EGYPTIAN MIGRANT PEASANTS IN IRAQ.
A CASE-STUDY OF THE SETTLEMENT COMMUNITY IN KHALSA

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ABSTRACT

In 1975, the Governments of Iraq and Egypt signed a bilateral agreement according to which Egyptian peasant families would be resettled in Iraq. One hundred settlers and their families arrived in 1976 in the Khalsa Settlement south of Baghdad, where each was given a house and the indefinite lease to a plot of land. The present study set out to discover the type of community which evolved in this Settlement given the fact that the Egyptian peasant families were recruited from different provinces in Egypt. It was assumed that the geographical remoteness of the home villages as well as the confrontation with a relatively alien socio-economic environment - cultural similarities between Egypt and Iraq notwithstanding - would serve to diminish the importance of the settler households' heterogeneous provincial origins and encourage the formation of a relatively cohesive community.

The majority of the Egyptian peasant families included in the present study have not failed to take advantage of new economic opportunities which have come their way after resettlement. This has necessitated a certain change in social values and norms. It was found that there is a certain selectivity with regard to the extent to which values and norms have been modified in response to the demands of a new way of life after resettlement. This very selectivity has had an impact on the scope of male and female social networks in Khalsa and thus on the type of community of social control which has evolved in this Settlement.
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Arabic words have been transliterated according to how they are spoken in the Egyptian colloquial and not according to classical or literary Arabic. Arabic letters which have no equivalent in English have been transliterated to sound as near as possible to the Arabic language as follows:

The Arabic letter ghayn is written gh
'sayn is written 'a
khah is written kh
zah is written z
sad is written s
dad is written d
theh is written th
INTRODUCTION

During the Arab League Conference held in Rabat, Morocco in 1975, both the Egyptian and Iraqi Heads of State added their seal of approval to a bilateral agreement designated to serve as the cornerstone of a framework for intensified economic cooperation between the two countries. The agreement specified that the Egyptian Government would initiate a campaign to encourage Egyptian peasant families to settle and cultivate land in Iraq. For its part, the Iraqi Government committed itself to building village settlements to house these peasant settlers in and to hand over to them land which they would be allowed to cultivate as individual holdings. The agreement further specified that, as a first step, one hundred Egyptian peasant families would be resettled in a newly-built settlement south of Baghdad which was eventually named Khalsa after a village in Palestine. These first arrivals would be followed by other groups of settlers as soon as the necessary preparations regarding accommodation and provision of cultivable land were completed. Both Governments were also in agreement that the short-term goal would involve the resettlement of some five thousand Egyptian peasant families. However, officials in both countries intimated that, at the time the Iraqi Government had signed this agreement, it had been prepared to accept 'hundreds of thousands' of Egyptian fellaheen if they were prepared to concentrate their efforts on cultivating the potentially rich but to some extent unexploited agricultural lands in Iraq.

The political background to this bilateral agreement must at least partly be viewed from the perspective of Egypt's and Iraq's membership in the Arab League.
various addenda in the League's Charter laying down the theoretical framework for regional cooperation between member states. The bilateral attempts to put into practice this particular aspect of the Arab League Charter was, from the point of view of the Iraqi Government, a more or less natural culmination of Ba'athist ideology, one of the basic tenets of which is the belief that pan-Arab unity requires the creation of a solid economic foundation. Various Iraqi officials interviewed for the present study tended to stress the aspect of eventual political unity implicit in such a resettlement project by quoting the present Iraqi President: 'The Egyptian peasant in Iraq is not a migrant. Rather, he is a citizen who has changed his place of residence. The sons of the Nile will embrace the river-basins of the Tigris and the Euphrates with all the affection which we hold for the Nile itself'. For its part, the Egyptian Government also appears to have subscribed to the idea of Arab cooperation being a sound and worthwhile principle. However, in contrast to the official Iraqi attitude, the economic rather than the political aspects of such a cooperation appear to have figured more prominently. This attitude was implicit in the response of a number of Egyptian officials interviewed in connection with the Khalsa Settlement project.

Whatever the degree of the political overtones, the fact remains that the socio-economic advantages of such a resettlement scheme can be said to have been an equally motivating force behind the calculations of both Governments. This project was viewed essentially in complementary terms: underpopulated Iraq with its oil wealth and its relatively unexploited agricultural resources would benefit from the expertise traditionally attributed to the Egyptian fellah who, over the centuries, has acquired the not undeserved reputation of carefully nurturing
his infinitesimal plot of land in spite of the fact that it has tended to barely ensure his subsistence. Overpopulated Egypt, whose economy is afflicted by the dual problem of one of the highest population growth rates in the Third World and a lack of capital resources, would benefit from the export of its manpower surplus.

In contrast to Egypt, Iraq is a country which not only possesses capital resources and is relatively underpopulated, but also has an important reservoir of cultivable land. Even though half of the country's surface area of around 440,000 square miles is potentially productive, it was estimated as late as the mid-seventies that only one quarter of this arable land was actually under cultivation. The history of Iraq's agricultural sector is essentially the history of past governmental failures to concentrate efforts on the development of this sector's potential and in designing an efficient and comprehensive policy to deal with its socio-economic as well as its ecological problems. Prior to the 1958 Revolution and the overthrow of the Monarchy, development planners tended to concentrate their efforts on hydraulic projects rather than tackling the repercussions of an underdeveloped rural infrastructure and the socio-economic problems which to some extent were a result of the British administration's transformation of the hitherto communally held tribal lands into private ownership. The land-reforms initiated after the 1958 Revolution largely followed the Egyptian model but resulted in an aggravation rather than an amelioration of the problems besetting Iraq's rural sector. Inadequate preparation of land reform legislation and ill-conceived enforcement measures of its basic principles, coupled with the political upheavals and instability endemic in this period, are among the main factors which have contributed to the inconsistencies of agricultural
development policies up to the late 1960s in Iraq. In fact, it is only from the mid-seventies onwards that one may meaningfully speak of systematic governmental attempts to invest human and capital resources in modernizing the agricultural sector. These attempts received a crucial boost from the dramatic increase in the volume of oil revenues accruing to Iraq in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis. However, the availability of adequate capital resources has not automatically ensured the implementation of the Iraqi Government's development plans. Rather, the latter were, and to a large extent still remain, affected by the problem of shortages in the domestic manpower supply. Iraq's indigenous human capital resources are not only numerically inadequate to ensure the realization of the Government's social and economic goals, but suffer above all from a general deficiency in technical and managerial skills. There is also the problem of what may be termed a typical Third World syndrome: a rural out-migration coupled with the Iraqi urbanite's tendency to view rural service as a stop-over to promotion and permanent residence in an urban centre.

However, the socio-economic conditions which afflicted the Iraqi peasantry up to the recent past must not be judged solely on the basis of past governmental failures in the rural sector. Rather, there is the equally important fact that both cultural traditions and ecology have also left their impact. Two particular aspects will be singled out here for attention, a choice dictated by the manner in which they serve to accentuate the contrast between the Iraqi peasant and his Egyptian counterpart. The first concerns the ambivalent attitude which the Iraqi peasant has traditionally held towards the land he cultivates. Paradoxically, it is the relative abundance of potentially arable land which above all is said to have encouraged the Iraqi peasant to subsist on the minimum of labour efforts required to ensure
his survival. Following the tradition of semi-sedentarized nomads and for numerous historical reasons which cannot be delved into here, the Iraqi peasant has tended, at least up to the recent past, to move onto another plot when the land he was cultivating became too saline as a consequence of misconceived irrigation and drainage practices. In contrast, the Egyptian peasantry, confined as it has historically been to the Nile Delta and to the thin ribbon of arable land in the Nile Valley, has never had such a manoeuvrability at its disposal. On the contrary, the fellah's very survival more often than not depended on expending all his efforts in order to eke out a living from his fragment of land. Hence the fabled attachment of the Egyptian fellah to the soil, a tradition with which his counterpart in Iraq has remained largely unfamiliar. A second and equally important distinction between the Iraqi and the Egyptian peasantry concerns the former's adherence to the tribal norm which traditionally attributes a low social prestige to vegetable cultivation mainly, it would seem, because of the degree of manual labour it involves. Though manual labour is also generally accorded a low prestige in Egyptian society, rural social stratification has traditionally been based on ascriptive variables (e.g. socio-economic status of kin, extent of land ownership, education, religiosity), rather than on the type of crop per se. While ascriptive variables undoubtedly also play a role in defining the rural social structure in Iraq, it appears that specifically in the central and southern parts of the country, where, up to the recent past, tribal norms prevailed, the traditional mode of agricultural production has tended to be hierarchical: the date palm owner followed by the cereal producer both apparently enjoyed a higher social status compared with those engaged in vegetable cultivation. While this particular tradition is said to have undergone a perceptible change during the
last decade, not least in response to the Iraqi peasantry's increasing contact with the market economy and as a result of the rising standard of living which has contributed to a spiralling urban demand for fresh vegetables, it is nevertheless said to continue to operate as an influential cultural variable with which the Iraqi authorities are forced to grapple. The fact that the bilateral agreement between both countries is said to have stressed the point that the Egyptian peasant settlers should concentrate their efforts predominantly on vegetable cultivation is thus no coincidence. In fact, it is against the background of this socio-economic reality that the Iraqi Government's interest in the resettlement of Egyptian peasants must be mainly viewed.

Egypt comprises an area of some 380,000 square miles, of which only a little over 4% is habitable. Of this habitable area, some 1.5% is permanently settled while 2.5% is allocated to agriculture. Beset by a lack of capital resources and an annual population growth rate of around 2.5%, Egypt's rate of economic development has been unable to keep pace with its population's demands for food, housing and employment opportunities. This trend has above all been conspicuous in the rural sector, where, according to S. Radwan's estimate based on a representative sample of rural households, some 44% of rural families were, in the mid-seventies, existing below the poverty line. Seen from the perspective of the share in total annual consumption expenditure, Radwan further estimated that, during the seventies, the share of the bottom 40 per cent of the rural population was 17 percent, but that of the top 10 per cent alone was 31 per cent. In spite of land reform, land reclamation projects and the establishment of a cooperative system designed to increase agricultural productivity in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution, Egypt's agricultural sector has been unable to provide a substantial segment of its rural population with
even the essential means of subsistence. Though a sharp controversy has emerged between observers of Egypt's rural scene with regard to the extent of unemployment as well as underemployment which traditionally was believed to be an inherent characteristic of the agricultural sector, the fact remains that lack of employment opportunities in the rural sector has remained one of the crucial push factors behind a seemingly ever-increasing rural out-migration. Accurate statistical data depicting this trend are hard to come by. However, C. Parker, for example, has estimated that during the seventies, at least 200,000 rural dwellers were migrating each year to urban centres in search of a livelihood. A more recent estimate of the net annual internal migration flow sets this figure at 400,000. While rural out-migration is not a recent phenomenon in Egypt - i.e. internal migration appears to have been a more or less well established pattern even before World War II as the 1937 population census attests - it is in fact not only the volume of this migration flow but above all its direction beyond Egypt's national boundaries which constitutes a hitherto unknown trend. Up to the 1950s, migration of Egyptians abroad could be described as a trickle rather than as an established pattern. Since then, three distinct periods of migration out of Egypt may be distinguished. A first wave in the aftermath of the nationalization policies pursued by the Egyptian Government in the early 1960s which was followed by a second wave after the 1967 war with Israel. Both these waves were directed to the West (mainly the United States and Canada) and, to a lesser extent, to Australia. However, while the first wave was composed mainly of foreign nationals affected by the nationalization decrees, the second wave involved for the most part Egyptians from the professional class. The third migration wave out of Egypt began to gather momentum after 1973 when the sharp increase in
the price of oil in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war during the same year encouraged a number of Arab oil-exporting countries to embark upon extensive development plans. Since the resultant manpower demands could not be fulfilled by the indigenous labour force, Arab as well as non-Arab workers began to find increasing employment opportunities in these countries. The most important characteristic of this third migration wave is that not only was its direction mainly confined to the Arab oil-exporting countries, but, more significantly, it was not confined solely to the skilled labour and professional categories. Rather, semi-skilled and, to some extent, even unskilled migrants were also finding their way to these countries. However, at the time of the bilateral agreement between Egypt and Iraq in 1975, this third wave was a process which had just begun. In particular, it had not yet encompassed rural Egypt to the extent which was to become a particular characteristic of the late seventies and the established trend by the early 1980s. Those first Egyptian peasant families who responded to the Egyptian Government’s campaign in 1975 calling for volunteers to settle and cultivate land in Iraq were not only largely setting a precedent, but can, in fact, be considered as pioneers insofar as Iraq had hitherto not been one of the main destinations of non-selective migrants out of Egypt.

But the enthusiasm generated by this 1975 bilateral agreement between Egypt and Iraq underwent a rapid deflation not long after the arrival of the first hundred Egyptian peasant settlers in the Khalsa Settlement in 1976. Political differences between both Governments in the aftermath of Egypt’s decision to seek out a separate peace treaty with Israel culminated in the rupture of diplomatic relations. The bilateral agreement was put on ice, so to speak, and the planned resettlement of at least five thousand more Egyptian peasant families
was officially shelved by both sides. Nonetheless, the deteriorating political climate between both Governments did not stem the influx of Egyptian nationals into Iraq. The Egyptian Government adopted the official stance of ignoring the reality that thousands of Egyptians of various skill categories were finding their way into Iraq by using a third Arab country, mainly Jordan, as a convenient transit route. Political differences may have dictated a rupture of diplomatic relations, but economic self-interest could not ignore the at least short-term advantage of exporting the country's unemployment problems and the benefit accruing from the volume of remittances. For its part, the Iraqi Government has been pursuing a deliberate policy of differentiating between Egyptian nationals, whose labour contributions are considered to be invaluable with regard to the implementation of the country's development plans, and the Egyptian regime which had cast aside the ideal of a unified Arab stance against Israel. Here too, economic rationale has tended to outweigh political considerations. Nonetheless, it should be added that, in contrast to the other Arab oil-exporting countries, Iraq pursues a policy which strives to equate Arab aliens with Iraqi nationals.25
Notes to the Introduction

1 As will be more fully detailed in the methodology chapter, none of the Egyptian officials who had been involved with the project of resettling fellaheen in Iraq were found to be forthcoming in granting me access to documents concerned with this scheme. Neither were their Iraqi counterparts able to provide me with a copy of this bilateral agreement. However, for a summary of the pertinent clauses therein, see an unpublished report prepared by the Arab League Council for Economic Unity: Mouzakarah Tabririyyah li-'Amal Mash li-Tagrobat al-Ussar al-Fallahiah al-Misriyah ila al-Gumhuriyah al-'Iraqiah (Explanatory Memorandum for a Survey of the Experiment of the Migration of Egyptian Peasant Families to the Republic of Iraq), (Cairo, no date.)

2 The term peasant is used interchangeably with the Egyptian term fellah (pl. = fellaheen). In my judgement, T. Shanin's definition of a general type of peasantry is the most relevant to the present study: 'The peasant family farm as the basic unit of multi-dimensional social organization. Land husbandry as the main means of livelihood directly providing the major part of the consumption needs. Specific traditional culture related to the way of life of small communities. The underdog position - the domination of peasantry by outsiders'. (Th. Shanin, ed., Peasants and Peasant Societies (London, 1979), pp.14-15. E. Wolf's definition of a peasant as a cultivator who is more concerned with satisfying the needs of the household than with obtaining a profit is, in my judgement, not quite applicable to the Egyptian peasant families in Khalsa, since most of them have ceased to be subsistence farmers, (E. Wolf, Peasants (New Jersey, 1966)). On the other hand, since Khalsa's settler households continue to adhere to a mode of agriculture which is generally labour-intensive rather than capital-intensive, they cannot be defined as post-peasants or farmers in the sense adhered to by F. Gamst, (see Peasants in a Complex Society (New York, 1974)).

3 While the Iraqi Government publicly favours the mechanization of the agricultural sector in conjunction with the establishment of state farms at the expense of private farming, in fact, as R. Springborg writes, there are signs '...that none of these countries (i.e. Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Syria and Iraq) is going to put all of its eggs in one basket and adopt a single land tenure system for their reclaimed areas. Instead, each appears to be purposely mixing state farms, agribusinesses, agrarian reform cooperatives and even family farms in those areas recently won back from desert or swamps. While there are, of course, economic rationales for such experimentation, the underlying political factor of the relative weakness of authoritarian, patrimonial political systems ... forces most political leaders to appease various segments of their publics by adopting several policies on the same issue'. See: 'New Patterns of Agrarian Reform in the Middle East and North Africa', in Middle East Journal, Vol.31 (1977), p.141.

The Iraqi authorities appear to have implicitly recognized the incentive of private farming, since the Khalsa Settlement was, from the very start, designed to become a community of small landholders.

4 Information obtained during interviews with various Egyptian and Iraqi officials concerned with this resettlement scheme.


My translation of the Arabic: 'Al-fallah al-Masry fi al-'Iraq layssa mouhageran, wa innama houwah mouwaten taghayyar mahal ikamatih. Saytahtaden hawd Diglah wa al-Fourat abna' al-Neel bikul al-hobb allazi nahmalahou lil-Neel zatihi'. (Also quoted in H. Badry, Fallah Misr fi Ard al-'Iraq (The Egyptian Peasant on Iraqi Soil), (Baghdad, no date).


Ibid., p.47.


R.A. Fernea, Shaykh and Effendi, op.cit., p.41.

Iraqi informants familiar with the rural scene explained that, traditionally, the palm date owner would not give his daughter in marriage to the son of a vegetable cultivator. Though other social stratification considerations undoubtedly also play a role (see H. Batatu, op.cit.), my informants' awareness of this particular tradition seems to me to be of interest since it indicates the fact that this hierarchical notion can be traced to the not too distant past.

17 Ibid., p.3.


19 Ibid., p.47.

20 See M. Clawson et al., *The Agricultural Potential of the Middle East* (New York, 1971), in particular pp.48-51 which present an interesting summary of this controversy.


25 To my knowledge, Iraq remains the only Arab country which offers non-Iraqi Arab residents the chance of acquiring the citizenship of the host country. Iraq as well as Jordan are also the only Arab countries which do not demand work permits from Arab nationals as a pre-condition for entering the country. See J.S. Birks et al., 'Who is Migrating Where? An Overview of International Labour Migration in the Arab World', in A. Richards and P. Martin, eds., *Migration, Mechanization and Agricultural Labour Markets in Egypt* (Cairo: American University in Cairo, 1983).
PART I: THEORY AND PRACTICE

Chapter 1: Theoretical Aspects and Focus of the Study

My interest in studying the Khalsa Settlement in Iraq was kindled by a number of considerations. To begin with, I had become interested in rural development in that part of the Arab World with which I was the most familiar. What eventually became a sociological concern with the dynamics of rural society had been fed by an awareness of the difference between my social world as a Cairean and that of the Egyptian fellaheen of whose life experiences, as I came to realize, I had only a very fragmented view. Through the study of agricultural cooperatives and their functions particularly in the Third World, I more or less stumbled into the topic of new human settlements. It was thus almost inevitable that the Khalsa Settlement should attract my attention during a trip to Iraq in 1976. A further factor which encouraged my interest in this particular resettlement project is my Arab perspective which to a great extent has been influenced by a German university education stressing the importance of European economic ties as a prerequisite to the elimination of conflicts between the West-European states. Khalsa and other similar settlement schemes might, I hope, play a part in furthering economic ties between Arab states and thus perhaps contribute to a lessening of conflicts between them. The novelty of the Khalsa Settlement lay in the fact that peasant families were being resettled in another Arab country at a considerable geographical distance from their home villages. In addition, the host country did not regard these settlers as temporary migrants come to amass some savings before returning to their country of origin as is generally the pattern in most of the Arab labour-importing states. Rather, they were viewed as one important and, it was hoped, permanent bridge between societies perceived to be linked by a common regional history, culture and language.
1.1 A Theoretical Framework

It was, in fact, the Iraqi authorities' official view of the permanency of this resettlement scheme which to some extent influenced my decision to focus on the aspects of social organization and community development in the Khalsa Settlement. A further consideration was the fact that, to my knowledge, no studies have been published on the social relationships of Egyptian migrant communities in the Arab labour-importing countries. Instead, the hitherto published studies generally focus on economic and demographic aspects of this trend. In addition came the realization that Egypt's relatively important resettlement experiences over the past three decades appear to have generated surprisingly little interest in the in-depth study of the community-building process specifically in new settlements which, as in Khalsa, have grouped settlers from different localities and provinces in Egypt. In contrast to many of the studies published on the involuntary resettlement of the Nubians as a consequence of the Aswan High Dam, much of the material available on voluntary resettlement projects in Egypt is concerned with the initial adaptation process rather than providing an analysis of the variables which may or may not contribute to the social cohesiveness of newly created communities. Even the relatively comprehensive study carried out by H. Tadros in new settlements in the North-Western Nile Delta confines itself to presenting general data on the type of community which has developed.

However, my interest in the social organization of voluntary settlements was essentially also fed by a sociological training in the functionalist tradition. This approach was to a certain extent encouraged by the functionalist perspective pervading much of the literature on the rural Middle East, although, as I came to realize,
it is this very perspective which has become controversial since it is believed to account for the surprising paucity of anthropological research on villages and peasantry in the Arab Middle East (the implications of which will be taken up later).5

Thus, prior to embarking on the actual field-work for the present study, the focus of my interest revolved around the following questions: What type of community have these Egyptian peasant households founded in Khalsa? Have the geographical remoteness of the home villages as well as the fact of being transplanted in a relatively alien socio-economic environment encouraged some social cohesiveness, regardless of the settler families' heterogeneous regional origins? Is the value system which it is assumed these peasant families have in common - given their socio-economic origin from the stratum of poor peasants in Egypt - a sufficient basis upon which to build a cohesive community? Will the settler families continue to adhere to this value system as a reaction against being transplanted into a setting which, cultural similarities between Iraq and Egypt notwithstanding, must in many respects seem alien?

As a first step, it seemed pertinent to attempt to define the term community. One conceptual framework of community which is particularly applicable to the focus of my study involves three aspects: the relative concentration of households in a delimited geographical area, a certain degree of social interaction between the households and a sense of belonging which transcends consanguine ties.6 Implicit in the first aspect of this definition is the issue of group size, a variable which R. Antoun, for example, perceives to be relatively neglected despite Simmel's research on the relationship between quantitative membership and group structure.7 Group size has important implications for the scope of face-to-face contacts and the nature of ties
(personal/impersonal) in a community and therefore for the degree of social interaction which is the second aspect of the above definition of community. The third aspect, a sense of belonging, is to a large extent dependent on a host of values and norms which community members hold in common. This in turn implies the existence of specific mechanisms to ensure that community norms are not subject to any serious deviations. Group size is also of relevance here since it has implications for community surveillance and thus for the effectiveness of sanctions ensuring compliance.

Turning to the Egyptian peasants in Khalsa, one may first observe that, compared to the average Egyptian village, this Settlement which was designed to house one hundred settler families, is indeed relatively small. The physical space of which Khalsa is composed could thus be expected to facilitate the process of familiarization between households originating from different localities and regions in Egypt. Furthermore, an intensification of social interaction between settler households seemed to me more than plausible given the following facts: First, the settler families' similar post-migratory experiences - i.e. an understandable fear of migration, the geographical remoteness of the home village, a new and relatively alien socio-economic setting, the almost inevitable social isolation during the initial phase after resettlement, the Iraqi authorities' expectation that they would not be subsistence farmers but produce for the market with all the challenges this denotes - all seemed to me to contribute to the likelihood that Khalsa's settler households would develop a sense of identification with the Settlement of which they have become a physical part. Second, though the variable of regional origin is no doubt important as the discussion of distinctions within rural Egypt will subsequently illustrate, one could nevertheless expect Khalsa's settler families to
have similar socio-economic backgrounds given the fact that they have supposedly been recruited from the stratum of poor peasants in Egypt. If, moreover, one accepts the evidence that rural migrants generally tend to recreate a replica of the life they have left behind, then this would lend credence to the assumption that Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families will tend to view and deal with one another largely on the basis of the value system which used to dictate their way of life prior to resettlement. However, the intensification of social interaction based on an adherence to common values and norms and the homogeneity of economic activities within the Settlement does not in itself imply that a settler family has necessarily formed a commitment to the new community of which it has become a physical part. Rather, the crucial point would be the acknowledgement of the social mechanisms designed to regulate behaviour of community members and their effectiveness in guarding against serious deviations from those social norms perceived to be important. In other words, it is the existence of what Antoun refers to as a 'community of social control' which is indicative of the extent of social integration and cohesiveness in the Khalsa Settlement.

Though Antoun's concern revolves essentially around the hypothesis that the boundaries of political competition at the village level are dependent on the number of communities of social control, some of the variables he puts forward to determine the latter are to some extent relevant to the context of my research focus. Briefly, the author singles out a number of variables which he regards as reflecting the existence of either one, or two, or several communities of social control or, alternatively, the possibility that no such community may exist. These variables include: ideology, spatial relations, status differences, marriage patterns, sociability, sanctions and leadership.
The particular nature of the Khalsa Settlement in the sense that it has been established by a governmental authority rather than being created through a historical process as well as its relative youth seemed to me to cancel the applicability of ideology or a myth of common descent at this stage. However, it remained to be discovered during the field-research whether or not settler households bound by kinship bonds had in fact formed distinct, spatially segregated groupings. The incidence of marriages discovered during the preliminary survey for the present study (carried out in 1979) and which by all accounts involve members of settler households who are neither kin nor had known each other prior to resettlement seemed to me a promising indication of the process of identification with the Khalsa Settlement. However, this too was a tentative conclusion since it could not be ruled out that these unions have come about as a result of the geographical remoteness of the home village as well as of the social isolation in which Khalsa seemed to exist at the time of the preliminary survey. The variable of status differentiation seemed to me also ambiguous at this stage. For, in spite of the fact that all the settler households are supposedly pursuing the same occupation, own more or less equal plots of land and have equal access to the social and health services provided by the Iraqi authorities, differences in productivity levels may well have induced differences in the material wealth accumulated since resettlement. But again, only the field-research would indicate whether and to what extent status and prestige function as relevant symbols in the Settlement. Whatever the case, this would have important implications for the formation and effectiveness of leadership as well as for the scope of the visiting network. Finally, given the assumption that the Egyptian peasant families share a more or less common value system and that, moreover, the latter continues to function as a frame of reference after resettlement, then
the consensus regarding the importance of valued social norms would be reflected by the effectiveness of a number of social sanctions ensuring conformity.

These deliberations led to the formulation of the following main hypothesis of the present study:

The Egyptian settler families' similar backgrounds, their common post-migratory experiences together with the geographical remoteness of their villages of origin all contribute to the possible development of a single community of social control in the Khalsa Settlement.

However, during the process of field-work, I gradually came to realize that I had unconsciously tended to accept the consensus approach implicit in Antoun's functionalist model, a perspective which emphasizes stability and continuity of the social system. More important, I also discovered that this model was inadequate for understanding the implications of the developments which have taken place in the Khalsa Settlement. This realization was fed by my exposure to data which I was collecting in addition to that perceived necessary for the focus of my study. I believed that an understanding of the manner in which variables of social control do or do not function in Khalsa demands, as a first step, a descriptive analysis of the Egyptian peasant families' way of life after resettlement. Specifically, the manner in which the settler households organize their social and economic activities, might provide insight into the adaptive strategies to which a settler household has resorted in order to deal with the demands and challenges of its new way of life after resettlement.

My interest in these adaptive strategies was largely fed by a number of arguments put forward by H. Rosenfeld in his 'Overview and
Critique of the Literature on Rural Politics and Social Change'.

The author's criticism of the structural dichotomy implicit in much of the published ethnographic and sociological research on the rural Middle East seemed to me of particular interest to the context of the present study. Briefly, Rosenfeld disagrees with a school of thought which adheres to the implicit belief that rural and urban are polar opposites and which '... tends to place one structure (village) against the other (urban, state) ... [without explaining] ... the meaning of the state or urban structures ... [or] ... why structures beyond the village represent social change while those of the village represent conservatism'.

Ethnographers tend to advocate that '... where the path to social change is blocked, the barrier is the culture- and structure-bound nature of the village ...', while sociologists generally tend to attribute this to] ... the traditional villagers' lack of 'psychic mobility'.'

Rosenfeld faults these theorists for their failure to take into account the fact that the non-acceptance of innovations at the village level may essentially be due to lack of resources, for example capital and technical know-how. In his view, it is the peasantry's general backwardness rather than conservatism or the rural psyche per se which in effect thwarts change.

The above is also largely expounded by I. Roxborough in his presentation of 'Theories of Underdevelopment'. Analyzing peasant conservatism and resistance to change and innovation, the author advocates the belief '... that the presence of market opportunities is not in itself sufficient to induce peasants to adopt new crops or new technologies which would increase their income and, simultaneously, greatly raise agricultural productivity; [rather], ... the slow rate of diffusion of innovations ... [is due] ... to the high element of risk attached'.

...
It seemed to me of interest to discover the applicability or otherwise of such views in the case of the Egyptian peasant families resettled in Khalsa. If a subjective cost-benefit analysis of the risks involved in undertaking a new venture is indeed a main obstacle, then, according to my reasoning, this was one element with which Khalsa's settler households were not confronted, at least during the early post-resettlement phase. Their initial fears based on a traditional mistrust of government officials and a history of largely unfulfilled promises were to some extent reduced by the authorities' shouldering of all resettlement expenses. Furthermore, upon arrival in the Settlement, each family was presented with a house, a plot of land which, if optimally cultivated, would provide an income well above the household's subsistence needs, and, finally, a monthly cash allowance to help ease the inevitable strains of the initial period after resettlement. How would the Egyptian peasant families who, by all accounts, originate from the poor peasant stratum, respond to the economic opportunities which have come their way after resettlement? Could the widely held belief among theorists of change that the poorest stratum or "... the lowest socio-economic groups are usually the poorest candidates for change" have any applicability after all? In other words, is a reduction of risk involvement in itself sufficient or does it also require a personality with what may be termed as a 'risk taking ability'?20

The data which I set out to collect in order to illustrate the manner in which Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families have adapted to their new way of life after resettlement, but which I had essentially believed to be of secondary importance to the focus of my study, in effect served to re-orient my research interest during the process of field-work. This re-orientation was largely fed by the realization
that while the variables of social control may provide me with some insight into the type of community which has evolved in Khalsa, the functionalist model I was applying was not in itself adequate to explain why a particular community and none other had come into being in the Settlement. It did not occur to me at the outset that it was these very adaptive strategies, which the Egyptian peasant households had adopted in order to cope with their new way of life, which were in fact of primary importance to an understanding of what was happening in the Khalsa Settlement. In other words, this re-orientation encouraged me not to restrict myself to a static model of community but instead to adopt a dynamic approach to the process of social change.

However, in order to grasp the scope of the Egyptian peasant families' reactions to the demands and challenges of their new way of life after resettlement, it seemed to me pertinent to attempt to establish the broad outlines of their socio-economic backgrounds and of the villages in Egypt from which they were recruited.

1.2 The Contemporary Egyptian Village:
The Multiplicity of its Socio-Economic Setting

Up to the recent past, various anthropological as well as sociological studies on the Middle East have generally tended to fall prey to ideal stereotypes of population groups - such as nomads, peasants, urbanites - where, according to J. Gulick, the oversimplified classifications are accepted as objective facts instead of treating them as some of the '... distinctive features of pastoralism, villages and cities respectively'. In fact, the very inter-dependence between these three population groups in the Arab World '... makes it very difficult to neatly characterize the ... typical traits ... except in very general ways', a realization which is being increasingly dealt with in recent literature on the Middle East. The problem of
generalization is not only a constraint insofar as, for example, comparative research on Arab peasantry is concerned.\textsuperscript{23} As a result of the great variety in village patterns, it is more often than not untenable to regard one village study as being representative of rural society within one Arab country.\textsuperscript{24}

In the specific case of Egypt, where the Nile Delta in the North represents the biggest concentration of villages in the Middle East, there is the added problem that surprisingly little anthropological research appears to have been undertaken. As previously mentioned, this dearth is to some extent a by-product of the influence of functionalism and its perspective of the social system. D. Eickelman, for example, believes that as functionalism '... requires that societies be treated as closed societies, ... it appeared to account better for relatively simple, small-scale societies ... [rather] ... than the large-scale, historically known societies ... typically encountered in the Middle East'.\textsuperscript{25} However, there is the added problem that most of the sociological studies carried out in rural Egypt over the past few decades also tend to adhere to the implicit assumption that, bar a few explicitly referred to exceptions, the data compiled is generally also applicable to other village settings. In fact, it is apparently only during the past decade or so that social scientists interested in Egyptian rural society have come to realize that H. Ayrout's near-famous remark in the 1930s that 'Nothing is more like one Egyptian village than another Egyptian village' is a fallacy which unfortunately has for decades influenced concepts of the socio-economic scene in rural Egypt.\textsuperscript{26}

The paucity of published anthropological and, to some extent, sociological material on rural Egypt is reflected by the fact that, for example, H. Ammar's study of an Upper Egyptian village in the early
1950s continues to remain one of the most quoted accounts of Upper Egyptian village social life and norms. J. Berque's *Histoire Sociale d'un Village Egyptien au XXème Siècle* (1957) can be said to play a similar role with regard to Lower Egypt. Even such classics as W. Blackman's *The Fellahen of Upper Egypt* (1927) or H. Ayrout's *The Egyptian Peasant* (1938), both descriptive rather than analytical accounts of rural Egypt, continue to find their way into recently compiled bibliographies. More recent publications and studies are either limited in their comparability, or tend to focus on one or more specific socio-political or socio-economic aspects of rural Egypt (for example rural local government, or land reform and its implications, or rural health issues, or rural-urban migration, or the influence of mass-media) or, finally, belong to the realm of social history studies. In addition, there is a conspicuous regional bias with regard to the location of sociological and anthropological studies on rural Egypt. The majority have been carried out in Lower Egypt and to a much lesser extent in Upper Egypt, while Middle Egypt remains a largely neglected field.

What then are the differentiating variables which must be taken into account when attempting to present generalizations about the contemporary Egyptian village? To begin with, there is a general regional variation between Lower, Middle and Upper Egypt which must be kept in mind, the most important aspects of which are the following:

- A myth of common descent continues to play a relatively significant role in the villages south of Cairo as compared with Lower Egypt except in the case of sedentarized bedouins. In the latter region, consanguine institutions have experienced a general degeneration, though consanguine norms largely continue to
function as an ideal. In addition, Middle and Upper Egyptian villages generally tend to be more strife-ridden compared with those north of the capital.

- Women in Middle and Upper Egypt generally do not work on the land, though they are expected to carry out certain tasks during the harvesting periods. No such cultural restraint exists in Lower Egypt except in the case of sedentarized bedouins who tend to stress their distinction from the indigenous peasantry of the Nile Valley. However, the seclusion of the Lower Egyptian village woman is generally an indication of higher social status in village society.

- Rural-urban migration has a longer history in Lower Egypt compared to the provinces south of Cairo. Traditionally, migration in the former has been of the family-type, while in the latter two regions it was generally confined to males.

- Modernization and its many influences have spread earlier in the Nile Delta compared to Middle and Upper Egypt respectively. This is as much a result of Lower Egypt's proximity to the administrative capital as it is due to this region's more intensive contact with new ideas brought in by the many foreign conquerors who have come and gone.

- Cash crops and the shift from basin to perennial irrigation were introduced over a century ago into Lower Egypt. This transformation began to take hold in Middle Egypt around the turn of the present century while in Upper Egypt it was only completed in
the 1960s. The influence of this transformation on the organization of agricultural production has also left its impact on village social organization.

- There has also been a traditional variation with regard to crop types. For example, sugar cane cultivation was generally confined to the provinces of Upper Egypt, while rice was predominantly a Lower Egyptian crop. However, with the crop rotation system and other policy measures introduced in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution as well as the increasing spread of such non-traditional crops as fruit and vegetables, this distinction has been gradually losing its significance.

- Finally, Lower Egyptian villages generally have large populations and are more likely to be structured into quarters and factions, while those south of Cairo tend to be fragmented varying between '...the polynucleated type of village strung out along the edge of the desert and cultivated areas and those composed of a chain of closely adjacent hamlets'. Upper Egyptian villages are also more likely to have remnants of tribal structure due to the history of their establishment.

In addition to the regional variations, there are also differences between villages within the same province. One of the most important variables in the classification of village types is size which has a number of important implications. For example, larger villages are more likely to have a wide range of social services such as a school, a health clinic, a cooperative, perhaps a market serving the adjacent
area, a village bank and a post office. Larger villages are also more likely to be socially stratified due to a relatively higher percentage of non-peasant occupations and will tend to have more direct contact with the administrative centre since they are more likely to have an elected village council and a police station. By contrast, smaller villages will tend to continue to be administered by the traditional 'umdah (the government representative at the village level). Another important variable is the type of crop predominantly cultivated, since this has important implications for the degree to which a village is integrated in the market economy as well as for the extent of the required labour inputs for example.51 There is, furthermore, the variable of land ownership and its distribution to be taken into account, since this would have important implications for village social structure (egalitarian versus hierarchical).52 Such variables as type of leadership, political blocs and the existence of clear class distinctions also have important implications for village social organization.53

Though by no means exhaustive, the above review suggests the main variables which underline the truism that rural Egypt is neither socially nor economically homogeneous. Nevertheless, it should not be taken as a denial of the fact that there are a number of factors which Egyptian villages can be expected to have in common, albeit to differing extents. After all, in contrast to a number of Arab countries in this geographical area, Egypt has historically never been divided into ethnic components. The majority of the inhabitants of the Nile Delta and Valley share a common history, language and culture, a pattern which has undoubtedly been intensified through the common experiences in the aftermath of the 1952 Revolution and the socio-economic transformation this has engendered in Egyptian society.54
In spite of their heterogeneous regional origins, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families can therefore be expected to share a number of cultural values and traditions which identify them as rural dwellers and fellaheen.

Though social organization, which is a main focus of the present study, happens to be one topic in particular need of research insofar as the contemporary Egyptian village is concerned, I have in the following nonetheless made the attempt to present a broad outline of Egyptian village society. Given the paucity of the present state of sociological knowledge of contemporary rural Egypt, this must obviously be regarded as a tentative outline during the reading of which the above mentioned regional variations and intra-regional differentiations must be kept in mind. This general overview covering a number of aspects which the Egyptian peasant families in Khalsa can plausibly be expected to have experienced, albeit in varying degrees prior to their resettlement, is to my mind a necessary step contributing to an understanding of my research findings in the Settlement.

To begin with, the contemporary Egyptian village can generally be divided into a minority of haves and a majority of have-nots. Around 97% of Egyptian villagers were, in the mid-sixties, i.e. a little over a decade after the 1952 Revolution, estimated to have been living precariously near the recognized poverty line. A decade later, nearly 44% of Egyptian villagers were believed to be existing below this line. By 1972, landless peasants were thought to represent around 45% of Egypt's rural population.

However, it is not ownership of land per se but in fact the actual land tenure system as well as mode of agricultural production which are among the main factors by which the fellah's social standing and economic position in the village community is defined. Some 70% of
all agricultural landowners in Egypt were estimated by the mid-seventies to own one feddan* or less, a quota which is said to have undergone little change since. This group of fellaheen is unable to eke out a living from its land alone and is inevitably forced to take up wage-labour whenever such an opportunity presents itself. Peasants owning between 2-5 feddans, and specifically those among them who became the beneficiaries of the land reform law of five feddans per family (later reduced to 2-3 feddans) are mostly subsistence farmers who rely on family labour and traditional agricultural tools as well as draft animals. The crop rotation system enforced by the authorities is particularly disadvantageous to this group. The relatively limited size of its plots, in addition to the lack of capital, inhibits the introduction of mechanization conducive to the increase of agricultural productivity. There is also the fact that this group of landowners has, over the time, been affected by the negative aspects of population increase and land fragmentation due to the continuing adherence to the Muslim inheritance code. The group of peasants owning between 5 and 20 feddans have, in the long run, been the main beneficiaries of the land reform programmes because of their financial ability to purchase land released by the law enforcing a ceiling of 100 feddans per family (subsequently reduced to 50 feddans in 1969). They are also in a position to employ wage-labour, introduce a certain level of mechanization and concentrate on the more lucrative cash crops. Finally there is the category of landowners owning plots of between 20 and 50 feddans which, in fact, is the rich stratum in the contemporary Egyptian village. The size of its land has enabled this group to benefit from an economies of scale conducive to enhancing agricultural productivity and output.

* One Egyptian feddan is 1.038 acres.
Already by the mid-seventies, some 6% of all agricultural landowners with plots between 5 and 50 feddans were estimated to own 40% of all agricultural land in Egypt. Nearly two decades after the Revolution and the introduction of land reform, the Egyptian Government in its 'Programme for National Reconstruction' (1971) acknowledged that the living standard of the majority of the fellahaen in Egypt had not experienced any great change, either in the mode of agricultural production, or in housing, health and nutrition, or in the educational level. Though there is recent evidence to suggest that rural Egypt has been undergoing a more or less significant social and economic transformation during the past few years due, in part, to the spreading mechanization as well as the relatively large-scale migration of Egyptian villagers to the oil-rich countries in the region, the fact which is of interest in the context of the present study is that the above illustration was more or less valid at the time Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families were resettled in 1976.

The village community is basically hierarchically structured, i.e. men rank above women, elders above youth and the educated above the illiterate. Though recent evidence appears to suggest that migration, for example, has had some impact on traditional notions of status and prestige, the latter nevertheless largely continue to be ascribed rather than achieved. As such, status remains to some extent dependent on membership in a family of influence over village affairs, though it is also measured in terms of life-style, material wealth and the differential access to qualitatively better educational and health services. The village community is also largely divided into the social world of men and that of women. The fellah's center of communication and leisure-time activities is the present-day equivalent of the traditional guest-house (for example the village coffee-shop or the
social centre), while the home is generally avoided except for the satisfaction of his physical needs. Whether or not they work on the land, the house is the women's domain. The fellaha's information network is based on a web of kin and friendship ties reinforced by formal (life-cycle ceremonies) and informal (for example, baking, fetching water, washing on the bank of the river or canal) gatherings. A further dimension of this female network is women's role as the main perpetuators of folk-religion and non-Islamic rituals such as the zar cult and the worship of local patron saints.70

Though the ties of kinship remain the basic foundation of the village community,71 there appears to be no institutionalized economic cooperation between its members. However, unity and support are expected at the very least during life-cycle ceremonies and conflict situations.72 Implicit in kinship terminology - there are separate terms for father's and mother's kin - is the differentiation of kinship relationships which in turn dictate the scope of obligations, duties, rights as well as affective attachments.73 The Egyptian villager has few merely neutral relationships.74 However, though family authority is hierarchically structured, its validity is being gradually eroded by the decreasing possibility of land inheritance, with the growing importance of peer-groups strengthened in part by the compulsory, though by no means universally enforced, school attendance, by the settlement pattern where population pressure and land scarcity combine to spatially divide families from their kin (house neighbors are not necessarily cognates or affines), and, finally, by migration and employment opportunities outside the village. However, in the absence of or because of the differential access to governmental social services, the peasant family's kin and, to some extent, its circle of friends and neighbours continue to function as
the main social support institutions. Thus, for those who dwell in it and participate in its social affairs, the village and its community continue to dictate the scope and effectiveness of the mechanisms of social control such as economic sanctions, gossip or social isolation for example.

Due to a historically strong central government (stemming to some extent from the mode of agricultural production and the maintenance of irrigation networks in the Nile Valley), no feudal power structure in the European sense has ever been a feature of rural Egypt. But this central authority also led to a developed bureaucracy which, in former times, was represented at the village level by the tax-collector, the landlord-agent and the officially appointed 'umdah. The latter with the aid of shuyukh al-balad (sing. shaykh al-balad) representing the different village factions, was traditionally responsible to the central government for the maintenance of law and order needed to ensure tax collection, conscription and the efficient functioning and maintenance of the irrigation networks. Mainly out of fear of losing his position, the 'umdah tended to be generally ruthless in enforcing the laws ensuring public security. This traditional village leadership system, though its power became curtailed by the 'umdah law of 1964, continues to operate in many villages which are either not large enough or important enough to justify the establishment of a village council. Most Egyptian villages or cluster of hamlets also either have a multipurpose cooperative or a land reform cooperative (in some cases even both), depending on the pattern of agriculture prior to the introduction of land reforms. In conjunction with the village banks, these cooperatives have assumed a number of functions in the organization of agricultural production at the village level but also provide "... the continuity for some of the
institutions and procedures within the village for handling collective
decisions, dispute settlements etc.'\textsuperscript{80} Though those owning and/or
holding more than five feddans may not exceed one fifth of the member-
ship of the cooperative board, neither the latter nor the village
councils have perceptibly enhanced the poor peasant stratum's ability
to influence village affairs.\textsuperscript{81} For the law defining as peasant all
landowners with up to 25 feddans, in addition to stipulating literacy
as a condition of candidacy in the village council, has in effect meant
that politics at the village level remains largely under the influence
of the traditional local leadership.\textsuperscript{82} The ubiquity and historical
Persistence of a segment of rural influentials is ... [thus] ... the
characteristic political-sociological feature of modern Egypt ... [though] ... their power is usually local, their solidarity cultural,
and their political aspirations oriented to the micromicromocratic'\textsuperscript{83}
However, whatever the extent of the influence of the post-Revolution
institutions and organizations in rural Egypt, the traditional Egyptian
village largely continues to adhere to its own set of cultural values
and traditions for enforcing public order. This system of \textit{urf}
(customary) law tends to exist at the same time as the established law
of the central government,\textsuperscript{84} a pertinent example of which is the
blood-feud.

Keeping the aforementioned regional distinctions and local
variations in mind, this then is, broadly speaking, the socio-economic
setting in the villages which Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families left
behind at the time they were resettled in Iraq in 1976.
Chapter 2: Methodology and Problems of Field-Work
from the Perspective of an Arab Female Researcher

The experiences of social scientists during field-research are not only a function of the particular methodology applied during the process of data collection. They are also influenced by a host of variables - political, economic, social, cultural and/or psychological - which, each in their way, tend to leave their mark. Yet, up to the recent past, published research has all too often allocated minimal, if any, space to the subjective aspects of field-work. Instead, authors have tended to present their research findings in a vacuum more or less divorced from the identity of the researcher. The reader generally fails to appreciate the tortuous route which may have had to be negotiated during data collection and the impact of this experience on the research findings. The growing realization of the importance of this gap has, however, gradually encouraged social scientists to refer to the personal aspects of their field-work trials.

The present chapter will attempt to follow in these footsteps by presenting a description of my personal experiences during the process of studying the Khalsa Settlement and the extent to which these came to influence the scope of my findings. For the purpose of analysis, these experiences - which are to some extent culture-bound in the sense of being more or less typical of field-research in Arab society - will be divided into three spheres. The first will deal with the political aspects of field-work in Egypt and Iraq and the bureaucratic red tape which needed to be disentangled. The second part will deal with the perception of my gender role in the host culture and the manner in which this affected my mobility. The third will describe my choice of research methodology and the extent to which it had to be modified to take account of the realities encountered in the field.
2.1 Impediments to Field-Research in the Arab World: Politics and Bureaucracy

My first trip to Egypt in connection with the present study took place in the Winter 1978/79. Though the Egyptian media during this period clearly indicated the rising political tensions between Egypt and most of the Arab World as a result of President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, the Khalsa Settlement appeared by all accounts to have remained unaffected. Convinced that the obvious economic advantages of this resettlement scheme would encourage the authorities concerned to ensure its continuity, I set about contacting those who had been involved in this project.

Officials at the Ministry of Agriculture in Cairo informed me that they had not been directly involved in the planning of this resettlement scheme, other than instructing local rural cooperatives in the various provinces to spread the word about this migration possibility. I was referred to the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, specifically to the Director of the Social Research Unit. Since I was oblivious of the fact that any research undertaking needed to be officially sanctioned - I assumed this only applied to foreigners and not to Egyptian nationals - I simply asked about the way to this Director's office. Though my name was written down in the visitor's book, no one at the Labour and Social Affairs Ministry's reception desk thought of asking me about the purpose of my visit. The Director received me with every cordiality - I had, by way of an introduction, mentioned the name of the official at the Ministry of Agriculture who had sent me - and proceeded to explain to me the role of his Unit in the planning and execution of this particular resettlement scheme. Though he conceded that this had been in coordination with Maktab
Shuoun al-Fellaheen (Office for Peasants' Affairs) and that a Joint Preparatory Committee had been set up for this purpose, he nevertheless made a point of stressing that, in fact, it was his own office which had been wholly responsible for all aspects related to the Khalsa project. My request to view any documentation related to the latter led to the Director's discovery that I had not come equipped with the necessary security clearance. My belief that being an Egyptian national would simplify the procedure of obtaining this clearance was quickly shattered by the attitude of the Ministry's security officials to whom the Director sent me. They not only wished to know why I was interested in studying this subject in particular, but made a point of hinting that travel to Iraq was really not advisable for Egyptians. I was further informed that the clearance I was requesting might take weeks. (In fact, I never received it up to my departure from Cairo at the beginning of February 1979.) However, though the above mentioned Director categorically refused to let me view any relevant material, he nevertheless agreed to have an 'informal chat' with me about the Khalsa project. This conversation reinforced the impression I had gained during my contacts with the Ministry's security officials, namely that the political freeze between Egypt and Iraq had not left the bureaucratic apparatus unaffected. For the Director made a point of stressing that there were 'certain rumours' that the Egyptian peasant families in the Khalsa Settlement were not being well treated by the Iraqi authorities. In fact, a number of these families had decided to return to Egypt, which was the real reason why the Egyptian Government had decided to shelve the idea of resettling any more peasants.

At the Office for Peasants' Affairs I met one of the officials who had been a member of the Preparatory Committee referred to above. Though he insisted that all documentation concerned with the Khalsa
project was kept in the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, he was nevertheless more than forthcoming in raking his memory for my benefit. His direct involvement in the planning and even execution of this project was not only confirmed by the details he was able to give me about the Preparatory Committee's activities, but also by his vivid descriptions of, for example, how potential settlers were selected, the lengths the authorities had to resort to in allaying their fears, the travel preparations and the confusion over lost or non-existent certificates. He brushed aside the rumours reported to me by the above mentioned Director. According to this official, the latter had been only minimally involved in the planning and execution of the Khalsa project and thus could not know that those families who had returned had been sent back by the Iraqi authorities because of their lack of agricultural experience. However, he conceded that plans for the migration of other Egyptian peasant families to Iraq had been temporarily shelved following instructions 'from above' (presumably the Presidency). Nevertheless, this official was convinced that, eventually, this resettlement scheme would be resumed.

The impact of the deteriorating diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iraq was further documented during my visit to the National Centre for Social and Criminological Research in Cairo. In 1977, this Centre had joined the National Research Centre in Baghdad in carrying out a study in the Khalsa Settlement which had involved the application of a questionnaire to all male settlers. However, up to January 1979 the data collected supposedly remained unprocessed and I was informed that the study was being shelved due to 'problems' between the two countries.

Having heard that in 1977 the Arab League Education and Cultural Office, specifically its Institute for Arab Studies and Research, had
formed a Joint Committee with the Council for Arab Economic Unity for the purpose of monitoring the Khalsa project, I made an appointment to see the Director of this Institute. He informed me that though this project was regarded as an important example of regional economic cooperation between two Arab League member states, in fact the Committee's progress had been hampered by a lack of cooperation between its members and that the plan to monitor the Khalsa Settlement had not yet been put into effect. \(^8^8\) The visit I had planned to make to the Council for Arab Economic Unity to verify this information had to be indefinitely postponed since the official I was to meet turned out to be one of a number of Iraqi nationals expelled by the Egyptian Government for supposedly subversive activities. Realizing that the political climate prevailing at the time had not left even the Arab League bureaucracy untouched, I decided temporarily to shelve my efforts to obtain any more information about the Khalsa project.

A second trip to Egypt in January 1980 in order to supplement the meagre results attained the previous year was just as disappointing. The Camp David agreement between Egypt and Israel (concluded in the Autumn of 1979), had politically further isolated Egypt from the rest of the Arab World. \(^8^9\) Direct flights between Egypt and Iraq, which had enabled me to travel from Cairo to Baghdad at the beginning of February 1979, had since been suspended. At the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs I was informed of the need for a renewed application to obtain a security clearance (the previous one could not be traced). More perturbing to my mind were the thinly disguised hints by a number of government officials to the effect that it would really be advisable to study something else. Some even hinted that there might be 'consequences' if I should proceed with my research activities in Iraq. Given the political tensions between the two countries, I had no reason
to disbelieve them. Unfortunately, I did not at the time realize that, as previously mentioned, an ever increasing number of temporary migrant workers were quietly making their way to Iraq - mainly via Jordan - and that the Egyptian Government was turning a convenient blind eye towards this trend. Convinced that this second trip would not yield much more than had the first one, I decided to be content with the verbal information I had been able to obtain about the Khalsa project.

The first trip to Baghdad in connection with my study took place in February 1979. I not only wanted to carry out a preliminary survey of the Khalsa Settlement in order to make a final decision about the focus of my study, but also to attempt to pinpoint the necessary procedure for obtaining research permission. In my favour - so I was convinced - was the fact that I had chosen to study a project which by all accounts enjoyed the approval of the Iraqi authorities. However, as I should have expected, this did not in itself necessarily facilitate the procedure of securing a research permit. This difficulty was overcome through the activation of personal contacts.

Upon receiving the necessary recommendations (which also served as a security clearance), officials at the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform in Baghdad granted me permission to visit the Khalsa Settlement and were kind enough to provide me with a car. While this welcome arrangement helped solve numerous problems, including my transport, it had the disadvantage that my visits to the Settlement had to take place during the Ministry's working hours. However, my initial worry as to how the settler families would perceive my arrival in official company as it were, turned out to be unfounded. Since the Khalsa Settlement had become part of the itinerary of many official visitors to Iraq, the settlers had, it seemed, become more or less used to such visits. In fact, though I explained to those families I
visited that I was intending to write a thesis about them, they never­
theless tended to treat me as a visitor, albeit one who happened to be
coming more often than others. This attitude was also apparent on the
part of the officials involved with the Khalsa project, for one of the
social workers persisted in accompanying me on all my visits to the
settler households. Moreover, she subtly but firmly discouraged me
from picking my own sample of families and instead confined my visits
to a number of model households who were apparently always singled out
to be presented to visiting dignitaries. As I had not intended to
carry out the actual field-work during this first trip to Iraq, I
decided not to pursue the issue. Conscious of the fact that my
research endeavours were to some extent dependent on the cooperation of
the officials in Khalsa, I realized that it was necessary to establish
a rapport with them.

At the National Research Centre in Baghdad I was informed that the
data collected for the study which was jointly carried out with the
Egyptian National Research Centre in 1977 had been tabulated but not
analysed. There were, however, plans to proceed with the analysis and
the publication of the results regardless of whether or not the Egyp­
tian Centre would cooperate. (To my knowledge, this study remains
unpublished.) Nonetheless, I obtained a blank copy of the question­
naire which had been administered, and this helped reinforce my
decision to focus the research on aspects of community development in
the Khalsa Settlement. The above mentioned study appeared to have
given scant attention to this perspective.

The impression gained during this first trip was that there
appeared to be no major impediments to carrying out my research
undertaking. The officials I had met accepted my research proposal and
displayed much interest in the focus of my study. It was agreed that I
would return in the Autumn of that same year (1979) to embark on the field-work. However, personal reasons prevented me from carrying out this plan, a delay which did not really perturb me since I reasoned that the longer the time-span of Khalsa's existence, the more fruitful my research findings were likely to be. By September 1980 I had completed all my travel arrangements when, shortly before my departure for Baghdad, the Iraq-Iran war broke out. Since the situation was obviously not conducive to any research activities, I again postponed my trip. However, by the Autumn of 1981, I was given to understand by Iraqi friends and acquaintances that it would be feasible to proceed with my study. One year after the outbreak of war, the official attitude in Iraq seemed to be that life must go on, a spirit underlined by the uninterrupted continuation of the vast construction projects in the capital.

Accompanied by my husband, I arrived in Baghdad at the beginning of December 1981 to discover that, not surprisingly, the war had introduced many changes. My belief that the research permission I had been previously granted would merely have to be re-activated, turned out to be unfounded. The recommendation given to me by personal contacts in Iraq, and which had previously served as an introduction as well as a security clearance, now turned out to be insufficient. However, there was, at first, uncertainty with regard to the right channel to be pursued in order to obtain the necessary research permit. Finally, we were given to understand that since the country was at war, authorization would have to be sought from the Council of the Revolution. In addition, the questionnaire I wished to apply would have to be submitted for approval to a specific Committee in the Ministry of Planning. It was at this point that the highly personalized nature of contacts in Iraq, as elsewhere in the Arab
World, came to be an advantage. The Chairman of this Committee turned out to be a friend of a friend. Acknowledging my hints that, since I was personally financing my research, every delay was a costly business, and no doubt also influenced by the fact that the highest authority had not objected to my study, he took it upon himself to grant me permission to proceed with my venture. The Committee's approval, so he assured me after giving my questionnaire a cursory glance, would be a formality and not a problem.

However, I very soon realized that I was, in effect, not much nearer to embarking upon my field-work in the Settlement. Additional steps seemed to be necessary, for I had been informed at the Ministry of Agriculture that the Khalsa project now falls under the jurisdiction of Al-Moassassah al-'Aamah lil Mounshiat al-Zira'iyyah (State Organization for Agricultural Establishments). I would have to contact the latter to finalize the arrangements for carrying out my research. There seemed, however, to be some impediment of which we were unaware, since officials at this State Organization kept requesting us to come back another time. We finally learnt that the official in charge of the Nahrawan Establishment, which is administratively responsible for the Khalsa project, was absent at the war-front. Since this person was also the head of the local ruling party branch, I had to wait until he was back at his desk. By luck and to my immense relief, the said official returned from the front very shortly after. The final hurdle appeared to have been overcome, and some three weeks after my arrival in Baghdad I was able to embark on my field-research.

The question concerning my residence in the Settlement had not arisen during my first trip to Baghdad. For, apart from the fact that it had been intended as a preliminary survey, I was accompanied by my husband and young daughter. However, encouraged by the fact that some
of the houses in the Settlement, which had been designated to accommodate the government employees involved with this project, appeared to be vacant, I assumed that most probably it would not be problematic to secure permission to rent one. At the time of my second trip to Baghdad, I quickly realized that my earlier optimism had been premature. The capital's chronic housing shortage had spilled over into this area which meant that there was not a single house vacant in Khalsa. More important, my husband and I also realized that it is still difficult for even a married Arab woman to set up house on her own outside the periphery of the capital without being suitably chaperoned. When we first began to broach the subject to the authorities that I wished to secure accommodation at least in the immediate vicinity of the Settlement, we encountered an evasive reaction.Attributing this to the housing shortage in the area and embarrassed that our enquiries had obliged some Iraqi officials to offer the hospitality of their homes, I began to contemplate the inevitability of continuing to live in my hotel in Baghdad and finding some way of commuting daily to the Settlement. The advisability of this solution imposed itself when I finally realized that, housing crisis apart, it was in fact my female identity which appeared to be the real problem. This dawned on me specially during a visit to Al-Ittihad al-'Aam lil Gam'iyyat al-Fallahiah al-Ta'awouniah (General Union of Peasants' Cooperative Societies) when the Deputy Head persisted in referring to me as a bunayyah (young girl). By deliberately ignoring my marital status he was, so it seemed to me, attempting to convey to my husband that it was socially not permissible for me to live on my own. The Deputy Minister of Agriculture finally told us bluntly what other officials had apparently been too polite to voice openly. Social conditions in Iraq, so he explained, were different from the West; and with this the matter
was closed. In retrospect, I realize that we must have seemed incredibly thick-skinned to the officials whom we were trying to convince of the 'scientific necessity' of my residence in or at least near the Khalsa Settlement.

But again, luck appeared to be on my side. One of the officials remembered that a number of government employees were commuting daily between Baghdad and Mashrou' al-Wihda (which lay some three miles north of Khalsa) in a bus provided by the authorities. I gratefully accepted the offer of being picked up each morning (except Fridays) at 6 a.m. and deposited in front of my hotel by around 4:30 in the afternoon. This gave me the chance of carrying out my field-work between 8 a.m. and 2:30, unless, as was sometimes the case, I was able to secure a ride with one or the other of Khalsa's officials who happened to be driving into Baghdad before night-fall. I soon realized that this arrangement was, in effect, more advantageous to me than my residence in or near the Settlement would have been. For not only had I neglected to give much thought to the difficult and above all time-consuming problem of setting up house on my own in unfamiliar surroundings. In addition, I had overlooked the fact that since it became almost pitch-black around 6 p.m. due to the black-out imposed by the war, I could not have taken advantage of the evening hours to carry out the interviews. This would have required my reliance on a male escort - inevitably one of Khalsa's officials - which was precisely the situation I had been avoiding. More importantly, I had at first also neglected to appreciate fully the importance of the uninterrupted evening hours upon my return to the hotel, during which I could write out the day's interviews, recapture my experiences in the daily diary I kept and above all keep track of the direction of my research findings. A further advantage of this particular transportation facility was the
fact that my arrival in a state-owned bus seemed to reassure Khalsa's officials that my research activities were fully approved of by a higher authority. Though one or the other official seemed at first to feel obliged to accompany me on my visits to the settler households, I soon found myself left to my own devices. This development was particularly welcome, since it helped reinforce the impression among the settler households that my study was not associated with any governmental authority.

2.2 The Researcher's Role and Gender:

**Important Dimensions of Field-Research**

A discussion of the researcher's role during field-work entails, in my view, two different aspects. There is, on the one hand, what may be defined as the social role which a researcher assumes upon entering the field. He or she can opt for the role of observer, of participant or some combination of both. The main characteristic of this social role is that it is the researcher who defines it, thus imposing his or her own view regarding the type of relationship best suited to the study at hand. The second aspect concerns the sex attribute of the researcher, a variable which, unless disguise is resorted to, cannot be manipulated. The influence of the researcher's gender role is culture-bound. For, it is the cultural framework operating in the host community which essentially defines the physical and psychological boundaries confining the mobility of male and female researchers. Since the social role and its implications will be dealt with in the subsequent part concerned with the choice of research methodology, the concentration here will be on the influence of gender role on the process of data collection.
The importance of gender and the manner in which it may affect research findings in the Middle East in particular has inadvertently come to light during the many recently published discussions engendered by the realization of how little, in effect, Middle Eastern women have been the subject of serious research. R.A. van Dusen, for example, speaks of '... the lack of depth, or ... the unidimensionality of the earlier portrayals of [Middle Eastern] women'.93 N. Keddie attributes this lack at least partly to the problem that '... compared either with many other areas of Middle Eastern history or with numerous geographical areas of women's history, almost no serious scholarly historical work has been done'94 on Middle Eastern women. In fact, up to the recent past, studies on contemporary Arab women, for example, have tended to neglect to '... demonstrate that women's lives and status vary greatly according to class and productive unit: nomadic women, village women and the different classes of urban women have quite different life structures'.95 C. Nelson pursues the same trend of critical review of past studies on Arab women with her criticism of the traditional dichotomy depicting the public world of men versus the private world of women.96 In arguing that western social scientists have tended to '... impose their own cultural categories onto the experiential world of the Middle East',97 Nelson also points out that since '... most ethnographers of the Middle East have been European or American males who, by virtue of their foreignness and maleness, have had limited or no access to the social world of women, we seem to be confronted with the normative image of the society as reported to male ethnographers by male informants'.98

The realization of the importance of the researcher's gender role has undoubtedly also been encouraged by the fact that the hitherto predominantly male preserve of field-research has opened its doors to
female social scientists. This reality, coupled with the above mentioned trend to attempt to present the subjective aspects of field-research, is well documented in P. Golde's *Women in the Field*, for example, in which a number of female researchers describe the trials and tribulations encountered during their field-work. The common theme pervading these accounts is that not only does a female researcher find herself confronted with the many emotions and problems encountered by her male counterpart, such as initial suspicion of the host culture or the problem of reciprocity. In addition, she must deal with the perception of female sex identity adhered to in the community or group being studied. It is this cultural variable which tends to encourage the latter to offer their protection based on their '... assessment of the vulnerability of the women seen in terms of relative physical weakness, lesser resourcefulness in confronting unforeseen hazards, or openness to sexual attack'. The female researcher's gender role may also lead to the host community's expectation that she conform to the above mentioned perception. Thus, she may find herself faced with the dilemma of '... balancing the community's need to absorb and control her with her own need for independence of action. [This will inevitably mean that] ... some of her behaviour will almost certainly lead to flouting some of the culture's traditional expectations of women's behaviour'.

Protection and the expectation of conformity were also the most conspicuous attitudes which I encountered in my dealings with the Iraqi bureaucracy. Nonetheless, I believe that these attitudes were not only due to Iraqi society's view of the unchaperoned female. Rather, it would seem that these officials were also influenced by the fact that I was, first and foremost, part of the culture of this geographical area, a fact which became apparent during my attempts to secure accommodation
near the Settlement. Though a Western female researcher would be expected to respect the customs of the host country, I wonder whether her proposal to set up house on her own would have elicited the same consternation as was apparent in my case. The Western woman's freedom of mobility may not generally be approved of in Arab society, but it is nevertheless accepted as a fact. In contrast, I as an Arab woman was apparently expected to adhere to the cultural norm which prescribes that an honourable woman be suitably chaperoned. Not being a citizen of Iraq was not perceived as an excuse, since this particular norm also prevails in my home country. The bluntness of the Deputy Minister when reminding me that social conditions in the West were different was essentially a rebuke for my neglect to take account of this fact. I had wrongly assumed that my marital status and above all my husband's approval, stressed by his accompanying me on all my visits to the officials, were adequate barriers against being subjected to social criticism.

However, my female Arab identity did not impose any significant restrictions insofar as my relationship with the settler households was concerned. In fact, I believe that it was precisely my gender role which provided me with a number of advantages which I doubt my Arab male counterpart would so easily have enjoyed. For example, being female accorded me unrestricted access to the settler wives, an advantage heightened by my marital status. In my judgement, it is the latter in particular which, coupled with the lack of communication barrier since we more or less spoke the same language, played a role in shortening the social class distance separating the women's world from my own. The universal themes of motherhood, child-rearing and household responsibilities provided a common ground for initiating conversations with many a settler wife, regardless of how different our
way of life essentially is. My marital status also accorded me the freedom of broaching subjects of an intimate nature which an unmarried female researcher is expected to be too shy to talk about. Being able to take advantage of the married peasant women's habit of freely discussing sexual matters among themselves provided me with invaluable insights into the impacts of female circumcision for example.

Similarly, my gender role did not impede my access to Khalsa's male peasants. However, in my judgement, this was due mainly to the fact that my gender role appeared to be of secondary importance compared to my social class origin. No doubt influenced by the image transmitted via the television, the settler perceives the educated city woman - even though she may be part of the culture - to be accustomed to discoursing freely with men. My male respondents did not therefore expect me to adhere to all the social restrictions applicable to their own womenfolk. For example, I soon realized that few, if any, of the settlers I interviewed appeared to share my initial discomfort when I found myself alone with them in their home. It may have been socially unacceptable for me to have entered the male preserve of the traditional coffee-shop, a norm, incidently, which is also applicable in urban centres all over the Arab world, but, in the settler's home, I was generally treated as the male's equal. The deference I made a point of according the men in their role as household heads - for example by always interviewing them first should they happen to be present and not neglecting to request their permission to interview their wives - was accepted as a gesture of courtesy rather than an expression of female submissiveness.

At the same time, it was my gender role which enabled me to wilfully manipulate particular situations in order to attempt to extract more information than I perceived my respondents were willing
to give me. For example, I occasionally displayed the type of naive ignorance commonly attributed to the female sex in Arab society. This was a ruse which I freely admit to having resorted to when attempting to overcome the male respondents' stubborn determination not to divulge anything about their economic activities. The fellah appears convinced that city people in general, but urban higher class women in particular, know little, if anything, about agricultural matters. I therefore went out of my way to display my ignorance when asking about the latter. Though this bait did not, as I had hoped, bring me any nearer to securing accurate data about the settler household's income levels, it did, in my view, serve to lower their guard. In fact, quite a few male respondents seemed unable to resist the temptation of expounding their knowledge of agricultural production and its related activities, which, unschooled as I was, provided me with additional insights.

These experiences lead me to conclude that it is not only gender role per se which is of significance when undertaking research in Arab society. True, the cultural variables operating in the host country define the limitations to which male and female researchers will generally find themselves subjected. However, this cultural framework only defines the broad outlines of these limitations. The actual extent to which the latter are or are not enforced would appear to depend on a number of additional variables. On the one hand, the degree to which a researcher is expected to adhere to the cultural norms prevailing in the host country appears to depend on whether or not he or she is perceived to be a member of this culture. Though I am non-Iraqi, I was nevertheless accepted as part of this cultural area and thus judged accordingly. On the other hand, the expectation of adherence also appears to be influenced by the social class
differentiation prevailing within the host country. I may not, as an Arab woman, have been able to live on my own or walk about unchaperoned after night-fall outside the social periphery of Baghdad. But then, nor was I subjected to the social restrictions generally applicable to the Iraqi rural woman or, as it pertains to the present study, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant woman.

2.3 The Choice of Methodology

The preliminary survey I had carried out during my first trip to Baghdad in February 1979 had confirmed my belief that there was no feasible way I could have concealed my research activities from the Khalsa settlers. However, since I was unable to secure accommodation inside the Settlement or even in its immediate vicinity, neither was I able to assume the social role of participant observer. The only possible role thus seemed to be that of observer as participant. The settler households' knowledge of the world outside the social boundaries of their community facilitated their acceptance of the idea that I wished to write about them. They may not have had much notion of what exactly constituted a thesis, but, since they had been the subject of numerous newspaper and magazine articles, they did not seem unduly perturbed at the idea of someone else wishing to write about them. The cooperation of most of the respondents was not only due to the fact that I had expressed an interest in their customs and traditions as well as the manner in which they have acclimatized themselves to their new way of life after resettlement. It also appears to have been encouraged by the fact that, in contrast to the study which an Iraqi male student had attempted to carry out some three months previously, I did not focus on the settler households' economic
activities. This student's apparent lack of tact - he is said to have attempted to enforce the settlers' co-operation by reminding them of the debt they owed Iraq for accepting them - was a timely reminder for me to stress that my respondents were under no obligation to cooperate.

My deliberations over the most appropriate social role for me to assume during the field-work led me to give some thought to the issue of my national identity. Affected by the situation which I had encountered in Cairo during my first trip in connection with my thesis in the Winter 1978/79, I had begun to contemplate the possibility that the settler families might associate me with the Egyptian authorities and assume I would report to the latter about them. This seemed all the more likely given the fact that the survey carried out in Khalsa in 1977 had involved the Egyptian National Research Centre. At the same time, though the Iraqi Government was, by all accounts, encouraging Egyptian nationals to take up employment opportunities in Iraq, I wondered whether the strained diplomatic relations between the two countries would have adversely affected the officials with whom I would have to deal. At the very least, it might discourage them from uninhibitedly discussing the question of Egyptian migrants in Iraq with an Egyptian national. At the beginning of my first trip to Baghdad, I was still undecided on how best to proceed when, during the first visit to the Ministry of Agriculture, I noticed that some officials seemed to take it for granted that I was as Lebanese as my husband who had accompanied me, though inevitably some reference was made to my perceptibly Egyptian accent. Guessing that this must be due to the fact that I often tended to speak in the Lebanese dialect, I impulsively explained that I had, in fact, lived quite a few years in Egypt, hence my accent. This explanation seemed to satisfy all those who subsequently queried the latter and I found myself accepted as a Lebanese national (which in
fact I am since I have dual nationality). To my relief, none of the settler families in Khalsa appeared to doubt that I was a Lebanese who had lived some years in Egypt. In fact, quite a few openly showed their amusement at the apparent ease with which I could 'imitate' the Egyptian intonation and dialect.

Nonetheless, I was, at the time, frankly unsure whether it had really been wise of me to give in to the impulse of accentuating my Lebanese identity. I also began wondering whether it was not simplistic to assume that the settler families would automatically associate me with the Egyptian authorities. This feeling was fed by a book I had been given about Khalsa, written by an Egyptian female journalist who had apparently not found it necessary to conceal her Egyptian identity from the settlers, though she had, significantly, used a pseudonym. However, in the event, I believe that the constant dread I felt that someone would find out about my Egyptian origin was well worth enduring. On the one hand, my impulse of disassociating myself from the settler families' country of origin enabled me to assume the role of the ghareeba (the foreigner). Though being Lebanese and thus part of the Arab culture meant that there were few communication barriers between the settler families and myself, I was nevertheless foreign enough to be permitted a host of curious questions about issues which I could not be expected to know much about, regardless of how long I claimed to have lived in Egypt. I believe that the attribution of my lack of knowledge to my Lebanese identity helped at least partly to detract attention from the social class barrier separating the settler families' world from my own. Being an uninformed Lebanese differs, in my judgement, from being perceived as a Cairean whose urban class origin is, in the fellah's perception, all too often synonymous with a lack of interest as to how
the rural poor fare. On the other hand, giving in to my impulse seemed to me also vindicated by the fact that it afforded me better insight into the attitude of some of the Iraqi officials towards Egyptians in general and the settlers in particular. Without such data I could not, for example, have fully appreciated the implication of the social and psychological barriers separating Khalsa's settlers from their Iraqi hosts and neighbours.

My realization that the time I had at my disposal for carrying out my field-work was not only limited by my finances but also dependent on the authorities' attitude towards prolonged research as well as the settler families' readiness to cooperate, led me to opt for the application of a questionnaire. Whatever the latter's shortcomings specifically when applied to a peasant community, it seemed to me the optimal method of obtaining data given the fact that, apart from the time pressure under which I was operating, I was unable to reside in the Settlement and become at the very least involved in its social life. I also reasoned that since I had decided on the perspective from which I wished to study the Khalsa Settlement, I could focus the content of my questionnaire accordingly. The relatively small number of respondents (seventy-four households) ruled out the application of a pilot survey in the strictest meaning of this term. Instead, questions which the first interviews showed to be ambiguous or irrelevant were modified accordingly or alternatively, new questions were added. Conscious of the need to underline the fact that I was collecting material for a thesis, I refrained from arriving in the Settlement with stencilled questionnaire copies. Instead, I had a list of questions handwritten in Arabic and used separate sheets of blank paper to record the answers. After the experience of one literate settler attempting to read what I had written down about him in Arabic, I decided to
switch to instantly translating the answers into English unless I was quoting the respondent verbatim. My initial apprehension as to how this would be perceived evaporated more or less when I overheard one settler wife I had just interviewed encourage her house neighbour to cooperate with me  laennohom mabiye'rafoush Engeleezy (because they, i.e. presumably the Iraqi officials, do not know any English).

There were separate questionnaires for husbands and wives. These had some identical questions in case one or the other spouse could not be interviewed (see Appendix). This way I was assured of at least collecting demographic and other pertinent data on all settler households. The inclusion of the settler wives was not only influenced by their exclusion from the study carried out by the Egyptian and Iraqi National Research Centres. It was also motivated by my belief that no community study should neglect the male-female perspective. For example, as the subsequent chapters will illustrate, changes in the role of women or lack thereof are particularly important indicators of the manner in which the settler households have adapted to their new way of life after resettlement.

Empathy is a term which every researcher inevitably comes across in one or the other text-book on the technical aspects of field-research. Empathy in practice, however, is an emotion which each researcher may experience differently and one which cannot be planned in advance. For example, I was conscious from the outset that, since circumstances had dictated that I carry out the bulk of my field-work during the morning hours, I would have to count on the settler families' spirit of cooperation. My problem was how to reconcile the time pressure under which I was operating with the need to display sufficient consideration in view of the fact that the morning hours were generally the busiest period in the household's daily routine.
(even though the winter season involves less work in the fields and implies a decrease in marketing activities). In the event, I found I was able to achieve this mainly with the settler wives, most of whom tended to give in to my insistence that I squat next to them while they continue with whatever household chore they happened to be engaged in. This unhurried atmosphere led to many an interesting conversation after I had finished with the interview questions. In contrast, male respondents generally persisted in treating me like a guest who had to be seated in the best room and plied with refreshments, a pattern which reinforced my impression that it was my social class origin rather than my gender role which was more significant. In fact, I generally found it more difficult to begin the interviews with the settlers as compared to their wives, since the former tended to feel bound to prolong the traditional ritual of assuring the guest of his or her welcome. Empathy thus also involved curbing my impatience with those who rambled on about matters which I perceived to be unrelated to the issue at hand, or with those who, even more frustratingly, answered in monosyllables. It also meant making the wilful effort not to display my squeamishness when drinking from an unwashed glass or upon discovering that I had been sitting on the droppings of some fowl which had the run of the living quarters. Last but not least, empathy also involved remaining non-committal if I realized that my respondent was being less than truthful. The social role I had assumed during field-work also dictated that I remain aware of the fact that I was a guest who had to keep in mind the limitation of the host's proffered hospitality.

The application of a questionnaire as the main method of data collection necessitates the effort of giving careful consideration to the choice of informant. The latter's role is invaluable for filling the many information gaps which inevitably crop up during the field-
research. However, as in my case, a researcher cannot always count on having the absolute freedom of choosing his or her informants. The four who became invaluable sources of information were, in fact, to some extent imposed on me. The Chairman of the Cooperative Board, 'Amm Ali, and his wife, Om Said," were apparently always singled out by the Iraqi officials to meet visiting dignitaries. It was thus almost inevitable that I should also meet them during the preliminary survey of the Settlement in February 1979, a ritual which was repeated when I arrived to start on my field-research. To my surprise, Om Said remembered me from my previous trip (because, so she later explained, I was the only sitt zawat (upper class woman) she had met who believed in and practised lactation). Both she and her husband made it clear that they would be offended if I declined their hospitable offer of making their home my base from which I would set out to visit the other settler households. My initial misgivings as to the advisability of at least partly accepting their generous offer gradually diminished when I realized that almost all of the other settler families held this couple in high esteem. In fact, since 'Amm Ali was the elected Chairman of the Cooperative Board, it seemed to be taken for granted that I would defer to him, regardless of the erosion to which his leadership role had, as we shall see, been subjected. Om Said, in particular, turned out to be a witty and perceptive informant whose natural curiosity as to what I had found out about the other settler families was curbed by an inborn gracious reserve. Finding myself reciprocating the genuine affection which this couple appeared to bear towards me had, however, the negative effect of inducing in me a sense of disloyalty whenever I felt it necessary to check up on information they had given me. It inevitably also increased my guilt over having concealed my Egyptian origin, a feeling admittedly also fed by the fact that their home
village turned out to be not far from that of my own family in Lower Egypt. However, though I made a point of looking in on Om Said every time I visited the Settlement, I did not make her home my one and only base. Apart from not wishing to impose myself on this settler couple regardless of their generously offered hospitality, I believed that this would have unnecessarily confined my mobility. Instead, I also developed the habit of dropping into the Agricultural Extension Centre, ostensibly to wait for the bus to pick me up. This enabled me to intensify my contact with the Iraqi Head of the Centre who had become my third informant by virtue of his willingness to discuss the Settlement and its affairs. Like 'Amm Ali and his wife, he too took it for granted that I would turn to him for any information. My fourth informant, the Iraqi Cooperative Supervisor, was, by contrast, perceptibly reticent in divulging the information I needed about the Settlement's economic activities. However, he too made an effort to find the time to talk to me about Khalsa's settler households as long as I did not press him to show me any relevant documentation. (This attitude was encountered during most of my dealings with lower echelon officials and, as such, is more or less typical of Arab bureaucracy at large where the lower the official's rank, the less inclined will he/she be to bear any responsibility without directives from above.)

Conscious of the disadvantage of relying on a small number of informants, I had planned to finish with the interviews and then make a series of visits to a sample of settler households in order to supplement my data and obtain additional insights. However, finding that there were sometimes periods when I was unable to interview anyone, I decided from around the fourth week of my field-work onwards to begin these informal visits rather than wait until I had interviewed all those who were ready to cooperate. Some ten days after the first
of these visits I began to be aware of a subtle change in some of the
settler families' attitude towards me. A greeting which had inevitably
been accompanied by an invitation to step into the house for some
refreshment became at one point a greeting only or even just a casual
nod. More conspicuous was the fact that whereas one or the other
settler family would always call off the guard-dog, quite a few of
those I had already interviewed now ceased to do so and pretended not
to see me approach their alley-way. Even the group of children who
used to wait nearly every morning for my arrival upon which they would
burst into a chant of al-sitt Om Lina gatt (the lady the mother of Lina
has arrived) ceased to make a regular appearance. Om Said finally
admitted that some of the families I had revisited were openly wonder­
ing about my reasons, while some others felt I must by now have
obtained enough information about the Settlement. For my part, I tend
to relate this change in attitude at least partly to an incident which
took place around this time. The Moudir al-Nahia (Director of the
local District Administration) had requested that I come to his
office, where I was informed that I should have made this visit
before embarking on my field-work since this was independent of the
clearance I had obtained from the Head of the Nahrawan Establishment.
Upon leaving the building I happened to meet three of Khalsa's settlers
standing chatting in a group whose return greeting seemed to me
unusually cool. Worrying that they or anyone else might believe that I
had been reporting about them to an official who is in effect
synonymous with the law, I hastened to Om Said to explain the reason
for my having been summoned. However, this left me even more perturbed
since Om Said appeared to already know about my visit to this office.

Whatever the explanations for these subtle changes described
above, I realized that I was on the verge of outstaying my welcome.
This impression was intensified by the Iraqi bus-driver's increasingly frequent questioning as to how much longer I needed before my study was complete. Beginning to be convinced that even the authorities appeared to think I had done enough research, I decided to be satisfied with almost seven and a half weeks of field-work and end my research after having interviewed the last settler household which had been willing to cooperate. Nevertheless, it seemed to me an achievement to have interviewed sixty-nine out of the seventy-four Egyptian settler families which, at the time of my field-work, were living in Khalsa. (The remaining five, including the only Coptic family in the Settlement, refused to be interviewed.) Whatever the concrete reasons for this relatively high incidence of response, I believe the latter was to some extent also due to good fortune, something which every researcher hopes to have in abundance.
Notes to Part I:


However, it should be noted that this study remains more or less unique in that it has attempted to present every conceivable economic and social aspect of a new human settlement. Its counterpart on the Nubians is H. Fahim, *The Study and Evaluation of the Rehabilitation Process in the Newly Settled Communities in Land Reclamation Areas. Part II: The Nubian Settlement in Kom Ombo, Upper Egypt* (Unpublished Manuscript, American University in Cairo, 1975).


According to the author's estimate based on statistical data during the mid-sixties, some 64% of the around four-thousand villages existing in Egypt during this period had a population of 1,000 - 5,000; 25% exceeded 10,000 inhabitants and only 9% had a population of less than 1,000.


The authoress concludes that '... migrants to Cairo are active creators of a variety of social institutions whose major function is to protect migrants from the shock of anomie. [The migrant's] ... adjustment is further facilitated by the formal and informal institutions he develops within his small community ... [such as] ... the village benevolent society ... which plays a role in providing social groups for migrants' identification' (pp.402-403).


11 Ibid.

Antoun maintains that where one community of social control exists, households would tend to be dispersed over clan and class ties and no spatial boundaries are observed. A myth of common descent is adhered to and genealogical unity is the norm. One mosque or one church and a single cemetery tend to serve all villagers without distinction. There is a high incidence of village endogamy accompanied by a similar degree of lineage or clan exogamy. No status differences are discernible, neither spatially nor by conspicuous consumption patterns. Deviance from village social norms meets with effective socio-economic sanctions, of which gossip and social boycott are particularly potent weapons. Sociability encompasses the village as an entity and the visiting pattern is reciprocal. Finally, leadership is a pan-village affair, representing all its inhabitants.

Two communities of social control are characterized by two distinct village quarters, where spatial boundaries are clearly drawn and strictly adhered to in times of dispute. Two separate myths of historical descent are observed. Marriage patterns exhibit a relatively high incidence of village moiety endogamy as well as a significant tendency towards village exogamy. Status differences are reflected in conspicuous consumption, unreciprocated visiting and separate education for the more affluent. Sanctions remain effective only within moiety lines and free movement is restricted to within the latter's boundaries. Each of the two quarters tends to have its own political and religious leader.

Where many communities of social control exist, the many descent groups tend to be spatially segregated and have their separate genealogies. There is a high incidence of village exogamy, as well as some shallow lineage endogamy as far as marriage patterns are concerned. Education may take place outside the village. Only formal sanctions by authorities external to the village are effective. Even gossip becomes largely ineffective because of the villagers' heterogeneity. Visiting is confined to one's descent group or quarter outside of which there is little free movement. Village feuds are arbitrated by a formal, external authority, but each group or quarter tends to have its own religious leader.

Finally, in a village with no discernible community of social control, house neighbours are not necessarily related and households tend to keep to themselves. Antoun compares this particular case to
the modern housing estate, where there is no genealogical tradition, but instead many separate shallow origins. Village exogamy is the established marriage pattern. Social ties are few, as the restricted visiting activities indicate. Only formal sanctions by the external authorities are effective. The social isolation of households nullifies the effectiveness of gossip as a form of social control.

12 See E.C. Cuff and C.G. Payne, eds., Perspectives in Sociology (London, 1981). The authors present a concise analysis of functionalism from the perspectives of consensus as well as conflict theorists. Consensus theorists view society as an integrated system of interdependent parts and focus on the main features which hold society together and enable it to function in an orderly manner; conflict theorists view social life in terms of divisiveness and conflict which are encouraged by the fact that social organizations create different involvements and interests for people. Both these approaches study social structures as a whole but differ in their view of the nature of the social system, the nature of its parts as well as the importance attributed to these parts. (See pp.22-86).

13 H. Rosenfeld, 'An Overview and Critique of the Literature on Rural Politics and Social Change', in R. Antoun and I. Harik, eds., Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, op.cit.

14 Ibid., p.50.

15 Ibid., p.55.

16 Ibid., p.57.

However, Rosenfeld's belief that no meaningful change has taken place in the rural Middle East since it '...is the system, the total structure, that is underdeveloped, failing to produce social change and perpetuating the backwardness of rural peoples', (Ibid., p.57) has been criticized by a number of rural sociologists. See Introduction, in R. Antoun and I. Harik, eds., Rural Politics and Social Change in the Middle East, op.cit., p.3.


18 Ibid., pp.102-103.


22 Ibid., p.56.


The stress here is on published studies which are more or less easily accessible to the researcher. There are, in fact, quite a few recent but as yet unpublished postgraduate studies on rural Egypt which unfortunately have only recently come to my attention. See S. Me Hanna et al., *Egyptian Village Studies: An Annotated Bibliography*, Agricultural Development Systems Project (Unpublished Manuscript: Cairo, 1981).


R. Antoun, in referring to the problems of the native Middle Eastern anthropologist, explains the present focus of the Egyptian anthropologist's interest as being the result of the '...social and economic problems related to Egypt's most pressing problem, overpopulation'. See R. Antoun, 'Anthropology' (p.173) as well as G. Sabagh, 'Sociology', both chapters in L. Binder, ed., *The Study of the Middle East*, op.cit.


35 Though there is general agreement as to which areas constitute Lower Egypt - i.e. all which lies to the north of Cairo - no such unanimity exists as far as the rest of the country is concerned. Thus some authors refer to all the provinces south of Cairo as Upper Egypt or the Said, while others subdivide this area into Middle and Upper Egypt respectively. I have adhered to the latter division since the Egyptian peasant settlers in Khalsa come from all three regions and...
because of the regional differentiation which must be taken into account when studying rural Egypt. However, in many respects, Middle and Upper Egypt are very similar and may stand in more or less sharp contrast to Lower Egypt.


In 1979, I personally visited a village situated some twenty miles south of Cairo called Oskor. The village was divided into two distinct parts, Oskor al-'Arab and Oskor al-Fallaheen. Members of the latter who are the indigenous peasants of the Nile Valley, live nearer to the Nile and there is a clear spatial boundary between their dwellings and those of Oskor al-'Arab. Those from the latter claim to originate from the Arabian Peninsula and to have come to Egypt by way of Gaza some three-hundred years ago. They continue to adhere to this genealogical myth in order to accentuate their distinction from the fellaheen. A specific expression of this distinction is the fact that while an Oskor Arab claims to be able to marry the daughter of an Oskor fellaheh, he is equally adamant that he would never give his daughter or sister to the latter in marriage. The last known incident involving the elopement of an Oskor Arab girl with an Oskor fellaheh resulted in a blood feud in which the district police had to intervene. According to my informant (an Oskor Arab), this took place in the early 1960s and received wide press coverage.

41 See M. Dwaider, 'Taasheerat Dokhoul al-Qaryah al-Misriyah' (Entry Visa into an Egyptian Village), in L'Egypte Contemporaine, No.369 (July 1977).

42 J.B. Adams, 'Culture and Conflict in an Egyptian Village', op.cit., p.228.


44 R. Critchfield, Shahat, op.cit., pp.xiv, xiii.

45 J. Waterbury, Hydropolitics in the Nile Valley (Syracuse, 1979), pp.12-42.


These authors as well as H. Lemel (op.cit.) have, in my judgement, presented the most comprehensive review of the gaps which are in dire need of research in present-day rural Egypt.


50 Ibid., p.38.

51 Ibid., p.43.


54 Ibid., p.19.


56 The following overview is based on information gleaned from various published studies on rural Egypt which seemed to me to contain relatively less controversial findings compared to other sources.


Regardless of their ideological orientation, scholars writing about the impact of the agrarian and land reforms in Egypt are almost unanimous in their agreement that the latter has chalked up more failures than successes.

59 Ibid., p.81.


62 Ibid., p.240.

63 Ibid., p.225.

64 Ibid., p.30.

65 Ibid., pp.6,7.


71 J. Mayfield, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt, op.cit., p.60.

72 H. Ammar, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., p.44. See also R. Critchfield, Shahat, op.cit.

73 H. Ammar, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., p.56.


75 F. Abdel-Fatah, Al-Qaryah al-Mo'assarah beyn al-Islah wa al-Thawrah, op.cit., p.122.

76 Ibid., p.124.

77 J. Mayfield, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt, op.cit., p.36.

78 Ibid., p.84.

79 N. Hopkins and S. Mehanna, Egyptian Village Studies, op.cit., pp.25,26. (The multipurpose cooperatives were set up largely for small landowners who were unaffected by the land reform distribution; while land reform cooperatives were introduced in those areas where land was confiscated and redistributed).

80 Ibid., p.27.

81 F. Abdel-Fatah, Al-Qaryah al-Mo'assarah beyn al-Islah wa al-Thawra, op.cit., p.10.

82 Ibid., p.142.


84 J. Mayfield, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt, op.cit., p.38.


86 See for example, M.N. Srinivas et al., The Fieldworker and the Field: Problems and Challenges in Sociological Investigation (Bombay, 1979).

87 The Office for Peasants' Affairs was an integral even though separate part of Al-Ittihad al-Istiragi al-'Arabi (Arab Socialist Union, A.S.U.) founded by G. Abdel-Nasser in 1961. Under President Sadat, the A.S.U. was eventually renamed Al-Hizb al-Watany al-Democracy (National Democratic Party), but it continued to occupy the same headquarters in Cairo.

The Khalsa project was also brought to the attention of the participants in the Seminar on Rural Development organized by the Afro-Asian Organization for Rural Development (held in April 1977 in Alexandria, Egypt). The Iraqi delegation submitted a report entitled: Tagrobat al-Khalissah. Nakl al-Ussar al-Fallahiah al-Misriyyah ila al-Qotr al-’Iraqi (The Experiment of Khalsa. The Migration of Egyptian Peasant Families to Iraq), prepared by A.N. Ismail, Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform (Baghdad, 1977). To my knowledge, this Ministry has not published any further study of the Khalsa Settlement.

Of the twenty Arab League member states, only Somalia, Sudan and Oman did not break off diplomatic relations with Egypt.

The State Organization for Agricultural Establishments, together with Al-Moassassah al-’Aamah li-Mazare’ al-Dawla (State Organization for State Farms) and Al-Moassassah al-’Aamah li-Tarbiyat al-Hayawanat (State Organization for Livestock Breeding) are associated with the Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform but nevertheless seem to function as autonomous bodies. Under the jurisdiction of the first mentioned State Organization falls Mounshiat al-Nahrawan (Nahrawan Establishment) which is an agricultural administrative centre located south of the capital, but within the periphery of the Baghdad Governorate. The Nahrawan Establishment in turn administers two separate projects: Mashrou' Sab'a Nissan (The Project of April 7th, which is the founding date of the Ba’ath Party in 1947) and Mashrou' al-Wihda (The Project of Unity). The latter comprises one state farm and five co-operatives, one of which is in the Khalsa Settlement.

(The above translations into English are not my own but those used by the Iraqi authorities).

My husband was unable to remain with me for the duration of my field-work.


Ibid., p.227.


Ibid., p.552.

Ibid., p.553.
B.H. Junker (Field-Work: An Introduction to the Social Sciences, op.cit.) differentiates between four field-worker roles: a) the complete participant whose activities are wholly concealed; b) the participant as observer, where the researcher's activities are not completely concealed but instead subordinated to his or her activities as participant; c) the observer as participant, in which the researcher's activities are made known from the outset and are sponsored by the people in the host community; d) finally the complete observer, a researcher role which is particularly applicable to small experimental groups (pp.36-38).

H. Badry, Fallah Masr 'ala Ard al-'Iraq, op.cit. This book was commissioned by the General Union of Peasants' Cooperative Societies which distributes free copies to visiting dignitaries.


Up to the recent past and as numerous United Nations publications have documented, rural women in the Third World tended to be excluded from studies and development projects. United Nations agencies in particular have, over the past decade, attempted to remedy this neglect out of the realization that the female contribution to agricultural production is crucial to the development of the rural sector. See for example, I. Palmer, 'The Role of Women in Agrarian Reform and Rural Development, in Land Reform, No.1, (F.A.O.: Geneva, 1979).

As the Khalsa project is the first of its kind in this part of the Arab World and since the Settlement is numerically small, I have not resorted to hiding the identity of my respondents, since they are easily identifiable anyway.

Mohafazat Baghdad (Baghdad Governorate) is divided into seven Kada (Provinces), one of which is Kada al-Madaen. The latter is in turn divided into two Nahias (Districts), of which Nahiat al-Wihda (District of Unity) is judicially responsible for the area within which the Khalsa Settlement is located. The Moudir al-Nahia ranks above the Head of the local Police Station.
PART II: PHYSICAL INFRASTRUCTURE AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC SETTING OF THE KHALSA SETTLEMENT

The Khalsa Settlement lies some 35 miles south of Baghdad, directly off the Baghdad-Kut-Basrah highway. Turning off the highway, one drives into the Settlement along a dusty asphalt road, bordered by trees and shrubs. Beyond these on either side stand the houses originally built to accommodate the government officials employed in this resettlement project. Some of these houses are now occupied by civil servants working in various government offices in the district, a sign of the current housing crisis in Baghdad and its surrounding area. The first house on the left, as one enters the Settlement, continues to accommodate the Police Station. All these dwellings with their front gardens, spacious rooms and modern amenities differ conspicuously from those built for the Egyptian peasant settlers.

Continuing along this road one finds on the right a one-storey building which, at the time of my preliminary survey of the Settlement in 1979, had been the Centre for Social and Agricultural Extension Services. It offered literacy classes for both Egyptian and Iraqi adults living in Khalsa, and handicraft and sewing instruction for young girls and women from the Settlement as well as from the neighbouring Iraqi village of Al-Kadissiyah. The Centre's social workers - all female - were also charged with periodically visiting the settlers' homes to advise them on such topics as hygiene, nutrition, disease prevention and child-rearing. The Iraqi authorities had hoped to see this Centre develop into the focus of the settler families' informal gatherings (segregated by sex though it may have been), conducive to the development of an integrated community in the Settlement. By the winter of 1981/82, the Centre was only providing agricultural extension services. The male staff of two (one Iraqi, the other Egyptian) are in
charge of demonstrating modern techniques in agricultural production, the breeding of livestock and poultry and the keeping of bees. Settlers deemed particularly industrious are singled out every season and given a free supply of seeds, fertilizer and pesticide for use on a part of their land assigned for this demonstration purpose. Others are supervised in the breeding of livestock and poultry. The staff also holds a series of lectures following the guidelines in the programmes issued yearly by the Ministry of Agriculture in Baghdad. Some of these lectures are specifically aimed at the settler wives in recognition of the important role they play in agricultural production. The Centre also encourages the settlers to enroll in various courses on the use of modern agricultural machinery, and participants are paid a small sum to encourage their attendance. Illiteracy eradication classes continue to be held in this Centre, but they are now confined to Iraqi nationals. The Egyptian settlers and their wives have won the battle to be exempted.²

Further down the road is a covered arcade, which the Settlement's planners had hoped to see develop into a market-centre serving both Khalsa and some of the neighbouring villages. By 1979, there was a grocery shop with a rather limited supply of goods, a store selling a variety of electrical appliances and consumer durables and a coffee-shop, all leased and run by Iraqi nationals. A bakery, a hardware shop and a butcher were, so I was informed at the time, expected to open shortly. However, by the time of my field-research in the Settlement, the arcade was found to consist of two coffee-shops and a sandwich stall, all leased and run by Egyptians.² The remaining space was unused. One Iraqi informant indicated that Khalsa's shopping arcade had little chance of developing into a market-centre as the planners had hoped because of the literal mushrooming of various shops along the
highway leading to the nearby market-town of Jisr al-Diyalah (which lies half-way between Khalsa and Baghdad). This development is said to be as much due to this area's increasing population as a result of the capital's housing crisis as it is in response to the increasing truck traffic between Baghdad and southern Iraq and Kuwait.

Behind this arcade, in a small separate building, is the Post Office and Telephone Exchange, staffed by two Iraqi government employees. Across the road is the Cooperative Centre, situated in one corner of a large walled-in court-yard, which initially had been designated for the housing of agricultural machinery. Membership in the Cooperative Society is compulsory for all settlers in Khalsa. The Cooperative Board comprises seven members who must be elected every three years from among the settlers. It is supervised by an Iraqi government employee who is accountable to Mashrou' al-Wihda for the implementation of the agricultural production plan. He normally has one assistant who, however, was serving at the war-front at the time of my field-work. The Cooperative Supervisor is also responsible for helping the Board members procure the agricultural inputs ordered by the settler households, for ensuring the compulsory delivery of all crops apart from vegetables to the Mashrou', for coordinating with the technicians and engineers in charge of irrigation and canal maintenance, for ensuring the proper application of fertilizer and pest control and finally for reporting on the settler families' progress. The Society used to own agricultural machinery, leasable to members for a small hourly fee and operated by a technician employed by the Mashrou'. These have since been moved to the latter where a maintenance section is responsible for servicing all equipment which may be rented by the Khalsa settlers as well as by members of the other four cooperatives administered by the Mashrou'. The settlers tend to interpret this
change as an indication that the Iraqi Government has lost interest in the Khalsa Settlement and its welfare, a complaint however, which the Supervisor disputes. The reason, so this official explained, is the staff shortages in the war-time economy.

Adjacent to the Cooperative Centre is the Mosque, attended by both Egyptian and Iraqi inhabitants of the Settlement as well as outsiders from the neighbouring areas. The departure of the Sunni Kurdish imam (during the year preceding my fieldwork), resulted in a conflict between the Iraqi authorities and the settlers, for one of the latter proceeded to preach the Friday prayer sermon without securing the necessary authorization. As is the case in Egypt and presumably elsewhere in the Arab World, the Ministry for Religious Affairs in Iraq appoints the imam of a mosque and issues general guidelines which must be heeded in the contents of the sermons preached. No new imam had been appointed by the time of my field-work. While the Iraqi officials attribute this to the manpower shortages induced by the war, Khalsa's settlers tend to view this as one more indication of the Iraqi Government's lack of interest in the Settlement.

Next to the Mosque is the Medical Centre, which, by the time of my field-research, had been expanded to serve both the Settlement and some of the neighbouring Iraqi villages. The original staff consists of a medical practitioner and a pharmacist with their respective assistants, a male nurse, a midwife and a dentist. A number of other Iraqi civil servants are employed in various capacities, for the Centre also functions as the District Public Health Office. By the winter of 1981/82, the doctor, male nurse and dentist were all serving at the war-front. The doctor's replacement, a para-medic, was obviously not held in a similar esteem, for many settlers voiced their preference for attending the government health clinics in the capital. Dental work is
now carried out by an Indian national with a rudimentary knowledge of Arabic. Though he is apparently well thought of in the Settlement, he is nonetheless mostly sought out for a tooth extraction rather than for decay prevention. None of the settler families apparently think of bringing their children to him. The temporary absence of the medical practitioner necessarily limited the scope of information I could obtain on the settler families' health conditions. However, folk medicine, which according to information obtained during the preliminary survey in 1979, was at first more or less widely practiced, is said to have gradually declined since then. Few families have failed to appreciate the value of modern medicine. Indeed, the standing of the medical staff apparently rises in proportion to the variety of medicines prescribed. Many settler families were said to have been suffering, at the time of their arrival in Iraq, from endemic diseases common in rural Egypt (like bilharzia, trachoma etc.). All these families received medical treatment and were more or less cured. All households are issued with a medical card for each child to keep track of illnesses and vaccination dates. However, it is the continuing neglect of the infants' physical cleanliness out of fear of 'ayn al-hasoud, (the evil eye),\(^5\) and in particular the mis-use of powdered milk in their nutrition which remain the major concern of the medical staff. Nonetheless, only six of the settler families had lost a child up to the time of my field-work.\(^6\) Every July 14th (the Iraqi Revolution's anniversary) all boys are circumcised, free of charge, by the male nurse. The first such event in July 1976 was accompanied by a communal celebration organized by the Social Centre. Its discontinuation is seen by many settlers as further proof of the authorities' indifference.

Further down and across the way from the Mosque is the Khalsa Primary School,\(^7\) which up to recently had been attended by the Egyptian
settlers' offspring as well as by children from Al-Kadissiyah. The Iraqi authorities had hoped this would help foster the Settlement's contacts with its social environment. Meanwhile, a new primary school was built in Al-Kadissiyah and children from the latter have been replaced by Iraqis whose families are resident in Khalsa as well as in some adjacent areas. The Khalsa Primary School was at the time of my field-research supervised by a headmistress. All the teaching staff (four Iraqi and one Egyptian) is also female, another sign of the war-front and its demands. Every child is issued with a free uniform, books and other educational necessities as well as a daily mid-morning snack. Upon completion of the primary school, children are transferred to the Intermediate School in Mashrou' al-Wihda. A school-bus used to be specially assigned to transport them to and from school. Now these children take the public bus which commutes at regular intervals between Khalsa and Jisr al-Diyalah. As elsewhere in Iraq, all boys and girls attending the Khalsa Primary School are organized into Al-Talai', a kind of scout club in which they receive instruction in sports, handicrafts, civil defence and Ba'athist ideology. Very few settler families apparently let their daughters attend. Most of those who do, withdraw their girls around the age of nine or ten, even though participation is said to be compulsory up to the completion of the secondary level.

Facing the Primary School is a number of recently constructed houses currently leased to Iraqi as well as Egyptian government employees, none of whom are connected with the resettlement project. Continuing past these new houses one comes upon the recently established office of Moudir al-Nahia, who, as previously mentioned, is judicially responsible for Khalsa and some of the neighbouring villages.
Beyond all these buildings stand the settlers' dwellings, grouped into twelve blocks (see Chart I, over). Ten of these have eight, the remainder ten houses each. Each block comprises two rows of four or five houses; each row faces an identical row of houses from the opposite block across an unpaved alley-way. The dwelling unit, composed of house plus yard, covers an area of some 400 m² (see Chart II, over). Passing through an iron gate one comes into a yard, along one side of which are three rooms built in a row, each separately accessible from the yard. An outside stair-case leads to the roof-top with its low surrounding wall which most families use as additional storage space during the dry season. Kitchen and bathroom are a separate unit, each with its own entrance from the yard. The original animal shed in the far corner of the yard has since been enlarged by most families, the size depending on type and quantity of livestock and/or poultry they are breeding. Except for one family, none of the settlers I visited were cultivating their courtyard. Each house was furnished with the basics by the Iraqi authorities (an electric fan, beds and foam mattresses, a table and chairs, a wooden sofa, a two-ring gas cooker and kitchen utensils) and upon arrival the families were given a month's supply of rice, cooking oil, flour, sugar, tea and soap. Depending on family size, each household was paid a monthly subsidy averaging thirty Iraqi Dinars*, which was to cover the first year after resettlement but which was later extended for up to nearly three years. The controversy over whether these subsidies are repayable, indeed the whole issue of the magnitude of the debts incurred by the settlers since their arrival, seems to have been partly side-stepped by a Revolutionary Command Council Decree, which exempted the Egyptian

* At the time of resettlement in 1976, one Iraqi Dinar (I.D.) was worth around three Pounds Sterling.
Chart I: Physical Lay-out of the Khalsa Settlement

a-Housing for government employees
b-Police Station
c-Agricultural Extension Centre
d-Coffee-shop arcade
e-Post Office
f-Housing blocks for settler families
g-Cooperative Centre
h-Mosque
i-Health Centre
j-Primary School
k-Housing for government employees
l-District Administration
Chart II: Plan of the Settler's House in Khalsa

a-entrance gate
b-living quarters
c-stairs to roof
d-outdoor oven
e-kitchen
f-toilet
g-bathroom
h-wall separating house in adjacent row
i-back wall of next house in same row
j-wall looking onto alley-way
k-animal enclosure
peasant settlers from the payment of any debts up to May 1978. This precedent did not fail to encourage the settlers' belief that the authorities might again exempt them from the debts subsequently incurred.

The cultivated plots of land are immediately behind the settlers' housing blocks, stretching inland to the east, north-east and south-east. Not all the land had been ready for distribution among the settler families upon their arrival in Khalsa. Instead, during the first sowing season, the settlers were divided into groups, each of which was given a plot to cultivate communally. By the following season (winter 1976/77) each settler had received his individual plots, which, depending on family size and soil quantity, varied between 11-20 Iraqi Dunums*. By Egyptian standards, this places the settlers in the category of small landowners. The plots were distributed by lottery to ensure each settler's equal chance of acquiring one of the choice plots nearer the Settlement. Ownership of these holdings is in the form of an indefinite lease (called miri tapu by the Iraqi officials involved with Khalsa), which the settler may retain as long as he continues to cultivate it. Only one son may inherit the lease, in order to avoid the land fragmentation resulting from the application of the Muslim inheritance code, but any other son may upon his marriage acquire his own house and plot of land under similar conditions. According to information obtained during the preliminary survey, all settlers signed a five-year contract upon first arriving in the Settlement, in which they committed themselves to cultivate their plot to the best of their abilities. Upon fulfilment

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* One Iraqi Dunum is 1500 m² or 0.6 Feddans; one Feddan is 4200 m².
of this contract, each settler would receive the indefinite leasehold deed to his land. The existence of such a contract was disputed by some Iraqi officials questioned and no satisfactory answers could be obtained.

At the time of the preliminary survey, I came away with the impression of a Settlement which was relatively isolated from its social surroundings. The Police Station kept a watchful eye on all those entering and leaving. Houses previously occupied by settler families who were deemed (during the first year) by the Iraqi authorities to have lacked agricultural experience, were vacated and stood empty save one which had been given over to Al-Talai*. Social contacts seemed to be mainly confined to the younger generation, either through the Primary School or the Social Centre's handicraft classes. A sign of these contacts was the Egyptian peasant children's increasing use of a number of Iraqi expressions. However, socializing between the adult settlers and their Iraqi peasant neighbours seemed to be relatively limited,¹¹ in contrast to the picture which Iraqi officials tended to present to visitors to the Khalsa Settlement.

Arriving in Khalsa in 1981/82, I was immediately struck by the many obvious changes which had taken place. Of the one hundred houses built for the Egyptian peasant settlers, nineteen were now leased to Iraqi and six to Egyptian families. Save for one Egyptian employed in the Agricultural Extension Centre, none of these households are in any way connected to the Settlement or to land cultivation. Originally intended as a temporary measure to alleviate the area's housing shortage, this palliative, including the additionally constructed houses referred to above, seem to have developed into a long-term feature of the Settlement. This change in Khalsa's social structure could be regarded as one indication that the Iraqi Government has
shelved the plan to resettle other Egyptian peasants in Iraq as part of its bilateral agreement with the Egyptian Government. A further, even more explicit indication of this change is the arrival in March 1981 of some two hundred Moroccan peasant families in Al-Dalmaj, a recently established Settlement in the Governorate of Wasit (some 200 miles south-east of Baghdad), which had originally been designed for Egyptian peasants and their families.12

Another important change in Khalsa is related to the community of temporary Egyptian migrant workers in Iraq. Up to the late 1960s, Egyptians employed in Iraq generally belonged to the skilled and professional categories, i.e. those who constitute the so-called brain-drain. However, their numbers did not have any perceptible impact on Iraqi society. In fact, Iraq was to some extent a labour exporter, mainly to the neighbouring Gulf countries.13 As previously mentioned, the spiralling oil prices in the aftermath of the 1973 oil crisis enabled the Iraqi Government to embark on ambitious development plans which initiated an ever-increasing demand for manpower. From approximately the mid-seventies onwards, Iraq began experiencing a veritable influx of Egyptian labour in particular, which reached a peak at the beginning of the 1980s when the war with Iran increased the need for replacement manpower. Requiring no entry visa nor a work permit,14 many of these temporary migrants from Egypt have come in response to the encouragement of relatives and friends already employed in Iraq, including those settled in Khalsa, where a number of them find temporary accommodation. In addition, some of the Egyptian drivers employed in the increasing truck traffic between Baghdad and Kuwait appear to have kith and/or kin in the Settlement which they use as a resting place. A huge lorry parked by the side of one of the settler blocks has become a common sight eliciting little curiosity.
The housing of all these settler families on one site seems to have been motivated by two main considerations: the minimization of the initial trauma and disorientation to be expected after resettlement by encouraging the transfer of the Egyptian way of village life; and facilitating the administration of the Settlement as well as supervising its eventual integration with its social environment. However, there seems to have been little awareness on the part of the Iraqi authorities involved with this resettlement project's conceptualization phase, that there is an inherent contradiction between the long-term plan to integrate this Settlement socially, economically and institutionally with the area of which it is a physical part, while at the same time granting the settlers concessions which cannot but add to the social distance between them and their Iraqi neighbours. Whether we consider the Egyptian peasants' exemption from the illiteracy eradication classes or the permission granted to them to market their vegetable produce privately, such concessions have, not surprisingly, contributed to the social isolation to which the newly arrived migrants found themselves subjected.

The Egyptian peasant settlers and their families have reacted in varying ways to the demands and challenges which confronted them upon resettlement, as well as to the many changes, planned or otherwise, which have taken place in the Settlement. All these reactions have left their impact on the network of relationships which have evolved among the settler households as well as between the latter and the world outside Khalsa.
Notes to Part II

1 In 1979, attendance in these illiteracy eradication classes became compulsory for all illiterate Iraqis under the age of 45. Non-compliance is punishable by law. At the time of my preliminary survey, illiterate Egyptian settlers were also compelled to join, in spite of their repeated arguments that they were too busy. Protest was particularly loudly voiced by many settler wives because of their double burden of house- and field- work. Some of these women are said to have embarked on a determined effort to shatter the nerves of the social worker holding these classes. They insisted on bringing their toddlers and infants along, refusing to consider the offer of a supervised nursery in the room adjacent to the one in which lessons were held. Visiting such a class on one occasion in 1979, I found a number of Egyptian peasant women breast-feeding their infants, while toddlers were clambering all over the place and occasionally joining in the chorus of words or sentences which the social worker was hoarsely asking their mothers to repeat. Few of these women seemed to be taking any interest in these lessons.

2 A settler son owns part of the lease in one coffee shop, while the other is leased by an Egyptian migrant said to be related to one of the settler households. The sandwich stall is run by the kin of another settler household which also owns a share in the business. It specializes in foul medammes (brown beans) and ta'ammiyah (rissoles made out of brown beans) both of which are Egyptian national dishes.

3 Iraqi farmers are compelled by law to sell their produce to the cooperative society of which they are members. In contrast, the Egyptian peasant settlers were permitted to sell their vegetable produce privately, a concession apparently offered as an additional inducement to encourage migration. However, the settlers must sell any cereal crops through the Khalsa Cooperative. The implications of, but above all the deviations from, these regulations, will be discussed in a later context.

4 Except for one Coptic Christian family, all of Khalsa's settlers are Sunni Moslems. The majority of adjacent Iraqi villages are said to be Shi'a. The location of the Khalsa Settlement may well have been politically motivated. On the other hand, the location would have been subject to the availability of cultivable land. This area south of Baghdad, so I was informed, has during the past few decades suffered from particular neglect due to the migration of many rural dwellers to the capital and its adjacent districts in search of more lucrative job opportunities. This migration pattern is confirmed by D.G. Phillips, 'Rural-to-Urban Migration in Iraq', in Economic Development and Cultural Change Vol.7, (1958-1959), p.400. See also F. Baali, 'Social Factors in Iraqi Rural-Urban Migration', in The American Journal of Economics and Sociology Vol.25, No.4, (October 1966).

5 In a culture where childlessness is perceived to be a woman's curse, numerous precautions are employed to protect the child from the evil eye. Leaving a child unkempt is one such remedy, for the evil eye is believed to be attracted to physically pleasing children. Boys are considered to be specially vulnerable and are thus often dressed up like girls up to the age of three or four in order to mislead the evil eye. This precaution is an obvious expression of the cultural

6 This was confirmed by my informant, Om Said, but no details could be obtained from the Medical Centre. Because of changes in the numerical composition of the Settlement since its establishment, it is difficult to calculate Khalsa's child mortality rate. However, keeping in mind that 83% of the settler families included in the present study have had an average of two children each since their arrival in the Settlement, then the death of six children would compare favourably with the figure of 23.6 deaths per 1000 children aged 1-4 years, as published by the Egyptian Ministry of Health in 1972. The *United Nations Demographic Yearbook* for 1971 reports that 53% of all deaths in Egypt are of children under the age of five. (Both these data are quoted in J.O. Field and G, Ropes, 'Infant Mortality, the Birth Rate and Development in Egypt', in *L'Egypte Contemporaine* No.38, (July 1980)).

7 The Khalsa School curriculum is identical to the one carried out in Iraqi primary schools elsewhere: reading, writing, arithmetic, arts and religion. The older children also receive instruction in science and English. All children are taught about hygiene and issues related to agriculture, to instill an interest in this sector. During the winter term 1981/82, there were 151 children enrolled in the Khalsa Primary School, 56% of whom were Egyptians including the children of non-settlers. Of the 85 Egyptian children, 65% were boys. Primary school attendance is compulsory by law for all children, including non-Iraqi Arab residents, according to one of the Iraqi officials in Khalsa.

8 The Iraqi Government also employs Arab nationals in the public sector. These have the same rights and duties as Iraqi nationals. However, they are generally given a supplementary allowance and priority with regard to housing. While it is designed to attract Arab manpower to Iraq, this measure is said to have led to a feeling of resentment among Iraqis against non-Iraqis.

9 An unpublished report by Mashrou' al-Wihda, dated October 1978, briefly refers to this decree (No.235, issued on 8 May 1978). These debts apparently reached a sum of I.D. 92,000. The settlers claim that, contrary to the promises they were given before their departure from Egypt that the Iraqi Government would shoulder all their resettlement expenses, they were 'burdened' by these debts said to cover their travelling expenses, the construction and furnishings of their homes as well as their monthly subsidies. The Iraqi officials deny this and claim instead that these debts were incurred partly through the loan obtained in the name of the Khalsa Cooperative from the Agricultural Bank designated for the establishment of a chicken farm and partly as a result of the settlers' disinclination to pay for the agricultural inputs ordered through the Cooperative.

10 The term miri tapu means government lands leased permanently on the condition that they should be cultivated. However, there seems to be some confusion over the settlers' leasehold since a number of Iraqi officials referred to the latter as miri sirf, which means government lands leased to tenants. For a precise description of land tenure

11 This lack of social contact seemed to me quite conspicuous on the day (late in February 1979) when the Iraqi Women's Federation organized a celebration in the Khalsa Social Centre to commemorate the Settlement's third anniversary. Over one hundred Iraqi peasant women, conspicuous by their black 'abaya (a black floor-length garment covering the head which is also still worn by conservative urban women in Iraq), could be distinguished among the crowds. But only a handful of settler wives, equally conspicuous by their colourful dresses and shawls, participated. Neither did many settlers attend.

12 See the Iraqi newspaper Al-Jumhuriyah of 26 March 1981 and the London-based Arab weekly Al-Dastour of 3 August 1981. The report in Al-Jumhuriyah gave a detailed description of the consumer durables (which included a television and a refrigerator) distributed among the Moroccan peasant settlers. This report seems to have been circulated in Khalsa, for many settlers tended to quote it as proof of the Iraqi authorities' declining interest in the Khalsa Settlement.


14 See Al-Mouwaten al-'Arabi wa Tashri'at al Thawrah (The Arab National and the Statutes of the Revolution), and Hurriyat Intikal Kouwat al-'Amal al-'Arabiyyah ila al-'Iraq (Freedom of Mobility of Arab Manpower to Iraq). Both pamphlets were published by the Iraqi Ministry of Culture and Information in 1980.

It is at present difficult to estimate accurately the number of Egyptian nationals working in Iraq as the Iraqi Government has not, to my knowledge, published any such data. Moreover, Arab workers are not classified according to country of origin in the official statistical yearbooks. However, in his article 'The Shift in Egypt's Migration Policy 1952-1978', (op.cit.), A. Dessouki estimates that there were 50,000 Egyptians working in Iraq by 1978. But this figure appears to refer to those Egyptians who have left Egypt legally to take up employment in Iraq. It is a known fact that many thousands more have found their way into Iraq via a third Arab country, thus circumventing the need to obtain permission from the Egyptian authorities. A. Ezz-Eldin (see Al-Kouwah al-'Amelah al-Misriyah al-Wafedah ila al-Qotr al-'Iraqi: Dirasah men Manzour Balad al-Manshae (Egyptian Migrant Labour in Iraq: A Study from the Point of View of the Country of Origin), (Baghdad, 1982)), writes that by 1982, there were at least 1.5 million Egyptians working in Iraq, though he does not present a source for this figure. However, J.S. Birks and his co-authors dispute this; (see J.S. Birks et al., 'The Demand for Egyptian Labour Abroad', in A. Richards and P. Martin, Migration, Mechanization and Agricultural Labour Markets in Egypt, op.cit.). They believe - and substantiate this by an evaluation of various statistical sources on Arab labour imports - that by 1980 there could not have been more than 800,000 Egyptians working abroad in the Arab world, of which around 223,000 were employed in Iraq. Given the economic and political situations in the labour-importing countries, specifically the employment of vast numbers of Asian nationals, these authors doubt if the number of
Egyptians working abroad in Arab countries will exceed one million by 1985.

On the other hand, pointing out that the most visible presence of Egyptians abroad appears to be in Iraq, N. Choucri believes that 1.25 - 1.5 million Egyptians working there is a plausible figure (though the authoress stresses that this is an estimate since no data are available). See N. Choucri, Migration in the Middle East: Transformations, Policies and Processes. Op.cit.

Whatever the actual number of Egyptians presently employed in Iraq, it is, in my opinion, their social conspicuousness which may be regarded as one explanation for the animosity they appear to have evoked among many Iraqis. (This point is briefly referred to by S.E. Ibrahim, in Intikal al-'Imalah al-'Arabiyah: Al-Mashakel, al-Athar, al-Siyasiyat (Arab Labour Mobility: Problems, Effects and Policies) (Centre for Arab Unity Studies: Beirut, 1983) pp.161-164.) Most of the Egyptian temporary migrant workers do not bring their wives and children to Iraq because of the costs involved, even though, in contrast to a number of Arab oil producing countries for example, there is no Iraqi law which prohibits this. Because their social and educational backgrounds tend to deny them access to the leisure-time activities of the more skilled and professional Egyptian migrant community in Iraq, these migrant workers tend to congregate in coffee-shops and restaurants. Since the latter are mainly situated in the commercial centres, these male migrants are inevitably socially conspicuous, a fact further accentuated by their distinctive dialect and mode of dress. The animosity which they appear to have evoked in a country traditionally unaccustomed to such an influx of foreign nationals is aptly implied in a joke told to me by an Iraqi acquaintance. Two Egyptians were walking along Al-Rasheed Street (in Baghdad's main commercial centre) when one remarked to the other: Ya khabar, dah baka fi aganeb keteer awy al-ayaam di (My goodness, there seem to be a lot of foreigners (i.e. Iraqis) around here lately.)
PART III: THE EGYPTIAN PEASANT SETTLER AND HIS HOUSEHOLD

Chapter 1: Selection and Migration to Iraq

1.1 The Selection Criteria

The Preparatory Committee, jointly set up in late 1975 by both the Egyptian and Iraqi Governments to evaluate the applications of prospective migrants to Iraq, decided on the following selection criteria: only peasant families, not single men, would be eligible; families should average around three children and be of reasonable health; the family head should have extensive agricultural experience but nonetheless be from the class of subsistence cultivators; he was not to exceed 45 years of age and should be literate; he must also have completed, or have been legally exempted from, military service. No specific conditions, other than that of reasonably good health were drawn up with regard to the prospective settler's wife and children.1

A nation-wide campaign was launched in the Egyptian media.2 The Egyptian Government also instructed rural social centres and combined units, cooperative societies and local branches of the (now defunct) Arab Socialist Union to inform all villagers of this resettlement possibility.3 In retrospect, the media appears to have been the most effective channel. Around 78% of the forty-nine male respondents indicated that they had learnt of the resettlement project in Iraq either through the newspaper or the radio; 14% had obtained their information from local governmental institutions; the rest, who were not among the first group of arrivals in Khalsa in 1976, had been told of this migration possibility either by another settler or by an Egyptian migrant worker in Iraq.

The actual number of applications handed in to this Committee could not be ascertained with any accuracy. Sources in Egypt gave estimates which differed wildly, ranging from eight hundred to hundreds
of thousands. Bearing in mind that, at least up to the early seventies, the temporary migration of Egyptian villagers abroad had not reached the scale which came to be characteristic of the early eighties, then the hundreds of thousands suggested by one source in the Egyptian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs is, in my view, an exaggeration. Eight hundred, though surprisingly low, is perhaps the more plausible figure, not least because it was quoted by the official at the Egyptian Office for Peasants' Affairs in Cairo who was found to be relatively well informed with regard to this resettlement project. In the opinion of this official, the relatively low number of applications is consistent with the fellaheen's traditional prudency when confronted with a hitherto unknown situation. A similar view is also expounded by J. Mayfield, for example, who attributes this prudency to the fellah's fear of '... dreadful, unknowable and largely uncontrollable forces of the universe ... [which instill in him] ... a hesitation to use his initiative, an uncertainty concerning the quality of his own judgement, a tendency to let someone else evaluate a situation in order to avoid frustrations and anxiety'. Though the above may to some extent be applicable, in my judgement, this relatively low number of applications is also largely due to the fellah's unwillingness to take risks given his past accumulated experiences of a way of life offering limited economic opportunities. In addition, there is the previously mentioned fact that up to the early seventies, Iraq was more or less an unknown area to the Egyptian rural masses. Though the authorities explicitly underlined the fact that they would shoulder all resettlement expenses, the fact remained that the fellah contemplating migration neither possessed the certainty of being able to rely on this offer, nor was there a precedent to serve as an example. This is implicit in the fact that 83% of the forty-nine male respondents who
had been resettled in 1976, did not at the time know of anyone in their home village who was working outside Egypt. The rest had known of kin as well as friends and neighbours who were temporary migrant workers abroad, mainly in Libya and Saudi Arabia. But only one of these respondents knew of a man from his village of origin who was employed in Iraq. Significantly, these respondents stressed that - unlike their own case - none of these temporary migrants had taken their families with them. This may be a further plausible explanation for the supposedly low number of Egyptian peasant families who are said to have applied for migration to Iraq. Since, as previously stressed, the latter was relatively unknown, it would follow that the prospective migrant would be hesitant to take his family to a place lacking a supportive network of kith or kin to whom he could turn.

Seventeen of the one hundred families who arrived in the Khalsa Settlement in 1976 were discovered by the Iraqi authorities to have insufficient agricultural experience and were subsequently sent back to Egypt. Presumably influenced by their own resettlement policies and experiences, the Egyptian authorities apparently believed in the necessity of including a number of settlers whose function would be the provision of non-agricultural services - i.e. carpenter, grocer, barber etc. - on the grounds that it would be conducive to the development of Khalsa into a self-contained community. This concept was obviously not shared by their Iraqi counter-parts. According to one Iraqi source, the aim was the eventual integration of the Khalsa Settlement with its new social environment by encouraging the settler households' reliance on the provision of such services from outside their little community. No satisfactory explanation of these diverging perceptions could be obtained from either the Egyptian or the Iraqi officials concerned with this project.
Of the forty-nine male respondents who indicated their occupation prior to resettlement, 6% claimed to have been non-cultivators. However, they stressed that growing up in the village implied the assimilation of agricultural experiences which, in their case, had apparently been sufficient to impress the Iraqi authorities. Of the remaining respondents, 52% had cultivated rented land in their village of origin; 22% had cultivated the family plot together with their fathers and/or brothers; 12% had worked their own as well as additionally rented land; 4% had cultivated their own land exclusively; and the remaining two settlers had been employed in South Lebanon and Saudi Arabia respectively, prior to which they had cultivated rented land in their home village in Egypt. With the exception of two families who consider themselves to be socially above the peasant stratum and who claim to have owned over five feddans in their home village, all these respondents, by their own accounts, had owned and/or rented an average of one feddan or even less and had been obliged to add to the family's income through wage-labour. None of them had been beneficiaries of the land reform programmes carried out in Egypt since the early fifties. But, sensitive to Iraqi society's view of him as a poverty stricken migrant come to seek his fortune in oil-rich Iraq, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant made a point of stressing that, though he had been poor, he had nevertheless not belonged to the class of *tarahil* labourers who occupy the bottom rung of rural Egypt's social ladder.

Though they may not have originated from the *tarahil* class, the fact remains that, the two above mentioned exceptions apart, the settler families included in the present study originate from the stratum of poor peasants. The plot of land they claim to have been cultivating prior to resettlement, whether rented or otherwise, was insufficient to ensure their subsistence. Furthermore, the available
wage-employment opportunities did not significantly raise their standard of living either.\textsuperscript{13}

The settler families' socio-economic background is implicit in the reasons they gave for having decided to migrate to Iraq: 90\% of the fifty-one male and 63\% of the sixty female respondents indicated that \textit{akl al-'aysh} (i.e. eating bread, meaning a better standard of living) had been their foremost motive; for 78\% and 46\% of these men and women respectively the possibility of owning land had been the second most important reason. But over a third of the settlers and settler wives who responded also gave additional reasons which serve to illuminate the living conditions of the villages they had left behind. Overpopulation was repeatedly stressed and most of the male as well as female respondents expressed an awareness of its connection with their condition of poverty, the lack of cultivable land and the meagre employment opportunities. Some settlers spoke of quarrels with their kin, mainly over inheritance, as having been an additional reason behind their attempt to secure their livelihood elsewhere. Others described how difficult it had been to find respectable work outside their home village. Settling in Khalsa seemed a golden opportunity, not only because the authorities were willing to finance such a move, but also because it only required the agricultural experience which every \textit{fellah} is expected to have anyway. Some of the women stressed the duty of a wife to follow her husband, for otherwise he would seek a divorce or take another wife. Other settler wives spoke of the advantage of being able to keep the family intact and of their children's improved chances for a better life. However, this question also tended to provoke the additional response among the settler couples that, in fact, it is Iraq which is in need of the Egyptian peasants and their agricultural experience since the Iraqi peasant prefers to raise livestock rather than work with his hands on the land.
Given the settlers' socio-economic background, it was not surprising to discover the relatively high rate of illiteracy among them. Of the seventy-one settler wives included in the present study, only one, from Lower Egypt, has completed nine years of schooling and is proficient in both reading and writing. The 10% who have attended school for between four and six years have, one exception apart, more or less relapsed into illiteracy, for none can write more than her name and only a very few can read with some difficulty. Two thirds of this group are from Lower Egypt. All the remaining 89% of settler wives are illiterate. The correlation between regional origin and illiteracy rate is explicit and indicative of the differential rate of development between Egypt's regions: for, while 79% of all wives from Lower Egypt are illiterate, this rate rises to over 90% of all Middle and Upper Egyptian women respectively.

Among the sixty-eight settlers included in the present study, 12% have attended school for between eight and eleven years and most of them claim to be more or less proficient in both reading and writing. None of these respondents is from Upper Egypt. The 25% who have completed between four and six years of schooling are almost equally divided among the three regions. Compared to the settler wives, fewer have relapsed into illiteracy, for almost all of them can read more or less with ease, though few write without difficulty. The remaining 63% of the settlers were found to be illiterate, a rate which rises the further south one moves along Egypt's geographical map. Thus, while 41% of all Lower Egyptian settlers are illiterate, this rate rises to 73% of all Middle and 91% of all Upper Egyptians respectively.

None of the wives and husbands who had attended the illiteracy eradication classes organized by the Iraqi authorities indicated that they had benefited. But neither did they voice any regret over
discontinuation of the classes. Though lack of time appears to have been the main reason behind this lack of interest, the latter is, in my view, perhaps also due to the peasant's disinclination to invest his time and energy in the acquisition of a skill which he perceives to be of little value to him. Apart from the fact that the illiterate settler may rely on someone else to read and write his letters for him, there is also the cassette which has assumed an important function as a means of communication, in the form of taped messages, between the Settlement and the village of origin.

The selection criteria regarding family status were similarly ignored in certain cases. For, among those who arrived in Khalsa in 1976, there were one widow and seven bachelors. According to one Iraqi source, the inclusion of this widow is not unusual in view of the Iraqi Government's policy of recognizing and stressing the importance of women's role in the process of socio-economic development. However, one may also argue that her inclusion would appear to contradict the claim that fellaheen in their thousands applied for resettlement in Iraq. A source in Cairo indicated that these seven bachelors had been included at the instigation of the Head of the General Union of Peasants' Cooperative Societies in Baghdad. The apparent aim had been to encourage these men to choose brides from among the settler families in order to foster kinship bonds in the Settlement. (The men apparently had to commit themselves to marry within the first year after resettlement.)

While it appears obvious that the one hundred Egyptian peasant families who arrived in Khalsa in 1976 must have been the most eligible from among all applicants wishing to migrate to Iraq, it seems to me just as obvious that the Preparatory Committee's concept of the type of fellah likely to leave his home village in search of a better life was
not based on an accurate knowledge of migration trends in rural Egypt. As one settler put it, no peasant would ever leave his village if he were able to secure his livelihood we rassou marfou'a (his head held high). Though this may not apply to the two families who claim to be socially above the peasant stratum (the reasons for their acceptance by the Committee could not be ascertained), poverty or impoverishment were, as the settler families' socio-economic background suggests, one of the main push factors behind the decision to consider resettlement in Iraq. But it is precisely the poor Egyptian peasant who would be the least likely to fulfill many of the Committee's selection criteria. The peasant desperate enough to leave his village and venture into the unknown in order to escape the vicious circle of poverty is not identical with the selective migrant attracted by urban employment opportunities commensurate with his level of education. Rather, this non-selective migrant would more than likely be illiterate, suffer from poor health and have numerous children to offset the relatively high mortality rate afflicting the offspring of the rural poor. Furthermore, the limited area of cultivable land at his disposal would necessarily imply a lack of capital enabling the fellah to benefit from modern agricultural methods, thus limiting his cultivation experience to the age-old techniques handed down through successive generations of fellaheen in the villages of Egypt.

The fact that the age-limit seems to have been applied - 88% of the settlers included in the present study had been between 20-46 years of age at the time of resettlement; 7% had been over 47, but less than 55 years old; the rest are all settler sons who have married in Khalsa and are currently 19 years old or younger - need not necessarily be due to the Committee's attempts to enforce this criterion. It may simply be that age is an important variable affecting the fellah's decision.
to migrate. The settlers' average age at the time of resettlement partly explains the average number of children per family: at the time of resettlement Lower Egyptian families had on average three children, while those from the provinces south of Cairo had on average four each. However, it is also possible that the Committee gave priority to those who had relatively smaller families.

Not surprising, the completion of the military service is the one selection criteria over which the Committee by all accounts accepted no compromise. This reflects the fact that the stratum of poor peasants in Egypt are the least likely group in the population to have the influence to avoid this duty.

1.2 First Arrivals in Khalsa

Prior to their departure from Egypt, all the families finally selected for migration to Iraq were for some days housed in a converted school-house in Cairo. The behaviour during this period was vividly described by the Egyptian official from the Office for Peasants' Affairs, who, as previously mentioned, was among those in charge of preparing the settlers for migration and ensuring that all the relevant documents were in order. Many families tended to display a conspicuous wariness towards all those not from their own province, one expression of which was the hesitation on the part of many a mother to let her child play with wilad al-ghoraba (the children of strangers). For a number of settler families this was the first contact with villagers from regions perceived to be very remote from their own. The apprehension apparent in these families' eyes tended to be expressed through endless questions, which the officials' repeated answers never quite seemed to satisfy. A number of kin arrived, some even from as far away as Upper Egypt, to try to dissuade their relatives from embarking on
what they perceived to be a 'foolhardy' idea. To my mind, this is a further indication of the fact that migration of Egyptian peasants abroad was still an unusual event at the time. These visits inevitably tended to trigger off more apprehension and more searching questions. For their part, many settler families remember the officials from the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo who came to reassure them and distribute sweets and cigarettes. Others recall the lectures given them by Egyptian officials in which the settlers were given to understand that the Iraqi Government would shoulder all travelling and resettlement expenses. But in retrieving their memories of these early days, many tended to harp on the fact that not all the promises pledged by the Iraqi authorities had been fulfilled. (Some of these grievances will be discussed in a later context).

Clad in new clothes and shoes provided by the Egyptian authorities, and with all their worldly possessions crammed into cardboard suitcases and sacks of varying shapes and sizes, the first group of settlers arrived in the spring of 1976 at Baghdad Airport.20 There, they were met by representatives of the Iraqi Government, the Egyptian Embassy in Baghdad and the media of both countries. Buses were waiting to transport them to the Settlement, where the Social Centre staff and representatives of the General Federation of Iraqi Women had a hot meal awaiting them. According to one source present at the time, the Iraqi authorities had apparently intended to allocate the houses in such a manner as to avoid the grouping of families according to their provincial origin. But the attempt was apparently soon abandoned in the ensuing chaos of arrival. A number of families did make some effort to secure adjacent houses, in particular some of those bound by kinship ties. Others, after finding their bearings the following day, decided to move to another house judged to be more
central. However, in general, families tended to occupy the first empty house they encountered.

A number of the settlers and their wives vividly remember the fear and thrill of their first trip on an aeroplane; the first glimpse of the Khalsa Settlement; everyone talking at the same time with children crying almost incessantly because of bewilderment and fatigue; the pleasure of finding a ready furnished home with running water and electricity; the confusion mingled with amusement of trying to understand the Iraqi dialect; the first bus-ride into Jisr al-Diyalah and the grappling with unfamiliar money in the market place; but then the disappointment of discovering that the land was not yet ready for distribution and finally, the additional disappointment that none of the homes had been provided with television sets and fridges, or even donkeys or mules to transport the settlers to and from their land.21

But time has obviously dimmed many a memory, for the pattern of response to the question concerning the biggest difficulties encountered during the first few months after resettlement appeared to me to be mainly influenced by present problems or those of the immediate past. Thus, only 7% of the fifty-six female and none of the forty-nine male respondents mentioned a fear of the unknown. However, though there is no apparent correlation between the type of difficulty mentioned and the respondent's region of origin, men and women tended to emphasize problems which reflected the focus of their gender related interests and responsibilities. Thus, understanding the Iraqi dialect was the difficulty which ranked highest among the women (39%). It is not surprising that this issue should weigh on their minds given the fact that it is for the most part the settler wife who takes the produce to market. Social isolation ranked second (32%), followed by homesickness (18%), the hot climate and cultivation problems (14%
respectively) and finally quarrels with house neighbours, which 9% of these female respondents regarded as a particular problem. In contrast, 86% of the male respondents considered agricultural problems - in particular soil salinity and water shortages - to have been the biggest difficulty with which they found themselves confronted. Understanding the Iraqi dialect was the second most frequently mentioned problem (16%), followed by the difficulty of getting used to a new country (13%), social isolation (10%) and finally quarrels with neighbours (6%).

Around 14% of the female and 12% of the male respondents either could not remember any particular problem during the initial post-resettlement period, or they insisted they have experienced none. Significantly, this group includes some of the settler families which arrived after 1976. The general attitude among those particular respondents tended to be that fellaheen are used to problems all their lives and it is up to God what difficulties one is burdened with.

Chapter 2: The Egyptian Peasant Family

New human settlements can rarely, if ever, be a replica of the old: infrastructure, social environment and the settlers' experiences and motivations are but a few of the many factors which render this a truism. Thus, Khalsa's settler family found itself confronted with a cluster of new challenges with which it had to learn to come to terms. On the social level, there was the confrontation with a society which - cultural similarities between Egypt and Iraq notwithstanding - must have appeared in many aspects alien. Given the fact that, by their own accounts, the settler families had been recruited from their villages of origin, then one may surmise that the impact of some of these cultural dissimilarities would be all the more pervasive for migrants.
whose way of life prior to resettlement had largely been confined to the social setting typical of rural Egypt. Within the Settlement, the Egyptian peasant family had to deal with the social proximity to other households with which it did not have any previous contact. In the economic sphere, there were the challenges posed by an agricultural production process which demanded a re-orientation: more land to cultivate than the settler household had been used to back in Egypt, new soil requiring different input combinations, the experimentation with crops which they were unfamiliar with, and finally the familiarization with a new market setting.

Each settler household can be assumed to have developed its own coping mechanism or adaptive strategy in dealing with these many challenges and demands. The latter can be said to be influenced both by endogenous factors, for example the personality characteristics and motivations of household members, as well as by exogenous variables, such as the economic opportunities provided by the Iraqi authorities to name a particularly important one. However, since the focus of my interest does not lie in the Egyptian family per se, the following discussion and analysis will concentrate on discovering some of the common elements in the manner in which Khalsa's settler families have adapted to their new way of life. As explained in the theoretical framework to the present study, this pattern can serve to throw some light on the type of community which was found to have evolved in Khalsa up to the time of my field-research.

The field-work for the present study therefore involved the collection of data which would make it possible to analyse this adaptive strategy. However, the many restrictions described previously in the methodology chapter placed unintended limits on data collection and necessitated a certain selectivity with regard to the variables to be studied.
The present chapter will deal specifically with two aspects. The first is related to the peasant family system. The discovery that there existed a number of kinship bonds in Khalsa (though, at the time of the preliminary survey, I was unaware of their extent) seemed to me of special interest. How has migration affected the traditional pattern of ties which it may be assumed had prevailed in the home village in Egypt? Changes in kin relationships would implicitly provide some insight into the settler families' social ties with non-kin as well and thus into the settler household's way of life after resettlement. The second aspect which shall be dealt with here concerns the division of labour within the household. How has the settler family adapted to the demands of agricultural production and the Iraqi authorities' expectation of production for the market, given the regulation prohibiting the employment of non-family labour which, at least up to the time of my preliminary survey, appeared to be more or less rigorously enforced?

2.1 Peasant Family System: Tradition and Change

In the theoretical chapter of the present study, some generalizations concerning the Egyptian peasant family and its kin relationships have been put forward which at this point require further elaboration. It has been specified that, while the influence and dominance of the consanguine institution has generally declined, there is a regional variation with regard to this development which, in turn, illustrates the often neglected fact that rural Egypt is not homogeneous. Thus, though the decreasing dominance of the extended family system has a long history and has furthermore been more rapid in Lower Egypt compared with the regions south of Cairo, consanguine ideals nevertheless remain a feature of village life and culture. The diminishing
likelihood of land inheritance as well as the villager's increasing contact with the world beyond his social horizon are among the main factors which appear to have contributed to the increasing incidence of the Lower Egyptian family functioning as a separate economic unit. Nevertheless, it remains more or less subjugated to the consanguine institution insofar as the expectation of its adherence to socially valued patterns of behaviour and reciprocity are concerned. Social obligations may not necessarily be activated in the case of very distant kin. But the affective attachments which primary, secondary, and perhaps even tertiary kinship bonds may entail, demand varying degrees of reciprocity if the individual is to maintain his social standing in the community. For it is the family which largely determines the individual's rank on the rural social ladder. In addition, it is from these affective attachments that the peasant derives a measure of security when confronting the world outside his social setting. However, even though economic cooperation — in the sense, for example, of reciprocal assistance at times of financial need or on the land — may not be an institutionalized obligation among kin, it may nevertheless be extended between family members whose relationship is intact and has remained unaffected by strife and discord.

Moving from the Nile Delta southwards along Egypt's geographical map, one finds that the consanguine institution continues to function not only as an ideal but also as a reality insofar as certain aspects are concerned. Nonetheless, this does not imply that the Middle or Upper Egyptian extended family system necessarily functions in the strictest meaning of the term, i.e. as a joint family composed of two or more nuclear families sharing one residence, functioning as one economic unit and adhering to the patriarchal cultural norm according to which the eldest male's role as family head is commensurate with his
authority over all matters pertaining to his household. In fact, according to H. Ammar, already by the 1950s, the '... economic strength of the extended family and the harmonious relationships between its members ... [was not found to be] ... what is usually assumed. [As in Lower Egypt, it is generally only if family members] ... are on good terms ... [that] ... economic mutual assistance in borrowing money, animals and crops takes place'.

Here also, the diminishing possibility of land inheritance as well as the increasing multiplicity of ties between non-kin as well as between the village and the world outside have seemingly had their effect on the intensity of kinship bonds. Nonetheless, even though the Middle or Upper Egyptian nuclear peasant family may also essentially function as a separate economic unit, compared to Lower Egypt, where the lineage system is weak or even non-existent, there are indications that the extended family in the provinces south of Cairo continues to be regarded as '... publicly responsible for the general conduct and certain disciplinary measures to redress the offences of its members against the law and order ... [as well as functioning as] ... an intermediate social unit between conjugal economic family and the clan, shouldering the social responsibility for the smaller units and held accountable for their behaviour before the clan'.

Thus, the Middle or Upper Egyptian nuclear peasant household can be said to remain largely incorporated into - and not merely subjugated to the influence of - the consanguine institution.

It is perhaps of relevance at this point to indicate an indirect confirmation of the above described pattern, namely the incidence of kinship between spouses in Khalsa. The degeneration of the consanguine institution in the Egyptian villages in general is reflected by the fact that in 58% of the sixty-nine settler households included in the
present study, there is no kin relationship between husband and wife. However, taking the regional variable into account, one finds that though 81% of all wives (including second wives) from Lower Egypt are not related to their husbands, this rate sinks to 50% and 58% of all those from Middle and Upper Egypt respectively. This regional differentiation is further reflected in the degree of kinship between spouses. Of the sixteen wives whose husbands are their first cousins (mostly father's brother's son, but also father's sister's son and mother's brother's son), around 75% are from Middle and Upper Egypt. Similarly, 77% of the thirteen couples who are each other's distant kin (second or third cousins on either parent's side) are from provinces south of Cairo. Thus, the consanguine institution's importance as a source of eligible marriage partners seemingly decreases along a south to north continuum.

The Egyptian peasant family which arrived in Khalsa came from a background where the type and intensity of the socio-economic ties maintained between kin was a reflection not only of its particular region of origin but was also a result of the specific circumstances of its way of life in the home village, a pattern, however, for which unfortunately no data are available. The reality of resettlement is, in the first instance, underlined by the settler family's relative economic independence of the other Egyptian settler households. For each family received the indefinite lease to a plot of land, the ownership of which is guaranteed by an external authority. The provision of all the necessary social services by this same authority as well as the fact that the Settlement's proximity to urban centres facilitates the household's procurement of all its needs, further underline the settler family's self-reliance. Given the existence of alternatives to the possibility of assistance within the Settlement, what effect has this had on the intensity of kinship relations in Khalsa?
Taking into account the heterogeneity in the settler families' region of origin, it seemed likely that social contacts between kin would tend to be intensified. The plausibility of this hypothesis was to my mind all the greater since, during the initial post-resettlement phase, Khalsa was more or less socially isolated from its environment. Furthermore, though the general social structure of the contemporary Egyptian village has demonstrated that economic cooperation between kin is an ideal whose realization is dependent above all on the extent of cordiality between them, it nevertheless seemed to me conceivable that the common post-migratory experiences might have initiated some modification in this pattern. Specifically, the regulation prohibiting the employment of outside labour, as well as the fact that each family received more land than what it had been used to cultivating back in the home village, seemed to me to lend credence to the further hypothesis that kin would derive a mutual advantage from some type of economic cooperation with one another. This cooperation could well be strengthened by the very fact that the families concerned all occupy positions of equal strength (i.e. ownership of house and land and undifferentiated access to services), which would preclude any patron-client relationship.

Thirty-three out of the sixty-nine settler families included in the present study were found to be connected by a variety of kinship bonds. However, apart from two kinship groups functioning as extended families, the particular significance of which will be discussed later, none of the remaining twenty-eight settler households, forming eleven separate kinship groups, were discovered to have developed any significant economic ties with one another. Defining economic cooperation as the regular help reciprocated between kin on the land, in the market as well as with regard to the borrowing of
money, draft animals and agricultural tools, the settlers were asked if they extended any such assistance to one another. The 22% of the fifty-two male respondents, who claimed they did, also stressed that they only assisted their kin but not the other settlers. However, when pressed to define the type of assistance rendered, the pattern which emerged was found to be an explicit expression of the variance between the ideal as dictated by the cultural norm and the reality of the way of life in Khalsa. For, in fact, apart from the particular relationship inherent in the case of the two extended families, none of the above respondents can be said to be adhering to a pattern of mutual economic cooperation with their kin as defined above. Rather, any such assistance appears to be sporadic or strictly reciprocal and, more significantly, does not appear to include financial assistance.

Nonetheless, lack of economic cooperation does not necessarily preclude the existence of cordial relations if not intense affective attachments between kin. For example, in kinship group C from Lower Egypt (see Chart III, over), the wives of C2 and C3 are the daughters of C1 (Om Said and 'Amm Ali). But the latter, having neither sons nor daughters living with them (the former are all engaged in non-peasant occupations or continuing their education, while all the daughters are married), are not being helped by either son-in-law as far as the cultivation of their plot is concerned. Instead, 'Amm Ali has contracted an agreement with another settler (from Middle Egypt), who receives a share of the crop in exchange for his labour contribution. The C3 husband, who is employed full-time as a mechanic in a garage in Baghdad, but who is also attempting to cultivate beyond his household's subsistence needs, is not relying on his affines either. Instead, he too has contracted with a Lower Egyptian settler who receives part of the crop in exchange for his labour input. The C2
Chart III: Kinship Groups among Settler Families in Khalsa

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husband, who married Om Said's youngest daughter after resettlement (being one of the seven bachelors who arrived in 1976), is said to offer his labour to other settler households occasionally, but against payment in cash, not in kind. Household C4 in this kinship group, whose family head is the paternal second cousin of the C3 husband, owns a tractor. Nevertheless, he indicated that he would not grant his kin any price concessions, though he may give them priority by ploughing their land before that of other settlers. More significantly, neither C1 or C2, nor even C3 expect any favouritism.

Similarly, no pattern of mutual economic assistance was found to have developed in the case of kinship group L, composed of one Middle and three Upper Egyptian families. The husbands in L3 and L4 are brothers. But though they are house neighbours, each household functions as a separate economic unit, cultivating its own land and taking its own produce to market. The cordial relationship which appears to exist between the two brothers has not been translated into commensality. The two wives in L3 and L4 are the daughters of L2 and L1 respectively.26 Though the L1 family head is deceased,27 and the widow has one young son attending the Khalsa Primary School, she cannot much rely on her eldest son who prefers to work as an occasional wage-labourer outside the Settlement. But neither her daughter nor her son-in-law in L4 offer her any assistance in cultivating her plot. Nor is there any economic cooperation between the L2 household and the son-in-law in L3, though the former's sons are all continuing their education.

The same trend is also discernible in kinship groups A and M, both from Lower Egypt. A1's wife is the sister of A2's family head, the M1 husband is the brother of the M2 wife. Though in each case, the husbands are also distant kin, and though each kinship group is either house neighbours (A), or lives along the same alley-way (M), these
households nevertheless function as separate economic units. However, in contrast to C4, the A2 husband, who owns a tractor, indicated that he would plough his brother-in-law's land for less than the usual price for the sake of his sister's welfare.\textsuperscript{28}

Similarly, there is no apparent economic cooperation in the case of kinship group I from Middle Egypt: I1 is the father of I2's wife and the maternal uncle of I4; I3 is a distant cousin of the family-heads in both I1 and I4, and thus also related to I2. Both I3 and I4 own tractors, but neither would consider granting their kin any price concessions when ploughing their land. On the other hand, there is no obligation to use the services of a tractor-owning kin. I4, whose children are either married or pursuing urban employment, cultivates his land unaided by any of his male relatives.

In kinship group H from Upper Egypt, the widow in H1 is the maternal second cousin of the family head in H2. But here also, no mutually advantageous economic cooperation has been established. The H1 widow's son, who is one of the two butchers operating in the Settlement, would not accord his relatives any special price should they buy meat from him. Neither would his mother, who functions as the Settlement's traditional \textit{daya} (midwife), deliver her kin's children without payment. The H2 family head, who raises sheep for sale, sells them to the highest bidder, rather than to his cousin's son, the butcher.

Finally, there is kinship group F from Middle Egypt, where F2's second wife is the daughter of the F1 household. Here also, being affines has not encouraged any economic cooperation which might conceivably be of mutual advantage. In fact, the F2 family-head's second marriage (which took place in Khalsa), was motivated by the desire to acquire an additional source of labour, though his eldest son, who is very near in age to his step-mother, does not attend school but helps
his father on the land. Having married her off, the F1 parents accept that their daughter's labour is solely reserved for the conjugal household.

Nonetheless, regardless of the lack of economic cooperation characterizing these particular kinship groups described above, all the families involved are bound by varying degrees of affective attachments, ranging from very close (parent-daughter, sister-brother or brother-brother) to relatively close (distant cousins and affines). Far from being regarded as unusual or disruptive, this lack of economic assistance between kin seems to be accepted as the normal course of events, even in those cases where there would seem to be a clear advantage to one or the other party in such cooperation. Whatever pertains to the economic sphere appears to be treated as an issue separate from the realm of social relations, an attitude justified by the pursuit of one's economic self-interest implicit in the aim of profit maximization (the term is used here in the sense of the peasant settler's economic calculation of maximizing his income or minimizing his cost). As can be discerned from Chart III, kinship groups do not tend to necessarily cluster together in adjacent houses, a pattern which is in fact the general norm in the Egyptian village where population density encourages kin dispersion. Nonetheless, families who are on cordial terms with their kin maintain social contacts of varying intensity. In fact, such a relatively small community as Khalsa may well encourage an increase in frequency of contacts. As the subsequent analysis of the visiting network will illustrate, participation in each other's life-cycle ceremonies remains imperative, for this is an occasion to demonstrate the ideal of kinship solidarity. Male kin also expect each other's support vis-à-vis the rest of the Settlement, for example during disputes over the election of the Cooperative Board.
For these particular groups of families, kinship bonds remain a source of social support and a confirmation of their social identity and status. They may function as separate nuclear families - following what W.G. Goode describes as a 'secular trend' - but their individualism does not impede the maintenance of affective attachments to one another. In this sense, one may define these relationships as being similar to those attributed to the 'modified extended family', which is bound not only by affectional ties but also by choice. The compartmentalization of relationships into separate social and economic spheres is the accepted norm precisely because each party adheres to this division. No-one makes demands which may run counter to the other's economic self-interest, but neither does anyone wilfully resort to behaviour which would harm the social standing of their kin. To my mind, it is above all the fact that each of these settler households has the choice of alternative sources of assistance, i.e. the access to social and other services and the chance to fulfill its needs outside the Settlement, that these particular relationships appear to be flourishing with a minimum of strain. It is this reality in particular which may be one of the most significant differences between the settler family's way of life after resettlement as compared to the circumstances which assumedly prevailed in the villages of origin.

However, for every two such cases of kinship groupings in Khalsa, where regardless of economic non-cooperation, there nevertheless exists a valued pattern of relationships, one encounters in the Settlement a kin group where social contacts are either strained, or even non-existent. For example, in the case of kinship group B from Middle Egypt, the wife and husband in B3 are the daughter and son of B2 and B1 respectively. Having received their own house and plot of land from the Iraqi authorities upon their marriage some two years previous to my
field-research, this young couple has to all intents become not only spatially but also to some extent emotionally separated from their families of origin. The B3 husband is said to be in almost constant conflict with his parents in B1, who, though they paid the mahr (bride-price) in spite of not having fully approved the choice of the bride, resent their son's refusal to continue to help them on the land. It is said that the B1 parents had hoped to add their son's plot to their own and had looked upon their daughter-in-law as an additional source of labour. Similarly, the B3 wife is subjected to her parents' pressure to continue to help her mother look after the household and take care of her siblings. Both sets of parents-in-law confine their social contacts to the absolute minimum, each privately accusing the other of turning their child against its parents. The B3 couple's economic independence of its kin and its acquisition of house and land without the parents' help have undoubtedly encouraged it to evade the ideal of traditional filial duty demanded by the families of origin. It is precisely these expectations which, to my mind, are of particular interest. For they would seem to indicate that attempts at perpetuating parental control do not necessarily cease with the economic independence of offspring. (However, one must also not overlook the fact that these particular parents may have been influenced by the examples of the two extended families in the Settlement). But, while the B3 husband has cultivated a number of friendships among his peers in the Settlement and beyond, his wife tends to be socially more isolated. For the husband's apparent lack of concern for his family of origin is not matched by a disregard of certain cultural norms such as the one demanding the wife's confinement to the social network in the vicinity of the home.

Kinship Group K from Lower Egypt - the family head in K1 is the brother of the K2 husband - offers a similar example where the
geographical distance from the village of origin and its social support institutions has not necessarily led to the maintenance of cordial kinship bonds between primary kin. Though it was the K1 husband who had encouraged his brother to join the Khalsa Settlement (in 1979), there is apparently a periodic eruption of bad relations between the two brothers, which, according to Om Said, is mainly due to envy. K1 has a stake in the sandwich stall in Khalsa's arcade and is also said to have owned half the barber business of another brother who has since left the Settlement. Being financially better-off, K1's wife is said to often accuse her poorer sister-in-law in K2 of jealousy, attributing each and every problem to the latter's evocation of the evil eye. For her part, the K2 wife contends that because the K1 couple are first cousins while she herself is an outsider, her in-laws are intent on causing her trouble by trying to turn her husband against her. Whatever the actual motives behind all this strife may be, the fact that each household is economically independent of the other and, furthermore, not entangled in any future inheritance considerations, has, in my judgement, undoubtedly mitigated against the necessity of maintaining cordial relations whatever the cost. Though the brothers tend to still visit each other or meet in the coffee-shop, the sisters-in-law were, at the time of my field research, not on speaking terms and intent on avoiding each other's life-cycle ceremonies as well as preventing their children from playing together.

Similarly, it is strife which has seemingly led kinship group G from Middle Egypt to avoid each other socially. The husbands in G1 and G2 are paternal first cousins, but are by all accounts perpetuating the fight over inheritance which caused the rift between their fathers back in the home village. It was the G1 household which indicated its kinship with G2, while the latter denied having any relatives in the
Settlement. Neither family feels any inhibition in publicly expressing the rupture in their kin relationship. The men are said to not even greet each other should they happen to meet, while their wives, according to Om Said, confine themselves to a polite, but hurried greeting.

Finally, there is the, albeit extreme, example of kinship group D from Lower Egypt: the wife of D2 (one of the seven bachelors who arrived in 1976) is the daughter of the D1 family. Her parents are despised by some of the other settler families, not only for their acquiescence with regard to the son-in-law's tendency to avoid doing any work, but above all for not taking any effective measures to stop the rumour that their daughter is working as a prostitute (the implications of which will be discussed later). The daughter is said to repay her parents' lack of concern by a display of conspicuous indifference. More significantly, complaints about her husband are taken to the Police Station and not to her family of origin. While D2 was serving at the war-front with Iran, his wife continued to live in her own home, in spite of the presence of two male lodgers, instead of returning to the house of her parents as the traditional custom demands.

As the above examples of strained or non-existent social relations illustrate, the common post-migratory experience of being exposed to a multitude of challenges and pressures does not necessarily work in favour of reinforcing the web of affective attachments traditionally expected of kinship ties. Neither the distance from the traditional support institutions, nor the fear of social isolation seem to have been sufficiently influential in minimizing existing strife. The ideal social convention demanding a measure of family solidarity could, in fact, be the more easily ignored given each household's economic independence.

However, in contrast to all the kin relationships described above, the two remaining kinship groups to be discussed were found to be
functioning as extended families in the sense of a common residence, commensality and the carrying out of production tasks. In kinship group E (from Lower Egypt), E1 are the parents of the men in E2 and E3. The former was married in 1979 at the age of sixteen to his paternal second cousin, while E3 was fifteen at the time of his wedding in 1980 with a distant kin on his mother's side. Neither son chose his own bride, who in each case was brought over personally by the father from the home village in Egypt. Both brides were around fourteen years old at the time of their weddings, the celebrations of which took place in the Settlement. To ensure a common residence, the E1 parents paid their house neighbour to vacate his home in exchange for the one given to E2 by the Iraqi authorities upon his marriage. The wall separating the two compounds was knocked down, the entrance to E2's house in the adjacent alley-way sealed off, and the one leading into the parents' compound now serves as the sole entrance into the joint family home. E3's house in the adjacent block is rented out by his father to temporary Egyptian migrant workers. The sons' wives only leave the compound if their help is needed during peak harvest times. Otherwise, they are in charge of running the joint household under their mother-in-law's supervision. The latter helps her husband and sons full-time on the land and also takes the produce for sale on the market, though sometimes the crops are sold for a lower price to one of the settler households working additionally as merchants. The three plots of land, though not adjacent to one another, are nevertheless cultivated communally following the father's instructions. According to Om Said, E1 leases part of his land to Egyptian agricultural labourers working in the vicinity of the Settlement, but this could not be verified. The eldest son E2 also helps his father operate the family tractor and plough the land of other settlers. It is the E1
parents who handle the family's finances and, according to one 
daughter-in-law, neither son ever receives cash in his hand.

Kinship group J (from Lower and Middle Egypt), is another case 
where dominant parents have managed to enforce a joint household. The 
J2 husband is the son of J1, from Middle Egypt. It was the parents who 
decided on the choice of bride, who is the daughter of a Lower Egyptian 
migrant worker employed in a near-by provincial town. The bride was 
brought over from Egypt at her in-laws' expense and both spouses were 
also under-age at the time of the wedding (which took place in Khalsa). 
Here also, the neighbour was paid off to vacate his home in order to 
ensure that parents and son would have adjacent houses. The wall 
dividing the two compounds was knocked down, but the young couple only 
occupy one room of what is technically their home. The other two rooms 
are leased to an Iraqi family awaiting its turn to move into one of the 
government-subsidised blocks of flats currently under construction some 
distance from the Settlement. Though the two plots of land are 
relatively far apart, father and son nevertheless cultivate communally, 
while the mother takes the produce to market. The J2 wife and her 
unmarried sister-in-law are in charge of running the household.

The two kinship groups are, to all appearances, perpetuating the 
ideal of the traditional extended family, in which the father continues 
in his role as undisputed patriarch, and in which family members live 
in harmony under his wisdom and authority. According to Goode, this 
'...traditional and continuing process by which larger family groups 
develop ... [has even in the past largely been an ideal because it 
requires] ... great managerial skills to hold together a large ménage. 
[In effect] ... with increasing numbers the likelihood of fission or 
conflict causing one or more sub-units to break off, becomes more
likely. [In addition, because in the Arab world] ... average wealth and income are small, ... physically maintaining a large household in most Arab families has simply never been possible, in the past or in the present'.

Turning to the extended families E and J, both appear to fulfill the ideal stipulated above: the availability of physical space (house and yard), the economic facility (land) as well as the relatively small number of family members ensure that no 'great managerial skills' are required to hold the family together.

However, this does not, in itself, explain why the sons in these extended families have apparently accepted the perpetuation of parental control over their lives after marriage instead of seizing the authorities' offer of house and land as a means of forming their own conjugal household. One feasible explanation lies perhaps in the sons' youth and relative inexperience which, for example, enabled their parents to choose the brides themselves. In contrast to B3, all three were under the legally permitted age at the time of their marriage. A second factor which appears to be of significance is related to the personalities of the fathers concerned. However, while the E1 father is by all accounts a forceful and energetic man whose authority is apparently unquestioned by members of his household, the J1 father, according to Om Said, is unable to enforce a similar pattern. Thus, while the E2 and E3 sons were, at the time of my field-research, more or less socially isolated, and never seen in the Khalsa coffee-shops, the J2 son is said to have a number of acquaintances in the Settlement. In my judgement, it is very probably the lack of social isolation which may explain J2's publicly expressed dissatisfaction with his way of life. His wife is also on chronically bad terms with her mother-in-law. Having run away once to her father in Salman Pak (a provincial town, over an hour's drive from Khalsa), who brought her back after her
parents-in-law threatened with divorce, demanding not only the *mahr* but also the air-fare, the J2 wife apparently tends to escape to her distant kin in the E household. The latter, according to Om Said, feel sorry for her having been married off to a *ghareeb* (i.e. a stranger not from the same village or locality), yet, not surprisingly, are said to discourage her husband's visits. The continuity of these extended families would appear to depend on whichever force - that of the family of origin or that of the family of procreation - will exert the decisive influence.

Of particular interest is the fact that the variable of regional origin was not found to have any significance with regard to the type and scope of relationships between kin after resettlement. In fact, the regional variation, according to which the consanguine institution remains more or less effective as a frame of reference in the provinces south of Cairo compared with Lower Egypt where it functions largely as an ideal, was found to be largely insignificant insofar as the type of kin relationships cultivated within Khalsa is concerned.

Some of the described attitudes of settler households with kin in the Settlement serve, in my judgement, to underline the assumption that economic self-interest and the aim of profit maximization are among the main factors also motivating those households which have no relatives in the Settlement. It is, in fact, these behavioural aspects in particular, which, as we shall see, have left an impact on the range and intensity of social relationships in Khalsa.

2.2 Division of Labour in the Settler Household

One pertinent definition of the peasant family as a domestic enterprise stresses its function as an economic unit in which the production tasks necessary to cultivate the land and satisfy basic
consumption needs are carried out in accordance with a division of labour culturally determined by age and sex. This division of labour and the interdependence of the roles of household members are two among many factors which affect the production and consumption patterns in the peasant household. But, it also has implications for the type of relationships which the peasant family cultivates with its social environment.

Relating the above definition to Khalsa's Egyptian peasants, one may observe that, in accordance with foregoing conclusions on the peasant family system, the settler household - both nuclear and extended - functions as a separate production unit whose members carry out a number of specified tasks related to agricultural production, the satisfaction of basic consumption needs and the production of surplus for the market. Having established that, apart from two extended families and those households who are party to specific agreements involving the supply of labour in exchange for cash or goods, there is no significant economic cooperation even between households who are kin, it may be further deduced that Khalsa's Egyptian peasant family is basically relying more or less on the labour contribution of its own members. For, as previously mentioned, this self-reliance was (at the very least during the first few years after resettlement) accentuated by the Iraqi authorities' regulation which prohibits the employment of outside labour. However, the subsequent laxity of its enforcement did not significantly alter this pattern. Even though the majority of the settler households are concentrating on vegetable production which is relatively labour-intensive, employment of outside labour is the exception rather than the rule in Khalsa.

Given this pattern of self-reliance, what effect has this had on the traditional division of labour within the Egyptian peasant
family, the specific pattern of which we have assumed to be dependent on the settler household's regional origin? With regard to the settler's children, the extent of their labour contribution was assumed to be dependent on their age. School enrolment up to primary level is compulsory by law in Iraq. This regulation appeared to be more or less rigorously enforced in the Settlement (at least up to the time of the preliminary survey). Having no reason to assume a change in this law or its applicability to the Egyptian peasant families in Khalsa, and, given that 80% of the latter did not, at the time of their arrival in 1976 or even later, have any children above the age of twelve, I concluded that the majority of the families could only rely on their children's labour contribution after school hours and during the holidays. Accordingly, I turned my attention to the division of labour between the settler and his wife.

The Egyptian peasant woman's traditional duties as wife and mother involve the carrying-out of household chores (cooking, baking, the production of dairy-products, washing, cleaning) as well as child-rearing. These responsibilities are perceived to be a function of the fellaha's gender role, i.e. traditional peasant society views these duties as a distinct part of the female sphere of activities. The assumption of this role on the part of the peasant woman is the culmination of a pattern of socialization which begins early in the girl's life. During successive age-stages, she is introduced to, and then expected to be accomplished in, the carrying-out of specific tasks and duties. As is the case elsewhere in the rural Arab world, Egyptian peasant society offers no socially acceptable alternative to its women other than the traditional role of wife and mother. Similarly, the Egyptian peasant husband's sphere of duties and responsibilities is a function of his gender role. Men do not carry out any of the house-
hold chores described above. However, they are expected to assume an increasing responsibility for the socialization of their sons when the latter reach the age of about seven, which is the boy's introduction to the world of men. For Egyptian peasant society is above all characterized by the social segregation of male and female. Implicit in this separation is the cultural norm that it is generally unthinkable '... that a thing done by one sex can also be done by a member of the other sex'.

35 The division of labour demarcating the boundary lines between these two separate social worlds is also implicitly expressed in the division of animal husbandry. Women raise chickens, ducks and geese, i.e. that which is generally tended in the yard of the home. Men are generally in charge of raising cows, goats and sheep as well as draft animals, but again, it is women who milk the cow or goat, for this is an activity carried out inside the home compound.

However, the social structure in the contemporary Egyptian village presented in the theory chapter of the present study has indicated that the degree to which the fellaha is confined to her home is regionally differentiated. In the provinces to the south of Cairo, peasant women generally only carry out specific tasks during the harvesting season. By contrast, there exists no cultural tabu preventing the Lower Egyptian peasant woman's involvement in agricultural and marketing activities, though there is an adherence to the cultural ideal which equates female seclusion with a higher social status in village society. However, as in the case of poultry and animal raising, the production tasks related to land cultivation are also influenced by a sexual division of labour: men generally carry out the heavier work-load in connection with ploughing and watering the land as well as maintaining the irrigation canals and ditches, while women are mainly involved in weeding and sowing as well as helping the menfolk during the harvest.
Children also help to weed and harvest as well as collect dried stalks and dung used as oven fuel.

The validity of the above stipulation concerning the regional variation in the Egyptian peasant women's economic activities outside the home is largely confirmed by data collected in the Khalsa Settlement (see Table 1, over). Thus, around 89% of all Lower Egyptian settler wives used to work with their husbands on the land in Egypt; but 77% of all Middle Egyptian wives as well as all those from Upper Egypt did not. Women from the latter two regions explained that had they worked outside their home, then this would have been against their 'ird (woman's honour).36

While little post-migratory change is statistically discernible among Lower Egyptian women, i.e. 85% work with their husband on the land in Khalsa, the change which has taken place among Middle and Upper Egyptian wives is striking. Resettlement in Iraq, and the settler households' primary reliance on the labour contribution of its members, has led 81% of all Middle and 83% of all Upper Egyptian settler wives to cultivate the land alongside their husbands. Nonetheless, nearly all these women from the provinces south of Cairo made a point of stressing that their present economic activities outside the home were due to necessity as there was no-one else to help their husbands. As one wife put it: Haletna betekhtelef fi balad ghareeba laen mahaddesh biye'rafna. (Our situation differs in a strange land because no-one knows us.) Significantly, none of these women would even consider the possibility of working on the land should the family return to the village of origin in Egypt. This is an attitude also shared by those Middle Egyptian wives who used to work outside the home prior to their migration to Iraq (in itself an indication of the poverty they must have lived in before resettlement, for only desperation would induce
### Table 1
**Settler Wives' Economic Activities on the Land**  
(in percentage of seventy-one settler wives *)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Egypt yes (no)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Khalsa yes (no)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Egypt</td>
<td>89% (11%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>85% (15%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Egypt</td>
<td>23% (77%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>81% (19%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Egypt</td>
<td>0% (100%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>83% (17%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Excluded are the two second wives living permanently in Egypt; wives who were married after resettlement are included in the no-category for Egypt since the extent of their participation in economic activities outside the home is unknown.

### Table 2
**Settler Wives' Economic Activities in the Market (sale of crops)**  
(in percentage of seventy-one settler wives *)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Egypt yes (no)</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Khalsa yes (no)</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower Egypt</td>
<td>41% (59%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>77% (23%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Egypt</td>
<td>17% (83%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>87% (13%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Egypt</td>
<td>0% (100%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>42% (58%)</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
families in these provinces to let their womenfolk work outside the home). Thus, Middle and Upper Egyptian settler wives tended to consider their status as returning migrants to be incompatible with the necessity of having to work outside the home. For the migrant's final return is generally equated with the successful accumulation of savings enabling him to improve on his standard of living prior to migration. The latter implies a higher social status, a concomitant of which is the seclusion of women. The Egyptian fellaha, whatever her province, feels cherished if she has no need to work outside the home, for this is a signal to the community that, following the traditional sex-role expectations, her husband is fulfilling his role as provider.

The Middle and Upper Egyptian wives (19% and 17% respectively) who, at the time of my field-work, were found not to be working on the land with their husbands, are apparently continuing to adhere to the cultural norm which regards women's economic activities outside the home as shameful and agricultural production as the man's responsibility. In contrast, of the 15% of the Lower Egyptian wives who were not working on the land in Khalsa, only one indicated that she considers it to be shameful. The non-participation of the rest was either due to the husband's employment outside the agricultural sector, or the fact that they could not leave their pre-school children, or that their husbands could rely on their children's labour contribution. However, two women from among the 85% of the Lower Egyptian wives currently working on the land in Khalsa indicated that they had not done so prior to resettlement as this would have been considered shameful. Significantly, these are the two women, referred to elsewhere, who consider themselves to be socially above the peasant stratum.

The traditional sexual division of labour in the agricultural production process continues to be adhered to in those settler
households where both spouses are active on the land: men continue to carry out the heavier work-load, while women help with weeding, sowing and harvesting. However, though the men's work-load has been perceptibly eased through the introduction of mechanization in ploughing the land, few if any settlers would, according to Om Said, contemplate taking over the task of collecting dried stalks carried out by the women and children.

This trend in the settler wives' increased participation in agricultural production is more or less matched by an increase in their marketing activities (see preceding Table 2). Around 41% of all Lower Egyptian settler wives included in the present study used to sell part of the family's agricultural products on the market in Egypt, compared with 17% from Middle, and none from Upper Egypt. (It remains, however, unclear whether this was a regular or an occasional activity.) Resettlement has induced 77% of all Lower Egyptian, and 87% and 42% of all Middle and Upper Egyptian wives to sell the vegetable crops on the market outside Khalsa.

The fact that 59% of the Lower Egyptian settler wives had not been engaged in marketing activities back in Egypt was only partly due to the compulsory delivery of specific crops to the cooperative. For the most part, these respondents had been subsistence cultivators. However, over half of these women indicated that even had these reasons not been applicable, they still would not have sold any produce on the market, since this would have been considered 'ayb (shameful). This group of respondents includes the two settler wives who consider themselves to be socially above the peasant stratum. One may therefore conclude that women's activities outside the home in rural Lower Egypt is seemingly differentiated by the degree of exposure it involves. As one of these women put it: Al-ragel al-shareef ma biye'redsh meratouh
‘ala al-ghareeb (the honourable man does not expose his wife to a stranger).

Three of the 23% of the Lower Egyptian women who are not selling on the market after resettlement indicated that they regarded this as shameful. The first is one of the two previously mentioned settler wives from Lower Egypt who perceive themselves to be socially above the fellaheen. As her husband runs a coffee-shop in Baghdad, this household only cultivates to meet its own needs, anyway. The second woman is Om Said who admitted that she had stopped taking the produce to market some two years prior to my field-research in Khalsa in order not to shame her sons who are all non-agriculturists. The third is Om Said's elder daughter, whose husband works as a garage mechanic in Baghdad. Her seclusion is apparently dictated by her self-perceived social status, which is the reason why her husband has contracted with another settler to help him cultivate the land. The rest of these Lower Egyptian female respondents were temporarily leaving the marketing to their husbands because they could not leave their preschool children. These families were continuing to adhere to the traditional gender role which regards the care of young children as a female responsibility. By contrast, all the Middle (13%) and the Upper (58%) Egyptian wives who were found not to be involved with marketing activities in Khalsa continue to view this as shameful, even though some of them are working alongside their husbands on the land.

Thus, 69% of all settler wives included in the present study were found to be active in both agricultural production and marketing. Taking the regional variable into account, 78% of all Lower Egyptian, 73% and 42% of all Middle and Upper Egyptian women respectively were involved in both these economic activities. Around 12% of all the settler wives neither worked on the land nor sold on the market: these
represented 11%, 10% and 17% of the women from Lower, Middle and Upper Egypt respectively. Of the 13% who worked on the land, but did not carry out the marketing, around two thirds are from Upper Egypt. Finally, 6% of the settler wives - mainly from Middle Egypt - were not active on the land, but did take the produce for sale on the market.

Economic considerations appear to be the most influential reason behind the structural changes which have taken place after resettlement in the division of family labour, in particular with regard to households from Middle and Upper Egypt. As one settler wife from Middle Egypt put it: Lazem nestahmel haqat keetahar 'alashan akl al-'aysh (we have to put up with many things in order to eat bread). Cultural values as such are thus inadequate indicators of behaviour, for according to N. Youssef, the situational perspective in sociology asserts that '... behaviour is a function of the situation and is adjustive with regard to the eliciting situation'. However, comparing Latin American and Middle Eastern countries, the authoress comes to the conclusion that in the latter, there is nonetheless a '... close association between asserted ideals and actual feminine behaviour ... [which] ... had been made possible through explicit institutional arrangements which have cemented the cultural syndrome of female honour and female chastity'. Though this view is generally tenable, to my mind it does not adequately take account of one particular variable, namely poverty, which may contribute to a perceptible divergence between ideal and reality. An illustration of this would be the fact that around a quarter of the Middle Egyptian settler wives included in the present study had been economically active outside the home in their villages of origin, in spite of the cultural norm which dictates otherwise. On the other hand, the experience of Khalsa has demonstrated that where economic profit becomes a strong motivation, then the cultural norm of
confining women to the seclusion of their homes is consciously adjusted
to accommodate the adopted goal of profit maximization. However, this
adjustment is undoubtedly facilitated by the geographical distance
between the settler household and the prying, watchful eye of the
village of origin. The perpetuation of the latter's influence is
implicit in the contention of those Middle and Upper Egyptian wives who
indicated they would continue to adhere to the cultural value of female
seclusion upon their return to Egypt.

The pressures emanating from a new way of life after resettlement,
which have contributed to the diminishing necessity of adhering to
certain customs and traditions highly valued in the village of origin,
are aptly reflected in Om Said's explanation of why many husbands send
their wives to the market, even though they may think it is shameful.
Khalsa's Egyptian settler apparently soon discovered that the Iraqi
authorities tend to be relatively lenient towards a woman if she is
cought selling her wares above the officially decreed price (a habit
which Khalsa's settlers are said to repeatedly attempt). At most, her
scales would be confiscated which she could get back upon payment of a
fine (said to be five Dinars at the time of my field-research). In
contrast, settlers who are repeated offenders are likely to receive a
short jail sentence.43

However, the settler wives' additional duties and responsibilities
outside the home - specifically those among them who come from the
provinces south of Cairo - are not reciprocated by the husband's
increased responsibilities within the household. As is the case with
regard to agricultural production, the traditional notion of gender
role continues to function as the frame of reference, and the settler's
role as family head remains largely undisputed. This fact is aptly
reflected in the settler wives' tendency to refer to their economic
activities outside the home as 'helping' rather than 'working with' their husbands, thus stressing the ideal which equates the male role with that of provider, and which views women's activities outside the home as complementary. The husband remains, for example, largely responsible for maintaining the animal enclosure and the outdoor oven and carries out major repairs in house and yard. He also takes care of draft animals and livestock, if there are no children to take over these duties. But it is the wife and/or daughter who milk the cow or goat, and take care of the poultry. The husband would always slaughter the livestock if the need arises, while slaughtering fowl is considered a female responsibility. Moreover, it is generally the husband who purchases the household's needs, irrespective of whether or not it is the settler wife who takes the vegetable crops for sale on the market. Khalsa's Egyptian fellaha regards this as a sign of protectiveness, believing that a good husband does not force his wife to haggle with vendors in the market, an attitude commensurate with the traditional ideal of female seclusion. The fact that this same woman may haggle with her own customers when selling her produce is, to my mind, indicative of the compartmentalization to which social values tend to be subjected in the pursuit of the household's economic self-interest.

Chapter 3: Social Values: the Old and the New.

The preceding chapter has illustrated two specific aspects of the changes which have taken place in the settler household after resettle-
ment. In my judgement, it is in particular the pursuit of profit maximization, which goes beyond the fulfillment of the family's basic economic needs and has been encouraged by the economic opportunities open to each and every one of Khalsa's Egyptian peasant households
without distinction, which has induced a number of significant changes in attitudes. This aim was found to have influenced the scope of relationships between kin and has encouraged some structural changes in the division of labour within the family. At the same time, the descriptive analysis of these two aspects has also illustrated the manner in which traditional social values are modified to fit in with the demands of the new way of life after resettlement. However, far from initiating totally new behavioural norms and attitudes, Khalsa's settler families appear to have adapted to these new experiences on the basis of values and attitudes which they already hold. That the Egyptian peasant family's behaviour must therefore be viewed as being '... less the product of new ideas than of the effects of old ideas operating in new or changing contexts\[46\] is, in my judgement, aptly reflected by a number of other aspects which shall be the focus of the present chapter: the selectivity of change as reflected by the settler families' material circumstances, the aspirations for sons and daughters, ceremonial celebrations, family planning and the main focus of leisure-time activities.

3.1 The Settler Family's Home: the Selectivity of Change

Some of the first things which strike the visitor's eye upon approaching the settlers' homes are the elaborate chains and locks on the entrance gates as well as on all the doors of the living quarters. Many families, but in particular those living on the fringe of the Settlement, keep guard-dogs which tend to extend their duties well beyond their masters' homes, more often than not making the alley-way virtually inaccessible. The second thing which strikes the visitor when walking through the alley-ways is the fact that rarely does one encounter an entrance gate left invitingly open.
Most of the houses exhibit the wear and tear of some seven years of occupation. Though all the families, without exception, keep the animal enclosure and the out-door oven in good repair, few have bothered to repaint the living quarters. However, some have attempted to heighten the wall surrounding their compound while others have erected a mud wall in front of the living quarters to more adequately protect the family's privacy. Here and there one encounters a personal touch: a verse line from the Koran on the entrance gate or on the door of one of the living rooms; an amulet, mostly a blue eye, crudely painted above the door to protect the family from 'ayn al-hasoud; magazine pictures and family snap-shots pasted on the living-room walls; grape-vines or ivy or trees planted in the yard to provide shade in the summer. Few of the families appear to use the kitchen for the purpose for which it was intended, partly because of the need for additional storage space, but also because of the irregular water supply which necessitates their reliance on the yard-tap. Cooking is done in a sheltered part of the yard, mainly near the stairs leading to the roof-top, or alternatively in one of the living rooms. Neither is the bathroom used for washing the family's clothes, as its proximity to the toilet is perceived to render this place negess (unclean). Instead, washing as well as ablutions in preparation for prayer are generally carried out in a secluded part of the yard. A few families have attached a small electric pump to the yard-tap in order to increase the water pressure. When this tap runs dry, water has to be fetched from the main pump located near the entrance to the Settlement. The young girls and women walking to and from this water source is a reminiscence of similar scenes in the Egyptian village, except perhaps for the fact that the traditional clay vessels poised on top of their heads have been replaced by plastic containers in a multitude of
colours. Nearly all the households have a large clay jar standing in a shady corner of the yard, in which the drinking water is stored.\textsuperscript{48} Iraqi water, according to Om Said, is not as sweet as that of the Nile.

The initial euphoria of being able to afford a number of perhaps hitherto undreamt of consumer durables appears to have given way to the tendency to view their purchase as exciting but not unusual. Nevertheless, these possessions obviously take place of pride in the settlers' homes. Around 89\% of the sixty-nine households included in the present study were found to own a television set; 54\% have bought elaborate transistor radios while 29\% own a radio cassette; 76\% have purchased a refrigerator; 22\% of the settler wives own electric sewing machines; 28\% of the families have bought air-coolers; 61\% have bought electric fans (mostly to replace those given them by the Iraqi authorities upon arrival); 51\% have purchased electric heaters, but nearly all the households interviewed also use an ingenious heating device said to have been 'invented' by a Lower Egyptian settler.\textsuperscript{49}

The relatively high incidence of these consumer durables and appliances in Khalsa would, at first glance, appear to be a reflection of two particular factors. On the one hand these goods are apparently well within the means of the majority of the settler households,\textsuperscript{50} although one should also note that they are widely available in the Iraqi market. In addition, they are also relatively cheap compared to similar goods in Egypt. On the other hand, ownership of such durables is to some extent also a function of the notion of prestige inherent in the value system apparently adhered to by Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families. However, in my judgement, it is here that a distinction needs to be drawn between the village of origin and the Khalsa Settlement. With regard to the former, these consumer durables appear, by all accounts, to be attributed with a relatively high prestige value,
the actual rank of which is a function of their relative scarcity in the local market, as well as the incidence of their distribution within the village community. In fact, these durables can be said to be part and parcel of the 'must acquisitions' by which the returning migrant furnishes proof of his material success during the period of migration. One may thus contend that the settler family's status among its kith and kin back in the village of origin has to some extent arisen as a result of the ownership of these durables. The latter is not only substantiated by the settler household's own claims, but also by the eye-witness accounts furnished by temporary migrants returning from Iraq. However, the prestige value inherent in the ownership of consumer durables does not appear to have the same function in the Khalsa Settlement as it presumably has in Egyptian village society. Part of the reason may be due to the inverse relationship between the distribution of these goods and their actual rank on the prestige scale: the higher the incidence of ownership in the Settlement, the lower obviously the prestige value. But, there is the more important fact that, as we shall later see, actual ownership of consumer durables is not necessarily synonymous with a higher social status within the Settlement's community.

It was this differentiation with regard to prestige value which led me to question the settler household's motive for buying some, or most of the durables listed above. If, as the various data collected for the present study seem to suggest, the village of origin continues to function as the main frame of reference and considering the fact that around 91% of the settler families have indicated that they plan eventually to return to Egypt, then why would a household invest in a durable such as a refrigerator or an air-cooler which, given their size, are quite costly to transport back to Egypt? Could it be that in
spite of the fact that consumer durables are seemingly not viewed in terms of increased status within the Settlement's community (which, however, must be differentiated from the individual settler family's self-perceived status), their ownership is nevertheless coveted because of their demonstration effect vis-à-vis the village of origin? The latter could, in my view, be one plausible explanation, given the fact that, though the majority of Khalsa's settler families do not view their residence in the Settlement in terms of permanency, neither do they appear to contemplate it as a short-term affair. However, there is another perhaps more significant explanation, namely the use value attributed to a durable. (This term is used here in the sense of the subjective value which an owner attributes to the utility of a particular good.) It was the observation that all the refrigerators owned by the settler households appeared to be of the biggest size available on the market which led me to realize the importance of use value with regard to the settler family's decision to purchase a good many of the above listed durables. In fact, given Iraq's long, hot summers, the effects of which are exacerbated by a housing design offering minimal cool storage facilities, a refrigerator has the particular use value of enabling a household to harvest its vegetable crops on the eve of market day. The produce is stored in the refrigerator overnight to ensure its freshness and the settler or his wife can set off at the crack of dawn for the market, thus avoiding the midday heat (which can reach over 50°C in this part of Iraq), when vegetables in particular are likely to wilt in a relatively short time. The use value of this good is therefore relatively high since it can indirectly contribute to the settler household's aim of profit maximization.

Other durables may also contribute directly to this aim. For example, four of the fifteen settler wives who were found to own an
electric sewing machine had, at the time of my field-research, established themselves as the Settlement's dress-makers. (Only one of these women used to sew back in the home village, the other three as well as all the other settler wives who have bought a sewing machine, have learnt to dress-make in the handicraft classes which used to be held in Khalsa's former Social Centre). The use value of this particular durable is particularly high since it enables a household to add to its income without necessitating the woman's exposure outside the home. For those who sew for themselves and their family members only, ownership of a sewing machine may contribute to the household's savings.

However, apart from profit maximization, the use value of a consumer durable appears to be also influenced by the individual settler household's perception of the level of personal comfort deemed necessary to its way of life. Thus, while around two thirds of the settler families included in the present study apparently feel that a simple electric fan provides sufficient coolness during the hot summers, the rest have preferred to invest in the more effective, though relatively costly, air-cooler. Similarly, though nearly all the settler households interviewed have used the previously mentioned ingenious heating device, over half of them have added to their comfort by investing in the more efficient electric heaters.

Whatever the impact of an increased exposure to mass-media facilities may be - its discussion would be beyond the scope of the present study - the fact remains that a television set, a radio cassette and the more expensive type of transistor radio all function as important prestige symbols, and as visible signs of the returning migrant's success. In my view, this is probably as much due to the relative ease of transportability as it is a result of the Egyptian villager's aspiration to enjoy the same entertainment facilities as the city
dweller, regardless of the actual differences in life-style. However, in the context of the present discussion, a use value may also be attributed to the television and cassette in particular. Thus, the former is an important source of information (for example, the authorities in Iraq broadcast a weekly list of the official sale prices of agricultural produce) which serves to underline the settler household's relative independence of the Settlement's community. It has also, as we shall see, become above all the main focus of the settler family's leisure-time. Cassette recorders also have a relatively high use value in that, as previously mentioned, cassettes function as an important means of communication between settler household and village of origin. Taped messages are ferried to and from the home village by the stream of temporary migrant workers (though this flow has since been drastically reduced due to the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war). However, cassette recorders also serve as an additional source of income, since, by all accounts, owners are said to rent out their deck to non-owners for a fee.

The variability of use value is further underlined by the fact that just as there is no significant correlation between ownership of durables and the owner's region of origin, neither is there any apparent correlation between ownership and a household's financial ability. Those among the settler households who were found to possess only a few or a cheaper version of the consumer durables, were not necessarily less economically successful than those who were found to have purchased every one of these appliances. This is further substantiated by the fact that, among the seven settler households who were found to have invested their capital in tractors, only one family was found to own an air-cooler. Tractors have a relatively high use value, since owners plough the land of other settlers for I.D. 2.5 per hour. However it is
significant that these seven tractor owners have apparently not thought of buying new machines, but instead have taken advantage of the fact that nearby Iraqi farmers prefer to sell their old models and replace them by newer versions.

The subjective perception of use value seems to me further documented by the fact that there is a number of other consumer durables which only a very few settler households were found to have purchased. Thus, while the majority of the families interviewed have built their own benches, storage chests, tables or stools for example (from wood chopped off trees in the vicinity of Khalsa or 'obtained' from nearby construction sites), four of the settler households included in the present study were found to own such 'modern' furnishings as a wardrobe, a four-poster bed with fancy bedspread, a padded sofa, rugs, a gilt wall mirror, a chiming wall clock and fancy shelves. All four have also bought electric irons, two of them own cameras and one family has bought an electric washing machine. Another household has installed a big electric pump and water reservoir on the roof of the bathroom to ensure a regular water supply. Here again, no significant correlation between the ownership of these particular durables and a household's financial ability was found to exist. For there are at least four other settler families who, according to one of my Iraqi informants, are financially better off. Neither is there any apparent correlation between ownership of these goods and the settler families' future plans. Those who have purchased them were among those who have indicated their intention to eventually return to Egypt, while the minority which claims that it plans to stay permanently in Iraq (six settler families, three of whom have taken Iraqi citizenship) has not made any such investment.
One may venture the opinion that it apparently does not occur to the majority of the settler households interviewed to purchase such 'modern' furnishings or such appliances as an iron, a camera or even a washing machine which, in its perception, hold little use value. In my judgement, this attitude can at least partly be attributed to the Egyptian peasant's traditional frugality, formed by the socio-economic circumstances which have dictated his way of life prior to resettlement, as well as the migrant's tendency to be thrifty. Mayfield, for example, believes that it is generally poverty and the limited scope for improving his living conditions which have tended to make '... the fellah hopelessly avaricious ... [because the] ... objective situation in which he finds himself gives no outlet for his naturally generous instincts and impresses two objects upon his mind, the acquisition of land and money'.\textsuperscript{52} Having acquired the land up to the legally permissible level, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant household has apparently turned its attention to the accumulation of savings. Since temporary migrants as well as the settlers are permitted to transfer up to 75\% of their net incomes out of Iraq,\textsuperscript{53} money functions as the best proof of the migrant's success. Unfortunately, no data were obtainable regarding whether gold - traditionally considered a secure investment - also functions as a sign of the settler family's success.

A further plausible reason may be that the possession of such 'modern' furnishings is related to a life-style perceived to be characteristic of the social strata above the peasantry. In spite of their improved economic position as a result of resettlement, nearly all the settlers and their wives persist in referring to themselves as \textit{fellaheen}, a self-image above all accentuated by their mode of dress. Their higher standard of living is reflected in the improved quality as well as the increased quantity of the clothes they have (of which the
existence of four dress-makers in such a relatively small Settlement is one indication), rather than through the emulation of the dress style of a higher social stratum.\textsuperscript{54} It is therefore perhaps significant that the four families who were found to have purchased the 'modern' furnishings described above, are all engaged in non-peasant occupations. Three of these households are active full-time as merchants,\textsuperscript{55} purchasing crops below the official market price from some of the other settler households as well as from nearby Iraqi farmers and reselling them in the market. The head of the fourth household runs a coffee-shop in Baghdad and, as previously mentioned, only cultivates to meet his family's needs. True, the three merchants' wives continue to wear the Egyptian fellaha's traditional mode of dress, but nevertheless their respective husbands tend to wear shirts and trousers instead of the floor-length, loose-flowing gallabiah. To my mind, it may well be their status consciousness which has induced these particular families to acquire the type of possessions generally associated with the lifestyle of the relatively better-off class. However, these contentions must necessarily remain speculative since they are based on the impressionistic evaluation of facts observed during my field-research. There is no way of knowing at this stage, for example, whether other settler households may not eventually also start investing in such 'modern' furnishings, since the subjective perception of use value may change over time. This type of speculation is all the more unavoidable since there are unfortunately no data regarding the volume and destination of remittances which, according to the Cooperative Supervisor, well over half of Khalsa's settler families are known to be sending back to Egypt. However, some settlers have apparently freely admitted to this Supervisor that they have invested their savings in a house, a taxi or a shop back in the home village, but not apparently in agricultural
land. But durables which some settler families are said to be sending through a returning migrant are not necessarily designated for the sender’s personal use when the family eventually returns to Egypt. For, according to Om Said and 'Amm Ali, goods may also be sent in order to be sold in Egypt, thus assuring a profit for the settler household and a commission fee for the temporary migrant who transports them.

The settler families' attitudes towards the housing provided for them by the Iraqi authorities are, in my view, also of interest, not least because they reflect to some extent the level of their expectations. Questioned as to their opinions regarding their homes, the settlers and settler wives were almost equally divided for and against: 48% of the fifty-two husbands and 55% of the fifty-eight wives who responded indicated that they were not satisfied. There is some correlation between type of response and the respondents' region of origin as well as their sex attribute. Thus, only 33% of all Lower and 45% of all Middle Egyptian female respondents claimed to be satisfied with the design of their homes against 64% of the Upper Egyptian female respondents who indicated their satisfaction. In contrast, around 58% of all male respondents from Lower as well as Middle Egypt claimed to be satisfied, while only one of the seven Upper Egyptian respondents indicated his satisfaction. The intervening years since resettlement have perhaps dimmed some memories of the feelings experienced at the time of arrival in the Settlement, for many of those satisfied with their homes tended to answer that al-fellaheen met'awdeen 'ala kullu haga (peasants are used to everything).

The exposure of the living quarters to 'ayn al-ghareeb (the stranger's eye) was the most frequently mentioned reason by those dissatisfied with their house (84% of the men and 66% of the women). This is followed by the unsuitability of the housing design for Iraq's long
hot summers (building material, big glass windows without shutters, unconnected rooms with inadequate ventilation), mentioned by 59% of the female and 40% of the male respondents. This response pattern is, to my mind, of particular interest in that it aptly reflects the male/female perspective. The settlers' gender role which traditionally implies a wider exposure to the world outside the home compound as well as the preoccupation with the issue of honour would tend to encourage an awareness of being exposed to 'ayn al-ghareeb. By contrast, their wives' dissatisfaction appears to be generally more inward-oriented, focusing mainly on the home in which they spend most of their time after their activities on the land and/or market. The lack of adequate storage facilities, the limited area allocated for housing livestock and poultry, the irregular water supply and the inadequacy of the sole entrance into the court-yard (specifically mentioned by tractor owners who have all knocked down part of the yard wall in order to drive their machines into the compound), were among the other points of criticism put forward. However, nearly all the dissatisfied female respondents and some of their husbands tended to harp on the fact that the Settlement's planners had neglected to provide each house with the traditional oven in which to bake the family's bread. This point as well as the controversy which erupted over the Settlement's electricity bills will be singled out for scrutiny. For not only are they particularly revealing of the settler families' attitudes towards authority; in addition, they are also an example of the relationship which has evolved between the settler and his Iraqi superior and as such, also serve to throw some light on the type of community which has evolved in the Khalsa Settlement.

Nearly all the settler wives are said to have arrived in Khalsa with their matraha (baking utensils) only to find that, though each
household had been given a sack of flour, none had been provided with
the mud and straw oven in which the Egyptian peasant woman tradition­
ally bakes her bread. One Iraqi source indicated that it had been
expected that the settlers would build their own ovens, though he con­
ceded that none of the households had been provided with the necessary
materials to carry this out. Another Iraqi official said that the plan
had been to encourage the settler families to purchase their bread,
instead of baking it, though the bakery planned as part of Khalsa's
shopping arcade had not been in operation at the time of theirarrival.
Whatever the explanation, the fact remains that the Settlement's
planners would appear to have ignored, or at least not realized, the
importance of bread to the psychology of Egyptian peasant society. The
fear of not having an adequate supply of flour in order to ensure the
family's daily bread, if not survival, is deeply embedded in the
Egyptian peasant's psyche, not least because of the relative depriva­
tion in which so many of Egypt's villagers live. It is surely no co­
incidence that the term for bread in the Egyptian colloquial is 'aysh,"
which is a derivative of the verb to live (ya'eesh). It apparently
did not occur to the majority of the settler wives that bread-baking is
a chore they could easily have spared themselves. This attitude was
perhaps reinforced by the understandable hesitation to try something
new (Iraqi bread is quite different in taste), overwhelmed as the
settler families must have undoubtedly felt by their new surroundings.
Thus, during the first few days after their arrival, the settlers set
to building their own ovens (near the stair-well, since they were
apparently not allowed to do so inside the living-quarters as is the
custom back in the home village, where the oven is a source of warmth
during the winter.) The importance which bread continues to occupy in
the Egyptian peasant families' subconscious, is implicit in the fact
that, some seven years after resettlement, nearly all of Khalsa's settler households continue to bake their own bread in the same traditional way. The visitor's attention is quickly drawn to the fact that bread baked in a Lower Egyptian household differs from that baked in the provinces south of Cairo. Though some settler wives conceded that they may occasionally buy Iraqi bread from the market, it was stressed that they had not really developed a taste for it and would only do so if they were under time pressure. As Om Said put it, husbands prefer the Egyptian way of baking bread and every woman takes pride in the bread she bakes. Even the settler wives who consider themselves to be socially above the peasantry bake their own bread. Some of Khalsa's Iraqi employees still tend to shake their heads over the 'fuss' created by the settler families over such a minor thing as an oven. However, to my mind, it is quite conceivable that this particular issue became the first tangible focus on which the settler families could center their understandable feelings of apprehension during the initial post-resettlement phase, feelings probably also fed by their disappointment that the land had not been ready for distribution at the time of their arrival.

The second issue which apparently caused some controversy between the Iraqi authorities and the settler households concerns the latter's refusal to pay their electricity bills. According to one Iraqi source in the Settlement, all the families were informed upon their arrival that they would be exempted from payment of any electricity bills only during the first two years. The majority of the settlers dispute this, claiming instead that they were given to understand that this would apply indefinitely. The arrival of the first bills during the third year set off a wave of protests and complaints. Realizing that these appeared to be falling more or less on deaf ears - Khalsa's Iraqi
government employee not only regards it as none of his concern to question decisions handed down the bureaucratic hierarchy, but most probably also resented the fact that he was not exempted from paying his own electricity bills - most of the settler households very quietly diverted the electricity supply, intended for the illumination of the alley-way, into their homes. Connecting these wires apparently posed little difficulty, for, so Om Said airily explained, this is a widespread habit in the Egyptian village. No fellah in his right mind - so her reasoning - would even contemplate the idea of paying the government for the installation of an electric meter. Some of the settler households at first responded to the local municipality's threats to cut off their electricity supply and fine them for non-payment. But with the realization that the authorities were apparently not taking any further steps beyond cutting off the supply to the offending households, many more families set to hooking their homes onto the public wires. Some of the settlers reason that since the Iraqi Government is so rich in oil revenues, and could furthermore afford to present these Moroccan settlers with so many consumer durables, it could very well afford to foot Khalsa's electricity bills. Others argue that they are really only using electricity which, had there been no black-out imposed by the war, would have been used to illuminate the Settlement anyway. Exempted from the payment of land-tax or from water-charges, Khalsa's settler fails to understand why the Iraqi authorities should expect him to pay something as 'insignificant' as an electricity bill. The fact that most of Khalsa's settler households were at the time of my field-work apparently not paying for their electricity consumption has an important implication with regard to the previously discussed concept of use value, since the actual cost of running an electrical appliance is more or less nil.
The significance of these issues lies above all in the light which they shed on the settler's attitude towards authority. One may argue along Mayfield's line that Egypt's fellah generally "... does not look upon government authority as necessary to society. Power and authority are accepted only out of fear. [But he nevertheless] ... expects the superior to be strict and firm, since these are the characteristics of a good ruler'.

The superior who does not fulfill this role expectation is generally distrusted. Though socialized to "... assume that his desires and judgements must be subjected to the demands of his superiors', Khalsa's Egyptian peasant settler has gradually discovered that his traditional fear of authority need not always be applicable, at least not to the extent instilled in him since early childhood. Though he continues to be wary of the Iraqi authorities' motives, in particular as the latter sometimes appear inconsistent, the settlers' self-confidence has apparently increased in proportion to what he believes he may safely get away with without provoking any undue repercussions. Government authority is cast in the role of an opponent with whom one has a sparring, rather than a cooperative relationship. Very much conscious that there are specific issues in Iraq - notably politics and religion - which one had best not become entangled with, Khalsa's settler has nevertheless also realized that this very same authority apparently does not bother to consistently react over matters which are referred to in the Settlement as a masallah soghayyarah (a little issue). The Iraqi authorities' relatively quick response to the settler's volubly voiced complaints over the outdoor oven must have given him a first - and novel - inkling that his demands may be taken into consideration. These same authorities' non-response over the unpaid electricity bills - other than cutting off the supply - appears to have developed into a testing
ground for what the settler family felt it could try and get away with. When the Iraqi employees involved with Khalsa make a report to their superiors about any of these 'little issues', the settler families tend to view this action as one more typical example of the animosity they claim the Iraqis to be harbouring towards Egyptians in general. Firmly believing in the Iraqi President's pride in the Settlement as an example of Arab regional cooperation, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant family is more or less convinced that it is because of the President's active intervention that it is permitted to get away with a masallah soghay-yarah. For, as Om Said put it, Si Saddam menna we feena; moush shereb men mayyet el-Neel? (Mr Saddam is one of us; has he not drunk from the water of the Nile?). Reminded of his complaints that the Iraqi Government has lost interest in the Khalsa Settlement during the last few years, a settler will quickly counter that, in actual fact, the President is unaware of the settlers' 'harassment' by the ordinary Iraqi official, because no-one tells him. Convinced of his valuable contribution to Iraq's economic development, a feeling reinforced periodically by official pronouncements on the importance of Arab labour mobility for regional cooperation leading to the goal of a unified Arab world, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant appears over the years to have acquired a sense of self-worth. This, in turn, is fed by the realization that he can, to some extent, manipulate part of the situation in which he finds himself. Some of the settlers tended to boast about this manipulation - if they realized that I was aware of one or the other 'little issue' - thus perhaps exhibiting the most common manifestation of the fahlawi personality attributed to the Egyptian fellahaen in general who '... caught in the web of doubt, inferiority, and anxiety ... [tend to] ... project an outward picture of calm, daring, carelessness, or aggressiveness'. Nonetheless, this
boastfulness would appear, over the years, to have acquired some basis
if the above examples can be taken as valid indications of the
settlers' increased self-confidence.

The post-migratory changes which are discernible in the settler
family's dietary habits are of equal interest. They not only reflect
the degree to which the settler household is self-sufficient, but also
serve as a further indication of its attitude towards the host country
and its people. One relatively conspicuous change concerns the consump-
tion of animal meat. In the Egyptian village, meat is mainly consumed
during festive occasions, which is one important reflection of rural
Egypt's poverty.67 By the time of my field-research, meat had become a
regular part of the settler family's diet, a trend verified by the
existence of two butchers (both Upper Egyptian settlers)68 in Khalsa.
The latter appear to have a thriving business, supplying not only other
settler households, but also Egyptians operating food-stalls along the
highway not far from Khalsa. As well as indicating the Egyptian
peasant families' improved living conditions after resettlement, the
popularity of these two butchers would also appear to be due to their
Egyptian clients' mistrust of Iraqi butchers. As Om Said put it:
Allahu 'alam al-Shi'a dol beyedbahou izayy; 'ala al-akal benkoun
metakkedeen al-gazar al-Masry beyedbah 'ala al-tareeqa al-halal (God
knows how these Shi'a slaughter; at least we are sure the Egyptian
butcher does it the proper [i.e. Moslem] way.) This remained one of
the very few instances in which the Shi'a population - of which the
majority of Khalsa's immediate social environment is said to be com-
posed - was explicitly referred to. As Sunni Moslems, Khalsa's
Egyptian peasants would have had little experience of a sect whose size
and influence in Egypt is limited, 69 a fact which would at least partly
account for their attitude. However, this particular issue is also
significant in that it presents a further example of the 'little issues' which tend to create some controversy between Khalsa's settlers and the Iraqi authorities. In spite of having been repeatedly warned not to slaughter animals in their yards - all butchers in Iraq must sell meat slaughtered in the public slaughter-house under veterinary supervision - Khalsa's two butchers appear to be nonchalantly continuing their trade, though they have apparently resorted to slaughtering in the evening in order to avoid the authorities' prying eye. The fact that most of the households interviewed unhesitantly gave the names of these two butchers would appear to indicate the authorities' laxness in enforcing this regulation.

Another point of interest is the fact that households who own cows and goats do not appear to be making any dairy products other perhaps than ghee, but mainly for their personal consumption. Milk surplus is consumed fresh or sold to other households in the Settlement. Khalsa's Egyptian fellaha seems to allocate little time to the making of dairy products. Instead, most settler households tend to buy processed cheese and dried milk (all French products at the time of my field-research). Though lactation is considered essential, both as a form of contraception as well as for the infant's well-being, settler wives give their children bottle feeds of dried milk when land or market demand their absence from the home.70

The settler's preference for their traditional agricultural tools such as the fas (hoe) or the mangal (sickle) is also of interest. They claim that not only are these tools difficult to find in Iraq but, in addition, they tend to be of inferior quality compared to those produced in Egypt. Egyptian migrant workers are apparently requested to bring these tools over to Iraq. Dress-material is another item which the settler family dislikes buying in Iraq. The settler wives
believe that Egyptian cottons are not only of superior quality but are also more expensive when purchased in Iraq. Thus, many a migrant worker from the same village or area back in Egypt is asked to bring materials over with him. Settlers, for their part, prefer the Egyptian style or cut of gallabiah, as the Iraqi version is much narrower and provides little leg-room. These garments are either brought over ready-made from Egypt or they are sewn by one or the other Egyptian tailor who has opened shop in the nearby market-town of Jisr al-Diyalah. Similarly, nearly all the settlers prefer to frequent one or the other Egyptian barber shop in Jisr al-Diyalah. Household necessities are also generally purchased from Egyptian grocers. The provision of these services by the Egyptian migrant community outside the Settlement underlines the reality that the Iraqi authorities' hopes of encouraging the settler families' contacts with their Iraqi neighbours have not materialized, at least not to the degree anticipated at the time of resettlement.

3.2 Aspirations for Sons and Daughters

With regard to the sexual division of labour in Khalsa's settler household, the first impression which imposes itself is that those among the wives who are active in both land and market appear to have benefited the least from resettlement insofar as the extent of the work-load they are shouldering is concerned. The post-resettlement division of labour between the spouses would, in the first instance, indicate that it is generally not in the wives' favour, particularly in the case of those who had not been economically active outside the home back in the village of origin. Even though the peasant stratum, from which the majority of Khalsa's settlers originate, would imply that
their wives have been accustomed to hard work all their lives, the fact remains that the family's geographical separation from the home village in Egypt has deprived many of these women (those with cordial kin relationships in the Settlement excluded) from the traditional social network, which are perceived to be at least a potential support.

However, these deductions were found to be only partly applicable. For, though 69% of the settler wives included in the present study are active alongside their husbands on the land and also take the produce for sale on the market, not every one of these women is necessarily burdened with the full load of household chores perceived to be part of her responsibilities. Apart from the fact that the help of other females in the household may be available, it is also pertinent whether a family has one or more daughters, who can shoulder part or even all of these household chores. In fact, this is where the cultural preference for boys comes to the fore, expressed by the settler parents' social mobility aspirations which are almost exclusively concentrated on their sons. The latter are encouraged to excel in school, for it is educational success which is perceived to be the key to social mobility out of the peasant stratum. It is only when a son cannot keep up with his peers in school that parents will resign themselves to the fact that he will remain a cultivator or, if lucky, perhaps acquire some other skill requiring little or no academic qualifications. In contrast, apart from two partial exceptions to be taken up later, Khalsa's Egyptian parents do not envisage a role for their daughter other than the traditional one of wife and mother. Her education is not regarded as a priority. Rather, whether or not she may be attending school, she is expected to help her mother by carrying out a number of household chores (which are viewed as the best preparation for a daughter's future role), in addition to helping on the land at least during peak-
seasons and pest-control operations. This enables the settler wife to devote more time and effort in assisting her husband on the land or taking the produce to market.

A significant number of Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families were, at the time of my field-research, not sending their daughters to school. The continuity of this cultural norm favouring sons has been indirectly encouraged by the Iraqi authorities' laxity in enforcing the school-enrolment of all children in Khalsa regardless of sex. Some Iraqi officials claim that these children are not compelled to attend school, in accordance with the same regulation which eventually exempted their parents from attending the illiteracy eradication classes. On the other hand, the head-mistress of Khalsa's Primary School appeared genuinely surprised upon hearing that many of the Egyptian peasant girls in Khalsa are being kept from school. Whatever the actual regulations - and this could unfortunately not be satisfactorily verified - the non-enforcement of primary school-enrolment is significant not only with respect to its indirect effect on the manner in which the settler household has adjusted to the demands of agricultural production and the market in pursuit of profit maximization. It is a further index of the way in which old social values are manipulated to serve this end.

Thus, in thirty of the sixty-nine settler households included in the present study, which have one or more unmarried daughters of school age (i.e. 6-18 years, which is the corresponding ideal age from primary through to secondary level), 47% were, at the time of my field-research, sending all daughters to school; 16% were not sending the eldest, but all others; and 37% were not sending any daughters at all. The regional variance reflecting rural Egypt's heterogeneity is quite explicit. Of the fourteen families, where all unmarried daughters of
school-age are being educated, 50% are from Lower Egypt, 29% from Middle, and 21% from Upper Egypt respectively. Of the five families who are keeping only the eldest daughter home, only one is from Lower Egypt, and the rest come from Middle Egypt. No Lower Egyptian family is keeping all its daughters away from school. Of the eleven who do, one is from Upper and the rest all from Middle Egypt. However, this data requires some further elaboration. Of the families which were educating all their daughters without exception, only two had girls continuing beyond primary level. Significantly, these are the two Lower Egyptian families who consider themselves to be socially above the peasant stratum. Both sets of parents hope to send their daughters to teacher-training college, for this is considered to be the most respectable occupation outside the home for a woman. Nevertheless, here also marriage is viewed as a girl’s ultimate goal in life. In contrast, few of the families who were sending all their daughters, or all except the eldest, to school, are intending to let them continue beyond primary level. Furthermore, regardless of their regional origin, these families will tend to keep their daughters at home if their help is required. Nonetheless, though these parents’ social aspirations for their daughters may not match those they are pursuing for their sons, they are intent upon also improving the girls’ circumstances. For, whether or not a daughter is receiving any education, no parents wish her to marry a fellah. While some parents do not appear to regard a girl’s lack of education as a serious impediment to marriage with a non-cultivator, others are very much aware that no government employee – considered to be the best catch, because of the security of his monthly salary – would want an illiterate wife. Hence the investment in at least some education for a daughter. Some mothers hope that, though it is the eldest girl’s naseeb (fate) to be called
upon to sacrifice, she may nevertheless later be able to attend illiteracy eradication classes, in order to also catch a non-peasant husband. On the other hand, by keeping a daughter at home, or at least planning to do so after she has completed the primary level, these settler parents are, in effect, adhering to the cultural ideal of female seclusion which denotes a higher social status within village society. In fact, in relative terms, the way of life of Khalsa's Lower Egyptian girl in particular has improved greatly, for her labour is now never hired out, as may have been the case back in the village of origin, given her parents' socio-economic background. Only dire poverty would have induced Middle or Upper Egyptian parents to hire out their daughters' labour.71 Khalsa's Egyptian peasant daughters, whether or not they may be attending school, generally only help on the land during the peak harvesting periods, but never take the produce to sell on the market. By the age of around eleven, they are discouraged from leaving the house and alley-way without a valid reason, and even then are never let out on their own. What is significant in the context of this discussion is the fact that all the settler wives in these thirty households referred to above are active on the land as well as in the market. Having one or more daughters of responsible age may well have played a part in encouraging these women to devote as much time as possible to economic activities outside the home, without neglecting any of the household chores deemed to be their responsibility as females.

In a further fourteen households, where the settler wife is active in both land and market, circumstances vary. First, there are the two extended families in which the mothers-in-law delegate most of the household chores to their sons' wives. In one of the two households where there are second wives, the first (mute) wife is in charge of the
house as well as all the children, while the second works full-time on
the land and sells the produce in the market. In the other, both wives
share all the work, though the younger one is expected to do so under
the first wife's supervision. In another family, the settler's mother
is a permanent member of the household and runs the house which enables
her daughter-in-law to work on the land and sell on the market. There
is one family where the eldest married daughter is in charge of the
household (her husband works in southern Iraq) and this enables her
mother to be active full-time outside the home. (This is one of the
families who are active as merchants). In three other households,
there are daughters of around five or six years of age who are put in
charge of younger siblings and are expected to carry out light
household duties which enables their mother to devote more time to
economic activities outside the home. In the remaining five families,
the father takes care of his pre-school children, while the mother is
selling in the market. However, as the burden of household chores
falls on these women's shoulders, they tend to assist their husbands
less regularly on the land.

In contrast, in nine other households where there are only sons,
both of school and/or pre-school age, none of the boys' education is
interrupted to enable their mothers to devote more time to land and
market. Nor are they expected to help with the household chores. They
may be charged with keeping an eye on their younger brothers, or help
feed the livestock and poultry, but these duties also are not allowed
to interfere with their schooling. In only four of these nine house-
holds does the settler wife work full-time in land and market: either
because the sons can be left unsupervised, or because a female relative
or, less frequently, the father is willing to take charge. However,
here also, the full burden of household chores falls on the settler
wife's shoulders. In a fifth household where the sons cannot be left unsupervised, the wife only works on the land. The husband in this case takes the produce to market for he considers it shameful to take care of small children. In the remaining four families, the wives only take the produce to market but help their husbands on the land during the peak season. All these daughterless families have one particular attitude in common, namely that a son's education must take priority, even over the aim of profit maximization which the settler wife's full-time activities in land and market would have fostered. More significantly, economic self-interest does not appear to affect the male gender role: sons are not expected to take on responsibilities deemed to be part of the female sphere of duties, even if this would release the mother's labour, thus enabling her to be more fully active outside the home.

In eight of the remaining sixteen families, the settler wife is not economically active outside the home: three of these are part of the extended family; a fourth involves the widow who is Khalsa's traditional mid-wife and whose two sons (both drop-outs from school) work on the land and take the crops to the market; in the fifth household (Om Said's eldest daughter) the husband engages outside labour to help him cultivate the land; finally, the remaining three families of this group are continuing to attach shame to a woman's economic activities outside the home. Of the other eight households, one family only cultivates to satisfy its needs. Though the wife in this case perceives herself to be socially above the peasant stratum, she nevertheless works on the land though her husband engages outside labour for the heavier work. In the remaining seven households, the wife works on the land, but never takes the produce to market.
While the settler families' personal motivations and inclinations are undoubtedly of importance (though unfortunately these are variables for which no data are available), the manner in which the sexual division of labour within the family is adjusted to accommodate the household's goal of profit maximization appears, in the general absence of any other labour contributions, to be dependent not only on the number and age-group, but above all on the sex of the children in the household. Rather than prejudicing the son's education (and hence his chance of social mobility), Khalsa's parents tend to resort to the adjustment mechanism of concentrating on less labour-intensive crops and/or a reduction of the cultivated area. Girls and boys are expected to adhere to the same gender role as that of their respective parents: the former within the home, the latter in the world outside. It is on a son that parents concentrate their hopes. For not only will his success reflect back on his parents in the form of social prestige but it will also assure the latter of security in their old age. Moreover, the son's social mobility is regarded as improving his sister's chances of marriage with a non-peasant. The fact that the Iraqi authorities' regulation concerning a son's right to a house and land upon his marriage, does not apply to a daughter is not perceived as being to the latter's disadvantage. Settler parents do not even contemplate the possibility that a girl should acquire the same rights, for house and land are always registered in the husband's name. As the majority of these parents hope their daughters will marry non-peasants, the question of treating sons and daughters equally with respect to this issue does not arise.

Being a fellah, even if he owns land in Iraq, inevitably ranked lowest on the prestige scale drawn up by the settlers and their wives. This applies even in the case of the extended families or the other
households in which a son has dropped out of school and works full-time on the land. For while these particular parents may have resigned themselves to the fate of their cultivator-sons, they nevertheless pursue the same social ambitions described above with regard to any other sons they may have. Asked about their first preference for a son's future occupation, 68% of the fifty male respondents indicated that they hoped that their sons would be 'high' government employees, while 28% want their sons to be either doctors or engineers (both professions ranked equally high). Of the remaining two male respondents, one wished his son to become an army officer, while the other believes that, since Egypt has too many doctors and engineers, the job of plumber or car-mechanic would be the most lucrative. A similar response pattern is discernible among the fifty-five settler wives who responded: 64% of them want their sons to be government employees, against 31% who hope their sons will go to university to become doctors or engineers. Of the rest, two women believe that employment in a private company is best, while the third hoped her son would be an air-force pilot.

While there is no significant correlation between the respondents' answers and their literacy level, the variable of regional origin appears to have some influence. Of the male respondents who preferred a profession, 57% were from Lower Egypt, while 29% and 14% came from Middle and Upper Egypt respectively. A more or less similar trend is apparent in the case of the settler wives: 59% of those who indicated a profession were from Lower Egypt, against 23% from Middle and 18% from Upper Egypt. Of the male respondents who hope their sons will be government employees, 29% were from Lower Egypt while the rest all came from provinces south of Cairo. Similarly, Lower Egyptian settler wives were generally less interested in government employment for their sons
(40%), against 60% of Middle and Upper Egyptian female respondents who prefer their sons to be civil servants.

Of equal interest to the above presented data are the opinions which many respondents, both male and female, poured forth in connection with their hopes for their sons' future. For these opinions reflect not only the settler parents' self-image, but also, to some extent, the bitterness of the poverty in which the majority of them appear to have lived prior to resettlement. Thus, many fathers and mothers in Khalsa stressed that they did not want their sons to have the back-breaking job of a cultivator, even one who owns an indefinite lease on a plot of land. For a fellah can never really be secure: he must always worry about the crops, or the weather, or the shortage of water or what the government will think of doing next. Pressed on the issue of landownership, some respondents admitted that if they had as much land back in their villages of origin as they currently had in Khalsa, they would perhaps have wanted at least one son to become an agriculturist. However, there was the general feeling that one of the main reasons for migrating to Iraq was the provision of a better life for their children and in particular not having the son ending up like the father in an occupation the reward pattern of which is perceived to be relatively limited. Given the settler families' socio-economic background, the adherence to such a perception is not surprising. Without exception, parents of sons who are school drop-outs tended to answer that the latter had no brains (mafeesh mokh), which was why they would have to remain peasants. The importance attributed to education as both a means of social mobility as well as security is aptly reflected in a remark made by one settler, namely al-ragel al-met'alam biyekdar yerfa' rassou we mahaddesh biyekdar yefdessou (the educated man can hold his head high and no-one can subjugate him). Lack of data
renders it difficult to surmise whether Khalsa's Egyptian peasants had always nurtured these social aspirations for their children, in particular for their sons, or whether these hopes have been awakened through the economic opportunities available as a result of resettlement. Nonetheless, it is to my mind pertinent at this point to compare the findings above with those in some of the material published on new human settlement projects in the Arab world. According to the participants in the 1971 Alexandria Workshop on the Planning and Development of New Human Settlements, experiences in a number of Arab countries indicate that successful farmers tend to invest their profits in non-agricultural enterprises and, more significantly, their sons will, almost without exception, be non-agriculturists. However, this trend is not fully supported by some of the data presented in Tadros' study of new settlements in Egypt's Western Delta. The author found that around 46% of a stratified, representative sample of settler households who were landowners had school-age sons who were not attending school. Around one third of the heads of these households indicated what may be termed as technical reasons (i.e. health, intelligence or the distance of the nearest school) for their sons' non-attendance. The rest all gave reasons indicative of an attitude which does not give priority to a son's education, namely that they needed their sons' help on the land, or that their sons were not really benefiting from school or, finally that the boys are expected to follow in their fathers' footsteps anyway. Though this response pattern must be seen against the background of Tadros' criticism of the poor provisions of educational facilities in these new settlements compared to the situation in Khalsa, to my mind it is nevertheless of interest insofar as one may tentatively conclude that the improved circumstances of the settler families' way of life appears not only to have
encouraged their aspiration to maximize their profit, but has also widened the scope of their social ambitions for their sons. Though they may not themselves have changed their occupation after resettlement, i.e. the majority of Khalsa's settler families are agriculturists, they have nevertheless sampled a way of life which has encouraged them to think in terms of social mobility for their sons and, though to a lesser extent, for their daughters. However, one may wonder if these ambitions could not also be fed by the impossibility of legally acquiring more land in the Settlement which could elevate the settler families into the more prestigious class of middle landowners or holders.

The traditional role of wife and mother which Khalsa's Egyptian peasant parents generally envisage for their daughters is above all expressed through the fact that female circumcision is a tradition which is continuing unabated after resettlement. In all the fifty-nine households included in the present study which have one or more daughters, all girls above the age of nine or ten have been circumcised. Those who have reached this age since resettlement have been circumcised by a Lower Egyptian settler wife, who had apparently carried out this profession back in the home village in Egypt. Without exception, all these mothers believe that no respectable man would want to marry their daughter if she remained uncircumcised. While this is not the place to embark upon a discourse on the historical origins of clitoridectomy, it is nevertheless pertinent to illustrate Om Said's opinion as an example of the justification for female circumcision in Egyptian rural society. Om Said defends this tradition by her belief that an uncircumcised girl would, even before marriage, tend 'to think about it' (betfakkar feeha, i.e. sexual intercourse which was never mentioned by name). A father would always have to worry about his
daughter's chastity and be forced to lock her up in order to avoid the
danger of her deviation. As many families need their daughters' help
on the land - Om Said is speaking here with reference to her own
socio-economic background - girls must be circumcised in order to guard
the family's honour. When a woman's shahwa (i.e. appetite, meaning
sexual desires) has not been checked and reduced by circumcision, then
her husband can never fully trust her because she may be often 'think­
ing of it' and thus be tempted to be unfaithful. Thus the proverb:
Al-bint matkounsh tahira illa lamma tekoun mettaharra. (A girl is not
pure unless she is purified, i.e. circumcised). Implicit in Om Said's
explanations is the notion that women not only have, by nature, strong
sexual desires, but above all that they are incapable of fully control­
ing these feelings by themselves.77 Thus, a family's honour is
always at stake unless the appropriate social control is enforced.
According to Om Said, there is a reason why a girl is generally circum­
cised at the age of nine or ten (but before the onset of menstruation):
she must remember.

A similar, though less extensive, discussion took place with one
of the settler wives who considers herself to be socially above the
peasant stratum. Here also, it seemed unthinkable that a daughter
should remain uncircumcised. Much stress was laid on female chastity
as well as the fact that no respectable man would want to marry an
uncircumcised girl. No family, argued this respondent, would care to
be the first to stop circumcising its daughters and thus spoil their
chances of getting good, respectable husbands.78

However, it should be added that traditional Egyptian rural
society does not dispute a woman's '... right to sexual gratification
within marriage ... Since the clitoris is identified as the locus of
sexual excitement, the gypsy woman who performs the operation is always
cautioned against its complete excision'. This notion is also implicit in Om Said's explanations, for she tended to speak of the reduction (takhfeef) rather than the elimination (man') of the girl's shahwa. The same notion appears to be also prevalent in the provinces south of Cairo, for, by all accounts, here too female circumcision does not mean infibulation as is the practice in Sudan and Ethiopia for example.

The settler families' continuing adherence to the cultural norm which views female circumcision as the only effective means for ensuring female chastity is to some extent implicit in the settler wives' choice of marriage partners for their children. Asked which nationality they would prefer a daughter's or a son's spouse to hold, 26% of the fifty-seven female respondents indicated that this was naseeb. (Significantly perhaps, all had children of primary and/or pre-school age and may therefore not yet have given much thought to this issue). Around 12% claimed that they would not mind an Iraqi son-in-law, providing he was a non-peasant. In the case of a daughter-in-law, the important consideration is that she be men 'aylah mohtaramah (from a respectable family). (Two of these wives are from the households who have taken Iraqi citizenship.) But 62% of these female respondents indicated they wanted their sons and daughters to marry none other than Egyptians. The preference for an Egyptian son-in-law was explained by the fact that 'adatna betekhteleg (i.e. customs in Egypt and Iraq vary). But many of these women also mentioned the fear that should a daughter marry an Iraqi, her family may lose contact with her, which is an implicit reference to their hopes of eventually returning to Egypt. However, of particular interest in the context of our discussion are the strong feelings expressed by these respondents against the idea of their son marrying an Iraqi girl. While some women
conceded that Iraqi parents may also not wish to be parted from their daughters and while reference was also made to the differing customs between the two countries, it was the fact that female circumcision is not practised in Iraq which appeared to disturb them the most. Though none of these respondents could give me an example of an Iraqi girl with akhlaa saybah (loose morals), they nonetheless voiced a mistrust of the uncircumcised Iraqi girl. This attitude is implicit in the remark made by one of these respondents that al-bint illi moush mettahara, moumkin tegeeb mashakel li ahlaha (the uncircumcised girl can cause her family trouble). One may conclude that the notion of a powerful and uncontrollable female sexuality appears to be so embedded in the subconscious of Egyptian rural society (if not among certain Egyptian urban strata), that the absence of any social control to check it is viewed with mistrust.

The continuing practice of female circumcision among Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families reflects the reality that this custom is still enforced as a form of social control in Egyptian society, even though it was legally abolished in 1958. If anything, this trend may be taken as further evidence of the well documented fact that changes in the role and status of women tend generally to lag behind the socio-economic transformation initiated by the modernization process in the Arab world, an observation which is undoubtedly applicable to the Third World in general.

3.3 Ceremonial Celebrations: Accommodation to the Realities of Resettlement

The settler families' descriptions of the various life-cycle ceremonies and religious festivities are, in my judgement, of particular interest. Not only do they provide an example of the divergence
between the ideal, as custom and tradition would demand, and reality as practised in the Settlement, but also, as a later discussion of the visiting network in Khalsa will more fully illustrate, these descriptions reflect the type of community which has been evolving in the Settlement.

For example, Om Gamal, the settler/widow who functions as Khalsa's traditional *daya* (in competition with the Iraqi midwife in the Health Centre) generally does not extend her services beyond the actual delivery. She may provide such 'extra' services as giving the new-born child its first bath (usually on the seventh day) or putting a mixture of onion juice and kohl on its eyelids (which is believed to keep the infant's eyes healthy), but it was stressed that these services would be rendered only for an additional fee or in recognition of a special relationship between herself and the new mother. The proximity of the Health Centre has in effect absolved her from responsibility for the infant's health as well as the formality of registration. She may receive, in the case of a first son, a small sum in addition to her usual fee of three Dinars from the infant's parents. But none of the latter's guests, other perhaps than very close kin, are expected to present her with any money as is generally the tradition in the Egyptian village. For the birth of a girl, Om Gamal never receives more than her normal fee. While she is generally invited to, and often makes a point of attending, the *sebou'* (the naming of the child on the seventh day), she is nevertheless treated like any other guest rather than being in charge of the ceremony as her position would demand back in the Egyptian village.83

The reduction in the scope of services rendered by Khalsa's traditional midwife is more or less matched by the conspicuous lack of fuss accompanying the celebration of life-cycle events in Khalsa, in
spite of the settler families' adherence to the ideal when describing such occasions. Om Said and her daughters, for example, went into great details describing the sebou', a female ritual from which men are traditionally excluded. On the day of the sebou' itself beans, which have been soaked overnight, are placed on a tray, to which are added salt and different grains and dried beans, e.g. wheat, barley, rice, lentils, white and broad beans, as well as an oullah (a clay jug which only in the case of a boy has a spout) decorated with flowers. Finally, seven candles, each with a different name attached to it, are stuck in a circle on this tray and all are lit at the same time. The child will be named after the tag on the candle which burns down last. To ward off the 'ayn al-hasoud, salt is strewn in all the rooms. A selection from the grains and dried beans on the tray is sewn into a pouch and attached to the infant's clothes as an additional protection from the evil eye. At the end of the ceremony, the child is placed in a large sieve and repeatedly tossed into the air amidst loud shouting and banging in order that it may get used to sudden loud noises and never suffer from shock which is believed to be a cause of muteness.

According to Om Gamal, the Upper Egyptian daya, this is more or less the ritual in the provinces south of Cairo, except that for a girl, a gold bangle or necklace is placed on the neck of the oullah, a symbol of wealth which it is hoped the little girl will have when she marries. In contrast to the tradition in Lower Egypt, only salt is sewn into the pouch which is fastened onto the infant's clothes. In addition, the mother steps seven times over the tray with the soaked beans and selection of grains in order to ward off the evil spirits which may be hovering over her child. Furthermore, the parents of a new-born child send two hard-boiled eggs and a glass of sharbat (a syrupy drink) to the oldest and wisest man in the community. Upon eating and drinking this offering, the latter is believed to impart
wisdom and a long life to the new-born child. However, according to Om Said, this particular tradition is not known in Lower Egypt. Both Om Gamal and Om Said also gave vivid descriptions of all the food and refreshments which are traditionally offered to guests during the sebou ceremony. The biggest celebration is reserved for a first-born son or one born after many daughters and it is on such an occasion that no expenses are spared.

Given the settler families' continued belief in the powers of the evil eye, it is not surprising to find that the rituals during the sebou appear to be still in practice, irrespective of whether or not many female guests attend the celebration. However, it is with regard to the expenditures for food and drink offered during this life-cycle event that there appears to exist a perceptible lag between the ideal of hospitality as described by these two informants and the reality of life after resettlement. For, in fact, even female guests who are kin are generally not offered more than soft drinks and sweet pastries while non-kin are only given the former.

A similar discrepancy between ideal and practice is also apparent with regard to the circumcision celebrations for boys and girls. Compared to a boy's traditional circumcision ceremony in the Egyptian village, that organized for a girl is a comparatively quiet affair. Though she is dressed up in new clothes and jewelry for the occasion and has her hands and feet dyed with henna (to ward off the 'ayn al-hasoud as well as to ensure fertility), only close female kin, friends and neighbours generally attend this ceremony. Guests are offered a variety of refreshments and are expected to present the girl with a nuqta (money gift, pl. = nuqut). The girl's father and other close kin never participate in this ritual, indeed they are expected to feign ignorance of its occurrence. With regard to the Khalsa Settlement,
this ceremonial pattern has remained more or less unchanged except for the fact that the newly circumcised girl's mother generally only offers her female guests tea and soft drinks. However, be they kin or non-kin, the latter are expected to present the girl with a small nugta, variations in which are dealt with later during the descriptive analysis of the visiting network.

In contrast, the celebration of a boy's circumcision in the Egyptian village is more or less a public social affair. Musicians may be hired to entertain the guests (segregated by sex) and many food delicacies are offered. The nugut presented to the newly circumcised boy are, in their individual amounts, higher than what is generally given to a girl. Because of the public nature of this life-cycle event, a wider circle of kith and kin honour this social obligation. However, here also, the above described osool (i.e. the correct, traditional way of conducting a ceremony) did not in fact tally with the reality encountered in the Settlement. For apart from three exceptions, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant households have all taken advantage of the circumcision offered free of cost every July at the Health Centre. While kin and/or immediate neighbours and friends may visit to offer their congratulations, few of Khalsa's parents apparently incur the expenses which the celebration of a boy's circumcision according to the osool would have demanded. No musicians are hired and guests are generally offered no more than soft drinks and tea. Only kin appear to be offered sweet pastries and dates. However, as in the girl's case, the newly circumcised boy is given a nugta by both kith and kin. While these modifications must be viewed from the perspective of the community in the Settlement (and as such will be discussed in a later part), it is also a further example of the migrant peasant's frugality. Why
pay for a service offered free and of which nearly all the other settler families avail themselves?

In contrast, the three exceptions referred to above not only paid around ten Dinars each to have their son circumcised during a special ceremony at home (by the same Iraqi male nurse who performs it free in the Health Centre), but all three slaughtered a lamb which was offered to male guests - both kin and non-kin - from within as well as outside the Settlement, as well as to female kin. But even non-kin female guests were offered soft drinks and pastries during their visits of congratulation which generally took place in the afternoon. Though these parents all explained that this expenditure was justified because even if one should be fi al-ghurba (in a strange land), one should do things according to the osool, there are, in my judgement, various other factors which may also have motivated them. All three boys concerned were first-born sons and all three parents are, as a later analysis will illustrate, to varying degrees status-conscious. One of these boys is the grandson of Om Said and 'Amm Ali, and it is apparently they who arranged for the ceremony to take place in their home and who paid all the expenses. It is perhaps no coincidence that this ceremony was celebrated after 'Amm Ali's election as Chairman of the Cooperative, which implicitly confirmed his role as the Settlement's informal leader, (at least in the eyes of the majority of the settlers). The second family which incurred expenses to celebrate the circumcision of its son is from among the households which are active as merchants and which have purchased the 'modern' furnishings referred to elsewhere. The boy's mother stressed: 'Ayb ma netmaseksh bi 'aadatina hatta law kunna fi al-ghurba (It is shameful not to hold onto our traditions even if we are in a strange land). This also appears to have been the motive of the third family which derives a lucrative
income from its share in the sandwich stall in Khalsa's arcade. The fact that all three households invited friends and relatives from among the Egyptian migrant community outside the Settlement is not without significance. It is the latter who will report back to the home village how economically successful and respected - judged by the number of attending guests - the settler family is.

The death of one settler during the first year after resettlement (up to the time of my field-research the only case) not surprisingly evoked a conspicuous display of communal spirit in the Settlement. Almost without exception, all the other settler families expressed their compassion by visiting the bereaved widow and her sons to offer condolences to her for losing her husband *fi al-ghurba*. However, though a similar compassion was, by all accounts, displayed upon the death of six settler children, this did not encompass the Settlement as an entity. While there is undoubtedly a differentiation between the death of an adult and that of a child, and in the case of the latter, one between a male and female child given the cultural preference for boys in Egyptian peasant society, this decreasing community spirit must also be seen in conjunction with the visiting pattern in Khalsa. However, this observation requires some modification; for, though only close kith and kin accompanied the bereaved family to the cemetery (near the provincial town of Salman Pak), many other settler families felt obliged to visit the grieving household even though they may ordinarily not have been part of the same circle of social contacts. *Al-mowt kartha* (Death is a calamity) was 'Amm Ali's explanation for this. Because no-one wishes to be alone when such a calamity strikes, a person must be ready to commiserate with others in their grief. This attitude is aptly reflected by the fact that the majority of the settler wives who had at least one occasion used the services of the
Iraqi midwife, went to offer condolences to her upon the death of her father (which occurred during the period of my field-research). Even though they did not socialize or even exchange visits on the occasion of other life-cycle events, many of Khalsa's settler wives felt it was a duty to pay a visit of condolence. Nonetheless, as with other life-cycle ceremonies, expenditures which are traditionally incurred on such an occasion were avoided. As indicated by Om Said, the custom according to which the bereaved household does not prepare its own food (which may vary between three and seven days) but instead receives all its needs from neighbours and from kin, was not observed in the Settlement. Mafeesh hadd biyyesheel humoom gheyrouh (No-one carries the other's burdens) was a remark repeatedly heard in Khalsa.

The first two weddings (see kinship group L in Chart III) which took place during the first year after resettlement were celebrated with much fanfare. Almost without exception, all settler families made a point of attending: non-kin females generally in the early afternoon, while female kin and all male guests stayed on until late into the night. But none of the guests apparently presented the bridal couples with nuqut since, as Om Said explained, no-one at the time had any money to spare. However, this may also have been due to the fact that the expenses incurred by the brides' parents were negligible, for the General Union of Peasants' Cooperative Societies paid for food, drink and musicians. In addition, the Iraqi authorities helped the bride-grooms with the payment of the mahr (said to have been fifty Dinars). Though animosities between settler households, fed mainly by provincial clannishness, were rife at the time, most of Khalsa's Egyptian peasant households felt obliged to make an appearance at these celebrations, encouraged, no doubt, by the social isolation in which they found themselves during the initial post-resettlement phase.
By all accounts, this community spirit was very much less in evidence at the time of the subsequent weddings which took place in the Settlement. In contrast to the first two weddings, the attendance of female guests was confined mainly to the celebrating household's female kin and/or alley-way neighbours. However, not even all the latter made a point of attending leylat al-henna (the night of the henna), when the bride has her hands and feet dyed with henna to ward off the evil eye and ensure fertility on the eve of leylat al-dukhla (literally the night of penetration, i.e. the wedding night). In contrast, apart from kin and close friends, all settlers who were on cordial terms with the bridal couples' fathers attended, irrespective of whether or not they were alley-way neighbours. Equally important, none of the brides' families apparently felt obliged to lay out the type of food and drink traditionally offered on such an occasion back in the home village in Egypt. (The General Union did not shoulder the expenses of any subsequent weddings in Khalsa, an omission which the settlers inevitably perceive as one more sign of the Iraqi authorities decreasing interest in the Settlement). But commensurate with the settler households' improved economic conditions, the mahr demanded by the brides' parents has apparently undergone a perceptible inflation, reaching up to three-hundred Dinars according to Om Said. On the other hand, this is matched by a more substantial gihaz al-'aroussah (dowry) which generally consists of cooking utensils, bed-linen, storage chest, clothes and jewelry for the bride. What is of interest at this point is the fact that these subsequent wedding celebrations began to reflect the pattern of social relations in Khalsa. A particular expression of this is that while the fathers and other close male kin of the first two Khalsa brides are said to have displayed the white blood-stained cloth proving the girl's virginity all over the Settlement, during the
subsequent weddings this display was confined to the alley-way along which the bride's parents lived and where the celebration took place.\textsuperscript{88} Equally significant, only kin and/or very close friends were expected to present a nuqta.

This demarcation defined by the web of social ties became particularly conspicuous during the weddings of two of Khalsa's settler daughters with two Iraqi men, which also reflects the settler families' attitude towards the host country. The first of these weddings involved the divorced daughter of a Middle Egyptian settler family. She had been married off by her parents to an Upper Egyptian settler whose first wife was childless. When his second marriage also remained childless (thus confirming the settler's sterility), the second wife's family agreed to a divorce as they were not asked to pay back the mahr and their daughter brought back all the dowry items. Not long after, the divorced woman was married off to an Iraqi shop-keeper whom the father had got to know in Jisr al-Diyalah. The wedding celebrations, however, took place in the bridegroom's home, not in Khalsa as custom would demand. Moreover, only a handful of settlers who were on cordial terms with the bride's father attended, but none of the settler wives, not even those who lived along the same alley-way as the bride's mother. The lack of fanfare which surrounded this particular wedding was obviously influenced by the bride's divorced status. However, according to Om Said, this was also due to the groom's poverty: he - so she insisted - is a pedlar of wares and not a shop-keeper. For who but a poor man would marry a divorced girl and a foreign one at that? Be that as it may, the important point here is that the second wedding between a Khalsa girl and an Iraqi also did not take place in the Settlement, even though the groom is the brother of the Iraqi midwife, who, together with her husband, a male nurse, is employed in the Health
Centre and lives in one of the houses allocated for employees. This wedding too was only attended by a small number of settlers who were on friendly terms with the bride's father. However, commensurate with the groom's social status (he is a skilled factory worker), the celebration was also marked by the apparently increasingly popular Iraqi urban custom according to which the newly-weds are driven in a flower-bedecked car around the groom's family's residential area as well as in the commercial heart of Baghdad and, moreover, spend the first night in a hotel. More significantly, the bride's father did not display proof of his daughter's virginity in Khalsa. Om Said's remark in this context is an apt reflection of the lack of social bridges between the Settlement and the host country: Baa'ou bintohom li awal ghareeb akennaha malhash hadd (They - i.e. the bride's parents - have sold their daughter to the first stranger as if she had no-one).

The one exception to the above described pattern appears to have been the wedding of Om Said's youngest daughter to one of the settler/bachelors. As an Iraqi source confirmed, many settlers and, more significantly, a number of settler wives beyond the social circle of Om Said made a point of attending, a sign of the standing which the bride's father enjoyed in the Settlement. But this may also have been due to the fact that Om Said and her husband displayed the same spirit of hospitality which later marked the circumcision celebrations for their grandson.

Whatever the extent of the celebrations and the number of guests at the various weddings which have taken place since resettlement, all the brides, with the exception of the divorcee, wore long white wedding gowns and a white veil in emulation of the styles more commonly encountered in town and city in Egypt. Om Said insisted that this was the custom at least in her area of origin, but Om Gamal, the traditional
midwife, indicated that the Upper Egyptian bride is generally dressed in colourful fineries.

While the rituals of these life-cycle events continue to be more or less adhered to even though the majority of the settler households refrain from incurring the expenses which tradition in the Egyptian village would have demanded, there is one such ceremony which seems to have been gradually discarded, namely that related to the fetam (weaning of the child). Few of Khalsa's mothers, including Om Said's daughters, appear to celebrate this event and few, if any, settler wives apparently think of making a special visit to their female kin and/or neighbours to commemorate it. Though this life-cycle event ranks relatively low in importance back in the home village, which might explain its gradual decline in Khalsa, this trend could also be at least partly influenced by the fact that lactation has ceased to be an infant's sole source of food. The ritual related to the weaning of a child would thus cease to have much significance.

The change which the traditional period of confinement after the birth of a child has undergone also poignantly reflects the Egyptian peasant family's adjustment to the demands of its new way of life after resettlement. According to Om Said, the traditional forty-day confinement - a period during which a new-born child is perceived to be at particular risk and the mother's ritual uncleanliness bars her from carrying out any household chores, in particular the preparation of food - has generally ceased to be adhered to back in her village. This is particularly the case among the poorer peasants where the woman's labour contribution may make a difference to the household's economic welfare. Nonetheless, most women observe a confinement period of around seven days during which their female kin and neighbours offer their assistance. In Middle and Upper Egypt a long period of confine-
ment appears also not to be strictly adhered to. According to the Upper Egyptian traditional midwife, most women in her village of origin only observe between ten and fourteen days of confinement, even though women in these two regions are generally not economically active outside the home. However, with regard to Khalsa, few of the settler wives, irrespective of their regional origin, appear to observe even a seven day period of confinement. In fact, according to Om Said, most women are up and about by the third day after delivery. The demands of house and - where applicable - land and market, have rendered this particular tradition a luxury which the settler household, bent on maximizing its profits, cannot afford to indulge in. In addition, the absence of, or at least the reduced reliance on, the traditional social support institutions has reinforced the realization that self-reliance is a necessity.

The traditional celebrations of the Muslim religious festivals, the most important of which are Moulid al-Nabbi (the Prophet Mohammad's birthday), 'Id al-Fitr, or 'Id al-Soghayyar (literally the small feast marking the end of the fasting period of Ramadan) and 'Id al-Adha or 'Id al-Kabeer (the big feast or the feast of sacrifice held forty days later which celebrates Abraham's readiness to sacrifice his son), have also undergone a number of significant modifications after resettlement. In Egypt, both the small and the big feasts are public holidays associated with the reciprocation of visits, the handing out of alms to the poor and the remembrance of the dead through visits to the cemetery. While hospitality on both occasions entails the offering of specially prepared sweet pastries (kahk), it is during 'Id al-Kabeer that families who are financially able, sacrifice a sheep (in commemoration of that substituted in place of Isaac by Abraham). Part of the
meat is distributed among the poor and needy, while the rest is consumed by the household and its guests. 90

Though the small and the big feasts are also occasions of big celebrations and public holidays in Iraq, their observance in Khalsa is not associated with any undue expenditure other than perhaps the baking of kahk. Significantly, few if any families apparently think of sacrificing a sheep, though they may buy extra quantities of meat to offer to guests from among the Egyptian migrant community outside the Settlement. Om Said appeared somewhat surprised at my question whether she or any of the other settler families distribute alms among the poor, claiming she did not know of any Egyptian in need in Iraq. Furthermore, she explained, Iraqis would most probably be offended if they were offered alms by Egyptians for, after all, this was their country.

The celebration of the Prophet Mohamed's Birthday is the highlight of all festivals commemorating the many Moslem saints who continue to be revered in Egypt. 91 Moulid al-Nabbi in particular is marked by processions, fairs and fire-work displays. Apart from the traditional sweet delicacies offered to guests on this occasion, children traditionally receive sugar dolls and various other sugar figures which are decorated with papers in a multitude of colours. Though this festival is also a public holiday in Iraq, the accompanying celebrations are more solemn and lack the fanfare and excitement so typical of Egypt. However, similar to the other festivals described above, Moulid al-Nabbi appears to be also celebrated in a relatively muted manner in the Khalsa Settlement. 92 During the morning, the settler household's routine tends to remain largely unchanged. The scope of the visits which are exchanged during the late afternoon and evening are very much a function of gender and of the existing social contacts between the
settler families. As we shall see, similar to the observance of the other two above mentioned religious festivals, these visits do not encompass the Settlement as an entity. In addition, none of the settler families interviewed reported that their children are given new clothes, though they apparently present them with sweets instead of the traditional sugar figures, which are unknown in Iraq.

3.4 Family Planning

Every general analysis of the process of socio-economic development in the Third World almost inevitably finds itself confronting the issue of the population boom and the vicious circle this undoubtedly initiates: the inadequacy of available economic resources to keep up with an ever-increasing population perpetuates unemployment, poverty, illiteracy, ill-health, a high level of infant mortality and an ever-increasing birth-rate. Aware of the implications which population size holds for economic progress and social stability, governments in developing countries have, with varying degrees of success, attempted to introduce the concept of family planning. However, as the particular example of Egypt - a country with one of the highest population densities in the world - vividly illustrates, birth control does not simply involve the introduction of modern and effective methods of contraception. Neither does it appear to be sufficient to relate family planning to religious beliefs. Islam, for example, may not prohibit birth control of whatever method, but this by itself is an inadequate encouragement for the use of modern contraceptives. Rather, the problem for the most part appears to lie in motivating families to limit the number of their children by providing the basis conducive to initiating this type of motivation. Viewed from this perspective,
efforts, in the first instance, need to deal with the root of the problem: what are the social, cultural, psychological and economic factors which motivate families to have — or not have — numerous children?

With regard to Egypt, one promising approach was initiated in May 1977 as part of the joint research project involving the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Cairo. In a monograph published in 1980, two of the demographers involved with this project explain their interest in "... exploring the way in which infant mortality and the birth rate are each affected by such attributes of Egyptian society as population density, literacy, urbanization, and the availability of purified water ... [thus relating] ... births and infant deaths to the socio-economic context in which they vary". Of particular interest to the context of the Khalsa study is another monograph which deals with family planning in rural Egypt from the perspective of the health system and which concludes that "... the apparent popularity of lactation as a birth-control technique ... means that many families do not look to the health system for guidance on family planning decisions". Furthermore, receptivity to family planning is not only affected by "... the child survival hypothesis, which asserts that parents must first have confidence in their children's prospects for survival before they will lower their norm of desired family size", but also by the cultural preference for boys as well as the reality that children are an economic asset in the Egyptian village. Another point of relevance is the authors' finding that the regional variable has a bearing on the receptivity to family planning, the latter being higher in Lower Egypt compared to the regions south of Cairo. "When people share the fruits of development, improve their standard of living and have access to pure water, modern
sanitation and electricity, their interest in family planning is likely to increase dramatically. Yet, these authors also come to the surprising conclusion that, with regard to rural Egypt, modernization appears in the first instance to stimulate rather than lower the fertility rate. For lack of any concrete evidence, the authors speculate that "... as reduced infant mortality leads initially to there being more children around, perhaps incipient modernization is itself an incentive for peasant families to have more children. When the benefits of modern life are newly available but in scarce supply, rural people may be encouraged to have more children rather than less as they look ahead to better days within a traditional perspective featuring an already high norm of desired family size."

Both the findings quoted above as well as the first impressions gained during the preliminary survey conducted in Khalsa suggested the following argument. If the initial effects of modernization - in the form of a Settlement providing all the amenities of a modern infrastructure - is a stimulation of fertility, then the latter would tend to be all the more pronounced given the following three facts: First, as Khalsa's Egyptian peasant settlers were (at least initially) prohibited from engaging any outside labour to help them cultivate their land, then children would be an economic asset. Second, the Iraqi authorities' regulation of providing every settler son who gets married with his own house and land would also be conducive to an increase in family size. Finally, Iraq's underpopulation has led the government to officially prohibit the use of contraceptives and abortions. While health centres in Iraq may advocate the spacing of births as being conducive to a woman's health, they are, according to Khalsa's officials, prohibited by law from advocating the use of modern contraceptives. However, the contradiction between such a population policy and the
Iraqi Government's active encouragement of female participation in various economic sectors (as reflected in the increasing incidence of female employment), has, not surprisingly, led to the widespread use of modern contraceptives, at the very least in urban centres. In fact, according to a number of Iraqi female informants, they are freely available in the capital's pharmacies. Thus, in contrast to their probable experience back in the home village in Egypt, Khalsa's peasant settler families did not find themselves subjected to an officially sponsored campaign pressuring them to limit their family size. Rather, if motivated to use modern contraceptives, they themselves would actively have to seize the initiative to procure them from outside the Settlement. Given the above facts, the hypothesis that it is unlikely that Khalsa's Egyptian peasant households were practising family planning seemed to me very plausible.

The majority of Khalsa's settler couples were in their early twenties and thirties at the time of resettlement in 1976, i.e. an age-span when the fertility rate can be expected to be high. Thus, it is not surprising to discover that 83% of them have had children since their arrival in the Settlement. Around 47% and 43% of all Lower and Middle Egyptian children and 56% of all those from Upper Egypt included in the present study were born after their parents' arrival in Iraq. However, around 30% of the fifty-seven female respondents of childbearing age indicated that they were using modern contraceptives because they did not wish to have any more children. Apart from three Lower Egyptian wives (namely Om Said and the two who perceive themselves to be socially above the peasantry) who had used contraceptives prior to resettlement, all these respondents indicated that they had resorted to this modern form of birth-control during the two years preceding my field-research. While there appears to be no
correlation between family-size and contraceptive use, i.e. the respondents in this group each have between two and seven children, the influence of the variable of regional origin is unmistakable. Thus, around two-thirds of the contraceptive users are from Lower Egypt, the rest are Middle Egyptian. None of these respondents were found to be from Upper Egypt. Though around 60% of these women have had some schooling this is not a very significant point since the majority of the settler wives who claimed to have attended school in the village of origin have more or less relapsed into illiteracy. Rather, in my judgement, three particular factors may have played a part in influencing this group of respondents to use modern contraceptives. First, migration to Iraq has resulted in a relatively low level of child mortality reflecting above all the settler families' improved health conditions as a result of a higher standard of living after resettlement.103 Second, the cultural norm regarding the importance of male offspring has been fulfilled, for all the contraceptive users have at least two sons each. Finally, two exceptions apart, all these women were found to be economically active on the land and/or in the market. This lends credence to the assumption that an effective means of birth control appears to be consciously resorted to in order to reduce the time-span taken up by child-bearing, which, given the prevailing notions of gender role, confines women for certain periods of time to the home. The settler wife's undisrupted contribution to the household's aim of profit maximization is thus assured. However, with the exception of the two Lower Egyptian wives who regard themselves as non-peasants, all these female respondents believe that lactation is an effective safeguard against unwanted pregnancies and had only started using contraceptives after weaning their last child. Moreover, birth control does not necessarily imply an actual reduction in family size,
for those who had between two and four children indicated that they were not sure if they would not eventually have another child. Family planning among this group of respondents may thus be a change in the distribution of births during the fertile life-cycle rather than a definitive decision with regard to the optimal number of children to have. Of special interest is the fact that over half these contraceptive users (from Lower as well as Middle Egypt) use the three-month contraceptive injection which they apparently obtain from the Egyptian truck drivers commuting between Kuwait and Baghdad. Though this is more expensive than the conventional pill and involves a visit to the nurse in the Health Centre (which shows the discrepancy between the Iraqi authorities' official anti-contraception regulations and their lack of reaction to its use), settler wives who use the injection prefer this method in the belief that it does not cause cancer like the pill. On the other hand, while pill-users concede that the injection is easier on the memory, they are nevertheless convinced it is the cause of cancer as well as sterility.

A further 27% of these fifty-seven female respondents indicated that they were contemplating the use of modern contraceptives after weaning the child they were expecting or their youngest offspring. Interestingly, over a third of these women are from Upper Egypt and, like the majority of the contraceptive users referred to above, none had used modern birth control methods prior to resettlement. All of these respondents had at least four children, and, as with the contraceptive users, at least two of these were boys. The difficulty of coping with many children in a foreign land was the main reason cited by these women for wanting to limit their family size. However, not all of them were active in both land and/or market at the time of my field-research.
The twenty-six female respondents who indicated that they had never used nor were planning to use modern contraceptives in the near future were equally explicit about their reasons. Around 61% of them indicated they did not mind having more children since, as one woman put it, delwaqti qadreen nehott 'aysh fi bo-ouhoum (i.e. now we are in a position to put bread into their mouths), thus perhaps supporting the above mentioned authors' contention that improved economic conditions may encourage couples to add to their family size. Interestingly, one respondent from among this group who only had sons was hoping to have a daughter next. Five others were among those who had been married after resettlement and were not, or at least not yet, thinking in terms of limiting the size of their families. However, some 28% of these twenty-six settler wives expressed the fear that modern contraceptives were harmful and can cause sterility, though they too do not passively accept unwanted pregnancies but tend to resort to abortions. All these twenty-six female respondents were more or less evenly distributed among the three regions represented in Khalsa, and their family size varied between one and five children.

Only three settler wives (one from Middle, the other two from Upper Egypt) expressed the fatalism that having or not having children is naseeb and moreover fi eed RabbenAn (in God's hands), a course of events in which human beings should not wilfully interfere since this would be haram (blasphemous). The manner in which such fatalism is pervaded by folkloric beliefs is aptly expressed in the following example. One of the Upper Egyptian female respondents claimed she had no need of contraceptives as she was unable to conceive. The reason, so she explained, was that one of her children who had died before the family's migration to Iraq had been buried in the wrong position, i.e. not facing Mecca. If she or her husband open the child's grave and lay
him properly to rest, she might be able to have more children. Having come upon this folkloric wisdom some days after starting the field-work in the Settlement, it seemed an interesting opportunity to test the reaction of some of the other settler wives to this belief. Though some of the Upper and Middle Egyptian wives questioned indicated that they were aware of this belief, most of them tended to be evasive when pressed to explain if they too adhered to it. However, among the Lower Egyptian women who were asked about it, this folkloric belief appeared to be unknown. Rather, it tended to cause some amusement and was generally regarded as being typical of the Said, as the regions to the south of Cairo are generally called.

The fact that only a relatively small number of female respondents displayed a fatalistic attitude towards the issue of their family size is, in my judgement, significant. L. El-Hamamsy's contention that '... it is not surprising that the Moslem peasant, living so precariously, should decide that fate, decided by Allah, is responsible not only for the pleasures and good things in life, but also for its misfortunes and pain' may thus have lost much of its relevance insofar as Khalsa's peasants are concerned. In fact, the majority of Khalsa's Egyptian settler families included in the present study were found to have given some careful thought to the question of their family size or at least to the spacing of the birth of their children, be the wives users of contraceptives or not. However, there is another important factor to be taken into consideration. It is the conventional wisdom in Egypt, for example, that the spread of electric power tends to be accompanied by a decline in the birth rate. Applied to the Khalsa Settlement, I would like to maintain that it is specifically one important implication of electricity, namely the television, which may also have a significant influence on the birth rate in Khalsa.
The relatively conspicuous lack of passivity which in turn shows that fatalism is not necessarily an all-pervading attitude, is to some extent reflected in the self-awareness exhibited by many settler wives, a point which I believe deserves some mention. Though, as described elsewhere, most of Khalsa's Egyptian peasant women are weighed down by many chores and duties outside and/or inside the home, the stereotype, or rather the urban notion, of the meek and submissive fellaha was rarely encountered in the Settlement. Irrespective of their literacy level or their regional origin, many settler wives exhibited a measure of self-confidence which was expressed in numerous ways. Some, for example, tended to ask for the reason why a certain question was being posed, while others insisted on hearing my own opinion before putting forth their own. In quite a few households, the attempt to respect the tradition of addressing the family head before the wife could very easily have been dispensed with, for these either interrupted or contradicted their husbands while the latter were being interviewed, though this was generally done with good-humoured bantering. Though most of the settler wives tended to warm particularly to topics intimately related to a woman's life and experiences, some of them were also surprisingly knowledgeable about various events taking place outside their social horizon, a trend which, as we shall see, is very likely attributable to the television.

Self-awareness and -confidence are obviously very much a personality trait and one, furthermore, for which there are unfortunately no data available to indicate whether, and to what extent, they had been in evidence prior to resettlement. Nor are there any quantifiable data to measure changes in the relationship between settler husband and wife as a result of migration. However, personal observation as well as information gleaned from conversations with informants lead me to
conclude that, though the many post-migratory changes which have undoubtedly taken place in the settler family have not perceptibly influenced the traditional peasant notion of gender role, these changes have nevertheless left some impact on the relationship between spouses. For example, the majority of Khalsa's Egyptian peasant women do not have to compete for what may be termed as '... the residual unassigned power in the domestic sphere'. The absence of the traditional female hierarchy based on age and status can conceivably contribute to the wife's position in the nuclear family in Khalsa insofar as she may be the only adult female in the household to whom the family head can turn. The husband's reliance would, in my judgement, be all the more pronounced given the settler household's aim of profit maximization. It is the latter which can be said to have increased the wife's importance as an economic asset given the social mobility aspirations for sons. A further post-resettlement change which could also add to the settler wife's self-awareness is related to the physical lay-out of house and yard which, for example, renders it difficult for her to avoid male guests. Indeed, in the absence of the family head, it may very well be the wife who has to deal with callers. However, it is above all the husband's increased presence inside the home which may have come to exert a decisive influence on the degree of intimacy characterizing intra-family relationships. For the settler's home in Khalsa is no longer only the place where the family head may satisfy his physical needs. Rather, it has above all become the centre of his leisure-time activities which, as we shall see, revolve mainly around the television set. Resettlement can thus be said to have helped shorten the social distance separating the world of husbands and wives.

However, there is a further aspect which must be considered. The absence of the traditional social support institutions, in particular
that provided by male kin, in effect means that the settler wife without blood relations in Khalsa is almost totally dependent on her husband's good-will. For example, when a Middle Egyptian settler decided to take another settler's daughter as second wife (see kinship group F, Chart III), none of the first wife's threats apparently had any impact. Though she is her husband's paternal cousin, the first wife was nonetheless seemingly helpless to stop this marriage. Having no money of her own, she could not just leave and make her way back to the home village in Egypt. As Om Said put it, wala 'andaha abb, wala 'andaha akh wagfeen ganbaha (she neither has a father nor a brother to stand by her). There is, in addition, the fact that in contrast to the fellaha left behind in the home village by her migrant husband, Khalsa's settler wife has generally not experienced the need to head the household or to assume some of the responsibilities held to be the man's affair. Rather, she continues to remain largely subjugated to her husband's role as family head.

3.5 Leisure-Time and the Media

The first few settlers as well as settler wives, who were questioned about wakt al-faragh (leisure-time) they had on average during the peak and the quiet agricultural seasons, tended to counter promptly that fellaheen are always busy, and that the peasant way of life leaves little time for leisure. This first response pattern became a poignant and important reminder that a particular term can be imbued with a subjective meaning reflecting the settler families' social frame of reference. Thus, city people, who some respondents tended to refer to as ahl al-zawat (i.e. high society) are perceived to have nearly endless leisure-time while the fellaheen must toil all day li akl al-'aysh (to
Avoiding the term leisure, the question was rephrased and the respondents were asked what they usually did when all the day's chores in house, yard, land and market were completed. None of the fifty-three male nor any of the sixty female respondents mentioned visits to other households as their most preferred leisure-time activity, a response pattern the significance of which will be taken up later. Rather, without exception, all of them indicated that, after finishing their daily chores, they liked above all to watch the television programmes.

Apart from the Lower Egyptian households which regard themselves as non-peasants and claim to have owned a television back in Egypt, none of the settler families included in the present study had owned a set prior to resettlement. Even though husbands were generally more likely than their wives to have been exposed to Egyptian television broadcasts, having perhaps had the opportunity to watch the latter in the village coffee shop, or other foci of male gatherings, it is the continuous and regular exposure to television which is a novelty enjoyed by all members of the settler households after resettlement. In addition, television has become, in conjunction with the radio, an important channel of information. The settler household need not rely on word-of-mouth to form its own concepts of events outside the physical boundaries of Khalsa, a point which further accentuates its independence vis-à-vis the Settlement.

During the winter months, when it turns dark soon after six p.m., the set is generally switched on from the beginning to the end of broadcasting time (i.e. 6-11 p.m.). Viewing time is extended on Thursday evenings and commences from mid-morning onwards on Fridays (the official holiday, as elsewhere in the Arab world). However, during the summer months, when the settlers tend to work late into the
evening in order to avoid the heat of the day, less hours are generally spent in front of the television set.

Questioned as to their preference regarding the television programmes, 70% of the fifty-three male respondents answered they liked and watched all the programmes; 13% of them had a special preference for Egyptian feature films; 10% preferred the news broadcasts, while the remaining four respondents liked above all to watch recitals of the Koran. The answers of the sixty female respondents were less differentiated; 57% of them like to watch each and every programme, while the rest had a special preference for Egyptian films. None of these women indicated a particular interest in news or religious broadcasts.

However, probing to find out more about the settler couples' opinions with regard to the programmes presented on Iraqi television, there emerged the realization that having the set switched on during the entire broadcasting time did not necessarily imply that all programmes are followed. For, few settlers or settler wives displayed much interest in foreign (mainly Western) feature films or serials, understandably because, even should these be dubbed, most of Khalsa's settlers and settler wives are illiterate. Neither did non-Egyptian Arabic films or serials (mainly Iraqi, Jordanian and Lebanese) appear to elicit much enthusiasm. In contrast, there is a strong identification with Egyptian films. Young and old, most household members appeared quite knowledgeable about Egyptian actors and actresses, whose merits, or otherwise, became the focus of many a conversation.

Nonetheless, the response pattern regarding the settler couples' preferred television programmes requires the further qualification of relating it to their exposure to radio broadcasts. All of the forty male settlers who responded to the question about their preference in radio programmes indicated that they listened regularly to non-Iraqi
news broadcasts. Though the Voice of the Arabs (Sawt al-'Arab) broadcast from Egypt, was the most frequently mentioned programme, a third of these male respondents indicated that they also listened more or less regularly to the Arabic broadcasts of the Voice of America and the British Broadcasting Corporation. It was the general feeling that Iraqi news broadcasts either do not give adequate coverage of events in Egypt, or they tend to present a distortion of these news items. This remained one of the very few instances during which the issue of political relations between Iraq and Egypt were explicitly referred to. (However, conscious that further probing of this subject might result in the closure of many doors during the interviews, these opinions were registered without much comment on my part). This relatively high incidence of listening to radio news is not only indicative of the Egyptian migrant peasant's interest in events outside the social boundaries of the Settlement, but also reflects his strong identification with his country of origin, a bond which, as we shall later see, is kept intact and encouraged by the flow of temporary Egyptian migrants who have formed a literal channel of communication between home and host countries. Around 52% of these forty male respondents also regularly listened to radio recitals of the Koran, particularly on Fridays. None of them indicated an interest in radio plays, though some occasionally listened to Arabic songs. For these men, listening to the radio was generally a leisure-time activity, pursued in the home or in the company of other men in the coffee-shop.

In contrast, around 22% of the fifty-six female respondents indicated that they never had time to listen to radio broadcasts of any kind. Of the thirty-six wives who do, 66% only listen to Arabic songs, mainly while they carry out their household chores; 28% of them listen to songs as well as, occasionally, recitals of the Koran. Only two
settler wives from among this group of respondents (Om Said and one of the Lower Egyptian women who considers herself to be socially above the peasant stratum) indicated that they regularly listen to news broadcasts, mainly in the company of their husbands. Listening to the radio is not a regular leisure-time activity among the settler wives, for, in contrast to their husbands, women do not generally congregate around a radio set to listen in the company of female neighbours.

Apart from the two Lower Egyptian female news-listeners, on none of the above data regarding preferences for television and radio broadcasts does the variable of regional origin appear to have any bearing. Rather, it is the respondents' sexual attribute, which would seem to be the pertinent variable, for the pattern of male and female answers reflects the different interest foci, and thus the relatively separate worlds of men and women, in spite of the fact that the settler and his wife have come to increasingly occupy the same space.

This relatively high incidence of passive receptivity to media transmissions, as the watching of television programmes and the listening to radio broadcasts may be termed, is not matched by a similar level of active participation which the reading of newspapers and magazines would require. Given the data on the literacy level of settlers and settler wives, this finding comes as no surprise. However, even literate respondents do not appear to be much interested in the written word. Of the twenty literate male respondents, two thirds read an Iraqi newspaper occasionally, but mostly if they happen to get hold of a free copy. Only one regularly reads an Iraqi daily, which he apparently receives from Khalsa's Cooperative Supervisor. The remaining four indicated that they never had time to read. However, according to these literate respondents, a different trend had existed during the first few years after resettlement. For, up to its closure,
Khalsa's Social Centre used to provide every settler household with a free copy of an Iraqi daily, the discontinuation of which is perceived as one more proof of the authorities' declining interest in the Settlement. Few of these literate male respondents indicated a willingness to purchase an Iraqi newspaper regularly, though many claimed they would buy an Egyptian daily if it were available in Iraq. However, most of them exhibited an interest in the leaflets and pamphlets distributed by the Agricultural Extension Centre in Khalsa, which contain information pertinent to agricultural production.

Among the female respondents who had indicated that they could read more or less without difficulty, only the two Lower Egyptian settler wives who perceive themselves to be non-peasants indicated that they occasionally read a newspaper, depending on whether or not they had any time to spare. Like most of the other settler wives, these women felt that television and radio provided them with all the news and information they needed. However, these women indicated that they occasionally read women's magazines which their daughters liked to buy. Some of the other literate settler wives also indicated an interest in such magazines, but would only 'look' at them if they got a free copy. None would think of buying one. Khalsa's Social Centre used to distribute some of the publications issued by the General Federation of Iraqi Women, (for example, Al-Maraa al-'Iraqiyah, The Iraqi Woman), the discontinuation of which was criticized by some of the literate settler wives, who indicated they used to read it. However, none of these women expressed an interest in reading the various agricultural leaflets distributed by the Extension Centre; these were considered to be their husbands' affair.

The degree of media exposure may be viewed as one among many crucial indices of modernization, a topic, however, the exact implications
of which continue to remain largely controversial. In the absence of relevant empirical data, it must therefore remain a matter of speculation to what extent the settler families' attitudes and beliefs have been affected by their increased exposure to the mass media after resettlement. However, what is of interest, in the context of the present study, is the fact that the settler household's increased exposure has important bearings for the scope and intensity of social contacts which have evolved in Khalsa since resettlement. Television, in particular, competes with the settler families' need to seek each other's company. Given Khalsa's Egyptian peasants' cultural background, which in general '... places a high value on personal relationships, even at the sacrifice of privacy and internal development', this withdrawal is significant. The change in attitude towards the importance of primary social contacts has had important implications with regard to the type of community which has evolved in the Khalsa Settlement.

Chapter 4: Agricultural Production and the Market

Conscious of the necessity to avoid the impression that the field-research for the present study was concerned with the settler families' agricultural activities, I accordingly kept such questions to a minimum. Nonetheless, nearly all those interviewed exhibited a marked reluctance to discuss this subject even superficially, a resistance which appeared above all to be influenced by two considerations: superstition and the determination to keep their income levels a secret.

Fear of the evil eye tended more or less successfully to impede attempts to discover, for example, the type and quantity of poultry and livestock owned by the settler households at the time of my field-work.
Many settlers and their wives were evasive, countering that they had very few animals or poultry, nothing really worth mentioning. Others lapsed into a stony silence, thereby provoking my fear that the interview might come to an abrupt end. Some even denied any ownership outright, claiming that anything I saw moving in their yards really belonged to the neighbours and had strayed in by mistake. Attempts to visit the settlers' fields to see the various winter crops, or the process of harvesting clover, or the irrigation canals, were equally unsuccessful. Here, too, fear of 'ayan al-hassud tended to provoke a similar wall of silence.

Asked whether they managed to put aside any savings - while at the same time assuring them of my lack of interest in the latter's volume - settlers and settler wives would inevitably embark on detailed and emphatic denials. Though all conceded that their standard of living had improved after resettlement, few would admit to possessing more than what the visitor to their home could see for him- or herself. El-fellahah shoghla mot'eba (cultivation is a wearying occupation) was a remark often heard when this particular question was posed.

In the belief that, however general, some information on the settler households' economic activities is relevant for shedding additional light on the type of community which has evolved in Khalsa, I attempted to collect the pertinent data from Iraqi government employees involved with this project. However, here too, I was less than successful since my informants, though generally ready to discuss agricultural issues, were found to be perceptibly reluctant to let me view any written material, beyond some unpublished documents on the Khalsa project. The following description of the settler households' economic activities in land and market, as well as their probable level of income is therefore 'based on personal' observation, some data which
was obtained from Mashrou' al-Wihda, as well as deductions derived from conversations with my informants.

According to the Cooperative Supervisor in Khalsa, each settler household was given a cow and chickens upon arrival in the Settlement. Some families have since sold their cow, while others claim to have lost it through disease. Though allowance needs to be made for the fact that livestock is generally taken out to graze on the household's plot, according to my personal calculations largely substantiated by my Iraqi informants, only around 25% of the settler families keep a cow, and very few of them have two. These animals are generally raised for eventual sale on the market, where a cow of around one and half years can be sold for at least five hundred Dinars. However, the profit of one Dunum of clover per agricultural year would have to be forsaken. It is perhaps this calculation as well as the fact that many settler households have hitherto been unsuccessful in breeding livestock, which appears to lie behind the preference for the security of the clover sale and the instant cash it denotes. The fact that the purchase of dried milk and cheese is not beyond the means of the settler family is, in my view, an additional factor which should be taken into consideration. In fact, as previously explained, even those households who do raise one or more cows generally do not make any dairy products other than perhaps ghee. Thus in contrast to the traditional pattern observable in Egypt's villages in general, where, apart from land, ownership of livestock denotes prestige, animal husbandry in Khalsa is generally not a significant economic activity. A further evidence of this fact is that only six of the households were found to be raising sheep. They include the two Upper Egyptian settler/butchers referred to elsewhere. The rest apparently sell the animals unslaughtered, either to Iraqi livestock breeders, or to some of the Egyptians
operating food-stalls in the vicinity of the Settlement. Few households keep goats, but nearly all raise chickens, and many also keep ducks and geese. Though the respondents tended to insist that poultry was for their own consumption, the Head of Khalsa's Agricultural Extension Centre claims otherwise. As the sale of fowl is also subject to veterinary control, the settlers apparently try to keep quiet about such sales. Iraqi peasants from neighbouring villages are said to be Khalsa's best customers for poultry. They get to buy them at a cheaper price which is acceptable to the settlers who thereby save on time and transportation costs to the market. However, Khalsa's Iraqi neighbours apparently rarely buy ducks or geese, for these are generally not a part of the national culinary taste. Instead, this type of poultry is mainly sold to Egyptian migrant workers living in the Settlement's immediate neighbourhood.

By the settlers' own accounts, each household owns between 17-22 Iraqi Dunums (or 6-8 Feddans), depending on soil quality and the number of family members. Since it is a commonly held view, in Egypt, that a plot of up to five Feddans implies that its holder is predominantly a subsistence farmer, one may consequently assume that the Iraqi authorities expected Khalsa's settlers to be integrated in the market economy. Though allowance was made for family size at the time the plots were distributed among the settler households, none of the households who have since had more children have acquired additional land. However, a number of settlers have apparently exchanged their plot by paying another settler, who was either leaving Khalsa, or not concentrating on agricultural production, and therefore did not mind an inferior quality of soil, a sum of money (said in some cases to have been as high as two hundred Dinars) in order to acquire a qualitatively better plot and/or one nearer the Settlement.
Though the level of soil salinity has been gradually diminishing, it nevertheless appears to remain a problem requiring constant attention. Iraqi officials at Mashrou 'al-Wihda claim this is mainly due to the disregard both of sound irrigation rules, and of optimal crop rotation. For their part, a number of settlers blame this on the fact that, contrary to their expectations prior to resettlement, their plots of land were of inferior quality and in need of much hard work to render them productive.

Irrigation water is pumped in from the nearby Diyalah river, and this process is supervised by an irrigation engineer. Plots are grouped into sectors, each of which has been allocated a specific order in the irrigation rotation during which owners are allowed to direct the waterfall onto their land. The maintenance of the irrigation and drainage canals is carried out by Iraqi and Egyptian workers under the supervision of Mashrou' al-Wihda. However, each settler is responsible for maintaining the irrigation channels inside his own plot of land.

For those familiar with the traditional Egyptian village scene, perhaps the most conspicuous change in the mode of agricultural production is the near-absence of the mihrath (traditional plough), which in turn partly explains the insignificant number of draft animals in Khalsa. However, 70% of the families included in the present study were found to own donkeys and, to a lesser extent, mules which they use as a means of transport. The rest either use their tractors or walk to their fields. According to the Cooperative Supervisor, all of the settler households have resorted to the use of mechanization in preparing their land for sowing. All other activities with the exception of pest control (the settlers pay for the pesticide which the authorities apply free of charge) are carried out manually.
Vegetables are the predominant summer crops produced by the settler households in Khalsa: okra, aubergines, broad beans, green peppers, onions and mouloukhia, as well as maize and water melons. By the settlers' own accounts - they were asked to name the type but not the quantity of crops they had produced during the summer season preceding my field-research - the first four of the above mentioned vegetable crops were the most frequently grown: 62% of the settler households included in the present study had grown okra, 54% cucumbers, 52% aubergines and 49% broad beans. On average, each settler household had harvested four different vegetable crops during the summer season of 1981. Because of the relative labour intensiveness of the vegetable crops, only a part of the settler's plot is generally used for this type of cultivation. The rest is either devoted to animal fodder or left fallow.

During the first few years after resettlement, settler households tended to concentrate on winter vegetable crops such as radishes, spinach, cauliflower, cabbage, lettuce, peas and spring onions, though clover, wheat and barley used to be also grown at the instigation of the Cooperative Supervisor. By the time of my field-research, clover and, to a lesser extent barley, had become the predominant winter crops cultivated by Khalsa's settler household, with vegetable production lagging relatively far behind. The wide-spread cultivation of clover has apparently been in response to an ever increasing demand on the part of some of Khalsa's Iraqi peasant neighbours, who are concentrating on the breeding of livestock. The added attraction from the point of view of the settlers, is that these Iraqi peasants arrive in their own Toyota pick-ups to buy the clover crop directly from the settler household, thereby sparing them the time and cost of transporting this crop to the market. Though, as previously mentioned,
barley, like all cereals, is supposed to be delivered to Mashrou' al-Wihda via the Khalsa Cooperative, in fact nearly all the households which were growing this crop were selling it directly to Iraqi livestock owners, who use it mainly for animal fodder. The cultivation of wheat has apparently been dwindling over the years since resettlement. In fact, only six of the settler households included in the present study, indicated that they cultivated this particular crop during the winter season of 1981-82. (Significantly, these were the families who were found to own tractors). One plausible reason for the decline in wheat cultivation, is the fact that the sale of flour is subsidized by the Iraqi Government. It may thus be cheaper to purchase it on the market, compared to the opportunity costs incurred by the wheat cultivator.

Not being able to obtain any direct information on the income which a settler household generally derives from agricultural production (even Om Said studiously avoided the mention of money), the attempt was made to obtain some relevant data from the Cooperative Supervisor in Khalsa, as well as from some of the officials employed in Mashrou' al-Wihda, in order to compute at least a rough estimate of the settler families' average net or gross incomes. According to these informants, providing soil salinity is more or less under control, pesticides and fertilizers are used in the appropriate way, and the settler household's members are hard-working, the average gross profit per Dunum could be: 800 Dinars for aubergines, 700 Dinars for cucumbers or green peppers, 400 Dinars for okra or broad beans or water melons. The cost of material in-puts per Dunum (i.e. mechanized ploughing, and application of fertilizer and pesticides) are as follows: 35 Dinars for aubergines, 40 Dinars for onions, 15 Dinars for cucumbers, 20 Dinars for either green peppers or broad beans, and 25 Dinars for okra or
water melons. Disregarding cost of labour input because of lack of data on agricultural wages and man hours per Dunum for each type of crop, but keeping in mind that Khalsa's settler does not pay land or income tax, nor does he incur any irrigation costs, and assuming that on average a settler household cultivates at least four Dunums with vegetable crops during the summer season, then it seems plausible to assume that a household's average gross income during the summer of 1981 could have been as high as one thousand Dinars, an estimate confirmed by Khalsa's Cooperative Supervisor. With regard to the winter season, unfortunately only the gross profit for clover could be obtained. According to some Iraqi officials, each Dunum produces enough clover to fill around ten Toyota pick-ups (of one half ton capacity each) per season. Each pick-up load costs the Iraqi peasant buyer around ten Dinars. If these informant's calculation as well as their claim that Khalsa's settler household is cultivating between 7-10 Dunums of clover during the winter season, is correct, then the household's average gross income would be between 700-1000 Dinars per season for this crop alone. According to the Supervisor, a hard-working settler household could easily achieve a net income of around 2,000 Dinars per year. This calculation excludes any income derivable from tractor ownership, or from the sale of livestock and poultry, or from wage-labour outside the Settlement. According to this same source, an averagely successful settler household's gross earnings may be at least 700 Dinars per year from cultivation alone.

Both the Supervisor as well as the Head of the Agricultural Extension Centre, were asked to judge the settler's level of productivity on the land. Though their opinions were sought independently, their judgements differed on the whole very little. Both of them claimed that around 80% of the settler households are hard-working and doing
well on their land, to the extent that many of them are regularly transferring back remittances to their village of origin. According to these same sources, those among the settlers who are less successful have apparently been less productive from the start. Though officially prohibited, they generally tend to seek wage-employment outside the Settlement, instead of concentrating their efforts on cultivation. Neither regional origin, nor literacy level have any significant influence on this pattern.

While soil quality, the extent of the household members' labour contribution and the promise of profitability are among the main factors which can be said to exert an influence with regard to choice of crop type and quantity cultivated, the former, in particular, appears to be at least partly dictated by the settler household's desire to have as little as possible to do with the Khalsa Cooperative. One reason for this, is to be found in the Society's attempts to force the settler household to settle its outstanding debts by deducting part of the amount due from the sale of the cereal crops delivered. Another example of the settler households' attempts to distance themselves from the Cooperative is their general lack of adherence to the agricultural production plan agreed upon at the beginning of each season with the Cooperative Supervisor. Though the unavailability of the right seeds at the optimal sowing time is one decisive reason readily admitted by the Supervisor, this is not necessarily always the case. In fact, this is again one more 'little issue' which the settler families tend to nonchalantly shrug off. Some reports have been written about this state of affairs in Khalsa by officials at the Mashrou' al-Wihda,121 who are specifically concerned with the implication this may have for soil salinity as well as a sound crop rotation and consolidation system. However, to my knowledge, little seems to have been done about it.
Thus, by the time of my field-research, most of Khalsa's settler households were, by their own accounts, purchasing mainly fertilizer and pesticide through the Cooperative, simply because, according to 'Amm Ali, these agricultural inputs are not easily available in the private sector, as is apparently the case for seeds and bulbs. Dealings with Mashrou' al-Widha are confined to arrangements for the mechanized application of pesticides, since nearly all the settler households engage the services of the settler/tractor owners for ploughing their land.

It is difficult, without further research, to ascertain the multitude of variables whose interaction play a part in influencing the settlers' market-orientation. Nonetheless, the previously presented analyses of these peasant families encourage the conclusion that profit maximization is a decisive variable. Baghdad's ever-increasing demand for fresh vegetables, for instance, ensures the marketability of most, if not all, of the crops cultivated by Khalsa's settler households. Asked about factors which influenced his decision as to what type of crops to cultivate, 'Amm Ali explained: Al-fallah al-shater biyeshouf garouh negeh fi eh we biyyegaledouh. 'Ala raiy al-massal: koun ghayour wa la takoun hakoud (The clever peasant watches what his neighbour has succeeded in, and emulates him. As the proverb says: Be jealous, but do not be envious). By this 'Amm Ali meant to convey the belief that jealousy encourages imitation, while envy only provokes the evil eye. However, marketability is not only dependent on consumer demand. It is also a function of the cost, as well as the ease of transportation of the crops. Tomatoes, for example, need wooden or cardboard boxes to be conveyed in and are, in addition, highly perishable compared with other vegetable crops. This appears to be the main reason why settler households are not interested in this particular crop, even though
there is a relatively high market demand for tomatoes. In contrast, most of the other vegetable crops cultivated in Khalsa are easily transportable in sacks, either loose or tied up in bundles.

During the first few years after resettlement, the settler or settler wife used public transport - the bus which commutes regularly between the Settlement and Jisr al-Diyalah - to take their produce to the latter. They were allowed to display their wares in a specially assigned section of the pavement, bordering the market-town's main thoroughfare. By the time of my field-work, nearly all the settler families were selling their produce in Za'afaraniyah, a market-centre in the southern outskirts of Baghdad. According to the settlers, the Iraqi greengrocers in Jisr al-Diyalah had started harassing them to such an extent that they were forced to find another market. Though Za'afaraniyah is much further from Khalsa, which has added to the time and cost of transportation, this market centre is much bigger than Jisr al-Diyalah. The settler or settler wife thus have little difficulty in selling most of their produce on a given morning. While this has undoubtedly helped them to accept the switch to another market, the settlers nevertheless did not miss the opportunity to point out that the Iraqi authorities' lack of reaction to this alleged harassment by the greengrocers in Jisr al-Diyalah could not but be an indication of their declining interest in the Khalsa Settlement.

Realizing that Khalsa's Egyptian peasant is in need of transportation - the public bus only goes as far as Jisr al-Diyalah - some of the neighbouring Iraqi peasants who come to Khalsa to buy the clover and barley crops, have seized on the opportunity to fill the gap, thus ensuring for themselves a lucrative source of income. Regardless of how many sacks of produce they may have, the settler or settler wife
pay the Iraqi Toyota pick-up owner five Dinars per trip. Some settler families make their arrangements with these drivers in advance. But generally, the Toyota owners tend to arrive early in the Settlement, sounding their horn for those who wish to go to market. Very often, one can see Khalsa's children standing near the shopping arcade on the look-out for these pick-ups, the sight of which sends them scurrying home chanting: al-Tayootah gatt (the Toyota has arrived).

According to 'Amm Ali, the Egyptian settlers have staked out a corner for themselves in Za'afaraniyah which everyone refers to as al-roukn al Masry (the Egyptian corner). Though there obviously exists a spirit of competition between the settler households, Khalsa's vegetable sellers nevertheless apparently tend to group together. The steady demand for their products tends to ensure that they rarely return with unsold produce to Khalsa. However, it remains a matter of coincidence which settler or settler wives may share a Toyota ride into market, or which sellers squat next to each other. Coming back, everyone takes the public bus to Jisr al-Diyalah, where they change on to the bus bound for Khalsa. During the peak harvesting period, settler households may go as often as three times a week to Za'afaraniyah. The Sharqiah households who are working as merchants tend to go daily during these periods, which in spite of their denial lends credence to the rumour that they are in fact engaging outside labour to help them cultivate their land.
Notes to Part III

1 The details of the selection criteria were obtained during the interview in 1979 with the official at the Office for Peasants' Affairs in Cairo.

Until the National Research Centres in Cairo and Baghdad choose to publish the joint study they undertook in Khalsa in 1977, the data available on the original group of settlers who arrived in 1976 are limited. None of the Iraqi government employees associated with this settlement project appear to have kept track of changes in the numerical composition of Khalsa. However, according to my own calculations, of the original group of 100 families, only 66 were living in Khalsa at the time of my field-work. The selection criteria will be discussed with reference to the sixty-nine households included in the present study unless otherwise stated.

Four of the husbands in these sixty-nine households are the sons of settlers who married after resettlement and were given their own house and plot of land. Four other families arrived between 1977-1979, but have been nevertheless included as they are part of the Settlement's social network. In one household only the eldest son was interviewed, in another I only managed to half-interview the settler wife when her husband's verbal abuse (hurled at her but most probably meant for me) drove me to retreat. (It remained the only household that treated me rudely.) However, in both these cases enough data were obtained to justify their inclusion in some of the analysis.

In all, fifty-three husbands were interviewed. Of the rest, one is deceased (in fact his widow arrived alone with her sons in Khalsa) and another refused to be interviewed; the others were, at the time of the field-research, either serving at the war-front with Iran or they were pursuing non-peasant occupations outside the Settlement, or finally they were visiting the home village in Egypt.

Four settlers have two wives. In two such households, the first wives live permanently in the home village in Egypt and have not joined their husbands in Khalsa. In the third household, the first wife is mute and could not be interviewed. In the fourth the husband would not permit me to interview either of his wives. In eight of the remaining sixty-five households, I was also not able to interview the wife, either because she was absent visiting the home village in Egypt, or because the husband would not give his permission. Thus, sixty of the seventy-three settler wives were interviewed.

In all, in forty-four households both husband and wife were interviewed; in sixteen, only the wife; and in nine only the husband (which includes the interview with the eldest son).

The percentages computed refer to those who actually answered a question. No answer and 'do not know' are treated as non-responses. The number of respondents thus varies.

The settler households included in the present study were, for reasons of comparative analysis, divided into three regions of origin following the classification adhered to by the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture. Thus, settler families from the provinces of Menoufiah, Gharbiah, Sharqiah and Qalubiah are grouped under Lower Egypt, while those from Beni Suef, Guizah and Fayoum are classified as Middle Egyptians. Of the rest, only a few were inclined to specify their province of origin and tended instead to refer to themselves as originating from the Said, i.e. as Upper Egyptians.

2 It was difficult to obtain any accurate information on the time-span of this campaign. The most reliable information obtained (from
the Office for Peasants' Affairs) points to the late summer of 1975 as the start of the Egyptian authorities' launching of advertisements for the migration of Egyptian peasants to Iraq. However, it appears that this advertisement campaign continued up to the spring of 1976, which would confirm my impression that there was not exactly a stampede of prospective peasant migrants to Iraq.

According to one source in Cairo, the Egyptian Government took certain precautions to exclude employment agencies from becoming involved in this operation. The authorities had apparently been concerned that peasants may be discouraged from applying for migration to Iraq because of the often exhorbitant fees these agencies are known to charge for their services. See for example the article in the Egyptian weekly magazine Rose al-Youssef (30 Nov.1981) in which this problem was discussed.

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4 See J.S. Birks et al., 'The Demand for Egyptian Labour Abroad', in A. Richards and P. Martin, eds., Migration, Mechanization and Agricultural Labour Markets in Egypt, op.cit.

5 J. Mayfield, Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt, op.cit., p.66. Mayfield is one among a number of authors who have been criticized because of their adherence to the notion of cultural determinism in their analysis of the Egyptian peasantry. (See H. Lemel, The Study of Rural Egypt, op.cit., p.3.) Briefly, cultural determinism is a school of thought which views societies and communities in more or less static terms. Applied to rural Egypt, it implies that the fellah's purported adherence to village traditions, his fatalism and his suspicion of change are all determined by cultural variables inherent in the structure of Egyptian rural society. Keeping this in mind, I nonetheless believe that some of Mayfield's generalizations are to some extent applicable as long as one remains aware that they are just that.

6 See the Theoretical Framework of the present study.

7 See Part II, note 14 in the present study.

8 This was the version given to me by the Iraqi officials though I later found out that one of these families was expelled because of the settler wife's prostitution activities. Om Said claims that some of these settlers remained in Iraq and found employment in the capital, though they all apparently sent their wives and children back to Egypt at the expense of the Iraqi Government.

9 With the changes in Khalsa's social structure (see Part II), it would seem that these particular respondents felt little need to be secretive about their occupations prior to migration. They were, by their own accounts, mainly engaged in petty trade.

10 One of these exceptions is a household from the Lower Egyptian governorate of Sharqiah, whose family-head was, at the time of my field-research, running a coffee-shop in Baghdad. His wife repeatedly stressed that they had been land-owners (moullak) and not peasants. But their impoverishment due to corrupt officials back in the village of origin had forced them to migrate in order to improve their children's chances for a better life. This family only cultivates to meet its own needs and made no attempt to hide the husband's occupation outside the Settlement. Generally, it is the wife and children who see...
to the land, but outside labour is employed for the heavier agricultural work.

The other family is from Menoufiah in Lower Egypt. The wife is the daughter of a primary school teacher and also considers herself to be socially above the peasant stratum. The family's presence in Iraq is explained by the hard times which befell it because of crooked dealings in the home village which resulted in the loss of its land. But in contrast to the Sharqiah household, this family is engaged full-time in cultivation and is said to be one of the most productive in Khalsa.

11 As J. Hopkins (see *Egypt The Crucible: The Unfinished Revolution in the Arab World* Boston, 1970) put it: The tarahil labourers are '... the Great Landless, the very bottom of this great pyramid of people ... [who] ... do not protest: because to have work at all is good fortune. For three or six months of the year they may have none.' (pp.313-314).


12 See L. Binder, *In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt*, op. cit., p.71. The author adheres to the definition of a number of Egyptian leftist authors who have written on the Egyptian village and who have based '... their analysis of rural exploitation on the economic and political structure', (Ibid., p.71) and defines the poor farmers as those who own less than one feddan.

Though half the settler families included in the present study indicated that they used to cultivate rented land, I nevertheless classify them according to the above presented category in order to distinguish them from agricultural wage-labourers.


14 This is the settler wife from Menoufiah who classified herself and her family as non-peasants (see footnote 10 above).

The seventy-one settler wives referred to here include the two second wives who are living in Khalsa; the two who have remained in Egypt are excluded.

15 The exception is the wife from Sharqiah who perceives herself to be socially above the peasant stratum (see footnote no.10 above). She has apparently kept up the habit of reading and writing, explaining the interruption of her education as having been natural at the time of her youth when 'good families' kept their daughters home after primary level.

16 According to J.S. Birks and C. Sinclair (see *Human Resources Development in Iraq*, in T. Niblock: *Iraq, The Contemporary State*, op.cit.) Iraqi women in 1977 comprised 17% of the total work-force, but 37% of the total agricultural work-force. (pp.250-251).


These policies are also implicitly expressed in the programmes and

An example of the Iraqi Government's recognition of the role of Iraqi peasant women in the agricultural sector is to be found in the woman's state farm founded by the GFIW in 1972 on the outskirts of Baghdad. It only employs women, both in cultivation and in the administration. Together with their families, these women live in a housing complex adjacent to the farm. A crèche is available for pre-school children. Most of these women's husbands are working in the industrial or services sector in the capital. The women have flexible hours, are paid monthly wages and receive a share of the annual profits. However, though said to be economically viable, to my knowledge this experiment has not been duplicated elsewhere in Iraq. I was not successful in finding out the reasons behind this. For a descriptive analysis of this state farm see: Tagreer 'an Mazra'at Nisaa al-'Iraq (Report on the Women's Farm in Iraq) by Z.I. Shahid et al. (Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reform, Baghdad, 1978).

The above may help explain the acceptance of the settler widow in the Khalsa project, a policy further underlined by the fact that the wife of the settler who died during the first year after resettlement was allowed to remain. But it should be added that both widows have sons to help them cultivate the land. According to the Cooperative Supervisor in Khalsa, house and land are registered in the name of these widows though he could not say when the deeds would be transferred to the sons.

17 For an interesting analysis of the diverse variables which theoretically may affect the patterns and trends of migration, see: A. Seifelnasr, The Outflow of Labour from Agriculture: A Framework for Analyzing Migration from Rural Areas, op.cit.

18 Ibid. Most of the evidence compiled on rural migrants points to the fact that the latter tend to be from the younger age-group in the village.

19 As W. Blackman (in The Fellaheen of Upper Egypt, op.cit.) wrote '... to the Egyptian peasant his own village is the centre of the universe, and people of other villages, though treated with hospitality and courtesy as visitors, are, in some cases, locked upon with as much suspicion as if they were positive aliens'. (p.129).

That this attitude has remained largely unchanged nearly half a century later, in spite of the fact that the fellah's social horizon now reaches beyond his village, is attested to by J. Mayfield who writes that the Egyptian fellêih '... has a keen suspicion for all outsiders and usually considers all individuals from outside his province as foreigners'. (See: Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt, op.cit., p.59).

20 The settlers arrived in two separate groups, one in March, the other in April 1976. While the first arrivals had the advantage of choosing a home nearest the centre of the housing blocks - a fact which is said to have caused some dissatisfaction among the later arrivals - both groups had equal chances of obtaining a choice plot of land as the latter was distributed by lottery some two seasons later.

21 It remains unclear whether the settler families really expected to find these goods upon arrival, or whether this expectation came up
in retrospect after the realization that the Moroccan settlers had
received them (see footnote no. 12 in Part II).

The Iraqi Government's efforts to mechanize the agricultural
sector, as well as the availability of subsidized agricultural vehicles
and machinery, have all but eliminated the use of draft animals, at
least in the hinterland of Baghdad. Having no capital to purchase such
vehicles (which in the case of trucks and pick-ups requires a driving
license), Khalsa's settlers apparently requested the Iraqi authorities
to give them donkeys or mules for use as a means of transportation to
their fields. According to some settlers, the authorities did not
respond. The settlers were thus forced to rely on their Iraqi peasant
neighbours to provide them with these draft animals. Annoyed that they
had to pay for something which they considered a necessity, the settler
families became even more incensed when the rumour spread that donkeys
and mules roam freely in this part of Iraq and all the Iraqi peasants
had to do was round them up and sell them for up to twenty Dinars a
head to the settlers. An Iraqi source in the Settlement subsequently
confirmed that there was some truth to this story.

22 A separate nuclear peasant family is not to be confused with an
independent nuclear family. T.B. Bottomore describes the latter type
as the predominant pattern in modern industrial societies, where this
family structure is associated with '... the growth of individualism,
reflected in property, law and general social ideals of individual
happiness and self-fulfilment, and to geographical and social
mobility. [In such a system], ... the individual is no longer
dependent upon his family in times of distress.' (T.B. Bottomore:
Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature, op.cit., p.170.)

While the Egyptian peasant family which is functioning as a
separate economic unit may exhibit one or more of the above mentioned
traits such as the pursuit of self-interest for example, Egyptian rural
society nevertheless does not advocate the cultural ideal of individual
happiness and self-fulfilment. The peasant's or villager's social
status remains to a great extent ascribed and, in the absence of any
other social institutions, he continues to expect his kin's support in
times of distress.

23 H. Ammar: Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., p.44.
See also R. Critchfield: Shahat, op.cit., where the Upper Egyptian
village community studied by the author in the 1970s largely conforms
to this pattern.

24 H. Ammar: Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., p.44.
This trend is again confirmed by R. Critchfield: Shahat, op.cit.

25 The term kinship is used here in a relatively broad sense and
includes thus cognates (blood ties) as well as affines (ties by
marriage). See D.G. Mitchell, ed., A Dictionary of Sociology (London,

26 The L3 household is one of the two marriages concluded in
Khalsa in which the spouses are from different provinces. The father
of the L3 wife is looked down upon by many other settler families,
according to Om Said, for the geographical distance between the
spouses' regions of origin is perceived as a family's desertion of its
daughter. On the other hand, it should be added that the marriages of
L3 and L4 both took place during the first six months after
resettlement and both had been actively encouraged by the Head of the
General Union of Peasants Cooperative Societies in Baghdad.
27 This is the household (not included in the present study) in which the family-head died during the first year after resettlement, but where the widow was allowed to remain. (See footnote no.16 above).

28 The special relationship which is perceived to exist between brothers and sisters in Arab society is attested to by a number of authors. See for example H. Rosenfeld ('Change, Barriers to Change and Contradictions in the Arab Village Family', in American Anthropologist no.70 (1968)), who writes that there is a '... traditional structural dependence of the sister on her brother. [The latter is his sister's] ... representative, her legal status, and defends her from injustice' (p.745).

H. Ammar (Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit.) and R. Critchfield (Shahat, op.cit.) also refer to this special bond: the sister leaves her share of inheritance to her brother in return for the latter's obligation to stand by her vis-à-vis her husband and kin.

The prevalence of this special bond in urban Egypt is attested to by S. El-Messiri: Ibn Al—Balad, A Concept of Egyptian Identity. (Leiden, 1978); and U. Wikan: Life Among the Poor in Cairo (London, 1980).

However, given the relatively low per capita income in Egypt, specifically in the rural areas, one may wonder if there is necessarily a correlation between a brother's support for his sister and the latter handing over her inheritance share. What happens to this sibling relationship when there is nothing to inherit? For my part, I tend to view this in terms of honour, i.e. a man's honour influenced, among other values, by his ability to care for his womenfolk.


30 See M.B. Sussman and L.G. Burchinal: 'The Kin Family Network in Urban America', in M. Anderson, ed., Sociology of the Family (London, 1982). The authors define a modified extended family as a structure '... composed of nuclear families bound together by affectional ties and by choice. [It] ... functions indirectly rather than directly to facilitate the achievement and mobility drives of component families and individual members. Its tasks complement those of other social systems' . (p.208).

31 In his study on Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., H. Ammar writes that one of the main characteristics of childhood '... is the pressure of sibling rivalry which is specially recognized, being evidenced in certain symbolic forms of wear, folk-lore and symptoms of sickness' (p.107). 'The absolute order of birth is maintained as the source of sibling rivalry... [which is regarded] ... as essential in the process of a child's growth, particularly for the boys' (p.108). Ammar further contends that '... the motivation of rivalry connected with the presence, actual or potential, of another person, is one of the strong incentives for appropriate behaviour, which combines social conformity with a high pressure ego development' (pp.110-111).

Ammar's analysis is largely confirmed by R. Critchfield's descriptions of family life in the Upper Egyptian village he studied (see Shahat, op.cit.), as well as by U. Wikan, Life Among the Poor in Cairo, op.cit.

32 These are not the only cases of marriage involving minors in Khalsa. In fact, with the exception of Om Said's daughter, who was sixteen at the time of her wedding, all the marriages concluded since
resettlement involved at least one under-aged spouse. In both Iraq and Egypt, the legal minimum age at marriage is sixteen for the bride and eighteen for the groom.

The Khalsa marriages which involved partners who were both under the legal age were apparently not registered until the bridegroom was eighteen. According to 'Amm Ali, the Iraqi authorities do not make a fuss if a wife is under-age, provided she is 'physically' mature. Not all of the settlers who married after resettlement bothered to register their new status with the Egyptian Embassy in Baghdad.


S. Farsoun also believes that the traditional extended family exists or used to exist in interactional rather than residential terms. See The Family Structure of the Urban Middle Class of a Modernizing Society (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Connecticut, 1972); (quoted by R.A. van Dusen, 'The Study of Women in the Middle East: Some Thoughts', op.cit., p.11).

34 The definition of the family's social and economic functions in peasant society is broadly based on that presented by B. Galeski in his Basic Concepts of Rural Sociology (Manchester, 1972); (see Chapter 3 on the Peasant Family). The author defines the peasant family's social functions as follows: ' a) Insurance (providing material and other kinds of support for the individual in times of failure or crisis - the extended family often performs this function as well); b) The transmission of inheritance (both material and cultural); c) The provision of facilities for the individual's start in life and the preliminary determination of his position in the hierarchy of stratification, based on income, prestige and authority'. (pp.56-57).

The peasant family's '... economic function is that of carrying on the domestic economy (p.56), ... which is at the same time an enterprise, thus fulfilling an important production function' (p.59).

Galeski concludes that '... the distinctiveness of the peasant family is its basis in farming ... [which] ... is the source of its main special features, which are as follows: 1. It is the production team of a small enterprise; 2. It is autonomous to a greater extent than other families as far as the satisfaction of its members' needs is concerned. This stems from the nature of peasant farming; 3. The scope of its functions is more comprehensive and they are performed in a more permanent manner. The individual is consequently more deeply rooted and subordinated to the family, while the family itself is more solidary, and resists disorganization more effectively; 4. The peasant family derives support for its functions from the village community' (p.60).

35 H. Ammar: Growing up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., pp.48-49.

36 See A. Abou-Zeid: 'Honour and Shame Among the Bedouins of Egypt', in J.G. Peristiany, ed., Honour and Shame: The Values of Mediterranean Society (London, 1965). The author aptly explains the different connotations of the term shame. Thus, all shameful actions evoke society's disapproval. But '... actions of 'aib do not usually require severe intervention on the part of society as a whole and any response is usually directed against the wrong-doer himself. Actions of 'ar are treated differently, for they usually bring shame not only on the performer, but also on his kin as well as on the victim and his kin' (pp.246-247). Another term for honour, namely sharaf '... refers to the 'honour' of both individual and group.'...[but there is] ...
separate word for the honour of woman ... [namely] ... 'ird ... [which] ... is used only in connection with female chastity, prudence and continence' (p.247).

Lower Egyptian settler wives tended to use the term 'aib, even when they were referring to issues pertaining to a woman's honour. In contrast, Upper Egyptian women as well as some of those from Middle Egypt tended to use the terms 'ar or 'ird interchangeably when they were talking about women's economic participation outside the home.


For the prevalence of this sex-role expectation among urban Egyptian women see: S. El-Messiri, 'Self Images of Traditional Urban Women in Cairo', in L. Beck and N. Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim World, op.cit.

38 It should nonetheless be kept in mind that a female respondent's claim of non-participation in agricultural production does not necessarily exclude her labour contribution during peak harvest periods or in the sorting of crops in preparation for taking them to market. Economic activity on the land is used here in the sense of the settler wife's regular labour contribution.

39 For a description of how this cooperative system was introduced into the Egyptian village, see J. Hopkins, Egypt: The Crucible, op.cit., (Chapter 17: The Village: The Cooperatives Take Over).

See also: S. Radwan, Agrarian Reform and Rural Poverty in Egypt, 1952-1975, op.cit.

40 An additional motive on the part of Om Said may well be related to her husband's position as Khalsa's informal leader, at least in the eyes of the majority of the settler families.


42 Ibid., pp.334-335.

43 A further interesting example of this social adjustment with regard to female exposure outside the home concerns an incident which took place some two years prior to my field-research in Khalsa. A non-Egyptian Arab film producer, who was filming an epic in the vicinity, arrived in the Settlement to recruit settler families for some of the crowd scenes. They were given ten Dinars each per day including food, drink and transportation. One of the Middle Egyptian settlers apparently took it upon himself to help convince his co-settlers to participate and is said to have received a sizeable commission for his efforts. According to one Iraqi source in Khalsa, at least a third of the settler families, including the two which claim to be socially above the peasant stratum, participated. The film-producer apparently convinced them that the film would not be shown in Egypt. However, few of the settler wives who were questioned about this were willing to admit their participation. Some who did insisted they had been forced to by the film producer, a claim which could not be verified.

44 See S. Morsy, 'Sex Differences and Folk-Illness in an Egyptian Village', op.cit. The authoress writes that the Egyptian peasant
women's economic contributions are fragmented and diffuse, and always considered of a supplementary nature. They do not engage as a corporate group in any economic enterprise. Their work in the fields is viewed as complementary, and it is males' field labour that is considered prestigious and skillful' (p.605).

45 Om Said, for example, believes that the Koran prohibits women from slaughtering any livestock, for this is a man's prerogative. Women only slaughter poultry, but not if they are menstruating and not until forty days after the birth of a child. In fact, the Koran does not prescribe any such regulation.

46 See J.W. Scott and L.A. Tilly, 'Women's Work and the Family in Nineteenth Century Europe', in M. Anderson, ed., The Sociology of the Family, op.cit., p.131. The authors present a model which '... posits a continuum of traditional values and behaviour in changing circumstances. Old values coexist with and are used by people to adapt to extensive structural changes. This assumes that people perceive and act on the changes they experience in terms of ideas and attitudes they already hold'. (p.131). Though the authors argue this point in another context, I believe it to be relevant to the present study.

47 The term negess or nejess means impure. There are things which are impure in themselves, such as alcohol, dogs, blood and the meat and milk of animals which are never consumed. Sexual intercourse, menstruation and childbirth are part of the religious impurities. See H.A.R. Gibb and J.H. Kramers, The Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam (Leiden, 1953), p.431.

The place where a Moslem performs his ablutions before prayer should be separate from where other body functions are carried out. Though bathroom and toilet in the settler's home are in separate rooms, they nevertheless have a common entrance from the yard and are thus perceived to be one unit.

48 This large, oblong clay jar or vessel is called a sir (a smaller version is called an oullah) and is made from oven-baked clay which is left unglazed. Impurities in the water sink to the bottom and the air which circulates through the porous walls leaves the water fresh and cool. None of the settler households make their own sir but buy it from Jisr al-Diyalah.

49 However, Om Said claimed that this heating device is also in use in her village of origin.

Big, oblong blocks of white stone are 'obtained' from nearby construction sites. A groove is chiselled into the top, into which a spiral is laid. The latter is then connected to an electric wire and plugged into the mains. This device, used both for heating and brewing tea etc. costs around one Dinar to make, while a new electric heater cost at least ten Dinars during the period of my field-work.

50 According to 'Amm Ali, Iraqi shop-owners are generally disinclined to extend credit to Egyptians. Neither does the Cooperative Society extend any credit to the settlers for reasons which will be dealt with in a later context. Settler households must therefore either have the cash or have acquired the habit of saving in order to buy consumer durables.

51 This observation is largely confirmed by the data collected by F. Khafagi ('Socio-Economic Impact of Emigration from a Giza Village',
To my knowledge, this is the only published study about Egyptian migrants and their remittances as well as the type of consumer durables they are likely to invest in.

52 J. Mayfield: Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt, op.cit., p.73.

53 This was the figure quoted by an Iraqi source in the General Union of Peasants' Cooperative Societies in Baghdad.

54 See J. Abu-Lughod, 'Migrant Adjustment to City Life: The Egyptian Case', in S.E. Ibrahim and N.S. Hopkins, eds., Arab Societies in Transition: A Reader, op.cit. The authoress found that the dress of rural migrants in Cairo appears to change little and concludes: '... it is occupation rather than status per se or place of birth which dictates appropriate attire ... [because] ... for non-selective migrants the change is rarely required to conform to the urban pattern'; (p.400). In contrast, migrants '... who migrate in search of education or wider opportunities ... have both the drive and the facility for rapid assimilation into the culture of the city'. (p.392).

55 The term merchant is the literal translation of tager (pl. = tuggar) which is used in the Settlement both by the persons concerned as well as by the other settlers when referring to these settler/merchants. In the Egyptian colloquial the term denotes an enterprise of not unmodest scope.

56 This finding, though it remains necessarily inconclusive until additional research is eventually carried out, nevertheless tallies with F. Khafagi's data ('Socio-Economic Impact of Emigration from a Giza Village', op.cit.). The authoress found that though the relatively high price of agricultural land may well be one reason, the fact remains that emigrants tend, upon their return, to focus on non-agricultural activities after drawing up their own cost/benefit analysis according to which they seem to find agricultural activities less profitable.

57 Made of palm ribs in the shape of an outsized ping-pong racket, the matraha is used to flip the round, flat pieces of dough until they have spread to the desired size and thickness. The mud and straw oven is similar in shape to a small igloo. The bread is baked on a shelf, below which burns a fire fed by dung or dried stalks. Reading W. Blackman's The Fellaheen of Upper Egypt, op.cit. one realizes how unchanged this oven and the mode of baking bread have remained at least since the turn of the century.

58 H. Ammar (Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit.) describes the importance of bread and other food in his analysis of the characteristics of the period of childhood and concludes that it '... is not surprising to find food as one of the major interests ... in a community which divides the year into seasons of richness and plenty, referring to the time immediately after the harvest, while the times preceding it are called seasons of hunger' (pp.115-116).

59 Women from Middle and Upper Egypt generally tend to bake less often, at least in winter, for their bread (either round or oblong) can be stored. Water is sprinkled on it before it is reheated. Bread baked in Lower Egyptian households is flat, round and double-layered. As it is preferably consumed fresh, Lower Egyptian settler wives in
Khalsa tend to bake more often. However, commensurate with a higher standard of living after resettlement, Khalsa's peasant families eat bread made of wheat rather than maize. In the Egyptian village, the consumption of maize bread continues to be predominant since maize is cheaper than wheat.


62 For example, there is apparently little response to the settlers' diversion of the electric power (other than cutting off the supply when the bills are not paid), or to the fact that a number of settler households are renting out rooms to temporary Egyptian migrants even though this is prohibited. Yet, the Iraqi authorities are said to react relatively severely should a settler help himself to some building stones or pipes from nearby construction sites.

63 This is the literal translation of the term used by the settler families to describe issues which, from their point of view, are relatively insignificant.

64 The present Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, studied for a period during the early 1960s at Cairo University, a fact which appears to be common knowledge among Khalsa's settler families. The President's affection for Egypt and the Egyptians is perceived to be such, so one settler wife confided (after swearing me to secrecy) that he has taken an Egyptian woman as a second wife, a fact which is kept secret in order not to antagonize his first, Iraqi, wife. While there is no truth in this, many of Khalsa's settlers and their wives are totally convinced of it.

65 This is not necessarily an attitude which the settlers have acquired after resettlement. J. Mayfield, for example, writes that '... the fellaheen sharply distinguish between Nasser and his bureaucracy. The local official may be corrupt and harsh, but this was not Nasser's fault ... This would never happen if he knew was a common theme ... [fed by the belief that] ... Nasser was much too preoccupied with hatat muheem (important things) to be concerned with their problems' ( *Rural Politics in Nasser's Egypt*, op. cit., p. 96).


67 See for example S. Radwan: *Agrarian Reform and Rural Poverty*, op. cit., in particular the chapter on 'Trends in Rural Poverty'.

68 The fact that these two butchers are both from Upper Egypt is, in my judgement, of little significance, since it merely means that both these respondents must have pursued this profession back in the village of origin given the fact that this demands some training and skill.

There is, to my knowledge, no specific reference to the social status of butchers in any of the published material on the Egyptian
village other than to note his functions during ceremonial events. According to 'Amm Ali, in former times when villagers had little access to health centres, a butcher used to set broken bones.

However, S. El-Messiri (Ibn Al-Balad: A Concept of Egyptian Identity, op.cit.) writes that the butchers in a Cairean quarter, which is the focus of her study, are associated with the role of informal leadership. This occupation is independent (i.e. non-governmental) and also relatively lucrative, both variables which apparently contribute to the social status enjoyed by butchers in this Cairean residential quarter (p.62).

69 Egyptian Moslems are predominantly Sunni who adhere to three legal schools: 'Lower Egypt or the Delta is traditionally Shafi'i, while Upper Egypt ... [is] ... traditionally Maliiki. The third ... Hanafi, was supported by the former Turkish rulers of these lands and finds adherents in Lower Egypt ... For the ordinary layman these schools have been meaningful primarily in defining specifically religious rituals, such as ... the regular daily prayer'. H.B. Barclay, 'The Nile Valley', in L. Sweet, ed., The Central Middle East: A Handbook of Anthropology, op.cit., p.43.

The relatively small number of Shi'a in Egypt, who, according to Barclay, are mainly non-Egyptian Arabs, are not organized into any community as is found in many other countries of the Middle East where Shi'ism predominates or is at least a sizeable population group.

70 Khalsa's health officials expressed to me their concern over the casual way settler wives tended to use dried milk. Infants are often switched from baby formulas at a very young age and mothers neither adhere to the right quantity, nor do they ever bother to sterilize the feeding bottle.

I was able to personally witness this nonchalance in a household where a girl of about six was asked to prepare her brother's milk feed. She scooped dried milk into an unwashed feeding bottle, went to the yard tap to fill it with cold water and handed it to the child. The latter, who cannot have been more than twelve months old, held the bottle up against the light whilst shaking it vigorously, at the same time squinting at it with one eye in obvious imitation of an adult. When the milk-powder had dissolved, he lay back and contentedly fed himself. Neither his mother nor any of his siblings, gave him a glance during this whole procedure.


72 The Workshop was held in Alexandria, Egypt under the auspices of the Social Research Center of the American University in Cairo and the Egyptian Authority for the Utilization and Development of Reclaimed Lands as well as the Land Reclamation Institute of the University of Alexandria in September 1971. The papers presented at this Workshop were published in a book entitled Human Settlements on New Lands: Their Design and Development, edited by L. El-Hamamsy and J. Garrison, op.cit. In my judgement, this publication remains the best available on problems of new settlements in the Arab world.

74 H. Tadros: The Study and Evaluation of the Rehabilitation Process in the Newly Settled Communities in Land Reclamation Areas, op.cit., p.154. Tadros made a comparison between land-owner and tenant settlers. The data quoted here pertains to the former group since this, to my mind, would be the more valid comparison with Khalsa's settlers.

75 In this sense, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families can perhaps be said to be displaying a behaviour which, in some respects, is similar to that found among the returning migrants described by F. Khafagi. The authoress found that having 'sampled' a different way of life during the period of migration, these migrants apparently tend to pursue non-agricultural occupations upon their return to the home village. See F. Khafagi, 'Socio-Economic Impact of Emigration from a Giza Village', op.cit.

76 See N. El-Saadawi, The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World (London, 1980). The authoress, a medical doctor, is, to my knowledge, the first Egyptian feminist to openly discuss not only female circumcision but also many sexual problems which she believes need to be tackled in Egyptian society.

That female circumcision is not a specifically Moslem practice is verified by the fact that it is encountered as far up the Nile Valley as Ethiopia. See for example R. Hayes, 'Female Genital Mutilation, Fertility Control, Women's Role and the Patrilineage in Modern Sudan', in American Ethnologist No.4 (Nov.1975). Also J. Kennedy, 'Circumcision and Excision in Egyptian Nubia', in MAN Vol.5, No.2 (June 1970).

H. Ammar (Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit.) writes: "... there is no text in the Koran that enjoins circumcision upon the Moslem, and it is only mentioned in the prophetic tradition ... [one which says] ... 'Circumcision is my way for men, but is merely ennobling for women'" (p.120).

77 S. Morsy refers to this as 'sexual assymmetry', in which the differentiation between the sexes '... extends to the evaluation of persons' physical and moral status. Women are generally believed to be incapable of rational decision-making ... [and to be] ... lacking in mind and religion'. 'Their weakness is said to make them particularly susceptible to the temptations of the devil'. ('Sex Differences and Folk-Illness in an Egyptian Village', op.cit., p.610).


78 In her study of around 600 women, carried out in 1965, N. El-Saadawi found that '... even in educated urban families, over 50% still consider circumcision as essential to ensure female virginity and chastity'. (The Hidden Face of Eve: Women in the Arab World, op.cit., p.39).

79 S. Morsy, 'Sex Differences and Folk-Illness in an Egyptian Village', op.cit., p.611.

80 In fact, clitoridectomy appears to be virtually unknown in present-day Iraq. It was viewed with utter distaste by a number of urban Iraqi women with whom this topic was discussed. But, according to the cleaning woman in the Agricultural Extension Centre, who is a Shi'a peasant, female circumcision was practised in her mother's time. At the time of my field-work this woman was in her early fifties.
W.J. Goode: World Revolution and Family Patterns, op.cit., p.147.

For the Arab World in particular see, for example, J. Minces, The House of Obedience: Women in Arab Society (London, 1980), (specifically Chapter 3: The Legal Status of Women: Reforms and Social Inertia); also E.M. White, 'Legal Reform as an Indicator of Women's Status in Muslim Nations', in L. Beck and N. Keddie, eds., Women in the Muslim World, op.cit.

See L. El-Hamamsy, 'The Daya of Egypt. Survival in a Modernizing Society', in Caltech Population Program Occasional Papers Series 1, No.8, for a description of the sebou' and of the role of the daya during this ceremony (pp.22-25).

W. Blackman (The Fellahen of Upper Egypt, op.cit.) reports a similar ritual but does not offer any explanations, (p.79).

There is no reference to this ritual in A. Amin's Qamus al-Adat wa al-Taqaleed wa al-Ta'abber al-Misriyyah (Dictionary of Egyptian Customs, Traditions and Expressions), (Cairo, 1953).

However, I personally witnessed such an occasion when a Middle Egyptian family sent two hard-boiled eggs and a glass of sharbat to 'Amm Ali. It is possible that the two eggs are a fertility symbol. In the Tunisian village she studied, N. Abu-Zahra found that eggs are traditionally part of the gifts which families exchange during life-cycle ceremonies. (Sidi Ameur: A Tunisian Village (London, 1982), p.137).

Nuqta is the money-gift which a guest offers the host or hostess during a life-cycle event such as the sebou', circumcision and weddings. Essentially, this financial contribution is perceived as a reciprocal aid in order that the celebration of a life-cycle event may not be a financial burden on the celebrating household. Thus, the host receives a nuqta from kin and kith to whom he had given the same on similar past occasions. H. Ammar writes that '... traditionally, the fact that someone contributes to your ceremony counts rather than the amount of his contribution ... [so that] ... the qualitative rather than quantitative aspect of the social obligation ... is more important. [However, the author also found that this tradition had gradually undergone a change, for] ... there has been an increasing trend towards contributing on the same number of occasions as one has received a contribution from a particular person'. (Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., p.118).

See R. Critchfield, Shahat, op.cit. The death of Shahat's father and the rituals practised at his funeral are vividly described by the author and, certain modifications apart, are most probably valid for the rest of rural Egypt.

One of the Iraqi female teachers in the Primary School as well as the Iraqi peasant woman who cleans the Extension Centre did not hide their distaste of this practice when this issue was discussed with them. The latter insists that even in the Iraqi village this is a private and not a public matter, confined to the mother of the bridegroom who, upon being assured by her son that all is in order, conveys her satisfaction to the mother of the bride.

See H. Ammar, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., p.91.
90 See W. Blackman, The Fellaheen of Upper Egypt, op.cit., p.259, for a description of these festivals which remain relevant to present-day Egypt as I can attest from personal experience.

91 For a description of the saints' mawaleed (sing. mulid= birthday) which continue to be celebrated in the Egypt of today and the manner in which they reflect communal life, see M. Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology of Religion (Oxford, 1973).

92 This festival happened to fall within the period of my field research. But being a public holiday, I was unable to secure transportation to Khalsa on that particular day. However, I made a point of questioning those families whom I was interviewing two days after the Moulid as well as Om Said.

93 J.O. Fields and G. Ropes: 'Infant Mortality, the Birth Rate and Development in Egypt', op.cit., p.22.

The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the University of Cairo Health Care Delivery Systems Project is funded by the United States Agency for International Development. It is part of a wider Technological Planning Programme involving fourteen projects dealing with a number of socio-economic problems in Egypt.

94 R. Burkhardt, et al., Family Planning in Rural Egypt, op.cit., p.47. The data analyzed in this article are derived from interviews with medical staff employed in rural health centres in Egypt. While cautioning that the interpretation of these data is also influenced by a doctor's own beliefs and attitudes towards family planning, the authors nevertheless present a relatively pessimistic conclusion regarding the implementation of a successful family planning programme in Egypt. For, aside from the continuing popularity of lactation as a form of birth control, which is beyond the influence of the health system, there is the fact that the latter has a '... poor record of contact with mothers at birth and the immediate postpartum period. [Furthermore, the authors found that there appears to be] ... significant opposition to family planning by doctors responsible for it at the local level' (p.57).

95 Ibid., p.51.

96 Ibid., p.53.

97 J.O. Fields and G. Ropes, 'Infant Mortality, the Birth Rate and Development in Egypt', op.cit., p.56.


99 This information was obtained during the interview with the medical staff in the Khalsa Health Centre.

100 According to A. Al-Sharqi ('The Emancipation of Iraqi Women', in T. Niblock, ed., Iraq: The Contemporary State, op.cit.) '... the percentage of women in the total non-agricultural work-force rose from 7 per cent in 1968 to 19 per cent in 1980 ... [while] ... the annual percentage rise in the number of working women is currently estimated at 11.6 per cent' (p.83).
To verify this, I personally asked for a contraceptive pill in a pharmacy in Baghdad's commercial centre and was handed it without questioning. Granted that my non-Iraqi accent may have prompted the chemist to avoid any questions, the fact remains that they are available on the market, at least in the capital.

The contradiction between policy and reality as far as this issue is concerned, is well expressed by A. Rassam who writes that the '... Iraqi leadership ... seems to entertain a basic ambivalence with regard to the role of women and their 'proper place' in society. While ... [it calls] ... for the participation of women in the development process, ... [it seems] ... to balk at the full emancipation of women from social and legal bonds that perpetuate their status as permanent wards of their male kin, be they fathers, husbands or brothers'. (A. Rassam: 'Revolution Within the Revolution. Women and State in Iraq', in T. Niblock, ed., Iraq: The Contemporary State, op.cit., p.97.)

Considering that the import of goods of whatever description falls within the jurisdiction of the public sector, it is difficult not to conclude that the Iraqi Government must be aware that contraceptives are available on the market.

Not actual age, but the settler wife's own claim that she was no longer of child-bearing age, i.e. had had the menopause, was taken as the criteria of differentiation.

None of the six deceased children, mentioned elsewhere, had died during the two years preceding my field research in the Settlement.

According to Om Said, it is Om Gamal, the Settlement's traditional daya, who helps settler wives induce an abortion. Om Said claims that in Lower Egypt abortions are induced by a brew made out of a small cactus-like plant called handal, which is apparently only found in Sinai and which the gypsies bring for the villager. A very strong brew induces violent contractions, while in a diluted form this drink is said to be beneficial for rheumatism. One of the Upper Egyptian settler wives described another method: the opening of the womb is prodded with a mouloukhia stalk which, when stripped of its fibers and boiled in water, becomes very slippery. (Mouloukhia is a green leafy vegetable, much favoured in Egypt, out of which a soup is made and which is traditionally eaten with rabbit. The word is said to derive from malakiah, which means belonging to the king; folk-lore has it that this soup was considered, in former times, to be the dish of kings).


The exceptions would be the households where there are two wives, the extended families as well as some of the marriages concluded after resettlement.


In a comparative analysis of a number of peasant societies, the authors found a strong correlation between female participation in
agriculture and the strength of male dominance: where there is little female participation, male dominance tends to be strong (p.333). Writing on the social segregation of the sexes, the authors conclude that '... it appears relatively weak in communities that do not have strong male dominance ... Perhaps limited interaction between the sexes helps to preserve male dominance from erosion through intimate personal contact' (p.332).

109 See F. Khafagi, 'Socio-Economic Impact of Emigration from a Giza Village', op.cit. The authoress found that the majority of the women included in her sample whose husbands were working abroad had taken over the role as titular heads of their households. However, though they may make their own decisions about matters pertaining to cultivation or finances, generally their newly assumed responsibilities and functions do not imply more freedom of physical mobility (see pp.146-148).


Based on data collected in 1978/79 as part of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the Cairo University Technology Adaptation Program, which covers a number of villages in all of Egypt's regions, the author presents the following trend, though he cautions that these villages may not necessarily be representative of the region in which they are situated: 83% of the peasants who responded did not own a television set against 52% of non-peasant respondents who did. Radios were more evenly distributed: 81% of the peasants and 93% of the non-peasants were found to own a set. (See Table 1, p.258).

111 For a recent evaluation of the media in Iraq, see D.A. Boyd, 'Radio and Television in Iraq: The Electronic Media in a Transitional Arab Country', in Middle East Studies Vol.18, No.4, (1982).

112 There is a perceptible difference between these data on the Khalsa settlers' media programme preferences and those presented by K. El-Menoufi ('Occupational Status and Mass Media in Rural Egypt', op.cit.) With regard to the peasants included in this study, the author found that plays ranked the highest, followed by the Koran, religious programmes and the news insofar as the television programmes are concerned (see Table 6, p.262). However, religion was the most frequently mentioned radio programme, followed by the news and songs (p.262).

One may perhaps tentatively conclude that migration has expanded the settlers' social horizon which has resulted in the urge to inform themselves at the very least about happenings in the home country, though obviously the contents of the programmes presented on Iraqi television should be taken into account.

113 See H. Rosenfeld, 'An Overview and Critique of the Literature on Rural Politics and Social Change', op.cit. The author, criticising those who explain village modernization through communications, writes: 'Although modern means of communication can speed up certain processes which may take on a momentum of their own, it is social and power structures which are historical products that bring about and contain change ... The communication theorists fail to come to grips with real causes, with those real structures that do or do not bring about change'. (pp.56-57).


118 However, see A. Richards and P. Martin, eds., *Migration, Mechanization and Agricultural Labor Markets in Egypt* op.cit., who claim that the most conspicuous change in rural Egypt since the mid-1970s is the spread of farm mechanization, in particular in the Delta region (p.2). Nonetheless, given the settler households' socio-economic background, one can assume that they had not been affected by this change prior to resettlement.

119 Though mouloukhia is a vegetable said to be enjoying an increasing popularity in Iraq, the settlers nevertheless seem to have more or less ceased growing it, apparently because it requires more water than other types of vegetables.

120 These figures pertain to the winter season 1981/82 as well as the preceding summer season 1981 as believed to have been applicable in the estimate of a number of Iraqi informants in Mashrou' al-Wihda.

PART IV: THE COMMUNITY OF EGYPTIAN SETTLERS IN KHALSA

In the theoretical chapter of the present study, a conceptual framework was presented which defines a community by its spatial boundaries, by the degree of social interaction between the households living within these boundaries and, finally, by a sense of belonging which transcends kinship ties. This sense of belonging implies, in turn, the existence of a number of control mechanisms, which serve to reinforce the individual's identification with the community as well as to regulate deviance from the norms and values upheld by its members. The manner in which these mechanisms function, and the extent of their influence are indicative of the type of community of social control existing in a given social setting.

Given the relative youth of the Khalsa Settlement as well as the various, previously mentioned limitations imposed on the process of my field-work, the following variables have been chosen in the belief that they would be particularly conducive to providing insight into the type of community which has evolved in Khalsa: the visiting network as one crucial reflection of the type of social cohesion in the Settlement; the formation and effectiveness of leadership as an important indication of the settler families' identification with Khalsa; and, finally, the effectiveness of social control mechanisms as a reflection of the settler households' commitment to the new community of which they have become a physical part.

Chapter 1: Social Contacts and the Visiting Pattern

As mentioned previously in their exposure to the media, nearly all of Khalsa's settlers and settler wives included in the present study had indicated that, after completing the day's chores, they preferred
above all to watch the television programmes. They also made a point of stressing that they had little time to spare for socializing with other settler households in Khalsa.

But, the first respondents' stress on the lack of free time, inherent in which is the self-image that the fellah's way of life is one of drudgery from dawn to night-fall, was to a great extent contradicted by my personal observations of what, to all extent, appeared to be a conspicuous pattern of social contacts in the Settlement. The evening hours during the colder winter months (the period of my fieldwork) are indeed generally spent in front of the television set, around which mainly the members of the household congregate. However, during the day, a specific pattern of social interactions - differentiated according to the gender role of its participants - could be discerned. Groups of settler wives, surrounded by infants and toddlers, could be observed, during the periods of noon or early afternoon, squatting in their harah (the alley-way along which they live). For their part, settlers could be distinguished from among those sitting sipping tea or smoking a nargeelah (water-pipe) in one of Khalsa's coffee-shops, or they could be encountered in another settler's home. This social network did not seem to involve all of the settlers and settler wives. Nonetheless, the repeated incidence of these social gatherings seemed to me an obvious contradiction to the settler family's claim that it allotted little, if any, time to socializing with other settler households, specifically those with whom it had no connections of kinship.

Thus, I proceeded with the question originally included in the questionnaire, regarding the visits (ziyarat; sing. = ziyarah) which the settlers and settler wives exchange in the Khalsa Settlement. The respondents were not only asked about the frequency and motives for such visits, but were also requested to indicate the names of the
settler families they socialized with the most frequently. Both the male and female respondents' first reaction to the use of the term *ziyarah* was similar to their initial response to the question regarding their leisure-time activities. A *ziyarah* turned out to be another term which was imbued with a particular meaning reflective of the frame of reference within which the respondents' social values and attitudes operate. In the perception of Khalsa's Egyptian peasants, the term *ziyarah* implies a social debt which needs to be reciprocated at the appropriate time. At the same time, the context in which this term is used is also a function of gender.

1.1 The Social Network of Settler Wives

To Khalsa's settler wife, the term *ziyarah* generally implies entering another woman's home for a specific reason related to one or the other life-cycle event: either to congratulate her on a joyful occasion (such as the birth, circumcision or marriage of a child), or to condole her in her bereavement, or perhaps to inquire after her health or that of her child in the case of severe illness. However, it is not only the type of occasion, but also the extent of affective attachments inherent in kinship bonds as well as the degree of familiarity characterizing non-kinship relations, which constitute the main determinants of the appropriateness of making a *ziyarah*. Social contacts outside this sphere of ceremonial formality are never referred to as a *ziyarah*. The loci of such contacts depend largely on the type of relationship between the parties concerned. Thus, while informal social gatherings between female kin generally take place inside the home, those involving non-kin seem to be mainly confined to the *harah*. This physical space, which is regarded as the common property of all the households situated in it, is perceived to be the particular social arena of women and children and not, as we shall see, that of men.
The settler wife who has kin in the Settlement with whom she is on cordial terms, will generally be careful to make a ziyarah as a public expression of the ideal of kinship solidarity, regardless of the type of occasion. Thus, a settler wife will visit the home of her female kin, even on the birth of an additional girl or the circumcision of a daughter, i.e. life-cycle ceremonies, which do not rank high on the scale of socially significant events, for she herself would want to be visited on a similar occasion. The reduced circle of the traditional social support network, to which the settler wife had been accustomed back in the village of origin, would appear to be one of the main reasons why female kin attribute a relative importance to the reciprocation of ziyarat. Being fi al-ghurba and the fear of social isolation which this implies, has apparently encouraged efforts on the part of some of the settler wives to adhere to the ideal of kinship solidarity in the social sphere, regardless of the absence of economic cooperation between kin and the individualistic tendencies displayed by a settler household in its striving to maximize its profits. If anything, these ziyarat serve to confirm a hostess' social status, and more importantly, that of her husband, in the eyes of their kin. In contrast, where a certain formality or strain characterizes a particular kinship bond, then this will be expressed by the avoidance of ziyarat on the occasion of life-cycle events deemed socially less significant. Instead, only those which are perceived to rank high in importance are generally observed.

Whatever the occasion requiring a ziyarah, a female kin is expected to present her hostess with a nugta, which is based on the principle that it must be reciprocated at the very least in the equivalent amount. To give a nugta in excess of the sum previously received, reflects the high esteem in which the guest holds her
hostess. On the other hand, to repay the exact amount previously received is an expression of the lack of emotional closeness between kin. The actual amount of the nugta appears to vary, depending both on the importance of the life-cycle event being celebrated, as well as the degree of affective attachments between kin. Although the amount appears to have increased over the years, reflecting both the improved economic position of the majority of the settler households since resettlement as well as inflation, the increase has nonetheless been by no means dramatic. This must be seen in conjunction with the previously described pattern concerning the settler family's tendency not to incur any undue expenses for food and drink, as is traditional during the celebration of life-cycle ceremonies in the Egyptian village. The settler household is thus not necessarily in financial need when celebrating such special occasions and this has reduced the importance of the nugta as a means of easing the financial burden of the celebrating family. Rather, it would seem that the reciprocation of nugut among kin is perceived primarily as an expression of the existence of cordial relations between them. Distant kin are said to exchange money gifts to the amount of three Dinars, while those who are bound by a high degree of affective attachment tend to give each other a nugta of not less than ten Dinars. It is only if female kin are not on talking terms, that the reciprocation of ziyarat, and thus of the nugta, is dispensed with. Being fi-al-ghurba has, as previously described, not had any conciliatory effect on the conflict separating such households.

Female kin among the settler wives who exchange visits in addition to the above-mentioned social obligations demanded by life-cycle events, do not refer to these informal contacts as a ziyarah, but say instead: Ana batoll 'ala ahli (I am looking in on my family) in the
case of primary kin or ana batoll 'ala qaraybi (I am looking in on my relatives) in the case of more distant kin. If a settler wife is looking up her female kin in an alley-way other than her own, then she will generally be invited into the home, and not be expected to squat in the harah of whose social network she is not a part. The majority of the settler wives included in the present study appear to adhere to the cultural norm, which dictates that a woman has no business to be squatting in a harah which is distant from her own. In contrast, female kin living along the same alley-way, though they generally pay each other informal visits inside the home, may just as often squat together in their harah. However, regardless of the degree of formality or informality existing between them, female kin will almost invariably visit each other during the day-time, in accordance with the social custom which physically confines a woman to her home after dark, unless she happens to have a very valid reason (such as assisting another woman during child-birth, for example).

The notion of social duty implicit in the term ziyarah is also an inherent part of the social reciprocity expected between settler wives, who are not bound by any kinship bonds. However, the incidence of social interactions between non-kin women presupposes a familiarity established on the basis of relatively frequent face-to-face contacts. As very few of Khalsa's Egyptian peasant women leave the confines of their alley-way except for a valid reason, be it to work in the fields, or take the produce to market, or visit the Health Centre, or perhaps take some dress-material to one of the Settlement's dress-makers, or fetch water from the main pump when the yard-tap runs dry or, if applicable, to visit kin living elsewhere in the Settlement, it is her female neighbours living along the same harah who tend to constitute a settler wife's predominant network of non-kin social contacts. Settler
wives who live in the row of houses lying on the fringe of the Settlement do not regard the path-way in front of their homes as a harah, for there is no opposite house-row to demarcate the latter's space or boundary lines. Because these fringe households are exposed in the sense of opening onto fields or waste-land, which makes these path-ways more or less public thoroughfares, settler wives from such households never squat outside their own or their neighbours' entrance gates. Instead, those among them who are interested in socializing, generally become part of the female social network in the adjacent harah. Their mobility in this case is socially sanctioned.

Similar to the type of relationship existing between close kin, the greater the degree of familiarity and affective attachments in a non-kin relationship, the more likely that the settler wives involved will exchange ziyarat on each and every life-cycle event, regardless of its social importance. Female non-kin bound by such a friendship tend to say of one another hiyyah zayyi ukhti (she is like my sister), stressing the mahabba (affection) and the ma'azzah (esteem) they hold for each other, by exchanging money-gifts of a higher amount than is generally the case between non-kin. Equally important, the affective attachments inherent in such non-kin relationships are translated into an informality which permits the visiting of each others' homes without prior notification. But in fact, very few settler wives claimed to have such a sister-relationship with other non-kin women in the Settlement, or even in their own harah. Though around 80% of the fifty-nine female respondents who had been asked to name the women, other than kin, whom they saw most often, had almost exclusively named those living along the same alley-way or, in the case of those living on the fringe of the Settlement, in the adjacent harah, the majority of these respondents also indicated that their relationship with these women was one of
ma'reffah (acquaintanceship) rather than sohoubiah (friendship). Here also, the more formal this type of non-kin relationship is perceived to be, the less is a ziayarah expected on the occasion of life-cycle events deemed socially less significant. Though the tradition of presenting a money-gift is adhered to, and each party is careful to reciprocate this social debt on the appropriate occasion, the amount involved is also relatively small (few apparently exchange muqta totalling more than two Dinars) and, more significantly, the amount is rarely increased when the muqta is reciprocated. However, while a ziayarah between non-kin acquaintances involves the entry into each other's homes, where the guest is offered refreshments appropriate to the life-cycle event being celebrated, all informal contacts between them appear to be confined to the physical space of the harah. A settler wife will squat outside in the alley-way, with one or more of her female neighbours to have a chat, but because her relationship with the latter is perceived in terms of ma'reffah, she will rarely invite them into her home and, vice-versa, does not expect to be asked into theirs, unless there is a socially compelling reason. Neither does a ma'reffah knock on her neighbour's door to ask for or about something, unless she cannot find one of the harah's children to carry out this errand for her. If she does, she will always decline to enter the neighbour's house even though the latter may insistently repeat etfaddali (welcome, please enter).

The confinement of these informal gatherings to the semi-public space of the harah is, in my judgement, mainly influenced by four distinct considerations. As will be established in a later context nearly all the settler households receive visitors and many have lodgers from among the Egyptian migrant community in Iraq. Not all of these visitors or lodgers are necessarily a settler family's kin or even
friends, but may have obtained a settler's name through a mutual acquaintance. Either way, a settler wife will more than likely meet a ghareeb in her neighbour's home and, indeed, this is the most frequent reason mentioned when these women were asked why they prefer to squat in the alley-way, rather than inside the home. However, none of these women appear to perceive it as a contradiction that, though they are careful not to expose themselves to strangers in their neighbour's home, they themselves may in fact be subjected to just such an exposure when their husbands receive, or even let a room to, temporary Egyptian migrants, whom they may never have met before, and, more significantly, who may not even be distant kin. By all accounts, it would seem that it is the husband's presence in the home which is perceived to counteract the notion of a wife's exposure to the ghareeb. For, according to Om Said as well as some other female informants, there appears to be an unwritten rule that male visitors and lodgers, who are not close kin, should not stay in the house during the absence of the family-head. Thus, the settler wife can keep up the fiction that she is not exposed to the ghareeb, while at the same time enabling the family to pursue its aim of profit maximization. By also avoiding the neighbour's home other than on the occasion of the ziyarah, which is always announced beforehand, a settler wife is in effect signalling to her husband's male visitors her adherence to this traditional custom. For it is the temporary Egyptian migrant worker who will report back to the village of origin on the exemplary behaviour of the settler wife.

However, squatting in the harah is also perceived in terms of social control since the semi-public nature of the alley-way leaves a woman's behaviour open to scrutiny. Al-ragel b'ayebka metakked ehna bine'mel eh (The man - i.e. the husband - thus ascertains what we are up to) was how one settler wife put it. This is a further
consideration or motive behind the women's avoidance of the neighbour's home and the confinement of informal social gatherings to the arena of the harah. At the same time, because the latter is regarded as the social space of its inhabitants, the traditional value which restricts a woman's mobility is perceived to be upheld. Strangers to the Settlement are unlikely to venture into a harah unless they happen to have a specific business with one of its households. The guard-dogs, furthermore, help to ensure that this is upheld. In fact, the significance of the harah can be said to have increased in proportion to Khalsa's decreasing isolation from its social environment. The Settlement as an entity has ceased to be the exclusive social arena of the Egyptian peasant settler families.

A third possible motive behind the confinement of informal gatherings between non-kin women to the harah, appears to be related to the striving of the settler household to protect sirr al-bayt (the secret of the house) from the possible 'ayn al-hasoud of the neighbours. The pretence that they are in fact not doing well economically, which the settler family never tires of attempting to convey to those in authority, must be protected at all cost. The fear that a female neighbour may, out of envy, expose sirr al-bayt, is a deterrent to allowing her unrestricted access into the privacy of the home. The stress here is on the word female, for, in fact, it is women who are thought to be particularly envious, and it is they who are believed to feel little compunction about evoking the evil eye. This is not only a male notion. Rather, many settler wives, including Om Said, openly said that al-sitt al-hakoudah hiyya illi betekshef sirr al-bayt, (it is the envious woman who exposes the secret of the house). For even if a woman generally does not leave the confines of her alley-way, she may nevertheless meet other settler wives, during the, Toyota ride into the
market, or in the Health Centre, or at the home of one of the dressmakers and tell them about her neighbour's business.

This fear of 'ayn al-hasoud and of exposing sirr al-bayt must be seen in relation to another fact which may be a fourth motive behind the confinement of informal gatherings of female non-kin neighbours to the harah. One particular means of conflict resolution between neighbours is for one of the disputant parties to move house and live elsewhere in the Settlement. Though by the time of the field-research, this type of conflict resolution appeared to have dwindled in importance, a point the significance of which will be taken up in a later analysis, the fact is that it nevertheless remains a very real possibility. Any potential mistrust between female neighbours, which would be a more or less natural expression, given their heterogeneous regional origin, is thus further accentuated by the lack of stability and durability which can be said to be the dominant characteristic of a harah's female social network. This, in turn, is further compounded by the fact that the majority of the settler households are, by their own accounts, planning to eventually return to Egypt. This reality has encouraged a relatively calculative attitude among Khalsa's settler families, by which a relationship is judged on the basis of short-term, rather than long-term rewards which the parties concerned hope to obtain. Because membership in the harah's network lacks, at the very least, the durability normally attributable to social relationships among non-kin in the home village back in Egypt, non-kin settler wives lack the certainty that the help they may extend to a female neighbour, will be duly reciprocated during similar circumstances in the future. The fact that alley-way non-kin female neighbours reciprocate ziyarat on the occasion of life-cycle events is not a contradiction. The socialization typical of Egyptian village society, indeed of Egyptian
culture at large, which tends to instill a dislike of solitude and encourages the need to share life's joys and sorrows, will also tend to encourage a settler wife's participation in the harah's social network in spite of the peasant families' incipient individualism. Indeed, regardless of its relative superficiality, this network is perhaps all the more important, given the geographical remoteness of the home village and of the female social support network therein. Upholding the tradition of the siyarah, even on a reduced scale, may be viewed as a form of payment ensuring this membership. In fact, the price demanded for the avoidance of social isolation is minimal, given the great similarity in the settler wives' way of life, which ensures an abundance of life-cycle events during which social debts can be repaid. The reciprocation of the nugta between non-kin in the exact amount formerly received, as well as the relatively small sums involved, serve to underline the short-term rewards expected from the membership of the harah's social network.

The relative superficiality characteristic of non-kin female relationships in the harah, and the manner in which this reflects the individualistic tendencies displayed by the settler household are above all expressed by the general lack of communal activities and cooperation among settler wives. For example, around 85% of the fifty-nine female respondents indicated that they always bake their bread alone; 12% may occasionally bake with female kin, but generally only if they happen to live along the same, or at least in an adjacent, alley-way. Only two of these female respondents indicated that they sometimes bake with a non-kin female neighbour. Significantly, these are the women who had previously referred to their relationship as being like one among sisters. For the rest, communal baking would involve the frequent entry into each other's homes, a pattern which, as analyzed above, non-kin settler wives strive to keep to a minimum.
The avoidance of undue familiarity in a non-kin relationship is further underlined by the settler wives' response to the question regarding whom they tended to leave their pre-school children with, when they had to take the produce to market. None of the forty female respondents, to whom this applies, indicated that they would ask a non-kin female neighbour to help them out. The most frequently voiced reason was the often repeated statement that kullu wahda shayla 'ala addaha (each one is carrying as much as she can), implying that no woman should be expected to take on her neighbour's burdens as well. However, the worry that one's children may be involved in a quarrel with those of a neighbour, and thus cause problems between the parents, appears to be of equal importance, for many respondents mentioned this possibility. As will be detailed in another context, quarrels among children are said to be the main cause of rifts between alley-way neighbours.

The conspicuous lack of intimacy which appears to be an inherent characteristic of relationships between non-kin female neighbours is further exemplified by the settler wives' attitudes towards breast-feeding a neighbour's child during its mother's absence or sickness. Of the forty-six female respondents who, at the time of my field-research in the Settlement, were actually breast-feeding or had recently weaned a child, 66% indicated that they would never breast-feed the child of a non-kin neighbour regardless of the circumstances. These respondents justified their attitude by the fact that such a child could be given dried milk and, if sick, would receive the appropriate medication in the Health Centre. The remaining 34% indicated that they too would not be inclined to undertake such a favour, unless the child were so sick that it was unable to digest dried milk, and its mother was unable to continue with lactation. The stress here was on
the sickness of the child, and not on that of its mother. However, these particular respondents also made a point of stressing that helping a female neighbour in such a situation, is not only dependent on the reciprocal ma'azzah between them, but above all conditional upon obtaining their husbands' permission. Though they were more inclined to consider the possibility of breast-feeding a non-kin neighbour's child compared to the two-thirds referred to above, who were categorically against the very idea, nonetheless these women also tended to point out that each woman had enough burdens to shoulder, without taking on those of her neighbour as well, and furthermore, it is generally preferable not to breast-feed ibn al-ghareeb. It is the use of the latter term which best sums up the underlying attitude of non-kin female neighbours to one another. Of equal significance is the attitude of female kin towards the idea of breast-feeding each other's children. Those among the forty-six female respondents, referred to above, who have kin in the Settlement, indicated that, generally, they too would only be inclined to help breast-feed the child of their kin, if there was no other solution possible, i.e. the child's life was at risk. Similar to the attitude prevailing among non-kin settler wives, these women also felt that they each had enough responsibilities to shoulder. However, some of these women also indicated that an added reason for not wanting to breast-feed the child of their respective kin, is that yemken yehsal beyhoun naseeb (maybe fate will decree that their children should marry), a possibility which would be impeded by milk-kinship.³ By contrast, none of these forty-six respondents appeared to contemplate the possibility of milk-kinship, when talking about the reasons why they would not favour breast-feeding a non-kin neighbour's child.
Membership in a harah's female social network does not necessarily imply or demand a display of loyalty towards female non-kin neighbours. This is particularly reflected in the settler wife's choice of midwife. Of the fifty-seven female respondents who have had one or more children since resettlement, around 63% indicated that their first preference was to call on the assistance of Om Walid, the Iraqi midwife employed by the Khalsa Health Centre. Though nearly all of these women complained that Om Walid will generally not respond to a call after nightfall and, furthermore, charges five Dinars per delivery,⁴ they also felt that the injection she gives to ease the pain of contractions is a welcome relief. In addition, there is the assurance that, in case of emergency, Om Walid is empowered to call upon the services of the ambulance to transport the patient to hospital, either in Baghdad or a neighbouring town. Around 26% of these fifty-seven female respondents indicated that they preferred the services of Om Gamal, the Settlement's traditional daya. For not only are her services cheaper (she charges only three Dinars per delivery) and not only is she willing to assist after nightfall, in addition, she is sometimes ready to extend her services beyond the actual delivery, if she is on cordial terms with the new mother or if, according to Om Said, she is paid a little more in excess of her standard fee. More important, in the view of the settler wives who prefer her services, Om Gamal shows her interest by often attending the sebou' celebrations of the child she has delivered, even though, as previously mentioned, she is not given any nucut by the female guests. Of particular interest is the fact that nearly half these settler wives who prefer Om Gamal are from the provinces south of Cairo. But, more significant in the context of the present discussion is the fact that the Egyptian daya's clients are not necessarily exclusively from her own, or even from the adjacent harahs. Conversely,
among the 63% referred to above, who prefer to call upon the Iraqi midwife, there are a number of settler wives who live in the proximity of Om Gamal's house. In fact, two of these respondents were observed to be squatting and having a chat with the Egyptian midwife on a number of occasions. Asked if she minded that many settler wives tended to prefer the services provided by the Iraqi midwife, Om Gamal insisted that they were not many but a few, and that any woman who preferred Om Walid was meddallaal (spoilt), and seemed to think that she was a sitt zawat (i.e. an upper class woman). It seems, however, that as long as the Iraqi midwife persists in refusing to attend a delivery after nightfall and given the apparently universal tendency of children to be born during the night, Om Gamal has enough clients to satisfy her. Finally, the remaining six respondents insisted that they are never attended by a midwife during the delivery of their child. Instead, they manage on their own except during the last stage, when a female kin or neighbour is called upon to assist with cutting the umbilical cord, as it is considered unthinkable for the woman's husband to perform such a task.

The settler wives' preference for a dress-maker is another example of the lack of loyalty which appears to be a conspicuous characteristic of a harah's female social network. At the time of my field-research, there were four settler wives in Khalsa, who were sewing for other women, two each from Upper and Lower Egypt respectively. Om Essam (from Middle Egypt) is apparently the most popular, for 56% of the forty-eight female respondents who have their dresses sewn, indicated their preference for her. Om Essam's main competitor is Om Gamal (also from Middle Egypt, though not the same province), whose services are sought out by around 25% of these female respondents. The two remaining dress-makers appear to have been relative beginners at the
time of my field-research. For Om Said (the Lower Egyptian settler wife who considers herself to be socially above the peasant stratum), was mentioned by 13% of these forty-eight settler wives, while Om Ayman appeared to only have three customers. Om Essam's popularity is obviously related to her cleverness, and it is this fact which allows her to demand a relatively higher price, namely one Dinar per dress compared to the half Dinar which the other three charge (material and accessories are provided by the customer). In contrast to the choice of the midwife, where at least in the case of the Egyptian daya, there appears to be some correlation with region of origin, Khalsa's dress-makers count among their clients settler wives from all three regions represented in the Settlement. It is the willingness to pay double, as well as to wait longer for a relatively better-made dress, which appears to influence a settler wife's decision whether or not she chooses Om Essam, or one of the other three dress-makers in Khalsa. This self-interest is expressed by the fact that, for example, of the five settler wives who live along the same harah as Om Essam, only two are her customers. Similarly, not all of the other three dress-makers' clients are from their respective alley-ways.

Another indication of the lack of communal spirit among the members of a harah's female social network is that those among the latter who sell the household's produce on the market, do not seem to go out of their way to share the same Toyota ride into Za'faraniyah. Neither do they apparently make a point of squatting next to each other, when displaying their wares, or wait for each other to travel back together to the Settlement. Moreover, if the yard-tap runs dry, settler wives from the same harah do not necessarily wait for each other to fetch water from the water-pump near the entrance to the Settlement.
Moreover, there is apparently no social status distinction among the female members of a harah's social network. No particular entrance gate functions as the focus of these informal social gatherings. Rather, though squatting at either point of entry into the alley-way is generally avoided — thus accentuating the squatting group's distance from the public arena outside the harah — where the settler wives actually get together, appears to be as much due to chance as it is dependent on climate. The settler wife who steps into the alley-way in search of female company, will join a gathering already in progress. This lack of social ranking among settler wives is, in my judgement, partly due to the reality of resettlement, namely the equal access of all settler households, without distinction, to the same economic opportunities and social services. Though the post-resettlement differences due to the economic success of some settler households is recognized, this has not, as we shall later see, become a status distinction, acknowledged by all the Settlement without exception. On the other hand, there is also the fact that settler wives who live along the same harah, are more often than not from different regions of origin, and have generally been thrown together by chance. Unencumbered by the social hierarchy reference operating in their village of origin, female members of a harah's social network appear to have developed a relatively egalitarian relationship with one another. For, essentially, there is no pressure other than the fear of social isolation and loneliness, to compel a settler wife to participate in this network. It is this very choice, coupled with the fact that being alley-way neighbours is not perceived in permanent terms, which would seem to prevent the formation of any social hierarchy within this female social network in the harah.
The frequency of these informal social gatherings is generally dependent on the degree of the settler wife's economic participation outside the house. Combined with the settler wife's personal inclinations - some are obviously more interested in socializing than others - it explains why some harahs appear to have more frequent female gatherings than others. However, the frequency of such gatherings is also dependent on the season. During the hot summer months, both the heat (which can top 50° C) as well as the demands of vegetable cultivation (which, as previously mentioned, is relatively labour intensive, apart from requiring an increased marketing activity because of perishability) function as obvious restrictions on the extent of time available during the day for squatting in the alley-way. Because of the heat, female neighbours may meet shortly before sunset, when it starts to become a bit cooler, but the attraction of the television programmes tends to curtail the duration of these informal gatherings. In contrast, the daily routine during the winter months affords more opportunity for this type of socializing. In addition, the fact that the main winter crop, namely clover, requires less of a settler wife's time on the land and is sold direct to neighbouring Iraqi peasants, enables female neighbours to get together relatively more often than is the case during the summer season.

Of interest to the context of the present discussion is the fact that, in contradiction to the settler wives' insistence that they had little or no leisure-time - with many of those I encountered squatting in the harah insisting it was the exception rather than the rule that I should observe them sitting with nothing to do - these informal gatherings are nevertheless generally referred to as tasleyyah (i.e. whiling away the time). Implicit in this term is above all the notion that a settler wife is free to sit outside in her alley-way as long as
her husband is absent. For, upon the latter's return, she is expected
to be inside her home to see to his needs. *Tasleyyah* also implies that
the settler wife has finished all her household chores of the moment.
However, a few women were occasionally observed to bring out a chore to
finish in the company of other women in the alley-way.

Twelve of the fifty-nine female respondents who were asked to
indicate the names of the non-kin women they most frequently socialized
with, stressed that they were not part of the social network in their
respective alley-ways, for they considered the habit of squatting in
the *harah* to be shameful. Two settler wives from among this group of
respondents turned out to be from the two Lower Egyptian households
which consider themselves to be socially above the peasantry. However,
there is a significant difference between their attitudes. The settler
wife from Sharqiah (whose husband runs a coffee shop in Baghdad) would
only visit her neighbours on the occasion of socially very important
events, such as a wedding or a bereavement. Otherwise, she claimed not
to mix with any of her alley-way neighbours, other than to greet them,
should she happen to encounter them face-to-face. However, she
regularly visits, and is visited by, wives from the households which
are pursuing non-peasant occupations: for example, the wife of the
Egyptian technician employed in Khalsa's Agricultural Extension Centre,
or the wife of the Coptic settler, who only cultivates for his own
consumption and owns a food-stall not far from the Settlement, or the
wife of the Egyptian mechanic employed by *Mashrou' al-Wihda*, and who
lives in one of the newly-built houses near the Primary School. The
other Lower Egyptian settler wife who ranks herself above the
peasantry, but whose husband is nevertheless a full-time cultivator,
also views squatting in the alley-way as shameful. Nonetheless, she is
more disposed to be friendly with her *harah* neighbours, and generally
does not neglect to make a ziyarah, at the very least during socially significant life-cycle events, such as the birth or the circumcision of a boy. Her attitude appears to be partly due to the fact that she is striving to establish herself as one of the Settlement's dress-makers, and as such can obviously ill afford to snub the other settler wives. The fact that her husband is intent on replacing 'Amm Ali as the Settlement's informal leader (this will be taken up in a later part) is, to my mind, another important factor. Though she maintains her self-image by declining to actually squat down with the other women, she compensates for this by occasionally standing outside her own or a neighbour's entrance gate to have a chat. Unlike the coffee-shop owner's wife from Sharqiah, this settler wife does not mix very much with other households who perceive themselves to be socially above the peasant stratum, mainly, so she claims, because of lack of time.

Then there are Om Said and her two married daughters, who also view the idea of squatting in the harah with disdain. This attitude reflects above all Om Said's self-image as the mother of non-agriculturalist sons: to expose herself by selling in the market or squatting in the alley-way is, in her view, shameful. However, as previously mentioned, Om Said's status consciousness would also appear to be partly due to her husband's position as Chairman of Khalsa's Cooperative Board and, more important, to his role as the Settlement's informal leader. This self-perception is implicit in her claim that, in fact, it is generally the other settler wives who visit her, and not vice-versa. While this could only be partially corroborated through personal observation and discreet questioning of some of the other settler wives, it nevertheless serves to reflect the cultural value underlying Om Said's attitude, which equates social recognition and prestige with a person receiving, rather than making a visit.\(^5\) Though
neither she nor her husband perceive themselves to be socially above the peasantry, they nevertheless equate their present status with a relatively high rank within the peasant stratum. However, similar to the Lower Egyptian settler wife referred to above, Om Said softens her attitude of socially distancing herself from the other settler wives along the same alley-way by occasionally standing outside her entrance gate to have a chat with one or the other of her female neighbours. On the other hand, her status consciousness appears to have encouraged her to cultivate a relationship with those who consider themselves socially above the peasantry, such as the Coptic settler's wife, the wife of the Egyptian employee in the Extension Centre and one of the merchant/settler wives.

Om Said's status consciousness is more or less adhered to by her two married daughters. The eldest, whose husband works as a mechanic in Baghdad, only stays in her own home to finish her household chores; otherwise, both she and her children remain in her parents' home until her husband returns from work. Though she only lives a block away from her parents, Om Said insists upon this routine so that mafeesh hadd yegeeb seeret benti (no-one brings up the name of my daughter). A woman whose husband does not return before nightfall should not, in Om Said's view, remain alone in her home, because she might become the object of gossip. However, this eldest daughter generally spends the evening hours in her own house watching the television with her husband, for to be out after dark, even to cover the short distance between her own home and that of her parents, is considered 'ayb. The eldest daughter's status consciousness is above all reflected by her husband's employment of another settler to help him cultivate his plot, rather than have his wife work the land. Her younger sister, though she has little free time due to her cultivating and marketing activi-
ties, nevertheless attempts to adhere to the same pattern: any free hour during the day is spent in her parents' home, should her husband be absent, while the evenings are generally spent in her own house in front of the television set. This daughter's marketing activities are frowned upon by her parents, for Om Said privately confided that she is attempting to convince her son-in-law to sell his produce to one of the merchant/settlers in Khalsa. Though resigned to the fact that her youngest daughter will remain a fellaha, Om Said's social ambitions equates this daughter's social status with her seclusion, an attitude reflected by a remark she often made, even in the presence of her son-in-law: Lamma al-ragel biyy'ezz meratouh, biyyekaleeha fi al-bayt (When a man honours his wife, he keeps her at home).

Another from this group of twelve female respondents, who disclaimed any membership in the harah's female social network, indicated that neither she nor her husband like to socialize with anyone in the Settlement, for the others are always ready to give them the evil eye. Om Said, whose home lies back-to-back with that of this family, confirmed the latter's pronounced lack of interest in cultivating any contacts with the other settler households. Attributing this to the husband's addiction to drinking beer, and to his wife's unfriendly nature, Om Said tended to shrug off their attitude with the remark hommahoureen, we ehna maalna (they are free to do what they like, what we do care). This particular settler household serves to underline, if not confirm, the previously illustrated fact that the settler households' relative economic independence renders any social contact between them one of choice, and not necessity.

Three other women who claimed that they never squatted with their alley-way neighbours for a chat, are wives of the settlers who are active as merchants. Their more or less incessant marketing activities
obviously leave them little time for socializing. Indeed, this was indicated as one of the reasons why they were not members of the female social network in their alley-way. However, here too the notion that it is 'ayb for a woman to be seen squatting in the harah is adhered to. One of these merchant/settler wives claimed to be particularly friendly with the wife of the Egyptian employee in Khalsa's Extension Centre, as well as with the Coptic settler's wife, and Om Said, i.e. families who are either not identified with the peasantry, or who are attributed with a certain social prestige. Nonetheless, this woman indicated that it is a wageb (duty) to visit her alley-way neighbours on the occasion of socially significant life-cycle events.

Yet the second merchant/settler wife whose house also boasts 'modern' furnishings, has not attempted to compensate her lack of membership of the female social network in her harah by cultivating social contacts with those who consider it beneath their self-perceived social status to be seen squatting in the alley-way. While this may be due to this woman's disinclination to socialize, expressed by her remark during the interview, that the other settler households are envious, and that she does not care to make a ziyarah to any of the Settlement's families, her attitude may possibly also be related to the fact that she is the sole circumciser of Khalsa's Egyptian girls. Though this role naturally gives her access to all the households who wish to have a daughter circumcised, this woman did not seem to occupy any position of esteem. This may, on the one hand, be due to her monopoly position by virtue of which she is able to fix her own price for circumcising a girl. For a number of women openly voiced the complaint that, while it cost them nothing to circumcise their sons, they had to pay as much as five Dinars for a daughter's circumcision (compared to the one Dinar they were charged during the initial period
after resettlement). Far from being a variable of social prestige, the income which Khalsa's circumciser of girls has secured for herself is viewed with much envy, since this woman and her husband are also known to derive a sizeable profit from their merchant activities. On the other hand, this lack of esteem may also be related to the social status accorded to the female circumciser in the Egyptian village. Generally, this service is performed either by a ghagariyah (female gypsy, pl. = ghagariyat) or by the traditional daya. Though the circumcision of a girl is recognized to require a special skill, the gypsy who performs this service (the only life-cycle event in which she plays a part) is not accorded any social status within Egyptian village society. Rather, it is by her rank on the rural social ladder (gypsies have, by definition, no social roots, but move from village to village)\(^\text{6}\), instead of according to her skill, that the gypsy is classified in the village social hierarchy. By contrast, the traditional midwife who circumcises girls, performs this function in addition to all the other services she provides, and it is from the latter that she derives her social status. The low esteem accorded to the female circumciser, is aptly described in L. El-Hamamsy's study of the Egyptian daya, in which one of the latter contends that "... circumcision is not my trade; it would be shameful and beneath my status to perform it ... [and] ... people may shame our sons and tell them "your mother is a clitoris cutter"."\(^\text{7}\) The latter expression is perhaps the key-word. For apart from the low status which appears to be accorded to this particular service, it seems to me also indicative of the traditional view of the female as prevalent in Egyptian society. None of the Egyptian village-studies which refer to circumcision indicate, explicitly or otherwise, that the barber who traditionally circumcises the boys, enjoys a relatively low social status, compared to the one
who only sticks to his trade. The fact that Khalsa's female circumciser does not perform any other service for the settler families and, conversely, the traditional Egyptian midwife has not attempted to secure for herself an additional income by circumcising girls, is an important indicator of the cultural attitude described above. More significantly, none of the other settler wives have displayed any interest in learning this skill in order to compete with this female circumciser, regardless of how much they may envy her this source of income. Om Said indirectly confirmed the low social prestige associated with the woman who performs female circumcision when, upon being asked why she was not friendly with this woman, though she socialized with one of the other merchant/settler wives, she indicated that, apart from her unfriendliness, Allahu a'alam hiyya gayyah men feyn (God knows where she comes from). The significance of this remark is particularly pertinent, given the fact that the heterogeneous regional origins of the settler families renders it applicable to nearly all of the Settlement's inhabitants. Yet, this appears to have occurred to Om Said mainly in relation to Khalsa's female circumciser. For she never, at least in my presence, made such a remark about any of the other settler wives from a different province.

The third settler wife whose husband is active as a merchant, and who has also invested in these 'modern' furnishings, similarly considers it to be shameful to be seen squatting outside in the alley-way. Like the others who share her disdain, she does not encourage her children to play with their peers from the neighbouring households. However, she too has not compensated her lack of membership of this social network by cultivating wives from households which share her notion of status and prestige, though she is said occasionally to exchange visits with her next-door neighbour, the Coptic settler's
wife. Though this woman attributes her lack of socializing to time pressure, Om Said's observation that her husband is a heavy drinker, may be another possible explanation for her relative isolation. For if there exists any consensus among Khalsa's Egyptian families, then it is that drunkenness is an abhorrent habit and one, furthermore, which is against Islam.

Three other households whose women disclaimed any membership of the *harah*'s female social network, are those comprising the extended family E (see Chart III). While the mother-in-law claimed to have no free time to spend squatting with her neighbours in the alley-way, and viewed this activity with disdain anyway, her daughters-in-law are forbidden to set foot outside the house. Nonetheless, all three women indicated that they would not neglect to make a *ziyarah* on the occasion of socially significant life-cycle events, because they consider it a duty to display some friendliness towards their house-neighbours, specifically those who are friendly in return. However, this claim is contradicted by some of their female neighbours, who did not mention this extended family among the list of those with whom *ziyarat* are generally reciprocated. In fact, kinship group E is the focus of much envy, since it is claimed that it is among the most affluent in the Settlement. But this affluence does not connote any social status as far as their neighbours and the other settler households are concerned; rather, it has tended to isolate this extended family socially from the rest of the Settlement, a trend which the latter apparently has made little attempt to reverse.

This whole group of twelve settler wives who disclaimed any membership of the female social network of their respective *harah* have, with the exception of the household which indicated its lack of interest in socializing, one particular attribute in common. Whether
or not they consciously perceive themselves to be socially above the peasant stratum, they are adhering to a self-image which dictates that their social status must not be compromised by their exposure in the harah. Only the common fellaha sits in her alley-way to chat with other women, and to watch who is coming and who is going. The six women among these respondents, who are engaged in marketing activities (i.e. the three merchant/settler wives, the wife of the 'pater familias' in kinship group E, Om Said's youngest daughter, and the wife of the settler who is striving to replace 'Amm Ali as the Settlement's informal leader) do not perceive this type of social exposure to be a contradiction to their negative attitude towards the idea of squatting in the alley-way. Rather, to their minds, the former is imposed upon them through economic necessity, while the latter is perceived to be a matter of choice. However, these women's distancing from the social networks in their respective harahs does not necessarily imply that they are members of a distinct group who recognize each other socially. As I have shown above, each of these women's self-perceived social status is not readily acknowledged by all the others who also adhere to the notion that squatting in the alley-way is shameful. What is even more pertinent to the context of the present discussion, is the fact that the self-perceived social status of this group of women is not acknowledged by those who are members of the female social network in the harah. In fact, the latter tend to view those who disdain to squat with them with indifference, if not disinterest. They do not confirm a non-member's self-image or self-perceived social status by according her the prestige of visiting her in her house on occasions other than those pertaining to life-cycle events, assuming that a reciprocation of ziyarat has been established. The only exception appears to be Om Said, who, as previously mentioned, appears to enjoy
the respect of quite number of settler wives beyond the social circle of her harah and apart from those with whom she is on particularly cordial terms. While this is partly due to 'Amm Ali's position in the Settlement, it is undoubtedly also a result of the respect she has earned for her willingness to assist many a settler wife during the delivery of her child and her refusal to be paid for this assistance.

The Iraqi and Egyptian families who are non-cultivators and who have been housed in the homes originally built for the Egyptian peasant settlers, because of the area's current housing crisis, appear to largely ignore most of their settler neighbours, an attitude which the latter generally reciprocate. None of the settler wives included in the present study indicated that they had any social contacts with the women in these families, other than exchanging a brief greeting, should they meet in the alley-way. More significantly, their children do not play together and neither do they reciprocate any ziyarat. Even the wife of the Iraqi who has rented two rooms from household J2 (see kinship group J in Chart III) keeps more or less to herself, and does not appear to socialize with the J2 wife. Nonetheless, the intrusion of these new families into the alley-way has not had any perceptible effect on the settler wives' routine of squatting in the harah. To my mind, this is a further indication of the fact that the alley-way is viewed essentially as the semi-private property of the families who live in it, or more precisely, as the social arena of the women. Thus, for example, the Iraqi haberdasher, who periodically comes to the Settlement, was on several occasions observed to be standing at the entrance of an alley-way while one or more children rushed home to inform their mothers of his arrival. Only then was the growling dog called off and the pedlar invited into the harah, where the women would crowd around him to inspect his wares.
The development of other communal activities among the settler wives is hampered by the Settlement's physical infrastructure. Running water in every house has replaced the well or canal, where Egyptian peasant women traditionally meet to fetch water and wash clothes. Nor is there a public bath which could perhaps have served as a focus of female gatherings. The closure of the Social Centre, and the discontinuation of the handicraft and dress-making classes have been further impediments to the encouragement of social contacts among Khalsa's non-kin settler wives. The virtually irresistible attraction of the television has proved to be another effective barrier to the development of more intensive social contacts between the settler wives in particular. For not only has television tended to some extent to replace socializing as the favoured leisure-time activity. Rather, because the settler families contrive to adhere to the social value which prohibits a woman from going outside the confines of her home after nightfall and, just as important, because informal social contacts between non-kin females is generally confined to the social arena of the harah, television-viewing has developed into a family-centered, rather than a female group-activity. In addition, there is no cemetery where the women could meet as is the tradition back in the Egyptian village. The distance of Salman Pak, where those who have died since resettlement have been buried as well as the nature of community life in Khalsa, discourage female gatherings around the graveside. Furthermore, there is no saint's tomb or religious shrine in the immediate vicinity of the Settlement, with which the settler wives could identify, and around which they could congregate. The way of life after resettlement has also impeded the development of alternative forms of communal bonds, such as the zar cult, for example. The settler wives' continuing adamant belief in the powers of the evil eye seemed to me to provide a
relatively fertile ground for the revival of this cult, a folkloric belief which is prevalent in both rural as well as parts of urban Egyptian society. (Briefly, persons are believed to be possessed by spirits which are the cause of physical and mental sickness and distress; they are 'cured' by a zar practitioner during a specifically arranged ceremony which involves sending the afflicted person into a trance). However, settler wives as well as independent sources denied that this practice was being observed in the Settlement. This may be at least partly due to the fact that this cult requires a measure of privacy, which the harah obviously does not provide. To carry out such activities inside the home would run counter to the established pattern, according to which non-kin settler wives tend to avoid each others' homes, except on the occasion of the socially sanctioned ziyarah.

Of some importance to the context of the present discussion is the fact that - in contrast to the pattern which, as we shall see, is at least partly applicable to the settlers - the exchange of visits on the occasion of the three main Moslem festivities, namely Moulid al-Nabbi, 'Id al Fitr and 'Id al-Adha, is not part of the ritual of the ziyarah system observed by Khalsa's non-kin settler wives. Those who live along the same alley-way generally confine themselves to greeting each other with the traditional kullu sana we enti tayyebah (may you be blessed every year). The non-reciprocation of visits between female non-kin on the occasion of religious festivals appears, in the first instance, to be due to the fact that these occasions tend to be male-dominated. Settler households can expect male visitors from among the Egyptian migrant community outside the Settlement, even though, as previously mentioned, these religious occasions are not celebrated with the same fanfare as is traditional in the Egyptian villages. Female
neighbours would therefore tend to avoid each others' homes in order not to be exposed to strangers. Indeed, settler wives tended to give this as the main reason why ziyarat during religious festivals were generally not exchanged with non-kin neighbours. However, in my judgment, there are two other considerations which may also serve to explain this pattern. There is, for example, the element of reciprocity to be considered. In contrast to life-cycle events, the number of which ensure that the social debt inherent in the ziyarah will be reciprocated in the short term, a religious festival is a once-yearly occasion. Given the egalitarian nature of membership in the harah's female social network, there arises the question of who should visit whom. Another reason which may possibly serve to explain the above pattern is related to the traditional exclusion of women from the public observance of Islamic rituals. While men generally congregate in the Mosque to commemorate a religious occasion, there is no equivalent public arena to encourage communal gatherings of women. Apart from the pilgrimage to Mecca, Moslem women in the Arab world generally play a marginal role in the rituals of Islam. This is as much due to their social seclusion and segregation, as it is the result of higher rates of illiteracy among them, factors which have contributed to the proliferation of folkloric beliefs and rituals particularly among women in Arab Moslem society.

The marginal role which women tend to play in the rituals of Islam deserves some further mention, not least because it serves to illustrate further the settler families' way of life after resettlement. For example, during the discussion of the issue of milk-kinship in relation to lactation, none of the settler wives could accurately quote either from the Koran, or from the Sunna (the Prophet's Sayings) as to what exactly constitutes a milk-kinship. Some women believed
that only three consecutive breast-feeds created such a bond while 
others insisted that even one single drop meant that such a relation-
ship had been initiated between a woman and a child. Neither the 
variable of regional origin, nor that pertaining to literacy level, 
were found to have any bearing on the incidence of these beliefs. 
Equally interesting in this context, is the fact that only 17% of the 
fifty-nine female respondents who were asked whether or not they 
regularly observed their prayers, answered in the affirmative (compared 
to 63% of the fifty-one male respondents who claimed that they pray 
regularly every Friday, even though not necessarily in Khalsa's 
Mosque). Significantly perhaps, settler wives who pray regularly were 
found to be not only from the older age-group. In addition, some two-
thirds of them are either active on the land only, or in the market 
only, while the rest were not economically active outside the home. 
Nor is the fourth pillar of Islam, namely the fast (al-saum)\textsuperscript{16} parti-
cularly observed, for only 20% of these fifty-nine female respondents 
(compared to 54% of the fifty-one male respondents) indicated that they 
fasted regularly. The rest of the settler wives felt that being \textit{fi}
\textit{al-ghurba}, with all its burdens and responsibilities, absolved them 
from the need to be conscientious. The settler wives' attitude towards 
the \textit{hajj} is equally indicative of their general attitude towards 
religion. Five settler wives (compared with twelve settlers) had, up 
to the time of my field-research, made the pilgrimage to Mecca, each in 
the company of her husband. But while around 90% of the forty male 
respondents, who had not yet gone to the \textit{hajj}, indicated that they 
planned to do so in the near future,\textsuperscript{17} only six of the fifty-four 
female respondents claimed the same. The rest of these settler wives 
felt that this was not a priority, mainly because of lack of money.
More significantly, these respondents accepted that their husbands should be the first to make the pilgrimage, if the two spouses could not go together.

1.2 The Male World in Khalsa

The relationship between male kin in the Settlement being, in most aspects, identical to the pattern described above for female kin, suffice it here to repeat that the appropriateness of a ziyarah on the occasion of life-cycle events is also dependent on the closeness or otherwise between male relatives. The ideal of family solidarity requires that a settler display interest in the life-cycle ceremonies being celebrated by his kin. Even on the occasion of a female dominated ceremony - e.g. the sebou' for a boy - he is expected to make his way to his kin's house to offer his congratulations. Conversely, the more formal a kin relationship, the less expected are ziyarat on the occasion of socially less significant life-cycle events. However, in contrast to the women, where a relatively pronounced formal kin relationship absolves them from the need to exchange visits on the occasion of religious festivals, even male kin who are not on particularly cordial terms are expected to make a ziyarah to mark these important events. Regardless of the fact that the latter tend to be more or less muted affairs - indeed a settler may not even interrupt his routine in the fields - members of a kinship group in Khalsa like to display a sense of solidarity. But, significantly, the notion of reciprocity tends to be more or less discarded. Rather, the cultural value, whereby youth is expected to make a show of respect towards its elders, tends to serve as a guideline.

The settler's comparatively unrestricted mobility is implicitly expressed by the fact that none of the fifty-two male respondents who
were questioned about the non-kin settlers with whom they socialize most often, gave the names exclusively of men living along the same alley-way. In fact, around 42% of these respondents indicated that they were not on particularly cordial terms with their non-kin male neighbours other than to greet them should they happen to meet. The remaining 58% counted neighbours as well as other settlers among those they see most often in the Settlement. In contrast to the women, men do not perceive the alley-way as their social arena. Indeed, it is considered 'ayb for men to squat in the harah as this is a habit reserved solely for women and children. The settlers' freedom of choice with regard to the relationships they wish to develop with other non-kin settlers is reflected in the fact that only 28% of these fifty-two male respondents indicated that the non-kin settlers they mix with the most frequently are exclusively from the same province of origin as themselves. Interestingly enough, these respondents were mainly from Menoufiah and Beni Suef, governorates which are relatively over-represented in Khalsa. The decreasing importance of the variable of regional origin is further expressed by the fact that 63% of these fifty-two male respondents claimed to socialize with non-kin settlers from their own as well as from the other provinces represented in the Settlement. Only five settlers claimed that they did not socialize with anyone, be it at home or in the coffee-shop, though they generally observed the Friday prayers in the Khalsa Mosque. One is the husband of the female circumciser. Though he claims to dislike all the other settlers, one is tempted to relate his aloofness at least partly to the apparent lack of social recognition accorded to his wife, for none of the male respondents gave his name among those they most frequently socialize with. The second settler is from the previously mentioned household where both spouses claim they never mix with anyone in the
Settlement. The remaining three are the pater familias and the two sons in kinship group E (see Chart III), who claimed they neither had the time nor the inclination to socialize with other settlers.

However, it would be fallacious to take this pattern as an indication that with regard to the men's social world, some form of community integration appears to be evolving in the Settlement in spite of the heterogeneity in the regional origin of its inhabitants. In fact, these social interactions do not necessarily imply that the relationships which have been formed between non-kin settlers enjoy an intimacy characteristic of friendship, even though, as previously mentioned, settlers have a freedom of choice in the initiation of these contacts. As in the social network among Khalsa's non-kin settler wives, here also a very clear distinction is drawn between saheb (friend) and ma'areffah (acquaintance). Because it is shameful for men to be seen squatting in the harah, it is in effect the degree of affective attachment and trust inherent in a relationship which serve as the crucial criteria whether or not a settler will invite other non-kin from the Settlement into his home. For an honourable man will not expose his honour - as symbolized in the person of his wife - in front of other men. That he may be doing just that when he lets a room to an Egyptian migrant is a reality which the settler prefers to ignore or justifies by the unspoken rule according to which lodgers stay away until the family head has returned home. Thus, a settler will generally only invite into his home a non-kin settler whom he can refer to as houah zayyi akhouyah (he is like my brother), for the ideal relationship between brothers implies that neither man would covet the other's wife. Because a sohoubiah is viewed in the same light as the ideal sibling relationship, there is no stress on who visits whom, for the social prestige associated with receiving rather than making a visit is
perceived to be irrelevant in this type of relationship.\textsuperscript{18} Nevertheless, again as with the social network of non-kin settler wives, the majority of the male respondents disclaimed any close friendships with other non-kin males in Khalsa. Rather, most of them stressed that the non-kin settlers with whom they most frequently mix generally fall under the category of ma'areffah. As such, they are more or less barred from the privacy of the home. For, a man cannot trust a mere acquaintance to observe the rules of hospitality in the same manner as a close friend would. Because the harah is the social arena of females, it is in the coffee-shops, and to a lesser extent in the Mosque, that social intercourse between non-kin male acquaintances generally takes place.

One socially acceptable reason for male acquaintances to enter each others' homes is related to the ziyarah, which, like the pattern prevailing among the settler wives, implies the reciprocation of visits on the occasion of life-cycle events. Here also, it is the degree of formality characterizing the relationship between non-kin which decrees the appropriateness of making a ziyarah. Settlers whose social contacts are confined to the social arena of the coffee-shop or the Mosque do not reciprocate ziyarat except on the occasion of life-cycle ceremonies deemed socially important, such as the birth and circumcision of a boy, particularly if it should be a first-born son. The reciprocation of this social debt implies that the parties concerned hold each other in some esteem and — though they may at other times guard the privacy of their homes from one another — are ready to accord each other some social recognition. However, male acquaintances may just as often consider it sufficient to congratulate each other in public and thus dispense with the formality of a ziyarah. For sitting together in the coffee-shop or praying next to one another in the Mosque does not
necessarily create a social obligation or initiate a pattern of social
debt reciprocation. In contrast, non-kin settlers whose relationship
is perceived to be one of sohoubiah will tend to exchange ziyarat on
the occasion of all the life-cycle events from which men are
traditionally not excluded, even those which are perceived to rank low
in social importance. A sohoubiah demands therefore a reciprocation of
social debts to the same extent as is expected among close kin who are
bent on upholding the ideal of kinship solidarity.

However, it was observed at an early point during the field-
research that a number of settlers who had already been interviewed and
who had made a point of stressing that their relationship with other
non-kin settlers was one of acquaintanceship, and as such confined to
the social arena of the coffee-shops, were in fact encountered in one
or another settler home on errands which did not appear to be related
to any social occasion. From the subsequent interviews, during which
this issue was brought up, as well as from conversations with Om Said
and 'Amm Ali, there emerged the realization that some self-image of
social prestige appeared to be operating in Khalsa's male world. For
when a settler refers to the visits which male acquaintances from the
Settlement make to his home on occasions unrelated to the ziyarah
system, he tends to stress houah illi biyyetoll 'alayyah, laen 'andouh
mohemmah 'andee, moush ana illi barohlou (it is he who comes to look me
up, because he has important business for me to deal with, not I who
goes to him). Implicit in the term mohemmah (which is a derivative of
the word for important) is the notion that the man who makes the visit
is in need of a favour from his host. Because it is shameful and even
insulting to leave a man standing outside in the harah, such a visitor
will always be invited in. However, he will generally not be offered
any refreshments or is expected to decline if such an offer is made out
of politeness. For his visit is not perceived as a social occasion and, as such, is kept as brief as possible after the ritual of inquiring about each other's health is dispensed with. Yet, the same man who classifies the visits of other non-kin settlers to his home as being related to a mohemmah, does not negate the fact that he too may have to look up another settler/acquaintance in the latter's home should he be unable to find him in one or the other loci of male gatherings. However, in this case, such a visit is generally referred to as a maslaha (i.e. self-interest) and not a mohemmah. This differentiation is, to my mind, consistent with the settler's self-image of social prestige. Those who come to him do so because they need him for a mohemmah, which implies the existence of a patron/client relationship. By using the term maslaha when referring to his own errand to the house of a non-kin acquaintance, the settler is not only stressing that this must not be interpreted as contributing to his host's social prestige as is implicit in the act of making a visit. He is also indicating that his errand is purely out of self-interest which is to him the primary issue.

A settler may very well be aware that, as far as the Settlement's community is concerned, this stress on being visited while at the same time negating the equivalent implication of making a visit, is largely a fiction. For the reality of the way of life after resettlement has actually cancelled the need for any patron/client relationship between the settler households. Settlers may ask small favours of each other - for example the borrowing of an agricultural tool or a draft animal, or asking about a new type of crop and the special inputs it might require - but they are not dependent on each other to the extent that the non-granting of such favours could cause any hardship. For there exists within the Settlement alternatives, of which the settler may
avail himself. Nor do settlers require each others' services as intermediaries between them and the authorities. In fact, as we shall later see, they do not even require the services of the Chairman of the Cooperative Board, whose main task it is to function as just such an intermediary. Rather, it is in relation to the outsiders, i.e. those who are not part of the Settlement's community, that this fiction appears to acquire relevance and assume a significance. My role as researcher - i.e. the outsider - provided an almost ideal audience in front of which a settler could attempt to re-confirm his self-image as a respected and prestigious member of Khalsa's community. Hence the insistence that it is in fact the others who come to him because they have a mohemmah and need his help and opinion. Being an outsider, I was not expected to know that this image did not tally with the way of life in the Settlement. An even more important audience are the temporary Egyptian migrants who come from the same village or area of villages as the settler household. It is these migrants, whom a settler above all strives to impress. For it is they who will convey back to Egypt the news of his economic success, measured by the consumer durables he has purchased, and of his status in the Settlement, as evidenced by the many visitors who come to his home. Both are perceived to enhance his social prestige in the eyes of kin and kith back in the home village. The proof, so to speak, of this particular fiction is implicit in the settlers' response to the question whether or not they are interested in being elected to any of the posts on the Cooperative Board. Of the forty-six male respondents who, at the time of my field-research, were not serving on this Board, only one settler confirmed that he was planning to submit his name during the following election of the Cooperative Board. Significantly, this is the man who, as mentioned elsewhere, is competing against 'Amm Ali for the role of
the Settlement's informal leader. All the other respondents brushed off such a possibility. The reasons most frequently presented were lack of time and interest, attitudes which are aptly expressed by the remark of one of these respondents: Ana moush naessni mashakel (I do not lack problems).

Among Khalsa's Egyptian male peasants, the term *ziyarah* also implies the exchange of visits on the occasion of religious festivals, in particular *Moulid al-Nabbi*, *'Id al-Fitr* and *'Id al-Adha*. Here also the incidence of such visits is dependent on the degree of affective attachments characterizing a relationship. Non-kin settlers who claim a *sohoubiah* with one another may express the esteem in which they hold each other by attempting to be the first to make a visit to the other's home. However, more often, the custom which is adhered to among kin is also applicable here: the younger man visits the older in accordance with the cultural value which demands that age be accorded respect and priority. But among non-kin acquaintances, the stress was again on being visited rather than making a visit. A settler tended to claim that it was his male acquaintances who come to pay their respects on the occasion of one or the other religious festival and not vice versa. This was another fiction which was not borne out by reality as the information obtained from various informants confirmed. For, in fact, most of the settlers apparently avoid the issue of who should visit or be visited by whom, by meeting either in the Mosque or in one of the coffee-shops, i.e. the social arena which is associated with neutrality. Here, each can offer the other the traditional greeting of *kullu sana we enta tayyeb* (may you be blessed every year), while at the same time preserving his self-perceived social status. Like the visiting network among non-kin settler wives, the reciprocation of *ziyarat* on the occasion of life-cycle events tends to be more or less
balanced given the similarity in the Egyptian peasant settlers' way of life. In contrast, the *ziyarah* on the occasion of a religious festival tends to be perceived as part of the notion of social prestige. The same spirit which leads a settler to distinguish between *mohemmah* and *maslaha* and to perpetuate the fiction that other men strive to acknowledge his self-perceived social status, encourages him to present to the outsider the image of a man whom others like to pay respect to on the occasion of the communally significant religious festivals.

The fact noted above that around 42% of the fifty-two male respondents did not include their house and alley-way neighbours even among the circle of acquaintances deserves some further elaboration, since it is one indication of the more or less separate social worlds of men and women. However much the home may have become the settler's main locus of leisure-time activities - the attraction being the television - and whatever the extent of the social interaction between husband and wife as a result of their increased physical proximity, Khalsa's Egyptian settler couples do not socialize as such. The settler wife may regularly squat with her non-kin neighbour in the *harah* and both may reciprocate *ziyarat* on each and every life-cycle event, but this does not necessarily imply that their respective husbands also do the same. Conversely, a close relationship between non-kin settlers does not mean that their wives will also regularly socialize except perhaps if they should happen to live along the same alley-way. However, even if the wives and husbands in two families should happen to be friendly, this does not imply that men and women make or receive visits at the same time. Men consider it *'ayb* to be seen walking around with their wives, unless it is to and from the fields, in which case he tends to stride ahead. This also applies to those households which perceive themselves as ranking either high within or socially above the peasant stratum and
where, in contrast to the pattern described above, cordial relationships between wives are often matched by friendships between the husbands. Here too, men and women will tend to arrive and leave separately. 'Amm Ali's explanation for this custom was that other men may not realize that the man accompanying a woman is her husband and may pass a remark which questions her honour, thus forcing her husband to attack and beat them up. Or, so 'Amm Ali argued, a man may be hailed by an acquaintance or friend on the way and would have to brush him off in order not to leave his wife standing about in the street.

Another significant aspect of the fact that nearly half of Khalsa's Egyptian settlers tend to keep their distance from non-kin house-neighbours is possibly related to the settler family's striving to protect *sirr al-bayt*. A husband may be able to keep his wife's social contacts at a distance, i.e. confine them to the social arena of the *harah*. But because it is considered shameful for him to be seen squatting with other men in the alley-way, he would have to invite his male neighbour into the house. But it is precisely neighbours who are generally mistrusted, for the physical proximity of the households enables them to observe the goings-on inside. This inherent suspicion is implicit in a saying which was repeated by a number of settlers during the course of my field-work: *Sabah al-khayr ya-garee; enta fi daraq we ana fi daree* (Good morning, neighbour, you remain in your house and I remain in mine). Significantly, the fact that a lodger or a visitor from among the Egyptian migrant community may also be in a position to reveal *sirr al-bayt* appears not to be given much consideration. Conceivably, the settler household may discard such a possibility in view of the fact that such non-settlers would be unlikely to have contacts with officials directly involved in the Settlement, i.e.
the very authority in front of which Khalsa's Egyptian peasant wishes to keep up the fiction that he is economically not very successful.

The relative superficiality inherent in the relationship between non-kin male acquaintances is further reflected by the fact that only 28% of the fifty-two male respondents count their land-neighbours, i.e. those who are cultivating an adjacent plot of land, among their circle of acquaintances. This pattern may be partly influenced by the fact that quarrels between land-neighbours over irrigation water allotments continue to erupt periodically, especially during the summer, though generally on a reduced scale compared to the initial period after resettlement. Many a settler will repair to his fields at the dead of night to ensure that his land-neighbour is not directing more than his allotted quota into his fields. (Though there are night-watchmen appointed by Mashrou'al-Wihda, whose task is to ensure that there is no theft of the settlers' crops, these watchmen appear to be unable to verify the periodical accusations that settlers are stealing each other's water quotas.) Those who count their land-neighbours among their acquaintances are not necessarily from the same province or even the same region of origin as them. While this could be due to the fact that the distribution of plots among the settler households was subject to chance, it is nevertheless significant that land-neighbours from the same region, in some cases even from the same province, did not identify each other as friends or acquaintances. On the other hand, in only three cases from among the seventeen male respondents who count a land-neighbour among their circle of non-kin male acquaintances did these also happen to live along the same harah. This pattern can be taken as a further verification that, in contrast to his wife, Khalsa's settler has a greater freedom of choice with regard to the type and extent of the social contacts he wishes to initiate with his
co-settlers. However, as the above analysis illustrates, this choice does not necessarily imply the formation of sohoubiah relationships between the settlers. Instead, social contacts in Khalsa's male world were generally found to be relatively superficial. One aspect of this superficiality is the lack of interest in establishing a tariqa (religious brotherhood). Though essentially religious in nature, this type of brotherhood has a social aspect in that membership provides a common meeting-ground.

However, the above also underlines the further reality that relationships between non-kin settlers are subject to the calculative attitudes of the parties concerned. As is generally the case among settler wives, relationships tend to be viewed in terms of the ensuing rewards, a fact aptly reflected by the use of the term maslaha when a settler seeks to explain his own visit to the home of an acquaintance. Because relationships between non-kin settlers are not perceived in terms of durability - a settler may leave the Settlement any time or may exchange his plot of land for one believed to be qualitatively better and/or nearer home and thus lose contact with his land-neighbour - reciprocity cannot be a long-term affair. This is evidenced by the fact, mentioned elsewhere, that 78% of the fifty-two male respondents who were questioned about the assistance they may extend to other settlers - i.e. helping each other on the land, or borrowing money, or draft animals or agricultural equipment - disclaimed that they ever offered or expected such help from others, be they kin or otherwise. Here too the most frequently heard remark tended to be kullu wahed menna lazem yettekel 'ala halou we yesheel humoomu benafsoo (each one of us must rely on himself and carry his own burdens). In fact, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant settler takes pride in
pointing out repeatedly that he can achieve everything by himself and is not in need of the help of others.

The latter remark is a poignant reminder that, in contrast to the settler wife, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant settler is not exclusively dependent on the male company available within the Settlement. For there is a further aspect related to his freedom of choice, namely the community of temporary Egyptian migrant workers in Iraq, whom the settler refers to as baladiyat, i.e. from the same village or cluster of villages back in Egypt.21 Be they kith or kin, or friends and relatives of villagers whom the settler family knows back in Egypt, these baladiyat undoubtedly serve as a more or less vast reservoir of actual or potential relationships of which the settler can avail himself. It is difficult to surmise what the pattern of social contacts between non-kin settlers in Khalsa may have been had there not been this overwhelming influx of Egyptian migrants and baladiyat into Iraq. Would the settlers' greater reliance on the male company available in the Settlement have initiated and encouraged relationships of sohoubiah rather than that of ma'areffah as seems to be the dominant pattern in Khalsa? Or would the settler's unrestricted mobility in conjunction with the household's relative economic independence of the Settlement have resulted in a similar pattern of withdrawal which was found to have become characteristic of the Egyptian peasant community in Khalsa? Whatever the trend which could have developed under these circumstances, the fact remains that the settler's contacts with his baladiyat have not only perpetuated his emotional attachments to his village of origin regardless of the geographical distance separating him from the latter, but have also played a crucial role in accentuating his relative independence from the Settlement's community. The significance of this becomes particularly clear when one focuses on the
evolution and effectiveness of informal leadership in the Khalsa Settlement.

Chapter 2: The Formation of Leadership: Scope and Limitation

Though there were differences of opinion on a number of topics dealt with during the 1971 Alexandria Workshop on the Planning and Development of New Rural Settlements, 22 participants, on the whole, agreed that the social organization of a new human settlement is a crucial element in the project's viability and success. The type of social organization which may develop in a new settlement is dependent on a number of variables, two of the most important of which are a government's social policies and the selection of settlers who are to populate it.

The social policies pursued by a government in the attainment of specific socio-economic goals are, to some extent, culture-bound, in the sense that they are largely determined by the country's historical experiences and its traditional social, political and economic background. These policies will, in turn, determine the selection of the organizational model as well as the structure deemed appropriate for the administration of a new settlement. The organizational model ascertains the degree to which the settlers are free to participate in the decision-making process affecting their way of life after resettlement. One may envisage a continuum with, at the one end, a model which provides for full settler participation and, at the other extreme, one in which settlers are not accorded any say in the running of the settlement's affairs. In practice, however, most organizational models encountered in the Arab world tend to fall somewhere between these two poles. The administrative structure of a new settlement may
either be autonomous, or coordinated with existing governmental insti-
tutions or, alternatively, fully integrated with the latter. In fact, 
settlement planners tend to believe '... that the ultimate objective 
should be a fully integrated administrative structure ... [while] ... 
both the autonomous and coordinated options are viewed as two transient 
stages towards full integration',23 It is of interest in the context 
of the present chapter that both the organizational model and the 
administrative structure decided on by the authorities will affect the 
process of leadership development in a settlement. Generally, the more 
authoritarian a government structure is, the more restricted will be 
the settlers' participation in the decision-making process affecting 
the settlement's development and the less leeway will tend to exist for 
the development of a genuinely representative leadership.

Settler selection, being one of the main factors affecting the 
process of community-building, is one sphere over which planners of 
voluntary settlements may exert a far-reaching influence (and it is 
with voluntary relocation that the present discussion is concerned). 
However, in the published literature on new voluntary settlements in 
the Arab world, there appears to be little consensus with regard to the 
local/regional origin of settlers.24 Should the preferred policy be 
one of recruiting settlers from the same local community, whereby they 
would bring with them an already existing web of social and kinship 
ties providing the cornerstones of a cohesive community in which a con-
sensus with regard to traditional cultural values already exists? Or 
should prospective settlers be selected from different localities or 
regions in the hope that this would reduce the pressure of social con-
formity and thus provide a more fertile ground for the introduction of 
social and economic innovations? In the case of selection from the 
same locality, existing traditions of community cohesion, conflict
resolution and leadership selection tend to be transferred largely intact. The adherence to old cultural patterns is an important factor in easing the psychological trauma of relocation. Yet, it is precisely the continuity of these established social patterns, to which settler families will understandably tend to adhere all the more strongly during the initial post-resettlement phase, which may inhibit the introduction of the type of innovations deemed by the administrative authority to be crucial for the long-term economic viability of the settlement project. On the other hand, though the heterogeneity of the settlers’ origin may reduce the pressure of social conformity, the community-building process in this type of human settlement will more than likely be a long-term affair, at the very least spanning more than one generation. Social institutions need to be established, a consensus with regard to social values must evolve and a process of natural leadership selection must develop before this type of settlement can become a cohesive community. The difficulty of deciding on the appropriateness of heterogeneity versus homogeneity in the settlers’ region of origin is further compounded by the fact - often neglected by planners of new settlements - that each such project ‘... is unique, and every one faces unique problems requiring unique solutions. Because of variations in the physical, ecological and socio-cultural settings, there is no best system of farm size, land allocation, land utilization, land maintenance, settler selection, community building, or administration that can be generalized for all settlement projects’. The participants in the said Workshop agreed that all too often, this truism tends to be largely ignored by settlement planners and authorities. In my judgement, this applies to some extent to the planning of the Khalsa Settlement.
As was noted above, the Preparatory Committee, set up to evaluate the applications of prospective Egyptian peasant migrants to Iraq, decided that settlers should be recruited from various provinces, with priority to be given to those which are relatively overpopulated, notably Menoufiah in Lower Egypt and Beni Suef in Middle Egypt. However, in opting for heterogeneity, this Committee appears to have been less concerned with the positive aspects theoretically associated with this particular option. Instead it appears to have been more concerned with the issue of having 'nearly every part of Egypt represented in the Khalsa Settlement project', as the Director of the Social Research Unit in the Egyptian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs had put it. It is the latter consideration which must be taken into account when attempting to explain the criteria adhered to during the actual recruitment of potential peasant migrants to Iraq. For though heterogeneity in regional origin was undoubtedly applied, little if any thought appears to have been given to the fact that the additional criterion of giving priority to overpopulated provinces in Egypt would create a numerical imbalance which, as we shall see, has had far-reaching effects on the type of community which was found to have evolved at the time of my field-work in the Settlement. Given the lack of documentation on how this Committee made its selection, one cannot but assume that its members seem to have adhered to the belief that being in an alien environment would provide the psychological basis to unite the Egyptian peasant families regardless of their regional origins, a supposition most probably based on the belief that fellaheen are a more or less homogeneous class. But by opting for the numerical over-representation of those provinces deemed to be particularly overpopulated, in addition to accepting families who were bound by kinship ties, the Preparatory Committee appears to have been oblivious to the
implications this might have for the process of community-building. In
the context of the focus of the present chapter, the mis-application of
the selection criteria regarding heterogeneity in regional origin has
had far-reaching consequences for the pattern of leadership which has
evolved in Khalsa. For, the effects of the almost inevitable suspicion
with which settler families tended to regard those from a different
province was further compounded by attempts on the part of most members
of the numerically over-represented provinces to dominate any forum
which might have a possible influence on the affairs of the Settlement.

No documentation could be obtained from the Iraqi authorities
regarding the type and degree of settler participation envisaged for
the Khalsa project.\textsuperscript{25} Interviews with various Iraqi officials did
not contribute much to clarifying this point. However, implicit in
some of the information obtained during these various conversations is
the notion that the very fact of its being a new and unique experiment
- and this is a point repeatedly stressed by various government offi­
cials in Iraq - the Khalsa project must necessarily be largely subject
to the authorities' control. Nonetheless, the need for some form of
settler participation appears to have been recognized. Following the
example of similar settlement schemes in the Arab world, the coopera­
tive society was chosen as a forum for this participation, even though,
in the near-unanimous opinion of the participants in the Workshop noted
above, cooperatives have generally been unsuccessful however varied the
reasons for their failure.\textsuperscript{27} The Iraqi authorities believed that the
Khalsa Settlement was in need of a combined production and marketing
cooperative. The apparent failure of Khalsa's Cooperative Society to
fulfill these functions will be subsequently discussed. What is of
interest at this point is the role which, by all accounts, the Iraqi
authorities appear to have envisaged for the Cooperative Board, all the
posts on which are held by Egyptian settlers. On the one hand, this Board was apparently designed to function as a means of expression of the settlers' fears, problems and expectations by assuming the role of a channel of communications between the settler households and the Iraqi authorities. On the other hand, the latter apparently also hoped that some form of leadership would eventually crystallize in this Board which could help further the cohesion of the new community. However, it remains unclear what the Iraqi authorities' view of this leadership was: would it be collective in the sense of being representative of the different provincial factions in the Settlement, thus encouraging the settler households to feel that they each have a stake in the success of this project? Or did the authorities hope that, eventually, a single leadership would emerge whose recognition by the settler families would indicate that provincial clannishness had been transcended?

Whatever the authorities' concept, the fact remains that the Cooperative Board in Khalsa did not develop into the equivalent of the village council which has become one forum of consensus formation in the Egyptian village. In fact, the trials to which this Board has been subjected and the tribulations it has endured are reflected in the type of leadership which was found to have developed up to the time of my field-research. In addition, this pattern is indicative of the changes which have been taking place in the Khalsa Settlement, specifically with regard to the incipient individualism which has come to be the most distinctive feature of this community of Egyptian peasant settlers.

Some weeks after the settler families' arrival in Khalsa in 1976, the Iraqi authorities announced that a general meeting would be held in order to elect the Settlement's first Cooperative Board. Male settlers
eligible for nomination to the seven Board posts — namely Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Treasurer, Secretary, one active and two reserve members — must be literate. All settlers attending the meeting were required to choose seven names each. The seven nominees with the highest number of votes would be elected. The actual number of votes held by each nominee would also decide the distribution of Board posts. Thus, the settler with the highest vote numbers would be elected Chairman, while those who held the lowest number would be given the posts of reserve members.

The meeting for the election of Khalsa's first Cooperative Board was, by all accounts, marked by the rivalry between settlers, who, not unnaturally, exhibited a pronounced suspicion of the motives of those from a province different from their own. A settler may not have known each and every other settler from his same province of origin, but this did not prevent him from displaying a clannishness which was directed against all 'strangers'. However, this traditional provincial rivalry was apparently further compounded by the heated arguments which erupted between members of the two numerically over-represented provinces. The Lower Egyptian Menoufis and the Middle Egyptian Beni Suefis both considered it their right to occupy a dominant position in the Cooperative Board and attempted to influence the election process accordingly. Two further aspects served to complicate this controversy. On the one hand, there existed a number of kinship bonds between settler households which, not surprisingly, tended to reinforce the clannishness referred to above, while setting those nominees without kin in the Settlement at a disadvantage. On the other hand, the regulation according to which a nominee had to be literate meant that, in actual fact, the number of settlers eligible to serve on the Board was relatively small and, furthermore, worked to the advantage of those provinces
which were numerically over-represented. None of the Iraqi officials questioned upon this point could give a definitive answer as to why this regulation demanding the literacy of a nominee to the Cooperative Board was upheld even though it was apparent that at least two-thirds of the settlers were illiterate. Whatever the authorities' motive, the fact remains that the upholding of this regulation during this first election did not help ease the rifts between the different factions.

Nonetheless, there appear to have been a number of other aspects which may serve to further explain the behaviour and attitudes of the different settler groupings during this first election. Though for reasons of a more balanced quantification - justified, in my opinion, by the differential rate of socio-economic development in Egypt - Khalsa's settler households have been grouped into three separate regions,28 in the regional orientation of most Egyptians, all the provinces south of Cairo are generally referred to as the Said. It is according to this consciousness that Middle and Upper Egyptian settlers seem, by all accounts, to have reacted during this first election. Few of either the non-Beni Suefi Middle Egyptian settlers or those from Upper Egypt apparently contemplated the possibility that the numerically strong Beni Suefis would forego the possibility of advancing their own interests as a group - and this is how membership of the Board was perceived - by nominating settlers from other parts of the Said. Following the Arab proverb: Ana we akhouyah 'ala ibn 'ammi, we ana we ibn 'ammi 'ala al-ghareeb (My brother and I against my paternal cousin, my paternal cousin and I against the stranger), non-Beni Suefis from provinces south of Cairo tended apparently to support the nomination of any literate Beni Suefi settler eligible to serve on the Board. Regardless of the fact that the latter may have been a total stranger,
they nevertheless seemingly felt a greater affinity towards him than towards a nominee from Lower Egypt.

By contrast, settlers from Lower Egypt appear to have displayed very little regional consciousness. Though those from Menoufiah far outnumbered settlers from other Lower Egyptian provinces represented in Khalsa, it did not necessarily follow that settlers from the latter unreservedly stood behind each and every Menoufi nominee. In fact, the rivalry which erupted between members of the various Lower Egyptian provinces is said to have been every bit as pronounced as the rift between those from the North and those from south of Cairo. It is quite conceivable that the literacy variable played a decisive role. For, given the fact that nearly two-thirds of the Lower Egyptian male settlers included in the present study were found to be literate, and assuming that these data are more or less representative of the literacy rate which had prevailed among the first arrivals from this region in the Settlement, it comes as no surprise that non-Menoufi Lower Egyptian settlers would tend to resent the Menoufis' attempts to play a dominant role in the election process.

However, the settlers' pronounced interest in the election of this first Cooperative Board must also be viewed from the perspective of their attitude towards the Settlement during the initial period after resettlement. In spite of all the tensions, rifts and suspicion between the settler families, they are said, nevertheless, to have exhibited a degree of group-consciousness vis-à-vis the world outside Khalsa. As this spirit will be more fully analyzed in the subsequent chapter regarding social sanctions and their effectiveness, suffice it at this point to indicate that nearly all the settler families tended to view the Settlement as an anchor in a world which to them - irrespective of the cultural similarities between Iraq and Egypt - must
have nonetheless initially appeared alien and confusing. At the time of the election of the first Cooperative Board, few settlers had explored their social environment beyond the nearby market-town of Jisr al-Diyalah and even fewer had any contacts, social or otherwise, with their immediate Iraqi peasant neighbours. Moreover, the influx of temporary Egyptian migrants had not yet reached the scale in evidence at the time of my field-research. More important, the settler household's dependence on the services provided by the Cooperative Society was, at the time, almost absolute. The Iraqi Government's policy during this period was generally intent on the expansion of the public sector, which meant that Khalsa's settlers were dependent for almost all their agricultural inputs on the Cooperative and its channels. No settler household, at the time, apparently dared to circumvent the Iraqi authorities' regulations concerning their agricultural production and marketing activities.

However, there was perhaps another element in the keen interest exhibited by the settlers in this first election of the Cooperative Board. If one accepts that - very few exceptions apart - Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families originated from the poor peasant class whose livelihood hovered little above the minimum level of subsistence, then it follows that none were part of the political elite in their respective villages of origin. For, as L. Binder has illustrated, village committees in the present-day Egyptian village more often than not continue to be subject to "... the persistence of the traditional influence of rural notables", a finding also confirmed by a number of Egyptian authors who have written on various aspects related to rural Egypt. Thus, probably for the very first time in his life, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant found himself in possession of a measure of freedom enabling him to participate in the election of a forum without
being hindered by his socio-economic background. Though aware that he is, by the very nature of this resettlement project, in many ways dependent on and controlled by the Iraqi authorities, the settler must nevertheless have savoured the novelty that he had a relatively unopposed right to have a say in the formation of a body which could be expected to exert some influence on his new way of life in the Settlement.

The heated arguments which reached a peak during the actual meeting convened to elect Khalsa's first Cooperative Board led the Iraqi representatives of the General Union of Peasants' Cooperative Societies, whose task it is to supervise the election process, to suggest a compromise: from each province which had submitted a nominee, the one with the highest number of votes would be chosen. However, this compromise did not solve the problem of who should be given which post, specifically the symbolically significant one of Chairman. Both the Menoufis and the Beni Suefis coveted the post and each faction was unwilling to cede to the other. According to Khalsa's Cooperative Supervisor, the Iraqi authorities finally managed, after much haggling, to push through the solution that the elected member from the Lower Egyptian province of Sharqiah should be given the post, while a settler from another under-represented Lower Egyptian province - Qalubiah - was made Treasurer. Thus, neither the Menoufis nor the Beni Suefis could claim a victory.

This first Cooperative Board did not serve out its full term of three years. Rather, less than a year after the election, the almost continuous tensions and quarrels more or less forced the authorities to agree to the settlers' request that a new Board be elected. It was, not surprisingly, difficult to obtain detailed reasons for the first Board's failure, as the informants' memories tended to have dimmed over
a time-span of some five years. However, it appears that the settlers' main complaints were more or less focused on the Treasurer, whose tasks included aiding the Supervisor to settle the bills for the agricultural goods ordered by the settler households. None of the latter seem to have been ready to pay in advance and most were evasive when it came to settling their accounts after receiving the goods they had ordered. This attitude appears to have been fed by the settlers' conviction that it was the Iraqi Government's duty to provide them with the agricultural inputs they required in the same way as it was underwriting their living expenses through the monthly salary accorded each settler family. For his part, the Treasurer is said to have come to the conclusion that his unpaid job was a thankless task not worth the effort and to have submitted his resignation. The other Board members did not fare much better, for they were accused by the settlers of favouring their kin and/or fellow settlers from the same province of origin at the expense of other households in the Settlement. This state of affairs was further compounded by the dissatisfaction felt by many settlers over the final distribution of the plots, in spite of the fact that this had been settled by a lottery system. It was also partly fed by the antagonisms which tended to erupt over the distribution of irrigation water. More important, the Chairman apparently did not succeed in developing his position into a rallying-point around which the settlers could have at least developed some consensus over the best means to resolve their differences. The fact that he was from the relatively under-represented province of Sharqiah as well as having been nominated by the Iraqi officials, further served to undermine his authority.

By all accounts, the meeting held for the election of the second Cooperative Board appears to have been just as stormy and strife-ridden
as the previous one. The authorities' hopes that the first post-
resettlement year would have led to an easing of the major tensions to
be expected from a heterogeneous group of settlers, were disappointed.
Provincial clannishness was as conspicuous as ever. Nonetheless, the
Iraqi officials supervising this second election process insisted that,
this time, regulations must be honoured and no compromise solution
would be acceptable. The seven nominees with the highest number of
votes would be elected, regardless of whether or not the various pro-
vinces were adequately represented according to the settlers' pre-con-
ceived notions. However, in spite of complaints that Board members had
been biased and tended to serve their own interests rather than those
of the community, few of the remaining literate settlers thought of
submitting their own names to serve on the new Board. This attitude
was mainly due to the settlers' increasing pre-occupation with their
agricultural and marketing activities. But it was apparently also fed
by the realization that these posts, unpaid and honorary as they are,
can be a thankless responsibility. In the end, most of the names sub-
mited for the second election turned out to be of those settlers who
had served on the first Cooperative Board. In spite of all their com-
plaints, the majority of the settlers ended up confirming their support
for these nominees. However, it is this very fact which seems to have
increased their interest in who would hold the posts of Chairman and
Treasurer because of the realization that these were the most
important: the former as a potential symbol of leadership and as a
channel of contacts with the Iraqi authorities, the latter because of
the authority it implied over the settlers' accounts with the Coope-
orative. Far from accepting that these posts should be distributed
among the elected members of the Board according to the number of votes
they held, Khalsa's settlers wanted to ensure in advance who would
occupy these two important posts. The haggling, arguments and quarrels reached a renewed pitch, in particular between the Menoufi and Beni Suefi factions.

It is at this point that 'Amm Ali appears to have come on to the scene. None of the settler families or the Iraqi officials in Khalsa can quite recollect when 'Amm Ali began to be consulted and his arbitration sought in quarrels between the settler households. But all are agreed that he did not push himself and that it did not take long for Om Said's husband to be called 'amm (uncle), a term which traditionally denotes respect and status. In fact, at first glance, one would have to conclude that - age and piety apart - 'Amm Ali does not possess any of the attributes normally applicable to the position of a leader in the traditional setting of the contemporary Egyptian village. For he is illiterate and, though hard-working, is not counted among those settlers who are singled out for their outstanding productivity. Nor, at the time of the election of this second Cooperative Board, did he have any particularly close relationship with the Iraqi authorities which would have enhanced his position as mediator between the latter and the settler households. In addition, neither 'Amm Ali's home nor his manner of dress set him apart from the other settlers, a pattern which has remained unchanged for he did not invest in any of the 'modern' furnishings referred to elsewhere. Rather, it would seem to be in his personality that one must seek the reason for his obvious popularity in the Settlement. A tall, quiet man, whose very reserve exudes dignity and demands respect, 'Amm Ali appears to have acquired a reputation for fairness and wisdom by his refusal, apparently from the beginning, to adhere to the provincial clannishness exhibited by his fellow Menoufis in the Settlement. From his description of his past life prior to migrating to Iraq, it appears that he had never played
any role in either the village council or the cooperative society back in the home village. Resettlement presented the first opportunity for the unfolding of his talents as a mediator. Having decided to migrate to Iraq, 'Amm Ali explained that he felt he had some stake in the success of this settlement project. Vital to this success, he believed, was the promotion of good relations between the settler households. Though both he and his wife tend to exhibit the typical Lower Egyptian condescension towards all those from the Said - homma met'assabeen we kaman mokhohhom dayyak (they are fanatical and also have a narrow mind) was the way this couple explained the nature of the Saidis - 'Amm Ali nevertheless felt it was 'ayb to get involved in petty quarrels between settler households. His potential role as informal leader was not only due to his willingness to listen and advise his fellow-settlers in whatever problems they had, but it was to some extent also enhanced by his wife's similar attitude towards the settler wives.

The apparent consensus uniting the majority of the settlers regarding 'Amm Ali's honourable reputation did not fail to come to the notice of the Iraqi administrators involved with the Khalsa project. It was thus not surprising that they should turn to him for help in attempting to reduce the level of antagonism which had erupted over the distribution of posts on the second Cooperative Board. According to the Supervisor, someone suggested that 'Amm Ali be given the post of Chairman and, to the relief of the authorities, few of the settlers balked at the idea. Accordingly, the regulation, demanding that Board members be literate, was waived, and 'Amm Ali was nominated with the understanding that he would be Chairman. It appears that there was also little opposition to the suggestion that the post of Treasurer be given to the Sharqiah settler who had been the Chairman of the first
Board. It was felt that not only was his previous experience as Board member of value, but his nomination would also help to defuse the strife between the Menoufis and the Beni Suefis. Neither faction could claim a victory, since 'Amm Ali was not really counted as a Menoufi because of his attempts to remain neutral.

Nearly all informants, both Egyptian and Iraqi alike, who were asked to give an account of the second Cooperative Board's term, are agreed that the first two years were the best from the point of view of the diminishing level of rifts and petty quarrels among the settler households. This was due, on the one hand, to 'Amm Ali's talent for ironing out differences between Board members and encouraging their cooperation with one another. 'Amm Ali's very presence on this Board seemingly helped to dispel the suspicion that its members were generally intent on serving their self-interest. The Board's relationship with the settler households was given an added boost through the Iraqi Government's previously mentioned decision to cancel all the settlers' debts incurred up to May 1978, which included any money they owed the Cooperative Society. This particularly eased the functions of the Treasurer who could, so to speak, start afresh. 'Amm Ali also succeeded in having his authority recognized by the majority of the settlers. Though some of them still tended to turn to the Iraqi administrators or even the Khalsa Police Station to complain about their co-settlers and to seek arbitration in the quarrels they were involved in, they were, by all accounts, a minority. According to 'Amm Ali, these particular settlers had tended, from the start, to stand aloof from the rest of the Settlement and had not displayed much interest in the elections to the Cooperative Board. In contrast, most of the other settler households tended to believe it was ayb to involve the Iraqi authorities in the Settlement's internal affairs.
Unless it concerned an issue over which 'Amm Ali had no jurisdiction — such as the irrigation water for example — these settler households preferred to defer to the Board Chairman.

One significant indication of 'Amm Ali's acknowledged position as informal leader of the Settlement during this period may be discerned from the fanfare which surrounded his return from the pilgrimage to Mecca during the third year after resettlement. Though four other settlers and one of their wives went to the hajj at the same time as 'Amm Ali and his wife, none were received in the same manner as the latter upon their return. 'Amm Ali's sons-in-law painted the outside walls as well as those of the living-room of their parents-in-law's house in a vivid blue.\(^2\) Though they did not attempt to paint scenes of 'Amm Ali's pilgrimage, as is the tradition in the Egyptian village\(^3\) — this omission was explained away by the remark \(\text{ehna fi al-ghurba} \) (we are in a strange land) — Om Said's house stands out from the others in being the only one which exhibits a conspicuous sign that its owners have successfully completed the pilgrimage to Mecca. Even though the bus-trip from Iraq to Saudi Arabia is not fraught with the difficulties, material and otherwise, with which pilgrims from Egypt generally find themselves confronted, the majority of Khalsa's settlers considered it a duty to visit 'Amm Ali to congratulate him upon his safe return. For most of Egypt's rural dwellers, the hajj to Mecca is a dream which they hope to realize in their old age. But for many, this dream remains largely unfulfilled because of the expenses and the travel formalities involved. Thus the pilgrim returning to his home village enjoys a certain degree of prestige which enhances his social status in the community. One may assume that this also applied in some degree to the first group of Khalsa settlers who went on the hajj, if only for the fact that it reflected their improved economic position
since resettlement. Yet, it was 'Amm Ali who, by all accounts, received the highest number of visitors from among the Settlement's community, compared to the others who had also been on the pilgrimage. Both Om Said and her husband obviously expected this homage, for they brought back with them many small gifts to be distributed among those who came to congratulate them upon their safe return: caps, shawls and slippers for kin and close friends, and miniature copies of the Koran as well as small bottles of holy water from the well of Zamzam for the others. 34 Though 'Amm Ali later conceded that these gifts had set him back financially, he and his wife nevertheless felt that it would have been 'ayb to have come back empty-handed. In contrast, none of the other settlers who had made the pilgrimage at the same time appear to have found it necessary to distribute similar gifts except presumably among their close kith and/or kin. Nor, for that matter, did any subsequent pilgrims from Khalsa ever adopt this custom.

However, though, as previously mentioned, 'Amm Ali did not set himself socially apart from the rest of the Settlement by conspicuous consumption or a change in his mode of dress, he and Om Said appear to have become somewhat status conscious, in that they began to practice certain social customs commensurate with a higher rank in Egyptian peasant society. (Om Said, for example, ceased to take the produce to the market.) Nonetheless, 'Amm Ali's house was never transformed into the equivalent of the traditional village guest-house. Apart from the fact that he could ill afford such luxury, since he was by no means from among the group of those who are relatively well-off in Khalsa, he too very probably was not keen to expose sirr al-bayt in front of the Settlement. Nonetheless, his position was more or less acknowledged by the tendency of many settlers to pay him a visit, especially on the occasion of one or the other religious festival, while he himself
apparently rarely returned the visit except if it was deemed necessary in relation to some important life-cycle event.

This semblance of a community spirit did not last much beyond two-thirds of the second Cooperative Board's term. By the third year - the Khalsa project was by then some four years old - quarrels apparently broke out anew between the Board members and some of the settlers. The disputes were this time mainly fed by the accusation that the Treasurer had been manipulating the book-keeping and had been stealing some of the Cooperative funds. While 'Amm Ali personally was never criticised nor his integrity subjected to doubt, the other Board members were also accused of looking after theirself-interest at the expense of the other settlers. However, the settlers' demands for dissolving the Board were not heeded. The authorities remained adamant that it serve out its full term. As the Cooperative Supervisor explained, they did not want to set another precedent that every time there was a crisis, the Cooperative Board would be dissolved and re-elected. Rather, it was felt that the settlers had to be encouraged to solve their differences by working through the Board, and not against it. There was also the realization that, in the end, most probably the same group of settlers would again put their names up for nomination, thus leaving the problems basically unsolved.

It is difficult, in retrospect, to judge whether these tensions were a cause or the effect of other factors affecting the Settlement's community during this period. Whatever the case, these problems cannot be viewed separately from a number of other developments in Khalsa during this period. For example, as mentioned previously, the settler households had begun to locate sources outside the Settlement where they could satisfy a large part of their agricultural input needs, a trend encouraged by the Iraqi authorities' relaxing grip on the private
sector. The problems of marketing their cereal products via the Cooperative - due largely to the irregular availability of transportation means and its cost - led the settlers to attempt to sell their crops privately, a pattern further encouraged by the lack of any immediate reaction on the part of the Iraqi authorities. Equally important in the context of the present discussion is the fact that the settler households' relative self-sufficiency appears to have encouraged them to ignore the demands of the Treasurer to settle the debts they had incurred after May 1978. As mentioned elsewhere, the settlers appear to hope that the authorities might yet again issue a decree absolving them from the need to settle their accounts with the Cooperative. In the judgement of the Supervisor, it is partly this consideration which fed the settlers' accusations against the Treasurer in the hope that such a controversy would deflect the authorities' attention from the issue at hand. Another factor which must be taken into consideration is the tremendous rise in the number of Egyptian migrants coming into Iraq during this period. Among other impacts, this trend served to accentuate the settlers' sense of independence from the Settlement and its institutions. It not surprisingly also had an indirect effect on the authority of the Cooperative Board. More specifically, while the person of 'Amm Ali was apparently rarely criticized, the above described developments contributed to the erosion of the Board Chairman's role as leader of the Settlement.

The election of the third Cooperative Board was duly announced after the second term had been completed and a meeting was convened to elect its members from among those who had submitted their names. By all accounts, this third election process was just as strife-ridden as the previous ones, due mainly to the same controversy as to who should hold the two important posts. The Sharqiah settler who had served as
Treasurer had withdrawn his cooperation and refused to have any more dealings with the Cooperative, while 'Amm Ali showed signs of unwillingness to resume his post as Chairman. Though most of the other names submitted were of those who had served on the previous Board, it appears that at least a third of the settlers did not bother to show up at the meeting, a sign of the decreasing interest in the forum represented by the Cooperative Board. Though they are said to have been determined to ensure that the regulation regarding the distribution of posts according to the number of votes held, would be followed to the letter, the Iraqi authorities apparently came to realize that, given the heterogeneous composition of and the perseverance of clannishness in the Settlement, this was not feasible. The Beni Suefi faction thus finally managed to have one of their own accepted for the post of Treasurer in recognition of the fact that no-one from their province had hitherto held an important function. 'Amm Ali was prevailed upon to consider his re-nomination as Board Chairman, the acceptance of which he later explained as being due to the ihraq (embarrassment) he felt in front of the Iraqi authorities because of his fellow-settlers' petty quarrels. At the time, he also apparently still felt that his past relative success in functioning as a rallying-point would enable him to continue in his role as informal leader in spite of the settler households' increasing individualism and the lack of interest on the part of many of them in the Cooperative and its affairs. Nonetheless, it was the fact that, in his words, ehna 'asherna ba'ad fi al-quwayess we al-wehesh (we have lived together through the good and bad times) which apparently encouraged 'Amm Ali to hope that some semblance of a community spirit would continue to prevail in the Settlement.

By the time of my field-work in Khalsa, the third elected Cooperative Board had served nearly two-thirds of its term in office.
The majority of the settler households were found to have more or less fully distanced themselves from the Cooperative and, ipso facto, from the Board. Some settlers were, it seems, trying to obtain pesticide and fertilizer through other sources and most of them were said to be purchasing their seed supply on the market, regardless of the fact that they had to pay a higher price. No settler household was selling any cereal or clover crops through the Cooperative channel. This dissociation was further encouraged by the previously noted fact that all agricultural equipment had been moved to Mashrou' al-Wihda and Khalsa's peasant households were relying on the services of those fellow-settlers who owned tractors. In addition, the rumour had spread that the Iraqi authorities were intending to impound the passports of all those unwilling to settle their accounts with the Cooperative. While the Supervisor denied that there was any truth to this rumour, many settler families continue to believe this is a possibility. However, instead of settling their accounts, their reaction seems to have been to distance themselves even further from the Cooperative and its affairs. Even 'Amm Ali did not show any inclination to settle his debts, shrugging the whole matter off with a smile and the offhand remark that one should wait and see what the Iraqi authorities would do next. Indeed, up to the period of my field-research in the Settlement, the authorities had not taken any decisive steps in settling this issue, which the Cooperative Supervisor explained by the Government's pre-occupation at the war-front. But, as far as the settlers are concerned, this is one more sign that yet again they have got away with a 'little issue' because, so they are convinced, the country is in need of the vegetable crops they are producing.

Nonetheless, while the above may explain the deteriorating relationship between the settlers and their Cooperative Society as well
as their lack of interest in the Board, it does not serve to explain
the apparent erosion of 'Amm Ali's authority over the latter, nor the
fact that his role as the Settlement's informal leader appears to have
undergone a conspicuous modification. To my mind, this development
must be viewed from the perspective of the effectiveness of social
sanctions in Khalsa, as well as being sought in 'Amm Ali's attitude
towards his fellow-settlers. As the former point will be the subject
of the subsequent chapter, the following will concentrate on the person
of 'Amm Ali.

By the time of my field-research, 'Amm Ali had ceased to attend
any of the Cooperative Board meetings. Though the other Board members
insisted that they continued to defer to him, they also claimed that
the Chairman had lost all interest as he and Om Said were planning to
return permanently to Egypt in the near future. However, far from
blaming 'Amm Ali for this lack of interest, most of the Board's members
felt that he was quite justified in concentrating on his personal
affairs. Khadamna we ta'abnah (he has served us well and we have
causd him trouble), was the way one of the members put it. For his
part, 'Amm Ali claimed that the other Board members were ignoring him
and his authority by convening meetings in his absence and that,
furthermore, they were only working to serve their own self-interest.
As an example of the latter, 'Amm Ali pointed to the fact that one
Board member had bought a tractor even though he was not known to be
particularly productive on his land. Reminded that not only had others
in the Settlement also bought tractors but that Khalsa's Cooperative
was not exactly functioning, due to the lack of cooperation on the part
of the settlers, 'Amm Ali brushed this aside and insisted that the
other Board members were clever and knew how to obtain advantages for
themselves from the Iraqi authorities. Why else, so he reasoned, were
they still holding onto their posts even though there were so many problems involved with serving on the Board? Asked why this should have diminished his interest in the Settlement's affairs, as claimed by many settlers, 'Amm Ali explained that he had become disillusioned since so many families persisted with their petty quarrels. There was, he believed, little use in attempting to settle differences between the settlers and unite them into one community when each household was mainly concerned with its own affairs. Though he conceded that most of the settlers continued to show him respect, he claimed that, nevertheless, fewer and fewer of them were coming to him with their problems and that an increasing number were resorting to settling their differences in the Khalsa Police Station.

The void left by 'Amm Ali's decreasing involvement in the Settlement's affairs was apparently encouraging another Menoufi settler - Abu Said - to fill the gap and assume the role of Khalsa's alternative informal leader, regardless of the fact that though they continue to respect 'Amm Ali, as we shall see, most of the settler households do not appear to be interested in deferring to anyone's leadership. During the first few years after resettlement, Abu Said, who is one of the two settlers who perceive themselves to be above the peasant stratum, had apparently remained more or less aloof from the rest of the Settlement's community. He seems to have first come to the attention of the settlers when he attempted to replace the Kurdish imam of Khalsa's Mosque. The Iraqi authorities' intervention and subsequent prohibition of Abu Said's self-proclaimed role as Khalsa's new imam served to rally around him many of the settlers, who because of their wariness of authority, tended to respect his 'boldness' in attempting to assume this function. Having rallied a number of settlers around his cause - it is said he continues to hold a sermon occasionally in
the Mosque - Abu Said seemingly began to contemplate the idea of stepping into the void created by 'Amm Ali's withdrawal from the Settlement's affairs. It was difficult, during the interview, to draw Abu Said out on the actual motives behind this aspiration which he, incidently, did not deny; for he tended to brush off my questioning with the remark that illi beye'raf Rabbena lazem yesa'ed al-naas (he who knows God must help other people). One may, nevertheless, surmise that his identification with the Settlement's community is perhaps influenced by the fact that he has opted for being a full-time cultivator rather than taking up urban employment as the other family-head, who also considers himself above the peasant stratum, has done. Though Abu Said's wife and daughters stand out in the Settlement by virtue of their education and their style of dress, and though he tended to stress that he was not a fellah, he has not translated his status consciousness into a commensurate life-style by investing in the 'modern' furnishings. Abu Said's partial success in fulfilling his ambition may be measured by the fact that only 20% of the fifty-one male respondents, questioned on whom they would turn to if they had a problem which needed solving, indicated that they would seek him rather than 'Amm Ali out. (Only 16% claimed that they prefer to resort to the authorities while the rest indicated they would seek out 'Amm Ali). The fact that Abu Said's role as alternative informal leader was not yet fully acknowledged may be inferred from the fact that no-one in my presence referred to him as 'amm as was the case with 'Amm Ali.36

Chapter 3: Social Conflicts and the Effectiveness of Social Control Mechanisms

The analyses of the preceding chapters provide the portrait of a settler family which appears to have largely adapted its life-style to
the requirements of a way of life essentially dedicated to the aim of profit maximization. The settlers families' incipient individualism and social withdrawal from Khalsa's affairs, have left their impact on the visiting network operating in the Settlement, and have also had a perceptible influence on the formation of leadership and the scope of its effectiveness in Khalsa. The implications of these trends become particularly evident, when one attempts to trace the existence and effectiveness of social control mechanisms in the Khalsa Settlement.

Social control can be defined as a '... kind of regulation in which the appeal to values and norms resolves or mitigates tensions and conflicts between individuals and between groups, in order to maintain ... solidarity; [the term may also be used] ... to refer to the arrangements by means of which the values and norms are consummated and instilled'. Speaking of village society in particular, one may identify this arrangement as the type of social control at the disposal of villagers, and by which the village community enforces a conformity to the social norms it values. As illustrated in the theoretical background to the present study, there are a number of such social control mechanisms which a village community may put into effect.

One such effective instrument is gossip: to be affected by as well as to be involved in the spreading of gossip, is one important indicator of the individual's membership in a community. The restraint which gossip may exert on the individual's actions is, to a great extent, facilitated by the nature of social contacts typical of village society, which tend to be predominantly face-to-face. Another important sanction operating in the village is social boycott. To cease to be visited and invited by others, not only effectively isolates the individual, but also erodes his social status in the village community. The effectiveness of this particular sanction must be judged from the
perspective of the individual's psychological attachment to, and his
dependence on, the village community of which he is a physical part.
For to live in the village, yet exist outside its social boundaries,
and forego the social support of its social institutions is a threat to
the individual's social and economic security. The effectiveness of
this threat is further compounded by the cultural attitude, inherent in
Arab peasant society in general, which generally mistrusts individ-
ualism and encourages the villager to seek refuge in the collectivity
of kin and intra-village social relationships. For sociability and a
reciprocation of social obligations is a valued peasant tradition.
Finally, there exists the instrument of economic sanctions. The
villager's dependence on others for economic cooperation, if not
subsistence, helps ensure that he will not easily deviate from the
norms and values upheld by the community of which he is a member.
Thus, implicit in the effectiveness of these three social control
instruments, is the villagers' social, psychological and economic
dependence on the village society and the lack of any viable
alternative.

As far as the community in the Khalsa Settlement is concerned,
economic sanctions have never been a serious or effective option. In
fact, the very nature of this resettlement project would serve to
impede their enforcement. For, far from being economically dependent
on one another, Khalsa's settlers, during the initial post-resettlement
phase in particular, were reliant on the Iraqi authorities. It is the
latter who had, and continue to have, the power to enforce economic
sanctions against a settler household, for it is they who control the
distribution of land and irrigation water for example. In addition,
the regulation which initially prohibited the employment of outside
labour, played a role in discouraging the economic cooperation between
the settlers. This pattern of self-reliance was, as mentioned elsewhere, more or less institutionalized by the settler household's concentration on its economic self-interest, as well as by the successful exploration of its social environment.

Given the settler household's relative economic independence from the Settlement's community, how operative could the other two social control mechanisms, namely gossip and social boycott, be? The assumption of the possible effectiveness of these two particular sanctions was based on three further suppositions. First, the settler family identifies largely with the community of which it has become a physical part; second, a consensus has evolved with regard to the continuing applicability of a number of social and cultural norms particular to Egyptian peasant society; and third, the individual's deviation from these norms does not remain unpunished.

The effectiveness of some kind of social control in the Khalsa Settlement appeared to me particularly evident during the preliminary survey, when I learnt of the incident concerning the discovery of a settler wife's prostitution activities and, more important, the manner in which the Settlement's community had dealt with it. This impression was further compounded during the actual field-research by my first observations concerning the visiting network among the settler wives. In particular, the perpetuation of the cultural norm which prohibits a woman's unnecessary mobility outside the spatial boundaries of her alley-way, seemed to me a crucial element in favour of the assumption that some kind of social control mechanism appeared to be operating in the Settlement.

However, the actual study of the effectiveness of social control mechanisms posed a number of problems. To begin with, it did not seem to me wise to insert in the questionnaire some of the pertinent issues.
If my first impression regarding the existence of a community spirit in Khalsa was verifiable, then I considered that settler couples would very probably be disinclined to provide me with information, which might cast an unfavorable light on their community. On the contrary, they could well be inclined to paint a relatively idyllic picture of the Settlement and its way of life. In addition came the consideration that behaviour reflective of the effectiveness of social control, needs to a great extent to be observed. However, as previously discussed in the methodology chapter, the limits imposed on my field-work effectively curtailed the extent to which I could rely on participant observation. Thus, the only viable alternative source appeared to be my informants. However, apart from the fact that, at the beginning of the field-work, I was unsure how best to bring the conversation around to this topic, it seemed to me vital that I first concentrate on cultivating my informants' trust in me. To my mind, this was particularly important in the case of Om Said and 'Amm Ali since, in contrast to the two Iraqi informants, they were part of the community of settler households.

The realization that the act of moving house within the Settlement had apparently evolved into one effective means of solving, or rather by-passing, conflicts between house or alley-way neighbours, provided me with the first welcome opportunity to broach the subject of social control with my informants. As can be typical of the nature of field-research, I had stumbled upon this fact almost by accident. Om Said, who was the first person I interviewed in the Settlement, confirmed my casual remark that, at the time of the preliminary survey, her house had been situated on the outskirts of the Settlement, while now she and 'Amm Ali lived more or less in the centre. The reason for this move, according to Om Said, was partly her dislike of living on the
fringe of Khalsa. However, it had also been dictated by the quarrelsome nature of her female house neighbour, who persisted in dumping her garbage in front of her neighbours' entrance gates. As Om Said explained, mafeesh hadd 'awez waga' demagh (no one wants any headaches), concluding that kedda walla kedda, koll al-biyoot zayy ba'ad (anyhow, all houses are alike). The realization that, apart from being a means of conflict resolution, moving house could also reflect the settler household's lack of attachment to its home, and thus implicitly its future plans to return to Egypt, led me to include the pertinent question in all the subsequent interviews. The contents and implications of the answers to this question will be more fully detailed later. What is of relevance at this point is the fact that the first conversations initiated with all four informants, in the hope of obtaining information about other conflicts and their resolution in the Settlement, did not at first bear fruit. Other than reporting on petty quarrels, whose occurrence was an insufficient indication of the existence, or otherwise, of a community of social control in the Settlement, none of these informants mentioned any serious deviations from peasant social norms, which I was assuming were largely continuing to function as a frame of reference.

In the event, it again required a number of coincidences typical of the process of field-work to confirm my vague hunch, fed in particular by the visiting pattern which had begun to emerge, that all was not as harmonious in Khalsa, as I was being led to believe. The first such incident serving to sharpen my awareness, was in connection with the interviewing of two Middle Egyptian settler wives, some four days apart. Each of these women claimed I could not interview her husband, as he was deaf. In each case, I had managed to catch a glimpse of the said husband before he disappeared. After the conclusion of the second
of these interviews, I happened to look in on Om Said's house. Quite by chance, I mentioned these two deaf settlers, wondering aloud about the possibility of their disability being treated in the Health Centre. After a perceptible silence, Om Said very quietly remarked that, to the best of her knowledge, there was only one deaf husband among the Egyptian settlers in Khalsa. But in spite of my gentle prodding she refused to elaborate any further on the subject. Intrigued by her reaction, I made a point of mentioning to one of the Iraqi informants, that I had interviewed these two Middle Egyptian settler wives, but had been unable to question their husbands. This informant's response added some clarification to this apparent mystery, for he explained that it was unlikely I would be able to interview these two men, as one was deaf, and the other was said to be working in southern Iraq. The only conclusion that seemed feasible, was that the man I had caught a quick glimpse of in both houses, was one and the same. Yet, both women could not be his wives, for the other two settlers, who had second wives, had only one house each at their disposal. However, not wanting to push my informants further than, for some reason I could at the time not comprehend, they were willing to be led, I decided to lay the matter to rest temporarily.

Shortly after this experience, two further incidents took place, which I was able to witness first-hand and which seemed to me important indicators of my feeling that there seemed to be a lack of community spirit among the settler households. The first incident concerned the settler/butcher son of Om Gamal, the Settlement's traditional midwife. One day around noon, much shouting could be heard from the direction of Om Gamal's house, in front of which stood three Iraqi policemen. I had just entered the house next door to interview its owner, when I observed (before the curtains of the living room were pointedly drawn,
presumably to obscure my view) Om Gamal's eldest son throwing what appeared to be pipes, from the roof-top of his house into his neighbour's yard. The latter's sons were gesticulating wildly, and were just as quickly attempting to push the pipes back, amidst shouts of *ehna maalna* (this has nothing to do with us). The story which finally emerged, was that Om Gamal's son had apparently 'helped himself' to these pipes, from a nearby construction site, and had been reported by the Egyptian watchmen to the police. Significant, in the context of the present discussion, is the fact that, far from coming to his aid, this settler's neighbour went out of his way to distance himself from the whole affair. Even though this neighbour's married daughter prefers to turn to Om Gamal, rather than to the Iraqi midwife during her confinement, and even though his wife was, on various occasions, observed to be squatting with Om Gamal in the harah, this household did not feel obliged to be involved with its neighbour's problem with the police. Equally important, 'Amm Ali made no attempt to try and mediate between Om Gamal's son and the authorities. In fact, both he and Om Said shrugged off the incident with the remark *zanbou 'ala ganbouh* (literally: his guilt is by his side, meaning that it is the person's own fault, for having stolen in the first place).

The other incident involved the arrest of a Lower Egyptian settler (D1 in kinship group D, see Chart III), who was accused of stealing money from an Iraqi's pocket on a public bus in Baghdad. Only two settlers who were D1's friends attempted to help him, by journeying into the capital, where they sought the assistance of an official at the General Union of Peasants' Cooperative Societies. While the neglect of his married daughter, and the latter's husband, to come to his aid, will be discussed within a later context, suffice it here to point out that 'Amm Ali made no attempt to intervene on this settler's
behalf. Though the offender was eventually released for lack of evidence, no great fanfare greeted his home-coming, as I was able personally to observe. No-one appeared to take much notice of him, aside from his wife and a few friends, when he stepped off the bus one morning. Rather, the Settlement's daily routine flowed on uninterrupted.

It took, in the event, the occurrence of a fourth incident, to confirm my initial instinct that there were events of relevance to the type of community which appeared to have evolved in Khalsa, but about their occurrence I was being kept in ignorance. Waiting in the Mashrou' al-Wihda for the Ministry of Agriculture bus to transport me back to Baghdad, I chanced to overhear a conversation taking place in the adjacent office, to the effect that there were some Egyptian women in the Khalsa Settlement, who were willing to sell their sexual favours to any male customer who discreetly came after nightfall. Not daring to acknowledge my eavesdropping, I was unable to ascertain the identity of these male conversants, nor, more important, that of the women about whom they had been talking. My first reaction was one of disbelief, for, given the nature of Iraqi society as I had been able to observe it, it appeared to me highly unlikely that prostitution could flourish in the Settlement, as the conversation which I had overheard seemed to imply. The unlikelihood of this seemed to me further ascertained by the manner in which the first case of prostitution had been dealt with in Khalsa. After some hesitation, I decided to broach the subject with Om Said. But my voiced, and honestly felt, indignation at the spreading of such a rumour, which - so I explained - could not but add to the social tensions which were said to have surfaced between the Egyptian migrants and their Iraqi hosts, was met at first with stony silence. However, my apprehension that I had caused offence was, to my
relief, unwarranted. For, with a deep sigh, Om Said quietly answered that, unfortunately, the rumour I had overheard was true. For some reason, the coming to light of this incident seemed to encourage her to give up the pretense that all was well in the Settlement, and she proceeded to pour out all the gossip which she had hitherto kept to herself. For my part, I adhered to the cultural norm which views the discussion of such an issue as part of 'women's talk', not to be referred to in front of men. In this, I took my cue from Om Said, who tended to change the subject if her husband joined our conversation. However, 'Amm Ali had undoubtedly been told of my knowledge. For, after this incident, he too seemed to me more inclined to be critical of his fellow-settlers.

Encouraged by Om Said's attitude, I decided to broach this subject with the two Iraqi informants. One of them denied the truth of what I had overheard emphatically, insisting that this was just rumour-mongering. The reaction of the other was rather ambivalent: he did not confirm the rumour, but neither did he go out of his way to refute it. Instead, he conceded that he too had heard such 'talk' about Khalsa, and given the fact that there once had been a case of prostitution: 'no-one could really be sure'.

It is perhaps of relevance at this point to speculate on the reasons why my informants, who had otherwise displayed a conspicuous friendliness as well as willingness to cooperate, were disinclined to provide me with any significant insight into the reality of community life in the Khalsa Settlement. The motives of the two Iraqi informants would appear to be related to an attitude typical of Arab bureaucracy at large. They simply did not wish to be held accountable for whatever short-comings may come to light in this resettlement project. It was difficult to ascertain - without attracting any unwelcome attention to
my research activities - whether or not any higher authority was aware of this state of affairs in Khalsa. 'Amm Ali's and Om Said's motives are less easily discernible. The former, in his role as informal leader, had expended much effort in the hope of seeing the Khalsa Settlement develop into a community where a spirit of cooperation, based on the feeling that *ehna men balad wahda* (we are from the same country), as 'Amm Ali put it, prevailed. The Settlement's apparent indifference to the renewed incidence of prostitution, as well as the disputants' increasing tendency to turn to the authorities for arbitration, appear to have contributed to his final disillusionment with his fellow-settlers, and serve to underline his increasing withdrawal from the Cooperative Board and its affairs. But this in itself does not explain why both he and his wife were at first so reluctant to provide me with any insight into the reality of community life in Khalsa. It is possible that such a serious social deviation as prostitution may have reinforced this couple's provincial consciousness, a deduction based on Om Said's remark when, referring to the parents of one of these prostitutes who are also from Menoufiah, she said: *Moush hamemhom ennou kassafouna* (they do not care that they have shamed us). On the other hand, the host country's understandable tendency to lump migrants into one undifferentiated stereotype, may plausibly have increased this settler couple's reluctance to inform me about such an incident. Whatever my informants' motives may actually have been, the fact is that my knowledge of the 'worst' in the Settlement appears to have helped to largely dismantle the barriers between us: I ceased to be viewed exclusively as the outsider.

The following is a presentation of examples on social control in the Settlement, which were collected during various conversations with my informants. Most of these were conveyed and related by Om Said and
the Iraqi informant, who had not denied outright the truth of the conversation I had chanced to overhear in Mashrou' al-Wihda. Even though they obviously did not fully understand my interest in this particular issue, they were nevertheless generally willing to rake their memories for examples of social deviations from the norm.39 Though 'Amm Ali and the other Iraqi informant appeared to perceptibly discard their reticence, they nevertheless remained largely disinclined to mention the more serious deviations. As I made a point of talking to each of these four informants alone, I was generally able to double-check the accuracy of most of the incidents reported to me. However, rather than detail them according to whether or not they constitute a serious deviation from the established social norm in Egyptian village society, I have chosen, as far as the accuracy of my informants' memories permits, to present them chronologically. In my judgement, this will not only serve to substantiate the previously presented analysis of the formation and evolution of leadership in the Settlement, but also this type of presentation serves best to illustrate the settler household's incipient individualism, which appears to be accompanied by the decreasing effectiveness of social sanctions in Khalsa.

The petty quarrels which tended to erupt regularly between the settlers during the initial post-resettlement phase were, as mentioned previously, almost all due to the suspicion with which a settler family tended to view those who were from a different province or region. Influenced by a socio-economic background in which fair treatment at the hands of the authorities had, more often than not, been the exception, Khalsa's Egyptian peasant appears to have found it difficult to believe that his neighbour was not enjoying any more advantages than he himself had access to. This initial period after resettlement is
also characterized by the settlers' dependence on the Iraqi authorities, and this included the expectation that the latter would intervene to arbitrate in each and every dispute among the settler families. Thus, according to the Cooperative Supervisor, the authorities found themselves drawn into such quarrels as a settler's accusation that his neighbour was using his roof-top to peer into the accuser's yard and, implicitly, at the women in the household; or a family's complaint that the neighbour's dog was attacking their children; or the quarrel which erupted over a settler wife's habit of throwing her garbage into the neighbour's yard; or finally, the rumour that some settlers were being given better quality agricultural inputs and a higher monthly subsidy than others. These tensions were further compounded by the settlers' disappointment over the fact that the plots of land had not been ready for distribution at the time of their arrival. Though the Iraqi authorities had assured them that communal cultivation was an interim solution, few settlers were ready to accept such a promise at face value. Quarrels erupted amidst accusations that some members of a group who had been given a plot to cultivate communally, were not hard-working, and therefore were not entitled to an equal share of the profits from the sale of the crops. Though there inevitably was dissatisfaction with the final distribution of the plots of land - those who had drawn plots situated furthest from the Settlement, not surprisingly voiced a mistrust of the fairness of the lottery system applied by the authorities - the conclusion of this allocation is said to have perceptibly eased the tensions between the settler households. Their preoccupation with their own plot was further encouraged by the Iraqi authorities' expulsion of those settler families deemed to have had inadequate agricultural experience. Those who remained were aware they had to prove their ability to be productive cultivators.
According to 'Amm Ali, it was already during this period, i.e. less than a year after resettlement, that moving house began to develop as one means of conflict resolution. None of my informants could quite remember who had first resorted to this habit, but all are agreed that this must be judged as an expression of the settler families' inclination at the time to avoid being embroiled in disputes with their neighbours. Of the sixty-nine settler households included in the present study, twenty-one or 30% were found to have moved house at least once up to the time of my field-research in Khalsa. All claimed that they had had to pay the departing family an unspecified sum of money, in order to be given priority over one or more families, who also wished to move into this particular house. Five of these twenty-one families claimed they had been motivated by their dislike of living on the outskirts of the Settlement, and had seized the opportunity of moving into a house vacated by another family. The remaining sixteen families explained that they had moved house because of problems with a house or alley-way neighbour. Three of them indicated that the dispute they had been involved in was due to a neighbour's rudeness and quarrelsome nature, but refused to elaborate any further. The rest all explained that their problems with their former neighbours had been a result of disputes between their respective children. Few of Khalsa's parents, it appears, like to contemplate the possibility that their own child could be the instigator of quarrels with its peers in the harah. Rather, it is by all accounts always the ibn or bint al-ghareeb who is suspected of being the culprit, which in effect implies that it is his parents who are at fault for not having brought him or her up properly. More specifically, such disputes tend to involve the settler wives, for it is they who are in charge of the care and socialization of their children. Because women's mobility was, from the
outset, generally restricted to the spatial boundaries of the alley-
way and the social contacts therein, it would follow that it is above
all they who would have been interested in being on good terms with
their female neighbours. The validity of this assumption appears to me
further supported by the fact that, during the period under discussion,
i.e. around the first two years after resettlement, only a minority of
settler households had been able to afford the cash purchase of a tele-
vision set. Television viewing had thus not yet developed into the
main leisure-time activity of Khalsa's settler families as was found to
be the case by the time of my field-research. It is, however, diffi-
cult to ascertain whether it had been the instigator or the victim of a
quarrel, who tended to take the initiative of moving into another part
of the Settlement. The discovery that, according to 'Amm Ali, some
settlers have been willing to exchange their homes for a price, further
complicates the issue, in that it suggests that not all who moved house
were necessarily involved in quarrels with their neighbours, or were
forced to pay out any money. The only apparently indisputable case
involves one of the settler/butchers, who has installed a loud-speaker
on the roof-top of his home and persists in entertaining half the
Settlement with blaring music. His former alley-way neighbours are
said to have collected a sum of money between them, which they offered
him in return for moving to another part of the Settlement. Nonethe-
less, whatever the actual circumstances inducing a family to move into
another alley-way, the relevant fact is that, by the time of my field-
research in Khalsa, this pattern had more or less ceased to be a means
of conflict resolution between neighbours. Two distinct developments
are relevant here: on the one hand is the fact that, as the description
of the visiting network in the Settlement has illustrated, harah
neighbours have more or less established a modus vivendi during the
years they have lived in physical proximity. On the other hand, this may be a reflection of the reality that, for some settler households at least, it has ceased to be of importance who their house or alley-way neighbours are.

The semblance of a community spirit, which appeared to be developing in the Settlement during this particular period referred to above, is implicitly expressed by the settler families' reaction to the discovery that a settler wife was actively engaged in prostitution, and that, furthermore, her husband was fully aware of her activities. This settler couple's house-neighbours had apparently soon become aware of this state of affairs, for at the time, few outsiders could hope to obtain an unobtrusive entry into Khalsa. The news quickly spread among the other settler households, and the first reaction is said to have been the social boycott of the couple. But more important, instead of waiting for the Iraqi authorities to deal with this deviation, the settlers decided to take matters into their own hands. A meeting, attended by at least half the household heads from the various provinces represented in Khalsa, was convened in the Social Centre, and the decision unanimously reached to inform this settler couple that its presence would no longer be tolerated among biyoot mohtaramah (honourable households). Significantly, this settler couple did not refuse to comply, but packed its belongings, and left soon afterwards. While its departure was undoubtedly hastened by the Iraqi authorities' knowledge of its activities, it would seem to have also been affected by the stand taken against it by the other settler families. For the settler households' relative economic independence did not, at this point, cancel their psychological need of, or attachment to, the Settlement. Regardless of the suspicion which tended to feed the on-going strife during this period, the fact remains that the individual settler family
would have found it difficult to exist without the social contacts, however limited, provided by others in Khalsa. However, while the above may explain the reaction of the deviant settler couple, which appears to have felt it could not exist in a hostile environment, to my mind it does not sufficiently explain why the settler households were not content with social boycott, but were adamant in expelling this family. It is at this point perhaps of some relevance to attempt to provide some insight into the issue of prostitution in Egyptian society. This will not only facilitate the comprehension of the Egyptian settlers' reaction to the first incidence of prostitution in Khalsa. Rather, one may thereby appreciate more fully the implication of the changes which had taken place in the Settlement by the time of my field-research.

Apart from a number of contemporary Egyptian writers, who have directly or indirectly dealt with this issue in their novels, there are, to my knowledge, no sociological studies published on the topic of prostitution in Egypt. The one exception would appear to be N. El-Saadawi who, in her demands for the social and legal equality between men and women in Egypt, makes a reference to prostitution as a pertinent example of women's inferior status in the eyes of the law and ipso facto in the view of society: 'The law punishes a woman for committing adultery much more heavily than does a man; ... her punishment could be a maximum prison sentence of two years. A man, however, is not punished for adultery as long as it is committed outside the home in which his wife is living with him ... According to Egyptian law, if a man is caught in sexual intercourse with a prostitute, he is not put in jail, but is used as a witness against her, whereas she is sentenced to a term of imprisonment'. However, '... a prostitute is safe if she is under the protection of the police, or of somebody with influence.'
Prison is her fate only if she is poor, or if she refuses to comply with the wishes of the police, or of someone else in power.\textsuperscript{46} Though prostitution has been illegal in Egypt since 1951, it is by all accounts continuing to prevail.

Of interest to the context of the present discussion, is the question to what extent these pronouncements can be said to be pertinent to the social setting in the Egyptian village. According to Om Said, it is not unusual to hear of prostitution in rural Egyptian society. However, she stressed that di moush haga tabi‘iyah (this is not something normal), and that a prostitute never has any social ties — kin or otherwise — with the village community, but is a ghareeba malhash assl (a stranger without any known origin).\textsuperscript{47} As such, village society is not morally responsible for her or her actions. Nonetheless, as such women tend to move about, like gypsies, according to Om Said, the village community tends to tolerate their presence, which is confined to the fringe of the village. But no respectable male villager would ever have anything to do with such a woman; rather, her clients tend to be also strangers who have no social ties with the village. R. Critchfield, in his anthropological novel about the life of an Upper Egyptian peasant,\textsuperscript{48} makes a number of references to prostitutes in the village he describes. Here too, the prostitute is generally a stranger from another village, but the stress is on the fact that such women have no male kin to take care of them. While this is not taken as a justification for their social deviation, it is regarded by village society largely as an explanation for their behaviour. However, Critchfield stresses that the village community's tolerance of this social deviation must be judged from the perspective of its possible detection: Islamic law, as practised in the village community, requires the burden of proof.\textsuperscript{49} As long as adultery and
prostitution remain secret and no-one can prove the gossip, the community tends to - indeed may prefer to - close its eyes. However, in contrast to Om Said's description, Critchfield's study indicates that a prostitute's clients are not necessarily from outside the village community. In fact, because such a woman tends to live outside the spatial boundaries of the village, i.e. more or less out of eyesight of the latter, male villagers so disposed can discreetly make their way to her house without attracting much attention.

In my judgement, it is both the spatial confinement, or rather the social isolation of the prostitute, as well as the detection of this social deviation, which are the main considerations behind the reaction of Khalsa's Egyptian peasants towards the first incident of prostitution in the Settlement. For, given the physical infrastructure of Khalsa, even if this deviant couple had moved to a house on the outskirts, it remained within the spatial boundaries of a relatively small Settlement, and as such could not be ignored. Om Said's remark that homma kanou 'aysheen fi westeena (i.e. this particular settler couple were living in our midst) is indicative of the attitude which appears to have prevailed at the time. On the other hand, the very fact that this incident did not remain undetected, more or less forced the settler households to take a stand in order to stress their dissociation from this settler couple. Regardless of the heterogeneity in their regional origin, and the suspicion which fed the ongoing strife between settlers at the time, Khalsa's families reacted as a community which was not only bent on upholding the social values which had dictated their way of life before resettlement. In addition, they seem to have cared about the opinions of outsiders - i.e. the Iraqi administrators and officials involved with this project - with regard to Egyptians in general.
A further example of the existence of a community spirit during this particular period is the incident involving the accusation against the honour of a settler wife. The latter and her husband had an Egyptian lodger - the first perceptible influx of temporary Egyptian migrant workers into Iraq had just about begun - who was a baladiyat, but not a relative. (However, the authorities were apparently told that he was a paternal cousin.) Though employed outside the Settlement, this lodger regularly frequented Khalsa's coffee-shop. One day, so it is said, he openly bragged to other settlers that his landlord's wife was not averse to granting him certain favours. According to 'Amm Ali, he never got around to repeating this story twice. For a number of the men present promptly informed the woman's husband and, more important, helped the latter to administer a severe beating to the lodger. Moreover, before being thrown out of the Settlement, the lodger was submitted to the final insult which could befall a man: he was stripped and the landlord's wife was allowed to spit in his face, in the presence of the other men. Everyone (so Om Said) knew that this woman was shareefa (honourable), though she was also lucky in that her husband was inclined to disbelieve this accusation. Here also, Khalsa's Egyptian settlers can be said to have displayed a community consciousness which would not tolerate an unfounded accusation against a settler wife's honour and, by implication, that of her husband, by an outsider, i.e. one who did not belong to the original group of Egyptian families who had been resettled. It is tempting to speculate that this incident may perhaps have introduced the unwritten rule that lodgers should keep away until the family head has returned home.

Another example showing the community spirit prevailing at the time, i.e. approximately the first three years after resettlement, concerns the harassment to which the settlers claimed to have been
subjected by a number of Iraqi greengrocers in Jisr al-Diyalah. This attitude encouraged one settler couple (significantly perhaps, this was one of the settler/merchants from Sharqiah) to explore other possibilities. Having heard of Za'afaraniyah and found it to be an even more suitable location for the sale of their produce, because of this market's proximity to the capital, this couple did not hesitate to inform all the other settler households of this find. Similarly settler families would tend to inform each other about where, for example, one could best purchase agricultural inputs, or a cart, or certain household necessities. Khalsa's settlers may have not yet fully overcome their ingrained suspicion of one another. Nonetheless, few had reached a state of social self-sufficiency or psychological security which would have encouraged them to turn their backs on the Settlement's community, regardless of their relative economic independence of the latter. A particular evidence of this pattern is the fact that, according to 'Amm Ali, some settlers who were among the first to own a television set were apparently inclined to invite their non-kin neighbours to watch the programmes with them. Given the fact that settler households had not yet begun to accumulate any significant savings and possessions, then protecting _sirr al-bayt_ may possibly not yet have acquired the significance as found to be the case by the time of my research. More important, the period during which the above incidents took place, saw above all the gradual acknowledgement of 'Amm Ali's role as the Settlement's informal leader, to which his nomination as Chairman of the Cooperative Board more or less set the seal. Though provincial clannishness and petty quarrels over trivial issues continued to be disruptive, the majority of settler households nonetheless appeared to have begun to identify with the Khalsa Settlement.
None of my informants can quite indicate when it first became noticeable that Khalsa's settler households were becoming increasingly preoccupied with their own concerns, and less interested in taking a stand for or against the goings-on in the Settlement. However, from the previous analysis of the evolution of leadership in Khalsa, one may assume this to have been during the fourth year after resettlement, for this coincides with a number of developments in the Settlement. This period marks, for example, the settler household's previously mentioned decreasing reliance on the services provided by the Cooperative Society, a pattern furthered by the Iraqi authorities general lack of remedial action. It also marks the wider spread of television which has played a part in encouraging the settler family's gradual withdrawal from the Settlement and its affairs. Another development of importance concerns the authorities' decision to permit non-settler families to be housed in Khalsa, in order to help ease the housing shortage in the area. But this period, above all, witnessed the tremendous upsurge in the number of temporary Egyptian migrants in Iraq. The television in its role as the main focus of the settler families' leisure-time activities, as well as their decreasing association with the Cooperative Society, have already been dealt with in the previous chapters. The concentration here will therefore be on more descriptive details of the Egyptian migrant community, as well as of the non-settlers resident in Khalsa, and the effects both have had on the Settlement.

True, these temporary migrants had begun to arrive in more or less significant numbers from the mid-seventies onwards. But these first migrant waves did not have a perceptible influence on Khalsa, for, as previously mentioned, only one settler household had, at the time of their resettlement in 1976, kith or kin working in Iraq. By the late
seventies, there was an unmistakable upsurge in this trend. A consid­
erable number of these temporary migrants appear to have come upon the
couragement of Khalsa's settlers. The letters or news which the
latter sent to their villages of origin are said to have spread almost
like wildfire, and acted as the final encouragement for many a poten­t
tial migrant to make his way to Iraq.\textsuperscript{50} Khalsa began to develop into a
kind of clearing place where many new arrivals could collect their
bearings, before they embarked upon the search for jobs and accommoda­
tion, a trend which is aptly reflected in a saying coined by the
settlers (which is a pun on the word Khalsa, also meaningcompleted):
Igraat al-safar matkounsh khalsa illa fi al-Khalsa (travel arrangements
are not completed except in Khalsa). However, this trend must also be
viewed in conjunction with the fact that the authorities had by then
perceptibly loosened their grip on the Settlement. Khalsa was trans­
formed from a relatively enclosed community, where each strange face
was instantly noticed by the sentries on duty in front of the Police
Station, to one in which there was an almost constant coming and going
of visitors, many of whom made the Settlement into their temporary
base. It was difficult to find out from my two Iraqi informants why
the authorities had not opposed this trend. Both tended to attribute
this to the fact that, with the allocation of vacant settler homes to
Iraqi and even Egyptian non-peasant families, the authorities were
unable to continue to control access into the Settlement. One of the
Iraqi officials at Mashrou' al-Wihda insisted that the authorities had
never had any wish to isolate Khalsa's settlers from their social
environment, be it their Iraqi peasant neighbours, be it their fellow­
nationals in the country. Whatever the case, none of these informants
could pinpoint the date when Khalsa's Police Station had ceased to
question the identity of anyone entering the Settlement.
The effects of the sharp increase in the inflow of temporary Egyptian migrants into Iraq on the Khalsa Settlement have been far-reaching. They have, as previously mentioned, above all assumed the role of a human channel of communication between settler household and village of origin back in Egypt, which has served to intensify the contacts between them. The settler family manages thus to keep abreast of happenings in the home village, while the latter remains informed of events in Khalsa. To quote 'Amm Ali: Al-Khalsa baqet mashhoura men awel ila akher Masr (Khalsa has become famous from one end of Egypt to another). The importance of these contacts is implicit in the settler families' response to the question whether or not they know other Egyptians living in Iraq outside the Settlement. Only two families insisted they did not: the settler couple, referred to elsewhere, who claimed not to socialize with anyone in Khalsa and the Lower Egyptian settler household where I had only been able to interview the eldest son. Of the sixty-seven families who do, 65% claimed that the majority of the baladiyat they know are either close or distant kin, or friends from the village of origin. Two-thirds of them indicated that these baladiyat visit them regularly, on average two or three times a month depending on the distance of their job and residence from the Khalsa Settlement. All these settler families indicated that baladiyat hardly ever omit a visit on the occasion of an important life-cycle or religious festival. Even though these events are, as previously mentioned, generally celebrated in a relatively muted manner compared to what tradition requires back home, nevertheless a settler family will always make a point of inviting them and expects their visit. The temporary Egyptian migrants have also helped add to the settlers' knowledge of their social environment, as well as diversify their contacts with the latter. Both settler and temporary migrant are
generally ready to accord each other small favours such as providing information about employment opportunities, or various services which either of them may need. However, by all accounts, there appears to be a commercial aspect to this relationship. For a settler household's temporary hospitality is apparently not always offered free. Many of Khalsa's families are said to demand payment from all their temporary guests, other than close kin, regardless of how short their stay may be. Nonetheless, far from causing any ill-feelings, this has come to be the accepted pattern. Even 'Amm Ali, though he generally disapproves of the habit of putting up baladiyat, concedes that there is nothing unusual in requesting payment for the provision even of temporary accommodation, explaining that, after all, each one has come to Iraq for the same purpose, namely 'alashan yshassen ahwalahou (to improve his situation). Whether or not the Egyptians in Iraq have established associations, similar to those described by J. Abu-Lughod, in her study of rural migrants in Cairo,\textsuperscript{51} whose main function is the direction of new arrivals to employment possibilities, and the provision of social contacts with those from the same area of origin, must remain for the present unanswered in view of the lack of published research on the Egyptian migrant community in Iraq. Whatever the case, the fact remains that Khalsa's settler households have ceased to be solely dependent on the social contacts available in the Settlement and this, in my judgement, has been one among a number of crucial factors which have contributed to their increasing withdrawal from the Settlement and its affairs.

The changing character of the Settlement was further encouraged by the arrival of Iraqi, as well as Egyptian non-peasant families, who were housed in Khalsa as a temporary palliative to the chronic housing shortage in the area, but who were not associated in any way with this
resettlement project. Up to this point, only Iraqi officials employed in different capacities in the project had been permitted to reside in the Settlement. The settler households had, from the outset, become used to their presence. However, because these civil servants were housed in modern-type bungalows which, moreover, are spatially set apart from the settlers' blocks, they were not perceived to be socially part of the Settlement's community. The social distance existing between the two groups, is as much due to the Iraqi officials' position of authority, as it is the result of the lack of common meeting-ground. The Iraqi employee, by all accounts, would rarely, if ever, visit the Khalsa coffee-shops. Neither have the Friday prayers in the Mosque apparently initiated any social contacts beyond the customary exchange of greetings. Similarly, the closure of the Social Centre, but in particular the exemption of settlers and settler wives from the illiteracy eradication classes, have effectively curtailed the development of social contacts between them. Around 89% of the forty-six male respondents indicated that they never visit any of the Iraqi officials, not even on special occasions, such as religious festivals. The exceptions were 'Amm Ali and his 'rival' for the role of informal leader, Abu Said, both of whom indicated that they would not neglect to visit the Cooperative Supervisor and the Head of the Agricultural Extension Center on the occasion of a religious festival. Two other Middle Egyptian settlers, one of whom was serving on the Cooperative Board during the period of my field-research, also indicated that they visited the Supervisor on special occasions, because they liked and respected him. The fifth respondent, whose daughter is married to the brother of Khalsa's Iraqi midwife, confines his visits to the home of his in-laws, though he also claims to be on visiting terms with some of the Iraqi staff employed in the Health Center, who are also resident in
the Settlement. Of the fifty female respondents, 92% indicated that they never visited any of the wives of Khalsa's Iraqi government employees, not even on very special occasions, though, as mentioned elsewhere, a number of settler wives made an exception, when they paid a condolence visit to the Iraqi midwife upon the death of her father.

As previously explained, death is the one life-cycle event which appears to reduce the importance of social barriers. The remaining 8% which includes Om Said as well as the two settler wives who perceive themselves to be above the peasant stratum, indicated that they visited the Cooperative Supervisor's wife as well as the wife of the Head of the Extension Center on important social occasions.

The allocation of vacant settler homes to non-peasant families affected the spatial division which had hitherto separated the settler families from the households of the Iraqi officials resident in Khalsa. It also introduced the aspect of social stratification into the harah. The newcomers, whose occupations classify them socially above the Egyptian peasants, have, as previously mentioned, apparently made little, if any attempt to initiate social contacts with their alley-way neighbours, other than offering a polite greeting. Otherwise, they have remained generally aloof and are, in turn largely ignored by their settler neighbours. The result of all these changes has been a fluidity with regard to the criteria of who does and does not belong to the Khalsa community, a fact further exacerbated by the authorities' decision to build new houses adjacent to the Primary School to accommodate other government employees. Thus the Egyptian settler families have ceased to be a majority in the community which had originally been built to accommodate them.

The assumption that this particular period in the Settlement's life-span was a turning-point in the transformation of Khalsa into a
community characterized more by individualism, rather than by cohesiveness, is, in my judgement, further supported by the fact that the following incidents reported to me by my informants, which clearly reflect the decreasing effectiveness of gossip and of social boycott, appear to have taken place after this date.

One example of this trend concerns the settler widow whose husband had died during the first year after resettlement, but who had nevertheless been permitted to stay and cultivate her plot with the help of her eldest son. The latter, who was supposed to eventually take over the title-deed upon reaching the legal age, began to display an increasing disenchantment with the way of life of a cultivator. Encouraged by the example of other settlers, who use their contacts with baladiyat and other Egyptian migrants to secure occasional employment during the slack season, he too began to seek such opportunities. However, instead of taking up wage-employment only during the slack periods, he apparently began to avoid helping his mother on the land altogether. In 'Amm Ali's view, it is his very independence, fed by the feeling of ready cash in his hand, which at least partly explains his increasing mistreatment of his mother. However, the first time it became known that he had beaten his mother, not only did his brother-in-law (see kinship L, Chart III) intervene, but also 'Amm Ali as well as a number of other settlers made a point of publicly rebuking him. To ill-treat one's mother is almost a social crime in Arab peasant society, indeed in Middle Eastern society in general, and Khalsa's Egyptian peasants reacted accordingly. Nonetheless, by the time of my field-work, not only was this settler widow being regularly ill-treated by her son, but more significantly, no-one appeared to take much heed. As 'Amm Ali explained, no-one can do anything, because this young man neither listens to his elders, nor does he care about the
opinions of others, to the extent that his own brother-in-law is apparently powerless to intervene. The rest of the Settlement has come to treat the matter as an internal family affair which is none of its concern. However, far from being socially ostracized by the others, the young man could often be seen sitting among other settlers in one of the coffee-shops.

Similarly, no-one cares to intervene in the case of those settlers who are habitually drunk. Even though they do not confine their drinking to the privacy of their homes, no-one, according to 'Amm Ali, can do anything about them. Here too, those who are guilty of contravening a social and religious custom – Egyptian village society frowns upon the consumption of alcohol, as this is against the teachings of Islam, but is generally inclined to close its eyes, as long as this deviation is not flaunted in public – apparently do not much care what the rest of the community may think of them. 'Amm Ali's powerlessness to influence this particular state of affairs, is reflected by the fact that the wife of one of these settlers is said to often resort to the Khalsa Police Station to complain about her husband's drunkenness and beatings. Interestingly, the idea that this woman should be beaten by her husband, did not appear to shock Om Said as much as the fact that a wife should resort to the Police Station to complain of her husband. Nonetheless, Om Said also acknowledged that any wife who did resort to the authorities in such circumstances, had no alternative since she had no male kin to protect her.

Another example of the reality of community life in Khalsa, some seven years after resettlement, is to be found in the incident recounted about the deaf settler whom two women claim as their husband. The woman, whose husband he is not, apparently takes no notice of the rumour circulating in the Settlement, that she has murdered her own
husband and buried him in the yard, while pretending that he is working in southern Iraq. (Apparently, there had been no sign or word from the said husband for around six months prior to my field-research in the Settlement). Venturing the opinion that this deaf settler may be employed by this woman, to help her cultivate her plot of land during her husband's absence, Om Said was quick to retort that the very fact that she had introduced him to me as her husband, was proof that an illicit relationship existed between them. Moreover in Om Said's opinion, no respectable woman would let a strange man into her house during her husband's absence, even if he should be another settler. Implicit in my informant's judgement is peasant society's view of the woman who lacks male protection. It is the latter which appears to be perceived as an encouragement for a woman's unlicensed behaviour, an attitude which is not surprising, given that same society's view of the necessity of subjecting female sexuality to social control. What is more significant with regard to the context of the present chapter is that neither 'Amm Ali nor anyone else in the Settlement appears to have attempted to intervene on behalf of this deaf settler's legal wife. Though the other woman appears to be socially boycotted - contrary to her claims, she is not a member of the female social network of her harah, for none of her female neighbours mentioned her name among those they socialized with most frequently - the Settlement's community has not undertaken any attempts to have her expelled.

However, it is above all the incidents of prostitution in the Khalsa Settlement which best reflect the extent of the change in the settler families' attitudes towards the community of which they have become a physical part. One case, confirmed by Om Said, concerns the daughter of D1 (see Chart III). At the age of thirteen, she was married off to one of the bachelors who had been resettled in 1976.
Since the groom is from the same province as the bride, he was considered to be a good catch. However, not long after his marriage, this settler began to visibly slacken his efforts on the land, and to resort to drinking. Om Said is unsure when the gossip first began to circulate that this settler wife was engaged in prostitution. The rumours were fed by the observation that, apart from the baladiyat, who were renting rooms from this couple, there appeared to be other men entering the house after nightfall. Another indication, according to Om Said, lay in the fact that though her husband was obviously not expending much effort on the land, nor appeared to be taking up wage employment outside the Settlement, this settler's wife was never short of cash. In fact, she was a regular customer of Om Essam, the Settlement's best dressmaker. During my rounds of the settler homes, I had often observed this young woman sitting outside her entrance gate during times when others in her harah were busy with house or land, or were in the market selling the produce. Considering that, during most of the period of my field-research, her husband was serving at the war-front, it seemed to me puzzling that she should obviously have so much time on her hands. Nonetheless, I did not hesitate to take advantage of this and, whenever time permitted, made it a habit to squat next to her to chat about the Settlement in the hope I would learn more about its affairs. The first inkling that matters were not quite what they seemed was fed by Om Said's nagging not to enter the home of this particular settler wife, however much I may be pressed to do so. Though I was tempted to attribute Om Said's remarks to jealousy - she was obviously enjoying the fact that I had chosen her home as my base, more or less, and did not perhaps wish me to cultivate another female informant - and though I found the whole affair somewhat puzzling, I nevertheless pushed it temporarily out of my mind intending to pursue
it at some later point. Then came the conversation which I overheard about the existence of prostitution in the Settlement. By all accounts, it appears that this woman's husband is actively supporting her activities. In Om Said's view this is evidenced by the fact that, when the latter departed for the war-front, his wife continued to live in the conjugal home, instead of returning to that of her parents and, more important, continued to let out rooms to lodgers. Some settlers from the same province, including 'Amm Ali, apparently took it upon themselves to inform the young woman's father of the rumours circulating about his daughter. However, by all accounts, her parents have steadfastly refused to acknowledge even the existence of such a rumour. The father has thus effectively absolved himself of the necessity of taking any remedial action as would have been expected of him back in the home village in Egypt. Indicative of the break-down of parental responsibility in this kin relationship is the fact that, instead of resorting to her family of origin, this young woman apparently takes her grievances against her husband to the Khalsa Police Station. Furthermore, she displays a conspicuous indifference towards her parents as evidenced during the previously described incident of her father's arrest upon being accused of theft. Neither she, nor her husband, who had shortly before come back from the war-front, made any attempt to come to his aid. Equally significant, neither did 'Amm Ali attempt to intervene on behalf of this settler, a gesture which his position as Chairman of the Cooperative Board would have demanded. Om Said aptly expressed her husband's opinion of his fellow Menoufi, when she remarked that, since this settler had not attempted to undertake any action following the gossip about his daughter, it is not far-fetched that he may also be a thief. Nonetheless, according to my own observation, this young woman is not completely socially ostracized, at
least not by some of her female neighbours along the same alley-way, in whose company she was sometimes observed, though none of them mentioned her name among those with whom they most frequently socialize in the harah. Om Said, who greets her though she would never set foot in her house, explained this lack of social boycott by the fact that people pity this settler wife whose youth has enabled her husband to lead her astray, and whose family of origin do not care about her honour. Om Said is convinced that part of this woman's problem is that she has not been properly circumcised, which means that her shahwa can be taken advantage of by a husband of low character. While the young woman's father appears to have a few friends in the Settlement, who, in 'Amm Ali's judgement, cannot be much better, since they continue to be on cordial terms with a man who disregards his daughter's honour, none of the settlers will seemingly have much to do with her husband.

The other settler wife said to be engaged in prostitution, was from among the five settler households who refused to be interviewed. The particular reason she gave was that, in her husband's absence - he was in hospital, after having suffered a stroke - she could not talk to strangers. Om Said brushed this excuse off, by pointing out that, not only did this particular family lease out rooms, but the lodgers continued to live there, in spite of her husband's absence. In addition, this woman apparently goes to and from one of the Khalsa coffee shops, in which her husband owns a share, and where her eldest son is working. It is this which Om Said, for example, finds particularly shameful, for no honourable woman would expose herself in a male preserve. Here too, neighbours have spread the rumour that 'strange men' other than the lodgers could be observed entering the house after nightfall, a pattern apparently facilitated by the location of this house on the outskirts of the Settlement. Moreover, according to the
gossip, the woman's husband is fully aware of, if not supporting, these goings-on. However, unlike the daughter of D1 referred to above, this settler wife appears to be socially ostracized. Not only was she not mentioned by any of her female harah neighbours among those with whom they most frequently socialized. In addition, according to one of Om Said's daughters who lives in the same alley-way, few women deign to greet her. The settlers' opinion of her husband is reflected in the fact that none of them apparently made the effort to visit him in hospital.

The incidents which, by all accounts, appear to have taken place during the two years preceding my field-research, are a clear indication that social sanctions have become more or less ineffective in the Settlement as an entity, after there had been reason to assume that some social control mechanisms had begun to operate. The community's failure to take any action against prostitution in particular, a social deviation which, measured by the moral standards adhered to in the Egyptian village, is most serious, is as much due to indifference, as it is a result of the fact that the deviant households appear not to be interested in the opinion of the other settler families.
Notes to Part IV:

1 Few of the female respondents gave more than four or five names of non-kin women with whom they socialized the most frequently. The fact that each settler house in Khalsa has a number facilitated the task of locating the physical proximity between the respondent and the women she named.


The author has attempted in this study to trace the patterns of interactions among kin in nineteenth century Lancashire. His findings have led to the formulation of a number of hypotheses '... about the situations in which different degrees and kinds of relational involvements within any given class of kinsmen will emerge... [as well as] ...the situations in which they change, and the directions of such changes' (p.172). In brief, Anderson contends that the maintenance of any given kinship relationship is dependent, though not exclusively so, on a person's lack of self-reliance. The willingness to enter into relationships will increase, the more certain a person can be that the other will, in turn, reciprocate the help previously extended to him. The lower the degree of trust and certainty between participants, the less will they be inclined to enter a relationship whose rewards are long-term. Alternatively, the participants may ensure that reciprocation must take place during a shorter time-span' (p.173). Finally, '... the more alternative sources of assistance there are to individuals in the form of assistance by bureaucracies, the greater is the possibility though not the necessity that the emphasis on kinship as a source of assistance will be reduced' (p.174).

However, in my judgement, the pattern of kin relationships found in the Khalsa Settlement does not entirely conform to Anderson's hypotheses, in spite of the settler household's individualistic tendencies encouraged mainly by its economic self-reliance and its unimpeded access to services provided by the authorities. Even though each settler household calculatively pursues its own self-interest to ensure its aim of profit maximization, it is in fact the social sphere which counts among kin. The most conspicuous difference between kinship in 19th century Lancashire and present-day Egyptian peasant society is the cultural variable which, regardless of many modifications in the scope and intensity of kinship bonds, continues to attribute a high value to the ideal of kinship solidarity, which demands above all to be expressed during life-cycle events and religious festivals. This pattern has been found to be largely applicable in Khalsa. Even though settler households have the choice whether or not they wish to keep up social contacts with kin in the Settlement, the fact remains that for many the ideal of kinship solidarity continues to be adhered to and more or less practised. It is this solidarity which confirms the settler family's standing among its kin in the Settlement, and it is through the nurturing of these kinship bonds that it re-affirms its links with the home village in Egypt.

However, Anderson's hypothèses is of interest with respect to the relationships between non-kin settler households. It is here that the short-term calculation of rewards appears to play a crucial role.

All the settler wives interviewed who seek out the Iraqi midwife insist that she charges this sum, though one of the Iraqi officials in the Settlement was just as adamant that Om Walid was not allowed to charge more than three Dinars per delivery. It was difficult to pursue this issue further without causing antagonism. The Iraqi midwife indicated during the interview that she refused to attend a delivery after night-fall because her husband was away on the war-front and would not approve of her leaving the house after dark. A number of settler wives refute this and claim instead that the Iraqi midwife had been refusing to heed any night call for quite some time before her husband's departure.

I have not come across any published material on this subject with regard to the Egyptian village other than the mention it receives incidentally in studies of class or leadership in rural Egypt which, however, essentially present the male perspective.

However, Om Said's contention appears to be comparable to the findings of N. Abu Zahra in her study of a Tunisian village: 'Material Power, Honour, Friendship and the Etiquette of Visiting', in Anthropological Quarterly Vol.47, No.1 (Jan.1974). The authoress writes: 'To belong to a new family which has no deep roots in the community confers no prestige on its members' (p.120). 'The logic by which being an outsider is a despicable position because he left his family and village of origin to go to live alone elsewhere is the same logic which underlies the system of visiting: for to leave one's own house or quarter to conduct an uncalled for visit puts the guest in the same vulnerable position as an outsider. For this reason, it is a manifestation of prestige to be able to make few visits while receiving many of them' (p.121).

On the other hand, H. Rosenfeld in his 'Non-Hierarchical, Hierarchical and Masked Reciprocity in an Arab Village', (in Anthropological Quarterly Vol.47, No.1, 1974), found that in the Palestinian village which he studied, the notion of social prestige being expressed by the incidence of being visited, rather than making a visit oneself, is a function of gender. It pertains more to male society, for '... essentially, the dynamics of politics and of property ownership structured attitudes of prestige, honor, good name, that is, those attitudes underlying male hierarchical reciprocity' (p.141). However, men's '... control of village politics and property fixed their dominance over women ... [but also] ... set the non-hierarchical level of reciprocity that prevails between females' (p.41). For, '... the sphere for active reciprocity open to women is almost totally limited ... [and] ... connected to rites de passage ... and in some mutual aid work. The quality of reciprocity between women is more clearly personal and equal.' (p.149). For a further elaboration of this subject see: H. Rosenfeld, 'On Determinants of the Status of Arab Village Women', in MAN (N.S.), Vol.40 (1960).


L. El-Hamamsy apart, there is to my knowledge no reference to the social status of the female circumciser in the published literature on the Egyptian village. More important, there is no comparison
between her and the barber who traditionally performs the circumcision of boys. Both J.G. Kennedy (see 'Circumcision and Excision in Egyptian Nubia, op.cit.) and R.O. Hayes (see 'Female Genital Mutilation, Fertility Control, Women's Roles and the Patrilineage in Modern Sudan: A Functional Analysis', op.cit.), for example, mention the midwife as the one who circumcises girls but do not make any reference to whether this function decreases her status as appears to be the case in the Egyptian village. To my mind, implicit in the differential status accorded to the role of male versus female circumciser may be the notion of ritual impurity associated with the flowing of female blood (e.g. menstruation, defloration of a virgin and child birth).

To my knowledge, there are no sociological or anthropological studies published on the subject of the female social network in the harahs of the Egyptian village, though there are three such studies published on Cairo, in which this issue is directly or indirectly dealt with: U. Wikan, *Life Among the Poor in Cairo* (London, 1980); S. El-Messiri, *Ibn Al-Balad: A Concept of Egyptian Identity* (Leiden, 1978); and A.B. Rugh, *Coping with Poverty in a Cairo Community*, *Cairo Papers in Social Science* Vol. Two, Monograph One, Jan. 1979.

None of my informants could explain why Salman Pak was chosen and not, for example, the cemetery of the nearby village of Al-Kadissiyyah. A possible reason may be that the latter is a Shi'a village.

Nearly every Egyptian village or group of villages has its local village saint whose tomb serves as a focus of weekly or yearly pilgrimages and around which an annual moulid (the celebration of the saint's birthday or the anniversary of his death) is held. For a description of these moulids see: M. Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: An Essay in the Sociology of Religion*, op.cit. Interestingly, few settler families appear to have visited the Shi'a shrines in nearby Karbalah.

For an interesting description of the zar cult and its rituals, see H. Fakhouri, 'The Zar Cult in an Egyptian Village', in *Anthropological Quarterly* Vol. 41, No. 2 (1968).

The exception would be certain mosques in urban centres, where women are allowed to pray in a specially partitioned section, out of view of the male congregation. To my knowledge, such arrangements generally do not exist in the Egyptian village.

For an interesting description, see R. Fernea and E. Fernea, 'Variations in Religious Observance Among Islamic Women', in N. Keddie, ed., *Scholars, Saints and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions since 1500* (California, 1972).

See S. Altorki, 'Milk-kinship in Arab Society: An Unexplored Problem in the Ethnology of Marriage', op.cit., in which the authoress quotes the different schools of Islamic thought on this subject.

The five pillars (arkan) of Islam are the following: the declaration of faith, the five daily ritual prayers, alms-giving, fasting and the pilgrimage to Mecca. For a short but concise description of these pillars, see D. Eickelman, *The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach*, op.cit., pp. 206-213.
17 F. Khafagi, 'Socio-Economic Impact of Emigration from a Giza Village', op.cit. writes that though Egyptian villagers are generally not particularly religious, they nevertheless aspire to complete the pilgrimage since it connotes a prestige to be called al-hajj (i.e. one who has done the hajj), but also because of the belief that it obliterates all past sins. It is thus of interest that only 8% of the Khalsa settlers included in the present study had, by the time of my field-research, done the pilgrimage, even though this journey is much cheaper from Iraq than it would be from Egypt.

18 See H. Rosenfeld, 'Non-Hierarchical, Hierarchical and Masked Reciprocity in an Arab Village', op.cit.

19 For a description of the organization and influence of the brotherhoods, see M. Berger, Islam in Egypt Today: Social and Political Aspects of Popular Religion (Cambridge, 1970); also M. Gilsenan, Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt, op.cit.

The religious brotherhoods generally play an important role in the social life of the men in the village. Given the multiplicity of these brotherhoods, I was from the outset aware that it would be quite difficult to organize all these settlers with their different regional origins into one tariqa. However, given the clannishness that those from the same province tended to display during the initial period after resettlement, I could not completely discount the possibility of one or more torq (pl. of tariqa) being established in the Settlement in response to migration and the social isolation it entailed.

20 See M. Anderson, Family Structure in Nineteenth Century Lancashire, op.cit. and footnote no.2 above.

21 The term baladiyat derives from the word balad which in the Egyptian colloquial is used to refer to the village though it is also generally used to mean country. However, temporary migrants in general are referred to as souwah (tourists).

22 One of the most important themes discussed during this Workshop concerns, in my view, the distinction between the conceptualization, the planning and the implementation phases of a resettlement project. All too often, authorities involved with resettlement schemes in the Arab world have tended to neglect the first two phases. Instead, unforeseen problems tend to be remedied with ad hoc solutions during the actual implementation phase. See L. El-Hamamsy and J. Garrison, eds., Human Settlements on New Lands, op.cit., in particular the article by G. Wen, 'Community Building in Programs of Human Settlement on New Lands', (pp.33-50).


Indeed, apart from H. Badry's book, Fallah Misr 'ala Ard al-'Iraq, op.cit. and the report submitted by A.N. Ismail, Tagrobat al-Khalissah, op.cit. I was unable to obtain much written information about Khalsa except for a small number of unofficial reports prepared by Mashrou' al-Wihda. The information presented and analysed in the present chapter is based on various interviews with a number of Iraqi officials involved with this resettlement project, in particular the Cooperative Supervisor in Khalsa.

However, an interesting illustration of the Iraqi Government's settlement policies - though there is no reference to organizational model and/or administrative structure - is to be found in a study published by the Iraqi Ministry of Planning: M. Khorsheed, Dirasah fi Takhteet wa Tanmiyat al-Moujtama'at al-Moustahdassa fi al-Moustaslaha Hadissan fi al-'Iraq (A Study on the Planning and Development of New Settlements on Newly Reclaimed Land in Iraq) (Baghdad, 1973).

G. Foster, 'Community Building', op.cit., pp.58-59. The author writes that while the planner may view the cooperative as the optimal way of increasing agricultural productivity, the peasant may view his membership as a restriction on his freedom and as an enforcement of his association with other people whom he normally may not wish to mix with.

No accurate information could be obtained regarding any change in the number of provinces represented in the Settlement. Not even 'Amm Ali can quite remember where the families who had been asked to leave by the authorities during the first year after resettlement, originally came from. However, in my view, it is plausible to assume that the families who subsequently joined the Settlement are more than likely to have been from those provinces already represented in Khalsa. For, by all accounts, the later arrivals appear to have come at the instigation of other settler households already living in the Settlement.

See footnote no.3 in the Introduction to the present study.

L. Binder, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt, op.cit., p.74.

See, for example, F. Abdel-Fatah, Al-Qaryah al-Misriyah beyn al-Islah wa al-Thawrah, op.cit. and A. Abdel Mou'ti, Al-Sira' al-Tabagi fi al-Qaryah al-Misriyah (Class Conflict in the Egyptian Village), (Cairo, 1977).

'Amm Ali's daughters explained the choice of this colour as being the most effective against the evil eye, a belief supported by the widespread use of amulets (higab) in Egypt's villages which often depict a blue bead, or hand or eye.

For a description of such painted scenes, see H. Fakhouri, Kafr El Elow: An Egyptian Village in Transition, op.cit., p.81.

See D. Eickelman, The Middle East: An Anthropological Approach, op.cit., who describes how many pilgrims, after having completed the main ceremonies of the hajj proceed to the '... 'Place of Abraham' ... [where they] ... re-enact ... the search for water by Hagar the wife of Abraham ... [who] ... ran back and forth desperately searching for
water for herself and her child until the angel Gabriel appeared, stamped the ground with his heel, and brought forth water from the well of Zamzam for them', (p.213).

35 The Iraqi Cooperative Supervisor denies that this is true since he himself has access to these books and since one of his tasks is to supervise and check them periodically. Though none of the settlers could substantiate their accusation, most in the Settlement are said to be still convinced that the Treasurer had been dishonest. Some of the settlers who were asked about this issue during the interview point out that this Sharqiah settler had become one of the most affluent in the Settlement, and employs a number of temporary Egyptian migrants to help him cultivate his land, which has enabled him to take up full-time employment outside the Settlement. Far from attributing this settler's improved fortunes as being a result of his entrepreneurial talents, the other settlers in Khalsa tend to attribute his success to the money he supposedly stole from the Cooperative. As this Sharqiah settler was one of the five who refused to be interviewed, no information on his point of view could be obtained.

36 Interestingly, few of Khalsa's settlers referred to 'Amm Ali as 'al-Hajj' (the one who has done the pilgrimage), though the term hajj connotes a higher prestige than 'amm.

37 T.B. Bottomore, Sociology: A Guide to Problems and Literature, op. cit., p.217. The author writes that '... the phenomena of social control ... are more complex and more difficult to analyze than many accounts of the matter would suggest. [For, in the first instance, one must take account] ... of the relation between force and social control in the regulation of behaviour and the maintenance of group cohesion ... [and, secondly, that] ... between different types of social control: custom, opinion, law, religion, morals, education etc. [Furthermore it must be remembered] ... that social control refers to systems of values and norms which undergo change' (p.227).

38 In retrospect, I realize that this was perhaps one of the few instances during which I reacted as an Egyptian, more specifically an Egyptian woman, who felt offence at the spreading of an unfavourable national image by a non-Egyptian. My reaction was very probably further compounded by personal travel experiences in the area during which I have often been confronted with the image of the Egyptian woman with 'loose morals'. While the truth of this is obviously difficult to verify, to my mind, this particular image is to a great extent indirectly fed by Egyptian films and television serials.

39 The term social deviation was obviously not used in conversations with these informants. Instead, I spoke of problems (mashakel) and shameful behaviour (tassarroufat 'ayb or hakeerah) when referring to this issue.

40 Moving house during the first few days after resettlement in 1976 is not included in these data, as the move was motivated by the location of the house and/or desire to live near a particular family rather than by conflicts.

41 The prevalence of this cultural attitude, at least in urban Egypt, is documented by U. Wikan (Life Among the Poor in Cairo, op. cit.). The authoress observed that mothers tend to identify with any differences between their own and other children which is in turn
fed by the conviction that the other woman is responsible for not having brought up her children properly (p.66). However, quoting H. Ammar (Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit.), Wikan notes that the opposite appears to be the norm at least in Upper Egypt. For Ammar writes that adults do not interfere in the quarrels between children who are expected to smooth out understandings between themselves. (See U. Wikan, footnote pp.66-67).

42 See for example, Taha Hussein, The Call of the Curlew (Dou'a al-Karawan); Naguib Mahfouz, Midaq Alley (Zuqaq al-Midaq); Tewfik al-Hakim, The Sacred Bond (Al Roubat al-Mokaddass) and Ihsan Abdel-Qudus, I do not Sleep (La Anam).

43 In fact, the only published sociological case study I have come across for this part of the Arab World is by S. Khalaf, Prostitution in a Changing Society (Beirut, 1965), which deals with Lebanon.

44 See N. El-Saadawi, Al-Maraa wa al-Gins (Woman and Sex), (Cairo, 1972); also by the same authoress, The Hidden Face of Eve, op.cit., chapter 8, 'The Illegitimate Child and the Prostitute' and Chapter 17, 'The Heroine in Arab Literature', as well as Woman at Point Zero (London, 1983).

45 N. El-Saadawi, The Hidden Face of Eve, op.cit., p.56.

46 Ibid., pp.61-62.

47 In her study of a Tunisian village, N. Abu-Zahra has also found that women who are strangers in a community and who lack the protection of male kin tend to be equated with prostitutes. 'The modesty of such a woman is suspect because it is inconceivable that respectable fathers or brothers would allow their women to travel alone to another place. The stranger, who is referred to as barraniya (i.e. the outsider) will therefore be asked to sing and dance (both activities are usually work of barraniyah women and are equivalent to prostitution). See Sidi Ameur: A Tunisian Village, op.cit., p.119.

48 R. Critchfield, Shahat: An Egyptian, op.cit.

49 Ibid., pp.17-18; see also pp.xv and 77.

50 This information would appear to contradict F. Khafagi's findings ('Socio-Economic Impact of Emigration from a Giza Village', op.cit.) that '... migration to Arab countries is a migration of the relatively prosperous' (p.193). It is perhaps the demonstration effect, i.e. news of a migrant's success, as well as the availability of social relationships on which the newly arrived migrant can rely, which may be the crucial factors behind the migration of less prosperous Egyptian villagers to Iraq. This assumption is based on the fact that given the socio-economic background of Khalsa's settler families, one may suppose that their kith and kin who have found their way to Iraq are of a similar social origin.

See for example H. Ammar, Growing Up in an Egyptian Village, op.cit., where he describes the villagers' belief in the prophetic tradition that 'Paradise is at the feet of the mothers' (p.53). Ammar also writes that Egyptian peasant society believes that '... one cannot enter Paradise if one evokes one's parents' anger, and their blessings increase one's span of life' (p.138).

According to S. Morsy's findings, '... wife-beating is considered the legitimate right of husbands ... [for those women] ... who transgress the established norms', i.e. the cultural ideal which demands deference to the male. See 'Sex Differences and Folk-Illness in an Egyptian Village', op.cit., p.607.
CONCLUSION

The economic opportunities of which the settler families have availed themselves after resettlement have encouraged their transformation from predominantly subsistence peasants into cultivators who are integrated into the market economy and who are oriented towards maximizing their profits. The influence of the variable of regional origin, implicit in which is the differential rate of development held to exist between Lower Egypt and the regions south of Cairo, was found to be limited so far as the settler families' pursuit of their economic self-interest is concerned. The latter is largely facilitated by the settler household's self-reliance and independence from the Settlement's community, both economically and in terms of security. The domination of the settler family's leisure-time by the television is both an expression and a reflection of this relative independence from the community of settler households in Khalsa.

The cultural norm prescribing the more or less rigid differentiation between male and female gender roles characteristic of Egyptian village society continues to operate in the Khalsa Settlement. The persistent belief in the social control function of female circumcision is one important expression of the lack of change in perceptions of the role and status of women. Though social aspirations for daughters involve their seclusion and eventual marriage to a non-peasant - both indications of a higher status within traditional Egyptian village society - it is in fact the traditional female gender role which serves to further the family's economic self-interest, by providing the justification for a daughter's labour contribution in the house and on the land (at the very least during peak seasons) at the expense of her schooling. In contrast, her brother is encouraged to pursue his own
education as a means of social mobility out of the peasant stratum. Even though each settler son is guaranteed a house and a plot of land by the Iraqi authorities, the settler parents' aspirations for their sons are influenced by the higher reward system attributed to non-peasant occupations in Egyptian society, indeed in the Arab world at large. Though settler parents generally appear to be content to move up the peasant social ladder, rather than out of the peasant stratum per se, there is the expectation that they will bask in the shadow of their son's success in the traditional belief that sons must contribute to their parents' security in their old age.

The settler household's improved standard of living has paved the way to the acquisition of a number of consumer durables. However, though perceptions of prestige undoubtedly play a role, it was also found that the purchase of a number of goods is influenced by the notion of use value. This subjective evaluation appears to be essentially based on the utility of a consumer durable in the sense of its contribution to the household's aim of profit maximization and/or personal comfort. It is, however, also partly influenced by the Egyptian peasantry's traditional frugality as well as the migrant settler's tendency to be thrifty. The variabilities in the perception of use and prestige values, serve above all to underline the fallacy of assuming that the Egyptian peasant's acquisition of goods is an unquestioned emulation of the life-style of a higher social class.

The modernization of certain material and infrastructural aspects of the way of life in the Khalsa Settlement, is one variable which appears to have exerted some influence on the settler family's attitude towards family planning. However, there are a number of other equally significant factors to be taken into account. On the one hand, the settler wife's economic activities outside the home in conjunction with
the lack of many of the traditional social support institutions, render it imperative for her to free herself from the burden of consecutive births (though birth control is not necessarily viewed in terms of definitive family size, but may also be a means of spacing births). On the other hand, family planning may well be influenced by a declining child mortality rate, as well as the fact that numerous children are not necessarily viewed as economic assets. There is the further fact that, though vegetable cultivation is relatively labour-intensive, these crops are nevertheless lucrative, to the extent that the settler household generally prefers to leave part of its land fallow, rather than incurring the cost of employing outside labour, or, more importantly, interrupting the education of its sons. In fact, it is the settler parents' aspirations for their offspring which may also have an influence on attitudes towards family planning in the Settlement.

However, the analysis of the realities of community life after seven years of resettlement in Khalsa appear, at first glance, to be somewhat conflicting and contradictory. On the one hand, the pattern of social contacts would seem to indicate that, a number of exceptions apart, Khalsa's settler families continue to adhere to one of the most crucial norms operating in Egyptian village society, namely that by which a man's honour is synonymous with that of his womenfolk. The settler wife may be exposed on the market-place, but this is justified by economic necessity, and compensated by such precautions as never riding alone with the Iraqi Toyota-owner into market, or her confinement to the spatial boundaries of the harah, or her avoidance of the neighbour's home in order not to encounter any male strangers. In addition, regardless of the settler families' incipient individualism dictated by economic self-interest, and in spite of the modification
which ceremonial rituals have undergone, the majority of the settlers and their wives nevertheless continue to uphold the Egyptian village tradition, which demands a reciprocation of ziyarat on the occasion of life-cycle events and religious festivals with kin, as well as with non-kin, with whom they have cordial relations. Yet, on the other hand, these same families appear to tolerate a number of social deviations in their midst which, by the moral standards operating in the Egyptian village setting, would be considered intolerable. Furthermore, by the time of my field-work in the Settlement, mechanisms of social control such as gossip and social boycott were found to have been rendered apparently ineffective. Because the socially deviant households or individuals do not acknowledge the moral authority of the Settlement's community, of which they are economically as well as psychologically more or less independent, no social sanctions appear to be enforceable.

However, being economically and socially relatively independent has not induced each and every settler family to withdraw totally from its social surroundings. Rather, as the analyses of kin relationships and the visiting network among non-kin have illustrated, settlers and settler wives appear to be cultivating social contacts of varying intensities, which are obviously mutually satisfying. These relationships demand differing degrees of reciprocity, based on the, albeit modified, concept that social debts must be reciprocated according to the specific notions which have come into being after resettlement. These patterns of social contacts and their implications have led me to conclude that, while there may initially have been an embryo of one community of social control in Khalsa, as evidenced by the attempts at conflict resolution, as well as by the establishment of the role of one informal leader, a number of groupings have since developed in the
Settlement. Though these groupings exist more or less separately from one another, they nevertheless share a number of characteristics.

One such distinction is that members not only identify with the grouping of which they perceive themselves to be a part, but more important, they care to abide by the codes of conduct which it upholds. For example, female members of the harah's social network all adhere to the same notion of short-term reciprocity, as well as the custom which bars them from each other's homes, except when a life-cycle event demands otherwise. However, spatial boundaries are not an essential criterion of identification since settler wives who disdain to squat in the alley-way cultivate social contacts with like-minded women who may well be from outside their own harah. In Khalsa's male world, settlers who are more than mere acquaintances, and who care about each other's opinions, also adhere to specific social rules, such as for example the one which decrees the appropriateness of allowing a non-kin settler into the privacy of the home. Similarly, kin who are on cordial terms, make a point of expressing the ideal of kinship solidarity in the social sphere, by the reciprocity of visits on the occasion of ceremonial and religious events.

A second characteristic of these groupings is that they are not exclusive. For example, female members of the harah's social network may at the same time be members of a kinship group, even though both groups may be separate from one another. Similarly, settlers who uphold cordial relations with their kin may at the same time have a circle of friends and/or acquaintances, who have little or no social contacts with this kin. Each of these groupings makes its own demands, the one requiring an expression of kinship solidarity at the appropriate occasion, the other demanding an adherence to the established pattern of short-term reciprocity. Nonetheless, the simultaneous
membership of two different groupings does not appear to be conflicting, precisely because neither makes contradictory demands.

Finally, there is the distinction that, regardless of the type of grouping, i.e. kin or non-kin, or the sex attribute of its members, each and every one of them cares to uphold a certain moral standard which ensures that social conduct after resettlement remains largely in accordance with the general pattern dictated by custom and tradition in the village of origin in Egypt. True, some social values have undergone a modification, but this is in every instance held to be justified by economic self-interest. More important, these modifications are not perceived to have any negative repercussions insofar as traditional concepts of honour are concerned.

Underlining all these characteristics is the trend that the role of a single leadership in Khalsa has been subjected to a perceptible erosion. Groupings and their members have evolved their own mechanisms of conflict resolution. Conflicts which fall outside this sphere, i.e. those with individuals or households, who are not members of one's group, are generally taken to the Iraqi authorities. The latter have reassumed their role as final arbitrators and as the unquestioned authority. This pattern also underlines the reality that for the majority of the Egyptian settler households, the village of origin back in Egypt largely continues to function as the essential frame of reference as well as the social arena whose approbation continues to be sought and in front of which behaviour fi al-ghurba must to some extent be justified. Because life in the Settlement is not perceived in permanent terms, a settler household can afford to ignore any social deviance outside the grouping or groupings of which it is a member. In this sense, one may speak of the Khalsa Settlement as being a kind of housing estate more or less typical of urban low-income residential
quarters in Egypt, for example. Social contacts which are initiated by
the individual's free will and choice are the criteria of identifica-
tion and reference. Those who fall outside this social island, even
kin, can be ignored or treated with indifference. It is the grouping
which counts and it is with its members that the individual tends to
feel the most affinity. Non-members can, indeed must, be ignored for
the grouping has no jurisdiction over all the Settlement's inhabitants.

Conversely, deviant households who are excluded from these
groupings can afford to ignore the latter in a social setting which,
though it does not afford any large-scale anonymity, given the size of
Khalsa, nevertheless allows them to exist so long as they remain unaf-
fected by the hostility or indifference of their fellow settlers. What
is perhaps more significant, deviant households do not appear to be
unduly worried about what the grapevine in the guise of the baladiyat
coming to and from Egypt will report about them back in their home vil-
lage. One plausible explanation may be their belief that socially
disapproved of forms of behaviour fi al-ghurba can always be denied
since the village of origin cannot claim to have been an eye-witness.
An Egyptian proverb comes to mind here which might throw some light on
this context: Al-balad illi mahaddesh biye'rafak feeha, emshee we
shallah feeha (The place - or country - where you are unknown, walk
about and take off your clothes). Implicit in this saying is the
notion that the behaviour of the individual outside the social frame of
reference of the place of origin is of little concern to the latter.
It must remain speculation as to whether these deviant households plan
to settle permanently in Iraq (even though none of them have taken up
Iraqi citizenship), or whether they intend to eventually return but
reside in a place other than the home village. Being unknown there,
y they could expect to be judged mainly by their status as successful
migrants whose children have managed to scale some rungs on the social ladder. Either alternative would serve to explain why, in their case, the network of baladiyat in their role as a human channel of communication between Khalsa and the village of origin have not rendered the applicability of this proverb more or less ineffective.

In fact, the whole issue of whether or not the wish to return back to Egypt is a myth must remain within the realm of speculation. It is tempting to attribute some significance to the fact that, in contrast to the first two or three years after resettlement, when around a third of the settlers, though only a fifth of the settler wives, included in the present study made at least one trip back to Egypt, the incidence of such visits has since dwindled. Only four settlers indicated that they travelled regularly every year back to their place of origin, while around 60% of all family-heads and 80% of the wives from the settler households which were interviewed have never gone back since the day they first arrived in Khalsa. However, far from being an indication of possible permanent settlement, this trend could be influenced by two interrelated factors. On the one hand, it may be due to the network of baladiyat who undoubtedly have contributed to a lessening of the social isolation experienced by the settler family. The almost constant coming and going of Egyptian temporary migrant workers would tend to shorten the psychological distance between the Settlement and the home village. On the other hand, the lack of or reduction in visits back to Egypt may also be due to the acquisition of savings which in a considerable number of cases appear to be substantial relative to the standard of living prior to resettlement. Paradoxically, the very novelty of possession, may plausibly be an influential factor in encouraging thrift, a trend spurred on above all by the wish to return to their country of origin as the successful migrant.
However, the settler family's eventual return may also depend on the extent of their children's assimilation into Iraqi society as well as the host country's future policies toward migrants.

Whether or not the settlers intend to return to Egypt, the fact remains that the majority of Khalsa's Egyptian peasant families have largely organized their existence with this aim in view. It seemed therefore significant to discover that, apart from the three settlers who have taken up Iraqi citizenship, there were, by the time of my field-research in Khalsa, six other settlers among those included in the present study who had served or were serving at the war-front with Iran. One Iraqi informant's remark that their motive was money (volunteers are said to receive I.D. 75 a month) is, in my judgement, not entirely convincing since some of them were absent from their land during the peak season. The I.D. 150 supposedly earned during the two months of voluntary military service would not compensate for the income foregone from the sale of such lucrative crops as vegetables or clover. Some of the settlers who had not volunteered to serve at the war-front regarded those who did with ill-concealed contempt. One settler remarked: *Eh elli hasharhom yerouhou yeharhou badal ma yehtammou bi ardo hom* (What business have they got to go and fight instead of taking care of their land). A similar attitude was expressed by another settler who, upon being questioned whether he intended to volunteer for the war-front, explained that *ta'ab al-fallah biyyewakal al-'alam* (the toil of the peasant feeds the world). In contrast, some of those who had served at the war-front tended to stress that it was a duty. *Lazem nesa'ed Si Saddam* (We must come to Mr. Saddam's, i.e. the President's, aid) was how one settler put it, adding that, after all, *di al-balad elli wageletna 'aysh* (this is the country which has fed us bread). Whatever the individual motivations of these volunteers, few
of their wives appear to have been enthusiastic about this decision. Though most were cautious in voicing their disapproval, one particular settler wife openly complained \textit{rayeh yehareb we sayeb al-’iyal fi al-ghurba} (he has gone to fight leaving the children in a strange country).

Apart from the fact that no single community of social control was found to exist in the Khalsa Settlement, there are a number of theoretical implications for social change which are perhaps a more significant contribution. One such finding is that the Egyptian peasant families in Khalsa have eagerly taken advantage of the range of economic opportunities which have come their way since resettlement. This lends credence to Rosenfeld's and Roxborough's line of argument that the element of risk reduction is an important variable in response to modernization. It also further undermines the notion of cultural determinism positing the belief that it is generally the rural social structure per se which encourages resistant behaviour and impedes change. The limited influence of the variable of regional origin on the settler household's economic performance further substantiates this finding.

The data also reveal that the pace as well as the scope of the many changes which have taken place with regard to the Egyptian peasant families' social attitudes and economic behaviour are to some extent being dictated by traditional values and norms. This selectivity of change indicates that adaptive mechanisms tend to function in new situations on the basis of established norms. Though where ideal and reality come into conflict, economic self-interest tends to dictate an accommodation to the latter, nevertheless new sets of values do not imply a complete break with established patterns of behaviour. Instead, new expectations seek to reconcile a traditional
socialization, which attributes a high value to honour and generally shuns physical solitude, with an incipient individualism which accords primary importance to economic self-interest. This elective affinity between elements of peasant culture and elements of the economic base is a complex relationship as some of the data in the present study have illustrated. But it underlines the fact that continuity, albeit modified, is not necessarily an impediment to change. In fact, it may ease the process by which new behavioural patterns establish their legitimacy.

A further important finding which emerges from the data points to the significance of the operating stratification network. The value system which traditionally relegates the peasantry to the lower end of the social ladder and which attributes a higher reward in terms of status to non-peasant occupations has led the Egyptian settler parents to encourage the social mobility of their children out of the peasant stratum. Implicit in this sense of hierarchy is the attitude that profit maximization without status is inadequate. The majority of the plots in the Settlement appear unlikely to be handed down to successive generations of Egyptian sons of Khalsa's present inhabitants. In this sense, developments have not followed the course anticipated by the Iraqi authorities. This has important implications for agricultural policies specifically in those Arab countries officially adhering to a socialist ideology which, among other factors, strives to elevate the peasant's condition. Improvements in the standard of living of the rural masses and the development of an infrastructure conducive to raising agricultural productivity are in themselves insufficient measures. Rather, additional efforts are required to re-orient a value system which traditionally downgrades the peasantry's social status, an admittedly difficult task demanding a long-term perspective on the problems involved.
APPENDIX:

Questionnaire for Settler's Wives

1. When did you first arrive in the Khalsa Settlement?

2. How did you first hear of this resettlement possibility
   a) media (specify)
   b) local government organizations (specify)
   c) other sources

3. What reasons motivated you to migrate to Iraq? (rank according to importance)
   a) to obtain land
   b) to secure a better living standard
   c) to improve children's chances of better future
   d) other

4. What was your occupation prior to moving to Iraq?
   a) non-cultivator (specify)
   b) cultivator

4. Number and sex of children born
   a) prior to migration
   b) after resettlement

5. If cultivator, specify number of feddans cultivated (......) and type of land tenancy:
   a) land-owner
   b) land-owner/beneficiary of land reform
   c) land-owner/but cultivated together with kin (specify relationship)
   d) tenant
   e) other

6. What did you do with the land you had owned and/or leased prior to migration?

7. Age-group:
   a) husband
   b) wife
   c) children
8. Number and sex of children born
   a) prior to migration
   b) after resettlement

9. Educational level; if literate, specify number of years and whether can read or write at present:
   a) husband
   b) wife
   c) sons
   d) daughters

10. Did you and your wife attend the illiteracy eradication classes organized by the Iraqi authorities? If not, specify reasons.

11. What were the biggest difficulties you encountered during the first few months after arriving in Khalsa? (rank according to importance)
   a) homesickness
   b) difficulty of adapting to new way of life
   c) social isolation
   d) language
   e) difficulties with neighbours
   f) fear of the unknown
   g) hot climate
   h) economic problems (specify)
   i) other

12. Do you have relatives in Khalsa?
   a) yes
   b) no

13. If have kin in the Settlement:
   a) specify relationship
   b) are you on cordial terms with your kin?
   c) how frequently do you visit each other?
   d) do you help each other on the land? specify type of cooperation

14. Are you and your wife related to each other? If yes, specify type of relationship.
15. Did your wife work on the land back in your home village in Egypt?
   a) yes
   b) no (specify reason)

16. Did your wife take the produce to market back in your home village in Egypt?
   a) yes
   b) no (specify reason)

17. Does your wife work with you on the land here in Khalsa?
   a) yes
   b) no (specify reason)

18. Does your wife take the produce to market at present?
   a) yes
   b) no (specify reason)

19. Are you satisfied with the house provided for you by the Iraqi authorities?
   a) yes
   b) no (specify reason)

20. Have you changed house since resettlement?
   a) no
   b) yes (specify date and reason)

21. Have you carried out any alterations in your home?
   a) no
   b) yes (specify)

22. What consumer durables have you bought since resettlement?
   a) refrigerator
   b) electric fan
   c) electric heater
   d) air cooler
   e) television
   f) radio
   g) cassette
   h) sewing machine
   i) other
   j) none
23. What do you usually do when all the day's work on the land and/or in the market is completed? (rank according to preference)
   a) visit non-kin neighbours
   b) visit other non-kin
   c) visit kin
   d) sit in the coffee-shop
   e) watch television
   f) other

24. Which television programmes do you like best? (rank according to preference)
   a) Egyptian feature films and serials
   b) other Arabic films and serials
   c) Western films and serials
   d) religious programmes
   e) news broadcasts
   f) other
   g) watch all programmes

25. Which radio programmes do you prefer to listen to? (rank according to preference)
   a) news broadcasts (specify country of origin)
   b) religious broadcasts
   c) plays
   d) sports
   e) songs
   f) other

26. Do you regularly read a newspaper?
   a) illiterate
   b) no (specify reason)
   c) yes (specify reason)

27. Did you own a television back in your home village in Egypt?
   a) yes
   b) no
28. Do you exchange visits with other settler households in Khalsa?
   a) no (specify reasons)
   b) yes

If yes:
   b1) specify if kin only, or kin and non-kin, or non-kin only
   b2) name the settlers you most frequently socialize with (specify whether land and/or house neighbours)
   b3) are your visits confined to formal occasions only or do you also visit each other informally?

29. Do you visit any Iraqis inside or outside the Settlement?

30. How much land did you receive when you first arrived in Khalsa?

31. What type of crops did you cultivate during the last summer season, 1981?

32. What crops are you presently cultivating?

33. Do you pray and fast regularly?
   a) yes
   b) no (specify reason)
   c) pray regularly only
   d) fast regularly only

34. Have you made the pilgrimage to Mecca after resettlement?
   a) went to the hajj prior to migration
   b) have gone to the hajj after resettlement
   c) no (do you intend to in the near future?)

35. Do you have any contact with other Egyptians living and working in Iraq?
   a) yes
   b) no

If yes:
   b1) specify relationship (kin, non-kin from same home village, other)
   b2) how frequent is your contact with them?
   b3) who generally visits whom?
36. Do you assist any of the other settlers such as lending them money, helping them on the land, offering them the use of your draft animals or agricultural implements?
   a) no
   b) yes, but kin only
   c) yes, both kin as well as non-kin

37. Whom, other than kin if applicable, would you turn to if you had a problem or a quarrel with another settler household?
   a) Iraqi authorities
   b) 'Amm Ali
   c) Abu Said
   d) other

38. Are you interested in serving on the Cooperative Board?
   a) yes (specify reasons)
   b) no ( "    "    )

39. Have you managed to put aside any savings?
   a) yes
   b) no

40. What are your aspirations for your sons' future occupation?

41. What are your aspirations for your daughters' future?

42. What do you intend to do in your old age: stay in Iraq or return to Egypt?
   a) intend to stay permanently in Iraq
   b) prefer to return to my home village when I am unable to continue working on the land
   c) want to return to Egypt even before then
Questionnaire for Settler Wives

1. When did you first arrive in the Khalsa Settlement?

2. What reasons motivated you to migrate to Iraq? (rank according to importance)
   a) to obtain land
   b) to secure a better living standard
   c) to improve children's chances of better future
   d) other

3. Age-group:
   a) husband
   b) wife
   c) children

4. Number and sex of children born
   a) prior to migration
   b) after resettlement

5. Educational level; if literate, specify number of years and whether can read or write at present:
   a) husband
   b) wife
   c) sons
   d) daughters

6. Did you and your husband attend the illiteracy eradication classes organized by the Iraqi authorities? If not, specify reasons.

7. What were the biggest difficulties you encountered during the first few months after arriving in Khalsa? (rank according to importance)
   a) homesickness
   b) difficulty of adapting to new way of life
   c) social isolation
   d) language
   e) difficulties with neighbours
   f) fear of the unknown
8. Do you have relatives in Khalsa?
   a) yes
   b) no

9. If have kin in the Settlement:
   a) specify relationship
   b) are you on cordial terms with your kin?
   c) how frequently do you visit each other?
   d) do you help each other on the land? specify other type of cooperation

10. Are you and your husband related to each other? If yes, specify type of relationship.

11. Did you work on the land back in your home village in Egypt?
    a) yes
    b) no (specify reason)

12. Did you use to take the produce to market back in your home village in Egypt?
    a) yes
    b) no (specify reason)

13. Do you presently work with your husband on the land?
    a) yes
    b) no (specify reason)

14. Are you presently taking the produce for sale on the market?
    a) yes
    b) no (specify reason)

15. Are you satisfied with the house provided for you by the Iraqi authorities?
    a) yes
    b) no (specify reason)
16. Have you changed house since resettlement?
   a) no
   b) yes (specify date and reason)

17. Have you carried out any alterations in your home?
   a) no
   b) yes (specify)

18. What consumer durables have you bought since resettlement?
   a) refrigerator
   b) electric fan
   c) electric heater
   d) air cooler
   e) television
   f) radio
   g) cassette
   h) sewing machine
   i) other
   j) none

19. What do you usually do when all the day's work on the land and/or in the market is completed? (rank according to preference)
   a) visit non-kin neighbours
   b) visit other non-kin
   c) visit kin
   d) watch television
   e) other

20. Which television programmes do you like best? (rank according to preference)
   a) Egyptian feature films and serials
   b) other Arabic films and serials
   c) Western films and serials
   d) religious programmes
   e) news broadcasts
   f) other
   g) watch all programmes
21. Which radio programmes do you prefer to listen to? (rank according to preference)
   a) news broadcasts (specify country of origin)
   b) religious broadcasts
   c) plays
   d) songs
   e) other

22. Do you regularly read a newspaper?
   a) illiterate
   b) no (specify reason)
   c) yes (specify reason)

23. Did you own a television back in your home village in Egypt?
   a) yes
   b) no

24. Which midwife do you generally call for when you are giving birth?
   a) have not had any children since resettlement
   b) give birth on my own
   c) prefer to call for Om Gamal, the Egyptian midwife
   d) prefer to call for Om Walid, the Iraqi midwife
   If c) or d), specify reasons

25. Do you use modern contraceptives?
   a) no (specify reasons)
   b) yes (specify what kind and duration of use)

26. Would you help breast-feed another settler wife's child?
   a) not applicable
   b) would only breast-feed child of female kin (specify reason)
   c) would breast-feed child of female non-kin neighbour
   d) would never breast-feed a child other than my own (specify reason)
27. Do you exchange visits with other settler households in Khalsa?
   a) no (specify reasons)
   b) yes

   If yes:
   b1) specify if kin only, or kin and non-kin, or non-kin only
   b2) name the settler wives you most frequently socialize with
   b3) are your visits confined to formal occasions only or do you also visit each other informally?

28. Do you squat with any of your female neighbours in the alley-way?
   a) no (specify reason)
   b) yes

   If yes:
   b1) regularly or occasionally
   b2) indicate house number of these women

29. Do you bake together with other settler wives?
   a) no
   b) yes (specify with whom and frequency)

30. Do you have any dresses sewn with any of the dress-makers in Khalsa?
   a) no, sew for myself
   b) yes (specify name of dress-maker)

31. Who do you generally leave your pre-school children with when you take the produce to market?
   a) do not take the produce to market
   b) with husband
   c) with female kin
   d) with non-kin female neighbour
   e) other

32. Do you pray and fast regularly?
   a) yes
   b) no (specify reason)
   c) pray regularly only
   d) fast regularly only
33. Have you made the pilgrimage to Mecca after resettlement?
   a) went to the hajj prior to migration
   b) have gone to the hajj after resettlement
   c) no (do you intend to in the near future?)

34. Do you have any contact with other Egyptians living and working in Iraq?
   a) yes
   b) no
   If yes:
   b1) specify relationship (kin, non-kin from same home village, other)
   b2) how frequent is your contact with them?
   b3) who generally visits whom?

35. Do you have any social contacts with Iraqi women?

36. What are your aspirations for your sons' future occupation?

37. What are your aspirations for your daughters' future?

38. What is your preference with regard to the future marriage partners of your sons and daughters? Specify nationality of spouses and occupation of son-in-law.

39. Have you managed to put aside any savings?
   a) yes
   b) no

40. What do you intend to do in your old age: stay in Iraq or return to Egypt?
   a) intend to stay permanently in Iraq
   b) prefer to return to my home village when my husband and I are unable to continue working on the land
   c) want to return to Egypt even before then
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International Herald Tribune (1 Dec. 1982).
The following is a list of Arabic words which appear more than once in the text:

Al-Talai' : scout club
'abaya : floor-length black outer garment
'ammm : uncle
'ayb : shameful
'ayn al-hasoud : evil eye
baladiyat : those from the same village or place of origin
daya : midwife
fellah : fem.=fellaha; pl.=fellaheen: peasant
fi al-ghurba : in a strange place or country
gallabiah : loose flowing, floor length outer garment
ghareeb : stranger
harah : alley-way
ibn al-ghareeb : stranger's son; bint al-ghareeb is stranger's daughter
'Id al-Adha : or 'Id al-Kabeer: big feast of sacrifice held forty days after the fasting period of Ramadan commemorating Abraham's readiness to sacrifice his son
'Id al-Fitr : or 'Id al-Soghayyar, small feast marking the end of Ramadan
imam : leader of prayers in the Mosque
kahk : cakes
ma'azzah : esteem
mahabbah : affection
mahr : bride-price
masallah sogharayyah : a little issue
maslaha : self-interest
ma'reffah : acquaintance or acquaintanceship
mohemmah : an important business
Moulid al-Nabbi : Prophet Mohamed's birthday
naseeb : fate
nuqta : pl.=nuqut, money gift
oullah : clay jug
sebou' : naming of the child on the seventh day
sohoubiah : friendship
shahwa : appetite, here in the sense of sexual appetite
sirr al-bayt : the secret of the house
tasleyya : whiling away the time
osool : the correct, traditional way
ziyarah : pl.=ziyarat, visits on special occasions such as life-cycle events or religious festivals