PLANNED TRANSFER OF LABOUR;
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE COAL INDUSTRY.

Thesis submitted for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
in the University of London

by

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The thesis seeks to explore the possibility of using planned transfer of labour to facilitate economic change and discusses the merits of this policy compared with Distribution of Industry policy. This is done by examining the National Coal Board's transfer scheme, by which over nine thousand miners were transferred between coal fields in the years 1954 - 56, with a special study being made of Central Scotland, West Durham and North Staffordshire.

Resistance to transfer is shown to have been caused more by the effects of Government social policies, especially in the field of housing than by the organised opposition of community leaders. Individual resistances to migration are also discussed.

The social consequences of the transfer of labour were much less than had been anticipated. The standards of living of those left behind did not fall, community life was not disrupted to any significant degree and few people were deprived of normal social satisfactions. No social capital was wasted.

Over a half of the miners transferred into North Staffordshire failed to settle there. The reasons for this lay especially in the fact that wages were not up to expectations, but also in the different organisation of work, the system of contracting and working conditions.

The social problems of transfer were, surprisingly, greater at the receiving end. There were numerous difficulties in the location
of the estates and in the provision of amenities and social services. There were also problems of social adjustment.

Despite the difficulties experienced in this particular scheme of transfer the economic rewards were immense and similar rewards could be expected from such a policy applied to other industries. Governmental policy should therefore not only facilitate such movement; it should also cease to obstruct it.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I should like to express my thanks to Lady Williams, my supervisor, for valuable help. It has enabled me to see things in their context and, I hope, to present my material in an orderly fashion.

I should also like to thank Dr. J.M. Rogan, Chief Medical Officer of the National Coal Board for his very great encouragement to me in my work; also to thank Miss Irene Bowyer and Mr. J. Parsons, my research assistants in this enquiry. I have benefitted greatly from long discussions with Mr. Harold Pollins.

As the author is still in employment with the National Coal Board it is necessary to add that nothing in this thesis should be taken as an expression of Board policy unless it is specifically so labelled. The author is alone responsible for the interpretation of the findings of the enquiry and exploring their relevance to the wider fields of social policy.
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CHAPTER 1

INDUSTRIAL CHANGE AND THE NEED FOR MOBILITY OF LABOUR

In a modern industrial society it is impossible to stand still even if you wish to for competition drives the economy on to greater technical efficiency and greater output. In any case people do not wish to stand still for they have come to expect the higher standard of living which economic progress provides and the needs of the economy for change are therefore in some sort of harmony with the needs of the individual. The rub arises from the fact that although most people would like to own motorcars they do not always like the industrial upheaval which comes in switching production to them. It is this theme, that of the social resistances to economic progress, which provides the subject for this thesis in which we shall discuss the factors affecting the willingness of miners to migrate from dying coalfields and settle in expanding ones.

Any economic planner, whether he is the owner of a sweetshop or directing the fortunes of a large nationalized industry, is faced with the same economic problem. How can he get the greatest return with the least employment of resources? Not the least of his worries in solving this equation will be to decide the amount of human effort which will go into his enterprise. If business is good and he can afford to expand he will offer the wages needed to attract workers to him. The whole course of the country's industrial history is bound up with countless decisions of this kind, decisions which continually change the employment pattern. Sometimes the change has been extremely rapid but more often than not it has been a slow continuous process, always in the end sorting out those industries which were willing and able to pay the price for labour from those which were not. The character and extent of this change over the last century is illustrated in the table.
### TABLE NO. 2

**THE CHANGING PATTERN OF EMPLOYMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN 1911 - 1959**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry</th>
<th>1911</th>
<th>1921</th>
<th>1931</th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1959</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture &amp; Fishing</td>
<td>1,493</td>
<td>1,373</td>
<td>1,259</td>
<td>1,808</td>
<td>631</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining &amp; Quarrying</td>
<td>1,308</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>1,354</td>
<td>855</td>
<td>844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building &amp; Contracting</td>
<td>950</td>
<td>826</td>
<td>1,149</td>
<td>1,468</td>
<td>1,480</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>1,033</td>
<td>917</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal Goods, Engineering, Shipbuilding, Vehicles</td>
<td>1,784</td>
<td>2,491</td>
<td>2,406</td>
<td>3,526</td>
<td>3,645</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport &amp; Communic.</td>
<td>1,360</td>
<td>1,359</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>1,747</td>
<td>1,682</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemicals</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>523</td>
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<tr>
<td>Distribution</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>N.A.</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>2,632</td>
<td>2,803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Service</td>
<td>1,640</td>
<td>1,332</td>
<td>1,596</td>
<td>519</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SOURCE** Census Census Census M. of Lab. M. of Lab.

**NOTE**

It is not possible to obtain really comparable figures of employment in Great Britain over the last fifty years. There have been changes both in classification of industries and the coverage of statistics. The examples chosen above are meant to illustrate the broad changes in the pattern of employment.
The changes since the end of the first World War will concern us most in this thesis. This period has seen not only a break with the industrial traditions of the past with the emergence of the mass consumer market but it has also seen a decisive shift in the geographical distribution of industry. The failure of the new industries, especially those producing for the consumer market, to locate themselves in the old industrial areas gave rise to the twin problems of localised unemployment there and chronic manpower shortages elsewhere, which are still not solved today. For the last twenty five years the preferred solution to both problems has been to take work to the workers. This thesis will explore the possibilities of taking workers to the work, but first we must find out why these problems exist at all? Why did the North fail to attract industry and the South succeed?

The key to the location of industry in the 19th century is the distribution of the coal deposits. Coal, the only adequate source of power, was expensive to transport and it was therefore cheaper to bring the other factors of production to the source of power. The great coal-fields of the North, Scotland and Wales were magnets which attracted the textile, engineering and metal industries. In all of this development labour was expected, as the natural course of things, to turn up when expected and this in fact usually happened. Most workers, with exception

1. For the purposes of easier discussion, the use of the term "North" will mean the following Ministry of Labour regions - Scotland, North Eastern, North Western and Wales and the term "South" will mean the South Eastern and the Midlands regions.
of the Irish, did not have to travel far to find a place in the new industries for most of the urban proletariat was recruited from the countryside surrounding the new towns.

As late as 1921 "about two thirds of the five and a quarter million persons concerned with the Staples were to be found north of the Trent" but since then the balance of industry has tilted decisively in favour of the South. The old order had been shattered by two developments; firstly when slowly it became clear that people at home and abroad no longer wanted only what nineteenth century Britain supplied, and secondly when the discovery and harnessing of electricity, liberated industry from its close dependence on the coalfields.

The success of the South and the Midlands in the inter-war period was tied to the growth of the new mass consumer market and as the largest and wealthiest part of this market was in the London area it is there that consumer goods were made. Industries producing labour-saving and leisure-spending devices clustered round the Metropolis for there were advantages in being near to the point of sale when raw materials were not expensive to transport. Not all of the decisions to locate in the South were taken on the basis of straight-forward economic advantage. Some industrialists were anxious to avoid the old industrial areas because of their militant working class traditions. Some disliked the thought of having to live in the culturally undeveloped areas. But the effect of this variety of expressed motives was the same - a striking disparity in the rate of industrial growth of different regions of the country.

Percentage Changes in Number of Insured Workers, 1923–37 (1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Change</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>+ 22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>London and Home Counties</td>
<td>+ 42.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Midland Counties</td>
<td>+ 28.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Riding, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire</td>
<td>+ 15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mid-Scotland</td>
<td>+ 9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lancashire</td>
<td>+ 7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northumberland and Durham</td>
<td>+ 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glamorgan and Monmouth</td>
<td>- 4.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This difference in the rate of growth of industries in different parts of the country, already noticeable before the first World War, was reinforced after its conclusion but it was only when the Depression emphasized in stark terms the already predictable decline of the old industrial areas, that the problem became urgent to policy makers. In the context of heavy unemployment there was a natural tendency to see the effects of growth and decline as being primarily problems of unemployment rather than the need of new industries in the South to recruit labour.

The labour needs of the South and the Midlands were also obscured in this period by the formidable opposition to the growth of London on military and town planning grounds. The Barlow Commission, set up in 1937, gathered together many strands of sentiment when it delivered its stern warning against the continued expansion of London. But in 1940 when the Report was published there were more immediate problems to be solved.

The first attempt by a Government to meet the pre-war unemployment situation in the old industrial areas was, in keeping with classical economic doctrine, to assist the surplus workers of the North to move to the vacant jobs in the South. The Industrial Transference Board set up in 1928 was intended to assist migration from the depressed areas by making it financially easier to move but it was least successful in achieving its objects in the years when unemployment was widespread and it was most successful when trade recovered. Although the total number of people who used this Scheme was several hundred thousand, it is estimated that more than one third of these migrants returned home again.\(^{(1)}\)

This policy of transferring labour was thought to be unsuccessful, the volume of unemployment was so great that both spontaneous and assisted migration only touched the fringe of the problem. At the peak of the inter-war migration in 1936 over 120,000 people moved from the North and Wales but more than four times as many remained behind unemployed.\(^{(2)}\) Furthermore, there was widespread resentment against enforced migration by the communities losing population.

Something more than free travel to the Midlands was needed to solve the unemployment problem.

1934 marked an historic change in the attitude of the State to the economic life of the country. In that year the principle was conceded that the economic forces making for the location of industry in the South and the Midlands could be legitimately resisted. It is true that/

1. Sir W.H. Beveridge - Full Employment in a Free Society p. 65
2. ibid. Calculated from figures given on pages 65 - 67.
not much resistance was offered by the three Special Areas Acts which followed but the idea of re-distributing industry for social purposes was officially recognised.

The employment situation, already on the mend in the late 1930's, was radically altered by the Second World War for the war economy needed every man it could get. The problem of structural unemployment was therefore put on the shelf and not taken down until the end of the War was in sight. It was then immediately obvious that nothing had really changed. The heavy industrial areas of the North were still highly dependent on industries which were likely to continue declining whereas the South was bound to prosper in the post-war consumer boom.

What was to be done about the possibility of unemployment returning to the North and the likelihood of a chronic shortage of labour in the South and Midlands? In the climate of opinion produced by the war-time situation it was likely that more attention would be given to avoiding unemployment, for full employment was seen as a reward for winning the war. It was equally likely that migration would never be thought of again as a cure for unemployment, especially if a Labour Government came

1. The Special Areas Acts of 1934, 1936 and 1937 were designed to help four Areas, West Monmouthshire and the greater part of Glamorgan, Tyneside and the greater part of County Durham, West Cumberland and the middle industrial belt of Scotland, by the creation of trading estates with financial assistance from the State, land settlement, allocation of factories needed for defence and other government contracts, and the location of factories set up by foreign firms.
to power, since it received some of its most loyal support from the old industrial areas. Any unwillingness there may have been to prevent migration for these reasons was reinforced by the strong desire to prevent further massing of population in the London Area.

The 1944 White Paper on the Distribution of Industry laid the basis for the 1945 legislation of the Coalition Government. This strengthened the attractions pulling industry into the special areas but the real teeth were not put into the location of industry policy until the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 which gave a powerful negative control over where industry would be allowed to develop. The principles which have laid behind Government policy since 1945 have not changed with changes of the party in power. It is true that a considerably larger portion of the Nation's industrial growth was directed to the Development Areas during the Labour Government but the broad lines of policy have remained the same which is, where possible, to take work to the workers. The weapons in the Government armoury today are perhaps not so powerful as they were but a tight control is still exercised over the distribution of industry by the use of Industrial Development Certificates, Government loans and grants.

How far has the policy for re-distributing industry eliminated localised unemployment? On the face of it it has been highly successful for whereas in 1932 the number of unemployed in the Development Areas constituted 38% of the insured workers the figure in 1954 had fallen to 2.2% of a much higher insured population. It is true that there are still small areas where the rate of unemployment is considerably higher than 4% but the numbers of people involved are not very great. The low level of 1. Dame Alix Meynell D.B.E. _"Location of Industry" (Public Administration Spring 1959 p.9)
unemployment is not, however, mainly due to the Distribution of Industry policy. The true cause of the prosperity of the once depressed areas lies mainly in the overall prosperity of the economy and the revival thereby of the basic industries. There has been no depression of trade in post-war years to equal the Great Depression.

Furthermore, about a half of the half-million increase in the occupied population of the Development Areas between 1939 and 1954 has been in the employment of women. This is a valuable achievement in areas where opportunities for women to work have always been limited but it does not satisfy the main objective of Development Area policy, that is to provide employment for men.

Moreover, Government policy aimed at reducing unemployment has been assisted by the greater willingness of workers to travel farther daily to work, and the ease with which they can now travel. Trading Estates have thus been able to attract industries which would never have located in out-of-the-way villages and indeed some factories are too large to consider setting up in small villages.

Finally, the level of unemployment in the formerly depressed areas is low because of the continued spontaneous migration from these districts. Although the movement of population is by no means comparable with that of the 1930's there are still substantial numbers leaving the North-East and Wales.

2. J. Sykes - "Some Results of Distribution of Industry Policy"
Manchester School Jan. 1955
The success of the Distribution of Industry Policy has been less in eliminating unemployment than in diversifying the economies of the Development Areas so that they are no longer so dependent on a narrow range of capital goods. This point has been made in more detail by Robson:-

It can be seen that each is now less specialized in relation to the industrial distribution of their insured populations than it was in 1939. A comparatively small reduction has taken place in the Scottish area. This was already fairly well diversified in 1939. The most marked reductions have occurred in West Cumberland and South Wales, both of which were fairly highly specialized in 1939. South Lancashire and Wrexham were also both fairly highly specialized in 1939. There has since been some reduction, but they were in 1954 the most highly specialized of the areas with the exception of North-east Lancashire. A fairly substantial reduction of specialization has also occurred in the North-eastern area.

It might be asked at this point whether there is any justification for continuing the Distribution of Industry policy now "that the short term problem of unemployment in the areas has been largely overcome" and now that their economies are more diversified. In fact the Local Employment Act (which came into force on the first of April of this year - 1960) shows that this thought had also been in the mind of the present Government. The end result of this Act will be, only, to reduce the size of the insured population in areas benefitting from Distribution of Industry policy from 14% to 12%; to drop some areas and to include others and from

2. Ibid.
now on to use the term 'Development Districts'. Distribution of Industry policy is still seen by the Government as the only effective way of dealing with/unemployment. But the pressing economic problems depend not so much on securing full employment in every district but on securing a proper allocation of manpower, particularly to the exporting industries. These industries are mainly located in the South and the Midlands and have suffered from chronic manpower shortages. What is the attitude of the State to their needs?

The Government is not only still fully committed to a policy of taking work to the workers but/it positively obstructs migration by its policies in the fields of housing, and the Social services.

A substantial proportion of this country's housing has been built by local authorities and a large part of the remainder has been effected by public policy on rents or home ownership. One commentator has remarked that:

"In theory, the post-war housing programme should have been so designed as to favour the areas where labour was scarce and migrants were required; in practice, the acute needs in each area of the existing population, the fact that the building industry is so widely dispersed, and the political opposition which the preferential treatment of some parts of the country might have encountered, have made it difficult to do more than a little

1. In the discussion which follows the term 'Development Area' is usually employed. The new term 'Development District' can be substituted without affecting the line of the argument.
along these lines."

In the years when Local Councils were building substantial numbers of houses for general needs (1946 - 1956) the Development Areas shared in the building in a proportion roughly equivalent to its share of the insured population. These houses may in the future become a solid argument for resisting migration both by the Councils who own them and the tenants who have invested their money in furnishing them.

Rents for local authority housing are fixed by the local authorities themselves and are generally below the economic level. This would have little effect on labour mobility if these low rents were uniform throughout the country but this is not the case. The areas which most need labour, generally have higher rents than those which could afford to lose it; for example, in the older coalfields there is a tradition of cheap or free colliery housing and the low rents for council houses acknowledge this fact. In Scotland generally the rents of local authority houses are considerably lower than in England.

Rent control of private housing may also operate against mobility of labour for movement out of a rent controlled tenancy to other accommodation may mean a very substantial increase in rent. This is likely to be more noticeable if the move is to the South and Midlands where property is more expensive and rents higher anyway.

A final aspect of housing policy affecting worker mobility is to be

found in the Government's attempt to spread home ownership. Among industrial workers this often leads to their being rooted in one place. This is not just because of the difficulties of re-selling property in a declining area, especially since the new legislation designed to compensate people who wish to migrate from such areas. It is much more a question of attitude and attachment to a particular house.

It has been suggested that another strong deterrent to mobility created by public policy is our system of Social security.

"The self-adjusting character of industry has been profoundly changed by the development of a system of Social security. The provision of a subsistence income based on needs weakens the urge to find and keep an independent job." How much is there in this point of view?

(1) The present unemployment benefit for a married man with two children (the average sized family) is £5 2s. 0d. This represents only 40% of the average worker's wage (about £13 10s. 0d.), which is, incidentally, a lower proportion than before the War. Being out of work is likely therefore to cause a sharp change in the standard of living of a household and therefore persuade a worker to return to work as soon as possible.

The issue becomes more real when we compare the benefits which a man with a large family can draw and when we bear in mind that there is perhaps a tendency for "problem families" to be large. The men in such households are likely to have poor work histories.

Furthermore, one must recognise that the standard unemployment benefits can be increased by National Assistance, and sometimes where there is redundancy, by special redundancy pay. A redundant coal miner can draw £4.5.0 over and above his unemployment benefit.

1. Gertrude Williams - The Price of Social Security (1944)
The interesting fact about the effect of social security, even when increased by special benefits, is that very few men remain dependent on it for long and certainly not as long as they could. It is the exceptional worker who is likely to take his time looking for a new job.

In another field of policy, that of social investment, there has been little discrimination exercised against areas which appear to have no expanding economic future. The life of hospitals, schools and other public buildings is a long one and it must be asked, as we have already done with the allocation of housing above, whether these investments will be later used as an argument for measures to restrict migration.

Thus, the Government has not only not promoted internal migration; may its policies have discouraged it. Yet valuable experience has been gained by non-governmental bodies which shows that internal migration can be fostered to solve labour shortages without serious social consequences. The new steel works at Corby in Northamptonshire set up before the war was almost totally dependent on labour brought in from outside. This has also been true of the expanding coalfields. Both in Scotland in 1948 and 1949 and in England in 1954 and 1955 substantial numbers of men were moved from the declining coalfields (all in the Development Areas) to man up developing collieries.

In the last 25 years, since the first Special Areas Act, the solution offered for the twin problems of a surplus of labour in one area and a shortage in another has not changed. It was and remains accepted policy to take work the workers; a policy supported by the indirect effects on migration of other kinds of government action. The policy has been based on a variety of arguments, emotions and assertions, not on the facts of
the situation, and a major purpose of this thesis is to present some concrete information of the actual working out of a policy of organised migration as a means of securing the manpower necessary for economic change. On the basis of this evidence it will be possible to make a more realistic assessment of the situation.

As a preliminary it is obviously useful and important to describe the main theoretical and practical considerations involved in both methods of solving the manpower problems. Broadly they may be divided into two main groups: economic and social, and they will be looked at, from the points of view of, firstly, the economy and society as a whole, and secondly, the individual firm.

The prime economic issue is that of efficiency. Are new industries in the Development Areas (or Districts) more or less efficient than they would have been in other locations that might otherwise have been chosen for them? There are numerous variables in this question: the cost of training 'green' labour; distance from the market; distance from head office; for example. There may be considerable differences in productivity between different parts of the same organisation, and it can be argued that manpower should be concentrated in those units which are highly productive. But - as with this matter generally - hardly any research has been done. One of the few investigations so far carried out suggests that costs in a branch firm in a Development Area are higher than those in the parent factory but this may conceivably be because it is a branch factory.

(National Institute of Social and Economic Research 1952)
Another investigation suggests that the problem is not so great with large plants but that small factories need to be located near their related industries.

"Localisation has been shown often to take the place of large plants and with the external economies of localisation the internal economies of the large plant may be essential to diversification and decongestion." The most one can say therefore at this stage is that there is no proof that industries which have been forced to set up in the Development Areas are functioning less efficiently as a consequence.

The second point concerns the industries which cannot be steered to the Development Areas because of their inherent character. Some industries in need of manpower cannot be moved because they have large fixed capital - Steelworks, for example; or because they are fixed by the location of natural resources. Others such as public utilities can only function as fixed local services; London Transport could not be moved to South Wales. On this point Prof. Thomas has argued:

"Some industries can be juggled with in order to mop up unemployment and their prospects of survival are not much affected thereby. But others, like coal mining and farming, cannot be moved about, or, like steel, shipbuilding and heavy chemicals, can be moved only at great cost. Such industries control the distribution of population, and to attempt to fit them to a fixed distribution of population is to court industrial disaster. If industries of this type are expanding or contracting, the areas in which they are located or to which they are suited will also rise or fall."

Thirdly, although it is often necessary to train new labour in Development Areas to meet the needs of industry then - usually because local labour has little or no knowledge of that kind of industry - the
workers may already possess skills which can be readily used if they migrate. Thus pits may close in Scotland but coalmines are still needed in the Midlands; if the Scottish coalminer decides to stay at home he may have to try his hand at a semi-skilled engineering job. The financial value of such skills, especially where formal training has been undertaken, can be very substantial indeed.

Finally, there is the effect which the alternative policies may have on employment in the Development Areas. It can be argued that migration on a large scale did not solve the pre-war unemployment problem, although it undoubtedly relieved it. On the other hand it cannot be argued that (1)

Distribution of Industry policy is really the main cause of the high level of employment in Development Areas today, although it has certainly helped in achieving this objective. Moreover, not all districts within the Areas have experienced the same prosperity. It cannot possibly be assumed that every village with surplus labour can expect to receive a new factory to replace say, a closed colliery. Many localities are too isolated or small to meet the needs of modern large scale industry. And in any case as was pointed out earlier, if the new industries provide work for women who were not hitherto employed, there is no solution to the problem of male unemployment, however desirable the employment of women may be.

It is the social arguments which have carried most weight in the evolution of policy. The most compelling of these centres on the effect of migration on local community life. It is wrong, it is said, that small communities with their own way of life should be disrupted and allowed to decline. Not only does migration reduce the total population, it is selective in its effects. The most valuable and virile members leave;

those who are the most intelligent, the most skilled, the most respectable and the most enterprising. These are the people, it is said, who hold the community together. On this, there are two things to be said. Firstly, that we do not know what the consequences of migration are, since they have not been studied; nor have the characteristics of the migrants been examined in any systematic way. Secondly, a policy of migration for the 1960's must not be thought of in terms of the 1930's. Migration from the Development Areas could not possibly affect more than 1% of the population of those areas which have a surplus of labour.

In addition to the disruption of the community there is also the possibility that each migrant suffers a loss of normal social satisfactions. He may have to leave behind relatives and friends. This probably does happen for most people are involved, somehow, in a set of social relationships, and migration must mean a change. But it may be (and further research may establish the point) that migrants are those with inadequate social relations and who leave the community because they do not feel attached to it. Further, new social contacts can be built in new areas, and they may be wider than those left behind. The status quo of community life ignores the improvements that mobility - widely defined - can provide.

Allied to these arguments is that which states that migration leads to the duplication of social capital. The social investment in an area losing population is not used to its full capacity and houses, roads, schools, hospitals are wasted. This argument tends to ignore two features about areas which are losing population. The first is that much of the social capital in these areas is already obsolescent and this particularly
applies to housing. The second is that the standard of many social amenities is lower there than the standard provided elsewhere, because it was provided when expectations were not so high. The loss of population might reduce numbers waiting for rehousing and ease the burden on the hospitals and schools. Again it is relevant to ask what scale of movement people have in mind when they warn against the loss of social capital. The population in the so-called declining areas is still continuing to increase despite present migration and the issue is rather whether to enlarge the existing social capital or to maintain its present level in line with the increasing population.

Finally, there is an important point of administration. It is easier to encourage or force industrialists to locate their factories in a Development Area than to match migration with the needs of industry in the South and the Midlands; as against the single decision of one board of directors, there are numerous decisions of individual migrants. Without direction of labour an administrative policy for promoting mobility will be very complicated. Moreover, while many people migrated before the war, many preferred to stay at home, unemployed. The individual’s resistance to migration is a fact which must be admitted, although its actual extent is unknown. But as is shown later in this thesis none of these considerations rules out the possibility of limited migration to meet the limited manpower needs of a particular area.

These aspects of the problem are general to the economy and the community. They are also worth examining from the standpoint of the individual firm. As far as it is concerned, the relevant questions are these: Do they object to being directed to Development Areas when they want to expand? Would they prefer labour to come to them and under what conditions? Would they prefer to compete for local labour or would they
consider mechanising the work and do without labour altogether?

It is a valid generalisation that most firms have gone to the Development Areas because they wanted to expand and were not allowed to expand elsewhere. About four fifths of the new firms in these areas are branches of firms already established elsewhere. In the early post-war years vacant factories and building licences were great attractions to industrialists but today the State benefits to firms settling in these areas are less important than the restriction on development elsewhere.

Those firms which are allowed to expand their premises in the Midlands and the South will often experience a shortage of labour which can be met in several ways; to try to attract labour locally by wage increases; to make more economical use of the labour they have, perhaps by mechanisation; or to import labour. Since the war, in the South and the Midlands the first two alternatives have had most appeal. The use of wages increases to attract labour has only secured a temporary advantage for a firm. Where the pool of labour is limited the gain has to be at somebody else's expense and he is likely to retaliate with the same weapon. Some firms have been somewhat hampered in the wage war by the fact that they are controlled by national agreement and that to secure an advantage in one area it has been necessary to benefit all areas.

The second method of solving labour shortages is to mechanize, so reducing the manpower required, and converting the reduced labour force into semi-skilled (and therefore easily trained and transferable) operatives. But it seems that such gains are temporary before a higher level of output leads to further demands for labour.

1. Cf. Meynell - op. cit. p. 20
There remains the possibility of importing labour or arranging for somebody else to do so. The advantages that lie in this course of action are: that it will be cheaper where a firm has a uniform agreement covering wage rates in a large number of areas but only has a labour shortage in one or two; that it may be the only way to secure a particular kind of manpower in the short run. (Where craftsmen are needed and there are none to be had locally it may not be possible to wait until they are trained.); this is the only way when the factories or mines are so geographically isolated (and have to be so) that there is no extra labour in the locality. These three advantages apply to firms which have only one location but there are others which can apply where a firm has units in several districts. The needs of one district can be balanced against the needs of another and labour can be transferred from high-cost units to low-cost ones. Where factories are having to close in one area and expand in another redundancy can be avoided (and thus preserve the good name of the firm) if the firm can offer work in factories in another area. It may help too to preserve skills in which firms have invested considerable sums of money. Miners, for example, cost nearly £250 to train and it is more economical to employ them in pits in other areas which need men than to train local 'green' labour there.

In the face of the obvious advantages to a firm of importing labour, it is essential to ask why more firms have not tried it. For it seems that very few have. The experience of the large scale transfers of labour in the coal industry will be examined in detail in this thesis but it is
perhaps worth reviewing the general difficulties in the way of such policies.

Perhaps the major difficulty which employers have experienced when they have considered importing labour has been to find a way of providing housing and amenities for the workers, despite the advantages to the firm which builds its own houses of reducing its labour turnover by tying the tenancies to employment with the firm. This difficulty was especially acute during the Labour Government when such a high proportion of housing resources was allocated to local authorities but even today the cost of providing housing still makes employers very reluctant to do so. They may be forced to only if there is no other method of securing labour in the right place at the right time. Local authorities or New Town Corporations cannot usually be relied upon to build houses to a firm's schedule and usually they will want their location to satisfy considerations other than a particular firm's shortage of manpower.

A second difficulty for the firm which imports labour is that mixing workers with very different industrial backgrounds often leads to disturbed industrial relations. Local workers may shun the incomers or refuse to allow them a fair share of the best jobs. Immigrants may be from areas with traditions of militant trade union activity and therefore be unacceptable to management. They will in any case take some time to settle down in their new location.

The third and last source of difficulty arises from organising the movement of labour. This can be costly and it may also require adequate administration both in the receiving and the sending areas. Small firms obviously cannot afford to make elaborate arrangements for securing men and arranging for their transfer just to satisfy a limited manpower need.

Many of the difficulties outlined above would disappear if the responsibility for labour transfer was assumed by the State. If housing and transfer arrangements could be arranged with less difficulty and expense undoubtedly more firms would adopt this approach. On the other hand the failure of industrialists to try this method of recruiting labour may just be in their ignorance of its possibilities. All of these points will be borne in mind when the practical implications of the whole problem at the end of the thesis in the light of the evidence to be presented here.

Naturally the context of this subject is vast with many wide varifications in many areas of study.

This thesis does not attempt to discuss them all but the experience which it describes and analyses covers some of the most important of them. Moreover it is an empirical study of a subject in which facts are noticeably absent from the discussion.

The core of the work is a case study of labour transfers in the coal mining industry. It is essentially an examination of the value of migration in four aspects of economic policy set against the social costs of achieving that policy: firstly, in securing a better use of labour, secondly, in reducing unemployment in the formerly depressed areas, thirdly, in preserving the skills valuable to the mining industry and lastly of course in achieving the main objective, that of securing labour which cannot be recruited in isolated mining localities.

Chapter 2 discusses the importance which migrant labour has had in the mining industry. From there Chapter 3 goes on to examine the methods used to study a particular large scale transfer of labour into the Midlands in the years 1954-56. In Chapters 4 and 5 the difficulties at the
exporting end of this transfer are considered from the standpoint of the community and the pits which lost population and manpower. The arrival of the migrants and the social and industrial problems thrown up in their resettlement are described in Chapters 6 and 7. In the last Chapters we are drawn the lessons for economic and social policy.
THE VALUE OF MIGRATION TO THE COAL INDUSTRY

The location of the coal mining industry is fixed by geology. In this the industry is unique, for while it was not uncommon in the early stages of industrialisation for industry to be located according to the supply of some geographical feature – water power, for example – in the coal mining industry the geological determination of location has remained fundamental. Further, coal deposits have been, and are, more readily accessible in comparatively isolated places; and where deposits exist under populated areas they are difficult and expensive to work because of the possibility of subsidence. Thus coal mining must/be carried on in out-of-the-way number places and it is understandable that a substantial of the country's miners live in Rural Districts. It is also understandable that any in a district rapid growth of mining/must depend on migration; it cannot rest on the hope of local labour being available and it cannot wait for the natural growth of population. In the brief summary which follows of seen the value of migration to the coal industry, it will be /how these This will principles applied in the history of its manpower supply. / provides a background introduction to the main body of the thesis.

Although each coalfield has its own local history and traditions, the history of the early labour supply is remarkably general and consistent everywhere. In every coalfield opened up in the second half of the nineteenth century there was an early initial stage of settlement by migration, followed by a second stage of population
growth usually due to a very high birth rate but sometimes accompanied by further migration. After the first World War the coalfields of Wales, Scotland and the North of England lost a substantial part of their population, some of it to the coalfields in the Midlands and the South. The number of miners in these latter coalfields did not increase very much but more and more of them were of migrant origin. After the Second World War the manpower of most coalfields remained roughly static until the 1958 recession. During this post-war period a small amount of migration has taken place between the coalfields along the same routes as the pre-war movement.

It is the post-war movement which really interests us in this thesis but it is very useful to note how it differs from migration in the past. In particular it is useful to know what kinds of migrant labour were attracted; what was the value of migration; in what way it was organised, if at all; and what provision was made for immigrant workers.

The main source of labour for the pits before the first World War was from agriculture, usually from the surrounding districts. One quarter of the population of Durham had been born in Ireland. A much smaller but very valuable group, because of their skills, was the lead and tin miners. Much of this migrant labour was male, young and unmarried.

The value of this source of labour to the coal industry was simply that, in the short run, there was often no alternative supply.

The pits in West Durham and Lanarkshire were well away from the towns and, with the exception of some lead and tin miners, there were few skilled men who could be transferred to coal mining.

The movement of this labour into the colliery districts needed no elaborate recruiting organisation because most of it came from a relatively short distance. Recruiting agents were sometimes used to secure skilled men.

As more and more men married and brought their wives into the colliery villages there was a growing need for housing and in some district this was provided by the coal owners. They built over 100,000 houses before the first World War. Most of these were to be found in Durham (about 27,000), Yorkshire (about 20,000), Scotland (about 13,000) and the East Midlands (about 14,000). Strangely, there were comparatively few in South Wales, where the largest number of men in the coal industry were employed: home ownership was much more common there.

The story after the first World War has been described by White: "Between 1919 and 1939, the demand for labour in the industry as a whole was weak, output in 1939 was 0.7 per cent higher than in 1919, but was produced by a labour force 34.5 per cent smaller. The restrictions placed on entry into the industry by the Mining Industry Act, 1926, the high rate of unemployment among miners and the steady flow of population from the coalfields to the Midlands and the South were all signs that the supply of mining labour was generally in excess of demand. In these circumstances the amount of building
which the colliery companies undertook was not large, and because motor transport gave much greater flexibility to daily journeys, it was hardly necessary to build houses at all to secure the redeployment of labour within a coalfield. In all the older coalfields unemployment among the miners was such that men were prepared to travel considerably distances to work, and it was unnecessary to offer men houses as an inducement to work in pits which needed labour. But there are limits to the distance which men can travel to work each day, and in those coalfields where new mines were being sunk to replace the output of exhausted mines in the older fields, such as Lancashire, Durham, South Wales and Lanarkshire, there was a need for workers which could only be satisfied if men would move with the industry. The coalfields where miners were needed most urgently were South Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire, North Derbyshire and, later, Kent. In all these places the sites of the new mines were in districts hitherto given over almost entirely to agriculture, there was little suitable labour to be had locally and recruits were sought in mining villages where the local pits could no longer provide work for the population dependent upon them.¹

From ten to fifteen thousand houses were built in this period by colliery companies, but little else was done to organise the movement of labour to where it was needed. Little else in fact needed

to be done while the rate of unemployment was so high. Although ownership was dispersed among a great many individuals and companies the provision of housing was secured by a Housing Association to which the coalowners subscribed.

"In 1922, twenty-four colliery companies operating mainly in the coalfields of South Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and North Derbyshire, sponsored the formation of the Industrial Housing Association to finance and carry out building projects for the coal industry. The Association raised loans to finance its work, designed the villages and either built them with its own labour or else supervised the work of contractors whose tenders had been accepted. The choice of site, however, was left to the colliery company on whose instructions the village was built.

"The bulk of the houses..... were built by the Association at comparatively little cost to the industry. A colliery company requiring houses to be built by the I.H.A. subscribed for shares equal to the cost of the houses, although only 10 per cent of the nominal value of the shares was paid up. The remainder of the Association's capital was raised by loans from the Public Works Loan Board, subsidies and from private sources."

Many thousands of miners found work in other coalfields by migrating. Scots miners found their way to South Yorkshire, Warwickshire and Kent, between the Wars. Durham men also favoured Yorkshire. Welshmen migrated to the Cannock area. Their value to their new employers was not so much in manning up new collieries, in fact very few new pits were sunk in this period, but rather in
ensuring a more adequate and therefore cheaper supply of labour. Also it helped in providing special categories of workmen. The one coalfield where it did help to provide a labour force for new developments was in Kent, where 1,656 houses were built between the Wars.

During the Second World War the main transfers of labour in the mining industry were of 'Bevin Boys': young men drafted into mining for their National Service. This desperate policy was made necessary by the unwillingness of young men of mining stock to enter the industry. It was an unpopular policy and more than 40% of those picked out in the ballots appealed against being directed into mining. 21,800 men were drafted in this way but "few of them were prepared to think of coal mining as their permanent occupation" (1) Most of them left the industry as soon as possible after the end of the War.

The nationalisation of the coal industry in 1947 was expected by its advocates to introduce a more rational and humane approach to manpower problems. With the whole industry under unified central control it would be possible to phase closures of pits with expansion and to concentrate labour in the most productive collieries. To some extent these hopes have been justified. In the first ten years of its

1. H.M.D. Parker - Manpower (1957) p. 255
existence the National Coal Board transferred over 15,000 of its workers between coalfields, sometimes over distances of hundreds of miles. These movements of labour are quite separate from the many thousands of transfers between pits in reorganisation without men moving their homes. The two main migrations of a non-local character have been a movement of about 6,000 men away from the Central coalfield of Scotland to the East and West coasts, a process which reached its peak in 1949; and a movement of greater magnitude into the coalfields of Yorkshire and the West Midlands, which reached its peak in 1954. Each of these planned movements of labour continued a spontaneous migration which had taken place on a considerable scale before the Second World War, but on this occasion the men were provided with jobs before they left home, the expenses of moving themselves and their families were covered, and houses were provided for them in the reception areas. The transfers into Yorkshire and the West Midlands cost the Coal Board about £25m. for 20,000 houses (on which there is current loss of £50 a year for each one) and half a million pounds for the expenses involved in the transfer.

There were different underlying reasons for the Scottish and the English schemes of transfer and as we must focus our attention in this thesis on the English scheme it is convenient to describe the Scottish transfers first. Basically in Scotland there was much more emphasis on rationalising the industry, that is on closing inefficient pits and concentrating production at more efficient ones. The English scheme was dominated by the intense competition for labour in the
Midlands and Yorkshire, a situation with which the coal industry was unable to cope without looking outside the locality.

The chief problems confronting the Scottish coal industry have arisen from the physical and economic exhaustion of the Lanarkshire Coalfield. Total Scottish output has been declining for more than a generation: today, at 23 million tons it is only just over half the 41 million tons produced in 1910. Not all four Scottish fields have suffered equally, but the one which has declined most has been the largest of the four, the so-called Central coalfield. Between 1910 and 1939, output in the Central coalfield declined by 45 per cent. Within the Central coalfield itself the area of greatest reduction in output and employment is the Clyde Valley, stretching the twenty miles from Lanark to Glasgow and including such well known mining towns as Wishaw, Motherwell, Larkhall, Hamilton, Blantyre, Bothwell and Cambuslang. As far as the future is concerned only two or three of the thirty or so Clyde Valley pits operating in 1947 are expected to remain open after 1965.

To deal with this situation the Scottish Divisional Coal Board produced a plan early in 1948 to re-locate workers from pits about to be closed. The advantages of the plan were set out by Lord Balfour, then Chairman of the Board, in the following ways:

"(1) It will provide a planned transfer for the men concerned with the minimum social hardship - in practically every case actual closure on a planned basis will be only slightly ahead of the sheer physical necessity forced upon the collieries by exhaustion."
(2) It will undoubtedly provide an overall increase in total production.

(3) It will provide for far more economic use of manpower, nearly double the output per shift being won by every face worker who agrees to transfer and materially increase the overall output per manshift in Scotland.

(4) It will relieve the industry of an intolerable economic burden. The average cost of production in the collieries scheduled for closure during the first six months of this year, was, during the last 11 months, 18/7d. per ton above the average cost of production in the developing areas where the increase of output will take place."

By the end of 1950, 26 pits in the Central coalfield had been shut and about 4,000 men lost their employment at them. According to Professor Baldwin, "approximately three-quarters of these men were successfully placed in other jobs in the coal industry, but — and this is the point of most interest — most of these successful transfers were made within the same Area where the layoff occurred; only a small proportion (on the order of one-quarter) were transferred out of the declining field and into an expanding Area, a transfer which requires a change of residence. The proportion of men laid off at a closed pit who transfer to an expanding Area seems to vary greatly from one closure to another. An examination of records for seven closures in 1950 showed from 6 to 41 per cent. of the redundant men placed, as being placed in an expanding Area requiring a change of residence.

"It thus appears that, on the average, three out of every sixteen men (a quarter of three-quarters) laid off as a result of closing a

1. Beyond Nationalisation — G. Baldwin, p.260
pit migrate to an expanding Area. Of the remaining thirteen men, three or four leave the industry because they want to or cannot be absorbed by other nearby pits, and the remaining nine or ten find work at other pits in the area surrounding their closed pits. Some may feel that the attempt to "transfer resources" by closing high-cost pits and transferring men to low-cost pits in other Areas is not very successful if only three out of sixteen redundant men actually transfer... but one may fairly ask: what proportion of the men laid off at any pit ought to be considered as potential migrants? When one makes allowances for the older men not in a position to start life anew, for boys too young to go out on their own, for injured men whom other pits will not hire, for men who decide to retire, for men tied to a particular region by family responsibilities, then the proportion who do in fact agree to migrate does not seem surprisingly low.

He comments further that:—

"The process of consciously relocating labour through the transfer programme, however, does not end with the migration of men who have been laid off as a result of closures. The benefits of the migration programme are open to anyone in the declining Areas who wishes to use them, and the record indicates that more employed people have migrated than unemployed. From one-half to maybe two-thirds of the migrating men have moved from pits that were not undergoing immediate closure. Many such men are, of course, migrating "ahead of unemployment" for the dim future of the Central coalfield's pits is widely appreciated among the mining population. When employed miners migrate, it makes easier the task of distributing men during each subsequent closure."
The Scottish experience seems to have been dominated by the desire of Scottish management to cut out uneconomic production (though only 50 of the 165 pits producing coal at a loss up to 1955 were closed) and only secondarily to provide manpower for the expanding coalfields. The English experience which we are about to describe is somewhat different in that the chief concern of the National Board which administered the scheme was to obtain the largest total production of coal, cost being a secondary consideration.

To understand why the Coal Board took the step of transferring over 9,000 men to the West Midlands and Yorkshire from 1954/1956 it is necessary to consider the alternatives before it when it laid its plans for their transfer in early 1952. The chronic labour shortage which had dogged all parts of the coal industry during the Labour Government began to ease in 1951, when it affected a smaller number of Areas. "While manpower deficiencies at the beginning of the year amount\textsuperscript{ed} to 24,000 men in 39 Areas, by its end they were down to 16,000 men in 20 Areas - almost all in Yorkshire, Lancashire, the West Midlands and South Wales". (N.C.B. Annual Report 1951). Moreover, certain policies which had had a limited success in recruiting or retaining manpower for the industry in the early post war years were now ruled out. Foreign labour was no longer acceptable to the men and general wage increases could not be justified to meet a selective need. Direct controls would not have been re-imposed by the Government even if the Coal Board had wanted them.
Several possibilities remained. It was open to the Board to continue its publicity to attract recruits and it was possible for them to improve the quality of management to make a more contented and stable labour force. It was feasible to ask the Government to continue to improve the housing conditions in mining communities by special allocations of houses to local authorities. In the event the main effort of the Coal Board was thrown into providing its own houses for stabilising the existing labour force in the deficiency areas and housing workers transferred to them. Permission was sought from the Government to build 20,000 houses and this was granted on the condition that the houses were completed in 3 years. The bulk of houses were to be built in the 7 deficiency Areas of the West Midlands and North Eastern Divisions. By 1953 plans were under way for using some of these houses for workers transferred from other coalfields and the N.U.M. was being approached locally to come to some arrangement about/distribution of houses between local and transferred men.

In 1954 a large scale transference of men took place between the Divisions of the N.C.B. Its purpose was to reduce the manpower deficiencies of the highly productive pits in the West Midlands and the North Eastern Divisions. In April 1954 the offer of houses and jobs was made through advertisements in the National Press to men not already living in deficiency divisions. This appeal produced about 25,000 replies and 12,000 men followed up their first enquiry by filling in detailed application forms. From 1954-56 about 9,000 men actually transferred into Yorkshire and the West Midlands. The Times commented:-
Board will have completed with striking success their plan to attract recruits and maintain the labour force in developing coalfields by providing houses themselves for miners... It is not too much to say that in the West Midlands Division the successful importing of 3,200 miners from declining coalfields in the last two years has averted an almost disastrous drop in manpower because of losses through normal wastage and the drift to labour-hungry manufacturing industries. Although only a few men from other parts of the country failed to remain in the new coalfield, the net gain in manpower was only 500 last year, so great was the movement of local miners into other occupations...

There is little doubt that it was the bait of new houses that brought the miners to the West Midlands rather than the closure, or threat of closure, of their own collieries. Many in Scotland, South Wales and the northernmost English coalfields, were living with large families in slum villages."

(Times) 14/2/55

It is this migration which has been studied in detail to provide a case study for assessing the value of migration in securing economic change.

Migrant labour is even more valuable to the coal industry today than it was in the past. It is still the only way of manning up new developments in isolated areas and it still eases the difficulties of recruitment in areas where there is intense competition for labour. But it now also, by virtue of serving one organisation with expanding and contracting coalfields, helps to increase productivity by concentrating output on the most efficient coalfields.
Chapter 3. Methods of the Investigation

The scope of this thesis is considerably wider than the scope of the original interview programme. Thus this thesis deals with the economic rewards and the social consequences of migration, as illustrated by a case study of labour transfers in the coal industry, but the original investigation set on foot by the National Coal Board had a more limited and directly practical purpose. It was provoked by reports from the receiving coalfields that transferred men were returning home in large numbers. Its first problem clearly was to investigate the reasons why transferred miners failed to settle. However, since transfers of labour were seen to be an important part of the industry's future manpower policy, it was decided to investigate a second problem: the reasons for the willingness of miners to migrate.

Despite the difference in the perspective of this thesis from that of the original N.C.B. investigation, very little was omitted from the interviews which might have proved essential to the argument of the thesis. They were deliberately formulated with the needs of the thesis constantly in mind. No concession was made in the techniques of the investigation to the willingness of industry to accept rough and ready answers.

The time available to the director of this research project was three years (1955-8) and for this period he had two research assistants. The main functions of these assistants were to interview with Schedules designed by the director and to work on official records. With these resources it was decided to concentrate on three locations. North Staffordshire was chosen as one of the areas most likely to be short
of men in the future and also the receiving area with the highest rate
of wastage of transferred men in the past. The Central Scottish coalfield
(National Coal Board Areas 3 and 4) and the West Durham coalfield (Areas
5 and 6) were chosen because they already had sent men to North Stafford-
shire and because they are both scheduled under the National Plan for
coal production to reduce manpower substantially. They are therefore
among the more natural sources of labour for transfer.

Two samples of men were interviewed, a sample of those who had
migrated and a sample of those who had not. As is well known, it is
always a problem when selecting a sample to ensure as far as possible
that it is homogeneous for this makes it easier to reach significant
conclusions with small numbers. On the other hand candidates for the
sample should not be left out if they exemplify an important aspect of
the problem being studied. To meet these two contending claims of
homogeneity and relevance it was decided to interview only those migrants
who were faceworkers, married, between 20 and 50 and who had migrated
to 9 (of the 21) pits in N. Staffs in the period April 1954 to December
1956. In point of fact this meant excluding about one third of the men
(105 of 320) mostly on the grounds of their not being at one of the 9
pits. Of the 215 men who were apparently eligible from the records 17
had later to be discarded when their records were found to be incorrect.
198 men were left in the sample and 97 of these were still in N. Staffs.
Of these 97 only one was not interviewed but 23 of the 101 who returned
home were not interviewed; 2 had left the country and 19 could not be
traced after they had left N. Staffs. The Ministry of Labour, which
co-operated in tracing the men who had returned home, was unable to locate them. This migrant sample of 174 was randomly assigned for interview to the two male members of the team.

In order to make useful comparisons the migrants were matched on a number of counts with 174 men who had never migrated. As this technique is so central to this investigation it is worth saying something more about it. Matching is a research procedure which has certain basic limitations. It cannot by its very nature reveal the effect of the factors which are being matched. Usually, however, the more general or crude factors which are controlled have been studied sufficiently in other investigations before matching is used. This makes it possible "to uncover the subtler processes of personality and environment" in social investigation. The greatest limitation upon the use of matching is usually the practical difficulty in securing the matching population.

The classic study Unravelling Juvenile Delinquency, by the Gluecks, experienced considerable difficulty in using four controls. In the present study migrants were matched with non-migrants for the following factors: age, marital status, occupation, area of origin, and housing status.

The men to match the migrants were selected from 18 pits randomly chosen in National Coal Board Areas 5 and 6 of Durham and Areas 3 and 4 of Scottish Division. Fieldwork in Scotland was to be completed before beginning in Durham. At the 8 pits in Scotland the industrial record cards of all married men who had been on books since April 1954 were examined and lists were drawn up of faceworkers (or grades interchangeable

1. Sheldon & Eleanor Glueck - Unravelling Juvenile Delinquency
Chapter 4.
with face grades, e.g. back rippers) aged 20 - 35 and those 35 to 50. These were then further sub-divided into tenants and sub-tenants. Each of the three interviewers was then assigned randomly a third of the names on these lists and was allocated a number of interviews with men in each age group and each housing status (old house, new house, and sub-tenant). The interviewer had to take each name in its turn on the list until enough tenants of each housing category and age were secured. In Durham it was possible, learning from the Scottish experience, to cut down the search for the right number of men in each category by circulating the Colliery Training Officers beforehand with a "short list" of men randomly chosen for interview. They were able to fill in the details of housing.

The fact that 24 of the migrants were not interviewed makes it impossible to compare them with a matched group of non-migrants. Most comparisons of migrants and non-migrants have, it must be noted, this limitation. Some information was available, however, even for those men who were not interviewed - age, family size, pit, area, Division and town of origin, earnings before and after transfer. When this information is used and the full sample of migrants is available, the sample of non-migrants has been made up to the same number and the same information has been secured.

The interviewing of the two samples of men was supplemented by interviews with 91 wives of men who were still in N. Staffs. The purpose of this programme was to throw more light on the reasons for returning home after being housed (about one fifth of the total wastage up to

/December
December 1956) and also to assess the degree of satisfaction with the
Coal Industry Housing Association housing estates.

The total and achieved samples are set out below:

Table No. 3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Migrants</th>
<th>Wives</th>
<th>Non-Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soots, Durham</td>
<td>Soots, Durham</td>
<td>Soots, Durham</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Sample</td>
<td>61 137</td>
<td>28 65</td>
<td>61 137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interviewed</td>
<td>52 122</td>
<td>27 64</td>
<td>61 137</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To ensure comparability in their replies, a similar schedule of
questions was used in interviewing both migrants and non-migrants. (See
Appendix A to this chapter). Migrants were then given a supplementary
schedule to examine in detail their experience of migration. These
schedules were developed from a pilot survey of thirty interviews. Written
instructions were given to interviewers to guide them in interpreting the
questions (see Appendix B). Interviews were conducted at the men's homes
and in only two cases were there refusals (both by non-migrants). Apart
from these two men, for whom substitutes were found, cooperation was
extremely good. Previous enquiries at the pits had shown what shift each
man was working, but many visits had to be made before finding men at home.
30% of the interviews required 2 or more visits. The former homes of the
men who had migrated again after returning from N.Staffs had usually to be
visited before finding their new addresses.

A comparison was made of responses to certain questions to examine
the possibility of "interviewer-bias": "If at the hostel were you
satisfied with it?" and "Were you born locally?". In neither case did
/any
any significant difference emerge.

One further requirement was to examine the effect of wording questions differently. One half of the sample was given the question "If, at the hostel, were you satisfied with it?" and the other half was given "If, at the hostel, were you dissatisfied with it?". To the former question 63% replied negatively while 65% replied positively to the latter question. In this case the form of the question was clearly not important.

The interview schedules were coded and the data punched on to Hollerith cards. These were sorted and over 200 tabulations were produced. The process of coding is a stage at which errors are liable to enter unless precautions are taken but a check on the coding showed a very small degree of error for pre-coded questions. The coding and checking of the open-ended questions was shared by the research team and very little disagreement was found.

Office records have been another source of information. A card has been made out, principally from the man's application form for transfer, for every experienced miner who transferred to N. Staffs, which gives details of age, size of family, pit and area of origin, receiving pit and dates of transfer. These cards have been hand-sorted and where the results have been used in the text they are referred to as coming from the 'Index'.

Colliery records were used in investigating the man's earnings before and after transfer and also to compare the earnings of those people who had not migrated with those who had. In N. Staffs these records were transferred to data sheets by the research team. In Scotland
and Durham the information was collected by the wages clerks.

The analysis of wastage in the text refers, unless otherwise stated, to those who returned home within the first six months of their migration. Area wastage refers to the movement of men back to their home towns whereas pit wastage also includes the movement of men between pits.
In 1952 the National Coal Board decided on a policy of transferring labour from the declining coalfields. There was little else it could do to meet the labour needs of the expanding areas. The hope was that new housing would provide the incentive to move: 20,000 houses were to be built and a substantial number were earmarked for transferred workers. There were also lodging allowances, settling-in grants and free travel to the place of work to facilitate the move. Hostels were provided for temporary accommodation. An important aspect of this early planning was to consult with the Divisional managements which were to lose manpower. The Divisional officers in their turn consulted the local Union officials.

Having done all this the Coal Board opened its national publicity campaign in April 1954. Space was taken in four daily papers, four Sunday papers and several weeklies, and several months later this cycle of advertising was repeated. The response to these appeals was staggering. 25,000 men wrote in for further details of the Scheme and 12,000 subsequently made firm applications for transfer. When it is considered that practically all of the applications were from men aged 20 to 50, and that there were only just over 220,000 men in these age groups in the Divisions which could send men, it is staggering that nearly one in every eight men of those who might have moved, not only contemplated leaving his own county but actually did something about it. In the event over 9,000 men moved from all parts.
parts of the country, as the table below shows:

### Table No. 4 Division of origin of experienced miners transferred in the years 1954-56

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Sc.</th>
<th>Nor</th>
<th>Dur.</th>
<th>N.E.</th>
<th>N.W.</th>
<th>E.M.</th>
<th>W.M.</th>
<th>SW</th>
<th>S.E</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>North Eastern</td>
<td>1835</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>723</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>516</td>
<td>476</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>499</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>4694</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Midlands</td>
<td>999</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>858</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1301</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2834</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>1581</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>978</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1800</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>9069</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source: Official Records)

It is right to regard the large number of men who wanted to transfer as staggering for the general outlook for such a transfer of labour was not a happy one. The heavy migration of the pre-war period had produced a highly defensive attitude among the leaders of the communities in Durham, Scotland and South Wales, and it was very unlikely that they would give their blessing to organised mass migration. This attitude was likely to be reinforced by the vested interests of shopkeepers, property owners and professional people in these areas.

Apart from such organised resistances to mobility of labour, various social policies worked against the transfers which the Coal Board was trying to promote from the declining coalfields. Work was being steered by the Board of Trade into the Development Areas of Scotland, Durham and South Wales at the rate of 15,000 male jobs a year. Vast amounts of capital were being invested by local authorities to improve the amenities...
of mining communities. Social security benefits had been supplemented by a scheme of special redundancy pay for miners. Who would want to move from a new house in a town where light industries were arriving and where an income of two-thirds of basic pay was guaranteed, even if unemployment were to come? These economic considerations were added to the very many social ties and obligations which held people in these communities.

It is the purpose of this chapter to examine the various barriers and resistances to migration in the specific situation of two areas which lost labour in the transfer scheme. It was possible in the time available for the investigation to take a close look at only two areas which lost men in this transfer of labour - West Durham and Central Scotland. In these areas an attempt to find the reasons why, despite the strong resistance by the community leaders and despite the many obstacles to moving, hundreds of men decided to migrate. First one must look at the nature and strength of the resistance to migration.

The leaders of the communities threatened by migration were strongly opposed to migration. They wanted to resist it either by making it more worthwhile for men to stay at home or by applying pressure to deter them from moving. They tried, too, to influence local Coal Board officials against the national policy of transfer.

The most effective opposition to the transfer came from the Union which in mining is particularly strong because of the close relationship between the place of work and the place of residence: between the pit
and the pit village. In the declining coalfields it is even more well organised and strongly supported by the men for events in the history of decline have brought the ranks of the union together.

The regional leadership in both Durham and Scotland is not, in principle, against migration of miners to other coalfields. Abe Moffatt, the leader of the Scottish miners said in 1949 that it was in the men's interests "where absolutely essential", and Sam Watson in Durham has echoed these sentiments. It is at the actual pit that the Union has been obstructive. In Scotland every closure had by agreement to be considered before special meetings of the Colliery Consultative Committee, and to be discussed if necessary at Divisional level by the N.U.M. and N.C.B. in their Consultative Council. Practically every closure of a pit in Scotland has been contested by the N.U.M. and in a few cases they have even backed such protests by strike action. In one such strike in April 1949, 1,500 miners were on strike at Portisatt and Hillhouse Collieries.

Another way of showing their feelings has been for miners to ban overtime work when a colliery is under notice of closure. In October 1957 at a mass meeting at E. Benhar Colliery (Central Scottish Coalfield) the N.U.M. branch officials were given power to discipline any of the 150 members who defied one such ban on overtime, operated by the Union against the redundancy of 38 men.

Resistance to migration has been much stronger in Scotland than in Durham but this is not due, as might be expected though, to /nationalistic
nationalistic sentiment, for most migration from declining areas of Scotland is to expanding areas in that country. It is mainly due to the more rapid rate of pit closures. From Vesting Date to 1955 there had been about 50 closures in Scotland compared with about 15 in Durham.

A more constructive approach by the Union has been to show technical alternatives to closure. In 1949 in Scotland they put forward a plan which involved new sinkings in Chryston and Thornlebank developments at Douglas, Kilsyth and Twechar; consideration of the de-watering problem, and the establishment of a distillation plant in Lanarkshire. Very little of this plan was accepted by the N.C.B.

The management has been the obvious target for the strong feelings produced by the threat of migration but they have not been the sole exclusive target. Miners who decide to migrate have also been criticised for lack of loyalty. In both Scotland and Durham the migrant who returned home lost his priority in the queue for the best paid jobs. At some pits where redundancies were imminent the men were not taken back despite the assurance of Sir Hubert Houldsworth that men would be re-employed.

It is worth remembering that in mining areas there is a considerable overlap of the union leadership and the leadership of the local authority. It is therefore to be expected that their views should often coincide. The local authorities are not so well placed as the Union however, to apply sanctions on the Coal Board. The most that
they can hope to do is to express their disapproval and hope for action by the Government. They can also do their best to foster the growth of new industries to replace the closing pits.

In Scotland the local authorities - the 'districts' and the Lanarkshire County Council - have consistently opposed closures and the migration of miners. The Lanarkshire County Council reacted strongly against the proposals for closure made by the N.C.B. in 1949.

The Glasgow Herald reported on the 3/2/1949:

"complaints that the future of Lanarkshire as a coal producing centre was being decided by the N.C.B. and the N.U.M. without the Local Education Authority having been given an opportunity of stating their case for the retention of 'redundant' pits were voiced yesterday by representatives of all parties in the Lanarkshire County Council."

They followed up these complaints by asking two mining experts to examine the proposals to close pits but unfortunately the experts came to the same conclusions as the Coal Board. The County Council then "attempted unsuccessfully to enlist the support of the Scottish Steelmakers' Association", but "the Association felt that the Council's representations would add to the difficulty of obtaining coal cheaply".

In Durham the slow rate of closing collieries has not provoked as much reaction from the local authorities but local town planning officials
officials are very conscious of the dangers:-

"Coalmining in West Durham will cease in 50 years, Durham County Council will be told tomorrow. In a report on future employment in mining, Mr. William A. Geenty, County Planning Officer, says the industry in West Durham provides nearly 50 per cent. of the male employment in the area. Any decline must cause a reduction in employment in the service industries, and if no cheap high-quality coking coal is available at Consett, then one of the major factors holding the steel industry in the town will have gone. Mr. Geenty estimates that in 50 years' time the man-power in Durham's 118 pits - 25 of which have more than 50 years' life and 93 fewer, will have shrunk to 39,671 from the current 102,176. Because of the changes, the character of West Durham over the next 50 years may alter completely. It may mean that housing developments in the next 20 years will be restricted, and that special measures may be needed to ensure enough houses. Mr. Geenty says that the solutions adopted will depend to some extent on the way in which the Government decide to operate their distribution of industry policy. He thinks it may be necessary to seek Government advice on how the policy will affect the future of West Durham and on what scale housing and other development should continue." (Newcastle Journal: 29th July 1958).

In both Durham and Central Scotland the County Councils have been very active in trying to attract new industries but

the declining districts in Scotland have been

/more
more fortunate than the declining districts of Durham.

Local authorities can also make their communities more attractive so that people do not want to leave and much has been done to improve housing conditions with a striking effect on mobility. We shall see later that a substantial number of the men interviewed were living in new houses.

In most of the mining areas affected by migration there is only one effective political party, the Labour Party. It controls the local authorities and is very influential among union leadership. The Communist Party which is its only competitor for union control is without power in Durham but in Scotland its power resides not only in the Area leadership, especially General Secretary, Abe Moffatt, but also in a substantial minority of branches.

The Labour Party is generally in favour of bringing work to the workers rather than transferring workers to where work is available. Its desire to make nationalisation function effectively does however sometimes conflict with this view especially where pit closures are used to provide men for expanding pits. In Shotts, the area of Lanarkshire most threatened by pit closures, the local Labour M.P., Miss Margaret Herbison, expressed the unpopular view that:

18th April, 1949

"The N.C.B. and the Government can't possibly carry on an uneconomic pit and at the same time give the Social services which we intended, such as two weeks' holiday with pay".

/There
There has been surprisingly little opposition by the Church when it is recollected that there are considerable Catholic communities in the declining mining areas and that they are moving to mainly Protestant districts. At a conference called by the 7th District of Lanarkshire in February 1949, the Rev. T. Finlayson said "no matter what sentiment meant to the people in the district it would not make any difference to the National Coal Board 'were concerned with matters of finance'."

Most of the villages and towns in West Durham and Central Scotland whose livelihoods appear to be threatened are too small to have organisations representing business interests but local traders are prominent on local defence committees. In Shotts they joined the Clergy, the Union and people from all walks of life to campaign against the Coal Board. Such communities tend to be almost entirely defensive and unable to do anything positive as for example to attract new industries.

The most effective private organisations attracting industry and promoting employment have been the regional Development Committees. These have attracted leading figures from both sides of the industry, the local employers being particularly well represented. In Scotland the Committee has national coverage whereas in Durham it is organised regionally through the North East Development Association. These organisations accept the decline of local industries as inevitable and seek to meet the situation by bringing in new industry. The

1. The Scottish Council for Development and Industry

/presence
SCOTTISH DIVISION
AREA No.3. (CENTRAL WEST)

KEY
- COLLIERIES
- TOWNS
- AREA OFFICE
- ROADS
- RAILWAYS
- RIVERS

KIRKINTILLOCH

GLASGOW

COATBRIDGE

HAMILTON

MOTHERWELL

AIRDRIE

KILSYTH

DUMBRECK

TWECHAR No.1

GARTSHORE 9 & 11.

AUCHENGEICH

CARDOWAN

AUCHENGEICH

BEDLAY

BLANTYREFERME 1, 2 & 3

BLANTYREFERME 1, 2 & 3

SARDYKES

MOTHERWELL

AVONBRAES

LARKHALL

KNOWETOP

THINACRES

CANDESID

GLENTORE

BOGLEA
presence of leading industrialists on these committees assures that their views are heard in the right places and they have played an important role as a pressure group in Government decisions on Distribution of Industry.

Much of the private opposition to labour transfers clearly had only a limited effect (except possibly in generating a climate of opinion unfavourable to transfers) but the efforts of the two regional development committees were particularly fruitful because they were harnessed to the powerful Distribution of Industry policies of the State. Indeed it is the various State activities which are of crucial significance in this context, and they comprise not only Distribution of Industry policy but also the influence of other Social policies - security - the allocation and investment of Social capital, and social activity in migration.

There has been more success in taking work to the workers of Central Scotland than to those of West Durham, but in both coalfields there are still few jobs outside the coal industry. In both districts, too, there are isolated towns and villages which have proved to have no attractions for other industries.

The Central Coalfield of Scotland (see map opposite) has been declining steadily in manpower and production since before the First World War. There are now less than half the number of producing units of 30 years ago. At Vesting Date in the Area which corresponded to the present Areas 3 and 4, the manpower was deployed among 91 N.C.B. collieries
colleries but by the end of 1957 there were only 52 N.C.B. collieries with just under 23,000 men on books. By the end of 1960 this manpower will have been further reduced by about 4,000 men and by 1965 by a further 5,000.

The declining of mining manpower in the Central Coalfield has not meant the extinction of the mining communities there for new industries have been directed into these areas and other local industries have been expanding. Between June 1945 and September 1954 new employment was created for 60 - 70,000 persons in the Central Development Area (1). Unemployment in the Central Development Area in 1954, at the beginning of the transfer scheme, was only 2.7 % although the situation was rather worse in the Clyde Valley.

The steel industry in the Motherwell area has expanded considerably and further large expansion is now under way. Colvilles Ltd., which at present has 17,000 employees, intend to build a second blast furnace at their Ravenscraig Works where work on an initial project costing £24 million is complete (1960). This plan will cost £32m. in all and take five years to complete. Colvilles Ltd. also shared the new strip mill with South Wales as a result of a Government decision.

The West Durham Coalfield (see map opposite) can be divided into four districts, that on the South Bank of the Tyne Valley, that of North West Durham centred on Stanley and Consett, that of Mid-West

(1) as defined by the Board of Trade. It comprises a population larger than that of the Central Coalfield alone.
Durham with its orientation to Durham City and that of South West Durham. The first two of these districts are contained within Area 6. All of the third and part of the fourth are contained in Area 5 of Durham Division.

In all of these districts there has been a decline in the number of men employed in mining since the first World War. The decline, however, was especially rapid after the depression. In the six Employment Exchange Areas of North West Durham the number of miners employed fell from over 34,000 in 1929 to below 25,000 in 1947. The number of miners in Area 6 fell from 24,650 at Vesting Date to 20,319 in 1956. A relatively small number of pits - six - have been closed, and six new drift mines have been opened. In Area 5 the story has been of less dramatic decline. From 14,685 at Vesting Date it declined to 13,000 in 1956. Within this Area five pits have been closed and five drifts opened.

The estimated manpower in Area 6 for the end of 1960 is 17,900 but in the following five years a sharp decline is planned. In Area 5 on the other hand with 11,800 in 1960, is to suffer a slow change to 1965. In 50 years coalmining in West Durham will have ceased.

In December 1955 the unemployment rate for the North East region was 1.5% compared with about 1.1% for the U.K. The rate differed between industries, being below 1% for mining. North West Durham, because of its dependence on mining, shared this low unemployment rate. As in Scotland the Distribution of Industry Act has been instrumental
in bringing much new industry to Durham. By June 1950 employment
had been provided for some 53,000 people in the North East region
in new projects set up since the passing of the Distribution of
Industry Act. Just over half of these jobs were for women. In
Durham from 1945 to 1950 over 3,000 new jobs for men have been
created each year. West Durham, however, has shared only to a
very small degree in this influx of new industry. To quote from
a recent survey from the North East Industrial Development
Association:-

"It appears to us that in general, and for the male-employing
industries in particular, experience in West Durham has not
been as favourable as in other parts of this region". (p.90).

In most of the West Durham coalfield the coal industry still
dominates the employment position; one in every two adult males earns
his living in it. As the coal industry declines, men will have to
look much farther afield to work in other industries. At the
moment between 4 and 5,000 people make the journey daily from Consett
and the Stanley district to Tyneside and Team Valley, although this
means a bus journey of at least half an hour. Journeys of this
length are, of course, not unusual in metropolitan areas but they are
new to North West Durham where the colliery villages have been built
round the place of work. Nevertheless the fact that new industry
is available within daily travelling distance is obviously important
in providing an alternative source of employment for those who did
not wish to move away.

Clearly the elimination of unemployment by redistributing industry has the effect too of reducing migration. But it would be wrong to think that this policy was completely successful or was necessarily supported all round.

In the first place important voices have been raised against some aspects of Distribution of Industry policy.

Mr. Hamilton, M.P. has commented on the effects of these policies in the following terms:

"The feeling is, I think, growing up – certainly in these Areas (Fife and Midlothian) that the Development Area policy is immobilising labour which could be possibly better used in the developing mining areas".

This was also the view of the Cairncross Committee set up by the Scottish Council for Development and Industry.  

The second point is that where the new industries employ women there is clearly a greater disincentive than ever for the family to migrate. This is more important in the employment of single girls than in working wives. The number of working wives (full time or part time) in the survey was small: 11½% of the migrants' wives as against 11¾% of non-migrants' wives. And the greater availability of work for wives in N. Staffs. seems to have had little effect on the decision to migrate.

Thirdly the introduction of new industry does not, on the evidence

of our survey, bring to every member of these communities a confidence in their economic future. Both samples of migrants and non-migrants were asked "What do you think of the opportunities for children in this area?" (i.e. their home area) and two-thirds of each group thought that they were 'bad'.

In any case, even where new industry does reduce the incentive and need for migration, by providing local employment, it does not deter people who were dissatisfied with the amenities offered them in their home towns. "Amenities" can cover a wide variety of social capital, but the most important item bearing on migration is undoubtedly that of housing.

In the 1936 Survey of Overcrowding, Durham was found to be the worst community in England/Wales. The housing situation in Scotland too was universally regarded as deplorable. These pre-war images remain, but in fact they have become blurred. There have been large programmes of housebuilding since the War.

In Scotland, the Scottish Special Housing Association has built over 13,000 houses for miners and it must be remembered that in 1954 there were only just over 80,000 miners in that Division. Superimposed on these special programmes was the normal post-war house-building of the local authorities swollen by special allocations given to them for miners. It is true that Durham has been less fortunate, but the local authorities there have carried out very substantial schemes of house-building.

/Among
Among the 61 men interviewed in the Scottish sample, there were only 8 (13%) who had been sub-tenants and a further 14 (23%) who had been tenants of houses built before 1914. Comparing these men with 1,143 faceworkers (in the same age-range) still on books at the 8 pits selected in Scotland, less than 5% were sub-tenants and only 18% were still living in houses built before 1914. The remainder were living in houses built since then.

Among the 137 men in the Durham sample, 29 (21%) had been sub-tenants and a further 64 (46.5%) had been tenants of houses built before the first World War. Comparing these with 1,283 faceworkers still on books at 9 pits in Durham, (there is no information for the 10th pit) less than 4% were sub-tenants. It is not possible to say what percentage were living in houses built before the first World War but it is known that the Scottish miner is considerably better housed than his Durham colleague as a result of the S.S.H.A. housing programme for miners. Thus, in general, migrants' housing although worse than the average for their coalfield, was still surprisingly good.

It is, of course, not sufficient to list the objective nature of the housing. What is perhaps more relevant is the kind of attitude people have towards it. The table below classifies the response of two comparable groups towards the question "Are (were) you satisfied with the house you have (had)"?

1. Scottish Special Housing Association

/Table A
Table 5 A comparison of housing satisfaction of men in the migrant and non-migrant samples
(Source: Interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Non-Migrants</th>
<th>Migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Satisfied</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissatisfied</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Even after taking account of the matching for housing status Migrants are still more dissatisfied with their housing.

Clearly moving from bad to good housing is an important incentive to move for a substantial minority, but it is not as important as was expected by the manpower planners of the National Coal Board, partly because there have been such great improvements in housing in these areas.

The last field of Government policy which has a bearing on migration is that of social security. It is obviously impossible to gauge the effect of social security on a man's willingness to move, for there is no way of testing what his re-action would be without it. The most that can be said is that the benefits which unemployed miners can draw make it possible for a man and his family to live not too uncomfortably without working at least for 6 months. Under a special redundancy pay scheme miners with 3 or more years' service are entitled to have their Employment Benefit made up to two-thirds of their basic pay for a period of 6 months.
It is a common assumption that people used to finding their security and social nourishment in a familiar community are unlikely to want to be drawn on to their own resources and to go to live among strangers, but the scale of the response to the 1954 transfer scheme shows just how many people do not act according to expectations. Three explanations can be offered for this unexpected behaviour: firstly, that these migrants were not 'ordinary people' and therefore the normal reluctance to move was not there; secondly, that something was pulling them especially hard; and thirdly that they were being pushed by some unusual situation. Combinations of these explanations are also possible.

There is some basis for thinking that the migrants were not average members of the population and that there was less holding them to their home communities. They tended to be young, not very involved in local life and knowledgeable about life elsewhere.

The importance of age in this context is that young married men have to still have only small families and they certainly do not consider the opinions of their children. On the other hand proper housing made possible by migration becomes more important when the children begin to arrive. Further than this, if they are recently married they are likely to have withdrawn from wider community life into their marriages. These conclusions are borne out by the evidence from the Survey.
It is known from the 'Index' that most of the men from all Divisions who transferred to N. Staffs were young. (Experience in the other 6 receiving Areas was similar to N. Staffs.) The selectivity of the migration can be seen by reference to Table below; in every Division it was the men under 40 who were attracted.

### Table 6: Age of all migrants to N. Staffs compared with age distribution of faceworkers still on books in home area

(Source: 'Index' and Stats. Department)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of all Faceworkers</th>
<th>Scottish</th>
<th>S. Western</th>
<th>N. &amp; C.</th>
<th>N. Western</th>
<th>Durham</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mi-</td>
<td>Mi-</td>
<td>Mi-</td>
<td>Mi-</td>
<td>Mi-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>grants</td>
<td>grants</td>
<td>grants</td>
<td>grants</td>
<td>grants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 &amp; under</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 - 30</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>45.1</td>
<td>42.3</td>
<td>30.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 - 40</td>
<td>36.7</td>
<td>43.7</td>
<td>31.4</td>
<td>41.5</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 50</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>10.0</td>
<td>18.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 &amp; over</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>.98</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Men on books as at October 1954)

There are several indications from replies to interview questions that the men who have migrated have less strong local ties than non-migrants. Not so many of them were born locally, more had short residence in and many absences from the home area, more did not like their home towns, and less of them used to "go out much" before they moved. /People
People who have been born and bred in a community are less likely to want to leave it and this was borne out by the survey. 78% of the non-migrants answered 'yes' to the question "were you born locally" against 58 1/2% of the migrants. (7% of the migrants were foreign born).

When some of the negative responses were re-coded as "yes" where the person was living within a five-mile radius of his birthplace the percentages became 85 1/2% and 62%, that is to say that more than one-third more of the non-migrants were born locally. The wives of non-migrants were also more likely to be locally born: 83% to 71%.

One interesting feature of the migrant sample was the number who were of foreign origin - 13 out of 198. Ten of these were in the Scots sample of 61 who migrated and 9 of them were employed at one pit; one of the few in the Central Coalfield which took foreign workers. Many of them believed that this pit was soon due for closure and that their chances of being employed in the pits nearby were not very good. 7 out of the 10 have since returned to Scotland, all except 1 have been interviewed, and all of them were still in the pits at the time. As it might be thought that the behaviour of this group may unduly affect the conclusions, the results which apply to them are given separately. It is probable that the longer a person stays in the one place the more friends he makes and the more likely he is to continue to stay there.

This receives some support from the findings of the survey: 24% of the migrants (which includes all 7% of migrants who were foreign born) against 4% of the non-migrants had lived "locally" for 10 years or less.
30\% against 81\% had lived there 20 years or less and only 61\% against 87\% had lived there over 20 years, showing that the non-migrants belonged much more markedly to the area.

Those people who have come from outside a village will get deeper roots the longer they stay there but they will always be aware of another kind of life elsewhere. This gives them a head-start if they wish to migrate again. Similarly with local people who have spent time away they are more likely to migrate. Only 33\% of the migrants against 60\% of the non-migrants had had no absences (absence being defined as one month or more from the neighbourhood since taking up residence). The proportions of the absences from one month to five years were about the same - 14\% against 17\%, but 46\% of the migrants against 17\% of the non-migrants had had absences of over 5 years.

The categories of reasons for absence used for analysis were "work", "H.M. Forces", "family move" and "combinations", the numbers not falling into these groups and their combinations being very small. Few people had had a "work" absence alone, 12\% of the migrants against 7\% of the non-migrants, a slightly larger number had had "H.M. Forces" absences, 18\% against 13\%, and a much larger number came into the "H.M. Forces" and combination group, 22\% against 8\%. In other words, slightly more of the migrants had had a "work alone" or a "H.M. Forces alone" absence, but many more had been in H.M. Forces when the categories are combined, more than double in fact.

\textit{Ex-Servicemen}
Ex-Servicemen are much less likely to be deterred from moving by life in hostels and among strangers. They are also more aware of the amenities available in other parts of the country.

More migrants had spent part of their working lives outside the pits; 71% against 49%. This latter figure corresponds very closely with the results of the survey 'Scottish Mining Communities' for the Central Coalfield, which showed 44% had worked outside the industry. Where migrants have spent time outside of the coal industry, they are more likely to have spent it in H.M. Forces; 61% against 46%. This will have entailed living away from their home towns.

Turning more to the attitudes which the migrants had to their home towns the general tendency for them to have weaker ties was confirmed. 75% of the migrants answered 'yes' to the question "Do/did you like your home town"? (10/12 foreign born answered 'yes') as against 88% of the non-migrants.

Migrants and non-migrants were also asked the question "Do/did you go out much?" and the 'Yes' responses were 44½% against 53½% respectively. (4/12 foreign born answered 'Yes').

If as is usually supposed the inhabitants of small communities feel the pull of social ties more strongly than those in large towns this is borne out by the fact that only 38½% of the migrants came from villages against 62½% of the non-migrants. These proportions are reversed throughout all centres of population larger than the village; 16½% of the migrants came from towns of less than 5,000

1. B. Hutchinson - Scottish Mining Communities Government Social Survey 1946
Inhabitants against 11% of the non-migrants; in centres from 5,000 - 20,000 19% against 10%; in large centres 13½% against 7½%, and in metropolitan suburbs, 13% against 10%. In other words more migrants came from everywhere except the villages.

One interesting feature illustrating once again the comparative social isolation of the migrants was the very wide geographical area from which they came. They came in ones and twos from all over West Durham and Central Scotland.

Although it would not be accurate to present every migrant as a different man from those he left behind there seems to be good ground for concluding that a substantial number of them were not deterred by the resistances generated against migration because they were in some essential detail already emancipated from local ties.

It is necessary to turn now to the alternative explanations for the unexpected response to the transfer scheme: those which lie in the realms of motivation for moving. People who migrate may be divided into three categories of motivation. Those who move because they are pushed, those who move because they are pulled by a generalised picture of a new way of life and those who move to secure some particular object. In the first category we may include those who are redundant or are under threat of redundancy and those for whom something has gone wrong at their home pit or area. In the second category there are those who want to improve their own future and the lives of their families.
In the third category there are mainly those who want a house or a better house. One-third of the 248 reasons advanced by 174 men in the Survey Sample fall into category one, one-quarter fall into category two, and about one in five fall into the last category. The remaining $\frac{13}{60}$ths are widely distributed among other reasons. Seventy-three men gave more than one reason for their move, usually a combination of two.

The reasons given for moving vary with the age of the subject, as can be seen from Table 7 below:

**Table 7 Reasons for moving and age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>20-29</th>
<th>30-39</th>
<th>40-49</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'Pushed' Redundancy</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pushed' Fit Grievance</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pulled' Self-Improvement</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pulled' Housing</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'Pulled' Other</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>73</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>248</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40% of the reasons given were single reasons, housing being the most likely reason to be given by itself (53%). More men under 30 mentioned housing whereas the age group 30-39 were particularly likely to move for self-improvement and the 40-49 group were more likely to have been 'pushed'.

Roughly the same percentage of all age groups and not considered of non-migrants.

/ moving
moving but fewer of the 20–29 age group replied that their wives and family objected to moving.

**Table 8 Reasons for not Moving and age**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>Age Groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wife/family objected</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bad reports about reception area</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attached to locality</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pleased with housing</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Got a good job, etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past experience of moves</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opps. A/R here</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conditional, later, etc.</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Had not considered it</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On the face of it a substantial number of men were moving for reasons of self-improvement and it might be expected if they were strongly motivated that some previous evidence of ambition would be present. It is a point of view often expressed by the leaders of the communities in the sending areas that their most go-ahead people are moving to the new areas. There seems to be little objective difference however, in the aspirations of migrants when compared with those who stay. Very few (less than 5%) were preparing for promotion for supervisory positions and an equal number was to be found among non-migrants.
In response to the further question "What do you think of the opportunities for children in this area (i.e. home area)?" - two-thirds of the migrants thought that opportunities for children were bad but an equal proportion of the non-migrants thought the same way. It is interesting to note however that among the group who gave as their reason for moving that they wanted to improve the position of themselves and their families there were many more who thought that opportunities for children in the home areas were very bad: 21/65 against 32/183.

Perhaps the most convincing comment on the low intensity of motivation behind the migrants lies in the speed with which they turned back home. More than a half of those who returned home did so in the first fortnight.

It might perhaps be thought that those who moved because they were pushed were more highly motivated and certainly as will be seen later, they weathered the storms of transfer more successfully. One important group of men in this category were those with pit grievances (38 out of 248 reasons given) covering such things as difficulties with management, low pay and poor working conditions.

Although 17 out of 174 migrants gave low pay as a reason for moving an examination of the earnings of migrants before they moved (for a three-week period, ten weeks before transfer) compared with those of non-migrants for the same period shows that migrants tended to earn the same: 38/136 (27.9%) were earning under £2 per shift as
against 42/143 (29.4%) of the non-migrants.

There are considerable differentials of earnings in the coal industry between the faceworker and the daywageman. It is therefore a considerable frustration for a man trained as a faceworker to be employed as a daywageman because there is not sufficient faceroom.

In 1957 in Scottish Division Areas 3 and 4 had 350 'available' faceworkers [i.e. trained but not working at face] but they had 9,706 men at the face. In Durham Division, Areas 5 and 6, there were 1,527 'available' faceworkers but they had 13,916 men at the face. But the shortage of room at the face was not a major motive for migration. In fact only 2 of the migrants said they had moved in order to secure up-grading to the face, and the proportions of the two samples who said they had experienced difficulties in getting facework were very small and the differences were negligible: 62% of migrants and 9% of non-migrants.

The physical conditions of work are considerably different in Durham and in Scotland from N. Staffs. The seams are much thinner. 70% of the migrant sample came from pits with an average seam thickness under 30". 24/174 men mentioned bad physical conditions as being a reason for moving; wet working and thin seams being the usual complaints.

There were only two men who gave disagreements with Managers a reason for moving. In reply to a question "How did you get on with the Management at your old job?" only 5% of the migrants got on 

//badly//
'badly' with their previous Managers and there was an equal proportion of non-migrants who replied in the same way.

The largest single group of reasons for moving which contained an element of pressure to migrate were those to do with redundancy or the threat of redundancy (44 out of 248). This is despite the fact that in recent years many men who have been displaced by closures and re-organisation have had work found for them at other pits within the locality. Often subsidised transport has been arranged to facilitate this transfer and consequently the numbers travelling on such transport have been increasing steadily. With the closure of pits in the Clyde Valley, there has been a large increase in the number of men travelling to the Kilsyth Area. Two pits which have been taking redundant men from the Clyde Valley now have one-quarter and one-half of their men, respectively, travelling on subsidised transport, in some cases more than ten miles. In the period January 1954 to June 1956, 2,530 men were declared redundant at 30 collieries in Scottish Division. Of these 1,601 transferred to other collieries in the Division.

In the Central East Area there has been a considerable amount of movement daily from Airdrie, Bellshill and other Lanarkshire towns into Whitburn, although this has been eased to some extent by the building of new houses in the town; largely through the agency of the S.S.H.A. Since 1939, Whitburn has doubled its population and is still growing.

/As
As in Scotland the redundancy caused by closure and re-organisation of collieries in Durham has been met by redistributing men among neighbouring pits. In the period January 1954 to June 1956, 1,570 men were declared redundant in the whole of Durham. Most of these were transferred to other pits nearby. In Area 5 alone over 4,000 men have been transferred to other pits within the Area from Vesting Date. This has increased the number of men who are travelling on subsidised transport and at present there are over 2,000 miners in the two Areas who are travelling in this way because of redundancy.

But these solutions to the problem of redundancy, while often satisfying many miners, did nothing to avoid an atmosphere of gloom and a lack of faith in the future of the two areas. For a substantial number of miners it was enough to see so much redundancy and to think of the future of their own pits, to convince them of the need to move away.

has been concerned

This chapter with explaining why so many men were attracted by the possibilities of transferring to a new coalfield despite the good reasons there were for staying at home. The improvement in the employment position in West Durham apparently and Central Scotland in recent years has not been sufficient to convince people that their best interests do not lie elsewhere, and for others the immediate prospect of redundancy looked sufficiently frightening to send them on their way. Despite also the substantial improvements in the social capital of the North
there is still the general impression that life is cleaner, healthier and more entertaining in the South. All of these reasons were real enough to the average miner but they were especially valid for people who did not have so much reason for staying where they were.
In this chapter it is proposed to examine the social and economic consequences of the transfer of miners from the West Durham and the Central Scottish Coalfields in the period 1954 to 1956. Both these Areas suffered a substantial loss of population in the inter-war period which at the time provoked considerable discussion as to the social consequences of mass migration. The 1954 transfer, although on a much smaller scale — West Durham losing about 4,000 people and the Central Coalfield losing about 6,000 — still evoked strong reactions. The opponents of migration saw its most serious consequences to be in lowering the standard of living of those who remain behind, in disrupting community life, and in depriving people of their normal social satisfactions. There were also national issues involved in the supposed waste of social capital.

One writer has said that "it must be emphasized that no town or village which is losing the most active section of its population can hope to escape a lowering in its standard of life. Lower incomes, lower purchasing power and cumulative decline appear to be the unfortunate lot of areas of declining population. The decline in prosperity extends far beyond the proportion of population loss, just as in the course of a trade cycle a decline in investment produces a more than proportionate decrease in total expenditure."

1. G.H. Daysh - West Durham (1953) p. 174
The standard of living of those who are left behind could be affected in a number of ways:

(a) the smaller the population the less demand there is for the goods and services provided by professional, commercial, and business people.

(b) a decline of property values.

(c) a loss of rateable value by the local authority which is then unable to provide its usual standard of services.

(d) a greater demand for local authority services as a result of there being more old and infirm people in the community.

(e) a loss of "family payments".

From 1954 to 1956 both West Durham and the Central Scottish Coalfields lost population as a result of the transfer of labour and to that extent the business community and professional people of both areas lost some demand for their services but it is important to note that in spite of this and other kinds of migration, their total population still increased in the period mentioned. As official statistics do not distinguish these two areas one must take the County figures in which they are included. The general trend is likely to be the same, as the transfer scheme applied equally to other parts of Durham and Lanarkshire. The population of the County of Lanarkshire (excluding Glasgow) rose several thousands from the figure of 530,965 in 1954 and part of the administrative County of Durham increased
from 910,693 in 1954 to 921,600 in 1956.

It might be argued, however, that in this period there was a noticeable shift in the age structure to the older age groups - certainly the labour force in the pits aged considerably as can be seen below - and that as far as the business community is concerned this shift was significant. Young people setting up homes are big spenders and young men in manual occupations are usually at the height of their earning power. It can be seen from the Table below that there is something in this point.

Table 9 Age of Faceworkers Areas 3 and 4
Scottish Divisions Areas 5 and 6 Durham Division and Area 1 West Midlands Division
(Source: N.C.B. Stats. Department)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>% of all Faceworkers 1950 (earliest year available)</th>
<th>West Area 5 (D.)</th>
<th>Durham Area 6 (D.)</th>
<th>Central Area 3 (Sc)</th>
<th>Scotland Area 4 (Sc)</th>
<th>N. Staffs. Area 1 (W.M.)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 20</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>23.1</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>32.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>30.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>25.6</td>
<td>27.9</td>
<td>29.2</td>
<td>27.0</td>
<td>27.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>16.4</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| 1957                                                 |                   |                   |                     |                      |                          |
| Under 20                                             | 4.4               | 4.7               | 1.8                 | .6                   | 4.9                      |
| 20 - 29                                              | 20.8              | 17.3              | 13.3                | 16.3                 | 25.1                     |
| 30 - 39                                              | 29.4              | 28.8              | 24.8                | 31.0                 | 36.9                     |
| 40 - 49                                              | 26.0              | 28.4              | 31.7                | 30.2                 | 22.1                     |
| Over 50                                              | 19.4              | 20.9              | 28.6                | 21.8                 | 11.0                     |
It is obvious that if people do not want to live in West Durham and Lanarkshire the value of houses there will depreciate, but two things need to be borne in mind. Firstly, that home ownership is very limited in these areas, and secondly that overcrowding has always been, and still is, so marked that even with a loss of population there continues to be a strong demand for accommodation.

In West Durham there are two principal owners of property; the National Coal Board and the Local Authorities. The most common type of colliery house which is distributed over the whole of this area is found in the rows of two-storey dwellings, some stone but mostly brick, which were built during the middle part of the nineteenth century. The houses represent the cheapest form of construction, built hurriedly to house a rapidly increasing population. Most have four rooms, though examples of others occur in many villages where the number may fall to two. These houses appear to be very inadequate by modern standards, as for example the property in Hamsterley and Lintz. Though structural alterations have been made in some cases, as instanced by the building of windows at the back of the houses, the installation of taps indoors and the conversion from earth privies to water closets, these houses remain in large numbers as a rather forbidding reminder of the industrial revolution.

"At the close of the Victorian era larger terrace houses were built for the more prosperous members of the community. They have a greater number of rooms than those in group above and usually have small

1. G.H. Daysh - op. cit.
enclosed back yards, inside sanitation and bathrooms.

"During the inter-war and post-war periods Local Authorities built council houses, commonly four-roomed, to replace older houses, to alleviate overcrowding or to take an increasing population. These houses with their own gardens are usually arranged in pairs.

"There were also a number of privately built detached or semi-detached houses constructed during the same two periods. They are larger than the council houses and are better serviced, but they preserve, except in rare cases, that some air of uniformity which proves so monotonous to the eye." (1)

In Lanarkshire, the Central Scottish Coalfield, the housing situation is very similar and ownership of property is similarly concentrated in the Coal Board and the Local Authorities but one local feature is the ownership of a substantial number of new houses by the Scottish Special Housing Association. A useful view of the housing of one mining town has been given by Miss Heughan in her study of Shotts. "The houses in Shotts are owned by the Lanarkshire County Council, the National Coal Board and by private owners."

"The Lanarkshire County Council owned 975 houses in the summer of 1949, and of these 700 were permanent houses and 275 were prefabricated temporary ones. No more temporary houses were being erected, but a further 284 permanent ones were being built in three groups and by 1953,

(1) G.H. Daysh - op. cit.
(2) H. Heughan - Pit Closures at Shotts and the Migration of Miners. (1953)
the Lanarkshire County Council would own 1,259 houses in Shotts. About 1,000 families were on the County Council housing waiting list in the summer of 1949, and these families included those whose present houses were too small and those who had never had a house and were living in rooms. The temporary houses had been allotted to the latter group only, and on a basis of date of marriage, but by the summer of 1949 the allocation had reached no further than the couples married in the summer of 1944. However, although the waiting list was about 1,000, some of these families were also on the waiting list of the National Coal Board and as there was no co-operation between the two authorities some of the 1,000 might well have been housed already.

"In 1949 the National Coal Board owned 630 houses in Shotts that they had taken over on nationalisation from the private coal companies. All these houses were old and many had been condemned before the last war as slum clearance property. They were all either two-roomed houses or single-roomed houses (known as single ends), and over 500 families were waiting for one should any become vacant. Miners only were eligible, but any miner who worked within the National Coal Board, Shotts area could apply, so that miners living outside Shotts who travelled into the area to work were eligible as well as the miners living in the area or in the village."

"Most of the private houses in Shotts are owned by people other than the miners, although a few miners do live in their own houses. There used to be a tradition, before the County Council became
responsible for housing, that a miner saved and built himself a house, and today miners living in their own house are living in property that has been inherited from their fathers or grandfathers. This tradition is now dead, partly because the Council provides good houses, the tenancy of which is not tied to the job, and partly because the miner who owns property is not always eligible for the same State financial assistance if he is out of work that other unemployed men are given. Since the last war there has been no private building in the area.”(1)

Property in Scotland has never been an attractive investment either for the individual occupier or for speculators because of the traditionally low rents. The average rent of a 3 bedroom council house in 2/4d to 5/2d in Scotland is only 1/6d shillings a week as compared with from £/ shillings a week in England and Wales. (The Economist May 3rd, 1958)

From 1954 to 1956 every property vacated by transferred miners was quickly filled by other men and their families and over this period the yield from the rates in Durham and Lanarkshire actually rose. It might be said that although the rateable yield increased the burden on the rates also increased for as has been shown there was a considerable shift of emphasis to the older age groups in the population in this period and the selection of only physically fit people for transfer must of necessity have increased the percentage of infirm in the population. The relatively greater importance of older age groups would


(2) The RV. per head of pop. in Durham rose from £4.11.2d in 1952 (old valuation) to £23.11.0d in 1956 (new basis). (Municipal Year Books 1954-58)
mean that there is a greater demand for old people's welfare and the ancillary health services but what it also implies is that the rates were relieved of pressure at the other end of the age scale. Fewer school places are needed, fewer people apply for council houses and less people need maternity and child welfare services. In fact it may be said that Durham and Lanarkshire ratepayers got the best of the bargain, especially so since the responsibilities implied in the old poor law and the old health services have become national ones.

Turning to the last aspect of migration and the standard of living the results of social surveys of the economic condition of old people suggest that their income is adversely affected if their children move to other districts. Married children often rent rooms in their parents' houses, they pay for the services of child minding and they make occasional gifts of money. This impact of migration is likely to be mitigated in some degree by the fact that large families are still relatively common in mining communities. In Durham there are relatively more households of 5 persons and over and fewer of 1 or 2 persons, a natural consequence of the birth rates in Durham having been higher than in England and Wales. Several children could migrate but there would still be others to look after aged parents.

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1. P. Townsend - The Family Life of Old People (1957)
2. 1951 Census - County Report on Durham
life which may occur. The most common form of argument on this theme is to stress the loss of the most valuable members of the community. A.D.K. Owen has said of pre-war migration for example "During the course of recent visits to South Wales and County Durham I have repeatedly come across examples of social organisations which have suffered irreparable loss through the migration of some "key" man or a large section of their members. An unemployed welfare club I was visiting lost two officers and several members of its committee in the course of a few weeks. A Catholic church in Durham had lost nearly half of the families associated with it and more than half its young children in the last few years. A co-operative society was crippled by the loss of over 500 members, most of whom had left for employment in the south. Actually, as many "key" men in voluntary social organisations tend to be above the normal transference-age and as many active workers in voluntary associations tend to hang on for the sake of their interest in these associations, the loss to institutional life up to the present has not been as great as might have been expected. More serious from the point of view of these associations is the fact that neither their membership nor leadership is being sufficiently renewed from younger members of the community and, with some notable exceptions, the quality of their work is deteriorating."

(1) If one were to examine arguments of this kind more closely it would be found that what these writers have in mind is that migrants in their view

tend to be the civically active, the most intelligent, the most skilled and those with most moral character.

The evidence from the present investigation suggests, on the other hand, that those having official leadership positions in a community are much less likely to migrate than other people. Office holders on local councils or Union branches are usually opposed to migration because it presents such a threat to their activities. For a council it means less of voting power and for the Union official it means fewer members and a loss of subscriptions.

In the interview survey nearly 200 migrants were interviewed but only two had been office holders, a figure much less than could be expected in the normal population. It is of course to be expected from the usual pattern of civic participation that the comparatively youthful age of migrants would mean that they were unlikely to be civically active and this does not dispose of the possibility of their being more than usually active when they reach the active age groups, but even the older migrants were not civically active.

Much interest has been taken in the intelligence of migrant populations and a good deal of work has been done to examine in particular the intelligence of people who leave the countryside for the towns, but even so the findings are quite inconclusive. In the present survey no attempt was made to compare the intelligence of the migrant and the non migrant samples because of the practical difficulties of doing so.
A significant part of the migration from mining areas between the wars was of skilled labour, who might be regarded as the "better" migrants. The 1954-56 planned transfer did not attract craftsmen but it did include large numbers of "face trained" men. These are men who have had 6 months training or its equivalent in coal getting operations but very few of these men held deputy's papers (i.e. the equivalent of foreman) or had made any attempt to get them.

Because of the special nature of skill in mining, most miners at some stage of their working life are face workers. Thus the high proportion of face workers among the migrants - while it may tell us something about the age of the migrants, or about their desire for higher earnings - does not tell us anything about the kind of people they were or about their position in the community.

The selective character of the migration produced a strong reaction from the local Management of the pits which lost the men, as something like £2,500 had been expended on their training. It was not until 1957 that a scheme was conceived to compensate them for this expense, and this has in fact never been put into operation.

The reason for the concentration of face workers among the migrants is difficult to understand. The advertisements appealing for men willing to transfer gave no specification of particular types of men and yet over 95% of the men who applied were face workers. This group only forms about 40% of the industry's labour force. One relevant fact is that face workers, by reason of the heavy manual character of their work, are usually young men and could therefore be expected to be more susceptible to
migration. Another relevant fact is that faceworkers are generally pieceworkers and their earnings differ substantially from coalfield to coalfield. Haulage workers are paid at a national rate and no improvement in earnings could be expected from a transfer.

Migrants are not only commonly attributed with higher intelligence, skill and activity but also with having more moral fibre. It is argued that people who migrate are trying to improve things for themselves and their families. They are not waiting to have somebody to do it for them. They want to remain independent and earn their own living.

A typical newspaper report from one area affected by the Coal Board's Transfer Scheme is given below:-

"The National Coal Board policy of advertising for pit workers for other coalfields where they were being offered houses, better wages and working conditions was "skimming off the cream of Rhondda's miners", said Mr. Glyn Nicholas at a meeting of the Mid-Rhondda Chamber of Trades at Tonypandy last night. He said the N.C.B. was able to choose whom they wanted to take and quoted cases of five of his customers who had benefited financially by moving to England and had also been given houses at a lower rental rate than the Rhondda could offer.

"Mr. Nicholas asked why the same facilities and conditions could not be provided in the Rhondda and expressed concern at the number of better types of citizens who were leaving for jobs in England." "The Western Mail" 15th September, 1954.
No investigation has yet been carried out to say whether there is any basis for such contentions and these notions are not easily put to a scientific test. In an attempt to examine the quality of men objectively, four indices have been taken which might serve to illustrate the kind of men who transfer; firstly whether they were preparing for promotion or not; secondly how many jobs they had had in the post-war period; thirdly their record of attendance; and fourthly their housing records in the new area.

The number preparing for promotion in each group was small and was equal in both migrant and non-migrant groups.

There is no difference in the two samples in the number of pits which men worked at in their post war period.

An analysis of all men who had lost a bonus shift through voluntary absence or neglect in a three-week period ten weeks prior to migration, shows that there is about exactly the same pattern among migrants and non-migrants; 17.6% (24/136) of migrants lost their bonus and 16.8% (24/143) of non-migrants. (It is interesting to note in combining Durham non-migrants and migrants that loss of bonus shift was about half (13.0%) of the combined Scottish Group (25.5%).)

A comparison of the number of evictions of all transferred men who have been housed in C.I.H.A. houses with the evictions of local men from the same estates shows that there is the considerably higher figure of 81 for transferred men against only 16 for local men. This is with a ratio of 4 'incomer' tenancies to 3 'local' tenancies. Even if it were
suggested that men who make poor tenants are more likely to stay in
N. Staffs and all who transferred (including those who returned home)
were presumed to be tenants, then this proportion of evictions would
still be much higher (more than twice as great) than would be expected.

Another aspect of a man's housing record is the regularity with
which he pays his rent. An analysis has been made of all C.I.H.A.
tenants in N. Staffs who were more than eight weeks in arrears with their
rents at March 1957. Three-quarters of them proved to be incoming miners
and out of a total debt of £5,971 they owed £4,765. This debt has since
reduced considerably and there is evidence that bad payers are leaving
the neighbourhood.

An examination has been made of the ideas that those who were left behind by the
migrants suffered a drop in their standard of living, and found the
organisation of their community life disrupted. The third main argument
used against migration is that it deprives people of their normal social
satisfactions; they are separated from the people to whom they are
attached.

It would seem from the present investigation that the 1954-56
organised transfer in fact deprived people far less than might at first
be believed. Firstly, it has been shown that a substantial
percentage of migrants are not native to the communities from which they migrated, and this is
especially true of the men. Secondly, that they did not participate very
actively in local life and were glad to leave it. Thirdly, it has been shown
that most of them came singly and from many different villages. Their
/disappearance
disappearance is not likely to have been noticed except by their immediate circle. The loss of one member of a family was not serious where, because of large families, there were children still at home. Fourthly, among those who returned there were very few who returned because they missed, or were being missed by, somebody. Among those who stayed the number who complained in interviews of missing home was very small.

Without doubt the argument most commonly deployed against migration is to point to the possible duplication of social capital in the reception areas. This argument is addressed to the nation for if there is such duplication it is the nation which suffers; a community which has already paid for its Social capital does not like having something it does not now need.

It is usually argued that a large-scale migration implies that much of the existing social capital in the towns to be abandoned will cease to be utilised. The value of the social capital may be below average. In some of the declining communities where property is in bad repair and conditions of living rather low, but it must always amount to a very need large sum and houses, schools, roads, sewers, hospitals, etc., to be built in the newly settled area.

These criticisms could certainly not apply to the 1954-56 transfers for the effect of that migration was to improve the standard of the amenities for those left behind. A high percentage of the migrants had been living in houses built since 1918, mostly by local Councils and these
were quickly filled. The public services to these houses were also therefore in demand. The community services such as schools and hospitals benefitted by the reduced pressure upon them. Schools were very overcrowded and the waiting lists for hospital beds were extremely long.

Daysh has examined the social conditions of different districts of West Durham. Of Ryton "it may be said that the decline which is expected in coalmining will affect an area where many communities are utterly dependent upon mining but where much of the property is of a very low standard, amenities are lacking and social conditions are poor." His remarks on Consett district are not very different. "It is evident that this area again shows the contrast between the poverty, the low standards of property and living conditions and the lack of opportunity of the small, essentially mining hamlets and the better conditions of some of the bigger and more virile units." Of Brandon and district he says "The smaller mining villages and hamlets of the area are situated some distance from the main bus routes and consist of little more than a few rows of colliery houses, together with an occasional shop and public house. Many have not even a church or a school and most of them depend upon nearby villages and towns for even their everyday needs." (1)

In the Central Scottish coalfield, too, the effects of the migration have been to relieve pressure on inadequate amenities. Of Shotts, a town very much affected by migration Hengham has said: "The housing problem is one problem that has been partly solved by emigration but it has not been completely solved and there are many

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1. G.H. Daysh - op. cit p. 77  2. ibid. p. 79  3. ibid. p. 82
houses still being used that were condemned before the last war." (1)

Of the Primary Schools Heughan says: "They are all filled to capacity and find difficulty in taking in all the new children who reach school age." (2)

Much has often been made of the adverse social and economic consequences for areas which lose population. The evidence of this chapter urges the conclusion that, far from the consequences being wholly disadvantageous they have in fact been beneficial to those areas. while there

Moreover, which was, to the individual migrant, some loss of social satisfaction, it is clear that it did not amount to very much. Finally the supposed duplication of social capital was found to be nothing serious for the declining areas were poorly supplied with it and the new social capital of the new areas would, from a national point of view, still need to be supplemented by more in these old areas.

1. H. Heughan - op. cit. p. 21
2. ibid p. 20
The value of migrant labour to the economic planner rests with its net result in terms of workers who have settled where they are needed. The success or failure in re-settling workers after transfer may depend on two factors: the extent to which the transfer Scheme is well organised; and the ease with which the individual migrant adapts himself to his new environment. The second of these two points is clearly related to, and partly dependent on, the first. For the organisation of migration implies giving the migrants some idea of the conditions he will meet. But an individual's adjustment will also depend on a number of factors which are not easily amenable to preparation.

This Chapter will concentrate on the individual migrant's problems in settling down, but in the process we comment on the arrangements made for his transfer. In the next Chapter we discuss the same theme, but from the point of view of the family and the community rather than the individual man.

Altogether, it will be remembered, 25,000 men wrote for details of the transfer scheme, a number which was quite beyond the machinery to cope with. The resultant delays may well have been the reason why large numbers of men travelled on their own accord and presented themselves for immediate consideration. They may also help to account for the fact that only about 6,500 men actually transferred in 1954. By the end of 1956 the figures had topped 9,000.
Seven Coal Board Areas in Yorkshire and in West Midlands received these men. In the first year of the scheme from April 1954, nearly 2,000 men went to North Staffs, about 1,000 to Cannock and over 600 to Warwickshire. In the North Eastern Division nearly 800 went to Worksop, 1,350 to Doncaster, over 600 to Rotherham and 224 to Castleford.

North Staffs, is the only one of these Areas to be selected for intensive study and it thus provides the focus of much of this chapter but there is a certain amount of information available for the other six Areas. The period of North Staffs migration which was studied was between April, 1954 and December, 1956.

In this chapter the problems of the individual migrant are analysed mainly by using the objective index of wastage, and it is assumed that if a man goes back home he is dissatisfied (there may, of course, be other reasons). With this tool of analysis it is possible to distinguish the success differentials of migration and to examine the effect of experiences in the pit and outside.

2,235 experienced working miners migrated to North Staffs between April, 1954 and December, 1956; 56% of them in 1954, 30% in 1955 and 14% in 1956. By the end of 1956 58% of these men had returned home, 12.6% after having been housed in the area. In the sample survey of men from Durham and Scotland the wastage rate was lower than that of the total population of migrants being 51%. Of those who returned home about one half left in the first week and two-thirds had returned home
by the end of the third week.

The actual process of getting men to the new areas was entirely done by correspondence. An intending migrant, answering this publicity campaign, wrote to the Divisional H.Q., in Yorkshire or the West Midlands; the Division then contacted the Area in need of men and the Area administration contacted the pits. If a job was available at a given pit, the Division was told and the Division wrote to the migrant that this job was available for him at this pit and that he should report there at a certain time. Those men who wrote to Yorkshire received a brochure describing the life they might expect but the brochure for the West Midlands was withdrawn and a duplicate hand-out substituted.

The individual who migrates to another coalfield has two sets of adjustments to make, one inside the pit and one outside. By far the most critical for him in making a decision to stay or go home are the experiences he has at his pit. There are bound to be difficulties in getting established in another pit and these are heightened by differences in customary work practices. Unless the man feels he can cope with these difficulties, either by his own efforts or by enlisting the aid of the Management or the Union, he will be forced to return. There are four basic elements in this situation:

1. the demands made upon him;
2. his ability to cope with them;
3. the Management's role of facilitating his adaption;
4. the Union's role of ironing out his difficulties with the Management.
A miner who chose to transfer to the North Staffs coalfield was likely to find a situation likely to make great demands upon him if he were to settle down successfully. He was going to a coalfield where work norms were relatively high and physical conditions very different from those he had experienced; he would perhaps be getting less for doing his work; to have it organised in a manner totally alien to his own practices and to suffer social isolation while he did it.

Most of the men who moved had worked in thin seams in Durham and Scotland. Perhaps the best way to describe their experiences is that they had been used to working under the height of a coffee table and then they moved to pits where seams were seldom lower than a kitchen table. In the new pits they loaded more coal than in the old for their stint was bigger. It is a moot point whether the task required more effort but for many of the men at least it seemed to require more effort. Those who filled by hand now put at least 15 tons of coal on the conveyor belt as against 8 or 9 tons in their old pits, but under more roomy conditions. Two points which further complicate the comparison are that the pits in North Staffs are, on the whole, much warmer and drier and therefore possibly more difficult to work in; The hot atmospheres of North Staffs. pits made for greater perspiration and this led to various skin complaints; dermatitis, boils and blisters being the most common. 21% of those men who worked more than 2 shifts in their first 3 weeks lost one or more shifts through sickness or accidents.

Secondly
Secondly, the thicker seams required different working stance which may take some weeks to acquire. One in eight of those who returned home gave the working conditions as their reason for returning.

Whatever the reasons, many migrants were earning less after migration than before: 72.1% were earning over £2 a shift before moving but only 40% earned that figure in the first 3 weeks of migration. They were earning less for what they considered to be harder work.

It is no surprise then to find that pay was the most frequently advanced reason for returning home, and that those migrants who were able to maintain or improve their earnings tended to stay in North Staffs.

When compared with leavers, twice as many of the settlers were drawing over £2 a shift.

**TABLE 10**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
<th>Not known</th>
<th>Over 25/-</th>
<th>Over 30/-</th>
<th>Over 35/-</th>
<th>Over 40/-</th>
<th>Over 45/-</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transferred</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasted</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Wastage</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Underofficials and those who did not start or worked less than 3 shifts are omitted from the table. It is compiled from the earnings for the first 3 weeks of men transferred to North Staffs.)
As might be expected more of those who received under £2 were
dissatisfied with the pay for the work they did and more of the
settlers were satisfied with their money. 25% of those satisfied
with their pay were getting under £2 a shift against 43% of the
dissatisfied. The man's own statement of what he earned was checked
with the actual records of the pit and it provides a useful illustration
of distortion of fact which may occur when a man has a grievance.
Two-thirds of the statements which men made fell within the same 10/-
category as indicated by the records. Of the one-third who were
wrong considerably more of these under-estimated the earnings they
actually obtained than over-estimated them.

Not only were the earnings less than expected but the privileges
which miners have in North Staffs are not so extensive as in the sending
Areas. In Durham the concessionary coal allocation of 11 tons is free
whereas it is paid for at a cheap rate in North Staffs. In Durham
there is either free housing or a 5/- rent allowance. In North Staffs
the rents of the C.I.H.A. houses were comparatively high. In Durham
a man is provided with his tools free of charge but in North Staffs
he is required to provide his own. Another common complaint of Durham
men was that men in North Staffs are not paid travelling time; in
Durham 23 minutes were allowed for every mile to be travelled underground.

The next most serious problem for the transferred workers was the way
in which the work was organised and it is as well to remember that this
has a direct influence on pay. One-eighth of those who returned home
gave this as their reason for returning. There are significant
\textit{differences}
differences in the organisation of work between North Staffs, Scotland and Durham. In North Staffs there is a daily assignment of men to their tasks. Most men will have regular jobs to go to but a significant minority, especially on Mondays when attendance is low, will be assigned to fresh tasks to fill in for the absentees. Men who have recently arrived at a pit are the most likely recruits for the "market", as it is called. "Market men" are usually paid a basic daily wage.

"For a long time I got moved about a lot and the first Christmas I was here I got pushed off face work altogether when all the "players" came in to work - I took home £7.12.0. for the Christmas week".

In Scotland and Durham absenteeism is relatively low and there has to be less re-deployment of men, as a consequence. In Durham the 'cayt' system of allocating jobs by ballot each quarter makes it more likely that a man will have a fixed job.

Another significantly different practice is the use of workmen as "contractors" in North Staffs. These men are paid for a contract by the Manager and they can decide how the money is to be distributed within the team. This practice was sharply criticised by both Durham and Scotsmen who tended to favour "equal pay for all in the team". To their mind contracting led to favouritism and permitted the contractor to give less effort to the task then they gave.

One interviewer noted of one man:

"Put with a Polish contractor at first and paid a lot less money than him. He was mad and complained at the end of the first week and got
his pay made up the next week to team level but the contractor was
still getting 6/- to 8/- more than anyone else for the same work.
He is now a contractor himself but always pays the men the same as
himself even when they are transferred or trainees".

Another said:

"The Butty system is still here. The contractors have favourites.
Their drinking mates come first, local men second, and the transferred
men last".

"Often the contractors got £5 a day and the men got only £2."

"I was put on a back ripping contract with a trainee and did very
well so that I expected £24 at the end of the week. I received £6.14.0.
and complained to the cashier who denied responsibility. I complained
to the Manager also and he agreed it was a raw deal and offered to put
it right. He did this by putting £2 extra in. The total was then
£8.14.0. only 12/- more than a 3-week trainee. I later discovered that
the job was contracted to a man I never met or heard of and who took
the lion's share of the cash."

The pressure exerted by transferred men is leading towards an
elimination of these practices.

"We were the first section in Norton to stop contracting and others
quickly followed suit."

Another aspect of work organisation which created resentment among
transferred men was the unfamiliar close supervision exercised by
under-officials. They felt that the supervisors were "pulling their
/ranks"
ranks" and abusing their authority. The role of these under-officials is, no doubt, very different (in brief, less powerful) in the sending Divisions and it is these expectations which have not been realised. Below are some statements derived from interviews:

"The Management is friendly in Scotland. Everyone can talk as equals and sometimes when you talk to the deputy he is wrong and you are right. In North Staffs the deputy is always right and you are always wrong."

"You cannot get on face work now unless the fireman likes your face."

"In first day at Florence colliery he said to the overman about half-way through the shift "I suppose it is about bait-time now" and he replied "I will tell you whether it is bait-time or not - get on with your work." He stopped for his bait immediately and told the overman he would leave that day".

"Officials run around barking like dogs".

"There are too many little bosses here".

"An under-official said to one miner "If I can't break your heart I will break your back".

"We have chargehands here whereas we don't have them in Scotland. Grievances have to be reported to them and not the Union".

"Underofficials victimize the men. You have only got to have a bit crack on them and they make sure they get you for it - the next day you are off coal and on packing and somebody else has got your job".

"I saw the local men doing the same stint as myself but when /they
they finished early they were given overtime by the deputy and they took home 10/- a day more."

"Officials here seem to have the wrong attitude - too much "do this, do that". They think the Management is always right. There is no team work. A man does his stint and sits down and refuses to help his mates who may be having a day of difficulty. In Durham it is all team spirit - you work in a family."

It has been pointed out that the transferred miner was being expected to work harder in different conditions for less money; his difficulties being increased by the unacceptable way in which the work was organised. The net effect of these demands upon his personality were greatly worsened by the strain induced by working among strangers who were usually indifferent but sometimes very hostile.

It was a matter of some importance to both the men and management to decide whether transferred workmen should be kept together or to be dispersed, as one manager put it, 'in penny numbers'. From the men's point of view there was something to be said for being among their own kind. From the management's view point of men were found to be more belligerent and uncooperative when they were placed together. In the event there were very few cases of a definite policy of allocation followed through in practice. The transferred men were treated like any newcomers to the pit; they were fitted in where there were vacancies and the old rule 'last come, worst served' applied.
Men were asked by interviewers "Who did you work with"? Those who had worked with 'mostly local men' had a much lower wastage.

**TABLE 11 COMPOSITION OF THE WORKING TEAM AND AREA WASTAGE WITHIN FIRST 6 MONTHS**

(Source: Interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mostly local</th>
<th>Mostly foreign</th>
<th>Mostly transferred</th>
<th>Fairly Mixed</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stayed</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wasted</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Wastage</td>
<td>34.3</td>
<td>46.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There were very few teams of workmen who migrated together to the new Area. It was, therefore, easier to deploy men to different parts of the receiving pits. Only 8% of the sample had worked with transferred men only, and a considerable number worked with foreign workers. About 50% more of the settlers said that they got on "all right" with their workmates after migration, and fewer said that they had experienced difficulties in working with them, 27% against 35%. Communication with other workmen was made difficult by the very great differences in dialect between the Scottish, Durham and Staffordshire miners. Many mining terms used in North Staffs. were new to the transferred men.

There has been

/That
drawn attention to the fact that the migrants studied in this survey were likely to be marginal members of their original communities. Attention has also been drawn to the fact
that the men usually came in ones and twos from a wide geographical area. There does not seem to be, however, any correlation between migrants having friends from their home areas and their success in transfer. More men who had friends from their home towns in N. Staffs at the time of transfer, or who travelled down with them, returned home; 48% as against 36%. Whereas the presence of friends in the Area seems to have little effect on the process of transfer, a very marked effect can be seen when members of the same family migrate to the new area. The proportion having relations in the receiving Area at the time of transfer is small but more of the settlers had them; 18% as against 5%.

Added to and superimposed on the difficulties of actual pit work of conditions, of pay and of organisation - were the initial problems facing a migrant before he was re-housed. He would be separated from his wife and family, visiting them only at weekends. He lived in a hostel without the comforts and amenities of married life. He was no longer the hub of the household around whom all activities revolved. Those organising migration cannot be expected to deal with all of these personal problems, except to ease them where possible. Thus migrants were housed fairly quickly. Nevertheless their significance in the success or failure of the transfer scheme is obviously very great and it is worthwhile examining them.

The ability to withstand strain is distributed very unevenly among people and these strains imposed by migration were best stood by those
people who were most highly motivated to move and whose psychological and material sources were greatest. One miner described his own attitude to the difficulties he had experienced in the following words - "I decided to make a go of it whatever happened." This extreme view was rather more uncommon than that of men who said they moved with the intention of giving it a "fair trial". The fact that a very high proportion of men who returned home did so quickly is an indication that there was a third group whose motivation to migrate could not have been very powerful. One half of those who left went home in the first week and two-thirds had gone by the end of the third week. This means, that many left without trying to alter the conditions they experienced.

It has been mentioned earlier that a number of older men were transferred. It might be thought that they would have considered their decision to transfer more carefully and would be more determined to stick it out. On the other hand they were less physically adaptable than younger men and therefore were less able to cope with the changed methods of work. The table below shows that there was no significant correlation of age and wastage.

| TABLE |
TABLE NO. 12 AGE & WASTAGE

All 2235 experienced transferred workers in
N. Staffs and 198 men in sample at selected
9 pits

(Sources: Index and Interviews)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Stayed Sample %</th>
<th>All %</th>
<th>Returned Home Sample %</th>
<th>All %</th>
<th>Total Sample %</th>
<th>All %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 - 29</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 - 39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 - 49</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that there was no difference in the numbers in each age group of the settlers who said they were dissatisfied with their move, but among the reasons given by those men who had returned home there was a noticeable difference in those coming from the younger men. Of the 14 complaints about work organisation 9 came from men under 35, of the 5 about management 4 came from men under 35 and all of the 5 complaints about the ineffectiveness of the Union were also from these men. (Of the 112 reasons for returning which were recorded 65 were from men under 35.) Men over 35 tended to mention pay and working conditions more but it is relevant to note here that there was no actual difference in the earnings of younger and older men.

A high proportion of the transferred men had been householders before they moved and they kept possession of their houses while they were in process of transfer. To them the house offered by the N.C.B. was not in itself a reason for staying after transfer but it might be
thought that the minority who had been living in rooms or with in-laws would be more reluctant to return to their home towns. The table below shows no relationship between previous housing status and wastage:—

In the national picture there is no significant difference in the proportions of the two groups returning home, and this position is mirrored in the local picture.

**TABLE NO: 13**

Former Housing Status and Wastage

(Sources: Interviews and Records)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>New Householder</th>
<th>Old Householder</th>
<th>Sub Tenant</th>
<th>Unknown</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stayed</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Returned Home</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Being in need of better housing as a motive for transfer does not provide the most stable recruits. The wastage rate of the group giving this reason was higher than for all others.

It has been suggested in an earlier Chapter that there was little fear of immediate unemployment in Durham and Central Scotland in 1954. A man dissatisfied with his transfer who decided to return home could be reasonably sure of getting a job, but this did not mean that he could go back to the pit he left. Pits which had experienced or were likely to experience redundancy were very reluctant to take men back. It was the Board's policy that men should be re-engaged, but there was no guarantee
guarantee which could be made as to what would happen at the pit level. Here the Union could be against re-employment on the grounds of redundancy or might only agree to a man being re-employed on a lower paid job. In Durham, two out of twenty-four pits refused to take men back, eight agreed to take them if the manpower position allowed and fourteen had no special practice. This may help to explain why men who moved for reasons to do with redundancy were less likely to return home than migrants who moved for other reasons and were likely to stick it longer even if they finally returned home. Only one in five returned home in the first fortnight as against a wastage rate of about one in three for other men.

In more than one case the management made it difficult for men to get their jobs back. At one colliery men who had returned were brought before the pit Consultative Committee and used as an example of the folly of transferring.

From the interviews with men who returned home it was found in the event that the situation was not too difficult. One month after returning 56 out of 67 men, whose histories are known, were back in the pits, 8 were employed outside the industry and only 3 were unemployed. On the other hand, more than a quarter of those who went back to the pits said they had experienced some sort of difficulty in getting in again.

For those men who had given up their housing on migration there
was a very real difficulty in returning to their home towns and this may partly account for the very low wastage of men after re-housing, especially in the light of the relatively high percentage of men who declare themselves dissatisfied with the move they had made. The wait for a council house may take years and even the poor standard colliery houses may take months to obtain.

The largest group of migrants moved for the long-run objective of improving the future for themselves and their families. It is perhaps to be expected that these people are less likely to worry about immediate difficulties as long as the long term prospects still look good. Only one fifth of these men went home in the first fortnight.

The other important set of reasons given by men who moved were pit grievances. These usually concerned bad working conditions, low pay or antagonism towards the management. This group had the lowest wastage of all.

The individual's wishes with regard to continuing with his transfer had to be seen within a context of the pressures upon him by outside factors. Two of the most important factors are the ease with which he can return if he wants to and secondly, the kind of reception he will get from people on his return.

If they have the chance men tend to go to the Division nearest to their homes. (They have to apply to the Divisional Headquarters for transfer and they are then allocated to an Area. It is possible to
ask for a particular Area and be allocated to it if jobs are available, but very few men do in fact do this). Scots tend to go to Yorkshire, Welshmen to North Staffs. Those from Lancashire go in equal proportions to both Divisions. The apparent exceptions to this rule, N. & C. and Durham, are to be explained by traditions of transfer established prior to the 1954 scheme. In 1953 a considerable number of men had been transferred into the West Midlands from those Divisions when the alternative of going to Yorkshire was not available.

In terms of a single fare home, even the most extreme distances involved in the 1954 transfers were not likely to be expensive, certainly not more than £3 if a bus were used. Hitch-hiking is, of course, always open to those who have no money. It is unlikely anyway that a man's return would be delayed by shortage of money any longer than the next pay-day.

For some men the thought of having to admit to failure to the friends and relations they had intended leaving behind, was enough to persuade them to stay. One deputy who had left a tiny village in Durham for N. Staffs found that the hot working conditions were more than he could stand. His health deteriorated rapidly but rather than go back home, he moved on to Yorkshire to join a relation of his there. This fear of public opinion was not unreal as is obvious from the description given in Chapter 4 of the sanctions some union branches imposed on giving a man his job back if he returned. In a mining
community where the emphasis is placed on joint action and social solidarity a man who chooses to improve his own personal lot will never be popular.

The amount a man earned naturally affected his ability to weather the financial difficulties of transfer and about half of the migrants experienced financial problems in the course of their move. When it is realised that over half had outgoings of over £10 per week and yet the average take home pay of those with 35/- a shift (2 out of 7 had less) was only about £10 a week, there was not a lot of room for manoeuvre. This situation was made more precarious by the fact that one-third of the migrants took less than £5 with them. It is interesting to note that although a half of the settlers claim to have experienced financial difficulties, only one-sixth of the wives mentioned them as being difficulties arising out of the course of transfer.

The process of moving from one community to another inevitably involves meeting a lot of strangers and people are very differently prepared and equipped for such an experience. A commonly expressed opinion was that men who had lived away from home, especially in the Services, were likely to find things easier than those who had not. When compared with those who wasted, twice as many of the settlers had been in the Services: 24% as against 12%. Some of the many ways in which such experience was useful were that ex-servicemen were much less inhibited about eating with strangers and undressing before them in

/
the dormitories. Men who had served in the Forces also expected less in the way of comfort and good food at the hostel.

Hard times are easier to bear when an end to them is in sight. For many men the critical date they set themselves was when they could get a house and their families could join them. At the height of the scheme nearly three quarters of the new arrivals were being housed within one month.

**TABLE NO. 14**

LENGTH OF WAIT FOR HOUSING AND WASTAGE IN FIRST SIX MONTHS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
<th>1956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% wastage</td>
<td>% housed under 1 month</td>
<td>% wastage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>52.1</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>72.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>52.3</td>
<td>45.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>40.0</td>
<td>36.6</td>
<td>62.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>53.8</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>50.8</td>
<td>39.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>43.4</td>
<td>35.0</td>
<td>26.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>51.1</td>
<td>44.0</td>
<td>20.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>55.4</td>
<td>34.4</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>48.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
<td>26.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>56.0</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>64.2</td>
<td>57.9</td>
<td>50.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

but there appears to be no relation between the proportion who are housed in their first month in the Area and wastage in the first six months. The wait for housing tended to increase between 1954 and 1956.
Another important aspect to this same problem is when men are prepared to put up with low earnings until they work their way into better jobs. Most of these returned home were not prepared to wait very long. Rumours circulated very rapidly about the earnings in different pits but there was very little concrete information for men to judge what they might one day be earning. Many of the difficulties were caused by the fact that a substantial proportion of the men expected to be earning more money after they moved but a considerable number were in fact earning less. A great many men took for granted that they would earn the average earnings of faceworkers in the West Midlands Division, then 58/4d a shift, as this figure had been quoted as a guide in official correspondence. As has already been mentioned, only 40% of the migrants were earning £2 a shift in the first three weeks after the move, whereas 72.1% were earning this sum before migration. It is not surprising that three quarters of those who earned less than £2 a shift were dissatisfied with their pay.

It might be thought that a special responsibility lay with Management to smooth the way of transferred men and if this is so it is even more surprising to learn that generally the Management at pit level was in fact hostile to these men and commonly regarded them as nothing but a nuisance. The nuisance varied with the number they were pressed to sign on. They saw these men as an extra burden on the administration as provoking labour disputes and as a threat to the pit’s output per man/shift.
shift. They complained too that the offer of Coal Industry Housing Association houses in other Areas was attracting away some of their best local men.

The burden on the pit administration was especially heavy in the North Eastern Division since there the houses were let by the pit managers in consultation with the Colliery Consultative Committee. This right of consultation on the subject of housing was a concession obtained by the miners there in 1949.

Area Labour Officers frequently expressed surprise that the Scheme had not provoked more labour disputes. In Yorkshire there was one stoppage losing 9,750 tons of coal and a number of Colliery Consultative Committees resigned in protest. Frequent consultations between the Managers and the Union officials (and not a little informal bargaining) were necessary to keep the transfer scheme going.

Some of the views of the managers on the quality of the transferred men as workers are given below:

"One good workman out of thirty-one" - Undermanager

"Men who are more interested in insisting on their rights than in doing a good day's work" - Manager

"Some of them did not know what a cutter was" - Manager

"Bad types. Only 10% decent". - Undermanager.

These views can be taken to be representative of the average manager's reaction to his new men. In general they complained that
men had falsely declared their experience, that they were used to
easier work habits and that they could not fill off the stints which
local men cleared. The employment of these men was bound to affect
the pit's output per man/shift adversely and thus affect the Manager's
own reputation.

These views were reciprocated by the men:

In reply to the question 'How did you get along with the
Manager'? one quarter of the men claimed that they never saw
him. The proportion of those who went home who never saw him
was higher, 38% as against 17%, as might be expected from the
fact that they were 'at risk' for a shorter period. One fifth
of the total sample claimed that they had got on 'badly' when
they did see the Manager. Younger men were more likely to have
got on badly with the Manager 26% of those under 30 as against
16% of those over 40.

Most of the men travelled down to North Staffs at the weekend and
reported to their pits on the Monday morning. The Monday shift was paid
as a "signing-on" shift and they were not required to start work until
Tuesday. At the pit the men were usually received by the Training Officer
who was responsible for assigning them to their tasks but on occasion the
men were also taken in to see the Manager or Under-Manager and at two pits
this was the regular practice.
Practically all of the transferred men were trained faceworkers and they were offered face-work in North Staffs. In a very few cases no offer for face-work was made until training records arrived from the man's previous pit. Half of the men in the sample were signed on as colliers, one-quarter for ripping and one-seventh for packing. Packing pays less than other coalface operations.

The Management could have helped the transferred men in two ways; by getting the men accustomed to new conditions and by paying them adequately until they were fully productive members of the labour force. There was in fact no plan for training the men to meet the conditions they faced. They were expected to look after themselves. Because they were the new arrivals they were given the jobs which were least attractive. They were more likely to work in the hottest seams - 'Bone Alley' and the 'Burning Rag', to give two of them their popular names - among the other unfavoured workers such as the Poles, the Italians and the West Indians. Neither did they pay the men adequately. During the period of the transfer scheme, the Colliery Managers in North Staffs had been empowered to make up a man's earnings to the average for his place of work in the pit. This payment was to be allowed for the first eight weeks of a man's transfer, that is, until he was expected to be acclimatized or until he got a house, whichever was the shorter period. In point of fact, very few men ever received this payment.
For men who came from areas where the Union was strong, the Union was their natural way of getting these grievances remedied, but the Union in North Staffs was much less powerful than the Union in Durham and Scotland, and it fell short of their expectations. Three quarters of the men interviewed expressed a critical view when they were asked "What do you think of the Union's attitude to Management compared with Durham/Scotland?". 55% were highly critical using such standard phrases as "there is no Union"; "the Union is the Management". The men who stayed in Stoke were more critical of the Union than those who went home. Only 8% did not criticise it as against 14% of the wasters. Below are some comments:

"They held their union meetings on Saturday evening, of all times. I went along several weeks with my pal to raise our grievance. Only five men turned up (this pit had over 1,500 men) at each meeting."

"They were to put me on 'Afters' the next week and I knew there were no buses to the hostel to get me back. I saw the Union man and he said he would see what he could do tomorrow. I said 'Tomorrow's too late. I'm off home.'"

"The Union Secretary is an Italian and everything is absolute chaos. The Manager sits in on the meetings and he knows all about everything."

One common complaint was that the Management was the Union and this view seems partly to have arisen from the fact that in North Staffs
as elsewhere, union dues are deducted by the Management on behalf of the Union. In Durham a man is required to pay his dues personally to the Branch Officials. Dues in North Staffs. are only 6d. a week compared with 2/6d in Durham and as one miner remarked "You cannot have a Union for that."

One consequence of the dissatisfaction with the Union has been a drive by transferred men to fill Union posts. At the end of 1957 4 of the 9 pits from which the Survey sample was drawn, had transferred men as Presidents or Lodge-Secretaries, one had them in both posts. At another the Vice-President and both Branch auditors were transferees. Others were serving on J.C.C's and Branch Committees. There is no doubt (1) that the effect of this change is to produce a more militant union.

This Chapter may appear as a chronicle of woe and difficulty but it must be realised that migration - whether organised or not - necessarily produces problems. Any migrant faces having to adjust to a new environment. The process of moving in and settling down can be productive of difficulties, and there is always the conflict that come from the meeting of different cultures. The egalitarian Durham miner could not understand - indeed he actively disliked - the authoritarianism he found in N.Staffs. No matter how well organised the migration could have been, there was bound to be a large element of personal frustration and difficulty. These are costs, tangible but not decisive, to be included on the debit side when one compares the value of migration with Distribution of Industry policy,

1. Joint Consultative Committees
CHAPTER 7 - THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS CREATED IN NORTH STAFFS

One measure of the success of a transfer of population can be seen in the degree to which the needs of the migrants were provided for, and how far the men and their families were absorbed, without disturbance, into the local community. This chapter is designed to provide an assessment and to ask whether the Coal Board was in the best position to assume the social responsibilities which the transfer involved. In the provision of housing, for example, it may be that the local authority or a Special Housing Corporation would have met with less opposition.

The impact of the migration was considerably more disrupting in North Staffs. than it was in the Areas which lost population. For one thing it was more concentrated. Villages in the declining coalfields had lost only twos or threes but these had gathered into a sizeable flood of several thousand men into the North Staffs. Area. From 1954 to 1956 the total number of migrants represented about one seventh of the normal mining labour force of North Staffs. and nearly one quarter of its 'face-workers'. Certain pits were specially affected. One with less than 2,000 men on its books had more than five hundred transferred workers in that period.

Foremost among the needs of the migrants in the new area was that of housing. Until this had been done the transferred worker could not be joined by his family. The question as to who should provide the necessary housing was, however, not decided after long consideration. There was never any real alternative to the Coal Board. In 1952 the Government had offered the Coal Board an allocation of 20,000 houses
on condition that they were built by non-traditional methods and completed by 1955. These houses were originally intended as a means to stabilise or retain the mining labour force but it was later decided to use a substantial number to assist in carrying out a transfer of workers between coalfields. A subsidiary Housing Association was formed by the Coal Board to derive benefit from housing subsidies.

It might be asked why the local authorities were not approached to build the houses. Here it must be said that a number of local authorities had received special allocations to house transferred miners but they had been very tardy in delivering the goods. Some of the allocation of 1,500 houses to Stoke CB in 1951, half of which were earmarked for incoming miners, were not given to transferred workers until 1954 and 1955. Even then the full 750 houses were never produced by the local Council for this purpose. This record of slow progress was one reason why they were not approached but a more compelling reason was that the Ministry of Housing did not want this special effort to interfere with the ordinary housing programmes of the local authorities. This was the reason, too, for the insistence on non-traditional methods. There was to be no diversion of resources from local building.

The first the local authorities knew of this particular housing scheme was when they were approached to provide or approve sites. In some areas the regional office of the Ministry of Housing arranged a meeting of the local authorities and the Coal Board to discuss these matters. Only three local authorities in the North Staffs. area were really co-operative and two or them were districts wholly dominated by
coal mining. The reaction of the largest authority, Stoke C.B., was that they would not agree to the N.C.B. building non-traditional houses within the city boundaries. In any case the shortage of sites in Stoke-on-Trent would have made it very difficult for the County Borough to offer any assistance.

An important reason for the reluctance of the local authorities to co-operate was that they were under strong pressure from local builders and architects to secure the work for them. The Coal Board had made it clear that they proposed to bring in outside builders, as they had already committed themselves to do so.

One by one the local authorities were won over until only Stoke C.B. remained opposed. In spite of continued representations by the N.C.B. and the Ministry of Housing they did not change its minds. Eight estates were to be built within the boundaries of six different authorities. Two estates of 250 and 350 houses were to be built in Newcastle under Lyme Borough. One large estate of about 450 houses was to be built in both Kidsgrove and Biddulph Urban Districts. Two small estates of about 200 and 100 houses were to be built in Leek R.D.C. One small estate of 100 houses was to be built in Newcastle-under-Lyme Rural District. In the Rural District of Cheadle there was to be one estate with 409 houses. About 40% of the houses were to be built in rural areas, some way from urban amenities. They were also at some distance from the pits where the men were to work. It is to these drawbacks, which derived from the limited choice of sites, that we must now turn.
There were very good reasons for trying to build to the South of Stoke. The exploitation of the North Staffs. coalfield has moved steadily south and in line with this development major reconstruction schemes were being pursued at Hem Heath, Stafford and Florence Collieries, (see map). This southern part of the coalfield was not a built-up area and it was obvious that the projected increase in manpower could not be met from the neighbourhood. It was important, therefore, to build houses to bring men into the immediate vicinity of the pits. In the event only one estate, of about 400 houses could be built near enough to service these three pits. But on the western edge of the coalfield where the coal was running out there were three estates with 700 houses. Even where the estates were able to serve pits with manpower needs they were sometimes four or five miles away, since so many of the pits were actually located inside the boundaries of Stoke C.B. and the City Council had refused to let the C.I.H.A. build estates there.

One further problem, produced by this distance between home and the pit for which the men were intended, was that men were travelling past other pits on their way to work. Although these other pits had no great difficulty in getting local men they found that the men from the estates were applying for work to shorten their daily journeys to work.

Within the limitations imposed by local authorities the choice of site was determined by proximity to the pits. The amenities of nearby towns and the accessibility of schools were not major factors in siting the estates. Of 96 wives interviewed, 21 mentioned the isolation of the
estates amongst their reasons for being dissatisfied with the transfer; 7 of these lived on the Stoke C.B. estate, 6 on Biddulph and 6 on the rural estates. The bus services for most estates are usually quite adequate but of 21 complaints about the bus services in the interviews with wives, 18 of them came from one estate, Weston Coyney.

One of the most important items in the wife's day is her shopping. Most of the C.I.H.A. estates are supplied with small general shops for daily purchases or are sufficiently close to the village for shopping to be convenient. Wives living on Stoke Corporation estates seem to be the most discontented about the supply of shops. There are, in fact, a number of shops there but they tend to be near the centre of a very large transferred estate and 'miners' wives seem to be housed at the edges. More shops are being built.

One difficulty is that small shops on the estates usually charge more than the shops in town. 15 wives complained that they spent more on food and other necessaries after they moved. For week-end shopping most wives go to the local towns and here the isolation of the estates becomes important. Two of the estates, Biddulph and Kidsgrove, are built in urban areas, Kidsgrove having the best location of all the estates. It is near the centre of Kidsgrove, which itself is a small town with good shopping facilities. Biddulph, on the other hand, is built on a hill and is quite a long walk from the town. It forms part of a large council estate and consequently will, in time, have many amenities which a small estate cannot hope to maintain. Four estates, Weston Coyney, Baddeley Green, Madeley Moss and Brown Edge are built in rural areas,

1. Some people were allocated Council houses from the 1951 Special Allocation.
attached to small villages which themselves have rather poor amenities.
The other two estates, Crackley Bank and Silverdale are within the
Newcastle Borough boundaries. Crackley Bank is conveniently near the
village of Chesterton and Silverdale will ultimately be part of a
larger council estate. The majority of families housed by Stoke City
Council are on a very large estate which is still far from complete.
It is being developed as a neighbourhood unit and will eventually contain
all the amenities required, including an industrial estate.

One important consideration to local authorities in the siting of
the estates is that miners should not be kept apart from the rest of the
population. This view was also shared by the C.I.H.A. and a serious
effort was made to tie in C.I.H.A. development with local authority
house-building programmes. Four estates were built next to Council
housing estates but the value of this achievement was limited by the
fact that miners also formed a large proportion of the tenants on the
council estates. The possibility of mixing occupational groups is very
limited in coal mining communities.

Another serious problem which faced the Board in their housing
programme was that of deciding the level of rents to be charged. For
one thing there was a tradition of low rents in mining areas which could
not be ignored (in fact the low level of rents in Durham and Scotland
did give rise to some of the difficulties of transfer described earlier)
and for another many of the local miners to be housed were also on the
Council Housing List and some link was therefore needed with rents of
council housing. The policy decided by the N.C.B., and operated by the
C.I.H.A., was to fix the rent of a house at the same level as comparable accommodation provided by local authorities, but as the C.I.H.A. did not however receive the local rate subsidy, only the Exchequer subsidy (at the time £8 a house for 60 years), losses were inevitable and in fact they reached the figure of £50 per house each year.

This rent policy produced other complications. It was possible, and in fact likely, in a compact area like North Staffs, for one pit to attract labour from several different local authority areas. The differences in rents seemed very illogical when they were charged by one landlord, in this case the N.C.B., especially if the men making the comparison were transferred workers. Rents for a 3-bedroomed house varied from 15/8d. to 23/1ld. per week.

The Coal Board reserved the right to raise rents in line with any increases which might be made by the local authority but there were few adjustments. In 1957 they gave notice of an increase as a result of the changes in the Rent Restriction Act. The notice was received very unfavourably and in Yorkshire there were determined efforts to resist it. Tenants refused to pay it and several pits went on strike in protest. The result in Yorkshire was a reduction in the increase, but in North Staffs, the increases were accepted and the new rents paid.

Rents were to be raised to an economic level if a man left the mining industry, but surprisingly few did. It is very difficult for the highly paid faceworker to get such wages outside the industry because his skills are not transferable.
Two thorny problems for the Coal Board lay in the allocation of tenancies and the terms on which they would be given. The difficulty in the allocation of tenancies was that the houses were designed to facilitate long-distance transfers but obviously local miners objected to houses being put up in their villages for such a purpose without a certain number being given to local men who needed them. Negotiations were opened with the local Area officials of the N.U.M. and agreement was reached in North Staffs. at fifty-fifty for local men and incomers. In Yorkshire where labour relations were more inflamed three-quarters of the new housing was conceded to local men.

Having decided the proper distribution between local and transferred men the next thing was to see that every man was treated fairly. In North Staffs. the tenancies were allocated to individual men by a Joint Committee of N.C.B. and N.U.M. representatives at Area level. In making this allocation the committee bore in mind the individual's housing need and the distance from the house to the applicant's place of work. This meant sometimes that the speed and opportunity of re-housing depended on that part of the coalfield where houses were being built. In Yorkshire the allocations were made on a different basis; a certain number of houses were earmarked for particular pits right from the start and it was left to the Colliery Manager and his consultative committee to make the decision.

In North Staffs. the committees allocating houses were more interested in housing need than any other criterion and no attempt was made to select good tenants, who would pay their rent and look after their houses. By
contrast, the local authorities which had provided and were providing houses for transferred miners under special allocation from the Ministry of Housing were very unwilling to house anybody without an independent report on the condition of their previous accommodation. An adverse report was enough to rule an applicant out of court. The consequence of this attitude was that the troublesome tenants gravitated to the C.I.H.A. estates. On one estate one in six householders was eight weeks or more in arrears of rent and 8% of the total number of householders had been evicted.

The C.I.H.A. houses were let on service tenancies, that is, they were "tied houses". It may seem a little strange that a nationalised industry should adopt such an unpopular constraint on its workers but the Chairman of the Board at that time, Sir Hubert Houldsworth, argued that now that all pits were under the same ownership a man could change his job between pits without having to give up tenancy of his house. It is perhaps also significant that it was a Conservative Government which had sanctioned the Coal Board's housing programme. The Labour Party has declared itself against "tied" housing. Although the Coal Board did reserve the right to evict a tenant who no longer worked in the industry they have contented themselves in the few cases where it has happened with raising the man's rent to an economic level, usually about two pounds a week.

Once the Coal Board had decided to build houses themselves they were bound to run into the difficulties we have described over sites,
rents and allocation of tenancies, but other difficulties presented
themselves which were much less predictable. Most of these concerned
the services which could or should be provided by the local authorities:
street cleaning, education, maternity and child welfare services, and
meeting halls.

Although the local authorities should have assumed responsibility
for street cleaning after six months of the completion of an estate,
they often did not. The appearance of the C.I.H.A. estates more than a
year after they were built was appalling and provided the wives of
transferred workers with their most common complaint about the estates.
Good service roads were provided on all of them but local authorities
did not fulfil their statutory obligation to clean them and as they
served as playgrounds for many of the estate children, they were full
of litter. Area officials of the N.C.B. tried to bring pressure to bear
on local councils without much success and although there were widespread
complaints from the tenants, they were not sufficiently well organised to
do much for themselves. "Slums of the Future" or "slum clearance estate"
were terms often used by the wives to describe the estates. "They think
anything is good enough for miners' wives" was one wife's bitter comment.

But local councils are not solely to blame for the neglect of the
estates. The open spaces are either overgrown or, in wet weather, patches
of mud. There are still many undug gardens on the estates which add to
the general air of neglect, although officials in the area are attempting
to overcome this by organising annual gardening competitions. The first
one was held in 1957 and the results were most encouraging, about 300
Although street cleaning is an essential service, more feeling is likely to be aroused if schools are inadequate. Between 3,500 and 4,000 children were brought into North Staffs by migrant families and the responsibility for providing school places for them lay largely with the Staffordshire County Council. The rapid influx of such large numbers of children proved a considerable embarrassment, especially as consultation about the details of the migration had not been very close. This inevitably led to a poor standard of provision and an interference with the local authority's own established educational plans.

The overcrowding in the schools in the early days of the transfer in 1954 was very bad in all receiving areas. On one estate (in another area) children used a converted canteen as a school until the new primary school was completed. Special bus services had to be arranged to schools elsewhere, especially for the children of Secondary school age. For many children there was a very long walk to school.

New schools have been built (on the estates at Biddulph, Weston Coyney and Crackley Bank) but the mothers still complain that the schools are overcrowded, and their children's education is suffering as a consequence. This is a matter of great concern for the mothers, particularly those with children about to take the 11-plus examination. Only the mothers of Catholic children and mothers of children over primary-school age on the Weston Coyney estate complained that the children had far to travel to school. Children from Weston Coyney estate have to travel nearly three miles to school but do not have
subsidised transport because they are just inside the three-mile limit.

It is not surprising in view of this confusion that the wives often make unfavourable comparisons between the educational provision now available and what they had previously enjoyed. The local authorities had, of course, been aware since 1952 that a substantial programme of housing was being undertaken in the area, for not only had sites been agreed in discussion with them but town planning permission had been granted for the development. These discussions were not, however, directly held with the Education Department and certainly the Coal Board could not have predicted the exact number of children who might be transferred in miners' families. The pattern of family size did not become clear until the men actually applied for transfer. Nevertheless acknowledging that it may take several years to build a school there was a very long gap between 1952 and the completion of the first school in 1956.

The cost of providing this large number of school places was not felt immediately because the difficulties were met by stretching the existing resources that much further. Now, with the building and maintaining of new schools an extra burden has fallen on the rates. The expenditure on education by Staffordshire County Council rose by £15 m. in the financial year 1956–57 and the County rate increased by 1/10d largely as a result. This extra demand upon its resources has meant a delay in the County Council's own plans for reducing the size of classes and providing new accommodation for the existing population.
Besides the large number of school children on the new housing estates there were substantial numbers under school age. The existing maternity and child welfare services needed extension to deal with them. The services were usually available for those on estates near to towns but those who lived in rural areas were at first faced with very considerable journeys. Later on village halls were often converted to this purpose.

There were other amenities where the responsibility for provision was not so clearly with the local authority. Recreational facilities might well be an essential part of a council housing scheme, but who was to provide them when somebody else built the houses? In the event nobody did provide them, that is, until quite recently when one community centre was built on Weston Coyney Estate with funds provided jointly by the Ministry of Education Coal Industry Social Welfare Organisation and the local authority. None of the other estates has any facility to offer for meetings or recreation, but this criticism can, of course, be levelled at a great many council housing projects. Fortunately such amenities are still technically possible as sites have been left for their development by the C.I.H.A. architects.

The question asked at the beginning of this chapter just what problems were created in North Staffs by the transfer of population there. One group of problems concerning the provision of housing and amenities has just been discussed, the other group of problems arose from the social disturbance to the community. It would be natural to expect a considerable upheaval in an area which was experiencing a very large and rapid influx
of population and it is therefore not unexpected in view of the great variety of the regional origins of the migrants that North Staffs. suffered from population indigestion. The assimilation was made all the more difficult by the gold rush atmosphere, which attracted undesirable elements.

The problems of adjustment which faced the transferred families were first of all to find their way around geographically and socially in the new area. They needed to know where to shop, where to find a doctor or where to spend an evening out. More than that, they had to find their own level with their new neighbours and develop a new network of friends.

Removal of furniture from the previous address was arranged by and at the expense of the Coal Board. Generally speaking, the arrangements went very well and the van arrived with the furniture in time for the family which had travelled down by train. Sometimes, however, the family arrived at the new house to find themselves without furniture and having to rely upon their neighbours' generosity for lodging. Often the new family would need to rely on the neighbours for something, if only because the shops were so far away.

A housing visitor was appointed by the Coal Board in early 1955, with the intention that she should visit the incoming families within one month of their arrival in the area and help them with their difficulties. She was to assist them in getting to know where they could get the services they needed. In practice her main work was concentrated on preventing the damage of Board property and seeing that the tenants
met a certain standard of cleanliness. The reasons for this difference in the conception and execution of her role lie partly in the failure of the originators of the appointment in London to oversee the appointment in Stoke and partly in the unexpectedly large number of problem tenants who forced their attentions on the housing visitor. An idea so progressive and fashionable as that of easing people into their new homes is more easily understood in London than it is in a provincial town.

Relations with neighbours on the new estates were bound to be unusually tentative because of the different regional origins of the tenants. There were people from Scotland, Durham, Northumberland, Wales, and Lancashire. There were Polish families and there were local Staffordshire people. No set policy was followed for either grouping or mixing regional groups, but in practice some grouping took place because men arrived from the same area at the same time and worked at the same pit.

A question was asked of the incoming wives to gauge their attitude to the local people and this is set out in the table below against the proportions of each group on each estate. On most estates relationships are good, 63 (69%) of the wives saying that they found the locals "friendly" or "all right". However, by grouping the estates, i.e. Biddulph and Weston Coyney on one side, and Stoke and Brown Edge on the other, it will be seen that two-thirds of those interviewed in the first group found the 'locals' friendly, whereas on those estates where incomers are lost among the local population only 39% found them 'friendly'.
The Scottish migrants were particularly well represented on Biddulph and Weston Coyney sites, the Welsh on Biddulph, Kidsgrove and Weston Coyney, and the Durham men on Baddeley Green and Kidsgrove. Only 9 of the 64 Durham wives interviewed would have preferred to be 'amongst Scotsies' as some of them put it.

Although most of the tenancy turnover on the estates is accounted for by transferred families leaving because the man was dissatisfied with his pit, some was due to dissatisfaction with bad reputation of some of the estates. As the table below shows, Biddulph, the estate with the highest number of evictions and highest rent arrears, was also much the highest in tenancy turnover. At one time over 50 'local' men were asking the local Council to re-house them from this estate.

Table No.10 Tenancy turnover, Rent arrears (at March 1957)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Incomes</th>
<th>Local</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Friendly</th>
<th>All right</th>
<th>Unfriendly</th>
<th>D. Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kidsgrove</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Biddulph</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>134</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weston Coyney</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crackley Bank</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baddeley Green</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>146</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brown Edge</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stoke Housing</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Certain estates had more than their share of 'bad hats' and this
is probably due to a change in the type of man arriving at different
times during the Scheme. Half of those since evicted arrived in July
and August of 1954 although these months only account for 22% of first
lettings given to incomers. Some improvement has been noted since 1954
as a result of the greater tendency of bad tenants to return home and
also because of the evictions.

The transferred families had not only to become aware of the dangers
in their social and geographical environment, they had also to begin
constructing new friendships. Incoming wives did not only make their
friends amongst other incoming families: 40 of the 96 interviewed said
that their friends were chiefly amongst both locals and incomers. The
Durham wives tended to make friends amongst themselves even if it meant
travelling to other estates. 6 said they had relatives in Stoke so did
not bother to make other friends and 14 said they had friends amongst
other Durham wives. Only one Scot said she had only Scottish friends.

In spite of the mixture of people of different areas of origin and
different standards only 10% of the sample had 'no friends'. It may
perhaps be suggested that the early weeks after migration are especially
difficult because of the lack of friends but there is no difference in the
rate of wastage after housing when examined quarter by quarter.

On the two estates where incomers outnumbered locals by more than
two to one, a half of those interviewed had only incomers for friends (17).
On the two estates where the proportions were reversed, 12/30 had only
incomers for friends.
Organised social life for the wives on the estates is practically non-existent and the standard reply of the wives when asked about their leisure activities was "there is nothing to do here". Only 14 wives attended any kind of organised social activity. Tenants' associations have existed on all the estates at some time and have done an important job in organising social life, especially at Weston Coyney where an Annual Gala is still held. Groups of workers on Biddulph and Weston Coyney estates have been trying to collect funds to build their own centres, but the task has been too great. The great need on the estates is for afternoon or evening meetings, which wives with young children can attend, for it is they who miss their families most and tend to be most homesick.

From this chapter, in which we have surveyed the social problems in North Staffs. created by the planned transfer of population, it has become clear that not a few of them derived from the leading part which the Coal Board played in it. The resistance of the local authorities in the first stages of siting the houses, their failure to provide adequate services promptly for them, the difficulties in finding a rational basis for rent policy, were partly due to a refusal to recognise the right of the Coal Board to carry out such a transfer and partly to the overlap of responsibilities in such a novel field of operations. Certainly the people and the communities involved suffered as a result of the battles of the Corporations, but the interesting question is whether it could have been otherwise. Who else could have organised and planned such a scheme? Who had the expertise to ensure the least disruption of community life? These are some of the questions which we have attempted to answer in the last
chapter where the lessons for Social policy which can be learned from this case study are summed up. Meanwhile the next chapter will ask what positive economic rewards the Coal Board derived from this transfer of men and whether the same policies would hold rewards for other industries.
Chapter 8 - The economic advantages of migration

This chapter discusses the economic advantages which were derived from the 1954–56 transfer of labour in the coalmining industry, and examines the possibilities of gaining such advantages by re-deployment within other industries, and between other industries. Mention will be made of the value which planned migration has for other important industries, such as steel, chemicals and aircraft.

The economic benefits which came from the transfer of miners were distributed among several parties. Some helped the national economy, some accrued to the Coal Board, and some were to the advantage of the miners. The national economy was strengthened by the reduction of unemployment and by having to depend less than it might otherwise have done on imported American coal whereas the Coal Board improved its own position by securing labour in the small number of areas when there was a chronic shortage without conceding a national wage increase for that purpose or training green labour. In doing so it raised its productivity, lowered its costs and reduced the need for payment of compensation for redundancy. This improvement in the Coal Board's position obviously had in its turn a general value to the economy. These consequences will be examined in more detail.

In the years 1954–57 unemployment in Great Britain was very low and although it remained higher in the Development Areas, the
narrowed.\(^{(1)}\) In some measure this was due to internal migration but there has been some suggestion\(^{(2)}\) that it was not a major factor. There is, however, no gainsaying the fact that despite the migration from West Durham and Central Scotland the numbers employed in mining remained roughly constant over the years 1954–56. Some men must therefore have found employment in the coal industry and some of them are likely to have been previously unemployed. A small point worth noticing in this context is that the migration of miners left vacancies to be filled by other men and this was especially valuable in view of the relative shortage of male employment in those areas.

The other valuable contribution to the national economy made by the transfer of miners\(^{\text{3}}\) was to lessen the need to depend on imported American coal, with its adverse effect on the balance of payments. This may perhaps appear a curious conclusion to draw when in fact the imports of American coal rose from 3 million tons in 1954 to 11.5 million tons in 1955, and fell down to 5.3 million tons in 1956. But these figures have to be seen against a static level of home production, 223.6 million tons in 1954 and 222 million tons in 1956, produced by a substantially smaller manpower, 707 thousand men in 1954 and 703 thousand men in 1956, and a rising demand.

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\(^{(2)}\) Ibid.
demand for fuel in the economy. Inland fuel consumption in 1956 was 18 million tons (coal equivalent) higher than 1953.\(^{(1)}\) Even this static level of production would not have been achieved had there been no transfer of men to the high productivity pits in Yorkshire and the Midlands.

The advantages of migration to the coal industry are not new. Most coalfields because of their geographical isolation have had to be settled in their early years by immigrant labour. New and reconstructed collieries in some parts of Yorkshire and the Midlands in the 1950's were dependent on migration for the same reasons. A new aspect to the situation, however, sprang from the highly competitive labour markets in certain parts of these regions. In areas surrounding such towns such as Stoke, Doncaster and Rotherham the coal industry was quite unable to maintain its share of the labour force except when other industries were in a state of recession. The labour turnover of some pits was quite fantastic. One pit with over 2,000 men on books had 2,000 men come and go in one year. The gain of some 4,500 experienced faceworkers in the seven critically deficient Areas was therefore vital in filling the gap created by the boom of 1955 and in manning up isolated collieries.

It might perhaps be suggested that an increase in wages would have stimulated recruitment in such areas as Doncaster and Stoke.

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\(^{(1)}\) N.C.B. Annual Report 1956 p. 34.
and obviated the need for men to uproot themselves and their families. There was in fact a substantial revision of pieceworkers' price lists in Stoke and Doncaster in 1955, and these were as usual negotiated locally, but it is difficult to know whether this was a result of union militancy (buoyed up by transferred workers) or an attempt by management to attract more men. The evidence would tend to support the former hypothesis. Any increase in wages for daywage men would have had to be nation-wide because their rates are fixed nationally, and as only 11 Areas out of the Coal Board's administrative structure of 52 were in need of men, a national revision of wage rates would have been an expensive way of securing a marginal increase in manpower.

The transfer of trained manpower was economical for other reasons. It was cheaper to transfer a man and house him than to train local green labour providing that the man was redundant or could be replaced without training another man. To secure one incoming faceworker in North Staffordshire for at least a year's service the cost at the rates of wastage experienced there from 1954 - 56 is about £85. Of this sum the major item is the loss incurred by the Coal Board in letting houses at uneconomic rates: £46 for every man who stays at least a year. The comparable cost in transfer allowances was £36.4. These figures can be compared with those arrived at in another investigation into the costs of labour turnover in a similar area in another Division. Starting /with
with local green labour it is possible, with the rates of wastage experienced there, to produce at a cost of £100 one man who has completed his preliminary training and period of close supervision so that he may work underground. He will not have received the six months' training in facework neither will he have completed any useful service.

The case for transferring miners into Yorkshire and the Midlands did not rest just on maintaining a high level of manpower and output in those regions. It was solidly supported by high productivity and low costs. The pits there are newer and the conditions are better than in Durham and Scotland. A calculation was made on the basis of the average figures for each pit that a migrant left in West Durham and Scotland and each pit he went to in North Staffs. A given output needed about a half the number of shifts from the transferred miners after they moved. This improvement in productivity naturally had a considerable effect on costs of production. In a year's service a transferred man in our sample will have worked about 205 face shifts, assuming that he works as often as local miners in his new pit. This year's work will yield 850 tons of coal at a cost in faceworkers' earnings and allowances of £619. For the same output at the pit from which he originated it would have cost £1,132 in faceworkers' earnings and allowances. A year's work thus saves over £500 gross, less £85, the cost of transferring him to secure this year's service. (All figures in this set of calculations refer to 1954 and 1955.)
A last point which may be made about the value of migration to the coal industry is that there may be a considerable saving where redundancy can be avoided, for redundant miners can receive two-thirds of their basic pay for twenty-six weeks from the National Coal Board. Very few of the migrants in the 1954 Transfer Scheme were actually redundant but some were moving in anticipation of redundancy.

The coal industry has derived considerable advantages from being able to transfer labour between coalfields but what is the relevance of this policy for other industries? It might be thought that the conditions in mining are perhaps peculiar and especially suitable for organised migration. The industry is under common ownership; it contains declining and expanding areas of production; the skills of its workers in one area can be used in another; and there are great difficulties in attracting local labour in isolated areas and also where there is other industry. But there is good reason for believing that these characteristics apply in a sufficient degree to certain other important industries to make it worthwhile considering the transfer of labour within them. Before turning to discuss these matters in detail it is important to make a distinction between those transfers of labour which could be achieved within the same organisation, the same industry, the same occupation but not the same industry, and between different occupations of different industries.

/In
In the case of the transferred miners the movement was of men staying in the same occupation, the same organisation and the same industry. It would not be difficult to find small-scale movement of this kind in a great many industries. But this movement usually concerns key workers and is therefore not comparable with the migration in the coal industry. The nearest experience is to be found in the steel industry. The most important shift of location of production in the steel industry in recent years was in the 1930's when Stewart and Lloyds moved from Scotland to Corby. This development was designed to reap the benefit of the low cost iron ores of Northamptonshire. There were important economic advantages to be secured by the move to Corby:

"Basic Bessemer Steel, which had died out in 1925, was to be reintroduced with the added advantages of a site on the home ore-fields and the complete integration of processes from the ore-mining to the finished tubes. The ores would be extremely cheap, obtainable for many years by opencast methods, which hauls of only a few miles on the firm's own mineral railways to the works. The transport costs of steel from the Continent would also be saved. Complete integration and the latest technical advances would give great fuel economies. Not only did Stewarts and Lloyds have confidence in their ability to replace continental supplies of seam-manufactures steel without /increasing
increasing their price of their final product, but the new plant would make them the cheapest producers of tubes in Europe."(1)

But none of this could be achieved without manpower and there was none available in the small village of Corby. Labour had to be imported and the obvious first choice was from Stewarts and Lloyds' own works in Glasgow. Such transfers of labour obviously could only be achieved if housing were available and it was here that the company ran into trouble:

"In the 1930's the local authority, then the Kettering Rural District Council, did not feel able to undertake the building of the houses required for Stewarts and Lloyds' workers at Corby, and the firm itself had built 2,150 houses by 1939. The population rose from 1,500 in 1932 to over 10,000 in 1939. In the latter year an Urban District Council was created to meet the problems of the growing town, and in 1949 the New Towns Act was applied. In order to support the 10,000 steelworkers required, a town of 40,000 people was envisaged by 1960, with all amenities and the introduction of service and other light industries to provide balanced employment. But in 1954 the population was

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Monthly
(British Iron and Steel Federation)
was still under 20,000, and owing to the housing shortage it had only been possible to expand output to an annual rate of 850,000 ingot tons.\(^{(1)}\)

The economic advantages to the steel industry of expanding production in Northamptonshire have not been seriously in doubt; the vital question has been how to obtain the labour needed to achieve higher levels of output.

Another important industry which has had many re-location problems has been the aircraft industry. During the war factories were developed in isolated locations to reduce the risks of bombing but these locations were not always those best suited for peacetime production. Changes in the type of aircraft produced have also affected the choice of location: for example, with fewer seaplanes being made there is no longer such a need to locate aircraft factories near water. Perhaps the greatest factor making for re-location has been the changes in defence policy. Many of the leading aircraft firms such as De Havillands\(^{(2)}\) have only been able to achieve successful re-location in these circumstances by transferring their own workers, or accepting workers transferred from other employers.\(^{(2)}\)


\(^{(2)}\) See Acton Society Trust - Redundancy: A Survey of Problems and Practices Part II for transfers from the Isle of Wight.
In the chemical industry, too, they have tried migration, especially when there has been redundancy. In November 1957 Ardil production at Dumfries ceased and 250 men became redundant. Officials from the I.C.I. plant at Wilton interviewed these men and offered an option of transfer to Wilton with certain transfer benefits. 98 men accepted transfer.

The examples given so far have been to some degree organised within the same occupation, the same industry and the same firm. Such movements are characteristic of industries with nation-wide organisations and are obviously so much easier to arrange than movement between employers in the same industry. Little is known about any movement of this kind taking place but it does happen. The Ministry of Labour have organised the transfer of aircraft workers between different firms in different parts of the country. 97 of the 700 workers paid off by Scottish Aviation in December 1959 because of a fall in orders for the Twin Pioneer were brought to the London area to work for Handley Page Ltd.

The scope for moving men into different industries while retaining their previous occupations is greater than is readily apparent. One of the greatest needs in the expanding industrial areas is for craftsmen. Many of these skilled workers especially those on maintenance can in fact use those skills anywhere. The electricians and mechanics of the cotton mills who are being thrown out...
out of work by the reorganisation of the industry could use their skills in the engineering factories of Coventry. Some of the larger industrial firms do in fact advertise for craftsmen in areas with a labour surplus and without considering the ethics of 'poaching' the recruitment of trained labour in this way can be a very cheap way of obtaining skilled workers.

The transfer of workers into different occupations, in different industries with different employers is obviously the most difficult of the operations to arrange. The numbers who transfer without re-training under the Ministry of Labour Resettlement Transfer Scheme is negligible, being only \( \frac{1}{15} \) in 1959 and the numbers who receive re-training are not worth consideration. The incentive for an employer to recruit and transfer labour which has no skills of use to him cannot be very great. It has been done in the mining industry but with a conspicuous lack of success. The turnover rate of untrained labour transferred into the Doncaster area in 1956 was over 300% per annum. There are, however, an increasing number of employers who can train labour for their own needs in a very short space of time. It has been said that:

"The outstanding characteristic of industry in the twentieth century is the spread of mass-production methods; more and more skilled jobs have been subdivided into their constituent processes, each of which can be taken over by machinery, operated by workers whose activities are confined..."
to the repetition of one narrow range of actions. The
great majority of workers are now semi-skilled and required
little more training in these operations than could be
acquired in periods ranging from a few days to a few
weeks."(1)

The employers of semi-skilled labour are, however, very
unwilling to involve themselves in the expense and trouble of
organising the transfer of workers. They prefer to compete for
labour on the local labour market or to undertake intensive
mechanisation to reduce their manpower needs. The result in towns
such as Coventry is a chronic labour shortage which is never
eliminated by high wage rates and is accompanied by intermittent
technological redundancies.

The main conclusions which may be drawn from this discussion
of the economic advantages of migration to individual firms and to
the economy is that its full possibilities are not being realised.
The gains in productivity and lower costs which have been described
for the coal industry; the possibilities of securing labour needed
for the expansion of output; the preservation of skills; these
are also for the most part also clear gains to the economy. Many
of these results could also be achieved by the application of these
principles to other industries.

/This

(1) G. Williams. The Price of Social Security (1944)
This chapter cannot be brought to a close without some comment on the value of the alternative policies of Migration and Distribution of Industry. What would have been lost if the miners who transferred to the pits in Yorkshire and the Midlands had stayed at home and in time found their way into industries which had been guided into the declining coalfields? For one thing their skills and experience would have been lost and the least value which could be put on these would be £250 per man (the cost of their training). For another thing the collieries of Yorkshire and the Midlands would have been unable to maintain their output of low-cost coal. This would have, as has been explained above, put a severe strain on the national economy. To this must be added the cost of a Distribution of Industry policy needed to provide jobs in the Development Areas. This cost if the same period as the migration is taken must include a share of the Board of Trade's expenditure (£6,267,540 in 1955-56), most of which (£6,250,000) was to finance the building of factories. It must also include a share of the Treasury loans and grants which just topped the million pound level in 1955-56. There are financial losses incurred in the letting of Government factories and the effective rate of interest on the loans was far below the economic level (2.48% in 1953). The Local Employment Act of 1960 will reduce but not eliminate the losses incurred by the Distribution of Industry policy.

/Last
A last point may be made about the failure of Distribution of Industry policy to really affect the situation in some small areas of persistent unemployment. If fifteen years of Distribution of Industry policy cannot reduce the unemployment rate of Greenock below 6% there is some reason to alter or supplement it. It is perfectly possible to combine both guidance of industry and sponsored migration as government policies.

It is plain from the evidence presented in this chapter that if the value of sponsored migration were to be judged on economic grounds alone there is room for expanding its use. It is at this point, however, that the economist usually stops dead. Paralysed by the complexity and weight of the social arguments against migration he is reluctant to recommend it. It is the purpose of the last chapter to try to assess the social consequences of planned migration.
CHAPTER 9
THE BALANCE OF SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

It has been the intention of this thesis to examine how migration can be used for the purpose of economic change. Whereas the previous chapter summed up the economic advantages of migration to individual firms and to the economy, this chapter discusses the social arguments to be considered if a policy fostering migration were to be adopted.

It will be remembered that the arguments which have weighed especially heavily against migration have been social ones. It will be necessary to examine in turn the issues of social policy which are raised in the community which loses people, in the community which receives them, and nationally, to see whether or not the conclusions which were reached about the effect of the transfers of labour from West Durham and Central Scotland to North Staffordshire can be extended to other communities which might be affected by an organised transfer of labour.

The scale of movement which might form the basis of future policy should be made quite explicit. It does not in any way approach the scale of migration of the 1930s, not even the scale of the Government organised transfers of those days. A useful contribution to the economy could be made if 10,000 male workers were transferred annually. (It is worth remembering that the number of new jobs for men created in the Development Areas in the first 10 years of their existence averaged only 15,000 jobs each year). It is also important to remember that spontaneous migration far exceeding this scale is already a feature of
the national economy. The plea here is that this movement should be organised, so that it produces the best results. This means avoiding those areas of the South where population increase could only lead to congestion and to an increasing loss of amenities. It also means that those areas which are in greatest need of labour and which serve the basic purposes of the economy are more likely to get the labour they need.

Looking first at the areas which have lost and are likely in the future to lose population, it will become apparent that a number of other coalmining areas now share the unhappy situation of the Central Scottish and the West Durham coalfields. Since the 1954 Transfer Scheme the urgency of labour transfers has been made greater by the economic crisis which has hit the coal industry: in Cumberland, Northumberland, Neath, the Forest of Dean, to name only the most critical Areas, there is a labour surplus. The logic of moving men from high cost to low cost pits is now reinforced by the inescapable logic of moving men from where they cannot be employed to coalfields where there is plenty of work.

Were the virtues of planned migration restricted to the coal industry it is plain that a substantial number of workers and their families could with advantage be transferred each year; even at the moment when the industry has not yet recovered from the crisis the /expanding
expanding coalfields could find work for several thousand men. Planned migration can, however, be used to redeploy men from other declining industries, such as tinplate, cotton, jute, and slate. These industries also tend to be the dominant industries of particular localities and they tend to be isolated in the North or West of the country away from the growing centres of production. There is, also, the defence industry which does not share these industrial traditions and yet which is very liable to produce a sudden surplus of labour, sometimes in isolated areas, as a result of the rapid rate of obsolescence of modern weapons of war. One special feature of these industries, which coal does not share, is that their surplus workers would need to enter other industries. How far can the conclusions which have been reached about the mining communities which exported labour be extended to other declining industrial communities? Among the most important consequences which emigration is believed to have for exporting communities is that the standard of living of those who are left behind steadily falls; it is argued that the level of effective demand drops, that the yield of the rate falls and that the proportion of economically dependent people in the population tends to increase. In Chapter 5 it was found that not one of these points had sufficient substance to provide an adequate objection to the 1954 transfer of labour in the coal industry, for in spite of the loss of about 10,000 people by West Durham and Central Scotland the population
in both areas continued to increase. It was found also that the
large number of children who migrated with their parents from these
areas actually reduced the number of economically dependent people
in the population; the ratio of workers to dependents increased
despite the tendency of the population to age.

Most of these conclusions would apply to a similar scheme of
migration applied to other declining areas, for there are certain
conditions which apply not only to the two mining areas studied but
universally. Migration must alleviate unemployment to some degree
either directly by the unemployed finding work elsewhere or by their
filling the vacancies left by those workers who have migrated. This
reduction of unemployment will mean that the average standard of living
of the community must increase for men will be earning more than they
would receive in unemployment benefit. Their extra earnings will also
increase employment by increasing consumption.

The second universal condition governing the impact of migration
is that since the end of the Poor Law the local community no longer
supports its poor and needy. Even if the migration of the young left
proportionally larger numbers of old age pensioners the extra burden
would not be a great burden to local authorities, since both National
Assistance payments and pensions are claims upon the National
Exchequer. There would, however, be a greater need to increase the
provision of welfare services.
The disruption of community life was the second argument which had to be considered in examining the social consequences of migration. In Chapter 4 when the possible reasons for this disruption were reviewed, it was suggested that it could mean two things: the loss of those who made the greatest contribution to community life or the loss of so many people that the character of the community had to suffer a change.

In looking at the first of these two points in the present enquiry it was found that the migrants as a whole did not really differ in their degree of social participation from those who stayed behind, if anything they were less active. Furthermore among the migrants there were very few people who had held office in any kind of civic organisation and certainly fewer than among those left behind.

Neither could any grounds be adduced for believing that only those with character, ambition and skill were the ones who migrated. The proportions of those who had been preparing for promotion was very similar in both migrant and non-migrant groups and almost all of the migrants were ordinary 'colliers'. In fact if anything the evidence seemed to suggest that the attractive transfer arrangements had drawn in a more than average number of 'bad-hats'.

If there appeared to be no basis for the first of the objections to migration in the context of the 1954-56 transfers what weight must be attached to the second point? Very little. The striking thing about the geographical distribution of the 9,000 miners who moved勅from
from all over the country was that no particular village lost more than 30 men. It is unlikely that this loss would have affected the existence of any voluntary associations to which they may have belonged. It is unlikely also that these particular men were essential to the survival of those communities. In fact to all outward appearances life in these towns and villages goes on as before. Miners living in Stanley still make their annual trek into Durham City for the Miners' Gala. Shotts still has one of the finest Pipe Bands in Scotland.

It might be suggested that the circumstances of the 1954 scheme were rather special and that other communities would be more adversely affected by a policy of migration than those in mining areas. The first thing, however, which becomes obvious on closer inspection is that mining communities are so much stronger than other communities. The colliery village is dominated by the pit whether the men are at work or at leisure. It would seem sensible then to reason that these people would have more to lose than others if their community were destroyed. As everybody knows everybody else the departure of even one family leaves a gap in the life of the whole village. The second relevant characteristic of the mining communities we have looked at is that they are usually quite small settlements. It is reasonable to assume that the smallness of the mining village also leads to very strong social relationships.

There is not only good reason to believe that the damage to other...
communities would be less than to those studied in this thesis but
also that spontaneous migration from them is already a selective movement
of the better qualified. In such towns as Dundee and Llanelly (both
with declining industries) there is especial difficulty in placing the
large output from the grammar schools in suitable employment locally.

It is now time to turn to the problems created in the receiving
communities by migration. It was found unexpectedly in the case study
that it was at this end of the migration in the coal industry that the
trouble was experienced. The story told of the reception of migrant
miners in North Staffordshire was one of inadequate provision of housing
and amenities; of conflicts between the town planning needs of the
area and the manpower needs of the industry; of a clash of political
and industrial ideas; and of social upheaval. This story could be
repeated for all of the other mining communities of Yorkshire, Stafford­
shire and Warwickshire which received transferred miners. As it is
partly the function of this chapter to examine the relevance of this
experience for other types of industrial communities it is necessary to
ask just how far these problems were due to the way in which the transfers
were organised or to the special characteristics of the people transferred.

The first problem to be considered is by far the most important,
that is the provision of housing and amenities for migrants. It is
important not only because it is an incentive for some men to move but
because it is a prerequisite for most men moving. In the 1954-56 miners’
transfer scheme the housing was provided by the National Coal Board. It has been shown in Chapter 7 that this decision was not taken entirely because there was no other way to get the houses provided but there are good reasons for believing that the local authorities would have taken much longer achieving the same results as the Coal Industry Housing Association. Stoke Corporation received a special allocation of 1,500 houses in 1951, half of which were for incoming miners. By 1956 less than 500 had been produced for this purpose. When local authorities are housing local people there is much stronger pressure for them to keep up to the mark.

In several other areas the local authorities have refused to build houses for incoming miners:

*With Yorkshire pits ready to start a recruiting campaign to attract as many as possible of the 6,000 displaced Midlands car workers to the coal field, only one local authority out of 11 - Maltby, near Rotherham - who were asked to build miners' houses is doing so. And when the 20 houses which Maltby is now putting up are completed they, too, will fall out of the scheme. Yet a little over six months ago the North Eastern Division Coal Board in conjunction with the Ministry of Housing and Local Government asked the local councils - grouped around the expanding Doncaster and Rotherham pits - to agree to build 1,000 houses for men coming into the Industry. Why, when under the new Housing Act designed for this purpose they can get a building subsidy of £24 per year as against £10 for an ordinary Council house, and have been told that should the first tenant selected by the Coal Board leave they can have control over subsequent tenancies, have some of the authorities told the Ministry's Regional Office in Leeds that they will not co-operate, and others not replied?*
The main objection is fear of local reactions - "if any houses are going to be built they should go first to our own miners who have been waiting years for homes of their own", which is an attitude unaltered by the change in the national employment climate during the last four months - and an almost equal objection is that of paying higher loan charges for Council house building. Mr. G.H. Davies, surveyor to Maltby Urban Council, said "There will be a complete stop to all Council house building here after these 20 houses for the miners have been built. And plans for a number of shops have also been shelved. The reason is that the Council objects to the lowering of housing subsidies and to the increase in the interest rates on loans. So far they have not agreed to rent equalisation and a stage has been reached where the economic rent, including rates, of new houses would be £2 a week." Councillor R. Kelley, miners' secretary at Hatfield Colliery, near Doncaster, and Chairman of Thorne Rural District Council last year, when the Council voted against joining the scheme, said: "If the local need did not exist I think no local authority would object to putting up houses for men coming from outside, but their first responsibility is to house people in their own locality. In my own pit there are nearly 200 men on the waiting list, and some of the applications go back nearly three years".

(Yorkshire Post - 6th July, 1956)

"Coalville Urban Council have further considered the request of the National Coal Board for the erection of 100 houses for mineworkers from outside the area, and have decided that, because of physical difficulties, the council are unable to provide houses for this purpose.

(Western Mail: January 5th, 1956")

"Atherstone Rural Council has been asked by the Minister of Housing to build a further 150 houses this year for miners who, it is suggested
should be drafted into the area to work at Birch Coppice, Baddesley
North Warwick Collieries.

(Birmingham Post: January 13th 1956

None were built.

"The National Coal Board have not requested us to build houses; it is
the result of a direct appeal by the Prime Minister and Minister of Housing,"
said Mr. A. Mead, at Kirkby-in-Ashfield Urban Council meeting, last night.
He was replying to criticism by local residents of a scheme to build 50
houses for miners. Mr. Mead explained that the houses would qualify for
the full subsidy. The Board would nominate the first tenants, but once
the houses became vacant the council would let them.

(Guardian Journal: February 8th, 1956)

Past experience leads overwhelmingly to one conclusion: that mining
local authorities are not likely to co-operate in providing special
housing for workers transferred into their Areas, on present terms.

How would other local authorities which might receive population react to
this situation? A fairly reliable answer can be given for Coventry where
there has been a chronic shortage of labour in this area since the end of
the Second World War. The City Council did in fact receive a special
allocation of houses for transferred miners in 1953. None were ever built
for this purpose. It is unlikely that the City Council would exert
themselves any more for other industries and it is unlikely that the
engineering industries would do anything for themselves.
An alternative to the industry providing its own housing has been to use the New Town Corporation for this purpose. Corby and Hatfield are both New Towns which have been used deliberately to provide for the labour needs of two industries: Corby for the steel industry and Hatfield for aircraft. Before the vesting of New Town status upon these towns the local authorities were either not interested, in the case of Hatfield, or not able, in the case of Corby to provide sufficient housing for immigrants. Corby, in particular, failed to match the growth of the steel industry despite the fact that both the local authority and Stewarts and Lloyds tried at various times to build houses for incoming workers. The administrative instrument of the New Town Corporation has admirable advantages in dealing with the needs of industry for labour for it does not have to pander to the local electorate and it maintains a close control over both housing and industrial expansion.

The provision of amenities for migrant workers is a less important but more complicated question than that of housing for it is even more difficult to assign responsibility for it. The CHA estates for transferred miners lacked meeting halls, youth clubs and playgrounds; in fact all of those amenities for which the local authority had no statutory obligation and the Coal Board no immediate welfare motive. Once the houses were up on the estates the tenants were left to look after themselves. It is true that the estate layouts did envisage some welfare
welfare provision but the spaces provided remain bare patches of open ground. The local authorities had their hands full with their own estates and the Coal Board had reached the stage where the enormous costs of housing had blunted their appetite for more expense.

There is no reason for believing that this dismal experience would not be repeated elsewhere. Local authorities have never been very conscious of the needs of their housing estates and industry has done little better. On this score too, as well as that of housing discussed above, the New Town Corporation wins hands down. New Towns have been much more aware of the community needs as against the housing needs of their tenants.

Apart from the question of voluntary provision of housing and amenities the local authorities do have statutory obligations in the field of the social services, especially to children. It is interesting to recall here the heated discussion between A.D.K. Owen and Michael Daly on the effects of inter-war transference on educational facilities in the receiving areas. Owen held the view that:

(1) "The progress of urgent reforms, such as the reorganization of schools under the "Hadow" plan and the clearance of unfit property, has been greatly hindered in the outer districts of

London as a result of the pressure of new population. The delay in the raising of the school age under the new Act is partly due to the extra time needed by education authorities in expanding areas to complete their provision of additional accommodation."

Whereas Daly found that:

"The introduction of the Hadow plan had not been hindered, but rather, immensely stimulated by the migration of population into the newer areas. It has compelled the building of new schools in these districts, each of which was planned from the outset with the Hadow plan of educational reform in mind. The consequence has been that whereas in the country as a whole the proportion of pupils under the Hadow system is less than 50 per cent., in Surrey and Middlesex 83 per cent. and 75 per cent. of the elementary schoolchildren are in reorganized schools."

and:

"The facts are that, far from the influx of population having given rise to delay, additional school accommodation is more quickly forthcoming in the newer areas than in those districts where the growth of population is more stable, simply because the new ratepayers have often no school accommodation at all. Moreover, it will be appreciated that on the new housing estates,
it is quite easy to make provision in the new senior schools for the extra age group, as a school for 500 children can be built almost as quickly as a school for 300 or 400."

Chapter 7 described the serious delay in educational provision which arose in North Staffordshire because the Coal Board was unable to liaise closely with the local authorities. Extra school places were not made ready for the children with consequent overcrowding and long journeys to school. Maternity and Child Welfare services were not expanded in time for the demands placed upon them. These failures to plan ahead occurred there and elsewhere despite the fact that often the Coal Board had the advantage of having some of their local officials serving on local councils, thus well placed for informal consultations. It is therefore unlikely that any other industry setting out on a private venture to recruit labour in this fashion would do any better than the coal industry.

Once again when looking at the kinds of community which might be expected to receive migrant labour it would seem that the New Town Corporations have been best equipped to deal with this situation. They have been centrally placed to coordinate the plans of industry and the local authorities.

It has become clear from the discussion this far that local authorities cannot be expected to provide adequately for immigrants from other areas. It is also clear that industry has only a limited

/interest
interest in the lives of immigrant workers. These conclusions, together with the remarks made on the success of the New Town Corporations seem to underline the fact that migration must be considered from a national standpoint and as a national policy. These issues must therefore be taken up again later in this chapter.

The second set of problems, apart from those of social provision which beset the receiving communities, were those of the conflicts of the needs of town planning and the interests of industry. An industry which decides to build houses for its workers may want to build them near to the actual scene of its operations for this is believed to reduce the competition for labour from other employers and also to ensure better attendance and timekeeping. The local authority on the other hand is more likely to want to tie in such housing with its own development plans. This dilemma is of course more likely to occur in the mining industry than other industries because there is so little choice in the location of a colliery.

A further planning issue, which is perhaps unique to mining, is that community leaders are forever trying to break down the isolation of miners from other workers. The Coal Board, on the other hand, has no such stated objective. Generally speaking the possibility of mixing different industrial groups rests on the opportunity of doing so and the scope of the town planning authority is conditioned by this fact.

/Even
Even New Towns, which are usually so conscious of these town planning objectives, are sometimes highly dependent upon a single industry: Corby on the steel industry and Hatfield on aircraft are cases in point.

Another important facet of the town planning issue is that it is often argued in public debate that migration southwards can only lead to greater and greater congestion. Much was made of this point in the debate on the Local Employment Bill in the House of Commons recently (1960).

But as D.J. Odber has remarked:

"Britain does not consist only of three or four vast and congested conurbations surrounded by great areas of sparsely populated countryside, dotted with small towns and suffering from varying degrees of chronic unemployment. Both these types of locality exist, but there are other kinds, including many medium-sized towns in which industry has prospered in the last century or more and which are numerous enough to disprove the idea that if work is not brought to the worker's doorstep he must inevitably drift to London or Birmingham."

The 1954-56 transfer of labour in the coal industry has not produced any greater signs of congestion in the South. In North Staffordshire the housing development was mainly in rural areas and neither in the shopping centres nor on the roads is it more difficult

(1) D.J. Odber - "Local Unemployment & The 1958 Act."
to move. Nor is it likely that great difficulties would arise in Coventry, Wilton, Corby or Hatfield as a result of further immigration.

The third big social problem which arises from a transfer of labour organised by an employer, such as the Coal Board scheme, is whether the housing provided should be tied to employment with that employer. A great deal of resistance from local authorities and union branches to the Coal Board's plans developed on this score and this resistance was strengthened by the overlap of these two pressure groups. Branch officials are often local councillors in mining areas. It should be noticed, however, that although this problem is most acute where the employer is also the landlord it can also happen where a local authority earmarks houses for the needs of a particular employer.

The fourth set of social problems created in the receiving communities arose from the resettlement of the migrants. Each family had to find its new level in a completely new environment. Everyone had to find new friends and new interests and some members of the families had to find new jobs. These are by their nature individual difficulties which are not easily solved by administrative planning. Opportunities may be created to make it easier for people to do the things they need to do but each individual must make his own adjustment. The interviews with miners and their families in North Staffordshire showed that despite an extremely heterogeneous population of migrants
there were very few who did not make some social life for themselves after they moved. There were, it is true, a substantial number of wives who would have returned home if they had been given free choice in the matter but nevertheless most of them were preparing to settle down. This success in resettlement was not due to the skills of social workers. Some housing visitors were appointed to ease the lot of the newcomers but the impact they made was marginal.

It is unlikely that the reception of migrant workers would be handled in a more sophisticated manner elsewhere. As yet this is still in this field over much the stage of defining the problems without worrying about providing the answers. The New Towns with their specialised Social Development Officers are perhaps more sensitive to these difficulties without being able to do very much about them and their main successes have been in assisting those who want to participate in and develop organised social activities.

Throughout this chapter in examining the communities losing or gaining population the theme has recurred that the issues posed by migration cannot be adequately solved by local bodies. Neither, let it be said, are the advantages and disadvantages of migration of interest only to those communities directly concerned. The efficient use of manpower is a national concern just as much as is the disposition of resources for social welfare. The advantages to the national economy

1. See page 129 above.
of some degree of migration have been set out in full in Chapter 8 and they point to the need for a change in the Government's attitude towards migration. There is a need to remove or reduce the obstacles to movement and to provide inducements and facilities for it.

It was suggested at the beginning of this thesis that obstacles to migration might be found in three fields of Government policy: social security, rent restriction and the allocation of social capital. In the case study the only real resistance to movement came under the last of these headings, particularly through the allocation of housing. (Differences in local authority rents did produce some difficulties but these rents are not under central government control.) There had been such dramatic improvements in housing in the so-called depressed areas that people were loath to leave their homes behind them. Over half the Scots miners interviewed were living in houses built since the War, before they moved. It is perhaps still politically impossible for a Minister of Housing to apply pressure against local authorities who wish to build in areas which have a declining industrial future but there is no reason why he should not make it easier for migrants to be re-housed at a better standard in the expanding areas. It is in this incentive and other inducements that new ways can be found to increase labour mobility.

At the moment the family man who transfers under the Ministry of Labour transfer scheme is given a free travel warrant for himself and
his family; a lodging allowance; free removal of furniture; a settling-grant; financial assistance for those who have to sell their houses; and free travel home at the weekends. These benefits are not very different from those offered by the National Coal Board in their own transfer scheme. It was concluded about that scheme that its value did not lie in attracting men to transfer but in reducing the number who might return home. Without doubt the major facility which could be offered to a migrant is to ensure him speedy and adequate re-housing. The Coal Board scheme was able to do this and as a consequence the number of men attracted was very large. The transfer benefits have been available without the housing since 1957 but the numbers transferring have been negligible.

The administrative instrument by which the Government could provide housing is obvious. In spite of its limitations the New Town Corporation has the authority and the experience to do just this job. It is true that small scale needs could not be easily met in this way and that there might be a case for a special Housing Corporation with responsibilities for housing migrant workers but such a Corporation could model itself in many ways on the work done in the New Towns.

It is perhaps worth re-stating here at the end of this thesis the reason for these proposals. There are real economic advantages to be secured by an organised movement of workers from one part of the country to another. Even in the peak year of employment since the War there
was still a substantial difference in the level of employment of different areas. Those areas with chronic manpower needs and with an important role in producing for export markets could benefit from areas less vital to the national economy. The benefits are not only in securing labour where it is needed most, they may also lie in the higher productivity and the preservation of valuable industrial skills.

It is as well to remember that the price of securing these objectives has been grossly exaggerated. Not all movement southwards has to end up by adding to the congestion at Hyde Park Corner. Nothing suggested here will lead to more than marginal losses of population to the declining areas and there will certainly be no wholesale disruption of community life. The important thing now is to dissociate the traumatic experiences of the Depression from the situation as it really exists today.
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The core of this thesis is the analysis of interviews with miners, and fieldwork at both the sending and receiving ends. However, the theme of the thesis is part of the general discussion about distribution of industry policy and relevant matters of which there is a large bibliography.

The following is a list of the most important publications in the field (mainly British but including others).

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4. National Coal Board

   Annual Reports (1947 onwards)

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Ministry of Labour Gazette
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Iron and Coal Trades Review
Coal (N.C.B. Magazine)
Kidsgrove Times
Glasgow Herald
Newcastle Journal
Staffordshire Weekly Sentinel.
## Part 1 - Before Transfer

### Code No.

| 0 1 2 |

### N.A. No.

| 3 4 5 6 |

### Time: started | finished

| 0 1 2 |

### Date of interview

| 3 4 5 6 |

### Times called: 1 2 3 4

### Place

| 3 4 5 6 |

### 1. Ages:

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### 2. Household composition:

#### Age and sex of children

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*Ring role employed in mining*

### 3. Type of area

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### 5. Did you need to go out much before you moved?

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### 6. Were you born locally?

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### 7. Length of residence in the neighbourhood (years)

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### 8. (a) Periods of absence from the neighborhood

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### (b) If applicable:

#### Category of absence:

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<th>(b) H.R. Forces</th>
<th>(c) Family moved</th>
<th>(d) Other</th>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 9. Is your wife a local woman?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 10. Housing status:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Owner</th>
<th>Tenant</th>
<th>Sub-tenant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (a) Ownership:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Colliery Council</th>
<th>New Town</th>
<th>SH and CHA</th>
<th>Private Rent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### (b) Type:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Detached</th>
<th>Semi-Detached</th>
<th>Terraced</th>
<th>Flats</th>
<th>Semi-detached (up to 10)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

#### (c) Age:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pre 1914</th>
<th>Inter-War</th>
<th>Post-War</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 11. Were you dissatisfied with the house you had?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0 1 2 3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 5 6 7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### PART 2 - AFTER TRANSFER

**Work Situation**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Pit</th>
<th>Training</th>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Months</th>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Record</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
<th>(e)</th>
<th>(f)</th>
<th>(g)</th>
<th>(h)</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
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</table>

**Date of arrival:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
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<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Date of tenancy:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>6</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Date of leaving:**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 3. Earnings in first three weeks of transfer (respondent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(If applicable)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 4. Any reduction of pay?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't Know</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Not Know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 5. Who did you see when you reported to the pit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 6. How did you get along with the Manager?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Very well</td>
<td>Well</td>
<td>Well</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All right</td>
<td>Badly</td>
<td>Very badly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X</td>
<td>Y</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 7. How did you get on with your workmates in your first few days?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 8. Who did you work with? Mostly local men. Mostly transferred

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mostly local men</th>
<th>Mostly transferred</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 9. Normal shift (i) on arrival

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
<th>(d)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Days</td>
<td>Afternoons</td>
<td>Nights</td>
<td>Alt.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 10. What do you think of the union's attitude to management compared with Durham/Scotland?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>X</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 11. What money did you expect to be earning when you went to Stoke?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### 12. Here you dissatisfaction with the money for the work you did?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>No opinion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PART 3 - RETURNED HOME

1. Length of stay in area to which transferred. | 1 month | 6 months | 1 year | Over |
--- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | X | Y | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 |

2. Reason for returning

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3. What difficulties have you experienced settling down again in your home town?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. (a) Job to which returned?  
   Pit  Outside Industry  Unemployed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) If Pit, state name.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. If at Pit, enter earnings and occupation (pit record)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. Housing - Same house.  Similar  Better  Worse

| | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |

7. What advice would you give to someone considering transfer?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Have you any suggestions to make to improve the transfer scheme?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

179
### PART 4 - INTERVIEW WITH WIVES AFTER TRANSFER

1. Do you like living on this estate?  
   - Yes  
   - No  
   - Don't know  
   - No Answer

2. Do you find it is convenient?  
   - Yes  
   - No  
   - Don't know  
   - No Answer

3. List advantages and disadvantages which are mentioned:

   - Advantages:  
     - X:  
     - Y:  
     - Z:  
   - Disadvantages:  
     - A:  
     - B:  
     - C:  

4. Is there anything the estate still needs?  
   - Yes  
   - No  
   - Don't know  
   - No Answer

   ```
   Prompt:  
   - Shops  
   - Playground  
   - Nursery School  
   - Community Centre  
   - Church  
   - Public Houses  
   - Youth Club  
   - Schools  
   - Better housing  
   - Better medical service  
   - Other  
   ```

5. Have you made any new friends on the estate or elsewhere in Stoke?  
   - Many  
   - Some  
   - Few  
   - None  
   - No Answer

6. Are they mostly Locals  
   - Yes  
   - No  

7. How do you find the local people?  
   - Friendly  
   - Unfriendly  
   - Don't know  
   - No Answer

8. Do your children like it here?  
   - Yes  
   - No  
   - All right  
   - Don't know  
   - No Answer

9. Has the change affected them in any way?  
   ```
   Prompt:  
   - For example, at school?  
   ```

10. Do you feel that their prospects have changed in any way?  
    - No Change  
    - Better  
    - Worse  
    - Don't know  
    - No Answer

11. Do you find that you have fewer extra expenses here?  
    - Yes  
    - No  
    - Don't know  
    - No Answer

   List extra expenses (if any):

12. Have you tried for a job since moving here?  
    - Yes - have one  
    - Yes - had one  
    - Yes - couldn't get one  
    - No  
    - No Answer

13. Was this idea was it to move?  
    - Wife's  
    - Husband's  
    - Both  
    - Children's  
    - Don't know  
    - No Answer

14. How did you feel about it?  
    - Pleased  
    - Sorry  
    - Mixed feelings  
    - Don't know  
    - No Answer
16. What were your reasons for moving to the town?

17. Has the move changed your own life in any way?

18. What do you do in your spare time?

19. Everything considered are you satisfied with the move? Yes No Don't know No answer

20. Is your husband satisfied with the move? Yes No Don't know No answer

21. Could the R.C.D. help any further with the solution of the problems people face in moving? (Record answer and then prompt with the following questions)

(a) While waiting for a house?

(b) On arrival?

22. Present household composition (if different from Part 1)

23. Anything else?

24. Item | Condition
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>X Y O 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

25. Item | Condition
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F</td>
<td>X Y O 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

26. Item | Condition
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>X Y O 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

27. Item | Condition
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>L</td>
<td>X Y O 1</td>
</tr>
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<td>3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
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28. Item | Condition
<table>
<thead>
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<tr>
<td>P</td>
<td>X Y O 1</td>
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<td>3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
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</table>

29. Item | Condition
<table>
<thead>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>X Y O 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3 4 5 6 7 8 9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 13. Do your wife go out to work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Full Time</th>
<th>Part Time</th>
<th>Not Known</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>04</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### WORK SITUATION

14. How long have you been in the pits?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>0-5 years</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>03</td>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15. (a) Time spent outside the pits: None

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>0-5</th>
<th>6-10</th>
<th>11-15</th>
<th>16 and over</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) (i) Were you unemployed

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>Yrs.</th>
<th>(ii) Other</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

16. Pit experience since the end of the War:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time</th>
<th>(a) Pit Yrs.</th>
<th>(b) Occupational Experience</th>
<th>(c) Face Training</th>
<th>(d) A</th>
<th>(e) H</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
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<th>6</th>
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</tbody>
</table>

17. How do you get along with the management at your pit?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Well</th>
<th>All right</th>
<th>Badly</th>
<th>Very badly</th>
<th>N.B</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

18. Have you had any difficulty getting regular face work?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

19. (a) Are you preparing for promotion in any way?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>04</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(b) In what way?

20. (a) Have you considered the idea of transferring?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
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<td>04</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) What was it that really made you decide not to move?

21. Have you any great difficulty in the way of your moving?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

22. (a) Do you know about the Transfer Scheme?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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<td>04</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) How did you hear about it?

23. (a) If you were to transfer which would you prefer, Scotland or England?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scotland</th>
<th>England</th>
<th>Don't know</th>
<th>No answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
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</tbody>
</table>

(b) Why?


PART 1 - BEFORE TRANSFER

Code No. ________________________________ Interviewer ________________________________
M.A. No. ________________________________ Who present ________________________________
K.P.C. No. ________________________________ Time started ________________________________ finished ________________________________ Date of interview ________________________________

Times called: 1 2 3 4

Place ________________________________

1. Age: Under 14 15 - 24 25 - 34 35 - 49 50 and over

   0 1 2 3 4

2. Household composition:

Age and sex of Children

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2</td>
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<td>4</td>
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</table>

Others in household - state relation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M</th>
<th>F</th>
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<tbody>
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</table>

(Ring males employed in mining)

3. Type of area:

(a) % female employment < 5 5 - 10 10 - 15 15 - 20 Over

(b) % males in mining < 10 10 - 20 20 - 30 30 - 40 Over

(c) Population < 10,000 10,000 - 30,000 30,000 - 90,000 Over

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</table>

4. Do you like living in this town? Yes No Don't know No answer

5. Do you go out much? Yes No Don't know No answer

6. Were you born locally? Yes No Don't know No answer

7. Length of residence in the neighbourhood (years) 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 Over

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8. (a) Periods of absence from the neighbourhood (not more than 1 month - since Secondary School leaving age)

None < 1 < 2 < 3 < 4 < 5 yrs Over

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(b) If applicable:

Category of absence: (A) Work (B) H.B. Forces (C) Family moved (D) Other

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9. Is your wife a local woman? Yes No Don't know No answer

10. Housing status: Owner Tenant Sub-tenant

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(a) Ownership: Council Council New Town S.Q. Shanty Private Self

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(b) Type: Detached Semi-Terraced Flats Mansions (up to 10)

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(c) Age: Pre 1914 Inter-War Post-War

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II. Are you satisfied with the house you have? Yes No Don't know No answer

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</table>
1. The survey was initiated by the Board with the purpose of providing long term principles for the proper conduct of industrial labour transfer schemes. Although this fact should provide the perspective for the information in which we are to interest ourselves, there is bound to emerge much of immediate practical interest and value to the Board.

2. There are two main problems with which we are faced in this survey. The first of these concerns the investigation of factors which affect the willingness of people to migrate. The second concerns the investigation of factors which determine the success of migration, both in terms of the needs of the individual migrant and the needs of the organisation.

3. Apart from these two main problems there are several subsidiary ones: for example, in assessing the willingness of people to migrate we may find that some groups are more willing than others to move; that migration is selective. We shall be interested to know whether migration selects an unduly high proportion of bad workmen, or as an alternative school of thought holds, that it is the socially ambitious who migrate.

4. It should always be remembered that we are carrying out research and not acting in direct administrative capacity. We are not interviewing men in order to persuade them to migrate or in order to persuade
persuade them to stay when they have migrated.

The Use of the Schedule

1. Parts 1, 2 and 3 of the schedule must be completed for migrants who have returned home. They may be completed in any order.
2. Parts 1 and 2 must be completed for migrants who have stayed. Again they may be completed in any order.
3. Only part 1 needs to be completed for non-migrants.
4. Part 4 will be completed after the parts 1 and 2 are given to the migrants who have stayed.
5. Except in the case of part 4 the interview must be with the transferred miner himself and if other persons are present this should be noted and the interview should be kept as far as possible directed towards the migrant. In the case of part 4 the wife should be interviewed after the husband.
6. If the respondent has moved his address, enquiries should be made from local residents about his present address.
7. There is no need to be rigid in the order of asking questions, but the order in the present layout will usually be found to be the natural and convenient one.
8. Opinion questions should be asked exactly as worded on the schedule, but factual questions may be asked in the most convenient way.
9. Comments on Questions in Part I

Question 3 - Except for the name of the town all information will be filled in after the interview.

Question 4 - This question is particularly intended to separate out those who are or were positively dissatisfied with their home community.
9. **Question 5** - All activities outside of the house, i.e. cinema, voluntary organisations, football, etc. are to be included. These may be mentioned if it is necessary to prompt.

**Question 6** - A subjective answer is required here. This need not be objectively comparable with other people's estimates.

**Question 7** - Neighbourhood is again to be subjectively defined.

**Question 8** - "Local" is to be taken subjectively.

**Question 11** - As with other questions which have this alternative wording, the one which is to be used will be left unscored.

**Question 16** - **Column B** - The interviewer should list all occupations for which the man has had more than one month experience since the end of the war.

**Question 16** - **Column C** - The interviewer should list all operations for which the man **considers himself** to have been trained.

**Question 16** - **Columns D & E** will be completed from the records.

**Question 18** - "Regular" face work. It is the man's estimate which is to be taken.

10. **Part 2 of the Schedule**

    Dates at the top of the page are to be filled in from the records before the interview. Where there is a reason to doubt the reliability of the records the respondent should be asked to confirm the point in question.

**Question 1(b).** Training given at the pit should be filled in here, according to the man's estimate.

1(c). Occupations held at these pits since arrival.

1(d) and (e) from the pit records.
Columns 1 - 6 are for data to be taken direct from the pit profile.

**Question 2** - The interviewer should record total earnings and shifts worked if the period is less than 3 weeks.

**Question 3** - The interviewer may prompt the respondents about the scope and intention of the make-up scheme.

**Question 5** - This should mean the person responsible for receiving and allocating the man.

**Question 6** - It may be possible that the manager was never seen and this should be noted.

**Question 7** - The definition of "work mates" should be subjective. If clarification is needed it should be taken to mean a man working on the same operation in the same district.

**Question 9** - If alternating, ring both collieries which apply.

**Questions 18 & 19** - If the respondent actually travelled with a relative or friend this should be recorded as "yes" and a note made of this fact.

**11. Part 3 of the Schedule**

**Question 2** - If more than one reason state them in order of their importance.

**Question 3** - If more than one difficulty state them in order of their importance.

**Question 5** - This question will be answered from the pit records and it will refer to the first 3 weeks after return to the home area.
12. **Part 4 of the Schedule**

**Question 5**  - First ask this question without prompting and record the answer. If there is no reply prompt with the aid of the list.

**Question 6**  - "Don't mix" is to be taken as "none".

**Question 17**  - For a period longer than one month since secondary school leaving age.