RECASTING THE SECURITY BARGAINS: GERMANY, EUROPEAN SECURITY POLICY AND THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP

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This article analyses recent developments in European Union (EU) security policy and their implications for Germany's bilateral relations with France, the United Kingdom and the United States of America. It contends that the development of a greater EU security capability has significantly affected Germany's bilateral relations with the USA and Germany's main European partners. This has resulted in a recasting of the previous transatlantic security bargains of the Cold War period. Greater expectations on behalf of France and the UK concerning German involvement in military security within the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP) have also affected Germany's approach to security policy-making.

INTRODUCTION

Since 1998 and in particular since the moves made by Britain towards a more active role in the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union's capacity to act in the sphere of foreign and security policy has made rapid advances. The United States' growing reluctance to carry the main burden for security provision for its European allies means that Europe can no longer afford not to act as one in its security requirements. For Germany, as for France and the United Kingdom, this would entail taking over major responsibilities from the United States in crisis management and consequently being confronted with new challenges in security co-operation. The new demands placed on Germany in security provision may create more problems for the Red/Green coalition than for its major European partners. Where does Germany envisage the course of European security co-operation leading and what will Germany do to flesh out existing conceptions of the CFSP? In this connection, how is Germany translating its national interests in this field into EU policy through the process of co-ordination and bargaining with the other 14 member states? These are highly pertinent questions in German policy-making circles at present and must be considered in the light of the changing geopolitical dynamics on the European continent. This article will begin by
outlining the historical development of Germany's role in European security before going on to analyse Germany's relations with its major partners and recent events in Europe affecting transatlantic security relations.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO GERMANY'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY

The Post-War Security Bargain

The post-war security bargain which emerged in the immediate years after 1945 was based on material and ideational factors. The material factors enforcing the emergent transatlantic security bargain in the Federal Republic were plain to see, notably the stationing of Allied troops on German soil and, more importantly, the extension of American guarantees to provide a nuclear shield against the Soviet threat. The Washington Treaty signed in 1949 laid down the commitment of the Allied powers to safeguard the peace of Western Europe. The succession of West Germany to NATO in 1955 marked an acceptance of Adenauer's belief in the rationale of integration into the West, the welcoming of the Federal Republic back into the Western state system and the recognition by West Germany of the primacy of the United States in the security provision of Western Europe. Whilst military hardware was the visible sign of the commitment of West Germany and its major partners to a system of co-operative security, the clear visibility of the Soviet threat and the commitment to a democratic order were the cohesive forces which held NATO together.

German post-war foreign policy was based on a series of bargains struck by Germany in order to re-establish itself and insert itself into the international system. These were founded on Bonn's commitment to Westbindung (Western integration). Central to this bargain was NATO. This was a result of the mutual security need felt by both West Germany and the other allies in the face of the Warsaw Pact. This not only secured West Germany's security but also provided the basis for the post-war recovery of the German state. This post-war bargain was not, however, a one-way process. The multifaceted bargain ensured German recovery, but also provided the allies with a strong defensive bulwark against the East. The central argument of this paper, however, is that, with the end of the Cold War period, the security bargains are in the process of being recast. The bombing of Serbia and Kosovo marked a turning point in US-EU relations. The United States is now demanding greater Western European involvement in European regional security. This expectation has had major
repercussions on Franco-German and British-German security co-operation within the European Union.

The development of norms and the ensuing socialisation of national elites into shared beliefs based on sustained mutual co-operation during the Cold War were instrumental in the longevity of the transatlantic security bargain. West Germany's increasing reliance on multilateral security arrangements in the face of the huge military forces gathered on its borders presented West Germans with salient reasons for membership of co-operative security structures based on the presence on the USA. The hard security guarantees that could be offered only by the United States resulted in the predominance of the USA in NATO and placed limitations on Western Europe's ability to conduct a distinctive diplomatic policy.

As Hoffmann contends, Germany has not departed from its reliance on multilateralism, but this reliance is now founded on a more assertive Germany, less inhibited by its past and the international environment. This shift has had a major impact on the development of EU security structures in which Germany seeks to play a leading role. The underlying security bargain which Germany struck with the United States - that of the nuclear shield and ‘hard’ security provisions – remains. However, a more assertive, self-confident Berlin has incrementally sought to influence the future course of European security policy according to its own ideals and tied to the goal of eventual Political Union with its European partners.

Germany and the development of European Union Security Policy

There are or have been three main reasons for German policy-makers to consider the development of a European foreign policy to be in the best interests of Germany. First, Germany's support for the European Political Co-operation (EPC)/CFSP process was a means to counteract the deficiencies in German Foreign policy. Second, the growing confrontational aspect of the Cold War during the late 1970s and early 1980s necessitated the development of a distinctive European 'voice' in the international system. Subsequently, the post-Cold War European system has seen a 'collapse of illusions' regarding the future role and interests of the US in European regional security concerns. Finally, Germany has viewed the extension of co-operation in foreign and security policy among EU member states as a furtherance of the integration process. CFSP can be viewed as an area of the European integration process where Germany continues to play the role of Musterknabe (the ‘best pupil in the class’).
The function of NATO in the foreign and security policy of West Germany was limited in the field of diplomacy. Moreover, the 'inability of Europeans significantly to influence the course of events and the nakedness of its exposure to external aggression was nowhere more keenly felt than in the German Foreign Ministry'. It was important for Bonn to develop channels for pursuing policies which did not impact directly on the East/West conflict. EPC provided an invaluable opportunity for the pursuit of Bonn's foreign policy objectives. Membership of EPC provided an outlet for German diplomacy while multilateralising it to prevent any suspicions of a German Sonderweg arising. Germany actively pursued the process of European integration, most notably in the Genscher-Colombo proposals of 12 November 1981 to deepen integration and bring EPC into the EC process, with the aim of developing a common defence. EPC provided Germany with the first tentative means for the expression of Bonn's diplomatic interests. In addition, German leaders and foreign policy officials were worried by what they diagnosed as a waning of the commitment of the German people to European integration, and the need - not just in Germany, but also in the rest of Europe - to raise European ambition and reconfirm the loyalty of the member states to the community ideal. Most importantly, EPC provided West Germany with an important 'alibi function' which served as a 'means of deflecting external pressure, and cover for shifts in national policy'. NATO could not be used as a forum for expressing Germany's singular foreign policy interests because of the sensitive nature of the Cold War and the intention not to upset the close transatlantic relationship.

West Germany's attempts to create a European security policy were very much reliant on the support of the United Kingdom and France, the major Western European military powers. The constraints on West Germany's military capacity, embodied in the modified Western European Union Treaty of 1954 with its restrictions on the development of ABC (Atomic, Biological and Chemical) weapons, accounted for the notable modesty of German security policy. However, despite the Federal Republic's relative aversion to military security, beyond that of national defence, it scored a number of diplomatic successes through the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and Chancellor Schmidt's successful efforts to include Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in the NATO agenda in the late 1970s.

Chancellor Kohl pushed for foreign and security policy integration at Maastricht very much as a way of deepening Germany's commitment to the European integration process. The
German government also viewed the closer ties between the West European Union (WEU) and the EU as a way of legitimising defence in the post-Cold War environment and as a way of influencing the debate concerning German participation in 'out-of-area operations'.\(^2\) The development of the CFSP must be viewed in the context of the continued German commitment to European integration post-unification, at a time when Germany's future commitment to multilateralism was coming under scrutiny. German attempts to move forward foreign and security policy integration were not considered to be an open challenge to American involvement in Europe as a 'common defence was considered a very long-term process…'.\(^10\) The only circumstances in which a common European defence could be envisaged would be if the United States ever questioned its commitment to European security, something that seems unimaginable in the foreseeable future.

The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks agreed by the WEU in June 1992 into the Treaty of Amsterdam marked an important step forward in European security policy. The inclusion of Article J.7(2) to include ‘…humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking’ was a bold step which clarified to some extent the relationship between the WEU and the EU, without suggesting a fusion. However, this has also placed much greater demands and expectations on CFSP. With the coming into force of Article J.7(2) through the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in May 1999, the ‘capabilities-expectations’ gap\(^11\) could no longer be fudged. Hence the Bremen Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers that took place on 10 and 11 May 1999 expressed the ‘willingness of the European nations to strengthen European operational capabilities for Petersberg Tasks based on appropriate decision-making bodies and effective military means, within NATO or national and multinational means outside the NATO framework’\(^12\).

The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP presents Germany, France and the UK with major commitments spanning a wide range of military operations. The decisions made at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 and at Helsinki in December 1999 represent positive strides to meet these commitments. For Germany in particular, the inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks demands a more interventionist German style within the CFSP and means that Germany is no longer able to shirk responsibility in military operations.
Germany has aimed for Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to be partially extended to questions concerning the CFSP. Opportunities for the use of QMV procedures were agreed at in the Treaty of Amsterdam in an attempt to facilitate CFSP decisions and to create the option of ‘coalitions of the willing’ conducting missions under EU auspices and leaving room for 'constructive abstention'. Despite this, Germany's stance on QMV exhibits ambivalence, as between federalist and intergovernmentalist conceptions of security integration. Germany also pressed for the appointment of a High Representative for CFSP at Amsterdam to give the EU a more visible face and point of contact in world affairs, a post which has now been filled by former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana Madariaga. Significantly, the final decision to appoint Solana was taken at the Cologne European Council meeting on 3 and 4 June 1999.

According to Sjursen, 'the internalisation of a European dimension of foreign policy is most advanced and explicit in Germany, where it forms part of the overall strategy of reflexive multilateralism. This highlights the distinctive German approach to European integration in which policy-makers span the divide between European and domestic level forums and there is a cross-fertilisation of norms and policies in a two-way process. Although the same processes can be recognised in France and UK, albeit in a much more restricted sense, Germany's main partners are characterised by what has been described as 'nationalistic internationalism', in which policy-makers seek to 'exploit' multilateral institutions for their own national interest. This would equate with the neo-liberal institutionalist paradigm. In Germany, the European project has blurred the divide between what is domestic and what is foreign policy, highlighting the success of Germany's integration. Hill and Wallace have noted the 'transformationalist effects' that the interaction between policy-makers has had on traditional foreign policy-making practices.

Germany has been profoundly affected by involvement in multilateral institutions. Its commitment to institutions has been described as 'exaggerated multilateralism'. Garton-Ash states that ‘the Federal Republic was particularly interested in, and became increasingly adept at, not clearly articulating distinctive national positions, but rather feedings its own special German concerns and priorities into a common approach'.

Germany's embeddedness within the EU has reinforced a Europeanist outlook among Germany's foreign policy elites. Central to Germany's overall multilateralist strategy has been the maintenance of close bilateral relations. Significant injections of dynamism into the
integration process have resulted primarily from bilateral endeavours between the Federal Republic and its major European partners, most significantly with France. These bilateral relationships will now be examined.

SECURITY RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, THE UK AND THE USA

Franco-German Security Relations

The end of World War Two represented a watershed in relations between France and Germany. It was clear that co-operation between the two Western European powers was crucial for the future peace and prosperity of the continent. The development of Adenauer's *Westbindung* was therefore reliant on close Franco-German relations. The Elysée Treaty of 22 January 1963 was a culmination of efforts since 1945 to construct close Franco-German ties. It committed both parties to strengthen bilateral ties through co-operation on defence issues and also co-operation within the fledgling European Community structures. The Franco-German Treaty of 1988 further elaborated on the Elysée Treaty by establishing the Franco-German Defence and Security Council. Franco-German security consultation takes an institutionalised form based on two underlying aims: first, to prevent the return of military aggression between the two states and, second, to establish a dominant partnership as the 'engine' of European integration, based on the desire to control Germany within the EC with France providing the policy leads, while Germany provided the economic might.

In the day-to-day business of EU politics, the Franco-German 'co-ordination reflex' results in the tightly knit working relationship which exists at all levels between the two countries. Bulmer *et al.* posit that 'the relationship with France established a settled German preference for strategic partnerships based on a long-term commitment to a strategic project rather than growing out of agreement on a range of technical interests.' The highly institutionalised bilateral relationship between France and Germany has been described by Thomas Pederson as one of 'co-operative hegemony' in which they have been able to secure policy preferences in tandem through a process of close co-operation and through the use of 'side payments' to other Member States. Pederson's argument is generally highly persuasive, but it does not provide an adequate explanation of CFSP, where the Franco-German relationship does not dominate to the same extent as in other policy fields. The major difference which exists between the two states in European security policy concerns France's aim of creating
L'Europe puissance, a powerful Europe more autonomous of the US than at present. However, despite sporadic differences within the Franco-German relationship, the two sides have remained broadly united on the strategic goals of European security policy, largely due to the interwovenness of defence consultations between the two states.

British-German Security Relations

The UK’s ability to impact on the EU has been highly circumscribed by the Franco-German ‘hard core’, despite the recent attempt to shift the balance with the Blair-Schröder Paper. However, in security relations the British-German relationship has been positive due to their close functional interdependence within NATO. The UK has been able to exert considerable influence and prise open the almost exclusive Franco-German 'hard core' in the area of CFSP. The UK's experience and practical expertise in military intervention is likely to ensure it a central role in any future EU military forces. The introduction of EMU and the resulting marginalisation of Britain in the EU's major policy area has made the UK's high-profile stance in the development of ESDP all the more significant.

The UK has adopted a generally guarded stance towards the Franco-German-led Eurocorps. However, at the Anglo-French Summit before the Helsinki European Council meeting, the UK showed signs of adopting a more positive attitude toward the Eurocorps. British participation in the Eurocorps also represents an area where the UK can play a major role without, in its terms, 'sacrificing' further sovereignty, as co-operation in the Eurocorps resembles that which exists within the (intergovernmental) NATO. Britain's more interventionist attitude towards military engagement was reflected in the UK's 1998 Strategic Defence Review, the aim of which was to outline the future scope of structure of the armed forces according to strategic imperatives rather than financial constraints.

German and British policy-makers have been united in the understanding that the EU must develop a more coherent foreign policy, but the idea of progressing from this to a common defence has often met with British intransigence. The acceptance of the need for an independent crisis reaction capability by British elites has developed in the wake of the ethnic conflict in Kosovo and because of America's reluctance to continue to carry the buck in matters of European regional security. Thränert also posits that renewed British interest in CESDP is the result of wanting to bolster Britain's European standing to strengthen its hand.
with the USA, to increase Europe’s international status, and to prevent any attempt by France to weaken the transatlantic link.

*Franco-British Security Co-operation*

The primacy of Franco-British security relations within the EU is grounded in intergovernmental approaches to European security co-operation and is cemented by their status as permanent representatives on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Furthermore, the extensive post-colonial ties which France and the UK maintain in Africa and other parts of the world give their diplomacy a ‘world reach’ that Germany has lacked. The Franco-British security partnership has been vital for the renaissance of CFSP since 1998. The Letter of Intent (LOI) on defence co-operation and the declaration on European security signed at Saint Malo in December 1998 by Defence Ministers Robertson and Richard injected a vital dynamism into CFSP. As well as committing both governments to improve the quality of defence co-operation and troop deployment, the LOI strengthens co-operation in the fields of operations, logistics, intelligence, civil/military affairs, media handling, personnel and liaison. The positive impact of bilateral relationships involving France, Germany and the UK in European security results from the lack of exclusivity in these relations. While one eye is always cast on strengthening bilateral co-operation and transparency, the other is continually focused on the impact of such co-operation on other EU member states. The Franco-British tandem in military security affairs is critical due to the military expertise which both states possess and demonstrate in international operations.

*The USA's Commitment to Atlanticism and the emergence of the European Security and Defence Identity.*

America continues to regard Europe as its most important ally. Geipel posits four key ingredients of the American commitment to Europe: hard economic interests, moral purpose, cultural affinity, and, decisively, the sheer political will of American elites, although since the fall of the Berlin Wall cultural affinity and moral purpose have declined as major factors in the relationship. Central to US-German relations is the high volume of German and American exports and the concern, despite sporadic EU-USA trade quarrels, that these should be allowed to flourish in an open but fair market. While globalisation has placed new and increased demands on national diplomacy, the wide range of common interests which exist between the EU and the USA have necessitated close ties which are in turn reflected in the maintenance of security co-operation. 'Guarded engagement' rather than isolationism will be the hallmark of US foreign policy in the future.
The development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the Atlantic Alliance has been central to the incremental recasting of the transatlantic relationship during the 1990s. The declaration of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 10-11 January 1994 stated that the emergence of the ESDI was an ‘… expression of a mature Europe’ and supported the creation of ‘… separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to European requirements and contribute to alliance security.’ Most significantly in this declaration, NATO assets were to be made available for WEU operations through the Common Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. Ginsberg suggests that the efforts of the EU in the field of CFSP alleviated considerable tensions between the EU and the USA. In addition, the range of options open to both the WEU and NATO were enhanced. The North Atlantic Council summits at Madrid in 1997 and Washington in 1999 elaborated the principles of ESDI. While ESDI has been central to raising the profile of Western Europe within NATO, the United States has been very sure to maintain its position as primus inter pares at the head of the Alliance. The military capabilities gap between the United States and European NATO members means that the final decision on future NATO military operations will remain with America.

CURRENT ISSUES FACING GERMAN POLICY-MAKERS IN CFSP

The Kosovo conflict in 1999 provided an important impetus for greater European cooperation in the field of foreign and defence policy. This commitment to the European integration process was emphasised by Chancellor Schröder during the conflict in order to secure public support for German involvement in the bombing of Serbia: ‘The integration of Germany into the Western community of states is part of the German Staatsräson. We do not want a German Sonderweg. However, the new German government’s stance has changed subtly. According to Schröder, ‘the new German foreign policy won’t be unhistorical. But I believe we have shown in the past 50 years that there is no reason to tie down the Germans, out of fear of the furum teutonicus … My generation and those following are Europeans because we want to be, not because we must be. That makes us freer in dealing with others’. This view is mirrored in the opinion of one of the Chancellor’s advisers who stated that he wanted a Europe which is ‘worthwhile for Germans’. In the words of Hellmann, ‘in Germany's policy towards European integration (as in no other area) Germany's domestic discourse about "national" interests has markedly shifted during the past decade … from a position of supranationalism and "inhibitedness" … based on both Germany's post-war
enthusiasm for European integration and its pre-World War II legacy of "Machtpolitik" to a more self-centred, assertive and more "national" position.37

This new Euro-pragmatism has not manifested itself in the area of CFSP as it has in other areas of European integration.38 The fierce debate over the introduction of EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) is the clearest case study of the waning of the previously unquestioned public consensus on the merits of European integration. Nonetheless there remains broad public support for an enhanced European Union security presence and Germany's responsibility within such a project. Debates on European security in Germany centre on what kind of role Germany should have in any future autonomous European security capability. In many ways, the German public is still wedded to the concept of the Bundeswehr as a purely defensive force. However, Germany must now be bündnisfähig (capable of fulfilling the obligations of military alliance membership) and shoulder considerably more responsibility in military operations, as in the bombing of Serbia. The ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty improves the operability of the CFSP by improving decision-making processes, especially by removing the need for unanimous voting in some areas. These developments aimed at increasing solidarity within CFSP by allowing 'coalitions of the willing' to carry out common missions without the need for involvement of all member states. It is this area where Germany's new stance towards Europe is arguably most evident. According to Duke, the provisions contained within the Amsterdam Treaty 'might even encourage national-interest-driven foreign and security policy as opposed to the "mutual solidarity" sought by the treaty.'39 This is a scenario which Germany will guard against.

The development of the CESDP since the Cologne European Council Summit in June 1999 presents German policy-makers with two important choices. The first relates to the direction in which Germany wants the EU's foreign policy to develop and the extent of the constraints on this policy. Second, Germany must decide what the EU's future role should be. Germany has been described as a Zivilmacht (civilian power), relying on military means only as a last resort, but this categorisation is open to question in the light of recent developments in Kosovo.40 However, Germany appears reluctant to commit to further military involvement in multilateral task forces, while at the same time remaining very aware of its responsibilities as a NATO and EU member. The uneasiness that remains within Germany concerning the deployment of the Bundeswehr for anything other than peacekeeping operations may result in behind-the-scenes efforts to convince its main EU partners of the merits of a minimalist
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foreign and security policy in terms of the use of military force. Foreign Minister Fischer has been vocal in expressing his continuing view of the EU as a Zivilmacht. For Fischer the development of a European security and defence capability is ‘not about a militarisation of the EU’, rather the EU must be made ‘an effective and decisive peaceful power which is able, as was the case in Kosovo, to bolster the rule of law and renounce violence and thereby to consign war as a political tool in Europe to the past’. This view is backed by Angelika Beer, defence spokesperson for Alliance'90/The Greens, who maintains that 'the civilian power character of the European Union should not be lost.' While Germany is committed to the development of the CESDP and to react to American calls to take more responsibility in its 'own backyard', the transatlantic link will continue to exert an important gravitational pull. However, a reluctance to develop the CESDP further may lead to frustrations on the part of France and the UK, which feel more comfortable in resorting to armed force. In the changing post-Cold War environment, the CESDP can provide Germany with a multilateral solution for its evolving security needs.

If the CFSP should be truly communitarised (brought into the main treaty structure and put under greater supranational control) and the EU is enlarged to perhaps 28 countries, this would certainly further enhance the EU’s role as the most dynamic force on the continent of Europe. Communitarisation of the CFSP implies a common defence budget, greater involvement in CFSP affairs by the European Parliament, the subjection of CFSP to the scrutiny of the European Court of Justice, and, in the last resort, perhaps even supranational control of troops in the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). Extensive enlargement will inevitably signal a dramatic evolution of the EU’s geopolitical role in the international system. With this would come added responsibility. The EU might want or have to go it alone without American involvement – a scenario which would pose Germany with tough choices. Ultimately, the EU’s enormous economic strength and military potential may lead the EU down the path towards becoming a global power to match the United States and the emerging China.

There has been a notable growth in tension between the United States and the EU in recent times, primarily in economic affairs, but security-related tensions have also been in evidence. The latter have sprung not only from US exasperation at the lack of a European capability in security matters, but also from hints from some European quarters at the development of autonomous European security structures. On a similar line, the EU has also
been more concerned about the destabilising impact of Russia on the continent as a whole and has made efforts to bolster co-operation and transparent relations with Russia. Europeans have been very critical of plans for a US missile shield. This issue is particularly relevant for Germany and its security needs because of the non-nuclear character of German defence. Germany’s reliance on the United States for a nuclear shield, according to Fischer, ‘... was always based on our trust that the United States would protect out interests, that the United States, as the leading nuclear power, would guarantee some sort of order.’ Clinton's postponement of a decision on the National Missile Defence (NMD) system has been welcomed by Fischer, but Republicans seem determined to implement the programme, even to the extent of expanding its scope to cover Western Europe.

The main problem with NMD is that it is a fundamentally flawed project with little chance of success. There has been no serious dialogue between both sides of the transatlantic alliance over the proposals. NMD is an elite-driven programme which has not been sufficiently 'sold' to either the US public or America's European allies. Despite the ultimate aim of extending the NMD to cover Western Europe, the row over NMD is significant in that it shows up a lack of communication within NATO over the future security provision for the West. This issue is all the more unwelcome because it has emerged at a time when the security architecture is being reorganised to cope with the new demands facing Europe. Transparency and co-ordination within the EU and NATO over future burden-sharing is a prerequisite for the success of any military intervention under ESDP. There must be a two-way process of mutual reassurance in which Europe will be confident of the continued American commitment to European security. In addition, the United States will have to learn to overcome what Lord Robertson has called ‘a sort of schizophrenia’ over ESDP, in which it seems to welcome moves for a more balanced division of labour in defence matters, while at the same time remaining anxious that a more autonomous European capability could lead to the weakening of transatlantic ties.

What causes most friction between the US and its European Allies is America's continued unipolar vision of the world and its own leadership role in it. Lindley-French identifies the root cause of this as being that ‘America is incapable of true partnership because Americans, regardless of political persuasion, feel obliged to lead.’ This propensity will inevitably cause major difficulties within transatlantic security relations as the EU’s presence in the international community grows and it begins to act more assertively in
security affairs. The EU may increase its influence within the Atlantic Alliance, but, while this will give it a greater say in policy matters, the USA remains so far ahead in terms of military capabilities and in the technological Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that America will remain the dominant partner for the foreseeable future. Concerns have been voiced within Germany that the future European capability ‘might be a shield for Europe, but not America's sword.’ The development of a potentially semi-autonomous crisis reaction force, as outlined in the Helsinki Council Declaration in December 1999, has been one of the major issues within the Atlantic Alliance and the EU during the 1990s. Javier Solana has stated that 'putting practical military strength at the top of our agenda should reassure our North American Allies. We are doing what they have urged us to do for decades.

Calls have been coming from the USA, particularly from the Republican camp, for a clear division of labour between America and Europe, with the US focusing on fighting or preventing wars in the Persian Gulf and Asia, leaving the European states to concentrate on peacekeeping missions. Generally, the Europeans are more willing to commit ground troops in peacekeeping situations than the American. Bearing the legacy of Vietnam, the US prefers to focus on issues which impinge on America's geopolitical role rather than on regional disputes of the kind witnessed in the Balkans. However, such a division of labour and burden-sharing may not be in the best interests of alliance cohesion.

A key indicator of Germany's determination to help concretely in the development of the CESDP will be the fate of efforts to reform the Bundeswehr. Schake et al. note the need for Germany to modernise and professionalise its army and, in particular, its crisis reaction troops in order to make a satisfactory contribution. This is a very sensitive issue. Hoffmann and Longhurst argue that:

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\text{Essentially, the idea of an All Volunteer Force (AVF) does not 'fit in' with what the Germans see as being the role and purpose of their armed forces. The practice of conscription in Germany has profound meaning, stretching beyond military necessity, party politics and an attachment to economic benefits delivered by Zivildienst ... Conscription is clearly viewed by the mainstream parties as a mechanism to resist fundamental change in Germany's security policies by maintaining a healthy equilibrium and broad interface in civil-military relations.}
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This evolution in defence and security policy within Germany, while not representing a complete divorce from past German preferences and reluctance to engage in military operations, has impacted on the wider political environment. What would have been politically impossible in the immediate wake of unification can now be justified by German elites in terms of multilateral commitments and the maintenance of international human rights norms. German strategic culture defines the realms of the possible and thereby the constraints under which German policy-makers must operate. Longhurst has described the make-up of strategic culture as ‘a range of discernible norms, beliefs and ideas which act as a perceptual lens through which objective reality is processed and translated into understandable "facts".' Strategic culture is, however, an evolving concept, which can be seen in the development of a consensus over the need for a greater European voice in foreign and security policy. This is a case of what Aggestam identifies as 'Complex Learning' - actors going through a process of social learning in which their values and beliefs are altered through continuous interaction.

An analysis of the Balkan Stability Pact is a key indicator of how Germany would like to develop the CFSP. Joschka Fischer invested significant political capital in pressing for EU action in this area. The significance of the Stability Pact for the future of Europe for German policy-makers is very evident in Fischer’s remarks that ‘with the Stability Pact we must prove that we mean business with our commitment. This is also a question of the political reliability of Germany and Europe’s foreign policy’. Germany also framed the initial efforts to develop a Stability Pact as being in the national interest. 'Due to Germany's pronounced interest in stability in the region, Germany along with its EU partners should undertake the initiative to provide a middle to long-term strategy for the stabilisation of South-east Europe.' The desire evident here to communitarise a German initiative is typical of German European policy-making.

It is noteworthy that major advances towards CESDP were made at the Cologne Council summit. The fleshing out of Fischer's proposals for the Stability Pact for the South-east Balkans marked a clear determination to achieve a better co-ordination of the European's non-military crisis reaction capabilities. Germany's ability to conduct a successful European Council Presidency in CFSP matters was further bolstered by the entry into force of the...
Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May 1999. The adoption of Fischer’s proposals to bring stability to the South-east Balkans was greatly facilitated by the new institutional possibilities created by the new treaty. Clearly, Germany’s diplomacy was successful because it acted in accordance with its stated aim to utilise CFSP structures to the full.

Germany would nonetheless prefer the CESDP not to become an institution which demands too much from Berlin. Although Germany has progressed politically along the path towards assuming greater responsibilities in military operations, this movement has not been backed by a complementary reform of the armed forces. Germany has evidently undergone a process of ‘foreign policy learning’ during the 1990s, but there may be limits to this process. Hence Germany has sought to influence EU security policy in the direction of non-military endeavours in which political co-operation is more important than military intervention. Germany saw the Stability Pact as a necessary balance to the bombing of Kosovo, as compensation for the destruction which the bombing caused in the region. The Stability Pact may also be viewed as an attempt to gain diplomatic prestige and present a positive image of their European Council Presidency in the first half of 1999. In addition, the appointment of Bodo Hombach as head of the Stability Pact was also a politically expedient move by Schröder to remove a controversial politician from the German domestic stage.

A second major issue which German policy-makers must address is whether Germany should support the communitarisaton of the CFSP, so that EU would replace national control of what is traditionally one of the most jealously guarded areas of national sovereignty. Germany is considered in some quarters a post-national state that is comfortable with the ceding of sovereignty to supranational institutions. But the machinery of decision-making in this area may not be easily transferable to the EU, not even for the Federal Republic. Joschka Fischer clearly sees the ceding of national sovereignty in this area to the EU as a vital part of the integration project. Thus, in a recent speech to the German Bundestag, he stated: ‘The completion of this Europe of integration means … the transfer of the substantial sovereign rights of nation states to the political scope of the European Union … If you want that, then the military level will not remain with the nation-state … Without this development we cannot complete the political goal of a European Union’.

German policy-makers stand out among those of the ‘big three’ member states in pushing for political union with the inclusion of CESDP structures within the main EU body. France,
while being a vocal supporter of deeper integration, will continue to insist on an intergovernmental approach to EU security affairs, albeit not in the strictest sense of the word. The UK, due to the politically extremely contested character of European integration in Britain, would find it very difficult to go down the road of greater supranational control of CESDP. In terms of Putnam's two-level game metaphor, British policy elites are constrained at the international level by ratification difficulties on the domestic level which restrict the scope of policy choices which are acceptable to it at the EU negotiating table.69

Fischer's federalist vision of the future of the EU will inevitably clash with intergovernmentalist conceptions in the UK. One may also ask what impact a communitarised ESDP would have on bilateral relations between Germany and the United States. As defence is perhaps the most difficult policy area to communitarise, the CESDP would almost certainly be the final piece in the jigsaw of political union. A more cohesive and powerful EU could put pressure on EU-US relations. Even if this were the case, however, the transatlantic strategic partnership is not a zero-sum game; so the development of a more cohesive and effective CESDP should not dramatically affect security relations.

For Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping, the aim of a common security policy must be that ‘Europe speaks with one voice in international affairs and is in the position to decide upon and represent its interests’. Moreover, ‘Europe must be politically and militarily authorised to act and take responsibility for European security itself’. Scharping has stressed particularly the need for coordination to avoid costly duplications of resources and proposed the establishment of a Joint Air Transport Command, an area where Europe is especially weak. Scharping in fact proposed the creation of a European Defence Ministers' Council, which had its first informal session in Sintra, Portugal in February 2000, discussing future EU decision-making structures and the strengthening of military capabilities. This informal meeting of Defence Ministers will be backed up by interim military committees as well as by a delegation of national military experts in the EU Council secretariat. These measures were agreed by EU Foreign Ministers in February 2000. Moves have also been made by Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden to streamline European defence industries. These countries’ signed a ‘framework agreement’ for the Organisation for Joint Armament Co-operation (OCCAR), a step which the US sees as unwelcome.72
Scharping has also been trying to streamline existing institutions and to improve overall co-ordination in the field of foreign and security policy. The latter concern accounts for his initiative to stage regular, if informal, meetings of Member States' defence ministers, building on the 1998 Pörtschach summit. Scharping also supported the establishment of a Political Security Committee (PSC) in the same building as the EU Council of Ministers. Scharping has, however, been hampered in pursuing his policies by substantial cuts in the defence budget, cuts which will hinder his attempts to modernise the Bundeswehr. The reform of the Bundeswehr has provoked intense inter-party debate within Germany, with the CDU/CSU favouring an increase in the defence budget in order to meet the new security demands. The Bavarian CSU has stated that 'the austerity plans of the Red/Green coalition for the German Federal Armed Forces put Germany and its defence capabilities into last place behind its European partners' and that the budget should be raised to DM 50 billion. The opposition parties argue that Bundeswehr numbers should not fall below 300,000. Government and opposition accept the need for the Bundeswehr to remain bündnisfähig, but a debate is raging in Germany about how this should be achieved. By reducing still further the ability of the Bundeswehr to conduct unilateral operations, the Red/Green government hopes to increase the dependency of the German military on multilateralism. However, there is uneasiness in both the US and the UK that Germany is really only adapting to current perceived security threats and is not investing in its armed forces as it should to meet the challenges of the future.

What is clear in any case is that the major military member states - France, the UK and Germany - are taking the lead in the preparation of the CESDP. This has led to tension within the EU, especially with the smaller states, which are not always consulted on such matters. The use of directoires may become a more frequent occurrence within the CESDP as the necessity for swift and decisive action grows. Germany feels slightly uncomfortable about its position in the directoire, as this conflicts with its role as a Musterknabe ('model pupil') supporting deeper European integration. It will not therefore want to draw attention to its growing responsibilities within CESDP.

German policy towards the CESDP is affected by competition and conflict between different ministries with their different agendas. Bulmer et al. point to the clash between the foreign and finance ministries, the former with its 'positive sum conceptions' of integration and the latter with its 'cost-cutting' ethos. These antagonistic priorities have provoked
clashes within the government over CESDP and notably huge row over the Bundeswehr budget, in which cuts were imposed by Finance Minister Eichel. This inter-ministerial wrangling over the future financing of the Bundeswehr was seen outside Germany as a blow to the prospect of developing a viable and powerful European defence force. NATO Secretary-General Lord Robertson, while still UK Defence Secretary, was especially critical of the budget cuts, stating that: ‘The days of cutting defence budgets are over… There can be no peace dividend without peace. That is going to dawn on some countries.’ This view was echoed by the US Defence Secretary, William Cohen, who asserted that ‘now more than ever the alliance looks to German leadership to contribute to the capabilities necessary if we are to continue shaping peace and security into the next century.’ However, any suggestion of a German leadership role is viewed with concern by German policy-makers: 'We do not want to dance alone, but rather be the driver of further integration.' At the 73rd Franco-German summit in Toulouse, Schröder and Chirac stressed their 'determination to contribute all their weight so that the EU equips itself with the necessary autonomous means to decide and deal with crises.' The momentum behind Germany's decision to play a larger role in crisis management seems now to be firmly grounded.

The Foreign Ministry under Joschka Fischer actively supports the CESDP, emphasising, for example, as in the Stability Pact, the need for the extension of human rights and democracy to Southern Europe. Despite his unorthodox political background in the Green movement, the pressures of high office have forced Fischer to make concessions and prevented any significant 'greening' of German security policy. Although Fischer has supported the commitment to form a 50-60,000-strong ERRF by 2003, his main emphasis, under pressure from the ‘fundamentalist’ element of the Alliance'90/The Greens, has been on promoting non-military aspects of security. In contrast, Scharping's ministry is ingrained with a pro-NATO stance stemming from the long years of the Bundeswehr’s integration into NATO forces and is therefore more likely to emphasis 'hard security' measures.

How much room for manoeuvre does Germany have in the pursuit of new security policies? The upgrading of the European voice and capabilities in regional security issues presents Germany with a new set of priorities and policy choices. The decisions taken by the EU to develop a crisis reaction force were strongly backed by Germany, even though this will result in the increasing use of the Bundeswehr in military operations. There remains distinct unease among the German public concerning the use of the Bundeswehr, despite the relative
'success' of German involvement in Kosovo. Scharping's commitment at the informal Defence Ministers meeting at Ecouen in October 2000 to provide approximately 18,000 troops for the ERRF, almost a third of the total force numbers, signals a great commitment by Germany. The real test, however, will come when the fledgling force takes part in its first military operations. Will the German public continue to support this project if the Bundeswehr suffers losses on the front line?

CONCLUSION

Some initial conclusions can be drawn concerning Germany's evolving CESDP stance. First, Joschka Fischer advocates the development of a CESDP founded on the ideals of Zivilmacht, stressing non-military aspects of security in Europe. The Stability Pact is an example of Fischer's emphasis on democracy-building, economic development and respect for humanity as a means of securing stability. This is a clear example of Germany placing its imprint on the CESDP process. Second, this emphasis on non-military security and preventative security measures has affected the German government's decision to cut the defence budget. In defence matters, there appears to be an attempt in some quarters to cling to fundamental principles of the German strategic culture to brake attempts to improve the deployment capabilities of the Bundeswehr. This sends mixed signals to Germany's partners and will continue to result in frustration and tensions unless this issue is resolved. Finally, the broad political consensus favouring an enhanced European capability in foreign and security policy will almost certainly be put under pressure if Germany does develop a stronger military capability and the preference that existed hitherto in favour of non-military crisis prevention is thereby undermined.

Notwithstanding the recent growth of tensions in the Atlantic Alliance, German policy-makers still look to the US to provide Germany’s nuclear shield. Germany will therefore continue to pursue a ‘British-style’ approach to European security aiming at enhancing the European voice within NATO rather than at trying to build up a rival venture. The principal CESDP dilemma for Germany is whether it wants to create new machinery for CESDP without first having a clear vision as to how it is going to be used. If Germany cannot affect the process as much as it would like, then it will be forced to make difficult decisions
concerning military operations. Performing the Petersberg Tasks, which have been incorporated into the CESDP, will not be easy for the EU, but will rather require a substantial commitment by the member states, including Germany.

The EU’s Nice Summit in December 2000 advanced the CESDP further by forging agreement over the broad aims of EU security policy. Despite accounts of a dispute between France and the United Kingdom over the relationship between the CESDP and NATO, a 60-page report outlining the plans for the ERRF was unanimously agreed after only eight minutes of discussions. However, the UK's success in not having defence issues come under 'enhanced co-operation' may brake future development of the CESDP. While the relationship between the EU and NATO remains slightly hazy, there has been enough convergence of views on the subject to allow progress on CESDP to be made. The evolving compromise between ‘pro-Atlanticists’ and ‘pro-Europeanists’ has been the key to the development of the CFSP during the 1990s.

Germany remains pre-occupied by the task of balancing its relations with its European partners with its relations with the United States. American pragmatism and the US’s strategic interests will keep the US involved in European security affairs. Germany will continue to push to have its voice heard in security policy negotiations with its major partners to ensure that German interests are considered and that Germany can play an active part in CESDP. For Germany to keep pace with the inevitable consequences of the recasting of the transatlantic security bargains which is under way, German elites must continue to secure domestic approval for a more active role in military operations. To succeed in this, policy-making elites must try to explain, justify and legitimise the role of CESDP in Europe and Germany's security policy. In any case, the current discussions over the future shape of European security institutions cannot be considered as a zero-sum game in which the development of CESDP automatically affects and reduces the quality of transatlantic relations between the USA, Germany, France and the UK. The transatlantic strategic partnership will continue to exist but in a revised form in which Europe will carry more of the burden in crisis management. Thus, the recasting of security bargains post-Kosovo does not really pose a threat to existing security relations. Rather, this process reflects new geopolitical realities and the new quality of defence co-operation within the EU.
NOTES

1 The author would like to thank Professor William E. Paterson, Lord Roper and Dr Kerry Longhurst for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.


4 For example, the Federal Republic’s refusal to have diplomatic relations with the DDR, embodied in the Hallstein Doctrine, left the Federal Republic open to blackmail.


6 Ibid.


10 Ibid.


15 Ibid.


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23 The Third Way/Die Neue Mitte, Tony Blair and Gerhard Schröder 
http://www.labour.org.uk/lp/new/labour/docs/PMSPEECHES/THIRDWAYPURPLEBOX.HTM


32 Ibid., paragraph 6.


38 M. Knodt & N. Staeck, 'Shifting paradigms: Reflecting Germany’s European policy', European Integration online Papers (EIoP) Vol. 3 No. 3 (1999), http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/1999-003a.htm

40 However, Hanns Mauß continues to apply the term Zivilmacht to Germany despite Berlin's involvement in Kosovo. See H. W. Mauß, 'Germany and the Use of Force: Still a Civilian Power?', *Trierer Arbeitspapiere zur Internationale Politik, Nr.2* (November 1999).


42 Ibid.


46 The current EU-USA dispute over US tax breaks for exporting firms is bringing EU Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy into intense confrontation with the US Treasury, which if allowed to develop may escalate into a full-blown trade war. S. Taylor, 'Walking the tightrope in US tax dispute', *European Voice*, 21-27 September 2000.


49 Ibid.


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58 A. Hoffmann & K. Longhurst, 'German Strategic Culture and the Changing Role of the Bundeswehr' Welt Trends Nr.22 (Spring 1999), p.162.

59 K. Longhurst; 'German Strategic Culture: a key to understanding the maintenance of conscription in Germany?', Institute for German Studies Discussion Paper 98/6 (University of Birmingham, 1998).


63 Zum Stabilitätspakt für Südosteuropa, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/6%Farchiv/inf%2Dkos/hintergr/stabdt.htm

64 Conclusions of the European Council Meeting in Cologne, 3-4 June 1999, paragraph 56.


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http://www.presidence-europe.fr/pfue/static/acces3.htm