The Foreign Policy of Germany’s Grand Coalition

Base Line and First Assessment at the Beginning of Merkel's Term
Foreign Policy in Dialogue

ISSN 1862-7692 (Printed edition)
ISSN 1862-7706 (Online edition)

Imprint

Chair for Foreign Policy and International Relations
University of Trier
Universitätsring 15
54296 Trier, Germany
Phone: +49 (0) 651 201-2110
Fax : +49 (0) 651 201 - 3821
E-Mail: dap@deutsche-aussenpolitik.de

Free access to the Online edition at:


About the Project Deutsche-Aussenpolitik.De

This internet project on German foreign policy was established in 1998 at the Chair of International Relations at Trier University and is funded by the ASKO EUROPA-FOUNDATION. Its mission is to respond to the increasing interest in Germany's foreign policy by improving research, analysis and teaching in this field through the use of the internet. The project also aims at strengthening the democratic discourse on German foreign policy among researchers and analysts, decision-makers and the wider public. Our information services integrate media perspectives, official documents and secondary analyses.

The project is presently headed by Marco Overhaus. Current staff members are Kirstin Hein, Benjamin Koltermann, Anna Katharina Meyer, Daniel Tost and Peter Klassmann. Overall responsibility for the project lies with Prof. Hanns W. Maull.

Our Content-Partner for this publication is
Contents

I. Foreign Policy of Germany’s Grand Coalition - Base Line and First Assessment at the Beginning of Merkel's Term

Editorial.................................................................................................................................. 3
By Marco Overhaus

Back to the Future? The Foreign Policy of Germany’s Grand Coalition......................... 7
By Hanns W. Maull

The Grand Coalition and Franco-German Relations....................................................... 15
By Gisela Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet

The European Policy of the Grand Coalition.................................................................... 25
By Ton Nijhuis

German-British Relations – “Alliance and Friendship – Not Rivalry”?......................... 33
By Alister Miskimmon

Merkel, Bush, and German-American Relations ......................................................... 42
By Daniel Hamilton

The Security and Defense Policy of the Grand Coalition............................................. 49
By Franz-Josef Meiers

II. Book Reviews

Reviewed by Jonas Boettler

Reviewed by Marco Overhaus

III. Online and Offline Resources Related to the Contributions

1. Official Resources and Documents .............................................................................. 67
2. Policy-Papers/ Analyses/ Media-Reports ..................................................................... 68
3. Links to Relevant Actors on the Internet ..................................................................... 71
4. Selected New Publications on German Foreign Policy ............................................. 71

IV. About the Authors ........................................................................................................... 76
I. Foreign Policy of Germany’s Grand Coalition -
Base Line and First Assessment at the Beginning of Merkel's Term

Editorial

By Marco Overhaus

Commentators in Germany and abroad agree that Chancellor Angela Merkel had a remarkable
kick-start in foreign policy during her first three months in office. The Handelsblatt recently
days, Merkel has cautiously, yet persistently, marked her own course.” The French daily Le
Monde described le ton Merkel and the New York Times breathed a sigh of relief that
“Merkel Shows Break from Schroeder’s Way”.

High marks for the new German chancellor are not unfounded. Merkel managed to implicitly
criticize Russian President Putin’s domestic grip on democratic institutions and civil society
by deliberately meeting opposition groups in Moscow, without making Putin lose his face.
She pleased the Polish government when she visited Warsaw even before she travelled to
Moscow. She embraced her French counterpart Jacques Chirac without subscribing to a static
bilateral “axis” and she nourished feelings in Berlin and Washington that transatlantic
relations are now “back on track” while publicly calling into question the Guantanamo prison
camp.

The authors of this issue of Foreign Policy in Dialogue will not spoil this generally positive
first assessment of the Grand Coalition’s foreign policy. What they will do, however, is to put
it into a broader and deeper context. For one thing, our authors will take a look at the “legacy”
of the Red-Green government’s foreign policy. Was it really so bad or so damaging as the
enthusiasm towards Merkel by some commentators seems to suggest? Beyond ostensible
tastes and preferences: Which new opportunities in German foreign policy-making does the
new government offer and which old constraints do still exist?

Hanns Maull offers a cross-issue perspective on the first hundred or so days of the Grand
Coalition’s foreign policy. Maull shares the dominant view that Merkel and her foreign policy
team had a rather good start but warns of premature optimism. He notes: “While the new team
has done quite well during its first hundred days, this was the easy part: it mostly concerned
style and tone, rather than substantive problem-solving.” He sees the still limited domestic-
economic resources of foreign policy-making as well as the eroding pillars of Germany’s traditional Civilian Power orientation as the most important challenges for the Grand Coalition.

Germany and France have both lost much of their former reputation as European model cases in terms of socio-economic dynamism. Despite of this, Gisela Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet sees the Franco-German couple still as vital for the integration process. She states that bilateral relations under Chirac and Schroeder experienced “all possible ups and downs” in a quite short time span before they finally witnessed an exceptionally close rapprochement in 2002 and early 2003. According to the author, it was triggered internally by the European Constitutional process since February 2002 as well as the looming enlargement of the EU and externally by the Iraq crisis. While Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet has a positive view on this rapprochement in general, she criticizes Franco-German cooperation during the Iraq war because joint positions “did not spring from a sophisticated compromise between clearly divergent stances” in the wider EU context. On this account, she expects a more constructive policy of the Grand Coalition.

Ton Nijhuis starts with the observation that in the past, changes in government have hardly ever had an impact on the general thrust of German policy within the European Union. So far, he sees no indication that the Merkel government will be any exception to this general rule. While the first policy decisions of the Grand Coalition point towards continuity on most specific issues of European integration - for instance concerning the EU-Constitution, the Stability and Growth Pact for the Euro and even Turkish membership – Nijhuis sees important changes in the ways how European policy under Chancellor Merkel is conducted. He expects a return to the more traditional virtues of German foreign policy, most notably more sensitivity towards the interests of the smaller and the new members of the European club.

For quite some time, the United Kingdom often seems to have been left out of the equation of German EU policy. After the international upheavals of September 11, 2001, the transatlantic and intra-European rift before and during the Iraq war and the current institutional paralysis of the EU it has become clear to German policy-makers that the EU needs the “strategic triangle” Paris-London-Berlin as much as the Franco-German integration motor. Against this background, Alister Miskimmon sees some potential for improved relations between London and Berlin. Merkel’s emphasis on “subsidiarity” and EU-reform fit well with British
conceptions of Europe, says Miskimmon. According to the author, there are high expectations in London that Germany might again become a key partner in the European Union and in international affairs more generally. This is particularly true for security and defense policy and the transatlantic relationship.

Such high expectations of improved relations with Germany are also widely shared in the United States as Daniel Hamilton stresses: “Merkel’s ascendancy offers Germany an opportunity to reestablish its position as the continental anchor of the Atlantic world”, he states. In particular, the author singles out one geographic and one functional issue area which will define the transatlantic relationship in the next years. In geographic terms, the so-called Broader Middle East will loom larger than any other topic currently on the agenda in Washington and Berlin. Functionally, one of the greatest challenges to German-American and European-American relations will be to sort out a new consensus between the legitimacy and the effectiveness in the international order, especially when it comes to the use of military force. Hamilton has a critical remark for both sides of the Atlantic. In his view, the first Bush Administration sacrificed the global legitimacy of American leadership in its fight against terrorism while Germany has to acknowledge that international rules and norms need to be enforced effectively, sometimes using military force.

Finally, Franz-Josef Meiers deals with the one policy area where changes since German reunification and again since the end of the 1990s where probably most visible: security and defense. Here, German policy under Schroeder and Fischer has left a remarkable legacy as regards the geographic extension of German security, the participation of German armed forces in various out-of-area-missions, and (although belatedly) reform efforts to transform the Bundeswehr from a training to a deployment army. Meiers stresses that the new government’s room of maneuver will be limited by a tight federal budget and the still important impact of Germany’s “culture of restraint”.

In sum, the domestic and international expectations of the Grand Coalition’s foreign policy are high across the issue areas discussed in the individual contributions. In the media and in the public discourse more generally, a sense of a “new beginning” can clearly be felt. It is quite remarkable in this context how easily the accomplishments of the Schroeder/Fischer government have been replaced in the public perception by its most obvious failures - from the leadership crisis in the European integration process to the transatlantic rift over the Iraq war. For there clearly were accomplishments: Under Schroeder, Germany assumed a very
constructive role in reconstruction processes first in the Balkans and then in Afghanistan. Despite the incompleteness of military reform, Berlin under Schroeder and Fischer managed the tightrope walk between domestic constraints and international demands rather well. With German support, the European Union embarked on its largest enlargement round since the European communities were founded in the 1950s and on the ambitious project to create a Constitution for Europe (even if it failed for the time being).

Against this background, foreign policy seems to be a rather thankless business. At the same time, the transition from Schroeder to Merkel indicates that style matters quite a lot in foreign policy-making. It is especially Schroeder’s personalized and at times assertive fashion that has been criticized while Merkel has been hailed for her businesslike and balanced approach. To a major extent, our authors share the prevailing positive assessment of the Grand Coalition’s foreign policy during its first three months in office. Yet, the closer look in the individual contributions also reveals the structural, deeper factors which will shape foreign policy making, most notably the difficult socio-economic situation domestically. Now that the first crucial elections since the beginning of Merkel’s term in three German Länder have passed, the Grand Coalition now promises to tackle the most pressing domestic reform agendas. In foreign and European policy, some of the high expectations - for instance as regards Germany’s leadership role in the European Union - may be disappointed in the end. With a sizeable budget deficit, Germany’s ability to play once more the paymaster role to bring European integration forward will be very limited or will even prove to be unsustainable in the long run.

Finally, the new chancellor and her new foreign minister also introduced a new division of labor which seems to be quite different from the Schroeder/ Fischer tandem: While Merkel tours the red carpets internationally, Steinmeier plays the Grand Coalition’s “dreamcatcher”, dealing with the rather unpleasant and technical problems of German foreign policy – such as the BND’s role during the Iraq war, CIA flights in Germany and the nuclear dispute with Iran. It is not beyond imagination that this division might lead to future strains between the governing parties.
Impressive – So Far

By thoughtfully arranging its cards for the new game, and by playing them very well, the Grand Coalition foreign policy team led by Angela Merkel and her Social Democrat Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has been able to make a remarkable difference in its first hundred days in office. While the new team accomplished one little success after the other and – just as in domestic affairs - managed to spread a sense of feel-good all around, memories of the Schroeder/ Fischer foreign policy record have been fading at lightning speed. So, in fact, have its protagonists who – like Lewis Carrol’s famous Cheshire cat – faded away, leaving behind only their smiles. By resolutely changing style and delivery, Germany’s new foreign policy quickly achieved a collective sigh of relief and hope in some of the smaller EU member states, notably among the new members in Central Eastern Europe, significant atmospheric improvements in its important bilateral relationship with the United States, and an astute rebalancing of the complex triangular relationship with Paris and Washington. Merkel’s very successful first EU summit meeting performance, which was widely credited and compared to that of Helmut Kohl in his heyday as chancellor, even seemed to demonstrate a rebound of Germany’s dented influence in European affairs.

Despite this remarkable start, as the German saying goes, the trees of Berlin’s foreign policy will certainly not grow into the skies. For one thing, even during its honeymoon period, the new foreign policy has been buffeted by a series of minor but politically distracting crises, such as the kidnapping of several German nationals in Iraq, the reverberations of the Mohammed cartoons published by a Danish newspaper and subsequently reprinted in Die Welt, and by revelations about the role of German agents of the Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND) in the American-led war in Iraq in March 2003. Secondly, Chancellor Merkel did less well in her second European summit meeting in Brussels in March 2006, which produced rather underwhelming results on the important Lisbon agenda issue of liberalizing services in Europe and failed to secure any real progress towards a common European energy policy which even the Economist, normally taking a very skeptical view on further European policy centralization in Brussels, considered a good idea. On that occasion, Berlin very much seemed to be part of a general reluctance in European capitals to push European integration forward
by pooling selected aspects of national sovereignty and moving towards an effective common energy security policy.

**Getting Serious: The Tasks at Hand**

Those difficulties may well be harbingers of things to come. While the new team has done quite well during its first hundred days, this was the easy part: it mostly concerned style and tone, rather than substantive problem-solving. Now, with regional elections in three German *Laender* out of the way, the Grand Coalition is expected to get down to serious business in solving tough, almost intractable domestic issues – from health insurance and pensions to socio-economic reforms, unemployment and public sector deficits. Of course, this domestic agenda is important not only for its own sake, but also for strengthening the foundations of German foreign policy whose agenda also cries for attention. Some foreign policy problems ahead are wearyly familiar but acquire new urgency, such as the final status of Kosovo or the suspected Iranian nuclear weapons program. Other important problems – such as the next steps towards deepening European integration by revisiting the aborted Constitutional Treaty, the next rounds of EU enlargement (Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia, Turkey) have become more complicated as a result of the dejected mood all over Europe. The impact of this mood as well as of the domestic limitations of foreign policy resources could already be felt in the case of Congo, where a request by the UN Assistant Secretary General Jean-Marie Guehénno to the EU (and thus also to Germany) to protect the elections in this vast Central African country has produced considerable embarrassment in Berlin which saw the *Bundeswehr* ill-prepared and ill-equipped to take on (and to lead) such a mission. Yet, Berlin also felt obliged to demonstrate its support both for the effort to stabilize the political situation in Congo out of humanitarian considerations, and for the nascent project of a credible European Security and Defense Policy.

Finally, there are other issues on the list which are broadly perceived as new, such as energy (i.e., oil and gas import) security, heightened tensions between the Islamic world and Europe, as well as between Islamic groups and the majority within European societies, and the rise of economic nationalism.
Berlin’s New Old Foreign Policy Strategy

It may still be too early to assess the strategy with which the Grand Coalition government intends to tackle this demanding agenda. Yet for the time being, continuity once more seems to be the leitmotif. Both the foreign and security policy section of the November 11, 2005 coalition agreement and the first official statement of Angela Merkel as chancellor in the Bundestag recognize Germany’s historical responsibilities, from which they deduce the imperative to promote European integration, not least to make the EU a more effective international actor. Both documents emphasize the centrality and complementarity of NATO and the EU’s Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy (CFSP/ESDP) and define the foundations of German foreign policy in terms of both values (peace, freedom, democracy, rule of law, including international law, justice and human rights) and interests (with specific reference to Germany’s limited financial resources). Overall, this foreign policy orientation remains true to Germany’s “Civilian Power” approach to international relations; it continues to rely on comprehensive multilateralism, extensive cooperation and integration to promote shared values and common interests, the rule of international law and international institutions, and the ability to transform (i.e., “civilize”) international relations in that sense.

This also holds true for Germany’s skepticism towards the utility and use of military force: while German security policy has changed profoundly in its willingness to deploy the Bundeswehr abroad, this has not been motivated by narrowly defined national interests or by the pursuit of power and influence. Rather, military force has generally been deployed out of a sense of solidarity (Afghanistan, Horn of Africa) and of Germany’s new international responsibilities (Somalia, Bosnia), of the desire to accommodate expectations of its partners (Congo) and prevent massive human rights violations (Kosovo). There is still little sense in Berlin that German military power could be a strategic asset. So far, there are no signs that the Merkel government will depart from this “culture of restraint”.

Germany’s Civilian Power: A Heavily Contingent Capacity to Exercise Influence

Thus, Germany’s grand strategy as a Civilian Power has survived once again a change in government by and large intact. In fact, the coalition agreement this time offers even fewer hints than 1998 about possible new accents with which the government wishes to embellish

---

1 See the analysis of Franz-Josef Meiers in this issue, as well as his article “Germany’s Defence Choices”. In: Survival, 47(1), p.153-165.
policy continuity. The only notable major change is the distinctly more cautious tone in which Germany’s traditional support for the “deepening” and “widening” of European integration is expressed. In this sense, Germany has fallen in line with the presently prevailing euro-skeptic mood.

In a recent interview with the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, Foreign Minister Steinmeier used the term “*selbstbewusste Bescheidenheit*” (self-confident modesty) to characterize this government’s foreign policy. This term obviously is not too far away from the “*Kultur der Zurueckhaltung*” (culture of restraint) frequently invoked by the last foreign minister of the Kohl government, Klaus Kinkel. This is another indication of the high degree of continuity in German foreign policy from Kohl to Merkel.

Yet foreign policy, like any policy, in the long run needs to be more than popular, it needs to be effective (in fact, given the general scarcity of public sector resources, it also needs to be efficient). To be effective, however, Germany’s particular role concept (or, if you prefer, its grand strategy) depends on three critically important requirements. Firstly, it needs strong domestic political support in order to elevate foreign policy beyond bipartisan disagreements and prevent it from being kicked around like a football in the domestic political arena. Such support will not be easy to get. Electorates naturally do not care much about international issues and political awareness about the realities of international interdependence and its potential implications for individual and national well-being generally seems underdeveloped. To mobilize domestic support for an active foreign policy, including support for allocating sufficient resources to the foreign policy sector broadly defined (i.e., money for defense, foreign policy and development assistance), will therefore require considerable political leadership. Secondly, the effectiveness of Germany’s Civilian Power orientation depends on robust, vibrant and effective international institutions. In the time before 1989, Germany’s foreign policy was highly effective because it could use robust international institutions – notably NATO and the European Communities, which both prospered despite many setbacks and crises - as “power multipliers”. After unification, both institutions have continued to anchor Germany firmly in the new European order, and thus have provided German foreign policy with additional leverage. Finally, Germany needs supportive allies and partners willing to accept and enhance Germany’s particular foreign policy approach by designing and implementing extensive and effective forms of bilateral and multilateral cooperation.

---

around a division-of-labor approach. To some extent, this is a prerequisite for the second requirement identified above. Vibrant institutions rely on effective bilateral and multilateral cooperation between key member states. But the importance of supportive, congenial partners goes far beyond this. (West) Germany was fortunate to have such partners, notably the United States and France. Neither of which could be characterized as a Civilian Power, but both, for their own, separate reasons, were willing and indeed keen to accommodate and support Germany’s particular foreign policy orientation.

Sailing Into Rough Waters: Will Continuity be Enough?

But do these preconditions still apply? And will the new government take the precepts of Civilian Power more seriously than the previous coalition led by Gerhard Schroeder and Joschka Fischer? There can be little doubt that the kind of grand bargain for the transatlantic relationship which Dan Hamilton spells out in his contribution to this volume would be wise and politically highly desirable. Unfortunately, it also seems far beyond the capacity of what politics on both sides of the Atlantic presently are willing and capable to deliver. In fact, this point can be broadened further: under the conditions of globalization, politics in widely different places and at different levels (local, national, regional, inter-regional, global) appears to be affected by a widening gap between demand for political solutions and arrangements, on the one hand, and the policy supply delivered by political processes, on the other. This has also weakened the performance of national foreign policy and international institutions in key partner countries (e.g., France, the USA) and institutions (the European Union, NATO, but also the UN and others).

Against this background, consider only three of the major challenges which the Berlin government presently faces and its chances to achieve their satisfactory settlement. Firstly, there is the military mission in Congo. There is broad political agreement, in Germany and beyond, that securing peaceful elections and a transfer of power to an elected government in Congo would be in the German and European interest. Yet whether this can be achieved through a United Nations peacekeeping mission reinforced by a small European force, largely deployed offshore and led by a country and a military with almost no experience in Africa remains to be seen. What happens if the show of force will not suffice to deter some warlords from trying to “correct” the election results through force? Beyond that, even a successful

---

election and transfer of power will only be a first step on a very long road towards stabilizing the desperate situation in Congo which over the last years has claimed up to four million lives. This would require a major national and international effort at state-building under difficult circumstances. It is not clear who could and who would do that. Secondly, there is Iran. North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has already seriously undermined the nuclear non-proliferation regime; Iran’s nuclear program might well finish it off. Yet assuming that the Iranian government really does want to develop a military nuclear option, and that there are no viable military options without unacceptably huge concomitant risks to prevent this, what options remain for those who want to preserve the non-proliferation regime? The only possibility seems to be to dissuade the Iranian leadership from pursuing that option. But the mix of politically plausible incentives and sanctions at the disposal of Germany and its partners, even of the U.S., probably does not look particularly impressive from the vantage point of Tehran. What would be needed to change Iranian calculations effectively would be much more constraining and robust non-proliferation norms and arrangements – effectively, a powerful international “taboo” upheld strongly by a large majority of states. Such a taboo existed during the Cold War, and even persisted for some time beyond its ending. Now, however, this important segment of international order seems to be on the verge of irrelevance, not least for lack of support by its most important member country, the United States.

A third crucial issue currently on the European and international agenda is Energy security and environmental protection. The new German government recently has given those twinned issues particular prominence. In its public statements, the approach suggested by Foreign Minister Steinmeier to cope with the challenge of energy and environmental security has been thoroughly consistent with the Civilian Power approach. He suggested broadly based, institutionalized producer-consumer cooperation. Yet Berlin itself seems unwilling to cede some of its energy policy prerogatives to Brussels, so as to develop an effective common energy policy approach at the European level. It is doubtful what kind of producer-consumer cooperation could be achieved against such widely held reservations against European or international institutions. Nor is it easy to envisage the political will of governments to impose the kind of constraints on energy consumption or create the incentives for energy conservation which would be needed in many countries (starting with America) to make effective international arrangements to preserve energy security and the global environment possible.

---

In short, demands on German foreign policy (and its Civilian Power orientation) are considerable. At the same time, it does currently not enjoy sufficient domestic support, nor can it rely on strong and supportive partners and vibrant international institutions. One important reason for this is the continuing strength of nationalism, both in Europe and beyond. Yet nationalism as a powerful political ideology comes in many different varieties. What we find in Europe is a heavily defensive (economic) nationalism, born of timidity and angst. Yet even this defensive nationalism, which fears the risks of globalization and wants to defend the status quo ante, can turn nasty and violent, if many people in those societies feel cornered. This defensive nationalism essentially seems to be a post-modern phenomenon, confined to Europe and, perhaps, Japan. Elsewhere, a different, more old-fashioned form of offensive nationalism prevails which asserts national sovereignty and autonomy against perceived challenges from abroad. Its most prominent proponents are America and China. Their nationalisms belong to the modern, Westphalian world which lasted from 1648 through the mid-1970s. This world is fading, superseded by the new, interconnected world of accelerating globalization. Yet modern, offensive nationalism is far from finished; indeed, the rise of Asia may provide it with an opportunity for a powerful come-back.

**Conclusion**

Civilian Power Germany thus seems to be sailing into rough waters. What is to be done? Two conclusions may be drawn from this analysis. First, German foreign policy has to give priority to strengthening the foundations of its Civilian Power. This implies, domestically, concentration on socio-economic reforms and the mobilization of the society for a better-endowed foreign policy. Internationally, Germany needs to repair its influence by rebuilding trust and by pushing, carefully and selectively yet patiently and strongly, for more coherent and cohesive European foreign and security policies – not least in the field of energy security and the environment. It also should work towards strengthening its own, and Europe’s collective influence in Washington through all available channels.

The second conclusion is rather somber. While working hard for a more effective Civilian Power strategy, German foreign policy also has to provide for the risks of a world in which Berlin can no longer count on effective support from its key partners and the multiplier effects of functioning international institutions. If international relations should indeed become renationalized in that sense, as present trends seem to suggest, then Germany would have to think of how to cope with such a world. This would be far from desirable for Germany itself,
which for several reasons remains particularly vulnerable to such a development, and it would probably also set some alarm bells off elsewhere. Yet it needs to be discussed seriously. This might also help concentrate foreign policy minds elsewhere, gathering support for the kind of German foreign policy with which both we Germans ourselves and our partners have become perhaps too comfortable.
The Grand Coalition and Franco-German Relations

By Gisela Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet

Introduction

Ever since the beginning of the European integration process in 1950, Franco-German relations have been at the heart of this visionary project because integration fostered the two hereditary foes’ reconciliation. But even after reconciliation had been accomplished, the Franco-German relationship has continued to play a central role in European integration. It is not exaggerated to say that its raison d’être has been to propel the uniting of Europe. With the successive deepening and widening of the EC/EU, common action of both countries has become even more indispensable. Thus, relations have often been portrayed as the “motor of integration”.

But this has never meant that close, confidential and fruitful Franco-German relations are self-evident. In fact, periods of mutual suspicion and distance have regularly alternated with periods of highly productive friendship – as symbolized by the couples Erhard/ de Gaulle and Brandt/ Pompidou on the one hand and Schmidt/ Giscard d’Estaing as well as Kohl/ Mitterrand on the other. Almost as a rule, really good relations between chancellor and president hardly ever existed from the beginning of their respective mandates, but were reached through intense debate and co-operation thereafter. Diverging party affiliations, however, were never of great importance. Rather, external and/or internal events were necessary to trigger opportunities for fruitful relations which in turn generate all-European dynamics – such as happened with the EC’s first enlargement round and the international finance crisis in the mid-70ties or the end of the Cold War resulting in Germany’s unification during the Kohl-Mitterrand era.

Under Schroeder and Chirac, the French-German tandem experienced all possible ups and downs of the bilateral relationship in a relatively short period of time, changing under external pressure from bad and unproductive to extremely close and catalytic. Deeper analysis shows a second characteristic of recent Franco-German relations: with ten new member states joining the EU, the traditional “motor of integration” seems to have lost traction. Sometimes it has apparently fallen short of the necessary forces to pull, push and move the whole Union towards further integration and to open new dimensions of European unification.
In order to verify the above assertions, it is necessary to distinguish four temporal periods within the recent Franco-German relationship, each of them entailing different results for the functioning of the bilateral “integration motor”.

**Assessing the Heritage of Franco-German Relations under the Red-Green Government**

**From 1998 to 2002: In Search of New Impulses**

Despite the promise of continuity in foreign and European policy in the Red-Green coalition agreement of 1998, the first years of the bilateral relationship under Schroeder and Chirac were marked by many conflicts and passed without any remarkable results for the integration process. During the Agenda 2000 negotiations under German presidency in Berlin in March 1999, the chancellor – inexperienced in European Council meetings at that time - had to cope with Chirac’s firm opposition towards any substantial cuts in agricultural expenditure; the French president also rejected the German proposal of a 25 per cent national co-financing, denouncing it as “euro-skeptical, even nationalistic”. From this position, Chirac blocked Schroeder’s demands for a reduction of Germany’s financial contributions to the EU. During the electoral campaign, Schroeder had shocked the European public with blunt statements that European compromises could not longer be reached only because Germany paid for them; the country, burdened with huge unification costs, could no longer afford such a paymaster role, Schroeder said. But recalling the duties of EU-presidency, the chancellor finally gave in and agreed to very modest cuts in the German contributions. By doing so, Schroeder gained respect and the reputation of being a true European in Brussels and among Germany’s partners. But this postponement of a fundamental reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) before the EU’s Eastern enlargement still promises to become a heavy burden for the future of the integration process and specifically for Franco-German relations.

The year 2000 was even marked by explicit French-German rivalry; it ended with the disastrous Nice Summit. With his famous Humboldt-speech on the finality of European integration, on May 12, 2000, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer initiated a vivid debate that was picked up by most of the European capitals. In France, uneasy with the new status and importance of unified Germany since 1990, Fischer’s rush forward was interpreted as a claim for German leadership in the field of European constitutional politics. Therefore, on June 27, 2000, in the Berliner Reichstag, Chirac gave a carefully crafted reply to Fischer. His keynote
speech “Our Europe” did not outline much of a progressive perspective regarding the EU’s institutional future. The glittering figure of a “pioneer group” is not comparable to Fischer’s “avant-garde”: whereas the latter should form – in Fischer’s view - a “centre of gravitation” willing to form “the nucleus of a Constitution”, Chirac’s “pioneer group” was intended to guide limited integration advancements with changing ad hoc coalitions, very similar to the instrument of closer co-operation introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997.

When the Intergovernmental Conference in 2000 was approaching that had to adapt the treaty for Eastern enlargement, Franco-German relations fell into their deepest crisis for decades. The main point of dispute was the question how to change the Council’s decision-making system with regard to qualified majority voting (QMV). Faced with the admission of ten rather small or middle-sized countries, France insisted on a reform of this system. In fact, the rules for QMV, established through successive treaty amendments, favored the smaller member states. With Eastern enlargement, a problematic inequality between small and big member states would have arisen so that the French claim was perfectly legitimate. At the same time, however, Chirac insisted on the maintenance of French-German parity regarding Council votes. While this parity – valuable also for the other “big” members states, i.e. Italy and the United Kingdom, numbering roughly 60 million citizens – was perfectly appropriate until 1990, it became less legitimate after unification, given Germany’s new demographic weight of about 82 million people.

During the first negotiations within the bilateral framework of the Elysée-Treaty, the deputy Foreign Ministers Pierre Moscovici and Christoph Zoepel were able to compromise on all of the so-called “leftovers” of Amsterdam, including a reform of QMV. As an alternative, double majority was discussed. Under this system a majority vote would require the consent of half of the member states representing half of the EU’s population. But when France took over the European presidency in the second half of 2000, Chirac categorically insisted that he would never accept the décrochage of German and French Council votes. This harsh position was mainly due to growing discord and misfortune within his own party, the RPR, in the contest of the French parliamentary elections of 1997 and again the elections to the European Parliament. Thus, Chirac felt compelled to adopt firm and rather nationalistic positions in order to appeal to the right wing electorate in France.

Under these circumstances, the chill in Franco-German relations deepened, and the motor of integration could not deliver proper solutions for the Amsterdam leftovers. Thus, the Nice
Summit of December 2000 failed to prepare the EU for the challenges of enlargement. Once more, it became obvious that without strong French-German cooperation, the integration process could not advance. In policy circles and in the media, both in Germany and in France, harsh comments deplored the deep crisis of the bilateral relationship and called for new efforts to revive it. The French press savaged Chirac’s European policy, calling the Nice Summit a “diplomatic Suez” and suggested that France under Chirac’s leadership had lost all its European ambition. “La France est-elle encore européenne?”, Le Monde asked in February 2001.

Although efforts were undertaken after the Nice debacle to improve the bilateral relationship - such as the initiation of the so-called Blaesheim process which meant that the leaders would meet even more frequently than foreseen by the Elysée-Treaty - they continued to be in a poor state. Against this background, first talks for the preparation of the impending 40th anniversary of the French-German Friendship Agreement took place with the idea of renewing and adapting the foundations of the Elysée-Treaty in line with Germany’s new status. Behind the scenes, however, both sides seemed to wait for a political change after the 2002 elections. Chirac openly showed his sympathy for the CDU/CSU-candidate Edmund Stoiber while the Red-Green government was trying to build closer ties with the socialist candidate for the French presidential elections, Lionel Jospin.

Enlargement and the Constitutional Process as Catalyst for the “Motor of Integration”

In late 2002 and early 2003, the Franco-German relationship reached an intensity and quality hardly ever seen before. Internally, it was the European constitutional process, launched in February 2002, as well as the preparations for enlargement which produced the change. Thus, the first signs for improving Franco-German relations came at the Brussels summit of October 2002, where Chirac and Schroeder succeeded in reaching a compromise for the CAP. Although a fundamental reform of the CAP was again postponed, a ceiling for agricultural expenditures and a phasing-in system for the new member states’ farmers were agreed. Both measures were designed to limit the costs of enlargement. Because the French and the Germans have long been at odds with one another over the CAP, this compromise was celebrated as a milestone, showing that both countries were determined to make enlargement possible.
After this success, the “motor of integration” gathered momentum and in a short time delivered an astonishing amount of proposals for the constitutional process. Amongst this “flood of initiatives”\textsuperscript{5}, the ambitious plans for the European foreign, defense and security policy are especially noteworthy.\textsuperscript{6} It was the “common German-French contribution to the institutional architecture of the Union”, published on January 15, 2003, just before the Elysée-celebrations, that received most public attention. This initiative outlined the structures and decision-making system for both the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) within the framework of a European Constitutional Treaty, introducing the positions of a President of the European Council and of a European foreign minister, backed by his or her own foreign service.

All of these innovative proposals fulfilled the criteria the “motor of integration” usually has to meet to promote further European unification. They were perfect compromises between the classical German approach to integration, eager to anchor a maximum of supranational solutions into the treaty, and the French preference for intergovernmentalism, protecting the member states’ sovereignty as much as possible within the overall goal of deepening integration. This type of compromise usually enables other member states to join in because their own stances fall in between those two poles. And indeed, the “Convention on the future of Europe” took up all of the French-German initiatives, integrating the proposals largely unchanged into its draft of the Constitutional Treaty, submitted to the European Council in June 2003.\textsuperscript{7} When in December 2003 the European Council failed to adopt this document, it was not because of the provisions of Franco-German origin, but because of opposition to the double majority system elaborated by the Convention itself.

\textit{The Iraq-Crisis – Enforcing or Hindering Europe’s Unity?}

While the constitutional process and enlargement were important internal factors for the revival of the Franco-German relationship, the Iraq crisis in 2002 and 2003 was a crucial external event in this context. In fact, the extraordinarily close cooperation of Schroeder and


\textsuperscript{6} In 1999, in a keynote speech to the French National Assembly, Schroeder for the first time had adopted the ambitious French concept of a “Europe puissance”; he thus became a weighty supporter of an internationally strong Europe.

\textsuperscript{7} Whereas the French-German contribution of January 2003 had proposed to introduce QMV also into CFSP, the Convention opted for unanimity. Chirac himself fell back when it became clear that QMV would not have helped to avoid the European divisions over Iraq.
Chirac during this crisis was the most dramatic recent example of a functioning relationship between Paris and Bonn/ Berlin. The crucial question is whether this unusually close alignment of positions against the U.S. strengthened the “motor of integration” and promoted European cohesion, or whether, on the contrary, it meant a setback for European unity. This question is hard to answer. On the one hand, the common opposition to the U.S.-led war against Iraq undoubtedly promoted bilateral co-ordination and co-operation in European affairs. This led to very constructive proposals for the Convention. On the other hand, the common Franco-German opposition to the Iraq war contributed to the divisions of the nascent new, enlarged Europe. In fact, many new member states favored good transatlantic relations over European unity. Because Franco-German opposition to the U.S. threatened these good relations, they rejected what they perceived as a French-German “directorate” in European and world politics. Therefore, most of them signed the famous letter of the eight, on January 30 2003, thus rendering the European divisions obvious. This collapse of the CFSP incited U.S.-Secretary of State Donald Rumsfeld to distinguish between the French-German-led “old Europe” as the “axis of the weasels” and the “new Europe” faithfully backing the U.S. And indeed, all states who had signed the letter of the eight joined the “coalition of the willing” once the U.S. had decided to attack Iraq.

Regarding the Iraq controversy, it needs to be stressed that the common Franco-German anti-war positions did not meet the criteria for a properly functioning “motor of integration”, because these positions did not spring from a sophisticated compromise between clearly divergent stances. The French-German “No” to the war did not offer opportunities for other member states to join in and failed to reflect the views of pro-American, strongly transatlantic-minded countries.8

The Franco-German opposition to the Iraq war led, however, at least to important advancements. With their call for stronger and more efficient European capacities in CFSP and ESDP, Schroeder and Chirac outlined a new project for European integration, that is, the construction of a “Europe Puissance”, a strong and independently acting Europe, capable of defending its interest and safeguarding of international peace. The Franco-German proposal of November 11, 2002 elaborated numerous provisions for closer co-operation in the field of ESDP among willing and capable member states and was further developed by a gathering of Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg, the so-called Praliné summit of April 2003; this

---

initiative was partly picked up by the Convention and introduced as Art. I-41.6 into the Constitutional Treaty. By identifying the need for a European headquarter for those European military and civilian missions which make no use of NATO assets, i.e. stay outside the “Berlin-Plus-Agreement”\(^9\), the Praliné summit pushed reluctant states such as the UK into negotiations. The compromise solution reached on this issue by the European Council in December 2003, and the subsequent decision of December 2004 to establish so-called European Battle Groups represented important and critically needed steps towards a “Europe Puissance”.

Franco-German Relations and Negative Integration - A New Configuration?

After the tense months of division, the failure of the Constitutional Treaty at the European summit of December 2003 and the final compromise reached in June 2004, the EU stumbled into the next unpredicted crisis, a crisis of confidence due to an enlargement that many of the citizens in the old member states did not accept. This crisis cumulated in the French and Dutch “No” votes in the referenda about the Constitutional Treaty in May and June 2005.

To which extend were Franco-German relations responsible for this fiasco? Firstly, the crisis made evident that Schroeder’s influence on Chirac was very limited. Despite their close and often symbolically staged friendship, the chancellor could not stop the president from exploiting the referendum for domestic political purposes (Chirac, the next elections firmly in mind, wanted to divide the socialist opposition on Europe). Secondly, the French-German tandem recently has developed a certain predilection for what could be called “negative integration”\(^10\), in this context meaning that the two countries join forces not to promote, but rather to stop or circumvent existing European regulations. Examples include the continued violation by France and Germany of the Stability and Growth Pact for the European currency and their joint resistance to EU directives enforcing free competition in the energy, recycling or banking industries. Public rejection, in line with official criticism, of the so-called Bolkestein Directive on services by voters was a major reason for the French “No” to the Constitutional Treaty.


Though limited to a narrow range of subjects, this predilection for negative integration has nevertheless had a deep impact on the lead role of the French-German tandem. In an enlarged EU of 25 to 27 member states, this suggests to the smaller and the new member states that the “big boys” of the Union and especially France and Germany enjoy privileged freedom of action. This provokes resistance to their leadership as could be seen when the couple could not find acceptance for their preferred choice, the Belgian Verhofstadt, as new president of the European Commission, leading to Barroso as a compromise candidate. To conclude, the Franco-German tandem under Schroeder and Chirac succeeded in initiating important constitutional advances, thus acting in the positive tradition of the “motor of integration”, but it also experienced its leadership limits when bilateral cooperation became too exclusive, leaving no room for others to join in and support their joint positions.

**Perspectives for Franco-German Relations Under the Grand Coalition**

The above assessment of Franco-German relations under the Schroeder government already provides the guidelines which the Grand Coalition should follow. The new government should avoid a tendency towards “negative integration” and go back to the tradition of courting other member states by taking their positions, interests and choices seriously. This is exactly what Chancellor Angela Merkel has promised to put at the centre of her European policy. At the same time, she emphasizes the central role of Franco-German relations, as she declared in her first address to the Bundestag, on November 30, 2005.

**Challenges in the Short Run**

Considering the deep crisis the EU is currently undergoing and considering the choice of leadership available, it seems almost natural that this role should be falling to Germany at present. Merkel already played this role successfully in December 2005 when she contributed very actively (and generously) to shaping the compromise on European finances for the period 2007 to 2013. Afterwards she very modestly attributed this success to close French-German co-operation, thus also flattering Chirac. But do both countries follow the same ideas and strategies to lead the European Union into a better future?

Unfortunately, as the French-German consultations of January 2006 showed, Berlin and Paris have not yet developed common guidelines for overcoming the present EU crisis. Whereas Chirac, with regard to the future of the Constitutional Treaty, proposes a strategy of “cherry
picking”, hoping to save some of its provisions by adding them to the existing treaty, Merkel still defends the document as a whole. A lack of communication was also observable with regard to Chirac’s new doctrine on the use of French nuclear weapons made in January 2006. In order to avoid trouble within her Grand Coalition, the chancellor was forced to calm the mood by assuring the public that she could not see principal changes in France’s nuclear strategy – which is wrong. French experts argue that Chirac extended the possible use of the nuclear force substantially by expanding the definition of France’s “vital interests”; like the U.S., he even envisages nuclear strikes to prevent terrorist attacks.

The question is whether it is worthwhile for Angela Merkel to invest a lot of political capital in relations with Paris as long as the French elections of 2007 are still pending. Indeed, not only Germany, but the whole of Europe is waiting for the next French president and his or her prime minister. Thus, there is not much to be expected from the “motor of integration” until next summer.

Meanwhile, Merkel and her staff should use their temporary European leadership position to develop feasible strategies for how to amend the Constitutional Treaty before calling the French and Dutch electorates to the polls again. Most importantly, Germany must find a way to rescue the principle of double majority voting because it is the best safeguard against negative coalitions of euro-skeptical countries– regardless whether they are new or old, small or big. Furthermore, Merkel must help the Austrian and Finnish presidencies to launch a serious debate on how to define the future borders of the European Union. This could well end with quarrels because of deep disagreements among the governing coalition parties in Berlin. Nevertheless, the government must find a common stance on how to meet the consequences of the 2004 enlargement, especially in terms of protection or deregulation of social standards, for example with respect to the Bolkestein Directive. In the light of waning public support for the EU and especially for further enlargement rounds, both parties must also agree on how to handle Turkey’s EU-membership aspirations. And finally, the government must decide whether Germany still wants to support the construction of a “Europe Puissance”. In short: There is a lot of work awaiting the Grand Coalition. But this work must be done if Germany, itself holding the EU presidency in the first half of 2007, wants to open new horizons to European integration.
Indeed, a relance européenne will probably be possible in 2007. Chancellor Merkel and her future French partner must then think about remedies to recent shortcomings in Franco-German relations. When dealing with an enlarged Union, there are many ways to improve the motor’s efficiency. Above all, the Franco-German tandem must address the major question concerning its future: Is there any chance that the “motor of integration” can deploy sufficient energy and traction to pull and push a Union of 25 to 27 member states to deeper integration? If the motor cannot accomplish this Herculean task by its own any more, how many and which other member states should or could be included in the group to strengthen it sufficiently?

Enlarging the “motor of integration” in order to strengthen it comes close to squaring the circle. Which of the traditionally pro-European countries could be included without stirring the fear of the others? Belgium, for example, would be suspected of strengthening the “French front” within the Union, the same goes for Austria with regard to Germany. Italy is still too weak, and Spain or Portugal are geographically too peripheral. Including euro-skeptical countries - the Scandinavians, the UK or Poland for example – would involve a very high price, the price of abandoning ambitious goals for the integration process. A closer analysis of the options of enlarging the “motor of integration” might thus well lead to the conclusion that, for the foreseeable future, there is no feasible alternative to a French-German-led powerhouse for Europe. Or, to put it in other terms: If under conditions of enlargement, with its strong centrifugal forces, the Franco-German tandem is no longer capable of fulfilling its function, then the alternative might well be no motor at all for the further uniting of Europe – with unpredictable consequences for the EU’s future.
The European Policy of the Grand Coalition

By Ton Nijhuis

Continuity in Substance, Change in Style

Changes of government in Germany have always had little if any effect on the substance of German European policy. This ancient truth will not be belied by the Grand Coalition under Angela Merkel, as there is widespread agreement among the political elites in Germany on the general principles of European policy. The broad consensus ensures that Europe always plays a subordinate role in the election battle, and the unexpected general election in 2005 was no exception. The campaign focused almost exclusively on domestic economic issues. The CDU/CSU was not even prepared to play the card of Turkish accession to the European Union, although a large proportion of the electorate still is against it. Europe was and is a permanent part of the German raison d’état. Despite of – or because of - this it does not win elections.

With the election of Angela Merkel, as her initial comments indicated, most observers did not expect a major break in foreign policy substance, at most a change of style. Foreign policy is always somewhat sluggish when it comes to changes of course, if only to ensure reliability and predictability and to avoid too much confusion among the partners - something that did occur under Schroeder with respect to relations with Paris and Washington before and after the summer of 2002. No major lurches can be made without causing substantial political damage. That the word ‘continuity’ is thus often heard in Berlin is not surprising from this point of view. But in spite of the emphasis on continuity, and Merkel and Steinmeier’s careful use of language, there could be more going on than just changes of style.

In order to assess the first few months of European policy-making of Merkel’s government we need to make a distinction between (a) actual standpoints on the various policy areas and (b) the tools and the intensity with which European policy is conducted. As regards specific areas, continuity is still the watchword, but if we shift our gaze to how European policy is shaped, the differences go beyond mere style.
The Making of German EU Policy: A Return to Old Principles

To some extent it can be said that the start of the Merkel government has been characterized by a return to more traditional characteristics of German foreign and European policy. A number of these principles had started shifting, particularly during Schroeder and Fischer’s second term. German politics has always sought a highly developed sense of balance - between France and the U.S., between French-German cooperation and the relationship with the other EU countries, and between Russia and the countries formerly under Russian influence, especially Poland. Under Schroeder, German politics at times looked more like a pendulum than a balance. During his first term, French-German cooperation for a long time was in a rather poor state to the extent that there was even talk of an ice age (see the contribution of Mueller-Brandeck-Bocquet in this volume). This was followed by a closeness and intimacy that made even die-in-the-wool Francophiles blush with shame. Fischer’s Atlantic policy, on the other hand, turned very critical of the U.S. in 2002. And the buddy-buddy relationship that suddenly blossomed between Schroeder and Putin has aroused suspicion in many parts of Central and Eastern Europe. In a very short time it destroyed a lot of political capital and trust that had been built up before with much difficulty especially in Poland.

It is precisely on these points that Merkel and Steinmeier seem to revert to the traditional role, to continue Helmut Kohl’s policy. During the first days of their first tour of the various European capitals in November last year, they already did some necessary repair work and tried to restore the old balances, without disavowing their predecessors too openly. Crucial to European policy, of course, is the relationship with France. During her foreign capitals tour, Angela Merkel, conscious of the symbolic significance, visited Paris first, and she has moreover stated that cooperation with France remains a cornerstone of German policy. But at the reception in the Champs Elysées, in contrast to Chirac she audibly omitted the term ‘French-German axis’. Unlike Schroeder, she was not inclined to follow Chirac in everything - a message that came across very clearly. She also pointed out that the new EU member states need to feel safe in Europe, thus distancing herself from Chirac’s criticism of these country’s pro-American stance. This is a different, more assertive, tone than that of Schroeder, who stood silently beside Chirac when the latter grumbled at a summit two years ago that the new member states should keep their mouths shut about European security matters. Moreover, on that same day, she was full of praise for the compromise the European
Parliament had drawn up on the contested services directive, which clearly opted for market liberalization.

Merkel made it clear from the outset that she was not inclined to blame the British for the failure of the June 2005 negotiations on the next EU budget (2007-2013). During the European Council in December she was able to play the mediating role in reaching a compromise, for which she has been lauded. On this occasion, all the elements of the classic German role as an “honest broker” came to the fore again: a close cooperation with France whilst maintaining good relations with the UK and being open to the interests and desires of the smaller countries, especially Poland. In order to achieve results, Merkel was ultimately willing to dig a bit deeper into the nation’s purse, giving Poland an extra 100 Mio. Euro of European money that was originally earmarked for the German state of Bavaria.

Now that Chirac is no longer able to count on Schroeder’s feudal loyalty, France has begun to moderate its stance on the European stage. For instance, Chirac seems to have softened his critique on London somewhat since Merkel became chancellor. Moreover, Paris has most recently been making advances to the U.S. as well. Now that France cannot play its role as senior partner of the Franco-German couple in European and international politics as before, it focuses more on its position as a permanent member in the United Nations Security Council. In order to be successful in this role, however, Paris needs to improve the relationship with Washington. Thus, Germany has had an indirect influence on French policy that could be beneficial to Europe as a whole. In fact, the European house is in need of a lot of repairs.

Under Schroeder, Germany has not really been able to present itself as the engine of European integration. On the contrary, the exploitation of foreign policy for domestic policy purposes has caused a lot of tension in Europe. Growing irritation and mistrust have increasingly crippled European politics during the past few years. The close cooperation with France under Schroeder was not able to prevent the EU stagnating and losing its direction. Indeed, if anything, Germany’s fixation with France acted as a brake, as other countries saw the axis as too much of a management board that aimed mainly to defend national interests and privileges, with the two states moreover protecting one another when European rules such as the Stability and Growth Pact were systematically disregarded.
French-German cooperation was effective over a long period because it was complemented on the German side by intensive bilateral consultations with the smaller countries, sometimes referred to as ‘multiple bilateralism’. This was neglected by the Red-Green coalition government. Merkel announced straight away that she intended to resume Kohl’s old policy of maintaining close contacts with the smaller countries, as this is a prerequisite for reinvigorating European integration.

**Continuity in Policy Issues**

When it comes to specific policy areas, as already noted, continuity is the watchword. As regards the European Constitution, Merkel has indicated that her intention is to try to breathe fresh life into the constitutional process during the German Presidency in the first half of 2007. It is unlikely that the text can be rescued in its present form, though it may well be possible to implement institutional changes and more efficient procedures that do not require ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by the member states. At the same time, an alternative to the Constitution will have to be developed, namely a much smaller document that confines itself to the essentials.

Like Schroeder, Merkel stresses the need for the EU to recognize its self-limitations and also have the self-discipline to resist the temptation to interfere with everything. Brussels, in Merkel’s view, will need to place more political limitations on itself. She points to the dangers of creeping loss of sovereignty on the part of the member states, the regulatory zeal and burgeoning bureaucratic interference from Europe, against which the European publics are increasingly revolting. “Euro-maximalism” has had its time in the Federal Republic too.

There is not likely to be a change in policy for the time being as regards the accession of Turkey either. The CDU and CSU have always been against full membership for Turkey, it is true, and both political parties have urged a “privileged partnership”. Yet, the government adopts the *pacta sunt servanda* principle. Negotiations have begun, and the government does not want to undo that fact. Nevertheless, the Turkey issue will keep cropping up regularly in the coming years, and with growing skepticism among the publics in the EU about ever wider expansion, this government will not be keen to take initiatives to speed up the accession process. Nor will there be much change when it comes to violations of the Stability and Growth Pact for the Euro, however much the new government would like this to happen. Although the CDU/ CSU fiercely criticized the Red-Green government for constantly
violating the three per cent limit, it does not look as if the new government will be in a position to change this. The financial problems are still too great and will remain so for some time to come. However, if we take the remarks of Finance Minister Peer Steinbrueck seriously, the Grand Coalition is likely to make stronger efforts than its predecessor to put the federal government’s finances in order. At least, the new government will not be able any longer to hide behind the argument that reform policy is blocked by the Bundesrat where the governing parties now have a comfortable majority. Finally, continuity in German EU policy is also the watchword when it comes to such crucial areas as agricultural policy and the Lisbon strategy.

More Influence Through ‘Self-Assured Modesty’

The differences from the previous government lie mainly in the way European policy is shaped, the way the partners are dealt with and in the tools applied. By adopting a more critical stance towards Vladimir Putin and improving relations with the U.S. (which is not to say that criticism is now ruled out), the Merkel government has taken a major step towards bridging the gap that had opened up between the countries of Europe, not least during the Iraq war. The French-German-Russian troika that opposed American policy had deeply divided them, with consequences that go far beyond the military intervention itself. Combined with the intention, as already mentioned, of devoting more attention to the smaller and/or new EU member countries, especially Poland, this at least creates the minimum conditions for bringing the countries of Europe more into line with one another on strategic issues.

Schroeder wanted to put Germany back on the map as a normalized, emancipated and self-assured medium-sized power. This, as we know, resulted in a lot of outward show and rhetoric but not in greater influence. Merkel and Steinmeier seem to realize that effective German foreign policy is best served by embedding it in European policy. Germany can better look after its interests through Europe than through a policy based on national interests narrowly defined. They also realize that influence in Europe cannot be imposed by means of bullish behavior. Europe is not a hierarchical organization; it requires a form of leadership that is based on dialogue, legitimacy and trust. Recently, Steinmeier spoke of ‘self-assured modesty’ (selbstbewusste Bescheidenheit), thus expressing the fact that Germany must not try to make itself great, as it did under Schroeder, but be great by remaining modest - and by not constantly harping on its national interests but being open to the desires and anxieties of the smaller member states. By making advances to the UK and Poland, Germany can create trust
among EU member states again and play the role of a mediator within the Union. This will ultimately result in the Federal Republic gaining more influence in Europe, ultimately enabling it to look after its national interests in a better way.

The new government attaches more priority to European policy. Although Merkel campaigned mainly on domestic political issues, and knows that she will ultimately be judged on whether she succeeds in cutting unemployment, from her first day as Chancellor she has taken an active interest in both foreign and European policy. This is very different from Schroeder, who had difficulties to evince any interest in Europe during his first term (though this changed during his second term in office).

As chancellor Angela Merkel will be able to take advantage of the strong position the office has gained in relation to the foreign office since 2002 under Schroeder. So far this has not resulted in any conflict with the Foreign Minister Steinmeier who for that matter has had his hands full managing a number of tricky political scandals, such as the role of the German intelligence service in the Iraq war and the issue of CIA flights to German airports, on top of the first kidnappings of German citizens in Iraq.

In any case, Steinmeier seems to have a different conception of his job than his predecessor Fischer, whose foreign policy was to some extent very traditional and who regarded himself as a visionary, a man of great ideas. By contrast, Steinmeier realizes - perhaps because of his coordinating role at the chancellor’s office in the previous government - that foreign and European policy is no longer an exclusive matter for the foreign office as such but requires close cooperation and coordination with the other ministries. In this sense, foreign and European policy under Steinmeier is likely to take on a different quality. He is also likely to take more interest in Europe than his predecessor, Fischer, who lost much of his initial enthusiasm for the European project after his famous Humboldt speech in 2000. If, for example, he had invested some of the energy and time which he put into the Middle East conflict into relations with Germany’s European neighbors instead, the EU might be in a better shape today.

The new Grand Coalition government includes a number of ministers and high-ranking officials familiar with Europe and European policy. In addition to the new head of the Europe department in the chancellor’s office, Uwe Corsepius, Merkel appointed the foreign policy and security specialist Christoph Heusgen from Javier Solana’s staff as her personal foreign
policy adviser, and Steinmeier has brought the former head of the Europe department, Reinhard Silberberg, into the foreign office. A new state secretary at the foreign office, SPD member Guenter Gloser, is another recognized European specialist. Eckart Cuntz remains in charge of the Europe department in the foreign office. With so much European competence in house, the main problem will be sharing out the portfolios to everyone’s satisfaction. Finally, the new government also has an interior minister, Wolfgang Schaeuble, who for decades has been one of Germany’s most important thinkers on European and international affairs. On the basis of the current staffing of key posts, the Merkel government can be expected to give greater priority to pulling the European project than was the case under Schroeder, who had a preference for world politics. Against this background, it can be hoped that foreign and European policy will be less reduced to serve national economic interests. On his foreign trips, Schroeder often saw himself mainly as a commercial traveler, subordinating other aims, such as human rights, to these economic ends wherever necessary.

**Conclusion**

On the one hand, German European policy is characterized by a high degree of continuity when it comes to concrete standpoints in specific issue areas. On the other hand, it is characterized by a clear break with previous policy concerning the way the Federal Republic tries to shape its role - less through an exclusive partnership with France and more by taking on its classic mediating role again. The government seems to be willing to invest more energy in European integration than Schroeder and Fischer, who devoted a lot of their time to the relationships with the U.S. and Russia, the Middle East, and to lobbying for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council.

The fact that Angela Merkel and Frank-Walter Steinmeier do not really have a master plan for re-floating the European ship should not be seen as a sign of incompetence. A flexible and pragmatic course of small steps makes more sense at present than remote vistas and grand ideals. In the future, foreign and European policy will be guided by events and incidents rather than by the unfolding of a predetermined plan. This results from the exigencies of foreign policy, not from Merkel’s preferences. Yet, her pragmatic and sober approach to foreign policy-making may serve Germany well under these circumstances.

The first hundred days encourage optimism that the new government will be able to combine steadfastness with flexibility and will do less damage than Schroeder. The success of
European integration stands or falls with economic growth and the most important contribution Germany can make to the process is by acting as Europe’s economic engine again. In this sense the best European policy for the Grand Coalition is to reform the welfare state as soon as possible and to let the German economy grow again. There is a lot of work to be done here.
German-British Relations – “Alliance and Friendship – Not Rivalry”?

By Alister Miskimmon

During a recent visit to Berlin, Tony Blair stated that he hoped that German-British relations under the Grand Coalition would be characterized by, ‘alliance and friendship – not rivalry.’ This contribution examines the legacy of the Schroeder chancellorship in German-British relations and looks to Chancellor Merkel’s short period in office to see what opportunities and stumbling blocks are likely to be present in the bilateral relationship. As leading players in the European Union (EU), close relations between these two states should ideally play a fundamental role in shaping the EU of the 21st century. However, borrowing from the work of Dolowitz and Marsh, if we accept that policy transfer between the two states provides fruitful terrain on which policy convergence can emerge, there remains significant policy divergence on major issues affecting both states. In order for both states to improve relations between one another and thereby play a larger role in European and global affairs, greater effort to co-ordinate policy between Berlin and London is essential.

The Legacy of the Red-Green Government on German-British Relations

With the end of Conservative Party’s rule in the United Kingdom in 1997 and the conclusion of the Kohl-era in German politics in 1998, both Prime Minister Blair and Chancellor Schroeder turned their attention to constructing a joint social democratic agenda in European politics. Dubbed the “Third Way/ Neue Mitte”, Blair viewed enhanced German-British relations as a way to break up the Franco-German core in Europe and work towards a strategic triangle alongside Germany within European integration. The good personal bonds between Schroeder and Blair, contrasted by indifferent relations between Schroeder and Chirac at that time, imparted a new impetus to German-British relations. The optimism which surrounded the relationship in the late 1990s did not last long, however, as Schroeder and Blair came to be at loggerheads over a series of foreign and economic policy issues. In foreign policy, vastly diverging positions over the war in Iraq in 2003 and its relevance for transatlantic relations complicated developments towards building EU defense capabilities.

---

Schroeder’s subsequent rejection of Blair’s vision for EU reform left the two governments little substance to work together on.

**Domestic and EU Policy Agendas of Merkel and Blair**

Angela Merkel and Tony Blair face very different domestic circumstances. As Tony Blair frets about his legacy in British politics in his final period in office, political commentators in Germany have poured over the Grand Coalition’s report card of its first hundred days in office. As Blair has sought to rediscover the momentum of New Labour’s early period in office to complete the social and economic reforms he aspires for modern Britain, Angela Merkel and her coalition partner, the SPD, have concentrated on establishing a solid working relationship, rather than announcing substantial changes within German politics. With highly positive approval ratings unheard of in Germany in the region of 80 per cent, Angela Merkel, with an eye on regional elections in March, has sought to establish herself in the role of chancellor both within Germany and abroad, without fully taking up the reform process she ran on during the German federal elections in 2005. Another important contextual difference is the relative performance of the U.K. and German economies. The British economy has enjoyed moderate success in recent years whilst Germany’s economy has noticeably underperformed. Blair has also enjoyed substantial parliamentary majorities during his time as Prime Minister, whilst Angela Merkel’s CDU/ CSU only narrowly ended up as the largest party in the 2005 elections.

The U.K. does not merit a mention in the Coalition Treaty between the CDU, CSU and the SPD. Nevertheless, German-British relations are important and deserve attention for their relevance within both the European Union and wider transatlantic and global affairs. In the past, the arrival of new governments in the U.K. and Germany normally sparked renewed optimism in forging stronger relations – as happened, in particular, with Kohl/ Major and Blair/ Schroeder. Sadly, recent post-Cold War experience has taught us that whilst British and German relations have often benefited from the improved engagement of British prime ministers and German chancellors, these efforts have seldom proved permanent or had the foresight of Franco-German co-operation.

---

12 CDU, CSU and SPD (2005) Koalitionsvertrag zwischen CDU, CSU und SPD, November 11, 2005. [http://www.bundesregierung.de/Anlage920135/Koalitionsvertrag.pdf](http://www.bundesregierung.de/Anlage920135/Koalitionsvertrag.pdf) The coalition agreement outlines Germany’s important relations with France, Poland, the USA, Russia and Israel.
Expectations within the U.K. that Angela Merkel would prove a solid partner within the EU and be less tied to following French political leads were somewhat dashed with Merkel’s first appearance at EU summitry. Whilst initially gaining plaudits for her deal-brokering success at the closing summit of the U.K. Council presidency in December 2005, as soon as it transpired that the deal had been secured by additional German funds, the success within Germany was somewhat soured. Blair was also left feeling disappointed in his closing European presidency summit when Merkel did not support the U.K.’s proposals for reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. Relations between the EU’s leading member states have suffered in recent years largely due to difficult personal relations between Blair, Chirac and Schroeder. In terms of Realpolitik this alone should not be a deciding factor in maintaining purposeful bilateral relations. However, the Iraq debate, major differences over the form which Europe’s economic and social model should take over the coming years and divergences over the future of European integration have all drastically reduced the range of issues Berlin and London can collaborate on. Within the U.K., Angela Merkel has been dubbed the ‘New Thatcher’, but hopes for a Merkel-led Thatcherite reform of the German and European economy are far-fetched under the constraints of the Grand Coalition. Merkel’s emphasis on subsidiarity within Europe and on EU-reform fit well with British conceptions, but problems remain due to German reluctance on the EU services directive, which is currently the subject if intense debate in Brussels.

Merkel has been viewed surprisingly favorably in the British press. In a rare show of positive British-German sentiment, The Times declared that, ‘London and Berlin are on the cusp of a beautiful relationship’, to mark Blair’s first meeting with Merkel in Berlin on February 18, 2006.13 The Times bases this assumption on Merkel being a, ‘more congenial and reliable individual than Gerhard Schroeder’, on close relations on the Iran nuclear dispute, and greater co-operation on EU issues such as energy security, deregulation and efforts to connect more effectively with ordinary EU citizens. Efforts to repair faults in German-British relations have also witnessed Blair actively praising Merkel’s speeches at the World Economic Forum in Davos and the 2006 Munich Security Conference, whilst Blair’s recent European speech to Oxford University received a positive appraisal from Merkel.14

Blair clearly wants Merkel as a key partner in the European Union and in international affairs in order to work towards Blairite reforms of the European economy and as a reliable partner to build European defense capabilities which are firmly anchored within transatlantic structures. However, Blair may be disappointed. Germany’s domestic problems will take up the lion’s share of the Grand Coalition’s time, leaving Merkel less time to concentrate on Germany’s role in the world. The Grand Coalition’s first major piece of reform – the reform of Germany’s federal system – has only just got under way, but this promises to be a major political challenge. If Merkel is to have any chance of success in this process, she will have to play a more managerial role in forging agreement within the Bundestag, the Bundesrat and the wider German polity for this major piece of constitutional reform.

Strong differences remain between the governments in the U.K. and in Germany concerning such issues as Turkish membership in the EU and the fate of the European Constitution. Rather than injecting the European Union project with dynamism, the difficulties which have plagued German-British relations in recent years have done little to advance co-operation among the EU-25 and prepare the EU for the challenges of the 21st century. During its Council presidency in the second half of 2005, the U.K. did not seek to revive the EU Constitution after the collective blow of the French and Dutch referenda, as EU economic reform and the EU budget ranked higher in its priorities. Politically, the French and Dutch “No” votes relieved the British government of the need to hold its own referendum on the constitution, freeing Blair to focus on his domestic reform agenda.

**The German-British Relations within ESDP**

It has never been possible to talk of a German-British tandem in EU foreign and security policy. Nevertheless, British, French and German leadership will be central to the future development in this area. As regards the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the ESDP, Franco-British relations have dominated within the EU so far. As Clarke states,

“…nothing short of an effective Franco-British axis in defence affairs will be sufficient to build an effective European security pillar. Only on the basis of such an axis can Germany play a full part in an ESDP: without it Germany is simply too far behind the curve in post-Cold War military adjustment and could not, for all its numbers, provide an effective pillar in a bilateral
arrangement with either France or Britain alone. London and Paris hold between them the keys to a successful ESDP.”

France and the UK have been in the vanguard of developing the European Security and Defense Policy since the groundbreaking agreement of St. Malo in December 1998 and have also been at the forefront of efforts to achieve the EU’s 2010 Headline Goal and the development of the “Battlegroups”-concept. A further sign of Franco-British relative *bonhommie* in European security have been recent efforts to co-operate more closely in defense procurement. In themselves these measures do not signify a substantial Europeanization in British policy, despite fears expressed in the euro-skeptic British press. However, they do demonstrate that the U.K. is not against European measures which make financial sense and/or are capabilities-driven. By balancing Germany’s relations with France and the U.K., the Grand Coalition could generate some real policy success – forging stronger relations with the U.K. will help build EU defense capabilities, firmly wedded to the Atlantic Alliance, but also satisfy French demands for autonomous EU action should events demand so.

In the last decade, the U.K. has pressed Germany to play a more active role in military crisis management. Germany has come a long way to achieving this, especially under the Red/Green government between 1998-2005 (see the contribution of Franz-Josef Meiers in this volume). Due to financial constraints, Germany has not been as big a player in European defense procurement in recent years, with well documented difficulties in financing its commitment to the Eurofighter/Typhoon project. Germany’s ability to forge closer European co-operation within the European defense market will continue to be curtailed under current economic difficulties, despite the obvious benefits which European co-operation could offer.

Recent data by Eurobarometer demonstrates that German public opinion remains very supportive of German involvement in both the development of European foreign policy and European security and defense policy. A comparison with the data from the U.K. indicates quite significant differences as the British are generally more skeptical. At the same time there is also a gradual improvement in favor of European policies in the U.K. over the recent years.

---

16 Currently there are 13 Battlegroups, either already in existence or in the planning to be operational by 2007, which consist of multinational configurations of EU member states.
18 The following data can be accessed at [http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm](http://europa.eu.int/comm/public_opinion/index_en.htm)
and thus a convergence with public attitudes in Germany. In sum, these figures suggest that there is at least some room for maneuver for the leaders of both countries to work together on developing CFSP. By stating her transatlantic credentials more clearly than Schroeder, cooperation on developing European capabilities to bolster transatlantic relations should be less fraught under Chancellor Merkel than during the later years of the Red/Green government.

Table 1: Support for a Common European foreign policy in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EB63 (Spring 2005)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB64 (Winter 2005)</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Eurobarometer Question:** What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common foreign policy among the member states of the EU, towards other countries?

Table 2: Support for a Common European security and defense policy in Germany

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Germany</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EB63 (Spring 2005)</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB64 (Winter 2005)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Eurobarometer Question:** What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common defense and security policy among EU Member States?

Table 3: Support for a Common European foreign policy in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EB63 (Spring 2005)</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB64 (Winter 2005)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Eurobarometer Question:** What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common foreign policy among the member states of the EU, towards other countries?

Table 4: Support for a Common European security and defense policy in the UK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK</th>
<th>For</th>
<th>Against</th>
<th>Don’t know</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EB63 (Spring 2005)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EB64 (Winter 2005)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Eurobarometer Question:** What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement whether you are for or against it? A common defense and security policy among EU Member States?

Despite Germany’s increased willingness to share the burden in military crisis management in the Balkans and further away, there remain self-limitations within German policy which policy-makers in Paris and London do not have to deal with (see Franz-Josef Meiers’
contribution). The current discussions within the EU over the United Nation’s request for EU forces to help police the upcoming elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2006 are a case in point. Germany has been forced into a potential leadership role by its EU colleagues which it feels uncomfortable with. The U.K. has stated its intention not to be involved in any mission in the Congo due to concerns within Whitehall of military overstretch caused by British involvement in Iraq and the recent increased military presence in Afghanistan, as well as reported fears of the lack of language ability among U.K. forces to operate in French. With little or no experience of peacekeeping in Africa, and continued sensitivities over the legacy of the Afrikakorps, Germany has been reluctant to deploying the Bundeswehr to Congo, even as part of an EU mission, and even more so to assume the lead-nation role.

**Germany, the United Kingdom and Transatlantic Relations**

The success of Merkel’s first visit to Washington signaled hope for improved German-American relations with the expectation that Germany will once again play the role of ‘honest broker’ in transatlantic affairs between the Europeans and America.19 Chancellor Merkel’s message to Washington was based on the following premise, as outlined in her first speech to the Bundestag as chancellor:

> “Let the battles of the past lie. Those battles have been fought. As far as the future is concerned, the new government will work with all its strength for a close, honest, open and trusting relationship in the trans-Atlantic partnership.”20

If Merkel can reinvigorate German-American relations, the impact on British-German relations should be significant. U.K. diplomacy in security affairs has struggled in light of major differences which emerged over the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. Despite the plaudits won by Angela Merkel during her first trip to Washington as chancellor, soured relations will not mend overnight. The legacy of ill-feeling between Berlin and Washington will take time to repair (see the contribution of Daniel Hamilton in this volume). During Merkel’s visit to Washington in January 2006 the *Wall Street Journal* caustically commented that,

---

“(…)) until Mrs. Merkel deals head on with the moral and intellectual rot that now passes for sophisticated discourse in Germany, the battles of the past will not lie and the alliance will not be restored.”[21]

It may then be Blair and his successor as prime minister who act as the transatlantic interlocutor for Berlin and Washington in order to develop relations across the Atlantic.

**Conclusion: Common Challenges and German “selbstbewusste Bescheidenheit”**[22]

The U.K. and Germany both face common challenges – competing in a global economy with rising mega-economies such as China and India; maintaining momentum in European integration within an EU of 25 (and soon to be more) states; and playing an influential role in world affairs in the post-9/11 era. There is a need for both states to look at the world afresh in order to find the right policies to advance national and European interests in the 21st century. Central to forming a working relationship during these changing and challenging times is whether both states seek to forge common responses to these challenges or whether both states retreat to the apparent security of national policy-making circles.

Today in political and geographical terms, the U.K. is in Europe, but not yet a full part of it.[23]

Until this position changes in the form of a more engaged British role in the EU within the single currency and in moves towards building Political Union, German-British relations will be confronted with a glass ceiling when it comes to the maximum heights which relations between both governments can reach. In the medium term, U.K. membership of the Euro-Zone would give the British government’s criticism of sluggish economic performance in this area some credibility. This would also signal British interest in making a success of the single currency and the wider European economy. It would also demonstrate the U.K.’s commitment to the European integration project and win much needed political capital among EU member states for British policy proposals.

The U.K.’s relations with Germany are no longer characterized by fears of a dominant central power in Europe. However, German-British relations will not take on a renewed quality without establishing more institutionalized modes of co-operation – perhaps not to the same

[21] Ibid.
[23] A former German ambassador to the Court of St James, documents a conversation between Winston Churchill and Konrad Adenauer at the beginning of the 1950s. Churchill is reported as stating, ‘You can rely on Great Britain always being a good neighbour to Europe,’ to which Chancellor Adenauer responded, ‘But Mr Prime Minister, that is not enough. Great Britain must be part of Europe.’ Cited in: von Herwarth, Hans (1963): Anglo-German Relations: I. A German View’. In: International Affairs, 39(4), p.516.
extent as Franco-German relations, but some way towards that. During Blair’s recent trip to Berlin, both states announced the introduction of video-conferencing between both capitals and the resumption of more regular intergovernmental meetings. Within an EU of 25 states, the U.K. and Germany will need to work together in order to occupy the middle-ground of EU opinion, and to continue to play influential roles.

From a British point of view, Germany will have to demonstrate a greater zeal for domestic and EU economic reform alongside the U.K. in order for the bilateral relationship to take on renewed quality. Flanking this, Germany must become more certain of its role in world affairs and aspire to meaningful leadership alongside France and the U.K. For obvious reasons, Germany is concentrating on domestic challenges at the very time that it needs to play an active role in building Europe. It is a paradox that at the very time the U.K. would welcome a greater German contribution in international affairs, it does not have the resources to fulfill such a role. Foreign Minister Steinmeier’s recent description of Germany’s foreign policy as ‘self-confident modesty’ will not be enough for Germany to work in partnership with the U.K. on the major challenges facing Europe in the 21st century.
Merkel, Bush, and German-American Relations

By Daniel Hamilton

The advent of the Grand Coalition led by Chancellor Angela Merkel offers Germans and Americans an opportunity to turn a page in their relationship and lay the groundwork for a global partnership rather than one rooted in 20th century clichés or ideological stereotypes. Opportunities are not guarantees, however. Each nation is beset by challenges at home; each continues to register significant differences with the other; and each has yet to advance the relationship in ways attuned to the challenges of our age and the promise of our time.

Merkel’s ascendancy offers Germany an opportunity to reestablish its position as the continental anchor of the Atlantic Alliance. Her initial steps and statements on foreign policy have been welcomed in Washington. She will not send German troops to Iraq, but she recognizes that instability in the Broader Middle East is dangerous for Europe. She will address these instabilities by sustaining German commitments in Afghanistan; perhaps considering greater Iraqi training energizing more multilateral reconstruction aid; and working with the U.S. and other partners to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions and manage tensions associated with the rise to power of Hamas in Palestine. She will continue German engagement in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in global aid and relief. She is particularly keen to break out of both the personality-driven politics and the Berlin-Paris-Moscow triangle that framed a good deal of her predecessor’s foreign policy. She will work with Russian President Putin but avoid his embrace, she will work with French President Chirac but avoid his shadow - and she will work with George W. Bush while working even harder to avoid being identified with the extremes of his policies.

Certainly a good deal of German-American irritation during the Bush-Schroeder years was due to personality; the two could not have been more different. But it would be a mistake to over-personalize German-American irritations during that period, just as it would be a mistake to believe that good personal relations between Bush and Merkel will make everything better.

Grand Coalition policies will be influenced by the legacy of the SPD-Green government, particularly since the foreign office and key portfolios of interest to the U.S. are held by the
Social Democrats. That legacy is decidedly mixed in terms of relations with official Washington.

There were of course important positive elements. German military intervention in Kosovo to halt ethnic cleansing, German diplomacy to resolve the Balkan wars and provide a framework in which to integrate Southeastern as well as Central Europe into the EU and NATO, German solidarity with the U.S. in the wake of the September 11 attacks, and Germany’s engagement in Afghanistan since then were all welcomed in Washington. But there were also many negatives, particularly the tensions over Iraq.

The Grand Coalition does not plan significant shifts on issues of division with the Bush Administration, including Iraq, strategies for fighting terrorism, questions of civil liberties and human rights, reform of the U.N. Security Council, the legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, and implementation of the Kyoto Protocol on global warming. The domestic context of these disputes is even more important. The German public is more than skeptical of the American president; the prevailing popular impulse is simply to thumb one’s nose at the “Bushies”.

Moreover, from the start the Grand Coalition has been continuously embarrassed and embroiled in domestic controversies related to relations with the Bush Administration, particularly the U.S. rendition praxis of terrorist suspects, allegations of CIA secret prison facilities, and a Bundestag investigation into press reports that in April 2003 two German intelligence agents were on the ground in Iraq, despite Schroeder's antiwar stance, providing coalition forces relevant military information. The Bush Administration, in turn, was irritated by the recent decision by German authorities to release convicted Hezbollah terrorist Mohammad Ali Hammadi, whose extradition had been a long-standing U.S. request.

Other nettlesome issues are certain to crop up, but the overall health of the relationship over the next three years is more likely to be measured by the ability of both sides to rebuild a sense of common cause in a few key areas: economic leadership, fighting terrorism, dealing with the Broader Middle East and reconciling effectiveness with legitimacy in the contemporary world order.
Economic Leadership

The most important issue facing the Grand Coalition is Germany’s stagnant economy. As long as Germany remains economically hobbled it will be politically hobbled too – and thus unable to conduct the active foreign policy role its allies need and its interests require.

Germany’s partners have a major stake in Merkel’s success.Unless and until Berlin embarks on painful economic reforms, the rest of Europe is likely to muddle along while more dynamic economies in other parts of the world forge ahead. If Germany proves unable to tackle its serious structural rigidities, then the economy that was once Europe’s *Wunder* could turn out to be its Achilles Heel.

Germany’s success is also important to the United States, whose own interests are tied to a vibrant and growing German economy. As the world’s third largest economy, Germany represents a huge market for U.S. companies. More than two million workers in both countries owe their livelihoods to strong German-American commercial ties. Moreover, our mutual stake in each other’s prosperity has grown dramatically since the end of the Cold War. U.S. assets in Germany alone are greater than those throughout South America. U.S. affiliate sales in Germany are five times those in China. Despite all the media hype about “big emerging markets,” over the first half of this decade U.S. direct investment in slow-growth Germany was three times that of U.S. investment in turbo-charged China and twelve times that in emergent India. Germany alone accounts for 17 per cent of total research and development expenditures (R&D) of U.S. foreign affiliates worldwide, and German R&D expenditures in the U.S. account for 20 per cent of its global total.24

The Grand Coalition’s ability to advance domestic economic reforms is related to the ability or willingness of both Germany and the United States to advance a two-fold international economic agenda. The first element is ensuring the success of the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations. The key to Doha is agricultural trade liberalization, which would do more than almost anything else to raise the developing world from poverty. As the world’s number one exporter, Germany has a significant stake in the success of multilateral market-opening initiatives, and in previous trade rounds German economic leadership has been needed to

---

ensure success in the end stage. The key question is whether Chancellor Merkel is prepared to press France and Poland to shift EU agricultural support funds away from export subsidies and other trade-distorting measures, thus opening the possibility for compromises on all sides and a successful Doha deal.

The second opportunity is to forge an open transatlantic marketplace grounded in the vital stake both countries have developed in the health of their respective economies. The transatlantic economy is the freest in the world, but it is not free. A variety of non-tariff barriers and domestic regulatory differences still limit the full potential of the transatlantic market. The OECD estimates that a package of transatlantic market-opening initiatives could lead to permanent gains in GDP per capita on both sides of the Atlantic of up to three to 3.5 per cent. This is the equivalent of giving every working person in Europe and America an extra year’s worth of earnings during their working life. Most of the transatlantic barriers to be tackled are not the traditional tariff barriers being addressed by Doha, but domestic non-tariff barriers. Even a successful Doha global trade round, for example, will not address such pressing issues affecting the European and American economies as competition policies, standardized corporate governance, more effective regulatory cooperation, tax and other issues. Nor will it address issues raised by European and American scientists and entrepreneurs, who are pushing the frontiers of human discovery in such fields as genetics, nanotechnology and electronic commerce where there are neither global rules nor transatlantic mechanisms to sort out the complex legal, ethical and commercial trade-offs posed by such innovations. There are no patented "European" or "American" answers to these challenges. In fact, for most of these issues, neither side has even sorted out the appropriate questions, much less the answers.

**Finding Unity Against Terrorism and on Transformation of the Broader Middle East**

The Broader Middle East is the region of the world where unsettled relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, impoverished societies, fragile and intolerant regimes and deadly combinations of technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast energy field upon which Western prosperity depends.

---

Choices made here could determine the shape of the 21st century – whether the spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) will be stopped; whether the oil and gas fields of the Caucasus and Central Asia can become reliable sources of energy; whether catastrophic terrorism can be prevented; whether Russia’s borderlands can become stable and secure democracies; whether Israel and its neighbors can live together in peace; and whether millions of people can be lifted from pervasive poverty and hopelessness. The Broader Middle East has become the central arena for transatlantic relations in this new century. The main threat to European and American security is destruction or disruption of our societies or irretrievable damage to our interests generated by turmoil in this region.

Can we find a common approach? The first step is to affirm that this is decidedly not a “clash of civilizations” but a clash between civilized people in all cultures and those who cloak themselves in the language of the world’s great religions even as they betray their most fundamental teachings. We must define this struggle not as one between Islam and the West, but one between prejudice and respect, between those who would open societies and those who would shut them down. We must define this struggle not only within our own communities but in the minds of one billion Muslims.

Second, we must seek wherever possible to align our positions regarding the worrying trends in the region. Whatever our differences over the Iraq war, we share a stake in a viable peace. Whatever our tactical differences over dealing with Iran, we share a stake in containing the nuclear ambitions of its leaders. Whatever our views on Israeli-Palestinian differences, we share a stake in advancing the Middle East peace process and remaining united in our message to Hamas after its victory that it must forswear violence and recognize Israel’s right to exist. Moreover, beyond the specifics of any one of these challenges, we share an interest in developing a regional security structure for the region that takes into account the interests of Israel, Iran and the Arab countries.

Third, we must transform our Alliance. Chancellor Merkel has urged NATO to revise its strategic concept by its 60th anniversary in 2009. NATO summits planned for 2006 and 2008 can set the stage for a NATO that is better, not just bigger. Such a NATO must transform its scope and strategic rationale, its capabilities and its partnerships. Most European NATO forces must be better at deploying and projecting power. The Alliance as a whole must be able to win peace, not just deter or win war, by creating an integrated, multinational security support component that would organize, train and equip selected units—civilian and
military—for a variety of pre- and post-conflict operations. These units should be designed flexibly to support operations by NATO, NATO and partners, the EU, and the U.N. Finally, NATO’s nations — and their partners — must be prepared not only to project power beyond Europe but also to prevent, deter and, if necessary, cope with the consequences of WMD attacks on their societies—from any source. If Alliance governments fail to defend their societies from a WMD attack, the Alliance will have failed in its most fundamental task. These challenges are daunting in themselves, but we will be unable to address them if we cannot infuse power with legitimacy, a final major test for both partners.

_Harnessing Power to Purpose_

For the past 60 years the transatlantic relationship has been the world’s transformative partnership. More than with any other part of the world, America’s relationship with Europe has enabled both partners to achieve goals together that neither could alone. This is what still makes the transatlantic relationship distinctive: when we agree, we are the core of any effective global coalition; when we disagree, we are the global brake.

Harnessing this potential means paying attention to both legitimacy and effectiveness. The genius of the American-led system constructed after the collapse of Europe, following two world wars, was that it was perceived to be legitimate by its members. We have not enjoyed the West’s sixty-year peace just because our countries are democracies (although democracy is a major contributor!), but because we built our success on a dense network of security, economy and societal interaction, and because all partners came to believe that, by and large, they had a voice in the overall direction of the transatlantic community.

The lesson is simple and relevant: The effective use of power includes the ability not just to twist arms but to shape preferences and frame choices - to get others to conceive of their interests and goals in ways compatible with one’s own. The ability of any nation to translate power into sustainable influence derives from the perception among those it seeks to influence that its authority is legitimate. This perception of legitimate authority, in turn, stems from the principles a nation stands for and the degree to which it adheres to those principles itself, both within its own society and in its dealings with other societies. Unfortunately, in recent years official Washington has confused power with virtue. On a host of issues the

---

26 This point was made by Samuel Berger on occasion of a lecture at the American Academy Berlin on December 8, 2005.
United States has allowed its power to obscure its need for legitimacy. When challenged, we strike out on our own rather than seek common ground. By viewing our key alliances, international treaties and regimes at best as ineffective and at worst as an unacceptable constraint on U.S. freedom of action, we have paid the costs of less legitimacy, greater burdens, and ultimately a diminished ability to achieve our goals.

The global legitimacy of American leadership was a major casualty of the first Bush Administration. Restoring it has become a defining issue for transatlantic relations and a key measure of the second Bush Administration. The U.S. cannot lead unless others choose to follow, and they will not make that choice over and over again unless they perceive it to be in their own best interests to do so. This depends on the degree of confidence they have in Washington’s capacity to cope with core challenges, and whether the way in which the U.S. does so is perceived to be legitimate.

Integrating legitimacy with effectiveness is also a challenge for Germany and its European neighbors. Those who believe that robust international norms and multilateral enforcement mechanisms are needed to tackle global threats must focus equally on the effective enforcement of such regimes, and consider more forthrightly the necessity to act when these regimes fail. Might there be circumstances under which commitment to international law could risk national survival or result in mass human tragedy? How can we narrow the yawning gap between legality and legitimacy in today’s world? What should we do when faced with a conflict between state sovereignty and human rights? How can international institutions originally created to keep the peace between nations be adapted to secure peace within nations? How can the international community prevent future Afghanistans, future Rwandas, future Kosovos, future Iraqs, future Sudans? Europe’s instinct in response to these challenges surely cannot be to contain U.S. power, but rather to marshal its own – to be America’s counterpart, not its counterweight.
The Security and Defense Policy of the Grand Coalition

By Franz-Josef Meiers

This article discusses the development of Germany’s security and defense policy under the Schroeder government from 1998 to 2005 and offers a first assessment of the incoming Merkel government in this issue area since 2005. These past years have been a period of dramatic upheavals in international relations. In particular the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001 have moved the focus of attention to the new security threats: the jihadist terrorism with global reach, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and attempts of terrorist groups to gain access to WMD. The terror attacks also served as a catalyst for both the transformation of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and enhanced efforts of EU member countries to strengthen the fledging European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) to better prepare them to deal with these threats. The new arc of crises with its epicenter in the Greater Middle East (Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Israel/ Palestine) confronts German decision-makers with different and more robust demands on German security and defense policy as well as raising expectations of its major allies to assume a true leadership role in international crisis management – one commensurate with the country’s resources and status as a leading power in Europe.

The new security tasks raise two central questions: How have German decision-makers responded to both the raising demands of a truly global security environment and raising expectations of Germany’s allies and partners to make tangible contributions to the Alliance’s transformation and the broader mission specter? Is the election of Angela Merkel in 2005 as Germany’s new chancellor a seminal event which heralds significant changes in German security and defense policy or does it mark a high degree of continuity with the policies of the Schroeder government? The discussion of these two questions should allow for a clearer idea about what allies and partners might realistically expect from Germany within the realm of security and defense policy.

The Legacy of the Schroeder Government

Under the Red-Green government, German security and defense policy made some far-reaching changes. They concern the extension of the geographic boundaries of German security, the participation of German armed forces in various out-of-area-missions, and
accelerated reform efforts to transform the Bundeswehr from a training to a deployment army ("Armee im Einsatz").

Transformation of NATO and the New German Defense Doctrine

The negotiations of the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance in 1998 and early 1999 revealed sharp differences among the Allies over the scope of NATO’s future mission. At the root of the differences lay the conviction of the Clinton Administration that NATO should be seen as an “alliance of interests”. Those interests may in some instances push NATO into activities anywhere in the world, for example to counter international terrorism or the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The German government initially opposed a broader interpretation of NATO’s strategic role and favored its traditional task of territorial defense. The collapse of the Twin Towers in New York on September 11, 2001, marked the end of NATO’s out-of-area-debate. The invocation of Article V for the first time in NATO’s history – without putting NATO’s structures to use in Afghanistan – underlined the determination of all Alliance members to make combating terrorism an enduring NATO mission. In recognition that within the post-9/11 strategic environment the new threats of terrorism and WMD emerge outside of their borders, NATO foreign and defense ministers endorsed a broadening of the meaning of collective defense. At the Prague summit in November 2002, NATO heads of state and government reaffirmed their determination that, “to carry out the full range of its missions, NATO must be able to field forces that can move quickly wherever they are needed” (emphasis added).

The sweeping changes in NATO’s mission and reach also left their mark on Germany’s security policy. The Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG) published by Defense Minister Peter Struck in May 2003 recognized that defense can no longer be defined in narrow geographical terms. Security threats need to be confronted where they arise, which could be “on the Hindukush”, as Struck noted on December 20, 2002 before the German Parliament. The DPG conclude: “The necessity for the Bundeswehr to participate in multinational operations may arise anywhere in the world and at short notice and may extend across the entire mission spectrum down to high-intensity operations.” This broadening of the mission specter has far-reaching implications for the Bundeswehr’s tasks and capabilities. The DPG stress that the German armed forces have to be oriented towards the more probable types of operations, namely conflict prevention and crisis management, including the fight against international terrorism. Germany’s commitments under the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC) of
2002 and its participation in the NATO Response Force (NRF), also created at the Prague summit, point in this direction as well.

The Use of Force

Since the end of World War II, the fundamental principles of German foreign and security policy imply a pronounced preference for institutionalized cooperation in multilateral fora (sometimes referred to as “reflexive multilateralism”) and a deep skepticism about the appropriateness and usefulness of military force (“culture of restraint”). Instead, German security policy has preferred cooperative strategies for multilateral risk prevention and international conflict resolution. Yet, as a result of the Balkan wars in the early 1990s and in response to the new demands on German security policy by the transatlantic allies, the Kohl government accepted the need for German participation in out-of-area-missions outside the traditional context of collective defense. Since the signing of the Dayton Agreement in December 1995, up to 4,000 German soldiers participated in the NATO-run Implementation (IFOR) and later Stabilization Force (SFOR) peacekeeping missions in Bosnia. Since then, German participation in such out-of-area operations under the umbrella of NATO, the U.N. and – increasingly – the European Security and Defense Policy has no longer been a question of whether, but when, where and how.

Under the Red-Green government, the German involvement in such military missions further broadened both in size and scope. Even before it formally took office, the new Schroeder government accepted the commitment of the outgoing Kohl government to participate in NATO’s operation “Allied Force” in Kosovo. The terror attacks of September 11, 2001, further enhanced Germany’s profile in military enforcement missions. In his initial response Chancellor Schroeder extended “unlimited solidarity” to the United States. The Berlin government strongly supported the invocation of Article V and the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1368 which provided the legal basis for military actions against the Al-Qaida terror network responsible for the terrorist attacks and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan harboring it. Furthermore, Chancellor Schroeder defined the attacks against the United States as a turning point in German foreign and security policy. In a speech to the Bundestag on October 11, 2001, Schroeder implied a significant broadening of Germany’s international role, and signaled the readiness of his government to let German soldiers participate in an international alliance against the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks. On November 5, 2001, the Federal Security Council approved the concrete request of the U.S.
government to provide up to 3,900 troops for five specific areas of assistance: anti-chemical and anti-biological warfare forces (800), medical evacuation units (250), special forces (100), air transport assistance (500) and naval observation forces (1,800) for up to twelve months. In view of the strong resistance within both government parties Chancellor Schroeder called for a vote of confidence to secure a majority of SPD and Green parliamentarians for the government’s decision. The gamble paid off: the Bundestag passed the resolution on November 16, 2001, by a thin majority of just four votes.

Quite similar to its approach during the Kosovo crisis, the Schroeder government also took a high profile in the political and reconstruction process in Afghanistan, hosting two international conferences in this context on the Petersberg near Bonn (in November 2001 and December 2002). Berlin also committed up to 2,250 soldiers to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan to secure the implementation of the stabilization and reconstruction plan. Later, the German government strongly supported NATO taking over the lead of ISAF and the extension of the mission beyond the Afghan capital Kabul within the context of the newly established Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In this process, about 450 German troops were deployed to Faizabad and Kunduz. On September 21, 2005, three days after the presidential election in Afghanistan, the Schroeder government agreed on a further extension of Germany’s contribution to ISAF. The German contingency will be augmented to 3,000 soldiers, and German ISAF troops can be assigned to PRT projects in the western and other parts of the country as well.

In short, under the Red-Green government the Bundeswehr’s role in out-of-area operations substantially increased in terms of numbers, mandate and geographical scope. To give just one indicator, the number of German forces employed in various missions in the Balkans, in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf quintupled to 12,000 from 1998 to 2002.

Reform of the Bundeswehr

Of course, the increasing participation in multinational military operations did not leave the Bundeswehr structure unaffected. The Balkan experience raised the question of how to improve the operational capability of German armed forces for the broader mission specter. At the same time the Bundeswehr faced the daunting task of how to reconcile the expensive modernization commitments made by the Schroeder government to both the Alliance (NATO’s Defense Capability Initiative of 1999 and the PCC) and the EU (Headline Goal of
1999, now up-graded to the Headline Goal 2010) with a declining defense budget. The
“Weizsaecker Commission” summed up the dilemma as follows:

“The Bundeswehr is too big, ill-composed and increasingly out of step with the
times. The present form of military service produces a surplus of manpower
but a shortage of operational forces. Out-dated material diminishes its
operational capability and causes operating costs to soar. The current budget
estimates allow no scope for adequate modernization under the present
structure and form of military service.”27

Since then, the Red-Green government undertook more efforts to reform the out-dated
structures of the Bundeswehr. On June 14, 2000, the cabinet approved a reform plan of
Defense Minister Scharping to bring the Bundeswehr into the era of crisis prevention and
crisis management. Its “cornerstones”28 were to cut the force strength from 338,000 troops to
277,000 troops, reduce the number of conscripts to 77,000 (from 135,000 before) and to
substantially increase the number of readiness forces from 66,000 to 150,000. The Scharping
reform did not solve the structural problems of the Bundeswehr’s transformation from a
training army to a deployment army, however. The participation in Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and subsequently in ISAF further exacerbated the old problem: a tangible
shortage of employable and sustainable specialized personnel. Moreover, limited
sustainability, deficits in command and information systems as well as a backlog demand in
reconnaissance, strategic transport, mobility and precision-guided munition set “natural
limits” to further missions of the Bundeswehr.

Like his predecessor, Defense Minister Peter Struck concluded that nothing less than a radical
reform would be sufficient to transform the Bundeswehr into a force for the 21st century. To
meet the operational requirements of the global mission specter, as outlined in the Defense
Policy Guidelines of 2003, the Bundeswehr will consists of 35,000 response forces earmarked
for high-intensity operations, 70,000 stabilization forces employed in joint military operations
of low and medium intensity for a longer period of time across the broad spectrum of peace
stability missions, and 137,500 support forces earmarked for comprehensive joint and
sustainable support of operations and the Bundeswehr’s routine duty at home.29

27 See Kommission “Gemeinsame Sicherheit und Zukunft der Bundeswehr“ („Weizsäcker-Kommission“)
http://www.weltpolitik.net/texte/policy/bundeswehr/2000-06%20Scharping%20Eckpfeiler.pdf,
The good news on reforming the *Bundeswehr* is that the Schroeder government clearly recognized the necessity to push the *Bundeswehr* into an army of operations around the globe alongside Germany’s NATO allies. The bad news, however, is that the transformation of the armed forces (still) suffers from the fact that it is not sufficiently funded. In June 2004, the Schroeder government decided to further cut the defense budget by a total of three billion Euro over the period 2004 to 2008 compared to its mid-term finance plan of 2002. This means that the gap between actual expenditures (currently 1.4 per cent of GDP) and the critical target of two percent of GDP considered necessary by NATO for putting the modernization programs on a solid financial basis will not narrow. If Germany were to follow the demands of NATO officials and allies to increase its defense spending to the two percent benchmark of its GDP, defense expenditures would have to increase by 10 billion Euro (or 40 per cent) to 34 billion Euro.\(^{30}\)

This “spending gap” has also led to a “usability gap” of the *Bundeswehr*. Today and for the foreseeable future, the German armed forces remain the least deployable, mobile and sustainable of NATO’s and the EU’s leading armies. With their contributions to the missions on the Balkans and the Hindukush German armed forces have reached the limit of what they can cope with as Struck admitted.\(^{31}\) Germany’s top soldier, the Inspector General of the *Bundeswehr*, General Wolfgang Schneiderhahn, conceded (as already had his predecessor) that the *Bundeswehr* had too few forces for power projection missions because its structure is still geared towards the out-dated necessities of territorial defense.\(^{32}\)

**Red-Lines of Continuity Under the Merkel Government**

Less than 100 days in office, the new German Chancellor Angela Merkel made a head-start in German foreign policy. The “Merkel method” of carefully analyzing a situation and then taking pragmatic problem-solving action won plaudits during her visit to Washington in

---


http://l023sys0.nzz.ch/dossiers/transatlantik/usa_europa/2005/06/28/al/articleCXMP8.html

http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj0SPvkssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_OjzKLt4w3DTYE5GYRqbo-

m-pEwsaCUVlHlq_zeVH1v_QDqytlckdHRUJUA88qVzQ!@delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3Q880SVVFLzZ
fOV81UzE!?yw_contentURL=%2FC1256F1200608B1B%2FW26BUF8X618INFODE%2Fcontent.jsp
January 2006. However, allies may be disappointed by the degree to which the Merkel government will be willing (and able) to bring about significant modifications in German security and defense policy as regards defense expenditures, the reform of the Bundeswehr, and the use of military force.

Defense Expenditures

Despite Struck’s efforts to bring the transformation of the Bundeswehr and the defense budget again into a lasting balance, defense spending will remain caught in the budget trap. In the fiscal year 2006, the defense budget will decline from 23.9 billion Euro in 2005 to 23.88 billion Euro in nominal terms. The realization of a projected increase to 24.7 billion Euro in 2007 and 2008 will depend on the development of the federal budget within this period. The pressure on the defense budget will be reinforced by Merkel’s commitment to reduce the federal budget deficit below the 3.0 per cent Maastricht criterion in 2007. Moreover, the new Defense Minister Franz-Josef Jung will be confronted with a dramatic increase of acquisition expenditures for new weapons systems like the Eurofighter or the long-range transport plane A-400M, for which no budgetary precautions have been taken. Thus, Jung will face the same unenviable choice his predecessors from Ruehe to Struck had been confronted with: to defer, to stretch, and to cut (“schieben, strecken, streichen”) major weapons acquisition programs, including many international projects to which the German government has made legal commitments. In short, the Achilles Heel of the transformation of the Bundeswehr remains the mismatch between ends and means. Defense spending will not increase and the modernization plans will remain under-funded.

Reform of the Bundeswehr

As regards the implementation of the transformation agenda by 2010, modifications can be expected in two areas: the prioritizing of the Bundeswehr’s tasks and the composition and size of its force structure.

CDU/CSU and SPD strongly support the retention of the conscription system. Both emphasize that the conscription system, with its assured augmentation capability, is the guarantor of Germany’s collective defense treaty obligations. In addition, it maintains the bonds between the armed forces and society and between the citizen and the state. Both see a

---

citizens’ army as a prudent hedge against military interventionism around the world. Like its predecessors, the Merkel government will continue to ignore the clearly identifiable developments within the armed forces of Germany’s most important European ally, France, as the defining point of a structural reform of the *Bundeswehr*. The strong support for the maintenance of the conscription system will exclude a further reduction of the troop size to a level of 200,000 to 220,000 troops in order to create new room for higher investment within a declining defense budget.\(^{34}\) The security conception of CDU/CSU may compound the problem. They charge that, under the Red-Green government, the balance between out-of-area missions and the elementary task of homeland defense has been lost. They argue that the „expeditionary thinking“ introduced by Defense Minister Struck should be complemented by the constitutional task of homeland defense.\(^{35}\) In addition, Defense Minister Jung criticized that the present drafting system undermines fairness and equal treatment because large numbers of young men are excused. He therefore decided to increase the numbers of conscripts from 31,000 to 35,000 by the end of this year. In the long-run he plans to add 25,000 more conscription posts.\(^{36}\) That would come close to the troop level of 300,000 troops the CDU/CSU considers sufficient to assure that the *Bundeswehr* can carry out its constitutional responsibilities of national and alliance defense and to create a fairer balance and equal treatment in the drafting process.\(^{37}\)

*Use of Force*

The limits of the *Bundeswehr* - to provide no more than 10,000 soldiers\(^{38}\) to multinational operations around the world for years to come - will severely circumscribe the freedom of maneuver of the Merkel government to let the *Bundeswehr* participate in another military operation in addition to the missions on the Balkans (SFOR, KFOR) and in Afghanistan (ISAF). Moreover, the impact of the “culture of restraint” as defined above will continue to limit the use of German military force. Another reason to expect a very circumspect policy with regard to the use of force from the new government is Germany’s penchant for peace.


\(^{38}\) Due to the troop rotation every four months, the actual figure is five times higher: for each mission the *Bundeswehr* has to keep ready three employment contingencies a year as well as two contingencies for preparation in the field and mission evaluation.
support and stabilization missions. Both the CDU/ CSU and the SPD prefer an involvement of German ground forces in multinational peace support and stabilization operations with a distinctive humanitarian objective and under the auspices of the U.N., NATO, EU or OSCE. Both parties are still deeply opposed to the engagement of the Bundeswehr in high-intensity ground combat operations. The composition of the German armed forces and their contributions to international operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan reflect this clear preference for peace support and stabilization missions. When perceived as legitimate and appropriate, the German troop commitment to ongoing stabilization missions may even expand, as in the case of the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. By contrast, where the mission’s goals are viewed as fuzzy and elusive, as in the case of the planned EU mission to the Republic of Congo, requested by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan in late December 2005 to provide security for holding free elections in this country, the Merkel government only reluctantly agreed to participate. Foreign Minister Steinmeier and Defense Minister Jung told their European colleagues that Germany would be prepared to assume the lead role and to contribute up to 500 troops to the 1,500 strong EU mission provided that it is under a U.N. mandate, requested by the local government, that other EU countries participate and that the operation is limited to four months and confined to the capital of Kinshasa.

Two more current cases underline the reservations of the Merkel government vis-à-vis the use of force: Iraq and Iran. The Merkel government is not prepared to cross the “red line” set by its predecessor. German forces will not participate in a NATO-run training, education and doctrine Center at Ar Rustimiyah in Iraq. The Bundeswehr’s assistance for training Iraqi forces has to take place outside of the country. Thus, like her predecessor, the Merkel government will treat NATO’s collective effort as a matter of picking and choosing where one might wish to chip in, as high-ranking NATO-officials admonished the Berlin government.

Like its predecessor, the Grand Coalition government supports a diplomatic solution of Iran’s nuclear program. During the campaign in the summer 2005, Merkel declared that there

---


existed “no differences whatsoever” between her and Schroeder on the Iranian issue. Absent Iranian compliance with the nuclear agreement signed with the EU-3 (France, the United Kingdom and Germany) in November 2004, Chancellor Merkel supports a referral of the Iranian case to the U.N. Security Council; for her, such a step would not constitute a provocation to Iran. Berlin makes the imposition of meaningful sanctions on Iran contingent upon “a very broad international unity” and a mandate by the U.N. Security Council. Foreign Minister Steinmeier declared that the inclusion of the Security Council “does not mean at all the end of diplomacy – exactly the opposite. Our goal remains unequivocally a diplomatic solution.” The strong emphasis put on a diplomatic resolution excludes the country’s role in proactive counter-proliferation efforts based on the notion to defend against the threat before it is unleashed. A preventive military strike of the United States or Israel against the Iranian nuclear installations would meet strong opposition from Berlin. The arguments of the Merkel government against the resort to military force would be very similar to the ones made by the Schroeder government during the Iraq crisis in 2002 and 2003. In short, the use of force considered by the German government as non-legitimate and inappropriate will continue to expose both the deep dividing lines between Berlin and Washington and the limits of Germany’s commitment to multilateral cooperation as the Iraq crisis had exemplary demonstrated.

Germany’s Unenviable Predicament

The election of Angela Merkel as German chancellor does not herald a fundamental transformation but marks a high degree of continuity of Germany’s security and defense policy. Continuity also marks the structural problems the Merkel government inherited from its predecessor. As a result of the fundamentally changed security environment and the very different demands it poses for German security and defense policy, the two core elements of Germany’s foreign and security policy – multilateralism and the culture of restraint - no longer overlap and reinforce each other. The issues of transforming the Bundeswehr and of when and how to use military force, and the persistently severe economic constraints on


defense spending, illustrate the cross-cutting pressures of domestic and external demands that make it extremely difficult for the government in Berlin to remain consistent and faithful to these two traditions at once. The Berlin Republic, thus, is confronted with a delicate choice the Bonn Republic never had to make: a choice, or at least a trade-off, between the country’s reflexive commitment to institution-building on the one hand, and the deeply ingrained beliefs and convictions of Germany’s foreign and security culture on the other. Political decision makers in Berlin thus face the unenviable task to strike a balance between the “(...) the Scylla of collective memory” and “(...) the Charybdis of contemporary exigencies”\(^{43}\) in ways that ensure the predictability and reliability of Germany’s security and defense policy. In conclusion, the Grand Coalition under Chancellor Merkel faces the same central challenge in security and defense policy as its predecessors. It is the readiness to back up the country’s institutional and material commitments to both NATO and the EU by concrete deeds. This task may yet prove again like trying to square the circle.

II. Book Reviews

In 2005, the German Bundeswehr celebrated its 50th anniversary. This jubilee was accompanied by a variety of new publications on the state and the future of the German armed forces. In order to cover some aspects of this debate, we selected two very different monographs on the history of the Bundeswehr, both published in 2005, to be reviewed in this issue of “Foreign Policy in Dialogue”. Jonas Boettler starts with the quasi-official anniversary volume of Rolf Clement and Paul Joeris. Quite naturally, this book draws a mostly benign – though not uncritical - picture of its subject. By contrast, Detlef Bald’s book, reviewed by Marco Overhaus, explicitly claims to tell a “critical” story of the Bundeswehr.


Reviewed by Jonas Boettler

After the devastating physical and moral German defeat at the end of World War II, it was almost impossible for many to imagine the re-establishment of German armed forces. However, as the cordial alliance between the four powers who defeated Germany turned out to be not so cordial after all, a military contribution from the newly founded Federal Republic of Germany to defend Western Europe became inevitable and the Bundeswehr was created in 1955. At the end of last year, it celebrated its 50th anniversary. Despite its comparatively young age, the Bundeswehr has had a very eventful history and has been confronted with a wide array of challenges until the present day.

The book “50 Jahre Bundeswehr: 1955 – 2005” by Rolf Clement and Paul Elmar Joeris can be called the “official” anniversary volume to celebrate this event. It intends to present an overview of the history of the Bundeswehr as well as to discuss the current challenges to the German armed forces of today and those already looming at the horizon. The book clearly does not aim to meet high scientific demands, however. Rather, it addresses a broader public beyond the academia and thus provides easy-to-read overview texts and a wide array of photographs (some 150 of them). Of course, a fair appraisal of the book has to be based on this premise.
Starting with a chapter on security policy, the most important developments are discussed from the end of the Second World War to the collapse of the Iron Curtain and finally to the (old and new) challenges which the world faces today. This overview, however, is not too elaborate and could use some enhancement. For example, it would have been desirable to include some information on the controversial political discussions within the Federal Republic of Germany prior to the founding of the Bundeswehr. In addition, it has to be noted that information on the numerous crises in Europe during the Cold War (such as the events of Berlin in 1953, of Budapest in 1956 and of Prague in 1968) is missing as well.

When it comes to the security policy of the post-Cold War era, one would have hoped to find some information on new (and interdependent) risks like failing or failed states, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction or menacing conflicts on energy- and other natural resources. Unfortunately, of those new threats only international terrorism is discussed briefly. Also, the issues of the development of NATO and the future of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) should have been addressed in more detail.

The chapter on security policy is followed by one on the founding and development of the Bundeswehr itself, where the focus is not on the important dates and developments alone. Central issues like the concept of the “Citizen in Uniform” (“Staatsbuerger in Uniform”) and the ideal of “Innere Fuehrung” are explained. The chapter also addresses “thorny matters”: Which heritage of the numerous German armies suits best the self-conception and self-image of the Bundeswehr today? What about the integration of women into the armed forces? And what about the integration of the soldiers of the Nationale Volksarmee into the Bundeswehr after reunification? Furthermore, the chapter touches on recent scandals in the Bundeswehr (concerning allegations of mistreatment of young recruits), though this is dealt with only very briefly. This chapter, too, omits some important aspects, however. The most important discussions on the future of the Bundeswehr find almost no reference in the book. This concerns the whole issue of transformation of the armed forces, the highly disputed question on whether or not to keep conscription in Germany or the role of the Bundeswehr in international operations to fight terrorism.

Those two chapters mentioned above form the main part of the book. In addition to these parts, the book features a chapter on equipment and armament of the Bundeswehr from the first days until the present times. This chapter tries to describe in how far the equipment has changed in order to cope with the new security challenges. Unfortunately, this overview relies
heavily on the many pictures given, whereas the explanations in the text are kept very short. The organization of the different military branches is displayed in another chapter, giving an interesting insight in how the structures of the armed forces have changed during the years and how they are still changing in order to deal with the challenges in the best possible way. Finally, the book offers a chronic of the most important dates for the Bundeswehr and a selection of key documents on German and European security policy, from the WEU- and NATO Treaties to the European Security Strategy.

In sum, this book can be recommended to all those who are looking for an illustrated overview of the current situation and the development of the Bundeswehr. At the same time, it will be of limited use to those readers who are interested in a more detailed, scientific discussion of the subject. Moreover, it would have been a good idea also to include the history and development of the other German army behind the iron curtain. Unfortunately the Nationale Volksarmee (NVA) is mentioned only very briefly. This deprives the book of the opportunity to compare the development of German armed forces in East and West after the Second World War. It also fails to sufficiently deal with the awkward situation in which the German soldiers of both sides were in during the Cold War. Being caught in a situation where the inner-German border was the main line of conflict between the two opposing blocks, the breakout of hostilities would have forced Germans on both sides of the river Elbe to fire the first shots at their fellow countrymen. The authors of the book surely do not claim or intend to display the history and development of both German armies in the second half of the 20th century. Still, it is regrettable that the history of the other German army was not given more attention. In this regard, the volume clearly missed an opportunity.

Reviewed by Marco Overhaus

The 50th anniversary of the Federal Republic’s armed forces in 2005 has sparked a renewed public interest in the history and the current state of this institution. Whereas much of the debate has centered around the Bundeswehr’s fitness to cope with contemporary demands and missions (mainly in terms of capabilities and structures), the Munich-based historian Detlef Bald published a study which assumes a different - what he calls in his subtitle “critical” - perspective. The central theme which runs throughout the book is the competition between reformist and traditionalist ideas and conceptions, both in the political area and in the military, competing for influence and supremacy in the gradual development of the Bundeswehr since its creation in 1955. The conflict between reformism and traditionalism is reflected in three central aspects which Bald equally emphasizes in his chapters: the relationship of military thinking, policies and structures with history (especially of the German armed forces – or Wehrmacht – during the rule of national socialism), the increasing integration of German security and military policy with the international context and finally the relationship between the military on the one side and German society at large on the other.

The author takes the reformist ideas of Wolf Graf von Baudissin - reflected in the concepts of “Citizen in Uniform” (“Staatsbuerger in Uniform”) and “Innere Fuehrung” – as a benchmark to assess the subsequent developments in the history of the German Bundeswehr. Both concepts start from the assumption that, in order to prevent the re-emergence of militarism and totalitarianism, German soldiers have to be recruited and educated in a way that permits an overlap as wide as possible between society and the armed forces. From this perspective, the soldier is seen as a bearer of rights and duties quite similar to the individuals of society at large. Detlef Bald describes how this notion of civil-military overlap has met strong resistance by parts of the military leadership within the Bundeswehr which preferred a sui-generis thinking instead (underlining the distinctiveness of both spheres). Against this background, it is only consequent that the author devotes much space to the educational and recruitment aspects of German military policy. Both aspects have undoubtedly had a critical impact on how competing thoughts and conceptions between reformism and traditionalism have perpetuated and changed within the armed forces.
Bald starts with the “Magna Charta of German Rearmament” after World War II, the so-called Memorandum of Himmerod (“Himmeroder Denkschrift”), and sees this document as a compromise solution between both poles in the new (and old) military elite which was still very much tuned towards the “model” of the German Wehrmacht. This bias, however, was counterbalanced by new provisions, such as the creation of a parliamentary ombudsman (“Wehrbeauftragter”) in the Basic Law and first serious political attempts at military reform in the late 1950s (especially to open high-ranking military career opportunities to wider layers of the population and to introduce a wider educational concept beyond narrowly defined “military skills”).

These reform initiatives, according to Bald, had a limited impact on the reality of the Bundeswehr in the short run, but contributed to its transformation in the longer run. The struggle between “old” and “new” ideas continued in the following decades and was also shaped by the policy preferences of the respective personalities in charge of the defense ministry. The “critical” element of Bald’s study clearly comes to the surface when the author describes the legacies of Franz Josef Strauss (defense minister between 1956-1962) and Manfred Woerner more than twenty years later (1982-1988). According to Bald, both ministers contributed, respectively, to a “reactionary” and “conservative turn” in German military policy which in part annulled the progressive military reforms of preceding years. By contrast, the assessment of Defense Minister Helmut Schmidt (1969-1972) is more positive: “Despite all limitations, the reform policy of Helmut Schmidt was successful as an educational penetration (‘bildungspolitischer Einbruch’) in the stronghold of the traditionalist orientations of the military” [p. 86, translation M.O.]. There seems to be a certain political party bias here, but the author does not omit the failures and shortcomings, as he sees them, of Social Democratic defense ministers either (most notably of Georg Leber).

The end of the East-West conflict brought tremendous changes for the Bundeswehr (both in terms of mission demands in the course of the 1990s and of self-conception). Yet, while the military leadership rather quickly advocated and incorporated the new mission profile (out-of-area crisis management) and the corresponding Einsatzmentalität, Bald observes a general reluctance to really transform the outstripped military structure (e.g. as regards conscription), the armament profile and the educational system of the Bundeswehr. In the final chapter he raises the crucial question of how to account for this reform-hesitancy despite the radical changes in the international and domestic context. His answer is well in conformity with the general argumentation of his book. The decade-old struggle for influence between competing
conceptions between modernity and traditionalism as well as the inertia of wide segments of the military leadership have prevented the implementation of more ambitious reform policies. In this context, the author hails Defense Minister Peter Struck and his Defense Policy Guidelines (DPG) of May 2003 as the first serious reform attempt in the post-Cold War era: “They [the DPG 2003] really finish the old Bundeswehr” [p. 184, translation M.O.].

The book claims to present a “critical history” of the Bundeswehr and in fact this is what the study delivers in many respects. For instance, the author takes a very critical look at the way in which the West German military “liquidated” the Eastern military (Nationale Volksarmee, NVA) after re-unification, including the entirety of its military leadership. It is certainly true that there is still a conspicuous absence of work in this subject, though the author does not claim to fill the gap. Bald is also very concerned with a perceived right-leaning orientation within the contemporary Bundeswehr which he sees as “alarming”, especially with regard to the military elites. He cites questionable public remarks that have recently been made by leading military officers (Gert Gudera, Reinhard Guenzel) as well as recent “torture-scandals” within the Bundeswehr (Coesfeld) as indications of a wider emergence (or perpetuation) of “parallel structures” in the military. These general and wider implications, however, could have been substantiated by more references and empirical/documental evidence in the book. Despite of this, however, the study as a whole avoids a left-leaning one-sidedness as it does not simply offer a “critical” but also a balanced and constructive history of the Bundeswehr. Thus, the author acknowledges in his conclusion that “complexity of the military history until the anniversary year 2005 does not reveal ‘pure tendencies’. A new German military has evolved in which civilian values, internationalism and democratic conformity are accepted” [p.188, translation M.O.].

Another positive aspect of the book is that it puts the history of the Bundeswehr into a proper international and domestic context. Bald dedicates considerable space to portray the international developments within which German security and military policy had to operate during the Cold War as well as its impact on the Bundeswehr. This is true for the détente in East-West relations in the early 1960s and the resulting Neue Ostpolitik in Germany as well as for NATO’s “Double-Track-Decision” in 1979 which met fierce resistance in parts of German society (especially by the emerging anti-nuclear and peace movement). It has to be noted, however, that the book’s emphasis is clearly on the Cold-War period whereas its empirical richness is much weaker for the post-Cold War era. Most notably, the out-of-area debate in Germany throughout the 1990s is only dealt with in a rather cursory manner. For example,
Bald reduces the complex motives and decision-making processes before NATO’s Kosovo intervention in 1999 to “geo-strategic” considerations. According to this interpretation, the West sought to fill a “presence gap on the Balkans”. He thus omits the fact that most NATO countries (including Germany) have since then sought to reduce their troops in this volatile region. Without further explication, Bald’s history of the out-of-area debate risks oversimplification. Similar criticism can be made concerning the crucial debate on the future of conscription after 1990. The author raises the right “puzzle” when asking how to account for the difficulties of the Bundeswehr to reform itself despite the radical changes in Germany’s external environment. Yet, again, to explain this mainly in terms of the inertia in the German military leadership, as the author does, seems to be too simple. Again, he omits more profound factors such as Germany’s security culture (in the case of conscription) and a general reluctance of German politics to spend more money on defense reform.

Despite of these shortcomings, the book is strongly recommended for reading as it emphasizes aspects in the Bundeswehr’s history which have so far often been neglected. Much work has already been published on the out-of-area deployments, on the future of conscription and on the “capabilities gap” of the German armed forces. Yet, the inside-perspective of educational reform and recruitment practices in the military is equally important as it is here where the future self-conception of the Bundeswehr is internally reproduced and changed. Now that, according to official military doctrine, Germany is also defended at the Hindukush, these elements are likely to gain further relevance.
III. Online and Offline Resources Related to the Contributions

This section contains relevant documents which our authors refer to in their respective contributions. The indicated internet sources (URLs) were checked on April 11, 2006. We do not claim to give a full compilation of all relevant sources on the issue at hand.

1. Official Resources and Documents

http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/esc/BlairSpeechStAntonys.pdf

http://www.bundesregierung.de/Anlage920135/Koalitionsvertrag.pdf

http://www.cdcsu.de/upload/heimatschutz040331.pdf


http://www.spdfraktion.de/cnt/rs/rs_datei/0,,1663,00.pdf


http://regierungsprogramm.cdu.de/download/regierungsprogramm-05-09-cducsu.pdf

http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2005/p05-076e.htm


http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLt4w3D_TEUESYGYRqbm-pEwsaCUVH1fj_zcVH1v_QD9gty1ckdHRUUASqVzQ!!/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80SVVFLzZfOv81UzE!?yw_contentURL=%2FC1256F1200608B1B%2FW26BUF8X618INFODE%2Fcontent.jsp


http://www.geopowers.com/News/News_IV_2003/Struck-Weisung_1.10.03.pdf

http://www.bmvg.de/portal/a/bmvg/kcxml/04_Sj9SPykssy0xPLMnMz0vM0Y_QjzKLt4w3D_QoBSYGYRqbm-pEwMY-P_NxU_aCUVH1v_QD9gty1ckdHRUUASolmeng!!/delta/base64xml/L2dJQSEvUUt3QS80S VVFLzZfOv81UIQ!?yw_contentURL=%2FC1256F1200608B1B%2F264X9NX022MMIS DE%2Fcontent.jsp


2. Policy-Papers/ Analyses/ Media-Reports


Bertram, Christoph (2005): Angela Merkel Meets the World. 
http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/bertram29


http://www.zeit.de/2005/52/01_leit_2_52_txt
http://www.dgap.org/attachment/36292e5f08f727196eb4ca1f3d4df243/fa54667d6b4ea7e5b17d59f5cf21c8a9/koopmann_doku.pdf

http://www.welt.de/data/2006/03/08/856622.html

http://l023sys0.nzz.ch/dossiers/transatlantik/usa_europa/2005/06/28/al/articleCXMP8.html


http://www.welt.de/data/2004/11/12/358868.html


3. Links to Relevant Actors on the Internet

Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington, D.C.
http://transatlantic.sais-jhu.edu/

Council of the European Union, Brussels.
http://ue.eu.int/

German Federal Government, Berlin.
http://www.bundesregierung.de/

http://www.bmvg.de/

German Foreign Office, Berlin.
www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/

German Bundestag, Berlin.
http://www.bundestag.de/

Munich Conference on Security Policy.
http://www.securityconference.de/

North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels.
http://www.nato.int/

U.N. Security Council
http://www.un.org/docs/sc/

4. Selected New Publications on German Foreign Policy

http://www.internationalepolitik.de/attachment/d9fd79f17912202734ad02e1eb64a5c2/98d1a68ffe81b96a4267e5baf8d5f9/TIP-SI_Berger.pdf


http://www.soz.uni-frankfurt.de/hellmann/mat/Hagen_www.pdf


http://www.internationalepolitik.de/attachment/d9fd79f17912202734ad02e1eb64a5c2/b792f35d1dd64534ce9085e0ec2d1f52/TIP-SI_Herzinger.pdf

http://www.bpb.de/files/U7FO8G.pdf

http://www.internationalepolitik.de/attachment/d9fd79f17912202734ad02e1eb64a5c2/cf1ff943ccdff7514bc958f13a4937/TIP-SI_Janes-Sandschneider.pdf


http://www.internationalepolitik.de/attachment/d9fd79f17912202734ad02e1eb64a5c2/3c8c67ec4948597fa15501a314f7931d/TIP-SI_Krause.pdf
http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/die_politische_meinung/7_dokument_dok_pdf_7683_1.pdf


http://www.iep-berlin.de/publik/integration/heft-1-06/Marhold.pdf


http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/auslandsinformationen/7_dokument_dok_pdf_7133_1.pdf

http://www.internationalepolitik.de/attachment/d9fd79f17912202734ad02e1eb64a5c2/372858530a0dce4707a5e811d453d1a5/TIP-SI_Mishra.pdf


http://www.kas.de/db_files/dokumente/die_politische_meinung/7_dokument_dok_pdf_8019_1.pdf


http://www.internationalepolitik.de/attachment/d9fd79f17912202734ad02e1eb64a5c2/901a7d9d8d9b9f9df98f7f1523232537/TIP-SI_Posen2.pdf


http://www.internationalepolitik.de/attachment/d9fd79f17912202734ad02e1eb64a5c2/dba91157cf6a1f22061a529602860b86/TIP-SI_Stelzenm%FCller.pdf

http://www.internationalepolitik.de/attachment/d9fd79f17912202734ad02e1eb64a5c2/b876436bd4ffbcff2a6d2fa0bb6a92/TIP-SI_Szabo.pdf


http://www.ifri.org/files/Cerfa/Note_Wagner_MR.pdf

IV. About the Authors

Jonas Boettler is Research Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in Berlin.

Daniel S. Hamilton is the Richard von Weizsaecker Professor and Director of the Center for Transatlantic Relations at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington D.C.

Hanns W. Maull is Professor for Foreign Policy and International Relations at the University of Trier, Germany.

Franz-Josef Meiers is Lecturer on U.S. Foreign Policy at the Department of Political Science, University of Muenster, Germany.

Alister Miskimmon is Research Associate and Lecturer at Royal Holloway, University of London.

Gisela Mueller-Brandec-Bocquet is Professor for Political Science and International Relations at the University of Wuerzburg, Germany.

Ton Nijhuis is Professor for German Studies at the University of Amsterdam and Director of the Duitsland Instituut Amsterdam.

Marco Overhaus is Research Associate and Project Manager at the Chair for Foreign Policy and International Relations, University of Trier, Germany.