|---|-----|
| 1.0.0 | Introduction  | 220 |
| 2.0.0 | Participation and Democracy   | 221 |
| 3.0.0 | Standard Arguments for Workplace Democracy                            | 226 |
| 3.1.0 | The Parallel Argument   | 227 |
| 3.2.0 | The Spillover Thesis  | 229 |
| 3.3.0 | The Efficiency Argument   | 231 |
| 4.0.0 | The Marginalisation of Workplace Democracy in Deliberative Theory     | 233 |
| 5.0.0 | Challenging the Separate and Homogenous Economy                       | 236 |
| 5.1.0 | Multiple Rationalities: From Natural Consensus to Contested Dissensus | 239 |
| 6.0.0 | Agonistic Democracy   | 242 |
| 7.0.0 | The Inner Workshop of Democracy                                       | 246 |
| 7.1.0 | Association   | 249 |
| 7.2.0 | Contestation  | 251 |
| 7.3.0 | Ethos of Enlargement  | 252 |
| 7.4.0 | Decision  | 255 |
| 8.0.0 | Conclusion  | 256 |

## **Chapter Seven**

### **Towards a Politics of Meaningfulness: Capability Justice and the Capability for Voice**

|       |  |     |
|-------|--|-----|
| 1.0.0 | Introduction   | 258 |
| 2.0.0 | Capability Justice: Principle of Egalitarian Meaning and Threshold of Sufficient Meaning | 259 |
| 3.0.0 | The Capability Approach  | 262 |
| 3.1.0 | Sen’s Capability for Functioning   | 263 |
| 3.2.0 | Nussbaum’s Partial Theory of Justice   | 268 |

|       |  |            |
|-------|--|------------|
| 4.0.0 | Capability Justice and the Principle of Individual Development | 270        |
| 5.0.0 | Nussbaum's Capabilities and the Need for Meaningful Work       | 272        |
| 5.1.0 | Work in the Capability for Control over Our Environment        | 275        |
| 5.2.0 | Democratic Equality  | 278        |
| 5.3.0 | The Capability for Voice                                       | 280        |
| 6.0.0 | Conversion Factors for the Capability for Voice                | 285        |
| 6.1.0 | Mediating Institutions   | 286        |
| 6.2.0 | Basic Income   | 289        |
| 7.0.0 | Conclusion   | 291        |
|       | <b>Conclusion</b>  | <b>293</b> |
|       | Bibliography   | 301        |

**Abstract**

My thesis examines moral and political responses to the character of work through critical evaluation of the work we do to sustain a stable social order suitable for human acting and being. My original contribution rests upon my application of Wolf's (2010) distinct bipartite value of meaningfulness (BVM) to the structure of action in work, which integrates the objective and subjective dimensions of meaningfulness when subjective feelings of attachment are united to an assessment of the objective worthiness of the object. Work which is structured by the BVM is a fundamental human need, because it addresses our inescapable interests in autonomy, freedom, and social recognition, which are met when work is non-alienated, non-dominated and dignified. To realise the BVM, each person must possess the capabilities for objective valuing and affective attachment, in addition to their equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value. Being able to participate in creating and sustaining positive values through meaning-making alleviates concerns that meaningful work is a perfectionist ideal which undermines autonomy. But meaning-making gives rise to interpretive differences over values and meanings which often remain as pre-political potentials unless brought into public deliberation through deliberative practices. I argue that realising the BVM in work requires a politics of meaningfulness generated by a system of workplace democracy, where democratic authority at the level of the organisation is combined with agonistic democratic practices at the level of the task. Furthermore, capability justice requires the satisfaction of two principles – the principle of egalitarian meaning, such that all persons must be able to experience their work as meaningful, and the threshold of sufficient meaning, such that work is sufficiently meaningful when constituted by the values of autonomy, freedom and social recognition. I conclude that the relevant capabilities for meaningfulness are realised, indirectly, through institutional guarantees for the Capability for Voice.



## Introduction

*‘Meaningful work, like a meaningful life, is morally worthy work undertaken in a morally worthy organization. Work has meaning because there is some good in it. The most meaningful jobs are those in which people directly help others or create products which make life better for people. Work makes life better if it helps others; alleviates suffering; eliminates difficult, dangerous, or tedious toil; makes someone healthier or happier; or aesthetically or intellectually enriches people and improves the environment in which we live. All work that is worthy does at least some of these things in some small or large way. Still, not all people will find worthy work personally meaningful to them’ (Ciulla, 2000: 226).*

In advanced industrialised societies, work occupies a peculiarly ambivalent position – simultaneously valued for providing the means for self-realisation and disvalued for being burdensome and compulsory. Shershow (2005) describes work as consisting of a ‘double necessity’, whereby ‘we see ourselves both as *working to live* and as *living to work*’ (ibid: 13, original emphasis). Work is either a source of expressive human action, one of ‘the hopes of civilisation’ (Morris, 1993), fulfilled in a correctly ordered society which enables all persons to do decent, humane and dignified work; or it is an experience of oppressive degradation, from which we must escape, since the worker deprived of worthwhile activities ‘generally becomes as stupid and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become’ (Smith, 1999 [1776]), resulting in him or her becoming ‘a crippled monstrosity’ (Marx, 1978 [1867]). We can be in no doubt that our survival and our ability to flourish depend upon our being able to work together to produce the material and social goods which satisfy individual and collective human needs. But simply acknowledging that work, as a generalised human activity, is unavoidable for most people does not settle questions such as:

what activities count as work? Do we include only those activities for which we receive a payment, or do we also include unpaid labour in the home and in the community (see Bolle, 2009)? Is work simply what is necessary to sustain life, or can it add positively to the experience of a full and meaningful human existence? For some, work is no longer a site of human action which is valuable for its own sake. But although we have become sceptical about the emancipatory potential of work, the meaning of work as compulsion has not crowded out entirely the meaning of work as free, expressive, and creative action (Spencer, 2009). The ideal of meaningful work, of activity which aims at a compelling purpose and uses the full range of a person's distinctive capabilities, retains a strong hold upon our imagination, motivating us to seek work which adds to the personal meaning of our lives and to aspire to a society transformed by each person being able to work which he or she finds to be worth doing. This means that the contemporary organisation of work is a consequence of socio-historical contingencies, which are not natural inevitabilities from which meaningfulness has been eliminated, but are instead possibilities for a more humanised experience of work.

I aim to show that to engage in the conceptual evaluation of meaningful work is not simply an exercise in remote abstraction, but directs us toward the pragmatic political possibility of ensuring that all work possesses the structure for meaningfulness. Furthermore, not only can the value of meaningfulness in the concept of meaningful work be described, but social institutions can be arranged according to normative principles conducive to enabling all persons to attribute meaning content to their lives because of the work they do. Following Kovacs (1986), I take work to be 'a basic mode of being in the world', where 'to work means to humanise the world and to produce something' (ibid: 198). In this sense, work functions to create and to sustain values and meanings beyond the realm of its economic productivity: work is a mode of being in the world which transcends the employment relation to include all the activities which contribute to producing and reproducing a complex system of social cooperation. But, if work is to humanise the world, it must at the same time humanise the one through whom the work takes place; in Morris's terms: 'Nothing should be made by man's labour

which is not worth doing; or which must be made by labour degrading to the makers' (Morris, 1884). Work cannot be meaningful if it requires the enslavement of the worker, the deformation of her human capabilities, or the misrecognition of her vital commitments. This means that some work is morally desirable and some work is not, requiring that the improvement of individuals and of society depends upon work having a certain interior content, which I argue is given by the value of meaningfulness. Furthermore, to aim at the meaningfulness of individual lives because of the work people do is a proper moral and political project – and a necessary element in addressing the many challenges of our times, including how increasingly unequal societies unevenly distribute the benefits and burdens of the work of social cooperation.

I ground my reasons for making meaningful work for all a political project in a normative argument that being able to experience one's life as meaningful is a fundamental human need, which, under present economic arrangements, is extremely difficult for most people to satisfy if their work lacks the structure for meaningfulness. In justifying meaningful work as an object of political action, I start by making the strong claim that, because being able to experience work with the relevant structure is of such importance for living a fully human life, then it is a fundamental human need, requiring the organisation of society to eliminate non-meaningful work from the work of social cooperation. Meaningful work has always been available to the few who occupy social roles allowing them to exercise socially valuable capabilities in contexts of personal autonomy which aim at a worthwhile purpose. But a just social order will be concerned that meaningfulness in work is so unevenly distributed, and will seek to ensure, not only that there is equal opportunity in the competition for the most desirable roles, but that all work provides for the development and exercise of complex capabilities (cf. Gomberg, 2007). However, I shall not be proposing that society is organised to ensure that each person is able to access an elite ideal of exceptional meaning, but that everyday human action is structured to ensure that work provides the context for finding objects which are worth pursuing, and for developing human capacities for intersubjective meaning-making. Hence, I aim to

pursue an egalitarian conception of ordinary meaning which is already at hand in much of the work we do together, provided that we make certain adjustments to our institutional arrangements and the organisation of work in the basic structure of society.

In making this argument, I challenge the commitment of liberal political theorists to the principle of liberal neutrality, which results in the subordination of the human need for meaningful work to liberal concerns to avoid substantive normative conceptions of living. As a consequence of the commitment to liberal neutrality, describing and evaluating the concept of meaningful work has been a lacuna in the intellectual endeavours of modern political and moral theorists. Since Arneson's (1987) 'Meaningful Work and Market Socialism' and Elster's (1986) 'Self-Realisation in Work and Politics: the Marxist Conception of the Good Life' in the late eighties, little has been written on the normative character of work, and its implications for political theory and social policy. And this, during a period when the experience of work has been the subject of extensive empirical investigation by sociologists, ethnographers and psychologists, leading to new treatments of the organisation of work in the disciplines of business ethics, political geography and critical sociology. The disconnect between the normative description of work and the empirical investigation of work means that: firstly, the normative analysis of what morality or justice might demand with respect to the character of work, and how it contributes to a life of human flourishing, has not kept up with the accumulated empirical evidence, and secondly, the empirical literature has remained analytically under-developed.

I engage with moral philosophers, critical social theorists and liberal political theorists for whom the concept of meaningful work, and its implications for public policy, has been of marginal interest. In moral philosophy, the normative content of work is rarely the object of analytical consideration, because work is dismissed as a norm-free zone of human activity governed by technical rationality. In critical social theory, the interior content of work is seen as having been degraded to such a degree that it no longer supports the worthy objects necessary for us to find our lives to be meaningful. In liberal political theory,

meaningful work is treated as a preference in the market, because the irredeemably subjective content of meaningfulness threatens the maintenance of neutrality between different conceptions of living. However, the centrality of work in modern societies makes construing meaningful work as a preference, dismissing it as irretrievably degraded, or treating it as a realm from which ethical considerations of value and worth are absent, normatively unsatisfactory. There has been some recent revival of theoretical interest in meaningful work from a Rawlsian perspective (Hsieh, 2008; Arnold, 2011), from within critical social theory (Smith, 2009; Breen, 2006), from a liberal perfectionist standpoint (Rossler, 2011), and from moral philosophy on the meaning of life (Levy, 2005). But even theoretical attempts to address the empirical literature, such as Dejours's (2006) theory of work which draws upon ethnographic observations of the actual work which people do, remain incomplete in the absence of a positive critical conception of meaningful work enabling us to distinguish between morally viable and unviable forms of work. And the small liberal political theory literature remains, on the whole, committed to liberal neutrality, and therefore not able to account fully for how people experience their work. Moreover, commitment to liberal neutrality means that liberal political theory remains blind to the ways in which people's attempts to recast their work as meaningful through the exercise of meaning-making capabilities are distorted, thwarted, and misrecognised, often leading to meaning-making capacities being appropriated to benefit others without reference to the meaning-maker's inescapable interest in being able to experience autonomy, freedom and social recognition.

In order to describe the conceptual content of meaningful work which will have critical purchase in specifying the social transformations required to ensure that all work is meaningful, I draw upon the moral philosophy of meaningfulness, making use of Wolf's (2010) bipartite value of meaningfulness (BVM) to structure the interior content of morally acceptable work. Wolf's BVM unites subjective and objective dimensions into a value which can be distinguished from welfare and morality: 'meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness' (Wolf, 2010: 9). The BVM integrates objective and subjective

dimensions of meaningfulness when affective feelings of attachment, satisfaction or fulfilment are united to an assessment of the worthiness of the object at which the feelings aim. I employ the BVM to retrieve a critical conception of work which enables us to distinguish normatively between meaningful and non-meaningful work, extending the BVM beyond its conceptual evaluation in moral philosophy to a theoretical description of what each person requires in order to experience the value of meaningfulness in the work they do with others. I do so by arguing that meaningfulness is an intersubjective and institutional achievement, where social structures support the development of human capabilities for meaning-making, provided that there are widespread deliberative practices in all the associations which make up the system of social cooperation. As a result, I lend to empirical research more vigorous possibilities for understanding the evidence of how people use their sense-making capabilities to draw out positive meanings from the work they do with others; and I challenge liberal political theory's commitment to liberal neutrality by claiming that, given the importance of meaningful work to the individual's search for meaning, then liberal neutrality ought not to be maintained at the cost of rendering futile the efforts individuals make to find their experience of work to be meaningful.

Although Wolf specifies the value of meaningfulness, she does not develop an account of how we come to experience our lives as meaningful. I suggest that we appropriate the BVM to our lives through capabilities for objective judging and subjective attachment, supported by social recognition of our equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value, where I understand appropriation to be an intersubjective process requiring the active orientation of one's self to the particular value of worthy objects. In his recent hybrid account of the human good and preference formation, which draws close to the bipartite value of meaningfulness, Arneson (2006) says: 'nothing that an individual does or gets contributes in itself to her well-being unless the thing is both objectively valuable and positively engages her subjectivity' (ibid: 29). He adds that for individuals to experience genuine well-being, desires must be trained, such that they will 'not desire the cotton candy of life' (ibid: 31). There are some desires

that are better for us to have than others. And we can train our desires by developing and exercising the relevant capabilities for valuing and attachment, which means that, in order to experience their lives as meaningful, individuals must be situated in contexts rich in potential encounters with worthy objects. Furthermore, they must possess the relevant capabilities for affectively appropriating those objects to the meaning content of our lives. Thus, work acquires the requisite structure for meaningfulness when it provides the context for encounters with worthy objects expressing a range of attractive values, and for fostering the relevant capabilities for judging and feeling, where work is conceived, not only as those activities undertaken in the employment relation, but includes all those activities required to reproduce a system of social cooperation. Work with the requisite structure for meaningfulness provides the context for encounters with worthy objects because it expresses a range of attractive values and fosters capabilities for judging and feeling. The proliferation of positive values in a liberal perfectionist framework requires all individuals to be participants in the processes and practices of meaning-making from which purposes, values and meanings arise. This means that work is more likely to enable all persons to experience the BVM when it is organised democratically in social practices containing subjectively attractive worthy objects. The aim is not to guarantee that all persons will find their work to be actually meaningful, but instead to support each person's search for meaning by securing their membership of at least one social practice in a participatory society, where democratic practices, in themselves, are among the worthy objects making work susceptible to the BVM.

I concede that organising the work of social cooperation to meet the regulatory ideal of meaningful work breaks with the principle of liberal neutrality, but suggest that a framework of liberal perfectionism, supported by democratic deliberation over the constitution of the interior content of work, provides a sufficiently wide range of attractive values to allow for plural conceptions of living (cf. Roessler, 2011). I argue that the values of autonomy, freedom and social recognition are constitutive of the meaningfulness of work, because they

are necessary for creating and sustaining a range of positive values in the work we do together. Autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination and social recognition as dignified work are realistic targets of a theory of capability justice, meaning that institutionalising the value of meaningfulness in the basic structure of society is both normatively legitimate and politically achievable. With respect to autonomy as non-alienation, I draw upon the empirical evidence which shows how, despite the unpromising nature of many of the activities they must undertake in their work, people exercise meaning-making capabilities in order to excavate a sense of purpose and identity from the work they do together. Following Dejours (2006), I argue that this indicates a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in all acts of work. Because people must exercise capabilities for meaning-making in uniting means and ends in order to get the work done, this level of irreducible autonomy cannot be eliminated by intensifying the technical division of labour or completely appropriated by management efforts to co-opt workers' autonomy. Even though much of this autonomous action is rendered invisible, it is a potentially rich source of intersubjective encounter, solidarity and meaningful work, because it is productive of interpretive differences in meaning, which, if brought into public deliberation, have the potential to multiply the values which can be appropriated to the meaning content of a life. I evaluate dimensions of unfreedom in work using the concept of domination (Pettit, 1999), which I conceive, not only in the neo-republican sense of being subject to the capricious will of another, but also as exclusion from participating in developing the rules, social structures and intersubjective relations which frame our subjectivities. Non-dominating intersubjective relations in the work of social cooperation are secured within coordinating authorities which are legitimate when they are democratic authorities. Finally, I propose that social recognition in meaningful work is given by dignified work, where self-respect and self-esteem are united in a sense of one's dignity as a particular person, who bears responsibilities of care for worthy objects (Honneth, 1995; Rawls, 1999).

I acknowledge concerns that liberal neutralists may have with the way in which I make meaningfulness dependent upon taking part in democratic



deliberation, since not everyone has the taste for democratic participation – some people may be reluctant cooperators. Others may have limited opportunities for participation in publicly recognised practices because they undertake activities which they categorise as work in obscurity, such as the artist who remains unrecognised in her lifetime. If meaningfulness is realised only when individuals engage in activities which are valued through public deliberation, then this would seem to limit the opportunities for the unknown artist to experience her work as meaningful. In the case of the reluctant co-operator, much contemporary work is now organised along participatory lines, making participation an ordinary necessity for getting the work done. Although much of this participation may be of the pseudo-participatory variety (Pateman, 1970), such practices nonetheless sketch a line in the sand for ‘bleak houses’ organised through command and control (Brogger, 2010). In order to provide for the reluctant co-operator, however, I propose that participatory practices which are constitutive of the meaning content of work must be plural, including both direct/individual and indirect/representative forms of participation. This provides multiple channels for people to choose the form of their participation, perhaps delegating participation to their representatives, if they have no taste for direct involvement. In the case of the unknown artist, I argue that we must define work more broadly than paid work, so as to include an individual’s own identification of what counts as work. Since the unknown artist is part of an honourable tradition of the unrecognised innovator in all fields of human endeavour, this allows her to claim that her identification of her activity as work places her within an established public practice.

In opposition to the preference argument, I construct meaningful work as a fundamental human need, arguing that it addresses our inescapable interests in autonomy, freedom and social recognition, which are met when work is non-alienated, non-dominated and dignified. Therefore, it is not enough to privatise meaningfulness by claiming that we can satisfy the human need for meaning through non-market activities, such as hobbies, family life or voluntary participation, or placing the entire burden of finding their work to be meaningful

upon the psychological adjustment of the individual (Lips-Wiersma & Morris, 2009). For a start, much of this non-market activity is a vital part of the economy of social cooperation, and is an indispensable component of what it means to work. Thus, understanding the meaning content of work depends upon: firstly, conceptualising society as a system of social cooperation between equals, secondly, identifying the whole range of activities which contribute to the reproduction of society, and thirdly, identifying the general features of these activities which enable a person to experience their life as meaningful. Many of these activities can be performed in meaningful or non-meaningful ways, depending upon how they are organised by the social circumstances which pertain in the basic structure of society. A society concerned to enable each person to satisfy their fundamental human need for meaning will arrange the basic structure of society to ensure that all persons are able to undertake work which is conducive to meaning attribution. Furthermore, relieving society of the need to maintain liberal neutrality permits the political pursuit of meaningful work as a regulatory ideal, including entitlements to the realisation of meaningful work, given by the Capability for Voice in a system of workplace democracy.

I argue that work is more likely to enable all persons to experience the BVM when it is organised democratically in social practices containing subjectively attractive worthy objects, where agonistic democratic practices at the level of the task are combined with democratic authority at the level of the organisation. Agonism realises the emancipatory potential of the interior content of work by bringing into public deliberation interpretive differences which arise out of acts of work, but which are more likely to remain as pre-political potentials in hierarchically organised enterprises. Such practices are able to bring into public view the irreducible autonomy of workers by: firstly, enabling deliberation over acts of meaning-making which overcome technical reason by extending knowledge, developing skill, and re-uniting ends and means to complete necessary tasks, and secondly, enabling deliberation over the diversification and individualisation of the subjective formations which underpin positive self-relations. By bringing invisibilised interpretive differences which arise from

meaning-making into conscious collective deliberation, we can make available to all enriched sources of positive values which can be incorporated into a person's identity. Thus, to realise the value of meaningfulness in work for all requires a system of workplace democracy at the level of the task and at the level of the organisation. At the level of the task, a political mode of being structured by agonistic democratic practices has the potential to foster a form of workplace democracy which reveals the necessary autonomy in every act of work. At the level of the organisation, democratic authority contests the presumption of hierarchical authority. As a consequence, the individual worker is re-presented as an irreplaceable contributor imbued with expressive political agency, and situated in cooperative relations with others.

Finally, I propose that the regulatory ideal of meaningful work is achieved through a capabilities for functioning framework (Nussbaum, 2001). And I suggest two rules for securing meaningfulness in the interior content of work: a *principle of egalitarian meaning*, that all persons should be able to attribute meaning content to their lives because of the work they do, and a *threshold of sufficient meaning*, that all work should meet a threshold standard of meaningfulness, given by freedom as non-domination, autonomy as non-alienation, and social recognition as dignified intersubjective relations. That some people are able to experience more meaningful lives because of the work they do is due to arbitrary factors in the organisation of work which it is within our power to remedy. Each day, most people willingly take up significant responsibilities in the work of social cooperation, requiring capabilities of judgment, social interaction and creative action, where this willingness to contribute responsibly to cooperative joint working justifies each person being able to exercise the political mode of being in work. I argue that realising the relevant capabilities requires the conversion factor of a basic income which supports the recognition of a wide range of contributions to the reproduction of a system of social cooperation, therefore multiplying the range of attractive values which can be made available for appropriation to the meaning content of a life, in addition to a system of

workplace democracy which secures a wide variety of enterprises organised along democratic lines.

The political object is not to guarantee that every person's life will be actually meaningful, but that the organisation of work will secure for each person the Capability for Voice in the work they do with others, thus ensuring that the individual will not find her search for meaning unfairly hindered by social structures which benefit only a few. This means that realising meaningful work for all is not an unachievable ideal if the interior content of work is organised so that people can express the political mode of being through participation in democratic practices. I make democratic practices in the work we do together constitutive of the meaning content of work, arguing that they become the object of justice when we seek to institute the value of meaningfulness in the basic structure of society. It is not fair that some people are able to accrue meaning content to their lives because of the work they do (even when they have acquired such work through competition for social roles in which the terms of fair equality of opportunity have been met), whereas others must endure a lifetime of meaningless activity. Therefore, it is a matter of justice that all work be organised so that its interior content is structured by the value of meaningfulness. Capability justice ensures our individual Capability for Voice, enabling us to become equal participants in the democratic practices which are constitutive of the meaning content of work. And this requires institutional guarantees to ensure that all work is structured to give each person the best chance to experience their work as meaningful, according to their own lights.

In Chapter One, I undertake a descriptive analysis of the concept of meaningful work which I use to develop a normative justification for making the good of meaningful work the object of political action. My descriptive analysis of the concept of meaningful work is based upon the claim that, in order to contribute to the meaning content of a person's life, an activity being undertaken by that person must possess a certain structure (Levy, 2005). This structure is given by the distinct value of meaningfulness which can be conceptually

described by bringing together the dimensions of objectivity and subjectivity into the ‘bipartite value’ of meaningfulness (Wolf, 2010). If the bipartite value meaningfulness is constitutive of work then activities must be structured to enable objectively attractive values to be actively incorporated via subjective attachment into a person’s self-conception for what makes their life worth living. However, although the bipartite value of meaningfulness describes the relevant structure of activities (including the structure of work activities) which have the potential to add to the meaning content of a life, it does not describe the process whereby persons actively appropriate meaning to their lives. For this, we need a theoretical account of the process of meaning attribution which is given by our capabilities and status as valuers (Raz, 2001). To incorporate meaningfulness into a life is to give that life a distinct narrative shape, formed by and in turn forming, the self-concept of the person whose life it is. This is an active process, success in which requires us to see ourselves as the kind of person who has the authority and capabilities to be able to evaluate and judge the worthiness of objects we wish to appropriate to our lives (Raz, 2001; 2003). This means that becoming a valuer, and having the self-concept of being a valuer, is a developmental process requiring suitable sites for the formation of the relevant capabilities and sense of personhood. I make an ethic of care central to the development process of becoming a valuer because, through practices of care, we fulfil our responsibilities towards the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, and through practising care we make ourselves into the kinds of persons who are capable of being valuers.

In Chapter Two, I evaluate what theoretical resources for analysing and evaluating the concept of meaningful work are to be found in critical social theory and liberal political theory. And I conclude that each source supplies a dimension which the other lacks. Although critical social theory directs us to considerations of work as a socialised activity containing the potential for individual emancipation and social change, it does not systematically address the objective dimension of the value of meaningfulness, because it is deeply sceptical that

contemporary work contains objectively worthy objects. Liberal political theory provides resources for a conceptual analysis of meaningful work, particularly with respect to the substantive normative requirement for autonomous action. But, although liberal political theory illuminates the individual in relation to the activity of work by placing the emphasis upon the experience of autonomy as self-directed activity, it neglects the essential intersubjective dimensions of work, which are not merely side benefits, but are necessary for getting the work done. I develop a positive critical conception of meaningful work, which centralises the importance of intersubjective relations to the meaning content of work. I make use of Arendt (1958) to argue that acting in the political mode of being is constitutive of the meaning content of work; Habermas (1974) to identify how work takes place in multiple, overlapping timespaces; and Honneth (1995) to retrieve the material dimensions of our intersubjective relations.

In Chapter Three, I evaluate the first constitutive element of meaningful work – *autonomy*. I argue that critical social theory is too pessimistic about the prospects for the emancipatory potential for work because it characterises work as heteronomously governed by technical reason, and therefore lacking in the possibility for autonomous action. Although there is empirical evidence which supports such a view, it is not conclusive and is insufficient for sustaining the view that contemporary work is irredeemably degraded. Evidence from the ethnographic literature on what people actually do in work suggests that, even in outwardly Tayloristic organisations of work, there is a level of irreducible autonomy as people struggle to overcome rules, and thereby to unite means and ends, in order to get their work done (cf. Dejours, 2006). This struggle is constitutively intersubjective and relational, requiring interactions between self, others and the material world, and giving rise to interpretive differences over the purposes and meanings of work. These interpretive differences are a potentially rich source of social change and practical identity formation because they diversify the positive values which individuals might appropriate to the meaning content of their lives. But, these interpretive differences remain as pre-political

differences, unless activated by the political mode of being, that is by being able to exercise one's status as a co-authority and one's capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, through democratic practices at the level of the task. I propose that interpretive differences arising out of acts of work can foster the meaning content of work when they are evaluated, not by technical reason dominated by pre-given technical determinants, but by using a practical rationality of caring, based upon Dunne's (1993) concept of phronetic techne. This is because exercising phronetic techne, in order to address the needs of the situation, enables practitioners to form a sensibility for what is required to promote the good for worthy objects, through which they also develop the relevant orientations for legitimate affective appropriation of those worthy objects and generate intelligible reasons for acting and being.

In Chapter Four, I argue that *freedom* in work is not fully captured by either the negative or the positive concepts of freedom, and that we need also to evaluate the possibilities for an emancipatory experience of work by applying the neo-republican concept of freedom as non-domination. Weil's (1977 [1946]) account of unfree work reveals, from the inside of work, how distortion in the relations between persons acts to stifle human capabilities for thinking and feeling. Her account is useful to an analysis of the harms of contemporary work, where the complaint is that workers must submit to a management project of pre-determined ontological formations, that is, ways of being which are useful to the extraction, not only of objective labour, but also of affective labour. And it also illuminates the mechanisms which undermine sources of solidaristic relations and the sense of worthiness to act which contributes to the meaning content of work. Workers are constrained to modes of being which serve the interests of others, because they are not involved in setting the terms for subjectification, nor can they exit from the demands to act and to be in particular ways without damaging their position as economic participants. This means that, in order for us to experience personal freedom, we require political freedom - the freedom to be equal co-authorities, with a voice which will be attended to by others, combined with

access to the rules framing the possibilities for acting and being. Thus, I extend Pettit's concept of non-domination, as the absence of arbitrary interference without regard to the interests of the interferee, to having a share in creating and maintaining the framing rules governing the formation of subjectivities. This requires an account of how organisations frame the rules for acting and being, and I make use of McMahon's (1994) theory of democratic authority which allows a coordinating authority to be legitimate only when it is a democratic authority. Coordinating authorities are necessary, but necessary coordinating authorities are legitimate only when they are democratic authorities. This is because a democratic authority is conducive to fostering the cooperative and solidaristic relations with others which condition the possibility for collective self-determination in rule-making which render such relations non-dominating. Thus, the constitutive value of freedom as non-domination in a positive critical conception of meaningful work enables us to identify how the normative characteristics of cooperative relations are fostered by a system of workplace democracy, where democratic authority at the level of the organisation is allied to participatory practices at the level of the task.

In Chapter Five, I evaluate the intersubjective dimensions of work in relation to the *social recognition* we need to secure the positive relations to the self, upon which a secure sense of practical identity depends. We have a fundamental human need for stable positive recognitive relations to others which are increasingly difficult to secure in contemporary work. But I show that the contemporary organisation of work, by privileging achievement over contribution, values esteem recognition over respect recognition, encouraging a destructive race for esteem recognition, and leading to unstable self-formations which undermine human dignity. Both Rawlsian (1979) self-respect and Honneth's (1995) self-esteem are limited in their potential to overcome the instability of social recognition in contemporary work, because they each mediate recognition through the achievement principle. I propose, instead, a partial solution such that, rather than continuing to encourage the pursuit of the diminishing goods of self-esteem,



we secure a sense of our dignity, of our value as particular persons, because of our orientations and actions towards the worthy objects we have incorporated into the meaning content of our lives. When we allow our sense of valuable, worthwhile or useful contribution to be assessed against an ethic of care, then self-respect can be united to self-esteem. And these valuations, through democratic practices, can be made available for incorporation into a practical identity (cf. Korsegaard, 2009), provided that we understand a practical identity to be one which does not aim at unity or coherence, but at a constantly adjusting intersectional self (cf. Meyers, 2000).

In Chapter Six, I explore the prospects for democratic practices at the level of the task, where the experience of exercising the political mode of being enables a person to realise the value of meaningfulness in both the objective and the subjective dimensions. Interpretive differences remain pre-political potentials unless they are articulated and evaluated in public deliberation. Democratic practices are constitutive of both dimensions of the bipartite value of meaningfulness: in the objective dimension, such practices proliferate the positive values which inhere in worthy objects; in the subjective dimension, they foster affective attachments to worthy objects which are legitimate when they issue in correct orientations towards those objects. However, conventional justifications for workplace democracy are not, on the whole, grounded in its intrinsic value because it is transformative of the interior content of work. The parallel argument (Dahl, 1985) contends that economic enterprises are of the same kind as states; the spillover thesis (Pateman, 1979) proposes that workplaces are schools for democratic capabilities, and workers trained to democratic habits will apply their skills to an increasingly impoverished public sphere of action; the efficiency argument (Bowles & Gintis, 1993; Johnson, 2006) makes workplace democracy contingent upon its demonstrated ability to improve organisational effectiveness. These are instrumental arguments, where workplace democracy is valued for the benefits it brings to the enterprise or to society, rather than because it is intrinsically valuable for its own sake. Furthermore, deliberative democratic

theory has little to add to these arguments for workplace democracy, since the term itself is oxymoronic, making the attempt to apply it to action contexts governed by unified interests and technical rationality nonsensical. I argue, however, that democratic practices with agonistic dimensions provide the means for realising the full emancipatory potential of deliberation. Agonic democracy unsettles the tendency of deliberative practices towards an uncritical unity, which privileges rational consensus. And agonistic democratic practices can be specified with the help of Follett (1973 [1940]) and others to include a process of democratic dialogue staged by association, contestation, an ethos of enlargement, and decision.

In Chapter Seven, I argue for the necessity of a politics of meaningfulness, which is realised by securing the Capability for Voice through democratic practices at the level of the task and democratic authority at the level of the organisation. I propose that the principle of egalitarian meaning requires a basic income guarantee and the threshold of sufficient meaning is filled out by democratic equality, that is, our equal status as co-authorities. In a capabilities context, this means putting work in the political, as well as the material, dimension of Nussbaum's capability for 'control over one's environment', and specifying a Capability for Voice which is understood as having a share in decision-making. Using the structure of Sen's capabilities for functioning, a Capability for Voice is constituted by both an opportunity and a process dimension. In the opportunity dimension, individual agency, or the developed ablenesses of the individual, must be united to social agency, or the institutional mechanisms of workplace democracy. In the process dimension, people define *in situ* the criteria for decision-making over collective choices, which include the degree of control workers have over decision-making, the range of issue over which they exercise control, and the organisational level at which control is exercised. Many contemporary organisations seek to realise elements of a Capability for Voice in order to secure employee commitment to pre-determined organisational goals, but I argue that a full Capability for Voice is not given by

such programmes. In the end, a full Capability for Voice depends upon changing the governance arrangements of mediating institutions in the direction of co-ownership (mutuals, employee ownership and cooperatives), so that the Capability for Voice is no longer in the gift of management, but is an entitlement due to those members who are recognised as co-authorities in determining the purposes and means of the enterprise.

## Chapter One

### Meaningful Work as a Fundamental Human Need

#### 1.0.0 Introduction

*'Working is about the search for daily meaning as well as daily bread, for recognition as well as cash, for astonishment rather than torpor; in short, for a sort of life rather than a Monday through Friday sort of dying'. (Terkel, 1975: 1)*

*'I think most of us are looking for a calling, not a job. Most of us [...] have jobs that are too small for our spirit. Jobs are not big enough for people'. (Terkel, 1975: 14)*

The central claim of my thesis is that meaningful work is a fundamental human need. Since being able to experience our lives as worth living is of first importance, our normative concern must be to ensure that all work is structured so that it possesses the requisite structure for meaningfulness, and that society is organised to give each one of its members a plurality of options for meaningful work. Furthermore, to realise the regulatory ideal of meaningful work requires the transformation of work, not only in its organisation, but also in our conceptual understanding of what is work. I take work to consist of those activities in which we must all participate to secure the benefits of a system of social cooperation, including paid work, voluntary work, caring labour, and social reproduction in its broadest sense. This means that working is an enormously diverse condition of participation in joint action which exceeds the employment relation, and is unavoidable for persons needing to survive and to flourish.

In chapter one, I argue that meaningful work is a fundamental human need because it satisfies our inescapable interests in being able to experience the constitutive values of autonomy, freedom, and social recognition. In so doing, I distinguish my approach from liberal political theorists, for whom meaningful work, whilst an important ideal, is an individual preference which may or may not

be expressed in any particular conception of the good life, and thus cannot be a legitimate target of state intervention without coming into conflict with the principle of liberal neutrality. Instead, I propose that meaningful work is a fundamental human need within a liberal perfectionist framework, where institutional guarantees for meaningful work are guided by two principles – the principle of egalitarian meaning and a threshold of sufficient meaning (see Chapter Seven). I evaluate the conceptual content of meaningfulness using Wolf's (2010) concept of a bipartite value of meaningfulness, arguing that, in order to experience our lives as meaningful, we require certain capabilities for objective valuing and affective attachment, supported by the recognition of our equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value. This means that being able to experience meaningfulness depends upon our becoming valuers, situated in enabling social structures which allow us to engage with others in interpretive meaning-making. I conclude by proposing that an ethic of care provides the standard against which we can evaluate how well we are doing in relation to the commitments which constitute the meaning content of our lives.

## **2.0.0 Meaningfulness in Work: Preference or Need?**

I claim that meaningfulness is a fundamental human need which liberal political theorists have subordinated to their commitment to the principle of liberal neutrality. As a result, our need for work which is non-alienated, non-dominated and dignified has been relegated to the status of an individual taste or preference, which it is no business of the state to promote. This, I suggest, is normatively inadequate when the centrality of work in modern societies makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to remedy non-meaningful work in other action contexts.

### **2.1.0 The Argument for Meaningful Work as a Preference**

Meaningful work, liberal political theorists complain, is an immodest ideal, because, by making work central to the possibility of a meaningful life, individual preferences for meaning in other action contexts, such as the family, community or political life, are crowded out. Moreover, since meaningful work is

constituted by substantive normative commitments to what it is to live a good life, variously including values such as autonomy (Schwartz, 1982), expressive freedom (Marx, 1844), complex activities (Rawls, 1999 [1971]; Elster, 1986a), or self-respect (Honneth, 1995), then it arbitrarily specifies the content of the good life for all. As a result, the substantive normative content of meaningful work violates the liberal principle of neutrality, which maintains that a liberal democratic state must remain neutral between different conceptions of living. Since people possess a diversity of subjective preferences for the kind of work they wish to undertake, then the state has no legitimate part to play in saying whether or not that work should be meaningful (Arneson, 1987).

The liberal neutralist is concerned that to legislate for the character of work means that one kind of good will be prioritised over other equally valuable goods. If the state were to privilege meaningful work, then the range of values which people might incorporate into their conception of living would be narrowed. So, even though the importance of meaningful work for living a good life must be acknowledged, meaningful work must be restricted to the status of an individual preference (Kymlicka, 2002; Miller, 1999; Christman, 2002). To do otherwise is to support state sponsored perfectionism which promotes one conception of living, constraining options for finding meaning in other activities. In arguing against both a strong and a weak right to meaningful work, Arneson (1987) says: ‘implementing a right to meaningful work elevates one particular category of good, intrinsic job satisfaction, and arbitrarily privileges that good and those people who favour it over other equally desirable goods and equally wise fans of those other goods’ (ibid: 524-5). For Arneson, meaningful work is a perfectionist ideal which ‘assumes objective knowledge of the good life for human beings, the activities that constitute human flourishing’ (ibid: 520). Rawls (1999 [1971]) acknowledges the value of meaningful work (ibid: 463-4) from the point of view of human flourishing and autonomy (it is one of the human goods), but does not make meaningful work a primary good because to do so would result in the good of meaningful work being prioritised over equally valuable human goods. For Rawls, meaningful work is crucial to justice as fairness, because work

with the requisite structure supports the self-respect of citizens, but it need not be part of the good for everyone - and to make it so is to advocate perfectionism which breaches the priority of liberty. Since to legislate for the interior content of work would require interference in the available range of values which society allows to be constitutive of the good life, a liberal democratic state ought not to have an interest in the normative content of work, except to ensure that work meets basic humane standards, such as health and safety, employment rights, or welfare support for the unlucky, and to ensure that society is organised to secure justice in the equality of opportunity for the available supply of meaningful work. Where equality of opportunity pertains, we do not require guarantees for the interior content of work because the market will sort out individual preferences for meaningful or non-meaningful work (cf. Nozick, 1974). Thus, provided individuals are able to satisfy their preferences for meaning in other spheres of living, we need have no further concerns for the normative content of the work they choose to do.

### *2.2.0 The Compensation Argument*

But constructing meaningful work as an individual preference which can be satisfied in the market does not entirely eliminate the intuition that liberal political theory ought to have something more to say about the interior content of work. We are uncomfortable concurring with Henry Ford's conclusion that 'to some types of mind [...] the ideal job is one where the creative instinct need not be expressed' (Breen, 2011: 9). Surely preferences for some kinds of work over others do not extend to the desire to do work where no expressive human faculty need be exercised? I argue instead that it is incumbent upon a liberal democratic state to take seriously the moral concern that the interior content of much contemporary work stunts the human flourishing of workers by failing to meet their fundamental human interests in autonomy, freedom and social recognition. As I shall show, the empirical evidence, as well as our everyday experience of the work we do together, directs our attention to how non-meaningful work visits extensive harms upon those who have to do it, which for most people cannot be

offset by compensations in other spheres of action. If this is the case, then liberal complacency with respect to the availability and distribution of meaningful work becomes difficult to maintain. After all, despite the remarkable growth in varieties of work, as well as persisting expectations that work should be attractive or meaningful, work often fails to provide even a basic standard of living, let alone meets minimal standards for a humane and dignified experience of working. A common response to these concerns is some variant of the Compensation Argument: that work does not have to be meaningful, provided we can find our lives as a whole to be meaningful because of our activities in other spheres of living, such as our status in a community of interest (see Gomberg, 2007). Whilst I admit this to be a possibility, I argue that, in contemporary societies, such a strategy is extremely difficult for most individuals to pursue, because of the ways in which the burdens and benefits of the work we do shapes our lives as a whole. Work provides access to the roles, practices and social institutions of society which allocate resources for the development of the capabilities necessary to secure our social position and economic participation over the life course. Furthermore, such social structures embody the values we can potentially incorporate into our practical identities, grounding the sense that our lives have meaning (Roessler, 2012; cf. Korsegaard, 2009). This means that, in no small way, the work we do determines ‘the distribution of lives’ (Walzer, 1994). Indeed, to such an extent that, when our work lacks the requisite content in a system which restricts the supply of meaningful work, then we are less likely to develop the human capabilities necessary for equal participation over the life course, with the result that our lives as a whole are less likely to be structured for meaningfulness.

I argue that the Compensation Argument fails to address three kinds of concerns arising from a social organisation of work which generates a scarcity of meaningful work: firstly, the injustice of an unfair distribution of the most attractive work; secondly, harms to the capability formation necessary for equal participation in making one’s contribution; and thirdly, the diminishing of human well-being.



Firstly, the injustice of an unfair distribution of attractive work - all societies provide forms of meaningful work, but it has been meaningful work for the few and not for the many: Lane (1991) comments that it is the 'privileged class' for whom work offers 'self-direction, substantive complexity and challenge, variety, little supervision, and intrinsic satisfaction of excellence or self-determination' (ibid: 302). But liberal political theory has had little to say on the subject of elite expropriation of the most 'attractive work' (Fourier, 1983), nor has remedying the harms of non-meaningful work been central to theories of liberal egalitarian justice – and particularly of how social structures operate to shape an individual's search for meaning by enabling or disabling his capabilities for experiencing meaningfulness. Schooler (2007) theorises that one way in which social structure directly affects psychological functioning is through occupational conditions, where she defines social structure as 'the patterned interrelationships upon a set of individual and organisational statuses, as defined by the nature of their interacting roles' (ibid: 371). Schooler concludes that being able to undertake complex work, that is, work requiring self-direction, thought and judgement, depends upon where the job is located in the social structure of society (ibid: 375). This means that, because it unfairly allocates and unnecessarily constrains the kind of work which is most likely to enable individuals to satisfy their fundamental human interests in exercising thought and judgement, the way in which society arranges the work of social cooperation is unjust. Given the importance of the nature of work for the development of human capabilities, then justice requires that all work ought to be organised to allow each person to experience beings and doings which foster vital human capacities for thinking and feeling.

Secondly, the harms of non-meaningful work to the capability formation necessary to secure equal participation over the life course - such harms are not mere inconveniences to be remedied elsewhere, since, from poorly developed human capabilities to physical, mental and psychological deterioration, they affect the flourishing of an individual in every dimension of her life (Kohn & Schooler, 1983). Drawing upon Kohn & Schooler, Schwartz (1982) argues that the

prevailing structure of work is degrading because it fails to provide for the exercise of autonomy which is vital to moral personhood (Schwartz, 1982: 636). Lack of autonomy whilst at work affects a person's ability to lead an autonomous life as a whole, because the lack of autonomy at work cannot be made up for by full autonomy elsewhere: 'When persons work for considerable lengths of time at jobs that involve mainly mechanical activity, they tend to be made less capable of and less interested in rationally framing, pursuing and adjusting their own plans during the rest of their time' (Schwartz, 1982: 637). Autonomy is not simply having the capability to form one's own plans and purposes - it is also being able to exercise those capacities throughout all aspects of one's life. Schwartz (*ibid*) argues that action contexts cannot be artificially separated, and we cannot assume that if a person is able to practice autonomy in one sphere, then it does not matter if a person is deprived of autonomy in another. Kohn & Schooler (1978; 1983.) find that the structure of work affects the development of abilities to sustain thought and exercise judgement, and that the loss of these abilities carries over into the rest of the person's life so that those who undertake challenging and creative market work also demonstrate a preference for leisure work with similar characteristics. Kornhauser (1965) in his study of factory workers in Detroit found that: 'factory employment, especially in routine production tasks, does give evidence of extinguishing workers' ambition, initiative, and purposeful direction toward life goals' (*ibid*: 252). Specifically, the harms of non-meaningful work undermine an individual's ability to participate in the work of social cooperation over a lifetime by: stunting the development of her capabilities for free and autonomous action; undermining her sense of self-esteem and self-worth, of her standing relative to others; and thwarting her sense of efficacy, of being able to act with others upon the world. Together, these harms to capabilities, status, and efficacy reduce a person's ability to build the practical identity necessary to securing a sense that her life has meaning (cf. Korsegaard, 2009). Thus, work with the right content for avoiding harm is an essential experience for those living in contemporary societies who have an interest in the development of their human

capabilities, the securing of their social status, and their sense of being able to act with others – which is all people.

Thirdly, the diminishing of human well-being - the psychology of work literature provides compelling empirical evidence that being involved in ‘satisfying work’ is fundamental for psychological well-being ‘across various domains of human functioning’ (Blustein, 2008). Kohn and Schooler (1983; 1978), in their studies of how occupational conditions affect cognitive and psychological functioning in a 1970s longitudinal research of male workers in the US, present evidence for the pervasive impact of the interior content of work upon an individual’s sense of competence and self-respect: ‘Hence, doing substantially complex work tends to increase one’s respect for one’s own capacities, one’s valuation of self-direction, one’s intellectuality (even in leisure-time pursuits), and one’s sense that the problems one encounters are manageable’ (ibid: 304). Kohn & Schooler (1983) looked at occupational self-direction in terms of substantial complexity, closeness of supervision, and routinisation, of which substantive complexity was the core concept. They define substantively complex work as ‘work that, in its very substance, requires thought and independent judgement’ (ibid: 106), and identify a positive link between the substantive complexity of work and intellectual flexibility. They observed that job conditions shape personality (ibid: 47): jobs differing in complexity and self-direction were occupied by people with differing levels of cognitive functioning, but over time the nature of the job led to changes in the intellectual flexibility of job holders. Kohn & Schooler (1983) conclude: ‘The structural imperatives of the job – particularly those conditions that facilitate or restrict the exercise of self-direction in work – affect workers’ values, orientations to the self and society, and cognitive functioning primarily through a direct process of learning from the job and generalising what has been learned to other realms of life’ (ibid: 62-6, 126; see also Kornhauser, 1964). The Kohn-Schooler hypothesis receives strong confirmation from a 1978 study of Polish workers (Kohn & Slomczynski, 1990), and a Japanese study of employed males (Naoi & Schooler, 1985). More recently, Hauser & Roan’s (2007) evaluation of the Wisconsin Longitudinal Study shows

there are moderate, but significant, effects of work complexity upon abstract reasoning abilities in midlife. Moreover, Kornhauser (1965) identifies how the mental health of workers deteriorated ‘as we move from skilled, responsible, varied types of work to jobs lower in those respects’ (ibid: 75-76). Physical as well as mental health is affected by the interior content of work: for example, the Whitehall I and II studies showed that lack of control in the work environment, indicated by low job status, was associated with an increase in heart disease amongst government office workers (Bosma et al, 1997). Importantly, Bosma et al find that the objective state of low job control, independent of subjective reporting of the experience of low job control, had a deleterious impact upon health. They conclude that the harmful effects of disease could be ameliorated by increasing task variety and providing enriched opportunities for having a voice in decision-making<sup>1</sup>.

I conclude that the accumulated evidence from the empirical research supports my view that work affects the shape of a life, making the harms experienced at work difficult to remedy elsewhere: ‘When persons work for considerable lengths of time at jobs that involve mainly mechanical activity, they tend to be made less capable of and less interested in rationally framing, pursuing and adjusting their own plans during the rest of their time’ (Schwartz, 1982: 637). Taken together, evidence for the harms of non-meaningful work compels us to reconsider the claims of liberal theory - that the promotion of meaningful work is not state business, because it violates liberal neutrality. Of course, such research does not allow us to claim that a particularly forthright, reflective and capable individual doing non-meaningful work cannot find their lives to be meaningful because of their activities in other action contexts. But, if the present organisation of work unjustly distributes, and constrains the supply of, meaningful work, resulting in distorted capabilities and diminished well-being, then having to do non-meaningful work does present formidable barriers to most people being able to do so. In sum, the Compensation Argument fails because, firstly, our

---

<sup>1</sup> See Council of Civil Service Unions/Cabinet Office (2004), ‘Work, Stress and Health: The Whitehall II Study’, London: Public and Commercial Services Union.

experiences in work shapes the capabilities, status and identities which structure our lives as a whole and, secondly, the course of our life is influenced by the associations we belong to, and the social and economic positions we occupy (Young, 1990). Work is demanding, time consuming and, in complex societies, often requires skills to be developed over many years of training. Being able to do work with the requisite content structures an individual's life as whole, but the supply of meaningful work is restricted. This means that a just society should seek to make available to everyone work which secures the opportunity to develop important human capabilities, and to be able to do something worthwhile in mutually respectful relations with others.

### **2.2.0 The Need for Meaningfulness Argument**

I argue that institutional guarantees for meaningful work are justified by a fundamental human need for meaning, which, given the centrality of work in modern society, depends in important ways upon work possessing the requisite interior content, given by the value of meaningfulness. Frankl (1978; 1988) claims that the search for meaning, or the 'will to meaning', is a universal human motivation which addresses a fundamental need for a sense that one's life is worth living (see also Maddi, 1971). He says that the need for meaning is satisfied by active engagement with ordinary human living: 'Life ultimately means taking the responsibility to find the right answer to its problems and to fulfil the tasks which it constantly sets for each individual' (Frankl, 1984: 98). In a similar vein: meaning is 'the ontological significance of life; making sense of life situations, deriving purpose in existence' (Martsoff & Mickey, 1998: 294). Frankl acknowledges that there is a givenness to everyday problems, which appears to undermine our personal autonomy, but this does not mean that we are not choosers, since it is incumbent upon us to take responsibility for resolving the struggles of everyday living, demanding that we make reflective judgements when choosing the modes of acting and being appropriate to the situations in which we find ourselves. However, the necessity for an individual to choose how she

responds to everyday situations does not imply that she bears all the responsibility for finding her life to be meaningful, since the Kohn-Schooler research shows us how social structures can enable or disable capabilities, status and efficacy, thereby determining the resources which society makes available to any particular individual in her search for meaning.

Our need for meaning is confirmed by a number of different sources. From the psychological literature, Baumeister (1991) identifies four needs for meaning: a sense of purpose; a sense of efficacy; being able to view oneself as having positive value or being morally justified; and a sense of positive self-worth. Blustein (2006) identifies three fundamental needs for survival, self-determination and relatedness, consistent with the harms of non-meaningful work already discussed: stunted capabilities, damaged self-worth, and an inhibited sense of efficacy in acting with others upon the world and in forming a practical identity. From moral philosophy, Wolf (2010) suggests that meaningfulness may be '*felt* to answer to a certain kind of human need' (Wolf, 2010: 26), where we experience the need for meaningfulness as urgent and inescapable, because it addresses vital human interests which are necessary for human flourishing:

‘Our interest in being able to see our lives as worthwhile from some point of view external to ourselves, and our interest in being able to see ourselves as part of an at least notional community that can understand us and that to some degree shares our point of view, then, seems to me to be pervasive if not universal. By engaging in projects of independent value, by protecting, preserving, creating, and realizing value the source of which lies outside of ourselves, we can satisfy these interests. *Indeed, it is hard to see how we could satisfy them in any other way*’ (ibid: 31, emphasis added).

I argue that individuals who undertake non-meaningful work are less likely to be able to satisfy their need for meaning, and are made unacceptably

vulnerable to the harms of non-meaningful work. Remedying such harms demands a politics of meaningfulness, enabled by collective deliberation over the ways in which the interior content of work can be structured to alleviate heteronomy, unfreedom, and misrecognition. Holbrook (1977) describes the need for meaning as a ‘primary human need’ which he claims has been insufficiently recognised in political deliberation. According to Holbrook, reductionist philosophies have recast men and women into the roles of social functionaries in which our human worth has degraded into the value our roles and status positions have within the formal economy. Holbrook suggests that the frustrated will to meaning manifests itself in dysfunctions such as compulsive consumerism: ‘If we reduce men to their functions, both in their life and the predominant philosophy of their existence, they are doomed [...] For man reduced to functional man, there is no possibility of finding any meaning in his life (ibid: 183). Holbrook goes on to propose that the fundamental question for politics is: ‘*what opportunities do societies provide for the satisfaction of the human need for meaning, and how should societies be organised in order to provide those opportunities?*’ (ibid.). Workers are not motivated purely by external goods - they act also out of a fundamental need for living a human kind of life, which goes beyond the necessity for survival. In the absence of a functioning politics of meaningfulness, workers will seek some outlet for their frustrated will to meaning. For example, denied the experience of autonomy, workers will invent simulations of autonomy in the form of games, or even make deliberate mistakes, which Burawoy (1979) describes as the art of ‘making out’. Amongst numerous testimonies to such practices, is that of the worker who said: ‘Yes, I want my signature on ‘em too. Sometimes, out of pure meanness, when I make something, I put a little dent in it. I like to do something to make it really unique. Hit it with a hammer. I deliberately fuck it up to see if it’ll get by, just so I can say I did it’ (Mike Levevre, Steelworker, in Terkel, 1975: 22). In a liberal democratic society, the expressive need for self-determination must take the form of a politics of meaningfulness, which seeks to ensure that people are not prevented from experiencing their lives as meaningful because of the work they do.

### 2.2.1 A Fundamental Human Need

My claim is that meaningfulness is a fundamental human need because it identifies and satisfies what is of profound importance for living a human kind of life: ‘human needs are the things that must be if human life is to be’ (Reader, 2005: 135). Thomson (2005) defines a fundamental need as:

‘a non-derivative [...] inescapable necessary condition in order for the person A not to undergo serious harm’ (Thomson, 2005: 175).

A fundamental need directs us to what constitutes the normative outlines of a person’s life: ‘A person’s needs have a bearing on how he ought to live, but drives have no such relevance’ (Thomson, 1987: 14). A person is harmed when their fundamental needs remain unmet because, in such circumstances, they are ‘deprived of activities and experiences that answer such interests’ (Thomson, 2005: 177). Thomson (1987) argues that a fundamental need addresses vital interests that are characteristic of a person’s essential nature: vital interests are reasons which lie behind our ‘non-instrumental desires’ (ibid: 64), where an interest ‘defines the range and type of activities and experiences that partly constitute a meaningful, worthwhile life, and it defines the nature of their worth’ (ibid: 76). This means that harm is not to be understood just in terms of thwarted desire satisfaction; instead, harm arises when the unavoidable interests a person has in her life being a certain way are ignored or misrecognised, independent of whether or not her desires have been met. Interests may be unfulfilled even when desires are satisfied, because people adapt their expectations to the constraints of their circumstances (Elster, 1983): ‘the poor who have never had money are deprived and harmed, even though their standard of living has never actually fallen’ (Thomson, 1987: 26). This is because a continuing, unchanging, low quality of living, whilst it may keep life going, damages a person’s potential to lead a life of human flourishing. Wolf (2010) suggests that the value of



meaningfulness addresses several important human interests: an aspiration to objectivity or being connected to something larger than ourselves; a need for self-esteem or being able to judge ourselves and our projects as worthwhile; a sense of belonging or a wish not to be alone; and existential security (ibid: 28). Our self-esteem depends upon being able to assess ourselves and our situation from an external point of view, and then being able to judge our lives as ‘good and valuable’ against the standards generated by that exterior standpoint (ibid.) which then becomes a ‘rightful source of pride’ (ibid.). Meaningful work is a fundamental human need in this sense because it addresses our inescapable interest in living a life of human quality, which includes activities structured by autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination, and social recognition as dignified work. And in modern societies, such inescapable interests are satisfied or thwarted in the work we do together in a system of social cooperation.

Thus, fundamental human needs are not simply what are required (negatively) if harm is to be avoided, but are necessities (positively) for a flourishing life. Furthermore, the fundamental needs which we attribute to a person depend on what we understand to be their value as human beings. Reader (2005) defines entrenched needs as needs which are determined by relatively unchangeable facts of nature, facts which generate a need for work of a certain kind. She argues that what we understand by need is grounded in what we understand the human being to be: for example, in the same way that food is not simply what keep human physiology going, work is not simply what provides necessities for continuing to exist. If the human being is merely biological then work can be provided in any way which simply sustains life: it will not matter if the work is of poor quality. If, however, the human being is essentially free, rational and social, then this generates a demand that he is treated with respect in relation to work, which, given the kind of creature he is, requires that the work he does possesses the requisite interior content for autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination, and social recognition as dignified relations to others.

I conclude that meaningful work is an ‘inescapably valuable’ (Thomson, 2005: 84) fundamental human need, because it answers our unavoidable interests

in work being structured by autonomy, freedom, and social recognition. Thus, to argue for the political importance of meaningful work is to make the claim that each individual ought to be treated as a certain kind of being, one possessing dignity and worth. This means that, in contemporary societies, the centrality of work for securing a life of human flourishing makes evaluating how work inhibits the development of capabilities, status and efficacy a political priority. If we accept this claim, then meaningful work is not a mere preference in the market, but is a regulatory ideal, requiring societies to pay attention to how work meets the fundamental human needs of its members, by ensuring that the interior content of work has the requisite structure for meaningfulness. Therefore, I propose that a meaningful work standard is realised by the adoption of two principles as societal goals – the *principle of egalitarian meaning* and a *threshold of sufficient meaning* - where the principle of egalitarian meaning is met when each person's contribution to the work of social cooperation has the requisite structure for meaningfulness up to a threshold level of sufficiency (see Chapter Seven).

### 2.2.2 *Liberal Perfectionism and a Politics of Meaningfulness*

Adopting institutional guarantees for the content of work breaks with liberal neutrality, but this does not entail that the state is entitled to impose a perfectionist ideal of work upon its members. Rather, several writers have identified that it is possible for a meaningful work ideal to operate within a framework of liberal perfectionism (Roessler, 2011; Keat, 2006, 2009b; Hsieh, 2008; Muirhead, 2004), which Dzur (1998) describes as 'an effort to escape the shortcomings of the predominant liberal conception of the state as neutral in matters of life-choices without falling into the overreaching perfectionism of neoconservative writings' (ibid: 668; cf. Raz, 1986; cf. Sher, 1997). In a liberal perfectionist framework, meaningful work is an open-ended ideal containing an extensive range of values, allowing for the development of a diversity of capability formations and practical identities. Moreover, although a liberal perfectionist framework for meaningful work will 'reject the role of state agents in

channelling a person into a particular life' it will allow 'the 'mild illiberality' of preventing the degradation or truncation of capabilities' (Dzur, 1998: 678). However, the protection of capabilities does not prevent there being a very wide range of activities, embodying a plurality of values - although excluding those which are likely to result in capability deformation of self or others. Consequently, institutional guarantees for meaningful work will permit many worthwhile activities containing a plurality of attractive values, thereby making available a wide diversity of individual interpretations of meaningfulness.

Since people can continue to pursue a broad range of options for living, with the added security of capability protection, then liberal concerns that institutional guarantees for meaningful work will limit those options are overstated. Instead, setting meaningful work within a liberal perfectionist framework ensures that no person's efforts will be rendered futile by finding themselves in work which is structured by heteronomy, unfreedom, and misrecognition. But the concerns of liberal neutralists may not be so easy to set aside, because any kind of perfectionism runs the risk of compromising our autonomy. Dzur (1998) addresses these anxieties by making the legitimacy of a liberal perfectionist framework dependent upon a general capability for collective self-determination in forming the values embodied within the framework of acting and being. By allowing for deliberative engagement in the interpretation of what values add to the meaningfulness of an individual life, the form that meaningful work might take for any individual remains available for amendment, ensuring that individuals are not coerced into taking work which is subjectively unappealing or objectively valueless. Instead, deliberation provides, not only for the interpretation and multiplication of values, but also for engagement with others over the values which add to the meaning content of a life, disagreeing with them, being challenged and challenging in return. Through deliberative engagement over values, people develop and exercise the political mode of being, opening up possibilities for personal and social change, in the process finding that being able to express the political mode of being can add, in-itself, to the meaning content of a life.

Of course, simply securing institutional guarantees for the availability of meaningful work for all does not ensure that all individuals will experience their work as meaningful: ‘no one can make a success of another person’s life’ (Raz, 1996: 8). Hurka (1993) calls this the problem of asymmetry where ‘governments can provide necessary but not sufficient conditions for the realization of good lives’ (Dzur, 1998: 677). In defending perfectionism, Hurka (1993) says that seeking the fulfilment of one’s human potential requires the deliberate engagement of one’s own self in projects and persons: it ‘involves doing things, forming goals and realizing them in the world. And each person’s doing must be largely her own, reflecting her energy and commitment’ (ibid: 64). But although the individual herself must engage actively with meaning possibilities, governments can ensure that social structures do not inhibit the individual’s search for meaning, and that they contain values conducive to meaning attribution. In sum, liberal perfectionism legitimised by a deliberative framework requires: firstly, an active orientation of the self towards the values embodied in substantive ideals, ensuring that values are not simply received, but interpreted, made, accepted or rejected, supported by secondly, state action to ensure that social structures enable people to develop the capabilities and acquire the status for becoming co-authorities in the creation and maintenance of positive values.

### **3.0.0 The Value of Meaningfulness**

We might argue that, in the absence of God, or some transcendental standpoint, the individual search for meaning in life is nonsensical (Nagel, 1971; Hare, 1972), and our lingering need for meaning simply ‘a kind of hangover produced by overindulgence in the potent brew of metaphysics’ (Kekes, 1986: 79). Whilst acknowledging that we can no longer rely upon a transcendental standpoint to satisfy our need for meaning, I argue, with Frankl (2004), Kekes (1986) and Wolf (2007), that this does not entail having to dispense with all possibility of being able to attribute meaning to our lives. Wolf (2007) says that ‘an appropriate response to our status as specks in a vast universe is a concern and

aspiration to have one's life wrapped up with projects of positive value' (ibid: 19-20; see also Metz, 2001; Wong, 2008). Frankl (2004) says that the search for meaning is satisfied by the ordinary, everyday experiences towards which we adopt positive and active orientations: 'The perception of meaning boils down to becoming aware of a possibility against the background of reality, or, more simply, becoming aware of what can be done about a given situation' (ibid: 84). This means that meaningfulness, if such exists, must be sought in the mundane realities of our human lives, in our acting and being together in the messy everyday of human experience: 'Our lives have such meaning as we give to them. Meaning is made, not received or found; it is a human contribution to the world' (Kekes, 1986: 75). Even though meaningfulness is not given, but must, instead, be patched together from our experiences of living together, this does not force us to conclude that the value of meaningfulness is either illusory or cannot be described. Nor is the search for meaningfulness a purely personal affair for which we have no collective responsibility, because we have already seen how social structures can inhibit or support meaning-making capabilities, rendering us more or less vulnerable to the harms of non-meaningful work, and unfairly distributing the available range of positive values. Despite the loss of a transcendental standpoint, I conclude that the search for meaningfulness remains a legitimate personal and social objective, where a politics of meaningfulness acts to ensure that all work has the requisite structure for meaningfulness (Levy, 2005)<sup>2</sup>.

### *3.1.0 Structuring the Value of Meaningfulness*

Because work with the structure for meaningfulness shapes our lives as a whole, an individual seeking to find her life meaningful will be concerned to ensure that work contributes to 'the meaningfulness of her life, in virtue of the way it furthers her life story', rather than simply 'the sum total of good things in life' (Kauppinen, 2008: 2). I show that activities with the structure for

---

<sup>2</sup> Recent work by Alfes et al (2010) shows that 'the two most important drivers of [employee] engagement are meaningfulness of work and employee voice' (ibid: 36).

meaningfulness combine objective valuing with subjective attachment in actions which promote what is good for the objects of our actions, whether a person, an animal, an institution, or a practice. In Wolf's work on the value of meaningfulness, meaningfulness has an overarching structure, given by what has independent value beyond its value to the individual (Wolf, 2010; see also Wolf, 1982; 1997a; 1997b; 2002; 2007). Wolf (2010) says:

‘Our interest in living a meaningful life is not an interest in a life *feeling* a certain way, but rather an interest that it *be* a certain way, specifically, that it be one that can be appropriately appreciated, admired, or valued by others; that it be a life that contributes to or realizes or connects in some positive way with independent value’ (Wolf, 2010: 32).

Wolf describes a bipartite value of meaningfulness which unites objective valuation with subjective satisfaction: ‘meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness’ (ibid: 9), where the experience of meaningfulness is more likely to occur when a person becomes actively connected to a worthy object, or something or someone of value, such that they are ‘gripped, excited, involved by it’ (Wolf, 1997, 2002, 2009; see also Starkey, 2006). She distinguishes the bipartite value of meaningfulness from morality (duty) or happiness (feelings of goodness), where meaningfulness is ‘a category of value that is not reducible to happiness or morality, and that is realized by loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way’ (Wolf, 2010: 13). Wolf argues that a bipartite value for meaningfulness is necessary because the morality/self-interest distinction fails to describe all that is normatively significant about our actions and our relations. In particular, the morality/self-interest distinction is unable to account for the special ties we feel towards our ‘ground projects’ – projects which help us to answer the question ‘what reasons do we have for living?’ (Wolf, 2010: 56). Williams (1981) refers to ground projects as ‘closely related to [one’s] existence and [...] to a significant degree give meaning

to [one's] life' (ibid: 12; see also Smart & Williams, 1983). The special significance for meaningfulness of ground projects comes from how they organise our values and frame our practical identities. Having ground projects provides us with the material for the narrative formation of our lives, directing us to the responsibilities we have to act appropriately towards the objects for the sake of which such projects exist. Thus, meaningfulness does not come from the aggregation of individual goods, but from long-lasting, appropriate orientations towards particular objects, such as persons, animals, or activities, where orientations are appropriate when they point us towards the responsibilities we have to further the good for those objects.

But how ground projects add to the meaning content of a life is not given automatically by the values embodied in any particular project. Although a project may be acknowledged by all, including the one whose life is structured by the project, as valuable, this does not mean that the individual doing the project will have an affective sense of that project being meaningful. Objectively, there are 'many different kinds of lives that are good, many different activities and relationships that are valuable and can contribute to a life that is worth living' (Keat, 2009b: 360), but, subjectively, there is 'variability with respect to what is good for the different subjects' (ibid.). Consequently, finding meaning in ground projects requires the exercise of 'subjective judgement' (Hicks & King, 2009: 643), involving 'a confirmatory search for information suggesting that one's life is meaningful' (ibid: 644). The search for information is the search for validation, for affirmation of one's judgements, out of which we construct the objective value of our doings and beings. Wolf's bipartite value of meaningfulness integrates the objective and subjective dimensions when affective feelings of attachment, satisfaction or fulfilment are united to an assessment of the worthiness of the object at which the feelings aim. This implies that in order to find our activities to be meaningful, then what we subjectively feel to be meaningful must be joined to considerations of what is of independent value: 'A meaningful life is a life that a.) the subject finds fulfilling, and b.) contributes to or connects positively with something the value of which has its source outside the subject' (ibid: 20). Wolf

argues that a purely subjective view of meaningfulness as the pursuit of feelings of fulfilment fails to address our intuitions concerning the meaningfulness of objects and activities. She illustrates her argument with Taylor's (1970) adaption of the figure of Sisyphus, condemned to stone rolling, but who is given a drug to change him into someone who enjoys the activity of stone rolling (Wolf, 2010: 17). The reason Wolf gives for the continued meaninglessness of Sisyphus' life is that his efforts are objectively futile and their futility cannot be redeemed simply because they have become subjectively satisfying (see also Joske, 1974). In Wolf's bipartite view, the life of 'Sisyphus Fulfilled' cannot be meaningful without the objective dimension of being involved in activities which have independent value in a 'source *outside of oneself*' (Wolf, 2010: 19).

Thus, subjective satisfactions contribute to a life of meaning when they arise from engagements with worthy objects: 'what is valuable is that in one's life we actively (and lovingly) engage in projects that give rise to this feeling, when the projects in question can be seen to have a certain kind of objective value' (ibid: 27). Sisyphus fulfilled fails to meet the objective condition of the value of meaningfulness, but I suggest that the full explanation for the continued meaninglessness of Sisyphus's activities lies, not just in the structure of the action, but in the appropriateness of the action for the kind of creature Sisyphus is. Even though Sisyphus is now subjectively satisfied, the pointlessness of the task makes it unworthy of a creature who is capable of more complex and meaningful feats, and to whom violence had to be done in order to make him into the kind of creature who would experience such work as fulfilling. It is disrespectful of our status as human beings if the meaning of our valued activities or ground projects is reduced to manipulated feelings of satisfaction. This suggests that fulfilment which is worth experiencing must contain 'a cognitive component that requires seeing the source or object of fulfilment as being, in some independent way, good or worthwhile' (Wolf, 2010: 24). Some actions are inappropriate for a creature whose fundamental needs are not to be met in any way whatsoever, but in a manner consistent with the kind of creature he is, that is, one who has a



fundamental human need to express free, autonomous acts directed towards worthy objects in respectful association with others.

### **3.2.0 Worthy Objects in the Objective Dimension**

Whilst the bipartite value of meaningfulness provides us with the means to identify which activities have the structure for meaningfulness, it does not tell us how these activities translate into the actual experience of meaningfulness for any particular individual. I argue that to experience meaningfulness, we need to become valuers, able to recognise what has objective worth, and to affectively appropriate objective values to our lives. When we become valuers, we provide ourselves with the opportunity to become ‘appropriately related to what has worth’ (Wolf, 2010: 179) by developing the capabilities for objective valuation and subjective attachment, through which we learn to appreciate what objects have value, and to generate the relevant orientations towards those objects. I argue that the relevant orientations are those which motivate the right actions consistent with the nature of the object, for example, unconditional love when parenting a child or respectful care when looking after an aged relative. In addition, becoming a valuer must be incorporated into our practical identities, where we see ourselves as having the status as co-authorities entitled to make judgements upon the worthiness of objects, and to decide upon how to act towards those objects appropriately. But, developing the capabilities and practical identity necessary for becoming a valuer depends upon our being able to engage in activities which connect us to things that matter: ‘connecting with something of worth in a way that enables the direct appreciation of the value of one’s activity’ (ibid: 189). This is because, by investing their objects with meaning and positive values, and educating our capacities for judging and feeling, these connections are intrinsically valuable: ‘we flourish through (meritorious) activity such as parenting and music making, because these activities involve an appreciation of things that matter, things with worth’ (ibid: 179). In the following sections, I explore two possible avenues for learning to become valuers through encounters

with worthy objects – when activities contain *purposes*, or when they are structured as *projects*.

### 3.2.1 Purposes

A life of meaning is a life with a *purpose*: ‘A life has point when it is oriented toward goals which transcend the limits of the individual, goals which are more valuable than the subjective concerns of any one person’ (Levy, 2005: 178). But the life of a person does not reduce to her goals or purposes: ‘It is degrading for a man to be regarded as merely serving a purpose’ (Baier, 1957: 120). Besides, not all purposes are equally worthwhile - some goals are trivial, reprehensible or even wicked. Furthermore, a life defined by its goals is vulnerable to devaluation, as a consequence either of failure, or of over-achievement. For example, Wiggins’s (1998) farmer, trapped in a cycle of endless achievement in which the farmer buys land to grow corn to feed pigs, illustrates the pointlessness of the repetitious recreation of the same goal without resolution, unconnected to a wider structure of value. But, even though ‘lives do not acquire meaning just in case they achieve goals’ (Levy, 2005: 178), goals can add to the meaning content of a life. This is so even where the activities concerned lack intrinsic merit, as is the case with many kinds of hard work (Walzer, 1983), since those engaged in dirty, hard or menial work are not unjustified in claiming meaning for those activities when their ends benefit society; for example, cleaning sewers is vital for public health. In case study research of several workplaces from banks to retail, Doherty (2009) found that work interpreted from ‘the outside’ as unskilled, poor quality work, was often seen by workers themselves as invested in complex social interactions and meaning: ‘The job I’m doing now (customer service) is mostly pluses because I like dealing with people and I like arguing! I love the job I’m doing now (Deirdre)’ (ibid: 92). Thus, when sufficient political space is given to interpretive sense-making then even purposes judged as less worthwhile by society can acquire valuable meaning for those doing them – and I argue that when these judgements are brought into public deliberation through democratic practices,

they have the potential to reframe society's valuation of the worthiness of activities.

Democratic deliberation can not only provide one sense in which we can construct the objective basis for independent value, it can also encourage affective engagement in the subjective dimension. Affective engagement can be fostered by making purposes available for disagreement and negotiation, allowing individuals to deploy meaning-making capabilities in interpreting, shaping and ordering the values and actions necessary for achieving purposes. Interacting with purpose is a mode of political engagement with others, requiring confidence in one's equal status in relation to others, and the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, where the political mode of being is, in and of itself, one of the worthy objects rendering an activity susceptible to meaningfulness. This, I suggest, directs us to democratic practices at the level of the task which bring into public view interpretive differences over values, meanings, and purposes. We should be careful, however, not to conclude that, just by filtering the meaning of poor quality work through deliberative public evaluation, we have satisfied all normative concerns with respect to the content of work, since 'boring work is boring work' (Carter, 2003: 179). If the work fails to meet the threshold of sufficient meaning in an objective sense, then it must be reorganised to ensure that it contains a sufficient range of worthy objects embodying attractive values, structured by autonomy, freedom, and social recognition.

In sum, activities must be ordered around objects of worth which are valuable independent of the purposes at which they aim, since purposes alone, whilst necessary, are not sufficient for securing the value of meaningfulness. To be susceptible to meaning appropriation, purposes must be contained within wider structures of value, such as the roles, practices and institutions which make up the fabric of a system of social cooperation, where to be a practice participant is also to be afforded a vantage point for deliberation with others over the value of those objects, accessing information about the worthiness of objects, and of assessing whether our actions and orientations are appropriate for the objects in question.

### 3.2.2 Projects

A life of meaning contains *projects*. I argue that purposes alone are insufficient for realising the value of meaningfulness, and that purposes must be embedded in wider structures of meaning. In particular, projects are structures for organising purposes which enable positive values to be promoted. Wolf ascribes meaning to lives when they involve ‘active engagement in projects of worth’ (Wolf, 1997: 209), where to be meaningful, active engagement must be harnessed to the involvement of one’s self in worthwhile activities requiring hard work, commitment and long term planning which also generate a special sense of feeling alive. The concept of practices is useful for understanding how projects of worth need to be structured if they are to contribute to a life of meaning where ‘projects are practices in which supremely valuable goods are at stake’ (Levy, 2005: 185). MacIntyre (1981) defines a practice as:

‘any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course of trying to achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and partially definitive of that form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are systematically extended’ (MacIntyre, 1981: 175).

MacIntyrean practices are structured activities with the following features: internal and external goods; internal standards of excellence; and a community of fellow practitioners. Internal and external practice-related goods are among those objects of value we may find sufficiently subjectively attractive to appropriate to the meaning content of our lives, where *external* goods are goods such as social status and pay, and *internal* goods are goods which are particular to the practice and can be experienced only by those who become proficient in the practice (ibid: 176) - the satisfactions of being a nurse, for example, are not the same as those of being a dancer. Practitioners are subject to the standards of excellence interior to

the practice, which have become accepted through the accumulation of experience and tradition:

‘A practice involves standards of excellence and obedience to rules as well as the achievement of goods. To enter into a practice is to accept the authority of those standards and the inadequacy of my performance as judged by them. It is to subject my own attitudes, choices, preferences and tastes to the standards which currently and partially define the practice’ (ibid: 177).

When MacIntyre’s concept of practices is allied with Wolf’s concept of worthwhile projects then it generates a persuasive notion of how our activities can be structured for meaningfulness. Wolf (1997) warns, however, against over-emphasising structured activities as sources of meaningfulness: she suggests that ‘projects’ with their connotations of ‘well-defined and goal-oriented tasks’ are somewhat misleading, and that ‘meaning comes less from the individuated projects than from the larger involvements of which they are parts’ (ibid: 212). Her point is that, whilst structured projects do add to the meaning content of a life, so do the relationships and commitments which constitute the ‘ongoing strands of life’ of which projects, understood as structured practices, are only one part (ibid). Besides, practices can embody elitist or exclusionary values, and act to constrain rather than multiply the supply of meaningful work for all: for example, practices involving skilled workers often incorporate masculine identity as a value, frequently excluding women, constraining them to practices seen as essentially feminine, such as care work (cf. Frazer & Lacey, 1994). Moreover, when they become disconnected from wider public benefit, practices are vulnerable to distortion: Miller (1999), for example, distinguishes between self-contained and purposive practices, the latter being those practices which meet a wider social need, and can be judged against ‘an external purpose which gives the practice its point’ (ibid: 117). Consequently, practices cannot be divorced from wider structures of meaning, making them subject to judgements of value by the community of valuers beyond practice participants. Nevertheless, practices are

important sources for realising the bipartite value of meaningfulness when they are: conducted within a community; regulated by internal standards of excellence; enable the participants to acquire worthwhile internal goods, including being able to develop valuable qualities of character; and if the practice as a whole connects to objective value through societal endorsement.

Practices are important social opportunities for realising the bipartite value of meaningfulness. When we participate in practices, we open ourselves up to the self-development essential to becoming a valuer, because the intrinsic goal of ‘productive crafts [...] is never only to catch fish, or produce beef or milk’, but ‘to do so in a manner consonant with the excellences of the craft, so that there is not only a good product, but the craftsman is perfected through her or his activity’ (MacIntyre, 1981; see also Breen, 2006). Participating in practices forms the capabilities for evaluation, judgement and feeling necessary for becoming a valuer, because practices connect us to forms of public evaluation, giving us private confidence as a consequence of public endorsement that our efforts aim at worthy objects. Roessler (2007), for example, explains that family work is under recognised, not because it is unpaid, but because it has been relegated to an invisible, private sphere. This reduces the capacity of family work to be structured as a practice capable of providing us with the standards, information, and presence of co-valuers necessary to being able to validate our assessment of the values involved in family work, and of judging how we are doing against them. In addition, thinking of carework as a public practice helps us to distinguish between those intimate relations which form the basis of work and those which do not. Thus, caring relations become family work when the carer is connected to public practices, such as parenting or elder care. Nussbaum (2001) provides the example of two sisters who love their frail elderly mother equally, but one has chosen a work life at some distance from her mother, whilst the other sister has chosen to become her mother’s main carer. The distant sister may occasionally provide respite, but she has delegated her caring responsibilities to the caring sister – the caring sister is the family worker and her care work knits her into wider social practices of caring. When their mother dies, the life structure of the sister who is

the family worker is altered in a fundamentally different manner from that of the distant sister, requiring her to engage in a complex renegotiation of her practical identity. In this case, caring as a public practice helps to identify what is distinctive about the work of the caring sister over that of the distant sister. We must be cautious, however, not to conclude that caring as a practice can describe all that is significant about the relationship of the caring sister to her mother, a relationship which is invested additionally with affective ties transcending the sister's satisfaction that she is performing well against the internal standards of the practice of care. To understand the importance of these affective ties for the shape of a life, we need to evaluate the subjective dimension of the bipartite value of meaningfulness.

### **3.3.0 Affective Appropriation in the Subjective Dimension**

Recognition of the value of worthy objects, and even active involvement with those worthy objects through public practices, does not guarantee that a person will find those objects and activities to be personally meaningful, in the absence of their affective incorporation into the meaning content of that person's life. Practices and projects are sources of worthy objects and sites for the development of the relevant capabilities for meaningfulness, but, to secure the value of meaningfulness to their lives, a person must also experience those worthy objects as subjectively attractive. Realising subjective attractiveness requires that a person be able to incorporate worthy objects into her life, such that her life is shaped by the orientations and actions promoting the good for the worthy objects in question. But there may be occasions when, although we may recognise the objective value of things, we may be unable to experience them as valuable for our own lives. Raz (2001), for example, says that the attempt to revive the mood of a depressed person by pointing out to them the beauties and treasures of the world is unlikely to be successful: 'Their problem is not the absence of value in the world but the absence of meaning in their lives' (ibid: 19). In short, without affective attachment, worthy objects cannot, on their own, add to the meaning

content of a life: ‘Concrete attachments are good for those whose attachments they are; their value is within the sphere of personal meaning. The uniqueness of an object or pursuit established by an attachment is uniqueness to one person, not uniqueness impersonally judged’ (Raz, 2001: 39). This means that, for worthwhile activities to add to the meaning content of our lives, we need to experience them as subjectively attractive: ‘A housewife and mother, a doctor, or a bus driver may be competently doing a socially valuable job, but because she is not engaged by her work (or, as we are assuming, by anything else in her life), she has no categorical desires that give her a reason to live’ (Wolf, 1997: 211). And this implies limits to public practices as a source of meaningfulness because, although public acknowledgement of value or worthiness reinforces our affective engagement with values, public acknowledgement will not compensate for a person finding an activity insufficiently attractive. An achievement can be objectively and publically valued as a genuine contribution, but still be subjectively devalued by the individual whose achievement it is. Arneson (2000) claims that the slave’s achievements are not diminished by his state of slavery – they can still add to the perfection of his life, although he qualifies this by adding ‘no doubt achievement does more to enhance an agent’s life, other things being equal, when the agent wholeheartedly endorses the doing and properly rates its value’ (ibid: 57). Arneson does not find that the absence of subjective endorsement prevents an exceptional achievement from counting towards the *perfection* of a person’s life, but, in my application of the bipartite value of meaningfulness to work, it would constitute a formidable barrier to the *meaningfulness* of that person’s life.

### 3.3.1 *Appropriation and Affective Attachment*

I argue that for persons, objects and activities of value to be constitutive of the meaning content of our lives, we must make them our own through a process of affective appropriation. Affective appropriation in the bipartite value of meaningfulness implies legitimate emotional engagement with worthy objects



where legitimacy is given by how our emotions direct us toward what is good for worthy objects. As a consequence of affective appropriation, we acknowledge them as ours because of the particular place they have within our lives which gives us reasons to regard our life as worth living; but we also acknowledge them as ours because their objective value confirms that we are right to give them such prominence in our lives:

‘The personal meaning of objects, causes and pursuits depends upon their impersonal value, and is conditional upon it. But things of value have to be appropriated by us to endow our lives with meaning, meaning which is a precondition for life being either a success or a failure’ (Raz, 2001: 20).

Drawing on Raz’s identification of the need for appropriation of ‘things of value’, I understand appropriation not in the pejorative sense of exploitation, but as an active orientation of one’s self to the particular value of worthy objects, requiring a form of emotional engagement which does not seek to secure in ourselves a satisfying state of mind, but seeks instead what is good for worthy objects. Consequently, not just any kind of emotional state will do for meaning appropriation - some emotions directed at worthy objects are not legitimate if they lead to abuse, or simply misrecognition of what constitutes the good for the object. I argue therefore that we need an account of emotional engagement which describes the kind of affective appropriation of worthy objects capable of fostering the correct orientations towards the objects in question. Nussbaum (2001) characterises emotions as ‘forms of judgement’ (ibid: 22) which, in their intensity and particularity, are ‘acknowledgements of neediness and lack of self-sufficiency’ (ibid.). Because they are directed at objects (goals, projects, persons) constituting our vital interests in our conception of the good life, such emotions indicate where we are vulnerable to reversion, loss or harm: ‘The emotional importance of the projects that one values is revealed in the whole complex array of feelings to which one becomes vulnerable by virtue of one’s engagement with them’ (Scheffler, 2006: 254; see also Reader, 2007). Our sense of meaning, our

place in the world, is dependent upon the flourishing of the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, where the type and intensity of our emotions indicate the relative importance of various objects, and how they structure our lives as a whole. Nussbaum specifies the normative dimensions of the relevant emotions in relation to their objects which explains also the nature of our vulnerability: firstly, our emotions have an object (and in the value of meaningfulness, it is a worthy object); secondly, the kind of emotion which it is appropriate for us to experience is ‘internal’ to the object (Nussbaum, 2001: 27), that is, the nature of the object, in addition to the place it occupies in our lives, specifies the correct emotional orientation; thirdly, our beliefs about the object generate types of emotions, for example, the anger we experience if a loved one is threatened (ibid: 29); and fourthly, the kind and intensity of our emotions signals the value of the object, they are ‘concerned with value, they see their object as invested with value or importance’ (ibid: 30). Thus, our emotions alert us to what is important in our lives, in their intensity and persistence they indicate the shape of our lives, and direct us to how the judgements we make are legitimate when they are structured by what is good for the worthy objects to which we are affectively engaged.

But our emotions do not simply happen to us, rendering us out of control and unable to exercise choice of freedom (cf. Wallace, 1993). Instead, emotions are susceptible to change in the light of new evaluations and judgements, potentially leading to reassessments of the worthiness of objects: ‘Transformation in feeling for oneself is a transformation in judgements about the self’ (Gilligan, 1982). Developed emotions are person-specific, as well as object-appropriate; that is, they are constituted by the place the object has in the life of the person whose emotions they are, as well as by the nature of the object: ‘they insist on the real importance of their object, but they also embody the person’s own commitment to the object as a part of her scheme of ends’ (Nussbaum, 2001: 33). They are eudaimonistic (ibid: 31) because they are concerned with both the person’s, and the object’s, flourishing, and they specify the appropriate actions we should take towards worthy objects, such as deciding, making, preserving, caring and

restoring (cf. Spelman, 2003). This means that emotions which enable legitimate affective appropriation of worthy objects are ‘merited emotions’ (Kauppinen, 2008), that is, they are emotions which are structured by the recognition that the objective worthiness of the object *merits* our emotional engagement with the object (Kauppinen, 2008). In addition, they are merited because they reflect legitimate attachments; for example, unmerited emotions include feelings of attachment which keep us in destructive personal relationships, or foster misplaced loyalty to dysfunctional practices or institutions. ‘Merited emotions’ help us to forgo personal welfare maximisation: they support our recognition that our vulnerability to loss or harm of worthy objects is alleviated if we act to fulfil our responsibilities of care towards these objects, even if such actions are not maximally beneficial to ourselves. In sum, emotional engagement enables legitimate affective appropriation of worthy objects in two ways: firstly, when the objects are worthy of our emotional engagement, and secondly, when our emotions direct our attention and actions towards what is good for worthy objects.

### **3.4.0 Equal Co-Authorities in the Realm of Value**

In my account of the bipartite value of meaningfulness, I argue that being able to experience meaningfulness depends not only upon our becoming valuers, able to exercise the capabilities for objective valuing and affective attachment, but also upon our equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value. This is because to be involved in the creation of new meanings which enable us to generate new possibilities for world-building, we need to experience ourselves to be worthy of the entitlement to speak and be heard, where participating in world-making is necessary for experiencing our lives as worthwhile: ‘human beings denied the opportunity to exercise their world-building capacities live an impoverished life, a life that is somehow less human, a life without freedom, without happiness’ (Honig, 1993: 112). Christiano (2005) proposes that the fundamentally relevant feature of the person which grounds the principle of egalitarian justice is ‘their authority in the realm of value’ (ibid: 49) and it is in virtue of each person’s status

as authorities that we give each person their due (ibid.). Potentially, all persons possess the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, including being able to appreciate, to engage with, and to produce values. This means that being a valuer applies to all persons with no distinctions which are relevant to a theory of justice:

‘The humanity of a person is that person’s capacity to recognise, appreciate, engage with, harmonise with, and produce intrinsic goods. It is in virtue of this feature of human beings that they bring something unique and distinctive to the world [...] Humans do not merely cause these things to come about, as say a river causes the condition of life to come about; they bring about these things self-consciously and through their own activity because they appreciate them’ (ibid: 47-48).

But, although developing one’s human potential contributes to an activity being meaningful, simply realising one’s capacities is not the same as having a sense of one’s life being worth living, since ‘a slave might be forced to do theoretical physics and to do it surprisingly well’ (Arneson, 2000: 44). For meaningfulness, we must also find the project to be subjectively attractive, as well as judged objectively worthwhile against the values we have incorporated into our practical identities – and we maintain a sense of meaning by continuing to care about what we are doing in relation to worthy objects. And it is in the interlocking of the objective and subjective dimensions of the bipartite value of meaningfulness that we ensure a meaningful activity is not only recognised as objectively valuable and subjectively engaging, but is experienced as such by the individual whose activity it is: ‘meaning consists of engagement in an activity that is not only subjectively engaging, but that is also subjectively experienced as being meaningful’ (Kekes, 1986: 97). This requires a ‘fittingness between certain kinds of activities and the potential for fulfilment’ which Wolf calls Fitting Fulfilment (Wolf, 1997: 216-7; see also Muirhead, 2004). Fitting fulfilment arises

when there is a match between activities with the requisite structure for capability formation and the individual's own valuations of which activities and capability formations are worth pursuing. I argue that fitting fulfilment is more likely to be realised when we become valuers: that is, when we develop the capabilities relevant to realising the bipartite value of meaningfulness, given by the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, and where we possess a sense of our worthiness to be valuers. In sum, we need both the capabilities for meaningfulness and a sense of our status as co-authorities to give us confidence that we are entitled to engage with others in the co-creation of values; this means that we must be situated in social contexts which affirm our equal status as co-authorities, and support our development of the 'human capacity for building, preserving, and caring for a world that can survive us and remain a place fit to live in for those who come after us' (Arendt, 1977 [1954], 95).

#### **4.0.0 Ethic of Care: Fulfilling Our Responsibilities Towards Worthy Objects**

But subjective attachment, even to worthy objects, is not enough - we must also be able to understand how we are doing in relation to promoting the good for worthy objects. Being responsive to and engaging with the particular value of worthy objects does not mean that we can have any kind of orientation we want towards them, just in case such orientations generate strong affective attachments. What is required also is that our appropriation of worthy objects to the meaning content of our lives gives rise to legitimate involvement, where I understand legitimate involvement to imply that we promote the good for the worthy objects, in other words, that we have a care for how well they are doing. I propose that we judge the good for worthy objects against an ethic of care, which implies, furthermore, that if they are to contribute to the meaningfulness of our lives, our relations to objects of value must orientate us beyond how worthy objects add to our own welfare, because meaningfulness depends upon, not only the fitting

together of the dimensions of subjectivity and objectivity, but also being ‘able to do something about it or with it’ (Wolf, 2010: 25):

‘One must be able to be in some sort of relationship with the valuable object of one’s attention – to create it, protect it, promote it, honor it, or more generally to actively affirm it in some way or other’ (ibid: 9).

One source of active relations to worthy objects is the numerous social roles which make up the work of social cooperation. But being able to take up the values inherent in social roles depends upon our accepting the relevant responsibilities, where consenting to take on responsibilities for worthy objects often requires us to expend discretionary, as well as remunerated, time and effort. Schumacher (1979) blames the introduction of modern technology into the technical division of labour for creating work without dignity which is ‘utterly uninteresting and meaningless’ (ibid: 27), resulting in a stunted personality, a corruption of human relations, and fostering ‘a spirit of irresponsibility’ (ibid: 28). Schumacher is critical of the social complexity which absorbs so much personal time and effort: ‘modern industrial society is immensely complicated, immensely involved, making immense claims on man’s time and attention’ (ibid: 24-5). But I disagree that the complexity of society dissociates people from a sense of responsibility, and therefore from a potential source of personal meaning. Every day, people willingly take up responsibilities in the work they do:

‘Despite the many centrifugal forces of modern societies, despite their materialism and inequalities, despite the currency of ideological or self-serving notions of freedom and autonomy – despite all this it is striking that most of us not only depend upon one another but act in ways that allow others to depend on us. Most people take on extensive and demanding responsibilities, and – to their great moral credit – many of them act responsibly, often across all the roles they play. They thereby sustain a fabric of

relationships and institutions that [...] channels immense energies toward meeting one another's needs and wants' (Williams, 2008: 19-20).

Each day (and night), cleaners, call centre operatives, labourers and carers clean, make calls, and care for the sick and elderly – and they do not take up these responsibilities simply because they are paid to do so, but because they want to do good work. Indeed, many seek to extend their roles, excavating meanings from their work, meanings which motivate them to expend discretionary effort in order to meet the needs of fellow human beings. It is, of course, possible for people to train, to take up responsibility and to engage in complex, cooperative activities without those activities having the relevant structure for meaningfulness, but this is to instrumentalise persons with no regard for their fundamental need for meaning. One of the injustices of the modern organisation of work is the way in which organisations aim to increase worker's responsibilities, without a commensurate increase in control over the resources and decision-making necessary to fulfil their responsibilities (Pot & Koningsveld, 2009). In many cases, work is organised to extract discretionary effort from workers to the benefit of organisations, without addressing normative concerns for asymmetrical power relations which may require changing the basis of decision-making.

Being able to take responsibility requires 'a context for agency based in relationships, developed and borne out intersubjectively or in conjunction with others' (Borgerson, 2007: 479), where taking responsibility requires 'an active willingness' (ibid: 498) to take up the relevant activities for fulfilling responsibilities. I argue that unforced adoption of responsibilities implies that we also take up activities of care, where care is 'an ability and a willingness to 'see' and to 'hear' needs, and to take responsibility for these needs being met' (Sevenhuijsen, 1998: 83). Being able to fulfil our responsibilities is closely tied to our membership of practices and institutions, and the social roles we inhabit. Sciaraffa (2011) describes how our normative connection to our social roles means that we acquire also duties, which have the potential to contribute to a life

of meaning and purpose: ‘an agent can come to have a weighty and important justificatory reason for conforming to the duties of a role by virtue of identifying with the role’ (ibid: 2; see also Raz, 1989). For Sciaraffa, identification with the social roles we occupy gives us compelling normative reasons to meet the requirements of the attendant duties (ibid: 109). Identification with a role includes identification with the ‘comprehensive goals’ implied by the objectives, tasks and duties of the role: ‘If this comprehensive goal is rational, then she realises the fundamental goods of meaning and self-determination through generally conforming to her role’s duties’ (ibid: 110). This entails both a subjective and an objective dimension where, in order to enjoy the meaning goods contained within the role, the agent must experience an affective attachment to the values implied by the role and understand the independent value of the role: ‘realising a meaningful life requires not only that one perceives that one’s life is organised around a valuable point, but also that this point is actually valuable’ (ibid: 115). Thus, active relations are caring relations, which aim at fulfilling our obligations towards worthy objects. And discharging our responsibilities requires a ‘proneness’ (Wolf, 2010: 33), or a readiness to have our actions guided by reasons of love, which ensures that we are ‘acting in a way that positively engages with a worthy object of love [...] even if it does not maximally promote either the agent’s welfare or the good of the world, impartially assessed’ (ibid.). Becoming susceptible to reasons of love means putting ourselves into an active relationship with objects of value, where we develop the capabilities for recognising what is of value and for acting appropriately towards worthy objects.

I suggest that recognising value, and acting appropriately toward something of value, implies fulfilling responsibilities of care for worthy objects, and that the ability to evaluate how we are doing in relation to worthy objects is supplied by an ethics of care. An ethic of care provides the standard for evaluating how well we are doing in our actions and in orientations towards the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, where an ethic of care is concerned with ‘the compelling moral salience of attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take responsibility’ (Held, 2006: 10).



In addition, an ethics of care recognises both relationships and responsibility (Borgerson, 2007), where taking up our responsibilities of caring for worthy objects may include having to acknowledge that our relations to worthy objects are not entirely chosen: ‘we may be given responsibility, assigned it, inherit it and then accept or refuse it’ (Card, 1996: 29). Furthermore, adopting the standards set by practices of care demands that we pay attention to how caring for worthy objects points us beyond ourselves to what is required to secure the good of the object in question, including, dialogue with others over what constitutes good care, including defining with those others what the relevant needs are, where needs interpretation is a fundamentally political undertaking (cf. Fraser, 1989). Thus, in the bipartite value of meaningfulness, fulfilling our responsibilities towards worthy objects means having a care for those objects, that is, acting towards them with the correct orientations for promoting and protecting their welfare. Affective appropriation of worthy objects in the subjective dimension is legitimate when it is consistent with what promotes the good of worthy objects, where our understanding of the good arises from our own and others’ judgement as to how we are doing with respect to caring for those objects.

Fisher & Tronto (1990) define taking care as including ‘everything that we do to maintain, continue and repair our world, so that we can live in it as well as possible’ (ibid: 40). They identify four dimensions of care which imply four values in an ethic of care: caring about (attentiveness), caring for (responsibility), taking care of (competence), and care receiving (responsiveness) (Fisher & Tronto, 1990). Held (2006) distinguishes an ethics of care from an ethics of justice in what is morally relevant for ‘attending to and meeting the needs of the particular others for whom we take responsibility’ (ibid: 10). She rejects abstract reasoning as the only way to understand what morality requires, and proposes that practical reasoning, informed by attentiveness, trust, responsiveness to need, narrative sensitivity and cultivating caring relations, directs us to what is required for satisfying obligations (ibid: 15). For Held, care is both a value and a practice. Care is a *value* because it has critical purchase in enabling us to ‘pick out a more specific value to be found in persons’ and societies’ characteristics than merely

finding them good or bad, or morally admirable or not, on the whole' (ibid: 38). And it is 'probably the most fundamental value' because 'there can be care without justice' (ibid: 17) - and without care there would be no people or other worthy objects which can be subject to principles of justice. Care is a *practice* because it involves 'the work of care-giving and the standards by which the practices of care can be evaluated' (ibid: 36). Held (2006) points out that activities can be performed without adhering to the values relevant to the practice: 'An activity must be purposive to count as work or labor, but it need not incorporate any values, even efficiency, in the doing of it. Chopping at a tree, however clumsily, to fell it, could be work' (ibid: 37). But Ruddick (1998: 4) suggests that caring practices can become a vantage point from which to evaluate a much wider range of human relations and social practices: 'The ethics also extends beyond the activities from which it arises, generating a stance (or standpoint) toward 'nature', human relationships and social institutions' (ibid: ).

Work which incorporates positive values of care is meaningful work. And when work is done with care, then it can be evaluated against an ethic of care by asking what constitutes caring in relation to the particular worthy objects at which the actions aim. And this, I suggest, is a profoundly political question, because it involves disagreement, contestation and deliberation over what is meant by good care. Sennett (2008) evokes an ethic of care in his revival of the craft ideal when he says that when we engage with things we must learn to 'care about the qualities of cloth, the right way to poach fish; fine cloth or food cooked well enables to imagine larger categories of 'good''(ibid: 8). Weeks (1998) argues for 'intimate citizenship' such that caring forms part of our status as citizens, where the recognition of the human need for intimacy and belonging form part of practices of care in each person's everyday life. Caring relations produce people and reproduce societies, and practices of care are potentially transformative, rather than repetitive reproductions: 'care has the capacity to shape new persons with every more advanced understandings of culture and society and morality and ever more advanced abilities to live well and cooperatively with others' (Held, 2006: 32). This demands an ethico-political understanding of care as the basis for

deliberating over the values and standards necessary to the work we do together, requiring the practice of ‘democratic caring’ (Sevenhuijsen, 2000: 22) in which all citizens have access to the spheres of social life, and the structures of belonging, necessary for them to be able to make their contribution to the work of social cooperation and to participate in the interpretation of values inherent to the work they do. Tronto (2010), for example, argues that ‘creating caring institutions’ (Tronto, 2010) is an unavoidably political process requiring us to evaluate power relations, ensuring that care remains both particular to the worthy objects in question and pluralist in the range of caring values, and that ‘care has a clear, legitimate purpose’ (ibid: 162). To enable us to orientate ourselves to the needs of worthy objects, caring institutions must provide public space for needs-interpretation, a ‘rhetorical space’ (Code, 1995) or a ‘political space’ (Walker, 1998), in which each person can engage with values, finding them worthy or unworthy, attractive or unattractive, as they seek to satisfy the human need for meaningfulness. In this way, a politics of meaningfulness, grounded in an ethic of care, has the capacity to enable us to evaluate the extent to which social structures support our ability to fulfil our responsibilities towards worthy objects by developing the relevant capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment.

### **5.0.0 Conclusion**

In opposition to the liberal neutralist position that meaningful work is a preference in the market, I have argued that meaningful work is a fundamental human need, because it addresses inescapable human interests in freedom, autonomy and social recognition. Thus, meaningful work ought to be subject to institutional guarantees, ensuring that all persons can experience their work as meaningful up to a level of sufficiency. I base this claim upon the centrality of work in contemporary societies, and the empirical evidence of the harms done by non-meaningful work to persons in all areas of their lives. In order to avoid such harms, work must possess the requisite structure for meaningfulness, which I

propose is given by Wolf's (2010) bipartite value of meaningfulness where the dimension of objective worthiness is united to the dimension of subjective attractiveness. I suggest that work can be made susceptible to the bipartite value of meaningfulness if it contains worthy objects in the form of practices in the objective dimension, and affective attachment in the subjective dimension. An ethic of care provides us with the standard for evaluating the correctness of our orientations towards worthy objects, and for understanding the inescapably intersubjective nature of the activities we do to fulfil our responsibilities. But accounts of meaningful work in liberal political theory marginalise the constitutive value of our inter-relations; in addition, critical social theory is sceptical of the possibility of work containing worthy objects sufficient for realising the meaningfulness of work. However, I argue in Chapter Two that critical social theory and liberal political theory can provide resources for developing a positive critical conception of meaningful work.

## Chapter Two

# Meaningful Work in Critical Social Theory and Liberal Political Theory: Worthy Objects and Intersubjective Relations

### 1.0.0 Introduction

In this chapter, I draw upon Wolf's (2010) bipartite value of meaningfulness to construct a positive critical conception of work in which work has the requisite structure for meaningfulness when it contains subjectively attractive worthy objects, organised to realise the values of autonomy, freedom, and social recognition. I evaluate theoretical treatments of work in feminist theory, critical social theory, and liberal political theory in order to develop a positive critical conception of meaningful work. Firstly, I suggest that the feminist challenge to the standard economic conception of work provides resources for re-imagining what work is within a positive critical conception of work. Secondly, I evaluate approaches to the experience of work from critical social theory and liberal political theory, arguing that each fails to offer a full account of one or other dimension of the bipartite value of meaningfulness. *Critical social theory* is characterised by scepticism in the objective dimension of the bipartite value of meaningfulness. The complaint of critical social theorists is that the contemporary organisation of work strips out worthy objects from the interior content of work, thereby undermining stable subjective formations which would sustain a sense of one's life having purpose and value. *Liberal political theory* is characterised by incompleteness in the subjective dimension of the bipartite value of meaningfulness. Liberal political theorists have tended to import uncritically into their approaches the standard economic conception of work, in which work is a preference or disutility to be evaluated in terms of paid employment and market efficiency. The individual is treated as sovereign, and the intersubjective relations which constitute much of the work we do together are marginalised. Finally, I argue that a positive critical conception of work is able to retrieve worthy objects

and intersubjective relations when work is organised to allow workers to exercise the political mode of being.

## **2.0.0 A Positive Critical Conception of Meaningful Work**

Throughout this chapter, I construe meaningful work as a positive critical conception of work which enables a normative inquiry into how the interior content of work adds to or detracts from the meaningfulness of our lives. Smith (2009) puts the motivation for a normative inquiry into work as follows: ‘the moral significance of work lies, to put it bluntly, in the contribution it makes (when not distorted) to a meaningful, fulfilled, dignified human life’ (ibid: 49). Cooke (2004) says that ‘critical social theory is a mode of reflection that looks critically at processes of social development from the point of view of the obstacles they pose for human flourishing’ (ibid: 418), and Fraser (1985) suggests that Marx’s 1843 definition of critical theory as ‘the self-clarification of the struggles and wishes of the age’ has not been bettered in its implicit call to political action. I claim that fostering work capable of contributing to a meaningful life is an ethico-political project, where the aim is to secure the value of meaningfulness by ensuring that the interior structure of work is given by worthy objects united to subjective attachments. Smith (2009: 47-53) identifies the features of a critical conception of work as follows: it defines a ‘standard’ by which it is possible to distinguish between different kinds of work; it possesses ‘normative content’ (Honneth, 1995) which enables critical evaluation; it has empirical validity as a fact about the world; and it indicates the direction of social and individual emancipation: ‘[...] the social reality of the norm must be manifest in a potential for the ‘transcendence’ of actual work which is nevertheless immanent to work’ (Smith, 2009: 47). A positive critical conception of meaningful work operates within a liberal perfectionist framework by providing an enriched and pluralised source of values we can appropriate to the meaning content of our lives, but bounded by deliberative agreement over what constitutes an independent value. This is not an unattainable ideal, but draws upon what we

already know about how people value and draw meaning from the work they do together.

### **3.0.0 The Standard Economic Conception of Work**

The standard economic conception of work is one of consumption rather than production, where work is ‘the sacrifice that makes the purchase of commodities possible’ (Lane, 1992: 48). In standard economics, work is understood positively as the maximum level of wages which a worker can exchange for their labour, and negatively as a disutility which workers will prefer to trade for leisure. But such assumptions shackle us to an understanding of work as paid employment, that is, as market work which is carried out in the formal economy: ‘the category of work generally continues to remain underdetermined and committed to the production paradigm’ (Gurtler, 2005: 124). Work in the production paradigm takes workers to be rationally self-interested individuals, and assumes that the social product issues from measurable economic activity: ‘Economics conceives of social wealth only in the form of increasing GNP because it continues to hold to a representation of society as a mere collection of individuals’ (Meda, 1996: 640). Consequently, forms of human development which take place in other action contexts, such as the family and civic society, are ignored: ‘economics sees no value in an individual’s development towards a goal other than exchange, or in any form of ‘enrichment’ of society which has a truly collective (as opposed to aggregative) dimension or is measurable in terms other than those of ‘production’ (Meda, 1996: 639).

#### *3.1.0 Neglecting the Interior Content of Work*

In the standard economic concept of work, once we have satisfied the requirements of justice for equality of participation in open competition for paid employment and desirable work, what goes on *inside* the experience of work is of little philosophical interest. In Nozick (1974), for example, market efficiency mediates the supply of meaningful work which is created by employers when they divide work into more satisfying segments, create work teams, and employ task

rotation (ibid: 248). Meaningful work will then become more or less available according to whether the organisation of work used to generate meaningful work promotes productive efficiency. If productivity rises, then owners will reorganise to make work meaningful; if productivity stays the same, then worker preferences for meaningful work will generate competition for labour, thereby forcing owners to reorganise work. There are no normative considerations in these two cases because market efficiency will determine sufficient availability of meaningful work to satisfy expressed preferences. The only case where normative considerations arise is when the reorganisation of work results in reduced efficiency, giving owners no incentive to create meaningful work. If the market fails to satisfy workers' preferences for meaningful work, then normative considerations may direct us to compensatory mechanisms, such as: workers being able to trade off pay for more meaningful work; customers being prepared to bear the extra costs; or state prohibition of non-meaningful work (Nozick, 1974: 247-9). But since the market will sort out preferences for meaningful work, supported by some compensatory mechanisms in cases of market failure, political theorists need have no further concerns for the interior content of work (Schwartz, 1982: 635)<sup>3</sup>.

#### **4.0.0 The Feminist Challenge**

I argue that re-valuing work through deliberative evaluation is essential to pluralising the positive values in a liberal perfectionist framework. The standard

---

<sup>3</sup> The standard economic conception of work is susceptible to both negative and positive meanings of work. In public discourse and policy making there is by no means total indifference to the quality of the work that people do. The most important international standard for the quality of work is decent work which The International Labour Organisation defines as: 'opportunities for women and men to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and human dignity' (Report of the Director General, 1999). Decent work assumes that what counts as work is formal employment and fails to recognise other kinds of work or the fundamental interest that people have in work which does more than simply satisfy material needs in reasonably humane conditions. The concept of decent work does not provide sufficient resources for a critique of the way in which we organise our economic lives, whereas the more demanding concept of meaningful work yields greater emancipatory potential. See Bolle (2009) for an evaluation of the incorporation of unpaid family work into formal economic conceptions of work.



economic conception of work does not contain a sufficiently wide range of attractive values consistent with what would be required for each person to experience the bipartite value of meaningfulness in a liberal perfectionist framework. However, the standard economic conception of work has been put under pressure by rapid changes in the way we work, as well as proliferation of the kinds of work we are paid to do. These changes have shifted our understanding of what activities are required to reproduce society, how those activities are to be organised, and who is to do them, in the process expanding the potential range of positive values in work. Technological developments enable many of us to work outside formally specified boundaries of space and time; the domestic labour of women makes up an important element of paid employment; and we now allow many different kinds of unpaid, informal activities, such as care work, emotional labour, civic work and serious leisure, to be counted as work. But in the same moment we acknowledge a greater range of activities under the designation of work, we also reveal an entrenched hierarchy of more or less valuable work, where the gendered division of labour in family work is replicated in paid work. Thus, one vital strand of contemporary feminist theory has consisted of the attempt to bring to public attention an unjust social organisation of work, constructed upon the unpaid or low paid reproductive labour of women.

The work of reproduction, care-giving, and needs-meeting has been designated necessary, but inferior, activity from Aristotle through to Marx. The features of reproductive activity which contribute to its devaluation, include: it is gendered, it is unpaid or low paid, and it takes place in an inferior sphere of human action, the private family (Jaggar & McBride, 1985). Feminist revaluations of reproductive work are grounded in a critique of the now familiar female/male or nature/culture distinctions which find their classic expression in Marx's productive/reproductive labour, where male activity is opposed to female passivity as men work with the mind and women with matter (Meagher & Nelson, 2004: 117). For Marx, reproduction is 'a fundamental necessity of human life' (ibid: 187), which he makes a primarily female activity. He privileges production with an active role in social progression because it leads to the production of new

needs (ibid.) and the transformation of society through labour; reproduction, however, is a ‘historically repetitive activity [...] insusceptible to historical progress’ (ibid: 189). Reproduction cannot be transformed, and so cannot form the basis for the development of human creative potential: ‘art and industry and government create new human reality, while mothering merely ‘reproduces’ human beings, their cultures and social structures’ (Held, 1987: 115). Nature, and the realm of female activity, is associated with what is instinctual, lacking in reason, almost sub-human: ‘in accordance with the traditional distinction between the family and the polis, and the assumption that what occurs in the public sphere of the polis is distinctively human, it is assumed that what human mothers do within the family belongs to the ‘natural’ rather than to the ‘distinctively human’ domain’ (Held, 1987: 115). The designated inferiority of needs-meeting activities not only marginalises the reproductive labour of women, but shapes the meaning of all kinds of work as a degraded sphere of human activity, in competition with more worthwhile modes of human action such as political deliberation or private contemplation, thereby reducing the range of positive values we might appropriate to the meaning content of a life.

#### *4.1.0 Pluralising Values in Work*

Feminist theory has engaged in the difficult task of attempting to re-imagine how work might transcend a hierarchy of valuation by drawing upon feminism’s enlarged understanding of the variety of activities constituting the work we do together in a system of social cooperation. In so doing, feminism has alerted us to the plurality of values and meanings in work, which are potentially available to enrich the possibility of work being meaningful within a liberal perfectionist framework. Cameron & Gibson-Graham (2010) argue that feminist strategies for re-ordering work take one of three directions: firstly, the separate spheres of economic activity are retained, but the sphere of reproduction is added on, often leading to calls for women’s unpaid work to be given a monetary value (cf. Waring, 1988); secondly, the range of activities which count as work are

expanded, but with the consequences that women's work, although now publicly recognised, occupies a subordinate status in the formal division of labour; and thirdly, economics itself is redefined, so that the economic landscape is conceived as diverse, made up of a variety of capitalist and non-capitalist enterprises, in which 'multiple and unfixed economic identities can be conceived' (Cameron & Gibson-Graham, 2010: 151). Re-conceiving the work of social cooperation in this manner allows us to perceive the 'positive social values and self-directed structure' (Brandt, 1995: 55) of invisibilised work, making such values available for meaning appropriation through public deliberation which aims at proliferating positive meanings within a liberal perfectionist framework.

In her revaluation of activities which contribute to a system of social cooperation, Gurtler (2005) advances a more capacious conception of work by identifying work with 'an ethical dimension having to do with the needs of others and the common good' (ibid: 120), which grounds a general entitlement to being able to make our social contribution. She draws out a category of 'socially necessary work' which she characterises as a 'privileged mode of human activity' (ibid: 120), by bringing together three moral motives for human action: firstly, 'the need for self-preservation through individual effort'; secondly, 'the desire for social recognition in reasonably co-operative relations with others'; and thirdly, 'the aspiration to be useful to others' (ibid: 129). People share a desire to fulfil their ethical obligation to participate in the work of social co-operation and, as a matter of participatory justice, society ought to be organised so that we can discharge this obligation. Given the importance to us of being participating members of society, this implies we have a general entitlement to make our contribution to a system of social cooperation; that is, we have a 'right to carry out their ethical obligation to partake in useful and necessary cooperation in the sphere of socially organised communities' (ibid: 130).

Jaggar & McBride (1985) argue also for a more extensive conception of production (ibid: 188): they claim that there is no valid reason for maintaining the distinction between reproductive and productive labour because procreative and caring activities, which are largely undertaken by women, are as susceptible to

creative development as productive activities: ‘procreation and nurturing should be theoretically conceptualised as forms of human labour and more or less fully realised social expressions of human creative ability’ (ibid: 195). In an attempt to break down distinctions between formal employment and family work, Fraser (1994) identifies three models of work: the Universal Worker Model, based upon equal participation of men and women in paid work, supported by state funded caregiving; the Caregiver Parity Model, based upon providing those who undertake carework with sufficient reward; and the Universal Caregiver Model (UCM), in which everyone does both paid work and carework. The UCM ‘dismantles the gendered oppositions between working [for money] and caregiving’ (ibid: 61); Perrons (2000) foresees the profound consequences such a model implies for our conception of what work is and what it is for: ‘There is a wealth of evidence that suggests that neither paid nor caring work are equated solely with negative utility [...] caring for people can be very pleasurable. When for example is walking in the park or watching a football match with a young child, care, and when is it leisure? In practice, distinctions between work, care and leisure are blurred. Correspondingly the division of people’s labor and time needs to be spread more evenly between these activities; in other words it is time to round this triangle’ (ibid: 110). Thus, realising a general entitlement to making our contribution depends upon societal acknowledgement of a wider range of activities as work, and social arrangements to enable everyone to participate in the roles, practices and institutions through which individual contributions are coordinated and made productive for the common good (cf. Gomberg, 2007).

#### *4.2.0 Re-Envisioning Economics*

I claim that by multiplying the range of positive values in the work we do together, we will increase the possibility that everyone will be able to find their work to be meaningful. This will require individual capabilities and social procedures which support collective deliberative meaning-making over the character of work, and of the economic forms which structure our interactions.

One example of the effort to redefine economics can be found in the concept of *provisioning*, which consists of the daily activities required to provide the necessities and goods that sustain families and individuals (Neysmith & Reitsma-Street, 2005; see also Power, 2004): ‘Women are disproportionately affected because the multiple types of work they do inside and outside the formal economy restricts their capacity to sustain themselves today and develop options for the future [...] An emphasis on provisioning breaks down distinctions between market, familial and social activities; it includes production and distribution activities needed for human beings to survive and flourish’ (ibid: 381). Provisioning challenges the study of markets in conventional economics which treats citizens as undifferentiated labour or job holders (ibid: 382), thereby casting those who are without paid employment into the category of welfare dependents, or rendering their work invisible as a form of social contribution: ‘the centrality of the market in economic thinking throws into the shadows all other dimensions of citizen’s lives, dimensions that affect their surface appearance as workers and the decisions they make about engaging or not in paid work’ (ibid.). The concept of provisioning attends to the way in which people negotiate time/space boundaries in order to fulfil the requirements of their multiple social roles: ‘Boundaries may extend across several households and their shape changes over time. These relationships are also the basis for identity, participation and citizenship, all of which are part of understanding people’s sense of belonging’ (ibid: 386). Thus, provisioning is a complex, time consuming activity requiring the provisioner to form networks and relationships which secure, not only the material survival of provisioners and their dependents, but also a sense of identity and belonging.

Furthermore, I suggest that provisioning is an instance of value pluralisation because provisioning brings into public view the invisible activities essential to sustaining life and human flourishing, making already extant values available for sense-making and meaning-interpretation. But although meaning-making can be employed to realise the emancipatory potential of work, it can also be expropriated for the benefit of some at the expense of others. *Emotional labour*, for example, is the production of emotional and social affects in the work

people do together which, under capitalism, is made available for profit and accumulation. Hardt describes affective labour as a dimension of immaterial labour (Hardt, 1999), where immaterial labour is ‘labor that produces an immaterial good, such as service, knowledge or communication’ (Hardt, 1999: 94). In affective labour, ‘desiring production’ (ibid: 89) and caring labour is transformed into value-producing forms of production. Other dimensions of immaterial labour include informationalised industrial production and work involving symbolic-analytic tasks. In contemporary work, emotional labour has become a key vehicle for value creating activities in the service industries in particular, and is subject to a variety of organisational forms which aim to extract their value (see Hoschschild, 1983).

‘To one degree or another, this affective labor plays a certain role throughout the service industries, from fast-food servers to the providers of financial services, embedded in the moments of human interaction and communication. This labor is immaterial, even if it is corporeal and affective, in the sense that its products are intangible: a feeling of ease, well-being, satisfaction, excitement, passion – even a sense of connectedness or community’ (Hardt, 1999: 95-96).

Although affective labour has been used as a pejorative term for the exploitation by capital of human capabilities for emotional engagement, there has been a more liberatory tone in recent discourse which seeks to identify how affective labour can be appropriated by workers themselves in order to give voice to their own perceptions of what is valuable in their work (Weeks, 2007; Garetty, 2008). For example, Gurtek (1995) distinguishes between relational and rationalised forms of service work where relational service work such as caring for the elderly is characterised by bonds of trust and inter-dependence, and rationalised service work such as call centre activities is characterised by highly structured interaction based upon standardised rules (see also Weeks, 1998). In particular, the feminist identification and revaluation of emotional labour and

caring practices has added the distinct value of care to our repertoire of meanings of work which can be appropriated to the meaningfulness of work (Isserles, 2010). Isserles argues that every kind of work contains a dimension of care and that exercising the practice of care in one's work is a strategy for overcoming the harmful effects of estranged and heteronomous labour. Stacey (2005), for example, identifies how home care workers in California are able to derive support for their work being meaningful from the relational and emotional content of the work, which contributes to a sense of pride and dignity. Such workers experienced a greater degree of autonomy and control over the circumstances of their work, because they were taking care of others in their homes rather than institutions. This and similar examples encourage us to think about how work cannot be confined to conventional assumptions of time and place, and therefore how a broader understanding of how, when and where work takes place has the potential to enrich work as a source of positive values.

#### *4.3.0 Collapsing Public/Private Distinctions*

In order to attend to the emancipatory possibilities in all kinds of work, I argue that a positive critical conception of meaningful work must conceptualise work as a diverse realm of activity taking place in multiple negotiated timespaces, thereby making available more discursive resources for individuals to appropriate the positive values in their activities to the meaning content of their life. This means that we must re-imagine the distinctions inscribing some activities as nonwork, and therefore of lesser value. In particular, the empirical value of the public/private distinction has been reduced by new working patterns, such as homeworking and mobile communications, which cut across conventional lines of male/female work, and home/work boundaries, in the process complicating inequalities of gender and class: 'such divisions may merely have been supplanted by other means of perpetuating sex inequalities, where spatial or otherwise (Armstrong & Squires, 2002: 279). Instead, Gal (2002) theorises the public/private binary using a process of 'fractal distinction' (ibid: 81), where the

same space, through continuous recalibration signalled by different physical behaviours or linguistic symbols, is recast as private or public: ‘whatever the local, historically specific content of the dichotomy, the distinction between public and private can be reproduced repeatedly by projecting it onto narrower contexts or broader ones’ (ibid). Cal proposes that we imagine public/private distinctions recurring repeatedly inside the same space, and, rather than visualising them as boundaries carving up a territory, think of them as subdivisions nested inside one another according to the relations between persons and their social, economic and political context. People must increasingly manage fluid spaces and unstable boundaries (where the very concept of boundaries is in doubt) as they move in and out of roles, or simultaneously occupy different roles – and such active management is a form of discursive and symbolic *work*. For example, a conversation in the playground may be about arranging a play date for children, the agenda for a meeting to campaign against a school/hospital closure, or the exchange of business ideas. Shifting relations between persons constitute the playground in one moment as a public space, or in the next moment as a private space: ‘in their everyday lives, individuals are therefore likely to find themselves traversing a number of ambiguously coded spaces, few of which could be definitively or usefully classified as public or private’ (Coole, 2000: 349). Ettlinger (2003) takes a relational and microspace approach to ‘the spaces of interaction among people and nodes (workplaces) in networks of social interaction’ (ibid: 146) which enables analyses across spheres of life and by doing so reveals the multiplicity of work timespaces, where ‘workplaces can be situated in a firm, in a state-supported or governed office, in one’s home, or some ‘place’ in the informal economy’ (ibid: 150). Leach (1998) documents how meanings of work are ‘constructed and manipulated in the context of industrial homework’ (ibid: 99) where ‘the separation of home and work is largely a fiction’ (ibid: 107). Homeworking blurs conventional space/time boundaries, leading to long working hours for women who have domestic responsibilities during the day, and homeworkers being treated as flexible labour because all their work – paid and unpaid – is symbolically domestic labour (ibid: 114). Thus, what work means to



people cannot be captured by taking the formal work-place to be the only context in which work happens (see England & Lawson, 2005). In order to support new meaning-interpretations, new imaginings for how work takes place are required – and I suggest that the concept of work timespaces is a potentially fruitful discursive resource for proliferating the range of positive values.

### **5.0.0 Resisting Conceptual Closure by Pluralising Values**

Raz says: ‘meaning comes through a common history and through work’ (Raz, 2001: 20). Part of our common history is our meanings of work repertoire, from which we source the values we may accept, reject or reinterpret in order to form our practical identities. But this repertoire of meanings is frequently employed by political ideologies or managerial discourse to achieve conceptual closure for the purpose of maintaining the existing hierarchy of valuations. Meanings of work are co-opted to distinguish between different kinds of activities so that some work is rendered invisible, demoted to mere leisure, or simply designated non-work, obscuring the fact that work encompasses an enormous diversity of activities necessary to the reproduction of society, many of which evade fixed categorisation, and over which there is no final agreement. For example, the meaning of work as a curse informs both the economic conception of work as a disutility and the various ‘end of work’ theses (cf. Granter, 2009), whereas the meaning of work as expressive, creative self-realisation informs concepts of work based upon the craft ideal (Sennett, 2008). How we use our meanings of work repertoire reflects our underlying normative assumptions: work can be presented as morally neutral when it is theorised as part of an instrumentalised system of economic exchange (Smith, 2009: 48), or as morally negative when it is conceived as degrading and unfit for human beings (Spencer, 2009b). Normatively negative meanings of work allow work to be presented as irretrievably compromised as a source of moral action, competing with more meaningful forms of human activity, such as political action. Negative conceptions of work prompt propositions that work must be contained because it

has colonised too much of human life, or eliminated because it has failed to fulfil its promise to be a site of human expressiveness. In contrast, positive conceptions of work promote strategies to broaden work to undervalued human activities, or to advance work as the pre-eminent site for the formation of a virtuous citizenry (Spencer, 2009a).

I argue that the concept of meaningful work allows us to retrieve a positive critical conception of work which can be distinguished from other conceptions of work, such as decent work or work as an economic activity. But, although a positive critical conception of meaningful work supports an enriched plurality of positive values in a liberal perfectionist framework, being able to experience work as actually meaningful depends also upon the individual meaning-making capabilities of workers, combined with the opportunity structure made available to them by society. A crucial dimension of the meaning-making opportunity structure is the deliberative democratic practices which promote disagreement and struggle over the meanings of work. Moreover, the process of deliberative engagement with others is productive of our sense of self, forming our subjective attachments (or de-attachments) to the work we do together, constituting a vital dimension of our practical identities, and making democratic participation in itself one of the worthy objects. But to participate in creating differences in meaning we must become valuers, that is, be able to form and to exercise the two capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, in addition to having confidence in our equal status as co-authorities. This requires us to recognise that deliberating over meanings and values is a joint undertaking with others, for which we must be situated in social structures, such as practices, roles and institutions, conducive to supporting intersubjective relations with the relevant normative characteristics. When structured by democratic practices, work provides a value-rich environment, able to foster positive inter-relations, as a consequence of deliberative meaning-making through joint working, which are not merely functional or incidental, but are constitutive of the possibility of work being able to contribute to the meaning content of a life.

I want to emphasise that meaning-making does not issue in a set of values independent from acts of working, which are then made available for appropriation; instead, meaning-making produces values which are inherent to the structure of action, and to how we acquire skills, competences and knowledge. For example, Wrzesneswski, Dutton & Debebe (2003) describe how the engaged intersubjective sense-making activities of workers shapes their understanding not only of *what* they do, but also the *significance* of what they do: ‘Employees actively notice, interpret and seek out cues in the course of daily interaction that convey evaluation and worth [...] the creation, alteration and destruction of meaning at work occur in concert with others on a daily basis’ (ibid: 126-7). Making intersubjective encounters central to the meaningfulness of work is essential to recognising how dimensions of shared agency and cooperation contribute to the objective value and subjective attraction of the work. In my conception of meaningful work structured by the bipartite value of meaningfulness, I make intersubjective relations constitutive of the meaning content of work, where intersubjective relations are inherent to the formation of capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment. These capabilities underpin our ability to develop the correct actions and orientations of care towards worthy objects, thus allowing us to appropriate them legitimately to the meaning content of our lives. I argue, however, that meaningful work is recognised only partially in both critical social theory and liberal political theory: the former is sceptical of finding any worthy objects in the contemporary experience of work, and the latter neglects the inescapably intersubjective nature of work. Despite these limitations, I suggest we can develop a positive critical conception of meaningful work from critical social theory by considering how worthy objects can be retrieved in the experience of work through the exercise of the political mode of being, and from political liberal theory by considering the constitutive importance to work of intersubjective relations with the relevant normative dimensions.

## **6.0.0 Objective Dimension: Worthy Objects and Critical Social Theory**

I argue that critical theory is characterised by an overly pessimistic critique of the emancipatory potential of the interior content of work, leading to a conception of work from which worthy objects consistent with the value of meaningfulness have been eliminated, and resulting in the unnecessary disvaluation of work as a sphere of expressive human action. Many writers would agree with Meda (1996) that, when work crowds out the possibility of engaging in more worthwhile activities, such as political action, then we must contain work and reduce the amount of time people have to spend doing it (ibid: 642). The instrumentalism of market work has caused many critical theorists to abandon work as a sphere of truly human action: ‘progress has stalled since Arendt (1958) and Habermas (1974) turned their back on work as being incompatible with, or at least indifferent to, individual and political freedom, and they offered conceptions of work reflecting this philosophical demotion’ (Deranty, 2009: 70). Consequently, in critical social theory, work has lost the immanent potential for expressive freedom, and the status of work as the pre-eminent action context for social and personal emancipation - an ideal once central to social critique - has been demoted to, at best, a source of instrumental benefits to support spheres in which truly human action may still be possible.

I suggest that such pessimism, although not unwarranted, is excessive, and that, by using a positive critical conception of meaningful work, we have already to hand resources from within critical social theory to re-evaluate the emancipatory potential of work. But in order to revive a positive critical conception of meaningful work we need to engage imaginatively with the critical theory tradition. To this end, I employ Arendt (1958), Habermas (1974), and Honneth (1995) in order to develop three themes relevant to the transformation of the contemporary experience of work which extend work beyond paid employment in the standard economic model, thus presenting us with possibilities for pluralising values in work, and rediscovering already present worthy objects.

These three themes are: firstly, acting in the political mode of being is constitutive of the meaning content work (Arendt, 1958); secondly, the work we do cannot be confined to particular spheres of activity, but transgresses time/space boundaries, prompting us to exercise multiple rationalities beyond the purely technical (Habermas, 1974); and thirdly, retrieving the material dimension of intersubjective relations brings into public view worthy objects already present in the work people do together (Honneth, 1995).

### 6.1.0 Arendt - Retrieving the Political Mode of Being in Work

I argue that, because all work requires us to be able to respond to evolving situations for which there is no pre-determined solution, the experience of working calls forth a variety of modes of being and acting. And I draw upon Arendt's (1958) distinction between labour, work and action to describe how acting in the political mode of being can be realised in working. Arendt identifies three existential categories and three conditions describing what it means to be 'in the presence of other human beings' in the world (Dietz, 2002: 103); these are: labour and life, work and worldliness, action and plurality<sup>4</sup>. Labour produces things for consumption and work produces things for use (ibid: 94), but labour and work do not consist merely in the kinds of objects produced, more fundamentally each enables different modes of being human, in the form of *animal laborans* and *homo faber* (ibid: 85). The realm of *animal laborans* is where the biological processes of the human body – of birth, decay and death - are managed. It replicates the processes of nature and is characterised by repetitive, ceaseless activity which produces consumable objects – it is the realm of the perishable, the ephemeral and the impermanent (Dietz, 2002: 103). Labour is marked out by leaving 'nothing behind, that the result of its effort is almost as quickly consumed as the effort is spent' (Arendt, 1958: 87); it is necessary because it reproduces life and creates a private realm for renewal of mind and

---

<sup>4</sup> Arendt's threefold distinction between labour, work and action is influenced by Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's distinction between *praxis* (acting) and *poesis* (making) (Dietz, 2002: 169).

body, but to live one's whole life within it is to experience a darkened, instinctual existence. The realm of *homo faber* contains activity which 'corresponds to the unnaturalness of human existence' (Dietz, 2002: 104). Things are produced through repetitive processes of fabrication which have a definite beginning and end, but these things are durable and permanent objects which, unlike the end results of labour, are produced to be used or enjoyed, not to be consumed. They have an existence beyond their makers; they break out of the biological processes of nature, and produce a stable world (Dietz, 2002: 104). The usefulness and enjoyment of things, however, encourages objectification and instrumentalism which leads to 'a growing meaninglessness where every end is transformed into a means' (Arendt, 1958: 157)<sup>5</sup>. The realm of *homo faber*, instead of being the site of emancipation and a fully human experience, has become colonised by the realm of *animal laborans* through the processes of automatism: 'the automatism of labor and the instrumentalism of work – conspire in the modern world to obliterate the human capacity for action' (Dietz, 2002: 131).

For Arendt (1958), action is the only sphere in which it is possible to be fully human and fully free, and she privileges the realm of action for embodying the mode of being which is most expressive of what it means to be fully human: 'human beings express extraordinary capabilities that neither labor nor work encompass. They disclose themselves in speech and deed and undertake new beginnings, thereby denying the bonds of nature and moving beyond the means end confines of *homo faber*' (Dietz, 2002: 104). But although in the realm of action, human beings are revealed, in their plurality, as persons possessing 'unique distinctiveness', Arendt characterises the realm of action as lacking the means to institute politics with a practical purposefulness.<sup>6</sup> As a result, Arendt's concern with instrumentalism in the realm of work, and the rise of a society in

---

<sup>5</sup> Arendt would deny that meaningful work is a concept which makes any sense, since meaningful action can only be enacted in the realm of action.

<sup>6</sup> Public spaces, which reveal unique and distinct identities and enable people to act together, have been overtaken by social concerns which carry with them conformity and unfreedom (Tsao, 2002: 105). The corruption of these spontaneously emergent micro-spaces has diminished the public realm in which we appear to ourselves and to others, not as *what* we are (as functionaries or job holders in the division of labour), but as *who* we are (as distinct and unique persons) (Arendt, 1958: 181).

which all human activity is subsumed under *animal laborans* and *homo faber*, has left her without the resources to see where the programmes for emancipatory change in the political arena are going to come from, and how they are going to be implemented. The realm of action depends upon our being able to satisfy the demands of life as *animal laborans* and being able to establish a stable world as *homo faber*, but, despite being indispensable, these realms pose a threat to the possibility of becoming fully human, either by absorbing us in biological processes leading to an eclipse of the mind, or by instrumentalism leading to objectification and ‘world alienation’. In order to overcome the tension between necessary working and humanising acting, Dietz (2002) retrieves a ‘making in politics’ based upon the collective wisdom of citizens in identifying problems and consideration of methods (ibid: 178), and a ‘freedom in work’ based upon the worker’s autonomous problem-solving capabilities (ibid: 167). This means that multiple modes of being – technical-rational and ethico-political – are implicated in both working and acting, such that workers must exercise capabilities for judging what is relevant to the particular situation in hand. But, if making can be retrieved in politics, then I argue acting can be retrieved in production, provided that labouring, working and acting are taken to be modes of being rather than categories of different kinds of action. Following Hinchman & Hinchman (1984), labouring, working and acting should ‘not be understood as empirical generalisations about what most people usually do. As existentials they seek to illuminate what it means to be-in-the-world’ (ibid: 197). Lenz (2005) describes Arendt’s triad as ‘three basic forms of how activity takes place’ (ibid: 143), and identifies an Arendtian theme of inter-dependence between the three modes of being: ‘the balance of all three types of activity is necessary for establishing a society grounded in choices and creative abilities’ (ibid: 145). Lenz suggests that understanding our inter-dependencies across spheres of action and between modes of being allows us to examine the role of gainful employment in our conceptions of the good life (ibid).

In fact, despite privileging the mode of acting, it is not the case that Arendt denies that objective reality is a subject for action: she recognises that the

flourishing *vita activa* requires a balance of labour, work and action, because each mode of being answers different human needs for the necessities of living, a structured human world, and the disclosure of our unique identities (Moynagh, 1997: 29). Nor does Arendt cleanse objective purposes from acting, as many of her critics have supposed (Knauer, 1980: 731; Pitkin, 1981: 324): ‘Action and speech go on between men, as they are directed toward them, and they retain their agent revealing capacity even if their content is exclusively “objective”’ (Arendt, 1958: 182). In fact, Arendt’s own insights into labouring, working and acting can be united to a practical rationality of caring consistent with the bipartite value of meaningfulness by identifying a mode of acting in the work we do together that is generative of new beginnings in meaning-making, and ensures that, through acting together in work, we evaluate our actions against having a ‘care for the world’ (Arendt, 1958). If work-places are conceived of, not as spatially bound sites, but as timespaces intersecting across different spheres of human action where boundaries are open, fluid and contestable, then we can conceptualise how different modes of being, such as making and acting, can be instantiated both within and without the employment relation. Exercising the mode of acting, or the political mode of being, in production and reproduction allows us to ask what are the relevant social needs to be met by a system of social cooperation, whereas exercising the mode of making allows us to answer the question of how we are to meet our own and others needs - where the activities of asking and answering constitute in themselves much of the work we do together.

### 6.2.0 *Habermas - Challenging the Separate Spheres Thesis*

Making creative use of Arendt shows us how differing modes of being can be exercised in a variety of action contexts. But if we think of labouring, working and acting as modes of being which can be instantiated in multiple, overlapping timespaces, then maintaining strict boundaries between action contexts becomes problematic – particularly when separate action contexts fix modes of rationality, such as technical reason in the economic realm or emotional expression in the



private realm. For example, in Habermas's theory of work and interaction, the sphere of work is opposed firmly to the sphere of interaction. Eyerman & Shipway (1981) identify how Habermas's separation between action contexts originates in his critique of Marx who reduces all relations to economic relations in which 'human emancipation was developed along the single dimension of the interactive relationship between social labor and nature' (ibid: 555). In order to avoid Marx's reductionism, Habermas makes use of Aristotle's distinction between *praxis* (acting) and *poiesis* (making) to raise the status of 'intersubjective understanding as a type of action' (Honneth, 1995: 45). He distinguishes between work/instrumental and interaction/communicative action (ibid: 47), extending communicative action to much of what we would include as social activity, but denying that the experience of work can give rise to anything other than instrumental reasoning (ibid: 49). Habermas grounds the spheres of instrumental action and communicative action in two unchanging and universal human interests of work and symbolic interaction, which are 'analytically separate arenas in which self-conscious human subjects act, thereby transforming themselves and their world' (Keane, 1975: 87). In the realm of work (instrumental action), we satisfy our 'technical cognitive interest' for purposive-rational action which enables us to harness productive forces and gain technical control over the natural world (ibid: 87). In the realm of interaction (communicative action), we satisfy our 'moral-practical cognitive interest' in the development of social norms and subjective formations which underpin the stability and reproduction of the social order (ibid: 88). Habermas's distinction between a technical sphere of action, and a practical sphere of action, results in 'his almost exclusive concern with developing an emancipatory program in the practical realm of human activity, without the simultaneous development of a program in the technical [realm]' (Eyerman & Shipway, 1981: 557). The result is that Habermas strips technical reason of normative content, because: '[...] the technical interest in control over nature *does not allow for any interpretation*: technical rules are like signs, they point to a direct activity, but neither contain nor generate intrinsic meaning of their own' (ibid.). However, the meanings of efficiency or productivity in

technical reason are not normatively neutral, nor are they closed off from dissent and deliberation (ibid: 563). Furthermore, technical and practical reasoning do not take place in separate spheres of action, instead work is ‘*simultaneously* cultural and technical activity, and is never purely instrumental’ (ibid; 558).

The Habermasian theory of separate action contexts has the unfortunate consequence of diminishing the importance of work as a site for emancipatory social progress: ‘work merely designates the action substrate – the development of social forces of production – from which the processes of communicative liberation are then normatively distinguished’ (Honneth, 1995: 50). Whereas Habermas talks about an ‘unforced act of understanding’ (ibid: 52) in the realm of communicative action, he has no equivalent concept in the realm of instrumental action. Consequently, Habermas has few resources to offer the diagnosis and cure of the ‘moral vulnerability which grows not from the suppression of communicative modes of mutual understanding, but from the expropriation of the workers’ own work activity’ (ibid: 54). In the end, he is unable to offer us a positive critical conception of work (Smith, 2009), which has particularly serious consequences for our understanding of the gendered social division of labour. For example, Fraser (1989) criticises Habermasian social theory, which ‘uncouples’ or separates ‘systems’ from ‘lifeworld’ (ibid: 119), for failing to expose the family as a site of unpaid labour, and for failing to recognise the gendered nature of the paid workforce which assigns women to feminised roles of caring and domestic labour, thereby disguising the subordination of women to men (ibid.):

‘On the one side stand the institutional orders of the modern lifeworld, the socially integrated domains specialising in symbolic reproduction, that is, in socialisation, solidarity formation and cultural transmission. On the other side stand the systems, the system-integrated domains specialising in material reproduction. On the one side stand the nuclear family and the public sphere; on the other side stand the (official) capitalist economy and the modern administrative state’ (Fraser, 1989: 119).

Fraser (1989) ascribes Habermas's inability to take account of gender to two key distinctions in his social-theoretical categories: firstly, his distinction between 'the symbolic reproduction and the material reproduction of societies' (ibid) and, secondly, his distinction between 'socially integrated action contexts' and 'system integrated action contexts' (ibid: 116). In the first distinction, women's unpaid childcare activities map onto symbolic reproduction, because they reproduce the norms and behaviours of social identities through socialisation of the young. In the second distinction, contexts of inter-subjective consensus, such as the family, are differentiated from contexts of competitive interaction (ibid: 116) in which 'individual action is determined by self-interested, utility maximising calculations typically entertained in the idioms [...] of power and money' (ibid: 117). Two key institutions undertake the activities of symbolic reproduction – the private sphere of the family and the public sphere of political participation (ibid: 119). But categorising caring as symbolic reproduction fails to take account of the stubborn materiality of much unpaid domestic labour required to sustain and promote life. In addition, by confining consensual normative behaviour to the action context of the private sphere of family life, and self-interested maximising behaviour to the action context of the competitive sphere of production, Habermas is unable to account for how we experience multiple modes of being within the same spheres of human action: 'In few if any human action contexts are actions coordinated absolutely nonconsensually and absolutely non-normatively. However morally dubious the consensus, and however problematic the content and the status of the norms, virtually every human action context involves some form of both of them' (Fraser, 1985: 104). I use Fraser's observation to argue that caring for worthy objects in the value of meaningfulness is not realised solely either by the automatic application of technical rationality, or by the natural consensus of reproduction, but instead by a rationality of caring which responds to particular needs in particular situations relevant to worthy objects. A rationality of caring demands that we actively engage with fulfilling our responsibilities for worthy objects, giving rise to imaginative interpretive

differences in meanings, which have the potential to become the material for ‘acting in production’:

‘While it is true that the human need to transform nature requires that people turn themselves into instruments, and leads them to act purposively as objects rather than communicatively as subjects, this is only *one* dimension of the labor process. To this dimension must be added another, reflected in the use of imagination and creativity which precedes, terminates, and *weaves its way throughout* the instrumental dimension of the labor process’ (Yeoman & Shipway, 1981: 558, original emphasis).

In order to understand how we fulfil our responsibilities towards worthy objects through a rationality of caring, we need to appreciate that imagination, creativity and instrumentality are woven together in acts of work, giving rise to differences in meaning-making which transcend conventional space/time distinctions (cf. Massey, 1992). Davies (2001) evaluates the importance of a timespace approach for theorising the everyday experiences of women, which challenges accepted understandings of our relation to the boundaries between home and work, making the separate spheres thesis untenable: ‘the ideology of ‘separate spheres’ has obscured the links between work and family’ (Ferree, 1990: 871). Not only does it look to be theoretically redundant, but the separate spheres thesis, by invisibilising informal work in the voluntary sector or within the family, contributes to social injustice because it fails to explicate how the burdens of work fall disproportionately upon certain groups of people. Ferree (1990), for example, says that the undercounting of ‘invisible work’ in the informal economy is a perennial problem, contributing to social injustice (ibid: 872). The plurality of behaviours demonstrated by people in all spheres of action challenges the usefulness of maintaining rigid distinctions between action contexts, so that fulfilling our responsibilities of care towards worthy objects, requires us to

address the question: ‘what are the ‘normative principles to guide the structural intersections of institutional spheres?’ (Young, 2002). This is a political question for everyday living, as well as a theoretical task, because we must all make ethical decisions about how we fulfil our multiple social roles, necessitating deliberation with those others we seek to involve in our projects, who themselves have projects of their own requiring them to recruit the cooperative effort of their fellows.

Thus, we need to theorise work in terms of how the multiplicity of work timespaces provide the action contexts for the exercise of the political mode of being. But neither Arendt nor Habermas have been able to leave us confident that there are any objects in work which are worthy of either the mode of making or the political mode of being. I turn, therefore, to Honneth’s early account of meaningful work as craft work for guidance in what is required for retrieving worthy objects in the interior content of work.

### *6.3.0 Honneth - Retrieving the Material Dimension of Intersubjectivity*

In his essay, ‘Work and Instrumental Action’, Honneth criticises Arendt for separating work into two types of activity: firstly, reflexive bodily work, and secondly, experiential manual work (ibid: 42), resulting in a permanent divide which mirrors the Taylorisation of industrial work. He claims that, by purifying from the realm of ‘true action’ any contact with the production of things (ibid: 40), Arendt has removed ‘any sort of potential emancipatory significance from the act of working’ (ibid: 42). In order to retrieve a normatively positive conception of work out of his critique of Arendt and Habermas, Honneth specifies two levels of action, which can be characterised as work: firstly, at the level of social practice, work includes social reproduction and the construction of the human world ‘out of its natural setting’ (ibid: 32), and secondly, at the level of action, work includes the release of knowledge in order to ‘transform the means of domination and thus also make possible the evolutionary expansion of social freedom’ (ibid.). But this is a ‘counting in’ strategy, which suffers from the same problem as all such strategies – it results in the creation of a hierarchy of gendered

work. By specifying a sphere of work based upon reproduction and a sphere of work based upon the generation and use of knowledge, Honneth has re-inscribed body/mind distinctions within work itself, and the errors of the separate spheres thesis have not been overcome.

Despite his re-establishment of a hierarchy of valuation, Honneth (1995) directs us towards a critical conception of work in his description of ‘an undistorted act of work’ (ibid: 45) which is ‘complete in itself’ (ibid.), thereby enabling us to differentiate normatively between different kinds of work. Honneth’s conception of an undistorted act of work is shaped by the craft ideal which he associates with the pre-mechanisation period of labour, but which has been lost in the modern organisation of work, where whole acts of work have been divided into small, repetitive tasks in order to maximise efficiency and profit: ‘most types of work have lost any resemblance to acts of artisanry which are complete in themselves’ (ibid: 38). In Honneth’s undistorted act of work, work consists in freely expressed action directed towards others and towards objects, which aim at uniting means and ends in the interior content of work as workers act upon objects. By re-uniting means and ends, undistorted acts of work overcome the modern fragmentation of instrumental processes where work has ‘been separated from the autonomous control and empirical knowledge of working subjects’ (ibid: 46). Honneth opposes an undistorted act of work to unfree work which subjects workers’ actions to imposed bureaucratic rules and norms. But at the moment when work appears to have become irredeemably unfree, Honneth turns our attention to an, as yet fully to be realised, emancipatory possibility – that of the intersubjective relation between the worker and the object, which, in order to get the work done, calls out of the worker capabilities for judging and thinking in interpreting the needs of the situation. Honneth proposes that workers must engage in a ‘process of emancipatory reflection’ (ibid: 47), so that work regains the potential to enable ‘a morally oriented process of action in the region of social labor which would reclaim the meaningful work content of instrumental action from out of the social forms established through domination’ (ibid: 47). As a consequence of encounters with the material realities of working, workers must

exercise both instrumental and communicative rationalities, breaking down Habermasian distinctions between instrumental and communicative action. When joined to the political mode of being, of acting in production, such encounters are capable of bringing to light the values interior to the experience of working, and permitting a normative evaluation of worthy and unworthy objects.

But this material dimension of inter-subjective relations falls out of Honneth's mature theory of social recognition (Honneth, 1995a), where action contexts are mediated by three forms of recognitive relations between self and others (confidence, respect and esteem), but not between self and objects. Honneth reduces the experience of work to struggles for recognition of identity or achievement, without acknowledging the independent value of autonomous action in the interior content of work (Smith, 2009; Moll, 2009). It would be possible, for example, to imagine situations where workers are recognised for their efforts or cultural status, but are still denied the opportunity to exercise their independent agency as they grapple with the ineliminable materiality of work: '[...] *the relationship that arises between the subject and the object in the activity of work* needs to be acknowledged as a normative process *in itself*, externally to intersubjective exchanges' (Moll, 2009: 13, original emphasis). To sharpen our understanding of what is normatively significant about work, we need to reconsider how the active agency of workers relates to the material dimension of working life, in addition to the dimensions of positive practical relations to self and others. Margalit (2001) describes how we arrive at self-knowledge in a Hegelian sense through triangulation of 'the master, the slave and an instrument' (ibid: 128). Retrieving materiality reveals workers' irreducible autonomy in their relations to self, others and objects, demonstrating the limits of theorising an automatic technical reasoning to explain human action in work (see Chapter Three). Instead, in undistorted or meaningful work, workers apply a rationality of caring for worthy objects, where deliberation with others in the political mode of being gives rise to interpretive differences in the meanings of values, such as efficiency, productivity, caring, and needs-meeting. This is because deliberative evaluation of interactions with materiality surfaces interpretive differences,

opening up spaces for temporary agreements over positive the values which construct worthy objects.

## **7.0.0 Subjective Dimension: Intersubjectivity and Liberal Political Theory**

I argue that, in order to strengthen arguments that the concept of meaningful work is irredeemably substantive, and therefore inconsistent with the liberal commitment to neutrality, liberal political theory constrains the variety of positive values by which we conceptualise meaningful work. In particular, I suggest that liberal political theory's narrow determination of the conceptual content of meaningful work marginalises, and even eliminates, the value of intersubjectivity from the meaning content of work. Consequently, not only does this reduce the plurality of values which might be made available for meaning appropriation, but it fails also to provide us with the theoretical resources to describe how intersubjective relations are inherent to the ability of workers to get their work done.

### *7.1.0 Elster and Rawls: Meaningful Work as Complex Activity*

Using Wolf's (2010) bipartite value of meaningfulness, I develop a positive critical conception of meaningful work which unites objective worthiness to subjective attraction. In a liberal perfectionist framework, this means that meaningful work must contain the widest possible range of positive values invested in worthy objects in order to allow for differences in individual attachments. And the multiplication of positive values depends upon workers being able to exercise interpretive meaning-making capacities in deliberative encounter with others. But in Elster's (1986) account of meaningfulness, the range of positive values is restricted to complex activities, marginalising, in particular, intersubjective relations. In the attempt to distinguish between worthwhile and trivial activities, Elster (1986) characterizes the good life as 'one of self-



realization rather than passive consumption' (ibid: 97) and identifies the following features of activities which promote self-realization<sup>7</sup>: they aim at a purpose or goal ('spontaneous interpersonal relations' are excluded), they have a certain content (the drudgery involved in cleaning streets, for example, lacks the right content), and they have a value which transcends the immediate action (consumption is excluded because it aims at immediate satisfaction).

'The central features that turn an activity into a potential vehicle for self-realization are that it has an internal goal and that it can be performed more or less well – i.e., the goal can be realized to a higher or lower degree – according to independently given criteria. If an activity is to be an actual vehicle of self-realization, its goal must be of suitable complexity – neither so simple as to produce boredom, nor so difficult as to produce frustration. The activity must offer *a challenge that can be met*' (ibid: 100, emphasis added).

Elster says that it is the element of 'mental challenge' (ibid: 113) which distinguishes work conducive to self-realisation from work which is not. Such work is best promoted under conditions given by: the possibility of engaging 'in full-time concentration on one complex task' (ibid: 113) rather than rotating amongst a number of simple tasks; matching workers to jobs (ibid: 114) in a social order where 'for each individual there is some ability he can develop that will meet an effective demand' (ibid: 115); and where work is freely chosen, autonomously carried out, and enables social recognition (ibid: 115). Elster discounts 'spontaneous interpersonal relations' on the basis that they 'can be deeply satisfying but have no purpose beyond themselves' (ibid: 100). But his

---

<sup>7</sup> Elster provides a list of activities he regards as meeting the essential features for activities which promote self-realization: 'playing tennis, playing piano, playing chess, making a table, cooking a meal, developing software for computers, constructing the Watts Towers, juggling with a chain saw, acting as a human mannequin, writing a book, discussing in a political assembly, bargaining with an employer, trying to prove a mathematical theorem, working a lathe, fighting a battle, doing embroidery, organizing a political campaign and building a boat' (Elster, 1986: 99).

argument that inter-relations cannot support self-realisation because they are not intrinsic to the purposes of work is not supported by the empirical evidence, which reveals how intersubjective relations are essential if workers are to get their work done. Marchand (2010), for example, recounts his work as a building inspector in which he says the ‘site carpenters carried out often-complicated tasks with a Spartan economy of words – typically with minimal reference to my carefully prepared plan drawings. I recall observing a junior carpenter eyeballing his supervisor for cue while endeavouring to co-ordinate the patten of his own activities after those of the old man’ (ibid: 7). Complex socio-technical settings, such as operating theatres, air traffic controllers, factory work teams, R&D labs, are characterised by collaborative working where ‘one encounters flows of choreographed attending, prescient anticipation, mutual adjustment, and entwined action, out of which routinely emerge without remark a stream of decisions that often have life or death implications’ (Barley & Kunda, 2001: 89). By removing intersubjective relations from the meaning content of work, Elster describes a conception of meaningful work which narrows unnecessarily the range of positive values available for appropriation to the meaning content of a life. And, moreover, it cannot illuminate the normative dimensions of how people work together to get their work done.

Rawls (1999) fails also to account for how intersubjective relations are vital to the experience of working. Although Rawls gives more consideration than Elster to inter-relations, he makes complex activity the conceptual core of meaningful work. For Rawls, positive relations between persons are of theoretical importance for generating self-respect in the political conception of the person, and he recognises the relational dimensions of meaningful work in our membership of social unions and in the social bases of self-respect. In order to ensure that everyone experiences self-respect, Rawls argues that all persons must have the opportunity to belong to social unions, because it is in social unions that we have the opportunity to realise the Aristotelian Principle (AP) - a psychological fact about human nature which explains how our desire for the

primary goods motivates us to come together to form and sustain a just system of social cooperation. Rawls defines the AP as:

‘The Aristotelian Principle states that, other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realised capacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realised or the greater its complexity’ (Rawls, TJ 1999: 374).

When we realise the AP through our membership of social unions, then we receive social recognition through the formation, exercise and public display of our capabilities, and in turn recognise the accomplishments of others.

‘[...] a well-ordered society does not do away with the division of labour in the most general sense. To be sure the worst aspects of this division can be surmounted; no-one need be servilely dependent on others and made to choose between monotonous and routine occupations which are deadening to human thought and sensibility. Each can be offered a variety of tasks so that the different elements of his nature find a suitable expression. But even when work is meaningful for all, we cannot overcome, nor should we wish to, our dependence on others [...] The division of labour is overcome not by each becoming complete in himself, but by willing and meaningful work within a just social union of social unions in which all can freely participate as they so incline’ (Rawls, TJ 1999: 463-464).

In this passage, Rawls expresses his optimism that, simply by becoming just, a society will conjure out of the air a division of labour from which demeaning and poor quality work is eliminated. Yet he provides no explanation for how his principles of justice will constrain the tendency of the capitalist

system of production to create meaningless work. Rawls does identify important sources of meaning in work: that work can be meaningful because it is useful and necessary, it can be meaningful when it is done with others, and it can be meaningful when it employs cognitive, emotional and physical capacities which are subjectively valuable to the person undertaking the work (i.e. that choice of occupation and the development of the capacities have been freely chosen). The relational dimension of meaningful work, however, is confined simply to belonging, leaving under-developed the question of how the constitution of social unions and the content of the work enables or disables the intersubjective dimension of human action. But the desire to realise the AP means that we have an interest in meaningful work being made available to everyone, not just those who have won the competition for the limited range of meaningful work opportunities made available in market economies. This is because, firstly, our self-respect is dependent upon the social recognition of others, and secondly, we are not able to exhibit all desirable human capabilities in our own selves and therefore we need a social structure, or plurality of social unions, in which we are able to participate in and enjoy the mastered capabilities of others. For Rawls, 'the collective activity of justice is the pre-eminent form of human flourishing' (TJ: 463), and the sentimental basis of the social union is enjoyment in one another's achievements and excellences. We cannot enjoy the spectacle of somebody labouring under demeaning and meaningless work - to do so would be to do harm to ourselves as well as to others. But such harms are relevant only to the extent that they undermine the sentimental basis of social solidarity upon which political union depends, rather than because they indicate injustices in the economic division of labour.

To avoid violating the priority of liberty, Rawls makes the opportunity for meaningful work instrumental to sustaining his scheme of justice, rather than a good which all persons need for a flourishing life. For Rawls, engaging in suitably complex activity ensures the social formation of individuals imbued with certain moral capabilities which are crucial for maintaining a just society over time. Participating in complex activities consistent with the AP is crucial for moral

learning which includes the development of the capacity for rational deliberation and sense of justice, both of which are required for sustaining a stable just society. Rawls asserts that the AP is a fact<sup>8</sup> of human psychology which states that all human beings possess an innate desire for activities of progressive, increasing complexity guided by a principle of inclusiveness. It is a natural fact that we seek excellence through increasing mastery of complex skills: ‘I assume that human beings have a higher-order desire to follow the principle of inclusiveness. They prefer the comprehensive long term plan because its execution presumably involves a more complex combination of abilities’ (TJ, 364). The AP accounts for our major desires and preferences (ibid), including our desire for all purpose means in the form of primary goods. However, although it is innate in all human beings, the AP has to be realised through training and commitment (ibid.). Training of our capacities in line with the AP educates our preferences for increasingly complex activities: ‘Thus the principle implies that as a person’s capacities increase over time [...], and as he trains these capacities and learns how to exercise them, he will in due course come to prefer the more complex activities that he can now engage in which call upon his newly realised abilities’ (Rawls, 1999 TJ: 375). This formative process leads us to recognise what is admirable in others so that we desire to emulate them, and take pleasure in their excellences and achievements (ibid: 376-377).

But by constraining the conceptual core of meaningful work to complex activities, Rawls is in danger of violating his own commitment to neutrality, opening him up to the charge that he has introduced a form of perfectionism into the AP itself. Proudfoot (1978) suggests that: ‘the determination of simplicity and complexity, or of richness and poverty among human activities, may well depend upon prior conceptions of the good’ (ibid: 265). Judgments about what activities are simple or complex are socially determined and subject to valuations based upon factors such as the social status of the kinds of people who normally

---

<sup>8</sup> Rawls characterises the AP as a ‘natural fact’ (Rawls, 1999: 376) which is rational and which requires no explanation, except that it may have been the result of genetic selection: ‘It is a fact (combined with other facts and concepts of rational plan) which accounts for our considered judgements of value’ (Rawls, 1999 TJ: 379), i.e. the AP regulates our judgements of what things are counted as human goods and what human goods should be made ends.

undertake those activities in particular societies (ibid: 266). If the AP cannot be taken to be an incontestable natural fact about persons, then it becomes a kind of capability which we may or may not include in a worthwhile plan of living, because it may not be the only meaningful way to lead one's life. I conclude, therefore, that the determination of what is complex or simple, and how it contributes to a life which is worth living, is a value judgment, the determination of which requires the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment in the bipartite value of meaningfulness.

### 7.2.0 Arneson – *Meaningful Work as Variety*

In a different understanding of the meaning content of work, Arneson identifies meaningfulness with variety, which he opposes to specialisation in order to argue that meaningful work contains substantive normative commitments, making it a perfectionist ideal. Arneson (1987) argues against a right to meaningful work, as proposed by Schwartz (1982) and Doppelt (1984), on the grounds that this would require the state to promote a perfectionist ideal of what it is to lead a good life. Under a regime of market socialism<sup>9</sup>, a right to meaningful work is unnecessarily paternalistic because people will form differing conceptions of living which may or may not include meaningful work. Some people may prefer non-meaningful work because the conceptions of living they have chosen include attributing meaning to their lives through activities other than work. Given the diversity of ways in which work can play a part in individual conceptions of living, it is illegitimate for the state to effectively promote only those plans which contain meaningful work<sup>10</sup>. But since market socialism is a system able to compensate those who must undertake unavoidable boring or dangerous work, state perfectionism is redundant because: 'in a well-regulated market economy

---

<sup>9</sup> Arneson describes market socialism as an economy characterised by: a right to a job; a right to vote within the enterprise of which one is a member; a collective right to decide how to deploy capital and profit; state policy aimed at evening out the capital over which each citizen has some degree of control; equalised tax burden (Arneson, 1987: 534).

<sup>10</sup> Market socialism may not eliminate all non-meaningful work but this unavoidable problem can be eased if we adequately compensate those who have to undertake boring or dangerous work on our behalf (Arneson, 1987: 536).

that fairly distributes the benefits and burdens of economic cooperation, there is no ground for assigning individuals a further right to meaningful work beyond whatever array of meaningful work options the market happens to generate' (ibid: 536). This does not mean, however, that Arneson rejects the ideal of meaningful work. He suggests rather that meaningful work be 'considered as a regulative ideal that a socialist society – or any decent political economy – should regard as part of its mission gradually to fulfil' (ibid: 537).

In his conceptual understanding of meaningful work, Arneson employs what he characterises as a 'narrow' definition of meaningful work, where the use of the descriptor 'interesting' is understood to be dependent upon individual tastes and preferences:

'What I am calling 'meaningful' is work that is interesting, that calls for intelligence and initiative, and that is attached to a job that gives the worker considerable freedom to decide how the work is to be done and a democratic say over the character of the work process and the policies pursued by the employing enterprise. The term 'meaningful work' might rather be thought to suggest work that serves a good cause as contrasted with work that serves trivial or pernicious aims (making and marketing hula hoops or mustard gas). No doubt it is better that people's work should objectively serve good causes and on the subjective side no doubt it is desirable that people should experience their work as making a contribution to the goals they support' (ibid: 522-3).

Describing the concept of meaningful work in terms of 'interesting' work, allows Arneson to identify the perfectionist ideal of meaningful work with the positive values of variety and the freedom to choose one's occupation<sup>11</sup>. Arneson

---

<sup>11</sup> Arneson quotes Marx's famous critique of the capitalist division of labour from *The German Ideology*: 'For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose

reads the ideal of ‘meaningful work as variety’ from Marx’s critique of the division of labour: for Marx, the division of labour is harmful because it reduces our freedom to decide how to lead our life and frustrates our natural human preference for variety and challenge in work: ‘Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labour, the work of the proletarian has lost all individual character, and consequently, all charm for the workman’ (Marx, 1848). But, by agreeing with Marx that the division of labour is harmful, we assume we can know what it is to experience the good life, where the good life consists in variety rather than specialisation: ‘Narrow specialization is bad whether or not people want it’ (Arneson, 1987: 520). Arneson claims, plausibly, that if we then try to maximise meaningful work as variety, we end up by reducing the scope to satisfy human desire for other forms of living which may include specialisation – and, for Arneson, this kind of perfectionism is harmful, independent of the harms engendered by the technical division of labour.

From this position, Arneson critiques Schwartz (1982) for implying that we should have a ‘state-mandated meaningfulness standard for all jobs’ (Arneson, 1987: 523), which is mediated by meaningfulness as democratic participation: ‘we are therefore committed to demanding that this hierarchical division be replaced by a meaningful or democratic, division of labour that will ensure that no one is employed mainly at routine operations’ (Schwartz, 1982: 644). Arneson characterises Schwartz’s proposal as unacceptable perfectionism which marginalises other kinds of goods people may wish to acquire from their work, such as those related to productive values where ‘a worker might derive satisfaction from being a contributing member of an enterprise that efficiently serves vital human needs’ (Arneson, 1987: 525)<sup>12</sup>. A worker adhering to such

---

his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in an branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic’.

<sup>12</sup> Arneson identifies some of the other kinds of goods that people may want from their work (apart from meaningfulness defined by non-specialisation), including: ‘(1) wages to be exchanged for consumer goods now or in the future; (2) pleasant companionship with work colleagues or customers; (3) the knowledge that in producing particular goods or services one is being humanly useful to others or even contributing to the fulfilment of their vital needs; (4) interesting and



values may find demands to participate in management decision-making in the democratic division of labour proposed by Schwartz a frustrating limitation upon achieving their preferences in work. Therefore, the value of meaningfulness, understood as the ‘satisfactions intrinsic to the laboring process’ (ibid: 525), competes with and, when embodied in a right to meaningful work, crowds out alternative values. But, in many contemporary work environments, participation is not a bolt-on, optional extra, but inherent to the joint action necessary for getting the work done. Achieving the goals of service, care and effectiveness depends upon the intrinsic content of work being shaped by participatory practices and solidaristic relations between persons (Smith & Laitinen, 2009). In sum, there is not the competition between the value of meaningfulness and other values which Arneson presumes, because part of what makes work meaningful is expressed through those other values of service, production or contribution. Moreover, in a liberal perfectionist framework, the value of meaningfulness is not narrowly described by non-specialisation, and includes subjective attachment to values, such as useful contribution, and indeed many of the other goods listed by Arneson, such as solidarity, inter-personal relationships and responsible, skilful work. As a result, by attempting to avoid the perceived harms of state perfectionism, Arneson has failed to describe an adequate account of meaningful work, and diminished meaningful work as a rich source of the values we might wish to appropriate to our lives. Rather than preserving the widest field for freedom of interpretation in our subjective preferences for work which we can legitimately claim to be meaningful, Arneson has reduced our scope to make such claims to one-dimensional ‘variety’, with the consequence that our freedom to appropriate meanings has been severely circumscribed. In sum, a positive critical conception of work will pluralise the range of positive values, increasing our freedom to appropriate meanings of work to the meaning content of our lives, whether based on variety, specialisation, complex activities or caring.

---

challenging work that calls for discrimination, skill, and intelligence; (5) the thrill of taking financial or physical risks; (6) responsible work that requires for its successful execution the display of prized virtues; (7) solidarity with one’s work mates stemming from common commitment to a cause associated either with the enterprise product or the enterprise manner of operation; etc...’ (Arneson, 1987: 528).

### 7.3.0 Walsh – Meaningful Work as Structured Occupations

For some theorists, definitions of meaningful work, such as Arneson's speculative list of interesting activities, are too broad to be useful. And Walsh identifies these concerns with what he calls the 'Argument from Indistinguishability' (Walsh, 1994: 233), where 'the range of activities that may *legitimately* be thought of as forms of meaningful work is so diverse that it is unlikely that one could formulate a unified account of the kinds of work which the concept refers to' (ibid, emphasis added)<sup>13</sup>. To distinguish meaningful work from other kinds of activities, Walsh formulates a 'core definition' for meaningful work as work which offers opportunities to pursue 'eudaimonian activity' (Walsh, 1994: 244):

'Eudaimonian activity, then, is a form of meaningful activity that involves the development of skills and capacities. It is characterized by sets of intentional acts in which there is an interactive relationship between the agent's process of intention-formation and her observations of the consequences of relevant intentional acts' (Walsh, 1994: 243).

Eudaimonian activity involves 'activity processing' (ibid: 241) in which there is an interactive relationship between theory and practice; this interactive relationship is characterised by acts of intention, the outcome of which is the development of human capacities. Walsh makes use of Habermasian distinctions

---

<sup>13</sup> If this argument holds, then the attempt to distribute meaningful work cannot succeed because we cannot know what it is that we are intending to distribute – there are simply too many interpretations of what meaningful work is to make sensible the notion of meaningful work as a distributive good. Walsh (1994: 234-5) identifies distributive goods in the following terms: firstly, they are 'human goods which social institutions and arrangements allocate'; secondly, they are 'human goods whose occurrence is distributively determined', that is, they are susceptible to distributive processes (air is not a distributive good, but money is); and thirdly, 'distributive justice is justice as exhibited in the distribution of these goods'. This definition of 'distributive goods' constrains meaningful work to those elements of the work experience which can be abstracted from individual and subjective meaning attribution because it is impossible for social institutions and arrangements to fairly allocate subjective experiences such as solidarity or friendship.

to specify the content of eudaimonian activity: firstly, *instrumental-strategic* action, which involves the exercise of skill, and therefore excludes much factory work because the factory worker has ‘no theoretical input into the transformation of her practice’ (ibid: 243); and secondly, *practical-rational* action, which involves the deliberative interpretation of the goals of the instrumental activity and the proper distribution of collective goods, for example, it is not sufficient to count as eudaimonian activity if an engineer exercises great skill in building a bridge but his efforts result in severe damage to the environment. Consideration must also be given to the social goals of the work which transcend the goals inherent in the nature of the task. Institutional mechanisms for the distribution of eudaimonian activity which satisfies both instrumental-strategic, and practical-rational action are required because ‘opportunities for the performance of eudaimonian activity do not fall into the laps of individuals like manna from heaven’ (ibid: 244). Eudaimonian activity gives meaningful work an objective content and diminishes subjective considerations of what is or is not meaningful, which avoids the danger that ‘any work at all could be considered meaningful, so long as one has the right psychological attitude towards it’ (ibid: 237). Walsh concludes that:

‘A form of work is meaningful in the distributive sense, if and only if, its description as an occupation is the activity description of an activity that is structured in such a way that provides for the realisation of eudaimonian interests’ (Walsh, 1994: 247).

In order to avoid the Argument from Indistinguishability, Walsh applies meaningful work containing eudaimonian activity to structured occupations. The meaningfulness of structured occupations have the capacity to contribute to meaning attribution in their core activity only, and not because of any incidental benefits which may accrue such as friendship or a sense of solidarity; ‘it is structured occupations that are distributed, not a sense of purpose nor companionship’ (ibid: 245). Subjective interpretations of what makes work

meaningful render the concept of meaningful work less useful to maintaining boundaries between different spheres of activity. The loss of subjective elements from the meaning content of work is not only the loss of what makes work distinctively valuable to individual persons, but also leaves us deficient in the theoretical tools needed to describe the necessity of intersubjective encounter for getting the work done.

I identify three problems with Walsh's account which are relevant to a positive critical conception of meaningful work. Firstly, the legitimacy of activities: if there are many activities which can *legitimately* be thought of as meaningful work (as the original quote from Walsh suggests), then why cannot we include them within a conceptual framework of what it means for that work to contribute to the meaning content of a life? If, by some criteria, these activities are legitimately meaningful, then their exclusion for the purpose of philosophical neatness does not do justice to our diverse experience of respecting and engaging with value in the work we do. A capacious ideal of meaningful work has general normative appeal because it brings within the reach of all the possibility that the work we do can add to the meaningfulness of our lives. Of course, meaningful work is not the whole of what constitutes the meaning content of a life but, under our current organisation of work and social cooperation, it plays a central part in shaping and structuring a life as a whole. I argue that it is not the task of states or institutions to guarantee meaning content but to provide substantive all purpose means for the development of a capability for meaning attribution which will enable individuals to pattern their own meaningful lives.

Secondly, Walsh's characterisation of skill development arising from the interaction between the agent's intentions and her observations of the consequences of acting upon her intentions is not well supported by recent developments in our understanding of how human competence arises. Sandberg (2000) suggests rationalistic approaches (of which Walsh's is an example) set up a false separation between the worker and the work, whereas in reality 'worker and work form one entity through the lived experience of work. Competence is thus seen as constituted by the meaning of the work takes on for the worker in his or

her experience of it' (ibid: 11). Competence is arrived at through interpretative interaction with the context and with others. Sandberg illustrates his argument with an ethnographic study of machine optimisers who develop new model car engines. He found that machine optimisers developed different competences based upon what they understood to be the meaning of their work, so that, those who interpreted the meaning of their work to be about customer satisfaction developed different skills and knowledge bases from those who interpreted their work as keeping up with the latest technology. Key to the link between the interpretative meanings of work and the competency profile were the interpretive communities of practice which arose around differing understandings of the work<sup>14</sup>.

Thirdly, Walsh's concern to avoid the 'incidental benefits' of interpersonal relations de-values reproductive, caring and affective labour. Walsh is oddly dismissive of caring labour; in commenting upon the work undertaken by the nuns of Mother Theresa on behalf of those dying of leprosy on the streets of Calcutta, he says: 'obviously, in such cases, it is the idiosyncratic nature of such persons' psychological states, rather than the nature of activity itself, which makes this work fulfilling for them' (Walsh, 1994: 237). Clearly, such work is a particular kind of caring labour which only a few may wish to engage in, but marginalising such activities as indicative of an idiosyncratic, perhaps pathological, psychology, is to cast most caring labour, from nurturing small children to looking after the elderly, into the shadows of non-eudaimonistic or non-meaningful work. In addition to the exclusion of carework, Walsh's exclusion of 'incidental benefits' fails to take into account what we know about how work gets done in a complex system of social cooperation<sup>15</sup>. The incidental benefits of companionship and trust in one's colleagues are the result of completely necessary and unavoidable inter-dependences and affective relations without which it would

---

<sup>14</sup> See also, Sandberg & Pinnington (2009) for an integrative conception of what comprises professional competence based upon 'three interrelated ontological dimensions, namely human way of being, others in human way of being and things in human way of being' (ibid: 7)

<sup>15</sup> Walsh says that 'Repetitive factory work, for example, which people find meaningful because of their friendships, does not count as a form of 'distributively determined' meaningful work, because it is not meaningful under the activity description of it as an occupation' (Walsh, 1994: 246).

be impossible for our modern society to function. The fact that these inter-dependences and affective relations are also experienced as subjectively satisfying does not make them unqualified for the purposes of meaning appropriation. Finally, constraining the meaning of meaningfulness in work to ‘the activity description of it as an occupation’ (ibid: 246) seems to hand over what constitutes meaningfulness to those in organisations who define and distribute tasks, and who write job descriptions. It ignores struggles over the meaning of work, and the asymmetrical power relations this entails, for example care workers who contest job descriptions which fail to describe essential personalised caring labour.

In sum, I propose that, in order to secure meaningful work as a rich source of worthy objects which can be subjectively appropriated to the meaning content of a life, we use the three themes from critical social theory to re-imagine work as taking place in multiple timespaces; as the exercise of different modes of being (and particularly, the political mode of being); and as constituted by intersubjective relations in joint action - which will overcome also the narrowed conceptual understandings of meaningful work offered by liberal political theorists. The questions of *what* activities are work, *when/where* work takes place, and *who* does what work are ethico-political questions which do not admit of final resolution, but remain contested, therefore making it appropriate to subject them to collective deliberation over differences in meaning interpretation. To address the first question, a positive critical conception of meaningful work does not reduce work to the employment relation, but enfolds a wide range of productive and reproductive activities necessary to the work of social cooperation. To address the second question, meaningful work attends to how work traverses timespace boundaries, requiring the exercise of different modes of being within the same action context. Timespace boundaries can be thought of as a ‘container of meaning’ (Thompson & Bunderson, 2001: 18), allowing us to ‘address the nature of the activities that occupy our time, including the significance that they assume’ (ibid.). When Arendt’s labour, work and action are interpreted as different modes of being they become ‘three basic forms of how activity takes place. In this sense one might ask within which realms (for example, one’s own profession or life) the

activities of labor, work and action occur and *whether*, be this individually or socially, they are bound to certain spheres and time periods' (Lenz: 2005: 143). Work timespaces as containers of meaning for plural modes of being enable us to conceive of workers as active agents, incorporating differing meanings of work into practical identities - and further, actively re-interpreting meanings of work in order to engage with positive values capable of lending significance to the activities they do.

### **8.0.0 Conclusion**

To lack meaningful work is to be deprived of an essential social setting for encountering worthy objects and being able to affectively appropriate them to our lives. A positive critical conception of meaningful work in a liberal perfectionist framework operates to secure a plurality of values and meanings of work which can be made available for subjective incorporation into an individual's practical identity. Both critical social theory and liberal political theory are challenged by a positive critical conception of work: in the former, the excessive pessimism towards the immanent potential of contemporary work is confronted by evidence of how people act to appropriate positive meanings to their lives, and in the latter, liberal political theory fails to capture important dimensions of the interior content of work by excluding intersubjective relations from conceptions of work which are constructed to maintain commitments to liberal neutrality. To counter the excessive pessimism of critical theorists and the narrowing of values interior to the meaning content of work on the part of liberal theorists, I argue for a positive critical conception of meaningful work which acknowledges the plurality of activities which goes to make up the work of social cooperation, and the intersecting timespace dimensions which require workers to engage in deliberative ethico-political decision-making over the relative priority of activities, their goals and means, the necessary relations between persons, and the encounters with the material dimensions of work. In the following chapter, I explore how intersubjective encounters with the material realities of working life reveal a level

of irreducible autonomy in every act of work which grounds the exercise of the political mode of being through democratic practices at the level of the task.



## **Chapter Three**

# **Overcoming Alienation: Irreducible Autonomy and A Practical Rationality of Caring**

### **1.0.0 Introduction**

Never has work appeared to be so divided, intense, separated from our personal control and divorced from our sense of who we are. From Blauner's (1964) industrial blue collar workers labouring under changes to the division of labour as a consequence of automation to the 'managed hearts' of Hochschild's (1983) airline attendants, the complaint is that the experience of work has been systematically deskilled and subjectified by a capitalist project which aims to increase profit by appropriating and controlling workers' agency in the exercise of their skills and the formation of their identities. The critique that contemporary conditions of work are thoroughly alienating opposes deskilled and subjectified work to the mastery and secure identity of craft work, but, I shall argue, this dualism presents a narrative of work as irretrievably degraded which is not consistent with work as it is experienced by workers. I shall show the limits to the opposition between alienated work and craft work by describing a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of work, which reveals that there is no completely alienated work from which the possibility of autonomous action has been eliminated. I shall propose that the identification of a level of irreducible autonomy enables us to conceptualise personal autonomy in work as fundamentally relational, and the pre-condition for the exercise of political autonomy.

### **2.0.0 Alienated Work and the Craft Ideal**

In the ideal of craftsmanship, work has intrinsic value and is performed not just for the sake of external rewards, such as status or pay, but also for the sake of the actions and processes inherent to the work itself. The ideal act of work is a

complete act where completeness stands for a unity of means and ends in which the craftsman is recognised as having mastery over his skills, independence in his way of living and is respected for his display of the virtues relevant to his practice (See Murphy, 1993). Mills (1951) describes the craft ideal in the following terms:

‘Craftsmanship as a fully idealised model of work involves six major features. There is no ulterior motive other than the product being made and the process of creation. The details of daily work are meaningful because they are not detached in the worker’s mind from the product of the work. The worker is free to control his own working action. The craftsman is thus able to learn from his work; and to use and develop his skills and capacities in its prosecution. There is no split of work and play, or work and culture. The craftsman’s way of livelihood determines and infuses his whole being’ (Mills, 1951: 220)<sup>16</sup>.

Alienated work is the antithesis of craft work. In craft work, the craftsman achieves personal autonomy when he possesses *control* over the work process and its outcomes, and *independence* of self; by possessing skill in his own person and therefore a sense of personhood, the craftsman is able to choose when, how and for whom he employs his abilities. In alienated work, the worker is divorced from his skills and capabilities, because the content of his work inhibits his sense of autonomy over his actions, and he is separated from his own self when the relations and circumstances of work fail to support his sense of identity as an efficacious, distinct person. In his concept of estranged labour in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts (1844)*, Marx identifies four dimensions of

---

<sup>16</sup> Morris (1884), for example, idealised craftwork, from which the industrialised organisation of work represents a falling away. Macintyre’s attempt to revive the virtues through the device of practices also owes much to the intrinsic value of activity embodied in the craft idea. See Blauner (1964) for a Marxist approach to the loss of craftsmanship, and Inkson (1987) for an evaluation of the extent to which the craft ideal still retains a hold upon the imaginations of workers in his study of commercial potters in New Zealand. Sennett (2008) presents the most recent revival of the craft ideal, in which he also critiques the ways in which the craft ideal operates to designate forms of work as more or less valuable.

alienation: the worker can be alienated, firstly, from his product which appears as ‘an alien object exercising power over him’ (Marx, 1978 [1844]: 74); secondly, from his activities in the production process which is ‘activity as suffering’ (ibid: 75); thirdly, from his human and particular self which forces him to turn his capabilities for living a flourishing human life into ‘a mere means to his *existence*’ (ibid: 76); and fourthly, from others so that he no longer recognises others in their full expressive humanity, but ‘views the other in accordance with the standard and the position in which he finds himself as a worker’ (ibid: 77). When we are alienated from one another, we value the other person only for their position in the division of labour, making the mutual needs which should be a source of our solidarity ‘a source of tactical advantage’ (Miller, 2003). Alienation from our work, from our needs and from each other renders us vulnerable to exploitation:

‘[...] man’s relation to himself only becomes *objective* and *real* for him through his relation to the other man. Thus, if the product of his labour, his labour is *objectified*, is for him an *alien*, hostile, powerful object independent of him, then his position towards it is such that someone else is master of this object, someone who is alien, hostile, powerful, and independent of him. If his own activity is to him an unfree activity, then he is treating it as activity performed in the service, under the domination, the coercion and the yoke of another man’ (Marx, 1978 [1844]: 78).

Thus, alienation is the radical separation of the worker from the *interior content* of her work, given by purposes, processes, skills and products, and from the *constitutive social relations* to self, to others and to material objects which enable the formation of practical identities (Marchand, 2010; Dale, 2005). In the *interior content* of work, alienated work is deskilled, divided and objectified: by structuring their activities so that it does not require much initiative or exercise of human capabilities, capitalists can take unfair advantage of the inferior bargaining position of workers, thereby enabling the consolidation of efficiencies and profit-

taking through hierarchical coordination (Miller, 2003). In the *constitution of selves*, alienated work under conditions of global capital leaves no dimension of human expressiveness untouched – management strategies encroach upon the formation of subjectivities for the purpose of increasing profit through the production of affects, requiring workers to work upon themselves to create a self-conception and practical identity which aligns them with the interests of the organisation. ‘Alienation-as-subjection’ (Elster, 1986b: 56) is a conditioning factor for exploitation in which one person extracts benefits from another with no consideration for the welfare of the exploited individual. Alienation reduces the costs of exploitation to the exploiter because it operates in a framework which legitimises the social conditions under which the exploitation takes place: ‘Alienation adds to exploitation a belief on the part of the workers that the capitalist has a legitimate claim on the surplus, by virtue of his legitimate ownership of the means of production [...] The efficacy of capitalist exploitation rests on its ability to perpetuate the conditions under which it appears as morally legitimate’ (ibid.). Thus, alienation and exploitation operate together to condition workers to the organisation of work under capital, interpreting and controlling the meanings of work so that the pre-determined interior content and subjective formations of work appear as necessary and without any alternative. These are heteronomous conditions which impoverish the field of values available for subjective appropriation, with the consequence that autonomy-promoting meanings of work necessary to joint action are marginalised or even extinguished. Thus, heteronomy in one or more of the four dimensions of alienation inhibits our ability to experience the bipartite value of meaningfulness in the work we do together, because such conditions of work reduce the range of values which can be appropriated to the meaning content of our lives or fix the acceptable meanings of values to serve the ideological interests of a dominant group.

Elster (1985) identifies both an objective and a subjective condition of alienation, where alienation is understood as the loss of meaning consequent upon an organisation of work characterised by heteronomy: ‘spiritual alienation may be seen either as a lack of a sense of meaning, or as a sense of a lack of meaning’

(ibid: 74; see also Braybrooke, 1998a). When we *lack a sense of meaning* we are objectively alienated because ‘the aggregate outcome of individual actions appears as an independent and even hostile power, not as freely and jointly willed’ (Elster, 1986b: 49) making the social structures consequent upon the accretion of past actions and power struggles appear unquestionable and unchangeable. The content of work may be objectively alienated, but this does not entail subjective alienation: workers may experience contentment despite the degraded content of work, because the expanding economic product allows greater satisfaction of needs (Braybrooke, 1998a). When we experience a *sense of a lack of meaning*, we are subjectively alienated because we have ‘the experience of one’s self and life as empty’ (Wood, 1981: 9). In his reading of Wood, Elster (1985: 75) identifies how Wood makes the objective condition of alienation the primary characteristic of the presence of alienation: ‘it is a matter of whether my life in fact actualizes the potentialities which are objectively present in my human essence’ and not ‘a matter of whether my conscious desires are satisfied or how I think about myself or my life’ (Wood, 1981: 23-24). Since objective alienation, however, is naturalised in social structures which appear not only to be insusceptible to individual and collective action, but also beyond critical discernment and reflective evaluation, then it is difficult to see how we will come to realise that we are living out our lives under conditions of objective alienation, if we lack the experience of subjective alienation. Elster asks, in the absence of the subjective condition of alienation, how are we to realise even the minimal expression of autonomy as political and personal self-determination upon which social change depends? If Wood is correct that the objective condition of alienation is the primary mark of alienated work, and individual affective responses to conditions of work cannot be taken as a guide to the presence of alienation in work, then it seems unlikely that alienated work can be a force for individual and social progress because the objective conditions of alienation operate beyond our subjective perceptions.

I suggest that the way out of this impasse is to acknowledge that there is no realm of purely objective alienation, closed off from subjective affects, in

which self-reflexive practices are rendered sterile by the apparently immovable logic of hegemonic social and economic structures, practices and ideologies. Even in conditions of objective alienation people must act, and to do so they draw upon their meaning-making capabilities to create and promote values. Our unavoidable engagement with others in interpretive meaning-making allows values to become available for individual subjective appropriation. Our capabilities for interpretive meaning-making are part of the general preconditions for autonomous action, enabling us to mobilise our own and others' agency in the work we do together. Ethnographic studies of what people actually do when they are engaged in work provide significant evidence that, even under conditions of extensive objective alienation, workers are motivated to seek autonomous expression in their working activities independent of rewards, such as status or pay (see Marchand, 2010; Dejours, 1998; Hodson et al, 1998; Hodson, 1998). This urge is enacted in forms of subversion, of resistance, of play and of humour in the workplace: the factory worker who deliberately damages a uniform product in order to mark it as his or her own; the mother who resists the model of full-time employment; the artisan who adapts organisational rules in order to nurture a machine to produce well; the call centre operative who coaxes a bureaucratic system to deliver good customer service; or the care workers who protest at a job description process which renders their emotional labour invisible. Indeed, Elster indicates something of this kind when he says that social change may occur when 'objectively existing alienation at some point comes to be felt subjectively' (Elster, 1985: 76). I argue that objective conditions of alienation cannot be maintained by those who have an interest in doing so without the recruitment of workers' meaning-making capabilities, but that the very moment of successful recruitment also specifies the limit to the extractive power of some over others. Thus, the recruitment of workers' subjectivities is never total – there is always a surplus, an immanent potential interior to the content of work, allowing for the possibility of interpretive differences which arise when meaning-making produces 'remainders' (Honig, 1993) irreconcilable with the dominant culture's way of life.

But interpretive differences often remain invisible and marginalised, even though they are constitutive of skill development and the renewal of organisational practices. I propose that these ‘difference potentials’ can be given voice and purchase as the pre-conditions of social change when they are mobilised through a system of workplace democracy which operates both at the level of the organisation and at the level of the task. Braybrooke (1998b) gives democratic participation a role in overcoming the objective and subjective conditions of alienation because democratic participation generates engagement with the values and purposes framing the work people do together. Braybrooke (1998a) says that we experience alienation when we lack ‘a purposeful commitment to doing X’ (ibid: 40), that is, when our activity lacks the objective condition of an intrinsic purpose and the subjective condition of ‘sense of purpose in doing X’ (ibid.). But even when doing X has an intrinsic purpose, we may not meet the subjective condition of a sense of purpose in two ways: firstly, we may believe there is an intrinsic purpose, but lack the information to confirm our belief (Braybrooke gives the example of somebody occupied in an undercover operation who may not have full knowledge of the context of their work); and secondly, we may have knowledge of an intrinsic purpose, but find the tasks involved subjectively repellent, boring, or in some way dissatisfying (ibid: 40-41). Democratically organised work may overcome the objective and subjective conditions of alienation because it provides the opportunity to determine whether there are ‘socially more useful alternatives to N’s doing X’ (ibid: 40) and helps ‘to develop purposeful commitments’ (ibid: 48). Braybrooke points out, however, that, even where there are no democratic practices, people often work very hard to find an intrinsic purpose in their work, and he identifies the stubborn determination of workers to overcome alienation by constructing meaning out of unpromising work: ‘men make great efforts to convert themselves. They seek to rationalize their line of work in such a way that they can develop a purposeful commitment in following it. Certainly, it is very common for people to persuade themselves, once they find themselves doing X, that doing X is of great social importance’ (ibid: 43). I suggest that the demonstrated determination of workers to find value in their

work supports my point that there is no pure objectively alienated work, from which all possibility of self-determination has been eliminated. The efforts that people make to appropriate values through the interpretation of meaning directs us to a floor-level of autonomy in all kinds of work which is not simply about psychological relief, but indicates how meaning-making is necessary to the possibility of any kind of human action at all.

But undoubtedly conditions of objective alienation do enable elites to mobilise the agency of others, stunting the development of workers' capabilities for meaning-making and thwarting their search for meaningfulness. Our normative concern should, therefore, be directed towards ensuring that workers' efforts to appropriate meaning to their lives should be neither futile nor mistaken. Nor that society should force them through necessity 'to take their chance on alienation' (ibid: 46) by making being able to experience the bipartite value of meaningfulness in work a matter of personal taste. Braybrooke (1998a) cites Hegel, that 'The individual has an 'infinite right' to find himself 'satisfied in [his] activity and labour' (ibid: 44). This seems to me correct, and not only necessary for every individual, but also an achievable regulative ideal in a society organised to realise the deliberative capabilities of its members in a system of economic democracy. Furthermore, the regulative ideal of meaningful work becomes a pragmatic possibility when workers' meaning-making capacities are enabled by deliberative democratic practices. This is because when interpretive differences over values and purposes become publicly available for evaluation and judgement, they are made susceptible to generalised appropriation to the meaning content of lives through the exercise of the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment. I shall argue that the floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of work is the pre-condition for being able to act as an autonomous being, where personal autonomy is understood to be a relational achievement. To begin with, I shall explore the loss of autonomy argument, and challenge the narrative that work is irretrievably degraded and alienated.



### **3.0.0 The Loss of Autonomy Argument**

The principal hypothesis of the loss of autonomy argument is that our modern organisation of work is inhospitable to autonomous action, because owners and managers have succeeded in undermining the independence of workers - seen as a barrier to increasing profitable productive output – by systematically deskilling work through the division of means from ends in the technical division of labour (Braverman, 1974; Wood, 1982). According to this thesis, autonomy, as the exercise of discretion, competence and initiative, has been subject to two kinds of loss in the contemporary experience of work: firstly, the objective condition of alienation is consequent upon progressive deskilling in the interior content of work and secondly, the subjective condition of alienation is consequent upon organisational control over the formation of subjectivities.

#### **3.1.0 Objective Alienation in the Interior Content of Work**

Proponents of the loss of autonomy argument claim that progressive deskilling in the modern organisation of work is relentlessly stripping work of its potential for enabling people to develop and exercise their capacities for personal autonomy. Such claims are grounded in the assumption that the autonomous ‘hegemonising power of capitalist ideology and instrumental rationality’ has ‘become internalised by the fragmented individuals as immutably ‘natural’ (Eyerman & Shipway, 1981: 551). Internalising the present organisation of work as a natural inevitability makes it easy for everyone to agree that the goals of work, and the way that tasks are performed, are best determined, not by workers, but by managers and organisational experts: ‘workers are in effect paid for blindly pursuing ends that others have chosen, by means that they judge adequate’ (Schwartz, 1982: 635). Using process management practices, such as Taylorism, and its modern manifestations such as business process re-engineering, organisations have been able to break down the craft-based practices which sustained practical identities, disaggregating acts of work into isolated

components and integrating them into a system of production which operates beyond the control of workers. Workers no longer exercise autonomy of skill and judgement over the whole process of creating the product, causing them to become dependent upon the coordinating and unifying mechanisms of a hierarchical system of managerial control in order to get their work done. Such dependence eliminates the need for workers to exercise skill, eroding their human capabilities for autonomy. Braverman (1974), for example, characterises a specialised worker carrying out the plans of others as unskilled:

‘typists, [...] receptionists [...] and clerks are subjected to routines, more or less mechanized according to current possibilities, that strip them of their former grasp of even a limited amount of office information, divest them of the need to understand and decide, and make of them so many mechanical eyes, fingers and voices whose functioning is, insofar as possible, predetermined by both the rules and machinery’ (Braverman, 1974: 34).

In the loss of autonomy argument, objective alienation is exemplified by the use of techniques for the disaggregation and deskilling of work based upon the scientific management principles of Taylorism (Taylor, 1964), which Pruijitt (2000) defines as ‘management strategies which are based upon the separation of conception from execution’ (Prujitt, 2000: 440). Taylorism generates standardised tasks which can be distributed among cheaper, unskilled workers, thereby creating a controllable, low cost, undifferentiated work force, and allowing management to claim that a Tayloristic organisation of work is justified by reason of coordinative efficiency. But, Taylorism tends to increase indirect labour costs by multiplying administrative and bureaucratic functions, generating additional costs in the form of inflexibility, loss of innovative capacity, poor quality work and conflict with values such as autonomy (Prujitt, 2000: 442-445). The use of Taylorist principles, characterised by a division of means and ends, lack of trust between workers and managers, reduced worker control over the purpose of the tasks they do or the

means they employ to do them, and increased arbitrary interference by managers and organisational experts, entrenches objective alienation into the organisation of work: 'Deskilling is seen as an act of capitalism designed to transfer control over work to management by depriving the worker of his or her skill' (Inkson, 1987: 165). Thus, because Taylorism operates as an ideology to make the administration of work through the division of means and ends seem the natural and inevitable form of modern organisation to which there is no alternative, it meets the definition of objective alienation.

Under Tayloristic techniques of work organisation, an objective loss of worker autonomy is united to a re-interpretation of the meaning of autonomy, which is employed to serve managerial interests: 'In managerial discourse, the clash between Taylorism and autonomy gives rise to a language game in which the meaning of autonomy is emptied out' (Pruijt, 2000: 6). Managerial discourse deploys flexibility, generalised skills, devolved decision-making and teamwork to construct a kind of worker autonomy, based upon serving the interests of capital. But, despite hopes that team-working would usher in new forms of autonomous work organisation, the objective conditions of alienated work remain present. The 2001 Skills Survey, for example, showed a sharper decline in task discretion for those who worked in teams (Gallie et al, 2004: 255), depending upon the degree of scope over decision-making afforded to teams. Organisational forms embodying the simulacra of autonomy attempt to secure existing patterns of power and control by appropriating the irreducible autonomy of workers, but they do so at the cost of increasing objective alienation in the interior content of work. Team working, for example, can be used by management to capture the benefits of worker discretion based upon self-directed, semi-independent teams of workers. However, whilst I acknowledge the potential for objective alienation in work, I argue that organisational forms are never entirely successful in appropriating workers' autonomy, leaving the objective condition of alienation incomplete and available for the active engagement of workers' meaning-making capabilities. Moreover, the objective condition of alienation cannot operate in isolation of the subjective condition of alienation, meaning that there is always a

surplus of subjectivity in objective alienation which cannot be incorporated into the ideological project of management control.

### **3.2.0 Subjective Alienation in the Formation of Subjectivities**

The management of subjectivities thesis claims that, in the contemporary organisation of work, the condition of objective alienation from one's product and from the process of production has been extended by management strategy into alienation from one's sense of self, one's practical identity and one's relations to others for the purpose of turning subjectivities into exchangeable products to generate profit. Work is becoming increasingly subjectified, both enabling and obliging workers to be subjects of work through psychotechniques which recruit the subjective potentials of individual workers to further capitalist interests. Subjectivities are formed, managed and exchanged so that 'the prescription and definition of tasks transforms into a prescription of subjectivities' (Lazzarato, 1996: 135). Appropriation of subjectivities operates through the psychotechnical tools of organisational power where workers' autonomy becomes a disciplinary project of control and extraction. The aim of psychotechniques of subjectification is to form the self according to a fixed set of characteristics, such as the entrepreneurial self (Wee & Brooks, 2011) or the enterprise self (McNay, 2009), which becomes the form for socially acceptable individual self-development in general: 'work's focus on precisely individual accomplishments and obligatory autonomy has changed its character to such an extent that it has been reduced to a tool by which to fulfil the objective of individual competencies, projects and strategies' (Petersen & Willig, 2004: 342; see also Honneth, 2004). Workers are obliged to submit to this psychotechnical project of engineering selves in order to remain economic players, causing them to engage in 'play acting' activities of self-presentation, but leading to dissociation from their identities, rendering them vulnerable to psychological harms of anxiety and fragmentation (Goffman 1959; Sennett 1998; see Garrety, 2007). The conception of autonomy constituting the core of this project of appropriation is a very thin notion of autonomy, whereby

autonomy as control over work processes is transformed into a type of ‘pseudo autonomy’ (Petersen & Willig, 2004: 342), tied to heteronomously given objectives of efficiency and productivity: ‘The expectation of individual autonomy is devalued by the individual’s need to follow the requirements of efficiency and productivity and her/his exposure to constant efficiency tests’ (ibid: 342). As a consequence, an individual’s ability to act from normative demands is undermined, and her autonomy in work is reduced to marketing the self as a bundle of exchangeable capacities (ibid.).

But against inevitable submission to the forces of self-commodification, Garrety (2007) identifies a dualism in the management of subjectivities argument which opposes the vulnerable fragile self, under pressure from the management project, to the resilient self, resisting imposed formation of her subjectivity by carving out a private identity or using organisational identities for her own purposes. Hochschild (1983), for example, describes a process of ‘deep acting’, or self-management, where workers try to become the prescribed organisational self. And she advises that workers ‘reclaim the managed heart’ by forging a ‘‘healthy’ estrangement’ in which they ‘clearly define for themselves when they are acting and when they are not; they know when their deep or surface acting is ‘their own’ and when it is part of the commercial show’ (ibid: 187-188). However, many individuals possess a limited ability to foster a resilient self through healthy estrangement, because such strategies of resistance impose psychological penalties, making a resilient self difficult to maintain. This is because, in cases of ‘too much acting’ (Garrety, 2007), resistance to manipulation is achieved only through workers offering a public presentation of the self which is not their real inner self, generating psychological costs to the worker in the form of strain, anxiety, and even depression. Consequently, the difficulty of maintaining an inauthentic self produces a ‘special kind of alienation from self’ (Goffman, 1959: 229), in the form of internal conflicts, as workers are forced to work on themselves to produce and present inauthentic selves for public consumption. In sum, the conditions of subjective alienation support the entrenchment of objective alienation by aligning affective identity with the purposes of the organisation.

As a consequence of subjective alienation, being able to appropriate meaning content to one's life because of the work one does is increasingly difficult in modern organisations, structured as they are by 'a minimal ontology of a relatively pliable world susceptible to technical domination' (Connolly, 1995: 3). The management of subjectivity is a key feature of contemporary working life which Hancock & Tyler (2001) summarise in the following terms:

'the management of subjectivity has come to be recognised as fundamental to the pursuit of those essentially managerial imperatives of functional flexibility and the pursuit of cultural homogeneity often associated with so-called flexible or post-Fordist modes of workplace organisation' (Hancock & Tyler, 2001: 565).

In many economic enterprises, public service organisations and civil society associations, intersubjective relations and the ways of being they engender are being shaped to an ever greater degree by a management ideology informed by the values of efficiency and profit, thereby excluding other values, such as well-being and environmental sustainability. 'Engineered corporate cultures' (Ezzy, 2001) are management strategies for cultivating consent through self-disciplining practices consequent upon employees internalising corporate-crafted modes of being, rather than compelling obedience through authoritarian mechanisms such as financial rewards and incentives: 'workplaces with engineered cultures are an institutional site for the production of a culture of self-gratificatory narcissistic individualism consistent with more general consumerist social relations' (ibid: 631). Courpasson & Dany (2003) claim that in order to ensure obedience to management authority, 'post-bureaucratic business firms' have become 'individualised and subjectivized forms of organisation' (ibid: 1231). Hancock & Tyler (2001) describe strategies aimed at the management of subjectivity as 'strategic interventions into the perpetual process of *becoming* a subject at work' (ibid: 569) in which inter-subjective relations between employees – both

managerial and non-managerial – are manipulated to serve organisational interests, and values such as individual autonomy and trust are co-opted for the instrumental purpose of enhancing corporate performance, resulting in ‘a hypertrophy of the inner life of the subject’ and ‘eventually mitigates against their ability to engage in the kinds of social cooperation which remains central to any successful organisational project’ (ibid: 575). This means that the organisation of work has increasingly come to rely upon:

‘the goal of an imposed unity – a false reconciliation – of corporate identity through the suppression or commodification of ‘Otherness’ and its concomitant regimes of conflict through the management of, among other things, an ontology of ‘incorporation’. Difference is thus conflated into an inauthentic and alienated subjectivity’ (ibid: 581).

As a result, the experience of autonomy in work has been pushed out by an all encompassing strategy to recruit capabilities and subjectivities into an organisation of work in which differences are not only suppressed, but made redundant by a closed, ‘naturalised’ agreement that there is no other way for the work of social cooperation to be organised. If we are to experience autonomy, then we had better look elsewhere to private or political life, for there is no possibility of it in an economic life dominated by the subjective and objective conditions of alienation.

#### **4.0.0 Challenging the Loss of Autonomy Argument**

I argue, however, that, whilst both objective and subjective conditions of alienation are present in the contemporary experience of work, there is no purely alienated work, because objective alienation itself depends upon harnessing the irreducible autonomy and subjective potentials in every act of work, thereby leaving permanently open the possibility that workers will be able to re-

appropriate the meaning and content of the work they do with others, and by so doing to alter the objective and subjective content of their work. Empirical studies in sociology and psychology do show a decline in worker autonomy, defined as having a sense of control over one's work. Using a concept of autonomy as control over work tasks, patterns in the Employment in Britain Survey (1992) and the Skills Surveys (1997-2001) show that there has been an overall reduction in employee task discretion from 1992-2001: the number who said they had a great deal of influence over how hard they worked fell from 71% in 1992 to 64% in 1997 to 51% in 2001, and the number who said they had a great deal of influence over their choice of task fell from 42% in 1992 to 31% in 2001 (Gallie et al., 2004). Studies show that where there are reduced opportunities for decision-making then job satisfaction declines, indicating that workers continue to subjectively value the experience of being able to exercise autonomy in work (Blumberg, 1968; Patchen, 1970; Green, 2006). But, whilst these studies provide a degree of support for the loss of autonomy argument, they do not provide conclusive evidence for an irreparable loss of autonomy in work, consistent with critical theory's abandonment of work as an arena for emancipatory action. Whilst I agree that contemporary work has multiplied the harmful characteristics of work, I argue also that the loss of autonomy argument presents a narrative of work as irredeemably degraded and devoid of autonomous action which does not stand up to the evidence of what people actually do in work. I propose that it is possible to identify a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of work which, when revealed by workers themselves through engagement in democratic practices of public evaluation, provides the normative pre-condition for realising personal autonomy as constitutive of the meaning content of work.

The loss of autonomy argument is motivated by Marx's theory of estranged labour, but Marx's theory contains a dualism opposing alienated work to craft work – a dualism which has been criticised for tying the concept of work to 'a nostalgic ideal of pre-industrial artisanal work and to an essentialist ontology of labour' (Weeks, 2007: 243; see also Adler, 2004). Consequently, the oppressions and power asymmetries of craft labour, as well as the potentials for



autonomy and self-development in industrialised work, are omitted from the critical evaluation of work (see Rosser, 1997). Pruijit (2000) points out that because Taylorism is a rule transparent bureaucratic system it was seen as a protection against arbitrary interference, hence the unions' support of Taylorism in the 1920s. Adler (2004) argues that 'Taylorism may well have been negative for craft workers; but just as plausibly it constituted a net improvement for the far greater mass of less skilled labourers and operatives' (ibid: 8). Taylorism increases the need for coordination, inter-dependence and a broader understanding of the work process, thereby fostering the pre-conditions for the socialisation of production which workers can appropriate to advance their interests. And he identifies the ways in which work, organised according to the principle of Taylorism, retains possibilities for autonomous action which workers can appropriate for their own purposes: 'Taylorism was also a progressive step in the socialisation of the forces of production, both objective and subjective' (ibid: 8; see also Sohn-Rethel, 1978). Adler defines socialisation as 'the process whereby people new to a culture internalise its norms' (ibid: 6): thus, forces of production are socialised in an objective sense through an increasingly complex social division of labour, and in a subjective sense through the realisation of innate human capabilities for solidaristic social relations (ibid:6-7). Through processes of socialisation which aim at the conditions for personal autonomy as a pre-condition for political autonomy, Taylorism has the potential to make a positive contribution to the objective and subjective dimensions of non-alienated, autonomous production by: firstly, creating a body of socialised knowledge which workers can use to secure their interests, secondly, enabling workers to gain access to a wider variety of roles because an increasingly 'differentiated and integrated division of labour' requires specialist planning functions and a range of technical and support roles, and thirdly, requiring workers to engage in intentional coordination with others, thereby gaining a more complete understanding of the object of their work so that 'when mobilised in these tasks, workers find their horizons broadened' (ibid: 8). Therefore, whilst there can be no doubt that Taylorism is capable of generating alienated, heteronomous work, it is by no means inevitable that it

should do so in all circumstances, for instance, when a democratised coordinating authority employs such techniques with the knowledge and participatory consent of all those who will be subject to them.

In my view, the dualistic opposition of heteronomous work, as divided alienated work, to autonomous work, as complete non-alienated craft work, fails to identify ways in which autonomy operates within even degraded, deskilled work. I suggest that identifying a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of work allows us to specify the limits to the ability of some persons to impose the burdens of an unfavourable organisation of work upon others, and provides the grounds for a new organisation of work which meets the terms of a positive critical conception of meaningful work. Work can be more or less alienated, and no work is entirely autonomous or entirely heteronomous. Autonomy itself is never perfectly achieved. If autonomy is conceptualised in terms of the liberal ideal of the independent freely choosing sovereign individual, then the conditions of any work at all must be opposed to autonomy, because all work involves accepting the constraining conditions implicated in joining our actions to those of others. When we take up responsibilities to persons, animals and objects, we are required to form our decisions and actions according to already specified necessities, the nature of which is interior to the objects themselves.

But, although our experience of autonomy is partial, this does not mean that we fail to be autonomous beings. If autonomy is conceptualised in terms of right actions in relation to the responsibilities of care we have towards worthy objects which we fulfil by engaging with others in acts of joint agency, then what it means to be autonomous becomes constituted by our substantive relations to self, others, activities and objects in the work we do together. I suggest that the concept of autonomy which best describes how autonomy, although a partial achievement, becomes constitutive of a life we have reason to value is the distinctly feminist concept of relational autonomy (Meyers, 2000). I argue that the possibility of personal autonomy in work, where personal autonomy is understood as relational autonomy, constituted by and exercised through intersubjective relations, is indicated by a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of

work. The concept of irreducible autonomy provides the content for the immanent potential of work because, even in conditions of objective alienation, it gives rise to interpretive differences. Although many of these interpretive differences remain fallow as political potentials because they are invisible, misrecognised or appropriated by others, I propose that interpretive differences become the material for the exercise of the political mode of being in work when they are brought into public deliberation through democratic practices at the level of the task. To judge interpretive differences within the structure of the bipartite value of meaningfulness demands a kind of reasoning which allows us to evaluate our actions and orientations against the standard of an ethic of caring for the worthy objects one has appropriated to one's life. However, the kind of reasoning we need to employ in interpretive meaning-making includes, but also exceeds, technical rationality, and I consider how a rationality of caring can be described using the concept of phronetic techne (Dunne, 1993).

#### **4.1.0 Theorising Irreducible Autonomy**

I argue that there is no work from which autonomy has been entirely eliminated. Following the theoretical work of Dejours (2006), I use the idea of a floor-level of irreducible autonomy in every act of work to: firstly, justify the institution of democratic practices in work, and secondly, claim that such practices embody a relational concept of personal autonomy where, to be consistent with a positive critical conception of meaningful work, the relevant intersubjective relations must meet certain normative characteristics. Dejours draws upon the evidence from ethnographic studies which go beyond descriptions of work as given by organisational rules to examine the content of the work that people actually do, and to identify the active agency of workers in all acts of work (see Daniellou, 2005). In addition, Dejours employs Wisner's (1995) conceptual understanding of the experience of work: Wisner (1995) concludes from his evaluation of ethnographies of work that work can be defined as 'the coordinated activity deployed by men and women in order to face that which, in a utilitarian

task, cannot be obtained through the strict application of the prescribed organisation' (Wisner, 1995). Dejours (2006) argues that all work requires the overcoming of rules in the confrontation between the agent and material realities, resulting in a struggle which is both a source of suffering and the grounds for the formation of subjectivity. The irreducible autonomy in every act of work overthrows assumptions that hierarchical authority administering impartiality, knowledge and coordination is the best way of ensuring that work gets done. It shows that the very nature of work is constituted by the actions of workers who seek to reunite means and ends at the level of the task by adapting, subverting and confounding constraining organisational rules. Even though much of this work is rendered invisible and put beyond deliberative evaluation, it is a potentially rich source of the intersubjective encounters which are constitutive of skill and identity formation. Thus:

'[...] even where work is well conceived, even when the organisation of work is rigorous, even when the instructions and procedures are clear, it is impossible to achieve quality if the orders are scrupulously respected. Indeed ordinary work situations are rife with unexpected events, breakdowns, incidents, operational anomalies, organisational inconsistency and things that are simply impossible to predict, arising from the materials, tools, and machines as well as from other workers, colleagues, bosses, subordinates, the team, the chain of authority, the clients, and so on. *In short, there is no such thing as purely mechanical work*' (Dejours, 2006: 47, emphasis added).

Dejours's argument for the impossibility of 'purely mechanical work' shows us how actual human action in joint coordination supersedes and opposes prescribed human action, indicating an irreducible level of individual autonomy in all acts of work which cannot be controlled or eliminated by rule-based, Taylorised forms of work organisation. Dejours develops a triangular definition of

work which integrates the psychological, the technical and the cultural along three dimensions:

Ego-real: the instrumental moment in which the act of work takes place which involves an encounter between the worker and the real. The real is whatever resists the activity of the worker, engendering a sense of frustration, powerlessness and disappointment.

Real-others: the efficiency of the act which is also social because it is the product of social judgement guided by instrumental constraints and socially formed valuations of what makes an act of work efficient

Ego-others: the cultural moment constituted by the inter-subjective relation within the work collective (however that is structured) which enables the transmission of technique, the formation of judgements of value, and the social integration of the act of work into the division of labour (Deranty, 2009: 71ff).

‘The Real’ element of work consists in ‘all elements of the concrete reality of work which cannot be anticipated, regulated or coordinated in advance’ (Dejours, 2009: 79), where ‘the real’ can be social as well as material. The real opens up a gap between the prescribed rules and the constraining conditions of the world, demanding that the active agency of the worker be applied to bridge the gap so that acts of work achieve their purposes. All work is therefore embodied rather than immaterial; simultaneously theoretical and practical, making subjective investment on the part of the agent unavoidable: ‘without subjective mobilisation, no production is possible’ (Deranty, 2009: 81). This means that, in order to complete tasks – which often involves unifying means and ends divided by the technical division of labour - workers must subvert rules in labours which

are rendered invisible by rule-transparent hierarchy (Deranty, 2009). Coming up against the resistance of the real creates a moment of potential self-formation, especially where there is cooperative working and recognition of the worker's efforts, skill, and contribution. In the follow sections, I shall examine the intersubjective dimensions of skill and material objects, and of subjectivities and other persons, which allow us to see that intersubjective relations in work are not defined solely by the efficiency of the act, but that efficiency itself is a value which is subject to meaning-making, and therefore interpretive difference, drawing upon other values, such as well-being, caring, solidarity and usefulness (see Braybrooke, 1998c).

#### *4.1.1 Skill and Relations to Material Objects*

In the loss of autonomy argument, conditions of objective alienation are established through progressive deskilling. In Dejours's ego-real encounters, however, workers must acquire and apply skill to overcome social, technological and material resistances in their environment. Green (2006) characterises skill as distinctively human: 'the utilization of skill is an end in itself, with intrinsic value. Engagement in complex production processes, requiring both conception and execution of tasks in various measures, is the hallmark of distinctively human production activity, and is the means by which people have the potential for self-fulfilment' (ibid: 16). Skill formation relates us to the objects, technology and social systems which constitute part of the real or the total environment without which 'the properly human cannot exist' (Latour & Venn, 2002: 252). Latour & Venn (2002) argues that, along with morality, technology is a mode of existence, or 'a particular form of exploring existence, a particular form of the exploration of being – in the midst of many others' (ibid: 248). Material objects do not exist apart from us as inert objects which we make conform to our purposes; instead, they shape our cognitive and emotional capabilities as we learn to engage with them, and come to acknowledge the potentials and limitations they present to realising different modes of being (ibid: 251). Material reality is a structured set of

intersubjective relations between people, living beings, social systems and material objects which is not static, but is dynamic and mutually adjusting. Appadurai (1986) puts this in terms of ‘the social life of things’ where an object cannot be understood apart from ‘the analysis of the network this object or technique is part of’ (Faure-Rouesnel, 2001: 242). Material objects, bodies and space form part of a network of social relations, and indeed are constitutive of social relations: ‘their active participation in a process of social self-creation in which they are directly constitutive of our understanding of ourselves and others’ (Miller, 1987: 115). This means that our practical identities are shaped by our intersubjective encounters with materiality, forming or stunting our capacities to be producers of meaning.

Thus, the loss of autonomy argument, based upon perceptions of deskilling, is weakened by alternative interpretations of what people actually do in work, which do not support a dualistic opposition between craft work and alienated work. Attewell (1990) suggests that Braverman’s deskilling thesis unfavourably links skill with control, such that lack of control must imply lack of skill, and that, in a rule-bound environment, all that workers require in terms of skills are basic abilities to read, write and follow instructions: ‘Rule-governed work [...] implies that work is completely predictable’ (Attewell, 1990: 442). But Attewell (2009) argues that this is to misunderstand the role that rules play in the experience of work: ‘rules – however authoritarian and detailed – provide little more than a schematic for work, a guide into which employees insert their abilities in classifying, choosing, interacting, persuading, and so on’ (ibid: 443). Workers operating within rule-bound environments are not unskilled, in fact they must employ a wide range of complex skills which are simply hidden from organisational view, undervalued and dismissed by those who believe they are entitled to appropriate the task of planning the organisation of work. Kusterer (1978) suggests that one reason for the devaluation of ‘unskilled’ work is that, if the work requires general skills which many people possess or can acquire, then the skills involved must be less important than the skills which are practised only by a few. Kusterer recorded the following interview with a machine operator:

‘‘I don’t know why you want to interview me. You don’t have to know anything to do my job.’ Three hours later, too exhausted to keep writing down all she knew, I brought the interview to a close. As I was preparing to leave, she told me something entirely different, and this too is typical. ‘This was real interesting. You don’t get to stop and think about things like this, usually...It really makes you think, all the things we do that we don’t even realize’’ (Kusterer, 1978: 187).

Skill is constructed through our relations to material objects, and through our relations to others. Adler (2004), for example, identifies two components to skill: ‘mastery of the complexity of the tasks required of workers in their jobs, and mastery of the relations that coordinate activity across these tasks’ (ibid: 4-5). Thus, skills are not acquired and exercised in relational isolation, but are socially constructed, making the interpenetration of social relations with task content necessary for skill development (Littler, 1982). Wenger (2000) argues that to develop skill-based capabilities, we must belong to a social learning system which is constituted by three elements: firstly, communities of practice; secondly, boundaries between communities of practice; and thirdly, identity formation by participation in at least one community of practice. Institutions, practices and roles are sources of the intersubjective encounters through which we develop skill and competence. Wenger (2000: 229) says that communities of practice are containers of the competences that make up the social learning system where competence emerges out of a sense of *joint enterprise*, relations of *mutuality* which reflect interactions, norms of behaviour and expectations, and a shared repertoire of *resources* in the form of ‘languages, routines, sensibilities, artefacts, tools, stories, styles, etc.’ (ibid: 229). Boundaries, because they connect people to different practices, are sources of learning, innovation and identity formation, where practical identity is not simply consequent upon activities and relationships but is also constitutive of our knowledge and skill formation. Wenger (2000) comments



upon claim processors in an insurance company as follows: 'I noticed that their knowing was interwoven in profound ways with their identities as participants in their community of practice' (ibid: 238) in which 'knowing too much or failing to share a crucial piece of knowledge would be a betrayal of their sense of self and of their community' (ibid 239; Wenger, 1998). Barley & Kunda (2001) characterise communities of practice as networks of practitioners in which knowledge is unevenly distributed, and where practitioners must actively mobilise the resources of the community to solve problems. In contemporary work, rather than deskilling leading to loss of autonomy and objective alienation, the increasing complexity of tasks and the broadening of necessary social relations points towards a general uplift in the content of skills requirements (Adler, 2004: 2; 1990).

In communities of practice, people exercise their meaning-making capabilities intersubjectively through practical encounters with material realities, generating different interpretations of their work, or 'difference potentials', which I argue can be articulated by and made expressive of the political mode of being when framed by democratic practices. Orr's (1997) classic study of Xerox's copier repair technicians shows how technicians make little reference to formal programs and documentation, but instead pass on knowledge to one another through 'war stories': 'technical knowledge is encoded in and transferred through the narratives that technicians recount for themselves and one another' (Barley & Kunda, 2001: 88). Commenting upon the continuing importance of Orr's work, Barley (1996) says: 'Orr documents and develops the important and counterintuitive notion that technical knowledge is best viewed as a socially distributed resource that is diffused and stored primarily through an oral culture' (ibid: xiii). Knowledge and skill is constructed from intersubjective meaning-making encounters which are framed by the norms, values and standards of communities of practice. Bechky (1998; 2003) in her ethnographical study of engineers, technicians and assemblers in high-tech manufacturing shows that the meanings that the work has for the worker shape the knowledge and skill they acquire. Consequently, the most basic means workers require to accomplish their

work – their knowledge, skill and sense of identity – is intersubjectively formed and reproduced through their relations with others in joint working. Marchand (2010) in his review of the literature on embodied cognition suggests that whilst cognition is individual, making knowledge is ‘a process entailing coordinated interaction between interlocutors and practitioners with their total environment’ (ibid: 2). In the concept of embodied cognition, mind and environment are so inextricably linked that cognition itself is emergent from their interactions: ‘our cognitive processes are *constituted* through our embodied engagement in the world and predicated on inter-subjectivity’ (Toren, 1993: 467, original emphasis). Drawing on Clark’s (1997) influential ‘extended mind’ thesis, Adenzato & Garbarini (2006) describe the mind as ‘an emerging property of the brain’ (ibid: 748) where mind is grounded ‘in body experience and interwoven with action and interaction with other individuals’ (ibid: 748). They cite Ingold’s (2000) reflections upon apprenticeship which leads him to conclude that: ‘meaning is not the form the mind imposes onto the flow of purely perceptible data, through innate or learned schemas, but that it is continually generated in the relational involvement contexts that people pursue in their surrounding world’ (Adenzato & Garbarini, 2006: 753). Communities of practice structure our relations to others in the joint undertakings which require an investment of time, effort and subjectivity in order to develop the skills relevant to the internal goods embodied in the practice.

Thus, the frustrations and struggles people experience when grappling with material realities stimulates differing interpretations of the meaning of their work. Although these difference potentials are often invisible and unarticulated, they provide a reservoir of knowledge, understanding and skill development enabling workers to bridge the gap between prescribed and actual work. I conclude, therefore, that such difference potentials are a rich source of values formation, challenging the hegemony of efficiency as the sole value determining action, and providing the material for political self-determination in work, when the conditions for democratic participation pertain.

#### 4.1.2 Subjectivities and Relations to Others

When people work together, they join their capacities with those of others in the shared production of knowledge and skill, which emerges from active meaning-making between participants embedded in a context, or ‘community of practice’, including ‘artefacts, tools-to-hand, and raw materials; space, place and architecture; paths and boundaries; time-frames and temporal rhythms; light, darkness, and weather’ (Marchand, 2010: 2). This is not simply a technical exercise of coordination, but demands intersubjective encounters with other persons, where the marshalling of one’s subjectivity through reflecting with others upon the meanings of values interior to the content of work is intrinsic to the work process itself. Such interactions shape our sense of self, making subjective formations vulnerable to recruitment by a management project which seeks to profit from the voluntary cooperation of workers by exploiting subjective affects. For example, networked forms of work organisation lacking a hierarchical structure to enforce involvement attempt to mould subjective formation (cf. Ezzy, 2001), but, in the absence of opportunities for workers to deliberate over the framing rules which structure the terms of their cooperation, the participation of workers under such conditions cannot be considered ‘uncoerced’. But even though such organisations structure forms of compulsion, this does not mean workers’ subjectivities are co-opted without remainder into the management project. Indeed, the management of subjectivities argument overemphasises the ability of cultural engineering to align the individual self to organisational goals (Garrety, 2007), because workers seek to exercise agency, and indeed they *must* exercise agency if they are to get the work done. The irreducible autonomy in every act of work challenges the idea that organisational control over the formation of the self can be absolute: organisational controls over the self are more or less effective, providing opportunities for resistance and alternative subjective formations, although I acknowledge that psychological costs and power asymmetries means that workers cannot always maintain internal autonomy over their true selves. But internal fragmentation, as a result of simultaneous resistance to, and

accommodation of, pressures to align self-conception to organisational purposes is not inevitable: Ashforth & Tomiuk (2000), for example, found that occasional acting did not alienate service workers who acknowledged an alignment between the requirement of their job and their sense of self. Rau (2011) proposes that psychotechniques do not necessitate oppression, but can instead form the basis of a psychopolitics of emancipation, where workers not only work on the self using defensive strategies of resistance, but also claim the subjective experience of work as a source of self-realisation. Thus, workers do not accept the management of subjectivity without awareness and protest: ‘workers do not simply acquiesce to engineered culture’ (Ezzy, 2001: 634): Kunda (1992) highlights how employees see themselves as engaged in a kind of game or role-play; Graham (1995) shows how new recruits manipulate the selection process so that ‘over a period of time, team members withdrew their active participation from company rituals and resorted to open acts of defiance and resistance against management and company philosophy’ (Graham, 1995: 117); McCabe (2007) identifies the resilience of unionism in an environment of radical restructuring around team-working designed to undermine collective action and the forms of identity upon which such action depends.

A further compelling example of how interpretive differences feed into a psychopolitics of emancipation is provided by the activity of ‘job crafting’, which consists in ‘the physical and cognitive changes individuals make in the task or relational boundaries of their work’ (Wrzesniewski & Dutton, 2001). In job crafting, workers make ‘unsupervised, spontaneous changes in their jobs’ (Lyons, 2008: 165) through actions which are hidden from organisational view, and which therefore avoid including management in decision-making about how the job is being altered. Documented acts of job crafting have been found to be motivated by the desire to achieve the purposes of the work to best effect, and to enable workers to experience a sense of enhanced personal efficacy: ‘job crafting seems to help individuals to feel better about themselves and to enable them to perceive they have more control over what they do on the job’ (Lyons, 2008: 36). An important indicator of irreducible autonomy from the most recent research on

job crafting is that, rather than being marginal or the preoccupation of exceptional individuals, job crafting is both widespread and necessary to getting the work done (Berg et al, 2010).

Weeks (2007), in an attempt to break down distinctions between reproductive and productive work, suggests that, rather than thinking in terms of a true versus an alienated self, we conceive of a potential self, where ‘the self at work could thus be judged in relation to a self that one might wish to become, and both work and non-work then could be accessed in relation to the possibility of becoming different’ (ibid: 246). Recognising different subjective formations in the creative process of becoming requires us to acknowledge the dialectical relationship between an inner self and a public self, opening up ‘a discursive space’ which operates between different action contexts and timespaces of work ‘from which individuals can evaluate, resist and adapt’ (Garrety, 2007: 25). I suggest that discursive spaces mobilise intersubjective encounters with others from which interpretive differences over meanings, values and purposes of work arise, but that most of these interpretive differences will remain as pre-political ‘difference potentials’, invisible, ignored, or perhaps appropriated into a management project of engineered selves, unless they given are voice through public evaluation structured by democratic practices. Aronson & Neysmith (2006) describe how the identities of care workers are put under strain by job description processes which render invisible, and therefore difficult to contest, the emotional labour which is central to effective home care. They also explore how displaced care workers who had been made redundant from their not-for-profit employer – which failed to compete in the creation of a new market for home care – were unable to protest effectively because, rather than locating the responsibility for their loss in government policy, they blamed themselves for lacking flexibility and sufficient self-interest. I do not think it is too small a step to imagine how democratic practices might have enabled them to mount a protest exposing the exploitative character of the structures of meaning governing their work, and thus to collectively sustain their identities based upon the value they placed upon the affective dimensions of their caring labour.

Furthermore, democratic practices are protective of workers' interests in retaining control over the knowledge and skills inherent to difference potentials. Kocyba (2011) warns that making the processes and practices of work activity visible through 'radical transparency' means that workers' efforts become vulnerable to expropriation. In some instances, making work visible can conflict with the internal goods of the practice, for example, caring for others sometimes involves making one's activities invisible in order to secure the cared for person's sense of autonomy. Thus, we should not aim at transparency without also aiming at the participatory consent of workers, upon whose skill, knowledge and capabilities for meaning-making the work of social cooperation depends. Additionally, when we create difference potentials we are exercising our status and capabilities as valuers, but this does not mean that difference potentials are automatically transformative of the interior content of work. To realise their emancipatory potential, interpretive differences must be brought into public discourse through the exercise of the political mode of being. Difference potentials, or diverse interpretations of the meanings, values and purposes arising from acts of work, indicate the presence of an immanent core of irreducible autonomy in work. And this core of irreducible autonomy grounds the possibility for personal autonomy at the level of the task, which, when brought into public deliberation at the level of the organisation through democratic practices, makes possible political autonomy as collective self-determination. Difference potentials, however, will remain pre-political until they are visibilised through public discourse at the level of the task and at the level of the organisation.

In sum, autonomy in work is given by control, not only over the material dimensions of work, but also over the meanings of work, that is, the interpretive differences arising from the interactions with self-other-real which occur during the work of social cooperation. But to understand how we promote participatory practices which are productive of difference demands an appreciation of the relational dimensions of personal autonomy, where intersubjective encounters in the work of social cooperation must possess the relevant normative characteristics to encourage the equal participation of all meaning-makers. Interpretive

differences indicate that personal autonomy over meaning-making is a fundamentally relational capability – a capability which is a pre-condition for political self-determination in a system of workplace democracy which operates at the level of the task and at the level of the organisation.

### **5.0.0 Rationality of Caring in the Value of Meaningfulness**

Interpretive differences remain as pre-political potentials until they are activated by democratic practices at the level of task, and this requires the exercise of the political mode of being. By enabling the political mode of being in work, we reconstitute both the *content of work* so that people gain discursive, embodied and practical control over the tasks they do and the purposes for which they do them, and the *social bases for the constitution of selves* by enriching the sources of identity formation and narrative possibilities which contribute to a life of meaning. However, in order to realise the emancipatory potential of irreducible autonomy, we need a fuller concept of personal autonomy than the pseudo-autonomy offered by managerial practices of appropriation, one which enables a person to voice their differences and to add their capabilities to those of others in uncoerced joint action (cf. Pettit & Schweikard, 2006). I propose that applying a concept of relational autonomy to irreducible agency helps us to understand how invisibilised acts of work can be brought into the public domain through democratic practices which aim at developing the meaning-making capabilities essential to getting the work done. A relational concept of autonomy allows us to specify the normative dimensions of personal autonomy in work which is the pre-condition for political autonomy in the democratic practices enabling all work to meet the threshold of sufficient meaning. Mackenzie & Stoljar (2000) describe relational autonomy in the following terms:

‘They point to the need to think of autonomy as a characteristic of agents who are emotional, embodied, desiring, creative, and feeling, as well as rational, creatures; and they highlight the ways

in which agents are both psychically internally differentiated and socially differentiated from others' (ibid: 21).

The formation and exercise of the capacity for personal autonomy is shaped by our relations to others; thus, activities rich in relationality are vital to being able to experience personal autonomy. But acts of work which are rich in relationality, if they are to produce intersubjective relations consistent with the bipartite value of meaningfulness, require the exercise of a rationality which exceeds technical reasoning. I propose that the particular kind of rationality which is conducive to experiencing the bipartite value of meaningfulness in work is one which arises out of our efforts to fulfil our responsibilities of care for the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives.

### **5.1.0 A Practical Rationality of Caring**

To discharge our responsibilities of care, and thus to be able to claim that we have legitimately appropriated worthy objects to the meaning content of our lives, requires the capability to exercise a rationality of caring, which takes the particularity of worthy objects, and how they structure the meaning content of our lives, into account. A practical rationality of caring is one where the ends are not specified in advance, but emerge out of the developing needs of the worthy object in question. To be able to exercise a practical rationality of caring, we must possess the capability to respond with intelligent feeling to an evolving situation, which demands experience, intuition, practical knowledge, as well as commitment to the standards determined by the relevant practice of care. Furthermore, when the worthy object is a person, a practical rationality of caring requires an engagement with the cared for, such that we do not assume we know in advance what their needs are, but negotiate an understanding of their needs through mutual interaction (cf. Fraser, 1989). Thus, a capability for intelligent feeling is not based upon obeying automatically rules of care, set out prior to action, but crafts caring relations attentive to the particular needs of worthy objects.



I suggest that a practical rationality of caring useful to realising the bipartite value of meaningfulness can be described using Dunne's (1993) rationality of phronetic *techne*, which he draws out from Aristotle's distinction between two different kinds of practical knowledge: *poiesis* (production) and *praxis* (action) (cf. Breen, 2011; see also Murphy, 1993). In an Aristotelian conception of action, *poiesis* is the mode of producing or making, in which the goal that is pursued is external to the action itself; and *praxis* is the mode of acting, in which there is no product and the action is meaningful in itself. Dunne (1993) unites the technical and pragmatic requirements of *poiesis* to the expressive valuing and judging of *praxis* in the rationality of phronetic *techne*, where *techne* is a person's knowledge of the principles and techniques inherent to the practice in which they are engaged, and *phronesis* is the way in which that same person acquires understanding of how to live well 'not in the making of any product separate from oneself but rather in one's actions with one's fellows' (ibid: 244). Dunne opposes '*monopolistic reason*', which he defines as 'masterful, autonomous, technocratic and logocentric' justified by 'materiality, contingency, vulnerability, nature, and embodiment' (ibid: 355), to '*phronetic techne*' where 'responsiveness to the situation is not fully specifiable in advance and which is experiential, charged with perceptiveness, and rooted in the sensory and emotional life' (ibid.). Dunne says that production, governed by technical reasoning, has been the dominant rationality in the development of modern capitalist societies, giving rise to ambitions to control and master the contingencies of living through rigid specification of rules and the elimination of individual judgement. A technician rationality aims 'to construe specific tasks as value neutral and to immunize them [...] against the human condition' (Dunne, 1993: 244). In contrast, the rationality of phronetic *techne* acknowledges the simultaneity of *phronesis* with *techne*, such that to be a person of practical knowledge, uniting the rationalities of *techne* and *phronesis*, is to be a 'feeling, expressing and acting person' whose 'knowledge is inseparable from one as such' (ibid: 358). This means that technical knowledge is not divorced from ethical thinking, but is instead constructed through ethico-political modes of interacting with others and

the material world. Dunne says that to act out of phronetic techne is to see oneself as immersed in networks of intersubjective relations, and to exercise efficacy as influence, rather than efficacy as efficiency; and especially to recognise one's nonsovereignty in situations requiring us to respond with intelligent feeling (ibid: 359). The necessity for responsive relationality in the successful practice of phronetic techne suggests that phronetic techne constitutes a pragmatic, everyday capability, which people already exercise in their ordinary activities in order to fulfil their responsibilities towards worthy objects – and is therefore susceptible to inclusion into a rationality of caring. If we conceive of a practical rationality of caring in terms of 'phronetic techne', we are directed beyond rationalities predicated upon an automatic response to pre-given technical determinants to a mode of reasoning requiring responsiveness to the situation, and evaluated against standards inherent to the community of practice in which the action is framed. Moreover, when we exercise phronetic techne in the intersubjective relations between self and other, and self and materiality, then interpretive differences arising from encounters with others and with material realities generates values, which are not simply read off from action, but are constitutive of action itself:

'Human behaviour is really human to the extent to which it means acting into the world. This, in turn, implies being motivated by the world. In fact, the world toward which a human being transcends itself is a world replete with meanings that constitute reasons to act and full as well of other human beings to love' (Frankl, 2004: 93).

Because phronetic techne does not rely upon pre-given technical solutions, but requires open-ended evaluation and judgement crafted to the demands of particular situations, then to exercise phronetic techne is to engage in meaning-making, where meanings are created from the interpretive differences which arise from the work people do together to care for worthy objects. This requires, I suggest, a kind of authority in conceiving, speaking and negotiating which Tirrell

(1993) identifies as a form of ‘power of naming’ (Daly, 1973: 9). An authority which allows us to engage in ‘the distinctively human activity of defining, describing, and re-creating ourselves while simultaneously defining, describing and re-creating our social and material world’ (Tirrell, 1993: 2). In order to participate in activities of meaning-making which produce the world (including our selves), then we require ‘semantic authority’ which is ‘a matter of having a say (about something) that others recognize and respect; it is an important, perhaps necessary, element in constructing oneself as fully human’ (ibid: 16). Meaning-making is thus a distinctively human activity in which ‘I become a person and remain one only as an interlocutor’ (Taylor, 1985: 276). In fact, the extent to which I am a free person depends upon the degree to which I am included or excluded from the means to realise my status as a valuer, and to acquire the capabilities for valuing: ‘We are fully human only as creators (and inheritors) of values, as beings who make norms and to whom norms apply’ (Tirrell, 1993: 7). Tirrell argues that our ability to become valuers depends upon our membership of communities, because ‘our past actions and the actions of others establish a structure of significance’ (ibid: 13), and we depend upon communities to provide a structure of meaning, which ‘give our articulations ‘uptake’’ (ibid: 15). Communities can embody oppressive intersubjective relations, but, as I have already identified in relation to a management ideology which seeks to impose a unilateral interpretation of meaning upon the subjectivities and actions of workers, no oppressive community is entirely successful in closing down on differences in meaning-making (ibid: 10). Interpretive differences can lie fallow, or they can be made part of a public discourse of sense-making and world-building when we join with others in deliberations and disagreements over the value of objects, and the importance they should have in our lives. Such joining together in deliberation over interpretive differences multiplies the range of positive values within a liberal perfectionist framework which can be made available for meaning appropriation, and also makes possible emotional engagement consistent with the subjective dimension of the bipartite value of meaningfulness. Furthermore, when we evaluate, judge,

accept, reject and create meaning out of interpretive differences through the application of a rationality of caring, then we are best placed to realise the bipartite value of meaningfulness in our lives. And being able to exercise a rationality of caring requires us to see ourselves as relationally situated in structures of meaning in which we see ourselves as having the status of co-authorities in the realm of value, and where we possess the capabilities for meaning-making.

### **6.0.0 Conclusion**

Simone de Beauvoir said ‘It is in the knowledge of the genuine conditions of our life that we must draw strength to live and our reason for acting’ (1948: 9). The everyday experience of work provides some of the most important action contexts from which we draw our reasons for acting, and for being. I argue that acts of work are not irretrievably degraded, devoid of the prospects for personal autonomy which is constitutive of meaningfulness, but are replete with interpretive differences, as a consequence of ‘the anticipation of the problems by workers, responsibilities that are very difficult to evaluate and supervise’ (Sitton, 1998: 76-77; cf. Offe, 1997; 1985). Bringing the difference potentials inherent to the core of agency in every act of work into public discourse requires an understanding of the relational dimensions of autonomy, where each meaning-maker is regarded as a potential or actual carrier of autonomy capabilities. This demands democratic practices at the level of the task. In work, to make such deliberative processes available to everyone requires, I argue, democratic participation at the level of the task and the level of the organisation. The active capacities which workers must employ to get the work done justifies their status as co-authorities able to edit (and revise) the rules and behaviours framing their activities. This means that their status as co-authorities is grounded not only in their human status as ends-in-themselves, but also in their activity which bridges the gap between prescribed and necessary/actual work. In order to make visible encounters with ‘the real’ – or the material realities and irreducible agency in

every act of work - workers need to be able to exercise the political mode of being in work. This requires a form of workplace democracy which acknowledges the realities and the responsibilities of work as they are experienced by workers. Deranty (2009) suggests:

‘since the work process requires cooperation between workers, it functions best if the individualised forms of subjective investment that allow for the mastering of the task are confronted and discussed in a public forum, where a consensus can hopefully be found on the best way to realize the production’ (Deranty, 2009: 83).

We may, however, need something different from the consensus that Deranty is hopeful of. We may also require a new vocality, or means of expression, which will enable disagreement over the meaning of efficiency and productivity; challenging of rules and practices; a plurality of perspectives and subjective formations; and confrontation of managerial hierarchy based upon status and control over decision-making. I shall propose in Chapter Six that agonistic democratic practices have the potential to foster a form of workplace democracy which recognises the irreducible autonomy in every act of work by treating each worker as an irreplaceable contributor, imbued with the potential for expressive political agency. This amounts to a normative claim that ‘a just society has an obligation to promote autonomy by ensuring that its basic social, legal, political and economic institutions provide the recognitive basis for its citizens to realize their autonomy’ (Mackenzie, 2000: 524), where the basis for the realisation of autonomy in work is given by institutional guarantees of meaningful work for all.

## **Chapter Four**

### **Confronting Domination: Freedom and Democratic Authority**

#### **1.0.0 Introduction**

The question I propose dealing with in relation to the constitutive value of freedom in meaningful work is the extent to which authority relations at the level of the organisation enable or disable our capabilities for meaning-making, and support or undermine our status as co-authorities in the realm of value. I answer this question by applying the republican concept of freedom as non-domination to the action contexts in which we cooperate with others to reproduce society. A person may be negatively free, because they experience non-interference in their choice of employment and positively free, because interventions have been conducted on their behalf to develop their capabilities, but still fail to be free in a republican sense, because they are subject to relations of domination in the interior content of the work they do with others. For this reason, I suggest we need to pay closer attention to freedom in work as non-domination, and I propose that we conceive of domination, not only in the neo-republican sense of being subject to the capricious will of another, but also as being excluded from participating in the framing of social structures which shape our subjectivities. I shall show that non-dominating intersubjective relations in the work of social cooperation are secured within coordinating authorities, which are legitimate when they are democratic authorities, and that realising the link between freedom as non-domination and authority as democratic authority is part of what enables us to realise the value of meaningfulness in work.

#### **2.0.0 Non-Domination and the Value of Meaningfulness**

I argued in Chapter One that, in order to experience the bipartite value of meaningfulness, we must develop the two capabilities for objective valuing and

subjective attachment, supported by our equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value. In the process of acquiring these capabilities we become valuers, able to make our contribution to the creation and maintenance of positive values within a liberal perfectionist framework. I went on to argue in Chapter Three that, in meaningful work, the constitutive dimension of autonomy as non-alienating work is grounded in the irreducible autonomy in every act of work, where a person's ineliminable encounters with materiality and with others give rise to interpretive differences which have the potential to multiply the range of positive values, when they are brought to conscious evaluation in public deliberation. I identified how interpretive differences with the possibility of realising the emancipatory potential of work emerge from applying the rationality of phronetic techne to our responsibilities of care for worthy objects, through which we respond to the demands of particular situations, requiring the uniting of means and ends, by exercising our capacities for thinking, feeling and judging. And I proposed that we realise our autonomy in the meaningfulness of work when we act as valuers, as meaning-makers, by bringing interpretive differences into public deliberation through democratic practices at the level of the task, participation in which demands that we be able to experience certain kinds of supportive institutional and intersubjective conditions. Specifically, I suggest that to be secure in our capabilities and status, and thus to have the confidence to bring interpretive differences into public evaluation with others, each person must be able to experience the personal condition of non-domination in his or her most important relations in the work of social cooperation. This implies a broader understanding of freedom in work than would be offered by evaluating freedom in terms of negative and positive freedom alone (Berlin, 1969), since the possibility of any particular individual being able to realise freedom in their work does not depend solely upon forms of positive freedom such as experiences of expressive freedom in experiences of 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 1991), or negative freedom such as being able to choose to enter into or exit from employment relations, but also upon his or her ability to resist the arbitrary use of power, which I understand in terms of Pettit's (1997) neo-republican concept of freedom as non-domination.

I concentrate upon developing an understanding of freedom as non-domination in my positive critical conception of meaningful work, because, where relations between persons are dominating, then the risk of capability deformation is high, and it is less likely that individuals will have the sense of worthiness as co-authorities to be able to bring interpretive differences into public evaluation, even when institutional procedures for deliberation are in place. In processes of meaning-making which generate interpretive differences, asymmetrical power relations can operate to suppress or distort the interpretations of some to the benefit of others. Pettit (1997) describes ‘being dominated’ as ‘occupying a position where another can interfere on an arbitrary basis in your life’ (Pettit, 2002: 341; Pettit, 1999; see also Skinner, 1998), where ‘someone has an arbitrary power of interference in the affairs of another so far as they have a power of interference that is not forced to track the avowed or readily avowable interests of the other: they can interfere according to their own *arbitrium* or decision’ (ibid: 342). Because the possibility of domination exists in the structure and character of the relations between two or more people, Pettit describes freedom as non-domination as ‘social freedom’ (Pettit, 2007a), such that, ‘corresponding to social obstacles – obstacles generated by the power of others – there will be social freedom’ (ibid: 711). Furthermore, Pettit says that an individual’s personal freedom does not consist in his or her choices, but ‘in a standing capacity of some kind and his or her choices will count as free so far as they are exercises or manifestations of such an ability’ (ibid: 715). I take from Pettit’s understanding of freedom as non-domination that the capacity to resist dominating relations is both structural and individual, requiring equality of capability formation for meaning-making, and equality of status when making claims for one’s own interpretations of meaning and value in deliberative encounters with others.

### **3.0.0 Simone Weil: The Potential for Freedom in Work**

Simone Weil is one of the few theorists of work who combines philosophical reflection with phenomenological experience of everyday working



life (Weil, 1977 [1946]). Weil took work in Parisian factories, as a factory hand at Alstom, a packer with Carnaud and a line worker at Renault, when the Taylorist technical division of labour had taken hold in the organisation of work (see also Ezzy, 1997). Weil observes two aspects of Taylorism which she argues makes work an experience of unfreedom: firstly, it results in modes of acting and being which distort capabilities for thinking and feeling, and secondly, such distorted modes of acting and being are permitted when there exist oppressive relations between persons, such as those which can occur between manager and worker in hierarchical organisations of work: ‘since orders are now the sole factor making for variety, to eliminate them in thought is to condemn oneself to imagining an unbroken succession of ever-identical movements, to visualising monotonous desert regions of experience that thought has no way of exploring’ (Weil, 1997: 57).

For Weil, Taylorised work is oppressive because ‘the act of working is performed out of fear, rather than within the framework of an awareness of the purpose and value of the task’ (Ezzy, 1997). But, despite the unpromising nature of the activities she found herself undertaking, Weil seeks to excavate from within her experience of factory labour an emancipatory form of action which is immanent to the interior content of work. Against the oppressions visited upon thought and action by the factory system, Weil sets out an ideal of freedom in work where ‘true liberty is not defined by a relationship between desire and its satisfaction, but by a relationship between thought and action; the absolutely free man would be he whose every action proceeded from a preliminary judgement concerning the end which he set himself and the sequence of means suitable for attaining this end’ (Weil, 2006 [1955]: 81). Thus, free work engenders an experience of true liberty when a person is able to exercise capabilities for judging and feeling through a social organisation of work which gives ‘a proprietary feeling to all men’ (Weil, 1977 [1946]: 62); overcomes a sense of homelessness (ibid: 64); and relieves the irritations and anxieties that arise from being subject to ‘the boss’s unpredictable will’ (ibid: 57).

Weil's experience of factory work is characterised by a relationship between manager and worker in which subjection to the will of another in hierarchical authority links two dimensions: firstly, the loss of a sense of future, which operates to extinguish the possibility of thought and action, and secondly, the impairment of the worker's sense of worth as a person. For the person engaged in repetitive factory work, the anxieties and humiliations attendant upon having to respond to 'someone else's beck and call' (ibid: 57) are exacerbated by 'being forcibly reminded that the Boss's orders are all that matter' (ibid.). The result is that the factory worker's capabilities for judging and feeling become stunted because, in order to protect himself from the harms of domination, he will avoid imagining the possibility of change; his 'thought draws back from the future' so that 'this perpetual recoil upon the present produces a kind of brutish stupor' (ibid.). The factory worker's state is even worse than this, however, because thought cannot remain permanently withdrawn, but 'is obliged to remain in constant readiness not only to follow the monotonous progress of movements indefinitely repeated, but to find within itself resources to cope with the unexpected' (ibid: 59). The possibility of the work process going wrong puts the worker into a permanent state of anxiety, making him vulnerable to dependency upon others for the means to get his work done: 'when, as is so often the case, one has to turn to someone else in order to get on with his work, someone like a foreman, a warehouse keeper, a straw-boss, the feeling of dependency, of impotence, of counting for nothing in the eyes of those upon whom he is dependent, can become painful to the point of making a man cry' (ibid: 58). When the work itself is determined by the thoughts of those who plan the outcomes of the work, without reference to the worker's needs for self-determination, for positive intersubjective relations, and for cognitive engagement with the tasks for which he has been made responsible, then the worker's sense of worth, of his status as a person, is undermined. For Weil, the oppressions of work reduce finally to the conditions of servitude (Weil, 2006 [1955]: 90), which she understands in terms of how the 'existence of other men' press the worker into a relation of dependence, so that 'his own life escapes not only out of his hands, but

also out of the control of his intelligence; judging and resolution no longer have anything to which to apply themselves; instead of contriving and acting, one has to stoop to pleading or threatening' (ibid: 91). And she pleads for conditions of work which will 'not render them docile, nor even to make them happy, but quite simply not to force them to abase themselves' (Weil, 1977 [1946]: 72).

### 3.1.0 Domination

Weil's insights into the experience of work expose how patterns of domination in intersubjective relations are given purchase by the institutional organisation of work. And she illuminates the extensive harms to human capability formation and a sense of worthiness which such relations of domination engender. In a recent account of the concept of domination, Lovett (2010) identifies both objective and subjective harms which can be mapped onto Weil's capability and status distortions, where the objective material harms of domination give rise to exploitation and insecurity, and the subjective harms of domination give rise to damaged self-respect. Lovett says that domination makes a person vulnerable in areas of vital interest to them, either *directly* through forms of exploitation where material benefits are extracted from one person to benefit another without consideration given to the needs and interests of the dominated person in the relationship, or *indirectly* because the dominated person engages in 'strategic anticipation' (ibid: 131), and voluntarily gives up valued goods in order to avoid the anticipated unpleasantness of being on the receiving end of the arbitrary use of power. The possibility that a person may, at any moment, be subject to arbitrary interference generates such a degree of insecurity that her ability to plan her own life is severely restricted. A permanent state of *insecurity* gives rise to pathological behaviours where an individual attempts to avoid social interaction, or simply becomes resigned to their circumstances. The possibility that objective conditions of domination will give rise to harm is strengthened by the subjective conditions of domination, because the subjective condition of distorted *self-respect* undermines a person's ability to defend herself from the

objective conditions of material exploitation and insecurity. Lovett (ibid: 132) refers to Scott's (1990) concept of the 'public transcript', which Scott uses to identify how domination involves symbolic structures of deference on the one side and dishonouring on the other. Public transcripts are used as part of the structure of ideologies which aim to shape the subjectivity of one person to the advantage of another, thereby making it less costly for the dominant partner to extract the benefits of the relationship. Objective structures and subjective formations can be made to work together to form a system of domination: Blaug (2007), for example, identifies how pathologies of cognition and subjective formations arise when dominating organisational structures foster the development of perverse capabilities such as obsequiousness, impression management, and co-dependency. He argues that strategies of objective and subjective domination deliberately exploit meaning-making capacities in order to support managerial ideologies, such as the natural superiority of hierarchical organisations of work, which means that 'any democratization of organisational life is seen to turn on the capacity of participants to selectively use and manage hierarchy and to minimise its cognitive costs' (ibid: 24). In order to allow some to extract the advantages of a system of domination, the objective conditions of domination are reinforced by subjective conditions of socialisation, adaptive preferences, and identity formations. McMahon (1994) shows, for example, how the directives of managers have the force of orders which are meant to pre-empt an employees' own judgement upon how he or she should employ her time (ibid: 188), and that the internalisation of organisational rules through forms of socialisation reduce the need for managers to add coercive force to their directives; instead, 'subordinates are expected to be adept at reading the wishes of their bosses and putting them into effect without being told in so many words to do so' (ibid.). Such dominating relations are more likely to take root in 'conditions where people have to live at the mercy of another, have to live in such a way that leaves them vulnerable and exposed to the arbitrary interference and imposition of the will of another' (Alexander, 2008: 166). And these conditions pertain when the organisation of work thwarts capability formation by making

workers dependent upon the coordinating capacities of others in order to be able to get their work done.

### **3.2.0 Free Work**

But Weil does not leave matters thus - she goes on to identify the ‘joys of work’ (Weil, 1977 [1946]: 59), of a ‘life spent among machines’ (ibid: 55), where ‘any series of movements that participates of the beautiful and is accomplished with no loss of dignity, implies moments of pause, as short-lived as lightning flashes, but that are the very stuff of rhythm and give the beholder, even across extremes of rapidity, the impression of leisureliness’ (ibid: 61). Meaningful work is not work from which effort and hardship has been eliminated, but is work which presents to workers the possibility of a ‘completely free life’ as ‘one wherein all real difficulties present themselves as kinds of problems, wherein all successes were as solutions carried into actions’ (Weil, 2006, [1955]: 82). Free work requires a mode of thought and action combined such that:

‘[...] the only mode of production absolutely free would be that in which methodical thought was in operation throughout the course of the work. The difficulties to be overcome would be so varied that it would never be possible to apply ready-made rules; not of course that the part played by acquired knowledge should be nil; but that it is necessary that the worker should be obliged always to bear in mind the guiding principle behind the work in hand, so as to be able to apply it intelligently to ever-new sets of circumstances’ (ibid: 90).

Workers are obstructed from being able to develop principles, adapt rules, respond to the variety of problems at hand – and thus, to integrate thought and action – by the specialisation of coordinative functions ‘which implies the enslavement of those who execute to those who co-ordinate; and on such a basis

one can only organize and perfect oppression, not lighten it' (Weil, 2006 [1955]: 41). Increasing complexity entails increasing needs for co-ordination (ibid: 62), and therefore presents ever more sophisticated and extended opportunities for the arbitrary interference of some into the actions of others, sanctioned by the relations of authority between management as co-ordinators, and workers as executors. In Weilian terms, creating work with the requisite structure for free action and freedom in the person will demand attention to the character of work (Dagger, 2006), for work which integrates thought and action, commands the respectful attention of others (Ezzy, 2001), and develops the capabilities and status necessary for resisting domination (Alexander, 2008). And this will require, I argue, subordinating the activity of coordination to a democratically authorised authority at the level of the organisation.

Weil's vision of free work is one which secures a sense of rootedness, of being at home in the world, of usefulness (Weil, 2006 [1955]: 37), of imaginative horizons (Weil, 1977 [1946]: 70), and of ownership. For Weil, freedom of the person depends upon how social structures inhibit or extend freedom of thought and feeling, where freedom of thought and feeling is fundamentally relational and concerned with human dignity. And she gestures towards the republican ideal of the inter-relation between political self-determination and personal freedom when she says 'as long as working men are homeless in their places of work, they will never truly feel at home in their country, never be responsible members of society' (Weil, 1977: 64). The free person is one who has a share in the determination of the rules governing society, including those institutions in a system of complex cooperation of which she must be a member, if she is to exercise her entitlement to make her contribution. She must also be a co-authority in the determination of the scope and content of the 'dispensation' or 'common domain of choice' (Pettit, 2007a: 715) which determines how she may act, and how others must attend to her status as a free person. Weil's concept of freedom diverges radically from Arendt's (1977 [1954]) concept of freedom; for the latter, freedom as 'the sheer capacity to begin' (ibid: 167) is possible only within the sphere of political action, whereas for the former, freedom can be found within

work which integrates thought and action in relations of attentive respect. I argue that such work can be made widely available to the many, rather than the few, when there is co-determination, through joint action with others, of the production and maintenance of the principles and rules governing the sphere of action. Modern conditions of work, however, remain prone to relations of domination because of the necessity for coordination of (cooperative) activities, where coordination involves relations of power in which one person has the capacity to give directions and set purposes for another. But although I concur that complex co-ordination requires co-ordination, I argue that the activity of co-ordination is not automatically the preserve of a management elite. Instead, I make democratic co-ordinating authorities essential to freedom as non-domination where the principles and rules of co-ordination are legitimated through the authorisation and endorsement of those who will be subject to the rules governing thinking and acting, and the modes of being shaping intersubjective relations.

#### **4.0.0 Freedom as Non-Domination**

I argue that the neo-republican conception of freedom as non-domination helps us to understand Weil's concern for unfree work which unites objective and subjective conditions of domination by creating a social organisation of work inhibiting feeling and thought, thereby undermining a person's sense of self-worth. Moreover, I claim that such a system of domination is bad because it diminishes possibilities for experiencing the bipartite value of meaningfulness. Where our capabilities for meaning-making are exploited, distorted or coerced, then the interpretive differences which arise from our attempts to fulfil our responsibilities of care for worthy objects are prevented from achieving their emancipatory potential, because even where deliberative procedures are in place our interpretations may be ignored, mocked, or otherwise rendered invisible and impotent. Young (1990) defines domination as a social system which constrains self-determination as 'participating in determining one's actions and the conditions of one's actions' (ibid: 38). She argues that a system of domination

enables the oppression of individuals by restraining capacities for self-development as ‘developing and exercising capabilities expressing one’s experience’ (ibid: 38). Lovett & Pettit (2009) describe the converse of a system of domination as ‘an infrastructure of non-domination’ (ibid: 11) – and I argue that, in the work of social cooperation, this implies the need for a system of workplace democracy, where democratic practices at the level of the task are united to democratic authority at the level of the organisation. In such a system, personal freedom and political freedom are mutually implicated, because, in the absence of political freedom, our personal freedom to negotiate and make sense of our encounters with material objects and with others is constrained, and in the absence of personal freedom, the sources of pre-political interpretive differences necessary to enrich the political mode of being are impoverished. But when personal freedom and political freedom are united into an infrastructure of non-domination, then we create the possibility for any kind of objectivity at all. This is because our collective judgements upon what is worthy yields up objectivity, in the sense of stable, even if temporary, agreement, provided that we establish procedures of democratic deliberation in which equally situated participants advance their interpretive differences, and engage with one another in positive value formation.

#### **4.1.0 Personal Freedom**

I argue that we experience personal freedom in the work we do together when we are situated in relations to others which enable us to use developed and acknowledged meaning-making capabilities in the co-creation and co-maintenance of positive values which we are then able to appropriate to identity formation. But subjective appropriation depends upon, not just meaning-making capabilities in the objective dimension, but our affective attachment to the value of worthy objects. Such affective attachment depends upon our being able to identify our actions and orientations towards worthy objects as being authentically our own, as well as being legitimate, in the sense that they issue in actions which are centred upon what is good for worthy objects. Pettit’s concept of personal



freedom provides useful support to my argument that free actions are those which are directed towards fulfilling our responsibilities of care for worthy objects. Pettit (2001) says that a free person is one who is '[...] fully fit to be held responsible' (ibid: 4), one who sees their actions as essentially their own, so that they are not a 'mere bystander', but 'identify with what is done by their hands' (ibid: 10), and are thereby ready to give public account for their actions. Moreover, in the republican account, being a free person depends upon our political freedom, or our collective self-determination, in the institutions to which we belong. Pettit specifies that the capacity for being a free person consists in: first, 'a common domain of choice in which each is said to be free' and second, the recognition by all that each person enjoys a 'protected, empowered status' (Pettit, 2007: 715). Furthermore, he makes our status as free persons dependent upon our having 'discursive control' in which 'when one is actively treated in a discursive manner by others, and thereby is recognised as a free person, one enjoys discursive authorisation or address' (Pettit, 2001b: 77). Thus, to be able to enjoy discursive control requires the developed capabilities and status for being a free person in the midst of others, for which we need immunity from domination within a sphere of action where inter-subjective relations are normatively characterised by mutual recognition: 'the free person will normally enjoy such protection and empowerment as a matter of common awareness, with everyone aware of the resources available to the person, aware that everyone else is aware of this, and so on' (ibid: 716).

It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that spheres of action providing immunity from domination render us free from any kind of interference whatsoever. Some interferences are legitimate, provided that the interferer tracks the 'common avowable interests' of the interferee (Pettit, 1997), where common avowable interests are interests that the interferee would 'adduce without embarrassment as relevant matters to be taken into account' (Markell, 2008: 15). And it is possible for interferences to be legitimate at both the level of individual inter-relations and at the level of institutional rule-making. Thus, laws which we have a share in framing are not dominating, but constitute a sphere of action

allowing us to lead a life we have reason to value, provided that sphere of action embodies relations supportive of our equal human status. For example, in the case of the newly democratic state, interferences are not dominating when they secure freedom through strong laws, properly constituted institutions and embody distinctive ideals (Maynor, 2003: 75). And at the level of individual inter-relations, we might allow interferences which support the development of individual capabilities for participating in rule-making, provided that there is an absence of threat in the case of failure to develop such competences. In the case of the benign slave master, for example, a state of domination exists, even when the master is unlikely to exercise his capacity to interfere – it is the state of threat, not the act itself, which constitutes domination as unfreedom: thus, a reduced experience of personal freedom is about ‘a life lived under the threat of interference or coercion’ (Honohan, 2002: 183). Such a condition is made possible when the subordinated person is constructed as incapable, inferior, a being of diminished human worth, lacking in the relevant capabilities and status to be counted as a member of the category of free persons. Taylor (1911), in his notorious comments upon the specialisation of pig iron, deconstructs the worker as a being incapable of autonomy and independent judgement in the following manner:

‘Now one of the very first requirements for a man who is fit to handle pig iron as a regular occupation is that he shall be so stupid and so phlegmatic that he more nearly resembles in his mental make-up the ox than any other type. The man who is mentally alert and intelligent is for this reason entirely unsuited to what would, for him, be the grinding monotony of work of this character. Therefore the workman who is best suited to handling the pig iron is unable to understand the real science of doing this class of work. He is so stupid that the word ‘percentage’ has no meaning to him, and he must consequently be trained by a man more intelligent than himself into the habit of working in

accordance with the laws of this science before he can be successful' (Taylor, 1911: 41).

Such a radical reduction of capabilities and status renders silent and invisible every autonomous action and human feeling of the worker. And it is this condition that the constitutive value of freedom as non-domination in my positive critical conception of meaningful work seeks to illuminate and to remedy.

#### **4.2.0 Political Freedom**

Political freedom and personal freedom are mutually implicated, and it is one of the key insights of republicanism that the personal freedom of each person depends upon their political freedom because all are subject to common vulnerabilities which can be mitigated only through the participation of each in framing the rules of social engagement (Pettit, 1997; Honohan, 2002). In order to be able to identify with our own actions, to be capable of planning our lives (Wall, 2001), and to be acknowledged as co-authorities with equal social standing, then we must have a share in determining the rules governing our acting and being. Furthermore, being able to make and carry through plans of living depends upon being able to access a range of worthwhile options, supported by adequate resources, where the kind and range of options depend upon the framing rules describing the limits to acting and being in the action contexts in which we participate. This means that the non-dominating *res publica* is 'a shared political system in which there is no direct, personal rule of some people by others, but rather a condition of equal citizenship governed by the rule of law' (Lovett & Pettit, 2009: 12). Honohan (2002) describes the concept of the common good which is central to republican politics as: 'intersubjective recognition in the joint practice of self-government by citizens who share certain concerns deriving from their common vulnerability' (ibid: 156). Consequently, for republicans, to be a free person means to be free under the law, within a state which does not subject citizens to 'arbitrary caprice' (Rogers, 2008: 802), and where the law governing

the state and its constituent parts is a common good, which each citizen subject to the law has had a share in producing and maintaining.

Thus, being a free person depends upon the acknowledgement of others that we are co-authorities in the determination of the rules governing our common lives in a free state which ‘promotes citizens’ freedom from domination, without dominating them’ (Lovett & Pettit, 2009:12). This means that, in order to allow for inclusive and open-ended deliberation over the framing rules specifying the kinds of interventions we will authorise, non-domination must be structurally embedded both at the constitutional level of the state and at the intersubjective level of individuals. The aim is for each person to become a ‘full member of the human commonwealth’ (Pettit, 1997: 65) by securing their status as co-authorities and developing their participative capacities – which, in Pettit’s terms, are voice, standing, and claims to conversational attention (ibid) - through an institutional infrastructure of non-domination (Lovett & Pettit, 2009: 20). In a positive critical conception of meaningful work, I argue that political freedom as collective self-determination requires democratic authority at the level of the organisations, as well as democratic practices at the level of the task. Furthermore, that political freedom as participation in rule-making is constitutive of the meaning content of work. Maynor (2002), for example, suggests that political freedom is not merely instrumental to realising personal freedom, but also provides an action context for developing and exercising a person’s capabilities for participation which is intrinsically valuable, where participation itself constitutes an element of what gives life value: ‘one’s identity as a republican and as a human being is bound up with realising a distinctive essence that can only be realised through one’s participating activities’ (Rogers, 2008: 801).

#### **4.3.0 The Organisation of Work**

It is possible to argue that the modern organisation of work secures personal and political freedom because the rules of bureaucratic organisation are non-arbitrary, derived from expert knowledge, and available for amendment

(Weber, 1970, 1978; see also Olsen, 2006). This means that, at the level of organisational rule-making, a Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy is non-dominating because relations between managers and workers are subject to procedures which prohibit and investigate dominating behaviours, and managers are required to track the common avowable interest of their subordinates, so far as their interests consist of being employees of the organisation. The status of managers as technical experts in the coordination upon which cooperation depends is used to justify the bureaucratic form as an integrative system of man, machine and organisation: 'no longer was managerial power merely the blind, arbitrary, or wilful exercise of authority; it could be depicted as scientifically grounded and rationally, objectively judged' (Miller & Rose, 1995: 432). Thus, the interference of a manager can be deemed to be non-dominating, because the system of rules determining interference derives its authority from impartial scientific principles, and aims at the common interest of efficient production. Workers have exercised their negative freedom and chosen an employment contract. Once inside an organisation operating according to such principles, then, although they must follow instruction, they are not coerced nor are they dominated. The rules apply equally to all.

But, at the level of individual inter-relations, such a system may not alleviate an individual's vulnerability to domination because the rules, even when transparent and made known to the employee, may be formulated to secure the self-interests of the interferer, and such rules may be changed without notice or consultation (see Wall, 2001). Rule-making to suit some to the detriment of others is a form of domination, because the one who is at a disadvantage can never plan their lives with security: 'it reduces their freedom by frustrating their intentions and plans. It obstructs their ability to plan their conduct according to their view of what is worth doing' (ibid: 227), where 'freedom consists in the ability to act in accord with one's plans and intentions' (ibid: 228). Besides, although modern capitalism has produced a variety of new organisational forms, such as networked organisations and soft bureaucracies, in response to criticisms that classic bureaucratic organisations are inflexible, slow to innovate, and stifle the

development of human capabilities (Olsen, 2006), these new organisational forms continue to be prone to the temptations of dominated relations (Courpasson, 2000). For example, McRobbie (2002) identifies how networks constitute a particular kind of potentially dominating infrastructure by: fostering exclusionary and discriminatory practices across age, gender and race, thereby ‘reproducing older patterns of marginalisation’ (ibid: 513); generating arbitrary ‘rule-making’, which is justified as freeing people from bureaucratic control; embodying modes of esteem-recognition which evade security of identity; encouraging overwork or ‘speeded up’ work; and requiring a continual presencing and unrelenting self-promotion. Thus, the need for democratic authority at the level of the organisation is not eliminated by new organisational forms, which often fail to re-define the terms of power in the relations between managers and workers.

Furthermore, forms of empowerment freedom are deployed to make workers’ capabilities and subjectivities conform to organisationally defined needs for self-discipline and self-mastery, which Lukacs described as ‘objectified ‘performance’’ (Lukacs, 1971 [1922]: 90). Willmott (1993), for example, traces the efforts of ‘corporate culturalists’ to ‘constitute a self-disciplining form of employee subjectivity’ (ibid: 523), where not only does the behaviour of employees become the target of cultural formation, but so do their thoughts and feelings, resulting in practical autonomy being extended to ‘colonising the affective domain’, and to ‘promoting employee commitment to a monolithic structure of feeling and thought’ (ibid: 517). And Miller & Rose (1995) demonstrate how early twentieth century interventions into the organisation of work had as their aim the optimisation of the ‘utility of the worker as a psychophysiological entity’ (ibid: 431), in which the scientifically efficient administration of work through Taylorism is supplemented by a psychotechnical project to integrate the expertise of the worker into the ‘norms of production, calibrated by tests and assessments in relation to such norms, and enmeshed in an array of calculative practices’ (ibid.). When the objects of empowerment freedom – that is, the values constituting the subjectivities of being a good worker - are framed and defined by some, to be imposed upon others, then the category of free

persons is reduced to a vanishing minority. In hierarchical authority relations, managerial authority operates to define the good for all, with the result that ‘only the natural person or corporate actor at the top of the hierarchy is an undirected source of directives. The organization is thus a tool or instrument by means of which this person can achieve his, her goals’ (McMahon, 1994: 189).

#### **4.4.0 Meaningfulness in an Infrastructure of Non-Domination**

I argue that a system of domination operates to exclude (from rule-making) and to subjectify (the experience of being), thereby making it easier for some to exploit the benefits of inter-relations with others, without having to take the interests of those others in account. Lovett (2010) says: ‘Domination is bad because, given the sorts of creatures we are, it presents a serious obstacle to human flourishing’ (ibid: 130). Domination inhibits human flourishing by distorting the intersubjective relations upon which we depend to be able to imagine and to act upon life options (Rogers, 2008: 803). The objective and subjective harms of domination lead Lovett to claim that we are all under a moral obligation to reduce domination wherever it occurs:

‘[...] personal debasement not only hampers a person’s success in achieving his or her goals or aims, it also stands in the way of genuine fellowship or community with others, which at some level is predicated on a mutual recognition of personal worth’ (ibid: 133).

A system of domination multiplies dominating relations by excluding some from the shaping of social structures and subjective formations, thereby enabling others to extract benefits without taking their vital interests into account: ‘people live within structures of domination if other persons or groups can determine without reciprocation the structure of their lives’ (Young, 1990: 38). The result is that the intersubjective relations which ought to be a source of

solidarity are degraded into exploitative dependence of one person upon another, to which that person is forced to submit in order for her to secure her fundamental needs. In order to understand how systems of domination induce such a state of insecurity and dependency, I argue that the republican concept of domination must take into account, not only the framing rules governing action, but also the rules and norms governing the formation of subjectivities. In an elaboration of Pettit's theory of domination as arbitrary power and dependence upon a master's will, Thompson (forthcoming) proposes a three-fold concept of domination as coercion, authority and extraction, where Pettit's conception of domination describes the dimension of coercion only. Thompson identifies the other dimensions of domination to be: *authority*, where organisational routines reinforce the perception that the authority relation is legitimate; and *extraction*, where the productive and reproductive activities of one person are secured as a source of benefit to another. In Thompson's more expansive concept, domination does not reduce the arbitrary use of power to one dimension of coercion, but takes account also of 'the ways the social architecture is constructed to allow individuals to develop the capacities for a free life' (ibid.). Thus, domination is not described solely by arbitrary interference which fails to track the interests of the interferee, but also identifies how the capacity for domination is enabled by 'the constitution of individuals', where domination is a 'general state where one's acts, projects, wishes, labor, etc. are *controlled, oriented, and shaped for the benefit of others irrespective of the effects on that agent being dominated*' (Thompson, forthcoming, original emphasis).

The shaping of the lives and identities of some to the exclusive benefit of others engenders in the contemporary work of social cooperation a form of coerced participation, where domination is the 'rule by another who is able to prescribe the terms of cooperation' (Bohman, 2007: 9). Subjects are 'produced in power/knowledge', and subjectivity is 'the experience of being subjected' (Blackman et al., 2008: 6). To become a subject, we must all undergo the experience of being subjected, but prevailing norms and processes of subjectification leave little room for freedom in self-definition: 'If the subject –



right down to its most intimate desires, actions and thoughts – is constituted by power, then how can there be a point of independent resistance?’ (Feltham & Clemens, 2003: 4). But, as I argued in Chapter Two, subjectification is never complete, it is always ‘unfinished, partial, non-linear’ (Blackman et al., 2008: 16), and grounded in everyday experience and local knowledge (Smith, 1987; Haug, 1992; Rose, 1994). Potentially, therefore, subjectivity can be viewed as ‘an active agent that shapes and is shaped by prevailing social, cultural and political spaces’ (Blackman et al., 2008: 14). This means that it is possible for an infrastructure of non-domination to include procedures and practices enabling individuals to challenge the structures and norms of social interaction which shape the formation of their subjectivities.

I take domination to consist both in the individual capacity for the arbitrary use of power, and in the social constitution of selves through structures and practices, where the formation of subjectivity reinforces the capacity of one individual to exercise power over another without reference to their welfare. I propose that an infrastructure of non-domination will enable personal and political freedom by securing institutional arrangements in which the normative relation between the value of meaningfulness and non-domination is specified by: *(1) the condition of not being made vulnerable in the affective attachments to the worthy objects which constitute one or more areas of one’s vital interests essential to our being able to realise the value of meaningfulness in our lives; (2) where being made vulnerable is a consequence of intersubjective relations in which some have the capacity for arbitrary power over others, supported by the exclusion of those others from participating in framing the social structures which shape subjectivities and practical identities; (3) because a coordinating authority has the power to specify the terms of cooperation, then to be legitimate, such an authority must be a democratic authority.* When one’s vital interests are threatened intense emotions can be aroused and adaptive behaviour can result in the withdrawal of affective attachment from worthy objects. Thus, to be affectively secure in our areas of vital interests, we must possess the necessary capabilities to resist domination, and to engage in the uncoerced participation

necessary for fulfilling our responsibilities of care for worthy objects. This means that we must be able to engage in non-dominating intersubjective relations, which to be consistent with the bipartite value of meaningfulness are characterised by: an acknowledgement of our mutual dependencies which makes us vulnerable in areas of vital interest; security of affective attachment to worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives; equal status of participation in the social structures and subjective formations which frame the circumstances of our inter-relations; being in possession of the capabilities necessary for resisting domination; and participating as a co-authority in defining the rules which frame action.

### **5.0.0 Cooperation, Coordination and Authority Relations**

Much of the work of social cooperation is organised in hierarchical authority relations, but ‘since the quality of political and public life is affected by how people spend most of their working hours, the authority structures within which most people live is a matter of serious concern’ (Brenkert, 1992). In order to increase worker effort, many conventional capitalist firms use empowerment freedom, which operates to increase individual responsibility, but without instituting collective self-determination in decision-making. But Courpasson & Dany (2003) claim that ‘where empowerment systems apparently play a central role in the enhancement of cooperation, the issue of obedience to an authoritative centralised power deserves scrutiny’ (ibid: 1231). The impact that dysfunctional authority relations can have upon personal and political freedom is of sufficient moral concern for some critics of authority to agree with the anarchist account: that the displacement of one person’s judgement by another’s makes authority illegitimate under any circumstances (see Christiano, 2009). In the anarchist account, the value priority must be accorded to the exercise of personal autonomy, which requires that a person must always evaluate decisions and situations according to their own reasons. Submission to the reasons of another – whether of the state or of a manager - can never be right, even if the outcomes result in higher

welfare overall and the effective resolution of collective action problems, because it always compromises personal autonomy. In dominated relations where there is the arbitrary use of power, the judgement of the subordinated interactant is displaced, with the following potential consequences: her vital interests are ignored, her actions are structured to benefit another, and her identity is shaped by social structures and norms which she has had no share in creating. In sum, dominating authority relations are both morally disturbing and illegitimate because: firstly, any kind of one-sided submission to the will of another (Hsieh, 2008) is inconsistent with autonomy and personhood; secondly, domination in the form of rule-based authority excludes many who are subject to those rules from the co-determination of rules and social structures which shape subjectivities and practical identities; and thirdly, dominating authority relations produce capability deformation, and undermine mutual respect. But mitigating against such harms requires, I argue, not the extinguishing of all authority relations upon which coordination depends, but a system of workplace democracy which legitimates authority relations when they are a democratically organised authority.

### **5.1.0 Cooperation and Coordination**

I argue that cooperative joint working is both necessary and constitutive of the bipartite value of meaningfulness: cooperation generates solidaristic relations to which workers are affectively attached, and which are constitutive of the objective content of work, because they are essential to getting the work done. Such relations are themselves a source of positive values which can be appropriated to the meaning content of a life, when they are expressive of the 'democratic ethical life' which is 'the outcome of the experience that all members of society could have if they related to one another cooperatively through the just organizing of the division of labor' (Honneth, 1998: 780). Cooperative inter-relations foster acts of solidarity, where 'solidarity requires that one enters into the situation of those with whom one is solidary' (Freire, 1970: 31). In specifying the normative characteristics of cooperative relations in joint activities, Bratman

(1992) says that ‘shared cooperative activity involves appropriately interlocking and reflexive systems of mutually uncoerced intentions concerning the joint activity’ (ibid: 336), where cooperative activity is characterised by: mutual responsiveness; commitment to the joint activity; and commitment to mutual support (ibid: 328). He adds that mutual responsiveness occurs in circumstances where ‘I will be trying to be responsive to your intentions and actions, knowing that you will be trying to be responsive to my intentions and actions, and arises out of the commitment each has to the joint activity’. Commitment to the joint activity motivates each person to be mutually supportive of the other in ‘playing her role in the joint activity’ (ibid: 328).

In his counter argument to the need for substantive normative inter-relations to explain cooperative action, Kutz (2000) characterises Bratman’s account of collective action as appropriate only for ‘small-scale, inter-dependent, egalitarian activities’ (ibid: 1), and as ‘less useful in explaining the nature of collective action in larger or more diffuse social contexts’ (ibid). In contrast to Bratman’s thicker concept of cooperation, Kutz seeks a minimalist, anti-egalitarian account of acting together which will explain collective action in hierarchies. He does so by grounding collective action in the instrumental intentions of individuals to play their part, even where they may not intend the overall outcome. Indeed, persons may be alienated from the end to which they are contributing because ‘of coercion, wilful ignorance, or moral qualms’ (ibid: 26). This means that in the hierarchical organisation of collective activity, an individual is not likely to intend the whole outcome, but they will have ‘a subsidiary, participatory intention, an intention to do their part of achieving the executively-determined goal. They may have an intention regarding the whole, but they don’t need such an intention to identify with and act for the sake of the main goal’ (ibid: 23).

But, whilst Kutz is correct to establish the non-necessity for joint action of intending the overall goals of a large-scale, hierarchical organisation, this does not establish a normative basis for the kind of joint action which is conducive to the value of meaningfulness. His minimalist account describes how the work gets

done, but its tolerance of alienation, for the sake of describing the occurrence of instrumental participation, does not meet the requirements of a positive critical conception of meaningful work, in which affective attachment to worthy objects depends upon the appropriation of worthwhile goals to the meaning content of a person's life. Kutz describes cooperative activity as 'a condition of how agents conceive their own agency' (ibid: 17), where cooperation is interior to the content of the activity, defining the activity and the relations between those engaged in the activity. Thus, minimalist joint action, if taken as a model, will shape the interior perceptions and expectations of individuals as to the nature of their agency, and their capabilities to be effective in the world. Whilst Kutz's structure of joint action, by making a non-necessity of intending the whole outcome, helps to explain how much joint working takes place, such minimal conditions for securing joint action are not sufficient for realising the bipartite value of meaningfulness – and, indeed, are not even seen as sufficient by the large hierarchical organisations with which Kutz is concerned. Many of these organisations acknowledge the importance of intending the overall outcome for generating employee engagement, and they often undertake extensive communications and participation programmes, in the effort to foster employee commitment through enlarging their understanding of, and commitment to, the organisation's purposes and goals (see Cox, Higgins & Speckesser, 2011).

Although we cannot do without cooperation, we must elicit the cooperation of workers in a 'moral way' (Courpasson & Dany, 2003: 1232), which I argue means that cooperation must be characterised by substantive normative relations which are voluntary, foster mutual recognition, employ complex capabilities, and be directed at worthwhile purposes. Moreover, being cooperative is not just about obeying rules; it is also about joining our actions to others in a manner which enables us to fulfil our responsibilities of care towards worthy objects: 'being obedient is not simply to fulfil one's duties. It is to act in conjunction and in convergence with the interests of others; it is to be a member of a community' (Courpasson & Dany, 2003: 1257). Pettit & Schweikard (2006) evaluate the normatively ideal case of joint action in terms of 'unforced

cooperation' (ibid: 20) where cooperation means joining our agency to that of others in order to produce a shared outcome: 'There can be nothing underhanded or overbearing involved in unforced joint action; people must voluntarily contribute whatever is required for the desired performance' (ibid: 22). This means that joint action, when it is constituted by unforced cooperation, does not simply produce a joint effect from the sum of individual contributions, but is activity in which all persons involved are 'acting jointly' to produce an outcome for which they are 'responsible together' (Pettit & Schweikard, 2006: 19). Normatively satisfactory joint agency, characterised by the voluntary joining of one person's efforts to another, requires attentive inter-subjective relations which exclude treating others as tools to secure our own advantage: 'It might just be that we each thought that others were zombies who would automatically, as if under hypnotism, do what was required of them. It might be, in other words, that we thought of ourselves as the only properly intentional agent involved' (ibid: 22). I argue, however, that such a nightmare of total domination, which thoroughly eliminates thought and feeling in the Weilian sense, can never fully successful, because there are always remainders and differences, giving rise to emancipatory potentials from within the structure of joint action itself.

The realisation of cooperative relations between persons depends upon the coordination of joint activities, where the existence of a coordinative function implies the presence of a coordinating authority. I claim that, in a positive critical conception of meaningful work, this coordinating authority must be a democratic authority, because a democratic authority is more likely to be able to secure each person's capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, and to give her confidence in her equal status as a co-authority. Marx recognised the need for the coordination of individual actions, to make possible an increasingly complex system of cooperation which exceeded the capacities of self-organisation:

'All combined labour on a large scale requires, more or less, a directing authority, in order to secure the harmonious working of the individual activities, and to perform the general functions that

have their origin in the action of the combined organism, as distinguished from the action of its separate organs. A single violin player is his own conductor; an orchestra requires a separate one' (Marx, 1978 [1867]).

The bipartite value of meaningfulness is helpful in this respect because the basic obligation people possess is to fulfil responsibilities towards the particular worthy objects they have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives. It is the particular demands of the object in question which grounds responsibility, and being able to fulfil such responsibilities depends upon being able to participate in an extensive system of social cooperation, including legitimate authorities which have the capacity to exercise coordination. In order to decide and to act upon our judgements of how responsibilities towards worthy objects are to be satisfied, then we require the involvement of others – sometimes this involvement is extensive, such as the parent of a disabled child who must call upon the services of various medical and social agencies. Since cooperation requires coordination, which entails authority relations, a legitimate authority can be regarded as a good because it enables the coordination without which, in the general run of human affairs, any kind of cooperation necessary to our being able to fulfil our responsibilities towards worthy objects is exceedingly difficult to attain. But, to be consistent with constitutive dimension of freedom as non-domination in the bipartite value of meaningfulness, then a legitimate authority must be a democratic authority.

### **5.2.0 Authority Relations**

Hierarchical authority is frequently justified on the basis that it is the most efficient way of securing the coordination of activities necessary to the work of social cooperation. But Marglin (1974) argues that the development of the factory system was motivated by capitalist attempts to take control of the process of production away from workers, and through the technical division of labour to

secure an indispensable role in coordination, thereby allowing capitalists to extract benefits from the resulting dependency of workers upon their coordinative mechanisms. The desire for control over coordinative mechanisms can be understood from inside the structure of joint action: we must all secure the cooperative involvement of others, if we are to make a success of our life plans, and to see ourselves as autonomous agents. Persuading and negotiating with others in order to secure their unforced cooperation is costly, so shapers of organisational life are motivated to construct conditions of subjective domination. But the desire to control coordinative mechanisms can result in a radical unfreedom which ‘distort the worker into a fragment of a man’ (Marx, 1867) through heteronomously conceived and imposed work in which the worker is constructed as an extension of the manager’s will – an *instrumentum vocale*, or ‘ultimate human tool’ (cf. Patterson, 1982). Young (1979) characterises hierarchical organisation as a ‘system of perfect non-self-determination: all members of an organization, with the possible exception of those in top positions, are obliged to obey directives in whose formation they have no part’ (ibid: 34). For Young, the only free society is one which engenders ‘a situation of cooperation in which no persons have the right to determine the basic conditions of the actions of others without reciprocation’ (ibid: 40), although she does allow that some hierarchy may be necessary to ensure coordination and cooperation. Thus, it is only to the extent that authority relations must command coordinative mechanisms in order to secure our vital interests – and provided that we have agreed it is necessary for securing such interests - that it is a legitimate authority.

If it is the case that we cannot avoid having some coordinating authorities – and this seems reasonable, given our understanding of how organisations work – then, in order to secure the value of freedom in the interior content of work, that authority must be legitimated by being subjected to processes of collective self-determination. A coordinating authority can be organised more or less hierarchically and more or less cooperatively, but, in my positive critical conception of meaningful work, there can be ‘no authority without democracy’ (Sevenhuijsen, 2000: 8). In Raz’s service conception of authority, for example, an



authority is legitimate when, in its coordinative function, its aim is to secure and promote the vital interests of those who are subject to that authority (Raz, 1986; 2006). Warren (1996) identifies how any social order is made up of a diversity of legitimate authorities, variously arising from: the internal goods of a social practice, a substantive identity from membership of a social group, collective self-determination in deliberative contexts, or a coordinative function derived from a role in the division of labour held either by ourselves or another we have jointly authorised. In order to develop the relevant capabilities, and to be secure in our status as equal co-authorities, we must all have the opportunity to belong to and participate in at least one form of authoritative relation, such as a role, practice or institution, provided that authority is legitimate, that is, it fosters democratically determined intersubjective relations. Rothschild (2000) describes approaches to legitimate authority as ‘collectivist democratic’ in which ‘a decision is legitimate only if it reflects the will of the involved participants, and since the participants’ will can be known only through democratic dialogue, dialogue and consensus become the keys in this new form of organisation’ (Rothschild, 2000: 210).

Warren (1996: 46) argues that there are many circumstances where authority may be necessary; authority may be functional in complex societies burdened by a vast increase in the number of difficult decisions, giving rise to specialised discourses closed to broad participation. In situations where deliberative decision-making is impossible, then we should prefer authoritative decision-making, but only if such decision making can be made subject to democratic accountability: ‘democracy is necessary to chasten authority, to limit its claims and dangers’ (Warren, 1996: 47). Thus, democratic authority is authority which is open to contestation, where deliberative procedures produce ‘an authoritative background of commitments and beliefs that both sustain and contain democratic challenges’ (ibid.). This type of authority requires subjects capable of autonomous judgements informed by beliefs and commitments (ibid: 54-55). However, the development of this desirable form of subjectivity is hindered by oppressive structures of obedience: ‘democratic authority requires a context of critical challenge that is all too easily damaged by hierarchies of status

and inequalities of resource distribution' (ibid: 56). The need to develop the subjectivities and capabilities for collective self-determination in a system of democratic authority means that all coordinating authorities, whether public or private, small or large, must be democratic authorities. Young (1979) argues that the principle of self-determination must be carried through into a society of democratically organised enterprises and collectivities at an increasing level of scale (ibid: 42), and that this precludes 'the possibility that persons can form organizations of social cooperation possessing a hierarchical structure of basic decision-making' (ibid: 43).

### 5.3.0 Democratic Authority

I have argued that all organisations must be governed by a democratic authority, however constituted. McMahon's (1994) work, *Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management*, remains an important and sophisticated account of managerial authority which focuses upon the 'nature of the employment relation' (Hsieh, 2007: 348), and 'the moral limits to relationships that involve the submission of the will on the part of one person to another' (ibid.). McMahon (1994) identifies how, in a subordinate relation, one person's actions are controlled to some degree by another's, their will is displaced by another's: 'the subordinate's judgement of what the applicable directive-independent reasons require is displaced from its normal action-inducing relation to his will by a directive' (ibid: 30). He describes governmental and non-governmental organisations as operating in a single social system of political authority, where government and management make up 'two components of an integrated system of social authority that is essentially political in nature' (ibid: 3). Political authority arises out of circumstances in which fundamental disagreement over the common good is combined with the requirement to coordinate activities in order to promote general well-being. And management is analogous to government in that it is a public authority defined by coercive power where the legal right of some to control access to the resources necessary for

leading a decent human life enables them to force others, who have no such legal rights, to do as they demand (McMahon, 1994: 7): ‘If disagreement among people holding different substantive moral conceptions is the mark of the political sphere [...] nongovernmental organizations are as political as states’ (ibid: 22).

Those persons, such as employees, who are subject to authority relations will judge whether the decisions that guide their actions are legitimate on the grounds of whether these decisions further their vital interests in fairness and welfare maximisation (where McMahon refers to fairness as the chance that one’s preferred policy will be chosen at some stage in the voting cycle, and welfare maximisation refers to what the majority would prefer). But, the existence of a plurality of conceptions of the good means that there is a good chance of employees being required to follow directives which conflict with their moral convictions. If we are to demand obedience to directives from those who are in a weak position to resist, then we need to develop persuasive normative reasons for the legitimacy of such directives. Coercive power cannot justify political authority – therefore, we need to find other reasons for why people may submit to the directives of another which does not depend upon any prior legal powers that an authority may possess. McMahon provides such reasons by defining legitimate management authority as democratic ‘reflexive authority’ (ibid: 12), where directives which carry with them the force of obedience must be generated by those who will be subject to them, on the basis that people have the right to participate in the decisions which will guide their actions.

Legitimate authorities are not identical – there exists a plurality of possible legitimate authorities (Warren, 1996). McMahon distinguishes between three kinds of possibly legitimate authorities: E-authority, which is the authority ascribed to a person with expertise or special knowledge; P-authority, in which someone is recognised as an authority by another when a promise to comply has been exchanged which generates obligations upon the promisee; and C-authority, when the acknowledged ability of one to coordinate the cooperative activities of others generates compelling reasons for action. McMahon argues that neither E-authority nor P-authority are legitimate authorities from the perspective of a

person judging whether their vital interests have been advanced. The only legitimate authority which can be judged to be satisfactory against this requirement is a C-authority, where a C-authority enables ‘cooperation among people with conflicting views about what constitutes morally acceptable conduct in their working lives’ (ibid: 15). In the case of C-authority, the outcomes of cooperating must be more beneficial for those complying with the directives than the outcomes from not complying (McMahon, 1994: 233). A C-authority is therefore ‘justified as facilitating mutually beneficial cooperation’ in which each person participates in order to realise her own moral aims. McMahon advances C-authority as the form of morally desirable form of managerial authority when it is underpinned by the consent generated by a system of workplace democracy, because ‘considerations of fairness and welfare maximisation support the choice of an economic regime in which managers are democratically accountable to workers’ (Hsieh, 2007: 351).

In my positive critical conception of meaningful work, the constitutive value of freedom as non-domination addresses how the potential for free work is constrained by institutional conditions which allow some to extract benefits from inter-relations with no regard for the other’s needs for welfare, meaningfulness or flourishing. Although in McMahon’s theory of legitimate authority the individual is the fundamental unit of moral concern, he does not provide a full account of the intersubjective dimensions of authority relations, and the intrinsic value of not being subject to the harms of dominating relations. In assessing McMahon’s theory, Hsieh (2007) argues that the normative reasons for compliance based upon fairness neglects relations where there is ‘one-sided submission of the will’ (ibid: 355). Hsieh claims that ‘[...] being subject to authority is a relevant consideration, in and of itself, in grounding a claim in the part of workers to participate in the governance of economic enterprises’ (ibid: 354). Or as Raz puts it in his service conception of authority, the moral problem of how to make authority legitimate ‘[...] is a problem of the relations between one person and another’ (Raz, 2000: 16). Even in cases where contracts have been freely entered into, objections to ‘one-sided submission to authority’ would count against consent alone (Smith,

2007). Furthermore, McMahon confines his normative argument for a legitimate coordinative authority to large non-governmental organisations, but I suggest we must think also about authority relations in the context of the broader system of social cooperation, because 96% of commercial organisations are small to medium sized enterprises (Spence et al, 2003), which are replete with authority relations, but often plead for exemption from regulation. Equally, voluntary groups and individuals in unpaid caring work are subject to authority relations sustained by social practices, networks and hierarchical organisation, and I would require coordinative authorities in such organisations and social systems to be democratic authorities.

### **6.0.0 Conclusion**

Mill (1994 [1871]) wrote in the *Principles of Political Economy*:

‘The form of association, however, which if mankind continues to improve, must be expected in the end, to predominate is not that which can exist between a capitalist as chief and work-people without a voice in the management, but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations and working under managers elected and removable by themselves’.

Finding meaning in work is dependent partly upon finding rhythm in the interplay between working and living, where working is not a separate sphere of action from living, but is nested within activities of living, of being at home in the world. And here, Arendt (1977 [1954]; 1958) and Weil (1977 [1946]) are on common ground, because both acknowledge the ebb and flow between work and life, of exhaustion and recovery, of new beginnings and relations with others. The bipartite value of meaningfulness unites objective value to subjective attractiveness, and we experience the value of meaningfulness in our lives through

affective appropriation of worthy objects. Affective appropriation of worthy objects is fostered by the elements identified by Weil of possessing a proprietary sense of being at home in the world, supported by attentive intersubjective relations; whereas the objective value of work, she identifies with the unity of thought and action bent towards unexpected problems, requiring new solutions or the adaption of rules and principle, which themselves have been subject to co-determination with others. Where freedom is constitutive of the meaning content of work, it enables us to both create, and fulfil our responsibilities towards, worthy objects through the Weilian dimensions of thinking and intersubjective relations required in our joint activities with others. Thus, to be a free person is not about the clearing away of obstacles or even about the expansion of choices, but about being able to act upon those obstacles with one's human capabilities for action/thought in dignified and respectful relations with others. In the final count, freedom exists only in a quality of acting together.

## **Chapter Five**

### **Restoring Dignity: The Need for Social Recognition and Practical Identity Formation**

#### **1.0.0 Introduction**

As human beings, we are ‘obligatorily gregarious’ (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008: 52), implying that we cannot evade our physical, social and emotional inter-dependences, from which we derive many of our most important relationships, projects and sources of meaning. To be inescapably social means that, although we are separate individuals, we are not sovereign. We do not pick and choose our life plans from social materials which exist apart from us - instead, we are already constituted by our relations to others with whom we co-sustain and co-produce the meanings, norms and values of our intersubjective existence. This means that to experience our lives as meaningful, we require positive self-relations of self-respect and self-esteem, which are intersubjectively shaped by our relations to others. But realising positive self-relations becomes problematic when our relations to others are such that our valued identifications are misrecognised, or when institutional norms and values make it difficult to achieve a sense of being a valued person. In the contemporary work of social cooperation, stable positive self-relations are increasingly difficult to experience, making the task of forming a practical self-identity a demanding project. I evaluate the limitations of the concept of self-respect in Rawlsian justice, and of the concept of self-esteem in Honneth’s theory of social recognition, both of which mediate recognition through individual achievement. I propose that we need a concept of positive self-relations which is constitutive of the value of meaningfulness. To this end, I shall argue that uniting self-respect and self-esteem to a sense of dignity as particular persons, who bear responsibilities for the worthy objects we have appropriated to our lives, points us beyond the pursuit of individual achievement to worthwhile, if not completely stable, practical self-identities constituted by the values internal to caring for those worthy objects.

## **2.0.0 Our Need for Social Recognition**

Individual subjective formation emerges from a psychological process of increasing individuation through an intersubjective struggle, which arises in infant development and which Benjamin (2002) identifies as ‘thirdness’, or ‘the creation of something that no longer identifiably emanates from one person or the other but mediates between them’ (ibid: 49). In critical social theory, most notably in Honneth’s (1995) theory of recognition, this psychological process is translated into the political, cultural and economic domains in order to provide an explanation for individual motivation and societal change. Honneth (1995) uses Benjamin’s psychological theory of the formative development of the individual to support his ethical claim that individual self-realisation, and thus the possibility of social progress, depends upon the cognitive relations which arise out of the interactions between multiple subjectivities, where subjectivity is ‘the experience of being subjected’ or ‘the experience of the lived multiplicity of positionings’ (Blackman et al., 2008: 6). Since our individual subjectivities, or ways of being in the world, are formed through processes of feeling, thinking and acting (Taylor, 1989) then our subjectivities are implicated with those of significant others, such as parents, colleagues, or fellow members of a community of belonging. In Honneth’s account, correctly structured intersubjective relations generate practices of social recognition, resulting in positive self-relations, in the form of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. Thus, self-realisation, or the development of our human capabilities, depends upon being able to experience positive self-relations, arising from correctly structured intersubjective recognition (cf. Honneth, 2004a).

The inescapable necessity of social inter-relations for positive self-relations means that recognition is ‘not just a courtesy we owe people. It is a vital human need’ (Taylor, 1992: 26). To be acknowledged, to be seen by others, is essential to human action, and to a stable sense of identity which supports the moral and psychological conditions for well-being: ‘We run to be seen, recognised, admired by some subset of the others. If local victories were not



possible we would all be in despair long before we were done' (Walzer, 1983: 255). When we lack social recognition, it is difficult to maintain the positive self-relations essential to forming a self-conception of being efficacious and worthy persons to whom it is not legitimate to do certain things, and whose contributions are valued and welcomed by the society to which we belong: 'having both no authority and no intrinsic value in the eyes of others on whose actions and decisions one's life and future depends is a frightening vision for any rational person in any culture' (Ikaheimo, 2007: 40). As a result of being deprived of positive self-relations, individuals experience an insecure sense of belonging and relatedness, and are made vulnerable to the harms of isolation, social exclusion, and dominating, exploitative relations to others. Thus, our need for social recognition grounds political claims that individual flourishing depends upon living in social arrangements which foster positive self-relations of self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem.

Our legitimate need for social recognition, however, is increasingly difficult to satisfy in a contemporary organisation of work which mediates recognition through unstable forms of individual merit, thereby causing individuals to become subject to shifting terms in others' valuations of them, thereby undermining the possibility of stable positive self-relations. Following Ikaheimo & Laitinen's (2007) definition of recognition as 'taking someone as a person, the content of which is understood and which is accepted by the other person' (ibid: 42), I argue that the value of meaningfulness provides some remedy to the insecurity of social recognition when intersubjective relations are suitably structured for securing positive self-relations in the form of a sense of one's dignity as a particular person (cf. Noggle, 1999). In the bipartite value of meaningfulness, we advance our claims to recognition based upon our effectiveness in the practices of caring, respecting or promoting relevant to the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives. This is because engaging in practices of care for worthy objects removes our attention from seeking social recognition for its own sake to what we must do or become in order to promote the good for worthy objects. But this does not imply that our

needs for self-care have no importance relative to caring for others; instead, care of the self becomes part of a constellation of appropriate attitudes towards worthy objects which we form through mutual intersubjective recognition of one another's practical identities. I argue that both self-respect and self-esteem are necessary to a caring self which supports a sense of dignity as a particular person. Massey (1983) identifies that, for self-respect, a person needs both a subjective evaluation of himself, generating a 'certain kind of favourable self-attitude' (ibid: 248), and an objective evaluation of himself, where he does not simply value himself but 'properly' values himself (ibid): 'it is necessary but not sufficient for self-respect that a person believes he acts in ways that he believes are worthy. In addition, the person must have correct views about his worth and act in ways which are objectively worthy' (ibid: 253). Engagement in the numerous practices of care for worthy objects satisfies Massey's subjective and objective dimensions of social recognition because the achievement of practice standards requires other-regarding actions which stabilise self-esteem, reassuring us that what we are doing is worth our effort.

Wolf (2010) suggests that being involved in the practices framing worthwhile projects can be protective of the damage done to self-esteem consequent upon the failure of our plans, where self-esteem is protected by: mere belonging to communities and practices; subsidiary activities of the practice such as training and mentoring of others; and exercise of the virtues and talents required by the practice (ibid: 106-7). Simply *doing* the activities of a practice containing valuable internal goods can mitigate the personal consequences of failure and be protective of self-esteem, particularly where self-respect – our sense of our value and status as a person – is steady and well-grounded (ibid: 106). In addition, failure is an experience which can be retrieved by the learning and perspective that comes with the unfolding narrative of a whole life: 'Learning from mistakes, failures and disappointments allows us to redeem periods of our lives that would appear as total losses if viewed in isolation' (ibid: 107). Wolf claims that if the failed project has independent, objective value, then we can justifiably appropriate it to the meaning content of our life because putting forth

effort to make a contribution, as well as achievement, can enable us to experience the value of meaningfulness:

*‘something of value is achieved in the very commitment to that project and in the striving to pursue it, which can be a sufficiently intentional part of the agent’s activities and values to contribute a measure of meaningfulness to that period of the person’s life’* (ibid: 107).

Thus, being able to acquire a sense of our dignity as particular persons through orientations of care, for ourselves and for other worthy objects which constitute our practical identities, meets both the subjectively psychological need for esteem recognition and the objectively ethical need for respect recognition. This is because seeking the good for worthy objects subjectively reassures us that there is meaning in our lives, that our lives are worth living, and objectively confirms that the value of those objects is worth our effort. In uniting self-respect and self-esteem in a sense of dignity, I address two concerns expressed by critics of the contemporary experience of work who claim that it is no longer possible to secure stable positive relations to the self. Firstly, self-respect is vulnerable to under-objectivity, because the modern organisation of work strips collective institutions and practices of their intrinsic goods, thereby removing a source of objective value capable of providing a sense of greater purpose consistent with our need to value ourselves as particular persons. Secondly, self-esteem is vulnerable to over-subjectivity, because it can become too dependent upon the opinions of others, so that our own evaluations of what is a worthy object, and what our attitudes should be towards those objects, become misdirected, causing us to appropriate to our lives values we would not fully endorse if our subjective evaluations of what is attractively valuable to us were uninfluenced by the need to pursue self-esteem. I evaluate the problems of over-subjectivity in relation to self-esteem, and under-objectivity in relation to self-respect by drawing upon insights from empirical psychology and moral philosophy. In their well-known exchange, Fraser (2003) critiques Honneth (1995; 2003) for grounding his theory of

recognition in poorly substantiated and highly contested psychological theory. But Meyers (1995) proposes that we seek a mutual enriching, since each approach is incomplete without the other: ‘whereas the moral view insists that only the morally autonomous self and its good qualities can be respected, the psychological theory counters that any self together with its traits can be respected’ (ibid: 228). I argue that each approach contributes to the other in two respects: firstly, moral philosophy remedies an under-objectivity in psychological theory which takes no account of the value of the objects at which esteem recognition aims, and secondly, psychological theory addresses an under-subjectivity in moral philosophy which lacks a complete understanding of how intersubjective relations are constitutive of the formation of positive self-relations.

### **2.1.0 Self-Esteem: The subjective dimension of social recognition**

In psychological theory, social recognition secures self-esteem, where self-esteem is necessary for satisfying three fundamental needs for belonging, relatedness and control (Crocker & Park, 2005). Pyszczynski & Cox (2004a; 2004b) suggest that the motivation to pursue self-esteem may be hard-wired into human evolutionary psychology, because to lack self-esteem is to be in danger of social exclusion which is threatening to survival. In terror management theory, for example, self-esteem is essential to psychological health, because it protects the self from destructive anxieties and fear of mortality. In modern societies, however, our need for esteem recognition is vulnerable to exploitation: capitalist systems of production mobilise and exacerbate our need for self-esteem in order to secure our acquiescence to organisational controls aimed at pre-determined subjective formations, such as the enterprise self (du Gay, 1996; McNay, 2009; Garetty, 2007). But, over-stimulated hunger for esteem recognition directed towards inauthentic subjective formations is harmful to our ability to satisfy the fundamental human needs which depend upon positive self-relations. Crocker & Park (2005) conclude that fundamental human needs for autonomy, competence and relatedness remain unmet by our pursuit of contingent forms of self-esteem

which are dependent upon the approval of others, and therefore of standards and values which are not our own; in turn: *autonomy*, ‘the pursuit of self-esteem sacrifices autonomy’ (ibid: 399) because self-esteem is heteronomous, and when it becomes a higher order goal it displaces or inhibits other more autonomously conceived goals; *competence*, the pursuit of self-esteem inhibits learning and mastery because failure cannot be tolerated; *relatedness*, the pursuit of self-esteem focuses our attention upon ourselves at the expense of developing care, concern and meaningful relations with others. In the areas of life in which their self-worth is invested, people seek to have their abilities, goals and achievements validated, and can react to threats to success in destructive ways:

‘They interpret events and feedback in terms of what they mean about the self; they view learning as a means to performance outcomes, instead of viewing success and failure as a means to learning; they challenge negative information about the self; they are preoccupied with themselves at the expense of others; and when success is uncertain, they feel anxious and do things that decrease the probability of success, but create excuses for failure, such as self-handicapping or procrastination’ (Crocker & Park, 2005: 393).

Rather than relieving existential pressures, the frantic pursuit of positive social recognition makes stable self-esteem difficult to achieve – any positive valuations are insecure, forcing individuals to seek continual reassurance of their recognitive status. The result of making individuals responsible for their recognitive condition, whilst simultaneously placing secure self-relations beyond reach, is increased anxiety, and proneness to psychological and physical ill health (Wilkinson & Pickett, 2009). My proposal is that the search for esteem recognition does not have to be destructive, but that avoiding the excesses of esteem hunger means taking seriously the political project of reconfiguring the bases of social recognition to secure self-respect, as well as self-esteem, within a sense of our dignity as particular persons. For example, Roland & Fox (2003)

suggest that psychological approaches to self-esteem, understood as feeling good about oneself, fail to take proper account of self-respect as the ‘appreciation of being a person’ (ibid). Self-respect operates to mitigate high/low levels of self-esteem, acts as a buffer against failure or excessive self-appreciation, and enables self-regulatory behaviour: ‘self-respect is the couch on which the cushion of self-esteem resides’ and provides the ‘core of one’s psychological strength’ (ibid: 271). Pyszczynski & Cox (2004a) propose that the pursuit of esteem recognition should be steered towards an autonomous, self-determined life, construed as ‘meeting standards of value that have been freely chosen and thoroughly integrated into one’s self’ (Pyszczynski & Cox, 2004: 428). And Crocker & Park (2005) suggest that securing stable self-respect is more conducive to autonomy, competence and relatedness, because it assists in ‘shifting from superordinate goals concerned with self-esteem to superordinate goals that are not focused on self-esteem but are larger than the self or are good for others and the self’ (ibid: 406). Self-respect draws our attention away from an over-emphasis upon the practices of self-esteem, such as self-presentation: ‘monitoring and the ability to alter one’s behaviour in order to bring it into line with one’s standards [...] self-regulation or self-control is an integral part of a self-respect system’ (Roland & Cox, 2003: 273). Thus, self-respect has a vital functional role to play in the development of human capabilities for living a life of meaning: ‘the function of self-respect is to protect and nurture the human capacities necessary to know and navigate one’s world’ (ibid: 279). In sum, to secure a sense of dignity we should concentrate upon the development of the social conditions which ground self-respect, rather than seeking to multiply possibilities for self-esteem, thereby fostering a sterile competition for esteem recognition in an economy of esteem in which public attention is an increasingly scarce resource (Brennan & Pettit, 2004).

### **3.2.0 Self-Respect: The objective dimension of social recognition**

Moral philosophy makes clearer conceptual distinctions than does psychological theory between different forms of social recognition (Darwall, 1977; Dillon, 1995). I shall be concerned in this section with how the concept of

self-respect is necessary to secure the objective dimension of social recognition which is a more stable form of self-relation than self-esteem, and has a particular role to play in valuing objects in the objective dimension of the bipartite value of meaningfulness.

‘Self-respect is something most of us want and need. Few things are as important to our well-being as a secure sense of our own worth, or as debilitating and disempowering as its lack. Deep and enduring shame and self-contempt, unremitting doubts about one’s worth, a tendency to see oneself as not quite as good or not quite as valuable as others: such things constrict and deform lives, frustrating the quest for self-fulfillment and self-realisation’ (Dillon, 1995: 290).

I suggest that the objective dimension of social recognition is satisfied through: firstly, encounters with objects which we judge to be worthy of our efforts, and secondly, intersubjective relations of the right normative character, which contribute to sustaining a sense of dignity because they confirm we are correct in our evaluations of worthy objects, and give us information on how we are doing with respect to fulfilling our responsibilities of care.

Firstly, encounters with worthy objects: if they are to support self-respect, recognitive encounters must be based upon goods which are worth recognising, because ‘to desire recognition is not normally to simply desire to be noticed, but to desire confirmation of the worth excellences independent of recognition. Recognition is parasitic on objective goods’ (O’Neill, 1997: 193). This means that social recognition in itself cannot add to the meaning content of a life, unless such recognition is consequent upon our engagement with objects we judge to be worthwhile. So, valuing the social recognition of others depends upon our being able to acknowledge the value of the internal goods upon which recognition depends. Social recognition of goods, values and identities that we do not endorse is misrecognition, which can occur, for example, when powerful others over-identify us with our social roles, or when institutional rules and social norms

promote a personal identity which is at odds with our self-conceptions (cf. Deranty & Renault, 2007). Recognition of one's proficiency in worthless, pointless or futile practices cannot add to the meaning content of a life, even if we enjoy doing them. Equally, recognition of one's exceptional performance as a doctor or scientist cannot add to the meaning content of one's life if one is yearning to be a potter. I argued in Chapter One that subjective discounting of an identity-constituting activity, such as one's occupation, may not reduce the *value* of a life, but it does reduce the *meaning* of a life (cf. Arneson, 2000). The goods and the standards may be independently worthwhile in that they add value to the practice or contribute to some social good, but unless they are subjectively endorsed by the agent as valuable according to their conception of living, they cannot add meaning content to the agent's own life.

Second, intersubjective relations: respect recognition must do more than acknowledge us as a universal type. A sense of dignity is supported by being able to experience ourselves as particular persons, giving us confidence that 'one's life has value in all its everyday ordinariness – in the monotony, grime, inadequacy and despair as well as in the shining moments of achievement' (Dillon, 1995: 299). Thus, positive social recognition should enable an individual to arrive at a correct valuation of their particular selves, such that 'the self-respecting person has a keen appreciation of her own worth' (ibid: 292). When we possess positive self-relations, we see ourselves as distinct individuals, able to lay claim to the equal consideration and acknowledgement of others, not only because of our status as co-authorities and our capabilities for being a valuer, but also because we have our own projects and connections to others which constitute our sense of who we are as particular persons. But, to be able to evaluate ourselves in these terms, we need to acknowledge our 'interpersonal reality' (ibid: 300), where positive self evaluation is based upon 'what we do, on communal activities and achievements, thus moving us toward more integrative and mutually supportive social arrangements' (ibid.). This means that, if we are to develop the positive self-relations which secure the conditions for self-realisation, we must encounter one another in our daily activities as *equal* interaction partners, where equality



does not mean sameness, but is an equality based upon the particular ways in which we make our contribution to society, including the work of social cooperation, generating an entitlement to the acknowledgement of others because of our efforts to fulfil our responsibilities of care for worthy objects.

I argue that to have a sense of our dignity as particular persons, we need social recognition of our practical identities, where practical identity formation is an intersubjective achievement requiring the appropriation of values through the exercise of meaning-making capabilities (cf. Korsegaard, 2009; see also Roessler, 2011). A stable practical identity acts as a filter through which we make judgements, and in return receive judgements, about how well we are doing in relation to the orientations of care relevant to valuing worthy objects. Consequently, the formation of a self-conception, or practical identity, depends upon our self-attitudes, the beliefs we have about ourselves and the worthiness of the objects and values we have incorporated into our lives: ‘self-respect has to do with the structure and attunement of an individual’s identity and of her life, and it reverberates throughout the self, affecting the configuration and constitution of the person’s thoughts, desires, values, emotions, commitments, dispositions and actions’ (Dillon, 2010: 41)<sup>17</sup>. When we are affectively engaged with worthy objects, we establish orientations of care which enable us also to experience a sense of dignity as particular persons. The relevant practice of care depends upon the nature of the worthy objects, and how they enable us to affectively engage with the values we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, consistent with the objective goods which such values embody. In sum, our self-respect is secured through our sense of how we are doing in relation to caring for worthy objects, which I propose provides a richer account of human action than individual achievement or excellence.

---

<sup>17</sup> Dillon (1995) distinguishes between recognition respect and evaluative respect. Recognition self-respect consists in ‘taking appropriate account of one’s own status as a person: appreciating one’s fundamental moral worth and behaving accordingly’ (Dillon, 1995: 293). Evaluative self-respect ‘rests on an evaluation of oneself in terms of a normative self-conception – the view one has of the sort of person one ought to be or that it would be good to be, and of the kind of life such a person should live’ (Dillon, 1997: 23).

### **3.0.0 Rawls's Respect Recognition and Honneth's Esteem Recognition**

In this section, I evaluate the limits of Rawls's self-respect and Honneth's self-esteem as attempts to secure the conditions for self-realisation. I argue that, for different reasons, both theories are tied to a problematic ideal of individual achievement, which is increasingly difficult to realise in modern conditions of work, crowding out alternative values based upon solidarity and collective effort.

#### **3.1.0 The Limits of the Rawlsian Concept of Self-Respect**

Rawls (1999 [1971] TJ) remains an important theorist of self-respect, because of the central role he gives to self-respect in the organisation of a stable society, in which the development of the individual is secured through a fair share of primary goods and a system of equal political and civil liberties. Rawls claims that self-respect is 'perhaps the main primary good' without which we may lack a sense of life being worth living, where self-respect is of such importance that justice requires 'equality in the social bases of self-respect (ibid: 440)<sup>18</sup>. Rawls's concept of respect depends upon both status and capabilities because, to experience self-respect, we need: firstly, the status which gives us a sense of self-worth and of the worth of our conception of the good (ibid.) and, secondly, developed capabilities to give us a sense of confidence that we are able to carry through our intentions (ibid.). Thus, Rawlsian respect consists of both an objective status dimension, which relies upon the worth of the person as the 'self-authenticating source of valid claims' (Rawls, PL: 72) and a subjective individual dimension, where we judge ourselves to be more or less successful against a life plan, which contains activities of sufficient complexity to realise the Aristotelian Principle (cf. Zink, 2007). In Rawlsian self-respect, what social recognition aims at, and how social recognition is mediated, has a particular content which is

---

<sup>18</sup> Rawls does not clearly distinguish between self-respect and self-esteem, and uses the two concepts interchangeably: 'self-respect (or self-esteem)' (Rawls, 1999 [1971] TJ, 440).

necessary to Rawls's scheme of justice, but which also exposes the limitations of his concept of self-respect for securing positive self-relations through the work we do together.

### 3.1.1 *The Aim of Social Recognition*

In Rawls's theory of justice, social recognition aims at the self-respect necessary for securing a particular political conception of the person, which Rawls defines as 'someone who can be a citizen, that is, a normal and fully cooperating member of society over a complete life' (2005 PL: 18). A fully participating member of the polity is one who is capable of developing the two *moral powers*, or the capacity for a sense of justice and the capacity for a conception of the good, in addition to *developed capabilities* for observing the terms of cooperation and for forming their own particular conception of the good (ibid; see also, Freeman, 2007: 334). For Rawls, self-respect is important for supporting our status as democratic citizens: it does not aim at justifications for securing just socio-economic conditions, such as ensuring that all work in the system of social cooperation is meaningful work. Even so, Rawls acknowledges two obstacles to realising the aims of social recognition: firstly, socio-economic inequalities and secondly, poor quality work. Thus, Rawls recognises that a sense of self-respect may depend upon socio-economic equality, where 'to some extent men's sense of their own worth may hinge upon their institutional position and income share' (ibid). But Doppelt (2009) argues that, by making equality in the social bases of self-respect essential only to democratic citizenship in the political domain, Rawls discounts inequalities in the socio-economic domain in a manner which cannot be justified by our everyday experiences: 'Taken as an empirical claim, the dominance of democratic citizenship over other social positions in shaping the distribution of recognition-respect in modern liberal-democratic society is at best dubious' (Doppelt, 2009: 138). Doppelt (2009) points out that harms to self-respect as a consequence of socio-economic inequalities relate, not only to social status and differences in talent, application and achievement, but also to the

general kind of capability formation taken to be necessary for anyone whatsoever to be able to participate in society:

‘[...] certain inequalities of class also impact recognition-respect as well because they are generally taken to signify the presence or absence of powers that *all persons* of sound body and mind are expected to bring to economic life [...] Modern society rests on the presumption that all normal adults possess the capabilities necessary to be productive members of society and gain recognition-respect as such’ (Doppelt, 2009: 139).

In our everyday lives, social recognition is to be found for most people, not in the experience of political citizenship, but in the experience of socio-economic activity. Consequently, the social bases of self-respect cannot be guaranteed solely by equal democratic citizenship in the political domain. We need also equality in the social bases of self-respect in the economic and social domains, for which we must undertake an evaluation of how socio-economic inequalities undermine self-respect.

Furthermore, self-respect depends, not only upon our socio-economic status, but also upon being able to engage in activities which meet the terms of the Aristotelian Principle (AP), where such activities satisfy our natural inclination for complex tasks enabling increasing mastery and excellence (cf. Moriarty, 2009). In the absence of such activities ‘human beings will find their culture and form of life dull and empty. Their vitality and zest will fail as their life becomes a tiresome routine’ (Rawls, 1999 [1971] TJ: 377). Work has the requisite structure for realising the AP when it is organised to allow people to ‘enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (and their innate or trained abilities) and this enjoyment increased the more the capacity is realized, or the greater its complexity’ (ibid: 426). Moreover, Rawls acknowledges that self-respect is damaged by having to undertake poor quality work when he says: ‘Lacking a sense of long term security and the opportunity for meaningful work and occupation is not only destructive of

citizen's self-respect but of their sense that they are members of society and not simply caught in it. This leads to self-hatred, bitterness and resentment' (Rawls, 2005 PL, lvii). But what matters in Rawlsian justice is not good quality work for its own sake, but the damage that poor quality work does to the self-respect necessary for securing our status and capabilities as democratic citizens in the political domain (Freeman, 2007: 330). Thus, harms done to self-respect by poor quality work register as a normative concern only to the extent that they manifest as distorted capabilities for exercising the two moral powers in the political domain.

I argue that limiting the social bases of Rawlsian self-respect to those activities which meet the terms of the AP artificially narrows the range of values people may wish to appropriate to the meaning content of their lives because of the work they do. This has the consequence of excluding from the social bases of citizenship forms of contribution essential to the work of social cooperation, such as caring labour. Caring labour is complex and skilled (cf. Bolton, 2009), but the complexity or the skill of the work is not automatically the most subjectively attractive value to practitioners of carework (paid and unpaid), who may instead be motivated by values inherent to the practice of care, such as empathy, concern and usefulness. Therefore, I agree with Doppelt that making equal the social bases of self-respect will require more than the equalisation of income and status, it will also require a new culture in which we base respect upon 'the capability of persons to perform socially useful work'; and in particular where we recognise that 'the capabilities embodied in love, care, and nurture are reasonable social bases of recognition-respect' (Doppelt, 2009: 145). In particular, this will require a social revaluation of low status work employing practices of care, which I suggest can be provided by extending an ethic of care to institutional maintenance and repair (see Spelman, 2003), thereby allowing us to see how engaging in practices of care underpins every person's capabilities for acting as a participating citizen in the work of social cooperation.

### 3.1.2 *Mediators of Social Recognition: Achievement and Associations*

Rawls mediates social recognition through achievement and associations. But I argue that Rawlsian self-respect, by binding self-respect to the recognition of individual performance, narrows the possible range of values against which social recognition can be mediated. Rawls acknowledges the importance of interaction with others for securing self-respect when he says that ‘we acquire a sense of that what we do in everyday life is worthwhile’ through forms of social recognition in which ‘our person and deeds appreciated by others who are likewise esteemed and their association enjoyed’ (Rawls, 1999 [1971] TJ: 440). This means that to be in a position to draw the interest and attention of others, we need to belong to a wide range of associations containing activities organised to enable the realisation of the AP: ‘what is necessary is that there should be for each person at least one community of shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his endeavours confirmed by his associates’ (TJ, 442). Interaction with others is therefore vital and unavoidable, but interaction in Rawlsian respect is limited to display and response; it does not include an understanding of intersubjectivity where our inter-relations are constitutive of our practical identities, actively shaping our capacities for autonomous action, enabling or disabling our ability to appropriate worthy objects to our lives and to develop the relevant normative orientations towards them. Rawls does acknowledge an intersubjective dimension of shared working (see Gauss, 1981) when he evokes the importance of cooperation, and not just coordination. But shared working plays a limited part in Rawls concept of respect recognition because, for respect recognition to play the role Rawls gives it in his theory of justice, respect recognition must accrue to the individual, making the relevant dimension of interaction with others the performance of the individual, not the joint outcome for which no individual person alone is responsible.

Rawlsian self-respect is, in essence, transactional: Rawlsian interactive encounters take place through our membership of associations, where other people provide an audience for our individual endeavours. Achieving self-respect

depends upon positive relations with others which support the conviction that we and our projects are of worth: ‘unless our endeavours are appreciated by our associates it is impossible for us to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile’ (Rawls, 1999 [1971] TJ: 440). Such associations with others encourage us to believe that we are competent to carry through our plans: ‘to reduce the likelihood of failure and [...] provide support against the sense of self-doubt when mishaps occur’ (ibid: 441). But the worth of our projects, if they are to attract the necessary respect recognition to secure self-respect, must be reduced to their value as vehicles for individual display, rather than for their value as activities of intersubjective co-production, or for the other-regarding care they may provide to worthy objects. With the currency of our individual performance, we trade with others for their recognition of us in an economy of social recognition which cannot properly value joint agency in cooperative work, thereby failing to give a public presence to the intersubjective dimensions of shared working. Other people contract us to fulfil roles in the division of labour which they have not the time, nor the inclination, to undertake themselves; in the process, they become spectators taking pleasure in, or expressing disapproval of, our performance. Thus, our potential partners in social recognition are turned into consumers of the products of our life plan, rather than persons who involve themselves in helping us achieve our life plans, and who are jointly responsible with us for co-production in a system of social cooperation. I would not deny that relating to others as consumers and spectators can be satisfying – the ethical problem lies in reducing all intersubjective relations to their value as mediators of individual achievement, rather than allowing social recognition to be mediated by a wider range of social values, such cooperation and solidarity.

Our membership of associations provides the arena in which the audience for our performance is gathered. Rawls gives associations a functional role in ensuring that the basic structure embodies plural conceptions of the good, expressing a multiplicity of values. Associations fulfil their functional role – and satisfy the principle of neutrality - when they are allowed to express their ‘natural’ distinctiveness through their variation from the general principles of justice,

provided that they make certain adjustments required by the need to maintain background justice (ibid: 261): for example, ‘in a democratic society nonpublic power, as seen, for example, in the authority of churches over their members, is freely accepted’ (ibid: 221). Variations within the limits of justice are allowed because we are not bound to an agreement with one another as equals through our different roles in the communities and associations of the basic structure, but through our undifferentiated political status in which we are all assumed to have equal capacities (ibid: 258). Rawls gives two instances of legitimate variations - the authority structure of churches and universities, and the valuing of contributions that people make to associations - but he does not specify what adjustments such organisations are themselves to make in order to preserve background justice. Moreover, Rawls assumes that the internal organisation of such associations is incontestable, and that the basis for evaluating a person’s contributions to those associations is their ‘marginal usefulness to some particular group’ (ibid.). I suggest this is a bleak prospect for the majority of people who must compete for the appreciation of significantly placed others in the many associations organised hierarchically, and to the advantage of privileged groups, with the consequence that many forms of work, particularly work performed by undervalued groups, are misrecognised and hidden from public view. The marginal usefulness of low status persons, perceived in terms of how the value of the work they do is mediated through a status hierarchy laden with systemic disadvantage, is not likely to be sufficient for sustaining the positive self-relations upon which the formation of a practical identity depends.

I argue that differences from the general principles of justice must be removed from the presumptive designation of the ‘natural and necessary’, and made subject to deliberative democratic inquiry. This means that associations claiming that authoritarian leadership is necessary to preserve their character and ensure the widest possible range of values in society, must be subject to public evaluation of how their internal organisation may enhance or inhibit the respect recognition which underpins a person’s equal status as a worthy being, and how the measure of a person’s value to an association, by virtue of their achievements,



contributions, or efforts, enables or disables esteem recognition. This will require the political mode of being to be exercised in all the action contexts of associational life, directed towards on-going deliberations over the terms of cooperation in the associations which make up the basic structure (cf. Young, 2006). And it implies establishing democratic practices, not only in the associations where we work but also, more broadly, in a participatory society to ensure that unpaid family and voluntary work is subject to a similar standard of public scrutiny. Hussain (2007), for example, argues that democratic corporatism is likely to be more stable for a Rawlsian scheme of justice than a property owning democracy, because democratic corporatism expands the sphere of political action by putting within the reach of everyone the possibility of expressing the political dimensions of their personhood, and thereby of achieving the widespread respect recognition necessary to the long term security of the social order. Furthermore, Hussain makes such participation intrinsic to the content of work:

‘[...] work occupies a central role in the lives of individuals in a modern society. And unlike deliberations about laws and policies at the national level, deliberations about the structure of an industry bear directly on the shape of people’s work lives. This makes these deliberations *continuous* with the activities and concerns that occupy people at work in a way that national deliberations do not. This continuity suggests that the rate of participation in industry-level rule making will be higher, as people will see these activities as an aspect of their job or career’ (Hussain, 2007: 17).

The aims of democratic participation are to reveal misrecognised and invisibilised work, to examine the extent to which misrecognition is based upon essentialist and naturalised assumptions of what work is suitable for certain types of people, and to challenge mediators of social recognition such as individualised

achievement which narrow the range of contributions which can be made subject to social recognition. In contrast to Rawls, Honneth (1995) makes social recognition constitutive of the interior content of work, and he takes seriously the need to bring the possibility for social recognition because of the work we do within the reach of every person. But, in reducing struggles over the meaning content of work to claims for recognition, Honneth elides the materiality of the interior content of work (Moll, 2009; Smith, 2009) where, through their struggle with the material conditions of work, workers form identities and ways of being in the world. By so doing, Honneth forgoes the possibility of securing stable positive self-relations based an organisation of the interior content of work which grounds political self-determination in the immanent potential of work, and which I described in Chapter Three using the Dejourian idea of an irreducible level of autonomy in every act of work.

### **3.2.0 The Limits of Honneth's Concept of Self-Esteem**

In Honneth's (1995) critical theory of recognition, three dimensions of self-relations – self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem – are necessary to the developmental possibilities of self-realisation, which, given our inescapable need for social recognition, also explain the motivations driving social change. For Honneth, esteem-recognition plays a vital role in contemporary liberal egalitarian societies by ensuring that, through the division of labour, each person has access to resources enabling them to experience self-esteem. Esteem-recognition is vital to the possibility of self-realisation, and when structural or psychological distortions disable persons from achieving esteem-recognition for their particular contributions a struggle for recognition ensues, which can result in social change. We achieve esteem through intersubjective recognition of our traits and abilities (ibid: 121), where the bases for recognising traits and abilities are embedded in the norms, beliefs and institutions of the society in which we are situated. Therefore, to change the bases of esteem-recognition we must alter the norms, beliefs and structures of our society. Developmental progress in modern social

relations, for example, has been directed towards the steady dismantling of hierarchical status structures which value persons according to characteristics fixed by birth, class, social position and group identity. This is because traditional social structures are unable to provide the symmetrical recognition necessary for enabling each person to be equally esteemed for their abilities and achievements. The virtue of the modern division of labour is that it generates a progressively individualised, differentiated and pluralised environment for accruing social esteem to one's person. In the division of labour we find a 'framework of orientation' (ibid: 122) or 'community of value' for social goals and values which 'provides the criteria that orient the social esteem of persons, because their abilities and achievements are judged inter-subjectively according to the degree to which they can help to realise culturally defined values' (ibid.). The possibility of symmetrical recognition depends upon the 'pluralization of the socially defined value-horizon' which provides the value diversity necessary for each person to find a measure against which they can be esteem-recognised for their 'personality ideals' (ibid.).

Thus, the modern division of labour is a great advance in social relations because, by continually diversifying and pluralising the source of values within an overarching value-horizon, persons have the opportunity to be recognised as individuals, detached from static features defining them by birth or fixed tradition: 'the subject entered the contested field of social esteem as an entity individuated in terms of a particular life-history' (ibid: 125). For Honneth's theory, there is much riding upon the developmental possibilities inherent in the division of labour. It must pluralise to such an extent that all persons can find within it a mode of self-realisation or form of living which will enable them to 'earn' social esteem, but, simultaneously, it must universalise to hold all persons within a cooperative effort that relates them to one another as equal interaction partners. People become distinguished as individual persons against an evolving backdrop of values which allows them to be recognised for their particular capacities developed over the course of a lifetime:

‘Prestige’ or ‘standing’ signifies only the degree of social recognition the individual earns for his or her form of self-realisation by thus contributing, to a certain extent, to the practical realisation of society’s abstract goals. With regard to this new, individualised system of recognition relations, everything now depends, therefore, on the definition of this value-horizon, which is supposed to be open to various forms of self-realization and yet, at the same time, must also serve as an overarching system of esteem’ (Honneth, 1995: 126).

The potential for conflict over which values are to be publicly recognised and how they are to be assessed in relation to one another is ever present. The result is a ‘permanent struggle’ for recognition which cannot be avoided or ameliorated, and is an essential element in the process of turning universalised social goals into recognised forms of self-realisation which express different traits and capacities. ‘Secondary interpretative practice[s]’ (ibid: 126) mediate the process of recognising and valuing different modes of self-realisation: ‘the worth accorded to various forms of self-realization and even the manner in which the relevant traits and abilities are defined fundamentally depend on the dominant interpretations of societal goals’ (ibid.). Honneth uses the ‘seemingly neutral idea of achievement’ to mediate ‘societal goals’ so that they yield up ‘criteria of esteem’ (ibid: 126). The achievement principle is individualised, available within ‘an open horizon of plural values’ (ibid: 126), and expressive of many, continuously diversifying forms of self-realisation. And it is dependent upon ‘the capacities developed by the individual in the course of his or her life’ (ibid: 125). The values against which individual achievements are measured depend upon the ‘collective event’ of an agreed social goal, which operates to form a value-horizon within which people can earn esteem for their achievements against the values relevant to the activities (or ‘shared praxis’) necessary for achieving the goal:

‘it is the all-dominating agreement on a practical goal that instantly generates an intersubjective value-horizon, in which

each participant learns to recognise the significance of the abilities and traits of the others to the same degree' (Honneth, 1995: 128).

The target of symmetrical relations of esteem does not mean, however, that all contributions and achievements are valued equally (ibid: 130), in the sense of being quantitatively equivalent. Honneth defines symmetrical relations as the state where all persons are 'free from being collectively denigrated, so that each is given the chance to experience oneself to be recognised, in the light of one's own accomplishments and abilities, as valuable for society' (ibid.). Esteem recognition picks out the distinctiveness of esteem within the realm of work and its relevance to individuated self-realisation, where our inter-dependence with others in the work of social cooperation underpins mutual obligations to give esteem where esteem is due. The modern conditions of work, however, makes individuated self-esteem mediated by the achievement principle an increasingly remote possibility for many people.

### *3.2.1 The Achievement Principle*

Honneth's optimism that the achievement principle will pluralise the values against which we can secure esteem recognition for all has not gone unchallenged (Smith, 2009; Seglow, 2009; Roessler, 2007; Petersen & Willig, 2004). Smith (2009) critiques Honneth for being 'too sanguine about the integrative potential of social esteem based on individual achievement' (Smith, 2009: 57). In neo-liberal economies, the shackling of achievement to the production paradigm not only reduces the range of activities which can be recognised as socially valuable work, but constrains the variety of ways in which people can exercise their entitlement to make their contribution, leaving much potentially important work undone (cf. Gomberg, 2007). Furthermore, the solidaristic bases for the formation of collective coalitions capable of challenging the terms of recognition are undermined by the individualised allocation of esteem; at the same time, the sources of individual self-esteem are de-stabilised by

making the individual responsible for nearly all the risk of failing to accrue esteem recognition (Smith, 2009: 57; cf. Sennett & Cobb, 1972).

‘These effects bear on the self, whose capacity for autonomy may seem like a curse in view of the responsibility it brings for non-achievement or failure; and they bear on the social bonds, which are surely just as likely to be undermined as strengthened by the individualized competition for self-esteem’ (Smith, 2009: 57).

Seglow (2009) identifies how, although Honneth mediates esteem recognition through individual achievement, he makes the challenge to recognitive practices dependent upon collective coalition-building. Thus, Honneth relies upon two potentially incommensurable norms: the meritocratic individualistic ethic of achievement and the communitarian, solidarity-based, ethic of contribution (ibid: 70). Seglow argues that, whilst we may applaud contribution and seek it as an ideal, we will struggle to establish contribution as the basis of social recognition because ‘there is not the public institutional structure for the matrix of respect to be embedded’ (ibid: 73). This means that we cannot multiply esteem based upon contribution whilst the majority of our institutions and structures are framed by the individualistic and competitive principles of merit and achievement, since these principles narrow the range of possible values to those against which we can measure merit-based performance and assign a monetary value for reward. Consequently, making values based upon individual merit-based achievement the basis for public recognition crowds out values based upon collective achievement, such as those eliciting from joining our agency to that of others in order to produce a shared outcome.

When structured by the logic of individual merit-based achievement, our reasonable need for social recognition, instead of being a duty which we owe to one another because of our common willingness to make our contribution and take up our responsibilities for worthy objects, becomes a futile race by each individual alone for the devalued currency of esteem-recognition. In the contemporary organisation of work, the possibility of acquiring esteem-

recognition is becoming increasingly elusive, because the pursuit of self-esteem turns ‘the individual into a greyhound chasing the rabbit without ever receiving sufficient recognition for the mile sprinted’ (Willig, 2009: 351). Economic insecurity, combined with rapid social and technological change, means that workers are finding it increasingly difficult to hold onto a stable sense of esteem-recognition, limiting esteem only to those judged to be the most successful practitioners of a structured activity (Petersen & Willig, 2004: 344). The contemporary organisation of work mobilises and stimulates our need for esteem recognition through performance management practices which make the individual responsible for rendering their actions susceptible to recognitive practices, whilst at the same time reducing the individual’s influence over the terms of recognition. Realising stable esteem recognition is put beyond the reach of many individuals by the constantly shifting terms of cooperation, and the restriction of values and meanings which can be mediated by the achievement principle (cf. Willig, 2009). Moreover, meanings of work are appropriated by ideologies of productivity, which aim to recruit the effort of workers into the management project, but, in so doing, subvert those values, making them less employable for the crafting of positive meaning in individual lives. Usefulness becomes superfluousness in the form of unemployment; craftsmanship becomes alienation as autonomy and self-formation are frustrated in the technical division of labour; affective labour becomes commodified by the requirements to extract maximum value from the carer; and solidarity becomes the conscious attempt to use socialisation and the bonds between persons to promote the increase of profit.

The achievement principle has become so constrained under the contemporary organisation of work, that it is ‘now too narrow to incorporate types of work which cannot be ascribed recognition value in the reproduction of society’ (Petersen & Willig, 2004: 341; 2002). But when people seek social recognition through work, they are not searching solely for recognition for their individual achievements as measured by financial reward; in many instances, they also, and perhaps primarily, seek inclusion, membership, belonging, and the recognition that comes through direct relations with colleagues, clients, customers

and patients (ibid; Perrons, 2000: 110; see also Roessler, 2007). The achievement principle fails to describe what is important about unpaid, underappreciated work, such as care work, friendship work, or civic work (Schwarzenbach, 1996). It is a weak instrument for bringing into public view invisibilised dimensions of work, such as emotional labour or the irreducible autonomy in all acts of work. When mediated by the achievement principle, even a substantially diversified and pluralised value horizon cannot plausibly create a sufficiently wide 'esteem-net' to capture all of the kinds of valuable activities we may wish to count as work, thereby failing to facilitate esteem recognition to as many people as possible, since not all work which contributes to the social product can be readily captured by a metric of 'achievement', however defined. Roessler (2007), for example, claims that family work 'follows a fundamentally different logic, a fundamentally different rationality' (ibid: 141) and therefore family work demands 'a different form of social recognition than paid work; they should not be seen simply as equivalent forms of socially necessary achievements' (ibid: 136). She argues that family work and contractual work must be distinguished because they accrue self-esteem on a different basis due to the differing contribution they make to the good life for the individual (ibid: 153). Each kind of work shapes the development of the self in different ways, and the content of such labours will vary from context to context, such that contractual work with a substantive element of care will offer a different route to self-development than contractual work requiring only interaction with machinery or information technology. In sum, a principle mediating social recognition through an undifferentiating value of achievement will struggle to pick out what is objectively and subjectively worthwhile about each of these forms of labour.

I suggest that a partial way through these difficulties is indicated by acknowledging the value of doing good work, where good work is worth doing because it has the interior structure for autonomy, freedom and dignified relations to others. Doing work which is worth doing supports a sense of one's dignity as a particular person, independent of the possibility of accruing individual esteem recognition. Thus, our normative concern for the content of work is not simply



whether it enables social recognition, but also whether it meets relevant criteria consistent with a positive critical conception of meaningful work – that is, it aims at caring for worthy objects, embodying subjectively attractive values which can be incorporated into a practical identity. Roessler (2007) points out that social recognition measured by achievement and financial reward tells us little about ‘whether or not the achievement itself is satisfying’ (ibid: 160). An individual in receipt of a large financial reward may still fail to achieve subjective satisfaction if the content of her work misses something fundamental about her deepest value commitments and her understanding of her value as a human being. Work promotes a sense of dignity when it provides persons with ‘the opportunity to do something that they can do (well) and in which they have (at least minimal or basic) interest in its achievement, and under conditions that they normatively – at least partly or to a certain extent – want and are able to influence’ (Roessler, 2007: 160). I propose that, in a positive critical conception of meaningful work, a sense of dignity depends upon being able to exercise practices of care towards the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives, which implies that social recognition ought to be aimed at the practical identities we form from the extant values in the roles, practices and institutions to which we belong. Furthermore, I argue that democratic practices applied to the meaning-making activities in the work we do together allows for the re-interpretation of existing values, and the creation of new values which can be publicly evaluated and made part of our practical identities, supporting a sense of our dignity as particular persons.

#### **4.0.0 A Sense of Dignity**

I would not deny that modern conditions of work, even where democratic participatory practices are widespread, are challenging for securing social recognition for the values and identities which make one’s life meaningful. But the difficulties of realising positive self-relations does not mean we can give up on our continuing need to be acknowledged, not just as place-holders in a hierarchy

of social functions, but as particular persons (Noggle, 1999). Ikaheimo (2007) identifies two dimensions of personhood we would want to recognise: firstly, ‘the interpersonal status of being respected as a co-authority’ and ‘psychological capacities for norm-administration’ (ibid: 36), and secondly, the values, relations, states of affairs such that ‘caring about the happiness or good life of oneself/others is a structuring principle’ (ibid.). In the bipartite value of meaningfulness, to have the status as a co-authority, and the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, is to have the capacity to become a valuer, and thus to experience a sense of dignity. Personhood is enabled by being a valuer (cf. Tirrell, 1993), because valuing supports the formation of a practical identity, particular to our subjective appropriation of worthy objects. Being able to form a practical identity depends upon the capacity of persons ‘to freely constrain themselves to the terms of participation in the many social groups to which they belong.’ (Davies, 2006: 80-81), implying that each person needs to be a member of at least one social organisation. In order to secure a practical identity which is expressive of our particular personhood, I argue that we need to experience a sense of dignity which combines *self-respect*, as our sense of worthiness and capabilities to undertake right actions towards worthy objects, with *self-esteem*, as our judgements about how well we have engaged in the relevant practices of caring for worthy objects.

Dignity points to something inherently valuable in the subject; in the Kantian formulation of dignity, it is the inviolable worth of our moral rationality: ‘a human being regarded as a person, that is, as the subject of morally practical reason, is exalted above all price [...] as an end in himself he possesses *dignity* by which he extracts *respect* for himself from all other beings in the world’ (Kant, 1983 [1797]). A sense of dignity is a vital signifier of our recognitive status, where we know ourselves to possess that inviolable worth in our person which specifies the limits upon how we can be treated by others, giving us the confidence that we can legitimately make claims upon others – including our entitlement to contribute to the work of social cooperation, and have that contribution recognised. When we possess a sense of dignity, we understand

ourselves to be of equal standing with others, and jointly obliged with them to ensure that each person in the community of belonging is afforded the status to be heard and the capabilities to act and to be. Threats to our dignity through mistreatment or misrecognition are frightening because they render us invisible as a human being with intrinsic value to whom it is illegitimate to do certain things, to humiliate, to ignore, to degrade, to exploit or whatever. And dignity can be undermined by humiliating institutions which fail to foster intersubjective relations of the right normative character for respect recognition and esteem recognition (Margalit, 1996). A characteristic of humiliating economic institutions is the manner in which they structure intersubjective relations so that it appears to be legitimate for some to treat others solely as the means to fulfilling their plans and projects:

‘[...] they must never be treated merely as means, as things that we may use however we want in order to advance our interests, and they must always be treated as the supremely valuable beings that they are. Note that it is not wrong to treat persons as means to our ends; indeed we could not get on in life if we could not make use of the talents, abilities, service, and labor of other people. What we must not do is to treat persons as mere means to our ends, to treat them as if the only value they have is what derives from their usefulness to us. We must always treat them ‘at the same time as an end’ (Dillon, 2010: 23).

I suggest that establishing our equal status as co-authorities will require: firstly, evaluation of the internal organisation of the associations, practices and institutions to which we belong and secondly, widespread opportunities to exercise the political mode of being in the work timespaces of social cooperation – both of which require non-humiliating institutions. Non-humiliating institutions enable us to resist acquiescing automatically to another’s understanding of who we are, allowing us instead to enter into a relation with the recogniser where we

acknowledge their status as a recogniser, approve their competency to recognise us, and respect their judgements accordingly. Moreover, deliberative contestation of the social valuations of others, grounded in our equal status as co-authorities, opens up opportunities to challenge the terms of recognition, enabling us to express differences, ambivalences, incommensurables and obstacles in our efforts to advance the values we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives. Furthermore, humiliating institutions are not good for any person who belongs to them: hierarchical authority, for example, undermines managers' own interest in their personhood, because those situated in a favourable position within a hierarchical authority cannot respect workers as co-authorities. In evaluating within a Kantian framework the use multi-national companies make of sweatshop labour, Arnold & Bowie (2003) claim:

‘[...] managers who encourage or tolerate violations of the rule of law; use coercion; allow unsafe working conditions; and provide below subsistence wages, disavow their own dignity and that of their workers. In so doing, they disrespect themselves and their workers’ (ibid: 239).

Since subordinates in a hierarchy are not in the relevant category of authorisers of norms, they cannot give their superiors esteem-recognition which can only be provided by equal others (peers). Workers can give satisfaction to managers because of their submission or obedience, but they cannot give the satisfaction which comes from the esteem recognition upon which the positive self-relations constituting personhood depends. Thus, both groups have their potential as valuers distorted, because psychological capacities for valuing and recognising remain under-developed with consequences for all of their ‘interpersonal status of being a person’ (Ikaheimo, 2007: 13). Humiliating institutions which reduce the value of usefulness to instrumental usage fail to respect both workers and those who employ workers under such conditions,

because, by supporting humiliating institutions, employers end up undermining the social conditions for their own cognitive relations.

For a person to lack a sense of her dignity in the work she does with others is for her to be aware that her society does not value her sufficiently highly to afford her the kind of work which is worthy of her human status. Her society regards her potential human contribution as surplus to requirements, or demands only that part of her humanity which can be instrumentalised for profit. Such knowledge, when reinforced through everyday interactive encounters with significant others, erodes positive self-relations in the form of self-respect, self-esteem and self-confidence. I propose, however, that self-respect and self-esteem can be united in dignified work, which is work capable of supporting us in becoming valuers, and is performed in non-humiliating forms of belonging. Therefore, being able to undertake dignified work in cooperative relations to others, where our intersubjective encounters support the development of positive self-relations, is indispensable for living a life we have good reason to value.

#### **4.1.0 Forming a Practical Identity**

Our sense of dignity depends upon being able to see ourselves as a particular person with a secure practical identity, where practical identities are formed through our intersubjective encounters in the roles, practices and institutions to which we belong in a system of social cooperation. Korsegaard (2009) defines a 'conception of practical identity' as 'a description under which you value yourself and find your life worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking' (ibid: 20; 1996). We act as individual autonomous agents when we engage in 'an ongoing struggle for integrity, the struggle for psychic unity, the struggle to be, in the face of psychic complexity, a single unified self' (ibid: 7), success in which depends upon our being able to find reasons sufficient to motivate us to act and to be (ibid: 23). Korsegaard says that reasons are derived contingently from the roles and obligations we acquire through living an ordinary human life. Such reasons are contingent because we can choose whether or not to

endorse them as part of our practical identity, as sources of meaning and value for us (ibid), but since we cannot choose not to have reasons then we must engage also in the task of ‘making the contingent necessary’ (ibid.). In terms of the bipartite value of meaningfulness, this means we must find some way of subjectively appropriating non-obligatory values to the meaning content of our lives, in the process acquiring obligations of care for worthy objects which embody those values. Indeed, Korsegaard steers close to the bipartite value of meaningfulness when she says ‘to have a personal project or ambition is not to desire a special object that you think is good for you privately, but rather to want to stand in a special relationship to something you think is good publicly’ (ibid: 211). Our evaluations of how we are doing with respect to our actions and orientations towards worthy objects generates various kinds of self-regard which issue in a positive or negative reinforcement of our self-conception or practical identity: ‘you are faced with the task of *making something* of yourself, and you must regard yourself as a success or failure in so far as you succeed or fail at this task’ (Korsegaard, 2009: xii).

Furthermore, Korsegaard (2009) says that ‘we owe it to ourselves, to our own humanity, to find some roles that we can fill with integrity and dedication’ (ibid: 24). Our roles support our dignified status in the midst of equally situated others by providing us with the social bases for positive self-relations. This means that, if we lack certain fundamental positive attitudes towards ourselves, then we will lack the essential conditions for regarding ourselves as the kinds of persons who have projects and plans for living which can legitimately command the attention and support of others. For Korsegaard, our many roles and sources of identity must be brought into a coherent whole in order to establish the basis of a unified self, which enables us to act as autonomous beings - and she makes coherence in our practical identity the marker for autonomy. But I suggest this makes the task of creating a practical identity too demanding, particularly in societies characterised by intersecting social structures of oppression which obstruct the goal of unity and coherence, rendering us vulnerable to heteronomous influence and control (Meyers, 2000: 152). In psychological theory, acquiring

recognitive capabilities involves an unavoidable psychological struggle because each of us ‘must confront the difficulty that each subject has in recognizing the other as an equivalent center of experience’ (Benjamin, 1990: 34), and so there is always the possibility of less than total unity. Identities are always in flux, despite temporary settlements, because ‘subject positions are made available in a number of competing discourses [...] identity is thus of necessity always a project rather than an achievement’ (Knights & Vurdubakis, 1994). Furthermore, the process of identity formation does not consist only in internal identity formation, but depends also upon the range of ‘publicly available ‘personas’ or *social-identities*’ (Watson, 2008: 127) – from the definition of which most people have been excluded. So rather than coherence as unity, I suggest we aim at coherence as a constantly adjusting balance of values, meanings and differences, using the concept of an intersectional self, where an intersectional self is always in the process of becoming:

‘To define oneself intersectionally, one must activate competencies that mesh intellect and feeling in order to seek out and assimilate nonstandard interpretive frameworks. One must be introspectively vigilant, attuned to signs of frustration and dissatisfaction, attentive to baffling subjective anomalies, and willing to puzzle out gaps in one’s self-understanding’ (Meyers, 2000: 167).

Meyers (2000) understands an intersectional self to be imperfectly autonomous, but always progressing in self-knowledge and self-definition: ‘intersectional identity is constituted in part through a process of self-definition, the authentic self is an evolving self that is not chained to conventional group norms’ (ibid: 153). The shifts in an intersectional self contrasts with Korsegaard’s basis for self-constitution, which is the independent action of the individual, where a good action is one that constitutes the individual person by moving her towards a unified, coherent self: ‘action is self-constitution’ (ibid: 25). Korsegaard

does not have an intersubjective conception of the joint action essential to the constitution of selves; for her ‘action is simply interaction with the self’ (ibid: 204), which fails to illuminate the unavoidable social inter-dependency of human beings, particularly in relation to the work they do together in a system of social cooperation. Korsegaard says that ‘a good person is someone who is good at being a person’ (ibid: 26); if this is the case, then a good person is a social, inter-dependent individual, situated in intersubjective relations, which enable the formation of capabilities and are constitutive of the meaning content of our lives. In fact, Korsegaard acknowledges something of this kind when she identifies the effort which is required for the continual formation and maintenance of practical identity, made up of many different identities, roles and forms of belonging, saying that ‘in the course of this process, of falling apart and pulling yourself back together, you create something new, you constitute something new: yourself’ (ibid: 214). Meyers (2000) proposes a competency approach to intersectional identity formation which would allow for less demanding criteria of unity and coherence in creating our practical identities, and which emphasises the process rather than the goal of self-constitution, concentrating instead upon the formation of the relevant skills necessary to engage in intersectional identity development: ‘intersectional subjects analyze their position in social hierarchies, interpret the psychic impact of their social experience, and reconfigure their identities as members of social groups’ (ibid: 154). This makes practical identity dependent upon becoming a valuer, having the status as a co-authority, and the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective appropriation, which is achieved by understanding how we create ourselves from intersubjective relations in multiple forms of belonging.

Forming the capabilities necessary for developing the practical identity of an intersectional self depends upon our active engagement with worthy objects. When we engage with worthy objects, interpretive differences over how to care for worthy objects give rise to a plurality of meanings. When they are made available for public deliberation, these meanings have the potential to multiply the range of values within a liberal perfectionist framework, which can then be made



available for the formation of a practical identity (Korsegaard, 2009; see also Roessler, 2011) capable of securing a sense of one's life being worth living. Where the social goal is to widen the bases for experiencing the bipartite value of meaningfulness, then interpretive differences emerging from the application of phronetic techne in a rationality of caring are particularly productive, because these differences arise from our efforts to fulfil our responsibilities of care towards worthy objects, where the worth of the objects are subject to difference and deliberation. Thus, to engage with values through interpretive meaning-making is to have the bases for self-respect and self-esteem, enabling us to form a practical identity which secures a sense of meaning.

‘a (thickly) autonomous agent regulates her life on the basis of her values, where a person's values are deep psychological features that ground emotions of esteem and thereby reveal the shape of her self-conception’ (Copp, 2007: 18).

Meanings of work are understood to be: ‘the way in which workers bring significance and order to their experience of labour’ (Joyce, 1987: 7). A worker may find meaning in performing hard, menial, or dangerous work well: work such as coalmining, or fishing, for example, is embedded in a rich historical and social context, sustained by dense community relations (Antony, 1977: 286). Ashforth & Kreiner (1999) found that ‘people performing dirty work tend to retain relatively high occupational esteem and pride’ (ibid: 413), where dirty work is conceptualised as any kind of work which carries with it some kind of physical, social or moral taint but which is not regarded by society as unimportant or trivial: for example, undertakers, careworkers, refuse collectors. Workers doing dirty work are aware of the stigma of dirty work, but can obtain identity support through ‘strong cultures of meaning making’ (ibid: 419) and various strategies of interpretation, the most successful of which is *reframing*. Reframing enables workers to transform the very meaning of the work they do using ‘ennobling ideologies’ (ibid: 428). Positive interpretive strategies can be encouraged by the

organisational environment in which the work is carried out. Salzinger (1991), for example, found that, in one cooperative of domestic services, the work was defined as low skilled and temporary, resulting in no training for staff; in a second cooperative, the work was organised in professional teams which offered training and participation in decisions: ‘The result was that members of the first co-op came to regard domestic work as unimportant, whereas members of the second regarded it as an inherently skilled occupation, deserving of respect, fair treatment and decent pay’ (Ashforth & Kreiner, 1999: 431). Relational dimensions of work are fundamental to the formation of practical identity. Deliberative meaning-making through the exercise of the political mode of being shapes the common horizon of value, thereby allowing us to offer ourselves and one another intelligible reasons for why a person, object or activity should contribute to the meaning content of our lives. Sluss & Ashforth (2007) identify how self-definition is affected by interpersonal relationships at work, both in terms of seeing oneself as a unique individual and in making interpersonal comparisons. Organisational life is held together by both cognitive and affective dimensions of working with others: ‘to work is to relate’ (Flum, 2001: 262). Relations are important for *relational identity* which describes how role occupants behave in their roles in respect to one another (for example, manager/subordinate or worker/co-worker) and for *relational identification* which describes the extent to which someone may define themselves by the standards and practices of the role they occupy (Sluss & Ashforth, 2007: 11). An agent may experience a relational identity by behaving according to role expectations but not experience relational identification because they reject a self-conception based upon the role they are performing. Identification with others through relational identity satisfies a vital human need for connection and belonging (ibid: 20), but resistance to personal identification with roles also expresses a vital need to have a sense of oneself as an active agent who reflectively endorses what elements of one’s work are to become part of one’s sense of who one is.

In sum, it is the formation of an intersectional practical identity which ought to be the target of social recognition where the process of building a

practical identity, whilst never complete, nevertheless enables us to experience a sense of dignity as respected and esteemed persons who have a particular life of our own to lead. I do not claim that this resolves the difficulties of securing stable positive self-relations in the contemporary organisation of work, but I do suggest that the experience of work contains positive resources for securing a sense of dignity when interpretive meaning-making is organised along democratic lines.

### **5.0.0 Conclusion**

Social recognition is a fundamental human need, which is constitutive of the meaning content of work. In the contemporary organisation of work, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain the positive self-relations which enable us to experience a sense of meaningfulness. I argue that neither Rawlsian respect recognition nor Honneth's esteem recognition are able to satisfy the ethical and psychological needs for social recognition. I propose that self-respect and self-esteem ought to be tied to our sense of dignity as particular persons who bear responsibilities towards the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives. When we evaluate ourselves against the normative orientations relevant to the nature of particular worthy objects, then we find that practices of other-regarding care, which include the importance of self-care, are useful for directing our attention away from the frantic pursuit of self-esteem fostered by the contemporary organisation of work. A sense of our dignity as particular persons is dependent upon forming being able to form a practical identity. And I identify how the psychological process of intersubjectivity and the ethical requirements of self-constitution offer us an insight into the formation of our selves as particular persons with a life of our own to lead.

## **Chapter Six**

# **‘The Inner Workshop of Democracy’: Realising the Emancipatory Potential of Meaningful Work through Agonistic Workplace Democracy**

### **1.0.0 Introduction**

In this chapter, I argue that the emancipatory potential of the work people do together is realised by a politics of meaningfulness in work – a politics brought about by agonistic democratic practices at the level of the task which allow for contestation over the rules and modes of being framing action and subjective formations. And this makes democratic practices of intrinsic value, because, not only do they enable the political mode of being, but they are amongst the worthy objects and affective attachments constituting the value of meaningfulness. I proceed by examining standard arguments for workplace participation, concluding that they do not provide the resources for justifying democratic participation because it is intrinsic to the meaning content of work. I challenge the deliberative democrats who assume that, since the action contexts of work are characterised by hierarchical relations and instrumental rationality, then work timespaces lack the conditions of respect and fairness necessary for democratic deliberation, and are therefore inhospitable to the political mode of being. Instead, I argue for democratic authority at the level of the organisation and for participatory practices at the level of the task, which capture difference potentials arising from acts of work, making them available for public evaluation through democratic contestation over meanings and purposes. Because they unsettle assumptions that economic associations are sites of a unified consensus, and pluralise the range of values which are available for appropriation to the meaning content of a life, I argue that agonistic democratic practices have the potential to foster a politics of meaningfulness. Agonic democratic practices do not impose a permanent settlement, but are productive of difference by making closures always available for evaluation and contestation. Finally, I propose that in ‘the inner workshop of

democracy' (Follett, 1998 [1918]), agonistic democratic practices capable of realising the emancipatory potential of positive critical conception of work are characterised by: association, contestation, ethos of enlargement and decision.

## 2.0.0 Participation and Democracy

I argue that workplace democracy is justified because democratic practices are constitutive of a transformatory experience of working (Hsieh, 2008), and are therefore intrinsically valuable, irrespective of outcomes, such as increased efficiency. In my positive critical conception of meaningful work, democratic practices are the means to realising the emancipatory potential of the experience of working, because, not only do democratic practices foster the proliferation of worthy objects, but they are, in themselves, among the worthy objects which people can affectively appropriate to the meaning content of their lives. I proceed by distinguishing between workplace democracy and economic democracy. *Workplace* democracy operates at the meso- and micro-levels of organisational life and is the 'organisation of work such that employees working in each firm have a meaningful capacity to shape the conditions of work as well as to guide the strategic direction of the enterprise' (Williamson, 2004: 2-3), whereas *economic* democracy operates at the macro-level of the political economy: 'a functional economic democracy must create mechanisms allowing the public to make broad social choices, social choices which in turn constitute and affect the substance of daily life' (ibid: 5). Workplace democracy can operate independently of a system of economic democracy; alternatively, workplace democracy and economic democracy can be made co-extensive, such that workplace democracy becomes necessary to a functioning economic democracy (ibid: 12-13). In my positive critical conception of meaningful work, the value of meaningfulness is realised by a system of workplace democracy, consisting of democratic authority at the meso-level of the organisation, and by agonistic democratic practices at the micro-level of the task. Both are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for generating a politics of meaningfulness – the further condition of economic democracy at the

macro-level of society is also required because economic democracy pluralises positive values by proliferating the variety of associational forms along democratic lines (e.g. mutuals, credit unions, cooperatives, employee-owned enterprises).

It is important to note that not all participation is democratic participation: *simple participation*, or having a share in a joint activity, can be distinguished from *democratic participation*, or having a share in control over decision-making through collective self-determination. Pateman (1970) distinguishes between the full democracy of authority, the partial democracy of influence and the pseudo democracy of appearance (ibid: 70-73), where full democracy implies a transformation of the authority structure in which each employee has equal decision-making power; partial democracy describes participatory practices which confer influence but not power over decision-making; and pseudo democracy describes management strategies of communication which generate the illusion, rather than the substance, of democratic control. Cathcart (2009) identifies how employee voice is often instituted as consultation rather than a share in decision-making, in order to secure 'harmonious and less conflictual relations with the workforce' (Gollan & Wilkinson, 2007: 1136), where structures designed to represent employee voice are dependent upon the good will of managerial authority. Thus, there is a distinction to be made between having a share in participation, as simply taking part in an activity such as consultation, and having a share in power, as having a degree of influence over an activity (Heller, 2003). And I argue that to realise the intrinsic value of the political mode of being in meaningful work requires each person to have a share in power as control over decision-making, because such is required to secure our status as co-authorities in non-dominated relations to others, and to develop the capabilities for judging and feeling necessary for uniting the objective and subjective dimensions in the bipartite value of meaningfulness.

An example of the difference between democratic participation and simple participation is provided by recent UK regulations, established in response to the EU Directive on *Informing and Consulting Employees*, and applicable after 2008

to enterprises with more than 50 employees, which were anticipated as a ‘realignment of institutional arrangements to enable workers to have a voice’ (Dundon & Gollan, 2007: 1183). But, case studies of attempts to implement the regulations show that the dimension of ‘voice’ is often constrained to influence and appearance, rather than joint authority over decision-making: ‘responsibility for decision-making ultimately remains with management’ (Gollan & Wilkinson, 2007: 1138; see also Wilkinson et al, 2007). Such forms of pseudo-democracy fuel criticisms of ‘participation as a gloss on the biased structures of capitalism’ (Beirne, 2008: 679; Clarke, 1977), where the objective of participation initiatives is to promote the aims of management, rather than to realise the transformation of authority relations (Harley et al, 2005), or the creation of decent work (Ghai, 2003). Team-working is often invoked as a positive example of an autonomy-promoting strategy, but such practices can be made to serve organisational purposes: Ezzy (2001: 634) identifies how team-working is used to ‘appropriate workers’ solidarity and support’ and encourage them to ‘identify their interests with the company’s’, and Marsh (1992), in a review of the data on Japanese manufacturers, concludes that ‘systems of participatory decision-making in Japan have not led to workplace democracy’ (ibid: 250), because firms appropriate workers’ ideas and suggestions without giving them authority over decision-making. Hodson (2002b) identifies how the self-disciplinary character of work teams results in the coercive extraction of higher levels of discretionary effort by increasing competition amongst co-workers, monitoring and reporting of peers, and fostering interactive behaviours designed to humiliate, criticise and ostracise: ‘Team based organisations of work can thus provide the basis for an even tighter control of work life than management systems based on bureaucratic control or supervisory fiat’ (Hodson, 2002b: 496; see Barker, 1999). Hodson (2002b) concludes that such participatory schemes cannot be considered democratic forms of participation, they are not ‘real industrial democracy wherein workers and managers share profits, ownership and high-level governance of firms’ (Lincoln & Kelleberg: 1990). Furthermore, Brogger (2010), in discussing the conditions for democratic dialogue in a Norwegian retail chain, concludes that, whilst ‘structure

and action are critical conditions for cooperation’, what is also required is ‘institutional support in the form of concrete bodies, procedures and arenas to make employee participation part of legitimate, everyday organizational routines’ (ibid: 477). This means that enterprises with the greatest success at protecting and promoting good quality work, as well as at securing efficiency and productivity, are those which have ‘comprehensive direct employee involvement systems in partnership with the representative channels of labour’ (Tuselman et al., 2007: 163). Enterprises which lack such structural features are ‘bleak houses’, because they are characterised by ‘hidden conflict, instability and authoritarianism’ (Brogger, 2010: 479; see also, Wilkinson, 1999). Research on employee-owned enterprises shows that there are more likely to be positive effects upon the quality of work people do when ownership is combined with both control participation at the level of the task and indirect representative mechanisms at the level of the organisation (Kaarsemaker & Poutsma, 2006; see also Whyte & Whyte, 1991). Kaarsemaker & Poutsma (2006) argue that the empirical research indicates two conditions for successful employee ownership: firstly, the organisation of work must be guided by a shared philosophy of work in which employees are treated as worthy of being co-owners (ibid: 680), and secondly, the institution of a set of core practices including ‘participation in decision-making, profit sharing, information sharing, training for business literacy and mediation’ (ibid.).

The assumption of management prerogative means that management intervention is usually required if workers are to secure any kind of participation in the workplace. But workplace democracy cannot realise the emancipatory potential of a positive critical conception of work if democratic practices remain within the gift of management: workplace democracy can be said to exist only where ‘the employees have a legal or habitual right to participate’ (Brogger, 2010: 482), which I shall argue in Chapter Seven requires institutional guarantees for the Capability for Voice. The Scandinavian democratic dialogue tradition (Alasoini 2006; Gustavsen, 1985; Qvale, 2002) provides an example of a society-wide attempt to create a habitual right to participate. In this context, practices of democratic dialogue are shaped by different and conflicting discourses concerning



the nature of organisational life which draw upon local knowledge and provide the material for the difference and contestation upon which the creation of political moments depends: 'Within an enterprise, discourses are partly overlapping and partly disconnected. With proper channels and arenas for sharing between the different discourses, an enterprise has a capacity for generating a richer and more nuanced knowledge both of the 'realities' and their own learning processes' (Brogger, 2010: 483; see Palshaugen, 2006). Beirne (2008) suggests that a generative approach to revealing and enabling different discourses requires micro-emancipatory mechanisms and structures at the level of the task (Alvesson and Willmott, 2002) which release the autonomy potential of workers by building democratic practices out of the natural work groups, repertoires of local knowledge and established traditions developed by workers themselves (Beirne, 2008: 688). Moreover, Beirne (2008) characterises such participatory practices as 'negotiated, contested and precarious' (ibid: 682), which means that establishing publics for democratic practices at the level of the task require also a 'consolidated, independent source of influence and continuity' (Brogger, 2010: 491), or a system of independent institutions which can provide checks and balances within a pluralised system of democratic accountability. This implies that, to realise the full emancipatory potential of democratic authority at the level of the enterprise and democratic practices at the level of the task, requires a society-wide system of economic democracy. For example, the German system of co-determination, the Mondragon cooperatives of Spain, and the Emilia Romagna region in Italy are national and regional systems of economic democracies which combine different elements of ownership, and multiple channels for participation (indirect/representative and direct/individual) in a complex web of institutions and practices aimed at fostering the conciliation of difference for social co-operation (Frege, 2005; Crouch, 1993; Wiedermann, 1980).

### **3.0.0 Standard Arguments for Workplace Democracy**

I take democracy to mean that each person involved in the enterprise of collective self-determination has a share in decision-making. A workplace is democratic ‘when workers collectively exercise the final decisions over the most significant issues that affect the firm and their work lives’ (Schweizer, 1995: 367). Standard arguments for workplace democracy draw upon the concept of political autonomy to justify economic and workplace democracy, using the general principle that everyone engaged in a common activity ought to have the opportunity to participate in the decision-making affecting that activity (Dewey, 1927; Dahl, 1985; Carter, 2003): ‘everyone should have the opportunity to participate in making economic decisions to the degree they are affected by those decisions’ (Albert & Hahnel, 2002: 20). I examine three standard arguments: the parallel argument (Dahl, 1985; cf. Cohen, 1989), the spillover argument (Pateman, 1970), and the efficiency argument (Johnson, 2006). Standard arguments for workplace democracy, however, treat democratic practices as an instrumental good, where workplace democracy is valuable because it fosters beneficial outcomes such as legitimacy, accountability or efficiency, rather than being intrinsically valuable in its own right (Bowles & Gintis, 1993: 86). Since standard arguments do not take sufficient account of the intrinsic value of democratic participation to the interior content of work, I argue instead that democracy in work is justified because we each have a fundamental human need for meaningfulness, which, in contemporary societies, depends, to a large degree, upon the interior content of work being structured to realise the values of autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination, and social recognition as dignity. And at minimum, this requires institutional guarantees for democratic participation in work, secured by the Capability for Voice (see Chapter Seven).

### **3.1.0 The Parallel Argument**

The central claim in the parallel argument is that economic associations are similar to states, and therefore the rights of democratic participation which we enjoy because of our membership of political polities should be extended to our membership of economic organisations. Dahl (1985), for example, says that the characteristics of a democratic human association include: an ongoing need to agree collective binding decisions; such decisions are made by the people who are subject to them; each person is equally entitled to receive consideration; each person is equally well qualified to make decisions; and fairness requires ‘that each person’s needs or deserts be taken into account’ (ibid: 57-58). In democratic associations people possess an inalienable right to self-government: ‘people involved in a certain kind of human association (one in which the process of government ought to meet democratic criteria) possess a right, an inalienable right to govern themselves by the democratic process’ (ibid: 56-7). Dahl argues against a right to private ownership, which means that economic organisations meet the requirements for being amongst the kind of democratic organisations, and therefore the right to self-government applies. This means that the right of self-government must extend to our membership of such enterprises, because, if economic organisations can be shown to be analogous to states, then the exclusion of democratic practices from economic activities cannot be justified: ‘If democracy is justified in governing the state, then it must also be justified in governing economic enterprises; and to say that it is not justified in governing economic enterprises is to imply that it is not justified in governing the state’ (ibid: 111). Furthermore, conventional systems of ownership and control in economic organisations unjustifiably limit the ability of most citizens to participate in how economic organisations are run: ‘internal governments of economic enterprises are flatly undemocratic, both de jure and de facto’ (Dahl, 1985: 54-55). In the standard economic model of work, such inequalities of voice are taken to be acceptable, because the coordination activities of hierarchical management structures within free market systems are assumed to generate

efficiency and productivity gains which are generally beneficial. But if the coordination and efficiency benefits are in doubt, or if an alternative system can be shown to be just as efficient, then the moral complaint that undemocratic workplaces are unjustified because they undermine political autonomy cannot be so easily overridden.

The parallel argument attracts two types of objections. Firstly, unlike states, membership of economic organisations is voluntary, which means that economic organisations do not need to attend to maintaining the consent of their members in order to legitimate authority. However, states must secure the consent of their citizens who find themselves members by accident of birth, rather than by choice, and therefore have little option but to submit to whatever authority structures pertain. Secondly, hierarchical authority is required because it is epistemically superior: worker decision-making risks poor outcomes, due to participants' lack of information, understanding and judgement. Both of these objections, however, can be countered. In the first objection, the non-voluntary features of economic organisations make exit for employees far from costless and highly constrained: for example, firm-specific skills may not be easily transferable, and the necessity to earn a living makes exit highly problematic for most. Besides, the economic landscape is populated with conventionally organised enterprises, which means that, for most people, there is little scope for expressing preferences for democratically organised enterprises. In the second objection, the argument of epistemic superiority presents a false picture of the knowledge required to be a capable decision-maker. Workers would not be expected to be omni-competent in decision-making: 'it is sufficient to believe that citizens are qualified enough to decide which matters do or do not require binding collective decisions' (ibid: 118). Workers as citizens are capable of distinguishing between ends or general organisational purposes, and means which may require specialist technical expertise. Thus, both voluntary membership and superior decision-making do not hold up well as arguments for excluding democratic practices from the workplace. But, the analogy of firms with states may still be 'too strong' (Neron, 2010: 338; see Phillips & Margolis, 1999). Neron (2010)

suggests that, although firms are not states, they may be ‘*some sort of political communities*’ (ibid, original emphasis), perhaps more akin to cities which are ‘created by entrepreneurial energy, enterprise and risk taking; and they too, recruit and hold their citizens, by offering them an attractive place to live’ (Walzer, 1984: 295). And the kind of institutions which firms are puts them into the category of being political communities in this sense, because they too must hold their members to a cooperative endeavour, requiring from them personal effort and risk-taking. The risks and responsibilities which people take up in work precludes situating them in hierarchical relations which make them vulnerable to arbitrary interference, eroding their control over their own efforts, and subjecting them to misrecognition. This is not how citizens should be treated. Although economic organisations are not entirely the same as states, I conclude that we are right to be concerned that people to whom we are bound by common fate in a political polity are divided one from another by unaccountable structures of power and authority in the action contexts of social cooperation where they invest much of their time and energy.

### **3.2.0 The Spillover Thesis**

The central claim of the spillover thesis is that the loss of democratic participation in the public sphere can be compensated for by democratic participation in the private sphere of economic association, which, by stimulating the habits of participation, revitalises political life (Pateman, 1970). But by reconnecting them to sources of political solidarity which motivate political action, workplace democracy enables people to form the capabilities for political participation. Dahl (1985) expresses a version of the spillover thesis in the following terms:

‘Workplace democracy [...] will foster human development, enhance the sense of political advocacy, reduce alienation, create a solidary community based on work, strengthen attachments to

the general good of the community, weaken the pull of self-interest, produce a body of active and concerned public-spirited citizens within the enterprises, and stimulate greater participation and better citizenship in the government of the state itself' (ibid: 95).

Pateman (1970) criticises theories of democracy based upon competitive elites, such as Schumpeter (1943) and Sartori (1962), for accepting the low political participation of citizens as an unavoidable, if regrettable, part of the system. She argues that since workplaces structure our daily activities and experiences, they constitute a vital formative environment for generating the sense of political efficacy which will motivate workers to take up their duties as active citizens, provided workplaces can be democratised to overcome authoritarian decision-making: 'Participation develops and fosters the very qualities necessary for it; the more individuals participate the better able they become to do so' (Pateman, 1970: 42-3). Unfortunately, Pateman's spillover thesis attracts ambiguous support from the empirical literature (Carter, 2006). For example, Greenberg et al (1996) show only a weak association between workplace participation and political participation – workers in co-operative enterprises are not more likely to be involved in voting and party activities. Greenberg et al (1996) identify a more convincing link between long term membership of a co-operative enterprise and greater community involvement (see also Godard, 2007). Adman (2008), however, finds no relationship between political activity and the practice of civic skills at work, such as communicative and organisational capacities. The only positive spillover effect Adman is able to identify is the possibility that political tolerance may be promoted because 'exposure to differing political views is more common in working life than in voluntary organisations' (ibid: 133-4). The lack of evidence for a positive spillover effect may be because workers in democratically organised enterprises place are influenced by the wider democratic system of which they are a part. Schweizer (1995) suggests that empirical studies tend to conflate participatory (direct) with republican (representative) forms of democracy (ibid: 370): even where democratic

workplaces are successful in generating a sense of political efficacy, the institutional limitations of representative democracy and a bourgeois ethos encourages people to value their private lives over an active public life, and stifles political participation (ibid: 370-374). Republican government monopolises public spaces, and the delegation of political power to representative government reduces the incentive to participate. Workers whose preferences and capabilities for political activity have been formed by the experience of direct democracy in their workplaces are less likely to find engaging in the limited opportunities for political participation offered by representative government, such as voting or involvement in political parties, worthwhile (ibid.). This implies, I suggest, that a system of workplace democracy must operate within a deliberative society, in which opportunities for deliberative participation operate alongside representative democracy.

### **3.3.0 The Efficiency Argument**

The central claim of the efficiency argument is that participation improves economic performance. Efficiency justifications (Bowles & Gintis, 1993: 89) rely upon the superior economic efficiency of democratic firms ‘in the static sense of maximising output per unit of inputs’ (ibid.), where workplace democracy is justified if it can be shown to make a positive contribution to organisational effectiveness in advanced technological societies (Johnson, 2006). The strains of global capitalism have created knowledge intensive, decentralised, flat organisations which are functionally flexible: ‘knowledge is no longer organised through task continuity’ (Johnson, 2006: 249). In such organisations, employees must collaborate across traditional functional lines, and this is impeded by hierarchies which have compliance and oppression built into them. Therefore, workplace democracy provides an efficient mechanism for facilitating autonomy, self-management and empowerment by holding managerial hierarchies to account, and subjecting them to democratic critique. For example, Bowles & Gintis (1993: 92-4) identify the following efficiency gains from workplace democracy: firstly, it

reduces employees' alienation; secondly, it introduces a mode of coordination apart from the management hierarchy because employees monitor one another; and thirdly, it removes various costs. In addition, Block (1993) identifies the role that workplace democracy plays in identifying, creating and accessing new knowledge to increase innovative capacity. Cooperatives, for example, which combine both participation in economic returns and participation in organisational control, experience an enhanced level of productivity (Johnson, 2006: 257). But the empirical evidence for the superior efficiency of democratically run organisations is inconclusive. This may be due to claims to practices being democratic which are de facto forms of 'pseudo-democracy' (Pateman, 1970: 73) because they involve the appropriation of effort by organisations concerned to harness the positive benefits of participation, without changing the fundamental power relations: 'some organisational procedures aimed at influencing behaviour so as to manufacture consent to managerially sanctioned norms and mores' (Johnson, 2006: 254; Yates et al, 2001).

To provide additional support for an efficiency based argument for workplace democracy, Johnson turns to the contribution democratic participation makes to the quality of decision making by critiquing the managerial claim to epistemic superiority (ibid: 260). Johnson identifies three normative questions for workplace democracy at the micro-level of the organisation: what form should workplace democracy take; what is the scope and content of the decisions which will be subject to democratic control by employees; and what kind of employee ownership structure aligns with democratic control (Johnson, 2006: 254)? Democratic practices engender the capacity for critical reflection, which in turn requires a 'critical democratic consciousness' (ibid): 'if communal practices are to overcome hegemonic relations, they must entail full participation in situated learning so as to ensure the development of mutual understanding and a discourse of critique' (Johnson, 2006: 261; Gaventa & Cornwall, 2001). Good decision-making depends upon widely accessible information and knowledge combined with capacities for critical reflection – and these capabilities are not naturally the sole province of a management class, but instead can be vested in workers who



apply their capabilities and knowledge to the framing rules. In my positive critical conception of meaningful work, there is the additional requirement of a sense of one's worthiness to be a co-authority, and this, I argue, depends upon there being a general entitlement to the Capability for Voice. In the absence of such an entitlement, whether or not any particular organisation exhibits democratic features will remain subject to 'enlightened management', which means that, in many cases, the participation of some will be vulnerable to the appropriation or dismissal of others.

#### **4.0.0 The Marginalisation of Workplace Democracy in Deliberative Theory**

Deliberative democracy consists of a 'family of views' in which 'the public deliberation of free and equal citizens is the core of legitimate decision making and self-government' (Bohman, 1998: 401). It can be understood as a system of rule, where the 'laws and policies result from processes in which citizens defend solutions to common problems on the basis of what are generally acknowledged as relevant reasons' (Cohen & Fung, 2004: 26). To secure political autonomy as collective self-determination, a deliberative system operates against certain standards, which Mansbridge (2010) identifies as: respect among members; fairness in procedures; and 'epistemic fruitfulness' (ibid: 1). One example of the application of the standards of deliberative democracy to economic life is the Scandinavian model of democratic dialogue. This model incorporates insights from Habermasian discourse theory to generate a democratic dialogue which aims to overcome situated power-laden knowledge in order to encourage the self-reflection of an 'ideal speech situation (Brogger, 483; cf. Habermas, 2002 [1971]). The conditions necessary for realising the communication of an ideal speech situation are: freedom of entry and exit; equal rights of participants to say what they want; the truthfulness, comprehensibility and sincerity of participants' utterances; and 'an absence of coercion' (Habermas, 1993: 56). When such conditions are united with correctly designed procedures, then

participants will be brought into an ideal speech situation, which will cause them to recognise the ‘forceless force of the better argument’ (Habermas 1990: 23). But, the need for such pre-conditions, if an ideal speech situation is to pertain, casts doubt over the Scandinavian innovation. Since workplaces lack the pre-conditions of equality, respect, and fairness, economic life is a sphere of ‘norm-free sociality’ (Habermas, 1987: 171). This means that Habermasian discourse theory denies the possibility of an ideal speech situation in work from the outset. Technical-instrumental rationality, the imperative to maximise organisational efficiency, and the necessity for hierarchical co-ordination harnessed towards pre-specified (market-given) goals, suffuse relations between workers, managers and other stakeholders, suppressing differences in the drive to realise a naturalised, uncritical unity. Disagreements may occur over external goods, such as pay, and accumulate into interest group politics, but internal goods, such as the organisation of work, are set by market-given goals and practices, and therefore are inevitable and unchallengeable. The result is that, despite an extensive empirical literature exploring participatory practices and worker-managed firms, deliberative political theorists have had little to say about workplace democracy. In deliberative democratic theory, the ideals of democratic deliberation – freedom, equality, and the exercise of reason – do not pertain in workplaces dominated by technical reason, governed by hierarchical authority, and divided by economic inequalities (Estlund, 2003: 131). Indeed, Bowles & Gintis (1993) describe the concept of economic democracy as ‘oxymoronic’, because ‘if the capitalist economy is a sphere of voluntary private interactions, what is there to democratise?’ (ibid: 97). Even participatory theorists who support workplace democracy are not immune to the naturalised view of economic organisations, allowing that the hierarchical authority necessary for coordination and efficiency may preclude democratic accountability: ‘there is something paradoxical in calling socialisation inside existing organisations and associations, most of which, especially industrial ones, are oligarchical and hierarchical, a training explicitly in *democracy*’ (Pateman, 1970: 45).

Such observations suggest that deliberative democrats concur with Habermasian discourse theory - that the immanent experience of working has been purged of contestation and difference. For deliberative democrats, this may be regrettable, but for proponents of the neo-liberal capitalist model, this is only how matters ought to be, since the demand for political freedom (the 'freedom of the ancients') is an unnatural intrusion into the affairs of organisations, which are properly understood to be outside the political sphere (Tully, 2002). Connolly (1995) argues that, after the retreat of substantive conceptions of the human good, we have been left with a 'scaled down perspective of the world without intrinsic purpose, indifferent to human concerns, available for human disposition of it through technical organisation' (ibid: 3). Deliberative democratic theory assumes that, whilst the realm of the political is radically plural, making the harmonisation of interests the inescapable problem of politics, the realm of the economic is radically unified, making politics not only impossible, but unnecessary (Honig, 1993: 201). And in any case, participatory democracy, of which workplace democracy is cousin, is too inefficient and too costly to make available to mass populations. But Hauptmann (2001) points out that most deliberative democrats argue that 'deliberation is a kind of participation, or somehow essential to it' (ibid: 408), which means that deliberative democratic theory, rather than being a fully developed and independent theory, is on closer evaluation a revision of participatory democracy. And in fact, deliberative democracy may not necessarily be an improvement upon participatory democracy, because deliberative democrats have settled for the more modest aim of producing improved decision-making procedures, abandoning the emancipatory ambitions of participatory democracy, and resulting in a cautious, pragmatic approach which 'dulls the theory's critical edge' (ibid: 421).

### **5.0.0 Challenging the Separate and Homogenous Economy**

Constructing the economic as a norm-free action context encourages deliberative democrats to incorporate into their theories the assumption that the work people do together is governed by unitary interests and technical rationality. But this position has been challenged by empirical and theoretical literature from economic geography and feminist economics: ‘Empirical research indicates that real humans do not simply leave their needs for social relations, their values, their loyalties, and their creativity at the workplace door’ (Nelson, 2003: 92). For example, post-structuralist theorists concerned with ‘theorising the contingency of social outcomes, rather than the unfolding of structural logics’ (Gibson-Graham, 2008: 615) argue persuasively that the economic can no longer be conceived of as a sphere separate from the social and the political. Instead, work timespaces are situated in diverse economies (Gibson-Graham, 2008); riven by conflictual purposes (Noonan, 2005); characterised by multiple rationalities (Ettlinger, 2004); and exhibit no unitary consensus (England, 2003; Nelson, 2003). This means that, far from being unified and homogenous, the work of social cooperation is already saturated with difference and contestation. I suggest this evidence allows us to agree with Gould (1996) that shared, everyday activities must be incorporated in the public sphere, because trying to keep these activities to separate spheres removes ‘not only difference but also the creativity that issues forth an imaginative critique and rejection of existing agreement and in the generation of new and unexpected frameworks for agreement’ (ibid: 173).

Thus, the economy is not separate from other spheres of human action, nor is it a monological homogeneity, but consists instead of a plurality of overlapping action contexts in which generating and contesting plural meanings and interpretive differences is necessary to getting the work done. Rather than being a unified phenomenon, the economic is best conceived of as constituted by diverse economies, multiply interwoven into the political and the social. Political geographers and feminist theorists argue that there are hidden, alternative forms of economic exchange which, when brought into public view, enable us to ‘perform

new economic worlds' (Gibson-Graham, 2008: 614) and to 'repopulate the economic landscape as a proliferative space of difference' (ibid: 615). Gibson-Graham claim that such modes of exchange are not marginal economic practices, but are more extensive than conventional capitalist modes of exchange: caring for others, for example, contributes up to 50% of economic activity (ibid.). By taking a 'whole economy' approach to 120 households in a North Nottinghamshire locality, Williams & Nadin (2010) document a multiplicity of economic practices, ranging from 'purely monetized to purely non-monetized economic practices' (ibid: 56), including formal paid and unpaid work in the private, public and third sectors, informal employment, monetized community work and family work, gift exchange and self-provisioning. They describe 'the economy as a 'multiplex' combination of modes, rather than as a dualism between market and non-market forms' (ibid: 28). And they argue that, not only are economic practices fluid and 'seamlessly intertwined together' (ibid: 57), but that economic inequalities spilled over into inequalities of participation in diverse economic practices. Formal private sector employment in everyday economies is confined to 20% of the deprived community and 50% of the affluent community (ibid: 60); people do not engage in formal volunteering in order to provide care for others but to participate in sports and social organisation, (ibid: 65); and people in the affluent community are able to engage in a wider range of economic practices than those in the deprived community. Williams & Nadin (op. cit.) conclude that 'fostering development does not only concern fostering the formal market economy. It is also about nurturing participation in the full range of economic practices that are variously used to secure a livelihood' (ibid: 66).

But Gibson-Graham (2008) warns against opposing a diverse alternative economics to a monolithic, undifferentiated capitalist economics, arguing instead that we need to understand, not only how 'diversity exists not only in the domain of non-capitalist economic activity' (ibid: 624), but also how 'capitalist enterprise is itself a site of difference' (ibid.). Diverse economies are 'openings, to provide a space of freedom and possibility' (ibid: 619), already present in conventional economies, which, if brought into public view, provide a rich field of values for

appropriation to the meaning content of a life. They overturn assumptions that the economic is homogenous and autonomous from the political and the social, showing that the separate spheres thesis has little basis in lived reality. In a further example, Lee (2006) says that the economic is ‘an integral part of everyday life, full of the contradictions, ethical dilemmas and multiple values that inform the quotidian business of making a living. In short it is ordinary’ (ibid: 414). And, Ettliger (2004) defines a context as a symbolic space which is ‘present in many localities yet connected across space, through practices, discourses, and networks’ (ibid: 32), which usefully identifies how work timespaces cannot be fixed, except temporarily through the meaning-making capacities of those who act in and through them. Thus, individual persons are:

‘concurrently members of multiple social networks across different spheres of life (work, residential community, leisure-related communities), suggested that people unconsciously interweave multiple logics, that is, modes of thought and feeling associated with different spheres of life and different social networks’ (ibid: 32).

In the end, there is no separate sphere of the economic. Instead, there is an interlacing of action contexts between which people move, taking with them the values and practical identities they have formed from their experiences of production and reproduction, and through which they engage with others in the co-creation of meanings. Movement between action contexts and encounters with others gives rise to ‘cognitive dissonance’ which ‘reflects multiple logics that derive from experiences in different contexts, challenging presumptions of ultimate or inevitable conformity’ (Ettliger, 2004: 29). I argue that such cognitive dissonance is a potential, already available, source of the interpretive differences, which will remain as pre-political differences unless brought into public evaluation by democratic practices.

### 5.1.0 Multiple Rationalities: From Natural Consensus to Contested Dissensus

Dismissing political participation from ordinary working life allows economic associations to be characterised as legitimately unfree, closed, and homogeneous. Such assumptions promote arguments that democratic practices are redundant in economic organisations because the necessity for technical rationality compels a unity of interests and a homogenisation of ways of being human. The expulsion of the political from the economic is justified by claims that the coordination of activities enabling efficient economic functioning depends upon technical reasoning and a unity of interests. As a result, economic organisations encourage the flattening out of difference through the use of socialisation practices aimed at aligning workers' subjectivities against ideal characteristics, such as those which make up 'the entrepreneurial self' or the 'flexible personality': 'Likeness is prized because it appears as the primary ingredient of unity' (Wolin, 1996: 32).

I argue that everyday work timespaces provide numerous possibilities for producing interpretive differences, particularly when people are guided, not only by technical rationality, but also by phronetic techne in a rationality of caring. Nelson (2003) identifies how, in conventional economic theory, economic organisations are imagined either as '*separative*', that is, as autonomous, rational actors engaged in maximising their self-interest (i.e. profit), or as '*soluble*', that is, subject to economic forces beyond their control (ibid: 81-2). Inside the firm, relations are assumed to be of three types:

- a. Separative-separative, when people who make up the firm are themselves considered to be self-interested autonomous agents;
- b. Soluble-soluble, when all are assumed to be in pursuit of a common goal;

- c. Separative-soluble, when organisational issues are expressed simply as problems of designing the appropriate hierarchies of control (Nelson, 2003: 86).

Unitarist assumptions of relations between persons in work foster concepts such as ‘responsible autonomy’ (Friedman, 1977) which characterise attempts ‘to meld the interests of workers and their employing organisations’ (Hodson, 2002: 494). Nelson (2003) adds: ‘what is missing, clearly, in all these is any notion that firms might be active, connected, evolving organisations, or that they or the people within them have the capacity for acting in engaged, meaningful, and responsible ways’ (ibid: 92). According to conventional economic theory, the range of ‘motivations and relations’ within the unitary firm is narrow (ibid.), and of the soluble-soluble type: ‘the firm is just thought of as a unit, and it is simply presumed that all parts of it will work smoothly towards the goal of profit maximisation’ (ibid: 91). Democratic theorists take up this assumption uncritically, asserting that members of the firm lack the diversity which is a necessary pre-condition for deliberative democratic practices. This is because, where there is a naturalised consensus, then democracy as the contestation of differences and the formation of preferences through deliberative engagement with others is irrelevant.

But I argue that the individual struggle to find meaning in work has the potential to be conflictual, opening up cracks of difference in the presumption of a unified consensus, particularly at the ‘lower-levels’ of the organisational hierarchy where workers’ interests are often characterised as ‘soluble’, that is indistinguishable from the interests of the organisation. As people act within, and move across, different action contexts, they think and feel not simply within the dominant logic of the sphere in which they find themselves, but also actively attempt to link together diverse and conflicting logics across different contexts. Lee (2006), for example, suggests that multiple logics are ‘at work simultaneously within the various modes of social life’ (ibid: 420), giving rise to a ‘struggle to control what is and what is not of value’ (ibid: 416). This means that the values



inherent in the worthy objects which people may wish to appropriate to the meaning content of their lives do not have to be subject to permanent closure, but can be made available for difference and contestation. And in economic action contexts, the goal of productive efficiency does not have to automatically determine decisions and actions, without reference to external values. Noonan (2005), for example, identifies a fundamental clash between the value of ‘all round development of the individual’ and the value of efficiency (ibid: 102). In order to expose and conciliate value clashes in the economic, he argues for democratic practices which are ‘steered by a life-grounded value system’ (Noonan, 2005: 121), including normative evaluation of the interior content of the work people do. As a result, contestation over values, interpretive differences in meaning-making and interweaving of multiple logics of action opens out the economic space as ‘contingent, historical and thoroughly social’, and thus replete with new possibilities, where ‘citizens are able not only to freely regulate and redesign existing economic practices, but also to create new ones’ (Swanson, 2008: 56).

In sum, work timespaces do not embody a unitary consensus which dissolves the interests of their members into the homogenous goal of maximising shareholder value, profit or national GDP. Rather, they are already loaded with affective relations, a diversity of interests, and ways of being human, thereby providing already extant opportunities for contestation and difference over contingent values. Furthermore, work timespaces constitute important webs of relations which contribute to meaning attribution by giving us the resources to claim the involvement of others in helping us to fulfil our responsibilities of care towards worthy objects. I argue that where workplace democracy takes the form of agonistic practices, then divergences and differences are made visible, encouraging ontological diversity and the pluralisation of values in the work of social cooperation. This is because, whereas deliberative democratic theory starts with the assumption of dissensus and aims at consensus, agonistic workplace democracy challenges assumptions of a pre-existing consensus by setting out to

reveal submerged differences, using them to create spaces for acting in production.

### **6.0.0 Agonistic Democracy**

I have discussed how workplace democracy is usually theorised within a corporatist or deliberative framework, where it is justified because it increases business efficiency or equips workers for the duties of citizenship. It is less common for workplace democracy to be theorised because it has intrinsic value. I propose, however, that workplace democracy can be re-imagined as intrinsic to the meaning content of work if we develop practices which reveal, through the exercise of the political mode of being, the irreducible autonomy in every act of work. In a positive critical conception of meaningful work, I argue that democratic practices are most likely to realise the immanent potential of work when they possess agonistic dimensions. This is because, by bringing into public view pre-political interpretive differences, contestation and deliberation aims, not at a unified consensus, but at the production of interpretive differences and the pluralisation of values. In agonistic democratic practices, the agon is ‘celebrated as a never-ending play of differences which resists the homogenising drive for social unity, enabling plurality to flourish’ (Schaap, 2009: 1). Connolly describes agonistic democracy as:

‘a practice that affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the dogmatisation of identity, and folds care for the protean diversity of human life into the strife and interdependence of identity\difference’ (Connolly, 1991: x).

Connolly (1991) does not claim that agonistic democracy constitutes a programmatic priority for society, but suggests, instead, that it works with existing democratic forms by ‘folding agonistic respect into identity\difference relations in a democratic state’ (ibid: xxv). Consequently, agonistic democratic practices are

not opposed to deliberative democratic practices, as a different form of democracy, but are the means to bringing into being the already existing emancipatory potential of deliberative practices (cf. Bachtiger, 2010).

I suggest two ways in which agonistic democracy has the potential to multiply the range of positive values in a critical conception of meaningful work: firstly, by challenging technical rationality in deliberative procedures, and secondly, by proliferating the modes of being in work timespaces. Firstly, agonistic democratic practices challenge the assumption that technical rationality governs acts of work. Agonistic democracy advances a critique of deliberative democracy as the class of theories which assume that consensus on political questions can be attained by reasonable persons utilising a fair procedural system of decision-making, where rationality determines the legitimacy of the outcome. But agonistic democracy refuses 'to equate concern for human dignity with a quest for rational consensus' (Connolly, 1991: x). Agonistic theorists take deliberative democrats to task for generating rule-bound democratic practices which are 'overly rationalist' (Barnett, 2004: 5), and for failing to take account of how 'the very essence of democratic politics lies in the constant contestation of the boundaries of the political' (ibid: 4). The deliberative emphasis upon defining fair procedures generates exclusions and assimilations (Tully, 2002), which obscure the inescapably pluralist reality of political life; proceduralist liberalism, for example, leaves 'precious little space for initiatory or expressive modes of political action' (Villa, 1999: 108). Secondly, participating in agonistic practices enables people to express varieties of being and acting. Keenan (2003) claims that the central dilemma facing democratic societies is 'how to create a vibrant sense of democratic community able to generate widespread and active identifications while also recognising and respecting the radical openness of any shared collective identity' (ibid: 71). What modern circumstances demand, therefore, is a practice of democracy which both recognises the existing diversity of identities, and acts as midwife to emergent identities as they struggle to raise themselves from 'below the register' (Connolly, 1995) of dominant practices of exclusion.

I argue that, although the management of subjectivity does not make every person identical since ‘everyone does not become the same in a normalising society’ (Connolly, 1995: 90), it does confine legitimate ways of being to a narrow range of categories and, by so doing, crowds out and renders invisible the many ways in which people are human at work: ‘normalising societies subjugate and deploy otherness without eliminating difference’ (ibid: 91). But since the formation of subjectivity is too important to be handed over without critical democratic evaluation to management ideologies, then we cannot leave the development of ontological diversity to a vacated public sphere, and a politically cleansed and homogenised economic sphere. Bowles (1998) identifies the importance of the economic sphere for the learning of general behaviours and competences: ‘preferences learned under one set of circumstances become generalised reasons for behaviour. Thus economic institutions may induce specific behaviours – self-regarding, opportunistic, or cooperative, say – which then become part of the behavioural repertoire of the individual’ (ibid: 80). Not only are many ways of being de-legitimated, but the ones that remain are treated as essentialised ways of being human: ‘a normalising society treats the small set of identities it endorses as if they were intrinsically true’ (Connolly, 1995: 89). Organisational hierarchies mediate the management of subjectivity, resulting in framing rules which are alienating, dominating and misrecognising, where experiences of self and other are ‘arrested by meanings which are imposed rather than mutually arrived at’ (Allen, 2006: 576).

My point is not that we can, or even ought, to eliminate social formation of subjectivities, but that it matters who defines, and how they define, the structures and social processes through which the experience of subjectification takes place. Fossen (2008) says that ‘the proliferation of identities’ is a social good because it is ‘a necessary condition of human flourishing’ (ibid: 383), but that the range and kind of identities must be made susceptible to democratic evaluation. Kioupkiolis proposes that expressive freedom as ‘agonistic and creative self-definition’ (Kioupkiolis, 2009: 480) provides another dimension to the production of the subject (du Gay, 1995) through techniques of ideology and self-evaluation.

Agonistic democratic practices do not remove subjectification, but instead resist the reduction of modes of being to existing norms and rules by providing participants with the means to challenge and modify the rules framing action and the extant modes of being (cf, Allen, 2006). But, this does not mean that we aim for unlimited ontological diversity since not every kind of difference is valuable in itself, and agonistic democracy ‘does not entail the celebration of any and every identity’ (Connolly, 1991: 14). This means that defining the expansion of ontological possibilities within limits must be a political task, facilitated by an agonistic politics of meaningfulness which will sustain and facilitate a ‘social pluralism’ as an ‘achievement to be protected’ (Connolly, 1995: xiv)<sup>19</sup>. In the action contexts of work timespaces, such a politics will take account of the social pluralism already immanent within the multiple economic practices which make up the work we do together. This is because agonistic workplace democracy exposes the closures we impose upon one another, ostensibly because they are necessary for the coordination of the work of social cooperation, rendering them available for disagreement and renegotiation:

‘This form of identification in turn opens the way for (and is strengthened by) a vision of democratic community that sees the fate of each tied to the fate of others, acknowledging our deep interdependence and commonalities, yet without seeing each as *identical* parts of a homogeneous whole’ (Keenan, 2003: 188).

I make use of agonistic democratic practices to unsettle assumptions of a natural unity through the unfolding of difference and contestation over organisational purposes and the rules which frame action. In work timespaces, agonistic practices have the potential to challenge permanent closures by keeping open the possibility of contestation over goals and means, thereby engendering a politics of becoming through the fostering of an ontological diversity which is

---

<sup>19</sup> Connolly (1995: xiv) makes a distinction between ‘social pluralism’ as a social good and ‘pluralisation’ as the unpredictable eruption of new identities which potentially threatens the achievement of social pluralism.

capable of challenging the management of subjectivities. By forging a politics of meaningfulness as ‘a struggle around the very process of constructing and contesting identity’ (Smith, 1994: 228), agonistic practices make practical identity formation dependent upon being able to participate in the interpretation and formation of the objectively worthwhile values which are available for affective appropriation. This enables agonistic practices to expose value-deprived work timespaces, opening them up to challenge and contestation over means and purposes, advancing new ways of organising the work around different values, and enriching ontological diversity. White (2003), in advocating a weak ontology which combines the generosity of Connolly’s agonistic ethos with the respect of standard liberalism (ibid: 220), suggests that what distinguishes human beings is their capacity for ‘coherence-making’ (ibid: 224) and for natality, or new beginnings, through political action (cf. Arendt, 1958). Coherence-making, or meaning creation, emerges out of agonistic activity between human beings who are ‘constitutively engaged with difference’ (White, 2003: 224). Thus, workplace democracy with agonistic dimensions has the capacity to resist the assumption of a natural unity of interests through a coherence-making ‘politics of becoming’, thereby cultivating the use of different rationalities and fostering different modes of being within the multiple work timespaces to which we belong.

### **7.0.0 The Inner Workshop of Democracy**

I suggest that to experience agonistic democratic practices will require work timespaces to foster a different kind of group life - one in which the public expression of difference gives rise to new interpretive meanings, generating a pluralisation of positive values as a consequence of acting and being together. Follett (1998 [1918]) argues that the processes of a fully human group life are forged out of ‘the creative agonies of fellowship’ (ibid: 89) in the ‘inner workshop of democracy’ (ibid: 48). She claims that ‘democratic associations on which democracy should be based can maintain difference within unity, conflict within integration’ (Mansbridge, 1998: xxvii), where a group is ‘a community formed

through the interpenetration and integration of ideas, and emphatically not through the suppression of individuality and difference' (ibid: xxvii). For Follett, this constitutes a moral, as well as a pragmatic, imperative to make the democratic group life an everyday experience in work and politics: 'without this activity, both political and industrial democracy must be a chaotic, stagnating, self-stultifying assemblage' (Follett, 1998 [1918]: 48). And I argue that this requires a politics of meaningfulness, stimulated by agonistic democratic practices in multiple and overlapping work timespaces.

Bachtiger (2010) suggests that agonistic practices, rather than being an alternative and opposing model of democracy, are the means to realising the potential of deliberative democracy – and I apply his insight to the micro-level of the task in a system of workplace democracy. I propose that the already existing potentiality of work to exhibit the characteristics of the democratic group life is realised by democratic practices of agonistic inquiry, which Bachtiger (2010) identifies as questioning, disputing and insisting: 'agonistic inquiry is a key deliberative technique which helps to unleash essential parts of deliberation's normative potential (epistemic, ethical, inclusionary, and reflective-transformative) while simultaneously counteracting unwanted aspects of deliberation' (ibid: 3). The ideal deliberative process is characterised by 'reasoned, respectful, impartial, impassionate and truthful (or sincere) discussion' (ibid: 2). This leads to the marginalisation and exclusion of the inarticulate, and the intuitive, or the 'remainders' (Honig, 1993) which lie outside deliberative discourse as reason-giving aimed at rational consensus formation. Instead, an agonistic politics of meaningfulness remedies the exclusions and epistemic limitations of classical deliberation by fostering 'cognitive diversity' (Landsmore, 2010; see also Manin, 2005), and bringing into public evaluation interpretive differences, excesses, remainders, cognitive dissonances. Bachtiger (2010) suggests that agonistic practices permit 'tough questioning and radical argument' (ibid: 21) when they are both situated within a system committed to 'deliberative capacity building' (Dryzek, 2007), and are guided by an ethic of respect, attention and care towards those advancing new and challenging perspectives, sometimes in

modes of articulation which are at odds with the emotion-free ideal of reasoned deliberative discourse. Moreover, such practices answer the search of meaningfulness which generates a demand to participate in the democratic group life (Braybrooke, 1998b), because of the desire ‘to play a recognised role in a joint human activity’ (ibid: 55) – a desire stimulated by feelings of alienation (ibid: 73), a need to be heard (ibid: 80), and the need to occupy worthwhile roles constituted by relations of mutual recognition (ibid: 74; ibid: 77). Thus, agonistic democratic practices of questioning, disputing and insisting in work timespaces address the demand to have an equal share in the decision-making necessary to creating and reproducing the common life in the work of social cooperation, where such a demand arises from our fundamental human need for meaningfulness.

Workplace democracy aims at a transformation of the interior content of work by creating public spaces for the political mode of being in everyday acts of work, where ‘the capacities for judgement necessary for participatory democracy then are always already a developmental potential of social interaction’ (Warren, 1993: 218). Follett (1998 [1918]) makes political dialogue a ‘community process’, characterised by several features conducive to the opening out of public spaces expressive of the political mode of being. The dynamics of correctly structured group action, in Follett’s understanding of politics as community process, constitutes a kind of ‘governance from the ground up’ (Elias, 2008), where conflict and difference is revealed, deliberated, evaluated and integrated into enriched knowledge or creative decision. And as the cycle is repeated, it becomes a habit, changing each person’s understanding of the other, developing the skills for acting together, and providing for the development of political consciousness. Importantly, such a process depends upon local knowledge and practices, making it conducive to revealing the interpretive differences arising from our encounters with others and with materiality when we work together. I suggest there are four characteristics of distinctly agonistic work timespaces which frame Bachtinger’s (2010) practices of agonistic inquiry in Follett’s democratic group life: *association* to create an inclusionary public; *contestation* to foster the generation of difference; an *ethos of enlargement* to support normative orientation; and



*decision* to secure temporary closure. Agonistic work timespaces with these characteristics are capable of challenging assimilation of subjectivities by contesting the narrow range of legitimate identities for the purpose of promoting ontological diversity; and challenging exclusion from democratic processes by opening out the spaces in which participants in the work of social co-operation can come together for contestation and decision-making (Tully, 2002).

### **7.1.0 Association**

I propose that we conceive of work timespaces not as distinctly public or private spheres of action separate from the political but as arenas which, from one moment to the next, have the potential to become spaces for expressing the political mode of being. Estlund (2003) suggests that workplaces have a unique capacity to encourage cooperative relations, social ties and a sense of connectedness that transcends boundaries and social cleavages; the workplace is an action context in which ‘people find it necessary to get along and get things done with others with whom they would not otherwise choose to associate. They foster the connectedness which forms the background to a healthy democracy by constructing a ‘layer of public discourse’ (ibid: 123) from the multitude of everyday conversations. Workplaces supply ‘a place for the informal exchange of experiences and opinions and knowledge among people who are both *connected* with each other, so that they are inclined to listen, and *different* from each other, so that they are exposed to diverse ideas and experiences’ (ibid:123). Estlund (2003) identifies two features of workplace discourse which resonate with the values of democratic practices: firstly, conversations have a non-particularist, public dimension, because they take place between people who are not family members or friends; and secondly, they cut across lines of social, ethnic and gender divisions. Such features of everyday talk potentially enable people to not only explore their own needs and interests, but also to find the common ground upon which they can establish solidarity with others: ‘citizens deliberate with each other at work far more than in the fabled public square and far more than through voluntary civic organisations’ (ibid: 119). Economic necessity requires people to

take up work and then keeps them in relations with others in order to satisfy the need to earn a living (ibid: 103-4), and Warren (1993) suggests that the non-voluntary character of work lends it a particular virtue in holding us to the requirement to engage with others not necessarily like ourselves:

‘In workplaces individuals are likely to be thrown together out of need, selected by their skills, and related to one another through the division of labor. Here individuals are not necessarily drawn together by common identities or causes, so that a single organisation might be quite diverse in terms of lifestyle, gender, race, ethnicity, religious orientation and class, or at least more so than in a self-selected group’ (Warren, 1993: 228).

The voluntary character and ease of exit which characterises self-interested groups make them too homogenous, self-selecting, and therefore strategic in their decision-making, for them to be effective discursive forums – and thus less likely to produce the autonomous selves which are valued by democracies (Warren, 1993: 227). Workplaces, on the other hand, are relatively diverse, focus on common goals, and are part of the daily experience of most people: ‘as workplaces democratise, the structure of interests and identities is likely to produce imperatives for critique and discourse of a kind absent in most self-organised groups’ (ibid: 228). This means that workplaces play a vital role in providing the background conditions to associational life: they are sites of discourse and deliberation, they build interpersonal connectedness, cultivate civic skills, and generate a sentiment of connection and of a common fate (ibid: 106). Importantly, by enabling the recognition of individuals through everyday cooperative relations which allow ‘individuals to get to know each other and to care about each other’ (ibid: 108), they are a vital source of the worthy objects and subjective attachments which are necessary to being able to experience the value of meaningfulness. This ‘fertile territory’ for association provides an enriched social setting for fostering the group life in which agonistic democratic practices can become productive of difference, increasing the possibility of the political

mode of being breaking out into everyday work timespaces, and resulting in the proliferation of positive values which can be appropriated to the meaning content of a life.

### **7.2.0 Contestation**

The extent to which agonistic associations enable a politics of meaningfulness depends upon how such associations encourage or inhibit contestation and difference arising from the pre-political potentials brought into public evaluation. Agonic democratic practices in work timespaces foster interpretive differences by preventing a premature consensus which is ‘not based on the autonomy of participants’ (Warren, 1993: 229). Moreover, they allow workers to resist ‘identities that undermine cognitive competence’ (ibid), because involvement in democratic discourse places greater cognitive demands upon employees through increasing work complexity, thereby protecting their interests in developing capabilities for reasoning and deliberation. Correctly structured association enables intersubjective contestation through which we ‘think together’ (Follett, 1918: 29). And when we experience intersubjective encounters permitting difference and disagreement, we also generate the possibility for agonic group activity, which is ‘an acting and reacting in a single and identical process which brings out differences and integrates them into a unity’ (Follett, 1998: 33). Follett says: ‘Each must discover and contribute that which distinguishes him from others, his difference. The only use for my difference is to join it with other differences’ (ibid: 29). Indeed, for Follett, producing and expressing our difference is almost a duty laid upon those who find themselves involved in joint activity: ‘Give me your difference’ (ibid: 33). She adds ‘no member of a group which is to create can be passive. All must be active and constructively active’ (ibid: 29), and that in order to ‘think together’ then ‘each man must contribute what is in him to contribute’ (ibid.).

But applying such an approach to the social organisation of work timespaces may be too risky, because the interjection of dissensus could undermine the co-ordination and decision-making necessary for the maintenance of a complex

economic order. In the tightly bound webs of cooperation that constitute our modern economies increased democratic freedom of the kind advocated by agonistic practices will surely lead to a dangerous disunity: ‘the standard account is that increased democratic freedom over the rules of recognition and distribution is the cause of disunity’ (Tully, 2002). But disunity is more likely to arise as a consequence of relations of exclusion and assimilation because the kind of solidarity required in modern societies is undermined when citizens are not afforded deliberative experiences of rule-making which in turn underpin democratic self-formation (Tully, 2002: 225). Conflict need not be destructive and damaging, provided it can be turned into a productive dissensus within the context of an agonistic workplace democracy shaped by an ethos of pluralisation. Follett says in relation to conflict and diversity:

‘What people often mean by getting rid of conflict is getting rid of diversity, and it is of the utmost importance that these should not be considered the same. We may wish to abolish conflict, but we cannot get rid of diversity. We must face life as it is and understand that diversity is its most essential feature [...] Fear of difference is dread of life itself. It is possible to conceive conflict as not necessarily a wasteful outbreak of incompatibilities, but as a normal process by which socially valuable differences register themselves for the enrichment of all concerned’ (Follett, 1930 [1924]: 300)

### **7.3.0 Ethos of Enlargement**

Contestation which is productive of difference depends upon an ethos of imaginative enlargement, supported by the virtue of agonistic respect: ‘the virtue of agonistic respect requires openness to those who are excluded; and this ethos itself is predicated on the idea that such boundaries are never fixed, but contingent and revisable’ (Howarth, 2008: 188). Connolly suggests that pluralistic democracy requires two civic virtues: firstly, ‘agonistic respect’ between

opponents who radically disagree, and secondly, ‘critical responsiveness’ – an attitude of careful, attentive listening to the demands and claims of others. *Agonistic respect* recognises ‘already crystallised’ identities, whereas *critical responsiveness* operates where identities are emerging ‘from an obscure or negated place below the register of legitimate identity’ (Connolly, 1991: xxviii). These virtues underpin the possibility of maintaining a permanently open-ended agreement which retains awareness of the alternatives not chosen, of continued dissent, and of the possibility of revision. The struggle for emergence entails a ‘politics of becoming’ which Connolly expresses as ‘that recurrent, fugitive politics by which a new constituency or event surges into being from below the threshold of tolerance, justice or legitimacy’ (ibid.). Keenan (2003) suggest that the compassion and generosity needed for an ethos of pluralisation might draw upon our ‘shared suffering’ as:

‘[...] fluid, open, internally complex beings inevitably trapped (although to different degrees) in more or less fixed identity ‘scripts’ or self-images. It recognises that suffering comes both from the constraints of identity and from our being radically open and indebted to each other even in our mutual otherness. We depend upon each other, both materially and for the stories that tell us who we are – even as we don’t naturally fit together and are constantly called into question by each other’s differences’ (ibid: 188).

Therefore the practice of agonistic work-place democracy involves a politics of becoming which fosters emergent ways of being, where workers and managers recognise one another as ‘fellow sufferers’, in which the management of subjectivity is not only recognised to be a necessity, but also subjects organisational processes of self-formation to permanent openness and contestability. Our stance towards co-workers becomes one of reflexive evaluation of the ways in which our working identities are managed through

mechanisms of exclusion and difference, and compassionate generosity towards our own and one another's limitations generated by the understanding that we require one another to adopt constricted forms of identification which are incapable of fully expressing our multifaceted individuality. Thus, the inescapability and necessity of difference for identity requires an ethical orientation of agonistic respect towards others which generates a particular kind of bond, based upon gratitude and wonder at the diversity of human being, between those who would generally be thought of as locked into irreconcilable conflict, where this ethical bond forms between contending constituents 'engaged in intensive relations of interdependence and strife' (Connolly, 1995: xviii).

To create social roles enabling individuals to take up their responsibilities of care for the worthy objects they have appropriated to the meaning content of their lives requires not only participating in existing structures but also participating in reframing the rules of engagement in which participants call 'something into being which did not exist before, which was not given, not even as cognition or imagination, and which therefore, strictly speaking, could not be known' (Arendt, 1954 [1977]: 151). In order to do the best we can towards worthy objects, we must all have a share of political autonomy: that is, the participation in the collective self-determination necessary to bringing pre-political interpretive differences into public deliberation and thereby to have our part in the decision-making framing our orientations to worthy objects. Inkeles & Smith (1974) observe that factory work 'increases the tendency to hold opinions and the tendency to tolerate or even value the opinions of others' (ibid: 24): to both hold an opinion and to value the different opinions of others is the essence of 'agonistic respect', and to be able to collaborate under conditions of contingency is to learn to appreciate the abundance of life which cannot be constrained within totalising identities which deny the differences upon which they depend. It is also to be in possession of the resources for dissensus and debate which, if enabled within a practice of agonistic democracy, would facilitate the conditions for ontological expressiveness.

#### **7.4.0 Decision**

To critics of agonism, it can sometimes seem that this model of democratic participation is fixated upon endless disagreement in which nothing can actually get done, therefore not taking us much beyond simple conflict. This means that room must be made for the temporary closures of decision. Follett (1998 [1918]), commenting upon democratic decision-making in the group process, talked about integration or interpenetration, rather than ‘aggregation, compromise or concession’ (Mansbridge, 1998: xxiii), where her idea of interpenetration is a deeply inter-subjective, Hegelian-inspired ideal for a process of ‘related difference’ (Follett, 1998 [1918]: 33). Follett says that ‘unity, not conformity, must be our aim. We attain unity only through variety. Differences must be integrated, not assimilated, nor absorbed’ (ibid: 39), where purpose are not pre-determined but created through intersubjective encounters, framed by the aim of ‘coadaptation’ or ‘creating ever new values though the interplay of all the forces of life’ (ibid: 93). Thus, ‘it is man’s part to create purpose and to actualize it’ (ibid: 58). Moreover, we relate to one another through our differences, and in the act of relating, we initiate acts of creation (ibid: 63). Although the moment of decision describes the closures around purpose and identity which enable cooperative action to take place, in an agonistic framework these can never be permanent closures, but must be always available for contestation and revision. The political mode of being remains an ever present potential, but the activation of expressive political agency will depend upon the moment and the nature of the task. Follett (1998) suggests there is an alternative to both domination, and consensus in collective life, and that is a dialectical impermanent integration which is:

‘a harmonious marriage of difference which, like the nut and the screw or the parts of a watch, come together in a way that produces a new form, a new entity, a new result, made out of old differences and yet different from any of them’ (ibid.)

Decision describes the closures around purpose and identity which enable co-operative action to take place. In an agonistic framework these closures can never be permanent, but must be always available for contestation and revision. But this should not be mistaken for a simple unity of interests: the result is not a balance of power or aggregation of interests or elite domination, but the creation of new values, the introduction of something expressively original from the old materials. In sum, the aim of agonistic practices in work timespaces is to forge a particular kind of decision from within the inner workshop of democracy, a decision in which all can be satisfied, but from which differences are not eliminated, excluded or dissolved because they remain ever present, if dormant, seeds, already available to stimulate the next political moment.

### **8.0.0 Conclusion**

Agonistic democracy applied to economic associations opens out public spaces in spheres of human activity which have been presumed to be legitimately excluded from representative or deliberative democratic practices, and certainly from claims to plurality. In addition, the ‘all affected principle’, if valid for economic associations, requires the inclusion of outsiders within a stakeholder model of agonistic democracy. A political mode of being structured by agonistic democratic practices aims at overcoming exclusion and assimilation in intersubjective relations - enabling workers to reveal and to articulate their acts of agency and develop the relevant capabilities and sense of status. Workplace democracy becomes constitutive of the meaning content of work because it situates individuals in a setting which is rich in potential encounters with worthy objects and for forming the relevant capabilities, where being able to exercise the political mode of being is in and of itself one of the worthy objects. The individual worker is re-presented as an irreplaceable contributor situated in cooperative relations with others, and imbued with expressive political agency. Consensus-based democratic practices which fail to allow for the contestation of ultimate purposes, the revision of rules, or the expression of difference are perhaps



particularly susceptible to being used in this fashion. But workplace democracy structured by agonistic practices might offer us something a little different – something interior to the experience of work, making work valuable for its own sake, because, by making visible the essential agency of workers, it first, establishes the status of workers as ends-in-themselves and as co-authorities, and second, enables learning and freedom by giving voice to experiences which have been rendered speechless by the assumptions of a unified consensus.

## Chapter Seven

### Towards a Politics of Meaningfulness: Capability Justice and the Capability for Voice

#### 1.0.0 Introduction

I have argued that, in order to experience the bipartite value of meaningfulness, we must possess the moral and practical orientations relevant to caring for the worthy objects we have appropriated to the meaning content of our lives. Legitimate appropriation of worthy objects implies taking up responsibilities relevant to caring for worthy objects, where caring is structured by a range of social practices enabling us to promote the good for those worthy objects we have chosen or affirmed as constituting the reasons we have to regard our lives as worth living. This means that a politics of meaningfulness must address the institutional and social arrangements mediating our ability to create, recognise, and evaluate the objective worth of objects, and the values they constitute, within a liberal perfectionist framework. Furthermore, it must be concerned with, firstly, how we encounter subjectively attractive worthy objects and affectively appropriate them to the meaning content of our lives, and secondly, how we access resources to fulfil our responsibilities towards those objects. This means that we ought to ensure, not that people should actually find their lives to be meaningful, but that they should possess the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, supported by their status as equal co-authorities. In work, this requires a system of workplace democracy, structured by democratic authority at the level of the enterprise and participatory practices at the level of the task. I argue that the crucial institutional guarantee is for the Capability for Voice, supported by two key conversion factors: *mediating institutions* in the form of a variety of organisational forms, such as co-owned enterprises and cooperatives, and a *basic income guarantee* in order to ensure capability security. Both measures require a social economy embodying a greater

diversity of values than is presently encouraged by standard economic models. To this end, I make use of Nussbaum's partial theory of capability justice to promote a politics of meaningfulness, and to establish institutional guarantees for the Capability for Voice.

### **2.0.0 Capability Justice: Principle of Egalitarian Meaning and Threshold of Sufficient Meaning**

Meaningful work has always existed, but in most societies it has been an ideal which aims at elite meaning, or the maximal degree of meaningfulness for a few. Instead, I argue that we should aim at egalitarian meaning, or a satisficing level of meaningfulness for all, where the goal is not to guarantee that everyone will find their lives to be actually meaningful, but that social arrangements will provide the relevant capabilities for the functioning of meaningfulness. Consequently, I propose that justice in work (Muirhead, 2008) requires meaningful work for all, according to two principles: the *principle of egalitarian meaning*, where all persons are equally entitled to work which has the requisite structure for meaningfulness, up to the *threshold of sufficient meaning*, where the threshold is specified by freedom as non-dominated work, autonomy as non-alienated work, and social recognition as dignified work.

Firstly, a *principle of egalitarian meaning* requires that each person possesses, in equal measure, the capabilities to appropriate meaning to their lives and to realise the functioning of meaningfulness. In order to satisfy the principle of egalitarian meaning, the range of activities recognised as work in a system of social cooperation must be broadened so that society is expanding rather than limiting opportunities for capability development. Gomberg (2007) argues that market societies limit artificially the opportunities for capability development, constraining the efforts of some individuals and groups to participate in worthwhile activities which contribute to sustaining a cooperative social order. Many are excluded from making their contribution; certain groups are favoured with the most desirable forms of participation; and other groups are socialised to

accept poor quality work. As a matter of justice, we should not limit opportunity, but should make it possible for everyone to contribute: ‘it is unfair to deprive so many of the opportunity to contribute complex abilities’ (Gomberg, 2007: 42). And I argue that these contributive activities must be structured by the value of meaningfulness, if a scheme of capability justice is to be able to make provision for all persons to form and exercise the relevant capabilities within a liberal perfectionist framework, meaning that whilst ‘the *capability* to engage in good human activities should be provided to all; the individual is free to decide which activities to pursue’ (ibid: 46). In addition, Gomberg suggests that a theory of contributive justice will require an adjustment to the capabilities approach where ‘a good society should distribute widely the contribution of complex abilities’ (ibid: 130), by promoting a general complex functioning consisting of ‘participation in the economic life of one’s society in a way that confers dignity’ (ibid: 131). I interpret this general complex functioning in terms of a capability for the functioning of meaningfulness in work, which requires the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, supported by our status as co-authorities.

Secondly, *a threshold of sufficient meaning* is provided by the constitutive values of meaningful work, which are autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination, and social recognition as dignified work. I claim that the threshold of sufficient meaning is a modest standard, based upon the contribution that ordinary activities make already to a life of meaning. It does not require that lives as a whole be fully meaningful, but simply that important aspects of our lives, such as the work we do, are structured so that they contain goods and values sufficient to give us good reason to find our lives worthwhile. Huseby (2010) defines the threshold of sufficiency as follows: ‘the maximal sufficiency threshold equals a level of welfare with which a person is content’ (ibid: 181), where being content means ‘not the absence of any desire to further improve one’s lot, but rather satisfaction with the overall quality of one’s life’ (ibid.). When applied to the value of meaningfulness, I suggest this yields a threshold of sufficiency where one is not merely satisfied, but convinced that one’s life contains objects of value

giving one a compelling reason to live. I use the term ‘convinced’ in order to capture the sense in which the value of meaningfulness requires objective reasoning as part of an individual’s affective attachment to objects of value – reason and feeling work together to create a security of attachment to worthy objects which is supported by social as well as individual endorsement.

I suggest two institutional guarantees are required to satisfy the principle of egalitarian meaning and the threshold of sufficient meaning: a basic income guarantee and a workplace democracy guarantee. A *basic income guarantee* operates to promote the principle of egalitarian meaning by ensuring the social recognition of a wide range of activities in a system of social cooperation. A *workplace democracy guarantee* operates to promote the threshold of sufficient meaning by enabling a plurality of mediating institutions organised along democratic lines which are conducive to fostering agonistic democratic practices at the level of the task, and democratic authority at the level of the organisation. Together, the basic income and the economic democracy guarantees constitute the conversion factors for realising the Capability for Voice in a system of workplace democracy, where *voice* is understood as what is needed for an individual to have a share in the co-decision necessary for functioning as an equal co-authority in the creation and maintenance of values which inhere in worthy objects. In a politics of meaningfulness, a Capability for Voice supports the development of the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment, enabling us to become valuers capable of evaluating what is worth doing and being, and of incorporating these valuations into practical identities which give our lives a sense of meaning. Following Sen’s Capability Approach, I shall show that a Capability for Voice consists of both an individual and social dimension (cf. Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006). The individual Capability for Voice is constitutively intersubjective, that is, dependent for its formation and exercise upon our interrelations to others in the groups to which we belong. The social dimension of the Capability for Voice is provided by a multifunctional landscape of economic, social and political organisations embodying a plurality of positive values.

### **3.0.0 The Capability Approach**

In arguing for the applicability of capability justice to the formation of a social organisation of work with the capacity to foster meaningful work for all, I make use of Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach to identify what is required to realise the Capability for Voice. Although Nussbaum's CA is not a full theory of justice, I draw upon her specification of the central human capabilities for functioning which ought to be constitutionally guaranteed to argue that the capabilities for the functioning of meaningfulness in work require institutional guarantees for: firstly, a system of workplace democracy at the levels of the task and of the organisation, and secondly, a basic income. A basic income guarantee meets the requirements of the Principle of Egalitarian meaning by allowing a wider range of activities to be publicly recognised as work, thus expanding the range of positive values we can incorporate into our practical identities because of the work we do. A workplace democracy guarantee, by providing the context for collective self-determination, will ensure that work has the requisite content necessary to meet the Threshold of Sufficient Meaning. Since to realise both guarantees would require considerable social transformation, good justificatory reasons must be advanced, which I argue are provided by understanding that meaningful work is a fundamental human need. Moreover, the need for the interior content of work to be structured by autonomy, freedom and social recognition is required from within Nussbaum's capability approach itself. This is because the capabilities for meaningful work promote 'fertile functioning', that is, they provide a productive context for the development of other related functionings (Wolff, J. & De-Shalit, A., 2007). In sum, if work lacks the requisite structure for meaningfulness, then a person's ability to achieve all the other capabilities will be disabled.

Sen's and Nussbaum's capability approaches, although closely related, have distinct intellectual histories, theoretical underpinnings and practical implications for social policy. By identifying the evaluative space of capabilities for functioning, Sen has made room for a metric judging how well a society is

doing which is more information rich than the standard econometrics of levels of income and wealth<sup>20</sup>; whereas Nussbaum's normative justification of the capabilities for living a human kind of life generates both principles and implications for institutional guarantees in the form of a core list of central human capabilities for functioning. Sen does not claim that his Capability Approach is a theory of justice, because, in his terms, a theory of justice must contain aggregative as well as distributive considerations, and these are absent from his theory (Robeyns, 2004: 6). Nussbaum, however, describes her Capabilities Approach as a partial theory of justice, because it picks out certain invariant features of what it means to live a life that is worthy of a human being: 'We must ask which things are so important that we will not count a life as a human life without them' (Nussbaum, 1992 HF&SJ:10). But, although capability justice using Nussbaum's capabilities will not yield a complete theory of justice, it is still able to provide principles, rules and metrics to guide social policy where 'the object of public action can be seen to be the enhancement of the capability of people to undertake valuable and valued 'doings and beings''(Crocker, 1992: 587).

### **3.1.0 Sen's Capability for Functioning**

At the core of Sen's Capability Approach is a critique of tendencies in the discipline of economics towards value monism, which leads to a failure to take account of values other than efficiency and models of the person other than the individual as utility maximiser, resulting in an 'engineering approach' to economics dominating over approaches based upon 'the ethics-related view of motivation' (Sen, 1987: 4). He argues that theories of justice are subject either to the limitations of welfarism or of resourcism, such that welfarism, by subsuming well-being into a totalising measurement of utility, fails to differentiate between

---

<sup>20</sup> Robeyn (2004: 11) notes that Sen and Nussbaum use the term capability in slightly different ways. In Sen, capability is singular and refers to the capability set which consists of the combination of potential and achieved functionings; in Nussbaum, capability is a plural, and refers to a number of different capabilities which include potential functionings.

different modes of human well-being, whereas resourcism, exemplified by the distribution of primary goods in Rawls's Theory of Justice, fails to take account of differences between individuals. For Sen, Rawlsian justice suffers from three weaknesses. Firstly, Rawls does not take account of individuals who differ from the norm; for example, applying the principles of justice to severely disabled people is unsatisfactory because the difference principle determines how well-off somebody is in terms of income and wealth only, and would not justify any redistribution to a disabled person on the grounds of his or her disability. Secondly, the use to which Rawls puts the primary goods does not take account of relevant differences between people: people have 'very different needs, varying with health, longevity, climatic conditions, location, work conditions, temperament and even body size' (Sen, 1980: 215-216). Thirdly, because of inter-individual differences, people possess differing levels of ability to convert the primary goods into what they are able to do and to be in their lives.

Sen argues that Rawls is mistaken in using primary goods to make comparisons between persons because, since primary goods are means and not ends, they are unable to take account of human diversity because simply being in possession of the primary goods is not sufficient for people being able to convert them into equal amounts of human well being (Sen, 1980, 1992: 81-87; 2004: 332). Although we may be able to count what resources an individual possesses, this does not tell us whether that individual is able to use her resources to achieve her preferred functionings - for this, we need also to know specific information about the individual and her circumstances. This is because, in order to equalise well-being, people may need differing amounts and types of goods (e.g. food). So to understand what any individual may actually be able to do and to be, we must distinguish between means (primary goods and similar bundles of resources), and ends (functionings). Furthermore, goods are valued differently in a capability framework: in conventional economics, goods are valued when they can be exchanged for money, or if they can be made subject to rules of fair distribution, but in capabilities for functioning, goods are valued because they promote human flourishing. For example, a car is not simply an object with design specifications,



but is valued because it enables the functioning of mobility which contributes to a fully human life. However, the functioning of mobility need not be satisfied by possession of a car; in particular cultures or circumstances a bike may do as well, or even better. Thus, the CA can be made sensitive to a diversity of cultures, circumstances and individual characteristics of person, taking it beyond the aggregative principle of conventional neo-classical economics, and orientating us to the different ways in which goods are valued by agents, according to their needs and circumstances.

In order to provide us with information about how any individual is doing, Sen (1979; 1990; 1992; 1993a) develops the concept of a capability set which operates as an intermediary step between resources and functionings, where an individual's capability set consists of enablements from which she chooses her beings and doings, and functionings are her achievements in the form of what she actually does or becomes: 'the capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings a person can achieve and from which he or she can choose one collection' (Sen, 1993b: 31). Capabilities are what people are effectively able to do and to be: without capabilities there can be no functionings - the beings and doings of human well-being. Thus, functionings are achievements and ends, whilst capabilities are freedoms or choices from which people can select in order to realise their conception of the good. Sen argues that being human consists of both agency (what we can do) and well-being (what we can be), but that welfarism neglects the 'agency aspect' of persons: 'humans are not only experience or preference satisfiers; they are also judges, evaluators and doers' (Crocker, 1992: 600). Sen re-inserts agency by making freedom dependent upon choosing between the functionings, the doings and beings we want our lives to express. This means that capabilities rather than commodities express the extent of the effective freedom (in a positive sense) that a person possesses: 'Commodities are no more than means to other ends. Ultimately the focus has to be on what life we lead and what we can or cannot do, can or cannot be' (Sen, 1985b: 16). Hence, Sen (1979) claims that his CA is an improvement upon simply counting resources, such as measuring wealth or satisfaction of preferences in

conventional economics. This is because capabilities for functioning provide a richer information base for evaluating what is normatively significant about inter-individual difference, and for assessing the real opportunities individuals have available to them (Robeyns, 2004: 6). But Sen's capability approach, by relying upon a conception of the valuable ends of life in the form of agency and well-being, would seem to contain a comprehensive notion of the good which is incompatible with liberal neutrality. Sen responds (1992: 82-83) to this critique by putting the focus upon the combination of capabilities that a person can access - that is their capability set - which 'stands for the actual freedom of choice a person has over alternative lives that he or she can lead' (Sen, 1992: 114), and not upon achieved functionings, which would require the specification of a thick theory of the good. This move allows Sen to claim that his CA is not perfectionist because his employment of actual freedoms, rather than commodities, does not presuppose a particular comprehensive conception of the good (Crocker, 1992: 597): 'capability reflects a freedom to choose between alternative lives (functioning combinations), and its value need not be derived from one particular 'comprehensive doctrine' demanding one specific way of living' (Sen, 2009: 117).

So, Sen's CA is a way of evaluating ends, that is, the human functionings which contribute to well-being, rather than a way of evaluating the distribution of means in the extent to which everyone has an equal or fair share of commodities. In Sen's CA, functionings are the extent to which people have the opportunity freedom in the form of capabilities to employ means to achieve valuable functionings of being and doing, such as working, resting, being literate, being healthy, being respected, being part of a community (Robeyns, 2004: 6). Sen proposes that we evaluate valuable doings and beings through agency freedom and well-being freedom, giving rise to two dimensions of what people are actually able to do and to be, measured by agency achievement and well-being achievement. Sen emphasises a person's positive freedom to act in the choice that they make to select actual functionings from their available capability sets. Real freedom of choice consists in a person's actual ability to choose from existing

valuable options, provided that the condition of both genuinely valuable options and the condition of being obtain. Sen specifies two aspects of freedom relevant to developing any particular capability: opportunity and process, where *opportunity* refers to the ability of the individual to achieve valued functionings and *process* refers to the ability of the individual to demonstrate their agency in influencing processes and rules (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2005). Sen regards his concept of capability to be more suitably applied to the opportunity aspect of freedom:

‘While the idea of capability has considerable merit in the assessment of the opportunity aspect of freedom, it cannot possibly deal adequately with the process aspect of freedom, since capabilities are characteristics of individual advantage, and they fall short of telling us about the fairness or equity of the processes involved, or about the freedom of citizens to invoke and utilize procedures that are equitable’ (Sen, 2005: 155).

But, by placing the emphasis upon the opportunity aspect of freedom, rather than the process aspect of freedom, Sen’s theory elides an account of democratic participation: ‘one of the approach’s relatively empty boxes is called democracy’ (Gasper, 2007). Democratic participation is not straightforwardly a capability for functioning which we choose or not according to our individual conception of the good life, but is foundational to living with others as a citizen of a democratic society. Consequently, the potential of Sen’s CA as a ‘theory of social change’ (Dean, 2009: 9) is constrained, because, without the capabilities for the functioning of democratic participation, individuals are excluded from the means to bring difference and contestation over the values embedded in the framework which guides action into public evaluation. In a politics of meaningfulness, the result is that individuals are marginalised from the possibility that their interpretive differences will be acknowledged and taken up by others in the collective evaluation of worthy objects, making it less likely that they can,

with confidence, incorporate the values arising from interpretive differences into their practical identities.

### **3.2.0 Nussbaum's Partial Theory of Justice**

I make use of Sen's CA to identify the opportunity and process dimensions of a Capability for Voice, but I set the Capability for Voice in Nussbaum's partial theory of justice in order to identify the relevant institutional guarantees. Nussbaum is in broad agreement with Sen's critique of welfarism and resourcism, but her capabilities approach is normative in a way which makes her theory distinct from Sen's capability approach. Whereas Sen's proposal advances a more sophisticated and nuanced approach to measuring the state of persons in order to improve approaches in the discipline of economics, Nussbaum employs a neo-Aristotelian argument to extend the CA into a normative account of human flourishing, resulting in a partial theory of justice: 'Sen has focussed on the role of capabilities in demarcating the space within which quality of life assessments are made; I use the idea in a more exigent way, as a foundation for basic political principles that should underwrite constitutional guarantees' (Nussbaum, WHD 2000: 70-71). As a result, Nussbaum specifies a list of central human capabilities which she proposes constitute the fundamental entitlements to be guaranteed by every state at a constitutional level. Nussbaum describes her CA as a thick, vague theory of the good: the thickness deriving from a substantive understanding of the good, and the vagueness from subjective understandings of the good (ibid; see also Dzur, 1998: 679). However, in order to allow for a plurality of interpretations, Nussbaum emphasises the process dimension of deliberative inquiry, making the capabilities which have a place in the core list of guaranteed human capabilities subject to democratic deliberation.

Nussbaum's list of central human capabilities consists of: living a life of normal length; being in good health and receiving adequate nourishment; freedom of movement and freedom from physical assault; being able to use one's senses, imagination and thought in a 'truly human way'; being able to have emotional

relationships to people and attachments to things, including loving and grieving, and freedom from excessive fear or anxiety; being able to form one's own conception of the good (practical reason); being able to live in co-operative relations with others which include being treated in ways which are non-humiliating and which afford self-respect (affiliation); being able to play and engage in recreational activities; and being able to participate in forms of political and property relations which promote autonomy (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 78-80). Nussbaum specifies two thresholds, one for basic functioning and another for good human functioning: 'a threshold of capability to function, beneath which a life will be so impoverished that it will not be human at all, and a somewhat higher threshold, beneath which those characteristic functions are available in such a reduced way that although we judge the form of life a human one, we will not think it a *good* human life' (Nussbaum, 1992 HF&SJ: 221). The different elements of the central capabilities are irreducibly plural (Nussbaum, WHD: 81), because we 'cannot satisfy the need for one of them by giving a larger amount of another' (ibid.).

Nussbaum specifies further features of her CA (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 84-85). Firstly, the realisation of central capabilities depends upon the progressive combination of three kinds of capabilities – basic, internal and external. *Basic* capabilities are those we are born with - they are innate but rudimentary and consist of capabilities such as being able to see or hear. *Internal* capabilities are the trained, developed and mature capacities and powers which place a person in a position of readiness to convert capabilities into functionings. *Combined* capabilities are internal capabilities united to the external conditions which allow the actual exercise of a human functioning, where Nussbaum's central human capabilities are a list of combined functionings. Secondly, Nussbaum gives two capabilities – practical reason and affiliation – a particular place of importance: they are architectonic (Nussbaum, 1992 HF&SJ: 222) because they 'organise and suffuse all the others, making their pursuit truly human' (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 82). This means, for example, that 'the functioning of performing a job becomes a truly human activity only when the employee is given the opportunity to exercise

her practical reason and to form it with and towards others' (Alexander, 2002: 12). The architectonic capabilities are not, however, ends which reduce other capabilities to means, but special capabilities which make the exercise of all the others distinctively human: 'all items should be available in a manner which involves reason and affiliation' (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 82). All the central capabilities have the potential to be exercised with human distinctiveness, underpinning the normative claim that the object of political action and public policy ought to be the development of these capabilities for every person, including the social conditions for their exercise: 'The basic intuition from which the capability approach begins, in the political arena, is that certain human abilities exert a moral claim that they should be developed' (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 83).

In sum, Nussbaum's CA is susceptible to being extended to take account of the bipartite value of meaningfulness, because her approach is attentive to the situation of individuals within a liberal perfectionist framework. This allows not only for a wide range of expression, but also for the establishment of institutional guarantees for the capabilities necessary for experiencing the value of meaningfulness in the work we do together, in particular, the Capability for Voice in a system of workplace democracy.

#### **4.0.0 Capability Justice and the Principle of Individual Development**

I argue that Capability Justice requires institutional guarantees for a Capability for Voice. A theory of justice is specified by *principles* (what values should guide the institution of justice), *rules* (how the goods relevant to realising the principles of justice are allocated) and *metrics* (what goods are subject to the rules of allocation) (Anderson, 2010). The moral object of capability justice is the individual who needs to experience her life as worth living, rather than collectives such as groups, organisations or states: 'the flourishing of individuals taken one by one is both analytically and normatively prior to the flourishing of groups'

(Nussbaum, 1999: 62). Since, in Nussbaum's capability justice, the individual is the fundamental unit of concern, then every individual person must be brought over the threshold, otherwise justice has not been satisfied. She upholds the equal value of each person in the '*principle of each person as end*, articulating it as a *principle of each person's capability* [...] the ultimate political goal is always the promotion of the capabilities of *each person*' (Nussbaum, 2000 WHD: 74):

'(a) The promotion of individual capabilities necessarily involves the promotion of non-individualised social goods, (b) The human person is not a location of self-interest and maximisation of utilities but an individual whose innate powers and capacities should be nurtured towards human excellence or virtues, and (c) Human beings could flourish better as free and responsible agents under proper institutional support.' (Alexander, 2002: 3).

Thus, the central human capabilities for functioning describe what is sufficient for living a worthwhile human life: they 'represent a threshold below which a human person could not be considered as living in a truly human way' (Alexander, 2002: 9), and they are what satisfies the political objective of bringing everyone over the threshold into secure functionings.

Individual flourishing is the central purpose of capability justice, making the governing principle that of individual development – that each person is entitled to the central human capabilities for functioning. Nussbaum's capability justice is grounded in a conception of the person as an individual possessed of interior potentialities, situated within a social reality which operates to suppress or support the development of those potentialities. The principle of individual human development in capability justice draws upon an ontological ideal of what it means to be human which Giovanola (2005) identifies as one which is based, not just upon diversity between individuals, but also upon the interior diversity within the individual, such that all human beings are 'pluralistic entities' characterised by 'an internal multidimensionality and plurality which intrinsically characterises

each person and that every society should guarantee or at least promote' (ibid: 250). Since, the 'constitutive plurality' (ibid: 261) of complex persons cannot be reduced to one kind of functioning, and therefore capability justice must be concerned with flourishing in 'different life-dimensions' (ibid: 260), which I take to include the plurality of work timespaces to which we belong: 'human richness in the sense of each individual's interior diversity seems to be the possibility for each and every human being of realizing him or herself through a dynamic process that involves people's activities (capabilities to do) and their capacities to be' (ibid: 264). Moreover, individual capability development is not just about striving to become a fully realised individual, it is also about being related to others through continuing and mutually beneficial bonds: 'the highest richness for each human being is *other human beings* and such a richness is felt in the form of a *need*' (Marx, 1844). But, relations which simply secure respect are not sufficient because 'every person is *intrinsically related*' and the '*internal plurality and multidimensionality*' of each person is constituted by their 'connection with *other human beings*' (Gionavola, 2005: 263). This implies a strong normative relationality, where no individual can experience full human flourishing in the absence of constitutive intersubjective relations.

### **5.0.0 Nussbaum's Capabilities and the Need for Meaningful Work**

Nussbaum's Capabilities Approach draws upon Marx's proposition that human needs proliferate in developed societies, as advancing social conditions bring people to an awareness of their inner potentialities, stimulating demands that society be organised to enable the realisation of human capacities. Marx said:

'It will be seen how in place of the *wealth* and *poverty* of political economy come the *rich human being* and the *rich human need*. The *rich human being* is simultaneously the human being *in need of* a totality of human-life activities – the man in whom his own



realization exists as an inner necessity, as *need*' (Marx, 1844, in Nussbaum, 1987: 45).

Nussbaum's principle of individual development is grounded in Marx's maxim of individual self-realisation in association with others where 'the free development of each is the condition of the free development of all' (Marx, Communist Manifesto, Chapt 2). She acknowledges her closeness to Marx when she argues that 'the basic intuitive idea of my version of the capabilities approach is [...] a life that has available to it 'truly human functioning' in the sense described by Marx' (Nussbaum, 2006: 74-5). For Nussbaum, the task of societies is not simply to keep people alive by providing enough food, shelter, or paid work, but to secure their capabilities for living a life worthy of a human being, where human needs are expressed and fulfilled in ways consistent with their humanity. Thus, we do not fulfil 'perceptual needs in a mechanical way, producing a seeing eye, a hearing ear, etc' but rather 'make it possible for people to use their bodies and their senses in a truly human way' (Nussbaum, 1987: 183). When individuals experience the plurality of their human potential as an urgent need, then a politics of meaningfulness emerges which stimulates the development of society by bringing to public awareness the human need for meaning, provided that we foster democratic deliberation over what institutional forms and what human capabilities are required to satisfy this need. Radin (1996: 77) identifies 'the human need to construct a narrative for ourselves', where the need to be able to narrate something substantial and worthwhile about our lives is a fundamental and universal human concern. Braybrooke (1998d) says that to experience a richness of need is evidence of an advanced condition of human development, which obliges society to secure the development of human capabilities for all: 'the multiplication of desire needs in the successor society will accompany an expansion of human powers' (ibid: 22). As more individuals experience the need for meaningfulness as an interior, urgent and fundamental need to live a fully human life, then the desire for interesting work becomes, not just an elite preoccupation, but an indication of normal functioning: 'Functioning with normal

health and alertness as a citizen and worker may require in the successor society that people have interesting work' (ibid: 26). It is important to note, however, that there are limits to any one person's capability development set by the egalitarian principle that all should be able to experience the development necessary to meet the threshold for human flourishing to a satisfying level. This means that no-one should be living a meaningful life through unfair acquisition of the capability for the functioning of meaningfulness, such as: exploiting the capabilities of others to enable one's own functioning; or valuing only those capabilities of others which serve the meaning content of one's own life; or stunting the development of the capabilities of others through disproportionate command over the resources and means to realise functionings.

Although human beings have always thrived on meaningful work, and suffered from its lack, its scarcity in contemporary societies constitutes a peculiarly modern kind of deprivation. This is because contemporary societies demand that all persons acquire advanced capabilities for normal functioning, participation and belonging – capabilities which are formed and exercised through work with the requisite content. And when meaningful work is constructed as a fundamental human need, a general and unavoidable need which is felt as an interior lack, then individuals are more likely to suffer harms to their capability to experience human flourishing: 'Without food, human beings perish. Without labor, they falter in development; and in functioning, once development has proceeded that far' (ibid: 25). But, in contemporary societies, the demand to acquire and to exercise such capabilities as a condition of social and economic participation has not been matched by the supply of work which is organised to form complex capabilities. So, if meaningful work is a need, then it is an unmet need. I argue that the need for meaningful work is a need which meets Wiggins's criteria for a basic need which is both absolute and entrenched (Wiggins, 1998): it is *absolute* because it is an invariant fact about human beings that they need freedom, autonomy and social recognition, needs which if they remain unmet mean that a person will suffer harm, and it is *entrenched* because the centrality of work in contemporary societies means that it is difficult for people to avoid the

harmful consequences of being deprived of meaningful work. Wiggins (1998) says ‘freedom, choice and autonomy are themselves vital human needs, and are candidates for precisely the kind of protection that is accorded qua needs to other real needs’ (ibid: 327). As I argued in Chapter One, the presence of inescapable human interests in autonomy, freedom and social recognition implies, in modern societies, a fundamental human need for meaningful work, which is no longer an elite concern, but necessary for leading a human life of equivalent functioning to each other individual. Alkire (2003) links basic needs and capabilities in the identification of a ‘capability to meet a basic need’; thus, the need for meaningfulness in work is met through the relevant capabilities, where the relevant capabilities are the capability for objective valuing and the capability for subjective attachment. I propose, however, that, in a politics of meaningfulness, these capabilities for meaningfulness are not guaranteed directly, but indirectly by securing the Capability for Voice through the conversion factors of a basic income and an economic democracy guarantee. Thus, capability justice with respect to the meaningfulness of work is promoted when the principles of egalitarian meaning and threshold of sufficient meaning are realised through institutional guarantees for a basic income and a system of workplace democracy.

### **5.1.0 Work in the Capability for Control over Our Environment**

Nussbaum (1995) situates work in the central human capability of being in control over our own environment (ibid: 42; 2000: 79-80), which she describes as follows:

- ‘A. Political – being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life; having the right of political participation, protections of free speech and association.
- B. Material – being able to hold property (both land and moveable goods), and having property rights on an equal basis with others; having the right to seek employment on an equal

basis with others; having the freedom from unwarranted search and seizure. In work, being able to work as a human being, exercising practical reason and entering into meaningful relationships of mutual recognition with other workers' (Nussbaum, 1995: 42).

The architectonic capabilities for practical reasoning and affiliation imply that work must be activity of the requisite content, so that it supports cooperative relations, affords social recognition, and enables the exercise of practical judgement. But Nussbaum's specification of work in the material requirement of 'being in control of our environment' is not entirely satisfactory because, firstly, it does not specify the interior content of the work people do together, consistent with a positive critical conception of meaningful work and, secondly, it separates work from its political basis.

Firstly, for work to be meaningful, we need to experience cooperative relations in the interior content of work which are more substantive than coordinative relations. But Nussbaum's capabilities approach has been criticised for its individualism (Held, 2006: 13), neglecting the intersubjective dimensions of belonging necessary to the group life, from which we appropriate values enabling us to form a practical identity: 'the priority is individual liberty, not social solidarity; the freedom to choose, not the need to belong' (Dean, 2009: 5). Stewart (2005) argues that groups are not instrumentally important only for extending individual capabilities, but are 'a direct source of well-being (or indeed ill-being), as a mechanism for the enlargement of individual capabilities, and as a dominant influence over preferences and values helping to determine which capabilities individuals value' (ibid: 185). Groups are constituted by the roles and practices, and these embody values, where values in shared social practices (Raz, 2003) are 'irreducibly social goods' (Taylor, 1995), because they are intersubjectively created and sustained through ongoing relations with others which promote our moral orientations for what it means to care well for worthy objects. Thus, we need to belong to a wide variety of structures containing roles,

practices, and institutions which Williams (2008) describes as the ‘self-reflexive web of institutions’ (ibid: 465), making up the overlapping practices of social cooperation in complex modern societies. Furthermore, Sciaraffa (2011) argues that we have an obligation to participate in institutional maintenance (ibid: 122), in order to ensure that institutions embody social roles which are ‘sufficiently rich and complex to sustain the goods of meaning and self-determination’ (ibid: 123). A rich plurality of goods, in the form of positive meanings and values, are more likely to be maintained in work organised along democratic lines, that is, in enterprises governed by democratic authority which encourages affective attachments to worthy objects, because, by having a share in the rules shaping ways of being and acting, we increase our sense of responsible ownership and worthiness to act with others. In order to make this experience available to as many people as possible, we must encourage a plurality of democratic associations, from cooperatives, employee-owned businesses, mutuals and social enterprises to conventional economic organisations (see Restakis, 2010).

Secondly, Nussbaum does not define the range of activities to be counted as work, whereas, I take the work of social cooperation to be concerned not only with paid work, but also with unpaid labour, which means we must take account of how work is organised across overlapping action contexts. This means that work must be situated in both the material and the political bases of having control over one’s environment, where the material and political are not separate spheres, but implicated within one another. In this respect, workplace democracy recognises the political basis of work in a system of social cooperation. In fact, Nussbaum links the content of work to the need for social transformation when she says that ‘some forms of labor are incompatible with good human functioning’ (Nussbaum, HF&SJ, in Radin, 1996: 73), and calls for ‘a searching examination of the forms of labor and the relations of production, and for the construction of fully human and sociable forms of labor for all citizens with an eye to all forms of human functioning’ (ibid: 74). This suggests that, for Nussbaum, the content of work must consist of activities which are undertaken in a humanising manner: ‘some forms of labor simply are mindless and exhausting

enough to make it impossible for the worker to lead a fully human life and the worker himself becomes a commodity' (Radin, 1996: 74). And in order to secure work of the requisite content for all persons, then the institutional arrangements and resources of the polity must be structured so that 'everyone can cross the threshold into capability to choose well' (Radin, 1996: 72-73). Nussbaum proposes:

'The idea is that the entire structure of the polity will be designed with a view to these functions. Not only programs of allocation but also the division of land, the arrangements of forms of ownership, the structure of labor relations, institutional support for forms of family and social affiliation, ecological policy and policy towards animals, institutions of political participation, recreational institutions – all these, as well as more concrete programs within these areas, will be chosen with a view to good human functioning' (Nussbaum, in Radin, 1996: 240).

Thus, Nussbaum includes the transformation of the institutional and economic arrangements which structure work within her partial theory of justice. And this implies that the object of justice, informed by a politics of meaningfulness in work, must be to ensure 'work regimes' which 'enlarge and assure particular human capacities that can be seen as universally essential for those who labour in a civilized society' (Pocock, 2006: 1). This requires us to consider the prospects for a socialised economy, where democratically organised enterprises able to support the development and exercise of the Capability for Voice are widely available.

### **5.2.0 Democratic Equality**

I have argued that the emancipatory potential of a positive critical conception of meaningful work is realised when individuals express the political

mode of being through democratic practices at the level of the task and of the organisation. This requires an approach to capability development which is grounded in the political basis of economic life. For example, Anderson (1999; 2010) argues that society ought to secure the formation of the capabilities necessary for an individual to function as a democratic equal, including what is necessary for democratic equality in the work she does: ‘citizens have a claim to a capability set sufficient to enable them to function as equals in society’ (Anderson, 2010: 83). In the relevant capability set for democratic equality, Anderson specifies those capabilities necessary to participating in a system of social cooperation, implying that an individual’s social and political participation depends upon a capability for work – which, I argue, must be a capability for meaningful work:

‘To be capable of functioning as an equal participant in a system of cooperative production requires effective access to the means of production, access to the education needed to develop one’s talents, freedom of occupational choice, the right to make contracts and enter into cooperative agreements with others, the right to receive fair value for one’s labor, and recognition by others of one’s productive contribution’ (Anderson, 1999: 318).

Given how democratic participation enables individuals to experience the value of meaningfulness in the work they do, this means capabilities must be developed to the extent that they satisfy the threshold standard specified by democratic equality, where a threshold of sufficiency in democratic equality is given by the opportunity and process dimensions of a Capability for Voice. For each person to be able to function as an equal requires that each person possess, not only the capabilities for political citizenship, but also the capabilities for participating as an equal in the associations of civic society, including economic associations. Anderson (1999) proposes that to be able to see one another as a participant of equal standing in the work of social cooperation requires a

particular attitude to how we generate goods, where ‘people regard every product of the economy as jointly produced by everyone working together’ (ibid: 321). Such a system of cooperation implies unavoidable inter-dependencies where we effectively ‘commission’ one another to undertake the tasks we are unable to undertake on our own behalf (ibid: 322). This includes all the many kinds of unpaid labour for which the market will not pay, but which are nonetheless essential to the reproduction of a cooperative social order. Although Anderson does not extend her theory of democratic equality to specifying the content of work, she does indicate the necessity for internal and external goods of a particular character when she says: ‘Society may not define work roles that amount to peonage or servitude, nor, if it can avoid it, pay them so little that an able-bodied person working full-time would still lack basic capabilities’ (ibid: 325). However, her concept of the content of working is under-developed because of her thin understanding of joint working: Anderson conceives of the work of social cooperation in terms of a chain of remote interactions, and she does not discuss the possibility of capability deformation in the technical division of labour. Despite these elisions, I think it is plausible to suggest that Anderson’s concept of democratic equality, by pointing us towards the material basis of democratic participation, helps us to understand what is required to fill out the satisficing level of meaning in the threshold of sufficient meaning.

### **5.3.0 The Capability for Voice**

Democratic equality, and thus being able to achieve a satisficing level of meaningfulness in work for all, depends upon the realisation of the Capability for Voice in a system of workplace democracy. And the Capability for Voice depends upon opportunity and process, where opportunity is made up of both an individual and a social dimension:

‘In the capability perspective, *capability for voice*, which requires all persons concerned actively to participate in the policy process,



is the very condition of the legitimacy of any individualised social intervention. Capability for voice of course depends upon personal characteristics such as discursive competences or self-confidence, but it more deeply relies on the social and institutional environment and its ability to listen to the concerns voiced by the persons involved [...] the essence of the capability approach is procedural in the way defined above: it does not impose from the outside substantial solutions (e.g. moral behaviours) on job-seekers, but requires that a list of valuable functionings be determined through social choice or deliberation' (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006: 135).

Bonvin & Farvaque (2006) describe a capability for work as 'the real freedom to choose the work one has reason to value' (ibid: 126), implying that since there are some forms of work which we do not have reason to value, then a capability for work depends upon being able to distinguish between valuable and nonvaluable work:

'The capability approach requires that all people be adequately equipped to escape from the constraint of valueless work, either through the real possibility of refusing such a job (with a valuable alternative, be it a financial compensation or another job), or through the possibility of transforming it into something else one 'has reason to value'. Thus capability for work implies either a) capability not to work if one chooses (via a valuable *exit* option); or b) capability to participate effectively in the definition of work content, organisation, conditions, modes of remuneration, etc. (the *voice* option)' (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006: 126, original emphasis).

But the ‘capability for work’ is not simply about being employable, it is also about being able to participate in the ‘shaping of the social context in order to make it more professionally and socially inclusive’ (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006: 127). Bonvin & Farvaque employ Sen’s distinction between agency and well-being to explicate the ‘substantial content of capability for work’ (ibid: 127), where *well-being* in work is linked to material factors such as income and non-material factors such as self-fulfilment and a sense of belonging; and *agency* in work is linked to actual doings or participation in activities of work: ‘Capability for work is not identified as the mere possibility of getting an adequate wage: it focuses on the agency dimension, on the capability of participating in society’ (ibid: 128). Well-being and agency in work, however, do not operate as independent dimensions, but are mutually implicated, so that aspects of agency in work, such as an individual being able to form and hold to values relies upon aspects of well-being, such as job security, being satisfied (Lutz, 2008). Democratic participation which aims at involving people in the framing rules shaping their subjectivities and action contexts is thus inherent to a capability for work which is worth doing, and which supports the development of human capabilities relevant to economic participation over the life course – and this requires the Capability for Voice in the work one does with others, thus integrating the material and political dimensions of Nussbaum’s capability for control over one’s environment.

The Capability for Voice is ‘the ability to express one’s opinions and thoughts, and to make them count in the course of public discussion’ (Bonvin & Farvaque (2006: 127), where the concept of capability combines individual agency or ‘what the individual is able to do’ with social agency or ‘what opportunities are open to him’ (Bonvin, 2003). De Munck (de Munck & Ferreras, 2004) specifies three aspects to the Capability for Voice: firstly, it is a constitutive element of ‘Freedom of Choice’, because, in a fair society, each person ought to have the opportunity to publicly deliberate over the opportunities for acting and for being which society makes available to her; secondly, it is grounded in the plurality of individual abilities, but enabled by social conditions, such as

information, collective support, communication, being listened to and understood by others; and thirdly, it is dependent upon social institutions, such as rights (freedom of speech) and social conversion factors to convert the capability into valuable functionings. Bohman (1996) specifies three conditions for achieving a genuine Capability for Voice: firstly, equality of access must be guaranteed, which goes beyond formal equality to the real ability to access public debate, to express one's views and to be listened to; secondly, the publicity of the debate avoids the discretionary use of decision-making power, including access to independent courts of appeal; and thirdly, freedom of speech for all involved. In Sen's CA, the Capability for Voice requires both individual abilities and social agency: individual abilities to express rational arguments, to influence and to persuade others, and social agency, such as a supportive legislative framework, including avenues of appeal. This means that a full and equal Capability for Voice requires a transformation of the interior content of work, such that the capability for work itself must be reformed, if it is to realise the bipartite value of meaningfulness.

As I have already discussed, there is a difference between having a share in participation, as taking part in an activity, and having a share in power, as having a degree of influence over an activity (Heller, 2003). And in order for the Capability for Voice to be realised as having a share of power in decision-making, then the structure of the Capability for Voice must follow Sen's Capability Approach in having both an opportunity dimension and a process dimension:

*Opportunity* is 'the extent to which the actors possess the means, instruments or permissions to pursue what they would like to do; and are *actually* able to do things they would value doing' (Sen, 2005: 153, my emphasis). It is concerned with the equity and efficiency of the means, instruments and resources the institutional framework provides to workers to pursue what they consider to be valuable, and the extent to which it enables them to actually pursue what they value. Having a share in power or 'influence-sharing' depends upon both social agency and individual agency. Social agency is concerned with the institutional mechanisms at the micro, meso and macro levels of economic democracy which

address the workers' interest in the actual means they have to pursue what they value, and how they make use of such means (Deakin & Koukiadaki, 2009: 25). Individual agency is concerned with the abilities and basic capabilities of the individual, which combined with social agency, create the combined capability for functioning. In the case of a basic Capability for Voice this requires: personal competence in handling information, cooperating and influencing others, a democratic consciousness, trust and confidence in others. When individual ableness is combined with social mechanisms and opportunities for participation in decision-making, then we have to hand the opportunity dimension of the Capability for Voice.

*Process* identifies what procedures exist to structure decisions and create the conditions for consultation, negotiation and decision-making. In a system of workplace democracy, process highlights how social dialogue between management and workers takes place (ibid: 30). People define, *in situ*, the criteria for decision-making processes and collective choices, requiring the development of institutional mechanisms and cultural support for collective decision-making. (Deakin, S. & Koukiadaki, A. 2009: 6). The extent of decision-making capability is defined by the degree of control workers enjoy over decision-making, the range of issues over which they exercise control, and the organisation level at which control is exercised. And this requires there to be in place procedures for decision-making, given by consultation, deliberation, negotiation and agreement. Furthermore, full equality of participation requires the group life to be organised to make visible the agonistic dimensions of the discursive interactions between individuals. Gustavsen (1992) suggests that a process of 'democratic dialogue' will have the following characteristics: it must be possible for all concerned to participate; not only must everybody participate, but each person must be active; everybody has an obligation, not only to put forward his or her own ideas, but also to help others to contribute theirs; each participant must accept that other participants can have better arguments; and finally the dialogue must continuously produce agreements that can provide platforms for practical action.

In his evaluation of societal systems of economic democracy, Brogger (2010) identifies two forms of participatory engagement: firstly, social dialogue, or collective bargaining between employees and management, and secondly, human resource management practices (HRM) which aim at the raising the involvement of the individual employee. However, Brogger (2010) suggests that the Scandinavian tradition of ‘democratic dialogue’ is distinctive because it steers a course between collective bargaining and HRM approaches, where democratic dialogue is ‘a praxis informed by sociotechnical, psychosocial and discourse perspectives, developed along with the national systems of industrial relations’ (ibid.). Moreover, Brogger argues that, although arenas and procedures for participative decision-making are necessary, they are not sufficient, because what is also required is a ‘consolidated, independent source of influence of continuity’ (ibid: 491), or an institutional support system which provides employees with autonomy from the hierarchy and a basis for collective action. Thus, the Capability for Voice needs, in addition to opportunity and process which are internal to the organisation of work, external conversion factors in the form of mediating institutions and a basic income for all within a socialised economic system.

### **6.0.0 Conversion Factors for the Capability for Voice**

The conversion of capabilities into functionings depends upon resources, favourable background conditions, and human activity. Robeyns (2003) identifies three kinds of conversion factors influencing the transformation of resources into capabilities – personal, social and environmental. Conversion factors are both context- and individual-dependent: for example, the ability to participate in training opportunities for any particular individual may depend upon company policies (environmental), individual ability to use informal organisational resources (personal), and access to childcare (social) (Bartelheimer et al, 2009): ‘this concept of situatedness is at the very centre of the capability approach’ (Bonvin & Thelen, 2003). For successful conversion and development of

capabilities for conversion, individuals need to be situated in a ‘capability-friendly social context’ which enables the individual to ‘enjoy the real freedom to convert her command over commodities into valuable beings and doings’ (Bonvin & Farvaque, 2006: 124). This means that for any particular individual to be able to experience the functioning of a Capability for Voice two kinds of conversion factors are required: mediating institutions, and a basic income.

### **6.1.0 Mediating Institutions**

Institutions are accumulations of the roles and practices which are sources of internal goods and the means for self-development. Hodgson (2009) defines institutions as ‘systems of established and prevalent social rules that structure social relations’ (ibid: 2). They operate to enable and to constrain what people can do through established rules and habits: ‘institutions work only because the rules involved are embedded in shared habits of thought and behaviour’ (ibid: 6), where habits are ‘the constitutive material of institutions, providing them with enhanced durability, power, and normative authority’ (ibid: 7). Hodgson identifies how habits are the key mechanism for transforming individual behaviour, because they influence the range and extent of human ambition, both as individuals and as members of a collective (ibid: 7). Moreover, Hodgson identifies how institutions are dependent upon individuals for their continued existence and renewal, both through the dispositions of individual persons and through the structured interactions between persons: ‘institutions are simultaneously both objective structures ‘out there’ and subjective springs of human agency ‘in the human head’’ (ibid: 8). Thus, persons and institutional structures are ‘connected in a circle of mutual interaction and interdependence’ (ibid). In a capability framework, because they structure our practices, and roles (Williams, 2006: 210), institutions determine the opportunity dimension of the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment in a politics of meaningfulness. They are accumulations of the positive values which society makes available for appropriation to the meaning content of our lives. And they enable us to fulfil our

responsibilities towards the things we value (Williams, 2006: 209), because they distribute resources, provide us roles through which we can claim the involvement of others, and constitute the public arenas where we can deliberate with others over standards of care. In institutions, we encounter worthy objects, and form the ongoing commitments and attachments which structure our lives as a whole: ‘people live their lives amid complex, networks of overlapping institutions’ (Williams, 2006: 207). Williams identifies how ‘technologies of organisation’ (ibid: 2008) have produced varied roles in a system of social cooperation which give us ‘the freedom to participate in ways that are meaningful by one’s own lights’ (ibid: 209), and which enable our deliberations over values to become reflexively related to our affiliations and activities. Institutions provide vital resources for the development of attachments which enable meaning attribution because, firstly, the roles generated by institutions structure our activities and our evaluation of our activities in morally important ways (ibid: 210); secondly, institutions provide for the legitimate allocation of power and responsibility by enabling a ‘background working consensus to mediate disagreement’ (ibid: 212), and, by mirroring the liberal notion of ‘divided powers’, facilitating accountability and trust; and thirdly, institutions provide sites for individual recognition and a minimal level of social solidarity which are vital to the development of personal identity: ‘our interactions are structured in ways that lead us to recognise others as fellow participants in many different spheres of life’ (ibid: 215).

Furthermore, Williams (2006) identifies the importance of institutional variety in providing for the individual recognition which is a ‘crucial condition for moral agency’ (ibid: 215). A ‘plurality of institutions’ engenders ‘infrastructures of responsibility’ (Scheffler, in Williams, 2006: 214); they enable us to express the various roles which form the vital basis of our self-conception. Much of the work we do is therefore concerned with the maintenance and development of the social institutions constituting our common life, which reflects Arendt’s exhortation that we should have a ‘care for the world’ (Arendt, 1958), or the fabricated world of structured relations which enable us to lead a fully human life. Out of our experiences of belonging to institutions structured by common

activities, we form the particular attachments to worthy objects; and having access to institutional membership enables us to fulfil our responsibilities towards those worthy objects, thereby imbuing our acts of work with expressive meaning and purpose.

But, not all institutions contain normatively positive arrangements of roles, practices and common activities, making it necessary for us to specify the democratic character of institutions which are conducive realising the value of meaningfulness. Democratic organisations are a reliable social conversion factor for the Capability for Voice, activating individual agency by providing people with the opportunity to participate in collective decision-making. Bernstein (1976) distinguishes participatory mechanisms along three dimensions: degree of control employees enjoy over decision-making; range of issues over which they exercise control; organisational level at which control is exercised. These are necessary, but not sufficient, for ‘the bare structure of participation to become an on-going self-reinforcing system of employee power’ (ibid: 497), and he adds several additional components: employee access to and sharing of management information; guaranteed protection of the employee from reprisals for voicing criticisms (plus other rights); an independent board of appeals to settle disputes between managers and those being managed (separation of powers), a particular set of attitudes and values (political consciousness); ‘frequent return to participating employees of at least a portion of the surplus they produce’ (above their regular wage). Moreover, ‘for maximum benefit to the collective there is a particular mix of management authority and democratic control, the precise proportions of which have to be found by each case through its own experience’ (ibid: 498). Thus, democratically organised enterprises possess identifiable and coherent features which foster the Capability for Voice. Most importantly, democratically organised enterprises change the basis of ownership and governance, underpinning our sense of worthiness to act and to speak which secures our equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value.



### **6.2.0 Basic Income**

A basic income guarantee supports autonomy, freedom and social recognition in the interior content of work, because, when it is at a sufficient level to secure material independence, people are more likely to possess the real ‘capacity for making choices in all domains of life with the security that [...] nobody will have the remotest chance of arbitrarily interfering in their individual life plan decisions’ (Casassas, 2007). Casassas says that an unconditional BI grants individuals ‘bargaining power’ (ibid: 4), and I suggest that this supports the Capability for Voice in the interior content of work, as people bring interpretive differences into public deliberation through democratic practices at the level of the task. A BI is one of the conversion factors for realising agonistic engagement with fellow workers in one’s chosen sphere of activity, supported by shared ownership rights in the organisations to which one belongs, and upon which one depends to fulfil one’s responsibilities to the worthy objects which make one’s life worth living.

Van Parijs (1995) defends ‘real libertarianism’ which he proposes is realised in a social order ‘that could afford, and would actually implement, the highest sustainable unconditional income, subject to the constraint that everyone’s formal freedom should be protected’ (ibid: 1). The Principle of Egalitarian Meaning is satisfied when there is the widest range values which people can choose to appropriate to the meaning content of their lives. In the work of social cooperation, this requires an expansion of the activities which are recognised as work, in the sense that there are a plurality of activities, both paid and unpaid, which contribute to the reproduction of society. In a politics of meaningfulness, an unconditional basic income is the means to secure a plurality of values in the work of social cooperation, bringing to light values and meanings of work which have been rendered invisible by the standard economic model. Of the values constituting caring work, Pateman (2007) says that, in contrast to normal arguments for a basic income grounded in the value of reciprocity, those engaged in caring work are not motivated by an ‘immediate reciprocal contribution’, but by

affective attachments (ibid: 3). She suggests that the value of a BI lies, not in immediate mutual reciprocity, but in the opportunity it affords citizens *'not to be employed'* (ibid: 5) because 'employment is undemocratic, a vast area of hierarchy and subordination within supposedly democratic societies' (ibid: 4). Furthermore, the pluralisation of values is encouraged by the role basic income plays in capability security, which directs public policy to what is required to ensure that people can rely upon their capabilities into the future. A basic income means that no person need be forced to neglect or pass up on chosen functionings, or be forced by necessity to pursue functionings they do not value. Where there is an unconditional basic income up to the highest sustainable level, no person need do degraded work in order to avoid immiseration; it also affords society as a whole an opportunity to evaluate the 'undemocratic character of employment' and 'the meaning of work' (Pateman, 2007: 5).

Securing the material basis for the requisite content of work through a basic income guarantee ought not to be implemented in the absence of a critical evaluation and reform of the present organisation of work, in particular, the gendered division of labour. Robeyns (2001) warns that simply applying a basic income with no regard for the position of individuals may do more harm than good. She argues that paying some women a basic income, without altering systemic disadvantage and discrimination in the division of labour, would end up 'sending women back home and tempering emancipation' (ibid: 103; cf. Orloff, 1990). The unequal distribution of labour in the home, replicated in the structure of the labour market, is unlikely to be altered through an increase in women's bargaining power without a corresponding change in the structure of paid and unpaid work. Robeyn's critique implies that a basic income must operate within a system of capability justice, where the position of the individual with respect to her ability to convert innate capabilities into combined capabilities, and then into the functionings of her choice, is what counts in considerations of justice. Where the purpose of a basic income is individual self-determination (Pateman, 2004), then a basic income is a means to 'the creation of a more democratic society in which individual freedom and citizenship are of equal worth for everyone' and to

expanding women's freedom (ibid: 90). Pateman says that 'individual self-government depends not only on the opportunities available but also on the form of authority structure within which individuals interact with one another in their daily lives' (ibid: 91). Some commentators are concerned that a basic income would undermine participation in paid work, which they see as formative for cultivating the virtues of citizenship (Sandel, 1996; Dagger, 2006): 'basic income, according to this view, is a direct subsidy of civic vice' (White, 2007: 5). This would imply that a just society must be concerned with the boundaries between different kinds of work (Young, 2006) –who does what, when and where. In this way, a basic income guarantee can secure the Principle of Egalitarian Meaning only in combination with the Threshold of Sufficient Meaning, where the threshold is specified by democratic equality in the interior content of work.

### **7.0.0 Conclusion**

Some commentators have suggested that the capability approach does not directly address the relations of production and domination which stunt human capabilities (Bagchi, 2000), but when the capability approach is applied to the interior content of work by recognising in work both the political and the material basis of control over our environment, then we have to hand the means to remedy capability inequalities. In order to satisfy the Principle of Egalitarian Meaning and the Threshold of Sufficient Meaning, however, we will need to address the patterns of inequality across the division of labour, in particular, the way in which work occurs in multiple formal and informal timespaces. Young (2002) identifies that a concern for any theory of justice must be how our involvement in a diversity of relationships which generate simultaneous demands should make us ask 'what are the principles that ought to guide the relationship between out-of-home work and work at home in order to encourage and enable everyone to participate in both on roughly equal terms.' (ibid: 77) Structural relations (organisations, rules and practices) in one sphere shape our relations and capabilities for action in other spheres, therefore we must ask, 'Does the theory of

democratic justice have a place for normative principles to guide the structural intersections of institutional spheres, or is this theory restricted to principles to regulate the rules and relations within institutions only?' (ibid: 77). Enhancing human capabilities will strengthen the resistance of individuals to domination, provided that the basic structure of society contains non-dominating, capability-enhancing work timespaces, thus enabling the widespread availability of work structured by the value of meaningfulness. A society based upon respecting equal human worth requires that market efficiency be defined by the extent to which the economic system supports the development of central human capabilities, including the capability for meaning attribution. Non-alienating, non-humiliating work must therefore be accessible through a plurality of micro-structures of belonging; such work is defined by positive promotion of human capabilities (Gould, 1985), and negative protection from arbitrary interference (Hsieh, 2008). In sum, by requiring the end to de-humanising, alienating, and autonomy-depriving work, capability justice addresses how we will secure the social and political institution of meaningful work for all.

## **Conclusion**

My aim has been to establish that the concept of meaningful work deserves wider intellectual and political attention. Although we are now exhorted to find satisfaction and self-fulfilment in consumption, Morris's call for dignified and humane labour retains a toehold in our imaginings of what a flourishing human life ought to look like. Indeed, Morris's following comment upon the purchase of goods, 'Tis the lives of men you buy' (Morris, 1884), indicates a direction of inquiry for linking the moral and political dimensions of consumption and production. This is because if we acquire goods from the oppressions of others then we compromise the possibilities for our own life - if one life can be made vulnerable because of the work he or she does, then so can the life of any man or woman. Consumers can be satisfied even where producers are exploited, alienated, or otherwise harmed, but consumers are also producers with interests in not being exploited, alienated, or subjected to undignified work. This provides us with common cause with respect to ensuring that all work is constituted by the values of autonomy as non-alienation, freedom as non-domination and social recognition as dignified work. I argue, therefore, for a set of institutional guarantees which includes an entitlement to democratic participation in determining the purposes, means and circumstances of the work one does through the Capability for Voice. In proposing that institutional guarantees are necessary to ensure that the principle of egalitarian meaning and the threshold of sufficient meaning are secured in all the work we do together, some further comments are warranted: firstly, I am not suggesting we attempt to guarantee that all persons should actually find their lives to be meaningful; secondly, neither am I suggesting that we try to guarantee meaningfulness in every dimension of human living, at every moment in time and across the whole of a lifespan; thirdly, the threshold does not guarantee that any particular individual will find any particular work activity or social role meaningful; but I do claim that, fourthly, the inescapable interests met by the fundamental human need for meaningful work

entails that all persons are equally entitled to find their lives to be meaningful because of the work that they do.

I have described the outlines of a politics of meaningfulness which has the realisation of a positive critical conception of meaningful work in its sights. Furthermore, I have established that, in contemporary societies where work is a central activity, meaningful work is not a preference in the market, but a fundamental human need. In my positive critical conception of meaningful work, the conceptual content of meaningfulness is given by Wolf's distinct bipartite value of meaningfulness, which unites objective valuing to subjective attachment. In her construction of the value of meaningfulness, Wolf is seeking to respond to Frankfurt's (1988) question of what we should care about; to which his reply is that what you should care about is 'what it is *possible* for you to care about (Wolf, 2002: 227). Having things we can care about is vital to a flourishing life, but since 'it is not so easy for most of us to find things we are capable of loving' (Frankfurt, 1998: 94), Frankfurt suggests that we choose the objects of our care according to our ability to undertake the relevant activities of care. And moreover, we must choose something to care about because otherwise we will lack the motivational sources for any kind of acting at all:

'It seems that it must be the fact that it is possible for him to care about the one and not the other, to care about the one in a way which is more important to him than the way in which it is possible for him to care about the other [...] The person does not care about the object because its worthiness commands that he do so. On the other hand, the worthiness of the activity of caring commands that he choose an object that he will be able to care about' (ibid.).

Wolf is concerned that to simply care 'about what you can' (ibid) fails to take account of what is *worth* caring about (Wolf, 2002: 227). Instead, she seeks to establish an inescapable relationship between the objective and subjective

dimensions of meaningfulness, such that when something is worthy of love or affinity then our involvement with those objects contributes to the meaningfulness of our lives. She does not allow that this implies we should care about persons, or even objects, only if they possess worthy qualities, such as intelligence or beauty (ibid: 230), but it also does not imply that there is no connection between care and worthiness: ‘worth figures in, somehow, to what is desirable to care about, but not exclusively or perhaps decisively’ (ibid: 231). We want our lives to have positive connections to objects which are independently valuable, so that ‘meaning in life arises when affinity and worth meet’ (ibid: 237), and when the focus of our efforts lacks worth, then our lives also lack meaning. Responding to Wolf’s critique, Frankfurt replies that his concern is to establish the importance of the activity of loving to a person’s life (Frankfurt, 2002: 245), and that ‘since loving as such is valuable, it is reasonable to desire it for its own sake’ (ibid.). Thus, no matter the worthiness of the object, a person’s life is made better for him or her, just so long as he or she is engaged in practices of care. Hitler, for example, cared deeply about the success of Naziism, and his life was enhanced by having such profound concerns (ibid: 246): ‘an enthusiastically meaningful life need not be connected to anything that is objectively valuable, nor need it include any thought that the things to which it is devoted are good’ (ibid: 250). Frankfurt makes the important point that it is the activity of caring, itself, which creates value and meaning: ‘meaning in life is created by loving’ (ibid). The activity of care, itself, generates worthy objects, and forms us as creators of value – in the process, rescuing us from the frustrations of having to find sources of independent value: ‘locating the source of meaning in the activity of loving renders opportunities for meaningful life much more readily accessible’ (ibid: 250). Rather than starting out from worthy objects to which we attach ourselves, we start by engaging in acts of care towards whatever objects it is possible for us to care about, acts which establish the value of the objects of our attention, because we make them worth caring about through the exercise of our meaning-making capabilities – and in the process, we form ourselves as worthy objects by become creators of value.

There is much to be sympathetic with in this account, and I have made use of it in my incorporation of an ethic of care into the value of meaningfulness, arguing that meaning in life depends upon our becoming valuers with the status for being co-authorities, and the capabilities for objective valuing and subjective attachment. But Frankfurt's concern centres too much upon the caring person whose life is made better by engaging in care, taking insufficient account of the effect that person's concerns or actions may have upon the object of care, or upon the wider society in which that person is situated. So, Hitler's caring may have been of benefit to his own life, but he transferred the terrible costs of his caring onto the lives of others, and this transgresses the commitments of an ethic of care which focuses our attention upon what is good for the worthy object, and how our activities of care impact others and society at large.

This means that others have an interest in, not only what we care about, but also what we do about our caring. And these interests are given voice through public meaning-making in the form of deliberative democratic evaluation of the worthiness of objects and the place they ought to have in our lives. At this point, Wolf provides us with a useful corrective to Frankfurt's concentration upon the caring person, because she situates her objective valuing in a pluralistic framework 'against the background assumption that the facts about our value are likely to be highly pluralistic and complex and that in consequence our approach to questions of objective value should be tolerant and open-minded' (Wolf, 2002: 237). The presence of background assumptions opens up the possibility for contestation and challenge as to what constitutes such values, and what impact they have upon the objects of care and society at large. Thus, securing the dimension of objectivity in the value of meaningfulness does not mean a narrowing of the range of values, but instead requires a broadening out of what is means to be a valuer, because objectivity demands an active engagement with the background assumptions and a shifting of perspective from the carer to the cared for. In this sense, establishing objectivity is a practical and intersubjective process, requiring moral judgement including both reason and emotion, and is concerned with relevance rather than impartiality (Wallace, 1993): 'objectivity in morality



has to do with identification and assessment of what is relevant to a moral (or legal) verdict' (ibid: 63). I suggest this approach to establishing the content of objectivity allows us to use an ethic of care to determine what is relevant to a situation requiring objective judgement, because an ethic of care requires us to consider, not only the carer, but also the cared for, where all the worthy objects in a situation must be given proper attention, not just those which are relevant to the caring person. And this demands an intersubjective, deliberative engagement with differences in needs and values interpretation – an essentially political process, requiring the exercise of the political mode of being.

I suggest that bringing the formation of objectivity into the hustle of everyday life, and uniting it to each person's experience of subjectivity in the bipartite value of meaningfulness, requires capabilities for a particular kind of rationality. I have begun to explore this rationality in terms of phronetic techne, opposing it to the pre-giveness of technical rationality, which simply does not stand up to what we know about the ordinary experience of 'lay normativity' (Sayers, 2011). I argued that a rationality of care based upon phronetic techne is key to realising the transformative potential of interpretive differences which arise from intersubjective encounters between self, others and materiality at the level of the task. But, further research needs to be done on how the experience of phronetic techne can be theorised within the work that people do together. One possible avenue to exposing and evaluating the irreducible autonomy in every act of work is to adopt what Reason & Torbert (2001) call 'the action turn', which aims to integrate first person (inquiry into our own actions and beings), second person (collaborative inquiry with others) and third person (developing inquiring communities) critical inquiries into a transformatory social science, for the purpose of increasing the validity of local knowledge and responsiveness to evolving situations. The aim of such inquiries is to generate forms of knowledge and understanding which transcend positivist paradigms, and connect practices of critical reflection and participation to decisions about what are we to do and to be in this particular situation: 'How am I to act in a timely fashion now?' (ibid.). Furthermore, critical inquiry into the decisions we must make about how we are to

act and to be in order to be attentive to needs and demands of the situation is potentially transformatory of social and political practices and structures, because it ‘affirms the basic human right of persons to contribute to decisions which affect them and to knowledge which concerns them and purports to be about them’ (ibid: 8; cf. Heron, 1996). The three dimensions of inquiry contribute to a ‘critical subjectivity’ in which ‘we do not suppress our primary subjective experience, that we accept our way of knowing is from a perspective; it also means that we are *aware of* that subjectivity, and of its bias, and we *articulate* it in our communications’ (Reason, 1994: 327, original emphasis). Where critical subjectivity in first person inquiry is allied to co-operative inquiry with others, then the possibility emerges for democratic dialogue (Toulmin & Gustavsen, 1996), which I suggest will become productive of difference through the exercise of agonistic democratic practices, if it is to be fully enabling of emancipatory possibilities in a positive critical conception of meaningful work.

To be able to engage in, and become proficient in, agonistic democratic practices at the level of the task requires us to have an understanding of ourselves as capable valuers, that is possessing an equal status as co-authorities in the realm of value. Effective participation depends upon our having a sense of our worth as co-authorities, entitled to generate interpretive differences and to bring them into public deliberation. This begs the question of the nature of authority in democratic participation. I have argued that a system of workplace democracy will combine democratic participation at the level of the organisation with participatory practices at the level of the task, and that at the level of the organisation this requires an authority which is a democratic authority. An important argument in favour of management authority is its epistemic superiority – managers are best placed to make decisions because they possess the expert knowledge and information necessary to resolving complex situations; the local knowledge of workers may make a useful contribution to management decision-making, but their partial understanding can never place them in the position of epistemic equality necessary for effective democratic participation. So, for efficient and effective decision making we ought to accept a ‘technocratic model of expert

authority' (Moore, 2011), even though this must require from workers a surrender of their judgement, because technocratic expert authority, by its nature, excludes workers from independently evaluating and forming judgements upon the information and criteria for decision-making. By contrast, democratic authority demands the taking up, not the surrender, of judgement, which submits expert authority to wider practices of scrutiny and accountability. Fraser (1990), for example, proposes that we open up public spaces based upon 'subaltern counter-publics' which 'invent and circulate counter-discourses' and 'formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests and needs' (ibid: 57). Bringing out the agonistic dimensions of interpretive differences which arise from the work we do together links our status as co-authorities at the level of the task with mechanisms for democratic authority at the level of the organisation.

This demands a politics of meaningfulness which takes account of the different ways whereby it is possible to conceive of our economic life. To see ourselves as equal co-authorities we must possess a sense of both our epistemic equality and our capability equality: *epistemic authority* because we have knowledge and understanding acquired from the roles we occupy in the work of social cooperation to be able to contribute as co-authorities in the realm of value, and *capability equality* because we are situated in democratically organised structures which require the formation of abilities and competences necessary to being a participant. Through a politics of meaningfulness, we can multiply the range of positive values in a liberal perfectionist framework, provided that we ease up on commitments to liberal neutrality for the sake of a fundamental human need for meaningfulness. In the process, we will likely develop a far more nuanced understanding of our economic life. Gibson-Graham (2003) argue for seeing economic life as diverse, and our roles as multiply interwoven in complex relations which transgress traditionally conceived boundaries. They suggest that rather than opposing already existing capitalism to an alternative, we envision how diverse modes of exchange and cooperation are already implicated in the standard economic model, so that the task is to strengthen already present tendencies in the existing system towards 'non-capitalist economic processes'

(ibid: 157). Examining the Mondragon regional system of cooperation, they observe that there is no specialisation of product, function or organisational form, but a knitting together of the 'regional economy as a complexly differentiated and networked whole' (ibid: 142): 'in the mind of the co-operator is the idea that future society probably must be pluralistic in all its organisations, including the economic' (Arizmendiarieta, in ibid: 127).

Such a differentiated and variegated landscape of organisational forms is, I argue, essential to a politics of meaningfulness which aims at pluralising the range of values within a liberal perfectionist framework. Nussbaum's partial theory of justice, based upon her central human capabilities, allows for the political aim to be substantive, targeting what is needed for living a life which we have reason to value. Even so, Nussbaum places the emphasis upon individual choice of which functionings a person will realise from her capability set. If an individual can choose or not to realise the functioning of meaningful work, then Nussbaum's capability approach would appear to be little different from Arneson's meaningful work as a preference, to be selected according to individual taste, provided that the conditions of market socialism pertain. But Nussbaum's capability approach is liberal perfectionist in a way which Arneson's approach to meaningful work as a preference is not – it allows for individual choice from a range of values, but within certain constraints. Nussbaum suggests that the objectives of a decent capability-promoting social order are to avoid humiliating its members and to respect their human dignity. I conclude, therefore, that my argument for meaningful work as a fundamental human need, requiring institutional guarantees for its promotion, can be supported by resources from Nussbaum's theory of justice, based upon her central human capabilities.

**Bibliography**

- Acker, J. (1988) Class, Gender, and the Relations of Distribution. *Signs*, 13 (3), 473-497.
- Acker, J (1990) Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organisations. *Gender and Society*, 4 (2), 139-158.
- Ackers, P., Marchington, M., Wilkinson, A., & Dundon, T. (2006) Employee Participation in Britain: From Collective Bargaining and Industrial Democracy to Employee Involvement and Social Partnership – Two decades of Manchester/Loughborough Research. *Decision*, 33 (1), 75-88.
- Adenzato, M. & Garbarini, F. (2006) The As If in Cognitive Science, Neuroscience and Anthropology: A Journey among Robots, Blacksmiths and Neurons. *Theory & Psychology*, 16 (6), 747-759.
- Adkins, L. (2005) The New Economy, Property and Personhood. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 22 (1), 111-130.
- Adler, P. S. (2004) Skill Trends Under Capitalism and the Socialisation of Production. In: Warhurst, Grugulis & Keep (eds.) *The Skills that Matter*, Houndmills: Macmillan Palgrave.
- Adman, P. (2008) Does Workplace Experience Enhance Political Participation? A Crucial Test of a Venerable Hypothesis. *Political Behaviour*, 30, 115-138.
- Agger, B. (1998) *Critical Social Theories*. Evanston Ill: Northwestern University Press.

- Alasoini, T. (2006) In Search of Generative Results: A New Generation of Programmes to Develop Work Organization. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 27 (1), 9-37.
- Albert, M. & Hahnel, R. (2002) In Defense of Participatory Economics. *Science & Society*, 66 (1), 7-21.
- Alexander, J. M. (2003) Capability Egalitarianism and Moral Selfhood. *Ethical Perspectives*, 10 (1), 3-21.
- Alexander, J. M. (2008) *Capabilities and Social Justice: The Political Philosophy of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum*. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Company.
- Alfes, K., Truss, C., Soane, E. C., Rees, C. & Gatenby, M. (2010) *Creating an Engaged Workforce: Findings from the Kingston Employee Engagement Consortium Project*. [Online] CIPD Report, [http://www.cipd.co.uk/NR/rdonlyres/DD66E557-DB90-4F07-8198-87C3876F3371/0/Creating\\_engaged\\_workforce.pdf](http://www.cipd.co.uk/NR/rdonlyres/DD66E557-DB90-4F07-8198-87C3876F3371/0/Creating_engaged_workforce.pdf) [Accessed 13th December, 2011].
- Alkire, S. (2005) *Needs and Capabilities, The Philosophy of Need*. Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement. Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Allen, M. P. (2006) Hegel between non-domination and expressive freedom: capabilities, perspectives, democracy. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 32 (4), 493-512.
- Alperovitz, G. (2005) *America Beyond Capitalism: Reclaiming Our Wealth, Our Liberty, and Our Democracy*. Wiley & Sons.

Alvesson, M. & Willmott, H. (1992) On the idea of emancipation in management and organization studies. *Academy of Management Review*, 17 (3), 432-363.

Alvesson, M. & Willmott, H. (2002) Identity Regulation as Organizational Control: Producing the Appropriate Individual. *Journal of Management Studies*, 39 (5), 619-44.

Anderson, E. S. (1995) *Value and Ethics in Economic Theory*. Harvard University Press.

Anderson, E. S. (1999) What is the Point of Equality? *Ethics*, 109 (2), 287-337.

Anderson, E. S. (2010) Justifying the Capabilities Approach to Justice. In: Brighouse & Robeyns (eds.), *Measuring Justice, Primary Goods and Capabilities*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.

Anderson, J. & Honneth, A. (2005) Autonomy, Vulnerability, Recognition and Justice. In: Christman & Anderson (eds.) *Autonomy and the Challenges to Liberalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Anthony, P. D. (1978) *The Ideology of Work*. London: Tavistock Publications.

Appadurai, A. (1986) Introduction: Commodities and the Politics of Value. In: Appadurai A. (ed.), *The Social Life of Things*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Arendt, H. (1977 [1954]) What is Freedom? In: *Between Past and Future*, London: Penguin Books.

Arendt, H. (1958) *The Human Condition*. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London.

Arendt, H. (1963) *On Revolution*. London: Penguin Books.

Arendt, H. (1972) *Crises of the Republic*. London: Penguin Books.

Aristotle (1953) *The Nicomachean Ethics*. London: Penguin Books.

Armstrong, C. & Squires, J. (2002) Beyond the Public/Private Dichotomy: Relational Space and Sexual Inequalities. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 1, 261-283.

Armstrong, C. (2003) Opportunity, responsibility and the market: interrogating liberal equality. *Economy and Society*, 32 (3), 410-427.

Armstrong, C. (2008) Collapsing Categories: Fraser on economy, culture and justice. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 34 (4), 409-425.

Arneson, R. J. (1981) What's Wrong with Exploitation. *Ethics*, 91, 202-227.

Arneson, R. J. (1987) Meaningful Work and Market Socialism. *Ethics*, 97 (3), 517-545.

Arneson, R. J. (2000) Perfectionism and Politics. *Ethics*, 111 (1), 36-63.

Arneson, R. J. (2003) Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11, 122-132.

Arneson, R. J. (2006) Desire Formation and the Human Good. In: Olsaretti (ed.), *Preferences and Well-Being*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



- Arnold, D. G. & Bowie, N. E. (2003) Sweatshops and Respect for Persons. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 13, (2), 221-242.
- Arnold, T. C. (2001) Rethinking Moral Economy. *The American Political Science Review*, 95 (1), 85-95.
- Arnold, S. (2012) The Difference Principle at Work. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 20 (1), 94-118.
- Aronson, J. & Neysmith, S. M. (2006) Obscuring the Costs of Home Care: Restructuring at Work. *Work, Employment and Society*, 20 (1), 27-45.
- Ashforth, B. E. & Kreiner, G. (1999) How Can You Do It? Dirty Work and the Challenge of Constructing a Positive Identity. *The Academy of Management Review*, 24 (3), 413-434.
- Ashforth, B. E. & Tomiuk, M. (2000) Emotional Labor and Authenticity: Views from Service Agents. In: Fineman(ed.), *Emotion in Organizations*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Attewell, P. (1990) What is Skill? *Work and Occupations*, 17 (4), 422-448.
- Audi, R. (2005) Intrinsic Value and Meaningful Life. *Philosophical Papers*, 34, 331-55.
- Aufhauser, R. K. (1973) Slavery and Scientific Management. *The Journal of Economic History*, 33 (4), 811-824.
- Bachtiger, A. (2010) On Perfecting the Deliberative Process: Agonistic Inquiry as a Key Deliberative Technique. *2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington (DC), September 2-5, 2007*. [Online]

[http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=1642280](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1642280) [Accessed 5<sup>th</sup> June, 2011].

Bachtiger, A. & Hangartner, D. (2010) When Deliberative Theory Meets Political Science: Theoretical and Methodological Challenges in the Study of a Philosophical Ideal. *Political Studies*, forthcoming.

Bagchi, A. K. (2000) Freedom and Development as End of Alienation. *Economic and Political Weekly*, December 9, 4409-20.

Baggini, J. (2004) *What's It All About? Philosophy and the Meaning of Life*. London: Granta Books.

Baier, K. (2000 [1957]) The Meaning of Life. In: Klemke (ed.), *The Meaning of Life*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Baleren, B., Errasati, A., & Bergiristain, A. (2004) Governance of the Mondragon Corporacion Cooperativa. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 75 (1), 61-87.

Banks, M. (2006) Moral Economy and Cultural Work. *Sociology*, 40 (3), 455-472.

Barclay, L. J. (2005) Following in the footsteps of Mary Parker Follett. *Journal of Management History*, 43 (5), 740-760.

Barker, J. R. (1999) *The Discipline of Teamwork: Participation and Coercive Control*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Barley, S. R. & Bechky, B. A. (1994) In the backrooms of science: The work of technicians in science labs. *Work and Occupations*, 26, 85-126.

Barley, S. R. & Kunda, G. (2001) Bringing Work Back In. *Organization Science*, 12 (1), 76-95.

Barnett, C. (2004) Deconstructing Radical Democracy: Articulation, Representation and Being-with-others. *Political Geography*, 23 (5), 503-528.

Bartelheimer, P., Moncel, N., Verd, J. M., Vero, J., Buttner, R., Towards Analysing Individual Working Lives in a Resource/Capabilities Perspective. European Integration Research Project CAPRIGHT. [Online] [http://www.sofi-goettingen.de/fileadmin/Peter\\_Bartelheimer/Literatur/Net-Doc-50.pdf#page=25](http://www.sofi-goettingen.de/fileadmin/Peter_Bartelheimer/Literatur/Net-Doc-50.pdf#page=25) [Accessed Online 20<sup>th</sup> June, 2011].

Baumeister, R. F. (1991) *Meanings of Life*. New York: Guilford.

Bechky, B. (2003) Sharing Meaning across Occupational Communities: The Transformation of Understanding on a Production Floor. *Organization Science*, 14 (3), 312-330.

Beech, N. (2008) On the Nature of Dialogic Identity Work. *Organization*, 15 (1), 51-74.

Beirne, M. (2008) Idealism and the Applied Relevance of Research on Employee Participation. *Work, Employment and Society*, 22 (4), 675-693.

Benhabib, S. (1993) Feminist Theory and Hannah Arendt's Concept of Public Space. *History of the Human Sciences*, 6 (2), 97-114.

Benjamin, J. (1990) An Outline of Intersubjectivity: The Development of Recognition. *Psychoanalytic Psychology*, 7 (Suppl), 33-46.

Benjamin, J. (2002) The Rhythm of Recognition: Comments on the Work of Louis Sanders. *Psychoanalytic Dialogues*, 12 (1), 43-53.

Benson, P. (1994) Free Agency and Self-Worth. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 91 (12), 650-668.

Benson, P. (2000) Feeling Crazy: Self-Worth and the Social Character of Responsibility. In: Mackenzie & Stoljar (eds.) *Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Berg J. M., Wrzesniewski, A., & Dutton, J. E. (2010) Perceiving and responding to challenges in job crafting at different ranks: When proactivity requires adaptivity. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 31,158-186.

Berlin, I. (1969) Two Concepts of Liberty. In: Berlin (ed.) *Four Essays on Liberty*, London & New York: Oxford University Press.

Bernstein, P. (1976) Necessary Elements for Worker Participation in Decision-Making. *Journal of Economic Issues*, X (2), 490-522.

Blackman, L., Cromby, J., Hook, D., Papdopoulos, D., & Walkerdine, V. (2008), Creating Subjectivities. *Subjectivity*, 22, 1-27.

Blakely, T. J. (1979) Praxis and Labor in Jurgen Habermas. *Studies in Soviet Thought*, 20 (3), 291-294.

Blauner, R. (1964) *Alienation and Freedom*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.

Blaug, R. (2007) Cognition in a Hierarchy. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 6, 24-44.

Blaug, R. (2009) Why is there hierarchy? Democracy and the Question of Organisational Form. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 12 (1), 85-99.

Block, P. (1993) *Stewardship: Choosing Service over Self-Interest*. San Francisco: Berrett-Koehler.

Blum, F. H. (1968) *Work and Community: The Scott Bader Commonwealth and the Quest for a New Social Order*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Blumberg, P. (1968) *Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation*. London: Constable.

Blustein, D. L. (2006) *The Psychology of Working: A new perspective for career development, counselling and public policy*. Mahweh, NJ: Erlbaum.

Blustein, D. L. (2008) The Role of Work in Psychological Health and Well-Being. *American Psychologist*, 63 (4), 228-240.

Boatright, J. R. (2004) Employee Governance and the Ownership of the Firm. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 14 (1), 1-21.

Bohman, J. (1996) *Public Deliberation, Pluralism, Complexity and Democracy*. Boston: MIT Press

Bohman, J. (1998) Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 6, 400-425.

Bohman, J. (2007a) Beyond Distributive Justice and Struggles for Recognition: Freedom, Democracy, and Critical Theory. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 6 (3), 267-276.

Bohman, J. (2007b) *Democracy Across Borders: from Demos to Demoi*. MIT Press.

Bojer, H. (2005) *The Social Contract: Unpaid Child Care and Women's Economic Capability*. Department of Economics, University of Oslo.

Bolle, P. (2009) Labour Statistics: the Boundaries and Diversity of Work. *International Labour Review*, 148, Issue 1-2, 183-193.

Bolton, S. (2009) Getting to the Heart of the Emotional Labour Process: A Reply to Brook. *Work, Employment & Society*, 23 (3), 549-560.

Bondi, L. (2008) On the relational dynamics of caring: a psychotherapeutic approach to emotional and power dimensions of women's care work. *Gender, Place and Culture*, 15 (3), 249-265.

Bonvin, J & Farvaque, N. (2006) Promoting Capability for Work: The Role of Local Actors. In: Deneulin, Nebel & Sagovsky (eds.) *Transforming Unjust Structures: The Capability Approach*. Dordrecht: Springer, 121-142.

Bonvin, J. & Orton, M. (2009) Activation Policies and Organisational Innovation: the added value of the capability approach. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy*, 29 (11/12), 565-574.

Bonvin, J-M. (2003) Deliberative Democracy and Capabilities: The Impact and Significance of Voice. *3rd Conference on Capability Approach, Pavia, 2003*.

Borgerson, J. L. (2007) On the Harmony of Feminist Ethics and Business Ethics. *Business and Society Review*, 112 (4), 477-509.

Bosma, H., Marmot, M. G., Hemingway, H., Nicholson, A. C. Brunner, E., Stansfeld, S. (1997), Low job control and risk of coronary heart disease in Whitehall ii (prospective cohort) study. *British Medical Journal*, 314.

Bowie, N. E. (1998) A Kantian Theory of Meaningful Work. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 17, 1083-1092.

Bowles, S. & Gintis, H. (1989) A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise. *Economics and Philosophy*, 9, 75-100.

Bowles, S. (1998) Endogeneous Preferences: The Cultural Consequences of Markets and Other Economic Institutions. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 36 (1), 75-111.

Brandt, B. (1995) *Whole Life Economics: Revealing Daily Life*. Philadelphia, PA: New Society Publishers.

Bratman, M. E. (1992) Shared Cooperative Activity. *The Philosophical Review*, 101 (2), 327-341.

Bratman, M. E. (2000) Reflection, Planning and Temporally Extended Agency. *The Philosophical Review*, 109 (1), 35-61.

Braverman, H. (1974) *Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Monthly Review Press.

Braybrooke, D. (1987) *Meeting Needs: Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Braybrooke, D (1998a) Diagnosis and Remedy in Marx's Doctrine of Alienation. In: Brayrooke (ed.), *Moral Objectives, Rules, and the Forms of Social Change*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Braybrooke, D. (1998b) The Meaning of Participation and of Demands for It. In: Braybrooke (ed.) *Moral Objectives, Rules, and the Forms of Social Change*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Braybrooke, D. (1998c) Work: A Cultural Ideal Ever More in Jeopardy. In: Braybrooke (ed.), *Moral Objectives, Rules, and the Forms of Social Change*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Braybrooke, D. (1998d) Two Concepts of Needs in Marx's Writings. In: Braybrooke (ed,) *Moral Objectives, Rules, and the Forms of Social Change*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Braybrooke, D (2005) Where does the Moral Force of the Concept of Needs Reside and When? In: Reader (ed.), *The Philosophy of Need*, Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement. Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Breen, K (2007a) Work and Emancipatory Practice: Recovering Human Beings' Productive Capacities. *Res Publica*, 13 (4), 381-414.

Breen, K. (2007b) Violence and Power: A Critique of Hannah Arendt on the 'political'. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 33 (3), 343-372.

Breen, K. (2011) Work and Practical Reasoning: On Two Rival Visions of the Workplace. *Paper presented to the Contemporary Aristotelian Studies (CAS)*



specialist group of the Political Studies Association (PSA) 1<sup>st</sup> Annual Conference, 3<sup>rd</sup> June 2011.

Brenkert, G. G. (1992) Freedom, Participation and Corporations: The Issue of Corporate (Economic) Democracy. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 2 (3), 251-269.

Brennan, G. & Pettit, P. (2004) *The Economy of Esteem: An Essay on Civil and Political Society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Brinkmann, S. (2008) Identity as Self-Interpretation. *Theory & Psychology*, 18 (3), 404-422.

Brock, D. W. (1988) Paternalism and Autonomy. *Ethics*, 98 (3), 550-565.

Brogger, B. (2010) An Innovative Approach to Employee Participation in a Norwegian Retail Chain. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 31 (4), 477-495.

Bubeck, (1995) *Care, Gender and Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Buchanan, A. E. (1985) *Ethics, Efficiency, and the Market*. Rowman & Littlefield.

Buechner, C. F. (1973) *Wishful Thinking: A Theological ABC*. New York: HarperCollins.

Bullock, Great Britain, Parliament, House of Commons (1997), Report of the Committee of Inquiry on Industrial Democracy, Chairman Lord Bullock, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office.

Burawoy, M. (1979) *Manufacturing Consent: Changes in the Labor Process under Monopoly Capitalism*. London: University of Chicago Press.

- Byers, D. & Rhodes, C. (2007) Ethics, Alterity and Organisational Justice. *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 16 (3), 239-250.
- Cacioppo, J. T. & Patrick, W. (2008) *Loneliness: Human Nature and the Need for Social Connection*. W. W. Norton & Company Inc.
- Cameron, J. & Gibson-Graham, J. K. (2003) Feminising the Economy: Metaphors, strategies and politics. *Gender, Place & Culture*, 10 (2), 145-157.
- Camus, A. (1955) *The Myth of Sisyphus and other essays*. London: Penguin Books.
- Caney, S. (1991) Consequentialist Defences of Liberal Neutrality. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 41 (165), 457-477.
- Canovan, M. (1983) A Case of Distorted Communication: A Note on Habermas and Arendt. *Political Theory*, 11 (1), 105-116.
- Card, C. (1991) *Feminist Ethics*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas.
- Carter, N. (2006) Political Participation and the Workplace: The Spillover Thesis Revisited. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 8, 410-426.
- Carter, N. (2003) Workplace Democracy: Turning Workers into Citizens? *Paper presented at ECPR joint sessions, Edinburgh, March 28-April 2, 2003*.
- Casassas, D. (2007) Basic Income and the Republican Ideal: Rethinking Material Independence in Contemporary Societies. *Basic Income Studies*, 2 (2), 1-7.
- Casey, C. (1995) *Work, Self and Society after Industrialism*. London: Routledge.

- Casey, C. (1996) Corporate Transformations. *Organization*, 3 (3), 317-39.
- Cast, A. D. & Burke, P. J. (2002) A Theory of Self-Esteem. *Social Forces*, 80 (3), 1041-1068.
- Castel, R. (2003) *From Manual Workers to Wage Laborers: Transformation of the Social Question*. New Brunswick & London: Transaction Publishers.
- Cathcart, A. (2009) *Directing democracy: the case of the John Lewis Partnership*. [Online] <https://lra.le.ac.uk/handle/2381/7811> [Accessed 5th September, 2011].
- Chalofosky, N. (2003a) Meaningful Work, *Training and Development*. 57 (12), 52-58.
- Chalofosky, N. (2003b) An Emerging Construct for Meaningful Work. *Human Resources Development International*, 6 (1), 69-83.
- Chalofosky, N. & Krishna, V. (2009) Meaningfulness, Commitment, and Engagement: The Intersection of a Deeper Level of Intrinsic Motivation, Advances in Developing. *Human Resources*, 11 (2), 189-203.
- Chan, J. (2000) Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 29, 5-42.
- Christiano, T. (2004), *Authority*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Christiano, T. (2005) An Argument for Egalitarian Justice and against the Levelling-Down Objection. In: Campbell, O'Rourke & Shier (eds.), *Law & Social Justice*, Cambridge, Mass. & London: The MIT Press.
- Christman, J. (2002) *Social and Political Philosophy*. London: Routledge.

- Christman, J (2004a) Narrative Unity as a Condition of Personhood. *Metaphilosophy*, 35 (5), 695-713.
- Christman, J. (2004b) Relational Autonomy, Liberal Individualism and the Social Constitution of Selves. *Philosophical Studies*, 117, 143-164.
- Christman, J. (2009) Freedom, Autonomy and Social Selves. *American Political Science Association Meetings*, Toronto, Sept. 5, 2009.
- Ciulla, J. B. (2000) *The Working Life: The Promise and Betrayal of Modern Work*. New York: Random House.
- Clark, A. & Chalmers, D. (1998) The Extended Mind. *Analysis*, 58 (1), 7-19.
- Clark, A. (1997) *Being There*. Boston, MA: MIT Press.
- Clark, A. E. (2005) Your Money or Your Life: Changing Job Quality . *OECD Countries, Discussion Paper No. 1610*, The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
- Clark, B. & Gintis, H. (1978) Rawlsian Justice and Economic Systems. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 7 (4), 302-325.
- Clark, D. A. (2005) Sen's Capability Approach and the Many Spaces of Human Well-Being. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 41 (8), 1339-1368.
- Clark, G. (1984) Authority and Efficiency: The Labor Market and the Managerial Revolution of the Late Nineteenth Century. *Journal of Economic History*, XLIV (4), 1069-1083.

Clarke, S. (2006a) Debate: State Paternalism, Neutrality and Perfectionism. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14 (1), 111-121.

Clarke, S. (2006b) The Self-Development Argument for Individual Freedom. *Minerva*, 10, 137-171.

Clarke, T. (1997) Industrial Democracy: The Institutionalized Suppression of Industrial Conflict? In: Clarke & Clements (eds.), *Trade Unions under Capitalism*, Glasgow: Fontana/Collins.

Clayre, A. (1974) *Work and Play: Ideas and Experience of Work and Leisure*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson.

Clegg, S. R. (2006) Why is Organization Theory so Ignorant? The Neglect of Total Institutions. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 15 (4), 426-430.

Code, L. (1995) *Rhetorical Spaces: Essays on Gendered Locations*. Routledge: New York.

Cohen, J. & Rogers, J. (1992) Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance. *Politics and Society*, 20, 393-472.

Cohen, J. & Fung, A. (2004) The Radical-Democratic Project. *Swiss Journal of Political Science*. [Online]  
[http://www.archonfung.com/docs/articles/2004/Cohen\\_Fung\\_Debate\\_SPSR2004.pdf](http://www.archonfung.com/docs/articles/2004/Cohen_Fung_Debate_SPSR2004.pdf) [Accessed 9th September, 2010].

Cohen, J. (1989) The Economic Basis of Deliberative Democracy. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 6, 25-50.

Cohen, J. (1997) The Arc of the Moral Universe. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 26 (2), 91-134.

Cohen, J. (2002) Procedure and Substance in Deliberative Democracy. In: Bohman & Rehg (eds.), *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason & Politics*, MIT Press.

Collier, J. & Esteban, R. (1999) Governance in the Participative Organisation: Freedom, Creativity and Ethics. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 21 (2/3), 173-188.

Collinson, D. L. (2003) Identities and Insecurities: Selves in Work. *Organization*, 10 (3), 527-547.

Connolly, W. E. (1991) *Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox*. Minneapolis: Cornell University Press.

Connolly, W. E. (1995) *The Ethos of Pluralization*. Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press.

Connolly, W. E. (1999) Assembling the Left. *Boundary*, 2 26: 3.

Connolly, W. E. (2000) Speed, Concentric Cultures, and Cosmopolitan. *Political Theory*, 28 (5).

Connolly, W. E. (2004a) The Ethos of Democratization. In: Critchley & Marchart (eds.), *Laclau: A Critical Reader*, London: Routledge.

Connolly, W. E. (2004b) Realizing Agonistic Respect. *Journal of the American Academy of Religion*, 72 (2), 507-11.

Connolly, W. E. (2005) *Pluralism*. Durham & London: Duke University Press.

Connolly, W. E. (2011) *A World of Becoming*. Durham & London: Duke University Press.

Copp, D. (2007) Autonomy and the Social Construction of Values. In: Ronnow-Rasumussen, Petersson, Josefsson & Egonsson (eds.), *Hommage a Wlodek: Philosophical Papers Dedicated to Wlodek Rabinowicz*.

Coole, D. (2000) Cartographic Convulsions: Public and Private Reconsidered. *Political Theory*, 28 (3), 337-354.

Cooper, D. (1988) Life and Narrative. *International Journal of Moral and Social Studies*, 3, 161-172.

Cooke, M. (2004) Redeeming Redemption: The Utopian Dimension of Critical Social Theory. *Philosophy and Social Criticism*, 30 (4), 413-429.

Cornelius, N. & Gagnon, S. (2002) Re-Examining Workplace Equality: The Capabilities Approach. *Human Resource Management Journal*, 10 (4), 68-87.

Cornforth, C. (2004) The Governance of Cooperatives and Mutual Associations: A Paradox Perspective. *Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics*, 75 (1), 11-32.

Costa, M. V. (2009a) Rawls on Liberty and Domination. *Res Publica*, 15, 397-413.

Costa, M. V. (2009b) Neo-Republicanism, freedom as non-domination, and citizen virtue. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, 8 (4), 401-419.

Council of Civil Service Unions/Cabinet Office (2004) *Work, Stress and Health: The Whitehall II Study*. London: Public and Commercial Service Union.

Courpasson, D. & Dany, F. (2003) Indifference or Obedience? Business Firms as Democratic Hybrids. *Organization Studies*, 24 (8), 1231-1260.

Courpasson, D. (2000) Managerial Strategies of Domination: Power in Soft Bureaucracies. *Organization Studies*, 21 (1), 141-161.

Coz, A., Higgins, T., & Speckesser, S. (2011) Management Practices and Sustainable Organisational Performance: An Analysis of the European Company Survey 2009, *European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions*.

Cox, A., Zagelmeyer, S., and Marchington, M. (2006) Embedding Employee Involvement and Participation (EIP) at Work. *Human Resource Management Journal*, 16 (3), 250-265.

Crane, A., Matten, D., Moon, J. (2004) Stakeholders as Citizens? Rethining Rights, Participation and Democracy. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 53, 107-122.

Crawford, M. B. (2009) *Shop Class as Soulcraft: An Inquiry into the Value of Work*. London: Penguin Books.

Crocker, D. (1992) Functioning and Capabilities: The Foundation of Sen's and Nussbaum's Development Ethic. *Political Theory*, 20 (4), 584-612.

Crocker, J. & Park, L. E. (2004) The Costly Pursuit of Self-Esteem. *Psychological Bulletin*, 130 (3), 392-414.



Crouch, C. (1993) *Co-Operation and Competition in an Institutionalised Economy: The Case of Germany*. The Political Quarterly Publishing Co. Ltd.

Csikszentmihalyi, M. (1991) *Flow: The Psychology of Optimal Experience*. Harper Perennial.

Cunliffe, J. & Erreygers, G. (2003) Basic Income? Basic Capital! Origins and Issues of a Debate. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11 (1), 89-110.

Currie, G. (2007) Framing Narratives. In: Hutto (ed.), *Narrative and Understanding Persons*, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

De Beauvoir, S. (1986 [1948]) *The Ethics of Ambiguity*. Frechtman (trans), Citadel Press.

De Graaf, F. J. & Herkstroter, C. A. (2007) How Corporate Social Performance is Institutionalised within the Governance Structure. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 74, 177-189.

De Munck, J. & Ferreras, I. (2004) Collective rights, deliberation and capabilities: an approach to collective bargaining in the Belgian retail industry. In: Salais & Villeneuve (eds.) *Europe and the Politics of Capabilities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Du Gay, P. (1996) *Consumption and Identity at Work*. London: Sage.

Du Gay, P. (2007) *Organizing Identity*. London: Sage.

Dagger, R. (2006) Neo-Republicanism and the Civic Economy. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics*, 5 (2), 151-173.

Dahl, R. (1985) *A Preface to Economic Democracy*. Berkley, LA: University of California Press.

Dale, K. (2005) Building a Social Materiality: Spatial and Embodied Politics. *Organizational Control*, 12 (5), 649-678.

Dalton, B. (2004) Creativity, Habit, and the Social Products of Creative Action: Revising Joas, Incorporating Bourdieu. *Sociological Theory*, 22 (4), 603-622.

Daly, M. (1973) *Beyond God the Father*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Daniellou, F. (2004) Alain Wisner: Learning from the Workers Around the World. *Ergonomia*, 26 (3), 197-203.

Daniellou, F. (2005) The French-speaking ergonomists' approach to work activity: cross-influences of field intervention and conceptual models. *Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science*, 6 (5), 409-427.

Daniels, N. (1978) Merit and Meritocracy. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 7 (3), 206-223.

Daniels, N. (1990) Equality of What: Welfare, Resources, or Capabilities? *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1 (Suppl.), 273-296.

Darwall, S. (1995) Two Kinds of Respect. In: Dillon (ed.), *Dignity, Character and Self-Respect*, London: Routledge.

Darwall, S. (1999) Valuing Activity. *Social Philosophy & Policy*, 16 (1), 176-196.

- Darwall, S. (2002) *Welfare and Rational Care*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Darwall, S. (2004) Respect and the Second-Person Standpoint. *Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association*, 78 (2), 43-59.
- Davies, J. B. (2006) The Normative Significance of the Individual in Economics: Freedom, Dignity and Human Rights. In: Clary, Dolfsma & Figart (eds.), *Ethics and the Market: Insights from social economics*, London & New York: Routledge.
- Davies, K. (2001) Responsibility and Daily Life: Reflections over timespace. In: May & Thrift (eds.), *TimeSpace: Geographies of Temporality*, London: Routledge.
- Deacon, A. (2007) Civic Labour or Doulia? Care, Reciprocity and Welfare. *Social Policy & Society*, 6 (4), 481-490.
- Deakin, S. & Koukiadaki, A. (2009) The Capability Approach and Corporate Restructuring: UK Sectoral and Enterprise-Based Case Studies. *EU Sixth Research and Development Framework Programme: Integrated Project 'Resources, Rights and Capabilities in Europe'*, University of Cambridge
- Dean, H. (2009) Critiquing Capabilities: The Distractions of a Beguiling Concept. *Critical Social Policy*, 29 (2), 261-278.
- Deci, E. L. & Ryan, R. M. (2000) The What and Why of Goal Pursuits: Human Needs and the Self-Determination of Behavior. *Psychological Inquiry*, 11 (4), 227-268.

Dejours, C. (1998) *Souffrance en France. La Banalisation de l'injustice sociale*. Paris: Seuil.

Dejours, C. (2006) Subjectivity, Work and Action. *Critical Horizons*, 7 (1), 45-62.

Deneulin, S. (2002) Perfectionism, Paternalism and Liberalism in Sen and Nussbaum's Capability Approach. *Review of Political Economy*, 14 (4), 497-518.

Deranty, J-P. (2006) Repressed Materiality: Retrieving the Materialism in Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition. *Critical Horizons*, 7 (1), 137-163.

Deranty, J-P. (2007) Politicizing Honneth's Ethics of Recognition. *Thesis Eleven*, 88, 92-111.

Deranty, J-P. (2008) Work and the Precarisation of Existence. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 11 (4), 443-463.

Deranty, J-P. (2009) What is Work? Key Insights from the Psychodynamics of Work. *Thesis Eleven*, 98, 69-87.

Dewey, J. (1893) Self-Realization as the Moral Ideal. *The Philosophical Review*, 2 (6), 652-664.

Dewey, J. (1927) *The Public and Its Problems*. Swallow Press & Ohio University Press.

Dietz, M. G. (2002) *Turning Operations: Feminism, Arendt, and Politics*. New York & London: Routledge.

Digeser, P. (1992) The Fourth Face of Power. *The Journal of Politics*, 54 (4), 977-1007.

- Dillon, R. S. (1995) Toward a Feminist Conception of Self-Respect. In: Dillon (ed.), *Dignity, Character & Self-Respect*, London: Routledge.
- Dillon, R. S. (1997) Self-Respect: Moral, Emotional, Political. *Ethics*, 107 (2), 226-249.
- Dillon, R. S. (2010) *Respect*. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
- Dilman, I. (1965) Life and Meaning. *Philosophy*, 40 (154), 320-333.
- Doherty, M. (2009) When the Working Day is Through: the end of work as identity? *Work, Employment & Society*, 23 (1), 84-101.
- Doppelt, D. (1984) Paradigms of Human Freedom and the Problem of Justification. *Inquiry*, 27 (1-4).
- Doppelt, D. (2009) The Place of Self-Respect in a Theory of Justice. *Inquiry*, 52 (2), 127-154.
- Doyal, L. & Gough, I. (1984) A Theory of Human Needs. *Critical Social Policy*, 4 (10), 6-38.
- Dryzek, J. S. (2000) *Deliberative Democracy and Beyond*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dryzek, J. S. (2001) Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy. *Political Theory*, 29 (5), 651-669.
- Dunne, J. (1993) *Back to the Rough Ground: 'Phronesis' and 'Techne' in Modern Philosophy and in Aristotle*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame.

Dundon, T. & Gollan, P. J. (2007) Reconceptualising Voice in the Non-Union Workplace. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 18 (7), 1182-1198.

Dundon, T., Wilkinson, A., Marchington, M. & Ackers, P. (2004) The Meanings and Purpose of Employee Voice. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 15 (6), 1149-1170.

Dundon, T., Wilkinson, A., Marchington, M., & Ackers, P. (2005) The Management of Voice in Non-Union Organisations: Managers' Perspectives. *Employee Relations*, 27 (3), 307-319.

Durkheim, E *The Division of Labour in Society*. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.

Dzur, A. W. (1998) Liberal Perfectionism and Democratic Participation. *Polity*, 30 (4), 667-690.

Edwards, P (1967) The Meaning and Value of Life. In: Klemke (ed.) *The Meaning of Life*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Edwards, P. & Wajcman, J (2005) *The Politics of Working Life*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Ehrenreich & Hochschild (eds) *Global Woman: Nannies, Maids and Sex Workers in the New Economy*. London: Granta Books.

Elias, M. V. (2008) Governance from the Ground Up: Rediscovering Mary Parker Follett. *Public Administration and Management*, 15 (1), 9-45.

Elster, J. (1997) *The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory*. In: Bohman & Rehg (eds.) *Deliberative Democracy: Essays on Reason and Politics*, Cambridge & London: MIT Press.

Elster, J. (1983) *Sour Grapes: Studies in the Subversion of Rationality*. Cambridge: Maison des Sciences de l'Homme and Cambridge University Press.

Elster, J. (1985) *Making Sense of Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, J. (1986a) Self-Realisation in Work & Politics: the Marxist Conception of the Good Life. *Philosophy & Social Policy*, 3 (2), 99-100.

Elster, J. (1986b) *An Introduction to Karl Marx*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

England, G. & Harpaz, I. (1990) How Working is Defined: National Contexts and Demographic and Organizational Role Influences. *Journal of Organizational Behaviour*, 11 (4), 253-266.

England K. & Lawson, V. (2005) *Feminist Analyses of Work: Rethinking the Boundaries, Gendering, and Spatiality of Work*. In: England & Lawson (eds.) *A Companion to Feminist Geography*, Wiley-Blackwell.

England, P. (2003) Separative and Soluble Selves: dichotomous thinking in economics. In: Ferber & Nelson (eds.) *Feminist Economics Today: Beyond Economic Man*, Chicago & London: Chicago University Press.

Engster, D. (2005) Rethinking Care Theory: The Practice of Caring and the Obligation to Care. *Hypatia*, 20 (3), 50-74.

Epstein, S. R. (1998) Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe. *The Journal of Economic History*, 58 (3), 684-713.

Estlund, C. (2003) *Working Together: How Workplace Bonds Strengthen a Diverse Democracy*. Oxford University Press.

Ettlinger, N. (2003) Cultural Economic Geography and a Relational and Microspace Approach to Trusts, Rationalities, Networks, and Change in Collaborative Workplaces. *Journal of Economic Geography*, 3, 145-171.

Ettlinger, N. (2004) Toward a Critical Theory of Untidy Geographies: The Spatiality of Emotions in Consumption and Production. *Feminist Economics*, 10 (3), 21-54.

Eyerman, R. & Shipway, D. (1981) Habermas on Work and Culture. *Theory and Society*, 10 (4), 547-566.

Eylon, D. (1998) Understanding empowerment and resolving its paradox: lessons from Mary Parker Follett. *Journal of Management History*, 4 (1), 16-28.

Ezzy, D. (1997) Subjectivity and the Labour Process: Conceptualising Good Work. *Sociology*, 31 (3), 427-444.

Ezzy, D. (2001) A Simulacrum of Workplace Community: Individualism and Engineered Culture. *Sociology*, 35 (3), 631-650.

Faure-Rouesnel, L. (2001) French Anthropology and Material Culture, *Journal of Material Culture*, 6, 237-47.

Feinberg, J. (1973) *The Idea of the Free Man, in Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty*. Routledge & Kegan Paul.



Feinberg, J. (1992) *Absurd Self-Fulfillment, in Freedom and Fulfillment: Philosophical Essays*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Feldman, L. C. (1999) Political Judgment with a Difference: Agonistic Democracy and the Limits of Enlarged Mentality. *Polity*, 32 (1), 1-24.

Feldman, L. C. (2002) Redistribution, Recognition and the State: The Irreducibly Political Dimension of Injustice. *Political Theory*, 30 (3), 410-440.

Feltham, O. & Clemens, J. (2003) An Introduction to Alain Badiou's Philosophy. In: Feltham & Clemens (eds.) *Infinite Thought Truth and the Return to Philosophy*, London & New York: Continuum.

Ferber & Nelson, eds. (2003) *Feminist Economics Today: Beyond Economic Man*. London & Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Ferree, M. M. (1990) Beyond Separate Spheres: Feminism and Family Research. *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, 52 (4), 866-884.

Fisher, B. & Tronto, J. (1990) Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring. In: Abel & Nelson (eds.) *Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women's Lives*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Flanagan, O (1996) What Makes Life Worth Living? In: Klemke (ed.) *The Meaning of Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Flanagan, O (2007) *The Really Hard Problem: Meaning in a Material World*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.

- Fine, G. A. (1996) Justifying Work: Occupational rhetorics as resources in restaurant kitchens. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 41, 90-115.
- Flikschuh, K. (2007) *Freedom: Contemporary Liberal Perspectives*. Cambridge & Malden, MA: Polity Press.
- Flum, H. (2001) Dialogues and Challenges: The Interface Between Work and Relationships in Transition. *Counselling Psychologist*, 29, 259-270.
- Follett, M. P. (1998 [1918]) *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Follett, M. P. (1919) Community is a Process. *The Philosophical Review*, 28 (6), 576-588.
- Follett, M. P. (1930 [1924]) *Creative Experience*. London: Longmans, Green & Co.
- Follett, M. P. (1973 [1940]) *Dynamic Administration: The Collected Papers of Mary Parker Follett*. In: Fox & Urwick (eds.) *Dynamic Administration*. London: Pitman Publishing.
- Follett, M. P. (1987 [1949]) *Freedom and Coordination: Lectures in Business Organization*, Urwick (ed.). London & New York: Garland Publishing.
- Form, W. (1980) Resolving Ideological Issues on the Division of Labor'. In: Blalock (ed.) *Sociological Theory and Research*. New York: Free Press.
- Fossen, T. (2008) Agonistic Critiques of Liberalism: Perfection and Emancipation. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 7, 376-394.

Fourier, C. (1983) *The Utopian Vision of Charles Fourier: Selected Texts on Work, Love, and Passionate Attraction*. In: Beecher & Bienvenu (eds.). Columbia: University of Missouri Press.

Frankfurt, H. (1982) The Importance of What We Care About. *Synthese*, 53, 257-72.

Frankfurt, H. (2002) Reply to Susan Wolf. In: Buss & Overton (eds.) *Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press.

Frankfurt, H. (2004) *The Reasons of Love*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Frankl, V. E. (1978) *The Unheard Cry for Meaning: Psychotherapy and Humanism*. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Frankl, V.E. (1984) *Man's Search for Meaning*. Washington Square Press: New York.

Frankl, V. E.(1988) *The Will to Meaning*. New American Library: New York.

Frankl, V. E. (2004) Logos, Paradox, and the Search for Meaning. In: Freeman, Mahoney & DeVito (eds.) *Cognition and Psychotherapy*. Springer Publishing Company.

Franzway, S. (2003) You need to care: the work of care between home and market. *Paper presented to The Australian Sociological Association Annual Conference*, UNE, Armidale, Australia.

Fraser, N. & Gordon, L. (1994) A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State. *Signs: A Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 19 (1), 1-29.

Fraser, N. & Honneth, A. (2003) *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*. London & New York: Verso.

Fraser, N. (1985) What's Critical about Critical Theory? The Case of Habermas and Gender. *New German Critique: Special Issue on Jurgen Habermas*, 33, 97-131.

Fraser, N. (1989a) Talking about Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies. *Ethics*, 99 (2), 291-313.

Fraser, N. (1989b) *Unruly Practices: Power, Discourse, and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory*. Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press.

Fraser, N. (1990) Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy. *Social Text*, 25/26, 56-80.

Fraser, N. (1994) After the Family Wage: Gender Equality and the Welfare State. *Political Theory*, 22 (4), 591-618.

Fraser, N. (2005) Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World. *New Left Review*, No. 36.

Frazer, E & Lacey, N. (1994) MacIntyre, Feminism and the Concept of Practice. In: Horton & Mendus (eds.) *After MacIntyre*. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press.

Fredman, S. (2004) Women at Work: The Broken Promise of Flexicurity. *Industrial Law Journal*, 33 (4), 299-319.

Freeman, S. (2000) Deliberative Democracy: A Sympathetic Comment. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 29 (4), 371-418.

Freeman, S. (2007) *Rawls*. London and New York: Routledge.

Frege, C. (2005) The Discourse of Industrial Democracy: Germany and the US Revisited. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 26 (1), 151-175.

Freire, P. (1970) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. London: Penguin Books.

Friedman, A. (1977) Responsible Autonomy versus Direct Control over the Labour Process. *Capital and Class*, 1 (1), 43-57.

Fromm, E. (1945) *The Fear of Freedom*. London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co.

Fromm, E. (1947) *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics*. New York: Rinehart.

Fromm, E. (1955) *The Sane Society*. New York: Rinehart.

Fromm, E. (1976) *To Have or to Be?* New York: Harper & Row.

Frye, M. (1983) *The Politics of Reality*. Trumansburg, NY: The Crossing Press.

Fung, A. (2004) *Empowered Participation: reinventing urban democracy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Fung, A. (2005a) Representation and Association and Participation: Toward Three Dimensional Democratic Governance. *Midwest Political Science Association Meeting*, Chicago, April 7-10, 2005.

Fung, A. (2005b) Varieties of Participation in Complex Governance. *'Theorising Democratic Renewal' workshop*, University of British Columbia, Canada, June 10-11, 2005.

Gal, S. (2002) A Semiotics of the Public/Private Distinction. *A Journal of Feminist Cultural Theories*, 15 (1), 77-95.

Gallie, D. & White, M. (1993) *Employee commitment and the skills revolution*. London: PSI.

Gallie, D., Felstead, A., & Green, F. (2004) Changing Patterns of Task Discretion, Work. *Employment & Society*, 18 (2), 243-266.

Garrety, K. (2008) Organisational Control and the Self: Critiques and Normative Expectations. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 82 (1), 93-106.

Gaspar, D. (2007) What is the Capability Approach? Its core rationale, partners and dangers. *Journal of Socioeconomics*, 36 (3), 335-359.

Gaus, G. F. (1981) The Convergence of Rights and Utility: The Case of Rawls and Mill. *Ethics*, 92, 57-72.

Gewirth, A. (1998) *Self-Fulfillment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Ghai, D. (2003) Decent Work: Concepts and Indicators. *International Labour Review*, 142 (2), 113-145.

- Gibson-Graham, J-K. (1996) *The End of Capitalism (as we knew it): a feminist critique of political economy*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Gibson-Graham, J-K. (2003) Enabling Ethical Economies: Cooperativism and Class. *Critical Sociology*, 29 (2), 123-161.
- Gibson-Graham, J-K. (2008) Diverse Economies: Performative practices for 'other worlds'. *Progress in Human Geography*, 32 (5), 613-632.
- Gill, R. & Pratt, A. (2008) In the Social Factory? Immaterial Labour, Precariousness and Cultural Work. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 25 (7-8), 1-30.
- Gilligan, C. (1982) *In a Different Voice*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Gilligan, C. (1987) Moral Orientation and Moral Development. In: Kittay & Meyers (eds.) *Women and Moral Theory*. Totowa: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gilligan, C. (1995) Hearing the Difference: Theorizing Connection. *Hypatia*, 10 (2), 120-127.
- Giovanola, B. (2005) Personhood and Human Richness: Goods and Well-Being in the Capability Approach and Beyond. *Review of Social Economy*, 63 (2), 249-267.
- Giovanola, B. (2009) Re-Thinking the Anthropological and Ethical Foundation of Economics and Business: Human Richness and Capabilities Enhancement. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 88, 431-444.
- Glucksmann, M. (1995) Why Work? Gender and the Total Social Organization of Labour. *Gender, Work and Organization*, 2 (2), 63-75.

- Godard, J. (2001) High Performance and the Transformation of Work? The Implications of Alternative Work Practices for Experience and Outcomes of Work. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 54 (4), 776-805.
- Godard, J. (2007) Is Good Work Good for Democracy? Work, Change at Work and Political Participation in Canada and England. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 45 (4), 760-790.
- Goffman, E. (1958) *The Presentation of the Self in Everyday Life*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Gollan, P. J. (2007) *Employee Representation in Non-Union Firms*. London: Sage.
- Gollan, P. J. & Wilkinson, A. (2007) Contemporary Developments in Information and Consultation. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 18 (7), 1133-1144.
- Gomberg, P. (2007) *How to Make Opportunity Equal: Race and Contributive Justice*. Malden MA: Blackwell Publishing
- Goodin, R. E. & Niemeyer, S. J. (2003) When Does Deliberation Begin? Internal Reflection versus Public Discussion in Deliberative Democracy. *Political Studies*, 15 (4), 627-647.
- Gorz, A. (1999) *Reclaiming Work: Beyond the Wage-Based Society*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Gotis, G. N. & Kortezi, Z. (2010) Ethical Considerations in Organisational Politics: Expanding the Perspective. *Journal of Business Ethics*, Vol. 93, 497-517.



Gould, C. (1988) *Rethinking Democracy: Freedom and Social Cooperation in Politics, Economics and Society*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Gould, C. (1996) Diversity and Democracy: Representing Difference, in Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. In: Benhabib (ed) *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Graham, L. (1995) *On the Line at Subaru-Isuzu: the Japanese Mode and the American Worker*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Graham, P. (1996) *Mary Parker Follett: Prophet of Management*. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School Press.

Granter, E. (2009) *Critical Social Theory and the End of Work*. Surrey & Burlington: Ashgate Publishing.

Green, A. M., Ackers, P., & Black, J. (2001) Lost Narratives? From Paternalism to Team-Working in a Lock Manufacturing Firm. *Economic and Industrial Democracy* 22 (2), 211-37.

Green, F. (2004) Why has work effort become more intense? *Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society*, 43 (4), 709-741.

Green, F. (2006) *Demanding Work: The Paradox of Job Quality in the Affluent Economy*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Green, T. H. (1986) *Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation and Other Writing*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Greenberg, E. S., Grunberg, L. & Daniel, K. (1996) Industrial Work and Political Participation: Beyond 'Simple Spillover'. *Political Research Quarterly*, 49 (2), 305-330.

Griffin, C. (2003) Democracy as a Non-Instrumentally Just Procedure. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 11, 111-121.

Griffin, J. (1981) On Life's Being Valuable. *Dialectics and Humanism*, 8, 51-62.

Gurtek, B. A. (1995) *The Dynamics of Service: Reflections on the Changing Nature of Customer/Provider Interactions*. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Gurtler, S. (2005) The Ethical Dimension of Work: A Feminist Perspective. *Hypatia*, 20 (2), 119-134.

Gustavsen, B., Colbjornsen, T., & Palshaugen, O. (eds.), (1998) Development Coalition in Working Life: The 'Enterprise Development 2000' Program in Norway. *Dialogues on Work and Innovation 6*, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Gustavsen, B. (1985) Workplace Reform and Democratic Dialogue. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 6 (4), 461-479.

Gustavsen, B. (1992) *Dialogue and Development: Theory of Communication, Action Research and the Restructuring of Work Life*. Assen & Stockholm: Van Gorcum.

Gustavsen, B. (2007) Work Organization and the 'Scandinavian Model'. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 28 (4), 650-671.

Habermas, J. (2002 [1971]) *Knowledge and Human Interests*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.

Habermas, J. (1974) *Labour and Interaction, in Theory and Practice*. London: Heinemann.

Habermas, J. (1984) *The Theory of Communicative Action*. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, J. (1987) *Theory of Communicative Action, Volume 2, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist Reason*. Boston: Beacon.

Habermas, J. (1990) *Reconstruction and Interpretation in the Social Sciences, in Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action*. Mass. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Habermas, J. (1993) *Remarks on Discourse Ethics in Justification and Application, in Justification and Application*. Malden & Cambridge: Polity Press.

Haddorff, D. W. (2000) Religion and the Market: Opposition, Absorption, or Ambiguity? *Review of Social Economy*, 58 (4), 483-504.

Halford, S. & Leonard, P. (2006) Place, Space and Time: Contextualizing Workplace Subjectivities. *Organization Studies*, 27 (5), 657-676.

Hall, D. & Chandler, D. (2005) Psychological Success: When the Career is a Calling. *Journal of Organizational Behaviour*, 26, 155-176.

Hall, P. & Soskice, D. (2001) *Varieties of Capitalism*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Hamilton, L. (2003) *The Political Philosophy of Needs*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hancock, P. & Tyler, M. (2001) Managing Subjectivity and the Dialectics of Self-Consciousness: Hegel and Organisation Theory. *Organization*, 8 (4), 565-585.

Hanfling, O. (1987) *The Quest for Meaning*. New York: Basil Blackwell Inc.

Hardimon, M. O. (1992) The Project of Reconciliation: Hegel's Social Philosophy. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 21 (2), 165-195.

Hardimon, M. O. (1994) Role Obligations. *Journal of Philosophy*, 91, 333-363.

Harding, S. (1986) The Instability of the Analytical Categories of Feminist Theory. *Signs*, 11 (4), 645-664.

Harding, S. G. (1978) Is the Equality of Opportunity Principle Democratic? *The Philosophical Forum Quarterly*, X (2-4), Special Issue on Work.

Hardt, M. (1999) Affective Labor. *Boundary 2*, 26 (2).

Hare, R. M. (1972) *Essays on the Moral Concepts*. California: University of California Press.

Harley, B., Hyman, J., Thompson, P., (eds.) (2005) *Participation and Democracy at Work*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Harpaz, I. & Fu, X. (2002) The Structure of the Meaning of Work: Relative Stability Amidst Change. *Human Relations*, 55 (6), 639-667.

Hartman, E. M. (2001) Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, and Organizational Ethics: A Response to Phillips and Margolis. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 11 (4), 673-685.

Hartmann, M. & Honneth, A. (2006) Paradoxes of Capitalism. *Constellations*, 13 (1), 41-58.

Hauptmann, E. (2001) Can Less Be More? Leftist Deliberative Democrats' Critique of Participatory Democracy. *Polity*, XXXIII (3), 397-421.

Hauser, R. M. & Roan, C. L. (2007) *Work Complexity and Cognitive Functioning at Midlife: Cross-Validating the Kohn-Schooler Hypothesis in the American Cohort*. CDE Working Paper No. 2007-08, Center for Demography and Ecology: University of Wisconsin-Madison.

Heath, J., Moriarty, J., & Norman, W. (2010) Business Ethics and (or as) Political Philosophy. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 20 (3), 427-452.

Heath, J. (2009) Uses and Abuses of Agency Theory. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, Vol. 19, 497-528.

Hegel, G. W. F. (1977 [1807]) *Phenomenology of Spirit*. A. V. Miller (Trans.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Held, V. (1987) Feminism and Moral Theory. In: Kittay & Meyers (eds.) *Women and Moral Theory*. Totowa NJ: Rowman & Littlefield.

Held, V. (1995) The Meshing of Care and Justice. *Hypatia*, 10 (2), 128-132.

Held, V. (2002) Care and the Extension of the Markets. *Hypatia*, 17 (2), 19-33.

Held, V. (2006) *The Ethics of Care: Personal, Political and Global*. Oxford University Press.

Heller, A. (1974) *The Theory of Need in Marx*. London: Allison & Busby.

Heller, F. (2003) Participation and Power: A Critical Assessment. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 52 (1), 144-163.

Hendricks, C. M. (2006) Integrated Deliberation: Reconciling Civil Society's Dual Role in Deliberative Democracy. *Political Studies*, 54, 486-508.

Heron, J. (1996) *Co-operative Inquiry: research into the human condition*. London: Sage.

Hershovitz, S. (2010) *The Role of Authority*. Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 201.

Hicks, J. A. & King, L. A. (2009) Meaning in Life as a Subjective Judgement and Lived Experience, Social and Personality Psychology. *Compass*, 3/4, 638-653.

Hill, T. E. (1995) Self-Respect Reconsidered. In: Dillon (ed.) *Dignity, Character and Self-Respect*, New York & London: Routledge.

Himmelweit, S. & Mohun. S. (1977) Domestic Labour and Capital. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 1, 15-31.

Himmelweit, S. (2002) Making Visible the Hidden Economy: the Case for Gender-Impact Analysis of Economic Policy. *Feminist Economics*, 8 (1), 49-70.

Hinchliffe, G (2004) Work and Human Flourishing. *Educational Philosophy and Theory*, 36 (5), 535-547.

Hinchman, L.P. & Hinchman, S. K. (1984) In Heidegger's Shadow: Hannah Arendt's Phenomenological Humanism. *The Review of Politics*, 46 (2), 183-211.

Hirschman, A. O. (1970) *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to decline in Firms, Organizations and States*. London: Harvard University Press.

Hirst, P. (1994) *Associative Democracy: New Forms of Economic and Social Governance*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Hirst, P. (1998) Ownership and Democracy. *The Political Quarterly*.

Hirst, P. (2002) Renewing Democracy through Associations. *The Political Quarterly Publishing Ltd*.

Hochschild, A. R. (1985) *The Managed Heart: The Commercialization of Human Feeling*. California: University of California Press.

Hochschild, A. R. (1989) *The Second Shift*. London: Penguin.

Hochschild, A. (2001) *The Time Bind: When Work becomes Home and Home becomes Work*. New York: Owl Books.

Hodgson, G. M. (2006) What are Institutions? *Journal of Economic Issues*, 40 (1), 1-25.

Hodson, R., Welsh, S., Rieble, S., & Jamison, C. S. (1993) Is Work Solidarity Undermined by Autonomy and Participation? Patterns from the Ethnographic Literature. *American Sociological Review*, 58, 398-416.

Hodson, R. (1996) Dignity in the Workplace Under Participative Management: Alienation and Freedom Revisited. *American Sociological Review*, 61 (5), 719-738.

Hodson, R. (1998) Organizational Ethnographies: An Underutilized Resource in the Sociology of Work. *Social Forces*, 76 (4), 1173-208.

Hodson, R. (2002a) Demography or respect?: work group demography versus organizational dynamics as determinants of meaning and satisfaction at work. *British Journal of Sociology*, 53 (2), 291-317.

Hodson, R. (2002b) Worker Participation and Teams: New Evidence from Analyzing Organizational Ethnographies. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 23 (4), 491-528.

Hodson, R. (2004) Work Life and Social Fulfillment: Does Social Affiliation at Work Reflect a Carrot or a Stick? *Social Science Quarterly*, 85 (2), 221-239.

Holbrook, D. (1977) Politics and the Need for Meaning. In: Fitzgerald (ed.) *Human Needs and Politics*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Holmes, B. (2004) The Flexible Personality: For a New Cultural Critique. In: Cox, Krysa & Lewin (eds.) *Economising Culture*. Autonomedia (DATA browser 01).

Holtgrewe, U. (2000) Recognition, Intersubjectivity and Service Work: Labour Conflicts in Call Centres. *Industrielle Beziehungen, Zeitschrift fur Arbeit, Organisation und Management. The German Journal of Industrial Relations*, 8 (1), 37-54.

Honig, B. (1993) *Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Honohan, I. (2001) Friends, Strangers or Countrymen? The Ties Between Citizens as Colleagues. *Political Studies*, 29, 51-69.



Honohan, I. (2002) *Civic Republicanism*. Psychology Press.

Honneth, A. & Farrell, J. M. M. (1998) Democracy as Reflexive Cooperation: John Dewey and the Theory of Democracy Today. *Political Theory*, 26 (6), 763-783.

Honneth, A. (1995a), Work and Instrumental Action: On the Normative Basis of Critical Theory. In: Honneth (ed.) *The Fragmented World of the Social*. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Honneth, A. (1995b) *The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Honneth, A. (2004a) Organized Self-Realization: Some Paradoxes of Individualization. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 7 (4), 463-478.

Honneth, A. (2004b) Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice. *Acta Sociologica*, 47 (4), 351-364.

Hoschchild, A. R. (1983) *The Managed Heart: Commercialisation of Human Feeling*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Howarth, D. R. (2008) Ethos, Agonism and Populism: William Connolly and the Case for Radical Democracy. *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 10, 171-193.

Hsieh, N. (2005) Rawlsian Justice and Workplace Republicanism. *Social Theory and Practice*, 31, 115-142.

Hsieh, N. (2006a) Justice, Management and Governance. *Corporate Governance*, 6, 261-267.

Hsieh, N. (2006b) The Values of the Pluralist Commonwealth. *The Good Society*, 15 (3), 45-50.

Hsieh, N. (2006) Managers, Workers, and Authority. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 71, 347-357.

Hsieh, N. (2008) Survey Article: Justice in Production. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 16 (1), 72-100.

Hurka, T. (1993) *Perfectionism*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Huseby, R. (2009) Sufficiency: Restated and Defended. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 18 (2), 178-197.

Hussain, W. (2007) Sustaining Justice: Stability Under Rawlsian Social Institutions. *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, August 30-September 7, 2007.

Hutchins, E. (1995) *Cognition in the Wild*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Ibarra, H. (1999) Provisional Selves: Experimenting with image and identity in professional adaption. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 44, 764-791.

Ikaheimo, H. & Laitinen, A. (2007) Analyzing Recognition: Identification, Acknowledgement and Recognitive Attitudes Towards Persons. In: van den Brink & Owen (eds.) *Recognition & Power: Axel Honneth and the Tradition of Critical Social Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ikaheimo, H. (2007) Recognizing Persons. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 14 (5-6), 224-247.

Ingold, T. (2000) Evolving Skills. In: Rose & Rose (eds.) *Alas Poor Darwin*. London: Cape.

Inkeles, A. & Smith, D. H. (1974) *Becoming Modern*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Inkson, K. (1987) The Craft Ideal and the Integration of Work: A Study of Potters. *Human Relations*, 40 (1), 163-176.

International Labour Organisation (ILO) (2007) Social Dialogue. [Online] <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/themes/sd.htm> [Accessed 30th January, 2012].

Isaac, J. C. (1994) Oases in the Desert: Hannah Arendt on Democratic Politics. *The American Political Science Review*, 88 (1), 156-168.

Isserles, R. G. (2010) Caring for and about the Work We Do: The Dialectics of Alienation, Emotional Labor and an Ethic of Care. *Paper presented at the 28th International Labour Process Conference*.

Jacobitti, S. D. (1991) The Public, the Private, the Moral: Hannah Arendt and Political Morality. *International Political Science Review*, 12 (4), 281-293.

Jagd, S. (2011) Pragmatic Sociology and Competing Orders of Worth in Organizations. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 14 (3), 343-359.

Jaggar, A. & McBride, W. (1985) Reproduction as Male Ideology. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 8 (3), 185-196.

James, L. (2005), Achievement and the Meaningfulness of Life, *Philosophical Papers*, 34 (3), 429-442.

Jay Wallace, R. (2006) Rightness of Acts and Goodness of Lives. In: Wallace, Pettit, Scheffler & Smith (eds.) *Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Johnson, P. (2006) Whence Democracy? A Review and Critique of the Conceptual Dimensions of the Business Case for Organizational Democracy. *Organization*, 13 (2), 245-274.

Joske, W. D. (1974) Philosophy and the Meaning of Life. In: Klemke (ed.) *The Meaning of Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Joyce, P. (1987) The Historical Meanings of Work: an Introduction. In: Joyce (ed.) *The Historical Meanings of Work*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jubb, R. (2008) Basic Income, Republican Freedom, and Effective Market Power. *Basic Income Studies*, 3 (2), 1-19.

Kaarsemaker, E. & Poutsma, E. (2006) The Fit of Employee Ownership with Other Human Resource Management Practices: Theoretical and Empirical Suggestions Regarding the Existence of an Ownership High-Performance Work System. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 27 (4), 669-685.

Kahn, W. A. (1990) Psychological Conditions of Personal Engagement and Disengagement at Work. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 33 (4), 692-724.

Kant, E. (1983 [1797]) *Metaphysical Principles of Virtue*. Trans. Ellington, J. Hackett: Indianapolis: IN.

Karagiannis, N. & Wagner, P. (2008) Varieties of Agonism: Conflict, the Common Good, and the Need for Synagonism. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 39 (3), 323-339.

Karagiannis, N. (2007) Multiple Solidarities: Autonomy and Resistance. In: Karagiannis & Wagner (eds.) *Varieties of World Making: Beyond Globalisation*. Liverpool University Press: Liverpool.

Kauppinen, A. (2007) The Social Dimension of Autonomy. In: Petherbridge (ed.) *The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth*. Leiden: Brill.

Kauppinen, A. (2008) Why the Shape of a Life Matters. [Online] <http://www.philosophy.northwestern.edu/conferences/moralpolitical/08/papers/Kauppinen.pdf> [Accessed 30th July 2011].

Keane, J. (1975) On Tools and Language: Habermas on Work and Interaction. *New German Critique*, 6, 82-100.

Keat, R. (2006) Liberalism, Neutrality, and Varieties of Capitalism. [Online] [http://www.russellkeat.net/research/ethicsmarkets/keat\\_liberalism\\_neutrality\\_vocs.pdf](http://www.russellkeat.net/research/ethicsmarkets/keat_liberalism_neutrality_vocs.pdf) [Accessed 17th January, 2011].

Keat, R. (2009a) Choosing Between Capitalisms: Habermas, Ethics and Politics. *Res Publica*, 15, 355-376.

Keat, R. (2009b) Anti-Perfectionism, Market Economics and Meaningful Work. [Online] [http://www.russellkeat.net/research/ethicsmarkets/keat\\_antiperfectionism.pdf](http://www.russellkeat.net/research/ethicsmarkets/keat_antiperfectionism.pdf) [Accessed 17th January, 2011].

- Kekes, J. (1986) The Informed Will and the Meaning of Life. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 47 (1), 75-90.
- Kekes, J. (2000) The Meaning of Life. *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, XXIV, 17-34.
- Keenan, A. (1994) Promises, Promises: The Abyss of Freedom and the Loss of the Political in the Work of Hannah Arendt. *Political Theory*, 22 (2), 297-322.
- Keenan, A. (2003) *Democracy in Question: Democratic Openness in a Time of Political Closure*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Khan, G. A. (2008) Pluralisation: An Alternative to Hegemony. *British Journal of Politics & International Relations*, 10, 194-209.
- Kildal, N. (1998) The Social Basis of Self-Respect: A Normative Discussion of Politics Against Unemployment. *Thesis Eleven*, 54, 63-77.
- Kinna, R. (2000) William Morris: Art, Work, and Leisure. *Journal of the History of Ideas*. 61 (1), 493-512.
- Kioupkiolis, A. (2008) Post-Critical Liberalism and Agonistic Freedom. *Contemporary Political Theory*, 7, 147-168.
- Kioupkiolis, A. (2009) Three Paradigms of Modern Freedom. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 8 (4), 473-491.
- Kittay, E. F. (1999) *Love's Labour*. New York: Routledge.
- Kittay, E. F. (2001) A Feminist Ethic of Care Meets the New Communitarian Family Policy. *Ethics*, 111 (3), 523-547.

Kitching, G (1988) *Karl Marx and the Philosophy of Praxis*. London & New York: Routledge.

Klemke, E. D. (2000) Living Without Appeal: An Affirmative Philosophy of Life. In: Klemke (ed.) *The Meaning of Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Knauer, J. T. (1980) Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt's Concept of Political Action. *The American Political Science Review*, 74 (3), 721-733.

Knights, D. & McCabe, D. (2003) Governining Through Teamwork: Reconstituting Subjectivity in a Call Centre. *Journal of Management Studies*, 40, 1587-619.

Knights, D. & Vurdubakis, T. (1994) Foucault, Power and All That. In: Jermier, Knights & Nord (eds.) *Resistance and Power in Organizations*. London: Routledge.

Knights, D. & Willmott, H. (1989) Power and Subjectivity at Work: From Degradation to Subjugation at Work. *Sociology*, 23 (4), 535-58.

Kocyba, H. (2011) Recognition, Cooperation and the Moral Presuppositions of Capitalist Organizations of Work. *Paper presented to the 'Work After Liberalism: the significance of work for political theory' conference*, Institut fur Sozialforschung, Frankfurt, 24<sup>th</sup> – 25<sup>th</sup> February 2011.

Koggel, C. M. (2003) Globalization and Women's Paid Work: Expanding Freedom? *Feminist Economics*, 9 (2-3), 163-183.

Kohn, M. L. (1976) Occupational Structure and Alienation. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 82 (1), 111-130.

Kohn, M. L., Kazinmierz, M., & Slomczynski, K (1997) Social Structure and Personality Under Conditions of Radical Social Change: A Comparative Analysis of Poland and Ukraine. *American Sociological Review*, 62, 614-638.

Kohn, M. L. & Schooler, C. (1983) *Work and Personality: An inquiry into the impact of social stratification*. Norwood: Ablex Publishing.

Kohn, M. L. & Slomczynski, K. M. (1990) *Social Structure and Self-Direction: A comparative analysis of the United States and Poland*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.

Kornhauser, A. (1965) *Mental Health of the Industrial Worker: A Detroit Study*. Oxford: John Wiley.

Korsegaard, C. M. (1996) *The Sources of Normativity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Korsegaard, C. M. (2009) *Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity and Integrity*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kotan, M. (2010) Freedom or happiness? Agency and subjective well-being in the capability approach. *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, 39, 369-375.

Koukiadaki, A. (2010) The Establishment and Operation of Information and Consultation Arrangements in a Capability-Based Framework. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 31, 365-388.

Kovacs, G. (1986) Phenomenology of Work and Self-Transcendence. *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 20 (3), 195-207.



Knauer, J. T. (1980) Motive and Goal in Hannah Arendt's Concept of Political Action. *The American Political Science Review*, 74 (3), 721-733.

Kunda, G. (1992) *Engineering Culture*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.

Kusterer (1978) *Workplace Knowhow: The Important Working Knowledge of Unskilled Workers*. Boulder, CO: Westview.

Kutz, C. (2000) Acting Together. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 61 (1), 1-31.

Kymlicka, W. (2002) *Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Laitinen, A. (2002) Interpersonal Recognition: A Response to Value or a Precondition of Personhood? *Inquiry*, 45, 463-78.

Laitinen, A. (2003) Social Equality, Recognition and Preconditions of Good Life. *Social Inequality Today*, Macquarie University, CRSI 2003 Conference Proceedings.

Laitinen, A. (2007) Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood: Capacities, Normativity and Recognition. *Journal of Consciousness Studies*, 14 (5-7).

Landemore, H. (2010) Deliberation, Representation, and the Epistemic Function of Parliamentary Assemblies: a Burkean Argument in Favor of Descriptive Representation. *International Conference on Democracy as Idea and Practice*, University of Oslo, Oslo January 13-15. 2010.

Landes, J. B. (1995) The Public and the Private Sphere: A Feminist Reconsideration. In: Landes (ed.) *Feminism: the Public and the Private*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press (1998).

Lane, R. E. (1991) *The Market Experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lane, R. E. (1992) Work as Disutility and Money as Happiness: Cultural Origins of a Basic Market Error. *The Journal of Socio-Economics*, 21 (1), 43-64.

Latour, B & Venn, C. (2002) Morality and Technology: The Ends of the Means, Theory. *Culture & Society*, 19, 247-60.

Lawson, V. (2007) Geographies of Care and Responsibility. *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 97 (1), 1-11.

Lazzerato, M. (1996) Immaterial Labor. In: Virno & Hardt (eds.) *Radical Thought in Italy: A Potential Politics*. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

Lazzeri, C. & Caille, A. (2006) Recognition Today: The Theoretical, Ethical and Political Stakes of the Concept. *Critical Horizons*, 7 (1).

Leach, B. (1998) Industrial Homework, Economic Restructuring and the Meaning of Work. *Labour/Le Travail*, 41, 97-115.

Lecce, S. (2005) Should Egalitarians be Perfectionists? *Politics*, 25 (3), 127-134.

Lee, R. (2006) The Ordinary Economy: tangled up in values and geography. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers*, 31 (4), 413-432.

- Lefebvre, H. (2000 [1969]) *Everyday Life in the Modern World*. London: The Athlone Press.
- Lefebvre, H. (1991) *The Production of Space*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Lenz, C. (2005) The End or the Apotheosis of “Labor”? Hannah Arendt’s Contribution to the Question of the Good Life in Times of Global Superfluity of Human Labor Power. *Hypatia*, 20 (2), 135-154.
- Leonard, S. T. (1990) *Critical Theory in Political Practice*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Levinson, J. (2004) Intrinsic Value and the Notion of a Life. *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism*, 62, 319-29.
- Levinson, K. (2000) Codetermination in Sweden: Myth and Reality. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 21 (4), 457-73.
- Levy, N. (2005) Downshifting and Meaning in Life. *Ratio*, XVIII, 2<sup>nd</sup> June, 176-189.
- Lincoln, J. R. & Kalleberg, A. L. (1990) *Culture, Control and Commitment*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Lindkvist, L. (2005) Knowledge, Communities and Knowledge Collectivities: A Typology of Knowledge Work in Groups. *Journal of Management Studies*, 26 (6), 1189-1210.
- Lipman, M. (1995) Caring as Thinking. *Inquiry: Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines*, 15 (1), 1-13.

- Lips-Wiersma, M. & Morris, L. (2009) Discriminating Between 'Meaningful Work' and the 'Management of Meaning'. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 88, 491-511.
- Little, C. (1982) *The Development of the Labour Process in Capitalist Societies*. London: Heinemann.
- Logue, J. & Yates, J. (2001) *The Real World of Employee Ownership*. Ithaca, NY: Industrial and Labor Relations Press.
- Longshore, M. & Seward, C. (2009) The Relational Ontology of Amartya Sen's Capability Approach: Incorporating Social and Individual Causes. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 10 (2), 213-235.
- Lovett, F. & Pettit, P. (2009) Neorepublicanism: A Normative and Institutional Research Program. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 11-29.
- Lovett, F. (2001) Domination. *The Monist*, 84 (1), 98-112.
- Lovett, F. (2009) Domination and Distributive Justice. *The Journal of Politics*, 71 (3), 817-830.
- Lovett, F. (2010) *General Theory of Domination and Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lukacs, G. (1971 [1922]) *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Luscher, L. S. & Lewis, M. W. (2008) Organizational Change and Managerial Sensemaking: Working Through Paradox. *Academy of Management Journal*, 51 (2), 221-240.

- Lutz, M. A. (1995) Centering Social Economics on Human Dignity. *Review of Social Economy*, LIII (2), 163-180.
- Lutz, M. A. (2008) The ‘Dismal Science’ – Still? Economics and Human Flourishing, *Review of Political Economy*, 20 (2), 163-180.
- Lynch, K. (2010) Affective Inequalities: challenging (re)distributive, recognitive and representational models of social justice. *ISA XVII World Congress of Sociology*, Sweden, July 11-17, 2010.
- Lyons, P. (2008) The Crafting of Jobs and Individual Differences. *Journal of Business Psychology*, 23, 25-26.
- MacCabe, D. (2001) Joseph Raz and the Contextual Argument for Liberal Perfectionism. *Ethics*, 111, 493-522.
- MacDonald, C. L. & Merrill, D. A. (2002) It Shouldn't Have to Be a Trade: Recognition and Redistribution in Care Work Advocacy. *Hypatia*, 17 (2), 67-83.
- MacIntyre, A. (1981) *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory*. London: Duckworth.
- MacKenzie C. & Stoljar, N. (2000) Introduction: Autonomy Reconfigured. In: MacKenzie & Stoljar (eds.) *Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- MacKenzie, C. (2008) Relational Autonomy, Normative Authority and Perfectionism. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 39 (4), 512-533.

MacKenzie, C. & Poltera, J. (2010) Narrative Integration, Fragmented Selves, and Autonomy. *Hypatia*, 25 (1), 31-54.

Maddi, S. R. (1970) The Search of Meaning. *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation 1971*, University of Nebraska Press.

Maguire, S. (1999) The Discourse of Control. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 19 (1), 109-114.

Manin, B. (2005) Democratic Deliberation: Why should we promote debate rather than discussion. *Program in Ethics and Public Affairs Seminar*, Princeton University, October 13, 2005.

Mansbridge, J. (1981) Living with Conflict: Representation in the Theory of Adversary Democracy. *Ethics*, Special Issue: Symposium on the Theory and Practice of Representation, 91 (3), 466-476.

Mansbridge, J. (1998) Forward: Mary Parker Follett: Feminist and Negotiator. In: *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government*. Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Mansbridge, J. (2010) *The Deliberative System Disaggregated*. APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper, 2010.

March, J. G. (1962) The Business Firm as a Political Coalition. *The Journal of Politics*, 24 (4), 662-678.

Marchand, T. (2010) Making Knowledge: Explorations of the Indissoluble Relation Between Minds, Bodies and Environment. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Society*, Vol. 16, Supplement 1, 1-21.

Marchington, M. Wilkinson, A. Ackers, P. & Goodman, J. (1994) Understanding the Meaning of Participation: Views from the Workplace. *Human Relations*, 47 (8), 867-894.

Marcuse, H. (1964) *One-Dimensional Man*. New York & Oxford: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Marcuse, H. (1973) On the Philosophical Foundation of the Concept of Work in Economics. *Telos*, 16 (Summer), 9-37.

Margalit, A. & Honneth, A. (2001) Recognition. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volumes, 111-139.

Marglin, S. A. (1974) What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functions of Hierarchy in Capitalist Production. *Review of Radical Political Economics*, 6 (2), 60-112.

Markell, P. (2003) *Bound by Recognition*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.

Markell, P. (2006) The Rule of the People: Arendt, Arche and Democracy. *American Political Science Review*, 100 (1), 1-14.

Markell, P. (2008) The Insufficiency of Non-Domination. *Political Theory*, 36 (1), 9-36.

Marsh, R. M. (1992) The Difference Between Participation and Power in Japanese Factories. *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, 45 (2), 250-270.

Martins, N. (2007) Ethics, Ontology and Capabilities. *Review of Political Economy*, 19 (1), 37-53.

Martsof, D. S. & Mickley, J. R. (1998) The Concept of Spirituality in Nursing Theories: differing world-views and extent to focus. *Journal of Clinical Nursing*, 27, 294-303.

Marx, K. (1948), *The Communist Manifesto*.

Marx, K. (1978 [1844]) *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*. In: Tucker (ed.) *The Marx-Engels Reader (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)*. New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company.

Marx, K. (1978 [1867]) *Capital, Vol. 1: The Process of Production of Capital*. In: Tucker (ed.) *The Marx-Engels Reader (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition)*. New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company.

Massey, D. (1992) *Politics and Space/Time*. *New Left Review*, I/196.

Massey, S. J. (1995) *Is Self-Respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?* *Ethics*, 93 (2), 246-261.

Mayer, R. (2001a) *Robert Dahl and the Right to Workplace Democracy*. *The Review of Politics*, 63 (2), 221-247.

Mayer, R. (2001b) *A Rejoinder to Robert Dahl*. *The Review of Politics*, 63 (2), 225-257.

Maynor, J. (2002) *Another Instrumental Republican Approach?* *European Journal of Political Theory*, 1 (1), 71-89.



McAllister, D. J. & Bigley, G. A. (2002) Work Context and the Definition of Self: How Organisational Care Influences Organisation-Based Self-Esteem. *The Academy of Management Journal*, 45 (5), 894-904.

McCall, J. J. (2001) Employee Voice in Corporate Governance: A Defense of Strong Participation Rights. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 11 (1), 195-213.

McCabe, D. (2007) Individualism at Work? Subjectivity, Teamworking and Anti-Unionism. *Organization*, 14 (2), 243-266.

McClosky, H. J. (1976) Human Needs, Rights and Political Values. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 13 (1), 1-11.

McMahon, C. (1987) Autonomy and Authority. *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 16 (4), 303-328.

McMahon, C. (1989) Managerial Authority. *Ethics*, 100 (1), 33-53.

McMahon, C. (1994) *Authority and Democracy: A General Theory of Government and Management*. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

McMahon, C. (1995) The Political Theory of Organizations and Business Ethics. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 24 (4), 292-313.

McMahon, C. (2007) Comments on Hsieh, Moriarty and Oosterhout. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 71, 371-379.

McManus, H. (2008) Enduring Agonism: Between Individuality and Plurality. *Polity*, 40 (4), 509-25.

- McNay, L. (2008a) The Trouble with Recognition: Subjectivity, Suffering, and Agency. *Sociological Theory*, 26 (3), 271-296.
- McNay, L. (2008b) *Against Recognition*. Malden, MA & Cambridge, Polity Press.
- McNay, L. (2009) Self as Enterprise: Dilemmas of Control and Resistance in Foucault's The Birth of Biopolitics. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 26 (6), 55-77.
- McRobbie, A. (2002) Clubs to Companies: Notes on the Decline of Political Culture in Speeded up Creative Worlds. *Cultural Studies*, 16 (4), 516-531.
- Meagher, G. & Nelson, J. (2004) Survey Article: Feminism in the Dismal Science. *Journal of Political Philosophy*. 12 (1), 102-126.
- Meda, D. (1996) New Perspectives on Work as Value. *International Labour Review*, 135 (6), 633-643.
- Mele, D. (2006) Ethics in Management: Exploring the Contribution of Mary Parker Follett. *Working Paper no 618, IESE Business School*, University of Navarra.
- Metz, T. (2001a) The Concept of a Meaningful Life. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Issue 38, No. 2, 137-153.
- Metz, T. (2001b) Respect for Persons and Perfectionist Politics. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 30 (4), 417-442.
- Metz, T. (2003) Utilitarianism and the Meaning of Life. *Utilitas*, 15, 50-70.
- Metz, T. (2007) New Developments in the Meaning of Life. *Philosophy Compass*, 2 (2), 196-217.

- Meyers, D. T. (1995) Self-Respect and Autonomy. In: Dillon (ed.) *Dignity, Character and Self-Respect*. London: Routledge.
- Meyers, D. T. (2000) Intersectional Identity and the Authentic Self?: Opposites Attract! In: Mackenzie & Stoljar (eds.) *Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency and the Social Self*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Meyers, D. T. (2003) Gendered Work and Individual Autonomy. In: Fiore & Nelson (eds.) *Recognition, Responsibility and Rights: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory*. New York & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Meyers, D. T. (2005) Who's There? Selfhood, Self-Regard and Social Relations. *Hypatia*, 20 (4), 200-215.
- Michaelson, C. (2008) Work and the Most Terrible Life. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 77 (3), 335-345.
- Midtgaard, S. F. (2008) Rawlsian Stability and Basic Income. *Basic Income Studies*, 3 (2), 5-15.
- Mill, J. S. (1974 [1859]) *On Liberty*. London: Penguin Books.
- Mill, J. S. (1994 [1871]) *Principles of Political Economy and Chapters on Socialism*. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, D. (1987) *Material Culture and Mass Consumption*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Miller, D (1999) *Principles of Social Justice*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press.

- Miller, P. & Rose, N. (1995) *Production, Identity, and Democracy. Theory and Society*, 24 (2), 427-467.
- Miller, R. W. (2003) Capitalism & Marxism. In: Frey & Wellman (eds.) *A Companion to Applied Ethics*. Malden, M. A. & Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Miller, S. C. (2005) Need, Care and Obligation. *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*, pp. 137-160.
- Mills, C. W. (1951) *White Collar*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mills, C. (1998) Choice and Circumstances. *Ethics*, 109 (1), 154-165.
- Moll, K. N. (2009) The Enduring Significance of Axel Honneth's Critical Conception of Work. *Emergent Australian Philosophers*, Issue 2, 1-16.
- Moody-Adams, M. M. (1995) Race, Class and the Social Construction of Self-Respect. In: Dillon (ed.) *Dignity, Character and Self-Respect*. London: Routledge.
- Moore, A. (2011) Expert Authority in a Deliberative System. *2011 General Conference of the European Consortium for Political Research, Reykjavik, 25-27 August, 2011*.
- Moriarty, J. (2005) On the Relevance of Political Philosophy to Business Ethics. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 15, 455-473.
- Moriarty, J. (2009) Rawls, Self-Respect, and the Opportunity for Meaningful Work. *Social Theory and Practice*, 35 (2), 441-459.

Morris, W. (1884), Art and Socialism. [Online]

<http://www.marxists.org/archive/morris/works/1884/as/as.htm> [Accessed 16th October, 2011].

Morris, W. (1993 [1890]) *News From Nowhere and Other Writings*. London: Penguin Books.

Moynagh, P. (1997) A Politics of Enlarged Mentality: Hannah Arendt, Citizenship, Responsibility, and Feminism. *Hypatia*, 12 (4), 27-53.

Muirhead, R (2004) *Just Work*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: Harvard University Press.

Murphy, J. B. (1993) *The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Economic Theory*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Mutz, D. C. & Mondak, J. J. (2006) The Workplace as a Context for Cross-Cutting Political Discourse. *The Journal of Politics*, 68 (1), 140-155.

Nagel, T. (1971) The Absurd. *Journal of Philosophy*, 68, 716-27.

Nagel, T. (1986) *The View from Nowhere*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Naoi, M. & Schooler, C. (1985) Occupational Conditions and psychological functioning in Japan. *American Journal of Sociology*, 90, 729-752.

Narveson, J. (1992) Democracy and Economic Rights. *Social Philosophy & Policy*, 9 (1), 29-61.

Neale, P. (1985) Liberalism and Neutrality. *Polity*, 17 (4), 664-684.

- Nedelsky, J. (1989) Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities. *Yale Journal of Law and Feminism*, 1 (7), 7-36.
- Nederman, G. J. (2008) Men at Work: Poesis, Politics and Labor in Aristotle and Some Aristotelians. *Analyse & Kritik*, 30, 17-31.
- Neilson, B. & Rossiter, N. (2008) Precarity as a Political Concept, or, Fordism as Exception. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 25 (7-8), 51-72.
- Nelson, J. A. & England, P. (2002) Feminist Philosophies of Love and Work. *Hypatia*, 17 (2), 1-18.
- Nelson, J. A. (2003) Separative and Soluble Firms: Androcentric Bias and Business Ethics. In: Ferber & Nelson (eds.) *Feminist Economics Today: Beyond Economic Man*. Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press.
- Nelson, J. A. (2004) Freedom, Reason, and More: feminist economics and human development. *Journal of Human Development*, 5 (3), 309-333.
- Neron, P-Y. (2010) Business and the Polis: What Does it Mean to See Corporations as Political Actors? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 94, 333-352.
- Neysmith, S. M. & Reitsma-Street, M. (2005) 'Provisioning': Conceptualising the Work of Women for 21<sup>st</sup> Century Social Policy. *Women's Studies International Forum*, 28, 381-391.
- Nielsen, K. (1973) Alienation and Self-realization. *Philosophy*, 48 (183), 21-33.
- Nielsen, K (1978) Death and the Meaning of Life. In: Klemke (ed.) *The Meaning of Life*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Niemeyer, S. & Dryzek, J. S. (2007) The Ends of Deliberation: Metaconsensus and Intersubjective Rationality as Ideal Outcomes. *Swiss Political Science Review*, Vol. 13, 497-526.

Nixon, D. (2006) 'I just like working with my hands': employment aspirations and the meaning of work for low-skilled unemployed men in Britain's service economy. *Journal of Education and Work*, 19 (2), 201-217.

Noddings, N. (1986) *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Noggle, R. (1999) Kantian Respect and Particular Persons. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 29 (3), 449-478.

Noonan, J. (2004) Rights, Needs, and the Moral Grounds of Democratic Society. *Rethinking Marxism*, 16 (3), 311-325.

Noonan, J. (2005) Modernization, Rights, and Democratic Society: The Limits of Habermas's Democratic Theory. *Res Publica*, 11, 101-123.

Norman, W. J. (1989) The Autonomy-Based Liberalism of Joseph Raz. *Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence*, 2, 151-62.

Nozick, R. (1974) *Anarchy, State and Utopia*. New York: Basic Books.

Nozick, R. (1981) *Philosophical Explanations*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Nussbaum, M. & Glover, J. (1995) (eds.) *Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. & Sen, A. (eds.) (1993) *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1987) Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution. *World Institute for Development Economics Research, WP 31*.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1992) Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism. *Political Theory*, 20 (2), 202-246.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1995) Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings. In: Nussbaum & Glover (eds.) *Women, Culture and Development: A Study of Human Capabilities*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (1999) *Sex and Social Justice*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2000) Aristotle, Politics, and Human Capabilities: A Response to Antony, Arneson, Charlesworth, and Mulgan. *Ethics*, 111 (1), 102-140.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2001) *Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2002) Capabilities and Social Justice. *International Studies Review*, 4 (2), 123-135.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2003) Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice. *Feminist Economics*, 9 (2), 33-59.

Nussbaum, M. C. (2006) *Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.



- Nussbaum, M. C. (2011) *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Nyberg, D. (2008) The Morality of Everyday Activities: Not the Right, But the Good Thing to Do. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 81, 587-598.
- O'Doherty, D. & Willmott, H. (2001) Debating Labour Process Theory: The issue of subjectivity and the relevance of poststructuralism. *Sociology*, 35 (2), 457-476.
- O'Neill, J. (1997) Hegel against Fukuyama: associations, markets and recognition. *Politics*, 17 (3), 191-196.
- O'Neill, J. (2005) Need, Humiliation and Independence. In: Reader (ed.) *The Philosophy of Need: Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement*. Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Offe, C. (1977) *Industry and Inequality: The Achievement Principle in Work and Social Status*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Offe, C. (1985) *Disorganized Capitalism*. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
- Okrent, M. (1978-9) Work, Play and Technology. In: Schaff (ed.) *Philosophy and the Problems of Work*. Maryland & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (2001).
- Okin, S. M. (1991) *Justice, Gender & the Family*. BasicBooks.
- Olsen, J. P. (2005) Maybe It is Time to Rediscover Bureaucracy. *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 16 (1), 1-24.

- Orr, J. E. (1997) *Talking About Machines: An Ethnography of a Modern Job*. Ithaca, New York: ILR Press.
- Overvold, G. E. (1987) The Imperative of Organizational Harmony: A Critique of Contemporary Human Relations Theory. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 6 (7), 559-565.
- Owen, D. (2002) Equality, Democracy and Self-Respect: Reflections on Nietzsche's Agonal Perfectionism. *Journal of Nietzsche Studies*, Issue 24, 113-131.
- Page, S. (2007) *The Difference: How the Power of Diversity Creates Better Groups, Firms, Schools and Societies*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Paine, L. S. (2002) *Value Shift: Why Companies must Merge Social and Financial Imperatives to Achieve Superior Performance*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Park, L. E. & Crocker, J. (2005) Interpersonal Consequences of Seeking Self-Esteem. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31 (11), 1587-1598.
- Parker, L. D. (1984) Control in Organizational Life: The Contribution of Mary Parker Follett. *The Academy of Management Review*, 9 (4), 736-745.
- Parker, H. L. P. (2000) Career Communities, unpublished dissertation, Auckland: New Zealand. [Online] <https://researchspace.auckland.ac.nz/handle/2292/1029> [Accessed 16th August, 2009].
- Patchen, M. (1970) *Participation, Achievement, and Involvement on the Job*. Englecliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Pateman, C., Hirschmann, N. J., & Bingham Powell, Jr. (1992) Political Obligation, Freedom and Feminism. *The American Political Science Review*, 86 (1), 179-188.

Pateman, C. (1970) *Participation & Democratic Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pateman, C. (1971) Political Culture, Political Structure and Political Change. *British Journal of Political Science*, 1 (3), 291-305.

Pateman, C. (2002) Self-Ownership and Property in the Person: Democratization and a Tale of Two Concepts. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 10 (1), 20-53.

Pateman, C. (2004) Democratizing Citizenship: Some Advantages of a Basic Income. *Politics & Society*, 32 (1), 89-105.

Pateman, C. (2007) Why Republicanism? *Basic Income Studies*, 2 (2), 1-6.

Palshaugen, O. (2006) Constructive Practice and Critical Theory: The contributions of action research to organisational change and the discourse on organisations. *International Journal of Action Research*, 2 (3), 283-318.

Patterson, O. (1982) *Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Peffer, R. G. (1990) *Marxism, Morality and Social Justice*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Peffer, R. (1994) Towards a More Adequate Rawlsian Theory of Social Justice. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 75, 251-271.

- Pence, G (1978-79) Towards a Theory of Work. In: Schaff (ed.) *Philosophy and the Problems of Work*. Maryland & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers (2001).
- Persky, J. (1998) Wage Slavery. *History of Political Economy*, 30 (4), 627-651.
- Perrons, D. (2000) Care, Paid Work, and Leisure: Rounding the Triangle. *Feminist Economics*, 6 (1), 105-114.
- Perrons, D. (2005) Gender Mainstreaming and Gender Equality in the New (Market) Economy: An Analysis of Contradictions. *Social Politics*, 12 (3), 389-411.
- Perrons, D. (2009) Women and Gender Equity in Employment: Patterns, Progress and Challenges. *IES (Institute for Employment Studies) Working Paper: WP23*.
- Petersen, A. & Willig, R. (2004) Work and Recognition: Reviewing New Forms of Pathological Developments. *Acta Sociologica*, 47 (4), 338-350.
- Pettit, P. & Schweikard, D. (2006) Joint Actions and Group Agents. *Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, 36 (18), 18-39.
- Pettit, P. (1997) *Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pettit, P. (2001a) Capability and Freedom: A Defense of Sen. *Economics and Philosophy*, 17 (1), 1-20.
- Pettit, P. (2001b) *A Theory of Freedom: From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

- Pettit, P. (2002) *Rules, Reasons, and Norms: Selected Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pettit, P. (2006) Freedom in the Market, Politics. *Philosophy & Economics*, 5 (2), 131-149.
- Pettit, P. (2007a) Free Persons and Free Choices. *History of Political Thought*, XXVIII (4), 709-718.
- Pettit, P. (2007b) A Republican Right to Basic Income? *Basic Income Studies*, 2 (2), 1-8.
- Pettit, P. (2007c) Responsibility Incorporated. *Ethics*, 117, 171-201.
- Phillips, R. A. & Margolis, J. D. (1999) Towards an Ethics of Organizations. *Business Ethics Quarterly*, 9 (4), 619-638.
- Pierce, J. L. & Gardner, D. G. (2004) Self-Esteem Within the Work and Organizational Context: A Review of the Organization-Based Self-Esteem Literature. *Journal of Management*, 30 (5), 591-622.
- Pierik, R. & Robeyns, I. (2007) Resources versus Capabilities: Social Endowments in Egalitarian Theory. *Political Studies*, 55, 133-152.
- Pitkin, H. F. (1981) Justice: On Relating Private and Public. *Political Theory*, 9 (3), 327-352.
- Pocock, B. (2006) Jobs, Care and Justice: a fair work regime for Australia, [Online] *Clare Burton Memorial Lecture 2006*, <http://www.unisa.edu.au/staffdev/women/cblectures/speech2006.pdf> [Accessed 5th September, 2011].

Pogge, T. W. (2002) Can the Capability Approach Be Justified? [Online] <http://philosophyfaculty.ucsd.edu/faculty/rarneson/courses/pogge1capability.pdf> [Accessed 19th December, 2010].

Postow, B. C. (2008) Care Ethics and Impartial Reasons. *Hypatia*, 23 (1), 1-8.

Pot, F. D. & Koningsveld, E. (2009) Quality of Working Life and Organizational Performance – two sides of the same coin? *Scandinavian Journal of Work and Environmental Health*. [Online] <http://www.rower-eu.eu:8080/rower/conferences/1stWorkshop/pot.pdf> [Accessed 29th July, 2011].

Power, M. (2004) Social Provisioning as a Starting Point for Feminist Economics. *Feminist Economics*, 10 (3), 3-19.

Prendergast, R. (2005) The Concept of Freedom and its Relation to Economic Development – a critical appreciation of the work of Amartya Sen. *Cambridge Journal of Economics*, 29, 1145-1170.

Proudfoot, W. (1978) Rawls on Self-Respect and Social Union. *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 5, 255-269.

Prujit, H. (2000) Repainting, Modifying, Smashing Taylorism. *Journal of Organisational Change Management*, 13 (5), 439-451.

Prujit, H. (2003) Teams between neo-Taylorism and anti-Taylorism. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 24 (1), 77-101.

Putterman, L. (1988) The Firm as Association versus the Firm, Economics and Association. *Economics and Philosophy*, 4, 243-266.

Pyszczynski, T. & Cox, C. (2004a), Can We Really Do Without Self-Esteem? Comment on Crocker and Park. *Psychological Bulletin*, 130 (3), 425-429.

Pyszczynski, T. et al (2004b) Why do People Need Self-Esteem? A Theoretical and Empirical Review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 130 (3), 435-468.

Qvale, T. U. (2002) A Case of Slow Learning? Recent trends in social partnerships in Norway with special emphasis on workplace democracy. *Concepts and Transformations*, 7 (1), 31-55.

Ramsey, H., Scholarios, D. & Harley, B. (2000), Employees and High-Performance Work Systems: Testing Inside the Black Box. *British Journal of Industrial Relations*, 38 (4), 501-531.

Radin, M. J. (1996), *Contested Commodities*, Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Rau, A. (2011) Psychopolitics and the Need for a Politics of the Sorrow of Work. Paper presented to the 'Work After Liberalism: the significance of work for political theory' conference. Institut fur Sozialforschung, Frankfurt, 24<sup>th</sup> – 25<sup>th</sup> February 2011.

Raventos, D. & Casessas, D. (2002) Republicanism and Basic Income: The Articulation of the Public Sphere from the Repolitization of the Private Sphere. *Basic Income European Network, 9th International Congress*. Geneva, September 12th-14th.

Rawls, J (1999 [1971]) *Theory of Justice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rawls, J, (2001) *Justice as Fairness: A Restatement*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The Bellknap Press of Harvard University Press.

- Rawls, J. (2005) *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Raz, J. (1989) Liberating Duties. *Law and Philosophy*, 8 (1), 3-21.
- Raz, J. (1986) *The Morality of Freedom*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Raz, J. (1996) *Ethics in the Public Domain*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Raz, J. (2001) *Value, Respect and Attachment*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Raz, J. (2002) *Engaging Reason*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Raz, J. (2003) *The Practice of Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Reader, S. & Brock, G. (2004) Needs, Moral Demands and Moral Theory. *Utilitas*, 16 (3), 251-266.
- Reader, S. (2005) Aristotle on Necessities and Needs. In: Reader (ed.) *The Philosophy of Need: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*. Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.
- Reader, S. (2006) Does a Basic Needs Approach Need Capabilities? *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 4 (3), 337-350.
- Reader, S. (2007) The Other Side of Agency. *Philosophy*, 82, 579-604.
- Reason, P. (1994) Three approaches to participative inquiry. In: Denzin & Lincoln (eds.) *Handbook of Qualitative Research*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.



Reason, P. & Torbert, W. R. (2001) The Action Turn: Toward a transformational social science. *Concepts and Transformation*, 6 (1), 1-37.

Reshaur, K. (1992) Concepts of Solidarity in the Political Theory of Hannah Arendt. *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 25 (4), 723-736.

Restakis, J. (2010) *Humanizing the Economy: Cooperatives in the Age of Capital*. Canada: New Society Publishers.

Risse, T. (2000) Let's Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics. *International Organization*, 54, 1-39.

Roberts-Thomson, S. (2008) An Explanation of the Injustice of Slavery. *Res Publica*, 14, 69-82.

Robeyns, I. (2001) An Income of One's Own: a radical vision of welfare policies in Europe and beyond. *Gender and Development*, 9 (1), 82-89.

Robeyns, I. (2003) The Capability Approach – an Interdisciplinary Introduction. University of Amsterdam, [Online]  
<http://www.capabilityapproach.com/pubs/323CAtraining20031209.pdf> [Accessed 18th September, 2009].

Robeyns, I. (2004) Justice as Fairness and the Capability Approach. APSA meetings (Chicago, 2-5 September) & 4<sup>th</sup> Capability Conference (Pavia, 5-7 September). [Online] <http://www-3.unipv.it/deontica/ca2004/papers/robeyns.pdf> [Accessed 25th February, 2009].

Robeyns, I. (2005) The Capability Approach: a theoretical survey. *Journal of Human Development*, 6 (1), 93-117.

Robeyns, I. (2006) The Capability Approach in Practice. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14 (3), 351-376.

Robeyns, I. (2007) Will a Basic Income Do Justice to Women? [Online] [http://www.boell.de/downloads/Reihe\\_Wirtschaft\\_Soziales\\_Band2\\_Zukunft\\_sozialer\\_Sicherheit\\_2007\(1\).pdf#page=102](http://www.boell.de/downloads/Reihe_Wirtschaft_Soziales_Band2_Zukunft_sozialer_Sicherheit_2007(1).pdf#page=102) [Accessed 12<sup>th</sup> December, 2011].

Roessler, B. (2002) Problems with Autonomy. *Hypatia*, 17 (4), 143-162.

Roessler, B. (2007) Work, Recognition, Emancipation. In: van den Brink & Owen (eds.) *Recognition and Power*. Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press.

Roessler, B. (2012) Meaningful Work: Arguments from Autonomy. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 20 (1), 71-93.

Rogers, M. L. (2008) Republican Confusion and Liberal Clarification. *Philosophy & Social Criticism*, 34 (7), 799-824.

Roland, C. E. & Fox, R. M. (2003) Self-Respect: a neglected concept. *Philosophical Psychology*, 16 (2), 247-288.

Rose, H. (1994) *Love, Power, Knowledge*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Rose, N. (1989) *Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Private Self*. London: Routledge.

Rose, N. (1998) *Inventing Ourselves: psychology, power and personhood*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Rosenblum, N. (1998) *Membership and Morals: the Personal Uses of Pluralism in America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Ross, A. (2008) The New Geography of Work: Power to the Precarious? *Theory, Culture & Society*, 25 (7-8), 31-49.
- Rosser, G. (1997) Crafts, Guilds and the Negotiation of Work in the Medieval Town, *Past and Present*, No. 154, 3-31.
- Ruddick, S. (1998) Care as Labor and Relationship. In: Halfon & Haber (eds.) *Norms and Values: Essays on the Work of Virginia Held*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Ryan, R. M. & Brown, K. W. (2003) Why we don't need self-esteem: On fundamental needs, contingent love and mindfulness. *Psychological Inquiry*, 14 (1), 71-76.
- Sachs, D. (1981) How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 10 (4), 346-360.
- Salais, R & Villeneuve, R. (eds.) (2004) *Europe and the Politics of Capabilities*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Salais, R. (2003) Work and Welfare: Towards a Capability Approach. In: Zeitlin & Trubeck (eds.) *Governing Work and Welfare in a New Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Salzinger, L. (1991) A Maid by any other name: The transformation of 'dirty work' by Central American immigrants. In: Burawoy et al (eds.) *Ethnography Unbound: Power and Resistance in the Modern Metropolis*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Sandberg, J. & Pinnington, A. (2009) Professional Competence as Ways of Being: An Existential Ontological Perspective. *Journal of Management Studies*, 46 (7), 1138-1170.

Sandberg, J. (2000) Understanding Human Competence at Work: An Interpretative Approach. *Academy of Management Journal*. 43 (1), 9-25.

Sanders, L. M. (1997) Against Deliberation. *Political Theory*, 25 (3), 347-376.

Sankowski, E. (1981) Freedom, Work, and the Scope of Democracy. *Ethics*, 91 (2), 228-242.

Sayer, A. (2000) Moral Economy and Political Economy. *Studies in Political Economy*, 61, Spring, 2000, 79-104.

Sayer, A. (2007) Dignity at Work: Broadening the Agenda. *Organization*, 14 (4), 565-581.

Sayer, A. (2011) *Why Things Matter to People: Social Science, Values and Ethical Life*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sayers, S. (2003) Creative Activity and Alienation in Hegel and Marx. *Historical Materialism*, 11 (1), 113-128.

Schwalbe, M. (1985) Autonomy in Work and Self-Esteem. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 26, 519-535.

Schaap, A. (2007) Political Theory and the Agony of Politics. *Political Studies Review*, 5, 56-74.

Schaap, A. (2009) *Law and Agonistic Politics*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

Scheffler, S. (2006) Projects, Relationships and Reasons. In: Wallace, Pettit, Scheffler & Smith (eds.) *Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Scherer, A. G. (2009) Critical Theory and its Contribution to Critical Management Studies. In: Alvesson, Willmott & Bridgman (eds.) *Oxford Handbook of Critical Management Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Schlick, M (1987) On the Meaning of Life. In: Hanfling (ed.) *Life and Meaning: A Reader*. Open University.

Schumacher, E. F. (1979) *Good Work*. London: Jonathan Cape.

Schooler, C. (2007) Culture and Social Structure: The relevance of social structure to cultural psychology. In: Kitayama & Cohen (eds.) *Handbook of Cultural Psychology*. New York & London: The Guildford Press.

Schwartz, A (1982) Meaningful Work. *Ethics*, 92 (4), 634-646.

Schwalbe, M. L. (1985) Autonomy in Work and Self-Esteem. *The Sociological Quarterly*, 26 (4), 519-535.

Schwarzenbach, S. A. (1996) On Civic Friendship. *Ethics*, 107 (1), 97-128.

Schwarzenbach, S. A. (2005) Democracy and Friendship. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 36 (2), 233-254.

Schweickart, D. (1978) Should Rawls be a Socialist? A Comparison of His Ideal Capitalism with Worker-Controlled Socialism. *Social Theory and Practice*, 5,1-27.

Schweickart, D. (1980) *Capitalism or Worker Control? An Ethical and Economic Appraisal*, New York: Praeger.

Schweizer, S. L. (1995) Participation, Workplace Democracy, and the Problem of Representative Government. *Polity*, 27 (3), 359-377.

Sciaraffa, S. (2011) Identification, Meaning, and the Normativity of Social Roles. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 19 (1), 107-128.

Scott, J. C. (1990) *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. Yale University Press.

Seeman, A. (2009) Joint Agency: Intersubjectivity, Sense of Control, and the Feeling of Trust. *Inquiry*, 52 (5), 500-515.

Seeman, M. (1967) On the Personal Consequences of Alienation in Work. *American Sociological Review*, 32 (2), 273-285.

Segall, S. (2005) Political Participation as an Engine of Social Solidarity: A Sceptical View. *Political Studies*, 53, 362-378.

Seglow, J. (2009) Rights, Contribution, Achievement, and the World. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 8 (1), 61-75.

Sen, A. K. (1977) Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 6, 317-344.

Sen, A. K. (1979) Utilitarianism and Welfarism. *Journal of Philosophy*, 76, 463-489.

Sen, A. K. (1985a) Well-Being, Agency and Freedom. *Journal of Philosophy*, 32 (4), 169-221.

Sen, A. K. (1985b) The Standard of Living. In: Hawthorn (ed.) *Tanner Lectures, 1985*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sen, A. K. (1987) *On Ethics and Economics*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Sen, A. K. (1992) *Inequality Reexamined*. New York & Oxford: Russell Sage Foundation.

Sen, A. K. (1993a) Capability and Well-being. In: Nussbaum & Sen (eds.) *The Quality of Life*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Sen, A. K. (1993b) Markets and Freedoms: Achievements and Limitations of the Market Mechanism in Promoting Individual Freedoms. *Oxford Economic Papers*, No. 45, 519-541.

Sen, A. K. (1997) From Income Inequality to Economic Inequality. *Southern Economic Journal*, 64 (2), 383-401.

Sen, A. K. (1999a) *Development as Freedom*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sen, A. K. (1999b) Democracy as a Universal Value. *Journal of Democracy*, 10 (3), 3-17.

Sen, A. K. (2000) Work and Rights. *International Labour Review*, 139 (2), 119-128.

Sen, A. K. (2002) *Rationality and Freedom*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press.

Sen, A. K. (2004) Elements of a Theory of Human Rights. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 32, 315-356.

Sen, A. K. (2005) Human Rights and Capabilities. *Journal of Human Development*, 6 (2), 151-166.

Sen, A. K. (2009) *The Idea of Justice*. London: Penguin.

Sennett, R. & Cobb, J, (1972) *The Hidden Injuries of Class*. New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company.

Sennett, R, (1999) *The Corrosion of Character: The Personal Consequences of Work in the New Capitalism*. New York & London: W. W. Norton & Company.

Sennett, R. (2003) *Respect: The Formation of Character in an Age of Inequality*. London: Penguin Books.

Sennett, R. (2008) *The Craftsman*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.

Sevenhuijsen, S. (1998) *Citizenship and the Ethics of Care: Feminist Considerations on Justice, Morality and Politics*. London: Routledge.

Sevenhuijsen, S. (2000) Caring in the Third Way: the relation between obligation, responsibility and care in Third Way discourse. *Critical Social Policy*, 20 (5), 5-37.



- Shapiro, I. (1999), *Democratic Justice*, New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- Sher, G. (1997), *Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Shershow, S. C. (2005), *The Work and the Gift*, London & Chicago, The Chicago University Press.
- Shockley, K. (2009), Practice Dependent Respect, *Journal of Value Inquiry*, 23 (1), 41-54.
- Simms, K. (2003), *Paul Ricoeur*, London & New York: Routledge.
- Simon, B. & Oakes, P. (2006) Beyond dependence: An identity approach to social power and domination. *Human Relations*, 59 (1), 105-139.
- Simpson, B. & Carroll, B. (2008) Re-viewing 'Role' in Processes of Identity Construction. *Organization*, 15 (1), 29-50.
- Sitton, J. F. (1987) Hannah Arendt's Argument for Council Democracy. *Polity*, 20 (1), 80-100.
- Sitton, J. F. (1998) Disembodied Capitalism: Habermas's Conception of the Economy. *Sociological Forum*, 13 (1), 61-83.
- Skinner, Q. (1998) *Liberty Before Liberalism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sluss, D. & Ashforth, B. (2007) Relational Identity and Identification: Defining Ourselves Through Work Relationships. *Academy of Management Review*, 32 (1), 9-32.

Smart, J. J. C. & Williams, B. (1983), *Utilitarianism: For & Against*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Smith, A. (1999 [1776]) *The Wealth of Nations*. London: Penguin Books.

Smith, A. (2006 [1790]) *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications.

Smith, A. M. (1994) Hegemony Trouble: The Political Theories of Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe. In: Weeks (ed.) *The Lesser Evil and the Greater Good: The Theory and Politics of Social Diversity*. London: Rivers Oram Press.

Smith, G. W. (1977) Slavery, Contentment, and Social Freedom. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 27 (108), 236-248.

Smith, J. D. (2007) Managerial Authority as Political Authority: A Retrospective Examination of Christopher McMahon's Authority and Democracy. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 71, 335-338.

Smith, N. & Laitenen, A. (2009) Taylor on Solidarity. *Thesis Eleven*, 99, 48-70.

Smith, N. (2009) Work and the Struggle for Recognition. *European Journal of Political Theory*, 8 (1), 46-60.

Smith, S. (2001) Worthy Actions. *The Journal of Ethics*, 5 (4), 315-333.

Sohn-Rethel, A. (1978) *Intellectual and Manual Labor*. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press.

Spear, R. (1999) The Rise and Fall of Employee-Owned UK Bus Companies. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 20, 253-268.

Spelman, E. V. (2003) *Repair: the impulse to restore in a fragile world*. Beacon Press.

Spence, L. J., Schmidpeter, R. & Habisch, A. (2003) Assessing Social Capital: Small and Medium Sized Enterprises in Germany and the UK. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 47 (1), 17-29.

Spencer, D. A. (2009a) Work in utopia: Pro-work sentiments in the writings of four critics of classical economics. *The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought*, 16 (1), 97-122.

Spencer, D. A. (2009b) The 'work as bad' thesis in economics: origins, evolution, and challenges. *Labor History*, 50 (1), 39-57.

Spicer, A. & Bohm, S. (2007) Moving Management: Theorising Struggles Against the Hegemony of Management. *Organization Studies*, 28, 1667-1698.

Stacey, C. L. (2005) Finding Dignity in Dirty Work: The Constraints and Rewards of Low-Wage Home Care Labour. *Sociology of Health and Illness*, 27 (6), 831-854.

Staehele, L. A. (2010) Political Geography: democracy and the disorderly public. *Progress in Human Geography*, 34 (1), 67-78.

Starkey, C. (2006) Meaning and Affect. *The Pluralist*, 1 (2), 88-103.

Steger, M. F. & Dik, B. J. (2010), Work as Meaning: Individual and Organizational Benefits of Engaging in Meaningful Work. *Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology and Work*.

Steger, M. F. (2009) *Meaning in Life*. In: Lopez (ed.) *Oxford Handbook of Positive Psychology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Stewart, F. (2005) Groups and Capabilities. *Journal of Human Development*, 6 (2), 185-204.

Stinchcombe, A. I. (1959) Bureaucratic and Craft Administration of Production. *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 4, 168-87.

Strauss, G. (2006) Worker Participation – some under-considered issues. *Industrial Relations*, 45 (4), 778-803.

Strauss, M. (2003) The Role of Recognition in the Formation of Self-Understanding. In: Fiore & Nelson (eds.) *Recognition, Responsibility and Rights: Feminist Ethics and Social Theory*, New York & Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield.

Strawson, G. (2004) Against Narrativity. *Ratio*, 17 (4), 428-452.

Sunstein, C. R. (1988) Beyond the Republican Revival. *The Yale Law Journal*, 97 (8), 1539-1590, Symposium Civic Tradition.

Surroca, J., Garcia-Cestona, M. A. & Santamaria, L. (2006) Corporate Governance and the Mondragon Cooperatives. *Management Research*, 4 (2), 99-112.

Sutton, J. (2008) Material Agency, Skills and History: Distributed Cognition and the Archaeology of Memory. In: Knappett & Malafouris (eds.) *Material Agency: toward a non-anthropocentric approach*. Springer.

Swanson, J. (2005) Recognition and Redistribution: Rethinking Culture and the Economic. *Theory, Culture & Society*, 22 (4), 87-118.

Swanson, J. (2008) Economic Common Sense and the Depoliticization of the Economic, *Political Research Quarterly*, 61 (1), 56-67.

Swenson, D. F. (1949) The Dignity of Human Life. In: Klemke (ed.), *The Meaning of Life*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, C. (1985) The Person. In: Carrithers, Collins & Lukes (eds.) *The Category of the Person*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Taylor, C. (1989) *The Sources of the Self*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, C. (1992) *Ethics of Authenticity*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, C. (1995) *Irreducibly Social Goods, Philosophy Arguments*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Taylor, F. W. (2003 [1911]) *The Principles of Scientific Management*, Dover Publications Inc.

Taylor, R. (1967), The Meaning of Life. In: Klemke (ed.) *The Meaning of Life*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, R. (1970) *Good and Evil: A New Direction*, Macmillan.

- Taylor, R. S. (2004) Self-Realization and the Priority of Fair Equality of Opportunity. *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, 1 (3), 333-347.
- Telfer, E. (1995) Self-Respect. In: Dillon (ed.) *Dignity, Character and Self-Respect*. In: Dillon (ed.). New York & London: Routledge.
- Tepper, B. J., Moss, S. E., Lockhart, D. E., Carr, J. C. (2007) *Abusive Supervision, Upward Maintenance, Communication, and Subordinates' Psychological Distress*. *Academy of Management Journal*, 50 (5), 1169-1180.
- Terkel, S. (1975) *Working*. Wildwood House: London.
- Teschl, M. & Comim, F. (2005) Adaptive Preferences and Capabilities: Some Preliminary Conceptual Explorations. *Review of Social Economy*, 63 (2), 229-247.
- Teschl, M. (2006) The Impact of Identity on Economics. In: Clary, Dolfsma & Figart (eds.) *Ethics and the Market: Insights from social economics*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Thielemann, U. (2000) A Brief Theory of the Market – Ethically Focussed. *International Journal of Social Economics*, 27 (1), 6-31.
- Thomas, K. (ed.) (1999) *The Oxford Book of Work*. Oxford: Oxford University of Press.
- Thomas, L. (2005) Morality and a Meaningful Life. *Philosophical Papers*, 34, 405-27.
- Thompson, D. F. (2008) Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science. *The Annual Review of Political Science*, 11, 407-520.

Thompson, J. & Bunderson, J. (2001) Work-Nonwork Conflict and the Phenomenology of Time: Beyond the Balance Metaphor. *Work and Occupations*, 28 (1), 17-39.

Thompson, P. & Smith, C. (2000) Follow the redbrick road: reflections on pathways in and out of the Labour Process Debate. *International Studies of Management and Organization*, 30 (4), 40-67.

Thompson, P. (2003) Disconnected Capitalism: Or Why Employers Can't Keep Their Side of the Bargain, Work. *Employment & Society*, 17 (2), 359-378.

Thompson, S. (2006) *A Political Theory of Recognition: A Critical Introduction*. Malden, MA & Cambridge: Polity Press.

Thomson, G. (1987) *Needs*. London & New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Thomson, G. (2003) *On the Meaning of Life*. South Melbourne: Wadsworth.

Thomson, G. (2005) *Fundamental Needs*. In: Reader (ed.) *The Philosophy of Need*. Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement, Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Thompson, M. J. (forthcoming) Reconstructing Republican Freedom: A Critique of the Neo-Republican Concept of Domination. *Journal of Philosophy & Social Criticism*.

Tilgher, A. (1931) *Work and What it Has Meant to Men Through the Ages*. London: George G Harrap & Company Ltd.

Tinel, B. (2007) *The two sides of command in organizations: reading Marx again*. [Online] <http://hal-paris1.archives-ouvertes.fr/docs/00/27/13/92/PDF/WDW005.pdf> [Accessed on 15th October, 2011].

Tirrell, L. (1993) Definition and Power: Toward Authority without Privilege. *Hypatia*, 8 (4), 1-34.

Toren, C. (1993) Making History: The Significance of Childhood Cognition for a Comparative Anthropology of Mind. *Man*, 28 (3), 461-478.

Toulmin, S. & Gustavsen, B. (1996) *Beyond Theory: Changing Organizations Through Participation*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins.

Toynbee, P (2003) *Hard Work: Life in Low Pay Britain*. London: Bloomsbury.

Tronto, J. (1993) *Moral Boundaries: Towards a Political Ethic of Care*. New York: Routledge Press.

Tronto, J. (1999) *Care Ethics: Moving Forward*. *Hypatia*, 14 (1), 112-119.

Tronto, J. (2010) Creating Caring Institutions: Politics, Plurality, and Purpose. *Ethics and Social Welfare*, 4 (2), 158-171.

Tsao, R. (2002) Arendt Against Athens: Rereading the Human Condition. *Political Theory*, 30 (1).

Tuomela, R. (1993) What is Cooperation? *Erkenntnis*, 38 (1), 87-101.

Tully, J. (1999) The Agonic Freedom of Citizens. *Economy and Society*, 28 (2), 161-182.



Tully, J. (2000) Struggles over Recognition and Distribution. *Constellations*, 7 (4), 469-482.

Tully, J. (2002) The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to their Ideals of Constitutional Democracy. *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 65, 204-228.

Tuselman H-J, McDonald, F., Heise, A., Allen, M. M. C. & Voronkova, S. (2007) *Employee Relations in Foreign-Owned Subsidiaries: German Multinational Companies in the UK*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Uyan-Semerci, P. (2007) A Relational Account of Nussbaum's List of Capabilities. *Journal of Human Development*, 8 (2), 203-221.

Van Donselaar, G. (1998) The Freedom-Based Account of Solidarity and Basic Income. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 1 (3), 313-333.

Van Leeuwen, B. (2007) A Formal Recognition of Social Attachments: Expanding Axel Honneth's Theory of Recognition. *Inquiry*, 50 (2), 180-205.

Van Parijs, (1991) Why Surfers Should be Fed: The Liberal Case for an Unconditioned Basic Income. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 20 (2), 101-131.

Van Parijs, P. (1997) *Real Freedom for All: What (if anything) Can Justify Capitalism?* Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.

Van Oosterhout, J. (2007) Authority and Democracy in Corporate Governance? *Journal of Business Ethics*, 71, 359-370.

Van Staveren, I. (2001) *The Values of Economics: An Aristotelian Perspective*. London & New York: Routledge.

- Van Staveren, I. (2007) Beyond Utilitarianism and Deontology: Ethics in Economics. *Review of Political Economy*, 19 (1), 21-35.
- Varman, R. & Chakrabarti, M. (2004) Contradictions of Democracy in a Workers' Cooperative. *Organization Studies*, 25 (2), 183-208.
- Veblen, T. (1994 [1899]) *The Theory of the Leisure Class*. New York: Dover Publications Inc.
- Verba, S. & Shabad, G. (1978) Workers' Councils and Political Stratification: The Yugoslav Experience. *The American Political Science Review*, 72 (1), 80-95.
- Vezina, M., Derriennic, F. & Monfort, C. (2004) The Impact of Job Strain on Social Isolation: A Longitudinal Analysis of French Workers. *Social Science & Medicine*, Vol. 59, 29-38.
- Viggiani, F. A. (2011) Organization Development and Democratization of the Firm. *Business and Social Sciences Review*, 1 (1), 21-40.
- Villa, D. R. (1999) *Politics, Philosophy, Terror: Essays on the Thought of Hannah Arendt*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
- Vogt, C. P. (2005) Maximising Human Potential: Capabilities Theory and the Professional Work Environment. *Journal of Business Ethics*, 58, 111-123.
- Vranceanu, R. (2005) The Ethical Dimensions of Economic Choices. *Business Ethics: A European Review*, 14 (2), 94-107.
- Wall, S. (1998) *Liberalism, Perfectionism, and Restraint*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wall, S. (2001a) Neutrality and Responsibility. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 98 (8), 389-410.

Wall, S. (2001b) Freedom, Interference and Domination. *Political Studies*, 49, 216-230.

Wall, S. (2003) *Freedom as a Political Ideal*, Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation.

Walker, B. (1998) Thoreau's Alternative Economics: Work, Liberty, and Democratic Cultivation. *The American Political Science Review*, 92 (4), 845-856.

Walker, B. (2001) Thoreau on Democratic Cultivation. *Political Theory*, 29 (2), 155-189.

Walker, M. U. (1998) *Moral Understandings: A Feminist Study of Ethics*, Routledge: New York.

Wallace, K. (1993) Reconstructing Judgement: Emotion and Moral Judgement. *Hypatia*, 8 (3), 61-83.

Walsh, A. (1994) Meaningful Work as a Distributive Good. *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 32, 233-250.

Walzer, M (1983) *Spheres of Justice: A Defence of Pluralism & Equality*. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell.

Walzer, M. (1994) *Thick and Thin*. Paris: University of Notre Dame Press.

Warr, P. (2007) *Work, Happiness, and Unhappiness*. Mahweh, NJ & London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.

Warren, M. E. (1992) Democratic Theory and Self-Transformation. *American Political Science Review*, 86 (1), 8-23.

Warren, M. E. (1993) Can Participatory Democracy Produce Better Selves? Psychological Dimensions of Habermas's Discursive Model of Democracy. *Political Psychology*, 14 (2), 209-234.

Warren, M. E. (1996a) Deliberative Democracy and Authority. *American Political Science Review*, 90 (1), 46-60.

Warren, M. E. (1996b) What Should We Expect from More Democracy: Radically Democratic Responses to Politics. *Political Theory*, 24 (2), 241-270.

Warren, M. E. (1999) What is Political? *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 11 (2), 207-231.

Warren, M. E. (2001) *Democracy and Association*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Warren, M. E. (2002) What Can Democratic Participation Mean Today? *Political Theory*, 30 (5), 677-701.

Warren, T. (2007) Conceptualizing Breadwinning Work. *Work, Employment and Society*, 21 (2), 317-336.

Watson, T. (2001) *Organising and Managing Work*. London: Prentice Hall.

- Watson, T. J. (2008) Managing Identity: Identity Work, Personal Predicaments and Structural Circumstances. *Organization*, 15 (1), 121-143.
- Weber, M. (1930) *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Wee, L. & Brooks, A. (2010) Negotiating Gender Subjectivity in the Enterprise Culture: Metaphor and Entrepreneurial Discourses. *Gender, Work and Organization*, [Online] <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-0432.2010.00543.x/pdf> [Accessed 20th October, 2011].
- Weeks, J. (1998) The Sexual Citizen, Theory. *Culture & Society*, 15 (3-4), 35-52.
- Weeks, K. (1998) *Constituting Feminist Subjects*. Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press.
- Weeks, K. (2007) Life Within and Against Work: Affective Labor, Feminist Critique, and Post-Fordist Politics. *Ephemera*, 7 (1), 233-249.
- Weil, S. (1972 [1934]) *Oppression and Liberty*. London: Ark.
- Weil, S. (1977 [1946]) Factory Work. In: Panichas (ed.) *The Simone Weil Reader*. New York: David McKay Company.
- Weil, S. (1986) Prerequisite to Dignity of Labour. In: Miles (ed.) *Simone Weil: An Anthology*. London: Virgo.
- Weithman, P. (2004) Political Republicanism and Perfectionist Republicanism. *The Review of Politics*, 66 (2), 285-312.

- Wenger, E. (2000) Communities of Practice and Social Learning Systems. *Organization*, 7 (2), 225-246.
- Westlund, A. C. (2009), Rethinking Relational Autonomy. *Hypatia*, 24 (4), 26-49.
- Wetherell, M. (2008) Subjectivity or Psycho-Discursive Practices? Investigating Complex Intersectional Identities. *Subjectivity*, 22, 73-81.
- Whalley, P. & Barley, S. R. (1997) Technical Work in the Division of Labor. In: Barley & Orr (eds.) *Between Craft and Science: Technical Work in US Settings*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- White, S. K. (2000) *Sustaining Affirmation: The Strengths of Weak Ontology in Political Theory*. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- White, S. (2008) The Republican Case for Basic Income: A Plea for Difficulty. *Basic Income Studies*, 2 (2), 1-7.
- Whyte, W. F. & Whyte, K. E. (1991) *Making Mondragon: The Growth and Dynamics of the Worker Cooperative Complex*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Wiedermann, H. (1980) Codetermination by Workers in German Enterprises. *The American Journal of Comparative Law*, 28 (1), 79-82.
- Wiggins, D. (1988) Truth, Invention, and the Meaning of Life. In: Sayre-McCord (ed.) *Essays on Moral Realism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Wiggins, D. (1998) *Needs, Values, Truth: Essays in the Philosophy of Value*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Wiggins, D. (2005) An Idea we Cannot do Without. In: Reader (ed.) *The Philosophy of Need: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement*. Cambridge, New York & Melbourne: Cambridge University Press.

Wilde, L. (2004) A Radical Humanist Approach to the Concept of Solidarity. *Political Studies*, 52, 162-178.

Wilde, L. (2007) The Concept of Solidarity: Emerging from the Theoretical Shadows? *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 9, 171-181.

Wilde, O. (1986 [1891]) *The Soul of Man Under Socialism, in De Profundis and Other Writings*. London: Penguin Books.

Wilkinson, A., Dundon, T., & Grugulis, I. (2007) Information but not Consultation: Exploring Employee Involvement in SME's. *The International Journal of Human Resource Management*, 18 (7), 1279-1297.

Wilkinson, A., Dundon, T., Marchington, M., and Ackers, P. (2004) Changing Patterns of Employee Voice: Case Studies from the UK and Republic of Ireland. *The Journal of Industrial Relations*, 46 (3), 298-322.

Wilkinson, A. (1999) Employment Relations in SMEs. *Employment Relations*, 21 (3), 206-217.

Wilkinson, R. & Pickett, K. (2009) *The Spirit Level: Why More Equal Societies Almost Always do Better*. London: Allen Lane.

Williams, C. C. & Nadin, S. (2010) Rethinking the commercialisation of everyday life: a whole economy perspective. *Foresight*, 12 (6), 55-68.

- Williams, B. (1981) *Persons, Character and Morality*. In: Williams (ed.) *Moral Luck*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Williams, G. (1998) Love and Responsibility: a Political Ethic for Hannah Arendt. *Political Studies*, XLVI, 937-950.
- Williams, G. (2006) 'Infrastructures of Responsibility': the Moral Tasks of Institutions. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 23 (2), 207-221.
- Williams, G. (2008) Responsibility as a Virtue. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 11 (4), 455-470.
- Williamson, O. E. (1980) The Organization of Work: A Comparative Institutional Assessment. *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 1, 5-38.
- Williamson, T. (2004) The Relationship Between Workplace Democracy and Economic Democracy: Three Views. *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Sept 2-5, 2004, Chicago.
- Willig, R. (2009) Self-Realization Options: Contemporary Marching Order in the Pursuit of Recognition. *Acta Sociologica*, 52 (4), 350-364.
- Willmott, H. & Knights, D. (1998), The Problem of Freedom: Fromm's Contribution to a Critical Theory of Work Organisation. *Praxis International*, 2, 204-225.
- Willmott, H. (1993) Strength is Ignorance; Slavery is Freedom: Managing Culture in Modern Organizations. *Journal of Management Studies*, 30 (4), 515-552.



Willmott, H. (1994) Bringing Agency (back) into Organizational Analysis: responding to the crisis of (post)modernity. In: Hassard & Parker (eds.) *Towards a New Theory of Organizations*. London & New York: Routledge.

Winch, P. (1989) *Simone Weil: the Just Balance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wisman, J. D. (1997) The Ignored Question of Workplace Democracy in Political Discourse. *Empowerment in Organizations*, 6 (6), 149-164.

Wisner, A. (1995) Understanding Problem-Building: Ergonomic Work Analysis. *Ergonomics*, 38 (3), 595-605.

Wolin, S. S. (1996) Fugitive Democracy, in *Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. In: Benhabib (ed.) *Democracy & Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Wolf, S. (1982) Moral Saints. *The Journal of Philosophy*, 79 (8), 419-439.

Wolf, S (1997a) Happiness and Meaning: Two Aspects of the Good Life. *Social Philosophy & Policy*, 14, 207-225.

Wolf, S. (1997b) Meaningful Lives in a Meaningless World. *Quaestiones Infinitae*, 19. Utrecht: Utrecht University.

Wolf, S. (2002) The True, the Good, and the Lovable: Frankfurt's Avoidance of Objectivity. In: Buss & Overton (eds.) *Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes from Harry Frankfurt*. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London: The MIT Press.

- Wolf, S. (2007) *The Meanings of Lives*. [Online] New York University, <http://www1.law.nyu.edu/clppt/program2003/readings/wolf.pdf> [Accessed 25th July, 2009].
- Wolf, S. (2010) *Meaning in Life and Why It Matters*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Wolfe, A. (1997) The Moral Meaning of Work. *Journal of Socio-Economics*, 26 (6), 559-570.
- Wolff, J. & De-Shalit, A. (2007) *Disadvantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Wong, W. (2008) Meaningfulness and Identities. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 11 (2), 123-148.
- Wood, A. (1981) *Karl Marx*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Wood, S. J. (1982) *The Degradation of Work?* London: Hutchinson.
- Wrzesniewski, A., McCauley, C. & Rozin, P. (1997) Jobs, Careers, and Callings: People's Relations to their Work. *Journal of Research in Personality*, 31 (1), 21-33.
- Wrzesniewski, A., Dutton, J. (2001) Crafting a Job: Revisioning employees as active crafters of their work. *Academy of Management Review*, 26 (2), 179-201.
- Wrzesniewski, A., Dutton, J., & Debebe, G. (2003) Interpersonal Sensemaking and the Meaning of Work. *Research in Organisational Behaviour*, 25, 93-135.
- Wrzesniewski, A. (2002) 'It's not just a job': Shifting Meanings of Work in the Wake of 9/11. *Journal of Management Inquiry*, 11 (3), 230-234.

Yates, C & Lewchuk, W. (2001) Empowerment as a Trojan Horse: New Systems of Work Organisation in the American Automobile Industry. *Economic and Industrial Democracy*, 22, 517-42.

Young-Bruehl, E. (2004) *Hannah Arendt: for love of the world*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Young, I. M. (1979) Self-Determination as a Principle of Justice. *The Philosophical Forum*, XI (1), 30-46.

Young, I. M. (1990) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Young, I. M. (1995) Mothers, Citizenship, and Independence: A Critique of Pure Family Values. *Ethics*, 105 (3), 535-556.

Young, I. M. (2000) *Inclusion and Democracy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Young, I. M. (1998) Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual Systems Theory. In: Willett (ed.) *Theorizing Multiculturalism: A Guide to the Current Debate*. Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Young, I. M. (2004) Responsibility and Global Labor Justice. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, 12 (4), 365-388.

Young, I. M. (2006) Taking the Basic Structure Seriously. *Perspectives on Politics*, 4 (1), 91-97.

Zabusky, S. E. & Barley, S. R. (1996) Redefining Success: Ethnographic Observations on the Careers of Technicians. In: Osterman (ed.) *Broken Ladders: Managerial Careers in the Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zabusky, S. E. (1997) Computers, Clients and Expertise: Negotiating technical identities in a non-technical world. In: Barley & Orr (eds.) *Between Technology and Society of Technical Workers in Modern Settings*. Ithaca NY: ILR Press.

Zelizer, V. (2007) Ethics in the Economy. *zfwu*, 8 (1), 8-23.

Zimmermann, B. (2006) Pragmatism and the Capability Approach: Challenges in Social Theory and Empirical Research. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 9 (4).

Zink, J. R. (2007) Reconsidering Rawls's Special Conception of Self-Respect. *Paper presented at the Annual General Meeting for The Midwest Political Science Association, 2007*. Chicago, IL.

Zerilli, L. (2005) 'We Feel Our Freedom': Imagination and Judgement in the Thought of Hannah Arendt. *Political Theory*, 33 (2), 158-188.

Zurn, C. F. (2005) Recognition, Redistribution, and Democracy: Dilemmas of Honneth's Critical Social Theory. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 13 (1), 89-126.