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WARFARE IN THE LATIN EAST, 1192-1291

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After an introductory chapter, in which the studies of previous scholars are examined, warfare in the Latin East in the period is placed in its historical context. It involved not only crusades: there were long periods of truce when warfare was restricted to raiding expeditions, while many conflicts took place between Christians themselves. The Latin armies are then considered. There were many elements in them - the feudal levy, the Military Orders, mercenaries and other paid troops, confraternities and crusaders - but the armies proved consistently inadequate to deal with the Muslim threat to the Latin East. The Christians, therefore, were dependent on castles and fortified towns for their survival, and it was essential that these should be adequately built, maintained and garrisoned. The Military Orders took increasing responsibility for them during the thirteenth century. Strongpoints had a number of functions, both defensive and aggressive, but lack of manpower meant that their role was often restricted.

In the thesis there follows a consideration of the forms armed conflict took. Battles were not a prime factor in the decline of the Latin East, because the Franks were rarely able to raise an army to fight in the open with the Muslims. Battles therefore tended to take place during crusade expeditions, when adequate numbers were available. On some occasions - the First Crusade of Louis IX, and Theobald of Champagne's Crusade, for example - a lost battle seriously impaired a campaign. Battles should be distinguished from raids. The Muslims
used raiding expeditions as an integrated part of their efforts to remove the Franks from the east. But the raid was used as an end in itself by the Franks and towards the end of this period it had become their principal means of carrying war to their enemies. Finally, there is a study of sieges. The capture of strongpoints by the Muslims, particularly in the second-half of the thirteenth century, progressively loosened the Franks' grip on the area. Sieges undertaken by the Franks often became matters of attrition, whereas when they were defending themselves, a Muslim assault often proved decisive in a short space of time. The Franks' lack of manpower was again significant.
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ABBREVIATIONS

MGH  Monumenta Germaniae historica inde ab anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum auspiciis societatis aperiendis fontibus rerum Germanicarum mediæ aevi, ed. G. H. Pertz et al., (Hanover, Weimar, Berlin, Stuttgart, Cologne, 1826ff).

MGHS  MGH Scriptores in Folio et Quarto, 32 vols, 1826-1934.


QBSSM  Quinti Belli Sacri Scriptores Minores, ed. R. Röhrich (Geneva, 1879).


RHC Oc.  RHC Historiens occidentaux, 5 vols (Paris, 1844-95).

RHC Or.  RHC Historiens orientaux, 5 vols (Paris, 1872-1906).


RISWS  Rerum Italicarum scriptores. Nova series, ed. G. Carducci et al., (Città di Castello, Bologna, 1900ff.).
In May 1291 Muslim troops commanded by al-Ashraf Khalil captured and destroyed the city of Acre. Although this was not the last Latin-held site to be surrendered, the fall of Acre was regarded by contemporaries as marking at least the temporary end of Latin rule in the area. Similarly, in July 1191, the capture of Acre by forces of the Third Crusade had been the decisive point in a campaign, even though the Treaty of Jaffa, which acknowledged the re-establishment of the Latin Kingdom, was not signed until September 1192: the Kingdom of Jerusalem which had been virtually eliminated by Saladin after the battle of Hattin in 1187 was to survive, in a rather reduced form, for nearly a century. Until the defeat of St. Louis' First Crusade the kingdom was maintained largely as a result of Muslim divisions, rather than Latin strength. After this, the Mamluks' usurpation of power in Egypt and their subsequent unification of Muslim states in the area led to the Christian losses of the 1260's. This left only a few, mainly coastal sites to hold out until 1291.

It is quite unreasonable, however, to regard the 'Second Kingdom' as a mere appendix of the First. Recent work on the constitutional and social history of the Latin Kingdom in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries has suggested much positive achievement in the later period. Despite a fragmentation of authority, implications of innate strength are apparent in, for example, the baronial resistance to the demands of
Frederick II, and the constitutional debates and internecine conflicts which raged throughout much of the thirteenth century.

Military historians and the military history of the Latin East

In 1956 R. C. Smail's book on the military history of the Latin Kingdom from the period of its establishment to the end of the Third Crusade was published. By analysing a detailed body of evidence, Smail was able to place the military history of the period in its social and political context, and thus demonstrate the importance of warfare to the Latin states. This was in sharp contrast to the work of most military historians, who had been content to describe and sometimes analyse a quite arbitrary selection of battles, apparently chosen for their tactical significance. Except for the study of castles, which will be considered later, the thirteenth century has had less attention from scholars concentrating on military affairs. John of Joinville's narrative of the battle of Mansurah seems to be the only contemporary account which has received widespread consideration.

Several scholars, however, have considered certain aspects of the subject. Delpech dealt with the battles at Agridi in 1232, near Gaza in 1239 and at Mansurah in 1250. But his work was coloured by a pre-conception that medieval armies not only knew precisely what they wanted to do (often based on the theories of classical authors such as Vegetius) but also had the ability and discipline to carry out complex manoeuvres in battle. This, coupled with an uncritical use of source material, rendered many of his conclusions regarding the tactics of the thirteenth century questionable. In the case of Gaza, Delpech was
exceptional amongst general historians of medieval military history in making use of the very detailed account of this conflict. His analysis of this battle suggested that he wished it to conform to three pre-determined ideas, none of which can really be justified from an objective reading of the sources. First, he noted the exploitation of the terrain by Rukn-ad-Din al-Hijawi, although it was the crusaders' own decision to camp in a valley surrounded by low hills: this position was in no way forced on them by the Muslim commander. Secondly, following the account of Albert of Trois Fontaines, he emphasized the imbalance amongst the crusader forces caused by a lack of footsoldiers. In this he overlooked the significance of the account of 'Rothelin' which stated that one of the main causes of the battle was the reluctance of the mounted troops to abandon their footsoldiers, even though this would have allowed them, at least, to escape from the Muslims. Thirdly, he criticized the crusader knights for charging the Muslims, and thus breaking formation. He chose to ignore the statement that this charge resulted from the crusader crossbowmen running out of arrows. These three examples illustrate Delpech's tendency to manipulate the sources in order to justify certain pre-conceived ideas, which seriously diminished the value of his study of battle tactics in the thirteenth century.

The influential historian Delbrück paid no attention to the military history of the Latin East in the thirteenth century. Oman, on the other hand, incorporated a long account of the crusades and the Latin states into his study of medieval warfare. However, he dismissed the Second Kingdom as 'a mere survival without strength to recover
itself', and he had little to say about its military history. He preferred to concentrate on the crusaders' invasions of Egypt which he regarded as 'wholly independent of the defence of Palestine...', and his only use of material from the thirteenth century was that concerning the battle of Mansurah, for which he produced a composite account from some narrative sources. In his chapters on fortification and siegecraft, he dealt occasionally with evidence from the Latin East, but too superficially for his work to be of any real worth.

Lot included a section dealing with the Latin East during the thirteenth century in a work which, like Smail's, attempted to place military history in its social and political context. The results, however, are of limited value: Lot relied largely on secondary materials to produce little more than a disjointed political history with military overtones.

In more recent years two studies have added in different ways to the general understanding of medieval warfare. Two points should be made regarding the scope of Verbruggen's *Art of Warfare in western Europe*. First, apart from a section on strategy, it was primarily concerned with the tactics which were employed by combatants when they were in a battle situation (although this allowed an interesting examination of battlefield psychology). Secondly, although Verbruggen was prepared to use material concerning battles which took place in the east, for the thirteenth century he limited himself to occasional references to the battle of Mansurah. He also considered two other sources which seem out of place in a work which concentrated on the
west. In a section on discipline he made extensive use of the Templars' rule, whilst his chapter on strategy relied heavily on the *De Recuperatione* texts written after the fall of Acre. This suggests a failure to appreciate the major differences between thirteenth-century warfare in western Europe and that of the Latin East. Verbruggen, however, presumably intended his conclusions to apply to the Latin East '... defending commanders avoided battle, although it was one of the most effective means of gaining their ends... the weaker of the contestants took refuge behind the defence of his many fortresses... it created a balance between the various countries which was not easily upset.'

This statement does not fit the situation in the Latin Kingdom during the thirteenth century. It is true, as we shall see, that the Latins were sometimes able to use their strongpoints as places of refuge. But the balance, if there ever had been one, between Muslims and Christians, was destroyed by the marked superiority of the former in most types of military encounter, and by the inability of the latter to deal with Muslim methods which were geared towards the progressive reduction of Christian territory in the area, primarily by the use of the siege. Contemporaries attested to the growing sense of panic and bewilderment amongst Christians as a result of this Muslim strategy.

Contamine, in *War in the Middle Ages*, illustrated how the schemes of Fidenzio of Padua, in his 'Liber recuperationis Terre Sancte', reflected the improved administrative techniques of the period as employed by Edward I of England, Philip IV of France and Charles I of Anjou. This is characteristic of his wide vision of warfare. He concentrated on the period c.1100-1400, dealing not only with tactics
but also the position of war in society and the influence which the institutions of war could have. He examined such diverse aspects of war as armaments, siege techniques, the ability of society to control military affairs, and the motivation of troops. His work, therefore, treated tactics as one of many aspects of warfare, whereas Verbruggen had considered it largely in isolation. The wider approach of Contamine suggested that it was possible to establish a broad sense of the principles which governed warfare. His study of the period 1150–1300 examined most of the military resources which were available to the state, and some of the factors which could influence their role in warfare. Beginning with manpower, he dealt with knights, other mounted troops (including crossbowmen) archers and various types of infantry, besides briefly considering the Military Orders as a separate element. Then he examined the methods available to the state to bring into existence a fighting force appropriate to its requirements and limited resources. These varied from the arrière-ban and the servitium debitum to services for money and ultimately the employment of mercenaries, pointing out that during this period a shift occurred, to 'an economy of paid feudal warfare', in which the fief, however, remained a central feature. Fortified sites were another major military resource dealt with by Contamine, which he examined through the course of a siege. The assault improved in technique during this period, rather than in terms of the materials that were available to the attackers. In defence, the main development was the use of stone rather than wood for fortifications, whilst in suggesting the possible nature of a garrison force, Contamine made use of the text describing the rebuilding of Saphet in the 1240's. He was able to create a general impression of
how military institutions and activity were a product of their social context and he therefore concluded that warfare's increasing sophistication (at least on an organisational level) by the end of this period reflected developments within society as a whole. The military institutions of the Latin East were dealt with only briefly, however, and mostly from the researches of Smail. Contamine also had little to say about the thirteenth century in this respect, since his work was mainly concerned with north-western Europe.14

Scholars who have tried to deal with the military history of the Latin East in the thirteenth century have adopted one of two perspectives, neither of which is particularly satisfactory. First, historians of tactics, such as Delpech, Oman and Verbruggen were concerned simply with what happened when two armies met on the battlefield. Even on this level there is much material available, but these writers largely contented themselves with, at most, three battles which were removed from their appropriate context and either used in quite arbitrary fashion, as a reflection of the 'crusaders' warfare' of the thirteenth century, or employed to illustrate the tactics of western European warfare simply because (as in the case of Mansurah) they contained what scholars saw as detailed, and therefore important, information about tactics and strategy. Most historians who concentrated on battles have placed their accounts in an artificial setting which is unrelated to the actual historical context of the event.
Secondly, scholars such as Lot and Contamine made some attempt to examine the social and institutional aspects of war. They did not divorce warfare from other aspects of history, but their treatment of the Latin East was restricted, in the case of Lot by the nature of his method which largely produced a political narrative and, for Contamine, by his acknowledged bias towards material from north-western Europe. Smail's work on the twelfth century was unique in offering a study of warfare in the Latin East which combined the better aspects of these two perspectives: there was no lack of detail concerning the performance of armies in the area (and this was not restricted to the battle) and military history was shown to be an important aspect of the general history of the Latin states.

Most military historians have been concerned with the fighting man as the principal military resource at the disposal of a commander and the battle is therefore the subject of greatest interest to them. At a time when the number of soldiers was often restricted, however, other assets, particularly strongpoints, could have a crucial role to play in the survival of territory against an aggressor. Smail pointed out that the capture and maintenance of such sites was perhaps the key to the entire military history of the Latin East in the twelfth century, and the same is true of the period to 1291. The study of the Latin East's castles has been intensive over the last century, but two points limit the value of many of these examinations. First, the approach of most scholars has been primarily architectural. Like most military historians who have studied battles, such authors prefer to examine their subject in isolation from its context, considering its form rather
than the role that it may have played in the military establishment of
the Latin East. One exception to this was Smail, though his work was
concerned with the twelfth century.\textsuperscript{15} The importance of architectural
studies of this kind cannot be denied, but the value of such
investigations is restricted by a second point: the visible materials
available to facilitate such work are themselves far from adequate.
There has not been enough archaeological investigation and an example
of the difference that such an examination can make may be seen in the
castle of Belvoir, by comparing the plan that Smail was able to make
with that of Prawer, when the site had been cleared and excavated.\textsuperscript{17}

One of the first modern historians to examine the monuments of the
Latin East was Rey.\textsuperscript{16} Although largely outdated, his study remains
useful as many sites have disintegrated since he visited them. Some
of his work was consequently incorporated into the studies of
Deschamps, \textit{Les Châteaux des croisés en Terre-Sainte}.\textsuperscript{19} These are the
standard works on castles in the Latin East, and the authors did try to
place this aspect of warfare in an overall context, but they made little
attempt to analyse the information at their disposal. For most castles
a description of the remains was complemented by a history which was
dependent on the survival of narrative accounts. Deschamps went
beyond this to consider the location of the site and its theoretical
ability to control an area. His views will be discussed when the
functions of castles in the thirteenth century are examined.\textsuperscript{20} Other
studies, both of individual sites and groups of them, will be noted
later. But only detailed archaeological and architectural work and
careful analysis of texts will produce advances in the present state of
knowledge, after which more informed generalisations may be made. For
example, after an excavation of Tour Rouge (about 20 kilometres north­
east of Arsu) in 1983, Pringle is now pursuing an archaeological,
geographical and historical study of the site and the surrounding area
during the period of the Latin settlement.21

The Military Orders are another element of the military
establishment which has received attention. They became increasingly
significant for the survival of the Latin Kingdom in the thirteenth
century, but many studies of them are merely narrative accounts which
fail to analyse the specific role which they played in the area's
military structure. An example of this is the work by Melville, still
the best general account of the Templars in the Latin East. She
described some of the institutions of the Order, from the Rule, and
considered the political history of the Latin Kingdom but she was
unable to bring the two elements together, except when the Templars
played a clearly defined role as in the final siege of Acre. Much of
what she has to say about the thirteenth century is, therefore, just a
political history with occasional references to the Templars.22
Recently two scholars have dealt with public opinion regarding the
Military Orders and their role in the politics of the Latin East, before
and after 1291.23

Another detailed study of a Military Order, this time the
Hospitallers, was undertaken by Riley-Smith. Like Melville he gave a
separate narrative account of the Latin settlement in the thirteenth
century, but he was then able to place the Hospitallers within this
political framework. The Hospitallers' role in the military history of the period received careful and detailed examination, but his general analysis of warfare in the thirteenth century was rather tentative. An extensive narrative account of the Hospitallers' strategic role in the Latin East thus remained rather isolated. Riley-Smith noted the provision of soldiers for raids, advice on military affairs, acceptance of responsibility for the defence of various sites and the strategies which were adopted against their Muslim neighbours. By examining the extensive documentation of the Hospitallers, he established the overall structure of the Order. He then dealt specifically with the military side of the Order's operations, drawing conclusions about the role of the soldier which, if used carefully, have implications for the structure of military life within the Latin East as a whole.²⁴ Riley-Smith's work was not primarily concerned with the military history of the Latin East, but it revealed much about a not insignificant aspect of that military history. He tried to describe the Order as an element that should not be divorced from its surroundings.

Historians of the Latin East and military history

It has long been possible to write a reasonable narrative account of the Latin East's history during this period and, in all such accounts, military activity inevitably assumes great significance, given the sources from which any narrative history will be written. Runciman's account of the period c.1260-1277, for example, reads as little more than a narrative of military events.²⁵ By the use of materials such as the kingdom's law books, charters and the papal registers it is possible to produce a more complete narrative history
and at the same time to examine the constitutional and social history of the kingdom in far greater depth. This can also yield a detailed picture of aspects of the military history of the kingdom.

In the early 1950's Prawer and Richard were able to redefine the constitution of the Latin Kingdom. The first narrative history to acknowledge this was Richard's *Royaume Latin de Jérusalem* which appeared in 1953. The author used a wide range of sources besides the chronicles to produce a detailed impression of the Latin Kingdom's society. This extended to the field of military history, where he showed, for example, how important assistance from Europe (with both money and men) was to the survival of the kingdom in the thirteenth century and demonstrated the significance of the patriarch in military affairs as he was obliged to accept an increasing temporal responsibility.²⁶

Prawer's narrative account of the Latin Kingdom, although largely comprising a recital of the facts, included analyses of the influences which produced the events he described. His examination of military history was made outstanding by an awareness of the area's geography. He was thus able to discuss in theory and practice the significance of the treaties which were agreed between the Christians and Muslims in 1229 and 1241. The limited expeditions which took place when the troops of the Fifth Crusade had gathered at Acre in the autumn of 1217 were similarly scrutinised and information relating to a battle was shown to have additional interest if it could be placed in a geographical context. The value of the sources describing the battle
near Gaza of 1239 has already been noted; Prawer was able, by his acquaintance with the region, to suggest the likely route taken by the crusaders from Jaffa, leading to their final defeat at Beit-Hânûn. Knowledge of terrain has recently been used by Herde, in a study which compared the tactics of 'Ain Jalut with those used at Tagliacozzo.

One of the most influential historians of the Latin Kingdom's constitution is Riley-Smith. His major study of the kingdom's political ideas in theory and practice demonstrated again the significance of military affairs to almost any assessment of its history. Directly, he dealt, though not in great detail, with military service as a central element of feudalism in Palestine. Indirectly, military affairs were often the background against which political, constitutional and economic developments took place. For example, the increasing poverty of the lords in the thirteenth century was largely due to expenses incurred in the defence of their fiefs; many of them were therefore obliged to alienate their properties to the Military Orders. Riley-Smith was particularly concerned with constitutional developments. The attempts of Frederick II to assert his authority, on Cyprus and on the mainland, led to a wide range of military engagements: Riley-Smith considered these as a part of the scene which led the Ibelin faction to secure their own position by use of the Assise sur la ligece. The War of St. Sabas, in a similar way, encouraged John of Jaffa and John of Beirut to manipulate the complex regency laws in order to switch support to the Venetians. Riley-Smith, however, often failed to establish conclusively the link between military affairs and constitutional developments. He recognised the need, for example, for
strong government in the 1260's, but his subsequent analysis of the period's regency debates took no account of the military context, about which contemporaries were clearly aware.\textsuperscript{29}

**The aim and scope of this study**

Since a wide range of secondary material is already available, it is worth trying to create a general picture of the military life of the kingdom from the end of the Third Crusade to the fall of Acre in 1291, and this is what I have set out to do. Although many of Smail's conclusions for the twelfth century are equally true of the thirteenth, it will become clear that not everything he wrote is valid for the later period, where the circumstances were radically changed by such factors as the increasing aggressive abilities of the Muslims and a large-scale division of authority within the Latin states.

The range of materials available can be used to create a coherent impression of most elements which make up the aggregate of military events in the area: previously, these have only been used piecemeal or as a part of a narrative account with little attempt at analysis. The reports of sieges, raids and the functions of castles have scarcely been scrutinised, yet all are significant components of the whole military picture which will be examined.

From the military viewpoint, narrative accounts from the Latin Kingdom in this period scarcely compare with William of Tyre, but the various Old French continuations of his work\textsuperscript{30} and the collection known as the *Gestes des Chiprois*\textsuperscript{31} frequently prove rich in detail.
The same is true of the Arabic sources; I have only been able to study these in translation but they are often full of information, one of the most important being the account of an-Nasir Rukn-ad-Din Baybars' reign by his secretary, Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir,\textsuperscript{32} virtually copied by later writers such as al-Makrizi and Ibn al-Furat. These two main groups of narratives may be complemented by accounts from western sources. An event such as the fall of Acre provoked a great reaction which is reflected in the number of contemporaries who wrote about it; but such accounts are often of limited value. Alternatively, some western chronicles may be wholly devoted to events in the east and most obviously the process of a crusade. Oliver of Paderborn produced such an account;\textsuperscript{33} John of Joinville's arguments for regarding Louis IX as a saint caused him to concentrate on his crusading exploits,\textsuperscript{34} so both authors provided interesting material concerning military events in the east. Other worthwhile information can be gleaned from letters, some of which are contained in western chronicles. There are many in the work of Matthew Paris, for example.\textsuperscript{35}

Evidence from charters, the papal registers and materials relating to the Military Orders are valuable, and sometimes the author of an itinerary, such as Burchard of Mt. Sion, gave an impression of the military situation as he travelled through a region.\textsuperscript{36} Finally, there are many miscellaneous texts to be examined: some, such as the anonymous \textit{De constructione castri Saphet}\textsuperscript{37} and Fidenzio of Padua's suggestions for the recovery of the Holy Land,\textsuperscript{38} are primarily concerned with military matters, and therefore of considerable value.
Ideas about aspects of warfare can be obtained from the arts of the period. There are many problems with the interpretation of contemporary illustrations, but some tenuous suggestions may be possible, particularly when they can be related to textual evidence. Examples of the artists' interest in military life include illustrations from manuscripts, seals and coins, effigies and sculptures. These have not been studied in any depth, but they occasionally prove to be valuable, particularly in the fields of arms and armour (where thirteenth-century survivals are very rare) and siege techniques. It is a matter of coping with an artist's imagination and artistic licence; where this can be done, such materials will be used as additional evidence for an otherwise documented event. An example is a miniature from an Old French translation of 'De excidio urbis Acconis', probably produced around 1300 in Paris. It is regarded as one of the first narrative illustrations of the fall of Acre, and at the very least, constitutes a near-contemporary visual impression of the loss of the Holy Land.

Finally, material for the military history of a fairly compact area may be gathered by undertaking fieldwork. During the summer of 1984, an on-site investigation of all the significant surviving military positions of the period, in Israel and its occupied territories (except Château Pèlerin) was carried out. It was often possible to relate written sources to castles, towns and battle sites which were examined, whilst also considering the problems of terrain and climate which may have proved particularly difficult for crusaders from western Europe. In common with evidence from the arts, that produced by fieldwork will
be analysed largely in connection with written sources, which it either confirms or refutes. This, it is hoped, will give a fairly complete impression of military history in the period from c.1192-1291.

Evidence will be examined from all the principal areas of Latin settlement in the thirteenth century: the Kingdom of Jerusalem; the Principality and County of Antioch-Tripoli; the Kingdom of Armenia; and the Kingdom of Cyprus. The two crusades which invaded Egypt will also be considered, since conflicts between Christians and Muslims were quite uniform whether in Egypt, Palestine or Syria. Conflicts between Christian forces will also be analysed: they provide additional and contrasting evidence to augment that provided by the Muslim-Christian struggle in the region. Despite the wide range of military activity which will be examined, the nature of the warfare is such as to allow a reasonably consistent overall analysis to be attempted.

The ability of Latin armies to function in the area of the Latin East will be scrutinised in the context of the military, political and economic scene within which they operated for the defence and expansion of the Latin settlement. But analysis of the Muslim forces and military organisation will be restricted to areas where they came into direct contact with the Latins. In the second-half of the thirteenth century, however, the Muslims became increasingly significant as the Latins' presence in the region was threatened, specifically by the loss of their strongpoints. The Latins' problems were exacerbated by a background of inter-Christian rivalry and conflict.
The treatment of this history will be thematic, not chronological. By adopting this approach it is possible to make far more sense of materials which, if used on their own, can be both limited in value and ambiguous. In the case of battles, for example, Smail's remarks on the problems of interpreting such evidence were sensible and perceptive:40 less attention has been given to battles in the thirteenth century, but any effort to make sense of a single conflict in isolation is fraught with difficulties. There are inevitably gaps in accounts of individual engagements, so that even such detail as Joinville provided in his description of the battle of Mansurah is best regarded as a series of isolated incidents.41 The distortions of the source material combine with the rationalising tendencies of the historian to create a wholly artificial impression; to proceed from this to generalisations is unsatisfactory. Given the nature of the sources which will be looked at - diverse but often of restricted value - an attempt will be made to establish the tactics which appear to have been generally appropriate for use in the circumstances of the Latin East, from which it should be possible to understand individual accounts more clearly.

After some general remarks on the military situation in the Latin East during this period and its importance for the status of the Latin settlement, two principal elements of military history will be dealt with: the organisation of the resources which were available; and their application to a range of military activities. With regard to the former, the manpower (obtained from both inside and outside the Latin states) which produced the Latin armies will be discussed. There was a considerable diversity, both in terms of the source and the quality of
troops, something to be examined further in an appraisal of the Latin army in action. The impact of the crusades on the ability of the Latin forces to deal adequately with the Muslim threat will also be considered. Besides their manpower, the principal assets of the Latins were their strongpoints. There were simple towers, examples of which dotted the coastal plain of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, great castles such as Crac des Chevaliers, and a number of fortified coastal towns and cities which were increasingly the principal expression of Latin settlement in the area. The maintenance of such sites was fundamental to the survival of the Latin East; an examination will be made of their forms and functions.

The performance of the Latin armies will then be considered. Three types of military operation will be studied: the raid, the battle and the siege. In each instance, a wide range of evidence from the period will be used to suggest the Latin armies' abilities. As already noted, the discussion will not be confined to engagements with Muslim opponents. Much of the available evidence relates to conflicts with fellow-Christians in circumstances which had little to do with the external Muslim threat. It is not simply the survival of such material which makes it worth studying here. Many soldiers operating in the Latin East had to be able to deal with both Muslim and Christian enemies.
NOTES


6. In 'Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr de 1229 à 1261, dite du manuscrit de Rothelin', *RHC Oc.*, ii, pp. 541-46.


12. Verbruggen, *Art of Warfare*, pp. 39-64, including (pp. 44-6) material from John of Joinville.


15. Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, pp. 24-5.


20. For example, in *Le Crac*, pp. 16-42. The suggestion is often made about individual sites.


30. 'L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur et la conquête de la terre d'Outremer', *RHC Oc.*, i-ii, passim; 'Rothelin', passim. For some problems of these texts, see M. R. Morgan, *The Chronicle of Ernoul and the Continuations of William of Tyre* (Oxford, 1973) and 'The Rothelin Continuation of William of Tyre', *Outremer*, pp. 244-57.


CHAPTER I

WARFARE AND THE HISTORY OF THE LATIN EAST, 1192-1291

Introduction

The aim of most warfare in this period was the capture or defence of territory. Commanders had to employ troops in the most efficient way in order to achieve this objective, subject to the restrictions which the nature of medieval warfare imposed. The Latin armies, for various reasons, showed a marked inferiority in such campaigns and this was reflected in the gradual loss of their territories. The different types of engagement - the raid, the battle and the siege - were used to affect the territorial status of an enemy. These will be examined individually later: in this chapter, after a brief review of the overall historical and geographical situation, the major outbreaks of war during this period will be considered in their historical context and a framework will be established within which to analyse the resources at the disposal of the combatants and the nature of warfare at this time. The study of the Muslim threat in this chapter includes some brief remarks on the strategy and tactics which Muslim armies employed against Christian opponents.

The political and geographical background to warfare

Three forms of warfare were critical to the continuing Latin presence in the area: the crusades; the civil disruptions exemplified by the conflicts between Frederick II and the Ibelins; and the Muslim threat, especially under the Mamluk sultan Baybars. But these outbursts
of intense military activity were uncharacteristic. Warfare in the Latin East during the thirteenth century was endemic, but was often low level. It was probably even more constant than may reasonably be suggested from the available evidence. The nature of the Latin presence in the area meant that even periods which appear to have been fairly calm could have witnessed numerous minor incidents which chroniclers did not bother to record. Some indication of this type of relatively minor conflict comes from evidence concerning the first decade of the thirteenth century, when Muslims and Christians clashed constantly though without any large-scale engagement taking place. In 1203-4, for example, a truce was repudiated and King Aimery led troops on a number of occasions to raid Muslim territory, sometimes beyond the River Jordan. One of these raids was directed against Casal Robert (Kaffar Kanna) just north of Nazareth. Despite a Muslim attack on the rearguard and some fears at Acre for the safety of the force, these raids were successfully completed, until al-'Adil's movement of troops to Mt. Tabor led to a resumption of the truce, following a battle near Doc.' The pattern of raid and counter-raid, mingled with periods of truce, was repeated throughout the century. Such engagements were the kind which might most affect the lives of the populace, besides being probably the most typical form of military activity.

Restricted warfare in the form of raiding expeditions thus alternated with periods when concentrated efforts were made to achieve the primary aim of war - the acquisition of territory. Warfare, however, was not the only means of gaining land. The possible threat of a large, if temporary influx of troops (most obviously a crusade) or
the weakness of a Muslim state, or the desire for an alliance, could lead to some territory being offered to the Latins in return for peace. The second quarter of the thirteenth century was dominated in this respect by treaties which were a product of such circumstances. The major territorial gains in the Latin East during the thirteenth century were achieved through diplomacy rather than aggression.

a) The principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli

In the first-half of the century, the principality of Antioch and the county of Tripoli were actually much more stable territorially than the southern Latin states, but conflict was far from rare. The war of succession at Antioch involved the Armenians and the Military Orders. It was concluded by the mid 1220's but further civil strife broke out in the second-half of the century with a succession of rebellions by the Genoese lords of Gibelet. Muslim control of Latakia increased the isolation of Antioch: the former was in fact captured by the Latins, with Mongol assistance, in 1261 but by this time the period of great Muslim successes had begun with the accession of Baybars and Antioch itself fell in 1268. Tripoli survived until 1289. Before the emergence of Baybars, however, and particularly in the first-half of the thirteenth century, Muslims in the area had been much more threatened than a threat. Their own differences, combined with the strength of the Military Orders, centred on such strongpoints as Crac des Chevaliers, Margat, Chastel Blanc and Tortosa, enabled the latter frequently to assault the Muslim centres of Homs, Ba'rin and Hamah. An aspect of the military history in this region is the use of raids by the Military Orders to maintain their predominance. An aggressive
policy was continued by the Hospitallers at Margat even after most Christian territory had been captured by the Muslims. After previous Muslim efforts had failed, Margat finally capitulated after a siege in 1285. The Templars did not abandon Tortosa until 1291.

b) The Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem

In the Latin Kingdom the picture, superficially, was clear enough. Gains of lands, particularly through the treaties of 1229 and 1241, were wiped out and then the kingdom was reduced by Baybars to a few isolated coastal sites which were all lost by 1291. Two factors made it more complex, however. First, the process of Muslim advance was by no means so clear-cut. Gains and losses of territory were a constant feature of the period's history, with sites such as Caesarea and Ascalon changing hands several times. Secondly, Latin worries about manpower and financial resources meant that there was no guarantee that sites which had been acquired would be subsequently fortified and garrisoned. In 1241, for example, the Muslims returned Bethgibelîn and Belvoir to the Christians. Prawer suggested that the former 'assurait la communication entre Ascalon et Jérusalem', whilst Riley-Smith argued that it came back to the Hospitallers and may well have had a functioning burgess court. There is no positive evidence that Bethgibelîn was re-occupied during this period. Riley-Smith noted with regard to Belvoir that the castle was lost by the Christians in 1247, presumably having been refortified and garrisoned after 1241. Again there is nothing to support this statement and archaeological evidence suggests a homogeneous twelfth-century structure.
Evidence from treaties and other documents is, nonetheless, important for establishing the state of the Latin Kingdom, provided it is used cautiously. The treaty of Jaffa of September 1192 reflected the limited recovery made by the Third Crusade. The re-established kingdom consisted of some towns on the coast, whilst the walls of Ascalon were to be demolished again. Ramla-Lydda was to be divided between Muslims and Christians. Five years later Beirut was captured, renewing the coastal link of the mainland Latin states, but at the same time Jaffa was lost. A period of relative calm ensued until the commencement of the Fifth Crusade, which Innocent III argued was needed partly because of the fortifying of Mt. Tabor by the Muslims: this fortress could not only threaten Acre but also the security of the rest of the kingdom. Though the status of the Latin Kingdom itself was largely unaffected by this crusade (apart from the temporary loss and destruction of Caesarea and the reconstruction of Château Pèlerin) it did lead to the demolition by the Muslims of a number of sites which would have proved invaluable to an expanded Latin presence, including Toron, Saphet and Banyas. Jerusalem also suffered from this Muslim strategy.

This scorched earth policy means that Muslim territorial concessions, particularly those of 1229 and 1241, should not be regarded as being so beneficial as they initially appear. Moreover, the Christians' manpower problems would in any case have hampered any re-garrisoning efforts. From the military point of view the first of these treaties was of little importance: it either acknowledged fait accomplis, or granted territory such as Jerusalem which in purely
strategic terms was an unwanted drain on already stretched resources. Three areas inland were now theoretically under Christian control: from Jaffa to Jerusalem and south to Bethlehem; the area around Nazareth and west to Acre; and the area to the north-west of the sea of Galilee, including Toron, although this was not to be fortified, and Montfort. Sidon, where an uncertain condominium had previously existed, was granted to the Christians, though they had already occupied and fortified it. The treaty seems to have accepted much of the rebuilding which had been a feature of the years since the arrival in the east of the Fifth Crusade. Frederick II mentioned that permission had been given to rebuild Jaffa, Caesarea, Sidon, 'et castrum domus sancte Marie Theutonicorum' (Montfort); all had already been fortified.

The properties still retained by the Muslims were considerable, however, and this made the treaty of 1241 rather more significant. It can be considered alongside a document produced between 1236 and 1240, suggesting the extent of Muslim possessions in the area just before the agreement was reached. Again the possibility that many sites were abandoned must be allowed for, whilst some had been destroyed in the preceding years. But the list is an impressive one, suggesting the potential threat which the Muslims constituted even to the west of the River Jordan. In the south they held Darum, Gaza and Ascalon on the coast; holding Jericho and Hebron, and to the north Nablus and Sabastiya in the area of Samaria, they were also well placed to strike at Jerusalem. But their possessions in the entire Galilee region, and beyond, must have been of particular concern to the Latins. These included Belvoir, La Fève, Mt. Tabor, Saphorie, Tiberias, Saphet, Le
Chastelet, Banyas, Châteauneuf, Toron and Beaufort. Even though most of these sites were unoccupied at this time, it is clear that the repossession of areas around Nazareth and Toron would have been far from secure for the Christians before the treaty of 1241.

The treaty was completed in extraordinary circumstances which reflected the extent to which it exploited divisions on the Muslim side. Agreement was initially reached with as-Salih Isma'il of Damascus, because of his fear of as-Salih Aiyub, the sultan of Egypt. The former may have conceded much territory in Galilee - on this the sources are unclear - but he certainly gave the Christians Beaufort and its garrison had to be prized out, indicating that this castle, at least, was functioning. The Latins were also able to buy arms and siege engines at Damascus, which scandalised many Muslims. In theory at least, the subsequent treaty with Aiyub of spring 1241 represented the zenith of the Latin Kingdom in the thirteenth century. The agreement was still only a truce, but it reflected Muslim willingness to regard the Franks as potential allies in their own complex political manoeuvrings, rather than as the objects of the *jihad.* For the Franks, this would have appalling consequences a few years later at La Forbie. But although some details are unclear (and again the text is not available) the treaty could have re-established the Latin Kingdom on a firm basis. In the Galilee region especially, where the Muslims had retained many sites, the Christians now enjoyed almost total control, holding Saphet, Belvoir, Tiberias, Beaufort, Mt. Tabor, Toron, Châteauneuf, besides, further north, the areas around Sidon and Beirut. They may also have been given the Cave de Tyron, which was believed to
have been Christian in 1250. Further south Ascalon, which was already being re-fortified, Mirabel, and Bethgibelin became Christian, besides the territory around Gaza though not the city itself.

These gains, moreover, were not theoretical but real. Some sites may not have been re-occupied, but in the Galilee region a number were refurbished, the best-documented example being Saphet. Richard of Cornwall’s work at Ascalon could have had important implications for the military condition of southern Palestine and its relationship with Egypt, but it did not survive long enough to play such a role. It seems that the great problem was not an inability to fortify, but rather the isolated nature of the sites, which enabled them to be besieged and captured one by one. And this was to be the pattern of military history during the second-half of the thirteenth century. It began even before the crusade of St Louis. In 1247 both Ascalon and Tiberias were lost. The capture of Ascalon meant that Jaffa had an important role in the military history of the next two decades; the fall of Tiberias, seemingly with no attempt made to relieve it, emphasized that despite recent gains in the Galilee region, single sites were extremely isolated and vulnerable.

The First Crusade of St. Louis ended in disaster which nearly cost the king his life, but in the Latin Kingdom, where he remained until 1254, his contribution was precisely what was required, though inadequate on its own. He established a contingent of French troops which played a significant role in many military actions of the following decades and he strengthened the kingdom's fortifications with
work at Montmusard (the suburb of Acre) Caesarea, Jaffa and Sidon. Within ten years, however, much of this work was being laid to waste with the campaigns of Baybars. By 1271, the Latin Kingdom which had looked quite secure 30 years before, consisted of just a few coastal positions, notably Château Pèlerin, Acre, Beirut, Tyre and Sidon, each of which functioned independently of the others. After the Lord Edward's Crusade in 1271, the final 20 years of the kingdom's history lacked any positive achievement in the military sphere, though its position was at least sustained by external support, such as that provided by Charles of Anjou. The territorial stability of the Latin Kingdom prior to its final demise can be demonstrated by the fact that there was little change between a treaty which was agreed between Baybars and King Hugh in April 1272, the text of which does not survive, and one between Kalavun and the authorities of Acre in July 1283. In the latter, the Franks were to hold Acre, Sidon, Château Pèlerin and Haifa along with its castle. The last point suggests a re-occupation of Haifa by the Christians after Baybars' attack of 1265, with the fortified position referred to perhaps being on Mt. Carmel. But clearly, stability was in no way a reflection of strength. After St. Louis' Crusade, even limited Christian aggression in the area was only possible when there was a short-term injection of power provided by a crusading expedition.

The Crusades and the Latin East, 1192-1291

The impact of the crusades on the military resources of the Latin settlement will be considered below and strictly temporary increases in Latin military power will be seen to have had many disadvantages, which were in some ways acknowledged but never rectified in the course
of the century. Here it is necessary only to outline the crusades, although over and above the major and minor expeditions it seems that people who were fulfilling a vow to crusade were a constant element of the military establishment. In 1244, for example, a letter to Innocent IV complained that there were only 100 'milites aut pedites peregrini' in the Holy Land, to help to protect it against the Khorezmian threat.

The first two crusades after the Third had relatively little impact on the Latin states, though for different reasons. The German Crusade of 1197 ground to a halt at the siege of Toron, following news of the death of Emperor Henry VI, although it had previously succeeded in taking possession of Beirut. The Fourth Crusade prompted only a few contingents to come to the Holy Land and some of these participated in raiding expeditions against the Muslims and in the war of succession in Antioch. By contrast the Fifth Crusade made the greatest and most-wide ranging impact on the area of any crusade during this period, even though its principal energies were directed against Egypt. Raids were conducted into Muslim territory, the recently-built castle of Mt. Tabor (one of the reasons for the preaching of a crusade) was besieged but not taken, and building work was undertaken at Caesarea and Château Pélerin. The crusade then progressed into Egypt and an 18 month siege of Damietta which was finally captured, although subsequent efforts to progress towards Cairo in July 1221 were calamitous and resulted in a total collapse of the expedition. Whilst the crusade was in Egypt, the Muslims had made peace offers which would, apart from the Transjordan area, have nearly reconstituted the Latin Kingdom in its pre-1187 state. But these were rejected and the only other results
of this campaign were the Muslims' dismantling of many strongpoints in Palestine which might have come within the new boundaries of the kingdom, and their capture of Caesarea. An attack on Château Pèlerin, however, was successfully repulsed.®®

It is an irony of Frederick II's Crusade that an excommunicate should have recovered the Holy City and with it other territorial gains largely through diplomatic means. Not surprisingly, his achievement was regarded with horror by many contemporary commentators. In addition to the treaty which was agreed with the sultan al-Kamil, another benefit for the Latin states was a fair amount of work on fortifications. Before Frederick arrived at Acre in September 1228, work had already been carried out on the sea castle at Sidon, on Montfort and, after Easter 1228, on Caesarea.®® In the winter of 1228-29, Frederick was involved in rebuilding at Jaffa.®®

The next two significant crusading expeditions nearly overlapped. Between them, Theobald of Champagne and Richard of Cornwall managed to extort a treaty from the divided Muslims which gave hope for the long-term survival of the Latins in the east. Their other major achievement was the rebuilding of Ascalon, which they both had some part in, though Theobald's crusade had been rendered largely ineffectual by the defeat of a large contingent of his force near Beit-Hânûn.®®

The First Crusade of St. Louis, like Theobald of Champagne's expedition, suffered what proved to be a decisive setback through a battle. At Mansurah in February 1250, the crusaders were victorious,
but the heavy casualties they suffered, including the death of Louis' brother, Robert of Artois, gave the advantage to the Muslims, who finally defeated St. Louis as he marched his force back from Mansurah in April. Despite the massive organisational achievements of the French monarchy in its preparations, it had again proved impossible, as on the Fifth Crusade, to project this degree of efficiency into the practicalities of a military campaign in Egypt. St. Louis, despite the failure of his crusade, contributed in a major way to the security of the Latin Kingdom. He improved the fortifications of the area and then supplied troops which helped to alleviate the kingdom's manpower difficulties.

St. Louis' Crusade was the final major expedition to the Holy Land. It is interesting to speculate on the possible effects of a successful crusade in Egypt for the Latin settlement: in the very last years of the kingdom's history, interest was still being expressed in Egypt as a target to ensure the security of the Christian position, a view also to be found in many of the De recuperatione texts. The final crusades before the fall of the Holy Land had little impact. The arrival in Acre in December 1269 of two bastard sons of the King of Aragon was greeted with an attack arranged by Baybars which resulted in heavy Christian losses. In 1271 the Crusade of the Lord Edward organised two raiding expeditions, one of which may also have tried to capture Qaun. Edward nearly lost his life at the hands of an Assassin and he had no part in the truce which was subsequently agreed with the Muslims in April 1272. Despite Pope Gregory X's plans for another crusade which were mooted before and after the Council of Lyons in 1274, the papacy
and the European rulers became increasingly sidetracked by such issues as the conflict between Philip III of France and Alfonso of Castile, and a campaign against Peter of Aragon. Martin IV, for example, is said to have shown 'almost pathological determination' in espousing the French cause against the Aragonese. Major crusading projects concerned with the east would only be seriously thought of again when the Latins had lost their grip on their possessions in the area.

The Muslim threat to the Latin East

Warfare is an activity in which two sides oppose one another in a range of military operations, so it requires an understanding of both groups' organisation, aims and performance. When the Latin armies are examined in action it will also be necessary to deal with the Muslims, who were their principal antagonists. But before this, the political and military background in Islam should be briefly established and some suggestions made regarding the general tactics and strategy which the Muslims employed against their Christian opponents.

a) Muslim politics and the Latin states

In each generation in the half century following the death of Saladin, one Aiyubid emerged to dominate the rest of his relations and provide a considerable degree of unity. Al-'Adil, his son al-Kamil and his grandson as-Salih Aiyub, may have achieved great power but, with regard to their Latin neighbours, the point must be qualified. Christian successes in northern Syria reflected the disunity of the Muslim rulers in that area. And the territorial concessions made by al-Kamil, as-Salih Isma'il and as-Salih Aiyub were products of the
search which each made for Christian support in the face of opposition from their co-religionists. On the other hand, although the greatest Christian threats of this period to the Muslims, the two crusades into Egypt, coincided with the deaths of their sultans, these were problems which the Muslims proved able to surmount. In 1218-19, the death of al-'Adil caused a temporary crisis amongst his sons, but al-Kamil combined with his brother al-Mu'azzam, operating in Egypt and Palestine respectively, to defeat the Franks. A similar problem had to be faced in November 1249, when as-Salih Aiyub died. His mistress, Shajar-ad-Durr, was able to take control through the governmental machinery which Aiyub himself had enhanced. At crucial moments in their dealings with the Franks, the Muslims showed themselves able to cope.

The foremost historian of Mamluk military history has shown that the destruction of Fatimid power in Egypt was achieved by armies in which Turks, not Kurds, predominated.\textsuperscript{36} The crisis at Damietta in 1218 was caused by a revolt led by Ibn al-Mashtub, a Kurd. This drastically reduced Kurdish influence and in al-Kamil's reign it was therefore the Mamluks who predominated.\textsuperscript{36} Their dominance became even more apparent under as-Salih Aiyub and it was from his Bahriyah regiment that the Mamluk sultanate would emerge. It was also the Bahriyah, after the death of Aiyub, who played the decisive role in the battle of Mansurah, destroying the force led by Robert of Artois when the crusaders had appeared capable of overwhelming the Muslim army.\textsuperscript{37} The transference of control to the Mamluks seems thereafter to have come relatively easily. Aybeg, the army's new commander-in-chief, married Shajar-ad-Durr, the sultanah, who then abdicated.\textsuperscript{38} The 1250's were a period of
political manoeuvring within the new sultanate, faced by legitimist claims from the Ayyubids in Damascus and the growing threat from the Mongols. They ended with the defeat of the Mongols at 'Ain Jalut in September 1260 and the murder of the Mamluk sultan Kutuz by his general, Baybars. Baybars' conquests provided the unity which the Muslims had lacked since the time of Saladin and in a reign which lasted until 1277, many of the strongpoints held by the Latins were systematically captured. His campaigns made considerable use of raiding expeditions which were very profitable against the increasingly timid Franks: his principal assaults on them came in four campaigns.

In the spring of 1265, Caesarea, Haifa and Arsuf were captured. In July 1266, Saphet was taken, after campaigns which had included the capture of some smaller fortresses around Tripoli. In the spring of 1268, Christian losses included Jaffa, Beaufort and Antioch; in early 1271 Baybars conquered Chastel Blanc, Crac des Chevaliers and Gibelcar, and later in the year Montfort was captured.

Baybars' death in June 1277 was followed by the failure of his sons to sustain his dynasty and by December 1279 another Bahri Mamluk, Kalavun, had claimed the sultanate. The gradual decline in the extent of the Franks' possessions continued. In May 1285 Margat fell, followed by Latakia in 1287 and Tripoli in 1289. Kalavun was already preparing for the siege of Acre when he died in late 1290; the task was taken up and completed by his son, al-Ashraf Khalil, in May 1291, after which the remaining Frankish possessions were rapidly captured or abandoned.
b) Muslim military structure and methods

Apart from times when crusaders were assisting the Latin Kingdom, a perennial problem for the Christians was a lack of manpower. It is unlikely that they could ever raise more than about 1,200 mounted troops with the equipment of knights on a permanent basis. The mounted Mamluks may have outnumbered their Christian opponents by anything from four to ten times. The structure of the Muslim army was fairly static throughout the thirteenth century, since the *balqa* (the free, that is non-Mamluk, cavalry) continued to play a major role in Mamluk armies, certainly until the end of this period. In return for their services the Mamluks received grants of land, *iqta*: an example of territory being given to Mamluks took place on Baybars' first campaign in Palestine, when land around Nazareth and Mt. Tabor was distributed to his emirs. But a similar grant around Arsuf in 1265 was not *iqta*: the land was assigned as allodial property. With reference to Baybars' sultanate, Ibn Taghribirdi suggested that he instigated dramatic improvements in the equipment, clothing and pay of the army. In mid-1264, Baybars ordered emirs to provide themselves and their Mamluks with complete equipment, then a military review was ordered for August of that year. After this, the troops went on to target practice. Baybars again showed concern for the training of the army in October 1268, when he urged the practice of spear-throwing and archery. He was also interested, in 1272, in the manufacture of arrows. Much of this information may have been intended by the Muslim historians simply to portray the sultan in a good light but it does imply a strong central structuring of Mamluk military organisation.
Baybars' concern with arrow production and target practice is not surprising, since the principal Muslim weapon was the bow. Its potency was recognised from the end of the tenth century to the end of the twelfth and this was also apparent in the thirteenth century, where examples abound of the effect caused by a hail of arrows, 'que pluie ne gresil ne peust pas faire greigneur obscure'. During St. Louis' campaign in Egypt, after Robert of Artois had been defeated at Mansurah the Muslims attacked the other crusaders who had managed to cross the river, surrounding them and firing huge quantities of arrows which struck both men and horses. Joinville remarked that in this battle he was hit five times, whilst his horse received fifteen wounds, illustrating the lack of power from which Muslim archers suffered, but also the debilitating effects of their concentrated fire. Mounts appear to have been a popular target for Muslim archers. In the battle outside Acre of 1269, attacks on Christian horses (presumably by firing at them) effectively brought the conflict to its conclusion.

When the Muslims fought with the Christians in open battle, they displayed three qualities which Christian troops had to combat effectively if they were to have any success. These were mobility, discipline and an ability to fight at close quarters if necessary. The lack of penetration of the Muslim bow was counteracted by the troops' mobility, which meant that against heavier Christian soldiers they were able to operate fairly close to their opponents. They waited for the Christians to commit themselves to a charge, or for them to have sustained so many injuries that the Muslims had no fears about closing in. Their mobility often enabled them to outflank Christian troops to
give themselves additional advantage. As the crusaders marched south
towards Mansurah on the Fifth Crusade, al-Kamil sent 4,000 mounted
soldiers against them. They encircled the crusaders at a distance and
began firing on the footsoldiers, before being driven off by the
crusaders' own archers. After the crusaders had attacked the Muslim
camp at Fariskur, the Christian rearguard, as it retreated, was
persistently harried by Muslims who were firing arrows extremely
thickly. The pressure was too much for some crusaders, who chose to
charge their tormentors.

In a number of instances in combat with Christian knights, the
Muslim mounted troops showed great discipline to overcome their
opponents. In 1239 at Beit-Hanan, their use of a feigned retreat drew
the crusaders out of a protected position. In 1269 a charge by
Robert of Creseques, leading a force which was outside the walls of
Acre, was nullified as the Muslims opened their ranks, allowed the
Christians through the middle, then surrounded and defeated them. On
this occasion Baybars had set an ambush but this was not needed. The
use of an ambush, in fact, was a favourite Muslim ploy, but against
well-organised Christian troops it was not always reliable. When St.
Louis marched up the Nile in December 1249, the Muslims set an ambush
and then sent 600 of their best troops to attack the crusaders' 
advance-guard, which was principally made up of Templars. But the
Muslim attack was driven off with half the force being killed.

Discipline was also apparent when Muslim troops, despite their
preference for the bow, fought in close combat with Christian forces.
They acquitted themselves well even when this was forced upon them. A force led by Peter of Brittany attacked a Muslim caravan in 1239 and a Christian charge prevented the Muslims from using arrows, forcing them to fight with swords and maces which, it was said, they found awkward. But they persevered, and were eventually only defeated by the arrival of a Christian reserve force. At Mansurah Muslim forces, and especially the Bahriyah, were able to rally after being routed and defeat the crusaders in a mêlée in the narrow streets of the town. In other circumstances the Muslims closed in on Christian opponents of their own volition, hoping to finish them off. As the crusaders retreated from Fariskur in August 1219, Muslim assaults on the flanks, in front and from the rear, were made not just with arrows but also with lances, cudgels, javelins, swords and Greek fire, suggesting that they were in close contact with their enemies. In the battle of Beit-Hânûn, after the crusaders had mistakenly chased a feigned Muslim retreat the latter tried, at first, to destroy their opponents with arrows, before closing in on the shattered crusaders, using maces and swords to dispatch them. In the later stages of the battle of Mansurah, St. Louis' force was surrounded and at first weakened by the Muslims' volleys of arrows, until when the latter sensed that they were capable of gaining a complete victory they moved nearer, putting their bows to one side and using maces and swords instead.

In March 1264, Baybars ordered his subjects 'to remove all excuse for abstaining from the Holy War'. When the occasion demanded, Muslims could incorporate considerable numbers of footsoldiers into their armies, though the quality of such troops was at times dubious.
On the Fifth Crusade, for example, when the crusaders set out for Cairo from Damietta virtually every capable Egyptian was mobilised to face the threat. Similar troops were seen in action by Joinville at the battle of Mansurah. The Muslims tried to deal with two of the king's sergeants by sending peasants against them, who bombarded them with clods of earth. Not all Muslim infantry were so poorly-armed, however, and there are occasions when they were used to complement the mounted troops. At the battle of Beit-Hânûn, 'Les arbaestheticz, les archierz, les lanceueurz et les frandeilleueurz' were positioned on the hills to throw stones down on the crusaders, then mounted troops were sent to prevent the crusaders from escaping, implying that all the Muslims on the hills were footsoldiers. This suggestion is also supported by Rukn-ad-Din al-Hijawi's calls, by fire and messenger, that every available Muslim should fight against the crusaders. At the siege of Acre, for the final assault on 18 May the entire Muslim army may have begun the attack on foot, whilst the impact of the Muslim bow, noted above, was again apparent.

Muslim footsoldiers may also have been allotted more specialised tasks for siege warfare against a Christian strongpoint. Muslim methods in such situations, as will be seen in more detail later, relied on three principal elements: use of ballistic weapons, mining, and a frontal assault. It was the efficient combination of these forms of attack that broke down Christian defenders even when the latter were protected by the strongest of their fortresses. Much of this employment for Muslims must have been on an ad hoc basis, at least during the first-half of the century. At the siege of Ascalon in 1247,
for example, it was only after the Muslim fleet had been wrecked that the army had the materials necessary to construct siege engines. During the campaigns of Baybars the transportation of such engines appears to have been a well-organised affair even if, as at the siege of Saphet in 1266, their weight proved unbearable to the camels and emirs and soldiers had to assist. The engines had been prepared around Acre and Damascus. Abu'l-Fida witnessed similar problems during preparations for the siege of Acre in 1291.

The other principal form of Muslim military activity was the raid. This did not aim directly at the acquisition of territory, but nonetheless inflicted considerable damage on Christian lands and people. In some respects, Muslim strategy here was similar to that employed by the Christians: for example, they used raids in response to enemy aggression. In 1267, after meeting Frankish envoys at Saphet, Baybars carried out a big raid on Acre, 'in retaliation for your (the Christians') raid on the territory of al-Shaqif'. A raid of 1269 against Tyre resulted from unacceptable behaviour by Philip of Montfort, who had imprisoned and killed a number of Muslims. In the initial Muslim assault Baybars held back from doing too much damage, leaving the crops and returning female prisoners and children that had been taken. When Philip still refused to make reparation, however, the Muslims followed up with a further and more damaging raid against the area.

Christian use of the raid was primarily as a destructive force: at its most positive, such an expedition might provide booty and captives.
For the Muslims, however, the raid could also be an integrated part of their overall military strategy, aiming at the permanent acquisition of land. Raids were used to distract attention from the intended target of a campaign and to prevent assistance being offered to that target. In 1266, Baybars' major aim was the Templar castle of Saphet, but before attacking it forces were sent to raid many other areas, including the territory of Tripoli, where three small fortresses were additionally taken, Acre, Tyre, Sidon and Montfort, before most of the Muslim troops converged on Saphet. Raids were also used to weaken an intended target, particularly one that might not fall without a protracted siege campaign. Acre was a target for Muslim assaults throughout the century, but particularly in the 1260's. A more specific example is Crac des Chevaliers which Baybars attacked in 1270. This was a light raid, since the sultan had only 200 mounted troops with him, of whom 40 engaged a Christian force which made a sortie from the castle. But when Baybars returned to his camp, there followed an extension of the raid which was recognised as being of great significance by the Muslim chroniclers:

The horses grazed on the grass and plants. This was one of the causes of the capture of this castle, since it had no possessions except what grew on its territories, upon which the Sultan's horses had grazed all this time.

Crac was heavily dependent on its lordship for supplies and when the Muslims besieged the castle in 1271, the effects of the previous year's raid must have been apparent.

The Muslims showed a grasp of overall strategic requirements for a desired end - the destruction of a Latin presence in the area - which
might not be achieved in their lifetime but which even a small act of aggression could bring nearer. The unity of the Muslims, particularly from the 1260's, meant that all the resources which they felt were required could be used against their enemies, of which the Christians, however, remained only one. In a thirty year period the expulsion of the Latins was achieved by various methods which all ultimately intended the same result. The Latins' defence against this assault was by no means so coherent.

Civil War and Christian rivalry

In 1225 Isabel, the daughter of John of Brienne, married the Emperor Frederick II. For the next 60 years, with the brief exception of Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan, control of the kingdom was exercised by a succession of regents and lieutenants. This helped to produce an unstable political situation which found expression in a stream of constitutional and juridical disputes concerning the de jure rights, and limitations, of those who attempted to govern. These circumstances also contributed to two major outbreaks of war. As has already been pointed out, medieval warfare was generally a low-key affair, but in view of the Latins' persistent manpower problems, such conflicts inevitably lessened their ability to deal with their Muslim neighbours.

From 1228 to 1243 the Palestinian barons, led by the Ibelin family, fought with the troops of Frederick II and his allies for control of Cyprus and the Latin Kingdom. It was fortunate that this coincided with a period of Muslim disunity and, paradoxically, the Latins were able to increase their territories through diplomatic endeavours, at the
same time as they fought amongst themselves. Most of the military engagements in this conflict came in the period from 1229 to 1233 and the warfare was uncharacteristic, since battles played a significant part in its outcome. In July 1229 the Ibelin faction fought for control of Cyprus with the five *baillis* Frederick II had left in charge of the island. The Ibelins' victory at Nicosia was the platform for their subsequent success in the sieges of Kyrenia, Kantara and Dieudamour. Kyrenia was soon surrendered but the other two strongpoints were defended for ten months. Dieudamour offered particularly stout resistance and the Ibelins struggled to maintain a viable blockade, before both sieges were ended by starvation.

In July 1230, the Treaty of San Germano between the pope and emperor encouraged Frederick II to intervene once more in the Latin East. A force led by Richard Filangieri besieged Beirut in the autumn of 1231, whereas the Ibelins had anticipated an attack on Cyprus. Although the threat to the city was raised by an Ibelin relief force being sent into the citadel, baronial prospects remained uncertain in the first half of 1232. On Cyprus, Almalric Barlais, one of the five *baillis*, overran most of the island except for Dieudamour and Buffavento. The defeat of a poorly-defended Ibelin force at Casal Imbert was a further setback and a number of villages had to be sold to finance a new expedition to Cyprus.

At Agridi in June 1232, a battle again caused a decisive reversal in the fortunes of the antagonists. The Ibelins, despite being heavily outnumbered, were victorious and Dieudamour was relieved. The Imperial
forces fled to Kyrenia. A frontal assault on the town by the Ibelins failed and it was only after being besieged for a year that the garrison at Kyrenia surrendered. They were allowed to join their colleagues in Tyre, which was still held by Frederick's forces.\textsuperscript{63} The position remained fairly static for the next decade. The Ibelins controlled Cyprus and most of the Latin Kingdom, whilst the Imperialists had possession of Tyre. Diplomatic efforts to resolve this deadlock and outbursts of violence, often involving the members of the Commune of Acre, were frequent.\textsuperscript{64} One of the worst incidents led to the Hospital in Acre being besieged for six months because its occupants were suspected of complicity in an attempt by Filangieri to seize control of the city.\textsuperscript{65}

The coming of age of Frederick's son Conrad in 1243 gave the Ibelins an excuse to attack Tyre legitimately. The defence of Lothair Filangieri was effective until his brother, who had been shipwrecked, was captured by the Ibelins. Their threats persuaded Lothair to capitulate and the Lombard presence in Palestine was thus terminated.\textsuperscript{66} The cost of the overall victory must have been great, however. The correspondence of Gregory IX reveals the pope's concerns about the conflict and the damage being done to the kingdom;\textsuperscript{67} the drain on resources was considerable. Philip of Novara believed Filangieri had with him in 1231 600 knights, 100 mounted squires, 700 footsoldiers and 3,000 armed sailors.\textsuperscript{68} The indigenous forces available to the kingdom would have been sorely stretched to cope with such opposition. The Ibelins had frequent recourse to mercenaries and troops from Genoa
and Venice; Venetians, for example, played a leading role in the capture of Tyre in 1243, in return for commercial privileges in that city.\textsuperscript{31}

From 1256 the Italian city republics were again involved in warfare in the eastern Mediterranean, but this time they were at the centre of a conflict which subsequently drew in many of the other factions of the Latin Kingdom. The initial dispute concerned land owned by the monastery of St. Sabas, which was claimed by both Genoa and Venice. Genoa's early successes were reversed after their erstwhile allies, Pisa, had agreed to a ten-year alliance with the Venetians. A Venetian fleet under Lorenzo Tiepolo broke the harbour chain which was protecting Acre's port, burned a number of Genoese ships and captured and destroyed the fortified properties of St. Sabas. The Genoese, however, were able to retain control of their quarter, although they were subjected to a blockade. The following year, constitutional and military developments forced them to flee to Tyre. John of Jaffa's use of the regency laws caused the feudatories to switch their support to the Venetians, leaving Philip of Montfort as one of the few Genoese allies. In June he led an army to Acre, where it was joined by Hospitaller troops: a Genoese fleet was to attack the city simultaneously. The plan went awry as the sea force was overwhelmed by a Venetian fleet. Philip and the Genoese retreated back to Tyre and the Genoese quarter was overrun.

By 1261, something approaching normality had returned to Acre, but the Genoese did not receive their quarter back until 1288 and fighting between the Italian fleets remained a constant threat to the security
of the area, even though such conflicts had little to do with the Latin East. In 1267, for example, a Genoese force was able to capture the Tower of Flies and blockade the port of Acre. It was at least twelve days before they were driven out by a Venetian fleet.\textsuperscript{92} The Muslims were also involved in the conflict. In 1266, Baybars had an arrangement with the Genoese, whereby he provided troops to support a Genoese fleet in an attack on Acre. But the Genoese fleet failed to arrive.\textsuperscript{93} Contemporaries recognised the damage that such continuing violence was doing to the Holy Land, and Alexander IV and Urban IV both tried to achieve a peace. Urban considered the problem of internecine strife in the context of the threat from outside the kingdom; 'nunc timore imminente de Tartaris, nunc excrecente formidine de paganis...'.\textsuperscript{94} Another writer rued the damage which the War of St. Sabas had caused in Acre. 'Dont il avint que prez que toutes les torz et les forz maisonz d'Acre furent toutes abatues... et i ot bien morz de cele guerre .xx...m. homes...'.\textsuperscript{95} This was undoubtedly an exaggeration but nevertheless, the results of the warfare were severe, at a time when the Latins needed unity.

Conflict amongst Christians was not only a feature of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. In Antioch and Tripoli, feuding constantly produced military encounters. Throughout the first twenty years of the thirteenth century, a dispute over the right of succession at Antioch involved not only the Antiochenes but Armenians, Muslims, and the Templars and Hospitallers.\textsuperscript{96} When Bohemond III died in 1201, his grandson Raymond Roupen (also the grandson of Leon II of Armenia) should have succeeded him but instead Bohemond's younger son, Bohemond
IV, took control in defiance of Raymond Roupen's rights. The Templars, who were disputing ownership of Baghras with Leon, supported Bohemond: the Hospitallers remained neutral until 1205 when they became supporters of the Armenian faction. In 1203, Armenian troops were able to enter Antioch, but the Templars had fortified their positions within the city and they drove the Armenians out. Bohemond, the Templars and their Aleppan allies then carried out raids in the area around Baghras, prompting Leon to take possession of territory which included the Templar castles of Roche Roussel and Roche Guillaume.

The efforts of papal legates to achieve a settlement failed and in 1207 the Armenians were again nearly successful in an attempt to take Antioch. By 1211, matters were clearly getting out of hand and Innocent III was prepared to sanction a more aggressive response against Leon. When the Templars sent reinforcements into the area, the Armenians destroyed a number of villages and confiscated Templar possessions 'in portu Bonelli et aliis Armeniae locis...'. They also attacked a Templar relief force, killing one of the party and wounding several others, including William of Chartres, the Master of the Temple. Innocent consequently excommunicated Leon and ordered John of Brienne to organise a punitive expedition against the Armenians. The Templars sent 'tant come il porent de gent a pie et a cheval', and John, though he did not go himself, provided 50 knights. This force joined troops from Antioch and raided the area around Baghras, possibly besieging the castle. Faced by this threat, Leon agreed to return the castle to the Templars and a truce was arranged.
The Templars had to wait for Baghras until 1216, however, when the Armenians finally succeeded in taking Antioch. But Raymond Roupen's regime soon proved unpopular in the city and in 1219 a conspiracy returned control to Bohemond. Raymond resisted briefly in the citadel but then fled, leaving a Hospitaller garrison which Bohemond besieged. The Hospitallers' right to hold the citadel was subsequently confirmed by the papal legate Pelagius, but the precise date of their capitulation cannot be established. Three letters from Honorius III, dated winter 1225-6, indicated that by this date Bohemond had retaken the citadel and the Hospitallers were entitled to use force in response. It is unlikely, however, that the siege had continued for 6 years. By the mid-1220's Bohemond's position was quite secure, and it was over 30 years before his grandson, Bohemond VI, would again face civil disobedience on a large scale.

The Embriaco lords of Gibelet have been described as the 'most resolute opponents' of the princes of Antioch. They also enjoyed an extremely close relationship with the Hospitallers. In 1212, for example, Guy of Gibelet became a confrater, and in 1274, Guy II placed his family under their protection. The Embriacos were of Genoese origin, and it was natural that the Hospitallers' support of Genoa in the War of St. Sabas should therefore also be expressed in a conflict which simultaneously erupted in northern Syria. In 1258, dissatisfied with Bohemond's rule, the Embriacos destroyed land around Tripoli. Bohemond, supported by the Templars, attempted to repulse the assault but was defeated and wounded. Peace was only restored when Bohemond
was able to arrange for Bertrand Embriaco to be murdered by some serfs.  

This incident must have left some bitterness and in 1278, hostilities were resumed. Guy of Gibelet's brother and a nephew of the bishop of Tortosa, the regent for Bohemond VII, both wanted to marry the same woman and this provided the spark for renewed violence. The situation was slightly changed, however, since William of Beaujeu, the Master of the Temple, provided 30 brothers to support the Embriacos' cause: the lord of Gibelet had, in fact, recently become a confrater of the Templars. The Hospitallers remained aloof from the initial exchanges. After Templar properties in Tripoli had been damaged, the brethren joined the Embriacos in an unsuccessful siege of the city. On their way back to Gibelet, this force attacked a number of coastal sites, but they then had to repel an assault on Gibelet itself by troops from Tripoli. A fierce battle produced heavy casualties and a one year truce was agreed. The following year Bohemond retaliated against further Templar aggression by attacking their sea castle at Sidon. On 16 July 1279 the new Master of the Hospital, Nicholas Lorgne, was able to re-establish peace. This lasted until 1282 when Guy of Gibelet, again with Templar support, made a series of abortive attempts to seize Tripoli. His army finally gained entry, but its allies failed to provide the necessary support. Guy was forced to take refuge and despite guarantees offered by Bohemond, was subsequently killed, along with other ringleaders, at Nephin. Bohemond was probably right to follow his father's example here: after the removal of the
Embriacos, there is no suggestion of any further insurrection in the area.\textsuperscript{105}

**Conclusion: Christian and Muslim strategy**

It has been suggested that low-level warfare, exemplified by raids, counter-raids and skirmishes, was a regular feature of life in the Latin East during this period. In addition to its nuisance value, however, this form of warfare could make a significant contribution to major military campaigns, which aimed at either the defence or capture of territory, or more specifically, the strongpoints of that territory. In western Europe, there was an acknowledged reluctance to fight battles. Commanders organised campaigns which did not require them to face the risks of such an engagement and therefore warfare consisted of raiding, to reduce an opponent's supplies and lessen his resolve, followed by the besieging of a strongpoint.\textsuperscript{106} This strategy, as will be seen in more detail later, was one which was regularly employed by Muslim armies.

The term 'strategy' may, in fact, imply a degree of central planning and control which the Christian armies lacked for much of this period. Contemporary writers expressed certain simple ideas, however, and Latin strategy, in theory, may be summarised as follows. In attack, they hoped by means of sieges to capture territory, a process which might, on occasion, have been enhanced by previous recourse to battle. In defence they tried, by methods which were strictly limited by resources, to protect their strongpoints. They also made use of raids to inflict damage upon their enemies. But it will be seen later that
Christian use of the raid in this period was not normally integrated into a large-scale campaign which would be primarily concerned with the capture of territory. Moreover, despite the great risks which were associated with battles, the Latins in the east appear to have been unusually willing to face their opponents, particularly Christian ones, in open conflict. The results of a battle could, therefore, have important consequences in a struggle for territory. The triumph of the Ibelin army at the battle of Agridi in 1232, for example, was the ideal start to a campaign which continued with the capitulation of a number of fortresses, probably defended by weakened garrisons because of battle losses. The presence of crusade expeditions in the area also led, on a number of occasions, to a battle being fought.

But the armies of the Latin East rarely fought alone against Muslim troops and they appear to have made no effort on their own to increase their lands at the expense of the Muslims. Their dependence on outside help is therefore clear, but when faced by Muslim aggression they were usually without such assistance. So they chose to defend each strongpoint individually, rather than attempt to organise a field army which might attempt to drive back their enemies. The Latins' strategy, which will be examined in more detail in later chapters, was therefore subject at all times to the limitations which were imposed by their resources. Specifically, their army and their strongpoints had to be adequate for an effective strategy to be workable.
NOTES


5. Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 415.


11. Little effort was subsequently made to protect Jerusalem; see 'Rothelin', pp. 529-30; 'Annales prioratus de Dunstaplia', ed. H. R. Luard, Annales monastici, iii (Rolls Series, 36, London, 1886) p. 150.


17. 'Brades', ii, pp. 432-4.


19. J. Pryor 'In subsidium Terrae Sanctae: Exports of foodstuffs and war materials from the Kingdom of Sicily to the Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1265-84', *The trade of Palestine throughout the ages*, ed. T. Dothan, S. Safrai, B. Z. Kedar (Jerusalem, to be published) (In Hebrew). I am grateful to Dr. Pryor for an English version of this article, and for his advice on aspects of the naval history of the Latin states during this period.


24. 'Bracles', ii, pp. 256-7, 260, 263.


27. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 372-3.


40. Baybars' achievement is all the more remarkable since his interests were by no means confined to the Latin East; this was merely one element of his strategy, reflected in his biography by Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir.

42. Ibid., pp. 582-600.
44. Ibid., pp. 742-5, 748-9.
45. Ibid., pp. 756-7.
51. Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 241-56 (one of the most detailed of numerous accounts).
52. See Prawer, Histoire du royaume, ii, p. 557.
53. The various studies of David Ayalon remain fundamental; but now, see R. Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: the early Mamluk Sultanate 1250-1382 (London, 1986).
55. The numbers vary dramatically; for Muslim sources, see D. Ayalon, 'Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army', Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, xv (1953) pp. 222-3, 448-51. Some Christian estimates are 7,000 mounted (Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', p. 260) and 4,000 mounted, besides infantry and, in reserve, the Egyptian army (Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p. 146). Such estimates have to be treated with considerable caution.
57. Referred to by Ayalon, 'Studies on the Mamluk Army', xv, p. 223.


60. 'Rothelin', p. 544.


64. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiaete', *QBSSM*, pp. 188-9.

65. 'Rothelin', p. 545.


70. 'Rothelin', pp. 545-6. Earlier (p. 544, notes 46 and 47) a variant reading is preferable: the sense of the text clearly refers to Muslim mounted troops.


73. 'Histoire des patriarches', p. 564.


75. 'Rothelin', pp. 542-3.


77. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 433-4.


84. See Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, pp. 159-228, passim.


95. 'Rothelin', p. 635.


98. Innocent III, 'Opera Omnia', ccxv, cols. 504, 689-90; *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 16; 'Eracles', ii, p. 257; Riley-Smith, 'Templars and Teutonic Knights', pp. 102-3


100. 'Eracles', ii, p. 318.


104. His place of retreat was, according to contradictory accounts, the Hospitallers' or the Templars' buildings. The latter is more likely.


CHAPTER II

THE LATIN ARMIES

Introduction

A contemporary writer who described the fall of Acre in 1291 suggested that there were 7-800 mounted troops and 14,000 footsoldiers defending the city. This army was diverse, both in terms of the quality of the combatants and the methods by which they were recruited. In the final stages of the Muslim assault, the brother knights of the Military Orders fought alongside poorly-armed pilgrims; mercenary troops serving only for pay joined with the feudatories and townspeople who defended their properties and their very existence. The effort was in vain. The Christians of the Latin East had failed to gather an army capable of repulsing their Muslim enemies. It was a problem which had beset the Latins throughout this period and they were therefore restricted in defensive strategy to garrisoning their strongpoints, since they were unable to protect their lands simultaneously with an adequate field army.

There were many sources from which the Christian army could be recruited, though they proved consistently inadequate to defend their territories effectively. The feudal levy and the troops of the Military Orders provided most of the kingdom's own army, and organisations such as the confraternities could provide additional numbers from residents or visitors to the Holy Land. Troops from Cyprus also provided support for the Latins in Palestine. These basic elements were
augmented by soldiers from western Europe. The crusades produced a short-term increase in the size of the Latin armies, but their achievements were not always of long-term value for the Latin East. Throughout the century individuals and small groups of crusaders provided a further means for the Latins to increase the number of troops they had available. This could also be achieved by using mercenaries, either recruited by the Latins or provided for them by western rulers such as the French kings, or the papacy.

**Members of the army**

a) **Knights and sergeants**

The quality of troops used by Christian armies in the Latin East varied considerably. Crusade expeditions probably continued to attract a popular element which would have been of little use as a fighting force. At the other extreme were the milites, who used their fief, or the payments they received, to maintain themselves. Many contemporary writers did not recognise any more complex divisions within an army than this, but both the mounted and foot elements contained distinct groups of personnel. The foremost amongst the mounted troops, and the basis of the Latin armies, was the knight (miles/chevalier). The secular knighthood of the Latin states remained much more reliant on the institution of the fief for their maintenance than did those of western Europe, where some commutation had led to a decline in personal service. In the east, a fief of 900-1,000 besants was considered adequate to support a knight in the mid-thirteenth century. The general term milites covered a range of warriors, whose sub-divisions became increasingly institutionalised in Europe during the thirteenth
century. Scholars have generally assumed that certain standards, particularly of equipment, had to be maintained but in the Latin East this does not always seem to have been possible. In the mid-thirteenth century a vassal might be summoned to serve who only owned one horse and if this were unfit, the vassal might ask his lord to equip him with a spare horse, "tant que le mien soit garis ou que je en ais un autre recouvré..."

The milites in general were distinguished from the rest of the mounted force by their social and economic standing. The process of becoming a knight had ecclesiastical and secular implications which placed the recipient within a specific rank of medieval society, whilst the caste of knighthood was reinforced by the economic requirements of the knight. Costs of maintenance for a knight's equipment were prohibitive. The largest burden was the sustenance of his horses, involving not only the mounts which he would ride into battle, but also his packhorses and mules. The importance of the horse was reflected in the payment by lords in western Europe and the Latin East of restor if their vassal's mount was lost during a campaign, and by the efforts of western governments to supply the east with horses, exemplified by the Sicilian Kingdom from 1265-1284. Differences between the appearance of a knight and a sergeant would have been readily apparent. The latter's equipment would have been lighter: amongst the Templars, sergeants were consequently not expected to fight with as much bravery as the brother-knights. The Military Orders distinguished their knights and sergeants even more clearly by the colours they wore over their armour. Knights of the Temple wore white mantles and surcoats,
but their sergeants wore black ones.\textsuperscript{10} The distinction may not have been made by the Hospitallers until the mid-thirteenth century, when Alexander IV stated that the brother-knights should wear a red surcoat in war, with a white cross. In 1278, however, the Hospitallers abandoned this discrimination, deciding that all their brethren should be equipped with a red surcoat during a campaign. The reasons for this change are unclear; perhaps the Hospitallers were finding it difficult to recruit sufficient numbers of brother knights.\textsuperscript{11}

Sergeants (\textit{servientes/serjans}) operated in the Latin armies both mounted and on foot. Their equipment and discipline was often sufficient for commanders to place a fair degree of reliance on them and, in theory and in practice, contemporaries recognised the importance of their role.\textsuperscript{12} Unfortunately, below the level of the knights, divisions made by contemporaries between the various elements of an army became increasingly blurred. The sergeants normally served alongside the turcopoles, native troops or westerners using native equipment, who performed a variety of tasks. The turcopoles were not necessarily used simply to combat the Latins' deficiencies in terms of mobility, but also to augment the limited number of troops which were often available to the Latin armies.\textsuperscript{13} The proposed role of native troops, Armenians and Georgians, in the recovery of the Holy Land was noted by one contemporary author.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{b) Archers, crossbowmen and engineers}

It is unlikely that mounted troops, whether knights, sergeants or turcopoles, were required to perform specific and distinct duties within
the army. This helps to explain why contemporary accounts normally failed to differentiate between them and, similarly, between the various groups of pedites. One group of soldiers often referred to specifically was the archers and crossbowmen, whose performance in battle was frequently a critical factor in the Latins' success or failure. Individual crossbowmen, moreover, could be lethal marksmen. During the War of St. Sabas, for example, a Genoese crossbowman tried to murder the Count of Jaffa from a Genoese tower. Fidenzio of Padua recognised the importance of archery for the possible recovery of the Latin East, and suggested that knights too should be trained to use the bow. In the west, mounted archers had been used by John I of England and Philip Augustus, whilst Frederick II had employed Muslim mercenaries; but such troops do not seem to have been used in the Latin East.

The sources unfortunately do not allow a detailed study of the engineers and their assistants who were employed in the Latin East, but they were an essential and distinct element of an army. It was they, not the knights and other troops, that prepared, operated and maintained the various siege engines that might be used. Information gathered from the Scottish wars of Edward I indicates their importance: their pay was as high as 9d a day compared to the 12d received by a knight. And the engines stored in a fortress could rapidly fall into disrepair if the garrison did not have men capable of servicing them. During St. Louis' First Crusade, carpenters, miners and labourers were employed, but the sums spent on them suggest that their numbers were quite small.
Resources in the Latin East

a) The feudal levy

The feudatories who owed military service still formed the nucleus of the Latin East's armies during the thirteenth century. The Military Orders had taken over responsibility for defending much of the Latin East's territory, but in terms of manpower this had not necessarily increased their obligations in the area, nor decreased those of the feudatories. Military service at Arsuf, for example, was still owed by vassals who had previously served Balian of Ibelin. All but one of the fiefs at Arsuf seem to have been evaluated in terms of money. It has been suggested that the large number of fief rentes in the east would have offset the loss of territories after 1187, and thus sustained the servitium debitum at around 670 knights, as John of Ibelin estimated for the period before the battle of Hattin. If this is accepted with the estimate that over 600 brother-knights were maintained by the Military Orders, it is clear that the secular knights who held fiefs in the east remained of considerable importance.

The vassals could owe different amounts of service, 'd'un chevaler ou de plus ou d'un sergent au cheval'. At Arsuf in 1260, for example, 6 knights were mentioned as owing service, compared to 21 sergeants. The precise terms under which a sergeant performed military service are unclear. John of Jaffa seemed to make no distinction between the military obligations of a sergeant holding a fief and those of a knight. Their rights were considered similar too, by the earlier Livre au Roi. And Philip of Novara recognised that rules of succession were the same for a knight and sergeant.
John of Jaffa argued that additional sergeants, probably serving on foot, should only be recruited from 'les yglises et les borgeis... quant le grant besoin est en la terre dou reiaume...' More specific obligations than this were owed by urban communities in the west, and it may be that a development of this service took place during the thirteenth century in the Latin East. The reference to 'grant besoin' seems to imply that this service was more akin to the arrière-ban than the more regular obligations of western towns such as Tournai. The large number of mounted sergeants who owed feudal service may not therefore be included in John of Jaffa's total of 5,025 sergeants.

Evidence for use of the arrière-ban, a general summons of all those fit to carry arms, in the Latin East during this period is scarce. It has been suggested that it was used at Caesarea during the Fifth Crusade, but the grounds for this assumption are questionable. Earlier, at the time of the siege of Jaffa in 1197, Count Henry of Champagne requested aid from the 'borgeis et as comunes', in order to relieve the garrison. And on St. Louis' First Crusade the king waited at Damietta for the Count of Poitiers, 'qui amenoit l'ariere-ban de France'. The use of the term in this context may be imprecise. A better example is the army that was gathered for the battle of La Forbie. The Master of the Hospital described it as including 'generalique exercitu Christianorum Terrae Sanctae, sub patriarcha publico edicto congregati'. The patriarch's role here is an interesting one. Innocent IV, in a letter to the ecclesiastics of the Holy Land in the previous year, referred to the status of the new patriarch, Robert of Mantes, 'in exercitu christiano pro subsidio Terre
Sancte',®® and his position was crucial in the period following the defeat at La Forbie.®® The patriarch's importance for the organisation of the Latin East's defences in the second-half of the thirteenth century will be noted again later: he was constantly employed by the papacy to direct funds to their proper use. But he did not appear again so clearly at the head of a Christian army.

The terms under which the knights served were described in detail by the feudal jurists, writing in the mid-thirteenth century and the jurists' texts have recently been surveyed from this standpoint. Many of Edbury's points are central to an understanding of the feudal summons during this period. A lord would not always serve with his own retinue, but servise de cors would almost always be performed personally and in theory for as long as one year. Many feudatories, however, owed the service of more than one knight, which led to some sub-infeudation, and the employment of mercenaries. It was also possible that some knights, including those who held fiefs, would serve voluntarily. A typical feudal retinue would thus include vassals, rear-vassals, mercenaries, and other retainers of the lord's household. In the development of feudal institutions, two factors were especially important: a lack of manpower and constant warfare. These meant that 'service, not financial profit, was what was wanted from fiefs'. Edbury concluded by suggesting that by the thirteenth century these institutions had become anachronistic in the context of territorial losses and long periods of peace, compared to constant warfare and lack of manpower in the twelfth century.®' But a lack of territory had probably been balanced in terms of the servitium debitum by the use of
the fief rente. Moreover, although it is true that continuous warfare no longer afflicted the Latin states (excepting the possibility of regular low-level conflict) and also that the Military Orders had relieved some of the strain on the feudal summons, a lack of troops, particularly in periods between the major crusading expeditions, would have been a matter of constant concern. Mercenaries in the area would perhaps have been offered fiefs and thus been absorbed into the feudal structure. The personal obligations of the fief remained the best way to maintain an army. Commutation of services remained inappropriate, since the isolated nature of the Latin East, coupled with its lack of manpower, would have made it extremely difficult to gather an army quickly by any other means. The nature of the Muslim threat required that a reasonable number of men should be constantly available. Service could thus be owed for up to a year within the kingdom whilst for service beyond a kingdom's boundaries, as in the case of Cypriot knights serving on the mainland, for example, the obligation was four months. For service outside the kingdom, victuals would be supplied by the lord. The importance of the feudal levy in the Latin East was pointed out by Hugh III of Cyprus. He stated that in 1197, it had been Cypriot vassals that were sent by Aimery of Lusignan to relieve the siege of Jaffa. It is unlikely that any other form of recruitment could have enabled such a prompt reaction to this situation.

The form of the lord's retinue has been described by Edbury, following Philip of Novara's account of the battle of Agridi. John of Jaffa elaborated on this in his lawbook, considering the value of the fief and the service which was expected from it. He examined the use
which was made of servise des compagnons. If a fief owed two
knights, then one method for the lord to fulfil his obligation was by
sub-infeudation. His right to alienate his demesne was restricted,
however, and thus it would have been preferable to employ a soldier on
a monetary basis. Although the term sodoier is used, this soldier is
not truly a mercenary. Mercenaries were normally employed for a
specific expedition and, more importantly, enjoyed a relationship with
their employer which was wholly financial. Troops who were employed
on the terms of servise des compagnons were clearly regular members
of the lord's retinue, and were not simply recruited for a single
campaign. Their relationship to their lord would have been little
different from that of a rear-vassal and the social formation of the
feudal auxilium thus remained essentially unaltered. For a 3,000-besant
fief which owed the service of three knights, the lord could sub-
infedate 1,000 besants for one knight, leaving 2,000 besants 'por lui
et por un sodoier'. The nature of the compagnons' relationship to
the lord and the problems of finding suitable knights in the Latin
East, were considered by John of Jaffa when he described what might
happen if a compagnon fell ill. The lord could agree that his vassal's
compagnon would join the feudal host later, or the vassal might be
obliged to find another knight. The pay for a knight seems to have
varied, since the vassal might not be able to recruit a knight at the
rate he was paying his compagnon, 'ne por les soz comuns de cest
reiaume'. In such circumstances, the vassal had to give the money
which he would have spent to his lord, who could then try to employ
another knight, or put the money to another use.
The recruitment of the feudal host relied largely on the *servise de cors* and *servise des compagnons* which the feudatories and the knights they retained owed. The feudal relationship did not simply produce obligations on the part of the vassal; it also obliged the lord to maintain the vassal's rights. This concept was most eloquently expressed by the jurists in their treatment of the *Assise sur la ligece*, although their ideas were not always borne out by events in practice.\(^\text{38}\) In the first of the jurists' works, the requirement of the lord to protect his vassals' lands from the Muslims was described. If 'les Sarasins averont saisie sa terre...et que li rois n'a poer de chasser ceaus Turs ou nel vora faire, qu'il n'est puis tenus de luy servir de riens por celuy fié'.\(^\text{39}\) The impotence of the Christians' defence against the Muslim onslaught, particularly in the second-half of the thirteenth century, would thus have affected the nature of the lord's feudal relationship with his vassal. The *Assise sur la ligece* meant that this system of mutual rights and obligations extended to all the feudatories.\(^\text{40}\) Many of them had alienated their properties to the Military Orders since they were unable to sustain the costs involved, but some retained their fiefs. Jaffa, for example, was held by its counts until it was captured by Baybars in 1268. Guy of Ibelin remained titular count until his death in 1304, but he may have felt disinclined to continue serving in the feudal levy. Money fiefs would be largely unaffected by this problem, although many fiefs were mixed. The possibility of feudatories wishing to withdraw their services because of a previous lack of support from their peers in a military crisis cannot be discounted.
b) The Military Orders

The feudal host on its own would have been incapable of defending the Latin East. It could not provide enough resources to face the demands of such a task. There were, however, other permanent institutions available in the area. The Military Orders had taken over increasing responsibility for the Latin East's protection since the first-half of the twelfth century. They were able to provide the manpower and, because of their estates in Europe, the other resources which were needed to support their armies, although during the thirteenth century increasing doubts were expressed as to whether the Orders' western properties were being used primarily to finance their operations in the east. They also received assistance from the papacy and bequests from the faithful. From the end of the twelfth century the Templars and Hospitallers were joined by the Teutonic Knights, although the Germans were also concerned to establish their position in Eastern Europe. In the thirteenth century, the three Orders were prominent in the military structure of the Latin East and their importance continued to grow until the end of this period.

The Hospitallers' ability to function effectively in the Latin states depended not only on the brethren who were resident in Palestine and Syria, but also on a constant supply of cash to pay mercenaries and fief-holders. The armies which the Military Orders maintained were recruited from a wide range of sources and were as varied as all the armies of the Latin East. The principal element, however, was the brother knight: it has been suggested above that the Templars and Hospitallers each supported about 300 of these in the east, whilst the
Teutonic Knights probably had rather less. Many contemporary writers exalted the virtues of the knights of the Military Orders, who they regarded as the élite troops of the Christian armies. By the beginning of the fourteenth century, some of the performances of these soldiers, for example, at the siege of Saphet in 1266, had already become almost legendary. The distinction between 'frater vero serviens, qui de armis servit'/'les frères sergens qui servent d'armes' and 'fratrum militum'/'frere chevalier' would probably have been unimportant on campaign. There is no evidence that the brother sergeants had any role to play which was independent of their more heavily-armed brother knights and the same is probably true of the turcopoles, although, as already noted, the Templars' Rule did not require sergeants to show the degree of bravery which was expected of the knights. Support in battle was also provided by squires.

Brother knights and sergeants were not, however, the only element of the Military Orders that provided personal and direct aid to the Holy Land: other troops volunteered for temporary membership of a Military Order. The idea of voluntary service in the Latin East without joining the ranks of a crusade, was one which appealed to many men in the thirteenth century. It has been noted that in 1244, for example, there were 100 knights or footsoldiers from western Europe serving in the Latin East, and James of Ibelin claimed that Cypriot knights were used to serving on the mainland as volunteers. Temporary service with one of the Military Orders, considering the prestige which they enjoyed, would probably have been particularly popular. An example has recently been examined from a thirteenth
century folk tale, in which the count of Ponthieu served the Templars for a year.* In 1237 Gregory IX referred to the need for confessional arrangements for those who served in the Templars' sites, either freely or for pay.®

Troops serving for pay were probably important for the armies of the Military Orders, both on campaign and for the efficient day-to-day maintenance of the military establishment. Unfortunately, information regarding this is limited. On the Fifth Crusade, Honorius III knew that the Orders were employing 'militibus servientibus, balistariis ac aliis personis ad pugnandum'. 2,500 out of 4,000 crossbowmen on the Fifth Crusade were said to have been mercenaries and some of them may have found employment with the Military Orders.® In 1268, Hugh Revel stated that there were now only 300 brothers serving in the east, whereas the Hospitallers had previously supported 10,000 men. The significance of the latter figure is unclear, but it would certainly have included many mercenaries.® In a letter describing the siege of Acre in 1291, John of Villiers, the Master of the Hospital, mentioned 'no sodouier', though it is uncertain whether this refers to the mercenaries of the Order, or to the city as a whole.® The size of armies may imply that paid troops were serving alongside the brethren of an Order, but it is wrong to place too much stress on generally ambiguous information. In 1280, for example, 600 men 'a chevau' repulsed a Muslim assault against Margat. The following year Nicholas Lorgne, the Master of the Hospital, informed Edward I that the castle was 'bien garni de freres et d'autres gens d'armes...'. When Margat was captured by the Muslims in 1285, 25 Hospitallers, probably the total
strength of the brethren in the castle, were allowed to leave with their horses and arms. The rest of the garrison would have presumably consisted mainly of mercenaries. The Hospitallers were clearly maintaining large numbers of troops during the final years of their last stronghold in northern Syria.

The forces of the Military Orders would also have been augmented by their vassals who owed them military service. The acquisition of Arsuf by the Hospitallers in the 1260's provided that Order with the service of 6 knights and 21 sergeants. Their obligations to the Hospital would have been the same as those previously owed to their lord, Balian of Ibelin and Arsuf's contribution to the servitium debitum was therefore unaffected by this transaction. The Hospital agreed to fulfil the obligations of the lord to provide knights, with the exception of the servise de cors which was owed by Balian. It is uncertain whether the Military Orders themselves owed service to the government, but this form of agreement at least ensured that the feudal levy was not affected by their acquisition of territories.

At the Templars' castle of Saphet in northern Galilee, the garrison in about 1260 was estimated to be more than 1,700 men, rising in wartime to 2,200. Of the peacetime force, only a quarter were full-time combatants, but the further breakdown of the soldiers' numbers provides valuable, though still incomplete, information regarding the use made by the Templars of the various kinds of troops which were at their disposal. 'In stabilimento cotidiano castri sunt necessarii 1 milites et xxx servientes fratres cum equis et armis et 1 Turcopoli cum equis
et armis et balistarii ccc... It appears that vassals of the Order were not expected to perform castle-guard at Saphet, although such obligations did exist elsewhere. It is also interesting that as many turcopoles as brother knights were serving at Saphet, an indication of the numerical importance of such troops to the Templars. The large number of crossbowmen were probably serving for pay, though there is no evidence of mercenaries being amongst the mounted contingent, apart from the turcopoles. If there were about 300 brother knights maintained by the Templars in the Latin East, then the presence of one-sixth of them within Saphet suggests the importance of that castle to the Order. Any feudal obligations to the Templars would perhaps have been fulfilled only when the castle was under threat, when support may also have been provided by the Hospitallers. Conversely, one writer believed that Templars had assisted the Hospitallers at the siege of Arsuf in 1265.

The Military Orders were prominent in every aspect of the Latin East's military life during the thirteenth century. Their reputation was generally excellent, and criticism such as that expressed by Philip of Nanteuil after the debacle at Beit-Hânûn in 1239, or that of Joinville regarding the Templars' arrogance at Mansurah, was rare. The renown of the Orders and their relative wealth in the Latin East ensured that their leaders enjoyed an influential position in the Christian hierarchy. They were generally to the fore in discussions of strategy, whether this concerned the policy of the Latin states or the progress of a crusade. A typical example of such discussions took place in 1239 before the crusade led by Theobald of Champagne set off
south from Acre, towards Ascalon and Gaza. The Masters of the Temple and the Teutonic Knights were both present at the meeting, but the Hospitallers' Master was not mentioned.\textsuperscript{62} It is not surprising, considering the commitment which all the Military Orders made to the defence of the Holy Land, that their interests clashed occasionally. Their differences, however, sometimes became long-term political ones which adversely affected the unity which the Latin settlement required for its survival. It has been seen that when the Hospitallers favoured Raymond Roupen during a conflict in northern Syria, the Templars supported Bohemond of Antioch. During the Crusade of Frederick II, the Teutonic Knights were alone amongst the Orders in their support of the emperor,\textsuperscript{64} but later the Hospitallers supported Filangieri in his conflict with the Commune of Acre. The War of St. Sabas led to the Hospitallers supporting the Genoese and their allies, whilst the Templars joined most of the feudatories and favoured the Venetians. By the late 1270's, however, the Templars were siding with the Genoese Embriaco family against the lord of Tripoli.\textsuperscript{65} These internecine squabbles were grave, and suggest that the Orders were, for various reasons, constantly at odds with one another. But ill-feeling does not normally seem to have prevented them from combining in actions directed against Muslim enemies. Raiding expeditions invariably included troops which were provided by both the Templars and Hospitallers. The decision to fight on the side of the Damascenes against Egypt in 1244 may not have suited the Hospitallers but it did not prevent them from providing and losing hundreds of soldiers at La Forbie.\textsuperscript{66}
The Military Orders excelled amongst the Christians in their approach to warfare in the Latin East. Their experience of the region's military affairs amounted to over 150 years by the time of the final loss of the Holy Land. The quality of their troops, and thus their value to any Latin army in which they featured, resulted from their ability to carry out in practice what they had learned in theory. They did not attempt to execute complex manoeuvres but they applied common sense and collective discipline to their fighting methods, attributes which were often absent from the rest of the Christian armies. The most detailed account of their military code is contained in a set of statutes dated to the twelfth century from the Rule of Templars, but it continued to develop in statutes promulgated in the thirteenth century. When the Templars were camped, for example, their movements were carefully restricted. If the camp was threatened, their response should be ordered but positive; those nearby should go to investigate, armed with shield and lance, whilst the rest should assemble. In July 1219 during the Fifth Crusade, a concerted Muslim assault against the crusader camp routed the footsoldiers, and French secular troops were unable to repulse the attack. The crusaders were seriously threatened until the Templars, led by their marshal who carried their standard, the bausan, were given permission to charge. They forced the Muslims to withdraw, inflicting on them heavy losses although Christian casualties were also numerous. The Templars' performance was praised by Oliver of Paderborn, who may have witnessed their charge. Their discipline contrasts with the lacklustre efforts of the Ibelins and their allies at Casal Imbert in 1232, when their inattentive sentries allowed the Lombards to take the Ibelin camp by storm.
On Christian raiding expeditions, the Military Orders played a crucial role. Again, the discipline which their statutes demanded suited them to such a position. The Templars were required to restrain themselves as far as possible, although they were allowed to test and water their mounts, with permission, and to leave their position if a Christian was threatened by a Muslim. At night they should remain silent. As when they were camped, if a cry was raised those nearby should take their shield and lance and mount their chargers; they should then await the orders of the marshal. James of Molay, the last Master of the Temple, argued against the unification of the Hospital and Temple by pointing out that on raids, the two Orders protected the front and rear of the army; if the Orders were joined then obviously this practice could no longer be maintained. A raid of August 1219 on a Muslim camp at Fariskur indicated the kind of discipline and courage which was demonstrated by the Orders. The Muslims pulled back from their camp, allowing the combined effects of wine and heat to destroy the order of the Christian army. When the Muslims attacked most of the Christians panicked and fled in disarray. Only King John, the Military Orders and a few other knights marched together as the rearguard, thus preventing a major Christian defeat. But their casualties were still heavy. The Templars and Hospitallers may have lost as many as 200 knights between them, whilst the Teutonic Knights lost 30. 250 other knights were lost and King John's armour was scorched by Greek fire.

The Military Orders were not immune to rash behaviour themselves, however. In 1260, for example, Stephen of Saisi, the Marshal of the
Templars, was dismissed from the Order after his behaviour on a raid led to a heavy defeat for the Christian troops. Stephen was reinstated by the pope, but his subsequent career in the west was also controversial. In 1266 a Christian raiding party heading towards Tiberias was wrecked when the advance guard, including the Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights, pushed on too far ahead of the main force and was ambushed by Muslim troops from Saphet.

On the few occasions when Christians fought with Muslims in battle, the Military Orders were normally prominent in the action. It has already been noted that their losses at La Forbie were serious. At Mansurah on St. Louis' First Crusade, the Templars tried to dissuade Robert of Artois from chasing the Muslims into the town. Their efforts failed but they still followed Robert's precipitate charge, losing many brethren as a result. The Orders did not hesitate to provide troops in order to help defend a Christian strongpoint. At the siege of Tripoli in 1289, the Hospitallers lost 40 brothers. The Templars also fought at Tripoli, whilst an eye-witness to the fall of Acre praised their willingness 'suum sanguinem fundere pro Christi nomine et pro defensione fidei christianae...'

In the thirteenth century the presence of the Military Orders in the Latin East was most clearly expressed in the numerous castles and strongpoints which they maintained. Their acquisitions in Palestine during this period came from varied sources. The Templars constructed two major castles in the area; one was wholly original, the other had
been previously ruined. At Château Pèlerin in the winter of 1217-18, the Templars were joined by the Teutonic Knights, Walter of Avesnes and a number of pilgrims, to construct a castle on a promontory not far from their fortress of Destroit. The building was completed by May 1218. It soon proved its worth, resisting al-Mu'azzam's assault in 1220, whilst Frederick II was discouraged from attacking it in 1229, since it was 'fort et bien garni'. In December 1240, the Templars began to rebuild the castle of Saphet. Two-and-a-half years later the task was finished, at a cost of 1,100,000 Saracen besants, and the castle was a great asset to the Christians in the area until it was captured by the Muslims. Many of the sites taken over by the Military Orders in the thirteenth century reflected the nobles' inability, or unwillingness, to deal with the problems of defending their properties. The principal castle of the Teutonic Knights, Montfort, was purchased by them from Jacob of Mandelee; they had begun work on the site in 1228. Leopold of Austria helped them with a gift of 6,000 marks, which was remembered by Gregory IX when he urged the west to offer further donations to the Order. A good example of an Order taking over defensive duties from a lord no longer able to bear the burden was the Hospitallers' acquisition of Arsuf from Balian of Ibelin in the early 1260's. The rent of 4,000 Saracen besants a year which they agreed to pay contrasts with the sums the Templars spent on the restoration of Saphet, although it is not known how much the Hospitallers spent on refurbishing the site. It may therefore have been regarded by contemporaries as something of a bargain, although its capture by Baybars in 1265 proved costly to the Order. Further north, Julian of Sidon found himself in the same predicament as Balian
of Ibelin, and sold Sidon and Beaufort to the Templars in 1260. He had also been negotiating with the Hospitallers, who only gave up their possessions in the lordship of Sidon in 1262.\textsuperscript{33} Not all properties which were passed to the Military Orders in this period were necessarily a straight sale or lease arrangement with a secular lord. After Richard of Cornwall had rebuilt Ascalon, he handed it to a representative of the emperor who subsequently granted it to the Hospitallers, promising to pay expenses which were necessary for the defence of the castle.\textsuperscript{34} In 1255 Alexander IV presented Mt. Tabor to the Hospitallers, since the threat which it faced from the Muslims had been recognised. The pope suggested that they should maintain 40 'équites' there. It is not known, however, whether the site was ever fortified.\textsuperscript{35}

In northern Syria the Military Orders were already well established by the beginning of this period and they received little new territory, except in Armenia. The Hospitaller castles of Crac des Chevaliers and Margat, and the Templar positions of Baghras, Tortosa and Chastel Blanc combined with numerous lesser fortresses to dominate the region at the expense of their weak, faction-ridden Muslim neighbours. Their strength was increased by their right to make war and peace as they wished. A sequence of documents concerning Jabala and the Château de la Vieille indicated the type of position they could be accorded. In 1210 Raymond Roupen granted the town, though it was not in Christian hands, to the Hospitallers and 'Dedi eciam eidem domni liberam potestatem ad faciendum guerram et treugam cum Saracenis...'. This arrangement was confirmed in 1215, but by 1221 it was clear that the
Templars and Hospitallers were disputing ownership of Jabala. And in 1233 the Patriarch of Antioch had to warn the two Orders about making separate truces with the Muslims of the area.®

The Military Order of St. Lazarus was a small body of leper knights. Their disease must have given them a strange position within the army, but they do not appear to have had any problems with recruitment: Templars who contracted the disease were amongst those who would join the Order.® In 1244 the entire force of lepers was killed at La Forbie®® but their numbers must have been restored since they were referred to by Joinville during St. Louis' stay in Palestine, and they were granted 200 marks by Alexander IV in 1257. This contrasts with the 10,000 marks received by the Templars and the 2,000 marks given to the Hospitallers around this time®® but the leper-knights did take on some responsibilities for the defence of the Latin Kingdom. They guarded the Gate of St. Lazarus at Acre, for example.®® It has been suggested that the Order merged with the Hospitallers in 1259, but the Master of St. Lazarus may have been at the siege of Acre in 1291.®® The history of the Order in the second-half of the thirteenth century seems likely to remain shrouded in mystery.

The Military Orders, therefore, had a leading role to play in all the Christians' efforts to maintain their territories in Palestine and Syria. Their arguments with one another and their frequent siding with opposing groups in the politics of the Latin East exacerbated many disputes and thereby weakened the Latin states, but without them there would probably have been no Christian presence in the area in the
thirteenth century. A Muslim chronicler was referring to Saphet, but could have been speaking of the Orders who garrisoned such fortresses, when he dramatically described it as 'an obstruction in the throat of Syria and a blockage in the chest of Islam...'

**Resources from the West**

a) **The Crusades**

In September 1270, Baybars demolished Ascalon. Six months earlier, he had received news of St. Louis' Second Crusade and he feared that the site might be refortified by the French ruler. This crusade, as Baybars was soon to learn, posed no threat to the Muslims in the region, but the sultan's reaction is nonetheless interesting. The Muslims clearly feared a large additional Christian presence and the consequent threat to their territories. But the nature of the crusade, the *passagium generale*, in the thirteenth century prevented it from satisfying the military needs of the Christians in the Latin East. It gave a short-term impetus to their efforts but did nothing to alleviate the long-term manpower crisis which afflicted the Latins. The crusade in this respect could, in fact, leave the inhabitants of the area with additional problems to solve. Muslim rulers who had been subjected to the zealous militaristic behaviour of the western armies would have to be placated, whilst fortifications established by crusaders had to be garrisoned by inadequate numbers. Such a situation is not surprising. Christians had taken the cross in Europe, to fight the infidel and earn salvation. They had left their homes and families and expended considerable sums of money to finance their expeditions. When they arrived in the Holy Land, they naturally wanted to do something to
justify their trip. Unfortunately such actions were often far from welcome to the Latin East's governments, whose aims were more limited but more pragmatic.

Some contemporaries began to realise that the crusade, in its present form, was not the best way for Europe to aid the Holy Land. Fidenzio of Padua argued that sufficient troops were necessary because 'non multum valet in Terra Sancta fuerit acquisita, et statim postea sit cum oprobio derelicta'. He therefore suggested that each bishopric, abbey or city should send a few knights to the east. Other authors of De recuperatione memoranda added ideas such as the formation of a new Military Order, the employment of troops used to fighting in their own countries, and the careful colonization of the newly-conquered territories. As early as 1235, Gregory IX had suggested that after the crusade of 1239 a force should be maintained in the Holy Land for ten years. In practice, however, the crusade, as the most obvious institution by which Europe could help the Holy Land, remained unaltered and thus generally unable to benefit the Latin East in the thirteenth century. St. Louis had recognised some of the problems of the area when he established a garrison of French troops there and the success of this venture will be examined later. The idea of permanent garrisons maintained by the west for the defence of the Latin East had proved most fruitful with the creation of the Military Orders. The formation of national companies, and confraternities, added much-needed reinforcements. Those who were best able to analyse the plight of the Latins supported these organisations. William of Beaujeu, the Master of the Temple, argued at the Council of Lyons in 1274 for the provision of
an advance expedition numbering 250-300 knights and 500 infantry.®®
With hindsight such a strategy could be considered a prerequisite for
the survival of the Latin East but permanent forces were, in practice,
ever adequate to justify the theoreticians' hopes that the Holy Land
could be successfully defended by them.

The crusade was the instrument of the papacy and it was one which
the popes often used for their own ends (against the Hohenstaufen, for
example) rather than for the aid of the Holy Land.®® They were,
however, well aware of the conditions which existed in the area. They
received regular reports from ecclesiastics and secular leaders whilst
some, such as Urban IV and Gregory X, had personal knowledge of the
kingdom's problems. Innocent III had not been to the Latin East but
his proclamation of the Fifth Crusade showed him to be appreciative of
the threat resulting from the recent Muslim fortification of Mt.
Tabor.®® The papacy's awareness of the situation in the area suggests
that there was a cynical attitude towards the diversion of crusade
funds, particularly for papal concerns in Sicily, whilst Baybars ravaged
the Latin East. But few other western rulers showed any genuine
interest in the crusade, which meant that, however well-intentioned
popes such as Innocent III and Gregory X might have been, their appeals
for aid were often unheeded. The crusade was a voluntary enterprise
and all rulers must have hesitated at the massive commitment required
to finance a large-scale expedition. St. Louis' outlay on his First
Crusade was about 1.5 million pounds tournois, at a time when the
average income of the French monarchy was 250,000 pounds, most of
which was required for internal expenses. Nearly 1 million pounds was
collected from the Church, predominantly the French church, from the
tenth which was levied. The balance was made up largely by
exploitation made possible by improvements in administrative techniques
and the system continued to function until the beginning of 1253, when
it broke down because of political, rather than fiscal, problems. Logistical factors meant that a campaign such as St. Louis' First
Crusade was bound to prove costly. And in spite of the huge sums of
money which the king spent, organisation collapsed as the crusade
progressed south towards Cairo. Like the Fifth Crusade, St. Louis' expedition was beaten by the climate and the Muslims' resources,
supported by their knowledge of the area's geography. This situation
arose despite the care with which St. Louis had planned the crusade.
An advance party had been sent to Cyprus to prepare the army's
victuals: Joinville's description of the scene which greeted him when
the main force arrived on the island indicated how successful this
effort had been. More mundane enterprises than the two crusades into
Egypt during this period still required considerable expenditure. The
great achievements of crusaders in the Latin East were their building
enterprises, which required both men and money if they were to be
successful. St. Louis spent 95,000 pounds tournois on fortifications in
the Latin East after the failure of his crusade in Egypt. Fortifications which were constructed with the aid of crusaders
included Château Pèlerin, Sidon, Jaffa, Caesarea, Ascalon and the city
defences of Acre.

When a large crusade expedition was organised to help the Latin
states, the Christians in the area thus received an injection of
manpower, supported by other resources, which they would have been incapable of mustering by their own efforts. The number of knights usually sustained on the mainland of the Latin East probably amounted to about 600 secular, and slightly more within the Military Orders, suggesting a total force of about 1300-1500 knights, including mercenaries. An examination of the numbers involved in a crusade indicates the impact such armies would have had, and the justified concern which was felt by the Muslims. On the Fifth Crusade the eyewitness Oliver of Paderborn estimated that there were 1,200 mounted troops excluding turcopoles and other mounted, innumerable foot (which the Muslims compared to locusts) and 4,000 archers. Another contemporary suggested, before the army left for Egypt, the rather larger figure of 3,000 knights and mounted sergeants, 20,000 foot sergeants and 30,000 others, including women. Some of the problems in establishing the size of medieval armies are indicated by a further estimate of 20,000 knights and 200,000 foot, but the previous assessments probably give a rough idea of the actual size of the army. By the Treaty of San Germano in 1225, Frederick II agreed to maintain 1,000 knights on crusade for two years and provide facilities for 2,000 more to travel. Each knight would be equipped with three horses. The army which assembled near Brindisi in the summer of 1227 may have exceeded this figure. The crusade led by Theobald of Champagne in 1239 set off south from Acre with a force of 4,000 knights, including those supplied by the Latin Kingdom. There were considerable numbers of other troops present on this campaign. St. Louis' First Crusade is well documented by contemporaries and two of the best eye-witness accounts tally closely in their estimates for the size of his army.
Joinville suggested a force of 2,800 knights, whilst Jean Sarrasin, a royal chamberlain, believed that there were 2,500 knights, 5,000 crossbowmen and other troops both mounted and on foot. A smaller expedition led by the Lord Edward in 1271 included a force under his personal command of 200-300 knights and twice as many footsoldiers. This figure may be reliable, since a raid on St. George du Lebeyne was supported by all the Military Orders and the local barons. Muslim sources estimated that the combined force totalled 1,500 cavalry and many infantry.

The crusade armies which came to help the Latin East offered, potentially, a vast increase in the size of the Latins' forces. A crusade such as Theobald of Champagne's probably doubled the number of troops which the Latins had available. Smaller expeditions, of which the Lord Edward's is only one example, still provided hundreds of men to augment those who were normally garrisoning the area's strongpoints, thus enabling some pre-emptive military action to be undertaken. The crusades into Egypt threatened the Muslims with up to twice the number of troops that were normally resident in the Latin East. But the crusade in the thirteenth century was largely ineffectual, achieving little of value for the maintenance of the Latin settlement. The emphasis, however, still remained largely on the crusade as a means for the west to assist the Holy Land. How was this resource used by the inhabitants of the area?

The decision of the Fifth Crusade to attack Egypt, after a period of castle building and raiding Muslim positions which bordered the
Latin Kingdom, seems to have been taken by John of Brienne following a conference which he held with the leading figures of the Military Orders and the kingdom. There may not have been any crusaders present at this meeting, although this seems unlikely. The earlier decision to raid Muslim territory had been made at a parlement in the tent of the King of Hungary, at which all the leading figures of the crusade had been present, in addition to the leaders of the Latin East. At the later conference, John of Brienne not only recognised the potential value of a large-scale assault on Egypt, but also argued that the crusade would serve little purpose if it remained in Palestine: 'Il m'est avis que nous ne porons mie grantment exploitier en ceste tierre sor Sarrasins. Et se vous veés qu'il fust boin à faire, jou iroie volentiers en la tiere d'Egipte, assegier Alixandre ou Damiete, car se nous poons avoir une de ces cités, bien m'est avis que nous en poriemes bien avoir le roialme de Jherusalem'. With such an army, an offensive campaign was the best means to defend and possibly extend the borders of the Latin Kingdom. But the best opportunity to achieve this was lost when the legate Pelagius, and others, refused to accept a generous settlement offered by the Muslims. The strategy adopted when Theobald of Champagne led a crusade to the east suggested a desire to protect the kingdom through the building of a frontier strongpoint in the south at Ascalon, and then the lessening of any possible threat from the east by an attack on Damascus. Neither of these schemes, which had been agreed at a stormy conference at Acre, was carried out. This was principally because of the inability of the Count of Bar, and others, to accept the discipline which Theobald and the Military Orders attempted to enforce. A Muslim chronicler who commented on the failure of this crusade made
two interesting observations. First, he suggested that the Latins preferred to ally themselves with the Muslims rather than to support crusaders from Europe. This overstates the point, which is nevertheless true, that the Latins had become increasingly accepted by feuding Muslim states as possible allies. Secondly, the tactics employed by the crusaders were considered: 'qu'ils ignoraient la topographie du pays et aussi qu'ils n'étaient pas au courant de la tactique que les Musulmans employaient dans les combats.' The failure of Theobald of Champagne's Crusade reflected many of the problems that the leaders of the Latin states faced when trying to make use of an army which was supposedly intended to help them. Crusaders did not understand the circumstances of the region they had volunteered to fight in and they were often unwilling to submit to wise counsel on such an enterprise.

St. Louis' First Crusade had probably always intended to attack Egypt, though the evidence is inconclusive. The Lord Edward's Crusade was hampered by a lack of manpower which was recognised by its leader: not having enough men to face Baybars, he opted for some raiding against Muslim positions in the vicinity of Acre, and a half-hearted attempt to besiege the important Muslim stronghold of Qaqun. The crusades generally presented a series of fait accomplis to the inhabitants of the Latin East, most of which would have disappointed them. Invasions of Egypt were regarded with approval, but the Fifth Crusade failed after control of its direction had become blurred following the arrival of Pelagius. And St. Louis' Crusade was halted at Mansurah when the exuberance of crusaders again overcame the cautious
advice of the Military Orders. Other crusades, such as the Lord Edward's, provided inadequate troops to achieve anything of note, but the desire of the crusaders to fight with the infidel still had to be accommodated by a government which would have probably preferred appeasement to aggression.

It is clear from the financing of St. Louis' Crusade that most of the monetary resources for such an enterprise were provided by the Church. Funds were not only given to help major crusade expeditions, however. Tenths which had originally been levied for specific campaigns became a regular aspect of papal financial policy. The money collected was employed in various ways. It could be used in Europe to assist individual crusaders; it could be sent to the Holy Land to be used in whatever way was deemed appropriate; or it could be returned to the papal treasury and subsequently diverted to other projects.

Documents from Innocent IV's pontificate indicated the means by which individual crusaders were able to join St. Louis' expedition. William Longsword, an English crusader, died in heroic circumstances at Mansurah if the account of Matthew Paris is to be believed. His journey was financed in part by the redemption of vows of other cruscesignati in the diocese of Lincoln and elsewhere: "propter impotentiam corporum vel alias justas causas in terram predictam nequent personaliter transfretare..." Confraternities of crusaders enabled their members to journey to the Holy Land and it has been argued that organisations such as the Confraternity of Châteaudun were intended specifically to prevent members from commuting or redeeming their vows. But Innocent IV's letter to Odo of Châteauroux regarding
the confraternity indicated that as far as the papacy was concerned, their status as *crucesignati* simply required them to fulfil their vow in some form, which need not necessarily have involved personal service: "*ut in optione ipsorum sit tempore generalis passagii vel personaliter transfretare, vel de bonis suis illuc mittere juxta proprias facultates, aut bellatores idoneos destinare..."" The idea of providing enough money for men to be sent on crusade was widespread and was important for enabling men such as William Longsword to fulfil their vows personally. In December 1247, Innocent told Odo of Châteauroux to provide the lord of Château-Chinon with 500 marks, 'de vicesima seu legatis aut redemptione votorum crucesignatorum'. Landericus of Floriacus, a knight, was a friend of the lord of Château-Chinon: he was to receive 50 marks."" Material aid to individuals who would consequently offer their services to the Holy Land was not restricted to those who journeyed in the ranks of a crusade. It has already been noted that individual pilgrims were a constant feature of the potential resources of the Latin East. In January 1264 Urban IV, the former patriarch of Jerusalem, received news of the poor condition of the Latin states and therefore ordered the levying of a hundredth for five years, which was to be collected by Giles, the archbishop of Tyre, and John of Valenciennes, the lord of Haifa. There does not seem to have been any great enthusiasm in Europe for a new crusade, but in July 1264 Urban assured the rulers of the Latin Kingdom that aid would soon be on its way, at the same time sending part of the hundredth for work to be done on the defences of Jaffa."" Urban also wrote in July to the
count of Blois, urging him to take the cross. The count and his wife were given a subsidy to help them to undertake the journey. In 1287 or 1288 the countess of Blois arrived in Acre with a large number of troops, one of the last Christian pilgrims to visit the Holy Land whilst it was in the hands of the Latins. She built a tower at Acre, and a chapel. The following year she died in the city. Another committed crusader towards the end of the Latin Kingdom's history was Geoffrey of Sergines. He had already been in the east before he fought on St. Louis' expedition to Egypt. After the crusade he remained in the Latin East, apart from a brief return to Europe, until his death in 1269. He was seneschal of Jerusalem and thus must have become a fiefholder in the kingdom, and he was a leader of the French troops maintained in the area by St. Louis and his successors.

b) Confraternities

The need for continual support of the Holy Land beyond that provided by the crusades was not only recognised by individuals such as Alice of Blois and Geoffrey of Sergines. Groups of lesser individuals, often from urban centres in Europe, formed charitable institutions which enabled their members to spend some time serving the armies of the Latin East. Unfortunately, evidence of only eight confraternities has survived but it can be assumed that there were many more. They are important because they provide almost unique information for the role of reasonably equipped footsoldiers who were perhaps the largest single group within the Latin army. In general, however, the confraternities did not represent the burgesses of the Latin Kingdom, since they were either foreign residents or crusaders.
Three confraternities demonstrate the different form that these groups could take, and the type of function which they might be expected to perform. It has already been noted that at Châteaudun, Odo of Châteauroux encouraged the formation of a confraternity as part of the preparations for the First Crusade of St. Louis. A recent scholar has pointed out that the confraternity's purchase of crossbows probably indicated that it was made up of burgesses. The later history of the group cannot be traced. The Confraternity of the Holy Spirit may also have been initially founded to enable its members to join a crusade, the Fifth, but it definitely survived after this, having its statutes confirmed by Pope Alexander IV in 1255, and also participating in the final defence of Acre in 1291. It was important enough for one contemporary writer to refer to it, paired with the Templars, as one of eight groups which led the resistance to the Muslims. The members of the confraternity were Italians, so they may have joined merchant ships going to the Latin East and then spent some months in voluntary service with the Latin armies. The size of the confraternity is not known, nor are the number of troops that it provided. Some details suggest it may have been a fair number, however. Members of the confraternity were expected to carry arms if they were able to equip themselves, but if they were not then these could be provided. This also suggests that members were probably burgesses, many of whom would not normally carry weapons. Money was available to ransom members of the society who were captured by the enemy. Sections in the rules concerning division of booty and the need for discipline in battle - interesting in itself, for troops probably serving on foot - also imply that membership of the confraternity was quite large. During a
conflict, troops would have rallied under the banner which the confraternity possessed.\textsuperscript{122}

The Confraternity of St. Andrew, founded before 1187, was rather different from the societies considered so far. Not only was it based in the Latin East, but membership was open to 'li riche home et li chevalier et li borgeis', a point which seems to have caused some surprise.\textsuperscript{123} It played a leading role in the resistance of the feudatories to the demands of Frederick II. But its position as a means by which inhabitants of the Latin East who did not owe feudal service could help the armies of the kingdom has remained undocumented.

c) The French Regiment

A document from Edward I's reign noted that after his Crusade, members of the English Confraternity of Saint Edward the Confessor were ordered 'to preserve and maintain the tower in Acre which the king caused to be built'.\textsuperscript{124} St. Louis, after his Crusade, had also wished to make a permanent contribution to the defence of the Holy Land. He therefore established a body of troops who were to be maintained by revenues from the French monarchy. The history of this regiment is sketchy and their numbers fluctuated, whilst support from France was at times neither regular nor adequate. But the force remained in the Latin East until the fall of the kingdom. It provided much needed additional numbers for the army, playing a significant part in many of the military events of this period. Moreover, some of its leaders became important figures in the government of the Latin East.
The original force which St. Louis left with Geoffrey of Sergines
was 100 knights, with crossbowmen, mounted and foot sergeants. This
was a large commitment when compared to the 300 brother knights which
the Templars and Hospitallers each maintained. Geoffrey was also
appointed seneschal of the kingdom, a position which was
subsequently held by other members of the French regiment. The
addition to the kingdom's army soon indicated the value of these
troops. It is reasonable to assume that they were present when their
leaders were mentioned: in the winter of 1255, for example, they were
involved in repelling a Muslim assault on Jaffa after a successful
Christian raid in the area. In 1263 Geoffrey was wounded in the
course of a Muslim raid on Acre, but this cannot have been a serious
injury because in the following year he was present during a Christian
raid in the vicinity of Ascalon. Also in 1264 Oliver of Termes came
to Acre and in November of that year he took part in a raid on
Bethsan. Oliver was a man with a 'questionable past', having been
involved with resistance to the French crown in Languedoc. But he
appears to have been successfully rehabilitated. One contemporary
writer, describing Oliver as 'j. haut home d'Espaigne' did not seem
to connect him with the French presence in the Holy Land, but by the
following year Geoffrey and Oliver were both associated with documents
sent to St. Louis regarding the financing of the regiment. At this
time, its solvency was in some doubt. In early 1263, Urban IV had to
write to Louis, encouraging him to maintain his support for
Geoffrey. Two or three years later, Clement IV was similarly aware
of the high costs which Geoffrey was incurring. It was arranged that
some of the hundredth which was being collected for the Holy Land
should therefore go to him.\textsuperscript{133} In the mid-1260's Geoffrey, Oliver and Erard of Valery, who had recently travelled to the east, were able to ensure regular payments from France in the form of loans,\textsuperscript{134} but these still proved insufficient and in 1267 the patriarch of Jerusalem wrote to the commander of the Templars in Paris asking for further assistance. The letter indicated the extent to which French knights were active in the Holy Land at this time. The patriarch wished to hire 50 French knights, who had come to the east with the count of Nevers and Erard of Valery, for eight months at a cost of 60 \textit{livres tournois} per knight. Erard, before he had set out, had been provided with 1,000 \textit{livres tournois}. An additional 48 French knights had been retained at a cost of 1,800 \textit{livres tournois} for five months. Although both these groups were hired by the patriarch on behalf of the papacy, they may well have served with their colleagues in the French garrison. For both groups, the payments indicate an annual salary for a knight of 90 \textit{livres tournois}. Geoffrey of Sergines was spending 10,000 \textit{livres tournois} a year on his force, which suggests that he had been able to maintain it at around the figure of 100 knights with which it had been created in 1254. But his expenses were not being paid wholly by the French crown. The patriarch noted that Geoffrey had been obliged to borrow 3,000 \textit{livres tournois} to pay his troops and would be forced to alienate his own properties in order to repay this loan.\textsuperscript{135} The regiment, despite its difficulties, continued to serve with the Latin Kingdom's armies, but its problems extended to the military sphere. In 1266 as part of an advance guard for a raiding party, members of it were ambushed by Muslims on the plain of Acre.\textsuperscript{136}
Geoffrey of Sergines' position as the leader of the French troops enabled him to play an influential part in the kingdom's political life. From 1259-61 he was lieutenant in the kingdom, appointed by Plaisance of Cyprus after the death of John of Arsuf. When Plaisance herself died in 1261, Geoffrey was appointed regent for Hugh of Cyprus, perhaps being re-appointed following the death of Isabella of Cyprus in 1264. After the High Court had selected Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan as the new regent, in c.1265, Geoffrey was the first to offer him homage. Geoffrey then became lieutenant for Hugh of Antioch-Lusignan until 1267. He was thus one of the foremost Christian figures in the period of the first Mamluk onslaught on the Latin Kingdom and he was involved in much of the correspondence to and from the region at this time. His concern for military affairs was not limited to the maintenance of the French regiment. In July 1264, Urban IV stated his concern about the condition of the defences of Jaffa. Part of the hundredth which was being collected should be used to improve these: the money was to be sent to the patriarch and Geoffrey of Sergines and 'per manus eorum in subsidium predictorum operum et ipsius castri Joppensis reparationem ac defensionem integre convertenda'.

Geoffrey died in April 1269, after a career in the east which had earned him eulogies from the papacy and a contemporary poet. Unfortunately the activities of the French regiment are rather obscure after his death. He was succeeded as seneschal by Robert of Creseques, but the connection of the latter with the French regiment is unclear. His action in a battle with Muslim troops outside Acre in 1269 does not sound that of a responsible leader and it may be that control of
the regiment had passed to Oliver of Termes, although a contemporary Muslim source stated that whilst Oliver had led the army which was defeated, St. Louis' 'governor' at Acre was killed in the battle.\textsuperscript{40} Meanwhile, Erard of Valery had returned to Europe, playing an important part in the battle of Tagliacozzo in 1268.\textsuperscript{41} There is no information on the regiment in the next few years and it is possible that it went into temporary abeyance in view of St. Louis' Crusade to Tunis. In the winter of 1270-1, Oliver, Erard and John of Grailly, a future commander of the French troops, were all in Sicily with the Lord Edward before his departure for the Latin East.\textsuperscript{42} By 1272, however, the presence of the regiment was again apparent. In that year John of Grailly was appointed seneschal\textsuperscript{43} and Oliver of Termes was making preparations for a return to the Latin East. By the summer he was ready and in 1273 large numbers of troops were sent by Philip III and Gregory X, possibly to reconstitute completely the French presence in the Holy Land. Giles of Sanci arrived with 400 crossbowmen; Peter of Aminnes brought 300 crossbowmen, whilst Oliver himself travelled with 25 mounted troops and 100 foot archers.\textsuperscript{44} Gregory hoped that Oliver would remain in the east but he died in August 1274\textsuperscript{45} and the regiment may again have been leaderless until 1275 or 1276 when William of Rousillon arrived in the kingdom, with 'gens à chevau & à pié de par le roy de France, & fu lor cheveteine'. His force consisted of 40 knights, 60 mounted sergeants and 400 crossbowmen which represented a sizeable addition to the armies of the Latin East.\textsuperscript{46} He died in 1277 but this time the succession of a new leader for the regiment seems to have been immediate, with Miles of Haifa taking over.
His name perhaps suggests that a native of the Latin East had been
selected for the position.\textsuperscript{147}

Also in 1277, Odo Poilechien became seneschal of the kingdom,
presumably replacing John of Grailly, and it has been suggested that in
1286 Odo was commander of the French regiment.\textsuperscript{148} This does not
appear to have been the case, however. Odo was French, but he was part
of the body of men which arrived in Acre to support Roger of San
Severino as \textit{bailli} for Charles of Anjou. In 1282, when Roger left the
Latin East, Odo became the \textit{bailli},\textsuperscript{149} but four years later Henry II of
Cyprus came to Acre. The French regiment opposed Henry, but it is
clear that it was simply supporting Odo, and was not being led by him.
With some other men-at-arms it joined Odo inside the castle of Acre,
but the leaders of the Military Orders were eventually able to achieve
a settlement without bloodshed and Odo surrendered the castle. Only
the French troops were mentioned specifically as the opponents of
Henry, which suggests that they had been able to retain a considerable
presence in the east.\textsuperscript{150} Their opposition to Henry does not appear to
have affected their status, however, or that of their leader. By
September 1288 when Pope Nicholas IV wrote to the Christian leaders,
John of Grailly was described as 'capitaneus gentis... Phyliippi, regis
Francorum' and he was also re-appointed as seneschal, a position he had
held before the arrival of Odo Poilechien.\textsuperscript{151} In the final years of the
Latin settlement, John of Grailly and his troops were prominent in its
defence. John, like Geoffrey of Sergines before him, was one of the
kingdom's leading figures and he was in regular communication with the
papacy.\textsuperscript{152} In 1289, as 'chevetaine des gens dou roy de France &
seneschau dou royaume de Jerusalem', John was present at the siege of Tripoli, presumably with his troops. Two years later the French regiment was given great responsibility at Acre, being required to defend the Tower of the Legate which, being in the south-east corner of the walls on the shoreline, defended access to the harbour. The regiment was supported by English troops commanded by a Swiss knight, Otto of Grandison. After much of the city wall had been breached, a mounted Muslim force attacked the tower. The French defended courageously, suffering heavy casualties, both wounded and dead: amongst the former was John of Grailly himself. Eventually the regiment was no longer able to prevent the Muslims' advance and with Otto of Grandison it was forced to withdraw. Opinion on the merits of the last commander of the French regiment seems to have been mixed, however: one writer claimed that John, having fled from the siege of Tripoli, did exactly the same at the siege of Acre.

The French regiment was therefore an important part of the Latin army during the second-half of the thirteenth century, playing a role which, in part at least, was comparable to that of the older institutions of the Military Orders. At times it suffered from financial problems but, with the exception of Acre, there is no evidence that it bore the burden for defence of its own strongpoints which the Orders had to face. It was thus able to operate as an itinerant force, taking part in raiding expeditions, battles and the defence of various strongpoints. This last function may help to explain the financial embarrassment it was suffering in the 1260's, when it may have taken a leading role in trying to contain the threat of Baybars and the Muslim
armies. Its captains were afforded the same kind of status in the Latin East as the leaders of the Military Orders. The regiment appears to have been based at Jaffa during its early years, probably then moving to Acre. It may have found accommodation in quarters erected by St. Louis during his period in the Holy Land. The presence of French troops in the Latin East maintained the tradition of French involvement which had begun with the First Crusade.

d) Papal support

The papacy, unlike the French crown, did not attempt to maintain a permanent force in the Latin East but it was the most consistent provider of resources which contributed to the Latin armies. The crusades, or revenues being granted to the individual crusader, were the obvious forms of papal support for the Holy Land, but it has been noted that funds gathered by the papacy could be employed in other ways. Provision of troops was possible either by the employment of men in the west who would then be sent to the east, or by the use of papal funds in the east to hire soldiers who were already there.

It has been suggested that during the 1260's, no aid was offered to the beleaguered Latin East by the papacy, because of its concern with Sicily. On the contrary, the direct supplying of troops by the papacy is evident from the 1260's and moreover, this does not seem to have been at the expense of sending money to be used in the Latin East. It may indicate an awareness on the part of the papacy that troops were needed immediately rather than having to wait for a crusade to be organised. In October 1266 Clement IV, referring to the losses of
Arsuf, Caesarea and Saphet, ordered that the cross should be preached quickly, but first, that money should be provided for the transportation of 500 balistarii on the March passage. In February of the following year the Pisans were instructed to send 10 galleys to the Holy Land in March. In May, through money which had been received, ships were to be equipped 'in subsidium Terre Sancte'. It has been noted above that major crusade projects in the 1270's and 80's may have suffered as a result of the preoccupation of the papacy, and other European rulers, with affairs in the west. But during the 1270's, support for the Latin Kingdom in the form of troops continued to be provided both by Philip III of France and the papacy. This may even have been a concerted action, since in 1273 Giles of Sanci brought to Acre 400 crossbowmen who had been paid for by the King of France and the church. Two years later William of Rousillon arrived in Acre to take over as leader of the French regiment; his force too had been at least partly employed with the aid of papal funds. In 1289-90, Pope Nicholas IV sent galleys from Venice and Genoa to the east where they were to be maintained by the patriarch of Jerusalem. Considerable difficulties arose, however. The equipment of many of the ships proved inadequate and Nicholas advised that, of an original fleet of 20, only 10 or 12 vessels should be hired by the patriarch. The smaller force should be properly provided for with arms and men: the rest of the fleet would then be free to go. This series of documents suggests the importance of naval support for the defence of a coastal site; the willingness of the papacy to help the Latin East, but the problems which could be faced in practice; and the role played by the patriarch as the representative of the papacy in the area.
The troubles which the papacy faced with the employment of the fleet in 1290 may help to explain a tendency throughout the period to send money to the Holy Land which could then be used as those in the area saw fit. In 1208 for example, Innocent III sent 1,000 livres of Provence, to be used by the patriarch, the Templars and the Hospitallers. In 1209 another 850 livres were sent, but Innocent was also inquiring about the sum which had been dispatched the previous year. The money was to be spent 'in necessitatibus terrae sanctae, prout melius expedire viderit...' allowing total freedom in its use. In contrast to these sums, Innocent personally provided 30,000 livres towards the cost of the Fifth Crusade. In the 1260's and 70's, too, the papacy's activities included the provision of money as well as troops. It has already been noted that in 1267 William, the patriarch of Jerusalem, wished to employ the 50 knights that the count of Nevers and Erard of Valery had brought to the Latin East with them. For this arrangement permission had to be obtained from the pope. William's successor as patriarch was Thomas Agni. In the summer of 1272 when he was preparing to journey to the east, Gregory X warned him about hiring poor quality troops. In October 1272 Thomas arrived at Acre with 500 mounted and foot troops purchased with church funds and presumably of satisfactory quality. Four years later in one of the few recorded acts of a short pontificate, Hadrian V sent 12,000 livres tournois to the patriarch, leaving him and other leading figures in the kingdom to decide how the money could best be spent. The patriarch also had to deal with church funds which were directed towards the fortification of strongpoints in the Latin East. This will be considered later.
The large-scale crusade expeditions were unsuitable for the strategic requirements of the Latin East. Apart from providing manpower for building enterprises they were able to achieve little else of value. But the supply of men, materials and funds from the west, whether on an individual basis or as part of an organised group, was a constant feature of the period's military history. It was simply that the amounts available were insufficient to create a strategy which might have been capable of stemming the Muslim advance.

Mercenaries and paid troops

Troops serving for pay were an important element of the Latin armies. The French regiment was paid for by revenues from Europe and the obligation of servise des compagnons meant that paid troops served amongst the feudal levy. It has, however, already been demonstrated that troops employed by feudatories owing servise des compagnons were, in effect, regular members of their lord's retinue; their relationship with their lord would have been similar to that of a rear-vassal. Many of the soldiers who served with the Military Orders were paid, probably including those who were employed for long-term tasks such as castle-guard. It has been seen that mercenaries were employed by the Military Orders during a crusade or for the defence of a strongpoint during a siege campaign. Troops who came to the Holy Land, such as those with Erard of Valery and the count of Nevers, could be employed for a specified length of time, in their case eight months. But most examples of mercenary troops, on the evidence available, were restricted to campaigns between Christian armies.
During the Lombard-Ibelin war, mercenaries were used by both sides. In 1229 when Frederick II sold the bailliage of Cyprus to five nobles, they were provided with German, Flemish and Longobard sodoyers, whilst other troops were hired at Acre and elsewhere. It is interesting that such troops were available to be hired in Acre. On the Ibelin side Genoese ships were offered commercial privileges and property on Cyprus in return for support, before the battle of Agridi in 1232. During the siege of Kyrenia after this battle, thirteen Genoese vessels were hired by the lord of Beirut with funds provided by the king. It was then possible to besiege the castle by land and sea. Sergeants were also being employed as mercenaries during this siege. When the Ibelins besieged Tyre in 1243 mercenaries and galleys were employed by Philip of Novara, the lord of Beirut and the lord of Toron. The Genoese and Venetians also supported this enterprise, the latter receiving commercial privileges in return for their aid. In 1258 during the War of St. Sabas the Venetians and Pisans hired many troops at Acre to employ on their galleys, paying them ten Saracen besants a day and nine at night.

**Arms and armour in the Latin East**

Contemporary authors recognised that combat in the east presented particular problems to troops whose equipment had evolved in the environment of western Europe. But there does not seem to have been any attempt to modify arms and armour in order to deal with these problems. Armour in the thirteenth century was in a transitional period before the emergence of full plate armour. A comparison of texts from the twelfth-century Rule of the Templars (if the dating of
this source is to be accepted) and John of Ibelin's mid-thirteenth-century legal treatise shows how little development had taken place in this period. The basis of the knight's clothing was the hauberk, a coat of chain mail. Some plate armour protection for the legs was provided by the chausses de fer and the shoulders were protected by espalieres. Underneath the hauberk a padded tunic could be worn, the ganbisson, whilst over the hauberk a surcoat was worn. This equipment was virtually standard for a knight. The sergeants who fought with the Templars were expected to possess the same protection, although their hauberk might be lighter without gauntlets and they would not wear very much plate armour. Complete effigies from the thirteenth century, allowing for problems of dating, appear to support the evidence of these texts and confirm that there was no distinction between armour worn by Latins in the east and the west.

The head was a particularly vulnerable part of the body. In the thirteenth century there were various methods of covering it. Most knights used the chain mail coif, often with a steel cap beneath it, which could be augmented by a range of helmets. The Templars' Rule referred to sergeants wearing a chapeau de fer, an iron hat which, Joigniville reported, he wore at Mansurah in 1250. A similar hat was worn by a Genoese knight outside Acre in 1253. Broad-rimmed helmets known as kettle hats were worn by troops at the siege of Acre in 1291, depicted in an early fourteenth-century miniature. These must have been common: a similar hat was drawn by the contemporary Villard of Honnecourt. A low cylindrical helmet was another means of protection, exemplified by the early thirteenth-century effigy of
Geoffrey of Mandeville in the Temple Church, London. According to textual evidence, however, the most common form of protection was the heaume, which as the pot helm had been available at the end of the twelfth century. An example of a pot helm was discovered at the Teutonic Knights' castle of Montfort. It was widely used in the thirteenth century in the form of the heaume à visière. The failure of a knight to wear such protection at the battle of Nicosia enabled John of Beirut to kill him with a blow to the mouth. It is interesting that in the same battle the five baillis appointed by Frederick II wore distinguishing marks on their heaumes. At the siege of Damietta during the Fifth Crusade, John of Arcy was easily identified by the defenders of the city: he was wearing a peacock's feather on his heaume. The heaume à visière is illustrated in a number of contemporary seals from the Latin East, including those of Balian of Arsuf, the lord of Haifa and John of Montfort. Such a helmet compared to the pot helm at least allowed the possibility of breathing some fresh air without having to remove it completely. It appears that the chosen form of protection varied according to personal taste and perhaps cost. A thirteenth-century miniature depicting St. Louis' Crusade to Egypt illustrates some of the possibilities. One knight is wearing a chapeau de fer, one on a ship appears to wear nothing on his head but a mail coif, perhaps with a steel cap underneath, whilst a third is protected by a heaume à visière. The clothing of St. Louis is interesting. He appears to have plate armour on his knee but he has no facial cover, perhaps for stylistic reasons, simply wearing a crown over a mail coif. His shield, surcoat and the horse's coat are all covered with the fleur de lis. Personal identification was clearly worn
by some knights during this period: the surcoat, as already noted, was for a long time one of the main distinguishing features of the knights and sergeants of the Military Orders. St. Louis' shield, being fairly small and triangular, is typical of the thirteenth century.  

The knight also had to carry a wide range of weapons. The sword, dagger, lance and mace turquese, a spiked iron head on a long handle, were referred to in the Rule of the Templars and by John of Ibelin. Joinville's account of the battle of Mansurah included an incident when the author was pinned to his horse's neck by the lance of a Muslim, which prevented him from using the sword which he wore on his belt. But he also carried a sword on his horse and when he was able to draw this, his attacker fled. The horse itself was also provided with some protection. Knights were expected to own as many as four horses and their value made it necessary to take care of them. Horses in the Latin East wore plate armour, as well as an iron headpiece, on which they should wear 'une broche tel come celle de l'escu', again suggesting a desire for knights to be easily identified. An account of the preparations for Theobald of Champagne's Crusade illustrated some of the efforts necessary to gain the maximum benefit from equipment: 'armeures regarder, hauberz ouller, heaumes forbir, espees et coustiax esmondre, chevax ferrer, couvrir et armer.'  

Amongst the lesser troops of the Latin armies the arms and armour used appear to have depended largely on what the individual could afford. This would consist of a selection from that available to the
knight, with the addition of the bow, and the crossbow which could be used by both mounted troops and footsoldiers. Some sergeants, even those on foot, were extremely well armed. Fidenzio of Padua noted the need for footsoldiers who used lances, bows and crossbows, with some holding shields to deflect Muslim arrows. It was also important that they should have armour or clothing to protect themselves. Some footsoldiers, such as those using a bow and a lance depicted by Villard of Honnecourt, had very little such protective covering.

For mounted troops in particular, the cumbersome arms and armour led to difficulties because of the terrain and climate of the Latin East. The knights were required to make great efforts on the battlefield which would have been made even more awkward by the weight of their equipment. Their unwieldy combat technique in a mêlée was exemplified at the battle of Nicosia. Balian of Ibelin struck the Lombard standard-bearer so hard that he fell from his own horse: John of Beirut also fell off his horse when he killed a visor-less Lombard knight. In some circumstances a knight who was thrown from his horse, or obliged to dismount, was virtually powerless. At Agridi in 1232, for example, Berart of Manepeau was knocked from his mount by Anceau of Brie. Seventeen of Berart's colleagues dismounted to help him remount, but they were all killed by foot sergeants. Moreover, the Christian knights, in comparison with their Muslim opponents, were extremely heavily-armoured, which would have made some of the terrain in the area almost impossible for them to fight on. Much of the coastline of the Latin Kingdom was dominated by sand dunes which extended many miles inland. An investigation of the likely battle
sites of Beit-Hânûn in 1239 and La Forbie in 1244 confirmed that in both cases the Christian mounted troops would have been fighting on sand dunes, making their task almost impossible. In August 1219, the crusaders' retreat from Fariskur was made on sand which seriously hampered their movements. At Nicosia in 1229, rather different conditions caused problems, for the recently-ploughed field produced so much dust that it was almost impossible to see. John of Beirut was only able to appraise the situation after most of the Lombard force had fled and the dust had settled.

The climate was another matter of concern to heavily-armed Christian troops. This was particularly evident during crusade expeditions. Humbert of Romans, writing in the early 1270's, was aware of men's fear of conditions in the east, particularly with regard to the climate, their food and the terrain. At Fariskur on the Fifth Crusade the weight of arms for the footsoldiers and a lack of water which obliged them to drink unmixed wine combined with the heat to cause, it was said, insanity and death. The battle of Mansurah was fought in February 1250, when the heat would have been less oppressive, but some of St. Louis' sergeants were still desperate for a drink. During the Lord Edward's Crusade in 1271 men died because of the heat, their thirst and the food which they had eaten. In all these instances their cumbersome equipment must have exacerbated the problems of the Latin troops. As noted above, however, little effort was made to adopt a lighter form of equipment for combat in the east, though the Templars were permitted to wear a short linen shirt during the summer, 'por la grant ardour de la chalour qui est el pais
d'orient..." The equipment which the Christians used appears to have caused them considerable handicap and it is surprising that they were so little influenced by their surroundings: the constant influx of troops from western Europe may have contributed to this apparent lack of integration in the military sphere.
NOTES


4. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 67; Edbury, 'Feudal Obligations', p. 337.


7. For the various mounts, see Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, no. 2213, pt. 112.

8. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 97; see, for example, Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, no. 2985; Pryor, 'Exports', shows that thousands of horse-shoes were also sent to the Latin East.


10. Ibid., nos. 138, 140-1.


12. See, for example, 'Eracles', ii, p. 401; Fidenzio of Padua, 'Liber recuperationis', p. 29.

13. Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 111-12; Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 325. For their presence in the Hospitalers' army in the thirteenth century, see Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, no. 1193; Gestes des Chiprois, p. 154.


15. Gestes des Chiprois, p. 149.


17. Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, pp. 70-1.

19. 'Dépenses de Saint Louis', *RHF* xxi, pp. 513-14; for the role of engineers in the Lombard-Ibelin conflict, see below, page 309.


25. J. L. La Monte, *Feudal Monarchy in the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, 1100 to 1291* (Massachusetts, 1932) p. 160; see 'Eracles', ii, p. 334.

26. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 219-20.


41. Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 95-7; Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, pp. 441-3; Forey, 'Military Orders', pp. 325-6.

42. For example, Alexander IV, Registre, no. 848; Barber, 'Social Context', pp. 42-5.

43. Riley-Smith, Knights of St. John, p. 328.

44. Many contemporary accounts refer only to the Templars and Hospitallers in the organisation of the Latin armies. The military commitment of the Teutonic Knights fell far short of that of the first two and the number of their brethren can be assumed to have been consequently smaller.


46. Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, no. 1193.

47. Règle du Temple, no. 179.


50. Gregory IX, Registre, no. 3520.


52. Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, no. 3308 (vol. iv).

53. Ibid., no. 4157.


55. Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, nos. 2985, 3047.


57. De constructione castri Saphet, p. 41.

58. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p. 8.
59. 'Sachs chronicon Lemovicense a Petro Coral et alii conscriptum', RHF, xxi, p. 773.


63. 'Rothelin', pp. 531-2.

64. 'Eracles', ii, p. 372.


67. Règle du Temple, nos. 77-181, passim; Melville, La vie des Templiers, p. 85. I am not convinced of the dating. There is no reason why statutes dealing with the Commander of Jerusalem and pilgrimages to the Jordan place this section of the Rule before 1187. But I cannot prove the statutes are later than this.

68. Règle du Temple, nos. 148, 149, 155, 380.


70. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 396-7; Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 90-1. For the importance of sentries see Fidenzio of Padua, 'Liber recuperationis', pp. 32-3.

71. Règle du Temple, nos. 156-63.


77. *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, no. 4050.

78. 'Processus Cypricus', pp. 394, 155-6.

79. Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', pp. 169, 244-5, 254-6; 'Eracles', ii, pp. 325-6, 373-4 (variant readings).


81. *Tabulae ordinis Theutonici*, nos. 63, 72; *Historia diplomatica Friderici secundi*, iii, pp. 92, 97, 117-21; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', p. 207.

82. *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, nos. 2972, 2985, 3047, 3071.


84. *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 123; *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, nos. 2301, 2320.


88. Salimbene of Adam, 'Chronica', *MGHS*, xxxii, p. 177.


100. Jordan, Louis IX, p. 78.
102. 'Eracles', ii, p. 323.
103. 'Annales Ceccanenses', MGHS, xix, p. 302.
105. 'Rothelin', p. 532.
106. Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p. 82; 'Rothelin', p. 571.
108. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 322-3, 326; Chronique d'Ernoul, pp. 414-15; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', pp. 222-4.
112. Purcell, Papal Crusading Policy, pp. 137-57; Richard, Latin Kingdom, pp. 376-7.
114. Innocent IV, Registre, nos. 2758-9, 3723-4.
116. Innocent IV, Registre, nos. 3450, 3451.
117. See Urban IV, Registre, nos. 473, 868, 869.
118. Ibid., no. 690; 'Annales de Terre Sainte', pp. 459-60; Gestes des Chiprois, p. 245; Marino Sanuto the Elder, 'Liber secretorum fidelium crucis', ed. J. Bongars, in Gesta Dei per Francos, sive
orientalium expeditionum et regni Francorum Hierosolimitani Historia a varis, sed illius aevi scriptoribus litteris commendata, ii (Hannau, 1611) p. 229.


120. On the confraternities see Riley-Smith, 'A Note on Confraternities', pp. 301-8.

121. Innocent IV, Registre, no. 2644; Riley-Smith, 'A Note on Confraternities', p. 307.


123. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 391-2; J. Frawar, 'Estates, Communities, and the Constitution of the Latin Kingdom', Crusader Institutions, p. 62.

124. Quoted in Beebe, Edward I and the Crusades, p. 277.

125. 'Eracles', ii, p. 441; 'Rothelin', p. 629.

126. 'Rothelin', pp. 630-2.


132. Urban IV, Registre, no. 183.


135. Ibid., pp. 284-5, 291-2; see 'Eracles', ii, p. 454; Gestes des Chiprois, p. 176.


143. 'Eracles', ii, p. 463.


147. 'Eracles', ii, p. 478.


149. 'Eracles', ii, p. 479; *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 214.


156. *Onze poèmes de Rutebeuf*, p. 25.

158. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 464, 467.
159. Nicholas IV, *Registre*, nos. 2252-8, 2269, 4385-90; *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 238 (presumably the same fleet).
161. 'Emprunts de Saint Louis', p. 292.
163. 'Eracles', ii, p. 477.
170. 'Eracles', ii, p. 337.
171. G. Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Orient Latin* (Paris, 1943) p. 65, pl. 17 no. 1; pp. 41-2, pl. 17 no. 5; p. 64, pl. 18 no. 7.

179. See, for example, *Règle du Temple*, nos. 101, 110, 132, 138; *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, no. 1193.


181. 'Rothelin', p. 532.


186. And see 'Rothelin', p. 541; Salimbene of Adam, 'Chronica', p. 177.


CHAPTER III

CASTLES AND STRONGPOINTS

Introduction

The Latin states were able to defend their territories against external threat and civil dispute by means of the field army and the strongpoints. The interdependence of these two elements is striking. An empty castle was clearly worthless and could actually pose a threat, since it provided an aggressor with a ready-made base from which to operate. Christian troops, moreover, were almost wholly reliant on strongpoints in order to perform effectively, both in attack and defence. The constant problems caused by a manpower shortage, except at the time of a crusade, meant that the gathering of a large field army was rarely, if ever, possible in the Latin East during the thirteenth century. Most of the available troops, rather, were dispersed among a series of individual garrisons which were, to some extent, augmented by forces such as the Military Orders, the French regiment, or groups of peregrini. The relationship of a garrison to its strongpoint thus provided the basis of the kingdom's military strategy and the framework for much of the military history of the period. This relationship is illustrated by two documents dating from the 1240's. In September 1244, just before the battle of La Forbie, the principal ecclesiastics of the Holy Land, the leaders of the Military Orders and a number of lords wrote to Innocent IV explaining the difficulties caused by a lack of troops:

Cumque in Terra sancta non sint milites aut pedites peregrini, nisi paucissimi, quibus omnibus
computatis vis possit ad centenarium numerum computari; milites etiam terre sunt hinc inde dispersi prope castra munientes, qui non valent de facili congregari, eo quod non possunt castra relinquere immunita; commune terre consilium dissuasit multipliciter, sine majori subsidio illos nequissimos invadere, seu pugnare cum illis.\footnote{At Ascalon, following the battle of La Forbie, the garrison veoient qu'il ne povaient avoir nul secorz ne nulle aide des Crestienz qui estoient ou paiz, car cil meismes estoient tout emblaé de garder leur fortresces ou il estoient.}

So they fled from Ascalon, abandoning it to the Muslims.\footnote{So they fled from Ascalon, abandoning it to the Muslims.} The defence of strongpoints was regarded as the best means by which the limited numbers of troops available could be used. The Muslims' growing ascendancy, particularly in the 1260's, was thus reflected in their gradual acquisition of fortified sites which had previously been in Christian hands. The division of the Latin army into a number of garrisons did not simply find expression in defensive strategy, however. Strongpoints were also used in a more aggressive context, as a base for raids into hostile territory, for example, and in a general sense to 'threaten' the enemy. Their physical presence, and that of the garrisons within them, were the most obvious expression of Latin dominance in the region.

The functions performed by castles and other strongpoints will be one aspect of this study. The other will be the efforts which were made to establish and maintain them. In both respects, the analysis of materials from a wide range of sites has been preferred to a consideration of individual castles. The latter approach has been adopted by most scholars who have dealt with this subject. But even
for major castles such as Crac des Chevaliers or Château Pèlerin, where the survival of the monument has made possible substantial architectural studies, the paucity of written material, with gaps often amounting to decades, makes a more general study of castles in such a manner rather unsatisfactory. The sites studied include both fortified towns and castles, since it will become evident that in the thirteenth century, the roles played by the two were quite similar: with a few exceptions which will be noted, a fortified site could only be effective as a result of the strength of manpower which it possessed.

The acquisition and building of strongpoints

Throughout the thirteenth century it was the Military Orders who increasingly took responsibility for the maintenance of the kingdom's strongpoints, particularly in more exposed areas. Some instances of sites which the Orders established, or took over the control of during this period have already been noted: Château Pèlerin, Montfort, Ascalon, Sidon, Beaufort and Mt. Tabor, for example. During the building work at Saphet, which took 2½ years, knights, sergeants, archers and other armed men were recruited, whilst labourers and slaves were also sent. Pack horses carried arms, food and other supplies. A Muslim source suggested that there were 1,000 Muslim prisoners involved in the work, but less than 200 Christians. The Muslims planned a revolt but Isma'il of Damascus learned of this threat and warned the Templars, who took prompt action. It is possible that the use of Muslim slaves on building enterprises was a common practice; there is no further evidence on this subject. Expenses on Saphet after the major building work had been done were still 40,000 besants a year, suggesting that
minor repairs and alterations were a constant feature of castle life. At Crac des Chevaliers considerable work was done on the castle in the thirteenth century, financed by a number of exemptions and grants from the papacy and others. In 1218, for example, Andrew of Hungary made an annual grant to the Hospitallers at Crac of 100 marks, which was confirmed soon afterwards by Honorius III. In 1255 Alexander IV granted exemption of certain payments at Crac, 'non sine magnis laboribus et periculis innumeris ac maximis expensarum oneribus, ante inimicorum facies custoditis'. Two years later Alexander wrote to the patriarch of Jerusalem and the archbishop of Tyre, regarding bequests which the faithful in the Latin East had made for the fortifying of Jerusalem and Ascalon. Alexander realised that there was no prospect of these sites being recovered but he urged that the money should be used: 'ea pro munitione civitatum et castrorum ac defensione terre ipsius expendatis'. After most of the building at Château Pèlerin had been completed, Honorius III wrote to England in 1222 asking that further money be sent there. The fortress of Cursat in northern Syria also benefited from a papal grant - not surprisingly, as it belonged to the patriarch of Antioch. Cursat had suffered from the attacks of Muslims in the area around Antioch, so Innocent IV gave the patriarch, Opizo, a three year grant of revenue from the churches of Cyprus and Antioch, in order to make the necessary repairs. The problems of maintaining a castle will be examined in more detail later.

It was noted in chapter two of this study that during the Antiochene war of succession, Raymond Roupen granted property to the Hospitallers which was not actually held by Christians at the time.
Such gifts would encourage efforts to reconquer territory lost to the Muslims. In January 1257, for example, a grant was made by Julian of Sidon to the Teutonic Knights of 'ma forteresse, la quele est apelee Cave de Tyron, et totes ses raisons'. From Arabic sources it appears that the site had already fallen to Muslim troops around 1253, possibly at the time of their assault on Sidon.

The Military Orders were not only given individual castles and large tracts of territory, however. They also played a valuable role in the defence of sites over which they did not exercise full control. In 1218 the Teutonic Knights supported the Templars in the latter's construction of their castle of Château Pèlerin. This work was carried out at the same time as the rebuilding of Caesarea, where the Teutonic Knights had been granted two towers in 1206. At Acre, the Orders frequently vied with one another, and other groups, for the privilege of defending an area of the city. In October 1281, for example, a dispute between the Hospitallers and Pisans over the guarding of sentry positions, walls and towers from St. Anthony's Gate to the Accursed Tower was settled by Roger of San Severino in favour of the former. At Tripoli, the maintenance of defensive positions continued until the fall of the city in 1289: the Tower of the Bishop was old, but the Tower of the Hospital was 'fort & neuve'.

The crusades were a useful source of manpower for building projects during the thirteenth century, work which was often done with the assistance of the Military Orders and local nobility. At Acre in particular, many of the towers bore the names of their patrons, such as
the one established by Alice of Blois towards the end of the period. At Sidon in 1227-8, work was done by crusaders who felt frustrated at having to wait for Frederick II. At Ascalon in 1240, when Richard of Cornwall had decided to rebuild the castle, the Orders and the barons obtained both workers and materials which were needed for the task, before they came to Ascalon. St. Louis spent over a year working on the fortifications of Caesarea, from March 1251 to May 1252. No contemporary account described this project in great detail, but it was done with advice from the Templars and Hospitallers. At Sidon in the second-half of 1253, St. Louis was advised by the barons to rebuild the town, rather than work on a fortress and he did this, constructing high walls and towers, and great quarried fosses.

At many sites which were either acquired or re-fortified by the Christians in this period, the Military Orders played some role in their subsequent history. Most of the local nobility could not afford to do other than hand over their growing responsibilities to organisations which possessed the resources to cope in an increasingly hostile environment. In the period immediately before the campaigns of Baybars, the Templars received Sidon and Beaufort and the Hospitallers were granted Arsuf, suggesting that this was a critical time for the feudatories. The Hospitallers had also recently been granted Mt. Tabor by the papacy. The Military Orders therefore acquired great responsibility for the defence of strongpoints in the Latin East, through grants from nobles and other sources. But this predominance did not extend to the work of building and restoring sites which were still held by the feudatories. Deschamps argued that it was ‘tout à
fait exceptionnel' for one of the local barons, John of Beirut, to undertake such work. John, in a rousing speech to Frederick II, said that when he had been given Beirut in exchange for becoming constable of the kingdom, the site was a ruin. The Templars and Hospitallers and the local baronage declined to have anything to do with it, so John was compelled to do all the work himself, using the rents which he had from Cyprus and elsewhere and alms which were offered. There are, in fact, other examples of the nobles building and maintaining their own fortifications. Tiberias was rebuilt and presumably garrisoned by Odo of Montbéliard before it was captured by the Muslims in 1247. John of Ibelin, the son of John of Beirut, strengthened the castle of Arsuf in 1241 after which his son, Balian, sold the city and castle to the Hospitallers in the early 1260's. The site of Jaffa was maintained by its lord, John of Jaffa, until his death in 1266. It was captured by Baybars two years later. John was able to re-fortify the position with the help of crusaders and with grants of revenue from western Europe. In the period after the fall of Ascalon in 1247 Jaffa was the most southerly strongpoint in the Latin Kingdom, and an important base for attacks into Muslim territory. Jaffa's role in this respect, and the efforts which were made to maintain it, will be considered in more detail later. An extremely late example of baronial castle-building was the island fortress at Maraclea, which was constructed by its lord Bartholemew some time between 1277 and 1285. The information is only present in Muslim accounts but it is extremely detailed. Bartholemew received help from the count of Tripoli, the Hospitallers of Margat and other Latins, but after the work had been completed the sultan Kalavun
demanded its destruction because of the threat which it posed. The
demolition was undertaken by both Muslims and Christians.24

Some feudatories were able to prevent the alienation of their lands
to the Military Orders, but there was very little work undertaken by
the crown in this period, reflecting the relative weakness of the
monarchy and the problems of long minorities and absentee rulers.
John of Brienne was an exception to this. In March 1212 he purchased
all the property that the abbey of St. Josaphat held at Tyre, since this
land was necessary for the building of 'castrum novum quod edificare
cepi'. It was presumably this castle that the Lombards were forced to
retreat into during the siege of Tyre in 1243.25 Frederick II was
another example of a royal builder. In 1229 he did some rebuilding at
Jaffa, although he lacked the support of the Military Orders because of
his conflict with the papacy.26

Architecture and design

Detailed studies of individual sites and groups of well-preserved
castles have been made by many scholars, concentrating on the
construction of the strongpoints. These studies have considered their
subjects in isolation from the general military context of the Latin
East: the castles are examined in terms of influences from and on
western Europe and the Byzantine Empire.27 The architecture and design
of strongpoints in the Latin East can also, however, be related to more
general military trends in the area.
The sites on which the Latins established their strongpoints were diverse. Some, occupied in the twelfth century, were sites of earlier fortresses where the ruins were made use of by the Franks. In the thirteenth century sites which were occupied included caves, islands, coastal positions and spurs extending from the end of mountain ranges. The last are important since it has been suggested, by Benvenisti for example, that they were 'decisive evidence of the period of weakness, retreat and pessimism in the history of the Crusader kingdom': as examples he gave Saphet, Beaufort, Montfort and Château Pèlerin. This statement gives a somewhat negative impression of the role of castles in the Latin East during this period. First, Saphet (which is not actually a spur-castle) Beaufort and Montfort were constructed in the twelfth century, as were other spur-castles such as Saone and Kerak. The building of castles on such sites appears to have been just as common in the twelfth century as in the thirteenth. Benvenisti also argued that the use of the spur-castle, or perhaps of other isolated sites, reflected the attempts of the Franks to hide from the Muslims. After Hattin 'the aggressive tactical conceptions, based on self-confidence and readiness to meet the enemy everywhere, gave way to a conception of passive defence...'. But even a site such as Montfort, which is now quite difficult to visit, was at the junction of a highway which linked Tyre and the north with the Sea of Galilee, the Jordan Valley and Jerusalem. Later it will be seen that throughout the thirteenth century the Latins continued, where possible, to adopt aggressive policies towards their Muslim neighbours; this was especially apparent in the strategy which was pursued by the Hospitallers in the north. Moreover, the castles themselves, including...
Saphet and Château Pèlerin, continued to have an aggressive role to play in this period.

The choice of a site for a castle was much more a result of sound reasoning than a sense of weakness and loss of confidence. The Latins realised that strongpoints were critical for their survival in the east. They also recognised that the problems created by a lack of manpower could, to a certain extent, be reduced by well-built defences, since the stronger a castle was the less men were required to defend it. Further, they acknowledged the threat posed by Muslim siege techniques. Pragmatism and sensible use of the physical geography of the area therefore caused the Franks to take advantage of good natural defences, and this was just as true in the twelfth century as in the thirteenth. But the evidence which will be examined later does suggest that wherever a castle was placed, its value, in terms of limiting an enemy's capacity to operate, was restricted.

Choosing a naturally protective position was, therefore, one means of making a castle easier to defend: another was the manner in which the fortress was constructed. The process of a siege was the gradual wearing down of various elements by which the strongpoint was defended. Some of these defences were unimportant, as medieval 'optional extras', but others were fundamental to the design of the castle. Not all strongpoints could rely on any form of natural defence, moreover. Most of the coastal sites in the Latin East were easily approached and besieged, so their man-made barriers had to be doubly effective. At Ascalon and Arsuf, the use of an artificial tel enhanced
the defensive qualities of the site. Caesarea relied wholly on its walls for protection. All three sites had two lines of defence: the town walls and a citadel. The citadel of Arsuf was independent of the town, divided from it by a steep slope leading to a ditch. At Caesarea the citadel was sited on a promontory which formed the south wall of the harbour and could be isolated from the rest of the site. But it could be seriously threatened from the site of the cathedral which was built on top of the remains of Roman buildings. The position of Ascalon's citadel in the thirteenth century is uncertain, but it is worth consideration since its builder, Richard of Cornwall, wrote in some detail of his work at the site:

...duplici muro cum altis turribus et propugnaculis et lapidibus quadris et incisis columnis marmoreis decenter ornato et circumcente, omnia quae ad castrum pertinent et rite erant perfecta, praefer fossatum circa castrum, quod annuente Domino infra mensem a die Paschae perficeretur sine omni defectu.

When the work was completed, the castle was garrisoned and supplied with engines, food and other requirements. The citadel, built on the concentric principle, has been assumed to have been situated in the south-west area of the site where remains are fairly extensive, but recently it has been argued that the north-west corner is more likely: access to the shore is no worse than it is to the south, whilst a tower remains which would have probably been demolished by Muslim troops had it been standing in 1192. Just to the north of the centre of this area are the remains of a church. The north-west corner does appear to have better claims to being the citadel. The tel, which is divided from the rest of the site with evidence of a rock-cut ditch, dominates the surroundings to a far greater extent than the south-western area.
There is also evidence of a glacis on the north wall, constructed with smooth ashlar masonry. This differs visibly from the earlier structures at the site, and is compatible with thirteenth-century work found at Caesarea, for example. This northern area of the site seems far more akin to Richard's description of a concentric castle than do the remains in the south. The destruction of Ascalon in 1247 and 1270 prevented further evidence of Richard of Cornwall's fortifications from being traced; it seems that when he rebuilt it most of the town was left in a state of ruin and the extent of resettlement there is uncertain. One interesting point which can still be examined is the use made of antique marble through-columns to strengthen the walls, as described in Richard's account of his work there. The re-use of marble and granite columns is found at many sites in the Latin East and the strengthening value of such stone, at Caesarea and Arsuf as well as Ascalon, is apparent where the later wall, when exposed to the elements, has gradually receded leaving the column bare. That Richard of Cornwall should refer to the practice of re-using antique columns suggests the importance which was attached to it as a means of augmenting the defences of a site and, especially, as protection against Muslim mining techniques. Columns were not the only means of strengthening a wall. When Willbrand of Oldenburg visited Beirut in 1212, he noted that the walls and towers had iron clamps incorporated into them.

The use of a moat round a town's outer defences was important for preventing small raiding parties from doing harm within the town, as well as providing a first line of defence against a more serious
aggressor. At Caesarea these outer defences are particularly well preserved. The moat has masonry on its far side in addition to the smooth ashlar construction of the walls which, in their current state of preservation, rise at least to the level of the glacis throughout their length. Access to the town was by gates which, as potential weak points in the defensive system, were heavily fortified. Those on the east and north sides of the town still survive. A person wishing to enter via the east gate was confronted by the blind wall of a tower, which incorporated arrow-slits into its design. The moat would be crossed by a drawbridge with the tower to the left: men on the drawbridge were exposed to fire from arrow-slits in towers along the line of the wall as they crossed, in addition to slits in the face of the wall directly in front of them. When the far side of the drawbridge was reached, it was necessary to turn left through a gate into a hall within the tower which was commanded by a gallery on an upper level. A further turn to the right was then required in order to leave the tower and come into the town. In peacetime this route into Caesarea may have caused some congestion, but it made entry by an unauthorised person extremely hazardous. From the evidence of the north gate, at least part of the drawbridge was of stone construction. To the west of this gate the remains of a column in the centre of the moat suggest a further possible point of entry.

Arrow-slits were an essential means for defenders of a strongpoint to repel an attack. At Caesarea they were incorporated into the glacis and, from the surviving evidence above this level, they were also employed in the walls and towers to provide the maximum possible
angles of fire. Belvoir, a twelfth-century castle, included arrow-slits in the glacis of its inner defences. It also has well-preserved slits in its walls, which indicate the cramped posture which was necessary for an archer to make use of them. These slits are virtually identical to some found at thirteenth-century Muslim sites such as Subeibe and Mt. Tabor. At Saphet protection for archers was provided by the crotta used on the walls and in the outer defences, by which archers could conceal themselves and fire unobserved by the enemy. They did not require protective clothing because of this.\textsuperscript{35}

Defence against a siege was not simply conducted from within the strongpoint. It was sometimes possible to leave the protection of the castle and carry out sorties against the besiegers, but this was not very desirable if it required the opening and closing of gates. Posterns were therefore built into the walls, normally allowing the defenders entry into the moat, at Belvoir and Caesarea for example. A particularly well-preserved example is at Caesarea, leading into the moat on the south side of the town wall. A problem with the postern was that as well as allowing defenders out, it was also a means for attackers to get in, so it must have been well blocked at all times when it was not in use. With regard to the need for tight security at gates and posterns, it is interesting that both the Templars and Hospitallers would dismiss a brother from the Order who left a castle by the wrong door: in the case of the latter, if he 'istra per autre part que per la porte deu chastell...\textsuperscript{35}
The principles behind the construction of town defences, castles and other strongpoints were basically the same. Even the size of a castle might be little different to other sites. Montfort was certainly compact but Saphet was nearly as large as the town of Arsuf. The only clear difference was the diverse nature of a town’s inhabitants - and even here, a castle would require many of the goods and services which were available within a town. The military needs of a castle were also the same as those of a town, and their man-made defences were the same, with use made of arrow-slits, posterns, fosses, as well as outworks such as barbicans. The ruined remains of a barbican may still be seen at Ascalon. The Christians ceased to use the *castrum* form of the castle in the thirteenth century, generally preferring the use of concentric walls where the inner wall was able to command the outer. At Crac des Chevaliers a second outer enceinte was added around 1200, after which it was possible to carry out improvements to the inner wall. Château Pèlerin is another example of a castle incorporating the concentric principle. Oliver of Paderborn acknowledged that only at the east end of the promontory was there any threat to the position, so all the defences were concentrated there. After the fosse came the outer wall with three rectangular gate towers, and then, 'ante frontem castri' was a massive wall which was linked by two towers positioned between the three gate towers. Oliver also referred to a device by which 'équités armati' were able to be transported up and down the wall. Château Pèlerin was never taken in conflict. At Saphet the reference to *antemuralia* suggests some outworks, which is confirmed by the very scant remains at the site.
The Israeli Navy forbids visits to Château Pèlerin at the moment, but Montfort is another-well preserved and largely thirteenth-century structure. Unfortunately much of the site has been levelled, which means that as at Caesarea, the structure of the upper defences is unclear. Enough remains, however, to suggest some of the reasons behind the form of the castle. The strongest point of its defences is the keep, situated in the east of the site. It was divided from the remainder of the spur, away to the east, by a rock-cut ditch, whilst it was also possible to isolate it from the rest of the castle to the west. A large cistern situated below the keep would have enabled it to maintain an independent existence for some time. Additional cisterns existed below structures on other parts of the site. Just to the west of the keep are the remains of a projecting tower on the south wall but further defences to the south of this tower are not evident. On the west and north sides of the castle, however, an outer wall provided additional protection. Whether this outer wall did not exist on the south face or has simply disappeared is unclear, but since no remains at all have been found it may be that there were no outworks on the southern side. The slope on the south is steep and further reinforcement may not have been felt necessary. The north-western area of the site was particularly vulnerable to attack and here defences were established at various levels. A round tower is augmented by a square tower slightly to the east along the line of the north wall, the latter incorporating a well-preserved arrow-slit facing north. Below the round tower an outer wall survives almost complete on the west face of the gentle slope to the Wadi Qurn: there is evidence of another tower in the south-west edge of the outer wall. Along the north side
the line of the outer wall can still be discerned although it is incomplete. It extends up to 40 metres from the main area of the castle. The masonry at the site as a whole is of quite variable quality when compared to that at Caesarea, for example, and much of it is very poorly cut.

The castle of Montfort, although of relatively small size, presented a great challenge to anyone attempting to besiege it. It is a typical example, of which others have been noted for the twelfth century, of man-made defences adding to the natural strength of a site. To the east the cut from the rest of the spur afforded protection. More vulnerable areas were protected by two sets of walls: Montfort was thus apparently conceived on a semi-concentric principle. The spur gave defenders the advantage of height on three sides, whilst if the outer defences were breached, the garrison could gradually fall back to the self-contained keep where it still enjoyed a height advantage over the rest of the castle. Montfort, by its geographical position and the means by which it was constructed, was regarded by the Teutonic Knights as suitable for their base of operations in the Latin East. But however strong castles may have appeared, the Muslim army was able to break resistance with good siege techniques and by sheer weight of numbers. Montfort fell to Baybars in 1271. It has been suggested, quite plausibly, that the site retains an unusual relic from its final defence. In the face of the south wall, about three metres long and two metres deep, a neat cut has been made, possibly as part of mining operations against the castle. Perhaps the castle capitulated before
the mine was completed: it is difficult to think of any other reason why such a cut should have been made.

**Maintenance of the strongpoints**

In this section an attempt will be made to describe how strongholds were able, in peace and war, to maintain a credible state of preparedness. But information is sparse and there is no detailed account of life in a castle during this period. It has been seen that constant improvements were being made to the defences of strongpoints such as Crac des Chevaliers and Saphet, whether to combat any potential Muslim assault, or as repairs after an attack on the castle, or perhaps after an earthquake. Between the purchase of Beaufort from Julian of Sidon in 1260 and the fall of the castle in 1268 the Templars constructed a new fortification on the plateau about 250 metres from the south wall, presumably to add to the strength of the fosse on that side. When the castle was besieged in 1268, this was the first position to be abandoned by them as they fell back to the older citadel.44

An important aspect of keeping a fortress in good order was the maintenance of supplies of victuals, arms and manpower. In the thirteenth century, sieges by Muslims did not usually last very long, so the threat of possible starvation was not normally a consideration. Christian sieges, however, could sometimes develop into campaigns of attrition in which the maintenance of supplies became a problem, possibly for the attackers as well as the defenders. And it was essential, even in peaceful times, that the castle was well provisioned.
In 1268 the Templars abandoned Baghras without a fight and Muslims who came there found 'crops, provisions, and such things as are usually stored in a castle of this kind...'. This can be added to with evidence from the Rule of the Templars. The commanders of Antioch and Tripoli were required to ensure that garrisons were well supplied with leather, corn, wine, iron and steel. In the Palestinian climate water supplies were critical and the Franks used various means to ensure that supplies were freely available. At Saphet, whilst the building work was being done there was a lack of water, but a source was discovered by an old Muslim. It seems that the supply thereafter was plentiful, since there were many water mills working outside the castle, as well as others operated by wind and animals. At Montfort the Teutonic Knights were able to use a source of water outside the castle in peacetime, in addition to the cisterns which they maintained within the walls. But this is an area where reliance is generally on architectural rather than historical evidence, since few contemporary accounts bothered with such matters. There would have to be large storerooms in every castle and also small mills for grinding flour, wine and olive presses and kitchens, remains of which exist at Belvoir, Montfort and Château Pèlerin. But strongpoints were also heavily dependent on the surrounding area for supplies. In the near vicinity of Saphet, for example, were 260 villages with a total population of 10,000, besides a large town with a market. Vines, trees, herbs and olives are examples of the produce which was abundant in the region. At Château Pèlerin, Oliver of Paderborn noted that the neighbourhood, both on land and sea, was extremely fertile. The same was true at Margat, where the Hospitallers were able to harvest 500 cartloads of crops a year.
Willbrand of Oldenburg went on to claim that the castle had stocks to sustain it for five years, even against a siege: in fact it held out for only six weeks against Kalavun in 1285. Sometimes there might even be too much food and not enough men, as occurred at the siege of Beirut in 1231-2. The Ibelins had plenty of food and arms but they had to await reinforcements before they could conduct an active defence of the castle. Similarly, food does not appear to have been a problem at Château Pélerin during the siege by al-Mu'azzam in 1220. 4,000 warriors were fed daily, besides many who had come to defend the castle at their own expense or, interestingly, to sell food. It is not clear how these merchants were able to enter the castle: perhaps they were Italians who had come down the coast by ship from Acre. Even at the height of a conflict there were people who were keen to make a profit and were able to do so with such a fundamental commodity.

Castles were not always well supplied in spite of their vast storerooms, either because of problems with obtaining produce from the countryside or because enough food had not been laid in to face the rigours of a siege. Montfort suffered from such problems towards the end of its period in Christian hands. In 1270 the Teutonic Knights came to an agreement with the Hospitallers that in view of the poor condition of their castle, the Germans could farm the Hospitallers' fortified casal of Manueth for one year, though they were to hold no other rights there. The Teutonic Knights clearly had serious difficulties in supplying the garrison at Montfort from their own territory, whether because of poor harvests or as a result of direct Muslim activity. It was the latter threat, as noted earlier, that was
a factor affecting the supplies of Crac in the same year.®® The methods that Christians employed in a siege were less likely to have any rapid consequences than were those used by the Muslims. The siege of Dieudamour (1229-30) by the Ibelins became a typically drawn-out affair and the defenders began to suffer from a lack of food - so much so that they were forced to eat their horses. The Ibelins, however, did not maintain the siege effectively and the Lombards were able, by a sortie, to capture the Ibelin camp and, it is specifically noted, acquire some food which enabled them to maintain their defence for far longer than would otherwise have been possible.®®

The supply of arms was also essential to the maintenance of a strongpoint. It was imperative that the supply could be sustained in time of conflict, so strongpoints had to be capable of producing weapons themselves. At Saphet, for example, the manufacture of crossbows, arrows, machines and other kinds of arms was a constant process.®®

In 1239 Muslim troops from Kerak defeated the Christian defenders at Jerusalem. It was said that Frederick II 'avoient malvaisement garni le chastel de genz et de viandes et d'armeurez, et d'anginz et de toutes manierez de choses qui apartiennent au chastel deffendre'.®® Problems with the victualling of a garrison could lessen a strongpoint's ability to withstand assault, but lack of sufficient numbers to garrison a site was just as serious a matter. An idea of the size of garrisons is necessary before considering the functions of the strongpoints in the military history of this period. It also indicates the extent to which
the entire Latin army was committed to defending the strongpoints.

**TABLE 1:** The reported size of garrisons in the Latin East, 1192-1291.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASTLE</th>
<th>GARRISON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Acre - 1291</td>
<td>7/800 mounted (knights), 14,000 foot.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Antioch - 1268</td>
<td>8,000 warriors in the citadel.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Arsuf - 1265</td>
<td>1,000 taken prisoner, 90 Hospitaller brothers killed or captured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alternative numbers of Hospitallers given by sources are 80, 180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hospitallers and Templars or 410 Hospitallers. They had lost nearly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>all the Convent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Ascalon - 1244-7</td>
<td>100 knights, or a number of sergeants sent to relieve the siege.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Beirut - 1231-2</td>
<td>Force of 100 armed men - knights, sergeants and squires - sent into</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the citadel by the Ibelins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Caesarea - 1265</td>
<td>More than 1,000 knights and sergeants captured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Chastel Blanc - 1271</td>
<td>700 men - it is unclear if this was the garrison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Château Pèlerin - 1220</td>
<td>4,000 warriors fed daily, others were there at their own expense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Château Pèlerin - 1237</td>
<td>(force from) - 120 brothers, archers and crossbowmen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Crac des Chevaliers - 1212</td>
<td>2,000 warriors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crac des Chevaliers - 1255</td>
<td>60 équites to be maintained there by the Hospitallers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Jaffa - 1197</td>
<td>40 knights, or a number of knights and sergeants sent there by Aimery of Lusignan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Kyrenia - 1232-3</td>
<td>50 knights and 1,000 crossbowmen/sailors.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
13. Maraclea - c1277-85
100 warriors.

14. Margat - 1212
Margat - 1280
600 mounted troops came out and drove off a Muslim assault.
 Margat - 1281
The castle well-defended by brethren and other armed men.
 Margat - 1285
25 Hospitallers allowed to leave the castle with their horses and arms: this was probably the full Hospitaller contingent.

15. Mount Tabor - 1255
40 equites to be kept there by the Hospitallers.

16. Saphet - c1260
'In cotidianis expensis dantur victualia mille et septingentis personis et plus, et tempore guerre duobus milibus et ducentis. In stabilimento cotidiano castri sunt necessarii 1 milites et xxx servientes fratres cum equis et armis et 1 Turcopoli cum equis et armis et balistarii ccc, in operibus et aliis officiis dccc et xx, et sclavi cccc.'

Saphet - 1266
27 brothers and 10 Templars killed after the siege, but not the Hospitallers, and 767 warriors and 4 Franciscans. Alternative figures suggest that there were 3,000 other people there. Or, 2,000 men were taken and slaughtered. There were native (Syrian) troops in the garrison.

17. Tripoli - 1289
40 Hospitaller brothers were lost.

There are three main problems with these statistics. First, almost all of them contain at least some element of ambiguity and most are an incomplete statement of the total garrison strength. Numbers of footsoldiers and other lesser persons in a garrison are only rarely referred to. Secondly, many appear to be arbitrary totals: the figures '100' and '1,000' seem very common and units of 1,000 cannot be
regarded as accurate, since they may have been used simply to imply a large number of men. Thirdly, the statistics for one fortress often come from different dates, when circumstances might have changed. Allowing for these reservations and the question of the sources for some of these figures, some suggestions can still be made.

The detailed breakdown given for the garrison of Saphet in 1260 is particularly valuable, although even here there are problems and ambiguities. It seems that the figures given represent the ideal state of the castle (sunt necessarii) and not necessarily the men that were actually there. But the total of this ideal force comes to 1,650 and as it is said that daily expenses were for more than 1,700, in the early 1260's Saphet was probably at nearly full strength. It is immediately clear that the fighting force of the castle was only one element of the garrison as a whole and numerically a minor one. Just over a quarter of the men stationed there were full-time combatants: although this is an isolated example, it seems reasonable to assume that this would have been normal in any strongpoint. If the circumstances required it, however, many of those 'in operibus et aliis officiis' would presumably have been able to fight too. The high number of slaves present is interesting. It is known from other evidence that slaves had been important in the building of the castle and with 300 still being retained, it would seem either that considerable amounts of menial work had to be done, or that strengthening of the castle, as seen in other instances, was a continual process. With nearly 1,000 men engaged 'in operibus', this may well have been the case.
The figures relating to the combatants are equally revealing, though they must be used with caution as there is so little to compare them with. The presence of 300 crossbowmen indicates that this was a crucial part of the Latin garrisons in the thirteenth century. The mounted troops numbered 130, that is about 8% of the total garrison. From the figures quoted for the sieges of Arsurf and Acre, it seems that the mounted troops of a garrison would normally constitute between 5% and 10% of its total strength. Of the horsemen at Saphet, the 50 milites and 30 servientes fratres (sergeants) would appear to be Templar troops. This, as noted earlier, means that possibly a sixth of the total of Templar brethren in the east was committed to the garrisoning of Saphet, indicating the importance of the site to the Order and to the region as a whole. The 50 turcopoles represent the mounted mercenary element, a common aspect of Military Orders' forces in the Latin East. It does not seem that in peacetime, at least, the Templars expected to employ any knights as mercenaries, or any of their vassals, in the garrisoning of Saphet.

The numbers suggested by Alexander IV for the garrisoning of Crac and Mt. Tabor, and Willbrand of Oldenburg's numbers for Crac and Margat in 1212, can be interpreted by use of the information for Saphet. This has its dangers but it is suggestive and does have some evidence to support it. Alexander's remarks about the équites to be maintained at Crac and Mt. Tabor probably meant brother knights like the milites at Saphet, where they constituted about 40% of the mounted contingent. The number of Templar brothers at Saphet was particularly large, but Crac, Mt. Tabor and Margat would probably have warranted a
portionately similar commitment by the Hospitallers. Working from the Saphet statistics, the following approximate figures can be attained. Those with question marks have been calculated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CASTLE</th>
<th>KNIGHTS</th>
<th>MOUNTED</th>
<th>FIGHTING FORCE</th>
<th>GARRISON</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saphet</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>1,650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crac</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>160?</td>
<td>520?</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margat</td>
<td>30?</td>
<td>80?</td>
<td>260?</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Tabor</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>105?</td>
<td>340?</td>
<td>1,300?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Margat the likely proportions are suggested by working backwards from Willbrand's total, from which it would seem there might have been about 30 Hospitaller brothers in the fortress. This is close to the 25 Hospitallers that were allowed to leave Margat with their arms when the castle fell in 1285. It is possible that the Hospitallers had nearly a third of their total brethren in the east engaged in garrisoning the two sites of Crac and Margat, but considering the great importance of these castles to the Order, this is not so surprising. Projected figures for Mt. Tabor suggest how substantial a strongpoint this might have been to the Hospitallers, for the control of a wide range of estates granted to them which had previously belonged to the monastery.

From these figures it seems that larger fortresses and other strongpoints in the Latin East would have total garrisons of around 1,000 men, of which 200-300 would have been a permanent fighting force. But this figure would obviously vary considerably from one site to another. As far as the Military Orders were concerned, 20 to 30
brethren was a large force: the provision of 30 Templar brothers to assist Guy of Gibelet in the 1270's may be seen in this context.\textsuperscript{98}

Much of the remaining evidence which is not too ambiguous comes from instances when the garrison appears to have been augmented, to help deal with an assault of some kind. As the Muslims increasingly dominated the hinterland and inland sites therefore found themselves more and more isolated, any effort to assist a beleaguered garrison would normally have to come from the sea, as at Jaffa in 1197, Beirut in 1231, Ascalon in 1247 and Acre in 1291. The Hospitallers often devoted large numbers of troops to deal with a threat to a coastal strongpoint. The lowest estimate of the Hospitaller brethren at Arsuf is 80, in itself a very large number of men. The sending of 40 brothers to Tripoli in 1289 is clear evidence of the Order's willingness to commit itself even when its own properties were not directly threatened. Examples from other instances when positions defended by the Military Orders were under attack add to this picture. Even in the 1280's Nicholas Lorgne was fairly confident of Margat's ability to resist attack and in 1280, 600 'a chevau' drove off a Muslim assault. But most of this force would presumably have been mercenaries: there does not seem to have been any great concentration of brethren in the castle and only 25 were left at the end of the siege in 1285. The statistics relating to the fall of Saphet in 1266 suggest that no great influx of Templars had taken place, although the garrison was clearly larger than the 1,700 of c1261. The author of \textit{De constructione castri Saphet} suggested a total in wartime of 2,200. This increase of 500 men would presumably have been largely made up of
mercenary troops. It is interesting, as already pointed out, that there may have been Hospitallers at Saphet, whilst one source suggests that Templars were present at the fall of Arsuf.

The force of 100 knights, sergeants and others sent into Beirut in 1232 dramatically altered the course of the siege. A garrison of 50 knights and 100 crossbowmen was able to repel attackers for 10 months at Kyrenia, before deciding to capitulate with no hope of relief. These two examples of strongpoints being defended against Christian opposition suggest that a fairly small force could achieve some success against Christian siege methods, but faced by a Muslim army such a force stood little chance.

The information which has been examined is limited and ambiguous, but some tentative conclusions may still be drawn. It is noteworthy how small the fighting force in a garrison was and particularly, the restricted number of mounted troops that were available. It seems unlikely that any garrison would in normal circumstances have contained more than 500 full-time combatants: this force was liable to be strengthened at times of crisis - at Château Pèlerin when it was besieged by al-Mu'azzam, 4,000 warriors were fed daily - but in many instances, it is questionable how far such strengthening would have been practical. The troops sent to Ascalon left immediately after having revictualled the garrison. A study of the functions of the strongpoints in the thirteenth century will indicate the extent to which their small garrisons could hope to influence events in their area.
The functions of the strongpoints

a) Contemporary and modern views of the strongpoints' functions

Contemporary writers occasionally attempted to assess the role that a fortified position might be able to play in the Latin East. Oliver of Paderborn, for example, regarded Château Pèlerin as constituting a serious threat to Mt. Tabor in 1218; but the two sites are about 25 miles apart and it is therefore unlikely that the building of Château Pèlerin led to the destruction of Mt. Tabor by Muslim forces. Better contemporary impressions may sometimes be gained from accounts of travellers such as Willbrand, who noted in 1212 that Margat, being situated on a mountain, was especially useful for warding off the Assassins and Muslims; so much so that they were obliged to pay the Hospitallers 2,000 marks a year in tribute. Six years later Andrew II of Hungary, having come east with the Fifth Crusade, also spent some time in northern Syria. As a result of his trip he endowed both Crac and Margat with revenues from his salt mines. He hinted at the kind of role which he felt Margat could play: 'recte in frontibus paganorum situm est, sustentationem perpetuam...', whilst with regard to Crac he was even more graphic: 'cotidianos Amalechitarum insultus viriliter repellunt, qui partem Terre Sancte contra inimicos crucis Christi et blasphematores nominis ejus potenter retinent...'. The papacy appears to have been particularly fond of vague pronouncements concerning the role which, it was believed, castles ought to play in the Latin East. Crac des Chevaliers was 'a paganorum incursibus defendere ac tueri...' for example. Innocent IV saw the expenses of the Hospitallers at Ascalon as 'contra inimicos catholice fidei defendendum'. In 1230 Gregory IX appealed for aid to be given to the
Teutonic Knights in their building of Montfort. The fortress was described as 'positum in confinio paganorum, per quod christianis in partibus illis immensa dinoscitur utilitas provenire', which it has been suggested reflected propaganda rather than a genuine idea of Montfort's status.®

Modern writers have tried to be rather more precise about the role of castles. Many have followed Deschamps, whose ideas will be considered later, and looked at them in terms of their supposed ability to defend frontiers, but Smail considered some other points in an argument which may be the zenith of work on the strongpoints' functions:

...frontier defence was a role (they) could only imperfectly fulfil... They were used in attack, and played a notable role in the Latin conquest... they were used to establish Latin control in areas of strategic importance, and... became centres of colonization and economic development. They served as residences, as administrative centres, as barracks, and as police posts. Above all, they were centres of authority.®

In the thirteenth century the context had altered, but the functions of the strongpoints can be considered in similar terms. In this study the castle and its occupants will be regarded as independent, though closely linked, entities. And in some respects the basic manner of appraisal which was, perhaps unconsciously, adopted by contemporaries will be followed. It is only by using their evidence that the functions of castles in this period may be considered. Writers primarily regarded castles, and the people within them, as being able to defend and to attack. These are the most obvious military aspects of the role
which castles could play, but their administrative functions will also be considered, as will the role of strongpoints in the politics of the Latin East during this period.

b) The administrative and policing function

Lordships in this period, whether they were held by lay lords or the Military Orders, seem to have all followed broadly the same pattern. The centre of administration for the seigneurie was the town where the lord's chief castle stood. This would contain a market for the surrounding area, it might be a port, and it would probably also be the seat of a bishopric; so the castle was one essential factor in the administrative set-up of a lordship. In the west the castle was the focal point for all the inhabitants of the seigneurie, and its role in administration seems to have been virtually total. This was probably not so true in the east, because the survival of Muslim administration at this level appears to have been considerable. When the Latins came to the east, they found a highly developed local structure which they chose not to alter, so the role of the castle in this respect would have been correspondingly lessened. The castle would still, however, have played an important function in a number of aspects which can be better described as administrative rather than military.

The existence of a bourg around a castle was important, particularly on the coast, where a port and market could provide revenue for the lord. This may be one reason why a fair number of coastal positions could still be maintained by the lay ruler, whilst so many inland fortresses, where there was less opportunity of exploiting
trade and commerce, were alienated to the Military Orders. Outside the main administrative centre of the seigneurie, castles would undoubtedly still have played an executive role in the countryside. In the lordship of Sidon, for example, Beaufort, the Cave de Tyron and the small fortress of Belhacem may have all performed management tasks for the lord at one time or another. By the mid-thirteenth century Saphet, perhaps along with the Hospitaller site at Mt. Tabor, was controlling the remains of the principality of Galilee, with an administrative role which, in fact, began for Saphet whilst it was being built. The building cost to the Templars was 1,100,000 besants, 'preter redditus et obventiones dicti castri...'. The Teutonic Knights used their castle at Montfort as a central store for their revenues, with another store being at Acre. At a local level many villages which were possibly collection points for harvest or other produce would have made use of fortified warehouses or towers, such as those at Tour Rouge and Calansue. It also appears that some mills, like the one at Recordane which was held by the Hospitallers, were fortified in the thirteenth century.

At other sites the presence of the castle was important to the trade and industry of the area, but its principal non-military function was colonizing rather than administrative. In the early years of the Latin settlement such a role was inevitable: the evidence of the part played by the Hospitaller fortress of Bethgibelin is particularly interesting, where an example of organised colonization dating from the 1150's can be traced. In the thirteenth century colonization activities continued and the role of the castle in this respect was
frequently an important one, but a distinction should be made with regard to that role, since certain security aspects of the castle's role and its effect on colonization were very closely related. The strength of a castle was used by the civilian populace to pursue their own existence peacefully and securely, but this strength had a more purely military function as well. Settlers were able to use the castle in their colonization plans: for the castle and its garrison, this was merely a by-product of their ability to dominate an area by military means, though it was one from which they were able to benefit, because the product of the civilian presence, whether agricultural or industrial, was then used either directly by the castle or in terms of a rent and other returns as at Saphet. Since land ownership in the Latin Kingdom during this period was by no means static, with the re-acquisition of areas previously held by Muslims, security was, of course, essential if anything like permanent roots were to be put down in such territories.

At some sites re-population by civilian Latins was impossible. Throughout the period Ascalon was frequently, in theory at least, under Frankish control, but despite the rebuilding of the castle in the early 1240's the area around it appears to have remained desolate. But at Caesarea, the construction of a castle was seen as the first step towards the re-population of the city. Oliver of Paderborn reported that it was hoped by the rebuilding of the fort that the city too could be restored.104 Besides the citadel which St. Louis built there in 1251, he also strengthened the suburb with walls, fosses, and 16 towers,105 perhaps utilising earlier construction at the site. The
invaluable text De constructione castri Saphet included important information about the role of a castle in colonization. This is particularly interesting as Saphet was situated in the fertile area just west of the Jordan, an area which was often subjected to Muslim assaults during this period. Before the rebuilding of the castle, attacks had been frequent, often penetrating as far as Acre, but now Muslims would not dare to cross the Jordan unless in large numbers. Prior to Saphet's reconstruction, 'religiones et barones ac milites ad quos pertinent dicta casalia, ... nichil habebant', since the Muslims were able to take everything. Prospects for settlement appear to have been similar at Château Pèlerin. But Oliver of Paderborn emphasised the colonised areas which the Muslims would thus have to abandon, rather than a more positive situation which Christian-organised settlement might be able to exploit. With the building of Château Pèlerin, 'loca culta deserere coguntur': there was a long wide plain between Château Pèlerin and Mt. Tabor, which had previously been occupied by Muslim agriculture, but now 'nec arare nec seminare nec metere quisquam secure poterat propter metum habitantium in eo.' (Château Pèlerin). It is to be presumed, however, that the Christians would not wish to leave such a rich area barren and the existence of a burgess court there is evidence that this had not happened. Christian settlement had again followed as a result of the building of a strongpoint and the security which this brought to the area.

Strongpoints were not solely concerned with the Muslim threat from outside the kingdom's borders, at least in the twelfth century. An unbridgeable gulf remained between Latins and Muslims which manifested
itself particularly at times of stress.\textsuperscript{107} In the thirteenth century it is possible that there were minor native risings on which information is lacking. Even more likely is that garrison troops occasionally had to perform other policing duties such as the settlement of minor disputes and conflicts, even though the\textsuperscript{rays} remained responsible for most aspects of justice at the village level.\textsuperscript{108}

Major sites such as the Hospitaller castles of Crac and Margat, which were monasteries as well as castles, should not be regarded as austere and purely functional. When Andrew II of Hungary visited the two sites in early 1218, he must have been impressed by the frescoes which had been recently added to the chapels.\textsuperscript{110} It was not only visiting Latins that would make use of the castles as residences, however. The point has often been made that the Frankish nobility preferred to live in the larger towns, and undoubtedly this was increasingly true as the Muslims gained control of the countryside. But they also made use of their castles to reside in, and for other purposes. In 1282 the Gibelet faction was advised to attack Tripoli, since Bohemond was known to be spending some time at Mephin. Guy of Gibelet was probably imprisoned at Mephin after the failure of his revolt. A court was convened there on 6 February 1282, to hear his confession. In attendance were the count of Tripoli, the lords of Maraclea and Botrun and numerous ecclesiastics. The gathering may have been merely to hear Guy speak and there is no evidence of any sentence being passed, though he was subsequently killed at the castle.\textsuperscript{111} The Rule of the Temple implied that Château Pèlerin was the major prison of the Order in the Latin East, with a number of instances of it being
used. One case can be dated between 1218 and 1268. At Antioch three Templar brothers, including one called brother 'Paris', killed some Christian merchants: having been expelled from the Order they were whipped at Antioch, Tripoli, Tyre and then into Acre, before they were taken to Château Pèlerin to remain in perpetual imprisonment. They all died there.\textsuperscript{112}

c) Defensive functions

The physical barriers presented by a castle or strongpoint, aside from the ability of the occupants to add to its defensive capacity, could be enough to repel some types of Muslim threat. The growing sophistication and relative isolation of some strongpoints in the thirteenth century was, as noted above, to some extent a reaction to a lack of manpower and it was possible for the very strength of fortifications to make up for a dearth of numbers. This is reflected occasionally by contemporary accounts. At Saphet, for example, few men were required to defend the castle effectively, but large numbers were needed to besiege it.\textsuperscript{13} A similar situation existed at Dieudamour. It was situated on a very steep slope and required a substantial force to maintain a siege. At the siege of Beirut in 1231-2, the Ibelins in the citadel were desperately short of men, but despite some structural damage to their defences they were able to hold out until a relief force came. Their only problem was an inability to take the initiative against the Lombard attackers, but other than this, they were reasonably secure.\textsuperscript{14}
Strongpoints were sometimes used as a shield against a low-key Muslim raid. The defenders would not make any attempt to drive off the raiders, but nor would the raiders have the equipment to do any harm to the defenders, who were quite content to watch the enemy expend their energy from behind the castle walls. Many castles and towers remained empty for much of the time, but they would undoubtedly have been utilised by the inhabitants of the area when a Muslim threat arose. A strongpoint's walls were a valuable asset for those who normally lived outside them. During the 1260's, Baybars constantly attacked Acre and although he was able in that time to do much damage to the area outside its walls, many of the peasants and villagers of the surrounding countryside must have been able to save themselves by going into the city. But in May 1267, by using the banners of the Templars, Hospitallers and of Tyre, Baybars was able to come extremely close to the city without being recognised, at a time when many peasants were outside the walls constructing defensive works. The Muslims rode right to the gates of the city, taking and killing more than 500 people. By virtue of their cunning, they were able on this occasion to prevent the defences of Acre from being effectively used as personal protection.\textsuperscript{115} In 1253, a small force which St. Louis had sent to begin refortification work at Sidon was faced by a heavy Muslim raid and, realising that they were incapable of combating such an onslaught in the open, they pulled back into the sea-castle, 'qui est mout forz et enclos est de la mer en touz senz'. A few other people were able to protect themselves there too, but since the castle was not large enough this was by no means all the local inhabitants and the
Muslims, facing no opposition, were able to kill 2,000 and take considerable booty.\textsuperscript{116}

When Christians within a castle were faced by a serious attempt to capture that site, they were, again, sometimes able to rely largely on the fortifications to protect them. Not all the Muslim sieges were successful and when they did fail, the strength of the strongpoint's defences was often an important factor. Château Pèlerin, for example, repulsed the Muslims in 1220.\textsuperscript{117} Further north, Crac and Margat both faced many abortive sieges in the thirteenth century, before finally succumbing in 1271 and 1285 respectively. Crac was attacked in 1207, 1218, possibly 1265 and 1269, and Margat in 1206, 1231, 1269, 1281 and 1282.\textsuperscript{118} Both these castles had strong garrisons but their survival indicated the strength of the fortifications too. In 1260 the Mongols besieged Sidon but Julian, its lord, was able to retreat into the land castle. The Mongols rampaged through the town and smashed its walls, but they were unable to take the castle: nevertheless, this was a heavy blow for Julian and he sold the town to the Templars soon afterwards.\textsuperscript{119}

The passive strength of a castle could also be important for the consolidation of a position after a defeat. On Theobald of Champagne's Crusade, after a force led by the counts of Bar and Montfort had been defeated near Gaza, Theobald's army turned round and returned to its camp at Ascalon, presumably safe from Muslim marauders.\textsuperscript{120} In 1244, the armies of the Latin East met their heaviest defeat of the thirteenth century in open battle at La Forbie. The losses were
enormous, but some were able to escape the carnage, including the patriarch of Jerusalem, the constable of Acre and Philip of Montfort. Their flight from the battle was not wholly precipitate, however, for they found refuge 'ou nouvel chastel d'Escalone' first, before making their way back to Acre. Had Ascalon not been refortified by Richard of Cornwall, the defeated forces would have had to march up the coast to Jaffa, exposed to the threat of pursuing Muslim troops or the ravages of Muslim peasants.

The inert strength of the strongpoint itself was augmented by the ability of its garrison to combat raids and sieges; and the position of the castle, combined with the strength of the garrison, produced its ability to control an area - that is, its strategic value. It has been argued in this respect that almost every strongpoint had a significance which was based on its geographical position. With regard to the twelfth century, this view has been convincingly rejected, but the extent to which castles in the Latin East acted as a means of frontier defence, opposing an external enemy, has been an area of persistent controversy amongst military historians.

A successful strategy is, amongst other things, the ability to influence one's opponent to one's own advantage and in this sense, some castles were unquestionably of greater strategic value than others. In the cases of Crac and Margat, for example, their garrisons' strength and their proximity to the Muslims at Ba'rin and Hamah and the Assassins were such as to allow the Hospitallers considerable influence over their Muslim neighbours. But it is clear from contemporary
evidence that very few Latin positions were of any genuine strategic value, at least in the thirteenth century. The only possible exceptions to this were the two Hospitaller castles mentioned above (with the support of others in the region) and the Templar castles of Saphet, which, as already noted, even Muslims acknowledged to be 'an obstruction in the throat of Syria and a blockage in the chest of Islam..." and perhaps Château Pèlerin, which Oliver of Paderborn, somewhat dubiously as noted above, considered in terms of its strategic value to the Latins and the threat it posed to the Muslim fortress at Mt. Tabor.' Some other castles may have been capable of playing a more limited strategic role. Gregory IX's remarks concerning Montfort, for example, suggested that the Teutonic Knights were able to offer some protection to the area. The castle of Saphet was able to restrict Muslim access to the fertile area west of the Jordan, as well as perhaps further progress westward towards the Christian positions on the coast - at least, as long as the Muslim force was not too large. There are no documented examples of such a function being performed by the castle, but the Muslims were clearly aware of its potential and this was supported by the text of De constructione castri Saphet, which described the strategic role that Saphet was able to play:

\[\text{ante edificationem dicti castri Sarraceni, Biduini, Coramini et Turcomani faciebant insultus frequenter usque Acon et per terram aliam christianorum. Sed edificato castro Saphet positum est repugnaculum et obstacle ne ad nocendum publice transire audeant a flumine Iordanis usque Acon, nisi esset maxima multitudo, et ab Acon usque Saphet vadunt secure honerati saumarii et quadrigae et agricultura et terre colonia libere ab omnibus exercetur.}\]
The threat which had existed of low-level raids on this fertile area of Christian territory had been removed by the rebuilding of the castle at Saphet, but more important, by the effectiveness with which its large garrison was able to dominate the area and prevent such limited but highly damaging attacks from taking place. Saphet was successful at this level of activity, a fact no doubt appreciated by those who wished to live in the area which it was able to control.

But Saphet was not so effective if the Muslims invaded with a large force - ' nisi esset maxima multitudo' - reflecting the inability of strongpoints to defend the frontiers of the Latin states. Smail went so far as to say, with reference to the twelfth century, that 'when warfare was fought on a scale likely to endanger the Latin occupation, no fortress or group of fortresses could restrain the passage of an invading force'. The same is true in the thirteenth century, but in some respects the position was even worse. In the twelfth century the major Muslim threat came from Damascus. Even for some periods of the thirteenth century, the Latins were reasonably well-protected from any low-level Muslim activity coming from east of the Jordan: it has been seen what Saphet was able to do and further north, Beaufort may have been able to play a similar role. But particularly from the time of the Mamluk usurpation, Egypt was the major Muslim power base in the area and the principal threat to the survival of the Frankish settlement. Christian strength in the south, despite this threat, was concentrated almost wholly on coastal positions such as Jaffa, Arsuf and Caesarea, and for a short period, Ascalon. The Christians were thus extremely ill-equipped to deal with any Muslim activity further
inland, although it is possible that sites such as Blanchegarde and Bethgibelin were briefly held in the 1240's: there is, as already pointed out, no positive evidence on this point. In such circumstances it is not surprising that the conquests of Baybars in the south were able to continue almost unchecked. There was no position held by the Christians that was capable of preventing this. The evidence is clear that the Christians had no hope of resisting a major Muslim assault and indeed, there is no suggestion that they ever attempted to do so. The situation was made worse because there were insufficient troops in the field: and this helped to encourage a sense of isolation within each individual strongpoint. This was the basis of the Latin East's strategic problems during the thirteenth century.

The Latins' strongpoints were not totally feeble, however. They were able to deal with the threat posed by small numbers of Muslim raiders and in the 100 years under consideration, this could mean a lifetime of peaceful existence for many inhabitants. In what may at times seem a constant catalogue of gloom and disaster, this should not be forgotten.

d) Aggressive functions

Some historians, as already noted, have maintained that the castle in the thirteenth century reflected the military weakness of the Latins in the east and their inherently passive approach. During the early years of the twelfth century many sites played a role that was at least as significant in attack as it was in defence, particularly those that were placed near Tripoli, Tyre and Ascalon. They performed an
aggressive role which limited the ability of the Muslim garrisons nearby to function effectively, whilst enabling the Christian forces to maintain constant pressure on their opponents. In the thirteenth century, manpower difficulties and the increasing strength of the Muslim states meant that this was not generally possible. But certain castles and their garrisons were still able to take the initiative in a variety of ways against their Muslim neighbours.

It seems that even castles which lacked a strong garrison could still assist with the aggressive actions of Latin forces. Strongpoints were used by troops as a base at various stages of a campaign. Many expeditions prepared themselves at Acre. These included the Fifth Crusade in May 1218,¹³¹ Theobald of Champagne's Crusade in 1239, when the army was camped both inside and outside the city,¹³² and the Crusade of the Lord Edward in 1271.¹³³ Acre was an ideal place to prepare. It was the great trading centre of the Latin East and most of the important barons, prelates and other leaders were easily accessible. When Theobald's army marched down the coast from Acre, two other strongpoints played an important role in the expedition. At Château Pèlerin, many were unable to go any further, so they remained there, 'pour leur maladies'. The rest of the army then moved on to the castle at Jaffa, which they made their base for the next four days. From there, first Peter of Brittany and then the counts of Bar and Montfort set out on raids which would lead this crusade towards its disastrous conclusion.¹³⁴
In northern Syria the Templar position of Roche de Roussel was not strong enough to influence enemy policy on its own. But as one of a network of strongpoints held by the Military Orders in the north, it was useful as a base from whence to operate in enemy territory. In 1237, a large force led by the Templars gathered there before an attack on Darbsak. The Christians suffered a heavy defeat, however, with the preceptor of Antioch amongst the dead. A castle without a strong garrison - and in theory, a castle without a garrison at all - could still be used when Christian troops carried out an offensive enterprise.

Garrisons, or parts of garrisons, could occasionally function independently of their castle, normally when they combined with other troops in order to attack the enemy. But it was necessary to be very circumspect when doing this. In 1187, the defeat at Hattin had so decimated the military strength of the Latins that Saladin and his troops were able to occupy many Christian strongpoints which were virtually undefended. The Military Orders proved especially adept at concentrating their forces by using garrisons to operate independently of strongpoints, although presumably they would not have left their castles completely empty. The Latins so consistently suffered from a lack of manpower, however, that it was essential that the maximum possible use should be gained from those troops that were available. The Military Orders committed large numbers of troops to most of the military actions in the area, and many of these must have been taken from their normal duty of protecting the kingdom's castles. Unfortunately, it is not often clear from where these troops were gathered. Many chroniclers may simply have assumed that the Military
Orders were active on all campaigns in the Latin East. Individual seigneurs were often named as taking part in military campaigns well away from their own lordships: presumably they would have been accompanied by at least some of their vassals.

It appears to have been possible for troops to be gathered from virtually everywhere if the occasion demanded. In 1233 the Hospitallers led an assault on Ba'rin, for which 80 knights had arrived from Jerusalem, under Peter of Avalon, and 100 knights from Cyprus, led by John of Ibelin, at a time when his faction was well-placed in the conflict with the Lombards. It also included the master of the Temple, with 'tout son covent' and 30 knights from Antioch. The Hospitallers themselves provided 100 knights, 400 mounted sergeants and 1,500 foot sergeants. Another large-scale raid, this time in the south, took place in 1260. The Templars made a significant contribution to a force which also included John of Beirut, John of Gibelet, and many knights of Acre, but which was beaten by the Muslims near Tiberias. The Templar garrisons from Beaufort, Château Pèlerin, Saphet and Acre had all sent contingents and the master of the Temple, William of Beaujeu, was made a prisoner. Raids undertaken by Christian armies, even though they had little long-term value, became, as will be seen later, increasingly important in the strategy which was adopted in the second-half of the thirteenth century. Another example of a force involved in action away from its normal site occurred as a result of the Templars' involvement in the civil conflict which centred on Tripoli and Gibelet in the 1270's and 80's. Templar support for the Embriacos encouraged the latter to send a force to Tripoli which would
be augmented by the Templar commander of that city. It was also arranged that a Templar contingent from Tortosa would be present at Tripoli when the Gibelet force arrived. But the Embriacos found themselves alone and were eventually obliged to surrender, through lack of Templar support.¹²³

It was not necessarily just to fight with the Muslims that Christian garrisons would move beyond the immediate neighbourhood of their own castle. They were sometimes involved in tasks such as castle-building. Most of the information is rather ambiguous, but as already noted, sometime between 1277 and 1285, the Hospitallers from Margat assisted the lord of Maraclea in his building of an island fortress. They were joined there by the count of Tripoli and other Latins.¹⁴⁰ Garrisons could also be involved with other strongpoints at times when they were not being directly threatened. There was cooperation between the Hospitallers at Crac des Chevaliers and the Templars at Chastel Blanc, for example. In 1266 a force of 50 Frankish archers and crossbowmen travelling from Chastel Blanc to Crac were encountered and dealt with by Muslim troops.¹⁴¹ The fact that this was a Templar site helping one which belonged to the Hospitallers is especially interesting: perhaps the force was a group of mercenaries that had only recently been hired by the Hospitallers of Crac.

Fortresses which were well-positioned and had a strong garrison were able to carry out aggressive operations against the enemy, normally in the form of raids. Such activities were slightly different in northern Syria from those which were undertaken in Palestine. In
the south the evidence is largely in the form of theoretical statements which cannot be directly related to any specific incidents. An exception to this is a brief reference to two raids carried out by Julian of Sidon, both dated to 1260. The first of these was against Philip of Montfort at Tyre, when Julian raided outside the city with knights and turcopoles before returning to Sidon. In the second, troops from Beaufort and Sidon assaulted some Mongol encampments, causing the furious Mongol general, Kitbogha, whose nephew had been killed in the attack, to besiege Sidon, though without any success. These are interesting examples of the efforts of a lord to express his authority in military terms, using a major castle of his seigneurie as the base for these efforts.

The aggressive tactics of the Templars at Château Pèlerin and Saphet had cleared their immediate areas of the Muslim threat and, in theory, made them available for Christian colonization and agricultural activities. In the case of Saphet,

A flumine vero Iordanis usque Damascum remen et terra inculta et quasi vasta propter metum castri Saphet, unde fiunt grandes insultus et deprehensiones et vastationes usque Damascum et ubi facte sunt plures miraculose victorie per fratres Templi contra fidel inimicos...

Allowing for exaggeration, the Templars had forced their Muslim neighbours on to a far more defensive footing as a result of their activities from Saphet, and raids had been carried out into Muslim territory, although unfortunately there is no more evidence. Positive measures had been an important element in the ability of the Templars to control an area and bring security to it.
In northern Syria the Military Orders were particularly powerful and able for much of this period to dominate their Muslim neighbours. Hospitaller policy, centring on Margat and Crac, but with many other dependent sites, was far more unified and effective in terms of the role played by the strongpoints than it could have been elsewhere. At least until the mid-thirteenth century these sites and their garrisons enjoyed a commanding influence over the neighbourhood which was unequalled anywhere else in the Latin East. Most of their campaigns were directed against the accessible Muslim positions of Homs, Hamah and Ba'rin and many took the form of raids which were motivated by the desire to maintain tribute. This phenomenon will be considered later, but it should be noted how persistent and strong the Military Orders were in their dominance of their neighbours. In the 1270's after the loss of Chastel Blanc, Baghras and Crac, the situation has some parallels with that which was apparent in the south as early as the 1240's: Margat was still able occasionally to perform aggressive functions but these were isolated instances compared to the large-scale ventures that strongpoints and their garrisons had organised earlier in the century. By 1285 this isolation was almost complete, despite the defiant mood which was shown by the Hospitallers right to the end.

**Castles and the feudal regime**

In this period, the crown was far weaker than it had been in the twelfth century. During the first hundred years of the Latin settlement there were disputes amongst lords, but the number of such conflicts was restricted by the power which the crown enjoyed: the kings of Jerusalem succeeded in dominating the feudal society subject
to them. And it does not appear that the role of castles was of any great significance in the disputes which did develop. But in the thirteenth century, after the death of John of Brienne, a succession of absentee monarchs and minorities made the position of the crown much weaker, whilst at the same time elements such as the Italian communes, the Military Orders and the lay baronage indulged in a number of conflicts, some of which also involved the participation of outside forces including various Muslim factions and the Armenians.

Castles had an interesting part to play in some of these conflicts.

In the Principality of Antioch, a dispute over the right of succession raged throughout the early years of the thirteenth century: some aspects of the quarrel were considered in chapter one of this study. The Templar castle of Baghras was a significant factor in this conflict: it has been seen that the refusal of Leon of Armenia to return it to the Templars encouraged them to side with Bohemond of Antioch. The Hospitallers were rewarded for their loyalty to the Armenians with grants of territories, such as Jabala, although the site was not in Christian hands at the time. Further north, another grant was made by Leon to the Hospitallers in an attempt to create a march between him and the Seljuq Turks. In April and August of 1210 the Hospitallers received land which included the castles of Castellum Novum and Camardias and the towns of Silifke and Karaman. The last of these, situated about 50 miles northwest of Camardias and not in Christian hands, suggests that Leon was keen to encourage the Hospitallers in expansionist activities, but they only remained in the area for about 15 years. As at Jabala the rights which they received were very wide,
including the power to make peace and war with the Muslims and to take all spoils, regardless of whether the king was present or not.¹⁴⁸

The dispute between Frederick II and the Ibelins in Cyprus and Syria involved castles in a role which was more obviously of a military nature.¹⁴⁹ The Ibelins were able to maintain their hold on Beirut and Acre, whilst the Imperial forces made use of Tyre as their main strongpoint on the mainland. On Cyprus, a succession of sieges in the period 1229-33 meant that the ownership of castles was constantly changing, but the eventual success of the Ibelin forces ensured that they were firmly in control of the island. Beirut was the centre of John of Beirut's lordship and it was also an important factor in the beginning of the conflict between Frederick II and the Ibelins, since Frederick had demanded that it should be returned to the crown.¹⁵⁰ In the autumn of 1231 he sent Richard Filangieri to the east with a large force, which began the siege of Beirut whilst Filangieri went on to receive the submission of Tyre. If Beirut had fallen to the Lombards, it was quite possible that their position would have become far stronger vis-à-vis the baronage, but the successful defence of the castle by an increasingly strong and confident Ibelin force prevented its capture. This can be regarded as important to the course of the conflict as a whole. The capture of Kyrenia in 1233 meant that the position of the Ibelins on Cyprus was assured, but the Lombards maintained an influential presence on the mainland, largely because of their control of Tyre. The previous year, Filangieri and his men had gradually made their way back to Tyre via Armenia after being under siege at Kyrenia.¹⁵¹ For over ten years, the Lombard hold on Tyre
appears to have been firm and they were still able to launch an assault on Acre in 1242, but in 1243 Conradin's minority came to an end and the baronial party agreed to attack the city. The fall of this strongpoint caused the final expulsion from Syria of the Imperialists: they no longer had any suitable bases from which to continue their activities.\footnote{\textsuperscript{52}}

Tyre was again important in the 1250's and 60's, during the War of St. Sabas. By 1258 the two groups involved in the conflict had polarized with the majority of the baronage and the Templars favouring the Venetians and Pisans, whilst Genoa's principal support came from Philip of Montfort and the Hospitallers. The Genoese were thus able to make use of Philip's main strongpoint, Tyre, as the base for a number of assaults on Acre, such as a land and sea operation which failed in June 1258. In this war, the two principal strongpoints were used by the protagonists mainly as bases from which to inflict damage on one another.\footnote{\textsuperscript{53}} The War of St. Sabas was an important factor in triggering off a conflict in northern Syria between the Embriacos, lords of Gibelet, and the princes of Antioch.\footnote{\textsuperscript{54}} Some aspects of this dispute have already been noted in chapter one, but the particularly interesting function of castles in its second phase justifies a re-examination.

The principal strongpoint in the area and the key to Bohemond's control of his county, was Tripoli. It is therefore not surprising that the Embriacos should have directed most of their energies at this target. In 1276 it was besieged by a force which included a strong contingent of Templars. Bohemond's troops chose to rely on the
strength of the city's walls for protection, since none of them dared to go out. A Templar-led attack by sea in 1278 was a failure. In 1282 there were three further assaults, but these ended in disaster. On the first occasion a knight, Paul Eltefahha, signalled to the Embriacos' fleet that they should come ashore, but they missed the signal so the attempt was aborted. The second time, the Embriacos believed dawn to be breaking, so they turned back. Finally, when they did succeed in entering Tripoli, the promised Templar support was not there so they were forced to surrender. The main base of the Embriacos was Gibelet itself and it is clear that all the efforts to take Tripoli started from this point. In 1276 Bohemond attempted to besiege the town but was met by the Embriacos in a violent engagement which took place outside the walls. This is interesting, as it has been suggested that the town's defences at this time were rather weak. If this was the case then it would have been quite appropriate for the Embriacos to face this attack in the open rather than, as was sometimes possible, to make use of the strongpoint's passive strength to combat the threat.

Two other sites just down the coast from Tripoli also became involved in the conflict. In the 1258 dispute, the lord of Botrun had been on the side of the Embriacos, but by the 1270's he was firmly allied to the count of Tripoli. On the way back to Gibelet after the assault on Tripoli of 1276, the Templars attacked the manor of Botrun and undoubtedly caused great damage. Burchard of Mt. Sion, writing seven years later, noted that the castle was destroyed, though in 1282 'sire Rostain, Seignor dou Botron', was one of those who witnessed the confession of the lord of Gibelet. Nephin also played a major role in
the course of this conflict. In 1276 after the destruction of Botrun, the Templar-led force came to Nephin and attempted to besiege it. Twelve brothers and Paul Eltefahha gained entrance to the castle, but the sergeants inside were able to close the gates and trap them. They surrendered and were taken off to prison in Tripoli. But Paul was presumably released soon afterwards, as he played an important coordinating role in the events of 1282. Nephin was also involved in a postscript to the conflict, something which has already been noted. The final attempt of the Embriacos to seize Tripoli was suggested because Bohemond was known to be spending some time at Nephin; Guy of Gibelet's confession was taken there; and it was also his final prison and place of execution.

Templar support for the Embriacos remained constant throughout the late 1270's. When the Templars' ships attacked Tripoli in 1278, a retaliatory raid on Sidon was organised with the attack apparently concentrated on the sea castle. The site was robbed and severely damaged and a number of Templars and others were taken prisoner. From Tortosa to Sidon, the strongpoints had a role to play in this conflict between a lord and his vassal.\textsuperscript{55}

The castle and town of Jaffa

It has been pointed out earlier that studies of individual sites have produced a very sketchy impression of the various forms and functions of the castle in this period. For this reason a more general approach has been preferred, but the castle of Jaffa will now be examined in detail. The absence of remains from the 200 years of the
Latin settlement has discouraged many scholars, most of whom have been more concerned with the architectural aspects of sites, from considering the range of written materials which are available. These materials are, in fact, abundant enough to provide a reasonably satisfying picture of some aspects of the history of this one site during the thirteenth century.

In 1197, Muslim troops successfully besieged Jaffa, despite efforts to relieve it. The news of its loss provoked a reaction from Innocent III. But in 1204 the site was returned to the Christians as part of a truce agreed with al-Adil. It remained part of the royal domain until 1247, by which time the regent Henry of Cyprus had granted it to John of Ibelin, the nephew of John of Beirut. The previous count, Walter of Brienne, had died in prison in Egypt. This was a time of crisis for many of the feudatories, but John was able to retain control of Jaffa until his death in 1266. In 1268 Jaffa was captured by the Muslims.

In the period before the Muslim conquest in 1197 the Military Orders had enjoyed a strong presence in the town. In 1194 Henry of Champagne granted a position to the Hospitallers "juxta castellum Joppen sitam, cum duabus turribus". The Teutonic Knights were granted land there in March 1196. But there is no evidence for the continuation of their presence into the thirteenth century. It is possible that Jaffa remained deserted until 1228: when Frederick II rebuilt the castle it was necessary for him to uncover the foundations before work could begin. This was the beginning of an intensive
construction programme, because the following year Gerald, the patriarch of Jerusalem built two towers there. No additional work at Jaffa was recorded for over 20 years, however, until the time of St. Louis' First Crusade.

St. Louis spent over a year at Jaffa, from May 1252 to June 1253. Just before his arrival, however, John of Jaffa repaired the castle to ensure that it could withstand an assault. His efforts were admired by Joinville, who was particularly impressed by the display of shields on the ramparts of the citadel. St. Louis therefore fortified 'un nuef bourc' around the castle: details of the work undertaken indicate that the town was undefended at this time. Louis built a wall with a moat which reached the shore to the north and south and incorporated 24 towers into its design, suggesting a size which was at least comparable with Caesarea. There were three main gates. One of these was built by the legate: with a section of wall, this work cost him 30,000 livres. Louis himself was involved in less glamorous work such as earth moving, 'pour avoir le pardon'. In April 1253, before Louis' work at Jaffa had been completed, Innocent IV had offered an indulgence of 40 days for help with constructing 'portum Joppensem, utilem et necessarium subsidio Terre Sancte...'. In the early 1250's John of Jaffa had impressive plans for the reconstitution of his town, which he was able to carry out with the help of the faithful. The complete rebuilding of the castle and the town walls facilitated colonization at the site, as seen in different circumstances at Saphet and Château Pèlerin. The probable provision of a port would have brought in trade and revenue to the town. But the count found it hard to finance the
scheme and by 1256 his problems had come to the attention of the
papacy, for Alexander IV stated that John was unable to provide for the
defence of Jaffa on his own. 1,000 marks from money which a previous
patriarch had deposited with the Templars was to be paid to the
current patriarch, 'in subsidium dicti castri'. The involvement of the
patriarch in military affairs is again of interest, although by the
following year the Templars were told by Alexander that they should
make the payment direct to the count.'

The work of reconstruction continued into the 1260's, with help
from Europe: John was unable to maintain the site himself, but he
resisted the temptation to sell it to the Military Orders. In 1264 the
papacy again intervened to provide assistance, 'pro reparatione ac
defensione castri Joppensis' since it was feared 'quod ex defectu
muniminiis hostilibus aggressibus non pateat occupandum'. Part of the
five year hundredth which was being collected in Europe was to be
directed to refortifying the castle, but the money was not to be given
to John. The patriarch of Jerusalem, Geoffrey of Sergines and others
would receive the payment, and 'per manus eorum in subsidium
predictorum operum et ipsius castri Joppensis reparationem ac
defensionem integre convertenda'. It is interesting that John's
willingness to hold on to Jaffa resulted in a considerable lack of
autonomy as far as arrangements for the defence of his property were
concerned, although this probably reflected the papacy's desire to make
use of its agent, the patriarch, rather than any positive intention to
restrict the rights of the count.'
Few other strongholds in Palestine and Syria attracted so much attention from the papacy during this period. This is not surprising, since for much of the thirteenth century Jaffa was the most southerly fortified point which was held by the Christians. The size of its garrison is not known, but its position meant that it was often used by other forces as a base from which to operate against enemy positions. The castle was the headquarters of Theobald of Champagne's Crusade, from which two raids were carried out. Although the Latins were largely restricted to the coastal plain in Palestine, Jaffa was well-placed for strikes inland. In 1242, a force raided north-east to Nablus, where a slaughter of Muslim and Christian inhabitants took place. By the 1250's when John of Jaffa's building work was in progress, the garrison may have been augmented by at least the occasional presence of the French regiment led by Geoffrey of Sergines. In 1255 a truce with Damascus was negotiated but Jaffa was left out of it. During the winter a force which included Geoffrey gathered there, since this was the only stronghold from which it was possible, at this time, to conduct a raid into Muslim territory. The defences constructed by the count and St. Louis proved adequate when the Muslims counter-attacked. The Christians, who actually were very few, chose at first to stay behind the castle walls to protect themselves rather than going out to face the Muslims. When the Christians did come out from behind their defences, they defeated the Muslim army, although they were heavily outnumbered. Forays of this type may have been more common than the sources suggest: it would help to explain the need for regular repair work during the 1250's and 60's. In 1264 the French regiment was again involved in a raid out of Jaffa,
but this time it was joined by the Templars and Hospitallers in activities which, it was hoped, would persuade the Muslims to return John of Jaffa's castellan, Gerard of Picquiny, who was a prisoner-of-war. The force moved south towards Ascalon, burning all the countryside. But the raid does not seem to have had the desired effect, since Gerard was subsequently the guest of Baybars at a military review held by the Muslims, only later being released at the whim of the sultan.¹⁷²

Four years later, Jaffa was captured by the Muslims. There is nothing left to suggest the grandeur of St. Louis' walls, or the continuous projects which occupied the count, and others in the kingdom, during the middle years of the thirteenth century. Some structures in the monastery of St. Peter may date from this period but there is little else to see, apart from that the site dominates its immediate surroundings and offers more natural protection than a position such as Caesarea. Only the written materials indicate the efforts which were made to maintain the strongpoint and its value to the Latins in the east. Jaffa was used on occasions to protect a small force but as late as the 1260's it also reflected the importance of such sites to the Christians when they were able to operate as a field army.

Conclusion

The inability of the Franks, without major assistance from the west, to create and employ an effective field army on a permanent basis meant that their strongpoints were crucial to the strategy which they
used to defend the Latin Kingdom. Throughout the century constant efforts were made by crusaders, the native baronage and the Military Orders, with the support of various patrons, to build and maintain strongpoints which could then be guarded by garrison troops. There were some sites which were able to control their neighbourhood and to repulse minor Muslim attacks. Moreover, garrison troops, particularly when acting in unison with troops from other strongpoints (or with itinerant forces such as crusaders, or members of the French regiment) were able, on occasion, to function outside their own strongpoint in order to inflict damage on enemy territory. But the continuation of the Latin settlement was increasingly reliant on the survival of independent, and isolated, fortified sites and a chronic lack of manpower condemned this policy to failure. The passive strength of fortifications might help to relieve their problems, but the Latins were unable to defend the borders of their kingdom and their strongpoints were lost, one-by-one, in a process which would eventually end the Latin settlement.
NOTES

1. *Chronica de Mailros*, p. 158.
2. 'Rothelin', p. 565.
7. See above, page 88.
10. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 325-6; *Tabulae ordinis Theutonici*, no. 40.
18. 'Eracles', ii, p. 445; *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 162; *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, nos. 2972, 2985, 3047, 3071.


29. See Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 218.


34. Willbrand of Oldenburg, 'Peregrinatio', Peregrinatores medii aevi quatuor, p. 166.

35. De constructione castri Saphet, p. 40 and note.

36. Règle du Temple, no. 228; Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, no. 3844, pt. 12.


40. This description of Montfort is largely based on my own inspection of the site.


42. Smail, Crusading Warfare, pp. 218-26.

43. See Dean, The Fortress of Montfort, p. 8.


47. *De constructione castri Saphet*, pp. 39, 42.


55. *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, no. 3400.


59. 'Rothelin', p. 530.

60. *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 241. This appears to be one of the more acceptable sets of figures. See below, pages 298, 305-7.


63. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 452.


65. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 452.

66. *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, no. 3173. It also appears to refer to Hospitaller losses at Caesarea in 1265.


69. 'Eracles', ii, p. 450.


74. *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, no. 2727.


83. *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, no 2726.

84. *De constructione castri Saphet*, p. 41.


88. *Cartulaire des Hospitaliers*, no. 4050.

89. *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 205.


95. Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p. 60.
96. Riley-Smith, *Feudal Nobility*, p. 25.
100. *De constructione castri Saphet*, p. 41.
105. 'Rothelin', pp. 627-8.
108. For the twelfth century, see Smail, 'Crusaders' Castles', pp. 141-3, developed in context in *Crusading Warfare*, pp. 47-8, 51-3, 55-7, 63.
112. *Règle du Temple*, no. 554. For other examples, see nos. 593, 603.
113. *De constructione castri Saphet*, p. 42.
115. Ibid., pp. 182-3. The raids of Baybars against Acre are dealt with in more detail in chapter five of this study.
117. Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', pp. 244-45, 254-56.
118. Riley-Smith, *Knights of St. John*, p. 137 note 2. At the time of the final siege of Crac in 1271, villagers had taken shelter in the castle. They were released by the Muslims to ensure the supply of agriculture from the area for the castle. Ibn Shaddad, in Deschamps, *Le Crac*, p. 133.


120. 'Rothelin', p. 548.


123. Smail, 'Crusaders' Castles', pp. 135-8; Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, pp. 60-2, 204-8.


126. *De constructione castri Saphet*, p. 43.

127. Smail, 'Crusaders' Castles', p. 137.


131. Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', p. 175.

132. 'Rothelin', pp. 529, 531-2.

133. Walter of Guisborough, 'Chronica', p. 207. This account includes details of an assault on Nazareth by the Lord Edward (pp. 207-8) which are not contained in sources written in the Latin East.

134. 'Rothelin', pp. 532-33, 535, 538.


136. *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr* (1184-1197), pp. 56-87, *passim*. Some sites in the north, such as Tyre, Tripoli and Antioch, remained well garrisoned.

137. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 403-4.

139. *Histoire de l'île de Chypre*, iii, pp. 663-7; *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 211.


143. *De constructione castri Saphet*, p. 43.

144. See below, pages 260-1, 275-6.


147. See above, pages 54-5, 88; Riley-Smith, *Knights of St. John*, p. 132.


156. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 218-19, 221; *La Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*, pp. 191, 193; Ibn al-Athir, 'Kamel Alteverykh', ii,


158. al-Makrizi, Histoire d'Égypte, p. 284.

159. Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, pp. 125, 215.

160. Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, no. 954.

161. Tabulae ordinis Theutonici, no. 32.

162. 'Eracles', ii, p. 373.

163. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 438; Gestes des Chiprois, p. 77.

164. Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, pp. 282-4, 306-8; 'Rothelin', p. 629; in William of St. Pathus, Vie de Saint Louis, p. 110, it is suggested that spiritual privileges were also gained for work at Caesarea; al-'Ayni, 'Le Collier', p. 227.

165. Innocent IV, Registre, no. 6463.

166. Alexander IV, Registre, nos. 1492-3, 2174-5.


168. 'Rothelin', pp. 532-33, 538.

169. 'Histoire des Patriarches', pp. 479-80, note.

170. Onze poèmes de Rutebeuf, p. 25.

171. 'Rothelin', pp. 630-2.

Historians who have studied medieval warfare have been more attracted to battles than other important topics, such as sieges and raids. For this period of the Latin Kingdom's history, however, battles do not warrant quite such a central position. The final reduction of the kingdom in the period from c.1260-1291, though the process was by no means a continuous one, was achieved through the successful besieging of strongpoints by Baybars and his successors. The resident Latins did not try to arrest their decline by confronting the Mamluks in open battle, since they normally had insufficient troops to create a field army and at the same time protect their strongpoints, but, when a crusade was organised, the additional numbers tended to operate as a field army and battles were not infrequent. They were, however, then fought by Christian troops who showed little understanding of how best to combat the tactics of their Muslim opponents. The crusades of Theobald of Champagne and St. Louis, for example, both suffered major setbacks as a result of defeat, or costly victory, in battle. An examination of the performances and methods of Christian armies in battle during this period is therefore by no means an insignificant aspect of the Latin Kingdom's military history. The battlefield tactics of the Muslims, about which some remarks have already been made, will be given fuller treatment when they have a bearing on the techniques employed by the Christian soldiers in and around the Latin East.
It is necessary to establish what a battle was in this period, since contemporary writers were often, if unconsciously, ambiguous on this point. In John of Joinville's account of the military action at Banyas and Subeibe in 1253, for example, the assault on the town may be considered an unsuccessful siege, as a result of the defeat of some German troops in a battle. But as the Christian force retreated it burned the crops in the fields, as if on a raid. A battle can be defined as being an engagement in which at least one of the opposing forces decides to seek military success through a direct confrontation, in the open, with their enemies. The defeat of the opposing army is the aim of the battle, though success or failure can lead to other consequences. Many Christian raids of the second-half of the thirteenth century were ended by the Muslims' willingness to seek such a direct encounter. Even the distinction between a battle and a siege is not always an easy one to make. A vigorous defence of a strongpoint could involve the defenders ignoring the protection of their site and facing their enemies in the open. This might produce a confrontation which contemporary writers described in terms of a battle (at Jaffa in 1256, for example) or it might lead to the aggressors being repulsed, or being successful, without a major conflict taking place.

Battles in the Latin East during this period present two distinct forms, as they did in the twelfth century. Besides the pitched battle, battles on the march took place in which the initiative lay with the Muslim forces, because of the mobility of their mounted archers. Some scholars have attempted to reconstruct individual battles which took
place in the Latin East during this period, although Smail has indicated the problems which are inherent in the narrative sources themselves and the temptation of historians to 'rationalize the irrational'. For the thirteenth century it is necessary to be equally circumspect regarding the attempts of contemporaries to give an overall impression of what happened in a battle. Even an account by an eyewitness, who would normally have been a combatant, is unlikely to show much awareness of events beyond his immediate vicinity: a genuine view of a battle is probably best given in Joinville's account of Mansurah, where the author offered little perspective on the conflict as a whole. Moreover, despite any initial good intentions on the part of commanders, battles in this period tended to disintegrate into a confused mass of isolated incidents, as seen in Philip of Novara's account of the battle of Nicosia in 1229. Thirdly, a source which may normally be regarded as fairly reliable can be shown to be seriously lacking in objectivity with regard to a battle account. The relatively detailed account which the writer of 'Eracles' gave of the battle near Gaza in 1239 appears to be acceptable. But if this is compared with the very detailed information in 'Rothelin', which may have been written by an eye-witness, then it is almost impossible to reconcile the two versions. An impression will therefore be given of the general form which battles took in the Latin East during this period, by examining the methods which were most consistently used by the main protagonists. Contemporary descriptions of conflicts will be supported by an eye-witness who attempted a theoretical study of Christian tactics against Muslims, the Franciscan, Fidenzio of Padua. His views are important since he had detailed first-hand knowledge of the Muslim
armies: he had been present with them at the siege of Antioch in 1268, for example. In conclusion, a more detailed study will be made of the battle of Beit-Hanun. This is not to establish the particular course of this conflict but rather to compare the contemporary description of a single encounter with the more general remarks which will have been made.

Size of armies and length of combat

a) Numbers of combatants in battles

Some of the statistics for combatants which were reported (not necessarily accurately) are given below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>CHRISTIAN:</th>
<th>MUSLIM:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1218</td>
<td>West bank of Nile</td>
<td>30 knights.</td>
<td>4,000 mounted; 4,000 foot. 3,000, or alternatively 1,500, were drowned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1219</td>
<td>East bank of Nile</td>
<td></td>
<td>Losses were in thousands constantly. More than 5,000 were killed on 31 March. More than 5,000 attacked on 31 July.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1219</td>
<td>Fariskur</td>
<td>CHRISTIAN:</td>
<td>Losses included 200 from the Military Orders, and 2,000 commoners. Alternative numbers lost were 250 secular knights, 30 Templars, 13 Hospitallers and innumerable others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1220</td>
<td>After raid on Burlus</td>
<td>CHRISTIAN:</td>
<td>Many Teutonic knights and about 20 secular knights were captured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1221</td>
<td>Advance of crusaders</td>
<td>CHRISTIAN:</td>
<td>About 1,200 knights (excluding turcopoles and other mounted) 4,000 archers (2,500 of whom were mercenaries) and innumerable foot, were on the journey south.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>MUSLIM:</td>
<td>7,000 mounted.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1229</td>
<td>Nicosia</td>
<td>CHRISTIAN:</td>
<td>The presence of turcopoles and mercenaries meant that the</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Christian Event</td>
<td>Christian Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>-----------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1232</td>
<td>Casal Imbert</td>
<td>24 Ibelin knights were taken, others were killed or wounded.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1232</td>
<td>Agridi</td>
<td>60 Lombard knights killed, 40 were taken. The total Ibelin mounted force was 233, with at least 50/60 foot sergeants. The Lombard force consisted of 2,000 horse.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1237</td>
<td>Darbsak</td>
<td>Losses more than 100 Templar 'milites', 300 crossbowmen, secular troops and foot.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1239</td>
<td>Between Jaffa and Damascus</td>
<td>Force of 200 knights, besides other armed men.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1239</td>
<td>Beit Hanun</td>
<td>600 knights, 70 knights carrying banners, crossbowmen, mounted and foot sergeants, and others.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1244</td>
<td>La Forbie</td>
<td>600 knights, 600 Military Orders, and turcopoles, other horse, foot, crossbowmen. Also perhaps 300 knights from Antioch, 300 from Cyprus.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1249</td>
<td>On march to Mansurah</td>
<td>600 mounted.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250</td>
<td>Mansurah</td>
<td>About 300 knights, 80 Templar troops and others were lost. Another source reports that the army included crossbowmen and mounted sergeants.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250</td>
<td>Egyptian counter-attack at Mansurah</td>
<td>4,000 mounted, innumerable foot, with other mounted in reserve.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1256</td>
<td>Battle at siege of Jaffa</td>
<td>200 knights, 300 archers, crossbowmen and sergeants. They lost 20 sergeants, one knight.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1260</td>
<td>Towards Tiberias</td>
<td>900 knights, 1,500 turcopoles, c.3,000 infantry.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As noted with regard to castle garrisons, there are problems here concerning ambiguity, arbitrary figures and their source, particularly in connection with Muslim forces. Even from such figures, however, it is apparent that most conflicts involved comparatively few men. The typical size of forces can be regarded as being in terms of hundreds, not thousands, which is consistent with the size of armies probably maintained in the Latin East at this time. The Christian army at La Forbie was probably close to the realistic limit that the kingdom could expect to call on. Christian forces were so small that great doubt has to be cast on suggestions of Muslim armies which numbered many thousands of men, a point recently examined with regard to 'Ain Jalut. Christian armies would rarely have numbered, in total, more than 1,000 men and their reasonable success in facing Muslim armies in
battle suggests that the latter's forces were not much larger. The Muslims were certainly capable of raising greater numbers than this but it is unlikely that they often did so, except when facing an extreme threat. A greater disparity of numbers is apparent in the course of siege campaigns, where the Muslims often enjoyed a significant advantage. On the battlefield, however, Christian forces were sometimes only opposed by contingents of the Muslim army. In western Europe, the small states produced only small forces and the same is undoubtedly true when considering the normal size of armies that would be put into the field in and around the Latin East.

The Latin armies were composed of three basic elements: mounted troops, which included knights and more lightly-armed soldiers; infantry; and archers. The role which each section of the army had to play depended on a number of variables, including the nature of the opposition, the relative size of the Latin army, the type of terrain and the circumstances in which the decision to risk a battle was taken. Unfortunately, contemporary writers often did not distinguish between the various forms of combatants. When knights are mentioned, the author may have meant a combination of knights and others such as mounted sergeants, turcopoles and mounted squires. The same problem exists when contingents of the Military Orders are referred to. It is known that they maintained a variety of troops within the numbers of their own brethren and their mercenaries, but it is not often possible to apply this knowledge to a single force, since details are so sketchy. There are also few statistics to indicate the number of foot soldiers in an army and the quality of these, too, could vary enormously. At
Agridi in 1232, the arrival of 50/60 sergens à pié was considered critical, but the total Ibelin mounted force was only 233. Many of the foot sergeants were professional soldiers, but crusade expeditions frequently found themselves having to support considerable numbers of lesser people. Many of these were virtually unarmed, simple peregrini who came along out of religious devotion or hoping to gain some booty. Such groups would have produced major logistical difficulties for the crusade armies, but to chroniclers they were just as much a part of the force as were the sergens à pié. This means that even if the extreme numbers of footsoldiers suggested in some sources can be accepted (and perhaps the frequent allusion that they were innumerable is not such an exaggeration) the actual number of effective Christian infantry cannot often be established from such figures: it must have been considerably lower.

A significant element in a Christian army was the archers, who had a particularly important role to play against Muslim troops. Their value was recognised by Fidenzio of Padua, who suggested that all Christian soldiers should be able to use the bow in order to combat effectively Muslim tactics. Armed either with the bow or the crossbow, they were an integral part of most Christian forces that went into action in this period. Their importance was recognised by contemporaries because, as with the mounted force of an army, their precise number was often given.
b) Length of combat

The length of a typical combat was, like the number of combatants, a subject which appears to have tempted contemporary writers to exaggerate in order to impress the reader. Some of the battles fought on the Fifth Crusade, when the Muslims attacked the crusaders' fosse on the east bank of the Nile, purportedly went on for days. A major conflict on 31 March 1219 lasted for ten hours, from dawn till night. In May, a battle was fought which went on for three days and nights and a conflict in July continued for two days. All of these battles may have become conflicts of attrition, since the length of an engagement depended greatly on its type. If, as in the case of the assaults on the crusaders when the latter were besieging Damietta, one side was attacking the other in an entrenched defensive position, then it was quite possible for a conflict to continue for a number of hours and even days. But it is unlikely that a pitched battle could continue for any great length of time. The extreme heat that often prevailed in the area, the weight of armour and other clothing that men wore, the relatively small number of combatants and the sheer physical effort of fighting would all have contributed to a short combat time. The possible effect of a blow, on deliverer as well as recipient, has already been noted.

c) Preparations for battle and battle formations

The initial stages of a battle were determined by two factors: the terrain, and the formations which were adopted by the opposing armies. Some of the problems of terrain have already been considered in chapter two of this study. Sand dunes and dusty ploughed fields
presented difficulties for the heavy chargers of the Christian knights and the heavily-laden Christian infantry, problems which were often exacerbated by the climate. In the twelfth century, a site for a battle with plenty of space had advantages for both Christian and Muslim commanders, since it provided a good area for the heavy Christian knights to operate in, whilst at the same time allowing the Muslims to use their lighter, more mobile mounted archers. In the twelfth century Christian troops utilized natural obstacles to prevent a possible attack against the flanks of the army. This idea may have been in the minds of the crusaders at Beit-Hânûn in 1239: if so, it failed disastrously, as will be seen later. Commanders were often restricted in their choice of terrain, however. At Banyas in 1253, it was necessary for Joinville and other troops to take up a difficult position on the slopes above the Grotto of Pan between the town and the castle of Subeibe, exposing themselves to Muslim troops advancing from the castle above them. After suffering heavy casualties, the crusaders' position became untenable and they were obliged to retreat on to the plain, by way of the southern slope of the hill on which Subeibe is situated.

It will be seen later that once a battle was under way, it was extremely difficult for commanders to maintain order and discipline. This meant that the initial battle-formation of the army, whether it was on the march or fighting a pitched battle, was important. But it is only rarely possible to establish how armies were ordered, even at the start of a conflict. The position of infantry and bowmen in particular is often a matter of speculation. In the case of the
mounted forces, Verbruggen has shown that, in the west, the *comrois* would line up next to one another, thus forming *batailles*.\(^{52}\) At the battle of Agridi in 1232, the Ibelins, who as noted above numbered 233 mounted troops, assembled in five *batailles*. The first was led by Hugh of Ibelin, Anseau of Brie commanded the second, Baldwin of Ibelin the third and John of Caesarea the fourth. Much of the Ibelin strength appears to have been held back in the rearguard, which included the lord of Beirut and the king of Cyprus. It should have also included Balian of Ibelin but he positioned himself to one side of Hugh and Anseau in the front line.\(^{53}\) When the Egyptians attacked the crusaders soon after the battle of Mansurah in February 1250, the latter were assembled in at least nine *batailles*, though again their precise positioning is unclear. In reserve was a force commanded by the duke of Burgundy, which guarded the crusaders' camp.\(^{54}\)

On the march, formation was equally important. In the attack on the Muslim camp at Pariskur in August 1219, the crusaders marched *sic cuneis*, but no further information is given. This suggests the use of a wedge formation, in order that by manoeuvring, the Christians would always be able to present a full face to the Muslims, from whatever direction the latter might attack.\(^{55}\) When the crusaders progressed southwards to Mansurah in July 1221, the Nile was on the right, with ships on it; on the left were the footsoldiers, whilst the mounted troops formed a link between the two. The *sagittarii* and *lancearii* stayed together, whilst the unarmed common people, who were mentioned by Oliver of Paderborn on this occasion, were close to the river bank. The experienced combatants (*paritiores*) were in the van and rearguard,
warding off any attacks, whilst it was publicly proclaimed that no-one should slip beyond the front or rear of the army. In this formation and by enforcing strict discipline, the crusaders were able to avoid heavy losses on the march southwards. Unfortunately, this is the only instance when such a full impression of a Christian formation on the march is given. On the march up the Nile by St. Louis' force, it is known that the advance guard was attacked and that this contained a large element of Templars, but it is not possible to go further than this. It has already been seen that the troops of the Military Orders were frequently deployed at the front and rear of a force.

Knights and other mounted troops

a) Discipline and morale

In many Christian armies of this period, the knights did not constitute the single largest unit but they were the most influential. If they could attack coherently, they were capable, in theory, of devastating a Muslim force with a single charge. The excellence of their protective armour meant that they were impervious to much with which the Muslims might attack them. As individuals, they provided leadership and the discipline of their training would enhance the quality of the army as a whole. Many of these elements will be examined below. But the principal characteristics of the knights were that they thought, and acted, as individuals or as members of a very small unit. This is not surprising, since it was noted in chapter two of this study that the knights in the armies of the Latin East were recruited from many different sources. In some circumstances, as in the early stages of a charge, for example, knights could perform
collectively. But they were rarely completely subordinate to the needs of the army. Throughout the period, and in diverse circumstances, Christian armies were therefore hampered by the personal ambitions and actions of their knights.

These problems manifested themselves at all levels of the armies. For the commanders, difficulties of decision-making in, or just before a battle, could destroy the unity of a force. Outside Acre in 1269, Oliver of Termes strongly advised Robert of Creques to retire into the city while it was still possible, but the latter refused, saying that he had come to die for God. Oliver and a few others were able to get away before the two sides closed and the Christians suffered a heavy defeat. An instance of prevarication occurred at the battle of Mansurah in 1250. At the height of the conflict, St. Louis called a council, to decide whether to move towards the river and thus gain the support of the duke of Burgundy and others, presumably meaning the Christian crossbowmen who would then be able to assist him, although they were on the other side of the river. This movement was agreed on, but when news came that the counts of Poitiers and Flanders, and others, were so hard pressed that they could not follow, Louis' council advised him to stay. The king was reproached for this, so he determined again to go, but then news came of the difficulties of his brother Robert, so he decided to advance towards Mansurah instead. Even with a monarch present, decision-making was a difficult and potentially disastrous process.
At moments of crisis for an army the knights often proved inadequate: their morale was frequently fragile. When the crusaders attacked the Muslim camp of Fariskur in August 1219, it was not only the footsoldiers but the Cypriot knights and even some Hospitallers who showed timidity when they were attacked by Muslims. In another account of this battle, it was 'quidam ex militibus nostris' who fled, leaving the Military Orders and other knights trying to protect the rear. Even the rearguard could not be absolved from all blame in this battle, however. Some of them, unable to tolerate any further the constant Muslim attacks, charged the enemy. James of Vitry believed this was an unnecessary action which caused Christian casualties to be higher than they might otherwise have been. On the retreat towards Damietta in 1221, panic prevented any hope of an orderly withdrawal. Just before the flight began, the crusaders foolishly burned their tents, indicating to the Egyptians that they were going. Many of the crusaders chose to try to forget their troubles and were too drunk even to make the journey. At the same stage on St. Louis' First Crusade, Joinville painted a vivid picture of the onset of panic in the army. As the crusaders began their retreat, a group of engineers led by Joscelin of Cornault was ordered to destroy the bridge over the river, but they failed to do this. Amid increasing chaos, the crusaders on land began firing on their comrades on the ships, in an attempt to make them wait. In these last two instances, the crusaders were probably already doomed, but their panic made their fate inevitable. At the battle of Mansurah, panic gripped some of the crusader knights. Their attitude contrasted with the courage and ingenuity of the footsoldiers. As St. Louis and those with him battled
to repel the Muslim attack, many knights stood on the opposite bank bewailing the fate of their king, whilst the infantry tried desperately to cross the river.

A lack of discipline could also result in displays of over-exuberance in which the careful planning of commanders was cast aside. At the initial landing near Damietta on St. Louis' First Crusade, Joinville, heading towards the beach by boat, was ordered to land near the standard of St. Denis. But he ignored this instruction and instead landed in front of 6,000 mounted Turks. At the battle of Mansurah, Robert of Artois was widely blamed for pursuing the Muslims into the town, although Joinville, not surprisingly as he was discussing his hero's brother, did not completely exonerate the Templars from all criticism. It is clear, however, that this was an occasion when, as St. Louis was said to have stressed, good discipline was critical: when one force was over the river, it should have awaited the arrival of the next. The first batailles, which included Robert of Artois and the Templars, instead chased the Muslims into the narrow streets of Mansurah where, unable to manoeuvre, they were overwhelmed by the lighter Mamluk forces.

Discipline and morale had, therefore, to be constantly sustained if an army was to perform efficiently. It has been seen that the rules of the Military Orders enabled them to act as a cohesive force within the army. The ability to maintain morale was occasionally referred to by contemporary writers. The morale of some sergeants at Banyas in 1253 was salvaged by the courageous behaviour of Joinville, who dispensed
with his horse when the sergeants complained that he could retreat, if necessary. This seems to have given them renewed confidence. For a Christian force, particularly one which was on crusade, assurance could come from religious invocations or symbolism. Prior to two Muslim attacks against the crusaders on the Fifth Crusade, the legate Pelagius was said to have urged the army on with a rousing sermon, before they went into battle on behalf of Christ. In May 1219 the crusaders constructed a carrocium round which they gathered, a type of wagon containing the consecrated host, which had been used by crusaders before. On this occasion, it caused the Muslims to have some doubts about attacking the crusaders. In the midst of battle too, religious faith was important. After the Muslims had dealt with the crusaders inside Mansurah in 1250, they attacked the rest of the force which had crossed the Ashmun river. Facing up to this challenge, St. Louis not only ordered his men to hold together and stand firm, but he implored them to trust in Jesus. Such faith could have undesired consequences, however. Muslim sources for the battle of La Forbie noted that the Christians marched under their crosses, accompanied by their priests which may have aroused some of the doubts which were expressed by al-Mansur Ibrahim of Homs about fighting with Christians against fellow-Muslims.

Examples of the unreliability of knights can be countered by instances when they showed consistency under pressure. During the Lombards' destruction of the Ibelin camp at Casal Imbert in 1232, something which admittedly could have been avoided if a better watch had been maintained over the site, the Ibelins fought tenaciously
despite the chaos and managed to hold out till morning, even though many were not mounted, or only half-dressed and lacking weapons. Both Muslim and Christian sources emphasized the bravery of the Latins at La Forbie in 1244. Their Muslim allies had fled, but the Christians fought on until they were overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers. Very few of them escaped the carnage.

b) The charge

The armour worn by the knights was in many ways a handicap. It has already been pointed out that fighting was a tremendous physical effort and it made the knight particularly cumbersome in comparison with a Muslim opponent. But the mail and plate armour which they wore did have some advantages. When under attack, the knights were well protected, so that amongst the Military Orders, as we have seen, a greater degree of bravery was, in theory, expected from the knights than from the more lightly-armed sergeants. When the knights were the attackers, the collective weight of their charge was the most potent weapon available to a medieval army and in western Europe this tactic was central to Christian methods. In fact, the Muslim approach to engagements with Christian armies during this period rendered the charge at best ineffectual and at worst, dangerous to the Christians themselves. But, since battles were normally fought by Christian armies which were largely composed of crusaders from western Europe, the charge, or a modified form of it, remained an essential element in Christian battle plans. In Europe, knights were accustomed to lining up in their batailles, prior to an ordered charge against a solid target. This could not be done in the east so the charge, rather
than being a pre-emptive act, took place after continual Muslim harassment and therefore lacked the structural unity which some scholars have perceived in it in the west. But it will be seen that the Muslims encouraged the Christians to charge: they could actually use the energy of this manoeuvre to their advantage.

Instances where the charge was used by Christian troops against Muslims seem to have taken place when at least part of the Christian army had recently arrived in the east, and when this army was already being attacked by the enemy. From the examples available it is clear that Muslim commanders, being aware of the possible threat of the charge, had developed tactics to deal with it. That this method was not just coincidentally employed is confirmed by Fidenzio of Padua, who described the Muslim technique, when faced by a Christian charge, thus:

Sarraceni cedunt et ad invicem dividuntur et vadunt, alii hue, alii vero illuc; postmodum vero ad sonum buccine,...congregantur et insultum faciunt in Xpistianos, et percucunt viros et equos ipsorum multis sagittis et occidunt eos.

The lighter Muslim horses were easily able to outdistance the Christian horses if they were chased: the problem for the Christians was that 'nesciunt se recolligere'. But this had been an unsolved problem throughout the thirteenth century. During the crusaders' retreat from Fariskur in August 1219, some of the rearguard who were protecting the rest of the retreating army decided to charge, because of the damage being caused by Muslim archers: when they did so, the Muslims opened their ranks and then closed up again, so that the Christians had gone straight through. The Muslims then closed in themselves on the crusaders, using cudgels, swords, javelins and Greek fire.
Christian charges did not inevitably fail, however. The battle fought by a force under Peter of Brittany in 1239 produced a successful charge by the crusaders. The Muslims advanced towards the crusaders firing rapidly, but when the latter charged they forced the Muslim archers back on to the rest of the Muslims who were following behind. As the Muslims were now unable to use their bows, a close mêlée developed, a conflict which was to be decided by the decisive intervention of a crusader reserve force. The battle of Beit-Hanûn on the same campaign, however, provided one of the best examples of a Christian charge, and its consequences, during this period: it will be examined in detail later.

At the battle of Mansurah in 1250, Muslim pressure again provoked a Christian charge. The Muslims were able to surround St. Louis' forces, and began firing great quantities of arrows at them. At this point in the battle, St. Louis did not have any crossbowmen with him to return the fire, so he had to charge in order to come to grips with the Muslims. It appears, however, that the number of Muslims present prevented this from being a particularly effective attack. A final example again demonstrated the established Muslim tactics in dealing with the charge. As Robert of Creques faced the Muslim forces outside Acre in 1269, the latter hesitated as the two sides closed, so Robert charged. The Muslims opened their ranks, allowing the crusaders to pass through, before attacking them from the rear and eventually defeating them. The charge when employed in conflict with the Muslims was a powerful but unwieldy tactic, used as a reaction to pressure which resulted from the Muslims' ability to maintain the
initiative during the first stages of a battle, rather than as a first
move in such a conflict. The more flexible Muslim cavalry could
therefore use a Christian charge to their own advantage, but this did
not prevent Christian troops from consistently trying to use a tactic
which was recognised by contemporaries such as Fidenzio of Padua as
anachronistic to the requirements of warfare in the east.

The Muslims, unlike the Christians, were able to modify their
tactics to deal with the opponents they were facing. Against the
Mongols, for example, they were prepared to use the charge themselves.
It is difficult to establish the precise nature of the battle of 'Ain
Jalut in 1260, but one eye-witness stated that the future sultan
Baybars, with an advance guard, 'repulsed the vigour of their (the
Mongols') first charge'. As a result of this, the other Muslims were
able to advance and gain the victory.\(^1\) The account of al-Makrizi also
suggested a conflict determined by the charge, as one wing of the
Muslim force was broken in disorder, but the situation was saved by the
Mamluk sultan Kutuz who charged in amongst the Mongols.\(^2\) At Homs in
1281, the Mongol and Muslim forces again lined up for a pitched battle,
each side deployed with a left, right and centre. The Mongol charge
broke the Muslim left, but the Muslim right held and this eventually
decided the battle.\(^3\) Homs, like 'Ain Jalut, was a conflict in which
the outcome was determined by the success or failure of the charge, and
its immediate penetration. This is very different from Muslim battles
against Christians. Their conflicts were far more fluid affairs, as the
Muslims normally had to avoid being confronted in the early stages of
a battle by the powerful Christian charge. With the possible exception
of the conflict near Doc in 1203/4, of which details are very sketchy, there were no engagements in the thirteenth century when the Muslims and Christians both lined up and took part in what might be termed a typical pitched battle, with an initial charge followed either by a breakthrough or a repulsion. The Muslims obviously believed that they could handle such an attack when it was carried out by Mongols, but modified their tactics to suit their opponents.

The Christians in the Latin East did have some opportunities to use a pre-emptive charge during this period, but only against Christian opponents. The Lombard-Ibelin conflict was significantly influenced by two battles, at Nicosia in 1229 and Agridi in 1232. In the first of these, few details survive of the battle but it seems that the two sides simply lined up in their batailles and charged. Philip of Novara added that once the efforts of the clergy to mediate had failed, each knight directed his energies against the enemy he hated the most. At the battle of Agridi, the charge of the first Lombard bataille led by Walter of Manepeau was carried out so badly that it took him past the Cypriot rearguard. After trying to attack the fourth Ibelin bataille, Walter fled. This indicated the difficulties of correcting a misdirected charge by a body of knights. The charge of the second Lombard bataille was more effective, but help from the third Cypriot bataille assisted the first, which had taken the full brunt of the assault. The battle subsequently developed as a series of confused individual combats, in which some great feats of arms were performed. The charge, though begun in a position of complete order, had merely been the prelude to an untidy mêlée.
Christian efforts to regroup after a charge would have relied heavily on the use of banners and standards: these were also important as symbols to maintain the morale of an army, particularly as many were imbued with religious significance. Their use has already been noted in the Confraternity of the Holy Spirit, suggesting that such rallying points were important for infantry as well as for mounted troops. The statutes of the Military Orders stressed how critical the standard was in battle both for the positional sense of the army and as a final symbol of defiance. The main banner of the Templars, the bausant, was held by the marshal or his deputy and was protected by between five and ten brothers. There was also a reserve banner, held by the Commander of the Knights. The leaders of each unit of the Templars also had a banner which was again protected by as many as ten brothers. If a Templar lost contact with the banner of his unit then he should attach himself to the nearest banner he could see. When the Christians were being defeated in battle, the banners had additional importance. No Templar should flee from the field as long as the bausant was flying; if it was impossible to reach the Templar banner then a brother should join a unit under another standard, and follow that. But if a brother of the Templars or Hospitallers abandoned the banner, he would be dismissed from the Order. The banner itself had to be flying at all times: hence the protection it was afforded, because

se le confrancon se baisse, cil qui sont loing ne sevent por quoi il est laissies... et les gens qui perdent lor confrancon sont mult esbais, et porroit torner a mult grant desconfiture...
c) Close combat

The charge, if executed correctly, would bring the knights into close contact with their opponents, in which situation they would use their lances, swords, maces and daggers. The typical kind of blow suffered by a knight would, far from causing instant death, simply result in some form of handicap. At Nicosia in 1229, Anceau of Brie had all his weapons (lance, sword and dagger) broken, and suffered so many blows that he could hardly use his hands. At Agridi in 1232, Anceau was again in close combat with a fellow-knight, Berart of Manepeau: Anceau seized his opponent by the helm, and threw him to the ground. This incident suggests the type of confused brawl into which many battles must have degenerated. The knights' problems in a tight conflict were exacerbated by the cumbersome equipment with which they had to cope, making them vulnerable if they were unhorsed. In the retreat from the Muslim camp at Fariskur in 1219, the Muslims' arrows were hitting not only the knights but also their horses: when a horse fell, the rider would either die or be captured. At the battle of Agridi, when Berart of Manepeau was thrown from his horse by Anceau of Brie, seventeen of his colleagues dismounted to help him to remount, but all of them were killed by sergans à pié. This indicated not only the difficulties which were experienced in trying to remount, but also the potential vulnerability of knights to footsoldiers when they had dismounted. At the battle of Mansurah, Joinville was thrown from his horse and, although he was able to recover, he suffered a severe battering, particularly when he was knocked to the ground again and ridden over. In the battle fought outside Acre in 1269, after the charge led by Robert of Cesseques had failed, the Muslims attacked the
Christians' horses, which brought the battle to an end: when one of the Christians was forced on to foot he was effectively dead. The possible results of close combat were indicated by the injuries which Joinville suffered at the battle of Mansurah. First, he was wounded between the shoulders by a Muslim lance. Then he was thrown from his horse and though he managed to get up, he was knocked to the

A Christian army could be severely disadvantaged in close combat when it was attacked in the flanks, a point already noted when considering Muslim tactics. Such an attack was an especial worry when a Christian force was on the march, but the threat was apparent at all times, since Muslim tactics also involved efforts to surround the Christians. The danger of an assault from the side was demonstrated in the initial stages of the crusaders' attack on the Muslim camp in August 1219: such an assault caused the Cypriot knights to flee, a flight which led to panic spreading rapidly throughout the army. This threat increased the importance of the advance- and rear-guard to the army, since they could help to ward off such an assault. When the Fifth Crusade retreated from Mansurah in August 1221, the role of the Templars was noted: bringing up the rear, they stayed together and protected all those who were ahead. A similar situation arose, as already noted, on St. Louis' First Crusade. On 7 December 1249, the Muslims launched an attack at dawn on the crusade army as it marched south. The ensuing battle was hard but the Templars and others who made up the advance-guard faced up to the threat and drove the Muslims off.

The possible results of close combat were indicated by the injuries which Joinville suffered at the battle of Mansurah. First, he was wounded between the shoulders by a Muslim lance. Then he was thrown from his horse and though he managed to get up, he was knocked to the
ground again, losing the shield which was protecting his neck as the Muslims rode over him. But he was still able to continue in the battle, apparently without being attended to. He suffered further wounds, however, from the barrage of arrows with which the crusaders had to deal. He was struck five times, despite the protection of a Muslim's padded tunic he had found and which he used as a shield. When the conflict was over, he desperately needed rest because of the wounds which he had suffered, but he managed hardly any as the Muslims attacked before dawn the next day. Because of his wounds, he was unable to wear a hauberk: this was also the case during the next Egyptian attack a few days later, when he added that he was not carrying a shield either. Whether these wounds were treated in any way is unclear, but Joinville now became very ill, blaming it on his injuries. As the crusaders later fled, a haubert à tournoier was placed on him to provide protection from Muslim arrows. But his sickness remained a problem throughout the time that he was a captive of the Muslims and when he came to Acre, he suffered a further serious attack of fever. Illness was a persistent hazard, but it seems from this account that Joinville's failure to have his injuries treated properly made his condition far worse and brought him close to death. The likelihood of wounds becoming infected, and of related illnesses, would have been a constant threat in the aftermath of battles during this period.

Despite the inability of knights to protect themselves when knocked from their mounts in battle, in a defensive situation they were often able to fight on foot. Moreover, there must have been times when the
ground was unsuitable for horses. At the battle of Nicosia in 1229, when John of Beirut found himself with only a few foot archers and faced by fifteen Lombard knights, he chose to dismount and lead his force to the courtyard of a monastery, where the enemy were kept at bay with lances until help came. On the First Crusade of St. Louis, when the Muslims attacked the crusaders at Mansurah many of the knights who faced the onslaught chose to fight on foot, including the count of Anjou and his knights. In the battle of the count of Poitiers, the entire force except its leader was on foot. At the end of the conflict, St. Louis praised the successful defensive action that had been fought, 'nous à pié et il à cheval'. The notion of fighting on foot was not in fact confined to the defensive context. When the crusaders arrived off Damietta in 1249, the knights plunged into the water alongside the footsoldiers, although some of the former were already mounted. When they arrived on the shore, they placed their shields in the sand with their lances pointed at the Muslims.

In a charge the collective mounted element of a Christian force could be outwitted on occasions by their Muslim opponents, but some examples indicate, even allowing for exaggeration, the possible value of a small number of knights in battle. On 23 June 1219, the Muslims launched a major assault on the crusaders' position on the east bank of the Nile. This attack was driven off by John of Arcy with four knights and a number of 'clientes', the precise meaning of this being unclear. One Christian was killed. The size of the Muslim force (reported as 5,000–8,000 men) may be questioned but the role of this small body of knights was regarded by the chroniclers as being decisive.
battle of Nicosia in 1229 demonstrated the value of the individual knight. The Lombard forces had designated 25 knights to attack only John of Beirut, whilst the five baillis wore metal mitres on their heads for recognition. As already noted, late in the course of the battle John of Beirut was obliged to defend himself, aided only by some foot archers, against 15 enemy knights. It was with the assistance of one knight, Anceau of Brie, that the Lombard knights were kept at bay until reinforcements arrived. In this particular conflict the principal contemporary account, by Philip of Novara, may have accentuated the importance of personalities but it still demonstrated the kind of coherence and added strength that the presence of a knight could bring to a force. In the same war, Balian of Ibelin performed great feats of arms in defending a pass against the Lombards at the battle of Agridi in 1232. During the battle of Mansurah, Joinville attempted, aided by only six men, to prevent the Muslims from crossing a bridge over a stream, since this would have meant that St. Louis was being attacked from two angles. This defensive action appears to have been effective, whilst the small Christian force also charged a group of Muslim infantry who were harassing two sergeants.

Against scantily-armed Muslim infantry, in fact, the knight might expect to do considerable damage. In the Muslim attack on the crusaders on the west bank of the Nile in October 1218, as the Muslim mounted and foot attacked from different directions, the crusaders concentrated their attack on the latter, slaughtering many thousands whilst others were drowned. And when the Egyptians counter-attacked after the battle of Mansurah, at one point the fleeing of
some mounted Muslim troops enabled the men of the count of Flanders to inflict heavy losses on the Muslim footsoldiers.\textsuperscript{108}
d) Reserve forces and use of ambushes

Battles involved such small numbers of men that the effective entry of a reserve or a fresh force could have a decisive influence on the outcome.\textsuperscript{109} At the battle of Nicosia in 1229, however, the significance of the latter may have been overestimated since it involved a chronicler of the battle, Philip of Novara.\textsuperscript{110} At Agridi in 1232 the arrival at the battle of 50/60 sergens à pié was of great importance, changing the nature of the conflict and particularly causing serious harm to the mounted Lombard force.\textsuperscript{111} A more carefully planned use of a reserve force occurred in the battle fought by Peter of Brittany in November 1239. With a complete force of 200 knights and other armed men, he placed two ambushes ready. If one failed to halt the Muslim caravan which was approaching, then the other would be able to do so, besides which one force would be able to aid the other. The Muslims fell into this trap and the force led by Peter charged them, forcing a close-fought conflict. It is clear that the caravan was accompanied by a large number of armed men. The second Christian force was unaware of what had happened, however, and Peter saw the battle swaying to favour the Muslims. By blowing on a horn, he was able to call the second force into action, as a result of which the Christians triumphed with the Muslims being obliged to flee.\textsuperscript{112} A judiciously placed ambush could produce excellent results, but it could also fail and turn to disaster. During the conflict outside Acre in 1269, the Muslim sources suggested that an ambush may have been set by the Christians, but it
did not work and the Muslim troops were subsequently able to surround their opponents.\textsuperscript{113}

In the course of this conflict, the Muslim force also deployed an ambush, although it was not used. This example, and another from St. Louis' crusade have already been noted when the Muslim army was briefly examined in chapter two of this study. Christian armies were wary of the possibility of a Muslim ambush. At Doc in 1203/4, Aimery of Lusignan refused to allow a charge until his scouts had established whether there were Muslim troops positioned to attack the Franks in the rear.\textsuperscript{114} At Jaffa in 1256, Geoffrey of Sergines was dissuaded from chasing the defeated and fleeing Muslims because of the threat of an ambush.\textsuperscript{115} The device was also used by the Muslims against other opponents. In one account of the battle of 'Ain Jalut, Kutuz placed most of the army in an ambush, exposing only himself and a few troops. This small force was obliged to retreat but the pursuing Mongols fell into the awaiting ambush and were subsequently slaughtered.\textsuperscript{116}

Footsoldiers

In battle, one of the most obvious features of the footsoldiers was their diversity. Their appearance would have varied from that of scantily-clad pilgrims to the well-armed professional troops who played a leading role in some of the Lombard-Ibelin conflicts. Ill-disciplined infantry could hamper the efforts of Christian horsemen to perform efficiently, but well-armed and trained footsoldiers could integrate with the rest of the army and provide valuable support.
The crusades would have attracted great numbers of people who had little to offer in terms of potential military value. Their activities may, in fact, have diminished the advantages to be gained from the presence of more experienced infantry. During the Fifth Crusade, on 31 July 1219, the Muslims launched a major assault on the crusaders' camp. They were able to destroy the barriers and rout the Christian foot, thus imperilling the entire crusade army.117 Even more serious than this was the debacle which occurred when the crusaders attacked the Muslim camp at Fariskur in August of the same year. The influence of the large number of common people within the ranks of a crusade army was apparent: most sources agreed that the initial decision to carry out the attack was prompted by the attitude of '11 pueples de l'ost', who were highly critical of the failure of the knights to attack the Muslims.118 Yet in principle the decision was a sound one, because of the constant threat which this Muslim position posed to the crusaders in their efforts to conclude the siege of Damietta. In the disaster which followed, at least part of the blame lay with the indiscipline of the footsoldiers, although it is clear that they were not alone in panicking. When the army arrived at the Muslim camp, the masses were seized by hysteria, and turned on one another, proving impossible to restrain. The effects of the weather in Egypt during August should not be underestimated in this situation.119 One source suggested that in the subsequent flight, none of the footsoldiers survived back to the crusaders' position.120 In another account of this conflict, Oliver of Paderborn stated that the infantry were also struggling because of the weight of their equipment.121 Footsoldiers would have been particularly affected by conditions in the region.
Poorly-trained footsoldiers who lacked the support of mounted troops were particularly vulnerable to Muslim attack: Fidenzio of Padua stressed that knights should not abandon their infantry. But knights and footsoldiers could complement one another to produce a more satisfactory means of combating Muslim tactics. Unfortunately, details relating to the interaction of these two elements within the Christian army are sparse. During the Fifth Crusade, when the Muslims were driven off after one of their assaults against the crusaders' fosse on the east bank of the Nile, the mounted crusaders came out followed by the footsoldiers. But it is unclear how they were organised relative to one another or what the function of the infantry may have been. Perhaps it was to collect booty and prisoners. It has been seen that on the march south from Damietta on this crusade the army was well organised, with the mounted troops forming a link between the ships and the footsoldiers so that they were able both to give and to receive support from the latter. The precise nature of this support is uncertain, but it must have been effective, since the crusaders suffered little injury from Muslim attacks at this stage. When the Christians were opposite Mansurah, however, their situation rapidly worsened. The army was under great pressure, particularly from arrow fire, so the crusaders used their *pedites* 'pro vallo' whilst they also fired back the shots which were aimed at the army. The infantry were being used as a wall in order to protect the mounted troops, possibly prior to a charge. The crusader cavalry also protected the footsoldiers, although precisely how is unclear, so it may be that they charged the Muslims from behind the ranks of their infantry, to alleviate the pressure on the army as a whole. This tactic was not
always effective, however. At La Forbie in 1244, when the Christian army was deserted by its Muslim allies it became terribly confused as the squires and foot sergeants became mixed up with the ranks of knights, so that the latter were unable to attack.\(^{126}\) This appears to reflect the failure of the tactic which was relatively successful on the Fifth Crusade. During the early stages of St. Louis' First Crusade, with the establishment of a beachhead at Damietta, it has been noted that both the footsoldiers and knights threw themselves into the sea which came up to their armpits: but precisely how, if at all, they were organised is unclear. Joinville's statement that he disobeyed specific instructions as to where he should land may indicate that pre-arranged plans had, in any case, given way to a wild scramble to reach the shore.\(^{127}\) At the battle of Mansurah, as St. Louis fought to drive off the Muslims who had already killed his brother Robert, the Muslims turned back to their camp when the crusader foot had successfully crossed the river. One Muslim source suggested that the crusader infantry had been unable to get into action because it all happened so rapidly, but if they had been able to do so, then the outcome might have been radically different, because there were enough infantry to protect the mounted troops.\(^{128}\)

Both Muslim and Christian writers regarded a Christian army as far more effective if it was supported by well-organised infantry: the same may have applied to a Muslim force. In October 1218, when the Muslims attacked the crusaders' position on the west bank opposite Damietta, the Muslim foot were approaching from one direction whilst the mounted came from another. It was made clear that if the two had joined
together, then the crusaders would have been unable to defend themselves. As many as 3,000 Muslims were killed in this battle. When the Muslims assaulted the crusaders' fosse on 31 July 1219 they had both horse and foot lined up within the Christian defences. An attack led by the Templars and supported by the Teutonic Knights and other nobles and knights caused all the Muslim foot to be killed, except those that were able to flee. This may indicate that when the conflict had reached its height, the two elements of the Muslim force had failed to operate successfully together. When the Egyptian troops came to attack the crusaders at Mansurah in 1250 it was stated, with reference to the bataille led by the count of Anjou, that the Muslims approached him as though they were playing chess with the footsoldiers in front, firing Greek fire. In the same battle, there was a further suggestion that a Muslim force was stronger if augmented by footsoldiers, as both foot and horse attacked the bataille commanded by the count of Flanders. Joinville himself ordered crossbowmen to fire on the Muslim cavalry and when they fled, as already noted, the count's men were able to inflict heavy casualties on the Muslim foot. Again, the apparent impotence of the Muslim foot when separated from the mounted troops was illustrated.

In contrast to the untrained footsoldiers who beset the leaders of crusade expeditions with difficulties, the more regular Christian infantry could, in addition to operating in conjunction with mounted troops, perform an independent role against both Christian and Muslim opponents, even during the course of a crusade. On St. Louis' expedition, when the Egyptians attacked at Mansurah, the crusaders were
faced with the problem of dislodging some stones which Muslim troops were using to conceal themselves. A priest therefore approached them, later assisted by 50 foot sergeants whom the mounted Muslims charged but did not dare to come close to. One of the Muslims, moreover, was wounded in the ribs by a lance hurled by one of the sergeants. The Muslims retreated under this pressure and the sergeants were able to remove the stones. This incident suggests that even mounted Muslims hesitated before involving themselves in a close fight with the better-quality infantry of a Christian army.\textsuperscript{132}

The greatest recorded achievements of Christian footsoldiers in this period came during the battles fought by the Lombards and Ibelins. The widespread employment of mercenaries in these campaigns may help to explain the high esteem in which the infantry element of the army was held. At the battle of Nicosia in 1229, it has already been noted that John of Beirut was assisted by some foot archers, when he was threatened by fifteen Lombard knights.\textsuperscript{133} At a key point in the battle of Agridi three years later, 50 to 60 Ibelin sergens à pié arrived from the town and when Berart of Manepeau was unhorsed, they were able to kill not only him but seventeen of his household who dismounted to try to help him. Good quality infantry could inflict serious damage in the right circumstances: another Lombard knight whose horse was killed was similarly dispatched by gens à pié. A passage in the 'Eracles' account of the battle (contained also in Philip of Novara's narrative) vividly described the performance of infantry in this particular conflict and their ability to alter the course of the engagement.
quant un de lor chevaliers estoit abatus, que li
sergent le relevoient, et le remetoient a cheval.
Et quant un des autres estoit abatus, piestant
l'ocioient li sergent et prenoient...

It was because of this, it was said, that Lombard casualties were so
heavy, with more than 60 knights killed and 40 taken prisoner.¹³⁴

The battles of Agridi and Mansurah showed that Christian infantry
were able to operate independently of any support from the mounted
elements of the army and that this was possible against Christian and
Muslim opponents. Fidenzio of Padua, who dealt with the role played by
Christian footsoldiers against Muslim troops, argued that if there were
too many foot in the Christian army they should be organised
separately. He went on to discuss the importance of a variety of
different weapons which infantry could make use of and the
interdependence of these weapons for a viable defence against Muslim
troops, whose principal threat was the mounted archer. The first line
of defence was the lance, a weapon which Fidenzio also recommended for
use by mounted troops. These should be ordered in a ring around the
other footsoldiers, with lances directed against the oncoming Muslim
horse who were thus unable to get to grips with the remainder of the
Christian infantry. The Christian spearmen on their own would be very
exposed to the firepower of the Muslim archers, however, so protection
for them was to be provided by shieldbearers. They should also have
with them swords and adequate clothing to minimise the blows of the
Muslim troops.
Archers and crossbowmen

Fidenzio of Padua also considered the function of the 'ballistarii et sagittarii' amongst a force which was comprised only of Christian infantry. He argued that the crossbow and bow were so important that no footsoldier should go to war who was not competent in the use of at least one of them. The spearmen would drive the Muslims off if they came close, but the use of archers and crossbowmen would keep the enemy at a distance and more significantly, would inflict heavy casualties on their horses. Fidenzio recommended this since he believed that Muslim troops were ineffective on foot. Without archers, however, a Christian force consisting only of infantry was liable to be destroyed by the Muslims. For similar reasons archers and crossbowmen should be mixed in with a force which included horsemen.135

Evidence from battles fought in the Latin East during this period confirms Fidenzio's argument that archers were critical to the success or failure of a Christian army, particularly against the Muslim tactics which had to be countered. The major function of the archer was to keep an aggressive Muslim force at such a distance that their own mounted archers were largely ineffective, whilst if the Muslims attempted to close in then the Christian firepower might successfully repulse them. For Christian tactics to be effective, massed ranks of archers were needed. On the Fifth Crusade, Oliver of Paderborn noted that there were 4,000 archers, of whom 2,500 'fuerunt ad soldas'.136 It would be wrong to regard this as indicative of the proportionate number of paid archers in a typical force of this period. But it does at least indicate the importance which was attached to this element of
the Christian army from the number that had been recruited, besides
which, as specialists and professionals, they would have been unlikely
to panic. The value of archers to this crusade was indicated by an
occasion when they were not present. When the Templars returned from
an attack on Burlus in 1220, the crusaders who went to meet them were
heavily defeated by the Muslims. Oliver of Paderborn suggested that
this had happened because the crusaders had not gone out prepared for
battle, since they lacked the support of crossbowmen and archers.137

It has previously been indicated that the charge of the mounted knight
in the Latin East frequently came as a result of Muslim provocation.
At the battle of Mansurah, it was specifically noted that the
Christians charged because they had no crossbowmen: those that had
successfully crossed the river had all been killed in Mansurah. The
point was reinforced by Joinville, who referred to a head-on clash
between some of St. Louis' knights and a group of Muslims, a violent
encounter in which neither bows nor crossbows were used by either
side.138

Muslim mounted archers preferred to operate at mid-range: if the
Christian archers performed effectively then the enemy could be kept at
a distance and liable to suffer heavy losses if they tried to close in.
These methods applied both to a pitched battle and a battle on the
march. Two incidents from the Fifth Crusade suggested the value of
archers when the Muslims tried to move closer. On 8 July 1219, Muslim
foot and mounted attacked the fôsse on the east bank of the Nile, so
the crusaders went out to face them: every time that the Muslims
charged, the archers and crossbowmen killed vast numbers of them. On
21 September when the Muslims attacked, the excellence of the Christian crossbowmen and archers kept their opponents under incessant pressure.\(^{139}\) The ability of archers to harm a force that approached too close was noted after Casal Imbert in 1232. John of Beirut deemed it pointless to chase the Lombards since they had already reached the pass, but additionally they had crossbowmen and archers with them.\(^{140}\)

On St. Louis' First Crusade, when the Muslims counter-attacked at Mansurah the mounted Muslim troops were forced to dismount and build themselves a barrier, to provide protection from crusader crossbow attacks.\(^{141}\)

On the march the crossbowmen had a vital role to play in warding off Muslim attacks, demonstrated by two examples from the Fifth Crusade. On the march south towards Mansurah, the sagittarii were used in partnership with the lancearii. The ability of the two elements to function together has already been seen in the later ideas of Fidenzio of Padua. Here, the combined force stayed together, using lances if the Muslims approached too closely and presumably (although this is not actually stated) complementing this with arrows at a greater distance. They were thus able to protect the baggage from Muslim assaults. Later, the archers were used in combination with other Christian troops. It has already been noted that when the crusaders had begun to retreat back to Damietta, as the crusaders used their infantry as a human barrier, so the footsoldiers also fired back the arrows which the Muslims were directing against the crusader army. This suggests that archers were intermingled with the other footsoldiers on this occasion.\(^{142}\)
When Christian forces moved on to the attack in a conflict, the archers still had an important role to play. This is evident on St. Louis' First Crusade. First, the crossbowmen were essential in the crusaders' success in establishing themselves at Damietta. As the footsoldiers and knights hurled themselves into the water, so the crossbowmen also worked well, firing rapidly and with great violence. By virtue of the excellent firepower which had supported the charge, the Muslims were forced back and the crusaders were able to land safely. Later in this crusade, at the battle of Mansurah, Joinville reported that it was the arrival of the king's foot crossbowmen from across the river that caused the Muslims to flee: the latter retreated as the former were preparing for action, when 'nous virent mettre pié en l'estrier des arbeléstes'. And it was suggested by William of Nangis that many Muslim horses died in this battle because of the crossbowmen.

It has been noted, in considering the role of Christian archers, that their interaction with other elements of a Christian force was important if they were to be effective. This was demonstrated, for example, in their work on the Fifth Crusade's march south from Damietta. The Egyptian counter-attack at Mansurah in 1250 provided two further examples of this. In the ordering of the Christian batailles, the count of Flanders was at an angle in relation to the position of Joinville. When Joinville saw that both mounted and foot Muslims were attacking the count, he ordered crossbowmen to fire on the horsemen. As these fled, so the count's men were able to come out and inflict heavy casualties on the Muslim foot. And when Jocerant of
Brançon's *bataille* came under pressure, Henry of Côme caused the king's crossbowmen to fire on the Muslims, again successfully warding them off. Here, the archers were important in the carrying-out of successful Christian tactics against an aggressive Muslim force.¹⁴⁸

In certain circumstances, however, archers might prove to be rather less effective. In the battle of Mansurah, all of the crossbowmen that entered the town with Robert of Artois' force died. In the narrow streets of Mansurah, or indeed in any confined situation, archers were generally of far less value than they were out in the open.¹⁴⁹ This problem was countered by the versatility which archers demonstrated. At Nicosia in 1229, foot archers with John of Ibelin defended their position with lances until help arrived.¹⁵⁰ In general there is no doubt that the Christian archer was a crucial element of an army, particularly when dealing with the threat which was posed by a Muslim force.

There is some evidence for the use of heavier artillery in battles, though this is extremely limited and usually occurred when a force was defending an entrenched position, a situation very like siege warfare. The clearest example came when the Muslims were attacking the crusaders' position on the east bank in the summer of 1219: the Templars were said to have had an *albarest de torn* with them, a large siege crossbow on a stand, which helped to drive the Muslims back. In 1253 the Damascenes approached Acre and, according to Joinville, were within range of this powerful form of the crossbow.¹⁵¹ In this period, however, larger artillery would have been too inaccurate to be used
efficiently in a battle and also too clumsy to be constantly manoeuvred as a battle situation changed.

The role of non-combatants

It has been noted earlier that certain types of conflict could continue for a long time - perhaps on and off for a number of days - and that debilitating injuries such as those from which Joinville suffered, were likely to result from the type of combat which took place. Additionally, the difficult conditions in the area meant that the support elements in an army could be crucial to the outcome of a conflict. The maintenance of supplies and the tending of wounds are good examples of this but unfortunately there is little information on this aspect of an army in battle. The only direct reference is from a conflict which took place outside Damietta on 31 March 1219. On this occasion the women brought water, stones, wine and bread to the fighters, whilst the priests prayed and tended the wounds of the injured. This was in a conflict which went on for ten hours.¹⁴⁹ The fact that these tasks were performed by women and priests may be indicative of the ad hoc nature of such arrangements, even on a large crusade expedition, but it would be wrong to attribute too much significance to a single piece of evidence.

The aftermath of battle

Many combatants, like Joinville, would have spent much time after a battle trying to rest and hoping that wounds would heal and not become infected. Another more enjoyable consequence of a battle would be the seizing of booty and the gaining of ransoms for captured prisoners,
though Christian armies appear to have normally enslaved their captives. After the Muslim attack on the crusaders besieging Damietta on 31 July 1219, the Christians were able to seize booty and slaves. A similar situation went disastrously wrong for them in August of the same year, however: at Fariskur, the Muslims attacked whilst the crusader footsoldiers were loading themselves up with booty. After the battle fought by Peter of Brittany in 1239, the Christians returned to Jaffa with plenty of booty and prisoners. On this occasion, the original object of the crusaders had been to raid, but a battle had had to be fought to attain their objectives. There was a major slave market at Acre and in addition, Muslim prisoners were held in captivity there. In 1274-5, a number of Muslim sea captains escaped from prison in Acre, having been set free by some of their compatriots.

When the Christians were defeated, there would also be booty taken, and there were many instances when Christian prisoners were taken off in chains, usually to Egypt. But in the case of some important prisoners, the Muslims were prepared to ransom them. In 1260, a strong Christian force was defeated by some Turcomans at their camp near Tiberias: many were killed, but the lord of Beirut was subsequently ransomed for 20,000 besants, as were the commander of the Temple, the marshal of the kingdom (John of Gibelet) and James Vidal. The total ransom may have been as much as 200,000 besants, but the arrangements caused much squabbling amongst the Muslims. Some captives were worth even more than this. When St. Louis and his army were captured, 800,000 besants was agreed on for the ransom of the army (after part of the ransom had been paid by the sultan) whilst Damietta itself
should be the price for the king. Only half of this sum was actually
paid, amounting to 208,750 pounds tournois. As the average yearly
income of the French monarchy at this time was about 250,000 pounds,
it is clear that this ransom was an enormous sum to have to pay.\textsuperscript{96}
The consequences of war could be costly in terms of money, as well as
manpower.

\textbf{A campaign without battle}

In the Latin East before 1187, campaigns in which battle was
avoided by a field army were an important part of the Latins' defensive
strategy, whilst to the Muslims, a battle-seeking strategy made sense
because of the manpower problems of their enemies.\textsuperscript{96} In the
thirteenth century, however, the native Latins chose not to organise a
field army as a part of their defensive policy, opting instead to
defend themselves at their individual strongpoints. When a field army
was organised, it was normally a force which had been heavily
augmented by crusaders who would wish, in some way, to confront their
enemies.

The defeat of St. Louis' crusade into Egypt may have encouraged
those who stayed with him in the Holy Land to behave more cautiously
towards their Muslim opponents. An incident outside Acre in 1253 thus
provides, for this period, what seems to have been the only example of
a success gained through a campaign which deliberately avoided a direct
confrontation. As the Damascenes approached the city, threatening to
destroy the gardens if they were not paid 50,000 besants, Christian
foot-sergeants fired on them with bows and crossbows. There was a
joust between a Genoese knight and some Muslims, but the Damascene army did not dare to fight so they set off in the direction of Sidon. The Christians had not attempted to force a battle and the Damascenes had caused no harm to the land outside Acre.

The Battle of Beit-Hânûn, November 1239

It has already been suggested that the close analysis of a single battle will produce unsatisfactory results and that to use such an analysis as the basis for more generalised remarks is liable to give a distorted impression. It is possible, however, to look at one detailed account of a conflict from the opposite perspective. No attempt will be made to establish the precise course of the battle of Beit-Hânûn: the events recorded in the 'Rothelin' source will rather be considered as a means of testing impressions which have been gained from other engagements. The account is particularly valuable for an analysis of the roles played by the various components of a Christian army in conflict with the Muslims.

The site of the battle was marked with the building of a 'Victory Mosque' by the emir Shams ad-Din Sunqur: local inhabitants are still proud of the inscription which describes the defeat suffered by the crusaders. The mosque is in the centre of the town, which is located in a shallow depression just north-east of Gaza. To the west is a line of sand dunes, whilst to the east are some gentle hills. It was to somewhere near this location that the counts of Bar and Montfort and many barons led their men in search of booty.
The dominant feature of the battle itself was the poor preparation of the Christians. This caused them to make a number of quick decisions leading to disorder which the Muslims were able to exploit to their own advantage. But before the battle had begun, the Christians allowed confusion and antagonism to dominate their decision-making. The count of Bar, one of the leaders of the proposed raid into Egyptian territory, had been incensed by the successful expedition organised by Peter of Brittany and it was this which encouraged him to carry out a second raid, despite appeals for caution from Theobald of Champagne, the leaders of the Military Orders and Peter of Brittany himself. Theobald even attempted to use the fealty which had been sworn to him as the leader of the expedition to enforce obedience, but it was to no avail and, in the cover provided by darkness, the army set off. It was an extremely large force, numbering 600 knights, 70 knights with banners, crossbowmen, mounted and foot-sergeants and many others. But within its ranks there were some who doubted the wisdom of the expedition. Walter of Jaffa became concerned about the damage which the horses might be suffering from the journey and advised caution, but although many advocated a return to Ascalon it was decided to press on towards Gaza. The target of the expedition was herds of animals, which had been moved by local inhabitants who feared the conflict.

Before the battle started, three other factors contributed to the subsequent downfall of the army. The Christians' choice of a site to make camp was unwise. It was in a valley which allowed the Muslims to dominate the position from the heights of the sand dunes and hills, with no means by which the Christians could reach the higher ground to
counter the threat. And the camp which was established had no guards or look-outs. This enabled the Muslims to investigate the circumstances of their enemies thoroughly before they attacked. Whilst the Christians were spending their time eating and sleeping, the Muslims were organising large numbers of troops which, according to the count of Jaffa and the duke of Burgundy, outnumbered the Christians by at least fourteen to one. When the Christians had recognised the peril they faced, some of them, including the count of Jaffa and the duke of Burgundy, decided to flee, thus weakening the army although it is impossible to say by how much. The rest of the force chose to stay, since they recognised that although the knights might escape, the infantry would be left helpless. On this occasion at least, there was no possibility of the footsoldiers defending a position without the support of mounted troops.

The simple disposition of the two sides was quite clear. It has been noted that the Christians had established themselves in a valley. On the sand dunes and hills which overlooked the position the Muslim infantry were massed, from where they could cast down various projectiles, particularly arrows, on to their enemies. The Muslim cavalry were placed to block a narrow entrance, in order to trap the Christians where they had made their camp. The battle started with the Muslim infantry bombarding the Christians with stones and great quantities of arrows. This caused confusion amongst the Christian ranks: many of their number were wounded and, it was interestingly stated, many horses were killed. The standard response in this situation was to attempt to drive the Muslims off with archers and
crossbowmen - and indeed, this tactic was adopted. For a time it kept both the Muslim infantry and cavalry at a safe distance but this could not be maintained because of a shortage of arrows. Once again the Muslims were able to move closer, so the Christian knights resorted to a charge. It has been seen in other cases that the charge was normally a reactionary manoeuvre and this is another good example: the knights had to attack in order to come to terms with the particular threat which they faced. On this occasion, the first stage of the charge was a great success. The Muslim cavalry guarding the narrow entrance presented a solid target and a close conflict began in which the Christians gradually gained the advantage, particularly because the Muslim footsoldiers could no longer strike at them from above. In order to draw the Christians from this protected position, the Muslims therefore employed a tactic also noted before - the feigned retreat. The success which the Christians had enjoyed was completely thrown away as they chased wildly after the apparently fleeing Muslims. When the latter turned again, the Christians realised their mistake: they faced the Muslim horse in one direction and, in the other, the Muslim foot who had come down from their previous positions. The depleted Christian force was trapped. They tried to regroup in their bataillons but it made little difference. The Muslims used their arrows to wear down the Christians before moving closer with swords and maces: few of the Christians were able to escape the slaughter.

When news of the disaster reached the rest of the army at Ascalon, they hurriedly armed themselves and rode towards the battle site. The Teutonic Knights were far quicker than the others and their approach
served to drive off the Muslims who were still chasing some of the survivors, but they were unable to free any of the prisoners. Then they saw the appalling carnage which had taken place. Christians lay dead and stripped of all their arms and clothing. A few were still alive, including Anceau of l'île who was found naked and covered in wounds. The survivors were carried back to camp on shields, but an operation to rescue the prisoners was ruled out, on the advice of the Templars, Hospitallers and the native Latins, who argued that such a scheme was bound to result in the deaths of the captives. The army retreated back to Ascalon. When Richard of Cornwall was in Palestine, he found that some of the victims of this battle had been left on the battlefield; their remains were gathered and buried in the cemetery at Ascalon.160

The battle of Beit-Hânûn illustrates a number of important points relating to battles which were fought in and around the Latin East at this time. The reliance of footsoldiers on other elements of an army, the importance of archers and the typical response of knights to the Muslim threat which they faced are all apparent. Two other more general points are striking, however. Throughout the battle, apart from brief moments when the Christian archers achieved some success and immediately after the charge of the knights, the tactical initiative always lay with the Muslims. All that the Christian army could do was respond in retaliatory fashion to pre-emptive moves by their opponents. Secondly, the battle reflects a paradox which was noted earlier: the armies of the Latin East could generally only fight when they were reinforced by troops from the west, yet these troops did not understand
the kind of conflict in which they were likely to become involved. They tried to respond, particularly through the charge, with the techniques which they knew from the battlefields of Europe, but the Muslims could use the power of the charge to their own advantage, thereby leaving the knights in an even worse situation.

Conclusion

It has been written that the knight, along with the castle, should be regarded as the symbol of medieval warfare, but in the Latin Kingdom and its environs the knight, particularly one from the west, would have frequently found his effectiveness seriously reduced. In the thirteenth century the Muslim armies were able to a very great extent to dominate the terms on which battles were fought, and thus the knights were reduced to imprudent gestures in order to try to reclaim their superiority. Robert of Artois' unnecessary death demonstrated the essential problem for the knight in this period - his reckless decision to chase the fleeing Muslims into Mansurah reflected the thwarted self-image of so many frustrated western knights both before and after him. Their inability to counter Muslim tactics explains, to a great extent, Muslim successes, and Christian failures, in battles during this period.

The significance of the battles which have been examined should not be underestimated. At various points in the thirteenth century a Christian army suffered a defeat in battle which had important consequences. Theobald of Champagne's Crusade was destroyed by the defeat at Beit-Hânûn. The heavy losses which were suffered by the crusaders at Mansurah in 1250 diminished the effectiveness of St.
Louis' force whilst the costly victory, if it may be regarded as such, was considered by Muslim commentators to be the turning point of their army's ultimately successful campaign. From this time, the crusader army was always forced to take the defensive against the Muslim forces. If Robert of Artois and the Templars had not ignored specific instructions and charged after the fleeing Muslims into Mansurah, the expedition as a whole might have had very different results. A successful crusade into Egypt would not only have eased the pressure on the Latin Kingdom, at least for a while, but also might have affected the Muslim power-structure in Egypt and the emergence of the Mamluks in the 1250's. But it has to be stressed that in the overall military history of the Latin Kingdom in the thirteenth century, battles were not decisive to its fate. With the exception of La Forbie in 1244, the Christians, who were obliged to defend their kingdom for most of the time without significant support from the west, learned from the lesson of Hattin and preferred to maintain themselves behind the walls of their strongholds rather than risk a major engagement with a Muslim army. This was most apparent in the period of Baybars' sultanate: in view of the crucial damage which he did to the Latins through the capture of, for example, Saphet, Crac and Antioch, it might seem surprising that there was no attempt on the part of the Christians to drive the Muslims out of their lands. This is largely explained by the dearth of manpower suffered by the Latins during this period. Only a crusade could have produced an army which might have been capable of taking on the Muslims and there was no great crusade in the 1260's. For the ultimate decline of the Latin Kingdom, the significance of battles was fairly limited.
NOTES

1. See above, pages 44-7.


3. See below, pages 327-8, 332.


5. Smail, *Crusading Warfare*, p. 140.


11. Fidenzio of Padua, *Liber recuperationis*, p. 29. For an examination of his views, see Schein, *The West and the Crusade*, pp. 53-64.


15. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', p. 190.


22. 'Rothelin', p. 533.


27. 'Rothelin', p. 597.

28. Joinville, Histoire de Saint Louis, p. 120.

29. 'Rothelin', p. 606.


33. 'Eracles', ii, p. 455; Gestes des Chiprois, p. 182.


35. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 454.


38. Cartulaire des Hospitaliers, no. 3782.


40. See above, pages 72-3.


42. For example, the battle outside Acre of 1265: Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Life of Baybars, pp. 727-8. For the number of troops involved in sieges, see below, pages 302-8.

43. Verbruggen, Art of Warfare, pp. 6-10.

44. Fidenzio of Padua, 'Liber recuperationis', pp. 29, 30.

45. 'Gesta Obsidionis', p. 90; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', pp. 205, 206-7.


47. 'Gesta Obsidionis', p. 94.

48. See above, page 117.


51. Joinville, *Histoire de Saint Louis*, pp. 312-18. The topographical details were established by an inspection of the site.

52. Verbruggen, *Art of Warfare*, p. 75. The sources for the Latin East do not allow the nature of the conrois and batailles to be determined: the two expressions seem interchangeable, as does eschele.

53. *Gestes des Chiprois*, pp. 101-2. The account in Amadi, *Chronique*, pp. 169-70, suggests that the Ibelins were organised in only four batailles.


55. James of Vitry, *Lettres*, p. 120.


58. See above, page 85.


64. *'Rothelin'*, p. 607.


67. See above, pages 84-5.


69. *'Gesta Obsidionis'*, pp. 78, 105-6, 91-2. I was told of the use of a carrociuom on the First Crusade by Professor Riley-Smith. And see Erdmann, *Origin*, pp. 53-6.

70. *'Rothelin'*, p. 606.

74. See *Règle du Temple*, no. 419.  
78. 'Rothelin', p. 535.  
84. *Chronique d'Ernoul*, pp. 358-9; 'Eracles', ii, pp. 262-3.  
92. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', p. 189.  
98. 'Rothelin', pp. 597-8.
110. *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 60.
112. 'Rothelin', pp. 533-5.
115. 'Rothelin', p. 632.
120. *Chronique d'Ernoul*, p. 424.

122. Fidenzio of Padua, 'Liber recuperationis', p. 29.


125. Ibid., pp. 272-3.

126. 'Bracles', ii, p. 429.


129. 'Bracles', ii, p. 333; 'Histoire des Patriarches', p. 552.


132. Ibid., pp. 142-4.


134. Ibid., pp. 103-4; 'Bracles', ii, p. 401.


137. Ibid., pp. 252-3.


139. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', pp. 174, 193-4. The dating is unclear. For the time of the first attack, compare 'Gesta Obsidionis', pp. 93-4.


146. 'Rothelin', p. 606.


150. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiaetae', p. 181.


152. 'Rothelin', p. 535.


CHAPTER V

RAIDING EXPEDITIONS

Introduction

The military strength of the Latin East was principally determined by its ability to maintain control of its fortresses and fortified towns. Even if an enemy launched a major invasion, it could only achieve effective domination by taking these strongpoints: it is for this reason that the campaigns of Baybars, particularly in the years 1263-71, were of such importance to the future of the kingdom. But the mechanics of warfare in this period and, in particular, the impracticalities of maintaining an adequate fighting force over a long period of time, meant that the ideal end of capturing and holding areas which had previously been controlled by the enemy could not always be pursued. The problems of gathering a force which could safely operate outside the confines of a strongpoint additionally restricted the military options which were available to the Latins. It was inevitable, therefore, that much of the warfare in this period should aim for quite limited objectives. The raid, or chevauchée, may thus be considered as an integral part of war in the Latin East during the thirteenth century. For the Muslims it was one element in their strategy designed to expel the Latins from the mainland. For the Latins, as they became progressively weaker in the course of the thirteenth century, raiding expeditions were their only means of carrying war to their Muslim neighbours, however desultory these raids may appear to have been.
It is necessary to try to establish precisely what is meant by a raid. The dividing line between this form of military action and others can at times be a remarkably thin one and one that is by no means always clear in contemporary accounts. The campaign of the Lord Edward in late 1271, directed against the Muslim fortress of Qaqun, has been regarded as one of 'few raids in 1271 (which) accomplished nothing...', but some contemporary sources suggested that this particular attack should be regarded as an abortive siege attempt.\(^2\) A superficial examination of the Christian attack on the Muslim camp at Fariskur in August 1219 might suggest that this was a raid, but the sources indicated that the crusaders hoped to encounter and fight with the Muslims, so in this instance a battle was the prime objective.\(^3\) If these two examples were not raids, then what was one? In the area around the Latin East in the thirteenth century, a raid may be defined as being a military action that had direct aims which did not include either the permanent acquisition of enemy territory or a major engagement against enemy forces. Raids were used as an effective reprisal against enemy activity; a means of maintaining or exacting tribute from the enemy; a means of assuring adequate supplies in the course of an expedition; and a means of draining enemy morale by aiming an attack at a target which was relatively unimportant militarily and therefore unprotected, but was nevertheless of great significance to the enemy. Perhaps the best example of this was Baybars' destruction of the church at Nazareth in 1263.\(^4\)

For both Christians and Muslims, raiding expeditions were an alternative to a major campaign which would still weaken the enemy and
cause long-term damage and injury. They would have been regarded as an inexpensive means of dealing a blow to the enemy, in terms of manpower, time and other costs. They could, moreover, bring in direct profit to the participants and they did not necessarily need to involve a great number of troops, assuming that there would be no significant encounter with an enemy force. Such expeditions would normally involve pillage and destruction on a large scale. Crops and trees would be burned, buildings destroyed, people killed or made prisoner and considerable amounts of plunder might be taken. These were the typical elements of raids: and the effects of such campaigns should not be underestimated.

The strategy behind the decision to carry out raiding expeditions, however, was markedly different for the Christian and Muslim armies. The Mamluks' usurpation in Egypt and their subsequent dominance of Syria produced a unified Muslim front against the Latins, resulting in a decline which was best reflected in the loss of numerous strongpoints during the 1260's and early 1270's. As far as raids were concerned, this meant that even when additional troops were available to the Latin Kingdom (in the form of a crusade, for example) a raiding expedition was likely to be the most aggressive action which could sensibly be undertaken. But the Muslims, by virtue of their strength and their intentions with regard to the Latin Kingdom, were able to endow their raids with additional purposes, a strategy which was particularly apparent during the sultanate of Baybars. A raid could hamper the Christians' ability to carry out an effective defence of another site which was under more serious and prolonged attack; it might also be
used against major strongpoints such as Acre and Tripoli, to debilitate Christian resistance at a stage when a full-scale siege was unlikely to be effective. Earlier in the century, however, the Christians too had been able to use raids as a part of a more ambitious strategy, rather than as the only pre-emptive aspect of their military thinking. In 1239, Peter of Brittany carried out a raid which produced much-needed supplies for Theobald of Champagne's Crusade. Unfortunately, it also aroused the jealousy of men such as Henry of Bar, who led another raid which ended disastrously at Beit-Hânûn. On the Fifth Crusade, raids were one element in a strategy designed to weaken the Muslim position in Palestine. It also included an abortive siege of Mt. Tabor and castle-building at Château Pèlerin and Caesarea. During the expedition to Egypt, raids were carried out locally, against the Muslim camp at Fariskur, and further afield to Burlus.

The raid was therefore an essential element in the process of warfare in the Latin East throughout the thirteenth century, but individual expeditions did not attract the attention of contemporary western chroniclers in the way that sieges did. This is to be expected, because the loss or gain of a strongpoint in the Latin East or the surrounding area would naturally be of far greater concern to them than would any small-scale raiding expedition. With a few exceptions, information on raids is therefore restricted to those western and eastern accounts which concern themselves primarily with events in the eastern Mediterranean lands. There are problems to be faced when reading these accounts. Unless a raid was aimed at a fixed point, it is often hard to determine precisely where the expedition
went and accounts are frequently contradictory, especially when western and eastern sources are compared. Information regarding the forces which set out on raids is often limited and in the case of the Muslims virtually non-existent. A more fundamental problem is the extent to which the raids for which there is evidence are truly representative. In comparison to sieges, for example, it is reasonable to say that something at least is known of most successful assaults on strongpoints in this area during the thirteenth century. But there were probably countless small raiding expeditions of which nothing is recorded.

The targets of raiding expeditions

a) Christian raids

It is possible to identify two different types of raids. First, there are the raids which were used principally by Christian forces operating from the coastal region south of Beirut. These were directed against small Muslim camps and villages, particularly in the region close to the west bank of the river Jordan, which for most of the thirteenth century was the border area between the Christians and their Muslim enemies to the east. It was only to be expected that this area should be a constant target of the Christians, less to make any permanent territorial gains than to inflict damage and injury on relatively unprotected Muslim concentrations of population and to seize crops and other possessions. Muslim positions west of the Jordan suffered from Christian raids throughout much of this period. In 1203, for example, damage inflicted on Christian shipping by a Muslim emir operating out of the Sidon area led to a number of retaliatory measures
being carried out by Aimery, to the west and the east of the river Jordan, as well as a raid by sea against Fuwah. In 1210, Christian raiders went out for three days into the region, but they returned having failed to take any booty, because the Muslims had pulled back to the east side of the Jordan.

Bethsan was a fertile site on the edge of the Jordan valley, about ten miles south of Belvoir and it was a constant target of Christian raids. In 1217, it was sacked by crusaders on a chevauchée out of Acre, as the protecting Muslim force under al-'Adil retreated in fear of a possible attack on Damascus. In early 1250, when the progress of St. Louis' First Crusade had possibly distracted Muslim troops in Palestine, a force from the kingdom led by John of Arsuf ravaged Bethsan and a Muslim camp in the vicinity, purportedly seizing as many as 16,000 animals in the process, as well as a Muslim emir. Then in November 1264, a large co-operative force led by Oliver of Termes and including Templars and Hospitallers destroyed Bethsan and three neighbouring villages, taking much plunder and prisoners. Not all raids in the area were quite so effective, however. In 1260 a big force which included the Templars from Acre, Saphet, Château Pèlerin and Beaufort, John of Beirut and John of Gibelet, set off in the direction of Tiberias to raid a Muslim camp, but they suffered heavy losses. In 1266, one of the last Christian offensives about which something is known again progressed towards Tiberias, but the advance guard which included the Hospitallers, Teutonic Knights and the troops of the French regiment led by Geoffrey of Sergines was decisively beaten by the Muslims near the plain of Acre. The campaigns of Baybars had
the effect of forcing the Christians back until their presence was restricted to the coastal region. This meant that by the close of the 1260’s Muslim positions in the area immediately west of the Jordan could be considered safe from Christian attack. The last two raids in southern Palestine that were recorded were undertaken by the Lord Edward against St. George, about ten miles east of Acre, and Qaqun, which it is probably wrong to regard as a raid anyway: it is about fifteen miles south-east of Caesarea.15

The policy of the Hospitallers, in particular, in northern Syria was more openly aggressive than that which was followed in the south, because in the north the Muslims were far less united and consequently weaker in relation to their Christian neighbours.16 This confident offensive policy is reflected in the type of raids which the Christians in the north attempted to carry out, though they were by no means wholly successful in their methods. It does appear, however, that Christian raiding expeditions in the north were far more like Muslim ones than were those of their fellow-Christians in the south. They were prepared to attack the larger centres of Muslim population in the area, rather than simply carrying out small, punitive expeditions against Muslim camps and villages. It should be noted, however, that such sites in northern Syria were far more accessible to the Christians than correspondingly-large Muslim towns would have been to the Latins in Palestine. Assaults were aimed, for example, against Ba’rin, Hamah and Homs. Ba’rin was first attacked in this period in 1203;17 it faced further attacks in 1230,18 123318 and 1236,20 in all of which the Hospitallers played a major role. Hamah faced an attack by the Franks
in 1204, which was successfully driven off, though it appears that the
raiders came right to the walls of the city and caused considerable
amounts of damage. In 1230 the town was attacked again. Homs was
attacked in 1204 and 1207, but the second assault seems to have
been a serious attempt to besiege the city and not just a raid. It
faced a further attack in 1265 by Bohemond VI, supported by the
Templars and Hospitallers, but the Muslims appear to have had little
difficulty in beating this off before the Latins came too close to the
city. Other Christian attacks in the area included two on Jabala, in
1204 and then in 1230, when it seems that they managed to gain
access to the town and actually held it for a few weeks, before they
were driven off, in the process losing everything which they had
taken. Latakia was also attacked in 1204. In 1237, a disastrous
raid against Darbsak resulted in heavy Christian losses, because the
Latin army had seriously underestimated the strength of the
opposition.

b) Muslim raids

With the possible exception of their raids on Bethsan, which may
well have been poorly defended by the Muslims on other occasions than
1217, most Christian raids that took place in Palestine were directed
against minor Muslim settlement areas, where they would have been able
to cause the maximum amount of damage without encountering any
formidable Muslim resistance. The nature of the Muslim attacks
undertaken in this part of the country was generally rather different;
they were aimed at major and usually well-defended Christian positions.
Throughout this period, there were persistent Muslim assaults on Acre.
In 1203/4, in response to Christian aggression, al-Mu'azzam came with a force to within five leagues of the city and Muslim raiding parties were sent to attack Christian positions just outside it. This raid ended in conflict with a Christian force near Doc. In mid-1207, al-'Adil carried out raids in the vicinity of Acre, in retaliation for Christian activity and a truce was subsequently agreed. Then in 1210, al-Mu'azzam came to Acre with troops, causing a considerable amount of damage and taking much plunder. From the 1260's, Acre became a constant target of Muslim raiding expeditions, often at the same time as more serious attacks were being carried out or prepared against other centres of Christian resistance. In the years of Baybars' ascendancy Acre found itself facing raids of varying severity on an almost annual basis.

Tyre was another major Christian centre of population and potential resistance and it too was subjected to Muslim raids on a number of occasions. In 1228, for example, Muslim raiders were able to take considerable quantities of booty, besides ambushing a Christian force which had come out to protect the commoners and their herds of cows and sheep. Before the Muslim assault on Saphet in 1266, Tyre was one of a number of targets raided by bands of marauding Muslims, who took considerable plunder. In 1269, there were two Muslim attacks on Tyre, involving plundering and the taking of prisoners. Château Pèlerin had to face raids from the Muslims in 1264 (as a response to Christian raids) and then again in the following year after Baybars had taken Caesarea but before he began the attack on Arsuf. It is apparent that the targets of Muslim raids were very different from
those which were selected by Christians. Muslim forces were prepared to challenge major Christian centres in their efforts to weaken the Latins' position in the east.

In northern Syria the Muslims followed a similar policy in their raids, attacking major and well-defended Christian sites. Tripoli and Antioch were especially common targets of Muslim aggression. When al-'Adil had finished with Acre in 1207, he moved north and eventually attacked Tripoli, blockading it whilst inflicting severe damage on the surrounding area. Baybars carried out raids against Tripoli on three separate occasions: these attacks will be considered later. Antioch also suffered three raiding attacks from Muslim forces in Baybars' reign before it fell in 1268. In 1262 a large co-operative Muslim force from Homs, Hamah and other positions struck at the city's port, St. Symeon, and caused massive damage. In January 1270, Baybars attacked Crac in a well-documented raid which probably sapped the morale of its defenders besides doing much harm to the neighbouring countryside.

c) Seaborne raids

Both the Muslims and Christians took to the sea to carry out raids against the enemy. The target of seaborne raids for the Christians was Egypt. In 1203, for example, a successful raid was carried out by about twenty Frankish boats on Fuwah, pillaging the area for between two and five days and in 1211, an attack was made on Burah, producing booty and causing much damage to the Egyptians. There is
evidence for two seaborne raids which were carried out by the Muslims, both directed against Cyprus. In the first, in 1203, the Muslims seized two boats and five Christians, but were unable to do any further damage.\footnote{45} Then in 1271, Baybars sent a force of galleys to Cyprus at the time of his assault against Montfort. But the fleet was shipwrecked off Limassol and many Muslims were killed and captured. The ships had been disguised as Christian vessels.\footnote{46}

The pattern of the targeting of raids suggests that a more confident and aggressive policy led to attacks on larger and better defended concentrations of the enemy. For those who were under greater pressure, most obviously in this period the Christians of Palestine, a typical raid would be against a small and ill-defended target.

**Organisation of Expeditions**

a) **Size and structure of the army**

Unfortunately, information in this respect is restricted to raiding expeditions which were carried out by Christian forces: there appear to be virtually no worthwhile statistics of this kind for the Muslims. The table below indicates the type of force that would have been used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Raid</th>
<th>Numbers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1203 Transjordan</td>
<td>Mounted, foot, Templars advance guard and Hospitallers rearguard.\footnote{47}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1203 Ba'rin</td>
<td>500 knights (led by the Hospitallers), 1,400 infantry, turcopoles and bowmen.\footnote{48}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1204 Fuwah</td>
<td>20 boats.\footnote{49}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1211 Burah and Djizèh</td>
<td>100 knights, 1,000 infantry.\footnote{50}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1211 Armenia
Templars, mounted and footsoldiers, 50 knights provided by John of Brienne and support from Antioch.\textsuperscript{81}

1218 Towards Sidon
500 men.\textsuperscript{82}

1233 Ba'rin
Templars, 100 knights from Cyprus, 80 knights from Jerusalem, 30 knights from Antioch, 100 Hospitaller knights, 400 mounted sergeants, 1,500 foot sergeants.\textsuperscript{83}

1237 Darbsak
100 Templar knights, 300 crossbowmen, secular troops and footsoldiers killed.\textsuperscript{84}

1239 From Jaffa
200 knights and other armed men.\textsuperscript{85}

1239 Towards Gaza
400 knights, Templars and Hospitallers.\textsuperscript{86} Or 600 knights, 70 knights carrying banners, crossbowmen, mounted and foot sergeants.\textsuperscript{87}

1256 Between Gaza and Ascalon
Mounted and foot.\textsuperscript{88}

1260 Towards Tiberias
Templars, secular knights, mounted and foot sergeants.\textsuperscript{89} Suggested numbers from an Arabic source are 900 knights, 1,500 turcopoles, 3,000 infantry.\textsuperscript{90}

1264 Around Ascalon
Templars, Hospitallers, knights of Acre, Geoffrey of Sergines (with French regiment?).\textsuperscript{91}

1264 Around Bethsan
Templars, Hospitallers, knights of Acre, Oliver of Termes (with French regiment?).\textsuperscript{92}

1265 Towards Homs
Troops from Antioch, Templars and Hospitallers.\textsuperscript{93}

1266 Towards Tiberias
Templars, Hospitallers, Teutonic Knights, French knights, Cypriot soldiers, others both mounted and foot. Over 500 mounted and foot killed.\textsuperscript{94} An alternative, Arabic source suggests 1,100 mounted.\textsuperscript{95}

1269 Around Montfort
Knights, turcopoles and squires; 130 mounted, excluding squires.\textsuperscript{96}

1271 St. George
Templars, Hospitallers, Teutonic Knights, English crusaders, troops from Acre,\textsuperscript{97} or 1,500 cavalry, with a large infantry force.\textsuperscript{98}

1271 Qaqun
Templars, Hospitallers, Teutonic Knights, knights of Acre and Cyprus, English crusaders and footsoldiers.\textsuperscript{99}
Conclusions from information such as this must be tentative, since it is not known how representative, or necessarily accurate, the figures are. They may often be an indication only of numbers that might have taken part in an abnormally large raid which would therefore warrant a mention by the chroniclers. Allowing for this, however, it is immediately apparent that by comparison with other statistics relating to the potential and actual size of the Latin armies, some of these expeditions were very large enterprises. In a number of instances the force would have been swollen by the presence of crusaders. But a raid such as the one of 1260 which was defeated when it was heading towards Tiberias represented, allowing for the dearth of manpower in the Latin East at the time, a major commitment of the kingdom's resources. The same is true of the raid which was undertaken by the Lord Edward and the kingdom's knights in 1271. And although precise numbers for the raid of 1266 towards Tiberias are not given, the variety of the troops which were involved suggests that again, a large force had been assembled. Even from these statistics it seems that such expeditions, however limited their aims and achievements may have been, had come to be regarded by the leaders of the Latin East as a central part of their military policy towards the Muslims. Almost all the raids for which statistical information is available were co-operative ventures to which the various and at times contrary military forces within the kingdom were prepared to commit themselves.

Most of these raids were undertaken by mixed forces, made up of both mounted and foot soldiers. This is interesting, since it reflects the value which the Christians placed on the role which could be
performed by the footsoldier, a point noted in the previous chapter. The Christians were far better equipped to combat any possible Muslim attacks on them if they had a mixed force with which to drive them off. But by using infantry in such a capacity they must have lost much of their potential speed of movement and advantage of surprise. So *chevauchées* in the Latin East should not be thought of as being undertaken purely by mounted knights who moved quickly and swooped down on unsuspecting adversaries. They must often have involved a systematic and thorough destruction of persons and property. It is unfortunate that there is not more detailed information on the role played by infantry forces in these raids. It is clear, however, that a typical raid into the Muslim region to the west of the Jordan would have been an extremely tiring experience for them: they would probably have had to travel at least 50 miles, carrying a considerable weight in arms and other equipment. It may tentatively be suggested that some Muslim raids may have been undertaken purely by cavalry forces, though the evidence is rather vague. In a raid against Acre in 1263, Baybars took with him one in every ten of his mounted troops but it is unclear whether this represented the entire Muslim contingent. In 1266 when Baybars was again at Acre, he dispatched a cavalry force under two emirs to raid Tyre. In 1269 Baybars himself set off with lightly-armed cavalry to raid that city, although two other Muslim forces of unknown composition were also sent. The force which Baybars took with him to raid Crac in 1270 seems to have been made up only of 200 lightly-armed horsemen, of whom 40 engaged and defeated a Christian force just outside the fortress.
b) Length of an expedition

In the next chapter it will be seen that one of the difficulties for an offensive force in a siege action was to maintain its numbers at an acceptable level. This at least would not have been a problem for a raiding expedition, since provided that a viable force could be gathered initially, then the subsequent action would not normally last for much more than a week. There was a limit to how much damage and plundering could be done in any particular area, as the more time that was spent in any one place, the greater the risk of an effective counter-attack being organised by the enemy. The Christians' use of infantry as an important element in a raid would have further restricted the distances which could be covered and the time which could profitably be spent away from a base. On the first chevauchée of the Fifth Crusade, directed against Bethsan and the surrounding area, the Franks were away from Acre for three, or, according to an alternative account, twelve days. The raid against Ba'rin and the surrounding area, led by the Hospitallers in 1233 lasted nearly a fortnight, but much of this time was not spent in active campaigning. The seaborne raid on Fuwah may have lasted for two days, or continued for as many as five. The Christians' other raid by sea in this period, directed against Burah and Djizèh, is said to have lasted for three days. Although they remained unhindered by the Egyptian army, the area was probably so devastated after they had spent three days there that there was nothing else for them to do.

Muslim raids lasted for a similar length of time. In 1263, Baybars spent three days in the vicinity of Acre, causing considerable damage, before he left for Mt. Tabor. In 1266, prior to the attack on Saphet,
the sultan was again before Acre for about a week and in the following year he was there for four days, once more damaging the area around the city.

A constant problem to a medieval army in the field was the need to maintain adequate supplies and this was something that could not be ignored even on a two day raid. The consequences of a lack of supplies were demonstrated by the raid of the Lord Edward towards St. George, which was probably unwisely undertaken in the middle of July. The expedition itself was not unsuccessful, but a lack of water and the type of food which the troops were obliged to eat combined with the oppressive heat to cause intense suffering and many casualties, particularly amongst the English crusaders. But raiders would not have wished to be hampered by taking large quantities of victuals with them, so the solution was to forage. On the first raid of the Fifth Crusade, the crusaders were able to re-victual themselves during their sacking of Bethsan and then as they progressed throughout the surrounding area where they remained for perhaps a further five days, they had no difficulty in obtaining both food and fodder for the animals. The account of the raid towards Sidon of Christmas 1217/18 which was recorded in the 'Eracles' does not wholly correspond to that of the other accounts, but it does contain some interesting information concerning the ways an army supplied itself during a raid. In each area the troops passed through, 'coreors' were sent out who, on finding villages full of clothes and food, were able to refresh themselves and to take supplies back to the main force. In 1228, a group of crusaders who were working on the sea fortress at Sidon sent
scavengers into Muslim territory in order to obtain victuals. They were able to seize animals, bread and corn, besides taking a number of prisoners. The last two cases are examples of a raid's purpose being to obtain supplies for the main part of an army on campaign. The first raid which took place on Theobald of Champagne's Crusade in 1239 had the same intention. Led by Peter of Brittany, the expedition successfully captured a Muslim caravan, earning great acclaim from the lesser crusaders amongst the main force at Jaffa, since the raiders brought back large numbers of animals of which there had been a shortage.

c) Raiding tactics

An essential aspect of an effective raid was the element of surprise. As already noted, the limitations of an infantry force may have hampered the Christians, but there were still ways by which the impact of an expedition could be increased. One of these methods, a tactic which was used by both Muslims and Christians, was to approach by night and aim to arrive in the target area at dawn, unnoticed by the enemy. For the raid led by Aimery from Acre in 1203, the Christian force of mounted and footsoldiers set out in the evening when the horses had been fed and then travelled all night so that by the morning they were in Muslim territory. Their tactics were successful, for only when they were on their way back to Acre were the Muslims able to attack the rearguard, an attack which was, moreover, ineffectual. Similar tactics were employed by the co-operative force headed by the Hospitallers which attacked Ba'rin in 1233. It travelled all night, having left Crac in the evening, and, reaching Ba'rin at
dawn, immediately began to plunder the suburb.® The trip would have been extremely tiring for the infantry, which formed an important part of the Christian force, as it is about 20 miles from Crac to Ba’rin. Both the raids of Theobald of Champagne’s Crusade travelled by night. On the first, Peter of Brittany was in position to ambush a Muslim caravan as it set out at dawn. The count of Bar and the other nobles on his chevauchée also set out in the evening.®® The Muslims used this method too, exemplified by Baybars’ attack on Acre in 1263. Setting out from Mt. Tabor at midnight, he was positioned at Acre by the following morning, ready to do the maximum amount of damage to the city.®® Careful planning was important to the success of a Christian raid out of Jaffa into Muslim territory at Christmas 1255/6. After the army had assembled and before departure, it sent out spies in order to ascertain from which part of the Muslim land it stood to make the most gain. The troops again went out at night, surrounded by secrecy and, travelling throughout the night, they came amongst the Muslims between Gaza and Ascalon.®

It was still vital, however careful advance planning might be, that good discipline was maintained when a raid was in progress; this particularly applied to marching formation. On the raid into the Galilee region in 1203, the Templars made up the advance guard and the Hospitallers the rearguard. The latter were attacked by the Muslims when they were returning to Christian territory, but the assault was successfully resisted.®® In 1266, however, poor discipline led to disaster as the advance guard (made up of Hospitallers, Teutonic Knights and the French knights in addition to some others) pushed too
far ahead of the rest of the force in their desire to obtain booty and were set upon and defeated by the Muslims, losing over 500 men. In 1239, as we have seen, overconfidence about their position contributed to the crusaders led by the count of Bar being overwhelmed by the Muslims at Beit-Hânûn near Gaza. Both these last examples, incidentally, illustrate the problems of differentiating a raid from a battle. The Christian troops were clearly intent on a raiding expedition but the Muslims were able to engage and defeat them in battle. Raids could develop into battles on the march, as in 1266, or even a pitched battle as occurred in 1239. It would be the intention of commanders to keep such risks to a minimum, however, and on both these occasions, it was indiscipline which led to engagement and defeat. Most raids were able to avoid a major confrontation. In some instances, moreover, it was necessary for raiding forces to divide up in order to inflict the maximum possible damage on the enemy. This could only be done when there was no major threat from any possible relief force. Instances have already been noted when small parties were sent out to obtain supplies. In the Galilee raid of 1203, once the Christians had arrived in Muslim territory they spread out in a number of directions. A similar technique was used by the crusaders who raided around Bethsan in 1217. All the land between Bethsan and Nablus was ravaged by sending out detachments which seized booty and killed great numbers of Muslims. In the course of the Christian assault on Ba'rin in 1233, after their initial raid on the city the army sent out 'coreors' and 'forriers' to plunder the villages in the area. For the Christian attack on Burah and Dżiżeh of 1211, the force of 100
knights and 1,000 infantry was said to have been divided precisely in two in order to ravage the area more effectively.®

The Reasons for Raiding

a) Retributive

Raids were used as reprisals against enemy activity, whether in retaliation for some damage which had previously been done, or if the enemy was in the middle of a campaign, to lessen its resolve or hamper its efforts. The raid as retaliation was used by both Muslims and Christians. Mention has already been made of an assault on Cyprus by a Muslim emir in 1203. This raid had taken place at a time of truce and Aimery demanded from al- 'Adil that restitution should be made for the damage that had been done. When the latter was unable to satisfy Aimery's demand, the Christians chose to take matters into their own hands, so the two sets of raids, first into the Galilee region and then the seaborne attack on Fuwah, were a reaction to the piracy of the Muslim emir. The 'Brades' account stated that much harm was done by the Christians, in revenge for the Muslims' seizure of five men on Cyprus.® In 1227, some Aleppans seized and killed a Templar knight. The Templars went out and killed many Muslims, besides taking prisoners and booty, but under threat from the governor of Aleppo, they returned much of their plunder.®

There were also instances when the Muslims retaliated against some Christian offence, although it is very likely that on some of these occasions, particularly during the sultanate of Baybars, a previous Christian misdeed was mentioned merely as a pretext. Two examples of
Muslim retaliation date from earlier in the century. The raid by al-Mu'azzam on Acre in 1203/4 was a further response to Frankish aggression, which itself had been in retaliation for previous Muslim activity. On this occasion, however, western and eastern sources disagreed over whether a conflict took place, although a truce was arranged in August 1204. The Christian raid of 1207 on Homs provoked Muslim reaction from al-'Adil. Leaving Egypt, he first came to Acre, where Muslim prisoners were returned and a peace was agreed. But the major problem was in northern Syria. Around May 1207, raids were carried out near Crac and then in the area of Tripoli, where a considerable amount of damage was done, before peace was once more agreed upon. It seems that as a result of these Muslim raids, the Frankish initiative in northern Syria petered out. In 1256, Muslim raiding around Jaffa was in response to Frankish raids between Gaza and Ascalon.

Many of the raiding expeditions of the Mamluk sultan Baybars appear to have been at least initially prompted by a desire to punish the Franks for some specific offence which they had committed, whether this had been a raid or something else. Baybars' first raid on Acre, in April 1263, was justified partly in this way by both Muslim and Christian sources. The two sides had failed to come to an agreement over an exchange of prisoners, since the Templars and Hospitallers would not return some Muslim captives whom they were maintaining as slaves. And Baybars had been further angered by the Hospitallers' construction of a wall at Arsuf. Serious efforts were made to satisfy Baybars' demands, but terms could only be agreed with John of Jaffa, a
man who had earned the respect of the Muslims in spite of his aggressive attitude towards them throughout the 1250's. Since no general agreement was reached, Baybars carried out a succession of raids against Acre and the area around, despite having previously ordered that no harm should be done to the Christians. In mid-1264, Baybars was told that the Franks had set out from Jaffa in order to carry out a raid. In retaliation for this action and to make it clear to the Christians that such behaviour would not be tolerated, Baybars sent an emir to carry out raids against Caesarea and Château Pèlerin, as a result of which the Frankish assaults were halted. Further threats to the Christians prompted the return of booty which they had seized on their raids. Other instances of retaliatory Muslim raiding which were noted above were an assault by Baybars against Acre in 1267 and one which was directed against Tyre in 1269.

b) As an expression of influence

Raids could also be used by an aggressor as an expression of authority over a subservient neighbour. This situation particularly applied, as we have already seen, in northern Syria where Christian strength relative to their Muslim neighbours was greater than it was further south. At various times in the course of this period, Muslim powers owed tribute to the Christians and some raids had the aim of enforcing these payments, when the Muslims were questioning the authority of the Christians to make such demands. An attack by the Hospitallers against Hamah in 1230 was successfully repulsed by the Muslims between Hamah and Ba'rin: one source for the incident suggested
that this raid was linked to the refusal of Hamah to pay tribute to the Hospitallers. The Assassins were paying tribute to the Hospitallers of Margat in 1212. In 1231, they were attacked by a combined force of Templars and Hospitallers in order to ensure the maintenance of tribute payments. Ba'rin had formed an alliance with Hamah in 1233, but in that year the sultan of Hamah had ceased to pay tribute to the Hospitallers, so a large combined Frankish force was sent to raid Ba'rin. The attack was bought off by the promise of fresh tribute to be paid by Hamah to the Hospitallers, ensuring that a new peace could be established.

The raid could also be used as a means of threatening or coercing a neighbour when diplomacy had proved ineffectual. In 1211, the Templars were joined by a force sent by John of Brienne and by men from Antioch to raid into the territory of Armenia, since the Armenians refused to return the castle of Baghras to the Templars. When Leon of Armenia saw this incursion and the damage which it had caused, he made his peace with the Templars and agreed to return Baghras to them.

c) To damage morale

To suffer as the victim of a raid would obviously be a distressing experience. But it is interesting to see that sometimes, besides the more obvious plundering and destruction perpetrated in the course of almost any raid, attackers also aimed specifically to damage or seize something which might cause a significant loss of confidence in the long term. Damage to a religious object would be especially liable to have such an effect. There were many occasions when either mosques, or
churches, were said to have been destroyed. The attack of the Templars from Jaffa on Nablus in 1242 involved not only the destruction of the mosque, but also the seizure of the minbar on which the khatib said prayers. An even more interesting example occurred during the raid by Baybars in 1263. Having failed to come to terms with the Christian envoys, he sent two emirs to raze the church at Nazareth. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir noted that there was no effective Christian defence against this action, but it must have been a great blow to Christian morale and the same writer discussed the importance of this church to the Christian faith. Only one Christian source from the Latin East, the 'Annales de Terre Sainte', recorded the destruction of the church, but the raid is, not surprisingly, one instance when the consequences were felt in western Europe. In a letter to Louis IX, Urban IV stated that the church had been 'redegit ad solum, ejus structura nobili omnino destructa'. From Baybars' raid on Tripoli of 1268 comes another example of the policy of destroying items whose importance could best be measured in moral terms: Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir remarked that, besides booty and prisoners being taken and more general destruction, there were also churches which were razed.

d) As part of an offensive campaign

For the Muslims, raids were also used in conjunction with sieges to reduce Christian territory. This use of the raid may best be considered by examining some of the campaigns which were organised by Baybars during his sultanate. First, by raiding a Christian strongpoint it was possible to isolate another site which it was intended to assault more seriously. If a strongpoint was occupied in
defending itself from raiders, then it would be in no state to offer any help to another position. This type of raid could also be used in order to distract attention from the principal target of a campaign. Baybars used a raid as a distracting factor in the first of his major campaigns in Palestine, that of 1265, when Caesarea, Arsuf and Haifa all fell to the Muslims. Whilst the attack on Caesarea was still in progress, Baybars sent a party of soldiers up the coast to raid Acre, thus diverting Christian attention from the principal target and reducing the likelihood of any relieving force being sent. Earlier in this study it was seen that the same tactic was used by Baybars in 1266, when the major target of his campaign was Saphet. Raids were simultaneously directed against Tripoli, Acre, Tyre, Sidon and Montfort. On this occasion the diversity of raiding was so great that the Franks cannot have had much idea where any major assault might be directed. The distribution of the raids had been such that any Christian relieving efforts would have been far less effective than might otherwise have been expected.

Similar tactics were used by the Muslims in preparation for the successful siege of Antioch in 1268. They began with a fairly heavy raid on Tripoli, which would surely have distracted Bohemond's immediate attention from the defensive capabilities of Antioch. Then, at Hamah, Baybars divided his force into three groups. One was sent to raid Darbsak, situated about 25 miles north of Antioch and held by the Templars; a second party was ordered against St. Symeon, the port of Antioch. This is interesting as it would have prevented any Frankish aid being sent by sea. Baybars himself moved north past Apamea
following the Orontes before coming to Antioch. By their raiding, the Muslims had almost totally isolated Antioch and had greatly decreased the possibility of a successful defence being conducted. In a similar manner, Baybars prepared for the successful campaign of 1271, when Chastel Blanc, Crac and Gibelcar were all taken, with a raid against Tripoli. This would have served to isolate and weaken potential resistance to Muslim conquests whilst at the same time confusing the Christians. Another diversionary raid also took place in 1271, although the precise date is unknown. Roughly contemporary with the siege of Montfort, Baybars dispatched a seaborne force to attack Cyprus. Al-'Ayni suggested that this was a serious effort to capture the island, but it seems far more probable, as is implied by most other accounts, that it was hoped in this way to distract Christian efforts. With the Lord Edward in the east, the sultan must have feared the potential consequences of a serious Christian counter-offensive. By raiding Cyprus, he would have hoped that this threat would fade away. As has already been noted, although the Muslim ships were able to approach the island, they were subsequently wrecked in the harbour of Limassol.

It was acknowledged even by the Muslim chroniclers on occasions that some Christian strongpoints were too formidable a target to be taken in a single siege campaign. Muslim armies, just as their Christian counterparts, found it virtually impossible to maintain a strong attacking force for any great length of time, particularly at harvest when men were needed elsewhere. One means to help solve this problem was to wear down Christian resistance gradually at any one
point by conducting a number of raiding expeditions against it. Amongst other effects, this would mean that when a determined effort was to be made to capture the position, supplies of food and other requirements were likely to be inadequate to withstand a long siege. It was partly by this tactic that Muslims were able to ensure that sieges never lasted much longer than six weeks. And the isolated position of Christian sites, together with the ferocious Muslim siege methods, meant that resistance from the Christian point of view must often have seemed futile.

Acre was attacked on numerous occasions during the reign of Baybars, though it is quite clear that he never intended any serious assault on its defences. The first time that the sultan came before Acre in 1263, his biographer Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir indicated that this was a reconnaissance raid. But considerable damage was done to the area outside the city, including the destruction of a tower, probably the one at Doc which was held by the Templars. The attack on the city of 1265, which has already been noted as a diversionary raid, would have had the additional value of further weakening Frankish resistance. Baybars was again at Acre in 1266 and in May 1267 he attacked the city on two separate occasions, causing destruction which included the Hospitaller mill at Recordane. In 1269, Baybars was once more at Acre, this time to deal with the Crusade of the Infants, though he undoubtedly used the occasion to weaken further the Frankish position in the area around the city.
Tripoli was also subjected to a number of raids which would serve to weaken its resistance in the event of an attempt being made to capture it. During Baybars' sultanate, the Muslims first raided the city in 1266. Before the siege of Saphet, Tripoli was one of the sites which was attacked by Muslim raiders and a number of fortresses in the area were captured. It was subjected to a more concentrated assault in May 1268, when there was considerable damage done and a number of prisoners were taken and killed. Then early in 1271, before the major assaults of the year against Chastel Blanc, Crac and Gibelcar, Baybars attacked Tripoli once more, killing and capturing some of the inhabitants. In an earlier chapter the debilitating effect of Baybars' raid against Crac in 1270 was noted. The Muslims allowed their horses to roam on the lands around the castle, thereby damaging the Hospitallers' supplies and undoubtedly contributing to the successful Muslim siege campaign which was conducted in the following year.

The Christians were not strong enough to use raids as part of an offensive strategy which also included siege campaigns. On the Fifth Crusade they used raiding expeditions to weaken the Muslims as part of a general offensive, but such expeditions were never intended to link up with simultaneous or subsequent siege campaigns; nor were they even in the earlier years of the thirteenth century when the Christians did attempt to capture strongholds which were in Muslim hands. But as their weakness worsened during the thirteenth century, the relative importance to them of the raid grew. It would have been inappropriate for them to have attempted to acquire territory which would almost
certainly have been lost again in a short space of time. But it was vital that they should retain the ability to attack their neighbours and to take advantage of any increased size of the army which resulted, especially, from a crusade. But when major expeditions in the twelfth century would have been aiming to acquire new territory, by the later years of the thirteenth century large Christian armies were gathered to achieve the short-term results of a raid into territory which would still belong to the enemy when the raid had been completed. The raid of 1266 towards Tiberias, for example, was a large co-operative venture, as so many of these expeditions seem to have been. The willingness of all the Military Orders, the troops who were maintained in the Latin East by the French crown, a large Cypriot force and many others from Acre, to take part in this raid indicates the importance of such an expedition to the Christians. Conversely, the failure of the raid to achieve anything, because of poor discipline which allowed a Muslim ambush to succeed, must have been a heavy blow to them when such an expedition was virtually their only positive reaction to the campaigns of Baybars during this period. The growing power of the Muslims was illustrated by two events during the raid. Muslim troops from the recently-acquired fortress of Saphet, which provided them with a forward base for strikes against Christian coastal positions and with an advance line of defence, were amongst those who ambushed the advance guard of the Christian army at Careblier, about eight miles south-east of Acre. And many of the Latins who escaped the battle were subsequently killed by Muslim peasants who lived in the neighbourhood and were anxious to obtain booty. The Latins were still the masters, but their subjects were not afraid to rise in rebellion if
a good opportunity presented itself. Moreover, the confidence of the Muslims is illustrated by their willingness to take on this Christian force so near to Acre, the Christian capital.\textsuperscript{127}

The Crusade of the Lord Edward was unable, because of the desperate military situation in the area, to hope for any long-term gain. It had to be content with short-term injury to the Muslims, in the form of two raiding expeditions. But the large and corporate force which went on the raid towards St. George emphasized the significance that both the Christians in the Latin East and the crusaders saw in such an action. The force included all the Military Orders, the men of Acre and the English crusaders; for the raid against Qaqun later in 1271, these were joined by Hugh of Lusignan and forces from Cyprus, though they were probably on the first expedition as well.\textsuperscript{128} It is possible, however, that this expedition against Qaqun was of rather more significance than the first raid. Some sources indicate that the crusaders besieged the castle, doing considerable damage before they were obliged to withdraw. Qaqun, moreover, was an important base for the Muslims in their efforts to re-establish their authority on the coastal plain. Since the capture of Caesarea and Arsuf in 1265 it had been the focal point for a number of Muslim centres of population (such as Tour Rouge and Calansue) both for administrative and protective purposes. It was particularly important as a defence against possible attacks from Château Pèlerin.\textsuperscript{129}
The results of raiding

Whatever the reasons for carrying out a raid, the effects of such an expedition seem to have been fairly consistent. They would normally have included damage to the land of an area and damage to buildings, besides the killing of a number of the enemy. It was also normal for prisoners and plunder to be taken.

Most chroniclers were concerned with giving an overall impression of what a raid involved rather than noting precisely what took place on a specific expedition. Since much of the relevant information has in any case been referred to above, it is sufficient here to consider the consequences of two well-documented raids. In 1271, English crusaders combined with troops from the Military Orders and men from Acre besides, possibly, a large infantry force, in a raid towards St. George. Crops were ravaged and burned, and grain was seized. The village itself was demolished and heavy casualties were inflicted on the local population. Finally, the Christians seized both large and small animals. In 1263, Baybars attacked Acre for the first time. On this occasion trees were cut down, and fruit and gardens were burned. Walls were destroyed, as well as a tower — presumably the Templars' fortified mill at Doc. Many people were killed; others were taken prisoner, including four knights and 30 infantry from the tower, though they may have later been released. Finally, the Muslims seized cattle and other booty.

Amongst the most significant physical damage that a raid was liable to achieve was the plundering and destruction of gardens,
orchards and crops, besides upsetting the system of irrigation which was particularly essential to the cultivation of sugar-cane and for mills and gardens. Such actions would undoubtedly have had a profound weakening effect upon the victims of such an assault. This could be in the short-term, when a harvest was seized by the enemy, or in the long-term, when the burning of fields and orchards, or the tearing up of trees would have had consequences for the land that would take a number of years to correct. Oliver of Termes and John of Joinville used an interesting technique to set fire to a field of corn during their retreat from Banyas in 1253. On Oliver's advice, they stuffed burning charcoal into hollow canes and then plunged the canes into the threshed corn. It has been suggested that the effects of raids in this period were felt for many centuries. The destruction of the aqueduct at Tripoli by the Muslims is an example of how agriculture could be affected. Most raids aimed in some respect to deal a blow to the agricultural system of the enemy and the cumulative effect of this policy must have been considerable.

Victims of raids were also injured by the destruction of their houses and of other buildings. In the longer term this may not have proved as disastrous as the destruction of the fields, but it was, nevertheless, an effective means by which raiders could harm the enemy. The destruction of religious sites such as churches and mosques has already been noted. The dismantling of towers and walls during Muslim raids was a means of preparing for a possible future siege. Though information is very limited, it may be presumed that any unprotected persons in the path of a raid would almost inevitably suffer. But such
expeditions did involve more than just the destruction of persons and property. They also presented an opportunity to make some profit in the form of the acquisition of people, or of plunder. The taking of prisoners would presumably be agreed upon by the raiders beforehand, since it would involve some amount of organisation and the prevention of troops from slaughtering everyone that they encountered. Prisoners could be useful as a bartering element if members of one's own side had been seized by the enemy. There was little point in holding them captive, since they might just as well be killed, but they could be put to work by their captors as slaves, noted earlier in this study at the building of Saphet. Some Christian accounts stated that Muslims were made slaves by raiders and some of these would no doubt subsequently have found their way to the important slave market in Acre. The Military Orders employed slaves on a regular basis. Some prisoners might be more fortunate; in 1269, for example, Baybars sent back some women and children he had captured in the course of a raid on Tyre, whilst of the captives seized by the crusaders who raided in Palestine in 1217-18, Oliver of Paderborn noted that some of the younger ones were baptised by James of Vitry.

Raids also presented an opportunity to take booty, of varying kinds. Most accounts simply stated that much booty had been taken, but when further information was provided, this suggested that both Muslims and Christians concentrated their attention on animals, seizing what appear to have been fair-sized flocks. Livestock was relatively scarce in the area of the Latin East, and had been since ancient
so the removal and acquisition of flocks would have been important both to Muslims and Christians.

Conclusion

Raids could weaken an enemy and undermine his morale, whilst at the same time offering the opportunity of profit to the raiders with little risk of disaster, providing that the scheme was well organised and the force did not encounter a large body of opposing troops. The Muslims used the raid as a part of their overall strategy to weaken the Christians and prepare them for capitulation through later use of the siege. For the Christians, as the thirteenth century wore on so the raid became increasingly their sole means of showing any aggressive intent. It was, particularly when they lacked the support of large numbers of crusaders, almost the only positive aspect of their military policy during this period. The fact that both sides, for whatever reason, placed a great emphasis on the use of raiding expeditions meant that the peculiarly destructive powers of such enterprises were constantly unleashed on the unprotected peoples of the region. Those least able to cope had to face the consequences of Muslim expansionism and the final military gestures of the shrinking Latin Kingdom.
NOTES


2. For example, Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 200-1.


5. 'Rothelin', pp. 533-48, passim; see above, page 241.


7. Ibid., pp. 213-6, 252-3.


19. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 403-5.


30. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 261-3; Chronique d'Ernoul, pp. 357-9.


33. See below, page 280.


36. Ibid., pp. 706-7.

37. Ibid., pp. 516, 561.


39. See below, page 281.


42. Ibid., pp. 729-30.


45. 'Eracles', ii, p. 258; *Chronique d'Ernoul*, p. 354.


47. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 259-60.


51. 'Eracles', ii, p. 317.


53. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 403-4.


55. 'Rothelin', p. 533.


57. 'Rothelin', p. 539.

58. Ibid., p. 630.


60. Abu Shama, 'Livre des deux jardins', v, p. 204.


62. Ibid., loc. cit.


64. 'Eracles', ii, p. 455; *Gestes des Chiprois*, pp. 181-2.


67. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 454; *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 200 (which does not mention the Teutonic Knights).

69. *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 200 (which does not mention the Teutonic Knights or the footsoldiers); 'Eracles', ii, p. 461.


74. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 323-4; Oliver of Paderborn, *Historia*, pp. 164-5.

75. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 404-5.


77. 'Histoire des Patriarches', pp. 298-9.


83. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 324-5.


85. 'Rothelin', p. 535.

86. 'Eracles', ii, p. 260.


88. 'Rothelin', pp. 533-4, 538-9, 541.


90. 'Rothelin', p. 630.

91. 'Eracles', ii, p. 260.

93. 'Rothelin', pp. 541-2; see above, pages 241-2.
94. 'Eracles', ii, p. 260.
96. 'Eracles', ii, p. 404.
98. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 258-63.
100. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 261-3; Ibn al-Athir, 'Kamel-Altevarykh', ii, pp. 95-6; Chronique d'Ernoul, pp. 357-9.
103. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Life of Baybars, pp. 447-62, passim; Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 167-8; 'Eracles', ii, pp. 446-7; Riley-Smith, Feudal Nobility, p. 27.
108. 'Annales de Dunstaplia', p. 128.
109. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 403-5.
110. Ibid., pp. 317-8; see Riley-Smith, 'Templars and Teutonic Knights', p. 106.
114. Ibid., pp. 556, 558.


136. See above, page 132.


140. Prawer, 'Palestinian Agriculture', p. 185.
CHAPTER VI

SIEGES

Introduction

The fate of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem in the thirteenth century was determined by a succession of siege campaigns which were conducted by Muslim armies throughout the period and with particular effect after the succession of Baybars to the Mamluk sultanate. Other forms of military activity were therefore largely incidental. Raids, when used by the Muslim armies, could help to weaken a Christian site as part of the long-term preparation for a siege. Battles could decimate the manpower which was normally available and, as in the case of Hattin in 1187, have such a decisive effect that many subsequent sieges presented few difficulties to the victorious Muslims. But neither raids nor battles were on their own a determining factor in the military history of the Second Kingdom. Both allowed the possibility of recovery, a process which would normally be heavily reliant on the protection which was afforded by the strongpoints. If the strongpoints themselves had succumbed to enemy pressure then the recovery process was made, at best, considerably more difficult.

Sieges were therefore fundamental in the military history of this period, because the possession of strongpoints was the principal means of controlling territory, and strongpoints would, ordinarily, only change hands as a consequence of a military campaign - although some sites were acquired by treaty. The prime importance of the siege was
recognised by contemporaries: the Latins' manpower in the thirteenth century was geared to operate principally as a series of garrison forces within the strongpoints. Additional troops enabled the Latins to undertake operations which they would not normally have attempted. But the garrison and the strongpoint which it protected were the obstacles which the Muslims had to overcome if they were to recover the Holy Land from the Christians. After the heavy Latin losses at La Forbie in 1244, for example, the Khorezmians were able to seize much of the Christian territory on the coastal plain; but the Christians still controlled the area because they maintained possession of their strongpoints. The means by which sieges were undertaken and the defences which could be used against an assault are thus the most important element in a study of the Latin Kingdom's military history.

Siege warfare was of similar importance during the twelfth century and the siege campaign had a simplicity throughout the 200 years of the Latin Kingdom's existence: the defenders placed a series of obstacles in the way of the attackers, who were required to overcome these obstructions by the means at their disposal. But the military conditions in the thirteenth century were somewhat different from those of the earlier period. For much of the twelfth century the Latins were the aggressors, attempting to increase the size of their territories. In the century following the Third Crusade, recovery of territory by the Latins was generally by diplomatic rather than military means - though sometimes diplomacy was backed by the potential threat resulting from the presence of a crusade army in the area. With the progressive Muslim expansion, particularly in the second-half of the
century, which ended with the eradication of the Christians through the
fall of the remaining Latin strongholds in 1291, it is perhaps even
more true than of the twelfth century that the ability to take or to
maintain the strongholds of the Latin Kingdom was decisive. From
1244, the fate of the kingdom was decided by the intermittent loss of
territory occasioned by a series of sieges. At no point did either the
Muslims or the Christians attempt to accelerate or halt this pattern of
events by resorting to a pitched battle.

The abortive siege of Mt. Tabor in 1218, the attack on Banyas in
1253 and the purported siege of Qaqun by the Lord Edward in 1271 are
rare instances of Christian sieges against a Muslim target during this
period. But information from the Latin Kingdom can be added to by use
of the extensive accounts from the siege of Damietta by the Fifth
Crusade and the sources which described the conflict between Imperial
and pro-Ibelin forces on the mainland and in Cyprus, from the 1220's to
the 1240's. These materials vary from a one-line reference to the fall
of a castle or city in a set of annals, to a work which is almost
entirely devoted to a particular siege, such as Oliver of Paderborn's
'Historia Damiatina', a detailed eye-witness account of the methods
employed by the Fifth Crusade during the siege of Damietta. It is thus
possible to examine the Christians' techniques as besiegers, as well as
defenders against a Muslim attack. Some sieges naturally attracted far
more attention than others. The shock of the fall of Acre in 1291 is
reflected in the fact that nearly 70 sources for it have to be
considered though many of this number are, in fact, largely repetitive.
But the expulsion of the Imperialists from the Latin East as a result of the siege of Tyre in 1243 was recorded in only five accounts.

There are problems connected with the sources (largely, narrative accounts) on which it is necessary to rely for information. There is not much that can be gained from the simple statement that in any given year, a castle or town was besieged by either the Christians or the Muslims; even the dating was often inaccurate. When slightly more information was given, it normally indicated the number of persons who were involved in the siege. These figures must be treated with circumspection: the writers were often trying simply to create an impression of vast size, or of the dominance which one side enjoyed over the other. Estimates of the Muslim forces at the siege of Acre in 1291, for example, varied from 70,000 mounted and 150,000 foot to 600,000 men, yet both may be wild guesses. The so-called 'Templar of Tyre' who produced the former estimate was an eye-witness and therefore in as good a position to know as anyone. But it would have been almost impossible to number accurately a force which contained hundreds of thousands of men. Even more unlikely is the statement that al-Ashraf engaged 666 engines in this siege, a reflection of religious fervour rather than numerical accuracy. The question of numbers of men and machines involved in sieges will be examined in more detail later.

A further problem with the sources is that accounts of a particular siege may merely reflect a stereotyped model of a typical encounter, rather than being an accurate report. Many writers were simply too far
from the action, and possessed too limited a geographical awareness, for them to describe a siege in the Latin East accurately. In spite of these reservations, however, much material is of excellent quality, including a number of eye-witness accounts. From these, an attempt will be made to deal with a number of aspects of siege warfare. Rather than consider sieges individually, an overall view of siege warfare in and around the Latin Kingdom will be presented. This method appears preferable since it avoids an over-reliance on any particular source, which may give an inaccurate impression. It is further justified because although a century of warfare is being considered, the sources available suggest that there was little development in the methods of attack and defence employed during sieges in this period.

**Siege weapons**

It is possible that some refinements were achieved during this time, but the weapons which were used remained substantially the same throughout the course of the thirteenth century. Moreover, the same basic weapons appear to have been used by both Muslims and Christians for defence and attack, although two exceptions will be noted. The first means of taking a strongpoint was to get over the walls, for which a simple ladder could be used, as in one account of the capture of Damietta. A rather more complex means of entering a site in this fashion was by the use of the siege tower, a device which was exposed to assaults from the walls and also required fairly smooth ground for it to gain access to the target. If it proved impossible to get over the walls, then a solution might be found in smashing them down. This could be achieved by a variety of devices which launched stones and
other projectiles. The principal engines in use in the thirteenth century were the mangonel, petrary and trebuchet, all of which are encountered in the Latin East. There are, however, problems regarding terminology in the sources. It is to be presumed that 'tunbereaus', for example, were a variety of mangonel. The mangonel worked on the principle of torsion, that is the twisting of cords and ropes to produce force by which to propel the projectile. The most recently developed and the most effective of the ballistic weapons was the counterweight trebuchet. It was operated by the sudden release of heavy weights and was frequently referred to in accounts as having caused a considerable amount of damage.  

In addition to ballistic machines which attempted to wreck the walls from a distance, other devices were effective when close access to the walls had been achieved. The use of the ram and the bore would appear to have been infrequent in the Latin East, though they may simply have been such obvious devices to contemporaries as not to have warranted a mention. Once the fosse had been successfully surmounted, these devices were immediately brought into use against the walls. Reference is more commonly made to the use of the mine. This could be dug in order to cause the walls or towers of a stronghold to collapse, or to go under the defences and thereby gain access to the centre of a strongpoint.

Attackers who were close to the walls of a city or castle clearly required protection from the efforts of defenders. For this, the most simple expedient was the use of the mantlet, a wooden shelter. More
sophisticated was the 'cat' or 'gattus', a type of penthouse which was used to protect men who were mining, using the ram or the bore, or generally assaulting the walls. Not only was it regarded as a valuable means for besiegers to gain direct access to the walls: it was deployed in a defensive capacity by Christians at the siege of Acre, to prevent the Muslims from entering the city. The cat was not only employed during sieges. Before the battle of Mansurah, two devices called 'chas-chastiaus' were used to protect men working to build a causeway across to the Muslim army on the opposite bank of the river. They appear to have been cats incorporated into the design of a tower. The crusaders tried to protect the cats from a Muslim bombardment of stones and Greek fire, but their efforts were in vain and the cats were burned. Another cat was constructed and once more the Muslims were able to set fire to it. Joinville very honestly admitted his relief at the second cat being burned: it meant that he and his men did not have the hazardous duty of protecting it during the night.

The weapons which were used in defence were precisely the same as those used in attack. Defenders sometimes chose to dig counter-mines against the mining operations of the aggressors and sorties could be made against enemy positions. Two weapons seem to have been peculiar to the Muslims in this period. Greek fire was a highly inflammable mixture which was not quenched by water. This was used by the Muslims in both attack and defence. Secondly, there was the cazabaha, a hand-held sling which was used for hurling stones. It was noted by Christian sources that these caused considerable damage at the siege of Acre in 1291. They could be used for rapid firing,
thus causing more damage than bigger engines. Finally, ships were important in an area where so many of the strongpoints were situated on the coast. They played a vital role in the siege of Damietta, for example, whilst their employment as a weapon of defence was noted at the siege of Acre in 1291 by the Muslim eye-witness, Abu'l-Fida. The varied uses, and effectiveness, of siege engines will be examined in more detail later when the tactics used by attackers and defenders are considered.

The numbers of men and weapons

There is some repetition in this table from an earlier one listing garrison numbers in the Latin East.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CHRISTIAN FORCES</th>
<th>MUSLIM FORCES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEN</td>
<td>WEAPONS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa, 1197</td>
<td>20,000 killed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Tabor, 1217</td>
<td>1,400 knights; 8 mangonels were aimed at Damietta from the Holy Land. 42,000 others; 400 knights from the west bank. 1,200 mounted troops excluding turcopoles and other mounted, innumerable footsoldiers,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Damietta, 1218-19 | 300 men in the Chain Tower | 45,000 garrison at start of siege | The Muslims tried to send a force of 500 men into Damietta. Total population of
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Christian Forces</th>
<th>Muslim Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Men</td>
<td>Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesarea, 1218</td>
<td>4,000 archers</td>
<td>60,000, but this declined to 3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Château Pèlerin, 1220</td>
<td>4,000 warriors fed daily, excluding those who were there at their own expense.</td>
<td>Trebuchet, petrary and mangonel destroyed the Muslim engines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem, 1229</td>
<td>15,000 men on foot attacked the city.</td>
<td>Trebuchet, 3 petraries and 4 mangonels.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dieudamour, 1229-30</td>
<td>A constant Ibelin force of 100 knights and many foot-soldiers was maintained.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut, 1231-2</td>
<td>The Ibelins sent a total force of 100 knights, sergeants and others into the citadel.</td>
<td>Imperial forces attacked with 'un grand trabuchet', 3 smaller trabuchets and 6 'tunbareaus'.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before the arrival of Filangieri at Beirut, their forces were made up of 300 knights and 200 crossbow-men/mounted sergeants.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Christian Forces</th>
<th>Muslim Forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia, 1232-3</td>
<td>Filangieri left a garrison of 50 knights and 1,000 arbalesters/sailors.</td>
<td>13 Genoese ships employed by the Ibelins: and they built 2 siege towers, petraries, mangonels and great trebuchets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem, 1239</td>
<td>20 knights in the Tower of David.</td>
<td>8 galleys and 2 'galions' from Cyprus; Or, 8 galleys from Cyprus, 15 galleys and 50 other ships from Acre.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascalon, 1244-7</td>
<td>100 knights sent to relieve the siege. An alternative source only reports that sergeants were sent.</td>
<td>Over 50 or 60 ballistic machines in the city.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre, 1257-8</td>
<td>800 armed men in the Genoese quarter, besides other people.</td>
<td>A garrison of 2,000, 90 Hospitallers were captured or killed, 1,000 others taken prisoner. Or, garrison of 1,000 captured and killed, including 80/410 Hospitallers. Or, more than 1,000 knights and sergeants captured.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHRISTIAN FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Saphet, 1266 | 2,000 Christians taken and subsequently slaughtered.\(^4\)
| Beaufort, 1268 | 2,200.\(^4\) |
| Antioch, 1268 | 1,000 men able to fight.\(^4\) or, 8,000 warriors in the citadel.\(^4\) |
| Chastel Blanc, 1271 | 700 men; it is unclear if this was the garrison force.\(^4\) |
| Crac, 1271 | Estimate, 1212, of garrison total of 2,000.\(^4\) |
| Margat, 1281 | 600 mounted |
| Margat, 1285 | 25 Hospitallers allowed to leave the castle with their horses and arms; this was probably the full Hospitaller contingent. |
| Tripoli, 1289 | 40,000 mounted, 200,000 foot.\(^4\) 1,500 stone-cutters, miners and workers.\(^4\) |
| Acre, 1291 | Total population of 30-40,000; 7/800 mounted |

### MUSLIM FORCES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WEAPONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 big engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 big engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalavun left a garrison after its capture of 1,000 soldiers, 150 Mamluks, and 400 workmen.(^5)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40,000 mounted, 200,000 foot.(^4) 1,500 stone-cutters, miners and workers.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70,000 mounted, and 150,000 foot.(^4) Or,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 big engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 big engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14 big engines.(^4)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
This table does not include, in general, references to population figures and the relative sparseness of numbers relating to siege engines ignores the fact that such devices were referred to at almost every siege, though rarely with any indication of the precise number present. The figures are far from exhaustive: particularly in the case of the siege of Acre, a wide range of estimates was given in the sources. The statistics from Arsuf in 1265 indicate how greatly estimates could vary: it is wrong to make too much of them. There are, however, points which can be noted. First, it is clear that most sieges involved fairly limited numbers of men and arms. The small force which was sent to Jaffa in 1197 in order to relieve it, was said
to have failed, not owing to its small size but because its commander, Renaud Barlais, proved himself incapable of conducting a satisfactory defence. In order to maintain an adequate blockade of a castle, as at Dieudamour in 1229-30, it appears that hundreds, rather than thousands, of men were required. Further examples from the Ibelin-Lombard conflict confirm this impression. At the siege of Beirut, the entry of 100 men into the citadel appears to have enabled the Ibelin troops to seize the initiative from the Imperial forces. At Kyrenia, Richard Filangieri was content to leave a garrison of about 150 men, yet they were still able to hold out for some ten months. It may be that there were other men present in the castle, since it has been noted earlier that the troops of a garrison might constitute only a small proportion of the total manpower of a strongpoint, but the complete force could not have been more than a few hundred. The statistics which deal with the Ibelin-Lombard war are particularly valuable since most of them came from Philip of Novara, who, as a leading figure on the Ibelin side, appreciated the situation.

An earlier examination of the size of castle garrisons in the Latin Kingdom suggested that even in the very largest castles, total numbers would not have exceeded 2,000 men and probably only a small proportion of these would have been knights or members of the Military Orders. At the siege of Acre in 1291 the city, according to the 'Templar of Tyre' who was present, could only raise 700-800 knights, a figure which presumably included the Military Orders, mercenaries, pilgrims and others. It is no wonder that the arrival of Henry of Cyprus was greeted with joy. But forces which could be numbered in hundreds,
although effective against a Christian assault involving small numbers of men, stood little chance against the large Muslim armies which could be gathered. The vast reserves of manpower which Muslim commanders seem, on occasions, to have been able to draw upon, were perhaps the single most important reason behind the series of successful siege campaigns which were organised in the second-half of the thirteenth century. At the siege of Acre, it would appear, if the figures for the Muslims are accurate, that the Christians were outnumbered by at least fifteen to one. The similarity in the weapons which the two sides possessed made such a numerical advantage all the more decisive: it means that accusations of cowardice which were put forward by some western writers with regard to the Christian defenders were unjustified.

The number of engines which were quoted as being used in a siege indicate that they were relatively few - the three petraries used against Caesarea in 1218 is a good example of this. It is clear from these and other figures which have been considered that a comparatively small number of men decided the fate of the Latin Kingdom by the capture or maintenance of strongpoints. And it may be that, as in the sieges of Acre and Antioch, for example, the enlisting of the populace as an element in a defence force led to an artificially inflated figure. The low numbers also reflect the problems of manpower shortages which the Latins faced throughout this period. This was a constant factor in their efforts to defend their fortified sites.
Preparations for sieges

The success, or otherwise, of a siege could be decided by the preparations which were made before the assault had even begun. But the materials available only allow a glimpse of this essential aspect of siege warfare. Some of the best information comes from Christian activity on the Fifth Crusade. Before the crusaders set off from Acre, it was necessary to acquire galleys and other vessels, besides enough food for six months, along with horses and baggage. When the army arrived in Egypt, it was similarly meticulous in its arrangements. On the west bank, the troops surrounded their camp with a fosse and a wall and they were at pains to produce a similarly well-defended position when they were able to cross to the east bank in February, 1219. They protected their camp with a fosse and palisades, and they established towers and a rampart, behind which were archers and other combatants. Bridges across the Nile facilitated easy communication with the Christians who were still on the west bank and ships provided further protection for the Christian position.

The preparation of the siege train varied depending on the geography of the region, the proximity of friendly sites and the degree of advance planning which had been undertaken. Some siege engines were transported ready-made to the scene but often they were constructed on the spot. At Beirut in 1231, the attacking Imperialists had not only many engineers, but also the materials needed to construct machines — timber, iron and lead. At Kyrenia, Philip Chenart, the commander of the Imperial garrison, had a number of engineers at his disposal, so he constructed trebuchets, petraries and mangonels. At
the siege of Ascalon in 1247, the Muslims were not so careful in their preparations. As a result of a storm their fleet was wrecked, but from the hulks they were able to construct cats, mantlets, covered ways and, with some trees, additional engines which they needed to complete the siege of the castle. From accounts of the campaigns of Baybars it seems, however, that Muslim commanders had become very particular about this aspect of the siege. Whilst the sultan examined the defences of Arsuf and Caesarea, prior to the commencement of activities against the latter, wood for siege engines, ammunition and supplies all arrived. Engines and ladders were made, and some engines were sent from nearby Muslim fortresses, whilst troops went into the mountains to prepare stakes, presumably as a defence against a possible Christian counter-assault. At the siege of Arsuf, wood was brought in order to construct defensive palisades. Against Beaufort in 1268, the Muslims again transported timber for engines and for the reinforcement of defensive positions. Fidenzio of Padua saw for himself, at the siege of Antioch in the same year, how meticulously the Muslim army had set up its camp around the city.

Later Muslim campaigns were also notable for careful planning. For the siege of Margat, Kalavun ordered engines from Damascus, along with other engines, fire and naptha: the Muslim soldiers carried engines to Margat on their backs and heads. Al-Ashraf made careful preparations for the siege of Acre. Wood was prepared in Syria for the construction of machines and Muslim forces were assembled from Damascus, Cairo, Syria, Hamah and Tripoli, with a variety of engines and arsenals. In the eye-witness account of Abu'l-Fida there is a record
of some of the problems which the men of Hamah encountered in the transportation of their weapons to Acre. The Muslims also took great care in establishing themselves once they arrived before Acre. The troops spent some days preparing their defences, trenches and palisades and setting up their engines around the walls.

It is very rare for information to be given about the preliminary arrangements which defenders made before a siege. At Acre in 1291, the Christians prepared their defensive positions with stones, engines, palisades, arrows, lances and hooks, whilst at the same time it was determined whom should defend which parts of the city. In preparation for the siege of Tripoli, most of the military forces in the kingdom forgot their differences and gathered to help in the city's defence, including Amalric of Lusignan with many knights and soldiers, the Templars and Hospitallers and the troops of the French regiment. The Venetians, Genoese and Pisans all sent galleys which may have prevented an even worse slaughter than actually took place.

During the course of a siege the result could be affected by the ability of attackers and defenders to maintain an acceptable level of men and arms, or even to increase it by outside aid. One of the great problems for the aggressor was to keep an army together and prevent the collapse of a siege, especially a long one. In a crusade, the problem was accentuated because many participants were under no contractual obligation to remain with the army. During the siege of Damietta, May 1219 seems to have been a time of crisis for the crusade as many pilgrims, including the Duke of Austria, decided to go home.
But the arrival of a new passage from the west maintained the army's strength and enabled it to continue the siege effectively. At this difficult time, the legate Pelagius was reported to have offered an additional indulgence in order to keep the army together. The problem arose again in September of the same year. At the siege of Dieudamour, 1229-30, John of Ibelin faced a similar situation: he was forced to take rents from Cyprus in order to keep the siege going, presumably for the payment of mercenaries and the maintenance of supplies. The number of besiegers at Dieudamour continued to decline, however, and eventually reached such a low level that the defenders were able to conduct a successful sortie in order to take supplies which they desperately needed. The Ibelins therefore agreed to maintain a permanent force of 100 knights and many footsoldiers: the siege was subsequently completed successfully.

Efforts could also be made to increase the size of the garrison within a beleaguered stronghold. In the course of the siege of Jaffa in 1197, Aimery of Lusignan tried unsuccessfully to help the town by sending a force there under Renaud Barlais. At the siege of Damietta, al-Kamil tried to increase the strength of the city by sending in both supplies and men. His ingenious efforts included the filling of empty animals' carcasses with food which the defenders hooked with long poles as they floated down river, but the crusaders were able to thwart most of these efforts. At Caesarea in 1218, the Genoese sent men, arms and supplies in to bolster the defence, but they proved inadequate and had to be rescued themselves. During the siege of Château Pèlerin in 1220, one contemporary wrote that there were at
least 4,000 troops within the castle, which suggests that the normal
garrison had been considerably augmented. It was believed that al-
Mu'azzam later terminated the siege at the prospect of further
reinforcements arriving. The position of the Ibelin forces at the
siege of Beirut was considerably enhanced by the achievement of John of
Ibelin, who sent a shipload of 100 men into the citadel and thus broke
the Imperial sea blockade. After this the Ibelins were far more
successful in countering the Imperial assault on the castle. The
maintenance of supplies was important when a siege became a matter of
attrition. The Genoese quarter in Acre was besieged for more than a
year during the War of St. Sabas, but the defenders were never short of
food despite efforts to blockade them. The Hospitallers were able to
keep their Genoese allies supplied, since their buildings were adjacent
to the Genoese quarter. Supplies and troops also reached the Genoese,
via the Hospitaller quarter, from their ally Philip of Montfort at
Tyre. But at the siege of Acre in 1291, the number of defenders fell
from 18,000 to 12,000 as men fled to escape the Muslims. And when
Henry of Cyprus left, it was reported that 3,000 men went with him.

The besiegers

Forms of the siege in the Latin East during this period varied
considerably between two extremes. The attacking force might prove so
dominant that it could almost immediately capture the target by a
violent assault or, if it was not, the siege could become a matter of
maintaining an effective blockade and harassing the defenders
sufficiently to cause them eventually to surrender, often because of
famine, but also because they came to realise that there was no hope of
succour. The rapid fall of Antioch in 1268 is a good example of the former type, whilst the siege of Damietta on the Fifth Crusade typifies the latter. Between the two extreme forms lie the great majority of cases from the thirteenth century.

a) The Christians

The first elements in use were siege engines. Their value was noted, in a negative sense, at the siege of Mt. Tabor in 1217, when the Christians attempted to gain possession of the site without their use. This was possibly because the slope was too precipitous for them to have been brought into position and used effectively. But the attackers were forced to abandon the siege and the 'Eracles' account suggested that it was the absence of engines that rendered this assault ineffective. At the siege of Damietta it was noted that petraries and trebuchets were of no use against the Chain Tower, although apparently they were tried for many days. This reflects on the one hand the limitations of these devices but on the other an appreciation by contemporaries of their value in the right circumstances. There is further evidence of the relative inefficiency of the ballistic siege engines at the siege of Damietta. One source suggested that the large number of trebuchets and mangonels lined up against the city were of little use and, therefore, other methods had to be employed which involved the Christians moving themselves closer to the walls. This placed them in far greater peril from the defenders. Oliver of Paderborn, in his eye-witness account, suggested that only one tower in the city had been damaged, by the repeated blows of the trebuchet of the Duke of Austria. But the 'Eracles' account indicated that the
damage to one of the great corner-towers, which the defenders were too weak to repair, had been done by the Hospitallers' engine. Yet apart from this, the only references to the suffering of the besieged Muslims at Damietta were in terms of plague and famine, caused by the length of the siege and the effectiveness of the crusaders' blockade. There was no indication that they were seriously affected by the siege engines.

But the difficulties encountered in the building and setting up of these engines must have been felt to be justified, because as soon as the crusaders arrived on the west bank opposite Damietta in mid-1218, they set up eight mangonels to keep up a constant barrage against the city. Oliver of Paderborn indicated some of the uses to which siege engines were put in the early stages of this siege: the Muslims had a bridge which ran from the city to the Chain Tower, to which a great deal of damage was done by engines on the west bank, as well as by archers firing from a ship. Once the Christians had successfully established themselves on the east bank, their assaults on the city included the use of trebuchets and petraries, but as already noted, these may not have proved particularly effective. In some later sieges in the Latin East, ballistic siege engines did prove their worth. At the siege of Kantara, 1229-30, Philip of Novara stressed the importance to the Ibelin assault of a trebuchet built there by Anseau of Brie. It was even suggested that the departure of John of Ibelin from the siege of Dieudamour to inspect this engine was a factor in the subsequent successful sortie by the defenders of that castle. At Kantara, however, the trebuchet clearly had the desired effect. The walls of the castle were almost completely shattered, though the rock
on which it was built was very tough and impossible to scale. At the siege of Beirut, engines which the Lombard forces had constructed proved to be similarly effective, having been well placed to inflict the maximum possible damage.

Reference was made to petraries, mangonels and trebuchets at the siege of Kyrenia in 1232-33. They served to weaken the walls sufficiently for an assault to be undertaken, although this failed. But John of Ibelin, regretting the number of men lost in this assault, indicated that he was quite content to let the siege be concluded by attrition. Philip of Novara, reflecting on the high costs incurred in terms of sergeants and galleys, believed that the strategic value of Kyrenia justified the expense. At Tyre in 1243, the Ibelins attacked with engines and petraries which are reported to have done much damage to the citadel. During the War of St. Sabas, siege engines were said to have had a devastating impact. In 1257-58, the Genoese quarter of Acre was under siege from the Venetians, Pisans and others. The large number of engines in use — as many as sixty — were firing day and night. The power of these machines was so great that the author of the Gestes des Chiprois named some of them. The Genoese used engines which he called 'Bonerel', 'Vincuguerre' and 'Peretin', whilst the Venetians had one called 'Marquemose'. By the end of the siege in 1258, the city looked as if it had been destroyed by a Muslim army. In the right circumstances, ballistic weapons could exert a powerful influence on the outcome of a siege, whether they were used as a decisive element in themselves, as at Kantara, or as an integrated element of an overall strategy, as noted at Kyrenia in 1232-33.
Another aspect of aggressive siege tactics involved weapons which, in order to be effective, needed to be close to the walls of a strongpoint. This often required as a prerequisite the successful filling of the fosse, as in the Christian assault on Damietta, for example. The simplest device was the ladder, such as the one which was used against Mt. Tabor in 1217. The crusaders succeeded in placing a huge ladder against the wall of a tower, but the Muslims managed to burn it with Greek fire. At Damietta, the crusaders' use of the ladder was more successful. The remarkable craft which Oliver of Paderborn and the Frisians constructed in order to assault the Chain Tower in the middle of the Nile had a ladder incorporated into its design and it was by means of this that the crusaders captured the tower, despite serious damage to the ladder by fire. A more complex construction than the ladder was the siege tower. Historians have stressed the importance of this device in medieval sieges, but in the Latin East it appears to have been used sparingly and to little effect. At Damietta the crusaders constructed wooden towers, but these do not seem to have played a major part in the siege. At the siege of Kyrenia, the Ibelins built two great siege towers that were successfully brought over the fosse and against the wall. But the defenders were able to set fire to them, forcing the Ibelin knights to rescue their infantry who were in them. A rather different type of tower played an important role in the Lombards' siege of Beirut. At 'Chaufor', the Lombards built a tower which overlooked the castle of Beirut and were therefore able to inflict considerable damage on the defenders.
The other major siege engine in use in the Latin East was the cat. At Damietta, with the ineffectiveness of ballistic weapons, the crusaders placed great emphasis on the role that the cat could play—presumably in gaining direct access and causing damage to the walls. Such a device, supported by ballistic engines and wooden towers, was to be used to destroy a tower, in July 1219. In August of the same year, the crusaders had constructed a huge cat encased in iron with which, they believed, they could capture the city. Unfortunately on both occasions the Muslims were able to destroy the device before it could be put to good use. In one of these assaults a 'ram' was also in use; but it too was burned. Some of the accounts suggest that the cat and the ram were also employed to fill in the fosse, before they were brought against the walls and towers of the city—though it is far from clear how a ram would be of use in such circumstances. Cats are not referred to as being employed in an aggressive context by the Christians in any subsequent engagement.

When it proved impossible to get over or through the walls, a solution could be to go underneath, by means of a mine. This could be used to weaken the foundations of the site. The miners would support the hollowed-out stonework with wooden beams: when these were removed, the structure would collapse. Alternatively, a mine could be dug as a means for the attackers to gain access to the strongpoint by bypassing the walls. An example of the former technique in this period occurred at the siege of Toron in 1197, where both Muslim and Christian sources noted the effect caused by the digging of mines. Arnold of Lübeck referred to the presence at the siege of several Saxons who were
experienced silver miners. The mining proved almost decisive and the Muslim garrison wanted to surrender after the Christians had burned out the foundations. Realizing, however, that their fate would not be guaranteed if they capitulated, the Muslims held out until a force under al-'Aziz 'Uthman relieved them. At Damietta, the crusaders attempted to mine, in order to bring down the towers or gain access to the city, but this proved to be impractical because of the water in the fosse. Similar problems had also been encountered when the crusaders had tried to undermine the Chain Tower. At Beirut in 1231-32, the Imperial forces were able to cause considerable damage by mining.

Two other devices which may have featured in many campaigns of this period were also mentioned in the Ibelin-Lombard conflict. At the siege of Beirut, the Imperial forces built a covered street, which would have enabled them to move from one part of the siege to another without being exposed to the defenders. It also incorporated a wooden tower in its design. At the siege of Kyrenia, the Ibelins constructed movable shelters, which obviously served a similar purpose. During the same siege, the value of the crossbowman was indicated, since with a large number present, many troops were wounded on both sides. The significance of the crossbowman to the Latin armies has been referred to in earlier chapters: the power and accuracy of the device meant that it could be used to pick out individual targets during a siege campaign, as well as playing an important role on the battlefield. At the siege of Kantara, for example, Philip of Novara reported that a tremendous shot by a crossbowman killed one of the five Imperial bailifs.
The geography of the Latin East and the area around it, and the sitting of many strongholds, made it inevitable that ships should play a large part in siege warfare: the point has recently been stressed with regard to the twelfth century and the same is true of the thirteenth. At the end of the twelfth century, the presence of Christian ships acting in unison with a Christian army at the siege of Beirut (1197) was regarded by western sources as an important factor in the decision of the Muslims to abandon their defensive position.

Christian ships also played an important role at the siege of Damietta. It has been seen that only a seaborne attack enabled the crusaders to capture the Chain Tower in the middle of the Nile. In the course of the summer of 1219, the Italian ships in particular made a number of attacks on the city and their troops tried to surmount the walls with ladders, but each time they were driven off by the Muslim defenders and suffered considerable damage. On one occasion the wind direction prevented an attack being made. At Beirut in 1231-32, the Imperial forces established a highly effective blockade, with their galleys chained together. But as already noted, John of Ibelin was able to break this blockade and thus changed the course of the siege. At the siege of Kyrenia, the lack of ships on the Ibelin side was a factor in the amount of time it took them to force the defenders into submission. The Imperial ships experienced no difficulties in going back and forth from Kyrenia to Tyre, thus maintaining their supplies. John of Ibelin therefore engaged thirteen Genoese ships to aid the Ibelin cause. In 1243, the Ibelins used both land and sea forces for their assault on Tyre, including the Venetians, who thus hoped to regain their commercial privileges in that city. In 1258 a Genoese
fleet led by Rosso della Turca attacked Acre, hoping to relieve the Genoese quarter in the city and win the War of St. Sabas. The fleet included, in addition to 48 galleys, four naves each of which was equipped with a siege engine; but the fleet was defeated by a Venetian force outside Acre and the Genoese quarter was subsequently overrun.126

b) The Muslims

Muslim armies relied heavily on the power of their ballistic weapons, either as the prelude to an assault or, unsupported, to bring the defenders to a state where they were forced to capitulate. They also made considerable use of mines, but there is little evidence to suggest that devices such as the cat or the siege tower found any great favour with them.

At Caesarea in 1218, al-Mu'azzam only needed three petraries to overcome the weak Christian efforts at defence.127 At the siege of Jerusalem in 1239, mangonels were used by an-Nasir Da'ud prior to a general assault. It seems to have only been after the surrender of the defenders that Muslim miners were brought in to raze the Tower of David.128 An unusual siege took place in 1241. The Muslim garrison at Beaufort refused to surrender the castle to the Christians, which had been agreed by treaty. Muslim troops used engines against the site (with no suggestion of any other form of assault) and their compatriots surrendered.129 At the siege of Ascalon in 1247, the construction of engines from the hulks of the Muslim navy contributed to the capture of the site. But the defenders resisted strongly and the Muslims were thus obliged to use other means of assault.130 At
Caesarea in 1265, in order to gain access to the citadel, siege engines were used at the same time as a general assault on the city walls. The citadel was immensely strong, having been constructed with granite columns incorporated into the walls, and yet the assaults of the engines were still enough to cause the Christians to surrender in a week. But as indicated earlier, the citadel at Caesarea could be commanded from a low tel about 50 metres to the east. A brave defence by the Hospitallers caused the Muslims some problems at the siege of Arsuf in the same year. A very big engine was built which did much damage to the defenders and the fall of the citadel was linked to the fact that the siege engines had again been successful in the destruction of the walls. At Saphet in the following year, 'Maghribi' and 'Frankish' mangonels were used by the Muslims but this was clearly a difficult siege for them and a number of other means of assault had to be employed on this occasion. At the siege of Beaufort in 1268, however, the Muslims were again successful, apparently with a very basic approach. With 26 engines in the assault, the Templars had to pull back from the citadel which they had recently constructed. The Muslims captured this and the machines were immediately brought up to fire on the other citadel; under such fierce pressure, the defenders were forced to concede. In the sieges of both Crac and Gibelcar, it was engines coupled with the fierce assaults of the Muslims that enabled them to triumph. At the former, the engines were moved forward, as the Hospitallers were forced to abandon the outer defences. Engines played an important role in the siege of Montfort in 1271 and against Margat in 1285, they were again of significance, although some of them were said to have been placed too
close to the walls of the fortress, enabling the defenders to destroy a
number with their own engines.\textsuperscript{138}

At Latakia in 1287, the Muslim engines completed the damage which
had previously been done by an earthquake, causing the Christians to
surrender.\textsuperscript{139} The sieges of Tripoli and Acre, like those of Saphet and
Arsuf, were only brought to successful conclusions after some stiff
Christian resistance and the Muslims required a wider combination of
siege techniques than they usually employed. In both instances,
however, the Muslim ballistic weapons undoubtedly played an important
part. At Tripoli, the presence of 19 large and small engines was
valuable in the weakening of the defences before the city fell to a
general assault,\textsuperscript{140} and at the siege of Acre, ballistic engines were
again significant for maintaining a constant bombardment on the city
and helping to weaken the walls and towers before a general assault
completed the capture.\textsuperscript{141} The inability of many Christian garrisons to
defend their strongholds vigorously meant that the Muslims could adopt
very simple and direct methods with siege engines and frontal assaults
which frequently proved sufficient to capture a site. But when the
Frankish defence was stronger, the Muslims were, as we shall see, able
to diversify their attack.

The other principal Muslim siege technique was the use of the mine,
which was almost as successful for the positive conclusion of a siege
as the ballistic weapons which were examined above. At Ascalon, mines
were used not simply to destroy the walls and towers, but as a means
of gaining direct access to the castle. The mine passed through the
hill on which the castle was built and came out in the middle of the castle itself. The Muslim troops used this route to enter the castle, but some of the defenders were able to escape. Because St. Louis had fortified Caesarea so well, mining proved ineffective against its defences during the siege of 1265. Mines were said to have been a factor in the fall of Saphet in 1266 and similarly they were used against Montfort five years later. It has already been noted that at the remains of Montfort there is probably evidence of a mine in the south wall of the castle. It is about two metres deep and three metres wide, very precisely cut. Mining appears to have been particularly valuable at the siege of Margat in 1285. An excellent mine was dug and then set on fire, as a preliminary to a general assault, but a tower which collapsed filled the breach that had been made. The mine, however, had gone so deep into the fortress that the 'Tour de l'Espérance', a main tower, was said to be about to collapse, so the Christians had to concede. Mines were dug at the siege of Tripoli in 1289, which undoubtedly contributed to the weakening of the walls. They were also employed at the siege of Acre, against a number of towers, including the tower of the Countess of Blois and the barbican of King Hugh, in the vicinity of the Accursed Tower where Muslim attacks were concentrated.

The Muslims used siege techniques which involved their coming closer to the walls at sieges where considerable Christian resistance was apparent - Ascalon, Arsuf, Saphet, Tripoli and Acre - though this may, to some extent, be a consequence of fairly full details being afforded by the sources. As noted with the Christians, this process
often initially involved overcoming the problem of filling in the fosse which surrounded the strongpoint, at the siege of Acre in 1291, for example. At the siege of Ascalon, the Muslims constructed cats, mantlets and covered ways, presumably because they were close enough to the walls to be threatened by the defenders: and the fosse had been filled in. At the siege of Arsuf, in a somewhat confused account by the contemporary Muslim chronicler Ibn 'Abd-al Zahir, it is nevertheless clear that the Muslims had difficulties reaching the fosse in order to gain access to the walls of the citadel and the Franks were able to destroy their efforts by fire. It appears that after this the Muslims dug tunnels through which they poured sand to bring up the level of the fosse, in order to cross it. At Saphet, it seems that rather than the usual Muslim method of a weakening of the walls followed by an assault, they used an assault first, presumably to force the defenders back, so that stonemasons could begin drilling at the base of the walls. At the same time the gate was burned by 'dart-casters' with containers of tar. A miniature, from an early fourteenth century Old-French translation of 'De excidio urbis Acconis' gives a visual impression of how Muslim stonemasons may have worked on the walls of that city, once the fosse had been filled in. The author of the Gestes des Chiprois implied that the caraboba mentioned above was only really effective at short range: at both Tripoli and Acre it was used in conjunction with other devices which would have necessitated the aggressors being fairly close to their targets. At Tripoli carabahas are mentioned along with wooden protection and 1,500 stone cutters, and sappers. At Acre, having overcome the fosse, the Muslims built ramparts to protect the carabahas.
In so many of the sieges during this period, a vicious Muslim attack ended a campaign rapidly and decisively. It is therefore fortunate that an eye-witness account of such an assault survives, that of the Muslims against Acre on 18 May 1291, recorded by the author of the *Gestes des Chiprois*:

Et quant vint le jour dou vendredi avant jour, une nacare souna mout fort, & à son de selle nacare, quy avoit mout oyrble vois & mout grant, les Sarazines asaillieren la cite d'Acre de toutes pars... Il vindrent tous à pié quy furent tant sans nombre; & par devant veneent seaus quy porteent grans targes hautes, & après veneent seaus quy jetent le feuç gryzés, & après estoient siaus qui trayoient les pilès & seetes enpenées si espesessemayt quy senbloit pleve quy venist dou siel,...

Throughout the century, Christians must have paled in the face of this kind of assault, yet Muslim successes were not always gained solely in the wake of noise and blood. In three instances during this period, propaganda was used to assist more conventional Muslim methods. At Saphet in 1266, Muslim losses proved much higher than Baybars was prepared to tolerate. Both western and arabic sources reported that he therefore spread mistrust among the garrison, offering the Syrians in it a safe conduct and ordering his men to attack only the Templars. Following this the Templars also sought terms of surrender, but they were deceived and were subsequently massacred. At Beaufort in 1268, Baybars intercepted letters from the garrison asking for relief so he forged replies which weakened the Christians' will to resist and spread disunity. And at Crac in 1271, the sultan forged letters from Tripoli, ordering the Hospitallers to surrender.
The Muslim armies of this period do not seem to have been so inclined to use ships as an element in an assault on a strongpoint as were the Franks. Indeed, references to the value of the sea in Muslim accounts tended to relate to the presence of Christian ships attempting to hamper a Muslim land-based attack. It may have been that the more direct Muslim siege methods, in pressing for a quick victory, did not require an effective blockade from the sea. In a number of sieges, such as Caesarea, Tripoli and Acre, it was reported that many of the Christian defenders were able to escape by sea, but this does not seem to have unduly worried the Muslims. The expulsion of the Christians from the mainland required the control of the strongpoints and Muslim tactics were sufficient to this end. In terms of Muslim strategy the siege was, as we have seen, the final step in an integrated policy which also involved raiding expeditions designed to weaken the strongpoints.

The defenders

Defensive tactics, like those adopted by the attackers in a siege, varied from active to passive ones. An attempt will be made to consider the different options which were open to the defenders and the manner in which they might be used against an attack.

a) The Christians

To the end of the thirteenth century, Christians were prepared to come out from behind their defences and oppose a Muslim assault with counter-attacks of their own. The more aggressive side of Christian defensive techniques can be examined in three elements: meeting a
Muslim attack outside the walls of a stronghold; using sorties; and countermining in order to force a Muslim mining assault back. Examples of such tactics are also provided by the Lombard-Ibelin conflict.

In the face of the overwhelming numerical advantages which the Muslims appear to have enjoyed, it is surprising to find that the Christians were prepared to stand outside and face them. It has already been noted in chapter four of this study that such tactics are closely related to, and may even be considered to be, battles. At Jaffa in 1197, this had disastrous repercussions. The Christians opened the gates and attacked, but they were forced to flee and their colleagues inside, fearing the threat of the Muslims, refused to re-open the gates and let them in.\(^{161}\) The tactic was more successful in 1281, when a Muslim attempt to besiege Margat failed. Despite reportedly being outnumbered by over ten to one, the Hospitallers came out and drove the Muslims off.\(^{162}\) Some sources, Muslim as well as Christian, for the siege of Acre, reported that the Christians kept the gates of the city open throughout the conflict: in view of the Muslim numerical dominance it is hard to believe that this happened.\(^{163}\) It may be that what was meant here was that posterns were kept open, so that troops could go out, undetected, on sorties. A carefully planned raid by a small force from within a stronghold could wreak havoc within the enemy camp and still get away in the confusion. The Ibelins relied on a tight blockade of Dieudamour to starve the defenders out, but when Ibelin numbers had carelessly been allowed to dwindle the Lombards successfully raided their camp and made off with supplies which the garrison of Dieudamour...
desperately needed. At the siege of Beirut, the Ibelins in turn used the tactic of the sortie to their advantage. It has already been noted that John of Ibelin increased the numbers within the citadel by breaking the Imperial blockade: now the Ibelin defenders were able to seize the initiative from their opponents. They recaptured the fosse, burned the covered street and, by sorties, set fire to many of the engines that had caused them such trouble. Christians also used sorties against Muslim besiegers. At Arsuf, for example, a sortie was successfully driven back by Baybars. But two of the best illustrations of this form of defence come from the early stages of the siege of Acre. It was decided that Muslim protective coverings for their engines had to be burnt, so the Templars with a number of other knights went out hoping to accomplish this. But the Christian force was not well-disciplined and the fire was thrown short, missing the defences but killing a number of Muslims. Chaos followed this poorly-delivered attack, as the Christians became entangled in the Muslims' tent cords and one knight was drowned in a Muslim latrine. The sortie had produced as much confusion for the Christians as it had on the Muslim side, but Christian losses, of 18 mounted troops, were regarded as low enough for the tactic to be deemed to have been effective. A second sortie was less successful, however. The Muslims had anticipated it and the Christians were routed. After this, there were no more sorties: it must have been felt that the advantages were outweighed by the cost in terms of injuries suffered by the limited Christian numbers. But the decision to adopt a more passive defensive policy surely condemned the Christians in any case to the inevitable loss of the city.
The tactic of counter-mining was another policy that aimed to drive opponents back, rather than merely contain them and prevent them from making further progress. The Christian defenders of Arsuf used a variation of this technique to hamper Muslim efforts to fill the fosse and thus to approach the walls of the citadel. By mining, the Christians were able to place barrels of grease and oil, or fat, underneath the Muslim trenches and, with bellows that they had constructed in the tunnels, they fanned fires which the Muslims were unable to put out. The Muslims were therefore forced to adopt other means of approaching the citadel. At the siege of Saphet in 1266 a counter-mine which had been dug by the Templars came over the top of the Muslim mine and led to an underground fight. At Acre, as already noted, Muslim mining was an important element in the assault on the city. The Christians were able to set fire to a barbican, which collapsed, and then they tried to counter-mine, but this proved ineffective because of the superior numerical strength of the Muslims.

Aggressive defensive methods required a fair degree of confidence on the part of the defenders. They also required the defenders to have sufficient troops to carry them out effectively. The Latins' lack of manpower would have handicapped them considerably in their efforts to repel a Muslim assault. Often the Christians were only able to defend themselves from within their stronghold, presumably hoping that the initial Muslim thrust would gradually fade away. At Saphet (in spite of the efforts at counter-mining considered above) Beaufort and Crac, it appears that the Christians simply fell back deeper within the
confines of the concentric defences of these fortresses. Some kind of effort would be made to try to hold back the advance of the assailants: this could be done by the use, in a defensive context, of the same ballistic weapons as were used in attack, or by simply hurling a variety of projectiles down on the aggressors. At Gibelcar in 1271, an Arabic source noted that the Christians defended themselves well, firing arrows and launching stones from mangonels which inflicted some damage on the Muslims. At Margat, because the Muslim engines were placed too close to the fortress, the defenders' engines were able to destroy a number of them and kill some Muslims as well. At the siege of Acre, in 1291, the Christians defended themselves from the city towers with machines, arrows and stones. When the Muslims seized the Tower of King Henry, the defenders brought up a cat in order to prevent the Muslims from making any further inroads into the city, although in the face of the violent Muslim assault of 18 May, the defenders were forced to abandon it. In the final stages of the siege of Acre, the Christians were reduced to fighting with the Muslim troops in the streets. Ships, as already noted, could also be employed as an element in a passive siege. Abu'l-Fida stated that a Christian ship with an engine on board did considerable injury to the Muslims during the siege of Acre, until it was wrecked by a storm.

In the course of the Lombard-Ibelin conflict there were also examples of defenders staying behind the walls of the strongpoint to conduct their defence. At Beirut, the Ibelin forces were initially obliged to defend passively whilst the Lombards made considerable progress. The defenders did not lack supplies, but they were low on
manpower because John of Ibelin had taken most of the garrison over to
Cyprus. At Kyrenia, however, it was the Imperial forces that had to
defend passively. Philip Chenart with his engineers was able to build
a number of petraries, mangonels and trebuchets and when the Ibelins
brought two siege towers over the fosse, the Lombards successfully set
fire to them.

b) The Muslims

Muslim defensive measures may be examined in similar categories,
from the aggressive to the more passive. Like the Christians, the
Muslims occasionally chose to fight outside their stronghold, but at
Beirut in 1197 this had disastrous results. As the Christian forces
approached the city, the Muslims came out to face them. But when the
Muslims decided to retreat a few Christian slaves and a carpenter who
had been left behind in the citadel were able to prevent them from re­
entering, as a result of which they fled. At Mt. Tabor in 1217, this
tactic had better results, as the Muslim garrison came out and
succeeded in forcing the crusaders back down to the foot of the
mountain. In the early stages of the siege of Damietta, in October
1218, it was widely reported that large numbers of Muslims raided the
Christian position on the west bank. When the Christians crossed
to the east bank following the flight of al-Kamil, a group of 500
Muslim warriors came out of the city to face them. They were probably
dealt with by the Templars, who led the advance on the city. There
is only one example in this period of the Muslims using a sortie and
this too was in the course of the siege of Damietta as the Christians
prepared for a land-based assault on the walls involving a variety of
engines as well as cats. In both July and August of 1219, the Muslims were able to leave the city and burn these devices, killing a number of Christians at the same time, whilst the latter were busy defending their rear from other Muslim attacks.\textsuperscript{101}

Evidence of more passive techniques being used by the Muslims is somewhat limited, but it suggests some variations in comparison with the Christians' tactics. The Muslim garrisons used Greek fire as a device to ward off a Christian offensive. This is first noted in the thirteenth century at Mt. Tabor in 1217: the Muslim defenders were able to set fire to the huge ladder which the crusaders had placed against the walls of the fortress.\textsuperscript{102} In the Franciscan museum in Jerusalem are a number of pots retrieved from Mt. Tabor, which may have been intended as containers for Greek fire. During the Christian assault on the Chain Tower at Damietta in 1218, the craft which Oliver of Paderborn and the Frisians had constructed was covered with hides, in order to try to protect it from Greek fire. In spite of this the fire proved a great problem in the assault, being launched from the tower and the city against a smaller ship which accompanied the assault vessel. It was successfully extinguished by vinegar and sand.\textsuperscript{103} In a seaborne attack on Damietta by Venetian, Genoese and Pisan boats, the Muslims were apparently able to destroy the hides protecting the ladders which the crusaders were attempting to use: then they set fire to them with Greek fire and oil. On this occasion, neither wine nor vinegar proved of any use in extinguishing the flames.\textsuperscript{104}
Another example of Muslim ingenuity occurred during the siege of Damietta when, after the crusaders had successfully taken the Chain Tower, the Muslims first constructed a dyke on the Nile and then sank a number of ships in the river, in order to stop the crusaders from moving up it and closer to Damietta. This considerably hampered the Christians in the winter of 1218-19. There is also some evidence for Muslim use of conventional ballistic weapons. They were used, with Greek fire, to harass the crusaders when they were attacking the Chain Tower at Damietta and, similarly, when the Muslims were defending themselves within Damietta against the crusaders' assaults. After the loss of the Chain Tower, al-Kamil created a new line of defence. Although assaults were still organised against the crusaders on the west bank, the Muslims not only scuttled ships but established fosses, high wooden defences and a variety of ballistic weapons. The Muslim troops were ordered in three ranks, with shieldbearers in the first two and the last mounted. They harassed Christian vessels with stones, darts and other projectiles. This strong defensive position could not be maintained, however, as al-Kamil, following a plot against him, was forced to abandon the camp.

c) Use of relief forces

Another means of resisting an assault was by the presence of a relief force which remained outside the strongpoint, engaging the besiegers from another angle and thereby weakening their resolve. Such a relieving force had a slightly different role to play from those allies of defenders who actually intended to enter a strongpoint and thus augment the strength of its garrison. By remaining outside, they
were a force besieging the besiegers. Such troops could have a major influence on the likelihood of a successful defence being conducted against a siege. Both Christian and Arab sources suggested that the siege of Toron by a Christian force in 1197 was terminated because of the expected arrival of al-'Aziz with a relieving army. And the author of the 'Erocles' account implied that the failure of the Christians to retain possession of Jaffa in the same year should be linked to their inability to make use of a relief force, following the death of Henry of Champagne. The presence of a Muslim relief force at the siege of Damietta was undoubtedly a major handicap to the crusaders in their efforts to take the city. Whenever the crusaders tried to press the siege, the Muslims in the city signalled to those who were at the rear of the crusader camp. The latter would then attack and cause any Christian assault on the city to fail. When Pelagius pressed for an assault on Damietta, the leaders of the army argued against it because their lack of numbers made it impossible to attack the city and defend their camp at the same time. A letter from the nobles of the army to Honorius III days after Damietta had fallen confirmed the threat which this second Muslim force had posed. Most of the army, except for a few who had entered the city, protected the palisades and fosses in order to guard against any possible Muslim attack from the rear. In 1229 the Christians at Jerusalem were besieged in the Tower of David by 15,000 Muslims. The baillis at Acre, Balian of Sidon and Garnier L'Aleman, gathered a relieving army of knights and sergeants. When the defenders of Jerusalem saw the banners of an advance party led by Baldwin of Picquigny they took
heart and came out to defeat their aggressors. The relief force merely helped with the slaughter — more than 2,000 Muslims were killed.  

At coastal sites, ships sometimes had an important role to play in this type of relief operation. At the siege of Beirut in 1231-32, the value of the force that John of Ibelin sent into the city has already been noted, but most of the Ibelin army would have remained outside. Moreover, although there was now no suggestion that the citadel was greatly imperilled by the Lombards, John did not have sufficient infantry or an effective sea force to raise the siege, so he left it. When such a force had been gathered, the Lombards burned their engines and left for Tyre. At Ascalon in 1247, the Christians raised a large seaborne force in order to relieve the garrison there and they were actually able to land their supplies; but the Muslims still went on to complete the siege. Finally, at Arsuf in 1265, the Christians had a number of ships which were attempting to break the siege. At many of the later sieges of this period, there were Christian ships present waiting to take away those who were able to embark, but these rarely played an active role in relieving the Muslim assault.

The effectiveness of sieges

With a few exceptions, the Muslim and Christian armies used similar weapons, if in slightly different ways, in attack and defence in siege warfare during this period. It is now possible to consider how effective their techniques were. Although most of the sieges for which information survives were, eventually, concluded successfully, the
sources allow an examination of how relatively successful a particular siege was.

1. **CHRISTIAN ATTACK - MUSLIM OR CHRISTIAN DEFENCE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIEGE</th>
<th>TIME TAKEN</th>
<th>HOW ENDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut, 1197</td>
<td>Very quick</td>
<td>The Muslims fled.(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toron, 1197</td>
<td>10 weeks</td>
<td>A relief force caused the Christians to abandon the siege.(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mt. Tabor, 1217</td>
<td>Up to 17 days</td>
<td>The Christians' attack was beaten off by the Muslims.(^4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damietta, 1218-19</td>
<td>19 months</td>
<td>Famine, disease and no prospect of aid caused the Muslims to surrender.(^5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dieudamour, 1229-30</td>
<td>10 months</td>
<td>The defenders surrendered with no hope of relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kantara, 1229-30</td>
<td>10 months</td>
<td>The defenders surrendered with no hope of relief.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia, 1229</td>
<td>Fairly quick?</td>
<td>A truce was arranged and the defenders capitulated.(^6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beirut, 1231-32</td>
<td>Some months?</td>
<td>The Lombards abandoned the siege.(^7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dieudamour, 1232</td>
<td>A few months?</td>
<td>The siege ended after the battle of Agridi.(^8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia, 1232-33</td>
<td>About 10 months, or more than a year</td>
<td>The defenders surrendered with no hope of relief.(^9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre, 1243</td>
<td>4 weeks</td>
<td>The return of Filangieri, and his capture, caused the Lombards to surrender.(^0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre, 1257-58</td>
<td>A year, or 14 months</td>
<td>The Genoese fled after the defeat of their fleet.(^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaqun, 1271</td>
<td>A very short siege</td>
<td>The Christians fled, at the arrival of Muslim troops from 'Ain Jalut.(^2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIEGE</td>
<td>TIME TAKEN</td>
<td>HOW ENDED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa, 1197</td>
<td>Perhaps only a day. But the course of events surely took longer.</td>
<td>Successful assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesarea, 1218</td>
<td>Probably not very long</td>
<td>Defenders fled in the face of a Muslim assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Château Pèlerin, 1220</td>
<td>Less than a month</td>
<td>The siege abandoned because of likely Christian reinforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem, 1229</td>
<td>3 days</td>
<td>Besiegers defeated by the garrison.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem, 1239</td>
<td>21 days</td>
<td>Assault caused the defenders to surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaufort, 1241</td>
<td>Probably not very long</td>
<td>Engines forced Muslim surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascalon, 1244-47</td>
<td>Blockade then a short siege(?)</td>
<td>Engines and mines forced the defenders to flee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias, 1247</td>
<td>Precise time uncertain - probably not very long</td>
<td>Taken by force with heavy Christian losses.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesarea, 1265</td>
<td>About a week, or 6 weeks(?)</td>
<td>With heavy attack by engines, the Christians conceded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa, 1265</td>
<td>Same day</td>
<td>Christians fled as the Muslims approached.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsuf, 1265</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>The citadel fell with the engines having destroyed the walls.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saphet, 1265</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>The Christians surrendered after a hard fight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa, 1268</td>
<td>A day</td>
<td>By assault, though most accounts suggest treason. Some inhabitants had agreed to surrender the town.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaufort, 1268</td>
<td>Blockade, then 11 day siege</td>
<td>Under violent attack the defenders gave in.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>Outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antioch, 1268</td>
<td>A few days</td>
<td>General assault and surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chastel Blanc, 1271</td>
<td>A blockade</td>
<td>Christians surrendered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crac, 1271</td>
<td>6 weeks</td>
<td>The Hospitallers surrendered after a heavy assault by engines.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibelcar, 1271</td>
<td>About 2 weeks</td>
<td>The defenders gave up after Muslim pressure by engines and assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montfort, 1271</td>
<td>7 days</td>
<td>Mangonels and mining caused the garrison to surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margat, 1285</td>
<td>5/6 weeks</td>
<td>The Christians surrendered mainly because of mining.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latakia, 1287</td>
<td>Less than a month</td>
<td>Engines prompted the Christian surrender.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli, 1289</td>
<td>Between 4 and 6 weeks</td>
<td>Weakened by bombardment, then taken by assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acre, 1291</td>
<td>6 weeks. The Temple survived a further 10 days</td>
<td>Weakened by bombardment, taken by assault.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sidon, 1291</td>
<td>One day?</td>
<td>After some resistance, the Templars fled.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table it is clear that the time which Christians took over a siege and, indeed, the form that the siege normally took, were very different from that of the Muslims. Muslim sieges took a few weeks, whilst Christian armies besieged enemy strongholds for months. Not once in this period did the Christians terminate a siege by an all-out assault, in order to end a campaign quickly. A typical Christian attack would be an extremely lengthy process. Even allowing for the protracted siege of Damietta, a campaign of well over six months
appears to have been quite normal. And Christian sieges were almost invariably concluded, when successful, by means of attrition. Their sieges could often have been prolonged for even longer, if the aggressors did not face insurmountable problems in the maintenance of their troop numbers. But the defenders, assuming that there was no prospect of relief, would normally have regarded any continued resistance as futile and costly. So Christian sieges depended on an effective blockade and a low-key deployment of the siege weapons and other resources which they had at their disposal.

There is no obvious difference in the means of defence which were available to Muslims and Christians in this period, either in terms of fortifications or the weapons of defence, apart from the Muslim use of Greek fire. There were, however, certain differences in Muslim attacking methods which help to explain the much shorter time which they took to end a siege in triumph. It has already been noted that Muslim tactics in attack were much more direct than those of the Christians: this suggestion appears to be borne out by the evidence of the above table, where the majority of Muslim sieges were terminated with a violent assault by men and machines, which led to a surrender. The Muslims used the means at their disposal to greater effect than did the Christians. And it does seem that accounts relating to Muslim sieges have a greater sense of urgency in them than do those of a Christian attack. In the eye-witness account of Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, for example, the sultan Baybars was often portrayed personally directing operations at a siege and urging his troops on to ever greater efforts. But the single most important reason for the success of
Muslim siege campaigns against Christian targets was, as already noted, the availability of large numbers of troops. Even though some of the numbers suggested for the size of Muslim armies in this period are scarcely credible, there is no doubt that the Muslim commanders enjoyed a significant numerical advantage over their Christian opponents which they were able to put to decisive use. The Christians, on the other hand, were obliged to defend their strongpoints with garrisons which were clearly inadequate. This meant that their efforts had to be cautious: they could not afford to lose men by conducting an active defence which might drive off the Muslim army. Muslim armies of the thirteenth century were willing to make use of the common Christian technique of the blockade - it has been noted at the sieges of Ascalon, Beaufort and Chastel Blanc - but whereas to the Latins this could be their entire means of advancing a siege, to the Muslims it seems to have been regarded as an introductory, weakening factor before the main process of the siege began. Once the siege was under way, Muslim policy was directed towards achieving a quick, decisive result, often regardless of the cost in terms of manpower. At the siege of Kyrenia in 1232-33, John of Ibelin was critical of his own use of such a policy, after an assault against the walls had failed. It was considered pointless to waste men when the castle would surrender by famine. So the Latins' limitations because of their lack of manpower applied in attack as well as defence. Muslim tactics, however, were unaffected by such qualms.

The means of defence may have been roughly similar for Muslims and Christians, but it seems that faced by a Muslim assault of the nature
described, Christian defence was not always as committed as it might have been: this too may have contributed to the relative speed of Muslim successes. It has already been noted that, at Saphet and Beaufort, Baybars played on the psychological weaknesses of the garrisons to help to gain their capitulation, suggesting an awareness that his opponents were already somewhat pessimistic as to their chances. At a number of Muslim sieges during and after Baybars' sultanate, such as Haifa (1265), Jaffa (1268), and Sidon (1291), the Christians fled almost without a blow being struck, suggesting a deep-rooted sense of dejection. At the sieges of Crac and Antioch, Baybars' method of isolating these major strongholds by the capture of any lesser Christian sites in the vicinity lessened the possibility of aid and relief. And finally, a number of sources indicated the discord of the Franks even at the siege of Acre: within a single city, it was suggested, unity could not be found and this was an important factor in the ability of the Muslims to capture the site. Ludolph of Suchem stated that even when the Muslims broke into the city, the defenders would not work together, preferring to organise resistance from within their individual fortifications. Such an accusation, however, has to be regarded as unlikely and even if it were true, it is doubtful whether in this case it would have made any difference to Acre's fate. It has been suggested above that the Muslims outnumbered the Christians at this siege by at least fifteen to one. Again, it should be stressed, this disadvantage is almost enough by itself to explain the loss of the city, particularly once its defences had been breached.
The aftermath of the siege

An examination of what took place at the end of a siege further emphasizes the differences in the Muslim and Christian approach. Where a siege was successfully concluded, these are the known, or suggested consequences for the defenders:

1. CHRISTIAN ATTACK - MUSLIM OR CHRISTIAN DEFENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIEGE</th>
<th>FATE OF DEFENDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut, 1197</td>
<td>The Muslims fled.(^2\text{236})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Damietta, 1218</td>
<td>Much suffering from famine and disease; some Muslim sources suggest there was a massacre when the city fell.(^2\text{237})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia, 1229</td>
<td>The Lombards surrendered and were allowed to go.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dieudamour, 1229-30</td>
<td>Agreement was reached and the Lombards were allowed to go.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kantara, 1229-30</td>
<td>Agreement was reached and the Lombards were allowed to go.(^2\text{238})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kyrenia, 1232-33</td>
<td>Peace agreed, and the Lombards were allowed to go. Philip of Novara provided them with galleys to go to Tyre.(^2\text{239})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tyre, 1243</td>
<td>Richard Filangieri freed and the Lombards were allowed to go after a peace had been agreed.(^2\text{240})</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. MUSLIM ATTACK - CHRISTIAN DEFENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SIEGE</th>
<th>FATE OF DEFENDERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa, 1197</td>
<td>The defenders were taken; there was a considerable slaughter.(^2\text{241})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesarea, 1218</td>
<td>Most of the defenders successfully fled.(^2\text{242})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem, 1239</td>
<td>The defenders surrendered, and they were allowed to go.(^2\text{243})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Event Year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaufort</td>
<td>1241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ascalon</td>
<td>1244-47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>1247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caesarea</td>
<td>1265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>1265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arsuf</td>
<td>1265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saphet</td>
<td>1266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>1268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beaufort</td>
<td>1268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Antioch</td>
<td>1268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chastel Blanc</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Crac</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gibelcar</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montfort</td>
<td>1271</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margat</td>
<td>1285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latakia</td>
<td>1287</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripoli</td>
<td>1289</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
especially women and children were taken prisoner.\textsuperscript{266}

Acre, 1291

A few Christians escaped; many were slaughtered.\textsuperscript{267}

Sidon, 1291

The garrison was able to flee to Cyprus.\textsuperscript{268}

Muslim and Christian sources often disagreed regarding the treatment of defenders after the seizure of a stronghold: most western accounts, for example, suggested that at Damietta deaths of Muslims had only resulted from the course of the siege and not from its aftermath. It is, similarly, only natural that western sources should have wished to paint the activities of their adversaries as black as possible. It was appropriate that Muslim troops should be pictured indulging in the wholesale slaughter of Christians as a matter of course. It is almost impossible to indicate how the Christians would have treated their Muslim captives, for want of information, though it is likely they would have enslaved captives to help ease their own manpower problems. It appears that the Muslims in victory were perhaps not as bloodthirsty as might have been expected and their treatment of military forces was usually very fair. If a garrison surrendered then it would normally be allowed to leave. Saphet, of course, is an exception to this. And it seems that the brave defence of Arsuf by the Hospitallers may have caused the Muslims to vent their frustrations on them even when the Christians had no further desire to resist. A massacre tended, in fact, to occur when a large Latin civilian element was present and this suggests either that civilian panic may have caused confusion which in itself led to a massacre, or that the Muslims
simply enjoyed the opportunity to pillage an unprotected populace. The latter would seem to have been the case in the instance of Muslim attempts to occupy the Templars' tower at Acre in 1291. though on this occasion their behaviour led to their deaths. Capitulation to the Muslims was not necessarily a guarantee of peace and freedom, but nor was it a guarantee of indiscriminate slaughter either. The Lombard-Ibelin siege campaigns normally ended with peace terms being agreed by the two sides. This is, however, an indication less of any inter-Christian respect and trust than of the inability of Christian attackers to complete a siege by force. It once more serves to emphasize the different approach which resulted from, in the Muslims' case, the availability of significantly larger armies.

The sieges of Damietta (1218-19) and Acre (1291)

An examination has now been made of a number of different elements of siege warfare, from the preparations for a campaign to events after a successful capture. It has been seen that both sides employed broadly similar weapons and tactics, allowing for the Christians' shortage of manpower and the fact that the Muslims favoured a more forceful approach and did not, as did the Christians, regularly use the technique of the blockade as a positive means to complete a siege. It remains to be shown, at the risk of some repetition, how Christian and Muslim tactics in attack and defence, were applied during the full length of a siege. Two sieges which are well-documented for this purpose are the Christian siege of Damietta in 1218-19, and the Muslims' siege of Acre in 1291.
From the start of the siege of Damietta, the crusaders showed especial vigilance in their defensive measures. They established themselves in a well-defended position on the west bank, though this site had no particular strategic value. But they quickly set up a number of engines, including eight mangonels which maintained a constant assault on the city. An initial problem for the crusaders was the Chain Tower in the middle of the Nile: Oliver of Paderborn reported that some Frisians were able to cross to the east bank, but although they appear to have secured their position they were called back because of the danger of leaving the tower behind the crusader army. In circumstances where an assault by engines or mines would be ineffective, and a blockade could not be maintained, the crusaders had to rely on a seaborne attack against the tower. Early efforts by ships were repulsed by Muslims from the city, tower and bridge, but an assault craft built by Oliver and the Frisians proved more successful. The Muslims worked hard to drive off the attack, using engines and Greek fire, but the crusaders were finally able to take possession of the Chain Tower.

In spite of this success, however, the crusaders were unable to take the initiative because of good Muslim defensive measures. Throughout the winter of 1218 the former's passage of the Nile was blocked, first by means of a dyke, then by the sinking of boats in the channel. The opening of the al-Azraq canal by the Franks did enable their ships to sail up the Nile, but still did not put direct pressure upon the city itself. After the loss of the Chain Tower, the Muslims adopted an aggressive defence policy, raiding the Christian position on
the west bank a number of times, but having suffered heavy losses in these raids they resorted to a more passive defence. They had established a well-fortified site on the east bank, with fosses and palisades, a variety of ballistic weapons and large numbers of troops. But they were forced to pull back from this excellent position because of a quarrel regarding the succession to sultan al-'Adil. In February 1219, the crusaders were therefore very fortunate in being able to cross to the east bank unhindered and thus to commence a full blockade and siege of the city.

The crusaders once again took care to establish themselves in a strong defensive position. They built a fosse, palisades, towers and a rampart behind which were archers and other soldiers deployed defensively, whilst two bridges ensured good communication with the west bank and two islands were also fortified. In addition to their land defences, ships patrolled the Nile. This stable Christian defence was extremely important since the leaders of the army acknowledged that their relative lack of numbers prevented them from dealing effectively with both the city and the Muslim camp which was behind them. It was also proving difficult to maintain the army's strength at an acceptable level. Around May 1219, many crusaders, including the Duke of Austria, decided to return home; fortunately a new passage from the west arrived, which allowed the siege to continue. Although the crusaders did have to face a number of attacks from the Muslim relief force, at the same time they made some efforts against the city walls, with cats, trebuchets, petratories, wooden towers, and assaults from ships and mines. The mines were intended to give the Christians access to
one of the city towers, not merely to undermine the walls: but because Damietta's moat was full of water, this tactic proved ineffective. The assaults on the city were driven off with ballistic weapons, arrows, Greek fire and stones, whilst at the same time sorties from the city destroyed many of the Christians' armaments. It would seem that their attacks were of no great significance in actually bringing the siege to an end, since there is little evidence to suggest that much damage had been done to the city.

The constant threat of the Muslim force at Fariskur was having a serious effect on the crusaders' ability to bring all their resources against the city itself. Their decision to attack the Muslim camp was thus understandable although it ended in disaster. The siege of the city came to an end (in November 1219) because the Muslim defenders had been worn down by the continual Christian blockade, the effects of plague and famine and were disheartened by the inability of al-Kamil to send any effective relief through to them. It would appear that the care with which the crusaders established themselves when they came to the east bank determined the progress of the siege. Their subsequent efforts to take the city by the accepted siege techniques were not successful. The siege of Damietta is an example of a situation where the attackers, although unable to terminate a campaign, were at the same time not so weak that they had to withdraw in the face of a relieving force. Damietta fell because it had been successfully blockaded and the Christian defensive position prevented the breaking of this blockade.
The siege of Acre in 1291 took a very different course. It is unfortunate that much of the available evidence, particularly on the western side, is more concerned with events once the Muslims had actually made their entry into the city and the siege was virtually ended. But there is still plenty of material on the siege itself.

Some western writers suggested that before the main Muslim assault, a smaller Muslim force had already been in the vicinity of Acre for about a month, in order to harass the occupants of the city. Al-Ashraf arrived, bringing with him the Egyptian forces and having ordered the Syrian troops to attend; he also required them to bring their engines. Wood had been prepared in Syria for machines, whilst many engines were transported from hundreds of miles away. When the Muslims arrived, they surrounded the city on its landward side, setting up their engines and preparing defensive positions, with ditches, palisades and portable wooden shelters. If it is true, as suggested, that the Muslims were able to surround the landward side of the city, then this is further evidence for the exceptionally large size of their army. The Christian defenders also made their preparations, organising their supplies of engines, palisades, stones, bows and arrows, lances, hooks and other implements.

When the Muslims began their attack, one of their early requirements was to overcome the obstacle of the fosse, in order that their miners, stonemasons and short-range weapons could be used more effectively. They appear to have achieved this aim without any major losses, though at this stage the defenders of Acre seem to have been
conducting a highly active defence of the city. It has previously been noted that Christian troops carried out sorties which had some impact, but in the last of these, the Muslims were waiting for them and were able to inflict serious damage. The Christians therefore tried to defend themselves solely from behind the city walls and thus the initiative passed firmly to the Muslims. By means of a constant bombardment with their engines, and by mining, the Muslims were able to make gradual progress in their assault which, though it was pressed from the north end of the city to the south, was particularly heavy against the north-eastern angle of the old city walls, near the Accursed Tower. This heavy assault had already obliged the Christians to burn the barbican and the King’s Tower was completely wrecked, despite Christian efforts to counter-mine. The Muslims created a path into the shattered tower and it was through this that they were able to make their first entry into the city, causing the Christians to place a cat there in order to defend themselves and to block any further incursions. The Christians also used their engines against this advance Muslim position, killing a number of their enemies.

But all Christian defence was swept aside in the fury of the Muslim assault on 16 May: again the attack was concentrated on the angle of the walls. When they had gained a foothold on the city in the Accursed Tower, in the inner line of the walls, they swept through it in all directions and the Christians were reduced to hand-to-hand fighting. Most sources agreed that at this stage of the siege, the brothers of the Military Orders were particularly brave, holding the Muslim advance for a while at St. Antony’s Gate before they were
overwhelmed by the weight of numbers. When the Templars were suppressed nearly twenty years later, many witnesses still recalled their bravery at that time, and particularly the heroism of their Master. At the Tower of the Legate, on the shoreline, mounted Muslims were able to force an entry: the French regiment and the troops led by Otto of Grandison were obliged to retreat, with heavy casualties. The remainder of the siege is a tale of panic and slaughter but some Christians were able to resist for a time in the Tower of the Templars situated in the south-west of the city (a site which is now below the shoreline). This tower was eventually taken by mining and the building collapsed as the sultan ordered his men into it — again, Muslim disregard for loss of life is apparent. Some Christians had been able to flee but many were slaughtered or imprisoned. The city was then demolished and burned.

Conclusion

The siege was one of the most direct means of acquiring territory during this period and is thus of prime importance for any study of military history, even though most sieges in the Latin East were fought with relatively small numbers of men and with equipment which does not appear to have changed much in the course of the thirteenth century.

Within the limited means of attack and defence which were available, Muslim and Christian armies employed a variety of tactics in order to try to achieve their aims. Christian armies tended to wear down their enemies gradually by constant pressure and an effective blockade, reducing them to a state where they were no longer able to
resist. The Muslims were far more direct in their approach, which is apparent from the length of time they took in a siege. They would immediately press for a result and utilise fully the means which were available - particularly, the vast quantities of manpower which they sometimes had at their disposal. In defence, tactics varied from a highly active campaign which could involve waiting for an attacker outside the walls of the strongpoint, to simply remaining behind the walls and trying if possible to contain the enemy's attack whilst hoping that it might fade away. The Christians, being constantly handicapped by manpower difficulties, were often forced to resort to the latter.

There are areas where knowledge of siege warfare is very limited. There is, for example, very little information concerning the maintenance of the forces in the course of a siege and much can only be inferred. But it is still possible to suggest not only how a siege would progress in the Latin East but also some of the ideas behind the use of the resources which were available to attackers and defenders. If the Muslims eventually triumphed in driving the Christians from the mainland with the capture of their principal surviving strongholds in 1291, the Christians still showed much courage and, as at Damietta in 1218, ingenuity in the course of a variety of siege campaigns. Christian achievements in the art of siege warfare, often faced by overwhelming odds, should not be underestimated.
NOTES

1. 'Rothelin', p. 565.
5. 'De excidio urbis Acconis', col. 769.
6. 'Liber duellii christianii', p. 162.
7. 'Bracles', ii, p. 388; Oman, Art of War, i, pp. 136-7; ii, pp. 43-6; Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, pp. 103-5. For a contemporary drawing of a trebuchet see Villard of Honnecourt, Sketch-Book, pl. 58.
8. Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 248, 249 (it was built of 'marain encuré'); for means by which the besiegers could protect themselves, see Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, pp. 102-3; Oman, Art of War, ii, pp. 49-50.
10. See notes in Rashid al-Din, Histoire des Mongols, i, pp. 132-5; M. Mercier, Le Feu Grégeois (Paris, 1952) pp. 90-1. As Mercier pointed out, the Christians tried to protect their engines from Greek fire; but there is no evidence that they used Greek fire themselves.
12. Gestes des Chiprois, p. 244.
18. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', pp. 200-201; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', p. 259.
20. Ibid., p. 551.
24. 'Eracles', ii, p. 334.
28. Ibid., p. 85.
29. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 385-7.
32. 'Annales de Dunstaplia', p. 150.
34. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 442; 'Eracles', ii, p. 433.
35. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 433-4; 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 442 (21 ships); *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 146 (21 ships and a 'nave').
37. 'Annales Januenses', iv, p. 32.
38. 'Rothelin', p. 635.
41. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 452.
42. 'Eracles', ii, p. 450; *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 171.
44. *De constructione castri Saphet*, p. 41.
46. 'Chronique de Primat', *RHF*, xxiii, p. 20.
52. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 460.
54. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 460.
57. 'De excidio urbis Acconis', cols. 765, 770.
61. 'De excidio urbis Acconis', col. 769.
63. Ludolph of Suchem, 'De Itinere', p. 43.
64. 'Annales de Terre Sainte', p. 460.
66. 'Eracles', ii, p. 219; *Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197)*, p. 191.
68. See above, page 153.
69. 'Eracles', ii, p. 326.
70. Al-Makrizi, Histoire d'Égypte, p. 315.
71. 'Gesta Obsidionis', pp. 87-8; 'Histoire des Patriarches', p. 559; Chronique d'Ernoul, pp. 420-1; 'Eracles', ii, p. 337.
72. Gesta des Chiprois, p. 79.
73. Ibid., p. 108.
74. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 433-4.
77. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Life of Baybars, p. 642.
78. Fidenzio of Padua, 'Liber recuperationis', p. 29.
83. 'De excidio urbis Acconis', cols. 765-6; Gesta des Chiprois, p. 241.
85. 'Gesta Obsidionis', p. 90; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', pp. 207-8.
86. 'Gesta Obsidionis', p. 104.
87. 'Eracles', ii, p. 377; Gesta des Chiprois, pp. 63-4.
89. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 344-5.
90. Ibid., p. 334.
94. 'De excidio urbis Acconis', cols. 765, 770.
97. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', p. 178.
99. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 337, 345.
100. 'Histoire des Patriarches', p. 549.
102. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', p. 178; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', p. 237.
108. 'Liber duellii christiani', p. 157; 'Gesta Obsidionis', p. 95.
111. 'Gesta Obsidionis', pp. 92, 95.


117. Gestes des Chiprois, p. 79.

118. Ibid., p. 109.

119. Ibid., p. 68.


121. 'Chronica regia Coloniensis', p. 161; Roger of Howden, Chronica, iv, p. 28; Chronique d'Ernoul, pp. 311-13.

122. 'Gesta Obsidionis', pp. 93, 95-6, 101; 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', pp. 173-5.

123. Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 84-5.

124. Ibid., p. 108.

125. Ibid., pp. 130-1; Amadi, Chronique, p. 192; Urkunden der Republik Venedig, ii, pp. 355-7.


127. 'Eracles', ii, p. 334.


129. 'Rothelin', pp. 552-3.

130. 'Eracles', ii, p. 434.


132. See above, page 140.


142. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 433-4.


146. See above, pages 146-7.


151. 'Eracles', ii, p. 434; 'Rothelin', p. 565.


156. *Gestes des Chiprois*, p. 244.


170. *Gestes des Chiprois*, pp. 244-5.


180. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', p. 171; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', pp. 199-200.

181. 'Liber duelli christiani', pp. 155, 157-8; John of Tulbia, 'De Domino Johanne', pp. 129, 131; 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', pp. 175-6, 178-80; 'Gesta Obsidionis', pp. 95, 100.


184. 'Fragmentum de captione Damiatae', p. 175; 'Gesta Obsidionis', p. 97.


187. Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', pp. 196-7; James of Vitry, Lettres, p. 107; 'Gesta crucigerorum Rhenanorum', QBSSW, pp. 44-5. This text is very closely related to Oliver of Paderborn.


189. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 219-21.

190. 'Gesta Obsidionis', pp. 93, 94.


192. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 384-5.

193. Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 84-5, 86, 89.

194. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 433-4.


197. Ibn al-Athir, 'Kamel-Altevarykh', ii, pp. 87-8; Continuation de Guillaume de Tyr (1184-1197), p. 197.

198. 'Eracles', ii, p. 324; Chronique d'Ernoul, pp. 411-2; al-Makrizi, Histoire d'Egypte, p. 314; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', pp. 165-7; James of Vitry, Lettres, p. 98; Ibn al-Athir, 'Kamel-

200. 'Eracles', ii, p. 377; Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 60, 68.

201. 'Eracles', ii, p. 396; Gestes des Chiprois, p. 89.


203. Ibid., p. 116; 'Eracles', ii, pp. 400, 402.


205. Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 150, 155; 'Rothelin', p. 635.


208. 'Eracles', ii, p. 334; Chronique d'Ernoul, pp. 422-3; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', p. 244.


210. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 384-5.


212. 'Rothelin', pp. 552-3.


217. 'Eracles', ii, p. 450; Gestes des Chiprois, p. 171; Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Life of Baybars, pp. 552, 566.


231. For example, at the siege of Arsuf: Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir, Life of Baybars, pp. 564-5.


235. See above, pages 305-6, 308.
236. 'Eracles', ii, p. 224; Ibn al-Athir, 'Kamel-Altevarykh', ii, p. 86; Roger of Howden, Chronica, iv, p. 29; Chronique d'Ernoul, p. 313.

237. For example, al-Makrizi, Histoire d'Égypte, p. 327.

238. Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 60, 68.

239. Ibid., p. 116; 'Eracles', ii, p. 402.

240. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 426-7; Gestes des Chiprois, pp. 134-5.


242. 'Eracles', ii, p. 334; Oliver of Paderborn, 'Historia', p. 244.


244. 'Rothelin', pp. 552-3.

245. 'Eracles', ii, p. 434; 'Rothelin', p. 565.

246. 'Eracles', ii, pp. 432-3; Gestes des Chiprois, p. 146.


259. Ibid., pp. 255-6.


CONCLUSION

The reactions of contemporary writers to the fall of Acre in 1291 varied from reasoned criticism to eschatological hysteria. But the need for such writers to explain the event, the shock which the event created, and the fact that most writers regarded the loss as a temporary one, suggests that perhaps the most widespread feeling was one of surprise.

This study, however, has indicated that the fall of Acre, whilst of major significance since it symbolised the effective end of Latin rule in the area, cannot be regarded as unexpected. Rather, it was the inevitable outcome of a period of forty years during which the Latin East, largely unsupported by the western states which had established, and then helped to recreate, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, was opposed by the united threat of the Muslim states in the area. Most of the damage had, in fact, been done by the end of the 1260's; only a few sites, mainly on the coast, were able to survive until the end.

The chronic lack of manpower from which the Latin states suffered, relative to their Muslim neighbours, was apparent in every aspect of the military history of this period and had a profound effect on Christian strategy. Try as they might, the Latins were unable to increase their military establishment to anything like a level which might have been expected to have some success in combatting the Muslim threat. The feudal levy, by itself, had never been adequate. This force was usefully, and permanently, augmented by the Military Orders.
But these two elements could never, without significant external support, hope to defend the Latin East against a concerted and long-term Muslim assault. Unfortunately the only time that the Latin Kingdom had sufficient troops to face the Muslims was when a crusade expedition had been organised by the west - and this, of course, could at best only provide a short-term respite for the Latins. The presence in the east, from the end of St. Louis' Crusade until the fall of the kingdom, of troops permanently stationed there by the French crown, was precisely the kind of support from the west which the Latin East needed. But the French regiment was far too small, on its own, to make anything more than a minor impact on the military situation in the area. And although some people in the west realised that the permanent provision of large numbers of troops was the only means to provide for an effective defence of the kingdom, in practice virtually nothing was done.

So the Latin East was left, for most of the time, on its own to defend its dwindling territories against the Muslim armies. The Latins' response was to adopt a defensive strategy which relied on the ability of garrison forces to defend a series of independent (and increasingly isolated) strongpoints. Ultimately this strategy resulted in the loss, one by one, of the remaining Christian castles and fortified towns - though given the problems which the Latins faced, it is impossible to believe that any alternative strategy could have proved more effective. Before the final destruction of the Latin Kingdom, however, this strategy had already set the tone for most of the military events in the area during the thirteenth century. Christian strategy could only
be modified when more troops became available, thus allowing a field army to be created. This happened at the time of crusade expeditions, though it produced some problems of its own.

The capture and defence of territory, if the military option was selected, came about through a combination of raids, battles and sieges. In each of these fields of military activity the Christians' lack of manpower, and their obligation to adopt, under normal circumstances, a defensive strategy, had a significant impact. Thus the Muslim armies, for example, used raiding expeditions as a part of their wider strategy which aimed at the elimination of the Christians from the area. Raids were used to distract the Latins from the true target of an expedition; in the case of major Christian centres of resistance such as Acre, raids served to systematically weaken a site before a major campaign against it was organised. For the Christians on the other hand, particularly in the second-half of the thirteenth century, raids became, in the absence of any realistic prospect of permanent territorial gains, their sole means of taking the military initiative against their Muslim neighbours. Moreover, any Christian raiding was likely to result in Muslim reprisals which could leave the Christians in a worse state than when they started, whilst the gains from such an expedition became increasingly questionable, as more and more Christian troops were deployed in less and less profitable excursions. By the 1260's, even the arrival of crusade armies might only result in some ineffectual raids being organised.
The Latins' use of most of their available troops as garrison forces meant that in attack, they were extremely unlikely to seek a confrontation in open battle with a Muslim army, whilst in defence, they relied upon the combined strength of their strongpoints and the men inside them to deal with any Muslim incursion. The strongpoints could not prevent the progress of a Muslim invading force; but, providing the Muslims were unsuccessful in any efforts to capture a castle or town by siege, then their army would make no permanent territorial gains and it would be obliged, eventually, to withdraw. A battle-seeking strategy therefore normally had no part to play in the Latins' efforts to maintain their kingdom. However, the arrival of a crusade expedition in the area frequently led to a campaign in which a battle took place. Unfortunately such battles were then fought, on the Christian side, by troops who for the most part had little understanding of the tactics which a Muslim army could be expected to employ against them. At Beit Hânûn in 1239, and Mansurah in 1250, Christian knights, and others, charged to their fates, ignoring the advice and appeals of men from the Latin East. When Muslim and Christian armies clashed in open battle during this period, it was almost without exception the former who held the initiative throughout the course of the conflict. Battles, for whatever reason they were fought, usually resulted in the defeat, or at best, the costly victory of a Christian field army and the consequent negative impact upon the course of a campaign.

The Latins' efforts, with the aid of crusaders, to achieve territorial expansion therefore foundered on the battlefields of Egypt
and Palestine. The Muslims' attempts to take possession of Christian territory, on the other hand, succeeded through a series of well-planned siege campaigns directed against the surviving Christian castles and fortified towns during the second-half of the thirteenth century. The Christians, in defence, were obliged to rely solely on themselves. Their garrisons, buoyed to some extent by the massive fortifications of sites such as Saphet, Crac and Margat, were still virtually helpless in the face of the onslaught of Muslim armies which frequently numbered thousands against the Christians' hundreds. Many sites, not surprisingly, were surrendered without a fight. At others the garrison conceded as soon as it became clear that there was no hope of a reprieve. Only at one or two sites, including Acre, was the fight continued to the end. Then, a wholesale slaughter with little prospect of mercy, could be anticipated.

It appears that the inevitable demise of the Latin Kingdom can be dated from the accession of the Mamluk sultan Baybars in 1260. From this, it seems that two points remain to be made. First, the Latin Kingdom in the thirteenth century enjoyed a period, lasting at least until the failure of St. Louis' Crusade, during which there was no genuine threat to its continued survival. This point is shown in the social and constitutional history of the period, in which there was considerable positive achievement. It is also evident in the military history of these years. The Muslims, for much of the time, were far more threatened than a threat. Both the Fifth Crusade and St. Louis' First Crusade posed a genuine threat to the Aiyubid Kingdom of Egypt. In Syria the Hospitallers and Templars were able to maintain some
degree of control over the activities of their Muslim neighbours. In a less likely form, the willingness and ability of the majority of the Latin East’s feudatories to oppose the demands of Frederick II is further evidence of the relative strength of the kingdom during the first-half of the thirteenth century.

Finally, and even after the accession of Baybars, there was life left in the Latin East. Debates, disputes - over the regency of the kingdom, for example - and civil conflicts continued. The War of St. Sabas virtually destroyed the city of Acre in the years immediately preceding the start of Baybars' campaigns against the Latins. As late as 1282, the Embriaco faction tried, by military means, to gain control of Tripoli. Despite the constant threat of low-level conflict to the Latins during the last years of their presence in the east, exemplified by raiding expeditions, it is clear that whilst they may well have been psychologically under siege they were not threatened, in a constant physical sense, by Muslim armies. The nature of medieval warfare was such that the Muslim threat to the kingdom, even in the last 30 years of its existence, remained for the most part an ephemeral one. In a kingdom whose fate had effectively been decided, life was still able to go on.
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