SELF-KNOWLEDGE

and

MORALITY

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with certain aspects of self-knowledge which are important for morality. It is an attempt to show the inadequacy of the theory of self-knowledge by parity with knowledge of others put forward by Professor Ryle in *The Concept of Mind*, whilst accepting his criticisms of the traditional theory of self-knowledge.

The thesis is largely concerned with knowing what we do, and the things that we do, and its purpose is to emphasise differences between agent and observer.

It is maintained (Chapter II) that knowing what I did is different in kind from knowing what others did, and an account is given of knowing what I did, which involves some consideration of the place of motives. Chapter I is an attempt to justify the rejection of the thesis that every action must have a motive.

Chapters III and IV are attempts to deny that we know all that there is to know about a man from his behaviour. It is claimed that there are things which we do in thought, which may be said to be constituents of our 'inner lives'. Some attention is given to one of the most important 'inner life' concepts, that of self-deception.

Finally, it is shown that the admission that we do not know all that there is to know about a man from his observable behaviour does not materially affect our ability
to predict his behaviour, and that the account of motives
and our knowledge of what we did, given previously, allows
us to account for a man's doing one generous action in the
whole of his life.

This thesis is in no sense itself a theory of self-
knowledge, for there are many aspects of self-knowledge
which have not been considered. But it is an attempt to
show that there are things to be said about self-knowledge
which are neglected if we believe with Ryle, that there are
no differences between self-knowledge and our knowledge of
others.
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There is, in contemporary ethics, an undue emphasis on the public aspect of morality, to the neglect of those aspects which are not public. It is more difficult to agree with Kant that 'When the question is of moral truth, it is not with the actions which we see are concerned, but with those inward principles which are not in the power of the senses. He was perhaps right to maintain, in the face of much contemporary philosophy, that our minds do not so much rely on the chance events which have befallen us or the acts thereby brought about in the world, but also with the 'state of man's soul'; contemporary philosophers are concerned with the inter-personal aspects of morality to the neglect of personal approval.

P.H. Rawls says that "The names of virtues and vices...are not the basis of praise and blame used to express approval and disapproval and to influence the conduct of the person whose character is to be appraised and else of others...Appraising, praising and blaming are things that men do and can only be understood on the assumption..."
Introduction

There is, in contemporary ethics, an undue emphasis on the public aspect of morality, to the neglect of those aspects which are not public. It is made difficult to agree with Kant that "When the question is of moral worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not see". It is difficult to maintain, in the face of much contemporary philosophy, that morality has to do, not merely with the changes brought about in the world, but also with the 'state of a man's soul'. Contemporary philosophers are concerned with the inter-personal aspects of morality to the neglect of the personal.

There is a notion that in engaging in moral discussion or in making ethical pronouncements, we are influencing, or seeking to influence, the behaviour of others. R.M. Hare regards the language of morals as prescriptive.

P.H. Nowell-Smith says that "The names of virtues and vices.....are terms of praise and blame used to express approval and disapproval and to influence the conduct of the person whose character is to be appraised and also of others......Appraising, praising and blaming are things that men do and can only be understood on the assumption

1. R.M. Hare The Language of Morals Pl "The language of morals is one sort of prescriptive language."
that they do them for a purpose and use means adapted to their purpose."

One objection to this is that when we appraise the conduct of a fictitious or historical character, it is nonsense to suggest either that we are prescribing a course of action for him, or seeking to change his character. This objection is countered by agreeing with this, and asserting that we are prescribing or seeking to change the behaviour of the person to whom we are speaking. It may again be objected that we do not always utter publicly our condemnation of other people. Again this is admitted, but, it is said, we are prescribing for ourselves. There is no difference in principle between those utterances which are public and those which are not. Professor Ryle has held in *The Concept of Mind* that there are no significant differences between ourselves and other people. Whatever can be said about public utterances can be said about private, and we may therefore confine ourselves to public utterances. Public utterances are of course, interpersonal; we seem therefore, to be justified in talking about private utterances as if they too were interpersonal.

In *The Concept of Mind*, Ryle has, it seems to me, completely exploded the concept of mind as the 'Ghost in

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1 Ethics P.301
the Machine'. To defend the traditional concept of mind, as something which exerts an influence on a man's body, or is influenced by a man's body, and the views which are a result of this, would not only be extremely difficult in view of Ryle's criticisms, but would, I think, be useless. The notion that all physical events (bodily movements) are preceded by mental events which take place in an inner life, and that mental and physical are in some way connected, has exercised philosophers for a long time, with no constructive results. Ryle has swept away a great deal of difficult and pointless talk about minds and men's inner lives; unfortunately, he has swept away talk of inner lives altogether. The traditional view of Privileged Access, based as it is on a distinction between body and mind will not stand up to his attacks, and I do not see how it could be reinstated, or what purpose an attempt to reinstate it would serve. It is not the destruction which is open to criticism so much as the reconstruction.

Briefly, Ryle's thesis is that whatever need be said about minds can be said about a man's behaviour. One of the consequences of the traditional theory was that

"One person has no direct access of any sort to the events of the inner life of another. He cannot do better than make problematic inferences from the observed behaviour of the other person's body to the states of mind which, by analogy from his own conduct, he supposes to be signalised by that behaviour. Direct access to the workings of a mind is the privilege of that mind itself; in default of such privileged
access, the workings of one mind are inevitably occult to everyone else. For the supposed arguments from bodily movements similar to their own to mental workings similar to their own would lack any possibility of observational corroboration. Not unnaturally, therefore, an adherent of the official theory finds it difficult to resist this consequence of his premises, that he has no good reason to believe that there do exist minds other than his own."  

Ryle points out that we do, as a matter of fact, know a great deal about other people, which on traditional theory, we could not possibly know. "Teachers and examiners, magistrates and critics...........all know well enough how to settle their daily questions about the qualities of character and intellect of the individual with whom they have to do."

There is indeed something suspect about a philosophical theory which maintains that we cannot know what in fact we do know. But there is also something suspect about a theory which goes against common sense in asserting that we know ourselves as we know other people, and that we may always know all there is to know about other people from their behaviour. Ryle's alternative theory also denies the obvious facts of our experience.

Ryle seems to see his approach as having two advantages:-

1. We can cut out reference to introspection, which is highly suspect as a source of knowledge, and consequ-

1. The Concept of Mind  P.14
2. "  "  P.7
ently, the mental acts or events which we are supposed to introspect.

2. What can be said about a man's overt actions can be verified, unlike what can be said about the results of some sort of inner observation (introspection).

With regard to the first, Ryle is not content with maintaining that there are no inner lives or mental events in the way in which these were traditionally described, but maintains that there is in fact, nothing of importance over and above appearances in conduct.

One of the consequences of traditional theory was that we know ourselves in a way different from the way in which we know other people. We know them only by their physical movements, but we have an additional source of knowledge about ourselves; we can observe our own minds.

It will be my thesis that we do know ourselves in a way which is different from the way in which others know us, that we do have what may be called 'inner lives', but that this may be maintained without recourse to minds which function like inner theatres, and without recourse to introspection. Neither shall I be forced to maintain that any of our knowledge of ourselves is indubitable.

It will however, be to maintain that there are some instances at least of which it is true that we cannot know 'other minds'. This will involve saying that not all that can sensibly be said about a man can be said in terms
of his overt behaviour, that in fact, some of the things that can be said, at any rate by him, are not capable of verification.

I am here primarily concerned with the question as it affects ethics, so that there will, in any event, be much that will remain unsaid on the question of self-knowledge. My main purpose is to show that there is privileged access of some sort; that is, to establish and not fully to explore this concept. In consequence, the extent to which our knowledge of ourselves differs from our knowledge of others is not fully considered. I have confined myself mainly to knowing what we are doing and those aspects of this which appertain to ethics. I have said nothing about knowing our own aches and pains, or our abilities, or our anger - states of mind. Moreover, within this limited field of self-knowledge problems arise which I have not been able to treat fully in this thesis. I hope it will be considered sufficient to have shown that there are problems connected with self-knowledge.

There are two things which I shall mainly be concerned to allow for, which cannot, it seems to me, be admitted if we consider morality solely by reference to a man's overt behaviour. One is the distinction between a man's doing something which is only apparently, and not really generous. Kant's position, that two men may perform exactly the same overt action, and yet one have moral worth
and the other not, cannot be admitted if we are restricted simply to what is observable. I do not wish to press this moral point of view, but to give an account which will allow it to be adopted. We may wish to say that such a distinction is unimportant, but I do not see that we need deny that it is a valid distinction.

The other is, that on Ryle's view, I do not see how it can be said that a man can do but one generous action in the whole of his life. This is important for questions of responsibility, since if we are to claim that a man could have acted otherwise, that, for example, however ungenerous he is, he could still have acted generously, we must allow for his doing a first generous action. I have not considered at all the question which is said to be of supreme importance in connection with responsibility, that of giving an analysis of 'He could have acted otherwise'. It seems to me that this is to underestimate the complexity of the problem. It is my view that this can only be done adequately after a careful reconsideration of some of the main concepts connected with responsibility, not least that of 'motive', and it is my hope that this thesis will be a contribution in that respect. I have throughout tried to keep the notion of responsibility in mind, as it is ordinarily used and not as an outcome of the free-will/determinism controversy.

What follows therefore, is a criticism of certain views of self-knowledge put forward in The Concept of Mind.
and an attempt to provide alternative accounts of those aspects which are of particular importance in connection with morality. It has been necessary, since I wish to talk about motives and the things we do, to preface the main part of this thesis with a criticism of the view that every action has a motive.

I have throughout accepted Ryle's account of the traditional view of privileged access. A new view can be better established by a criticism of Ryle than by a criticism of his criticism of traditional views. Accordingly, I am not concerned with the question of whether he does or does not misrepresent the holders of the traditional theory. I do not think we can go back from *The Concept of Mind*, but I hope we may go forward.

It will be obvious that in attacking Ryle's notion of self-knowledge, I am accepting much of what he says elsewhere in *The Concept of Mind*. I have tried to acknowledge what I have used as far as possible, but where I have failed to do this, my excuse must be that much of what is said there now seems to be public property, and I am here concerned, not so much with what is acceptable, but with what is not.

I have also made use of Professor Austin's 'performative utterances', particularly in connection with what I have called 'verbal activities'. It has been convenient to use a different term, since I intend 'verbal activities'
to be wider in scope than I think his expression 'performative utterances' is intended to be. But the source of this is his article on Other Minds.

One says nothing new if one points out that a great deal of philosophical talk about concepts is connected with notions employed with, and in, particular the talk of motives has been combined to ethical the terms. The influence of science on philosophy has been significant in various connections. A. N. Whitehead in *The Conceptual Foundations of Science* suggests that certain epistemological problems arise of the methodology and of the presentation of science. Whitehead considers that much of this has no real concern in science as a result of the facts of the concrete sciences and of the theory of the theory of metaphysics. So far as motives are concerned, he points out that it is wrong to consider them as evil, push and pull, as they are any sort of matters that pull. Then he points out, not only because our own most pressing such. However, it will not be simple to say that it is a mistake to talk or action in this way, even when it provides an alternative account. It might be true, I believe, adequate in other ways. Although, or correctly enough this of motives as some sort of social cause.

Talk of motives in this way and without concrete connection with the role of mind as separate from body, but this is an aspect of the question which I do not propose to-
"EVERY ACTION HAS A MOTIVE"

One says nothing new if one points out that a great deal of philosophical talk about conduct is permeated with notions connected with mechanism, and in particular that talk of motives has been conducted in mechanistic terms. The influence of science on philosophy has been considered in various connections. E. A. Burtt in The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science, suggests that certain epistemological problems arise out of the uncritical acceptance of the presuppositions of science. Professor Ryle considers that much of what has been considered in ethics is a result of the fear of the growing sciences; the fear of the 'Bogy of Mechanism'. As far as motives are concerned, he points out that it is wrong to consider them as occult pushes and Pulls, or even as any sort of pushes and Pulls. Men, he points out, are not machines, not even ghost ridden ones. However, it will not do simply to say that it is a mistake to talk of motives in this way; one must also provide an alternative account, and Ryle's is not, I believe, adequate in other ways, although he certainly avoids talk of motives as some sort of occult cause.

Talk of motives in this way has without doubt, connection with the idea of mind as separate from body, but this is an aspect of the question which I do not propose to
consider. Philosophers have tried to give explanations of man's conduct modelled on the laws of mechanics, and there are difficulties involved in the use of the mechanical model, which are not dispelled simply by considering the matter from the mind-body point of view, or by pointing out that motives are not causes. There are certain presuppositions implicit in talk of motives in mechanistic terms, which have been accepted, and still seem to me to be implicit in ethics. These assumptions must be displayed before we can consider the question of motives anew. I shall consider first, in some detail, the mechanical model as it is used by Locke, its use by other philosophers and the effects of its use on ethics.

"Every body perseveres in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change this state by forces impressed thereon."

Newton's first law of motion

"What moves the mind, in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular motion or rest? And to this I answer: The motive for continuing in the same state or action, is only the present satisfaction with it; the motive to change is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness."

Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding

Locke's account of motivation bears, perhaps not surprisingly, a remarkable resemblance to Newtonian mechanics. Not only is he primarily concerned with motion, but a great deal of his terminology is Newtonian
in character. He concludes his chapter on 'Powers', by remarking that all our ideas "might be reduced to these very few primary and original ones, viz:

- **Extension**
- **Solidity**
- **Mobility**, or the power of being moved

which by our senses we receive from body:

- **Perceptivity**, or the power of perception, or thinking
- **Motivity**, or the power of moving;

which by reflection we receive from our minds." 1

Powers, Locke tells us, are of two kinds, active and passive, the idea of the one derived from mind, the idea of the other from body.

"A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is set in motion itself, that motion is rather a passion than an action in it. For, when the ball obeys the motion of a billiard stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare passion. Also when by impulse it sets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and loses in itself as much as the other received: which gives us but a very obscure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilst we observe it only to transfer, not to produce any motion. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what passes in ourselves; where we find by experience, that, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies, which were before at rest." 2

It is important to notice the similarity between Locke's attribution to body of a 'power to be moved'; that there is that in a body which makes it able to be moved, and Newton's definition of *vis insita*:

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1. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding Bk.II, Ch.XXI, 73
2. " " " " " " 11, XXI 4
"The vis insita, or innate force of matter, is a power of resisting, by which every body, as much as in it lies, endeavours to preserve its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a right line."

"That all bodies are movable and endowed with certain powers (which we call the vires inertiae) of persevering in their motion or rest, we only infer from the like properties we have observed in the bodies we have seen." 1

According to Locke, just as bodies are endowed with a power to be moved, so men are endowed with a power to begin motion, they have a power to 'begin or forbear a motion'. Just as a body has a power to persevere in its present state, whether it be of rest or of moving uniformly forward in a right line, so a man has a power, in some sense, to control his moving or his staying at rest. This power is centred round the will, which is a power of the mind to prefer motion to rest, or rest to motion.

"This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will. The actual exercise of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition or willing." 2

This being able to prefer certain actions (not the power of being able to carry out one's preferences), is what distinguishes man from body, e.g. from the tennis ball.

"A tennis ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a racket, or lying still at rest, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis ball to think, and consequently not to

1. The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy trans. Motte
2. Essay Bk.II XXI 5
have any volition, or preference of motion to rest or vice versa." 1.

Thus, it seems obvious that there is a great similarity between Newton's account of matter and Locke's account of man.

Both Burtt and Mach point out that in Newton's conception of force, there is a great deal of animism, and both suggest that this is the result of an analogy with the 'feeling of effort' which we have. Burtt says:

"It is remarkable how very gradually modern science succeeded in divesting its conception of force or power of animistic trappings and indeed the purification may only be said to have been definitely begun when it was discovered that our immediate feeling of effort, which was undoubtedly the basis of earlier animism in the scientific notion of force, may be present without, due to some pathological condition, the occurrence of the appropriate limb-movements. When such a fact comes home to man he is prepared to see in force, only a name for the unknown causes of changes in motion. But of course, Newton lived before this purging had gone very far; because he shared the crude psychology of his time he believed it possible to know the existence of force quite apart from and antecedent to its effected motion." 2

Mach also comments on the use of the comparison between what he calls 'volitional impulses' and forces:

"That which in the mechanics of the present day is called 'force' is not something that lies latent in the natural processes, but a measurable actual circumstance of motions, the product of mass into the acceleration. Also when we speak of the attraction and repulsion of bodies it is not necessary to think of any hidden causes of the motion produced. We signalise by the term 'attraction' merely the actually existing resemblance between events determined by conditions of motion and the results of our volitional impulses. In both cases

1. Essay Bk.II XXI 9
2. The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Science P.251
either actual motion occurs, or when the motion is counteracted by some other circumstances of motion, distortion, compression of bodies and so forth are produced." 1

It is perhaps an open question whether Newton was influenced by the 'crude psychology' of his time, or whether the psychology of the time was influenced by Newton. But it certainly seems to be the case that Locke's particular psychology was very much influenced by Newton. At least, Locke's account of the will, and his account of the way in which a man can be said to be free, have much in common with Newtonian mechanics, and it seems true to say that whilst animistic notions may be involved in Newton's conception of force, Newton's laws of motion are certainly involved in Locke's discussion of man. Locke's chapter 'Of Power' is in fact, an account of man and his motivity by analogy with Newton's mechanics.

Before considering the justification for the explanation by analogy with mechanics, and its results for ethics, let us consider its place in Locke's moral theory. We have seen that for Locke, man has the power of motivity, a power to move, an active power that is closely connected with the will. A man is at liberty when he can do what he chooses. A man whose limbs are paralysed may will (prefer) to move them, but be in fact unable to do so. He is not then at liberty, but under necessity. He is in exactly the same state as the tennis ball in having no power to move, but unlike the tennis

1. The Science of Mechanics P. 246
ball, he can prefer to be in his state of rest.

A man may will (prefer) to remain at rest, but be unable to do so.

"A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to stop; and therefore in respect of these motions he is not a free agent. Convulsive movements agitate his legs, so that though he wills it ever so much, he cannot by any power of his mind stop their motion (as in that odd disease called Chorea Sancti Viti), but he is perpetually dancing; he is not at liberty in this action, but under as much necessity of moving as a stone that falls, or a tennis ball struck with a racket." 1.

In such a case, the man's actions are not the result of his volition; they are not the result of an exercise of his active power, but we must regard them as we regard those of the tennis ball, as a result of his passive power.

But the question arises, although a man may be at liberty to do what he prefers, is he free to will? Since man's liberty consists in his being able if at rest, to continue so, or to continue to move if moving, or to come to rest, according to which of these he prefers, he is not really free to will. He must either be in a state of motion or rest, and so when the question arises, of whether or not he is to make a change, he must make up his mind one way or the other. He may choose to remain in the same state or to change that state, but one or the other he must choose once he has considered the possibility of change. What can happen, however, is that he may

1. Essay Bk.II XXI 11
suspend his choosing until all the consequences of the proposed change have been examined, for the mind has this power to suspend its preferring.

What is it, asks Locke, which determines the will and sets us about making a preference, which we may or may not be able to carry out?

"The will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on such direction; to the question, What is it determines the will? the true and proper answer is, The mind. For that which determines the general power of directing, to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercising the power it has in that particular way. If this answer satisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the question, What determines the will? is this: What moves the mind in every particular instance, to determine its general power of directing, to this or that particular motion or rest? And to this I answer: The motive for continuing in the same state or action is only the present satisfaction in it; the motive to change is always some uneasiness: nothing setting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but some uneasiness."

This uneasiness is 'desire', which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of some absent good. This is perfectly obvious, Locke thinks. Every man's observation will satisfy him that when a man is perfectly content with the state he is in, which is when he is without any uneasiness, what will is there left but to continue in it? It is false, says Locke, that the greater good determines the will, as some philosophers have maintained, for a man may be "ever so well persuaded of the

1. Essay Bk.II XXI 29
advantages of virtue, that it is as necessary to a man who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life: yet......till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be determined to any action in pursuit of this greater good:

Locke summarises his theory:-

"To conclude this enquiry:- Liberty is the power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs. A power to direct the operative faculties to motion or rest in particular instances is that which we call the will. That which in the train of our voluntary actions determines the will to any change of operation is always some present uneasiness, which is, or at least is always accompanied with, that of desire." 2.

Thus Locke seeks to explain man's movements by analogy with the movements of matter, in such a way as will not contradict, if not actually support, the admirable Mr. Newton's discoveries with regard to matter. A tennis ball needs an impulse of some description to put it into motion; so does man - the greatest present uneasiness. The tennis ball will continue in the state of motion into which it has been put, unless compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon. A man would continue in that state in which he is, but he has the power to choose whether or not he shall change his state, a power which the tennis ball lacks. The tennis ball will continue in its movement unless other forces intervene. The man too will continue in his state of

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1 Essay Bk.II XXI 35
2 " " 71
motion or rest unless other forces intervene (another, stronger desire), but he has the power to control his own movements, to choose whether or not he will continue in his movement or change his state.

With what right does Locke extend to man the laws of mechanics? Mach, who obviously has great faith in this analogy, points out that to assume that men's actions can be explained mechanically is to indulge in mythology.

"The French Encyclopaedists of the 18th. century imagined that they were not far from a final explanation of the world by physical and mechanical principles; Laplace even conceived a mind competent to foretell the progress of nature for all eternity, if but the masses, their positions and initial velocities were known. In the 18th. century, this joyful overestimation of the scope of the new physico-mechanical ideas is pardonable. Indeed, it is a refreshing, noble, elevating spectacle; and we can sympathise with this expression of intellectual joy, so unique in history. But now after a century has elapsed, after our judgment has grown more sober, the world-conception of the encyclopaedists appears to us as a mechanical mythology in contrast to the animistic of the old religions. Both views contain undue and fantastical exaggerations of an incomplete perception. Careful physical research will lead, however, to an analysis of our sensations. We shall then discover that our hunger is not so essentially different from the tendency of sulphuric acid for zinc, and our will not so greatly different from the pressure of a stone as now appears.......The direction in which this enlightenment is to be looked for, as a result of long and painstaking research can of course, only be surmised. To anticipate the result, or even to attempt to introduce it into any scientific investigation of today would be mythology and not science."  

Locke, of course, does 'anticipate the result' and extends mechanical principles to man with very little

1 The Science of Mechanics P463/4
attempt at justification for doing so. He does indeed appeal to our experience - "When a man is perfectly content with the state he is in - which is when he is perfectly without any uneasiness - what industry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every man's observation will satisfy him." But this is scarcely an adequate justification for the extension of mechanical principles to man. When a man is content with the state in which he is, as Locke suggests here, he is not in a state of rest similar to that of the tennis ball when it is lying on the ground. A man who is content with his job, may not change it, but he cannot be considered not to be acting at all. He is still, presumably, catching his train, or leaving the office at five. It is extremely difficult to give a meaning to a man's doing nothing, and yet Locke presupposes it and even offers it as some sort of justification for extending the Newtonian model to man, for constructing what amount to universal laws of man's motion by analogy with Newton's universal laws of motion.

Ordinarily when we speak of a man's doing nothing, we mean for example, that he wastes his time, does little things that don't matter, but not the things that do. We know what it means for someone to be 'busy doing nothing'. We may announce that we've done nothing all day, but we mean, for instance, that we have done no work.

1 Essay Bk.II XXI 34
today, or none of the things which we ought to have done. But we do not mean that we have done nothing whatsoever. We may reply, if we are asked if we are doing anything, that we are not, but this usually means that we are not doing anything of importance, perhaps just reading the paper and we are available to do whatever needs doing. If a child says he is not doing anything, what is usually meant is that he is not doing anything that he ought not to be doing. It might be said of a man that he must always be doing something, that he just can't sit quietly, but this is still to be doing something.

The only times when a man can be said to be doing nothing are when he is asleep or otherwise unconscious. Perhaps even when he is asleep we should say that he is doing something, e.g. breathing, dreaming etc., but this is not to the point, for he cannot, as far as we know, choose what he shall dream or whether or not he shall dream, and Locke's point is that he should be in a position to choose. He might be able to choose whether to hold his breath or not, but he can hardly be said to be able to choose whether to breathe or not, unless this is one way of saying that he can choose to commit suicide, when he would undoubtedly be in a state of rest. It is extremely difficult to give a meaning to a man's doing nothing, or being in a state of rest, which would be analogous to the state of the tennis ball lying on the ground. It is
in fact, extremely difficult to avoid doing something; one might possibly retire to bed.

Locke is of course, concerned to answer the question 'What moves man at all?' - i.e. How can we account for a man's doing anything at all; doing something, rather than nothing? How can man's movements be accounted for as the movements of inanimate objects have been accounted for? His answer is as near Newtonian mechanics as possible. Some of man's movements, for instance, those of the man suffering from 'Chorea Sancti Viti' are to be explained in a way similar to the way in which the movements of a tennis ball are to be explained, but with the additional qualification that the man can prefer or will not to move, although his willing is ineffective. He is under necessity.

Apart from such instances, a man is at liberty. He is able to do what he chooses or prefers to do, to act as a result of his will. What moves the body is the active power (the will) just as what enables the inanimate object to be moved is its passive power. What sets the will in motion is the greatest present uneasiness. The desire for some absent good determines the will in its choice of the next action. Just as the inanimate object will persevere in its state of rest or of uniform motion unless it is compelled to change its state by forces impressed thereon, so a man will remain in his same state of rest or of motion, unless some greater uneasiness determines him to
choose another course of action.

Thereafter, whatever particular action is considered, if it was an action performed by a man at liberty and not under necessity, it is explicable in a certain way. Every such action has a motive, and the motive is always the desire for some absent good. Every action performed by a man not under necessity is caused by the will determined by the greatest present uneasiness. A man eats. What is his motive for eating? The desire for some absent good which is causing him the greatest uneasiness, in this instance, food; he eats to be rid of this uneasiness. If it is pointed out that men have gone hungry that others might eat, it will be said that in this case, the desire that others should eat was causing greater uneasiness than their own desire for food.

Although there have been variations on this theme, for example, that things other than desire for some absent good move a man to act, or change his state, the general model has been retained, very often. Some philosophers have felt that, like Locke, they must account for man's moving at all, in such a way that underlying any ethical discussion, there must be an account of the laws by which man acts, and the forces which operate on him. A motive is what moves a man to action, or accounts for his acting, and every action must have a motive; for every movement there is a cause of that movement. Just as
the laws of motion are sufficiently comprehensive to account for any movement of any inanimate object, so the laws of man's motion must be sufficiently comprehensive to account for any action he may perform.

Like Locke, Hume was greatly influenced by Newtonian mechanics, and he too used the mechanical model. Although he disagreed with Locke on certain points, he did not disagree with him on essentials. He too thought it possible, and indeed, the task of philosophy, to produce a statics and dynamics of the mind. In the Enquiries he comments on the success of Newton and states his intention of doing for man what Newton had done for matter.

"But may we not hope, that philosophy, if cultivated with care, and encouraged by the attention of the public, may carry its researches still farther, and discover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which the human mind is actuated in its operations? Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution. It is probable that one operation and principle of the mind depends on another; which, again, may be resolved into one more general and universal."

He disagreed with Locke on the question of our ideas of

1 Enquiries Pl4(Selby-Bigge)
power. He denied that we have any idea of power at all. We can get the idea of power from neither of the two sources Locke mentions, sensation and reflection.

"Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to the senses, give us no idea of power or necessary connection, by their operation in particular instances, let us see, whether this idea be derived from reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be copied from any internal impression. It may be said, that we are every moment conscious of internal power; while we feel, that, by the simple command of our will, we can move the organs of our body, or direct the faculties of our own mind. An act of volition produces motion in our limbs, or raises a new idea in our imagination. This influence of the will we know by consciousness. Hence we acquire the idea of power or energy; and are certain, that we ourselves and all other intelligent beings are possessed of power. This idea, then, is an idea of the reflection, since it arises from reflecting on the operations of our own minds, and on the command which is exercised by will, both over the organs of the body and faculties of the soul.

We shall proceed to examine this pretension; and first with regard to the influence of volition over the organs of the body. This influence, we may observe, is a fact, which, like all other natural events, can be known only by experience, and can never be foreseen from any apparent energy or power in the cause, which connects it with the effect, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. The motion of our body follows upon the command of our will. Of this we are every moment conscious. But the means, by which this is effected; the energy, by which the will performs so extraordinary operation; of this we are so far from being immediately conscious, that it must forever escape our most diligent inquiry." 1

Hume is arguing as against Locke, not that the will does not move us to action, but that we do not have an idea of the power by which it does this. The motion of our bodies as following upon the command of the will, he

1 Enquiries P51
takes as evident, but this is all we know; we do not
derive an idea of power from this. Moreover, he denies
that Newton ever meant by 'vis inertia' a real power in
the way that Locke thinks of it. Hume certainly accepts,
as Locke accepts, the mechanical model as one by which
man's movements are to be explained, although he does not,
as far as I know, attempt to give any sort of justification
for doing so. The will is still what causes a man to
act, but it is not said that this is a power within a
man enabling him to act, since this would be to maintain
the existence of a power of which we have no experience.
An action 'follows' upon the command of the will.

Hume claims to show, in the section on 'The
Influencing Motives of the Will', in the Treatise that
reason cannot move us to action, but that the passions do.
Reason, Hume insists, which "regards the abstract relations
of ideas or those relations of objects of which experience
only gives us information", can never give an impulse to
the will, can never influence any of our actions, but
only as it directs our judgments concerning cause and
effect. It is the passions and not reason which give
impulse to the will.

"'Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of
pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a conse-
quently emotion of aversion or propensity, and are
carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us
this uneasiness or satisfaction. 'Tis also obvious,
that this emotion rests not here, but making us
cast our views on every side, comprehends whatever
objects are connected with its original one by
the relation of cause and effect. Here then, reasoning takes place to discover this relation; and according as our reasoning varies, our actions receive a subsequent variation. But 'tis evident in this case, that the impulse arises not from reason, but is only directed by it. 'Tis from the prospect of pain or pleasure that the aversion or propensity arises towards any object: And these emotions extend themselves to the causes and effects of that object, as they are pointed out to us by reason and experience. It can never in the least concern us to know, that such and such objects are causes, and such others effects, if both the causes and effects be indifferent to us. Where the objects themselves do not affect us, their connexion can never give them any influence; and 'tis plain, that as reason is nothing but the discovery of this connexion, it cannot be by its means that objects are able to affect us." 1

This is one of the passages in which Hume is arguing against the rationalists, and he could quite well have argued that they could not explain how moral 'truths' supposed to be known by reason, could possibly have any effect on our actions, without also expounding a theory about what does move us to action. Hume's argument is sufficient, having said that matters of fact and relations of ideas are the only things we can know, and that moral 'truths' are neither of these, to show the inadequacy of the rationalist position against which he was arguing, and he was right to challenge the rationalists to show how something outside our experience could possibly have any effect on our conduct. But it need have been no more than a rhetorical question.

He was however, interested in explaining what moves man at all. Man only moves at the command of his will,

1 Treatise P414 (Selby-Bigge)
which is in its turn moved by the passions which have been
aroused by certain objects, and at the prospect of pleasure
or pain aroused towards that object. (It must be added
in fairness to Hume that he did regard the passions as
both calm and violent and he did take great pains in his
ethical theory to insist that all our passions are not
concerned with ourselves.) However, what this amounts to
is that whatever I do is to be explained in the last
resort, in terms of my passions or my interests, my wants
or my desires. I cannot tell you anything I did which
did not have a motive and the motive for which is not in
the last resort connected with my wants, desires or
passions. This must be so, or how could my doing anything
at all be explained?

Everything I do, whether it be something for which
I merit blame or moral approval, or something like
gardening or cooking a meal, going on holiday or to work,
is to be explained in terms of the satisfaction of my
desires, even though my desires may be to serve your
interests. However much I insist that I didn't want to
go to work this morning, it is insisted that I must have
wanted to, or I must have wanted to do something else,
which is served by my going to work. It must be said that
there was something that I wanted to do, or some desire
that I was trying to satisfy, or how could my doing
anything at all possibly be accounted for? (How could the
tennis ball possibly have moved if nothing struck it? How could I possibly act except at the command of my will acted upon by a passion or a desire, or in Locke's case, to satisfy the greatest present uneasiness?)

The only way in which an ethical theory based on the mechanical model can be refuted, is by giving an alternative account of what moves man at all, by giving an alternative account of the laws and forces by which man is governed. But whatever sort of question 'What moves man at all?' is, it seems not to be a philosophical question. It may belong to the realm of psychology or physiology or neuro-physiology, or be a question which belongs in some way to all, but there is no point in pretending that it is a philosophical question, or in supposing that it has been answered philosophically.

Now it may seem odd to suggest that there are still remnants of the influence of mechanics in contemporary philosophy, and particularly so in the case of Mr. Nowell-Smith, who explicitly rejects, in his book Ethics the notion of motives as causes. But it seems to me that there are remnants here. He accepts certain points made in the interests of giving a comprehensive account of the laws of man's motion by analogy with the Newtonian laws of motion. He affirms that every action must have a motive, but rejects the notion that a motive is a cause; a motive becomes a 'reason for choosing'. For every
action a man performs, he had a reason for choosing to do it. He accepts certain points made by philosophers seeking to explain man's actions by analogy with the laws of motion, although he maintains that they are logical points. It seems to me that there is no very good reason for accepting them either as logical or as psychological points.

Nowell-Smith says:

"Many philosophers have made the point that every action must have a motive, and that a motive can only be counteracted by another motive; and some have represented choice as simply the victory of the strongest motive or set of concurrent motives. These points have usually been put as if they were psychological laws; but they are really the elucidations of the logic of concepts. To say, for example, that every action must have a motive is to state a tautology, since what a man 'did' without a motive would not count as an 'action'. The theory that a motive can only be counteracted by another motive is also a logical rather than a psychological theory. For it is the theory that we use the word 'motive' in such a way that anything which counteracts a motive is also called a motive." 1

"A motiveless action or 'acte gratuit' is logically impossible; for it is not something that a man could be said to 'decide' or 'choose' to do and so would not count as an 'action'. It is, of course, possible to do something apparently aimless for the purpose of proving that a motiveless action is possible; but this is foolish, since the action in fact has a motive, namely to prove the possibility of motiveless action." 2

Although Nowell-Smith treats 'Every action must have a motive' as tautological, it will be convenient to treat what he says above as if he were making several points, so

1 Ethics P114
2 " P124
that the similarity with Locke can be shown. He makes the following points:

1. Every action must have a motive.
2. Only something that a man could be said to 'choose' or 'decide' to do would count as an action.
3. What a man 'did' without a motive would not count as an action.
4. A motive can only be counteracted by another motive.

Let us consider these separately.

1. **Every action must have a motive.**

   In the mechanical theory, an action of whatever sort is a movement, and there cannot be a movement without something that has caused (or accounts for) that movement, whether what moves or changes its state is a tennis ball or a man. A tennis ball does not move unless it is struck or otherwise set in motion; neither will a man move unless he is set in motion.

2. **Only something that a man could be said to 'choose' or 'decide' to do, would count as an action.**

   Man, as apart from inanimate objects, has a power to prefer certain states, either a state of motion or of rest, and this is what distinguishes him from the tennis ball. "This power, which the mind has thus...to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance is that which we call the will."  

   "The tennis ball, whether in motion by the stroke of a
racket or lying still at rest, is not by anyone taken to be a free agent. If we enquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not the tennis ball to think, and consequently not to have any volition or preference of motion to rest or vice versa."

The power to choose whether or not he shall remain at rest distinguishes man from the tennis ball, which has no such power. Only man can choose or decide what he will do.

3. What a man did without a motive would not count as an 'action'.

Only those movements which are made as a result of man's preference or choice are different from those of the tennis ball. A man who strikes himself, or his friend, by a convulsive motion of his arm, which it not in his power by volition or the direction of his mind to stop or forbear" is in the same state as the tennis ball struck with the racket. It is not an exercise of his active power, but his 'action' is a result of his passive power.

4. A motive can only be counteracted by another motive.

This appears in Newton's first law of motion as "Every body perseveres in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a right line unless it is impelled to change this state by forces impressed thereon" and in Locke "The motive to change is always some uneasiness; nothing setting us upon a change of state or upon a new action but some new uneasiness".

1 c/f P.13
2 Essay Bk.II XXI 9
3. c/f PII
4. "
And later, of course, this is qualified to 'the greatest present uneasiness'. The desire for one absent good can only be counteracted by a desire for a different absent good, one which is causing greater uneasiness.

These points can be seen to be points made in the interests of the attempt to give a comprehensive account of the movements of man by analogy with the laws of motion. Nowell-Smith explicitly rejects the notion that a motive is a cause, and substitutes for 'motive', a 'reason for choosing', but there is the same attempt to treat actions in such a way that what can be said about one can be said about all. Whatever action we consider, the agent must have chosen to do it, and although in Nowell-Smith's case, his choice need not be as a result of the greatest present uneasiness, his reason for choosing must refer to a 'pro-attitude' or a 'con-attitude'. Man's actions are still to be explained in terms of what he wants to do.

We have seen that there is no very good reason for accepting the analogy between man and inanimate objects, and so no very good reason for accepting Locke's laws of man's movements. Why then should we accept such connected views as that every action should have a motive?

Nowell-Smith says that these are logical points, which have usually been put as if they were psychological ones. He says that some philosophers have written as if they were elucidating empirical laws of human behaviour,
which they are not usually competent to do, and that

"...it is clear from their arguments that philosophers are really doing no such thing. What look like generalisations turn out to be logical observations; and these are either recommendations to adopt a certain set of concepts with certain logical relations between them or assertions to the effect that such a system already underlies, though unnoticed, our ordinary use of these concepts. In the latter case, what the philosopher says can be verified or falsified, but it would be by an examination of linguistic usage, not by an examination of non-linguistic behaviour." 1

and "Many philosophers have made the point that every action must have a motive... These points have usually been put as if they were psychological laws; but they are really the elucidations of the logic of concepts." 2

It may be true that one can regard what 'many philosophers' have said, as if they were making logical observations, but it seems to me to be untrue to say, in the case of Locke and Hume (and Hobbes, since Nowell-Smith mentions him,) that they were making logical observations. They were attempting to do for man what Newton had done for matter. They were attempting to frame laws of man's actions, by analogy with Newton's laws of motion.

However, let us consider 'Every action must have a motive' as a logical point. It seems to me that there is in fact very little to recommend our adoption of this tautology, and Nowell-Smith gives no reasons why we should adopt it.

To say that what a man 'did' without a motive would not count as an action, and that only something that a

1 Ethics P.106
2 " P.114
could be said to 'choose' or 'decide' to do would count as an action, seems to leave out of account such things as accidents, for we do not indeed 'choose' or 'decide' to do what we do accidentally, and it is difficult to see how certain 'events' which are reported in newspapers, involve loss of life, and often imprisonment for somebody, are not to be considered as actions of some sort. Magistrates, judges, victims and dependents do not usually take the view that if a man does not choose or decide to do what he does, what he 'does' does not count as an action. Anyone who begins to consider conduct from the point of view that every action must have a motive, could, no doubt, account for occasions of this sort. Men occasionally set fire to their houses. If a man does this because he wants to collect the insurance money, destroy incriminating evidence etc., this counts as an action. He had a motive. But if he didn't have a motive for setting fire to it; if perhaps he left the petrol in a position in which anyone using his common sense would have known was dangerous, what he 'did', i.e. set fire to his house, would not count as an action. This seems an odd position, but what one would presumably say, would be that his action was not setting fire to his house, but to leave the petrol in a dangerous position. And if he didn't choose or decide to leave the petrol where he did, we should have to look for something that he did choose to do.
We should have to say, in the case of a motorist who runs down a pedestrian accidentally, that what he 'did' was not running down the pedestrian, but, perhaps, exceeding the speed limit. But such a man is very often charged with manslaughter and not with exceeding the speed limit.

The trouble is not that this definition of an action will leave any sort of action out of account. It will be possible to account for any instance one cares to mention. It will be useless for a man to protest, for example, that he didn't want to give his last crust to a friend, or to protest that he didn't really have a motive for looking into the shop window as he passed, and at the same time claim that he did something, i.e. looked into the shop window. We can always find a motive or an action which did have a motive, if we look long enough. But it does considerably distort what we want to say about the things we do (or claim to do), for we do want to say that we don't always choose to do what we do.

Moreover, we do not, as a matter of fact, talk about the things we do in this way. Nowell-Smith says of what 'look like generalisations', but turn out to be logical observations, that these are "either recommendations to adopt a certain set of concepts with certain logical relations between them, or assertions to the effect that such a system already underlies, though unnoticed, our
ordinary use of these concepts. In this case what the philosopher says can be verified or falsified, but it would be by an examination of linguistic usage, not by an examination of non-linguistic behaviour." This particular usage does not seem to be particularly well supported by ordinary usage. We do not ordinarily say that if a man didn't choose or decide to do something, then he didn't do it. We do say 'He didn't intend to do it' or 'He did it accidentally', but if we were to take this recommendation seriously, this would be to talk nonsense, for if he didn't intend or choose to do it, he didn't 'do' it; what he 'did' doesn't count as an action. We couldn't then say 'He set fire to his house accidentally', or 'He ran down the man by accident', because 'setting fire to his house', or 'running down the man' were things he didn't 'do'! We often in fact excuse a man because he didn't intend to do what he did, but it hardly makes sense to say that we excuse him for what he didn't 'do'.

It seems to me that there is no very good reason for accepting this definition of an action. It derives from the mechanical model, and I can see no good reason for accepting talk of man in mechanical terms, for there is more to this than simply talking of motives as causes. It serves no useful purpose to deny that motives are causes, and yet to retain such dictums as that every
action has a motive. One of the things one might do
of course, would be to offer an alternative definition of
an action, but it seems to me that this could only be
done adequately by an examination of the ways in which
we do talk of actions, and I do not wish here to
undertake either. In what follows, I shall consider an
action simply as 'what a man does', and I shall maintain
that there are motiveless actions. I shall try throughout,
to isolate one particular sense of 'motive' which seems
to me to be one which is essential to morality.

I shall begin, therefore, by considering observable behaviour, and I shall
claim that here our knowledge of ourselves is different
from our knowledge of other people. Most of us, committed
or uncommitted to a philosophical theory, claim to know
what we are doing most of the time; but what is it to
know what we are doing?

First, let us consider Professor Ryle's position in
The Concept of Mind. He certainly acknowledges that we
usually know what we are about, and of the traditional view
he says:

"My consciousness-story is required to explain how
we are apprised of it......knowing what we are about
does not entail an incessant actual monitoring of
our doings and feelings, but only the
propensity inter-annel to avoid them, when we are in
the mood to do so; .......the fact that we generally
know what we are about does not entail our coming
across any happenings of ghostly status."

There is no objection to these negative views as there is

1 The Concept of Mind P.161
II

KNOWING WHAT WE ARE DOING

The case for some sort of privileged access is not to be established, I think, by defending the traditional view. Nor will it do to proceed immediately to a consideration of those things which we do which are not observable, especially as it is maintained that there is nothing of importance over and above overt behaviour. I shall begin, therefore, by considering observable behaviour, and I shall claim that here our knowledge of ourselves is different from our knowledge of other people. Most of us, committed or uncommitted to a philosophical theory, claim to know what we are doing most of the time; but what is it to know what we are doing?

First, let us consider Professor Ryle's position in The Concept of Mind. He certainly acknowledges that we usually know what we are about, and of the traditional view he says:

"No phosphorescence-story is required to explain how we are apprised of it......knowing what we are about does not entail an incessant actual monitoring or scrutiny of our doings and feelings, but only the propensity inter alia to avow them, when we are in the mood to do so; ....the fact that we generally know what we are about does not entail our coming across any happenings of ghostly status." 1

There is no objection to these negative views as there is

1 The Concept of Mind P.161
to Ryle's positive views. He says:-

"Our knowledge of other people and of ourselves depends on our noticing how they and we behave." 1

"The sorts of things I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things I can find out about other people and the methods of finding out are much the same." 2

"In principle, as distinct from practice, John Doe's ways of finding out about John Doe are the same as John Doe's ways of finding out about Richard Roe." 3

"The questions 'What knowledge can a person get of the workings of his own mind?' and 'How does he get it?' by their very wording suggest absurd answers. They suggest that, for a person to know that he is lazy, or has done a sum carefully, he must have taken a peep into a windowless chamber, illuminated by a very peculiar sort of light, and one to which only he has access. And when the question is construed in this sort of way, the parallel questions, 'What knowledge can one person get of the workings of another mind?' and 'How does he get it?' by their very wording seem to preclude any answer at all; for they suggest that one person could only know that another person was lazy, or had done a sum carefully, by peering into another secret chamber to which, ex hypothesi, he has no access.

In fact the problem is not one of this sort. It is simply the methodological question, how we establish, and how we apply, certain sorts of law-like propositions about the overt and silent behaviour of persons. I come to appreciate the skill and tactics of a chess player by watching him and others playing chess, and I learn that a certain pupil of mine is lazy, ambitious, and witty by following his work, noticing his excuses, and listening to his conversation and comparing his performances with those of others. Nor does it make any important difference if I myself happen to be that pupil. I can indeed then listen to more of his conversations, as I am the addressee of his unspoken soliloquies; I notice more of his excuses, as I am never absent, when they are made." 4

It seems however, that this account of self-knowledge

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1 The Concept of Mind P.181
2 " " P.155
3 The Concept of Mind P.156
4 " " P.163/9

(my underlining)
is not in principle very different from the view of self-knowledge embodied in the privileged access theory that Ryle is attacking. One of the objections to this theory is that, on this account of self-knowledge, we are required to attend to two things at the same time. It was maintained that a mind is able to 'observe' its own operations. A mind can observe what goes on outside it, but also, can observe by 'introspection', a species of inspection, what goes on within it. A mind is, as it were, a private stage and we can watch (introspect) what goes on on it.

Ryle very rightly points out, that if introspection were as the 'official' theory describes it, we should have to attend to two things at once. A man would, for example, "be both resolving to get up early and concomitantly observing his act of resolving; attending to the programme of rising betimes and perceptually attending to his attending to this programme." He admits that this objection is not logically fatal, since it is sometimes possible to attend to two things at once, for example, to the control of a car and to the conversation, but if not logically fatal, this objection is at least highly damaging to the privileged access theory. "Many people who begin by being confident that they do introspect, as introspection is officially described, become dubious that they do so, when they are satisfied that they would have
to be attending twice at once in order to do it. They are more sure that they do not attend twice at once than that they do introspect."

If this objection is damaging to the traditional theory of self-knowledge, it is even more damaging to Ryle's theory of self-knowledge by parity with our knowledge of other people. To observe my own behaviour would be at least as highly sophisticated as it would be to 'introspect' in the sense of observing what goes on in the private theatre of the mind, and gives rise to even greater difficulties. I can observe two of my friends talking to each other in the distance, but I cannot observe myself observing them, or observe myself talking to them. You may learn things about me from my facial expressions; it would make life very difficult if I had to do this. This is not, of course, to say that I never learn things from my facial expressions, but they are not the same as you learn. You may learn from the expression on my face that I am shocked, but I do not need a looking-glass to discover this, if indeed, I can be said to discover this at all, although I might, by catching a glimpse of myself in the glass, learn that I show that I am shocked.

We have exchanged observing what goes on on the private stage, for observing what goes on in public, and this exchange is not satisfactory. To say that I 'notice
more of my excuses', leads either to the difficulty of doing two things at the same time, which is an objection brought against the traditional theory, i.e. making an excuse and noticing that I am making an excuse, or to the absurd position of saying that I never really know what I am doing, but can only know what I have done, i.e. I don't know that I have made an excuse until I have noticed it. After all, I cannot 'notice' my pupil's excuse until he has made it.

Ryle's own analysis tends to suggest the latter. He certainly admits that there is a sense of 'knowing what we are doing' which is not simply a matter of 'finding out', for he says:- "But there remains another sense of 'know' in which a person is commonly said to know what he is at this moment doing, thinking, feeling, etc., a sense which is nearer to what the phosphorescence-theory of consciousness tried, but failed, to describe." "What sort of rider," he asks, "are we adding when we say 'I did so and so and knew at the time that I was doing it'"? But his answer is disappointing, for it turns out that we in some sense 'observe' or 'notice' what we have done, but that we are not surprised that it happened. We never, in fact, receive an analysis of knowing what I am doing at the time at which I am doing it.

It should perhaps be mentioned here, that Ryle's

1 C.o.M. P.174
2 " P.174
account of 'heeding' and 'doing something with heed' might very well have provided him with an analysis of knowing what one is doing at the time at which one is doing it, particularly as he opposes, to my mind, rightly, doing something with heed to doing something absent-mindedly, but this is neglected in the chapter on Self-knowledge, where 'heeding' is used in the sense of paying heed to what is there, or to what one has done, that is, it becomes a species of noticing, and is not used in the sense of doing something with heed. He speaks, for example, of the sense of 'unconscious' "in which a person can be said to be unconscious of a sensation, when he pays no heed to it." 1 And he says, "It is certainly true that when I do, feel or witness something, I usually could and frequently do pay swift retrospective heed to what I have just done, felt or witnessed. I keep, much of the time, some sort of log or score of what occupies me......" 2

The analysis Ryle offers of knowing what one is doing, is in terms of not being surprised to catch oneself doing something. He says, "Now usually we are not surprised to catch ourselves having whistled, planned or imagined something, and we say, if asked, that we are not surprised, because we knew we were doing these things, while we were doing them." 3

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1 C.o.M. P.157
2 " P.159
3 " P.174
Ryle places the emphasis on 'not being surprised'; "When a person is described as not being surprised when something takes place, he can also be described as having expected it or having been prepared for it." But it is not the notion of being or not being surprised to which objection must be taken, but that of 'catching ourselves', and of describing what we do as 'something that takes place'. How does one catch oneself doing, or having done something, if one knew at the time what one was doing? One may catch a thief red-handed; how does one catch oneself red-handed? One may indeed steal, but how does one catch oneself stealing? Talk in terms of 'catching' 'finding' is certainly appropriate to my witnessing other people's activities, but not, as a rule, to talk about my own activities, and certainly not on the occasions when I claim to know what I am doing. I can say significantly, that I am not surprised to find you here tonight, as I was expecting you to be here, but what does it mean to say that I am not surprised to find myself here tonight, as I was expecting myself to be here? It is by no means untrue to say that I sometimes find myself doing something, or that I sometimes find myself doing things which surprise me, but this is by no means always so, and is certainly not so on the occasions when I do something knowing that I do it. It would not be absurd, but in most cases it would be untrue to say that
I found myself coming here this evening, and it would be to say something different from simply 'I came here this evening'.

Ryle's analysis of knowing what one is doing is given, not surprisingly, since he wants to maintain that there is no difference between self-knowledge and our knowledge of others, in terms appropriate to knowing what someone else is doing. He says:

"Now in almost the same way as a person may be, in this sense, alive to what he is doing, he may be alive to what someone else is doing. In the serial operation of listening to a sentence or a lecture delivered by someone else, the listener, like the speaker, does not altogether forget, yet nor does he have constantly to recall the earlier parts of the talk, and he is in some degree prepared for the parts still to come, though he does not have to tell himself how he expects the sentence or lecture to go on.............the listener may be frequently surprised to find the speaker saying something, while the speaker is only seldom surprised;" (i.e. seldom surprised to find himself saying something.)

"the listener may find it hard to keep track of the course taken by the sentences and arguments, while the speaker can do this quite easily."  

On Ryle's account it is as if both lecturer and listener listen to the lecture, but the one is more prepared for what is said than the other. Now, one either gives a lecture or one listens to a lecture; one does not (usually) listen to oneself giving a lecture. In the passage quoted above in which Ryle claims that there is no difference between knowledge of oneself and knowledge of others, he says that if I myself happen to be the pupil

1. C.o.M. P.179
2. P.40
"I can indeed listen to more of his conversations as I am the addressee of his unspoken soliloquies; I notice more of his excuses, as I am never absent, when they are made."

But we surely do not listen to our own conversations or our own lectures unless they are recorded, and what does it mean to say that we are never absent when our own excuses are made? We know what it is to be absent when someone else makes an excuse or does something, but what would it be to be absent when I made an excuse, or did something?

Making an excuse or giving a lecture is to be doing one thing; listening to an excuse or a lecture is to be doing another. The speaker may know what he is doing, or he may not; the listener may know what he is doing, or he may not. If the listener knows what he is doing, he also knows what the speaker is doing. Part of what the listener does is to keep track of what the lecturer is saying, but what the lecturer is doing is not both delivering a lecture and listening to himself delivering a lecture (keeping track of what he is saying).

Knowing what one is doing at the time at which one is doing it, is not to be analysed in terms of knowing what someone else is doing or has done, if it is to be at all adequate, and that it requires separate treatment can be shown by some consideration of 'knowing'.
If a man claims to know something, he lays himself open to the challenge 'How do you know?'; he can be asked what his credentials were for making the assertion. To this, various types of answer can be given. He may substantiate his claim to know by saying how he came to be in a position to know; by saying, for example, "I know because I saw him do it", or "I know because I was there when it happened", or he may substantiate his claim to know by mentioning some special qualifications he possesses, for example, "I ought to know that this is a broken leg; I'm a doctor". He may substantiate his claim to know by giving some evidence which may or may not be conclusive; this may or may not prove that what he says is in fact so. Or his answer to the question 'How do you know?' may take the form of giving a piece of evidence which is conclusive; he may substantiate his claim to know that something is the case by proving that it is the case.

Now it seems that if we claim to know what we did or what we are doing, we lay ourselves open to the challenge 'How do you know?' and to this, no satisfactory answer can be given. The question of evidence, or of having special qualifications or of saying how one came to be in a position to know, are relevant to the question of knowing what someone else did, but not to the question of knowing what we did.

That saying how one came to be in a position to know
is not applicable in the case of knowing what one was doing at the time at which one was doing it, or of knowing what one did, has been shown, I hope, in the criticism of Ryle's position, for if his position were acceptable, we should be able to answer the very puzzling question 'How do you know that you made an excuse?' by saying 'I heard myself' (or him?). If the listener to Ryle's lecturer were to tell someone what the lecturer had said, he could sensibly be asked 'How do you know?' and as sensibly answer 'Because I heard him', or, 'Because I was there', but even supposing that the question 'How do you know?' can sensibly be asked of the lecturer if he tells someone what he said, the answer would hardly be 'Because I heard him' (or myself), or 'Because I was there'. If one is questioned as to how one knows that something has happened, or has been said, one would say 'I was there', or 'I saw it' or 'I heard it', if one had been a member of the audience, or in fact anyone present, but not if one had been the person who did or said whatever it was.

And neither would one include oneself among those present. One would simply say 'I did it'.

The question 'How do you know?' is sometimes treated as 'How did you find out?' or 'What are your grounds for saying that you know this?' and neither of these is relevant in the case of knowing what I did, although both may be relevant in the case of knowing what you did.
Suppose a man suspected of murder has said that he was at the theatre on the night in question, and that the detective has found the half theatre ticket. He may be asked how he knows that the suspect was at the theatre that night, and he may reply, among other things, that the man has told him so, and that he has the theatre ticket. (The suspect's saying that he was at the theatre would never be considered as evidence, nor would the half theatre ticket be considered to be proof that he was, but this does not matter here.)

For the detective, the half ticket might serve at various times:-

a. as a clue to the man's whereabouts that night. He may use it as a beginning, or a part of, his investigations; it may lead him to find out the time at which the ticket was issued etc.

b. as some sort of proof. It may function in the proof that the man was (or was not) the murderer, or as proof that the man was or was not at the theatre.

c. it may furnish him with grounds for saying that he knows the man was at the theatre because....and he has the ticket.

It may seem that there is no great difference between (b) and (c), and in some cases there may be little difference. Of course, (c) is much wider than (b); the way in which one substantiates one's claim to know need not necessarily
take the form of evidence, for saying how one came to be in a position to know may be just as good. (B) and (c) may co-incide. If the detective says that he was there when the man committed the murder, this is an adequate ground for saying that he knows and would also be considered as proof. The man was caught red-handed. Nevertheless, there is some difference between the two. One may have reasonable grounds for claiming to know and yet be wrong, although the claim was reasonable enough on the evidence. One might also claim to know, be right, and yet be unable to offer proof. Sometimes the relation between proof and grounds is like-

b. prove that \( 21 \times 67 = 1407 \) and
c. how do you know that \( 21 \times 67 = 1407 \), where the answers to both take the same form, that of working out the sum. But there is a difference between-

b. prove that arsenic is poisonous and
c. how do you know that arsenic is poisonous?

And it is not uncommon, at least in detective fiction, for the murderer, told by the detective that he knows he is the murderer, to retort 'But you can't prove it'.

So, a. 'I found the theatre ticket' may be the detective's reply to the question 'How did you find out that he was at the theatre? What led you to conduct the enquiries which resulted in this particular conclusion?'
b. The ticket may be produced at the trial as evidence that the man was at the theatre, and so is, or is not, the murderer.

c. 'Because I found the theatre ticket' may be the detective's reply to the question 'How do you know that he was at the theatre?'

Now, (a) and (c) have no place whatsoever in the suspect's account. His half theatre ticket does not function for him in these ways. It is not for him a clue to his whereabouts on that particular night, nor can it be said to be part of his grounds for saying that he was there. He can only offer it as proof of what he says. That is, the ticket is part of the detective's evidence or grounds for saying that he knows the suspect was at the theatre, and evidence or grounds for claiming to know are extremely important here. He will not remain a detective for long, if his grounds for saying that he knows are that the suspect told him so. And he would not be a detective at all if he had been in the habit of claiming to know without any evidence or grounds whatsoever. Yet it seems as if this sort of knowing is what is being attributed to the suspect, for it is true that the theatre ticket plays neither the part of evidence nor clue for him.

If I (the suspect) went to the theatre on the night in question and am able to tell the detective so (I haven't lost my memory now and I was in my right mind then),
whether or not I have the ticket now, or whether I have thrown it away or have lost it, is irrelevant to the question of my knowing what I did, although far from irrelevant to the question of whether I can convince the detective. The absence of the theatre ticket, or whatever else is needed to provide evidence of my activities, does not leave me not knowing what to believe, as it might leave the detective not knowing what to believe. To be without an alibi is to be without the means of convincing others, but not without the knowledge of what one did.

At this point, we could revert to inner processes, or say that it was 'intuitive' or 'immediate' knowledge, or that a man 'knows directly' what he did, but these concepts carry a great many difficulties with them. Professor Austin says:

"Knowing at second hand, or on authority, is not the same as 'knowing indirectly', whatever precisely that difficult and perhaps artificial expression may mean. If a murderer 'confesses', then, whatever our opinion of the worth of the 'confession', we cannot say that 'we (only) know indirectly that he did it', nor can we so speak when a witness, reliable or unreliable, has stated that he saw the man do it. Consequently, it is not correct, either, to say that the murderer himself knows 'directly' that he did it, whatever precisely 'knowing directly' may mean." 1

If the witness may be said to 'know directly', then it is not correct to say that the murderer 'knows directly' that he did it, for there is a difference between knowing what

1. Other Minds P.128 Logic and Language Second Series
someone else did and knowing what I did. Evidence or being in a position to know are relevant to the one but not to the other. And whilst it may be true to say that what is meant by 'intuitive' knowledge is knowing without evidence, to say that knowing what we did is intuitive knowledge is not particularly helpful. We are still left with the problem of what sort of knowledge the murderer's is.

There is a very good reason why the question 'How do you know?' is not relevant to knowing what one did. The question 'How do you know?' is primarily asked of someone who claims to know that something is the case, but not of someone who claims to know what he did, for knowing what one did is not an instance of knowing that something is the case.

If a man says 'The Matterhorn is in Switzerland', he is (or may be) claiming to know that something is the case; he may be said to be telling us that he knows that the Matterhorn is in Switzerland. If he says 'I climbed the Matterhorn', it is tempting to say that he is telling us that he knows that he climbed the Matterhorn, and so seems to become a possible candidate for the question 'How do you know that you climbed the Matterhorn?', just as the man who says that the Matterhorn is in Switzerland may be asked 'How do you know?'. But we know how to answer this, as we do not know how to answer the question 'How do you
know that you climbed the Matterhorn?'

The man who says that he climbed the Matterhorn is not telling us something that he knows to be the case, he is telling us what he did. He is not primarily claiming to know something, but claiming to have done something. The murderer who says 'I did it' is claiming, or confessing, to have done something, whilst the man who says 'He did it' is claiming to know something about him. The latter will know how to answer the question 'How do you know that he (the murderer) did it?'; the murderer won't.

It may seem somewhat arbitrary and dogmatic to say that is a man says 'I climbed the Matterhorn', he is not primarily telling you something that he knows, but something that he did, but the distinction between knowing that something is the case and having done something is one that we do ordinarily make.

What we write in our diaries, is, as a rule, what we have done, and not what we know, although our diaries may form a basis for other people to say what they know, as apart from what they did. You might substantiate your claim to know that he climbed the Matterhorn by telling of something you did - perhaps read it in his diary. What we know we tend to write in text-books, although we do not always omit to say how we found out; what we did, what experiments we performed etc.
If, in teaching history to children, I tell them that William the Conqueror ordered the compilation of Domesday Book, and add that I've actually seen this, both may be bits of knowledge for them, the first about William the Conqueror (or Domesday Book), the second about me, but in giving them this information, I am telling them firstly, something that I know to be the case, and secondly, something that I did.

A general knowledge test may be about any number of things or people, but is never about the candidate. A question paper on English Literature does not include a question, for which marks will be awarded, asking when we last read a particular book, or what we read last night. We set tests to find out what a pupil knows, for example, about Napoleon's activities, but not what he knows about his own activities.

Marks are given for knowing what someone else did, but not for knowing what we did. It is assumed that if we did it, then we know that we did it. We know, or we ought to know, because we did it. This is not, of course, to say we always know what we did; we do, after all, say we 'ought' to know. But it is to say that knowing what we are doing, or knowing what we did is intimately connected with doing it.

We are only driven to the point of having to say of knowing what we did, that we know by 'introspection' or
that we know 'intuitively' or even that we know by observing our own behaviour, if we regard knowing what we did as a species of knowing that something is the case, where the question of how we know is relevant.

There is no very good reason why we should consider that everything we assert should be an example of knowing that something is the case, a point which Professor Ryle makes in connection with 'knowing how' in The Concept of Mind.

"Theorists have been so preoccupied with the task of investigating the nature, the source and the credentials of the theories that we adopt that they have for the most part ignored the question what it is for someone to know how to perform tasks. In ordinary life, on the contrary, as well as in the special business of teaching, we are much more concerned with people's competences that with their cognitive repertoires, with the operations than with the truths that they learn." 1

There is, in fact, 'knowing how', as well as 'knowing that', and 'knowing how' calls for different treatment from 'knowing that'.

But there is no reason why 'knowing how' and 'knowing that' should be considered to exhaust the ways in which we use 'know'. 'Knowing what I did' is certainly not 'knowing how', for it is one thing to know how to do something, and quite another to know that one did it. But neither is it 'knowing that'.

1. C.o.M. P. 28
Knowing what I did, then, is not the same as knowing what you did, for knowing what you did, is a matter of knowing that something is the case; knowing what I did is not. It is always proper for me to be asked how I know what you did, but only rarely is it proper in the case of knowing what I did. Far from its being the case, as Ryle says, that knowing what we are doing or what we did, is a matter of 'finding out', we only find out what we did when we did not know what we were doing.

I can find out what you did last night, but it does not make sense in normal circumstances (e.g. unless I was drunk or suffering from loss of memory) to say that I find out what I did last night. The simplest way for me to find out what you did last night is to ask you, directly or indirectly. You may refuse to tell me, or you may tell me (truthfully), or you may lie to me. If I am as curious as all that, I may take steps to discover whether you are speaking the truth, and if not, what in fact you did do. And these methods would, in lots of ways, be similar to those of the detective who finds out what a suspect did on the night of the murder. It is not sufficient for him to take the suspect's word that he was innocently engaged; he attempts to find out if what the suspect said was true. He may try to find out if anyone saw the suspect in Southampton, if anyone
remembers seeing him on the docks; if he in fact registered at the hotel as he said he did, and so on. The detective, of course, may not even ask the suspect where he was; he may find out by other means—perhaps by asking the suspect's acquaintances.

The one thing the suspect does not (normally) himself do, is to make enquiries of his acquaintances in an attempt to find out what he did on that particular night. He does not see if he registered at the hotel or examine his room for fingerprints, to discover either where he was that night or if he is telling the truth about where he was that night.

Now it is true that at times one may undertake some such enquiry, particularly if some time has elapsed since the night in question. Few of us could remember what we did a year ago today, and we should have to employ methods of 'finding out' what we did, for example, by referring to our diaries, but my 'finding out' here is not the same as yours. It is appropriate for me to say 'I can't remember', but it is not appropriate for you to say 'I can't remember', for you never knew. I knew once, and have forgotten. I need to find out now because I do not remember; you because you never knew. Of course, when you have found out, you too will be in a position to say that you knew once and have forgotten, but I am, as it were, one move ahead of you.
I do not wish to suggest that questions of finding out about our own activities in this sense, only arise after a considerable time lag, for this is by no means the case. We may equally well be unable to remember exactly what we were doing at noon today, unless it was something of special importance, or something that we always do at that time, like having lunch. But such cases of 'finding out' can be said to be cases of 'trying to remember', although perhaps I never do succeed in remembering. I may simply say 'I see from my diary that I did such a thing, but I don't remember'. And your finding out is not like this; you could not (logically) have forgotten as I have forgotten.

Now it may be that my finding out is like yours or the detective's. I may wake up and find myself in hospital, and in certain circumstances, be unable to remember how I got there. I should then have to take steps similar to those of the detective to find out how I got there and what I was doing on a particular day. It might be that this is 'trying to remember' because I have forgotten, (perhaps, although I was well aware of the lorry when it hit me, I received a blow on the head as a result of which I am unable to remember what happened then), but it might also be that my finding out is exactly like yours or the detective's. I might, for example, be able to remember getting on the bus at
the corner of the road, remember finding myself walking by
the sea at the other end of the country, and be unable to
remember what I was doing between these times. And it
might be the case that I should not, in saying 'I cannot
remember what I did', mean 'I have forgotten'. I might be
in exactly the same position as you when you need to find out
what I did, in that I cannot (logically) have forgotten,
because I never knew.

There are more common and convincing cases of my not
having known what I was doing than this, and it is these,
together with knowing what I did that I wish to consider.
That is, I shall consider the cases where, if I say 'I don't
know what I did', I do not mean simply, that I have
forgotten, but where not knowing what I did involves not
knowing what I was doing at the time at which I was doing
it. I shall therefore, ignore the question of remembering.
It is common knowledge that memory is not always reliable,
but it is equally common knowledge that however often we
are in a position of having known and forgotten - needing
to find out in the sense of having to try to remember, we
are equally often in the position of knowing what we did.
To say that in these cases we knew what we were doing and
have not forgotten is true, but in itself is not partic-
ularly helpful, for our concern is not primarily with
remembering but with knowing. I shall be concerned with
what it is to know what I did in those cases in which I
knew what I was doing then, and I have not forgotten, and those cases in which I never did know, where the question of having to find out, much in the same way as you have to find out, is relevant.

I shall suggest an analysis of knowing what one is doing (or what one did), and shall substantiate this by considering cases in which we do not know what we are doing (or what we did), that is, by a consideration of those occasions on which we do do speak of our having found out what we did, where we do not mean that we have succeeded in remembering - the occasions on which we properly talk of 'realising' what we did, or are doing, or say we 'noticed' or 'discovered' that we had done, or were doing, something or other.

I suggest that knowing what one did, can be reduced to knowing what one was doing at the time at which one was doing it, and not having forgotten, and that knowing what one was doing at the time at which one was doing it can be reduced to:

a. being able (in principle) to say what one is doing at the time at which one is doing it, and

b. being able (in principle) to give reasons for doing whatever it is one is doing, where these are relevant.

Thus, for example, a man knows what he is doing if he is able to say (in principle) 'I am going to the theatre because......', 'I am digging the garden because......', at the time when he is going to the theatre, or he is
digging the garden. I suggest that this is an adequate account of what we mean when we deny that we found ourselves doing anything. I didn't find myself digging the garden; I was digging the garden. (I knew perfectly well what I was doing.)

It is necessary to include 'in principle' because we obviously do not want to say that a dumb man does not know what he is doing. Neither do we wish to say that anyone who has not the necessary technical vocabulary does not know what he is doing. (If the doctor says 'Well, what's the matter with you?' he does not expect us to give a diagnosis, to say 'I've got an appendicitis', but neither does he expect us to say 'That's what I've come to you to be told'. He does expect us to be able to tell him, for example, where the pain is, how we feel etc., so that we can, in a non-technical sense, say what is the matter with us.)

The possession of a certain amount of vocabulary is obviously involved here, but I do not think that the fact that we cannot say how much need worry us. I think I should be prepared to say that anyone who could not in any way describe what he was doing, would not know what he was doing. If a child says 'Look! I'm swimming', and we see that he has one foot on the ground, we might say 'That isn't swimming'. This is not to say that the child does not know what he is doing in the sense I am suggesting.
He has misdescribed his performance, but he could describe it, for example, as 'Standing on one leg and moving my arms like this'. In such a case, we might either say that the child does not know how to swim, or does not know how to use the word 'swim', but we should not say, or suggest, that he didn't know at all what he was doing.

It is also necessary to include 'in principle' since it is not intended to exclude those things which we do, which by their nature are such that there would be no time to say what we were doing, or no time to formulate our reasons for doing it. If a man throws out his arm to stop a child running into the road, he would not say 'I am now throwing out my arm to stop a child running into the road'. But he could, in principle, say what he was doing at the time at which he was doing it. That he could, in principle, give reasons for doing whatever it is that he does, is intended to cover the same sort of case. Such a man would have no time to go over his reasons - add 'Because there is a lorry coming and she might run into it', but there is no reason, in principle, why he should not. He can very often give them to us afterwards. It does not, therefore, involve maintaining that a man knows what he is doing only if he say what he is doing at the time at which he is doing it, or actually go over his reasons for doing it at the time at which he is doing it. Neither does it involve being able to say in advance what he is going to do, or go
over his reasons before he does it. In some cases, we decide what we are going to do and why we are going to do it, before we actually do whatever it is, but this is not necessary in order to know what one is doing. The man in the above example would know perfectly well what he was doing. One might say that he acted 'instinctively' or 'impulsively' to signify that he did not in any way plan his action, but one can perfectly well know what one is doing if one does something impulsively.

Neither does it involve saying that for a man to know what he is doing, he should, if what he is doing takes some time, be continually saying what he is doing. For example, my being able to say that I went to the theatre last night, as opposed to my having found myself going, is dependent on my having been able to say at some point last night 'I am going to the theatre', where this describes what I am doing, and is not a statement of my intention. (The difference, that is, between my answer if asked, 'What are you doing (what do you propose to do) tonight?' and 'What are you doing now?'.) Knowing what I did does not depend on my having said it, nor on my continually saying it, but simply on my having been able to say it.

There is no precise point at which one can say, as a description of what one is doing 'I am going to the theatre', as there is, (or at least, there is a more definite point) at which one might say 'I am writing a letter'. Doing
something like going to the theatre can be considered as doing lots of other things like leaving the house, waiting for the bus, catching the bus and so on. Many other things that we do can be considered as covering a number of activities; for example, making a cake can include such things as getting out the ingredients, as well as beating eggs and mixing the ingredients. I think this is very much a matter of making an arbitrary decision about what to include in one's description of one's activities.

What are the sorts of occasions on which we should say not simply that we did something, but that we found out, discovered, realised, noticed what we had done or were doing, those when we were not able to say what we were doing at the time at which we were doing it?

Being able to say what one is doing at the time at which one is doing it, is intended, in the first place, to point the difference between doing a thing consciously, and doing a thing unconsciously. The distinction between doing a thing consciously and doing a thing unconsciously is not one I wish to uphold as a general classification of actions, but it is a distinction which serves a useful purpose in that it indicates a sphere in which it is perfectly proper to talk of finding out what one has done. I cannot say, for example, 'I am now walking in my sleep'. If I say 'I walked in my sleep last night', it makes perfectly good sense for someone to ask me how I know this
as it does not make sense for someone to ask me how I know that I went to the theatre last night. I could not say 'I am now walking downstairs' if I did walk in my sleep, as I could say 'I am now going to the theatre'. It may be perfectly true, for instance, that when the dentist was taking out a tooth, having given me gas, that I knocked the instrument from his hand. It would be perfectly proper for you to ask me how I know this, since I could not have described what I was doing at the time at which I was doing it. In such cases, one would have to find out what one had done by asking people or one would discover what one had done by being told, or in some cases, shown. One could not remember what one did, because one did not know what one was doing at the time at which one was doing it. For example, conditions are such in certain cases of epilepsy that a man would not know what he was doing at the time at which he was suffering from an epileptic attack. He would have to find out what he did.

Not all the occasions on which we might be said not to know what we are doing are of this extreme type. We might sometimes say 'I didn't know what I was doing yesterday',

1. 'An epileptic attack is a transitory condition in which a part of the brain or the whole of it passes into a state of abnormal activity......If the abnormality affects the whole of the brain, consciousness is clouded and may be completely lost. In some cases, the relation between the epilepsy and the crime is close and direct. The clearest example is the case where a crime is committed in a state of automatism or clouded consciousness which follows a major epileptic fit.' (Report of Royal Commission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 P. 133/4)
where this involves nothing so alarming as that we had a major epileptic fit, and have since been told what we did. In these more ordinary cases, we are prepared to add why we didn't know what we were doing, and are not surprised to be asked 'What did you do?'. We might say, for instance, that we were so worried yesterday that we didn't know what we were doing, and add perhaps, that we went to the wrong station, went past our bus stop and so on.

Now these cases are different from the ones I have considered above, i.e. different from cases in which conditions were such that we could not know what we were doing, but it is important to make clear in what way they are different. It might be argued that we can consider being worried, if one were sufficiently worried, as being a case in which conditions were such that one could not know what one was doing. And against this it might be pointed out that whether or not being worried constitutes a condition under which one could not know what one is doing depends on how worried one is, whereas not knowing what one is doing because one does it in one's sleep, does not depend on any sort of degree. But this will not do as I have already included epilepsy, which is also a matter of degree.

It is important to avoid the line of argument that the consideration of doing things unconsciously tempts us to take. One can, if one wishes, argue that not knowing what
one is doing because one is worried is a case of doing something unconsciously, but this would be to press 'unconscious' farther than I am prepared to press it here. By doing something unconsciously, I mean in one's sleep, in a fit, under an anaesthetic etc. More important, is that it leads us to consider which sorts and degrees of conditions will warrant our saying that someone did something unconsciously, or did not know what he was doing. We can easily slip into attempting to provide a general criterion for deciding whether someone knew what he was doing or not. This would be a fatal move, because we have already moved away from the point of view of the agent, and are adopting the point of view of the observer. We have already moved from 'I' to 'he'.

The difference to which I wish to draw attention, between not knowing what one did because one did it unconsciously, and not knowing what one did because one was worried, lies, not in what others can say about the agent, but in what the agent himself can say. In the latter case, he can tell us a great deal, both about what he did and why he didn't know what he was doing at the time. Such cases are not only more common, but also more profitable for discussion.

In the case of someone who does something unconsciously, he may tell us afterwards what he did. He may have been told, or he may have found out for himself; for example,
he might have found himself at the foot of the stairs in the middle of the night, and so say 'I realised I had walked in my sleep'. This may also be so in the case of the man who does something, but doesn't know that he does it, because he is worried. He may either be told, or he may realise what he has done.

There is also this difference: the man who says he didn't know what he was doing because he was worried could not have said what he was doing at the time at which he was doing it, but he could have said at that time, that he was worried. The man who walked in his sleep, not only was unable to say what he was doing at the time at which he was doing it, but was unable to say anything else at that time. He would have been unable to tell us anything; one can only answer 'No' to the question 'Are you asleep?' and 'Yes' to 'Are you awake?' The anaesthetist does not expect his patient to tell him when he is unconscious. In the one case, that of doing something unconsciously, he cannot remember anything about the time in question, in the other he can. No doubt one could find cases of doing something unconsciously where this too could be qualified; we do talk of people being only half-conscious. However, I think this is to say that one cannot draw a clear distinction here, and I am not concerned to do this. At the one extreme, the agent can tell us nothing, at the other he can tell us a great deal, and it is these latter which are of
more importance in a consideration of self-knowledge.

Let us turn then, to the more ordinary cases in which one might say 'I realised, found out, noticed, discovered what I was doing, or what I had done', cases in which one was not able to say what one was doing at the time at which one was doing it, but which one only realised etc. what one had done.

Doing something 'absent-mindedly' is a case in point. If a man absent-mindedly, or because he is worried, goes to Paddington instead of Waterloo, he may say 'I found myself at Paddington', or 'I found myself going to Paddington'. The way in which he was able to describe what he was doing (until he 'realised') was as 'going to Waterloo', and not, what he was actually doing, going to Paddington.

A motorist who runs down a pedestrian may be able to describe his activity as 'I am running down this pedestrian', or he may not be able so to describe his activity. The first would be a case of murder, the second an accident. The first man would not discover or find out that he had run down or was running down a pedestrian, the second would. To say that the second case would be an accident, is not, of course, to say that the man could not have described anything that he was doing, for he might have been able to say, (for instance, 'I am exceeding the speed limit', and so, although he would have to find out that he was running the
pedestrian down, he would not have to find out that he was exceeding the speed limit.

Most of the time we know what we are doing, and do not think it necessary to point out that this is so. People usually take for granted that we know what we are about, and we do not think it necessary, if we tell someone what we did, to add 'I knew at the time what I was doing'. But we do sometimes say, for instance, 'I know what I'm doing', and people do sometimes ask us if we know what we are doing, or if we know what we did, or if we think that someone else knows what he is doing, and it will be as well to consider some of these.

'Do you know what you are doing?' is not a request for information, and neither is 'Do you know what you did last night?' This is not normally countered by 'Yes', or even 'Yes, I did this that and the other'. 'Do you know what you did last night?' is used as a preliminary to telling me for example, that I left the front door unlocked. And it is assumed that this is something that I do not know about; it is assumed that I did not know that I did this last night. The person who says 'Do you know what you did last night?', is prepared to give and not to receive information, just as the person who says 'What do you think?' is (usually) prepared to give and not to receive information. He does not expect us to tell him what we think, unless his question is intended to be equivalent to 'A penny for your
thoughts'. If you tell me that I left the front door unlocked and I say that I left it unlocked because some members of the household were still out, you are satisfied that I did know what I was doing, although you may question whether in fact members of the household were still out. You may tell me that everyone was in, or that everyone had a key or that to leave the front door unlocked was a silly thing to do, but you do not continue to think that I did not know what I was doing. I knew at the time what I was doing. I was able to say 'I am leaving the front door unlocked because people are still out'. On the other hand, I might simply say, 'So I did. I forgot', or 'It never occurred to me' and so on. To say this is to say that there never was a point at which I was able to say 'I am leaving the front door unlocked because......'.

'Do you know what you are doing?' is very often used in the same way, i.e. as a preliminary to telling someone something about what he is doing. Thus, you might ask me if I know what I'm doing when I'm making a cake. Your suggestion is not that although you know that I am making a cake, I might be asleep, or under the impression that I'm cleaning the cooker. It is a preliminary to pointing out to me, for example, that I am using salt instead of sugar. This is not to point out to me that I'm making a mistake about salt and sugar; you are not assuming that I do not know the difference. I know perfectly well, and you assume
that I know perfectly well what the difference is between the two, how to tell the difference and what will be the result of using salt instead of sugar. What you are concerned to point out is that I am not doing what you suppose I think I am doing, or that I am making a mistake about what I am doing. I am (until you tell me) able to describe what I am doing as 'putting sugar in the cake'. You point out that the activity I am actually performing is describable as 'I am now putting salt in the cake', or perhaps you do not need to point this out; perhaps I realise what I am doing the moment you ask 'Do you know what you are doing?' If you do not point out what I am doing, and I discover what I have done when the cake comes to be eaten, I shall say 'I put salt in by mistake', and this will be to indicate that there never was a moment at which I was able to say 'I am putting salt in the cake'. I didn't know what I was doing when I put the salt in.

Not all the occasions on which we are asked if we know what we are doing are quite like this. Sometimes the point of asking someone if he knows what he is doing, is not simply to draw attention to a mistake he is making about what he is doing, not simply to tell him what he is doing, but to give him further information about what he is doing and knows he is doing. An example of this might be saying to a child, busy pulling the cat's tail, 'Do you know what you are doing?' The child does know what he is doing, in that he could describe what he is doing as 'pulling the
cat's tail'. It is to ask, for example, 'Do you know what pulling the cat's tail involves? Do you know that you are hurting the cat?' He might, of course, answer 'Yes', in which case you have failed to give him any further information.

The case is similar when we ask 'Does he know what he is doing?' We might mean does he realise all that this involves, does he know the risks that he is taking, does he know that if he does this, that is likely to happen. It is accepted that he knows what he is doing to a certain extent, that he could, for instance, describe what he is doing as climbing on the roof and could give reasons for this, perhaps to mend the chimney pot, but is he also aware of what climbing on the roof involves? Such uses of 'Do you know what you are doing?' and 'Does he know what he is doing?' are really outside the scope of this analysis. We might say that this is to ask if he could give, not simply a description of what he is doing, but an adequate description, but I think that more is probably involved than this, for we do sometimes mean 'Does he realise what effects this (which he is now doing) will have?'. In any case, in such uses it is admitted that the person in question could describe what he is doing at the time at which he is doing it, whether or not something more could be said. I am here concerned with the minimum requirements for knowing what one is doing, and such cases go beyond the minimum.
I have said that a man knows what he is doing if he is able to describe what he is doing at the time at which he is doing it, and if he has reasons for doing what he does, and his 'reason' here is his motive.

To say that the man who knows what he is doing has a reason for doing what he does, does not involve saying that he should have a morally good reason. If a man can describe his activity as 'helping this old man across the street' and add 'because he wants to get to the other side', he has a motive, and so he has if he can add 'because I want to pick his pocket on the way'. What in each of these cases follows 'because' is his motive. In both cases, his motive relates to what he is doing now, and in both cases his motive can be morally appraised. They have the same status as motives, although we should appraise them differently.

'Because it is my duty' and 'because it is the right thing to do', 'because I ought to', etc., are not reasons for doing whatever it is the agent does, in the sense intended here. A nurse takes her patient's temperature perhaps, because this is one of her duties. But she knows what she is doing if she can describe what she is doing and has a reason for doing it - i.e. to see if it is normal; to see if the patient has improved or not.

This can perhaps be shown more clearly by considering e.g. 'because I have been told to'. If a workman, chipping the glass out of the window, can say what he is doing at
the time at which he is doing it, but cannot say why he is
doing it - he has no reason for what he is doing, except
perhaps 'Because the foreman told me to', then we should
probably say that he did not really know what he was doing.
This would be different both from the case of the man who
might say 'Because the old glass must come out before I
can put a new pane in', and from the case of the man who was
simply chipping out the glass for no reason whatsoever, and
of whom we should be inclined to say that he did not know
(at all) what he was doing.

Nor do I mean by 'a reason' in the case of the man who
knows what he is doing, that it should be a logically
complete reason, in Nowell-Smith's sense of this, in that
it should be a reason which leaves no further room for
questioning. A man knows what he is doing if he can give a rea
reason; a man who says that he is cleaning his car because
it is dirty knows what he is doing; he does not need to add
'Because I want a clean car'.

If a man cannot describe what he is doing at the time
at which he is doing it, he will of course have no reasons
for doing it. A man who is walking in his sleep cannot say
'I am now walking......', and so he cannot, (logically), say
'I am now walking because........'. If I put salt into the
cake by mistake, I had no motive for what I did. If I was
not able to say 'I am now putting salt in the cake....', I
could not (logically) say 'I am now putting salt in the cake
because...'. This is also the case if we do something absent-mindedly or accidentally. If a man absent-mindedly goes to Paddington instead of Waterloo, i.e. he finds himself going, or at Paddington, he had no motive for what he did. He was not able to say 'I am going to Paddington because...' but only 'I am going to Waterloo (which he was not) because...'.

It is important to emphasise that a motive is the reason of the agent, and not the reason of an observer of the action, whether the observer is some second person or the agent himself acting as observer - i.e. when he 'discovers' or finds out what he has done. That is, the motive is the reason he has for doing what he does at the time at which he is doing it, and not the reason he gives for what he has done when he has realised, discovered or found out what he has done. A man may say, for instance, that he went to Paddington instead of Waterloo because he was thinking of something else. 'Because I was thinking of something else' is not his motive, but his explanation, and must be distinguished from the case in which he says that he went to Paddington instead of Waterloo because he thought his train went from there.

In the latter case, he could say, at the time at which he was going to Paddington, 'I am going to Paddington because my train goes from there'. He knew what he was doing, but he was wrong about the station from which his train went. In the former case, it would be extremely odd if he were able to say 'I am going to Paddington because I am thinking of something.
else'. In this case, he would describe what he was doing at the time at which he was doing it, as 'going to Waterloo'. He would discover, realise, find out that he had arrived at Paddington. He would explain his arrival at the wrong station by saying that he had been thinking about something else.

Similarly, a motorist who runs down a pedestrian (assuming that this is not murder) explains his action if he says that he was tired, or that he was thinking about something else, or that he wanted to get home quickly. He might well have been able to describe his action as 'I am exceeding the speed limit because I want to get home quickly', and 'because I want to get home quickly' would be his motive for exceeding the speed limit. But he has no motive for running down the pedestrian, if he could not say at the time at which he was doing so, 'I am running down this pedestrian because...'. This would be an accident, whether or not he was to blame for the accident. In such a case, he would not have to find out that he was exceeding the speed limit, although he would have to find out that he had run down, or was running down, a pedestrian.

The case in which a man could say 'I am running down this pedestrian because I want to get home quickly' would not, of course, be an accident, but a case of murder. In the first case, the man couldn't (logically) have had a motive for what he did (ran down the pedestrian) because he was not able to describe what he was doing (running down the
pedestrian). In the second case he could, and did, have a motive. He knew in the full sense what he was doing.

If a man explains what he has done by saying that he was thinking of something else, this may or may not excuse him. There is certainly nothing which makes it impossible both to be thinking about something else, and to be able to say what one is doing at the time at which one is doing it. There is certainly no oddity about 'I thought this out as I was driving home', or 'I am thinking this out as I am driving home'. But to explain what one did by saying that one was thinking about something else, is to say that one did not have a motive for what one did. It is to say that there never was a moment at which one was able to say 'I am now running a man down.....', but only a moment at which one discovered, realised, found out, etc.

Although if a man is not able to say what he is doing at the time at which he is doing it, he cannot (logically) have a motive for doing it, it does not follow that if he can describe what he is doing, then he must have had a motive.

Among cases in which a man might be able to describe what he is doing and yet have no motive are 'unpremeditated murders committed in some sudden excess of frenzy, where the murderer has previously had no evil animus towards the victim, especially if he is weak-minded or emotionally unstable to an abnormal degree'.

These are the sorts of cases in which a man can quite well remember doing what he did - he could have described what he was doing at the time, but adds that he doesn't (didn't) know why he did it. In such cases, not knowing what one is doing acquires a technical meaning, and he himself is not able to give any sort of explanation of his action.

But again, we may quite well be able to describe what we are doing, and yet have no motive, where nothing so alarming as this is involved. In the case of habits, one may be quite well able to describe what one is doing at the time at which one is doing it, and have no reason for doing it. The habitual smoker may be able to describe what he is doing - i.e. reaching for another cigarette, and yet have no motive for doing so; it may not even be that he particularly wants one. People who do things from habit do not have a special sort of motive - they have no motive at all.

Another sort of instance in which we may be able to describe what we are doing without having a motive, are those cases in which we do something 'idly'. Perhaps a good example of this would be 'doodling'. We might very often be able to say what we were doing, but have no reason for doing it.

In neither of these last two cases, I think, would we want to say that we didn't know what we were doing, although part of the requirement for knowing what we are doing is not fulfilled. Very often, in the case of habits, mannerisms and
doing things idly, one might not know what one was doing at all, one might not even be able to describe what one was doing at the time at which one was doing it, and so, one would have no motives. In these cases, one would catch oneself doodling, taking another cigarette, and so on.

The reason why we shouldn't consider that someone didn't know what he was doing if he had no reason for doing it, although he could describe what he was doing, in such cases, is I think, because actions of this sort, perhaps playing with bits of paper, chewing our pencils, doodling and so on, are not the sorts of things for which we are expected to have motives. But it does not, of course, follow that if a man does an action of this sort that he does it idly or from habit.

If I, for instance, draw my finger along the table, being able to describe what I am doing, I may or may not have a reason for doing this. I might be trying to see if it has been dusted, but I may have no reason for doing it at all. I do it idly. We might doodle to pass the time or tap on the table to attract someone's attention, or play with a bit of paper to annoy someone, but very often we have no reasons for doing these things at all; we do them idly.

My purpose in this chapter has been two-fold. I have tried to show firstly, the falsity of Ryle's tenet that self-knowledge can be explained by parity with out knowledge of other people; that there are no differences in kind between
our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of others. I have tried to show that our knowledge of our own activities is different from our knowledge of other people's activities. Our knowledge of the activities of other people is a case of 'knowing that'; our knowledge of our own is not. The question 'How do you know?' is always relevant in the case of knowing what others did; it is very rarely relevant in the case of our own.

I have accordingly suggested an analysis of knowing what we are doing, and I have tried to show the adequacy of this by considering cases in which we would not know what we were doing, where we would catch ourselves, realise what we were doing, or discover or find out what we had done. And I have included a case where self-knowledge is explicable by parity with our knowledge of others - that of walking in our sleep, or doing something whilst otherwise unconscious.

My second purpose, and this is to some extent a result of the former, is to establish the status of motives. With regard to this, the following points emerge:

1. A motive is connected with the agent's knowledge of what he is doing.
2. It is not, in this account, a cause.
3. It is not in itself an occurrence, but it is connected with an occurrence.

Since I have been concerned mainly to substantiate the analysis of knowing what we are doing by showing that it will
allow us to account for the cases when we do not know what we are doing, I have considered motiveless actions rather than actions which have motives. The motiveless actions I have considered are those done absent-mindedly, accidentally, idly and from habit.

A man's actions can be of various kinds: they can be said to be done on purpose, deliberate, voluntary, involuntary, absent-minded, impulsive, compulsive, accidental, and no doubt there are many others. One of the ways in which a man's actions can be characterised is by reference to whether or not he had a motive. If, whatever he did, he had a motive, then he did not do it accidentally. If he didn't know what he was doing, he did not do it deliberately, or on purpose. (I am not of course saying that the only way in which a man's actions are characterisable is by reference to whether or not he had a motive.)

It is important to notice too that it is whether or not the agent had a motive which decides finally whether or not he did it, for example, idly. Although the action may be one for which we do not expect people to have motives - we are prepared to call them idle - it does not follow that if the agent performed one of these that he did it idly. He may do it to annoy; he may have a motive.

The sort of motive a man has is important for characterising his action as 'generous', 'prudent' and so on, but this is a point to which I shall return later.

I want now to consider certain other points in connection with self-knowledge.
III

THE THINGS WE DO

So far, in considering the question of knowing what we are doing, and maintaining that here at least our knowledge of ourselves is different from our knowledge of others, I have been mainly concerned with what may be called 'observable activities', the sort of activities which may be observed by other people, such as making a cake, writing a letter, going to the theatre and so on. These are the sorts of activities which, precisely because they are public and observable, no-one would wish to deny that we perform. I want now to consider the question of those things which we do which are not observable, because we do them 'in our heads', and are not public because they are part of our 'inner lives', and this is a much more controversial matter.

It is sometimes denied that we have 'inner lives' and that we do anything which is unobservable. Concepts which have been thought (traditionally) to belong to our 'inner lives' and to be connected with 'mental events', have been shown, so it is said, to be applicable to behaviour. For example, Ryle says that when we "describe people as exercising qualities of mind, we are not referring to occult episodes of which their overt acts and utterances are effects; we are
referring to those acts and utterances themselves".  

"The cleverness of the clown may be exhibited in his trippings and tumblings.... The spectators applaud his skill at seeming clumsy, but what they applaud is not some hidden performance executed 'in his head'.

"It is being maintained throughout this book that when we characterise people by mental predicates, we are not making untestable inferences to any ghostly processes occurring in streams of consciousness which we are debarred from visiting; we are describing the ways in which those people conduct parts of their predominantly public behaviour."

What Ryle is mainly concerned to reject, is talk of mental acts or events which are hidden performances, occult acts, and talk of 'inner lives' of which the constituents are counterpart acts, ghostly processes, internal causes, and so on. One objection to talk of mental acts in these terms is that it is said that they are acts which in some way 'occur', or processes that 'go on' and that we can observe them going on by introspection. I have already agreed that to talk of introspection does involve saying that we do two things - i.e. doing something and observing ourselves doing it, and although I have only considered this with regard to observable activities, the objection seems to me to hold in the case of anything that we do. Another objection raised against mental acts of this sort is that only the agent could know anything about them, which is not in itself, I think, a very good

1. C. of M., p.25.
2. C. of M., p.33.
objection, for there is no reason why a man should not do things which no-one else could know about, but where acts of the occult kind are concerned, the agent never does, unless he is a philosopher or possibly a psychologist, know anything about them.

"If ordinary men never report the occurrence of these acts, for all that, according to the theory, they should be encountered vastly more frequently than headaches, or feelings of boredom; if ordinary vocabulary has no non-academic names for them; if we do not know how to settle simple questions about their frequency, duration or strength, then it is fair to conclude that their existence is not asserted on empirical grounds."

(re acts of will)

and

"We hear stories of people doing such things as judging, abstracting, subsuming, deducing, inducing, predicating and so forth, as if these were recordable operations actually executed by particular people at particular stages of their ponderings. And, since we do not witness other people in the act of doing these things, or even catch ourselves in the act of doing them, we feel driven to allow that these acts are very subterranean happenings, the occurrences of which are found out only by the inferences and divinations of expert epistemologists".

The fact that people never do admit to doing certain acts which they are supposed to perform, certainly seems to suggest that these supposed acts are mythical. They certainly have no place in an account of self-knowledge, for we do not describe ourselves as now performing an act of willing, or ever admit or confess to having performed such an act.

When it is denied that acts of this sort are done 'in the

1. C. of M., p.65.
2. C. of M., p.285
mind' or that we do things like this 'in our heads', it is not also denied that anything goes on 'in our heads'. It is admitted that we do do things in our heads, but it is held that there is nothing which we do in our heads which cannot also be done publicly. The paradigm case here is that of doing mental arithmetic. We may do a sum on paper or we may do it in our heads. In either case the result, unless we are bad at mental arithmetic, will be the same, and the way in which we do the sum will be (roughly) the same.

If we regard doing a bit of mental arithmetic as a type of 'mental act', as one of the things we do in our heads, we have a type of mental act which is importantly different from acts of the sort which Ryle rejects: acts of will and the like, or any supposedly introspectable act. It is one which the agent does report himself as doing, and one which he may say he has done. It is a mental act which can be talked about, both by the agent and others in much the same sort of way as we can talk about observable acts. We can ask the same sort of questions about mental acts as we can about observable acts; did he do it well or badly; did he get the answer right or wrong; is he blamable for what he did, why did he do it, and so forth. We can accept doing mental arithmetic as a type of mental act, and so concede that there is not a radical difference between mental acts and observable acts.

Thinking is something that we do in our heads, and in
The Concept of Mind, Ryle stresses that thinking is saying things to oneself. In a symposium on Thinking and Language, Iris Murdoch objects to this view as being an extremely curtailed view of thinking, and as being one which apparently hinders our ability to talk of 'inner lives'.

She says:

"I shall assume, as we all do when we are not philosophising, that thinking is a private activity which goes on in our heads, that it is a 'content of consciousness'. Even those philosophers who are most opposed to the 'inner life' view of thinking allow such 'contents' to exist, though with an extremely curtailed role, under the title of imagined monologues, images, or sentences uttered to oneself."

In the same symposium, Ryle stresses that the "concept of thinking is polymorphous". There is no general answer to the question 'What does thinking consist of?', and to this end he makes the following points:

1. There can be thinking where there is no talking. "The architect might try to think out the design for the war memorial by arranging and re-arranging toy bricks on the carpet".

2. There can be thinking which is not 'private'. We do not reserve the title 'thinking' for inner processes. The child told to think again is not disobeying instructions if he mutters audibly, seven times seven is forty-nine, etc.

3. The title 'thinking' is not reserved for the labours of

trying to decide things - "I am thinking if I am going over in
my head the fortunes of the heroine of the novel that I have
been reading.....".

4. "Consider the dictum that in thinking the soul is talking
to itself. It is clearly both too wide and too narrow. An
actor's part may be running through his head while he eats and
walks, even though he wishes it would stop. If he is not
deliberately rehearsing his part or even considering the merits
and demerits of his words, he can deny that he is thinking...".

It is undoubtedly the case that the concept of thinking is
polymorphous, and that muttering audibly and arranging bricks
on the carpet, both of which are things done publicly, can be
considered, in certain cases, as thinking. It is also
undoubtedly the case that some thinking is a private activity
which we do in our heads and that it is something that we know
we are doing ('a content of consciousness'). Miss Murdoch
wishes to return to an 'inner life' view of thinking, but we do
not necessarily need to cast around for sorts of 'thinking'
other than the sort which can be equated with 'saying', and to
accept that thinking is saying in this respect, need not
involve giving thinking an 'extremely curtailed role'.

The view that thinking is saying seems to be a very useful
one. We can then say something about an utterance, be it
public or private. In children's comics, what people say is
often written inside balloons issuing from their mouths. If
this is an unspoken utterance, it is preceded by "thinks" to denote this fact. I do not think that the fact that it is said that some people think 'in images' need worry us here, for the words that appear in the 'thinks' balloon could be replaced, for their benefit, by a series of pictures. In this sense, it can be agreed that thinking is saying. To take one of Ryle's examples, 'There are seven tins of petrol in the garage' may be uttered publicly or privately. It may be either said or thought. If we agree that thinking is saying in this sense, we may say that there are private utterances which may be talked about in much the same way as public utterances. Thoughts (private utterances) may be characterised in much the same sort of way as public utterances. We have thus the notion of thinking as a private activity which is not radically different from a public activity, in the same sort of way in which doing mental arithmetic can be considered as a type of mental act which is not radically different from the public activity of doing arithmetic on paper. Saying and thinking are both of the same type; they are both verbal activities.

'Saying' is a convenient blanket term which covers a variety of activities; some of which are informing, telling, insisting, lying, ordering, reprimanding and so on. A novelist may choose to tell us what a man did, e.g. he told, he ordered, insisted etc., instead of telling what the man actually said. He may report his actual words, or he may
tell us what he did in using these particular words. For example, "Then Mrs. Camp rose, morally and physically rose - and denounced her. 'What', said Mrs. Camp, 'You bage creatur, have I know'd Mrs. Harris....'. Mrs. Harris did not denounce her and say 'What, you bage creatur', etc. 'Denounced' describes the particular activity she performed in such a way that we do not also need to know what she said.

It would be tedious sometimes to be given a verbal report of what was said, but one could interchange such descriptions as 'denounced' with 'I said.....'. There are people who tell their tales solely in terms of 'I said to her' and 'She said to me', or 'I said to myself'.

The same is true of thinking. In the following passage from The Vicar of Wakefield, we have an account not only of where he went, but of what he thought, or said to himself, as he went, but he tells his tale in terms of what he did.

"Though the child could not describe the gentleleman's person who handed his sister into the post-chaise, yet my suspicions fell entirely upon our young landlord".

(I said to myself: 'I'm sure it was the squire').

"I therefore directed my steps towards Thornhill Castle, resolving to upbraid him"

(saying to myself 'I will tell him exactly what I think of his conduct')

"and if possible to bring back my daughter, but before I had reached his seat I was met by one of my parishioners who said he saw a young lady resembling my daughter in a post-chaise with a gentleman".
"whom by description I could only guess to be Mr. Burchell".

"I therefore went to the young squire's and though it was still early, I insisted on seeing him immediately."

We can, depending on what a man actually said, say that he did something; we can also, depending on what he actually thought, say that he did something.

If all that is meant by saying that thinking is saying, is that both are verbal activities, then there should be no objection, and such a view certainly prevents our asking questions like 'What are we doing when we think?' because what we are doing depends on what we are thinking. (We do not ask 'What are we doing when we say?' but, for example, 'What are we doing when we say 'Get out!'?').

In The Concept of Mind, however, Ryle goes much further than this, for he does not simply say that thinking is saying, in the sense in which it may be said that both are verbal activities, but to maintain that thinking is talking to ourselves in the way in which we talk to other people; that just as public utterances are interpersonal, so private utterances are interpersonal; that the things that we do when we 'say' - ordering, telling and the like, are also the things we do when we think. In the chapter on Self-knowledge, he says that I
am the addressee of my unspoken soliloquies, and in the chapter on the Intellect:

"All talk is meant to exert some specific influence. A question is meant to be heard, understood, and answered; an offer is meant to be considered and accepted; a threat is meant to deter; and a condolence is meant to give comfort."

Didactic influence can be exerted not only by one person upon another but by one person upon himself. He can coach himself to say and do things which are not echoes of the words in which that coaching is given. Just as he can give himself orders which he then complies with in manual evolutions, so he can tell himself things which he then turns to account in new didactic moves. Having told himself that in the garage there are seven tins each containing two gallons of petrol, he can tell himself that there are fourteen gallons of petrol in the garage." 2

"Thinking things out involves saying things to oneself, or to one's other companions, with instructive intent." 3

What is mainly to be objected to in The Concept of Mind, are such contentions as that "In didactic discourse, written or spoken, published or self-addressed.....a person teaches what he has to teach", and

"Conversely, actions done from motives can still be naive in the sense that the agent has not coupled, and perhaps cannot couple, his action with a secondary operation of telling himself or the company what he is doing, or why he is doing it. Indeed even when a person does pass internal or spoken comments upon his current action, this second operation of commenting is ordinarily itself naive.................." 5

It is the notion that the things that a man can be said to do by uttering a sentence publicly, he can also be said to

| 2. " P.311/2 | 4. " P. 309 |
| 5. C.o.M. P.111 |
do by uttering a sentence privately, which is greatly misleading. It goes hand in hand with the notion that self-knowledge is the same as our knowledge of others, and that there is no important difference between talk of ourselves and talk of others. On the whole, Ryle relies on 'telling' ourselves when we think, just as he relies on 'noticing' and 'observing' in his account of knowing what we do. But we do not tell ourselves things, at least, not in the sense in which we tell other people things, any more than we (usually) notice or find out what we are doing. Moreover, just as, if we accepted Ryle's view of self-knowledge with regard to knowing what we do, we should either have to say that we never know what we are doing but only what we did, or say that we performed a double act of doing something and noticing that we were doing it, so, if we accepted his view that we 'tell' ourselves things, we should have to postulate two selves.

There are some things which I can be said to do to you which I cannot be said to do to myself - informing is one, and there are some which, if I can be said to do them to myself, they need to be considered differently from doing them to others, for instance, ordering and forbidding. Some of the activities which we perform when we say things are clearly interpersonal; we could not perform these activities when we think because they do require another person. There are others which we can be said to do when
we think, which are still interpersonal, but which can be self-directed, for example, encouraging, and there are others, like wishing and wondering which are not of the interpersonal kind at all.

First let us consider some of the activities which are clearly interpersonal, those which it does not make sense to say that I do to myself.

I cannot beg, enjoin, entreat, implore myself to do something. I must beg of you, implore, entreat you, although I may beg, implore, entreat you to do something for me. I cannot confide in myself, greet myself, insist or insinuate to myself. All these are activities which I must engage in with another person, as are informing and notifying.

It is obvious that I cannot greet myself, or converse with myself. I certainly cannot greet myself, for what would be the conditions under which this would be possible? We normally greet people who have been away from us, or people whom we have not met before. What would it be for me to have been away from myself, or for me not to have met myself before? I may say, for example, that I feel a different person this morning, or say 'Such and such an event made a different person of me', but whatever we mean by such remarks, we do not mean that we have never met ourselves before. (What, in any event, would it mean to talk of meeting ourselves at all?)
I cannot converse, or gossip with myself. I might have had an interesting conversation with him this morning and have learned a few things from him which I am now prepared to tell you, but what would it mean to have had a very interesting conversation with myself this morning, or have learned a few things from myself which I am now prepared to tell you? Ryle says that we learn things from our 'unstudied chat'. I can indeed learn things about you from your unstudied talk; I can learn about your ambitions, likes and dislikes from a conversation with you, but what would be the conditions under which I could 'converse' with myself in such a way that I could learn such things about myself? One may, in a sense 'converse' with oneself. I might rehearse what I'd like to say to you, going over in my head the things you might say and the replies I should make if you did, but this is not strictly conversing with myself, but holding an imaginary conversation with you. In an imaginary conversation, I pretend that there is another person conversing with me, and I have to speak both parts myself. We may also, of course, if we are engaged in thinking something out, be thinking in such a way that, if our thoughts had been written down they would have appeared in dialogue form. But we have not been conversing with ourselves.

Nor can I make an offer to myself. What would it be

1. C.o.M. P.311 'An offer is meant to be considered and accepted.'
to consider and either accept or reject one's own offer to oneself? What sort of things could one offer to oneself? I could offer you the loan of a book or of money, but how could I offer myself the loan of a book or of money?

One of the most important concepts for consideration is that of 'telling', for I cannot 'tell' myself, in the sense in which telling is informing, or do any of the things which involve 'telling'.

In order to inform you, I must tell you something which you previously did not know. And I cannot inform you of something I do not know. (I cannot, for example, tell you the name of the Unknown Soldier.) That is, for information to pass between us, I must be in a position to inform you and you in a position to be informed. I must say what I know or believe to be true, or I am not informing you, but lying to you. (I may, of course, give you wrong or false information under the impression that it is correct, i.e. I may say what I believe to be true, but which is not in fact so, and although I shall misinform you, I am not lying.) If you already know, you are not informed, at least, by me, although it might have been my intention to inform you. Now I cannot, unless we postulate two selves, inform myself. For if it is correct to say that the informer must impart information which he knows or believes to be true, and the person informed should not have known it before, I cannot do this to myself. For if I already
know, I cannot be informed, and if I do not know, I cannot inform. What would it be to tell myself something I did not know before? I might find out something I had not known before, but what would it be to tell oneself what one didn't know? There are occasions when we do talk as if there were two selves, for example, when we encourage ourselves. Not all philosophical talk of dual selves and bi-partite souls is inappropriate; it is indeed often illuminating, but to be able to inform myself, I should have to be two selves.

Information is something we can get, acquire, receive, give or impart. We get or acquire information from books or other impersonal sources; we get or acquire information from broadcasts or from the newspapers, but we do not talk of receiving information from newspapers. We receive or get information from people. I can receive information from a railway official, but I do not receive information if this is contained in a broadcast talk to which I listen. One could say 'I informed myself', in the sense of acquiring information, which would be a rather pedantic way of saying that I found out from a source like a railway timetable, but not 'I informed myself' in the sense of receiving information, for I cannot receive information from myself. I could compile my own railway time-table from information received from people who already know the times of the trains, but it would be a timetable which would not
increase if I were my own source of information. If I know, it will already be noted; if I do not know, it cannot be noted.

Informing is connected with didactic talk. Most often it is meant to be taken seriously, or is taken seriously. (I can, of course, give away information unwittingly.) It is very often connected with teaching, although by no means always, for the porter who tells me the time of my train is not teaching me anything, although I learn something from him, and although he is informing me.

It is a fact that we often talk of teaching ourselves and that one can buy books entitled 'Teach Yourself.........'. 'Teaching myself' is a perfectly good phrase with a well-established usage, but it gives no support to the claim that we do teach ourselves. Part of what we do when we teach others is to impart information, but this is not what we do when we 'teach ourselves'. In teaching ourselves, we acquire but do not receive or impart information.

To say that one is teaching oneself to read French is to say that one is learning to read French, but without a teacher. One is learning, but no-one is teaching. One is not saying that one is both pupil and teacher. To say that one is teaching oneself to read French rather than that one is learning to read French, is to forestall the question

1. C.o.M. P309 "...the didactic discourse, written or spoken, published or self-addressed in which a person teaches what he has to teach."
of where one is learning or who is one's teacher, for we do usually learn from somebody or something. If a man remarks that he is teaching French for part of his time, we expect him to be teaching the sixth form or private pupils, for one cannot just teach; one must teach someone. But we do not expect him to reply, if we ask him to whom he is teaching French, that he is teaching himself. An experienced teacher is not one who has taught himself any number of things. We never, strictly speaking, teach ourselves; we learn, with or without a teacher.

Talk of 'informing' is perhaps rather high-flown; the sort of talk to which government departments and pedantic people are addicted. We say, not so often 'He informed me of (or that)', but 'He told me of (or that)'. This is not merely a matter of which terminology we choose to use, but that the notion of telling is a great deal wider and vaguer than that of informing. We might say 'He told me again and again', but hardly 'He informed me again and again'. We should hardly, if he told us nothing we didn't already know, deny that he told us anything, although we might deny that he gave us any information.

We sometimes give information for a particular reason, i.e. in order to influence behaviour in some way or other, but this is to do more than inform. For instance, I may tell you that...(give you information) and not simply be informing, but also be advising. At one point, informing
may be completely remote from any attempt to influence behaviour. An example of 'pure' informing might be a 'Do you know?' column in a paper or magazine. It is not ranked as something like advice or teaching, and is not even meant to be taken seriously. We are not expected to respond with anything other than 'Fancy that!'

'Telling has a variety of uses, but I shall first consider 'telling that' where there is more to a particular activity than simply informing, and later 'telling to'. Amongst the activities which may be considered as 'telling to' are, e.g. ordering, prescribing etc. In 'telling to' one is not usually conveying information of any description. If the doctor prescribes the medicine, to be taken three times a day, he is not giving information as he would be if he were to tell us what it contained. But 'telling that' is connected with informing. We do use 'telling that' where we are not primarily concerned with conveying information, but where there is an element of informing.

Amongst those activities in which we engage which contain an element of informing are advising, confiding and recommending. And these are things which we cannot be said to do to ourselves, because of the element of informing.

Confiding is perhaps the best to begin with here. I can confide in you - tell you the secrets which I have told to no-one else, but I cannot confide in myself, tell myself my secrets. To say that a man kept his secret, is
to say that he confided in no-one, not to say that he
confided in one man, namely, himself. One might say
'Only I know where the money is hidden', or 'Only one man
knows where the money is hidden' (and that man is me), but
not 'Only one man knows my secret' (and that man is me).
To confide in you is to tell you something in confidence,
but I cannot tell myself anything, let alone in confidence,
Nor can I advise myself, or recommend something to
myself. To be able to advise you or to recommend something
to you, I must be in a certain position, that of knowing
what I should do if I were you, or of having decided what
in my opinion, you ought to do. If you know what my advice
is likely to be, there is no point in your asking me, except
perhaps to confirm your hypothesis. If I know what would
be the best thing for me to do, I do not need to advise
myself, if any sense can be given to this. What would it
be to advise myself? Can one give oneself bad advice, or
refuse to take one's own advice? Could one resent one's
giving oneself advice and consider it an impertinence, as
one might resent someone else's giving advice? Or would
it make sense to say to oneself 'I should buy that one if
I were you'?
We do sometimes encourage ourselves. When we
encourage others, we may do so by telling them something which
they did not know before, and we cannot encourage ourselves
in this way. Encouraging ourselves is more like encouraging
others by telling them something again and again, i.e. repeating what they and we already know. And we may encourage ourselves by saying to ourselves things like 'Come on; there's nothing to be afraid of' - the sort of things we also say to others. We may also, by telling ourselves again and again i.e. going over and over what we already know, be trying to convince ourselves. In doing both these things, we are talking to ourselves as if we were another person, and we do them to ourselves as we do them to others.

We come now to the sorts of activities which are connected, not with 'telling that', but with 'telling to', for example, ordering, forbidding, commanding, compelling, defying, prohibiting, threatening, obeying etc., and although we can be said to do some of these things to ourselves, they are not quite the same when applied to ourselves as they are when applied to other people.

To forbid, order, or prohibit requires a certain linguistic performance. One must either say something, or post a notice to the same effect, e.g. 'Keep out', 'Passengers are not allowed beyond this point', 'Smoking is forbidden'. But although the utterance may include 'not allowed', to forbid is to do more than refuse to allow, for one can refuse to allow something which one has not forbidden. If one has been forbidden to go beyond a certain point, one expects to be prevented if one attempts to do
so, but one may be prevented even if one has not been forbidden.

Although people no doubt usually have good reasons for ordering, prohibiting or forbidding the things they do, they are by no means compelled (logically) to give reasons. To say to a child who questions an order, or asks why he should do whatever it is he has been told to do 'Because I say so', may be bad educational policy but it is not logically improper. To say this, would not be to justify one's order, but to assert one's right to give orders. The child is expected to accept the authority. Obedience of this sort might be considered to be 'blind' obedience, and obedience of this sort is often necessary and accepted as necessary. A soldier may not be told why he has to do the particular thing he is ordered to do; he may not even expect to be told. He obeys orders, not because he sees the reason for the orders, but because he accepts that the person who gives them has the necessary authority. The person who gives the orders may not give reasons for them, not simply because he adopts the attitude that because he says so is sufficient, but because it is good policy to conceal his reasons.

We do not, I think, order or forbid ourselves in the same way as we order and forbid others. At no point does one issue an order to oneself. If one says, for example, 'I do not allow myself more than ten cigarettes a day',
one would not mean that at some point one had issued an order, as one might be saying that at some point someone else had issued an order, if one said that the doctor did not allow one to have more than ten cigarettes a day. One would be saying that at some point one had made a decision or a resolution to this effect. 'From tomorrow you will stop smoking', may be the doctor's order, but 'From tomorrow I will stop smoking', is not my order to myself, but my decision or my resolution.

We may decide to do things on our own authority and we may regard what we have decided to do as if it were an order which we must obey. But whatever we are doing here, we are not obeying or ordering in quite the same sense as when we obey or order others. I cannot conceal my reasons for my orders from myself because this is good policy, as a man might conceal his reasons for his orders to his subordinate because it is good policy. I cannot challenge my own authority, as I can challenge someone else's authority. I cannot say to myself 'Who are you to give me orders?' as I might say to you 'Who are you to give me orders?'

When someone orders or forbids something, when the railway official posts a notice 'Passengers are forbidden to go beyond this point', he may take steps to see that this rule is enforced. He may also threaten or warn, by adding 'Penalty........'. Perhaps in a sense, we also 'threaten' or 'warn' ourselves, in an attempt to do what
we set out to do. Perhaps to warn ourselves (remind ourselves) that we might get lung cancer works as making, or helping to make ourselves give up smoking, or whatever it is we have decided or resolved to do, just as to read (or recollect) 'Penalty......', might deter us from doing whatever it is others have forbidden us to do.

But someone else may not simply use threats or warnings; he may also appoint people to see that his orders are carried out. The railway official may post a man to see that no-one does go beyond that point. When we make a decision or a resolution, we have to carry it out or keep it. One may be able to evade the guard on the railway, - slip across the line when he isn't looking, but one cannot evade oneself. One might take an extra cigarette absent-mindedly, but it would make no sense to talk of taking an extra one when one wasn't looking.

If we exceed the limits we have set for ourselves, we are, for example, weak-willed, have changed our minds, have decided otherwise. If we exceed the limits others have set for us, we are not weak-willed, and have certainly not changed our minds; we are disobedient, defiant etc.

This is where talk, for example, of reason controlling the passions, or of the reasoning part of the soul controlling the rest seems to be particularly appropriate. Not allowing ourselves to do something, or compelling ourselves to do something, very often is like tackling a
man posted at a point beyond which we must not go, except of course, that there is no other man, but simply oneself, which is very often what makes keeping our resolutions so difficult. It would often be much easier to do what we set out to do, if someone else made us do it, or even if someone else ordered us to do it. It would no doubt, be easier, for instance, to stop smoking if one had been ordered by the doctor to do so, than if one had simply decided to do so.

Even so, this is to talk of ourselves by analogy with talking to others, of ‘controlling’ ourselves by analogy with controlling others, and although such talk may be useful and appropriate, there seems to me to be a case here for considering self-control, as something which is different from ordering, forbidding others.

No useful purpose can be served (except, perhaps the interests of a nice tidy theory) in pretending that whatever we can do to other people, we can also do to ourselves, or that where this is so, there is no difference between doing certain things to others and doing them to ourselves. There are differences, as I have tried to indicate.

There are of course, other things which we can be said to do to others which we may or may not be able to do to ourselves. There is, for instance, promising. I can promise something to you, but we also talk of promising to
ourselves. It is true that we rarely, if ever, say 'I promise' to ourselves, but we do, in retrospect say things like 'I promised myself a book'. One might say 'I will buy myself a book when......', just as one might say to one's niece 'I will buy you a book........', i.e. promise without using the phrase 'I promise'. But 'I promised to buy my niece a book but I changed my mind - thought better of it - decided to spend my money on something else', calls for comment in a way that 'I promised myself a book, but I changed my mind etc.' does not. We are reproached for breaking promises to others, but not for breaking promises to ourselves. Perhaps, although we do talk of promising ourselves, we make some sort of resolution which we either carry out or fail to carry out. In this case, one would have to say that promising is something which we never do to ourselves, but it seems clear at least, that if one promises oneself, this is different from promising other people, and also, that if we do say that this is a resolution, it is different from resolving in cases like resolving to give up smoking, where this may be said to be more like an order.

However, enough has been said, I hope, to show that even though we may consider thinking as saying, or as talking to oneself, it is mistaken to suppose that thinking is to be considered as talking to oneself in exactly the same way as talking to others, for there are things which
we do when we make public utterances, which we cannot do when we make private utterances.

Not all our thoughts are concerned with forbidding and encouraging ourselves and the like, any more than all our spoken utterances are concerned with ordering and forbidding other people. 'Telling' is perhaps one of the things we do most in our spoken utterances, but we have seen that we do not 'tell' ourselves things. Let us now consider some of the things that we do, or at least that we might claim to do, in thought. If I blame someone, approve of someone - or disapprove, suspect or judge someone, or if I wonder or wish, I am not doing anything 'to' anyone, as I might be said to do if I encourage someone, or encourage myself. There is, of course, the additional difficulty here, that some of these cannot rightly be said to be activities at all.

Of 'approving', Urmson says that this is not an activity, but is analogous to 'knowing':-

"Some verbs appear to have no present continuous, nor does their use in the present perfect appear similar to the use of other verbs in either the present perfect or present continuous tense (I know, I believe, I regret). 'I approve' seems also to be such an anomalous verb. It is indeed possible to use its present continuous tense but an example will show how anomalous such a usage is: suppose Smith has to obtain your approval if he wishes to do a certain thing. Then you will signify your approval by writing 'I approve' (not 'I am approving'). Now supposing someone were to dash into your room and say 'What are you doing?'"
just while you were writing these words you might possibly answer 'Oh, I'm just approving Smith's application'. Here, 'I am approving' describes what I am doing, but the doing which I describe is not asserting, expressing, or having any feeling or emotion or state of mind, I am writing 'I approve' and it is this action which I describe when I say 'I am approving'. To say, or to write 'I approve', however, is not to describe anything at all - it can be described but is not itself a case of describing. In the above case it is something like giving your authority for an action. I

What are we to say about 'approve' and 'disapprove' not used in this sense? They cannot be things that we do in thought for they are not things that we do at all.

Nevertheless, although approving, disapproving, blaming and the like are not in themselves activities, they are connected with an activity - that of judging.

When Ryle considers the question of judging in The Concept of Mind, he includes it amongst those 'cognitive' acts and processes which are "said to take place behind locked doors. We cannot witness them taking place in John Doe's life. He alone could report their occurrence though unfortunately he never does divulge such things". 2 He considers judging as a supposed act analogous to "abstracting, subsuming, deducing, inducing, predicating and so forth", as one which is supposed to have occurred when we are told that a proper use of an indicative sentence reflects an act of 'judging', or 'making a judgment'. These terms have been misapplied. They have been talked about as if they were

2. C. of M., p.293.
parts of our ponderings, when they are, he says, rightly to
do with the products of our ponderings, which can be called
'verdicts', 'findings' or 'judgments'.

Now there does seem to be a sense in which people do
talk of judging as something which they do, although it is not
indeed to be reckoned amongst the sorts of 'acts' mentioned
above. It is true that we do not ordinarily talk of
ourselves as 'making a judgment', but we do talk of ourselves
as judging or having judged. There is a sense in which John
Doe does report himself as 'judging', he may not only report
himself as having judged, but may blame himself for having done
so, or reproach others for doing so. This is the sense in
which we talk of ourselves or of others as being, for example,
too fond of judging others, as being apt to judge hastily or
unfairly, in which we say that we, or others, have no right to
judge, or of judging other people by standards different from
the standards by which one judges oneself. The precept
'Judge not lest ye be judged' exhorts us, in an intelligible
way to refrain from doing something. (It does not suggest
anything about the proper use of an indicative sentence.) In
the following passage from War and Peace, Natasha refers to
herself as having been 'judging', and moreover, the passage
suggests that she did 'catch herself' judging.

"She stood by her mother's side and exchanged nods
with acquaintances near her. From habit she
scrutinised the ladies' dresses, condemned the
bearing of a lady close by who was not crossing
herself properly, but in a cramped manner, and
again she thought with vexation that she was herself
being judged and was judging others."

In this passage, there are several things to be noticed:

(a) Natasha condemned the woman;
(b) She spoke of herself as 'judging';
(c) Her private utterance was presumably something of the sort 'How badly that woman is crossing herself' or 'The way in which that woman is crossing herself is deplorable';
(d) If anyone had asked her what she was (just) thinking, it is reasonable to suppose that she would have said 'I was just thinking how badly that woman is crossing herself' or, possibly, 'I was just thinking about the way that woman is crossing herself'. It is not likely that she would have replied 'I was just judging that woman's behaviour'.

It has to be admitted that there does seem to be something odd in describing what one is doing as 'I am now judging......'. And yet it might be perfectly proper for a man at a dog show to say 'I am judging the dogs', or to tell you what he is going to do by saying 'I am judging the dog show this afternoon'.

What is unusual about the first is to be explained, perhaps, by the fact that to be judging in the first sense is not, as it is in the second, to be doing something
officially. Anyone else at the dog show might 'judge' the
dogs too, and he would do the same sorts of things as the
official judge, but he might describe what he was doing in a
rather less official way. He would not say 'I am now judging
the dogs', but rather 'I am trying to decide which of these
dogs is the best specimen', which, after all, is exactly what
the official judge is trying to do. Anybody can judge a dog
show, but not everyone is chosen to do so in an official
capacity. To be the official judge allows one greater
opportunity for examining what is to be judged, but the official
judge will, as far as he is able, take into account more or less
the same sort of things as the official judge.

Perhaps, then, we ought to say that the man who claims to
be judging the dog show is misdescribing what he is doing; he
ought really to say, to be accurate, 'I am now trying to
decide which of these dogs is the best'. He is really
entitled to say 'I judged' when he has given his verdict, but
until then he ought simply to say 'I am trying to decide....',
and 'trying to decide' is something we all do, at times. It
is something that very often takes time, and can be
interrupted. It makes perfectly good sense to talk of taking
a long time to decide what to wear, or to whom to give the
prize, or whether this is a better book than that, and so on.
To take this view would be to agree that 'judging' is not
applicable to ponderings, but to the results of ponderings.
The work is describable as 'trying to decide'; only when we have a result are we justified in saying that we judged.

For we do not say that the jury are still judging when they pronounce the verdict 'Guilty' or 'Not Guilty'; they have then judged. It is tempting to assume that the 'judging' was what went on in the jury room, and is properly to be described as 'trying to reach a verdict' or 'trying to decide whether or not the man is guilty'.

This would be, I think, to agree with Ryle, that 'judge' is an achievement word, and so 'applicable only to the results of our ponderings'. To have arrived at a verdict is to have achieved something. One cannot be judging, one can only have judged - i.e. when one has succeeded, any more than one can be doing something if one arrives.

There are two objections to this. The first is that although to talk of verdicts might be an improvement on talk of judgments, it is natural to talk as in talking of juries, of delivering verdicts, and in Natasha's case, she did not deliver a verdict, for she said nothing to anyone, and we might just as well talk of someone's telling herself, as delivering a verdict to herself. The second is, that if we avoid talk of 'delivering' a verdict, we might say she arrived at a verdict, but one cannot arrive without travelling, and what, in her case, is to be accounted 'travelling'?

Her verdict was not a result of any ponderings, for she did not ponder. She did nothing which might be described as
'trying to reach a verdict' or as trying to decide. It takes some people no time at all to deliver a verdict on someone else's conduct. One thing that might be said is that in these cases, the person in question did a bit of rapid thinking - that something went on somewhere akin to what went on in the jury room. But to say this would hardly be legitimate in talking about self-knowledge. In Natasha's case, it would be thinking she herself was not aware of. She had, in fact, no difficulty in judging. We try when something is difficult. I try to solve a problem if I find it a difficult one. I do not 'try' to solve it if I find it easy. There is a point in the first instance at which I can truly say 'I am now trying to solve this problem'. The time during which I can truly say this will be more or less, as I find the problem more or less difficult. If it is easy, I don't have to try and it will be obvious that there will be no point at which I can truly say that I am trying; I did it immediately.

In Natasha's case, the task was not to 'try to decide', for we have seen that she did not do this. If, to arrive at a verdict is to have achieved something, what is the task here? Now Ryle says that there can be achievements which are prefaced by no task performances. "We sometimes find things out without searching; secure appointments without applying and arrive at true conclusions without having weighed the evidence". Did Natasha, then, perform no task at all? There seems to be

1. C. of M., p.150
something a little odd in this.

Elsewhere, Ryle says "When a person is described as having fought and won, or as having journeyed and arrived, he is not being said to have done two things, but to have done one thing with a certain upshot. Similarly, a person who has aimed and missed has not followed up one occupation by another, he has done one thing, which was a failure." From these examples it would seem that there must be a task, if there is to be an achievement. One can certainly aim and miss, or aim and hit, and one has done one thing (aimed) with a certain upshot. But one cannot simply 'miss'. I may aim at the barn door and succeed in hitting the barn door, or I may aim and miss, but if I do not aim at the barn door, although I do in fact hit it my hitting it cannot count as a success; I may indeed find something without looking, but we must distinguish between finding, for example, when I find something on the pavement, and finding where I have lost something. In the former case, I have not succeeded. In the latter case, I have. In this case, I may try to find, and fail; try to find and succeed, or succeed in finding what I have lost without trying.

One may in fact succeed without working for success, but one cannot succeed if one hasn't undertaken a task. One may indeed arrive at a verdict without having been engaged in a

1. C. of M., p.150.
bit of pondering, without having been engaged in a bit of work. The task which is connected with a verdict is not that of trying to decide, if by this we mean a bit of pondering, for there may have been no pondering.

The task of the judge in the law court is to examine evidence in such a way as to decide whether or not an accused man is guilty or not guilty. The task of the judge of the dog show is to examine—look at—consider—the dogs in a way which involves the assigning of a grading label. (His task is different from that, say, of the veterinary surgeon or the photographer.) The task of the tea-taster is to taste tea—with a view to assigning a grading label.

In the case of the man who undertakes to judge a dog show, to say that he is 'judging' is to say something about the task he has undertaken. Only if he undertakes to look at the dogs in this way can he be said to have failed, just as only if a man undertakes to taste tea in a way which involves assigning a grading label, can he succeed or fail.

If a man says 'I am judging a baby show this afternoon', he refers to a task he has undertaken. He has not completed his task, until he has delivered his verdict. To judge another person's conduct is to have undertaken the task of considering that person's conduct in a way which involves the assigning of a grading label. In Natasha's case, when she referred to herself as judging, she referred to herself as thinking about someone's conduct in this way.
But, it may be said, she did not 'think about', for she
did not ponder, engage in a bit of work at all. But there is
no reason why we should regard 'thinking about' as referring
to the work in which a man may at times and for a period be
engaged. It is enough that she uttered privately 'how badly
that woman is crossing herself', for although we may want to
say that she thought 'that' the woman was crossing herself
badly, we may also say that she was at that moment thinking
about the way in which the woman was crossing herself. Had
she been asked what she was thinking about, she might, sensibly,
have answered just that.

Tasks may be undertaken, or refused. A man may refuse to
judge a baby show because he has better things to do, or
because he is not qualified to judge, or because he doesn't
believe in baby shows. One may refrain from judging conduct
for similar reasons; one may not be sufficiently interested,
one may consider oneself not sufficiently qualified; one may
consider, for instance, that one ought not to judge because
one hasn't sufficient evidence, or because one hasn't the right
to judge or because one thinks one ought not to judge at all.

'Approve', 'disapprove' and 'condemn' are verbs, but they
do not themselves signify activities, although they are
related to an activity - that of judging. There is, as
Urmson points out, no present continuous tense. Although in
our example, Natasha is said to have condemned the woman's
conduct, she would not have said, e.g. 'I was just condemning..'
or 'I was just disapproving....', but rather, 'I was just thinking how much I disapprove of....' or 'I was just thinking how deplorably....', etc. If one thinks 'Napoleon was wicked' or 'That woman is crossing herself very badly', one has judged Napoleon or the woman's behaviour in a particular way, and one specifies the particular grading label one has affixed - i.e. wicked or 'badly'. Instead of saying Napoleon is wicked, etc., one might say 'I disapprove of Napoleon' or 'I disapprove of the way....' or 'I deplore....'. This would be to have judged, and to indicate, but not to specify, the grading label one had attached. 'Disapprove' will cover a certain range of grading labels, e.g. 'not very good', 'rather bad', 'unsatisfactory'. Something stronger would be needed for 'abominable', 'loathsome', etc. (For example, 'I loathe', 'I abominate', and in the case of something I consider deplorable, 'I deplore') To say that one approves or disapproves is to indicate the sort of grading label one would attach, if one were being more specific. We do not, of course, indicate to ourselves but only to other people. If one did utter privately 'I disapprove of', this might mean, in our own case, the same as 'Napoleon is wicked', or it might mean that we are not yet sure of which of a particular range of labels we were prepared to affix.

The way in which these are related to judging may be seen by a comparison with examining. To mark a candidate's paper 70% is to have assigned it a grading label (so is to
have assigned 'badly' to the woman's behaviour). To have passed a candidate is not in and by itself to have engaged in an activity of 'passing'. There is no activity which can be described by saying 'I am now passing this candidate' (except by writing 'passed' on his paper, by analogy with writing 'I approve' on an application. There is no activity which is described by saying 'I am now condemning...'; except, of course, in the case of the judge who sentences the man to death. One can pass a candidate without assigning him a specific mark, e.g. something in the range of 50 - 70. But one cannot mark the candidate's paper, or pass the candidate, without having examined the paper. And one cannot utter words like 'Napoleon is wicked', or disapprove of Napoleon, without having judged.

Praising and blaming are often regarded as if they were verbs of the same type, that is, as if they were both verbs which signify activities, and public activities at that, but I do not think that this is so. That they are words of the same type seems to be assumed when it is said that praising and blaming are things that we do, and that we do them for a purpose, namely to change another person's behaviour. But there is a sense of 'blame' which is not in itself an activity at all, and so cannot be something we do to change other people's behaviour.

1. Nowell-Smith, Ethics.
To praise, I think, is always to engage in a public verbal activity, for we cannot praise anyone under our breath. I do not have to say anything to you if I approve of your conduct, but I must say something to you if I praise your conduct. It seems to me very likely that although we might talk of complimenting ourselves on something, we should not be praising ourselves unless we actually made a public utterance. One might say, on reading someone's autobiography, that he was conceited, or fond of complimenting himself, a view based on what he had written about himself, but I do not think we should say he praised himself, unless he has actually said these things to someone.

There is a sense of blame which is also like this, that is 'I am now blaming him' does sometimes describe an activity, that in which I am saying to him 'I blame you for this', or saying 'This is your fault'. We should say that I was blaming him and not just telling him that I blamed him. (Just as I should not be telling him I praised him, but should, if I said something like 'This is a fine bit of work', be praising him).

But 'blaming' is not always like this, but sometimes more like 'approving', in that it is analogous to 'know' in having no present continuous tense, and is not in itself signifying an activity. It makes perfectly good sense to talk of blaming someone, or having blamed someone, even though one has never said a word to him on the subject, and it makes perfectly good sense to talk of having blamed someone all one's life.
One can say (or think) 'I have always blamed him for that'.

In the sense in which we can blame someone without saying anything to him or to anyone else, 'blaming' does not signify an activity any more than 'knowing' signifies an activity when we know something but do not tell what we know. In this sense, there is nothing I am doing which can be described as 'I am now blaming him', if I think 'I blame him' or 'It is his fault', whether it has just happened or happened a long time ago. One doesn't need to tell anyone what one knows. Perhaps 'blame' in this sense should be considered as 'holding him to blame'. But it is important, at least, to distinguish this sense of blame from the sense in which it is like praise, particularly in view of tendencies to say that praising and blaming are things that we do to change another person's behaviour.

However, there is a sense of blaming which is like approving, in not signifying an activity. It seems to me that this too is related to the activity of judging. We might say that judging in this case is rather like that of the judge who tries a man for an offence, that is a different sort of judging from that of the man who judges a dog show. We are not simply judging the man's conduct, which may range over a number of activities, but we are judging in respect of one particular event (a bad event) for which someone is responsible. It is to pronounce him guilty or not guilty.

The case is similar with suspecting. There is no
activity which is describable as 'I am now suspecting him', but in the case of the Vicar of Wakefield (cf p.92) he did say, of a particular moment, 'My suspicions fell upon the squire'. Someone had abducted his daughter and his task was that of considering his and his daughter's acquaintances in such a way as to discover which of them had abducted her. When he tells us that he suspected the squire, he is not saying that he did anything other than say 'I expect it was the squire' or 'It must have been the squire'.

Wondering and wishing are two things which we can do in thought which are different from judging. They are, I think, straightforward activities in the same sort of way in which promising is an activity, although promising demands, as wishing and wondering do not, a public utterance. To think 'I wish....' or 'I wonder....' is to wish or to wonder, just as to say 'I promise' is to promise. They do not describe activities; they are activities, and, of course, if one says (as opposed to thinks) 'I wish' or 'I wonder', one is actually wishing or wondering. They are performances which can be described. I could describe what I am doing by saying I am wishing, e.g. when I am eating my first mince pie of the season or whenever one makes wishes, although it would be difficult both to wish and to describe one's performance at the same time. The answer to 'What are you doing?' or 'What are you thinking?' might quite well be saying 'I was (just) wishing'or 'I was (just) wondering'.

We do not always wish by using the words 'I wish'. One
might look in a shop window and think 'I wish I had one of those......', or one might simply think 'If I had one of those I would......', or 'If only I had one of those......', and one might still be wishing, that is, wishing without using the words 'I wish'. If one says 'I wished' or 'I wondered', one is not necessarily reporting an occasion on which one thought 'I wish......', or 'I wonder......'; one need not be referring to a single utterance. If a man says that he wondered why his car wouldn't start, this may be to report a particular bit of pondering. If a man says 'I wished they would go', he is not necessarily saying that at a certain moment he uttered privately the words 'I wish they would go'. He may have uttered privately things like 'It's getting late.', 'I'm tired', 'If they stay much longer they will miss the last bus', and so forth, that is, his wishing may take the form of several utterances at various times. But it is difficult to see how he could be said to have wished that they would go, if he had not uttered anything of the sort.

Now although we do not reserve the term 'thinking' for private utterances, so that the architect arranging his bricks on the carpet and the child told to think again but muttering aloud can both be said to be thinking, there is a sense of thinking which is considered to be essentially private. We do think it necessary to talk of a man as 'thinking aloud', in certain cases. We call attention to
people who think aloud or talk to themselves in a way in which everyone else can hear them. We comment on the man who thinks aloud, but not on the man who thinks to himself. People are sceptical of the claims of those who say that they can read thoughts. They are sceptical because it is commonly believed that one cannot know what anyone else is thinking unless he tells them what he is thinking, or has just thought. The things a man does in thought are genuinely unwitnessable events, and if we adopt the view that thinking is saying, they are also inaudible. We cannot see or hear what he does in his head, but then, neither can he. This is not because what goes on in his head is of a peculiarly mysterious nature, but because he is the agent. I do not see or hear what I think, but neither do I ordinarily, see what I do, or hear what I say.

The things which we do in thought can, just as sensibly as those we do which are observable, or the things which we do by making public utterances, be morally appraised. We can, although very often only the agent is in a position to do so, consider that some of the things that we do in thought are morally wrong. One can, for example, think unkindly of someone, as well as speak unkindly of someone. We can consider ourselves to have done something morally wrong if we have judged someone unfairly, or have suspected an innocent person, or perhaps for judging at all. In Natasha's case, she did not think she was wrong for
condemning the woman unjustly, for indeed she might have been crossing herself in a cramped manner, but for judging her conduct at all. One might consider oneself blameworthy for thinking too much about one's achievements or one's virtues, or too much about other people's vices.

Gwendolen, for example, in Daniel Deronda, said that she was a guilty woman because she had wished that her husband would die. She still considered herself to be guilty after she had been assured that her wish could have had no effect on her husband's death. And Deronda thought she was guilty too.

"She sank back on her chair, exhausted with the agitation of the memory and speech. Deronda felt the burden on his spirit less heavy than the foregoing dread. The word 'guilty' had held a possibility of interpretation worse than the fact; and Gwendolens's confession, for the very reason that her conscience made her dwell on the determining power of her evil thoughts, convinced him the more that there had been throughout a counterbalancing struggle of her better will. It seemed almost certain that her murderous thoughts had had no outward effect - that quite apart from it the death was inevitable. Still, a question as to the outward effectiveness of a criminal desire dominant enough even to impel a momentary act, cannot alter our judgment of the desire." 1

The things which we do in thought, such as these, are the constituents of our 'inner lives'. Since such thought is private, no-one need know, unless we tell them, that we have done such things at all.

I have throughout considered thinking as something

1. This incident is referred to by Iris Murdoch in the symposium on Thinking and Language, Arist. Soc. Supp. Vol. XXV 1951
that we do, and not as something that goes on about which we know by introspection or any other sort of inspection. It is something that we do and not something that happens to us, about which we always know, but are only able at times to describe vaguely. If then, thinking is something that we do, what is it to know what we are doing, and what is it not to know what we are doing?

In the first place, motives do not occupy such an important place in our thinking, but then, although we are usually expected to have motives for most of the observable activities we perform, we are not always expected to have motives for the public verbal activities we perform. We very often tell people things, without having any motive for doing so. It may be said that although one may not have a motive for a certain remark, one nevertheless has a motive for indulging in conversation at all. That is, although we can give no motive for one remark, we could supply a motive for a whole set of remarks or for the whole of a conversation in which a remark occurs. And sometimes we can, sometimes not. One may talk to someone because one wants to be polite, or because one wants to make them feel at ease and so on. But one does not always do so. One does not always have a motive for talking to one's friends. There are people, no doubt, who never say anything without a motive, the sort of people of whom we say that they never say anything unless they have to, but
this is by no means true of most people. This is not to say that it is only the trivial things for which one very often has no motives for saying. Social chat is often motiveless, but so are discussions of the international situation. One can drift into a discussion of this sort just as one can drift into a philosophical discussion. And this is true, not only of much of our talk, but of much of our thinking. It is often motiveless, but none the less serious.

We may be pondering about the merits and demerits of a book, because we have been asked to give an opinion on it, but we may simply be doing so without having any motive whatsoever. One may have a motive for encouraging oneself to get up early, and one may have a motive for pondering about a book, or for rehearsing one's speech in one's head, but for the most part, we do not have motives for thinking about the things we do think about, whether 'thinking about' means a bit of pondering or an utterance.

Motives then, do not play such an important part in knowing what we are doing where thinking is concerned, but what of being able to describe what one is doing at the time at which one is doing it? Now, in considering observable activities, I considered some of the occasions on which we did not know what we were doing because we were not able to describe what we were doing at the time at which we were doing it. In doing something absent-mindedly,
unconsciously, accidentally, one would not know what one was doing and would have to realise, find out, notice, what one had done. It might be, of course, that one never did find out, notice, discover what one had done, and if this were the case, one could never say 'I did it accidentally'. In the case of saying, one might say something when one was unconscious, and subsequently be told what one has said.

It could be said of a man, in a case of this sort, that he didn't know what he was saying. He would not know that he was saying anything, and he would not know what he was saying, but he might find out by being told.

I do not know what it would be to think, and not to know at the time, either what one was thinking, or that one was thinking, in the way in which we might say that a man might say something in his sleep and neither know that he was saying anything, nor what he was saying. In this latter case, it is possible that he should find out, for someone may hear him and tell him, but if there is such a thing as thinking and not knowing that or what one is thinking, it would be impossible for us ever to come to know that or what we thought, for no-one could tell us, and if we did not know at the time, we could not (logically) ever remember.

To say this is not to say that we never have to 'realise' what we are doing when we think something, for in the passage quoted on P.112, Natasha realised that she was
judging. But it is to suggest that where we do talk of not knowing what we were doing, in saying 'I realised that...', we have already the minimum requirements for knowing what we were doing, in that we know what we are thinking, although we might not know exactly what, in thinking this, we are doing. And this is more akin to the sorts of examples I discarded in the chapter on Knowing what we are Doing, as going beyond the minimum requirements.

When Natasha realised that she had been judging again, she knew what she had thought, in the sense that if she had been asked what she thought then, she could have said 'The woman is crossing herself in a cramped manner'. What she needed to realise was that this was judging; that in thinking this she was judging. This might be illustrated by the sort of case in which we might be accused of telling someone, rather impertinently, what to do, or ordering someone to do something. We might deny that we were ordering, but still know exactly what we had said. And we might also say, for example, 'I didn't mean to order...', where we might mean that, since orders are often given in this way, what we said constituted an order. We didn't realise that we were ordering, although we knew quite well what we had said.

One might, for instance, not know that one had wished for something; i.e. realise at some later date that one had wished for it. But again, we must assume the minimum
requirements, that one knew at the time what one thought, even though one hadn't realised that one was wishing. Perhaps for instance, if one thought 'If this happened, then that would follow', one would be able to say this if one were asked what one had been thinking, but consider that in thinking this, one was merely considering what would follow if it did happen, and only later realise that in thinking this, one was really wishing. But one would have to know what one thought, even though one misdescribed what one was doing when one thought this, in order to realise at all.

There is, of course, the sense in which we might say that we 'found ourselves thinking about that again', or we found ourselves having wandered from the point-let our thoughts wander, but here again, it seems to be a necessary condition of our saying this, that we should be able to say what we were just thinking, if we were asked.

A view of thinking as something that goes on and which we observe by introspection does not avoid these difficulties. It lends itself to the suggestion that thoughts can slip by us if we are not constantly on the alert, and is still open to the objection that if a thought has slipped by when we weren't looking, how can we ever know this?

It is here that we encounter the difficult and important questions about self-knowledge and the things we do in our 'inner lives'.

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DECEIVING

I Deceiving Ourselves

It seems to me that there is a case for 'privileged access' of some kind, although, of course, a great deal depends on what is meant by this. The sort of 'privileged access' I am claiming does not involve saying that we can never be mistaken about ourselves, and it does not involve saying that we gain our knowledge of ourselves by introspection.

In his chapter on Self-Knowledge, Ryle sums up the traditional theory of self-knowledge by privileged access thus:-

"It is often held therefore (1) that a mind cannot help being constantly aware of all the supposed occupants of its private stage, and (2) that it can also deliberately scrutinise by a species of non-sensuous perception at least some of its own states and operations. Moreover both this constant awareness (generally called 'consciousness'), and this non-sensuous inner perception (generally called 'introspection') have been supposed to be exempt from error. A mind has a twofold Privileged Access to its own doings, which makes its self-knowledge superior in quality, as well as prior in genesis, to its grasp of other things. I may doubt the evidence of my senses but not the deliverances of consciousness or introspection." 1

It seems to me that there is something to be said for traditional theory in that it does recognize that self-knowledge is different from our knowledge of others,

1. G.o.M. P. 154
although it is not, I think, correct to say that it is superior.

Against this, Ryle puts forward his theory of self-knowledge by parity with our knowledge of others:

"The sorts of things that I can find out about myself are the same as the sorts of things that I can find out about other people, and the methods of finding them out are much the same. A residual difference in the supplies of the requisite data makes some differences in degree between what I can know about myself and what I can know about you, but these differences are not all in favour of self-knowledge."

Ryle denies, what traditional theorists maintain, that there is any difference between self-knowledge and our knowledge of others. Both, curiously enough, fail to recognize any differences in our self-knowledge itself. Traditional theorists suggest that all our knowledge of ourselves is different from our knowledge of others; Ryle maintains that it is all the same in kind. But self-knowledge is not in general different in kind from our knowledge of others, but some of it is, and which of our knowledge of ourselves is thus different in kind, depends on what particular aspect we are concerned with.

To talk of self-knowledge by privileged access is misleading, in that it has been associated with the mind-body distinction, and perhaps inclines us to think that all our self-knowledge is different from our knowledge of others. And even in cases where our knowledge of ourselves is

1. C.o.M. P.155
different, it is not particularly helpful to talk of 'privileged access', for the term itself is misleading.

'Privileged' does, I think carry with it a suggestion of superiority. It suggests that I am in a better position than you to know about myself, and in some cases we do want to say that this is so. But coupled with 'access' it suggests that I am in a better position than you to know about myself, in the sense in which I might claim to be in a better position than you to see what is going on because I am at the front of the room and you are at the back. I have an uninterrupted view of the stage.

To talk of having access to someone else's mind or thoughts is by no means inapt. To wonder what is going on in his mind is not necessarily to make a logical mistake, unless one takes this literally and supposes that his mind is a place where things do go on, as things might go on in the garden. Nothing 'goes on' in minds; people think. But what they think is as inaccessible to us, unless they tell us or we know them very well, or have special telepathic means, as it would be if something did go on in an inner chamber to which we have no access. The danger lies, not so much in our saying that we have no access to his thoughts to represent the fact that some things are private to him and which we do not know unless he tells us, as in using the word 'access' of ourselves and our thoughts. It is true that his thoughts are not accessible to me as
his observable activities are to me. But it is misleading to say also that his thoughts are not accessible to me in the way in which mine are to me. For my thoughts are not accessible to me. I may have to ask you what you are thinking -your thoughts are there for me to find out, as it were, but mine are not there for me to find out. To talk of 'access' leads us to talk of introspection.

I want to distinguish two aspects of self-knowledge, one of which I shall call 'Special Status of 'I' ', and the other 'Inner Lives'.

Some of our knowledge of ourselves is different in kind from our knowledge of others. Knowing what I did, for example, is not the same as knowing what you did, and this is an instance in which 'I' has special status. To say that 'I' has special status, is not to call attention to the fact that I (usually) know better than you, although this is also true, but to say that in this case, the fact that it is I who did it, makes a difference between knowing what I did and knowing what you did. And in so far as traditional theorists have called attention to this difference between agent and observer, even though they have made this point by saying that knowledge of this sort is gained by introspection or is self-intimating, traditional theorists seem to me to be right. But it need not always be the case that 'I' has special status. It may be correct to say that we find out about our own abilities and find out
in much the same way as we find out about the abilities of others. So that, although in knowing what I did 'I' has special status, in knowing what I can do, 'I' may not have special status. Another sort of instance in which 'I' has special status, is the case in which doing something to oneself is different from doing it to others. Again, this is not to say that everything one does in one's head is different from doing it overtly. Arithmetic is one of the things which does not need to be considered very differently when we do it in our heads, from when we do it on paper. Encouraging ourselves does not need to be considered very differently from encouraging others; ordering ourselves, on the other hand, if we do talk of ordering ourselves, does need to be considered differently from ordering others.

The things that we do in our heads are the things we do in our 'inner lives', whether they are the same as those we do publicly or not. Wishing and wondering may involve public or private utterances; if they are done privately they are part of our inner lives. This in itself is perhaps too rigid a distinction, for who cares whether we do our arithmetic in our heads or on paper, unless, of course, we are being taught the skill of doing arithmetic without the aid of paper, and who cares how we solved the problem as long as we did solve it? No-one else cares, and we very often do not care ourselves once we have solved the problem.
I do not think there is any very good reason why we should count doing mental arithmetic as part of our 'inner lives' rather than as part of our 'outer' or 'public' lives. No very clear distinction can be drawn between the one and the other, for we do not live two lives, one in the world and the other in our heads, but rather, we live one life during which we do some things which are observable and some which are not. To say that we have inner lives is not to say that we have double lives — that there is a mental or inner counterpart to an outer and observable life. It is rather to draw attention to those things which we do in thought, like wishing, wondering, judging our own and other people's conduct, about which no-one need know unless we tell them.

There are of course, more important concepts than the ones we have so far considered which require examination, and more than they can be given here. One of these is that of deceiving, which has important repercussions on the view that we can know all that there is to know about a man from his behaviour. Deception is also one of the things which requires different treatment when it is self-deception; here 'I' has special status. It is also an important 'inner life' concept.

At this point I shall say enough about deceiving to show that deceiving ourselves is very different from deceiving others, a little about the ways in which we might
explain what deceiving ourselves is, and then indicate some of the sorts of difficulties that remain to be considered. This will perhaps help to show the importance of recognising the cases in which 'I' has special status, and also to show in what sense self-deception is a peculiarly 'inner life' concept.

There are many ways in which we can deceive other people. We can deceive by making false promises, deceive people about what we have for sale, by lying and so on. There is forgery, fraud and false pretences. It can, I think, be taken for granted that most of these things one cannot do to oneself, for what would it be to make false promises to oneself, or to extract money from oneself on false pretences, or to forge one's own signature? For the purposes of showing the essentials about deceiving I shall consider lying. I shall say something about other forms of deceiving later in connection with deceiving others.

In order to deceive you by lying, I must say what is not true, knowing or believing it not to be true. For if I tell you something which is false without being aware that it is false, I am not lying to you. I may be mistaken, and you may reproach me for misleading you, but I have not lied to you if I tell you, as I think truly, what subsequently turns out to be false. (Lying is not 'making a false statement'. I have to know or believe that what I say is false.)
If I am to deceive you, you must not know that I am lying. I must not only say what is false, knowing or believing it to be false, but I must say what is false as if it were true. I must not say it, for example, hesitantly. (Some people of course, are bad liars. They cannot tell lies as if they were telling the truth. They blush or avoid meeting your eye.) And of course, if I am to deceive you by lying, you must not know that what I tell you is false. If you know that the cat is in the garden, I cannot deceive you by telling you that it is on the mat. If I deliberately tell you something which is untrue, and you know it to be untrue; you are not deceived, although I still lie.

In order to deceive then, the deceiver must say what is not true, knowing or believing it not to be true, and the person deceived must be unaware that it is not true. There is lying, but not deception if both parties are aware that what is said is false. How then, can we deceive ourselves by lying? For if, in order to deceive, I must know that what I say is untrue and in order to be deceived I must not know that it is untrue, how can I deceive myself at all? And yet we do deceive ourselves. If we deceived ourselves as we deceive other people, we should have to be two selves, one to deceive and the other to be deceived.

The main difference between deceiving ourselves and deceiving other people is that it is an essential factor in
deceiving others that one should know what one is doing. Deceiving oneself is something one does without knowing what one is doing.

It is essential in the case of deceiving others, that one should be able to say, in principle, 'I am trying to deceive you'. One must not of course, actually say this, for this would be to give the game away. I could not deceive you if I told you I was trying to do so. To say, or to be in a position to say 'I am deceiving myself', would be to give the game away. (I cannot decide to deceive myself, as I might decide to deceive you; nor can I make more or less elaborate plans for deceiving myself as I might for deceiving you. I might lie to you on the spur of the moment, but how could I do this to myself?)

Deceiving ourselves then, is not one of the things we do knowing that we are doing it, but one of the things we may realise, discover, find out that we have done. It is one of the things we catch ourselves doing. 'I am deceiving myself' or even 'I am trying to deceive myself', can never be descriptive of what I am doing now.

Deceiving ourselves is not simply to think or believe what is false, any more than deceiving others is simply to say what is false, for this might be to make a mistake. What might be said, is that in deceiving ourselves, we believe what is false, knowing that it is false. This sounds odd as it stands, but it must be remembered that we
do not, in deceiving ourselves, know what we are doing at
the time at which we do it. 'I deceived myself' might
be construed as 'I believed that, but I really knew all the
time that it was false'. The difficulty, of course, is to
say what this means. An example of self-deception might
help here.

On the occasion of Catherine Morland's first visit to
Northanger Abbey, she "looked round the room. The window
curtains seemed in motion. It could be nothing but the
violence of the wind penetrating through the divisions of
the shutters; and she stepped boldly forward, carelessly
humming a tune, to assure herself of its being so, peeped
courageously behind each curtain, saw nothing on either low
window seat to scare her, and on placing a hand against the
shutter, felt the strongest conviction of the wind's force.
A glance at the old chest as she turned away was not without
its use; she scorned the causeless fears of an idle fancy,
and began with a most happy indifference to prepare herself
for bed."

"Catherine.... was beginning to think of stepping into
bed, when, on giving a parting glance round the room, she
was struck by the appearance of a high old-fashioned black
cabinet..... The key was in the door, and she had a strange
fancy to look into it; not however, with the smallest
expectation of finding anything, but it was so very odd
after what Henry had said."
After searching the cabinet, she discovered a 'manuscript' which turned out, when she examined it in the morning, to be a collection of bills.

Catherine was clearly deceiving herself, both about her own expectations and about the room. She had all the evidence she needed, all the evidence it was possible to have, that the room was a perfectly ordinary room. She had examined the windows, for example, with sufficient care to know that (and she did know that) the movement of the curtains was caused by the wind. She did not indeed know that the papers she had found were bills and not a manuscript until she examined them in the morning. But there had been no real reason ever to suppose that they were.

The claim that Catherine was clearly deceiving herself is not simply based on the passage above, but on what she thought the following morning. When she discovered that the mysterious papers were simply bills she "felt humbled to the dust. Could not the adventure with the chest have taught her wisdom?" (She had been extremely curious about the contents of an old chest in her room. It had contained nothing more mysterious than a single white cotton counterpane.) "A corner of it catching her eye as she lay seemed to rise up in judgment against her. Nothing could be clearer now than the absurdities of her recent fancies. To suppose that a manuscript of many generations back could have remained in a room so modern, so habitable, or that she
should be the first to possess the skill of unlocking a door, the key of which was open to all”.

She did not, it is to be noticed, need to take another look around the room to decide that it was 'so modern, so habitable'. That is, she did not need any evidence to convince her that she had been wrong in her assessment of the room. It was not a mistake she had made, but she had deceived herself. She had believed that there was something odd about the room, because she had wanted to. Although she had thought on this occasion that there would be nothing of interest to be discovered (she had not the 'smallest expectation of finding anything'), she had on other occasions thought that there would.

What is particularly important in the matter of deceiving oneself, is that no evidence is relevant to the question, as evidence is relevant in correcting a mistake. Had Catherine made a mistake about the room, another look would have been relevant. This was not necessary; she 'knew all the time'.

One of the ways in which we deceive ourselves is by believing something because we want to believe it. Here again, only the past tense is meaningful - 'I believed that because I wanted to', and not 'I believe that because I want to'. (Believing is not something one can choose to do - and yet we do refuse to believe some things. We sometimes refuse to believe unpleasant things about our
friends, or pleasant things about our enemies. We say 'I am reluctant to believe that of him' and 'I didn't want to believe that...'.

However, if a man is asked why he believes (or how he knows) that his son is of high intelligence, he will not answer 'Because I want to'. His answer will be in terms of grounds for his belief - that his son behaves in such a manner, etc. He will give reasons which are such that they can be established independently of him, such that he thinks would fulfil the accepted criteria for being of high intelligence. It is legitimate to question his grounds for his belief, but not to say 'But you only believe that because you want to'. And it would be odd if he said, if it had been shown that his grounds were inadequate 'Yes, I admit that everything you say is true, but nevertheless, I want to believe it, and so I shall'.

However, once he has admitted that he was wrong, the question of why he believed it is quite relevant and can be answered by 'Because I wanted to', or it might then be pointed out to him that his assessment of his son's intelligence had been biased.

Austin has pointed out that if a man claims to know something, he can legitimately be asked how he knows, and that this may be to ask him how he came to know, or what evidence he has. It is to ask about his credentials. We do not in the same way, ask him how he believes, but why
he believes; we ask him for grounds for his belief. If a
man is shown to be wrong about what he claims to know, he
withdraws his claim to know. This is not expressed by
saying 'I knew but I was wrong', but by 'I thought I knew
but I was wrong', or 'I believed,...but I was wrong'.
It is true that we do not ask 'How do you believe?' as we
ask 'How do you know?', but we do ask, when we've both
agreed that he was wrong, 'How did you come to think you knew?'
or 'How did you come to believe that?'

Just as one can ask questions about his claim to know,
so one can ask questions about his admission that he was
wrong. (Why did you believe that? This reason is
irrelevant; how did you come to believe it was important?)
These questions might be impertinent, but they are not
improper in the sense that no answer could be given to them.
Certainly the agent might ask himself why he believed what
he now sees to be untrue, how he came to be wrong, and his
answer might be 'Because I wanted to'. He may, of course,
have been genuinely mistaken. He may explain his past
belief by saying 'I didn't take that into account. I didn't
know it was important or relevant'. But sometimes he did
know that it was relevant, yet he didn't take it into account.
He chose to ignore it.

Sometimes self-deception can be explained by saying
that one has been inconsistent in one's thinking. For
example, Catherine deceived herself about her expectations,
about what she was likely to find in the room. In her case, she thought both that there would be something mysterious and important to be found and that there would be nothing to be found. In itself there is nothing odd about this. We very often think at one point that we shall find something, and at another that we shall not - namely, when we have changed our minds. We express this by saying 'I used to think that, but now I don't'. But this is precisely what Catherine was not doing. She had not changed her mind. She had in fact good reason to change her mind. 'Could not the adventure with the chest have taught her wisdom?' She ought to have realised - acknowledged that there was no reason to expect to find anything. She simply thought 'I do not expect to find anything', without acknowledging that she had been wrong before, without changing her mind.

Simply to think inconsistently is not necessarily to be deceiving oneself. Sometimes we are inconsistent in our thinking as we are in our talking; we have forgotten that what we said a moment ago is incompatible with what we are saying now. Sometimes we might not have forgotten, but did not realise that it was incompatible. To say simply 'I didn't realise' or 'I didn't know' is to plead ignorance. If one hadn't realised or if one didn't know, one has made a mistake of some sort. But if one acknowledges that one
did know, or did realise, one acknowledges self-deception.

If deceiving ourselves is something we do not know that we are doing at the time at which we do it, but something that we find out that we have done, how does one find out? Only, I think, by discovering, or having pointed out to us that what we claim to know or believe is not in fact so. In Catherine's case, it was the discovery that the papers were bills and not an old manuscript. And secondly, by examining a stretch of autobiography, and this is often extremely difficult. It is also the more important.

Catherine might have continued to deceive herself when she discovered that she had not found a manuscript, by refusing to do this. She would then have had to say that although her expectations had not been fulfilled, they were reasonable expectations. (She would, of course, have had to make up her mind whether she did or did not expect to find anything.) After all, was it not reasonable to expect to find something in an Abbey, and especially after what Henry had told her. Wouldn't anyone have supposed that there was something odd about the room, on a night as stormy as that, and so on.

It is not only extremely difficult to decide for oneself when one has deceived oneself and when one has made a mistake, but the concept of self-deception is full of difficulties. What is it to deceive oneself about one's own motives, or about one's own actions? In one sense,
this could be explained as a lack of objectivity in our assessments of ourselves e.g. making exceptions in our own case I was perfectly justified in doing what I did. You, on the other hand, were acting selfishly. This is achieved either by using different criteria for the assessment of your action and my action (assuming that you did exactly what I did and in exactly the same circumstances), or by denying that the circumstances were alike. I acknowledge that I deceived myself when I admit that the circumstances were alike, and that I really knew this all the time. (It is important to notice that I am not saying that to use different criteria or to deny that the circumstances were the same is to deceive oneself. What I am saying is that on the occasions when one admits that one has deceived oneself, this is what might be involved in one's admission.

But we still have not a satisfactory account of what it is 'really to know all the time'. And what do we say about, for example, 'I thought at the time I did it because ...... but now I'm not sure', or 'I realise now that I didn't do it for that reason at all'? What is it not to be sure why I did something? I had a reason at the time I did it; I knew what I was doing in the sense that I didn't do it absent-mindedly or accidentally. Was I deceiving myself then, in which case I must in some way have known why I did it, although I had a different reason; or did I not really know?
Do we deceive ourselves about our own motives or is it true to say that in some cases we do not know our own motives? If there are cases in which we do not know our own motives, we cannot deceive ourselves about these, but how, in such a case, could one ever find out?

It will not do, I think, to take refuge in psycho-analytic concepts at this point, although the psycho-analyst is interested in our inner lives, and no doubt a knowledge of psycho-analysis would help here. For one thing, the psycho-analyst is more interested in people who could never, or who could never without help, say 'I deceived myself'. It may be legitimate and helpful in such cases to talk of 'subconscious' and 'unconscious' motives and thought, but such concepts are of little use in investigating self-knowledge. People do say things like 'I deceived myself', and did so long before they heard of Freud; they do not say 'I thought subconsciously' or 'I thought unconsciously', although the analyst may say this of them.

Self-deception is one of the most important inner-life concepts, and so is that of being a hypocrite. What is it to be a hypocrite? To simulate qualities which one does not have, or feelings which one does not have? To pretend to be what one is not? Again, we must distinguish between being a hypocrite in relation to oneself (in one's inner life) and being a hypocrite in relation to other people.

To call a man a hypocrite is to say nothing in his
favour. But one is by no means always branded as a hypocrite if one pretends to be what one is not, or if one simulates feelings or qualities one does not have. We very often approve of people who pretend, or simulate or conceal. To conceal the fact that one is irritated or feeling bad-tempered is not to be hypocritical. It is very often something that is expected of us. One is not always being a hypocrite if one says for example, that one is sorry when one couldn't care less; one might be being polite or tactful. Nor is one necessarily being hypocritical if one says one is pleased or if one congratulates someone when one is not pleased. If he won the prize I wanted I should surely not be being hypocritical if I congratulated him, even though I were not pleased. To behave as if one were not disappointed when in fact one is, is not to be hypocritical.

Perhaps to be hypocritical is to go out of one's way to pretend to be what one is not, for example, to make a show of being considerate; to make a fuss of you when you win the prize I wanted - where one is not simply Concealing one's disappointment, but advertising one's pretended pleasure.

One is not necessarily being a hypocrite then, in concealing one's feelings from other people, but one might be being a hypocrite in concealing them from oneself. One might not admit to oneself, that one was not really pleased,
but only saying that one was; one might not admit that one was really disappointed. But again, we do sometimes say 'I hadn't realised how disappointed I was', but we don't seem to mean that we knew all the time but wouldn't admit it.

There are a number of important questions connected with self-deception, and there are other concepts which need to be considered and which have a place in the field of 'inner lives' which needs investigation. But it is important to remember, that in so far as we are concerned with self-knowledge, we are concerned with 'I'. It is no use to ask, for example, 'What is a man doing when he deceives himself?' or 'How do we know when a man is deceiving himself?' These are no doubt, important questions in some fields, but they are of no help in considering self-knowledge. It is no use trying to consider self-knowledge as if it were knowledge of others; it is no use hoping to talk about 'I' by talking about 'he'. And there is no reason why we should, for people do, in novels, biographies and diaries and in conversation, speak of themselves as having deceived themselves. If we talk of self-knowledge it must be about the knowledge someone has of himself, or about what it means when he confesses that he hasn't got certain knowledge he thinks he ought to have. People do say things like 'I deceived myself', 'I thought I did it because.....
but now I'm not sure', and sentences such as these are as significant as 'Get out', 'I promise to come' or 'I went to the theatre'. They are, no doubt, a great deal more difficult to analyse.

One can tell what a man is 'using a sentence to do' by studying the context in which the sentence occurs. It may be true that one can tell what a man is 'using a sentence to do' in a sentence, where the context covers all aspects of a man's life, i.e. we often have reports of what a man thinks as well as reports of what he says and descriptions of his observable activities, but it is not true in fact. One can, of course, analyse sentences and talk about activities in which we engage by using language, and the context in which a sentence occurs helps with this analysis, but this is to consider language and to talk about certain activities which we perform in using language. What this does not do is to provide a means whereby we can tell what a man is doing from the sentences he utters. The view that we can know what a man is doing from his observable behaviour and from his public utterances, can be shown to be false by a continued
ii Deceiving Others

If we hold that people do things which are not observable, because they do them in thought, we cannot also hold that we can know all there is to know about a man from his behaviour. However, it seems to me that the view that there is nothing behind appearances in conduct, that one can discover all that there is to know about a man from the way he behaves, can be shown to be highly suspect on independent grounds. The same is true of the view that one can tell what a man is 'using a sentence to do' by studying the context in which the sentence occurs. It may be true that one can tell what a man is 'using a sentence' to do in fiction, where the 'context' covers all aspects of a man's life, i.e. we often have reports of what a man thinks as well as reports of what he says and descriptions of his observable activities, but it is not true in fact. One can, of course, analyse sentences and talk about activities in which we engage by using language, and the context in which a sentence occurs helps with this analysis, but this is to consider language and to talk about certain activities which we perform in using language. What this does not do is to provide a means whereby we can tell what a man is doing from the sentences he utters. The view that we can know what a man is doing from his observable behaviour and from his public utterances, can be shown to be false by a continued
examination of deceiving,

I have already outlined what I consider to be the essentials of deceiving, in connection with lying. They are:-

1. a man should say what is false, knowing or believing it to be false,
2. he should say what is false, as if it were true, and
3. as a necessary corollary of these, he should know what he is doing; he must be in a position to say, in principle (although, of course, he must not actually do so) 'I am lying' or 'I am trying to deceive'.

There are of course, other ways in which we can deceive besides lying, and in connection with these, it is not strictly accurate to say that one 'says what is false, knowing or believing it to be false'. Austin has pointed out that there are no lying promises. If one says 'I promise', one does promise; one is not saying anything which could be true or false. This is certainly true, but it by no means follows that there are no deceptive promises.

To make a false promise is not to pretend to promise, nor is it to say something which is false. It is to promise, but it is to promise in order to deceive. If one wants to lead someone on a wild goose chase, one can promise to be at a point several miles away from the point at which one intends to be. If perhaps, one has been pressed to come to tea and one doesn't like to refuse outright, what one might do, if one wanted to deceive would be to promise to go. One might
subsequently say, 'I promised to go, but I don't, and didn't when I promised, intend to go'.

If one says 'I promise', one's hearers are entitled to expect that one will do what one has promised to do. 'I promise to come', are in fact, at least in English, the proper words to use when one wants to give people to understand that one will be there. 'I promise' is the accepted (linguistically proper) phrase to use in certain appropriate circumstances, e.g. when one has been asked if one will come. The phrase 'I promise' is used to promise. If a man uses this phrase, he promises, and he gives his hearers to understand that he will do whatever it is he has promised to do. But from the fact that he gives people to understand that he will do something or other, nothing follows as to what he intends to do, and nothing follows as to what he will do.

The case is similar with certain other of what Austin calls 'ritual phrases', e.g. 'I do' uttered during a wedding ceremony. It is, in this country, both morally and legally required that one should not have more than one living husband or wife. If one utters the words 'I do' at the appropriate point in the wedding ceremony, one gives people to understand that one is not already married, but if one utters these words, it does not follow that one is not already married. If one is already married, one deceives a number of people by uttering the words 'I do', because by uttering them at the appropriate place, one gives people to
understand that one is not married.

These are the appropriate words to use at a certain point in the wedding ceremony; one must say 'I do' and not 'I promise' or 'I might' or even 'I will'. And they are the linguistically proper words to use if one wants to assure people that one is unmarried, and of course, this is precisely what the bigamist wants to do. In the same way, a man who borrows a large sum of money may say 'I promise to repay you at the end of the month', thereby giving you to understand that he will repay you. He wants to assure you that he will repay you, even though he is 'borrowing' the money in order to leave the country tomorrow, never to return. How else could he get you to 'lend' it to him?

If, in the appropriate place, i.e. a witness box, a man swears to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, when he has every intention of lying, he deceives the judge and jury when he subsequently lies, and of course, he commits perjury. But 'I swear to tell the truth... ' is still the proper (linguistically proper) thing for him to say. He could not deceive anyone if he announced his intention of doing so, or refused to take the path, or substituted some other set of words. He is still taking the oath, but he is doing more than that, he is taking the oath falsely; he is swearing in order to deceive.

'Deceiving' is something which has been much neglected of late. Austin, for instance, considers a false promise -
a promise made without the intention of keeping it - to be an act which misfires. Nowell-Smith considers that if Jones is deliberately deceiving Smith, in a case where Smith has asked Jones' advice, this is a bit of advising which goes wrong. It is true that Nowell-Smith does mention deceiving in his first rule of contextual implication, but he chooses to ignore deceiving as an activity worthy of separate consideration since "lying...is a secondary use.... to which an expression could not (logically) be put unless it had some primary use". It is certainly true that there could be no fake performances unless there were genuine performances, and that there must be an occasion for the use of a 'ritual' phrase like 'I do' or 'I swear....', before these can be used for deceiving. But because genuine performances must be logically prior to fake performances is no reason for ignoring fake performances or for maintaining that a fake performance is a genuine performance gone wrong.

A piece of deceit may be highly successful. After all, if I do extract a large sum of money from you in return for goods which you have never had and will never receive, I have succeeded, and have not failed to do what I set out to do. If a man lives with one woman, having gone through the marriage ceremony with her, whilst the woman with whom he has previously gone through the ceremony is still living and undivorced, he has not failed to do anything; he has succeeded. Nothing has gone wrong from his point of view; nothing has

1. Ethics P.81
m is fired, but something has come off.

Acts of deception themselves fail to come off at times. If you discover that I have nothing to sell before you pay for the non-existent goods, my attempt at deceiving will have failed. If the wife of the would-be bigamist claims him as her husband as he is on his way to the altar, from his point of view, something has failed to come off.

To say that something has failed to come off in these cases of successful deception, raises difficulties about what exactly has failed to come off. "But now, if the situation transpires to have been in some way not orthodox (I was already married: it wasn't mine to give....) then we tend to be rather hesitant about how to put it....). We call the man a bigamist, but his second marriage was not a marriage......'. Perhaps we don't know what to say about the marriage or the sale or the loan. If he 'borrowed' the money to leave the country for good, was it a loan or wasn't it a loan? If a man 'sells' someone else's property, the question of whether or not it was a 'sale', may have practical importance. But we do know what to say about the man, although unless we acknowledge various forms of deceiving as things people do, and not as other things which fail to come off, we cannot say it: we say he has obtained money by false pretences. And one can fail or succeed in obtaining money by false pretences.

1. J.L. Austin 'Other Minds' P. 146 Logic and Language. Second Series
Not all cases of deception are confined to the use of ritual phrases, and not all cases of deception are verbal activities, but it is essential, if one is to succeed in deceiving, that one should use the correct phrases when the need arises and that one should behave in every way like the man who is not deceiving. If what a man is trying to do is to obtain money by false pretences - perhaps by offering to sell houses which have not and never will be built, he must, if he hopes to be successful, go about this in a proper manner. He is more likely to be successful if he dresses like a prosperous house-agent rather than like a man selling matches in the street, or like a stage version of a confidence trickster; if he sees his clients in an office and not on the corner of the street, if he has a few plans to show them, and can show them a few workmen pottering round a building site and so on.

How then, can it be said with any truth, that we can tell what a man is doing by studying the sentence he uses in its context, or from observing his behaviour? How does one distinguish the bogus from the real house-agent? A glance at any newspaper, any day, should be enough to convince us that there is no means of doing this. An obvious objection here will be that what we see in the newspapers is precisely the bogus distinguished from the real, and that of course, this is discovered from the observation of behaviour. (How else could the bogus house-agent be brought to trial?) The
answer to this is that I am not equating 'successful'
deception with deception that is never detected. If a man
gets money from you in return for a non-existent house, he
has been successful in getting money from you. This piece
of deceit has been successful, and to say this it is not
necessary to say also that he has succeeded in escaping
detection for the rest of his life. A man is sentenced for
having obtained money by false pretences, not simply for
having tried and failed. If successful deception were to
be equated with deception that is never detected, one could
never say 'He deceived me', but only 'He tried to deceive me',
and if you have parted with a sum of money before you or the
police decided to carry out an investigation, then, 'He
tried to deceive me' is a curious understatement.

To recognize the various forms of deceiving seems to me
to show the inadequacy of Ryle's behaviourism. He does
mention deception, but either does not recognize its
importance, or dismisses it in the interests of his theory.
He says:-

There is one class of persons whose qualities
and frames of mind are specially difficult to appreciate,
namely persons who simulate qualities which they lack
and dissimulate qualities which they possess. I
refer to hypocrites and charlatans, ............that is,
to most of us in some stretches of our lives, and to
some of us in most stretches of our lives........It is,
moreover, always possible for a person to take others
or himself in by acting a part........At first sight
it seems, then, that no one can ever have proper
knowledge of his own mind, or of the minds of others,
since there is no kind of observable behaviour of
which we can say 'no one could possibly be putting that
on'. Certainly we do not ordinarily feel practically
embarrassed by this possibility, but some people feel a theoretical embarrassment, since if any particular action or reaction might be a piece of shamming, might not every action or reaction be a piece of shamming? Might not all our appreciations of the conduct of others and of ourselves be uniformly deluded? People sometimes feel an analogous embarrassment about sense perception, for since there is nothing to prevent any particular sensible appearance from being an illusion, there seems to be nothing to prevent all of them from being illusions.

However, the menace of universal shamming is an empty menace. We know what shamming is. It is deliberately behaving in ways in which other people behave who are not shamming. There is no mystery about shamming, though it is a tautology to say that skilful shamming is hard to detect and that successful shamming is undetected.  

First, 'We know what shamming is...'. This is certainly true; it is, as Ryle says, deliberately to behave in ways in which other people behave who are not shamming. But to be able to say what shamming is, does not help us, until we suspect someone of shamming, to detect it at the moment when he is shamming. An analysis of what a false promise is, does not help us to discover in this instance, whether the man is deceiving us or not, any more than an analysis of what promising is, helps us to discover in this instance whether he is deceiving us or not.

A more serious question is that of whether this view is a theoretical embarrassment. Is to claim that the fact of deception is a serious objection to Ryle's behaviourism, really a matter of feeling a 'theoretical embarrassment, since if any particular action or reaction might be a piece of shamming might not every action or reaction be a piece of

1. C.o.M. P. 172/3
Is it really like feeling 'an analogous embarrassment about sense-perception, for since there is nothing to prevent any particular sensible appearance from being an illusion, there seems to be nothing to prevent all of them from being illusions'?

I have already agreed that there cannot be universal deception. There must be genuine performances before there can be fake performances; there must be real house-agents before there can be bogus house-agents. Even so, I do not think that to take deception seriously is simply a theoretical matter. To take deception and the possibility of deception by anybody seriously, is not a theoretical, but a practical matter. It is not at the dictates of a theory that steps are taken, if not to prevent deception, at least to detect and apprehend those who deceive. Having witnesses at a wedding ceremony is not like inviting a few friends to tea on your birthday. Signing a contract is not like signing a visitor's book, and your bank manager does not require a specimen signature because he collects autographs like some people collect stamps. These are safe-guards, and not fool-proof safe-guards, against possible deceptions, or means to help apprehend people who are suspected of deceiving. They are safe-guards against the possible deception by anyone, in that everyone is required, for example, to have witnesses at a wedding ceremony and to sign the register, or to take the oath before giving evidence. Taking the oath
does not guarantee that you will tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, but it does guarantee that if you fail to do so, a charge can be taken out against you for perjury. And it is required of you no matter how great your reputation for honesty is; whether you are philosopher, poet, plumber or priest; whether this is your first or your fifty-first conviction, or whether you are simply a witness. For certain classes of action, precautions are taken on the assumption that any one of these actions might be deceptive.

Now it is obviously untrue also, to say that we can never know when some people are lying or otherwise deceiving us. Some people are bad liars - they give themselves away. But not all people are bad liars. We rely for the most part for our knowledge of other people on what they tell us, and there is no means of detecting whether or not a man is lying simply by considering the things he says or, very often by considering the way in which he behaves.

We can never prove that a man is lying. In some cases one might satisfy oneself that he was speaking the truth. If he says something that we can verify, e.g. if he says that the cat is on the mat, we are satisfied that he spoke the truth if the cat is on the mat. On the other hand, if the cat is not on the mat, how does one know whether he was lying and not mistaken?

There is, of course, a very good sense in which we can be said to know, although not to be able to prove that a man
was lying, and that is where we have sufficient evidence to warrant our saying that he must have lied; he could not possibly have been mistaken. Even so, short of obtaining a confession, there seems little one can do about it. For example, in a case reported in the Manchester Guardian (Jan. 18th, 1957), two soldiers said at an inquest that they did not know exactly what happened in a road accident in which another soldier was killed. The coroner said that the men 'must have seen the whole of this thing', and that between the time of the accident and the time they were questioned they must have put together the story that they did not see anything. The coroner said 'It is no good any soldier or anyone else, coming forward and saying that where a man is hit as hard as this man was and is killed three yards in front of them, they never saw what happened. It is trying our credulity beyond all bounds'.

Even so, there are the sort of cases where no evidence could be produced which would justify our saying that a man must have lied. For example, if he says he doesn't remember something that he has been told, how can one show that he does, or must do? If he says that he forgot to call for your parcel, how does one show that he did remember, (or must have remembered), but decided not to do anything about it, which he might very well have done?

However, although there are cases where one can say, with a great deal of justification that someone must be lying,
we are able to say this because we suspect him of lying. But if we don't suspect him, we don't check his story. How do we know that the people we don't suspect are speaking the truth?

The plain fact is that we don't. This might seem like a regrettable return to the view that we can never really know another person's mind, and perhaps in a sense, it is. But it is from the fact that there is deceiving, that is, it is maintained on empirical grounds and not from a theory about the relations between mind and body. We do know about a man because he tells us, but on the other hand, we cannot tell whether or not he is speaking the truth, which seems to leave us in the unpalatable position of claiming that we never know when even our best friends are speaking the truth.

It does however, point to a neglected distinction between believing what he says and believing him; that is, between believing the proposition expressed by the sentence he utters and believing him. To talk of believing a proposition is to talk of believing it independently of him; it isn't true because he says so, and we don't believe it because he says so. But in believing him, we may very well believe it because he says so. There is a difference between saying to a man 'I don't believe that' and 'I don't believe you'. One can say the first without offence, but not the second. Even where it is possible to verify the content of what a
man says, we do not always do so; in fact, we very rarely do this. We believe him.

To believe somebody is to take his word; it is to trust him. It may be that what he says can be proved to be true or false, and it may not. If one trusts him, one doesn't consider the question of proving it, unless one has grounds for thinking that he might be mistaken. The fact that we do trust people is one of the important factors which makes deception possible.

Most of us do not trust everybody. Depending on one's point of view one is either extremely foolish, or very charitable if one does. But it is because we trust them that people are able to deceive us. The man who obtains money by false pretences is able to do so, not merely because he uses the appropriate phrases etc., but because the people he deceives trust him. It is a little difficult to deceive a person a second time, if he has discovered that you deceived him before.

What grounds have we for trusting the people we do? The grounds are somewhat negative. That is, they are not in terms of what people have done, but of what they have not. If one says that someone is truthful, it is not that we have always found that they told the truth, for the problem of how we know they told the truth on any given occasion might still remain, but that we have never known him lie to us. We have never discovered that he lied. It is of
course, always possible that he has lied to us and we have not detected it.

The more people trust us, the easier it is for us to deceive them. It is often easier to deceive our best friends than it is to deceive total strangers. Our best friends are not likely to suspect us of lying (unless of course, they know us to be inveterate liars). It is not only the man with the record who appears in court on a charge of obtaining money by false pretences, the man we might have suspected, but the highly respected and trusted solicitor, the one we should never have suspected. We may have had no reasons for doubting them and every reason for trusting them, but it is because someone did trust them that they were able to do what they did.

In so far as our motives are reasons for acting as we do, we can deceive other people about these too, for we often tell other people what our motives were. If we have a reputation for truthfulness, we may be believed, otherwise people may hesitate to believe what we tell them.

Motives are not the sort of things that can be seen. One can see a man jump into a river after a child, but one does not see his motive for doing so. Nor, very often, does one have to ask. A great many things that we do are the sort for which it would be absurd to ask for a motive. They are obvious. If one sees a man in a bus queue, one assumes that he is there because he wants to catch a bus,
just as one assumes that a man is not lying, unless one has grounds for suspecting him. Of course, he may be there to escape from the police, or in order that he may pick a few pockets. It is precisely because we make assumptions of this sort that people are able to act in this way. We assume these things because they are the reasons why most people do them. Our experience is such that in most cases people who stand in bus queues are waiting to catch buses. In most cases, our assumptions would be correct. But in any given case, they might not be. Our experience of course, might be different. If pick-pockets abounded in bus queues, we should very likely attribute different motives to the people we saw there. And this would mean that a pick-pocket would have to be extremely skilful, if he were to be successful, and that a man waiting for a bus would have a great deal of difficulty in proving his innocence.

If we could know all that there is to know about a man from his behaviour, and if we could tell what he is doing from the things he says, we should not have to trust him, and deceiving would not be possible.
ONE GENEROUS ACTION

It has been maintained that we cannot know all that there is to know about a man from his behaviour, but the measure of uncertainty which I maintain that there is with regard to our knowledge of the conduct of others, has no disastrous results, to the extent of precluding our ever being able to say anything about a man and his actions. It does not mean that we cannot account for predicting what other people will do, in the way in which we ordinarily predict, for I am not here concerned with predictability in principle. The view that the agent's knowledge of his actions is different from the observer's will allow, as I do not think Ryle can allow, at least adequately, for a man's doing but one generous action in the whole of his life.

I shall first offer an account of what it would be to say that a man had done but one generous action in the whole of his life, and then go on to show why it is that this cannot adequately be allowed for in the framework of Ryle's theory. I shall then consider predictability in practice.

It will be remembered that earlier I maintained that a motive is the reason a man has for doing what he does, and that (in most cases) if a man knows what he is doing, he is
able to describe what he is doing at the time at which he is doing it, and has reasons for what he does. A motive is thus essentially connected with an event, although not itself an event. I wish to say that an action can be morally appraised, and that to say that an action was a generous one is to take account both of what the man did, and his motive for what he did. I shall consider the question from the point of view of the use of words like 'generous', as I think this will be more convenient in considering Ryle's theory.

First, a little about the words which we use to bestow moral approval and disapproval on men and their actions. These are not simply confined to 'good' and 'bad', but include those such as 'generous', 'brave', 'mean', 'loyal', 'cowardly' etc. There is no particular sort of action to which the word 'generous' is applicable, but there is a range of actions, for example, giving money to charity or to the poor, providing entertainment, perhaps, being hospitable. One can be generous about one's possessions—be prepared to give away what one has, and so on. One can be considered to be generous in other ways too—perhaps 'generous minded', being ready to appreciate other people's good qualities.

'Honest' also covers a range of actions, for example, speaking the truth, giving the right change if you are a shopkeeper, to use one of Kant's examples; not cheating, not stealing, being sincere. 'Kind' is perhaps particularly
vague; there are no doubt an enormous number of things one might do which might be labelled 'kind'.

'Brave' will also apply to a wide range of things, more easily specifiable, for example, doing any of the things that might earn you a V.C. or similar decoration, like assaulting the enemy single-handed, (or one might want to call this foolhardy), doing something dangerous in spite of your fears, saving someone's life at the expense of your own, or, in another sense, bearing adversity or pain well. We often call someone brave, not because of something he has done of the sort for which he might be awarded a decoration, but for, say, accepting a disability well.

Before going further, it is important to point out that there are differences between the words which we use to bestow moral approval and disapproval, which can be indicated by reference to 'brave'. We should probably not call a man 'generous' if he had only once ever done something generous—if he had perhaps only once given something away. Nor should we probably call him honest if he only occasionally told the truth. On the other hand, we often do call a man brave on account of one brave action. This may be because outside of wartime and certain sorts of fiction there is a limit to the number of brave actions a man can perform. But we do call a man brave even though he had only once done something of the sort which would merit a decoration of some description.
If one says that a man is generous, one gives people to understand that he will do certain sorts of things - if you ask him for a donation, he will very likely give you one, and we give people to understand that a man will do, or not do certain sorts of things if we say that he is honest.

But it is not quite the same with bravery, for we use the word in a different way. To say that a man who won a V.C. is brave is to say nothing about the way in which he would accept a disability. 'Patient' is another word which is different, and more like the second sense of 'brave'. We do not talk of 'patient' actions, as we do 'generous' actions or say that something was a patient thing to do, as we might say that something was a generous thing to do. It is essential to point out that there are these differences, since I do not wish it to be assumed that what follows applies without reserve to all words of moral approval and disapproval. I shall restrict myself as far as possible to words like 'honest' and 'generous'.

There are then, certain (not too accurately specified) sorts of action which are considered 'brave', 'honest' 'generous', and certain sorts of ways in which a man must behave in order to merit being called generous, brave, honest. There is a point at which we might no longer be prepared to call an action or a man generous, but perhaps foolish, if, for example, he reduces himself and his family to poverty. We might not be prepared to call a man who always speaks the
truth 'honest', but 'tactless'; a man who does something extraordinarily dangerous, not 'brave' but 'foolhardy'. Although we may disagree about the sorts of actions which are to be considered brave, generous and honest, there is a broad measure of agreement about the sorts of actions which do qualify for these terms of approval.

Now we may adopt the view that any action which can be be described as, for example, giving money to charity, is a generous one, and so say that a man performing the action so describable has performed a generous action, or has acted generously. This would be to take no account of his motive, his reason for giving money to charity.

On another view, Kant's view, we should not call the giving of money to charity a generous action, although it is one of the things to which the word 'generous' may be applied, if, for example, the agent's motive was to obtain some publicity. We should then call it something like 'prudent', perhaps 'cunning', or say that the man had an eye to the main chance, but we shouldn't say that to give money to charity in order to gain publicity was a generous thing to do; nor should we say that a man who gave money to charity for this reason acted generously. If the agent's reason for giving the money to charity was, for instance, because it was in need, then we should say that this was a generous thing to do or that he had acted generously. There may be no external difference whatsoever between the two actions;
both men may have given the same amounts, both may be in similar financial circumstances, and both may receive the same publicity. They have both performed an action of the sort to which the word 'generous' is applicable, but it could be said that one of these actions was really generous, the other only apparently so. This may not be able to be said by an observer, unless the motives for the actions were divulged, but there is no reason why one should tell others why one does the things one does. It could be said by the agent that his action was only apparently generous. He knows what he did and why he did it; and if he does it to get some publicity, that everyone else should think it generous, although it is not really so, is precisely the result he would hope for. For it to be obvious that he did it for the reason he did would no doubt be the wrong sort of publicity. He could quite well say 'Everyone thinks I acted generously, but I didn't really'.

To say this is to say something about the criteria for calling an action which is actually performed 'generous'. It is not sufficient that the action should be one of the sort to which the word 'generous' is applicable, the reason why the agent performed the action must be taken into account. It is also to say that, if anyone else, knowing what the agent did and why he did it, were to assess his action, he would, unless he were using different criteria, assess it as the agent does. It is not of course, to say that anyone
does know.

We call a man generous on the basis of several generous actions. Again, there is no precise number of generous actions a man must perform before he merits the label 'generous'. No doubt one or two would be too few, but if he repeatedly acts generously, we should call him a generous man. If we were asked why we call him generous, we should answer by referring to the generous things he has done, that is by referring to the occasions on which he has acted generously. This is a dispositional use of the words 'generous'. 'Generous' is applicable both to a man's actions and to the man. In the first instance it is applied to an occurrence, in the second it is not. But it is applicable to the man by virtue of the generous actions that he has performed; that is, to say that a man is generous, is not to say that he is doing anything now, but it is to say that he has on several occasions, performed generous actions. It is at least to say something about the way in which the man has acted. In what sense it is to say more than this, to say something about his future actions remains to be seen. The answer to the question which will perhaps arise, of how we can call a man generous on the basis of several generous actions, when we may not be sure what his motive was, was given, I hope, in the last chapter. He very often tells us what his motive was, and unless we have reason for doubting him, we usually believe him. In cases where he does not tell
us, we assume that his motive is of the sort that a man
doing the sort of thing he did, would usually have, or that
his motive is of the sort we usually take him to have, unless
we have reason to suspect otherwise.

If we consider that the word 'generous' is used in this
way, there is no difficulty in allowing that a man may do
but one generous action in the whole of his life, but this
is not to say that in such a case anyone other than the
agent would know this. If he had only once or twice acted
generously, he would not qualify for the label 'generous'.
We, as observers, would not call such a man generous, firstly
because acting generously once or twice is not sufficient for
the man to merit the label 'generous', and secondly, how
should we know that this action, done perhaps by a man with
a reputation for prudence and calculation, was generous in
this instance, and not, as usual, prudent? We should not
be unjustified in assuming that this too was a prudent action
and not a generous one. The question of how we should know
is by no means unimportant, but it is a different question
from that of what it would be for a man to do but one gener­
ous action.

To summarise this: there is no reason why a man should
not do one generous action in the whole of his life in the
sense in which he could be said to have done one thing which
conformed to the requirements for calling an action generous.
If any impartial observer knew both what change had been
brought about in the world, and the agent's motive, he too, as well as the agent, would call the action generous.

It seems to me that Ryle cannot account adequately for what it would be for a man to do something which was only apparently and not really generous, and I do not think he can account at all for what it would be for a man to do but one generous action in the whole of his life. He cannot allow adequately for the first, because he denies that there is anything over and above appearances in conduct. I have tried to show that this is not so, as anyone who has ever been deceived has to allow. He cannot account for the second, because he gives no meaning to 'one generous action'. 'Generous' for him, has no isolated occurrence, but only a dispositional use. If it is applicable to an occurrence, it is applicable because of its dispositional use.

In Ryle's account of 'motive' words, he does not give 'generosity.' His instances are, among others, 'vanity and 'indolence. But there is nothing in his account to indicate that what he says should not be applicable to 'generous', and much that suggests that it should. I shall quote three main passages in connection with Ryle's account of 'motive' words'.

"In fact, however, we do discover the motives of other people.......It is or is like an inductive process, which results in the establishment of law-like propositions and the application of them as the 'reasons' for particular actions. What is established in each case is or includes a general hypothetical proposition of a certain sort. The imputation of a motive for a particular action is not a causal inference to an unwitnessed event, but the
subsumption of an episode proposition under a law-like proposition."  

"The ascertainment of a person's mental capacities and propensities is an inductive process, an induction to law-like propositions from observed actions and reactions. Having ascertained these long term qualities, we explain a particular action or reaction by applying the result of such an induction to the new specimen, save where open avowels let us know the explanation without research."  

"Now 'brittle' is a dispositional adjective; that is to say, to describe the glass as brittle is to assert a general hypothetical proposition about the glass. So when we say that the glass broke when struck because it was brittle, the 'because' clause does not report a happening or a cause; it states a law-like proposition.....

How does the law-like general hypothetical proposition work? It says roughly, that the glass, if sharply struck or twisted, etc. would not dissolve or stretch or evaporate, but fly into fragments. The matter of fact that the glass did at a particular moment fly into fragments, when struck by a particular stone, is explained, in this sense of 'explain', when the first happening, namely the impact of the stone satisfies the protasis of the general hypothetical proposition, and when the second happening, namely the fragmentation of the glass, satisfies its apodosis"  

Now, substituting 'generous' for 'brittle', there are three points of importance:-

1. 'Generous' is a dispositional adjective; to describe a man as generous is to assert a general hypothetical proposition about him. It is to say roughly, that whenever he is asked to give a donation, or......, he will do so.

2. We arrive at this general hypothetical proposition by induction from observed actions and reactions.

3. When once we have arrived at this general hypothetical

1. C.o.M. P.90  
2. C.o.M. P.172  
3. C.o.M. P.89
proposition, we use it to explain new specimens - subsequent actions.

Let us consider the last two points. Presumably the 'observed actions and reactions' are actions which the agent has performed in the course of his life. How are these actions related to the general hypothetical proposition? What sort of actions are they? Are they generous actions from which we make inductions, or are they as yet actions which are morally neutral? It is tempting to assume that it is what the agent has done in the past which justifies us in establishing the law-like proposition, that we say 'He has acted generously in the past, i.e. on this that and the other occasions', and so we are justified in establishing our law-like proposition to the effect that he is a generous man, and is likely to act so on future occasions, and this would not be substantially different from the account given at the beginning of this chapter. But this cannot be so, for this would be to call an action a generous one before we had established the law-like proposition; it would be to use 'generous' of an occurrence, and not to use it dispositionally. Ryle gives no examples of the sorts of actions from which we make our inductions, but only of those which are to be construed as instances of the observance of the law-like propositions, e.g. "The statement 'He boasted from vanity'

...is to be construed as saying 'he boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so satisfies the law-like proposition
that whenever he finds a chance of securing the admiration
and envy of others, he does whatever he thinks will produce
this admiration and envy." That is, he gives example of
instances which may be explained by the law-like proposition,
but not of those from which we establish the law-like
proposition.

If the law-like proposition is based on what he has done
in the past, then there is surely an additional difficulty
in saying that we apply the law-like proposition which is a
result of induction from observed actions, to explain
subsequent actions. It is surely incorrect to say that a
word like 'generous' is applicable to this action in virtue
of what the agent has done in the past. Subsequent actions
are surely not to be labelled solely in virtue of what the
agent has always done. He might always have been late in
the past, giving you just cause to assume that he will be
late on this occasion, but we do not want to say he is late
on this occasion because he has always been late before,
particularly if on this occasion he arrives ten minutes
before and not ten minutes after the appointed time. That is,
you might have established the law-like proposition to the
effect that whenever he is asked to be at a certain place at
a certain time, he will be late, but only the occasions on
which he is late, are explicable by this law-like proposition.
That is, the occasions on which he is late can be 'explained'
by saying 'he is unpunctual', and this would mean roughly
1. C.o.M. P.89
that this is the sort of thing he usually or always does. We need to settle that he is late on this occasion, before we refer to the law-like proposition. Why should we say that this action is a generous one because this man has always acted generously in the past?

The answer to this is that we don't, on Ryle's account, say that he acted generously on this occasion because he has always acted generously in the past, for to say that he has always acted generously in the past, is to use 'generous' non-dispositionally, it is to apply 'generous' to past occurrences. We say that he acted generously on this occasion because he is a generous man, and this is to say something rather different.

The difficulty seems to be connected with establishing that he is a generous man. If we refer to his having acted generously in the past, we are using a non-dispositional 'generous'. When we have once established that he is a generous man, we may subsequently use 'generous' dispositionally, say that he acted generously because he is a generous man, which subsumes this action under a general law, but even here it seems as if we need a non-dispositional use, if we are to regard this as meaning that this is an example of the way in which he usually behaves. If we simply take the ordinary inductive account, which Ryle at times seems to be advocating, it would seem that we need a non-dispositional use of 'generous'; viz:-
1. X acted generously on occasions a.b.c.

2. Because he acted generously on these occasions, we say that he is a generous man.

3. To say that he is a generous man is to say that whenever he is asked to give money to charity etc. he will do so.
   (We regard this as a prediction.)

4. On subsequent occasions when he does give money to charity etc., we say that he acted generously on this occasion because he is a generous man.

5. If on a subsequent occasion he is asked to give money and refuses, the prediction will have been falsified.

   This seems to be a reasonable enough account, but it is not Ryle's account, for we have reckoned without the law-like proposition by analogy with 'the glass is brittle', and so without the force of 'whenever', and we have also used 'generous' non-dispositionally.

   What is involved in 'whenever' is not simply a reference to the future. To say that the glass is brittle is to say that whenever it is struck by a stone it would fly into fragments. It explains any occasion on which the glass has been struck and flown into fragments, or any subsequent occasion when the glass will be struck. And to say that to call a man generous is to say that whenever he is asked to give money to charity, he will do so, is not simply to refer to the future, but also to the past. The law-like proposition, however it is established from 'observed actions and
reactions', explains these actions and reactions. In this way, 'generous' has a purely dispositional use, viz:–

1. Acts of the sort - giving money to charity, being hospitable etc. are acts which a generous man would do.
2. X regularly performs acts a.b.c. (acts which a generous man would do.)
3. X is a generous man.
4. To say that X is a generous man is to say that whenever he is asked to give money to charity etc. he will do so. We can now say that he performed acts a.b.c. 'from generosity'.
5. When X performs acts d.e.f. (where acts d.e.f. are also acts which a generous man would do) we can say that he does these because he is generous.

In this way, the use of 'generous' as non-dispositional is avoided. We only say 'he acted generously' if we have established that he is a generous man.

Supposing that we consider –

1. Acts of the sort - taking money out of poor-boxes etc. are acts of the sort which a mean man would do.
2. Y regularly performs acts p.q.r. (acts which a mean man would do.)
3. Y is a mean man.
4. To say that Y is a mean man is to say 'Whenever....he would ......

We can then say that he did p.q.r. because he is mean.
5. When Y performs acts s.t.u. (acts which a mean man would
do) we can say that he does these because he is mean.

But, if Y performs a. what do we say? What we can say
is that he has performed an act of the sort which a generous
man would do, but we cannot say that he acted generously,
because he is not a generous man. What we might say is that
he has apparently acted generously, but this would not be
the same sense of 'apparently generous' as I considered
previously, in which it was said 'He apparently acted
generously, but he didn't really - he acted prudently'. It
cannot be said categorically that he did on this occasion
act generously.

Ryle says that to ask why someone acted in a certain way
is to make an inquiry into the character of the agent which
accounts for his having acted in that way on that occasion.
What he is concerned with, is not the dispositional use of
words, but the dispositions of men (or dispositional properties
of glass). He says:-

"When we ask 'Why did someone act in a certain way?' this
question might, so far as its language goes, either be
an inquiry into the cause of his acting in that way,
or be an inquiry into the character of the agent
which accounts for his having acted in that way on
that occasion. I suggest, what I shall now try to
prove, that explanations by motives are explanations
of the second type and not of the first type." 1

"When someone is described as a vain or indolent man
the words 'vain' and 'indolent' are used to signify
more or less lasting traits in his character." 2

"In fact however, we do discover the motives of other
people." 3

1. C.o.M. P.89
2. C.o.M. P.85
3. C.o.M. P. 90 (my underlining)
"In ascribing a specific motive to a person we are describing the sorts of things that he tends to try to do or bring about .........

Aristotle realised that in talking about motives we are talking about dispositions of a certain sort, a sort different from competences; he realised too that any motive, unlike any competence, is a propensity of which it makes sense to say that in a given man in a given walk of life this motive is too strong...... What is relevant to our inquiry is the fact, recognised by Aristotle as cardinal, that the relative strengths of inclinations are alterable. Changes of environment, companionship, health and age, external criticisms and examples can all modify the balance of power between the inclinations which constitute one side of a person's character. But so can his own concern about this balance modify it." 1

"To possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is to be bound or liable to be in a particular state...." 2

Behind the talk of law-like propositions, lies 'character!' Ryle says that we 'discover' people's motives or dispositions. His theory is that we discover a man's motives or dispositions from observed actions and reactions. We discover, from the fact that a man regularly performs acts of the sort that a generous man would do, that he is generous. We explain his past behaviour as his acting 'from generosity', and predict his future behaviour, not from his past behaviour, but from a knowledge of his disposition or character. We discover a man's motives, or his long term qualities, from his actions, and from a knowledge of his long term qualities, or his character, we can predict.

Talk of 'character' or a man's 'dispositions' raises needless problems, whether 'character' is taken to be something which causes a man to act in a certain way, or, in
Ryle's terms, that which accounts for a man's acting in a certain way. To say that a man acts generously on this occasion because he is a generous man, makes it difficult to allow for a man's doing but one generous action in the whole of his life. There is a fundamental difficulty connected with talk of 'character' or 'dispositions' in this way, which is not eradicated by refraining from talking of character as a cause, and so is not restricted to Ryle.

It has been asked 'If a man's actions could be predicted from a knowledge of his character, would he be free?' It is often assumed that what we do predict a man's actions from is a knowledge of his character, and Professor Campbell, for example, wants to answer this question by showing that a free action is one which is not predictable from 'his character as so far formed'. It might be more pertinent to ask what is this 'character' of which we obtain knowledge. Do we in fact need a knowledge of a man's character in order to predict?

It has recently been denied that talk of a man's actions as being due to, or explicable in terms of his character, has any bearing on the question of whether a man's action was a 'free' action or not. Nowell-Smith, in his book Ethics, discussing the libertarian theory as expounded by Professor Campbell says that a difficulty of the libertarians is that of 'distinguishing a free action from a random event'. The essence of Campbell's account is that an action should
not, if it is a free one, be predictable from a knowledge of the agent's character. "But, if this is so," asks Nowell-Smith, "can what he does be called his action at all?"

I am not here concerned with 'free' actions, whatever they may be, but with the notion of 'character'. According to Nowell-Smith, an action which is not predictable from a knowledge of the agent's character, is not to be called 'his' action at all. This is decidedly odd. What meaning then, does 'agent' have here? If this is to have bearing on the question of responsibility, as it is presumably intended to have, it seems to mean that we should not assign credit or blame - hold him responsible for such an action, i.e. one that was not predictable from his character. Nowell-Smith says

"Is it not rather a lusus naturae, an Act of God or a miracle? If a hardened criminal, bent on robbing the poor box, suddenly and inexplicably fails to do so, we should not say that he chose to resist or deserves credit for resisting the temptation; we should say, if we were religious, that he was the recipient of a sudden outpouring of Divine Grace or, if we were irreligious, that his 'action' was due to chance, which is another way of saying that it was inexplicable. In either case we should refuse to use the active voice." 1

What is undoubtedly asserted here, is that if the action is not predictable, and therefore explicable, from a knowledge of the agent's character, it is not one for which we should give him credit. It may be that Nowell-Smith means explicable at all, for he says 'If a hardened criminal ....suddenly and inexplicably....we should say that ...his action was due to chance, which is another way of saying that

1. Ethics. P. 282
it is inexplicable'. But if he does mean explicable at all he is not answering Campbell's argument, which is not that a free action is one which is not explicable at all, but merely that it is one which is not explicable from a knowledge of the agent's character.

The question that is involved here is that of what it is, if such a thing is possible, to act uncharacteristically, to perform an uncharacteristic action. Nowell-Smith objects to the way in which Campbell talks of 'character' - as if it were some sort of force which restricts a man's freedom.

"It is noticeable that, on Campbell's analysis, a man's desires and even his character are continually referred to as 'it'; desires are thought of as forces which, sometimes successfully and sometimes unsuccess-fully, prod a man into doing what he ought not, and his "character as so far formed" is the sum of these forces." 1

But, says Nowell-Smith, what I do will depend on my character, and this is not to say that my choice is restricted. "For to say that my choice depends on my character is not to say that my character compels me to do what I do, but to say that the choice was characteristic of me". This denial that 'character' is a force or a sum of forces, still does not explain what an uncharacteristic action is. What, it is to be repeated, is an uncharacteristic action? If there is no such thing as an uncharacteristic action, what is the point of saying that certain choices or actions are characteristic of me? It would seem that on Nowell-Smith's account, one cannot do an uncharacteristic action, for if

1. Ethics P. 289
2. " P289/290
one performed an action which was not predictable from one's
class, what one 'did' would not be accounted 'one's
action'; 'we should refuse to use the active voice'.

I do not wish to defend Professor Campbell. It may
be that he is wrong, and I think he is, to try to equate
'free' with 'unpredictable', and in talking of character as
some sort of force, but he is, I think, right in seeing the
importance for responsibility and morality of showing that
some actions are not predictable from a knowledge of the
agent's character, or explicable in terms of the agent's
character - that there are uncharacteristic actions. How
could one talk of a man's reforming unless he did one action
that was not predictable from a knowledge of his character?
If a hardened criminal reforms, he must at some point act
uncharacteristically.

We do, as a matter of fact, know of a great many
uncharacteristic actions. We often say, for example, 'I
should never have believed that of him,' 'I can't believe
that he would do a thing like that', and so on. If 'things
like that' were done by people in novels, we should say that
they were not in the least characteristic, and we might think
less of the author, for a man like that would never do such
a thing. But when a highly respectable and respected
'solicitor pleads guilty to embezzling his clients' money, we
might say that we should never have believed it, but there
it is. It should be sufficient, I think to show that there
is something suspect about the notion of an action's not being 'his' unless it is predictable from a knowledge of a person's character, to point to first offenders. Admittedly, all first offenders are not people who act uncharacteristically. Of some first offenders we have predicted that they will be in serious trouble sooner or later, but some of them do surprise us, some of them do act uncharacteristically.

If we were to take Nowell-Smith seriously, it would seem that we ought not to blame the solicitor who embezzles his clients' money, on the grounds that, since this action was not predictable from a knowledge of his character, it was therefore 'not his'. It is certainly true that in some cases of uncharacteristic actions, the agents are dealt with leniently. A man who has never before stolen anything, may be treated leniently because this is his first offence. But it is still an offence, and it is still 'his'.

One of the difficulties of 'character' is that it is assumed that it is something that is amenable, but difficult, to change. Nowell-Smith says "Men would not employ a special form of speech for changing the character and conduct of others unless they had a pro-attitude towards those changes." , and talks of 'strengthening and weakening certain traits of character'. Ryle talks in much the same way - "...the relative strengths of inclinations are alterable. Changes of environment, companionship.....can modify the balance of power between the inclinations which constitute one side of a person's character. But so can his own____________________

1. Ethics P. 301
about this balance modify it." Traits of character, or
dispositions are not completely unchangeable, but they are
difficult to change. They are not completely permanent, but
they are more or less permanent. It is not impossible to
change your character, but you have to try hard, or other
people have, to change it.

There is something highly suspect about the notion of
permanency here. Most people do not want to say that a man
can never change his character, and so, it is suggested that
character or traits of character are not permanent, but only
more or less permanent. Ryle's account of motive explanations
as analogous to 'The glass broke because it is brittle'
brakes down here. At times Ryle says, for example, that
'He boasted from vanity' is to be construed as saying that
"He boasted on meeting the stranger and his doing so satisfies
the law-like proposition that whenever he finds a chance of
securing the admiration and envy of others, he does whatever
he thinks will produce this admiration and envy." , that is,
he regards 'vanity' as being a dispositional property
analogous to the brittleness of glass. At other times, he
says things like "On hearing that a man is vain we expect
him, in the first instance, to behave in certain ways, namely,
to talk a lot about himself, to cleave to the society of the
eminent......To be vain is to tend to act in these and
innumerable other kindred ways." We have an introduction

1. c/f P. 186
2. c/f P. 181
3. C.o.M. P.86
of 'tends to'. We may want to say that a vain man only 'tends' to act in certain ways, but we do not surely, want to say this of the brittleness of glass. Glass does not 'tend' to fly into fragments rather than evaporate or dissolve when it is struck with a certain force. It does (and will) fly into fragments. It seems to me that it is misleading to talk of 'vanity' as a dispositional property at all, even if the account of this is modified, somewhat unaccountably, to say that the vain man has a 'tendency' to act in certain ways.

Now there is, I suspect, a verbal muddle here. To be vain is not to tend to act in certain ways; to be conceited is not to tend to act in certain ways. To say that a man is vain is to say that he talks a lot about himself, cleaves to the society of the eminent, and so on. To be vain is to act in these and innumerable other kindred ways and not to tend to act so. To be conceited is to boast of one's own excellences, to pity or ridicule the deficiencies of others and so on.

To say any of these things is to say how the word 'vain' or the word 'conceited' is used. The connection between vanity and boasting, is what, for want of a better word, I can only call 'quasi-analytic'. Boasting and making oneself prominent are two of the things to which the word 'vain' will apply. There are of course, others. There is no accurately specifiable range of actions which may be called
'vain'. Nevertheless, there are certain sorts of actions to which the word 'vain' will not apply. For instance, vanity and boasting are clearly connected; it makes sense to talk of a vain man boasting, but not of a modest man boasting; boasting is one of the things to which the word 'modest' will not apply. Thus, to say that a man is vain is to say that he will do certain things, but this is to explain to what sorts of things the word 'vain' can be applied.

Questions of the sort 'How can a mean man do a generous action?' raise gratuitous puzzles as long as it is assumed that 'mean' refers to some more or less lasting trait in his character, which has to be (more or less) eradicated before he can do something generous. We understand well enough what it is for a generous man to do generous actions, but how can an ungenerous man do a generous action without changing his character? Of course generous men do generous things, and the sorts of things can to some extent be specified if you unpack 'generous'. To ask what sort of things a generous man does is to ask what sorts of actions are considered to be generous. The relation is a quasi-analytic one; to talk of generous men doing things like robbing the poor-box, savours of contradiction. Modest men cannot boast; nor can generous men act meanly, but it is a logical 'cannot'. The word 'generous' is not applicable to actions like robbing the poor-box. Generous men could (logically) rob poor boxes if we included robbing poor-boxes among the
actions to which 'generous' will apply. To say in this sense that generous men cannot act in any way other than generously, is not to say that it is not possible, or even very difficult, for a particular man to act uncharacteristically. There need be no question of a man's changing his character. To boast is not difficult, even if you have always acted modestly, and even if you are said, with justification, to be a modest man, and it is certainly not impossible unless you change your character.

One cannot allow for a man's doing one generous action in the whole of his life, if 'generous' is taken to be a word which signifies a 'disposition', and the agent's actions are taken to proceed from that disposition. But we can do so if we consider particular actions to be generous ones, and from these establish that the man is a generous man.

At the beginning of this chapter, I said that we call a man generous on the basis of several generous actions. We do not call him generous because of his disposition, but we call him generous because of what he has done in the past; because he has performed certain actions which we consider to be generous actions. To say that he is a generous man is to say, at least, something about his past behaviour. If we are asked why we call him a generous man, we can justify this by calling attention to the generous acts he has performed; that is, by referring to the occasions on which he has acted generously. We do not say that he acted generously on these occasions because he is a generous man,
but we say that he is a generous man because on certain occasions in the past he acted generously.

We predict other people's behaviour, not from a knowledge of their characters, but from our knowledge of their past behaviour. It is perhaps trivial to point out that the people we know best are those whose actions we can predict most accurately. We should have no grounds for predicting the behaviour of people of whose past actions we have very little knowledge. 'I expect he will be late' can be justified by saying that he usually is late, or always is late. If I have met him on one or two occasions only, on both of which he has been late, I am hardly justified in predicting that he will be late on this occasion. If I have met him on many occasions, on none of which he has been early, I am justified in predicting that he will be late on this occasion and in saying that he is always late. I can, from my knowledge of his past behaviour, regulate my own.

I can say that I shall be there at nine and arrive at a quarter past. I should not be unjustified in arriving late, as I might not be, if I had always known him be early. If, as sometimes happens with people of whom we say 'He is always late', he arrives on time, my prediction that he will be late will be falsified, but I shall have been perfectly justified in making the prediction. Moreover, it may be that I am justified in regulating my behaviour in accordance with the way in which I expect him to behave. It is not
unreasonable of me to keep him waiting. If he is always late, but on this occasion acts uncharacteristically, it is what he might expect.

There are people of whom we cannot predict what they will do on this occasion, not because we do not know them well enough, for we do. They are the people who are unpredictable, and this too is something we learn from their past behaviour. Of them we say 'You never know what he will do'; 'Sometimes he is late, sometimes he is early'; 'He is erratic or unreliable'. Whether predictability is a restriction on the agent or not, it is very often a restriction on ours and a hindrance to us. We don't know what to do. If we get the meal ready on time, he will be late and it will be spoiled; if we don't, he will be early and that will be inconvenient. We cannot predict, we can only guess what they will do.

We apply words like 'punctual' 'generous' 'honest' to people, and we do so on a basis of their past behaviour. We say that a man is generous in virtue of his past (generous) actions, and we can be asked for our grounds for saying that he is generous. If we say of a man that he is generous or punctual, the person to whom we say this is entitled to expect that the man in question will do certain (not too accurately specified) things. If I tell you that he is always punctual, you are entitled to expect that he will not keep you waiting if you ask for an appointment. If you ask me if I think he will give a subscription to something or
other, and I reply 'Well, he is very generous', you are entitled to expect that he will give you a subscription. You know what to expect from the words I use of him.

To say that a man is generous is to give some sort of information about him, about what he has done, or what he usually does. To say that a man is vain is to say that he is always talking about himself, is fond of admiring himself in the glass and so on. To say that he is generous is to say that he gives freely to those in need, enjoys giving pleasure to others, and so on. If I am told that a particular man is generous, I have some idea of the sorts of things he has done and can be expected to do. And I have some idea of these things because I understand the word 'generous'. It is because I understand that the word 'generous' is usually applicable to acts of sorts a.b.c.d... that I know what to expect of him. This is not of course, to say that misunderstandings and disagreements do not arise, You might be prepared to apply the word 'generous' to actions to which I would not.

To say 'He did that because he is generous' in answer to the question 'Why did he do that?' is not an answer to an enquiry into the nature of the agent's character which accounts for his having acted in that way. We do not need to talk of more or less permanent traits in his character, but of the sorts of things he always, usually, or sometimes does. To say 'He did that because he is generous', is to
say that 'that' is a generous action, and that this action is an example of the sort he usually does. To say of a particular action that it is characteristic of the agent, is to say that it is one of the sort which he usually does. To say that his action was uncharacteristic, need involve us in no assertions about 'random events' or 'free acts' or 'acts which are not 'his' '; it is merely to say that his action is one of the sort which he has never, or very rarely done before.

To illustrate this, consider the fable of the boy who cried 'Wolf'. No doubt the people who had on more than one occasion rushed to his aid, only to find that there was and had been no wolf at all, called him a liar. In so using the word 'liar' they were using it dispositionally. They were not saying that he was doing any particular thing at the time at which they referred to him thus, but they called him 'liar' because of the occasions on which he had lied. They were justified, because of what he had done, in maintaining that whenever he had an opportunity of lying he would do so. They were justified in predicting that he would lie on subsequent occasions. In view of this, they were justified in expecting that he was lying on this occasion. (They may not have been morally justified, since the cry was 'Wölf', but this is another matter.) But on this occasion, they were wrong. The boy did tell the truth. This does not mean that they were wrong about the boy's
character, if by this is meant that they were wrong in calling him 'liar'. This might be so, in the case of a man who is discovered to have stolen the petty cash, and is also found, on investigation, to have stolen regularly before. We might then say that we had been wrong about him; he wasn't in fact honest and respectable. But in a case in which he has stolen the petty cash and on investigation we find that this is the first time he has stolen anything, we were not mistaken in calling him honest. He has acted uncharacteristically, and our prediction that he was to be trusted with the petty cash on this occasion, has been falsified. On this occasion, in calling 'Wolf', the boy was calling truthfully, and it can be said that the boy acted uncharacteristically and that people's predictions were falsified. There is no need to suppose that before he called truthfully on this occasion, that he had to change his character, or to suppose that he found speaking truthfully at all difficult.

On an account such as this, there need be no difficulty in allowing that a man did one generous action in the whole of his life; that he may be said categorically to have acted generously once and once only. But this does require a non-dispositional use. I said earlier that it is not sufficient for saying that a man acted generously on a given occasion, that he should have performed one of the acts to which the word 'generous' will apply, but that his
reason for what he did must be taken into account. That is, it is not sufficient that the agent should have done something like giving money to charity, for he may have done this in order to gain publicity, and would not thereby have acted generously, but say, prudently.

In trying to show the need for a non-dispositional account of words like 'generous', I have chosen to talk in terms of offences, and have talked of the first time a man has acted dishonestly rather then honestly, and I have neglected motives, and used examples in which the reason the man had for what he did does not appear to matter very much. We decide whether or not a man has embezzled money by examining his books and not by asking him his motives. I have done so largely because there is not so great a problem about how we know in these cases, as there is, for instance in the case of a first, or isolated generous action. There is a need for a non-dispositional use of 'dishonest' to meet the case of the man who steals once and once only, and we have plenty of experience of these instances, and so we also need a non-dispositional use of 'generous' to meet the case of the man who acts generously once and once only.

Now one can have a non-dispositional use of the word 'generous' where no account is taken at all of the reason why a man did what he did. It may be considered that simply to give money to charity is to act generously, no matter why the agent gave the money. That is, the criterion for calling an action generous may simply be that the agent
should have performed one of the actions to which the word 'generous' is applicable. If this view is taken, there is no difficulty about how we know that a man has acted generously once and once only, and no need to say that a man acted 'apparently generously', but that he didn't in fact act generously, but it would be a moral position that would take a great deal of defending. However, in maintaining the necessity of a non-dispositional account of 'generous', I have not, I think, denied that such a view could be adopted.

With the criteria for the non-dispositional use of 'generous' that I am advocating - consideration of his reason for doing what he does, as well as his having performed an action of a certain kind, there is a difficulty of how anyone would know that the agent had acted generously. How should we know that anyone who had repeatedly acted ungenerously, had acted generously on this occasion? I think it more than likely that we, as observers, wouldn't know. There is a certain amount of truth in saying that we explain a man's subsequent behaviour by what he has previously done. We do in fact, very often, having decided that a man is ungenerous, use this to explain his subsequent behaviour. We refuse to believe that he did, as he might say he did, act generously on this occasion. We might say of a man that whenever he can, he will avoid giving money away. If on one occasion he does give money
away, we may in fact say 'But he is a mean man. He probably couldn't get out of it', or 'He has some ulterior motive for doing it'. We should probably, on such an occasion, be reluctant to believe that he had acted generously, and should probably be suspicious of his action. And we should not necessarily be unjustified in refusing to believe that he had acted generously. But this is not to say that we should be right in explaining this action by what he usually has done. Because we don't believe that he has acted generously does not mean that he did not act generously. We are, of course, equally reluctant to believe of someone of whom we say, with justification, that he is honest, that he has on this occasion acted dishonestly. But the occasions on which we can find out that he has acted dishonestly are rather more numerous than the occasions on which we can find out that he acted honestly, or generously. It is often easier to discover first dishonest actions than first honest actions, but all this seems to show is that it is a great deal easier to destroy than to regain one's reputation.

In admitting that observers would very likely not know that a man who had always behaved ungenerously had on this occasion acted generously, we are not saying that this is something which is in principle unknowable. It is knowable and it is known, for the agent himself can know this and very often does. Once we are prepared to admit that the
agent's and the observer's positions are different, there is nothing odd in claiming that a man can act generously once and once only. No-one else, very likely, would know, any more than anyone else would know that he had lied if this were undetected. But the agent would know.
Conclusion

According to Ryle's view of self-knowledge, there is nothing either of interest or of importance to be said about it. It is not in any significant way different from our knowledge of other people; there are no important differences between agent and observer. I have tried to show that this is not so.

I have tried to show that various theses upheld by Ryle in *The Concept of Mind* are unacceptable if they are intended, as I think they are, to provide an account of self-knowledge which is an alternative to an account of self-knowledge by introspection. If they are regarded as negative theses, criticisms of the theory of self-knowledge by introspection, they seem to me to be correct, and I have in fact taken them as a starting point. But in their positive aspect they go too far, and are, I think, false. We can agree that an account of self-knowledge by introspection is unsatisfactory, without also agreeing with the proposed alternative of self-knowledge by parity with knowledge of others.

The points I have chosen to consider are:-

a. There is no difference in kind between our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of others.

b. Thinking is talking to oneself.

c. There are no such things as 'inner lives'.
d. There is nothing which we do privately (in our heads) which we could not conceivably do publicly.
e. We can know all that there is to know about others from their behaviour.

These points are, it seems to me, valid and important if directed against the traditional theory of self-knowledge by introspection, according to which we are able to scrutinize, what no one else could scrutinize, the states and operations of our own minds. In denying that introspection is a source of knowledge, because the acts which we were supposed to introspect are non-existent, and that in any case, introspection would involve a double act, for example, resolving to get up early and observing our resolving, it is necessary to give some other account of self-knowledge, and Ryle chooses to say that self-knowledge and our knowledge of others are the same in kind. In so far as the thesis that there is no difference in kind between our knowledge of ourselves and our knowledge of others is intended to deny that we have this mysterious source of information about ourselves, and to insist that the data for self-knowledge is the same as the data for the knowledge of others, i.e. the things we do and the things we say about what we do, then this thesis is acceptable. But Ryle goes too far in denying that there are any differences in kind. I have tried to show that there is a difference in kind in one case, and that is between knowing what I did and knowing
what you did. The latter is an example of knowing that something is the case, the former is not. A difference in kind can thus be claimed without resorting to introspection, and without having to say that our knowledge of our own activities involves a double act. Ryle's own account of self-knowledge by parity with our knowledge of others, in this instance, would, I hold, either involve our doing two things at the same time, for example, making an excuse and noticing our making an excuse, or have the result that we never know what we are doing, but only what we have done.

If we regard (b), that thinking is talking to oneself, (c) that there are no such things as inner lives, and (d) that there is nothing which we do privately (in our heads) which we may not do publicly, as objections to the traditional theory, that is, if we regard them as:-

b. opposing the view that thinking is operating with symbols or concepts etc.

c. as maintaining that there is no counterpart life corresponding to a physical life in which unreported events in some way occur, and

d. as asserting that the things which we do in our heads are not of a radically different type from the things which we do publicly, that is, that there are no mental acts like 'acts of will' or 'acts of judgment', things that people never do report themselves as having done, that there is nothing over and above thoughts, sayings, and
observable actions, these are acceptable.

But in so far as they mean:

b. that thinking is simply talking to oneself as one talks to others, i.e. interpersonally,

c. that there is nothing of importance which is not a part of our observable behaviour, and

d. that the things we do privately (or in our heads or to ourselves) do not require to be considered differently simply because they are done privately, they seem to me to be wrong. I have tried to show that

b. thinking may be considered as saying, in the sense that we may say that they are both verbal activities, but not as talking to oneself as one talks to others, i.e. interpersonally. In order to maintain that we, for example, told ourselves things, we should have to postulate two selves.

c. that there are things which we do consider to be important for morality which we do in thought, and that these are the constituents of our 'inner lives'.

d. that some of the things which we do in our heads, or privately, are different simply because they are done privately. In particular, deceiving ourselves is different from deceiving others.

We can develop a view of self-knowledge which includes 'inner lives' which does not involve admitting mysterious mental acts which are never reported.
If we deny Ryle's theses in their positive aspect, we must also deny (e), that we know all that there is to know about others from their behaviour, for what we do in thought is not a part of our observable behaviour. This can be denied on independent grounds by calling attention to deception, a concept which Ryle does mention, but to which he gives inadequate consideration.

The view of self-knowledge I have tried to develop is important for morality, not only in that the personal aspect of morality is now much neglected in favour of the interpersonal, but in that it does allow us to give an account of what it is for a man to do but one generous action in the whole of his life, and to agree with Kant, that 'When the question is of moral worth, it is not with the actions which we see that we are concerned, but with those inward principles of them which we do not see.'

I have tried to develop and isolate one use of 'motive' which seems to me to be important for ethics. A 'motive' in the sense used here, is the reason the agent has for doing what he does, in those cases where he has a motive, and as such is placed among those things which he needs to tell us. We cannot discover it from his behaviour, although we can assume what it is from his behaviour. For him it is an essential part of knowing what he did, and as such it is a part of his self-knowledge, which is different from the knowledge others have of him. If, in assessing actions,
the motive is taken into account, he may have a different view of his action from an observer, since he usually knows why he did whatever he did. His assessment of his action may differ in that he has, as others have not, a different knowledge of his action - he did it, and knows in the full sense what he did. His assessment may be such that anyone else knowing what he did and what his motive was, would assess his action in the same way, but it may be that no one else does know what his motive was.

Because a motive in this sense, is private to the agent it has been necessary to show that this, together with the more general view that we cannot know all that there is to know about a man from his behaviour, does not materially affect the matter of predicting and explaining the behaviour of others by the use of such words as 'generous'. The cost of maintaining that a man may do one generous action in the whole of his life, since he, if no-one else, may know this, involves conceding no more than that there are differences between agent and observer, and that we may sometimes be mistaken, and in fact, quite often are mistaken, about other people.

It is essential, if this point of view is to be maintained to have both an account of 'motive' which is non-dispositional, i.e. which is connected with an occurrence, and an account of words like 'generous' which have both an occurrent and a dispositional use - can be applied to an
action and to a man in virtue of several actions. Ryle's account seems to me to be deficient in that, since he does not allow for a non-dispositional use of words like 'generous', he cannot account for a man's doing one generous action in the whole of his life. Ryle is of course, anxious to deny that a motive is a cause, or is itself an event. On the account I have given, a motive is neither an event nor a cause. It is connected with an event, an action, but it is not itself an event.

To concede then, that the agent has a knowledge of his actions which is different in kind from his knowledge of the actions of others, need involve no concession to the idea of private theatres of the mind. The assertion that a motive is not a disposition, need not commit us to saying that it is a cause, or an event, occult or not.

To concede that we have inner lives involves no more than the admission that there are things which we do which no one else need know about unless we tell them, and which are also susceptible of moral approval and disapproval, at least, by the agent. Our inner lives are just as much candidates for consideration by the moral philosopher as our public lives. An agent may consider that to think unkindly about someone is morally wrong, just as to speak unkindly about someone is morally wrong. A moral philosopher may of course, hold the view that such a man would be neurotic or irrational; that what we think does not matter
since it does not affect anyone, but that what we say does matter. This would be at least to consider and reject such things, and not merely to neglect the things we do in thought.

The more interesting concepts, about which there is much more to be said than has been said here, are those such as self-deception and hypocrisy. And it is here, I think, that the importance of recognizing the difference between agent and observer is greatest. I hope I have said enough to show that deceiving ourselves is very different from deceiving others. To recognize this is to recognize the need for a consideration of first person sentences; to consider those things which a man says (or might say) about himself. It is pointless to consider self-deception as if it were deception of others. In the latter case, a man knows what he is doing, and so can say what he is doing; in the former case he does not know what he is doing, and so can only say what he has done. He will have to find out and he will have to talk of his self-deception in retrospect. If we are to consider self-knowledge at all, it must be from the point of view of the agent, the man who uses the word 'I'. 'How do we know when a man is deceiving himself?' may be an interesting question, but it is not a question about self-knowledge.

One complaint about traditional theories of self-knowledge is the peculiar nature of the material - acts
which only philosophers in their professional capacity talked about, but which the ordinary man, and the philosopher in his off-duty moments, never spoke of at all. There is plenty of material available for the sort of self-knowledge I have suggested here. People write diaries, talk about themselves, and there is plenty of material available in novels.

Ryle himself says "Novelists, dramatists and biographers had always been satisfied to exhibit people's motives, thoughts, perturbations and habits by describing their doings, sayings, and imaginings, their grimaces, gestures and tones of voice. In concentrating on what Jane Austen concentrated on, psychologists began to find that these were, after all, the stuff and not the mere trappings of their subjects."

But it is material which will not be used, unless we abandon the idea that there is no difference between self-knowledge and knowledge of others, and unless we admit that we cannot know everything there is to know about a person from his observable behaviour.

1. C.o.M. P.328
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I WISH to comment on Professor Austin’s treatment, in his broadcast talk on “Performathe Utterances”,¹ of promising when one does not intend to do what one promises to do, saying ‘I do’ before a clergyman when one is already married, and so on. I shall consider his treatment in the light of his remark that there are certain verbal forms which we do not have. The example he gave was ‘I insult you’, and he suggested that we do not have this form because we disapprove of insulting and so have not evolved a form ‘I insult you’.

This may be so, but there are more illuminating forms which we do not have; for example, ‘I lie to you’, ‘I deceive you’, ‘I hint’, ‘I insinuate’, etc., and the absence of these is not simply to be explained by the fact that society disapproves of deceiving, lying, etc. These activities, unlike promising, cannot be referred to both in the present and in the past tense. In the case of promising, once I have said ‘I promise’, whether or not I do what I promise to do, and even if I have never had any intention of doing it, at some future date I refer to this by saying ‘I promised’. Now I cannot say both ‘I deceive you’ and ‘I deceived you’; ‘I lie’ and ‘I lied to you’; ‘I hint’ and ‘I hinted to you’. The use of the past tense implies that I never used the present, although if I have deceived you, I must at some point have been deceiving you. We do not use the present tense in these cases, since, if we did, we could not perform the activities of lying, deceiving and hinting.

In order to lie to you, I must tell you something which I know or believe not to be true, as if it were true. I do not give the game away by saying ‘I am lying when I tell you that . . .’, although I may in fact be lying when I tell you that . . . I may say ‘I hinted that he should raise my salary’ or ‘I was hinting that you should raise my salary’, but I do not say ‘I am hinting that you should raise my salary’. Whatever I should then be doing, I should not be hinting.

It would indeed be odd to say ‘I promise to come but I don’t intend to come’. To promise to come without intending to do so, is to do more than promise; it is to make a false promise, or, to avoid misunderstanding, for I do not wish to

¹August 24, 1956. I am indebted to Professor Austin for allowing me to read the transcript of his talk.
suggest that we pretend to promise, it is to promise in order
to deceive. What one is also doing is deceiving and not simply
promising, and one could not deceive if one said ‘I promise
to come but I don’t intend to’.

In making false promises one uses the linguistic conventions
which govern the use of the phrase ‘I promise’, just as one
uses the conventions which govern the use of the word ‘know’
if one lies about what one knows. One relies on the fact that
if one says ‘I know’ other people will take one’s word, or if
one says ‘I promise to be there’ other people are entitled to
expect that one will be there. One does one particular thing—
one promises—in order to do another—to deceive.

If, in the appropriate place, i.e. in a witness box, one swears
to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, the
judge and jury are entitled to expect that what one subsequently
says will be the truth. If one swears to tell the truth with the
intention of lying, one swears falsely; one swears to tell the
truth in order to deceive the judge and jury, and of course, one
commits perjury.

If a man utters the words ‘I do’ in the appropriate place
(before a clergyman or registrar) at the appropriate point in
the wedding ceremony, he implies, amongst other things, that
he is not married or within the prohibited degrees of relationship
—or better still, these particular words uttered in a particular
place at a particular time, entitle the hearers to infer that the
speaker is not married or within the prohibited degrees of
relationship. If he is married, he deceives a number of people
by using a particular formula or engaging in a piece of ritual
by which he gives them to understand that he is not married
etc. And of course, he does more than deceive; he commits
bigamy.

It is precisely because certain words uttered in the appro­priate
place do arouse certain expectations that one is able to
deceive. How else could one commit bigamy except by
uttering the words ‘I do’ in the appropriate place and thus
giving people to understand that one was not married? How
else could one pervert the course of justice except by
swearing to tell the truth and then lying? One could not mislead
the court if one announced one’s intention of doing so. If a
man wants to commit perjury, then the correct formula to use
is ‘I swear to tell the truth etc.’, just as, if he wants to commit
bigamy, the correct formula to use is ‘I do ’ in the appropriate
place.
There are therefore no formulae—ritual phrases—for such activities as deceiving, lying etc., and no expressions which are reducible to 'I am deceiving you', 'I am lying to you', 'I am committing bigamy' etc. Yet deceiving and lying are things that we do for which a public utterance is required. One cannot lie by saying something under one's breath. We must use certain formulae like 'I promise', 'I know', 'I swear'.

The question is, is the best way of describing activities of this sort to say, as Austin does, that they are "infelicities"? It is questionable whether the most useful thing to say about a man's uttering the words 'I do' before a clergyman when he is already married is that he performs an act which "misfires"—fails to come off. One could be a successful bigamist. And of course, acts of deception may themselves fail to come off. To take this line is to obscure certain important differences. Misinforming, for example, is not always failure to inform; it is sometimes successful misinforming.

To go beyond saying that in performing certain activities one uses certain accepted procedures and to say that one abuses the accepted procedures is surely to introduce a moral point of view into an analysis of language and the activities we perform in using the language. To say that certain verbal procedures e.g. 'I promise' are intended for use by people who have certain intentions and that if one uses these formulae without having the intentions one abuses the procedure, is surely to make a moral pronouncement. If one wants to deceive there is no alternative linguistic procedure one could adopt.

Deceiving, lying etc., are things that we do, and for which a public utterance (deceiving sometimes, lying always) is required. As such they need to be examined in their own right, and not merely considered as "misfires" or "abuses", or indeed any sort of "infelicity".

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