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Abstract

The principal objects of this dissertation are three: first, to provide detailed readings of two long poems of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries—Musophilus by Samuel Daniel and A Treatise of Humane Learning by Fulke Greville; secondly, to recover the intellectual, moral, and aesthetic contexts in which they were written; thirdly, through a study of those contexts, to account for the markedly different attitudes towards learning and poetry displayed by the two men in their respective poems. This involves my outlining the current debates about the nature and function of human learning, and examining the concept of the learned poet and the particular situation within which it evolved in England.

Concerned to establish the credentials of English poetry alongside those of other nations and times, but confronted by an age-old hostility to the art, English poets of the later sixteenth century, and those who wrote in their defence, turned to the concept of *doctus poeta* to justify their vocation. Building upon the traditional humanist link between learning and virtue, they countered the various charges brought against poets, especially those of immorality and intellectual and social irrelevancy, and claimed for them a special role in the learned community. However, the nature of their claims and the ideology and circumstances within which they were shaped, led to the fashioning of a concept of the poet at odds with some of the major tendencies in the world of learning—towards the wider dissemination of knowledge, the direct involvement of the learned man in his society, and the recognition of a broader range of subjects and activities as acceptable modes of learning; at odds too in some respects with reformed doctrines.
concerning vanity, pride, and the right use of learning.

Musophilus is studied within this context, and Daniel's views are compared particularly to those of Spenser, Chapman, and Sidney. Creville, however, deliberately withdrew from the ideology within which these men worked out their mode of existence as poets, his ideas growing out of an involvement with contemporary scepticism and radical Protestant thought. Thus he could respond positively to certain realignments in current thought about learning in a way his fellow poets could not.
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Preface

The research for this thesis was begun in 1972 when I became a postgraduate student at The Shakespeare Institute in the University of Birmingham. That delightful house full of books provided the ideal environment for my first scholarly labours. Professor Joan Rees guided my efforts and generously continued to offer encouragement after my year at Birmingham was over.

At Royal Holloway College my supervisor has been Professor Joan Grundy, to whom I owe a special debt of gratitude. Even though substantial periods of time elapsed between the composition of various chapters, including one gap of three years when the pressures of a new job brought my research virtually to a halt, she always received my work with enthusiasm, read and commented upon it with great care, and showed a sympathy and understanding which stiffened my resolve to keep going.

Conversations with Arnold Harvey and John Morgan have enabled me to clarify my thoughts on several occasions. I have discussed my work with Ann Booy at every stage and have profited immeasurably from her trenchant and constructive criticisms. A more distant but no less real debt is owed to my teachers at Churchill College, Cambridge: Mike Long, who first encouraged me to read Greville, Tim Cribb, and Bob Hodge. In their markedly different ways they taught me how exciting it could be to study the literature and ideas of former times, and made my three years as an undergraduate a most rewarding time intellectually.

As a full-time research student I was supported by awards from the Department of Education and Science. Royal Holloway College also gave timely financial assistance, for which I am grateful.
In recent years especially most of my research has been done in the Rare Books Room of Cambridge University Library. Anyone who has read there will know how helpful and efficient the staff are.

Special thanks are due to Marion Childs, who has not only typed a rather daunting manuscript rapidly and efficiently, but also offered welcome moral support at times when I was beginning to wilt under 'the burden of lean and wasteful learning'.

Original spelling and punctuation have been preserved in all quotations from early printed texts. However, italics have been eliminated unless clearly used for emphasis, contractions other than the ampersand have been silently expanded, and the use of i/j, u/v, vv/w, and long s/s has been brought into conformity with modern usage. Obvious printers' errors have been corrected.

All quotations from the Bible are from the Geneva version, which was the most widely used in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England, and whose marginal annotations played a significant role in imparting radical Protestant doctrine to a large number of people. I have used the edition of 1607 with the New Testament in Laurence Tomson's translation and Junius's annotations on Revelation.
If I should generally discourse of knowledge what it is? how many kindes? which worthy, which not? I might build upon a large ground, and yet perchaunse leave you unsatisfied, & my selfe wander beyond myne owne reach. This no doubt is trewe, that such is to humane mindes the infiniteness of them, that to swallow them up is impossible. Well may a man be swallowed in them, and fruitelesly, if he have not the better lyne to guide him in the Laberinthe.

Philip Sidney in a letter to Edward Denny, 22nd May 1580.

... a just story of learning, containing the antiquities and originals of knowledges, and their sects; their inventions, their traditions; their diverse administrations and managings; their flourishings, their oppositions, decays, depressions, oblivions, removes; with the causes and occasions of them, and all other events concerning learning, throughout the ages of the world; I may truly affirm to be wanting. The use and end of which work I do not so much design for curiosity, or satisfaction of those that are the lovers of learning; but chiefly for a more serious and grave purpose ... that it will make learned men wise in the use and administration of learning.

Bacon, Of the Advancement of Learning, Bk. II (1603-5).

... if we believe that the truth of things should be weighed by the measures of reason, and if we estimate it by the standard of sound judgment rather than by the scale of vain popular opinion, we should clearly see and openly acknowledge that there is no branch of human learning over which poetry does not most deservedly take precedence.

John Rainolds, Oratio in Laudem Artis Poeticae (c. 1572).

... all other knowledges lie ready for any that hath strength of wit; a poet no industry can make, if his own genius be not carried unto it; and therefore is it an old proverb, orator fit, poeta nascitur.

Sidney, An Apology for Poetry (? 1581-83).
Introduction
From the time of Homer learning and poetry have been intimately connected and the poet has been regarded as a sage, a teacher, and a bringer of civilized values into society. Jonson proclaimed that

Poesy is ... the Queene of Arts : which had her Originall from heaven, received thence from the 'Ebrewes, and had in prime estimation with the Greeks, transmitted to the Latines, and all Nations, that profess'd Civility. The Study of it (if wee will trust Aristotle) offers to mankinde a certaine rule, and Patterne of living well, and happily; disposing us to all Civill offices of Society .... the wisest and best learned have thought her the absolute Mistresse of manners, and neerest of kin to Vertue.¹

It is not surprising therefore that the poets of Elizabethan and Jacobean England felt they could make a distinctive contribution to the contemporary debate on learning, urging high claims for their own roles in the learned community and becoming absorbed in the general discussion of the arguments for and against the pursuit of knowledge in its various forms. This thesis is a study of the poets' ideas and an exploration of some of the connections between them and the debate as a whole.

Robert Bolgar has rightly said that the history of learning is the history of society.² This has been fully recognized in recent work by social and educational historians such as Keith Wrightson and Rosemary O'Day, and it is a conviction on which my own work is founded.³ Moreover, in so far as the poets were involved in the general debate on learning, one cannot fully understand their ideas unless these are traced back into the complex of aesthetic, cultural, religious, political, economic, and social concerns of the age. Only by considering how these
concerns shaped and directed the poets' thinking can one make an accurate
assessment of their positions and values where learning is involved,
and understand the nature of the links between learning and poetry in
early modern England.

Thus, as well as offering careful readings of selected works by
Elizabethan and Jacobean poets, particularly by Daniel and Greville,
in order to show what poets were saying about learning and how they
related it to their concepts of themselves as poets, I have explored
the provenance of their views and have provided an outline of the debate
on learning as a whole. This has meant delving into many areas of
sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century thought and activity, for the
discussion of the nature, role, and scope of learning was ubiquitous.

The popular notion that there was an educational revolution in
Tudor and early Stuart England has recently been questioned, 
but there
is no doubt that the period was marked by a deep and widespread interest
in and many changes in attitude towards learning, and saw substantial
developments not only in educational theory and in actual schooling;
but also in the ways people pursued knowledge outside the classroom or
lecture hall. In addition, the kinds of knowledge worth pursuing, the
part learning could play in personal and public life, and the limitations
that were imposed upon it by man or God, were topics of burning interest
for intellectuals. The humanist movement inspired much enthusiasm for
learning, and the development of printing made available a far wider
range of knowledge - at least to the middle and upper ranks of the social
order - than ever before in this country. Literacy increased, albeit
in an uneven fashion, and there were sustained bids on the part of some
sections of the population either to provide or to benefit from much
more formal education. The age's preoccupation with learning was further encouraged by the Reformation, for Protestants saw as clearly as the humanists that education and learning were potent weapons when it came to establishing and defending ideologies. At the same time, however, Protestant divines stimulated a quite different kind of interest in learning, for they perceived that the quest for knowledge was inextricably bound up with pride, vanity, and curiosity, and could thus readily be connected with Adam and Eve's desire for unlawful knowledge in Eden. Dire warnings from the godly about the dangers of human learning countered humanist enthusiasm. Knowledge of God's word as revealed in scripture was a legitimate object of study — indeed, this divine learning was enjoined upon the Christian, but human learning in all its diverse forms was full of snares and pitfalls. The godly themselves, not at all willing to renounce human learning, had to engage with the problems of how it could be employed in civic and religious life without compromising one's hope of salvation.5

Hence the debate on learning has to be traced not simply in the plethora of contemporary treatises on the theory and practice of education, and the large number of writings to do with education handed down from former times,6 but also in humanist texts of various kinds, and in the numerous sermons, pamphlets, and treatises that form the literature of the Reformation in England. Indeed, there is hardly any type of writing in the period that does not yield information about the ways people were discussing learning, and I have in consequence ranged through primary material of all kinds, both contemporary and inherited, in order to achieve a broad and representative picture of the views of the age. Moreover, though I fully recognize the centrality
of (say) St Paul, Cicero, Erasmus, Calvin, and Bacon to the debate on learning, and have acknowledged and studied their ideas where appropriate, I have not confined myself to major authors and classic texts. My aims have been to recover the general matrix out of which ideas about learning grew, and to give a sense of intellectual, social, religious, and political contexts, and of the development and maintenance of the ideologies that led to this or that view of learning being espoused. To have dealt solely with the best known and greatest writers on learning would not have answered my purpose. Similarly, I have not limited myself to the classic texts of the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods where my study of the concept of the learned poet is concerned, but have deliberately used less familiar material too in an endeavour to recreate the context in which the major critics and poets were thinking and writing.

I have used the word 'learning' to signify both the process of acquiring knowledge, and the knowledge that has been acquired. Learning in this second sense was customarily thought of in the period as 'consisting principally in the knowledge ... and skilfull use of arts and languages', that is, as knowledge of what we would classify as the sciences and liberal arts, gained from systematic study of an academic nature. Bacon, however, in his efforts to advance learning, embraces a far larger range of subjects than is suggested by such a definition, and Greville, in *A Treatie of Humane Learning*, deals not only with the trivium and quadrivium, but also with such subjects as law, 'physicke', poetry, building, navigation, and husbandry. I have therefore not excluded from consideration anything that falls within this broader
range. The contexts in which the word 'learning' is used should make clear how it is to be understood.

Human (or worldly or secular) learning and knowledge was customarily opposed to divine knowledge, that is to the knowledge of God's word as recorded in scripture and to the understanding gained from spiritual illumination. However, human learning had a supportive role to play in the interpretation, teaching, and study of divine knowledge, and as the relation of the two kinds of learning was a matter of constant concern, I shall be dealing with both and the links between them.

I have not in the body of the thesis discussed ideas of wisdom. Thomas Morton, writing in 1599, reflected wryly that he had often heard 'that in men knowledge and wisdome may be not onley distinguished, but even quite separated the one from the other'. Many sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century writers did make a separation, with varying degrees of insistence. Charron, for example, spends several pages defining the difference between scientia and sapientia, and says that

Science and Wisdome are things very different; and that Wisdome is more worth than all the Science or Art of the world.... they are not onley different ... they seldom or never go together ... they commonly hinder one another; hee that hath much knowledge or Art is seldom wise, and he that is wise hath not much knowledge.

Behind Charron's words lie the thoughts of Montaigne, the paradoxes of Cornelius Agrippa, Erasmus, and Socrates, and the doctrines of St Paul, especially 1 Corinthians, 1: 19-20:
For it is written, I will destroy the wisedome of the wise, and will cast away the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? where is the Scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made the wisedome of this world foolishnesse?

And 1 Corinthians 3:18-19:

If any man amongst you seeme to be wise in this world, let him be a foole, that he may be wise. For the wisedome of this world is foolishnesse with God.

Such authoritative voices led many people to regard human learning with deep suspicion and to believe that earthly knowledge stands in the way of Christian wisdom rather than providing access to it. Christian wisdom was seen as something quite different from secular wisdom: William Vaughan, for instance, explains that while among the ancients wisdom was only a certain kind of prudence enabling people to handle great causes and matters of policy,

wisedome among Christians hath obtained a higher title, to wit, a knowledge to expound the word of GOD concerning our salvation, redeemed through his Sonne Jesus Christ.

As is usual in this period, however, the evidence of such statements must be balanced by reference to the opposite viewpoint: many people clearly thought that human learning was the path to wisdom and that the two were closely entwined. Ralegh said that some of his contemporaries stretched wisdom 'to almost all kindes of learning'.
Moreover, when one looks up the words 'sapientia' and 'scientia' in early dictionaries of English, it is often difficult to perceive a clear distinction between the definitions offered. The translators of Primaudaye's French Académie use the words 'wisdom' and 'science' indiscriminately in places.

As Rice has shown, the concept of wisdom underwent radical transformation between Plato and Charron, definitions changing to suit the needs and aspirations of successive ages. Human learning played greater or lesser roles in the search for wisdom, as individual, social, political, or religious requirements dictated. Wisdom was variously thought of as a complete development of people's natural abilities, either unaided or with the help of a divine agency; as an essentially Christian virtue, sometimes related to learning, sometimes in direct contradiction to it, as I have already suggested; as a mode of living (prudentia) - an active virtue as opposed to the older notion (at root Platonic) that wisdom is to be found in contemplation. Such a variety of notions existed throughout the Elizabethan and Jacobean period as well as in the previous centuries since the early Greek philosophers. Rice argues that the Renaissance was one of two periods that witnessed 'rapid, crucial changes in the idea of wisdom', though a central part of his argument has been disputed by Baron and Romualdez, who assert that wisdom was not drained of its religious meanings during the Renaissance quite as straightforwardly as Rice suggests. Romualdez maintains that two fundamentally distinct ideas of wisdom were held by Renaissance thinkers: it could either be, as Rice suggests, an acquired virtue of man, or it could be an infused grace from God; the classical and Christian formulations existed side by side. What work I have done...
in this field leads me to support Romualdez's view.

It will be clear, even from this sketch, that ideas about wisdom were in a complicated state during the early modern period, and, as the debate on learning was in itself multifarious and intricate, I have decided to confine myself to that and refer to notions of wisdom only in passing.

The varied and complex character of the debate on learning has meant a lengthy first chapter, but, even so, I am conscious of having compressed and oversimplified many issues that should be accorded more detailed treatment. However, I wanted to provide an initial outline of the debate and some of its sources and ramifications, and it seemed worthwhile offering a broad picture if I could bring out the multifaceted character of the arguments and lay the foundations for my own discussion in subsequent chapters. Moreover, chapter five explores the same territory from a different direction and along alternative paths, and the other chapters continually give fresh views and new information, so that by the end of the thesis a fairly comprehensive account of the debate on learning will have been provided.

Chapter two focuses on Daniel and his concept of the learned poet. The argument begun there is broadened and developed throughout the subsequent chapters, first specifically in relation to Spenser and Chapman, and then more widely through a study of the character and background of the concept of the learned poet in Elizabethan and Jacobean England. The thesis concludes with a detailed examination of Greville's ideas about learning and poetry, which I hope will be illuminated by the preceding discussion.
Chapter One

The Debate on Learning
Happy the man who knows the causes of all
that is: he stands serene above all fears, above
the inexorable Fate, and that insatiate gulf
that roars below.

(Virgil, Georgics, II, 490, quoted
by Bacon in The Advancement
of Learning, 1605.)

... not withstanding all corruption that is in
him, there is no man but naturally desireth
knowledge and skill, accounting science to be
excellent and worthy of great praise, and
ignorance to be full of shame.

(Pierre de la Primaudaye, The French
Academie, edition of 1618, sig. Pp1v.)

For in the multitude of wisdom is much griefe,
and he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow.

(Ecclesiastes 1:18.)

Festus said with a loud voice, Paul, thou art
besides thy selfe: much learning doeth make
thee mad.

(Acts 26:24.)

... many do fear the overthrow of all learning
as a threatened sequel of this your intended
discipline.

(Richard Hooker, Of the Laws of
Ecclesiastical Polity, 1594, Preface,
viii, 3.)
'Everie one desireth to have his childe learned', wrote the famous schoolmaster, Richard Mulcaster, in 1581:

the reason is, for that how hardly soever either fortune frowne, or casaultie chastice, yet learning hath some strength to shore up the person, bycause it is incorporate in the person, till the soule dislodge, neither lyeth it so open for mischaunce to mangle, in any degree, as forren and fortunes patrimonie doth.¹

Mulcaster's sentiments, while not universal, were shared by a large proportion of his contemporaries, who saw in learning an elixir, able to provide them with some kind of satisfaction and to give them a certain measure of confidence in their own abilities and endeavours in a world apparently subject in most ways to the various workings of fortune or chance. 'It is only knowledge which, worn with years, waxeth young', proclaimed Lyly, 'and when all things are cut away with the sickle of time, knowledge flourisheth so high that time cannot reach it.'² Behind such beliefs lay the dual authority of scripture and the classics. 'A wise heart getteth knowledge, and the eare of the wise seeketh learning', Solomon had written,³ while Cicero assured his son in the opening passages of the De Officiis that he could study for as long as he wished, for

we are all attracted and drawn to a zeal for learning and knowing; and we think it glorious to excel therein, while we count it base and immoral to fall into error, to wander from the truth, to be ignorant, to be led astray.⁴
Plutarch, who, like Cicero, was revered by the educated population of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, also praised learning and knowledge for the great advantages they brought to human life: 'richesse, beautie, glory, and health, fade, perish, passe away, come and go,' he wrote in his influential treatise on the education of children, but 'learning and vertue never stagger, always be constant, never change'.

It was the humanist movement that channelled the ideas of the ancient writers into Renaissance England. The humanists of northern Europe, emphasizing civic responsibility and the practical ethics of the New Testament, showed how learning could play a key role in public and personal life. They argued that learning was the path to virtue, worldly success, and spiritual edification. They maintained that a Prince must be both well educated himself and served by learned advisors if the state were to rest on sure foundations. They perceived too that education could be a means of social control and was thus of inestimable value in preserving the established order of society: education was not customarily seen as a vehicle of social change, though in some respects changes inevitably occurred as a result of it. Some humanists nurtured the ideal of widespread literacy, and recommended that learned and sacred works, the Bible in particular, should be in the vernacular for all to read—notions that were supported and furthered by the Protestant reformers, intent on building a godly society and believing that the individual's first-hand knowledge of scripture was an important element in this process. Literacy—especially the ability to receive and comprehend ideas—was also understood to be important if the government and the Church were to indoctrinate the people with the correct values and attitudes.
All in all, from the middle- and upper-class point of view, learning, if carefully monitored and controlled, was a fine thing, and humanist doctrines were greeted with enthusiasm, and entered into the corporate consciousness of the age. This is evident in the number of schools and colleges that were endowed or founded, and in the flood of books that poured from the printing presses. It is evident too in the numerous eulogies of learning one encounters in the writings of the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods: learning, we are told, lights the way to virtue; it is our glory; it lifts us above the beasts; it makes us noble, even divine; it enables us to discriminate between truth and error, good and evil; it brings us contentment in old age; it is the means to social, political, religious, and economic advancement; it even, according to William Martyn, Recorder of the City of Exeter, writing to his son at Oxford, gives a man a better chance of winning a fair woman. 

The trust in learning rested upon the belief that man was essentially a rational creature, and that his reason was a gift from God. "... it is the part of a wyse man to measure all thinges by the rule of reason," wrote Thomas Rogers. Even the great reformer, John Calvin, concerned as he was to demonstrate the deep corruption of mankind and to impress upon his contemporaries a sense of the gulf that separated our rational capacities from God's grace, affirmed that it is seene that in all mankinde is reason which is proper to our nature, which maketh us to differ from brute beasts, as brute beasts doe differ in sense from thinges without life. Reason is 'a free gifte of [God's] liberalitie towards everie man.'
There were many deep misgivings expressed about reason and the part it could play in human life, especially in relation to religious enlightenment, but a lot of people assented to the basic proposition that 'nothing is more excellent than reason whereof God hath made man partake'.

Reason was conceived of not simply as a subjective faculty of the human mind, but as a principle inherent in reality in which people participated. Consequently, ratiocination, working through the instruments of logic and dialectic, was the means by which man might comprehend creation, and, some believed, the path by which he could approach God. Aquinas hoped to have demonstrated that, though certain mysteries lay beyond the range of reason, rational thought would bring one to the same conclusions as faith, and Hooker, in part following Thomist formulations, argued eloquently that right reason leads us to seek absolute good. The humanists, enamoured with the figures and works of the ancient world, also trusted in reason and tied it closely to faith.

At the root of this high valuation was the teaching of Aristotle, who had marked man's intellect as his distinguishing feature, and maintained that happiness resulted from the exercise of the rational faculty. For the Christian the true and only satisfying object for the reason to engage with was God - in the whole 'hierarchical upward sweep' of his creation that leads ultimately to him. Herschel Baker (whose phrase this is) calls the Renaissance confidence in man's rational capacity the 'axiom of knowledge', and defines it thus:

It was the conviction that an essentially rational God, who created and sustains the universe for His own benevolent ends, is the legitimate object of man's supreme knowledge,
and that this knowledge, attained through the
discourse of reason and confirmed by revelation,
constitutes his ultimate well-being.\textsuperscript{14}

Those who conceived of the role and operation of reason in this way
saw divine grace as an enlightening and strengthening force that flooded
the intellect, rather than as an agency fundamentally at odds with
reason, which was the belief of Luther and Calvin. Reason thus supported
by grace was termed 'right reason', a phrase also applied when rational
knowledge and judgement operated in tandem with 'an inclination of the
will toward virtue, and the habit of trying to follow that inclination'.\textsuperscript{15}
The concept of right reason derives ultimately from the Socratic assumption
that knowledge and virtue are in their ideal forms identical. For the
Christian humanists, to whose mode of thought the concept principally
belongs, the true object of knowledge is God; God is good; the pursuit
of knowledge is therefore the pursuit of goodness: as Primaudaye put
it,

\begin{quote}
all knowledge is given of God to this end, to
desire that Good which it knoweth, and in
desiring to follow the same, untill it hath joyned
and knit it unto it selfe, as neere as is possible.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

The intellectual and moral realms are fused, and the rational person
is the virtuous one.

Given this conviction of the importance of reason, it followed
that learning (the exercise and training of reason) should be held
in high estimation. 'A man without Learning is but an immortall beast,
he hath being with blocks, life with plants, and sense with beasts',
but he is not a true man.\textsuperscript{17} Learning, like reason, was seen as an
essential mark of our humanity, and also as a measure of our civilization.
Bacon dismisses both these arguments as 'vulgar' when he undertakes his defence of learning, but clearly many of his contemporaries did not agree. The Plymouth schoolmaster, William Kempe, voiced a common view when he demanded 'Knowest thou not what profite and commoditie learning bringeth to the children of Adam?'

Looke upon the barbarous nations, which are without it: compare their estate with ours, and thou shalt see what it is to be learned, and what to be unlearned. They for want of learning can have no lawes, no civill pollicie, no honest meanes to live by, no knowledge of Gods mercie and favour, and consequently no salvation nor hope of comfort. Wee, by the meanes of learning have and may have all these things.

Another teacher, Brinsley, makes the same point, and is intent on stressing the role of God in ordaining 'schooles of learning to be a principall meanes to reduce a barbarous people to civilitie, and thereby to prepare them the better to receive the glorious Gospel of Jesus Christ'. Conversely, as the historian, William Harrison, feared, if learning decay, which of wild men maketh civil, of blockish and rash persons, wise and godly counselors, of obstinate rebels, obedient subjects, and of evil men, good and godly Christians, what shall we look for else but barbarism and tumult?

Vaughan's thinking was along the same lines, but he was especially concerned with the religious repercussions: 'to seeke the decay and abolishing of learning, is to prepare a way for Atheisme, and consequently, to put a mart or market for the Divell.' With an education, a person
becomes disposed to accept divine teaching, but 'if he lacke this
education, he waxeth the most wicked of all creatures, that are borne
upon the earth.' This last view was disputed by some writers,
especially those to the left of the Protestant spectrum, who saw great
dangers in learning and considered the learned person to be an easy
prey for Satan. But for those who subscribed to the central tenets
of the Christian humanist movement, the belief that academic learning
and spiritual growth were intimately related was axiomatic. For the
humanists worldly learning was sought as a propaedeutic and an auxiliary
to the study of scripture, secular education was part of the quest for
Christian virtue and the preparation for spiritual enlightenment.
Such notions are to be met with in abundance in humanist writings of
the earlier sixteenth century, and they were translated into actuality
in the schools. One of Colet's principal aims at St Paul's was 'by
this school specially to increase knowledge and worshipping of God
and Our Lord Christ Jesu and good Christian life and manners in the
children'. Erasmus believed that classical culture contained the
foundations of Christian teaching and had indeed rendered possible the
spread of Christianity; classical learning was also indispensable
for the right explanation of religious truths. Vives, arguably the
most interesting of the early educational reformers, maintained that
there is nothing in life more beautiful or more
excellent than the cultivation of the mind through
what we call branches of learning (disciplinas),
by means of which we separate ourselves from the
way of life and customs of animals and are
restored to humanity, and raised towards God
Himself.
The notion of a continuum between earth and heaven is clear, though we are not to suppose that secular learning can be a substitute for the understanding that comes with spiritual illumination: elsewhere Vives avers that

> There is a divine knowledge gyven of God, wherein all treasures of science and wisedome ar layde up, and this is the very and trewe lyght of mans mynde.
>
> All other lernynges, compared unto this, be verye darkenes and chyldyshe trifles.\(^{27}\)

A century after the labours of Erasmus and his fellow humanists had established a high regard for learning and education in England, and in spite of serious attempts to undermine confidence in reason and to demonstrate the shortcomings and even the dangers of learning, one encounters many euphoric statements about the power of secular knowledge to lift people to the heavens. Barnabe Rich, for example, proclaims,

> Learning is the Ladder whereby to climbe to heaven, it raiseth men from earthly vanities, to the contemplation of things celestiall and divine: A man that is enlightened with knowledge, grasps after universalities, and Science it is that stretches it selfe to the heavens, it meditates of eternity, and makes steppes whereby to ascend to the throne of Glorie .... There is nothing then so much to be sought for, as this knowledge of Artes, for that is the maine Ocean of celestiall light, from whence all knowlege doth derive it selfe.\(^{28}\)

The *thirst* for knowledge, like the possession and exercise of reason, was seen by sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century writers
as natural: 'nature it selfe ... hath planted in every one an unmeasurable desire of knowing much', William Pemble told his congregation.  

The Jesuit, Robert Parsons, agreed, saying that the immortality of the soul is 'prooved by the unquenchable desire which our mind hath of learning, knowledge, wisedome, and other such spirituall and immateriall things'. Parsons is influenced by Plato, to whom he refers; and so is Thomas Jackson, who concurred that knowledge 'is but our naturall desire': we should not 'so much desire to know any subject, unlesse love to it knowne were most naturall.' Jackson refers to knowledge as something intuitive and sees the tutor's or parent's task with the child as one of stimulating recall of 'what was before conceived'. He regards the soul as being integrated with the rest of creation, and thinks 'our eager thirst after knowledge' stems from 'a desire of intimate and intire acquaintance' with the nature and properties of all things, through an understanding of which we can come to understand ourselves. Jackson equates the desire for knowledge with that for happiness.

Usually, writers claiming that the human appetite for knowledge is natural have larger objectives in mind: Pemble is concerned to demonstrate the difference between the good and evil uses to which learning may be put; Parsons and Jackson aim to show that only a knowledge of God can provide lasting satisfaction: as the latter puts it, 'seeing as well our entitie as knowledge doth essentially and intirely depend on God, it is impossible our joyes should be full, untill we see him, and our selves in him'. This was a common belief, and was often expounded as a means of controlling wayward or potentially wayward intellects. 'Knowledge is of such a quality,' wrote Ling,
'that the more a man knoweth, the more increaseth his desire to know.' The same opinion can be found in a wide variety of authors, from Plutarch to Primaudaye to the magus, John Dee, and the popular scientist, Robert Recorde. Marlowe too clearly recognized that the desire to know was not easily assuaged, as *Doctor Faustus* shows, and Bacon, alert as ever, was fully alive to the temptations:

> the pleasure and delight of knowledge and learning,  
> it far surpasseth all other in nature.  
> .... of knowledge there is no satiety, but  
> satisfaction and appetite are perpetually inter­changeable; and therefore appeareth to be good  
> in itself simply.

Given the pragmatic truth of this, unless the mind *could* be satisfied, there was a danger that many would follow Faustus's steps and seek forbidden knowledge. The well-known Puritan minister, Richard Greenham, noted that 'Mans minde is infinite, which nothing can satisfie but God or the 'divell'. To prevent the devil gaining access to those perpetually voracious intellects was an object of primary importance, and if they could be filled with the knowledge of God, in his word and works, there was a better chance that Satan could be kept out. John Dove, in his treatise against atheism, recognized that the mind must be satisfied with an object equal to its infinite capacity, if restlessness were to be stilled: again, the only possible object is God. Bacon, Sidney, and Greville, each considering the same problem, agreed.

Embodied in this common contention is an insight into the psychology of learning: the mind is ever questing but rarely satisfied.
It was an insight shared by the author of Ecclesiastes both when he recorded his opinion that 'in the multitude of wisedome is much griefe, and he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow' (1 : 18), and when he gave voice to his famous lament:

> Then I looked on all my workes that mine hands had wrought, and on the travell that I had laboured to doe : and behold, all is vanitie and vexation of the spirit : and there is no profite under the Sunne.

(2 : 11)

The Preacher recognizes that mundane activities sometimes bring only frustration and despair, and that the pursuit of knowledge is particularly prone to do so. The marginal comment on 1 : 18 in the popular Geneva Bible reads,

> Wisedome and knowledge cannot bee come by without great paine of bodie and minde : for when a man hath attained to the highest, yet is his mind never fully content : therefore in this world is no true felicitie.

The same emphasis is made by Beza in his commentary on 2 : 11: 'And in these so transitorie thinges, howe can a man looke for anie true and sounde quietnesse of minde, wherewith he may have good cause to be content.' The Protestant reformers were quick to light on the pronouncements in Ecclesiastes, and shrewd enough to exploit the fact that earthly satisfactions often seem to fade or to be tinged by discontent in order that they might hammer home the doctrine that we can be satisfied fully only by God. As we have seen, this is the
case when learning is under consideration, for 'The eye is never satisfied with reading, and the mind searcheth till it be weary, our spirits faint before they come to the depth, and when they are nearest, then are they far off.' Texts such as Psalm 37, verse 4, on the other hand, were seen as pointing towards the source of lasting contentment: 'Delite thy selfe in the Lord, and hee shall give thee thine hearts desire.' It was a message repeated in numerous ways throughout scripture, and it was thus made much of by the godly advising their fellows about the pursuit of knowledge. Sometimes the advice was of a radical cast and its proponent recommended a wholesale rejection of secular learning in favour of absolute concentration on divine matters; more often it involved the placing of severe constraints upon the desire for earthly knowledge and the insistence that secular studies should always serve religious ends. Learning allowed to run free fostered pride; learning without godliness was vain.

Once one has embarked on the pursuit of knowledge, however, it is not always agreeable to be told that one's activities must be carefully circumscribed and directed towards a particular end, especially if the prescribed path is both narrow and straight, as that indicated by the godly was. Hence Bacon's manoeuvres at the start of The Advancement of Learning and in the Preface to The Great Instauration, where he distinguishes between acceptable and unacceptable forms of knowledge from the standpoint of the radical Protestant critic, and, agreeing that proud knowledge is to be shunned, takes all the rest as his legitimate domain. It is significant that he feels obliged to explain himself in this way, both because it shows his desire to be rid of restrictions, and because it suggests that those who inveighed
against too much licence in studies carried some weight.

Bacon set out careful programmes of study so that the natural and civilised worlds could be systematically investigated; his desire to be free from the shackles of what he regarded as religious obscurantism did not mean he advocated an undisciplined approach to learning - quite the contrary; indeed, thoughtless devouring of information annoyed him as much as the misapplication of knowledge did, and he urged that people should sincerely give 'a true account of their gift of reason, to the benefit and use of men.' His writings are, however, suffused with a sense of the excitement and joy of learning, and, while Bacon was undoubtedly sincere in his desire to reveal God's glory manifested in creation, he was also obviously captivated by the process of enquiry and understanding for its own sake.

The age was in fact remarkable for the number of students who pursued knowledge with great zeal. We learn, for instance, that in 1535, when an undergraduate at St John's, Cambridge, William Cecil, 'Being so dilligent & painefull ... hired the Bell-Ringer to call him up, at four of the Clock, every Morninge' so that he might study. He was renowned for his learning before the age of nineteen, and 'intirely loved Lerning & lerned Men, whome he ever held in Reverence & Regard'.

The magus, John Dee, writing of his life at Cambridge, says:

In the years 1543, 1544, 1545, I was so vehemently bent to studie, that for those yeares I did inviolably keepe this order; only to sleepe four houres every night; to allow to meate and drink (and some refreshing after) two houres every day; and of the other
eighteen houres all (except the tyme of going to and being at divine service) was spent in my studies and learning.\(^{49}\)

Dee's habits were similar to those of another Cambridge student, John Preston: 'so drowned & devoted was he [in learning], that he seldom or never could be seene abroad'. Preston even arranged the bed-clothes so that they might fall off in the night, let him get cold, and so awaken him for further reading. So devoted to study was he that 'his tutor was constreyned to reade unto him moderation; and to tell him that as there might be intemperance in meates & drinkes, so also there might be in studies'.\(^{50}\)

Similar stories are recounted of Lancelot Andrewes, Sir Thomas Egerton, sometime Chancellor of Oxford and a great patron of scholars, and Edward Brerewood, who became Professor of Astronomy at Gresham College.\(^{51}\) The Principal of Erasmus's college in Paris had, as a student, read by the light of the moon at the top of a tower in his progress towards his master's and doctor's degrees.\(^{52}\)

Confronted by such diligence, one might concede that Pierre Charron's words are just: 'We are troubled with an immoderate desire of learning, as of all things else.'\(^{53}\) Ben Jonson seems to have harboured similar feelings: recounting the story of a friend who 'knew no meane, either to intermit his studies, or call upon them againe', and who worked until he fainted, the dramatist cautions us that relaxation and ease are beneficial to studies: 'The mind is like a Bow, the stronger by being unbent.'\(^{54}\)

Men such as Dee and Preston were exceptional in their possession of these gargantuan appetites, though it was widely believed that
'that kynde of indevoure, whyche proceedeth of the desire of knowledge [is] the best worthy of commendation.' Schoolboys were required to work for long hours at their lessons (Mulcaster was notable in wanting to shorten the school day from ten hours to eight), and the statutory curricula of Oxford and Cambridge were, in theory at least, demanding ones. Excessive devotion to studies brought with it a trail of problems, however, which contemporaries were quick to perceive and always ready to expatiate on. The problems, or dangers, may be categorized under four headings: physical, economic and social, mental, and spiritual. The study of each of these categories in turn will provide a structure for much of the remainder of the chapter, though the complex network of motifs that is characteristic of the world of learning prevents neat divisions of material, and demands that a sense of the interweaving of ideas and attitudes be conveyed, and that certain ramifications be explored.

II

Edward Topsell observed of learned men that their diligence in studies made their days long, their nights short, and their diet inadequate, and concluded: 'Many and many are the miseries of the Student'. There is an extensive literature of complaint in the period about the hardships men of learning had to endure. Expressions of discontent from scholars themselves should naturally be received with some scepticism, but there is evidence from other sources to suggest that they did experience difficulties of various kinds.
Ill health seems to have been a common hazard. John Downname, in the course of upbraiding many of the learned for pursuing knowledge that is 'idle, light and vaine', remarked that it is nonetheless 'purchased at deare rates' and

attained unto with much study and excessive pains, which abateth the strength, impaireth the health, and oftentimes bringeth the body into deepe consumptions, and deadly diseases.  

Landi, also bent on discrediting what he considered to be the wrong approach to learning, made a similar point. Cecil is said to have contracted a lameness through working at his books too hard, and certainly, when planning his son Thomas's education, was concerned that his 'mind might be kept from hurt' and that his body should not be 'made subject, as mine hath been by study, to sickness'. Vives had warned scholars of the danger of constant study to their health, and his curriculum, like that of Plutarch, Ascham, Lyly, and Mulcaster, contained provision for physical exercise to counterbalance sedentary studies — indeed it was a fundamental part of the young student's daily round. Sir Henry Sidney was sure that Philip's master at Shrewsbury would organize the boy's study 'as shalbe both sufficient for your learning, yea & salfe for your health'.

The major practical disadvantages of the scholar's life, however, were economic and social in character, although an exploration of the topic quickly reveals many large-scale issues — particularly religious ones — lying behind the pleas for financial support and the discussion of social matters. A survey of these disadvantages, therefore, not only contributes much to our understanding of people's
views of learning in the period, it also enables us to perceive what forces were at work shaping those views, and indeed reminds us that attitudes to learning cannot be studied in isolation from the milieu in which they evolve.

It was a constant complaint that men of learning, whether scholars, teachers, educated ministers, or creative writers, did not receive adequate financial support or recompense for their labours, even though the period saw a large expansion in the provision of educational facilities. '... he that is stil fed with words shall sterve with wants,' remarked Barnabe Rich, for 'this travell of wit is yet the most thriftlesse and unprofitable exercise that a man can endevor'. Stubbies lamented 'the small preferment now adaies that learning getteth in the world amongst men, & the smal account that is made of the same', and suggested that this was a chief cause of the steady decay of learning, which he professed to see around him; for no one, 'having spent all his substance upon learning, yea, his bodie, strength, and all, and yet can hardly live thereby ... will covet after learning'. Some forty years later Burton was making the same complaint, and laying the responsibility for the state of affairs firmly at the feet of the patrons of learning who 'are so far nowadays from respecting the Muses, and giving that honour to scholars ... which they deserve'.

Burton also remarked on the small reward for the graduate's arduous labours which schoolmastering brought. Even if, like Mulcaster, a man was appointed to one of the great new schools like St Paul's or The Merchant Taylors', the salary was not high. Headmasters generally received about £20 per annum, masters or ushers just half the amount, while private tutors often had a very lean time of it. In the first
part of *The Return from Parnassus*, Studioso, who has the post of tutor to the stupid son of a wealthy farmer, is obliged to work as a servant and labourer too. Cleland condemned this sort of thing, pointing out that a tutor's poor position will 'disgrace him, chiefly with his Pupil, of whom he should be most honoured', and that if a scholar's 'attire be base, his words shall seldom be gracious'. Writers who defended the role of the teacher, from John Sturmius to Thomas Morrice, invariably insisted upon a good salary, lodging, clothes, and food, as necessary to the establishment of dignity in the master and as a means of drawing respect from the pupil. But, in spite of the great change in attitudes to learning effected by the humanist movement during the sixteenth century, some fathers clearly remained unconvinced that the education of their offspring warranted much expenditure. Sir Nicholas Bacon (in 1561) recalled gentlemen who paid far more to their grooms and huntsmen than to their children's teacher, 'wherby as they had verie reddy horses and perfect dogges, so had they very untoward children'. In 1619 Morrice made the same criticism, and saw such behaviour as an insult to learning and to God, whose gift knowledge is. John Carpenter was probably putting his finger on a strong current of discontent when he spoke of schoolmasters faced with ungrateful, disrespectful, and even cruel pupils - as he put it, poor rewards for 'paineful travailes'.

Yet many dedicated themselves to teaching, and there were the beginnings of what we would recognize as a teaching profession. Moreover, against the antipathy I have illustrated must be set the many statements of faith in teachers and scholars one encounters during the period, and the widespread understanding that they can play a key
role in the building of a sound and healthy state, both temporal and
spiritual. Henry Percy, ninth earl of Northumberland, giving advice
to his son around the years 1595-96, recognized that scholars could
be ambitious men seeking advancement, 'that will desire to make you
the bridge to go over to their conclusions', and he warned that 'there
are impostures in all kinds of learnings'. But generally he judged
scholars to be more reliable, some indeed being 'very honest, very
constant, very worthy men'.^ pirce found much to admire in a true
scholar, whom he described as one who delights in knowledge for itself,
not for gain; a modest man, open about his own shortcomings; a man
who does not teach to impress but who will take great pains with capable
and industrious pupils. In contrast, the bad scholar is depicted
as covetous, brash, ostentatious, and intent on hiding his failings.
It is interesting that Percy also censures the scholar who is keen on
demonstrating his learning in practical attainments, for much criticism
of learned men during the period was based on the feeling that they
had failed to translate theory into practice.75

The civic value of the scholar is recognized by many Elizabethan
and Jacobean writers,76 behind whose attitudes lie the doctrines of
the humanists who wrote earlier in the century. And for these men
there was the authority of Cicero. The Roman spoke strongly in support
of scholars, who have 'trained many to be better citizens and to render
larger services to their country.' In addition, Cicero maintained,
'by the written memorials of their learning they continue the same
service after they are dead.'77 William Vaughan saw the contemporary
attacks on scholars, which I shall examine in another context, as part
of Satan's mischief-making, for good scholars are models of Christian
piety, zeal, and charity, as well as being erudite. John Earle also considers hostility to scholars — men laugh at them by tradition, he says — and argues that they are 'good metal in the inside, though rough and unscoured without'. This means that the courtier, who is concerned with external appearances, mocks the man of learning, even though the latter has depth of character and understanding while the former is essentially shallow. Earle also makes it clear that it is the scholar's financial position that often causes him to apply himself so rigorously to learning, whereas the rich courtiers 'give themselves to pleasure, seeking the easie and superficial apparance, and not the painfull profoundnes, and depth of knowledge.'

Teachers were held in high estimation — at least by those who valued education and believed that the well-being of the country depended in large measure on the quality of its schooling. Plutarch had stressed the great care with which teachers must be chosen. His prescription was standard and lasting: the teacher must be a person 'which in life is inculpable, in manner uncorrupt, in learning excellent, by experience long taught, sober, honest, and painefull'. The Christian teacher was to be of the same mettle but with the added virtue of godliness, as Thomas Becon, writing in the 1560s, repeatedly emphasized. Becon conceived of the schoolmaster as a key figure in the Christian commonwealth. Thomas Morrice endowed the role of teacher with value by reminding his readers that 'Our Saviour CHRIST graceth the office of teaching. He himself taught: the twelve Apostles were his Schollers. They also according to his commandment, taught.' Morrice, whose defence of schoolmasters is presented in a standard Christian-humanist framework, is at pains to demonstrate that teachers are not socially
inferior. Moreover, their task is crucial to the well-being of a godly nation, for in mankind's perpetual struggle with evil they are 'the first instrumentall causes and ordinary meanes ordayed by God to furnish and fortify [other people] with divine and humane knowledge.' This is an argument that is developed at length by Geoffrey Fenton in his book, *A forme of Christian pollicie.*

Thus the teacher was understood to be a key figure in society, both by those who wrote within the humanist tradition and by those who, like Becon, were especially concerned with the building of a reformed Protestant Church. The godly scholar, closely acquainted with true doctrine and skilled in traditional techniques of mastering and imparting knowledge, could be an important instrument in the work of reform. Hence, for example, the Presbyterian, William Fulke, writing in 1572, turns to divine authority in order to invest the office of teacher with great significance. Referring to several New Testament texts, Fulke reminds us that teachers are to be numbered among God's gifts to mankind, and this beneficence we dare not scorn. Moreover,

> if we purpose to have the church to flourish in true knowledge, we must provide that this office be restored, both in the universities, and in as manie other places as maye be, as well for the better instruction of al men, which are desirous to learne, as especiallye for the information of those, which shoulde occupye the roomes of Pastours.

When attempts at reform by means of parliamentary pressure did not bear fruit, and when the Presbyterian movement declined (by the 1580s), the radicals had to put much more emphasis on reform from within
the existing structure of the Church, instructing, persuading, arguing, cajoling - with individuals or in groups - in a bid to rebuild from the inside outwards. And here the educated man with the necessary degree of commitment was a figure of primary importance. The essential knowledge in this situation was that of scripture and of the correct interpretations of it in the light of reformed doctrine; but a grounding in the liberal arts was of great use, especially as much of the work of reformation went on in the universities and schools.

From the accession of Elizabeth and the consequent re-establishment of the Protestant faith in England, however, there had been a general call for recognition of the importance of learned men - scholars, teachers, ministers - in the work of reform: it was not a cry from the radicals alone. The need for a learned ministry, for instance, was recognized by both moderate and radical Protestants alike, and was the spur to many pleas for the support of scholars and places of learning. Robert Some, in his debate with John Penry in 1588, urged that 'To provide maintenance for the teachers [ministers: i.e. teachers of God's word], is to shew kindnesse to the Lords house', for 'Skilfull teachers doe plough the Lords field, and are the Lords, both mouth and hands to deliver his blessings and treasure unto us: therefore they ought to have defence and maintenance ... Students cannot live of the ayre as the Chamelion doth.' From a more radical quarter came the question of how 'a learned man that hath spent many years in good letters, and in the holy scriptures' can be expected to work in a parish for the pittance generally given to ministers.

In the campaign for more financial support, the pulpit obviously played a significant role. Latimer had set the pattern here in his
famous 'Sermon of the Plough', preached in the Shrouds outside St Paul's in 1548, rebuking Londoners for their lack of support for scholars:

>'When I was a scholar in Cambridge myself, I heard very good report of London, and knew many that had relief of the rich men of London: but now I can hear no such good report.' Latimer made regular pleas for the support of scholars, almost invariably coupled with reproach of the public for not contributing to the upkeep of learning. The preachers at Paul's Cross in the 190s and early 1600s regularly raised such matters. William Fisher, Master and Keeper of the Hospital in Ilford, provoked by the decreasing funds available for the support of the preachers, called for 'a necessary Benevolence, and a Christian subsidy, to be supplyed', reminding his hearers of the 'great coste and charge' which fell on students of 'poore and small abilitye' who were called to London from Oxford and Cambridge: 'how hardlye, and unwillingly they ar drawen hither, it is but to wel known.' In the following year A.W. was speaking in the same cause, appealing to the rich to 'especiallye consider of such, as are the seed and hope of learning and religion, I meane poore & paineful students in the Universities.' Thomas Jackson of Kent, in his sermon at the Cross in 1608, also reminded Londoners of their duties to maintain scholars and ministers, and, like A.W., told them that 'by beeing liberall and bountifull Benefactors to good Schooles of learning', they would 'provide for the good of the Church in future times.' Jackson actually commended the generosity of Londoners, as did George Benson a year later, but in 1612 Thomas Sutton was once more complaining about the discouragement of scholars because of poor financial support.

One of the period's most notable attacks on the neglect of
learned ministers, and on the compromising of them, came in a sermon at Paul's Cross in 1597. The preacher, John Howson, was an eminent churchman, at various times being chaplain to Elizabeth and James, Vice Chancellor of the University of Oxford, where he made every effort to put down the Puritans, and Bishop of Oxford and Durham, in which position he was an active Laudian: his insistence upon adequate rewards for clergy may therefore be seen as a statement of belief in the existing career structure of the Church rather than as part of a bid for further reform through the placing of educated ministers in strategic positions, which is what lies behind similar demands from radical quarters.

Having stressed the pains and expense of long studies in school and university, he maintains that it is wrong for men who have worked so hard to have to buy from patrons what has been earned by labour, to be forced to sacrifice yet more money and effort to acquire what is a rightful inheritance. Moreover, the practice of selling benefices to ministers often causes them to behave immorally, even sinfully, and will eventually result in a decline in the number of men who want to go to university: for 'what father after a while will bee so improvident, to bring up his sonne to his great charge, to this necessarie beggerie ? What Christian will bee so irreligious, as to bring up his sonne in that course of life, which by probabilitie of necessitie ... will entangle him in simonie and perjurie ?' It is no argument to say, as many do, that 'Learning is her owne recompence : and the Minister must consider ... the good that he doth, not the reward hee must have', for a minister must eat. Learning might be 'the light of the minde, and delight of life, and for it selfe to bee desired; but of Gentlemen, who can live without it; and of Stoickes and Philosophers, which had
no passions, which lived as soules without bodies, so farre in love
with the food of the one, that they tooke no regards what became of
the other.' Howson emphasizes that learning is 'much discouraged'
when scholars have to approach gentlemen 'as the Philosopher came to
Herode to begge a penny to buy him bread; because ... Vertue though
it be commended, yet if it bee not honored and rewarded' will soon
decline. He admits that there is a very small number of well-off
clergy, but stresses that, as in no other profession, the majority
are not properly supported, but have to live off parish alms or involve
themselves in simony. The general result of all this is and will be
'an unsufficient and unlearned Ministerie'.

Behind Howson's attack there are almost certainly tendentious
motives. His slighting remarks about gentlemen are apparent in the
quotations already given, but he was more caustic elsewhere, as in
this passage:

if Gentlemen onely should bee learned, a competent
measure would serve their turne, the depths of
professions are above their endeavours, they are
so painefull: and you shall finde as few scollers
that doo reach to that height of Philosophie, as
to feed their mindes and to starve their bodies,
as you shall finde Gentlemen that are come to that
height of Christianity, to forsake all and follow
Christ, or to love their enemies and studie their
good.

As an arch conservative, Howson would have been angered by the support
given to Puritan ministers by the Elizabethan gentry, who had in their
gift a large number of church livings, the presentation of which was
effectively outside the control of the bishops. Howson, therefore,
is in all probability directing his invective specifically at one of the major points of growth and sources of strength in the Puritan movement.

Against the call for greater financial support must be set the fact that learning and the learned did receive many benefactions throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Twelve new collegiate foundations were endowed at Oxford and Cambridge, for example, and numerous grants and bequests were made to schools.\(^{98}\) These were also times that could boast of great patrons of learning: Wolsey, Leicester, the Sidneys, the Pembrokes, Burleigh, the monarchs themselves. And there was a host of lesser benefactors to learning and the arts, including Greville.\(^{99}\) Much of their patronage was extended for politic reasons, it is true, but some arose from a genuine regard for learning in its broadest form. 'I would shew some token of affection, that I have evermore boarne, to the studies of good Learning', wrote Sir Thomas Bodley in his letter to the Vice Chancellor of Oxford, when he offered to endow a University library.\(^{100}\) 'I coulde not busie my selffe to better purpose, then by reduing that place (which then in every part laye ruined and wast) to the publique use of Students.'\(^{101}\)

An expressed desire to aid learning, perhaps formally and publicly made with an eye on social impact, was not the same as actually carrying through one's intentions into action though. It is not at all certain that all the funds intended for education really did reach their intended destinations. Harrison complained in 1587 that, although the Oxford and Cambridge colleges 'were erected by their founders at
the first only for poor men's sons, whose parents were not able to
bring them up unto learning ... now they have the least benefit of
them, by reason the rich do so encroach upon them.' Harrison remarks,
as Stubbes had done four years earlier, that those with influence get
fellowships and other rewards, not the best scholars, 'which will turn
in the end to the over throw of learning.' Such a state of affairs
would have been most depressing for the aspiring scholar.

It is interesting that in a period which saw so many complaints
on this score, we should find Mulcaster adhering steadfastly to the
principle that the rich should not be disqualified from receiving
scholarships and fellowships. Social and economic factors should
not be the criteria by which students are to be advanced; intellectual
merit is what matters. Mulcaster is in fact attempting to establish
the fairest criterion he can think of.

He condemns election to college places on the grounds of favour
and friendship; such habits will in time rebound against the electors.
He personally knows no cases of favouritism or fear influencing the
disposal of scholarships and fellowships, but remarks, 'some thing
there is that feedeth the generall complaint, and some contentious
factions there be, that bring catchers into colleges.' Academic
recognition for the intellectually unworthy brings scorn upon universi-
ties from the people in general; 'Preferment to degrees ... ought to
be a mightie stripper of insufficiencie, by cause that way, the whole
countrie is made ... a laudable soyle to sober knowledge' rather than
'a lamentable spoile to bould ignorance'.
The situation of the learned or would-be learned man was made uncomfortable in other ways too. Broadly speaking, there was towards the close of the century an increasing sense of disillusionment with the humanist programme of studies and the whole notion that the highly educated man makes the best ruler. This was partly because the humanist movement tended to lose its central impulse after the death of Erasmus, partly because many humanist issues were swamped in the larger flood of the Reformation, and partly because the gap between university and court had never really been successfully bridged. As Professor Hunter has remarked, 'the Humanist dream forced the learned into dependence on a court which did not really need them.'

Elizabeth's court remained, throughout its history, a largely medieval pageant of royal bounty and chivalric allegiance. The progressive and intellectual elements in the country were gradually squeezed into Puritan opposition which had as little time for eloquent classicizing as had the politicians. Yet the dream that the centre of power was the natural home of learning and eloquence was by now so ingrained that it was not to be denied; reluctance to enter the Church, together with inability to find any other niche for learning was the common lot of those Elizabethans who made the 'pilgrimage from Parnassus'.

The surge of educational activity during the sixteenth century meant that by the later years of Elizabeth's reign and in the first years of James's there was a surplus of well-qualified men who could find no employment fitted to their aspirations and attainments within the contemporary organization of the state. Disillusionment and bitterness were inevitable in the circumstances. The historian of the Puritan
movement, William Haller, remarks that 'more and more of the professional intellectual class were ... led by the circumstances of their positions as well as by their convictions to become the critics and opponents of authority, of custom, of accepted ideas and vested interest.' Bacon, keenly aware as usual of the prevailing situation and mood amongst the intellectual class, and himself well accustomed to what was involved in the frustrating quest for advancement at court and in the various echelons of the administration, wrote to James in 1611 and warned him that there were too many educated people for the number of suitable positions available. This meant on the one hand that there was a shortage of 'servants for husbandry, and apprentices for trade', those men who would formerly have taken such work having now been 'bred unfit' for it, and on the other that there were many well-trained young men about who could not find fitting employment, and who were therefore a potential source of dissension and possibly sedition. Consequently, advises Bacon, the number of grammar schools should not be increased for there are too many already. He voices the same warning in the Essays, and it is one Mulcaster had uttered quite clearly twenty years or so earlier. Elsewhere Mulcaster analysed the nature of an excessive desire for learning, and judged his own time to be prone to this.

What posts were open to the highly educated? 'Let him yet happily escape all ... hazards' connected with long study, 'now consummate and ripe ... profited in his studies', let the graduate or scholar of long-standing emerge to seek employment:

where shall he have it? he is as far to seek
it (after twenty years' standing) as he was at
the first day of his coming to the University.
For what course shall he take, being now capable
and ready? The most parable and easy, and about
which many are employed, is to teach a School,
turn Lecturer or Curate, and for that he shall
have Falconer's wages, ten pounds a year, and his
diet, or some small stipend, so long as he can
please his Patron or the Parish. 112

A graduate, if unable to attain one of the coveted posts at court, in
the higher reaches of the administration, or in some secretarial or
tutorial capacity in a great household, had few choices open to him.
Medicine and the law were lucrative professions, but a successful
career in the Church, as Burton noted, depended upon patronage just
as much as a career in secular fields did, unless one was to remain
in a lowly and hence ill-paid position.113 For the Puritan minister
of strong conviction, of course, a successful career meant devotion
to parish work, preaching, and instruction in true reformed doctrine,
and not progress through the ecclesiastical hierarchy, securing
numerous benefices on the way. This is not to say that the Puritan
minister did not want adequate financial recompense for his labours -
indeed, many of the best preachers were paid good salaries - but his
ambitions were generally more spiritual and pastoral than to do with
normal worldly achievements. When Samuel Crooke, the Puritan clergyman
who baptized Locke, discussing the role of ordained men in society,
remarked that 'it is eyther pittie that able workemen [educated clergy]
should not be employed, or shame, that any that seeke not to enable
themselves, should be tolerated', he was speaking from the godly and
not the worldly point of view.114
At the end of *The Pilgrimage to Parnassus*, an allegory of the period spent at university in quest of the bachelor's degree, Ingenioso advises the pilgrims to return home; 'Parnassus is out of silver pitifullie', he tells them, 'Apollo is banckroute, there is nothing but silver wordes & golden phrases for a man' (Act V, 11. 576-77 and 620-21). The main concern of the three plays is how to make a living out of one's learning. Studioso and Philomusus are forced to descend lower and lower into the world of the hack writer, and eventually abandon letters to become shepherds. We may compare the scholar in Breton's discourse, who has not 'dined nor supped well for many a day' and falls 'to sucking of certaine rootes, which he had gathered in the fields as he went'. Unable to fill his stomach, he can only 'feed his fancie with some contentive conceit or other'. Joseph Hall suggested that 'second brothers, and poore nestlings' without an inheritance are the unfortunate ones forced to eke out a living somewhere in the world of learning.

Not surprisingly, then, many of those who were involved in the world of learning saw reason for complaint, or at least expressed their regret that things were not better. In some cases the grumbles we read are personal, arising out of a sense of injustice, frustration, and perhaps bitterness, as the well-educated man tries to come to terms with a callous world that refuses to value him as it ought. In other cases what we encounter is an ideological commitment and a subsequent call for support: this is so with the endeavours to improve schooling
and to further humanist ideals, and with the struggle to build a godly society. Many people recognized the value of scholars, teachers, learned ministers, and the well educated in general, and responded to the appeal for aid, but others clearly were more sceptical or maybe just indifferent. One thing is sure, that the learned were well-equipped to state their case and did not hesitate to do so.

III

Several examples were given earlier of writers commenting on the way learning led to physical ailments. That mental stress resulted from over-taxing oneself with study was also widely recognized during the period, as it had been in previous times. William Martyn, for example, cautioned his son that 'a willing mind being oppressed with overmuch study, will ... wax feeble, and dull', while Burton pointed to overmuch study as one of the principal causes of melancholy, for 'learning dulls and diminisheth the spirits', an effect exacerbated by the lonely and sedentary lives scholars lead, 'to themselves and letters, free from bodily exercise, and those ordinary disports which other men use'. Serranus painted a darker picture of the mind being 'diversly wore and broken with cares' by 'the troublesome and painfull endeavours to knowe things'. Serranus's view is expressed in his commentary on Ecclesiastes, and it was this book that provided the key texts for the discussion of the detrimental effects of learning on the mind. Ecclesiastes 1:17 reads, 'And I gave mine heart to knowe wisedome and knowledge, madness and foolishnes, I knew also that this is a vexation of the spirit.' Ecclesiastes 1:18 warns, 'in
the multitude of wisedom is much griefe, and he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow.' The marginal comment in the influential Geneva Bible explains that 'Wisedome and knowledge cannot bee come by without great paine of bodie and minde: for when a man hath attained to the highest, yet is his mind never fully content: therefore in this world is no true felicitie.' It is a comment that reveals the reformers' habitual train of thought clearly. Not that this view was held only by Protestants: Thomas à Kempis had admonished the faithful in precisely the same fashion, and it is apparent from The Imitation of Christ that he, like the writers who belonged to the reformed Church, believed not only that too earnest a pursuit of knowledge jeopardizes one's peace of mind, but also that devotion to secular learning is a specious and time-wasting thing, distracting one from true knowledge — of God. This was confirmed by other verses from scripture, such as 1 Corinthians 1:19-20, where Paul speaks of God's destroying the wisdom of the wise, and making foolish the wisdom of this world. Again the annotator of the Geneva Bible takes the opportunity provided by the Apostle's words to castigate the 'learned fellow' who spends his days only 'turning ... bookes'. Worldly learning can serve divine ends, but if sought for itself, or if not carefully circumscribed and pursued soberly, becomes distracting and leads us away from God instead of towards him. Learning is therefore potentially dangerous because it can be the path to frustration, even to damnation.

Solomon and Paul were not the only authorities for the view that learning brings agitation of mind. St Bernard had likened learning to wine, which tends to make people drunk rather than nourishing them, and in the famous eighty-eighth epistle Seneca had suggested that too much knowledge is a kind of intemperance. Montaigne
discovered mental turmoil in the actual workings of the mind:

Whence proceeds the subtillest follie but from the subtillest wisdome? ... from the rarest and quickest agitations of our mindes ensue the most distempered and outrageous frenzies.

So powerful are these mental agitations that they 'distract, trouble, and wearie the force of [the] bodie' as much as they exhaust the mind itself. And what is it that commonly casts the mind 'down even into madnesse, but her own promptitude, her point, her agility, and, to conclude, her proper force?'

But the problems for the learned man were not all generated solely within the mind. Perturbation was no doubt also caused by adverse external circumstances. Some of these — such as the sense of financial precariousness, the problems of employment, and the low estimation set on the learned in certain quarters — have already been mentioned; but several other factors played an important part in discomforting those who sought after knowledge.

One of the major problems for the Elizabethan and Jacobean scholar to come to terms with was the immense number of books and pamphlets that were pouring off the presses. This flood of printed material was, paradoxically, deplored by many writers, and for a complex of reasons. Some men feared that so many books could not but distract people from God, stuffing their brains instead with 'old matter, glosed over with new words' or 'with strange Doctrines lately devised', many of them profane. Some believed that too many outlets were being provided for the ungodly — 'the Brownists and especially the Popish,
and trayterous Priests, and Jesuites', who bred dangerous questions
rather than edifying their readers. Some merely aired their prejudices
and inveighed against 'unauthorized authors': 'to fill and fit his humor
.... every red-nosed rimester is an author, every drunken mans dreame
is a booke'. Others saw the 'vaine glory, and desire of popular
fame in the writers, and desire of filthy lucre in the printers' as the
chief causes of the glut of printed material.

But it was also the case that the plethora of books exacerbated
the difficulties of the student in a dramatic fashion, in as much as
it made the task of assimilating the thoughts of other people a far
more onerous business. One had, it seemed, either to select (often
awkward in itself), or to read everything, which was clearly an impossible
assignment. There was, of course, no external compulsion to read vast
amounts, but, given some people's unquenchable thirst for knowledge
and their yearning for completeness, control, and prestige, the inner
(mental) pressure to devour as much as possible could be hard to regulate.
Yet the same person might be acutely aware of the psychological pressures
involved in the attempt to know much and consequently to be acclaimed
by one's fellows, and so could be caught between two powerful and
destructive forces. 'A multitude of Bookes burtheneth and instructeth
him not that learneth,' Seneca had warned, 'and it is better for thee
to addict thy selfe to few Authors, then to wander amongst many.'

Solomon too had spoken wearily of the endless making of books
(Ecclesiastes 12:12), and his words were repeated and elaborated
endlessly by writers in the early modern period, Chaderton, in the
epistle to the reader before a sermon he had preached at Paul's Cross,
said that true wisdom eschews 'much reading' and 'making many booke's,'
activities that will be condemned 'of all learned Christains'. He
believed that the contemporary outpouring of print had been 'to the great hurt of many good wits, and to the hinderance of constant judgement in the soundnes of Christian doctrine.' Chaderton in fact demanded some kind of censorship to be operated, but this was not the uniform view. John Dove, for instance, fighting for the same Puritan cause as Chaderton, advocated battle rather than suppression: 'Our Adversaries are never weary of withstanding the truth, they never cease to provoke us by bookes, our names are daily traduced in their papers'; therefore, although Solomon's words are true, 'yet doth the condition of this present age require a multitude of bookes'. Richard Capel took the same line, maintaining that, although there are possibly too many works coming from the presses, 'Bookes are more necessarie in a state than armes' for they 'preserve us from the infection of errors' which 'endanger the soule'; there can never be enough 'good and learned bookes ... fitted to the errors and diseases of the time'.

William Gouge was more generally in favour of the expansion of the book trade: 'a good thing, the more common it is, the better it is', and 'It cannot be denied but that knowledge and learning have wonderfully increased by the benefit of printing.' Gouge noted the common complaint against the multitude of books, but judged it either to be unjust or directed against 'idle and evill Bookes'.

Additional cause for anxiety amongst men of learning was that (in Donne's words)

here in this world, knowledge is but as the earth,
and ignorance as the Sea; there is more sea then earth, more ignorance then knowledge; and as if the sea do gaine in one place, it loses in another, so
is it with knowledge too; if new things be found out, as many, and as good, that were knowne before, are forgotten and lost.135

This deeply pessimistic view that there can be no real progress in knowledge was related in Donne's case to a preoccupation with the supposed decline of the world and the feeling that people's intellectual powers were gradually weakening. The Frenchman, Luis Le Roy, whose theories were presented to the English reading public in 1594 by Robert Ashley's translation, had propounded the idea that, like everything else to do with this world, people's knowledge of the arts and sciences moved in cycles; thus everything has been invented or known once, but has at some point been lost, then later rediscovered.136 The cyclical theory could also have been used to chasten man's aspiring mind, but it was not as fundamentally damaging to the advancement of learning as Donne's attitude. Le Roy's approach was basically optimistic: 'if we consider it well there was never age more happie for the advancement of learning, then this present';137 while the whole tendency of Donne's thoughts concerning the state of man's knowledge was pessimistic.

The currency of theories about the decay of the world, even if they were merely fashionable, as Kocher has argued,138 coupled with works like Le Roy's and pronouncements like Donne's must have had a disquieting effect on many scholars.

This is also true of the related conviction that 'Whatsoever part of divine and humanes affaires thou shalt comprehend, thou shalt be wearyed with huge abundance of things to be sought for, and to be learned.'139 The notion that outside the spectrum of man's knowledge lies an infinite area into which one can hope to make only small inroads,
the mass being forever unknown, was a tormenting one. 'Much may be gained by studious inquisition; but more will ever rest, which Man cannot discover.' 'Our knowledge doth but shew us our ignorance.'¹⁴⁰ '... we are ignorant of more things then we know .... How imperfect is all our knowledge? What one thing doe we know perfectly?¹⁴¹

The starting points for this idea were the Socratic profession of ignorance, and, once more, Ecclesiastes: 'yet cannot man finde out the worke that God hath wrought from the beginning even to the ende' (3:11), a text that was developed by Cornelius Agrippa, for instance, as part of his notorious bid to undermine confidence in learning.¹⁴² Greville seems to employ a similar view in building his case against human learning.¹⁴³ The argument could, moreover, be used to show that curiosity was a futile (as well as a reprehensible) trait.¹⁴⁴

In this sort of climate it is not surprising to find the preachers telling their congregation that the waters of learning 'are bitter, and end in desperation', or that too much learning makes people mad,¹⁴⁵ nor to discover Serranus and Charron arguing that the search for knowledge brings only doubt, anger, and sorrow, serving 'nothing to the sweetning of our life', nor ridding us of evils, but rather sharpening them.¹⁴⁶ There are echoes of the same idea in Greville's view that 'where Science multiplies, Man multiplies with it his care of minde', and also in Daniel's 'who knowes most, the more he knows to doubt',¹⁴⁷ which indicates the poets' responsiveness to one of the dominant moods of the age. Indeed, poets themselves were often thought to be prone to suffering, as subsequent chapters will show.

Bidding farewell to her son, the Duchess of Malfi reflects,
Thou art happy, that thou hast not understanding
To know thy misery. For all our wit
And reading brings us to a truer sense
Of sorrow.

This linking of knowledge with sorrow and suffering is a persistent theme in classical and biblical literature. William Elton, in his study of *King Lear*, defines Webster's position as the Sophoclean one, and relates it to Lear's suffering. But, as Montaigne rightly perceived, it was a notion also set out by Sophocles' counterpart in the Christian tradition, the author of *Ecclesiastes*, and elaborated continually during the early modern period.

That learning can bring pain and agitation to the mind in the process of acquiring knowledge as in the increased awareness and understanding that is won, is a truth familiar to many who have sought knowledge, and what we can see being recorded is at centre a psychological fact, however embedded it may have become in various doctrines and philosophies. Hence, the persistent demand during this period for an active use of knowledge is not merely the articulation of a principle; it grows also from the need to feel that one's learning has some positive use, beyond its passive acquisition, in the world of action, that it is not only an enclosed and introverted thing, preparing the seeker after knowledge merely to receive more knowledge. It is a commonplace that contemplation and solitary reflection is more conducive to painful thoughts than action is; the mind has greater opportunity to direct its energies inward upon itself.

In the Elizabethan and Jacobean periods, as we have seen, the perception that learning is inextricably bound up with suffering was
consolidated by the actual social and economic position in which many learned men found themselves. But it would be misleading to limit to local circumstances the notion of knowledge bringing pain. What we have seen rising to the surface with particular force in this period is something deeply ingrained in human consciousness, and arising initially from the bid to account for man's woes by defining his relationship with God or the gods. In the Christian schema this definition was worked out through the myth of the Fall, when man had attempted to gain illicit knowledge and understanding of his Creator. In the classical world the archetypal figures were Prometheus, punished by the divine powers for bringing knowledge to men, Icarus, who became an emblem of the overreaching pride and confidence of man, and Oedipus, who achieved terrible knowledge and was able eventually to stand against the gods. 'Thus much I know', wrote a Jacobean essayist, 'the Gods detest a curiosity'.

IV

In the continuing discussion of the nature, role, and scope of learning during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries the issue of curiosity - of people's prying into forbidden matters - was a constant theme. The charge of curiosity was levelled at whatever intellectual activities were deemed to be dangerous to people's spiritual welfare, or at those kinds of knowledge judged to be distractions from the godly life. Curiosity was often linked by Protestants to pride, for the tendency to press too far in one's search for knowledge was evidence of a proud intellect and the flaunting of the ego in the face
of God and the world:

Curious questions, and vaine speculations how like they are to plumes of feathers, each of us may judge; for that many very earnestly ... are desirous to be seene in them.  

Some writers are specific when they discuss forbidden knowledge. Calvin, on one occasion, attacks people who try to work out the 'nature, degrees, and multitude of Angels'. Brathwait is particularly concerned with the dangers of curiosity arising from the study of mathematics, while John Woolton cautions his readers against delving too deeply into the make-up and creation of man. One or two writers even extended the warning to cover social matters as well as the mysteries of God. A central target was the study and practice of alchemy, astrology, and certain, illicit kinds of magic,

unlawful things,
Whose deepenesse doth intise such forward wits,
To practise more than heavenly power permits.

Such arts involved manipulation of natural forces, dealing with demons, and presuming to predict and perhaps even thwart the divine purpose, and thus led their practitioners into areas of action and thought that were the province of God alone. Greville spoke for many when he said that these 'unlawfull Arts ... Are onely to be cur'd by extirpation'.

In many cases, however, admonitions about man's prying intellect gave only a general indication of which areas were forbidden. The Jesuit, Thomas Wright, proclaimed simply,

Things deeper than thee, inquire not after, and
stronger than thee, search not; but thinke
always upon those things which God hath
commanded thee; and in many of his works
be not curious.  

And the Puritan, John Downname, remarking that vain curiosity is one of
the chief impediments that hinders us from leading a godly life, causing
us to neglect true knowledge of God as revealed in his word, says that
we spend too much time trying to 'pry into his secrets which belong not
unto us; spending our wits in spinning such Spiders webs, as are utterly
unprofitable for any use.' Downname is no more exact than this.

Calvin called for a 'rule of modestie & sobriety' in our studies,
suggesting that we should not 'desire to knowe any other thinges than
that hath bin taught us by the word of God'. In addition we should
only search out and study 'such thinges as perteine to edification'. The call for sobriety was derived from such Biblical texts as Ecclesiastes
7:16 and Romans 12:3. Beza, in his commentary on the former, sees
in the Preacher's words a caution against prying into God's mysteries,
and advises 'holde thou the meane betweene those two extremeties' of
ignorance and curiosity, 'neither prophaneely inquiring into God him
selfe, nor wickedly scorning at that which [you] can not conceive'. Henry Smith, preaching on the second text, makes the same points. The majority of divines were not against secular learning - indeed,
ye almost invariably had praise for it as a God-given instrument to
help conduct earthly affairs in an efficient manner, and even as a
sound basis on which to build up knowledge of spiritual matters - but
strict controls had to be set on man's aspiring intellect, and he had
to be constantly reminded of the limits imposed on his corrupted mind.
Behind the admonitions lay the deep conviction that some things are forbidden to men by God — or by the gods. In the Christian tradition this was focused on the Fall and Adam and Eve's bid to know what God had decreed should be withheld from them. For the Protestant reformers, engrossed in Pauline and Augustinian doctrines concerning natural corruption, the Fall was one of the two crucial episodes in the history of mankind, and thus the unbridled quest for knowledge was seen as an epitome of man's plight as a fallen creature, and a perpetual re-enactment of the proceedings that led to the primary loss of grace.

It was inevitable, therefore, that Satan should be seen as the instigator of curiosity by many writers. The author of *Bromleton*, for example, wrote of those 'who being too desirous, to know more than is meete and convenient for them to search after .... enter into covenant with the devil, to show them hidden matters, and to helpe them to their desires'. In reaching thus 'for a worldly delight which cannot long endure', they damn 'their soules for ever'. Henry Smith, discussing the same topic, agreed that 'Some have a great deale more desire to learne where hell is, then to know any way how they may escape it', and William Perkins warned that

> God was making hell fire to burne all such curious persons as will needs know more of God then hee hath revealed to them: for where God hath not a mouth to speake, there we must not have an eare to heare .... our duty is, to let ... curious questions passe.

This was a powerful threat, indicative of the gravity with which curiosity was viewed. Yet, as one might expect, the attempts to chasten the human intellect were not always based on pure theological tenets: the
charge of curiosity, as those of pride and vanity, being so powerfully based, was a useful weapon to direct at one's opponents in doctrine or learning, and was a strong barrier to erect in the path of dangerous innovation and what one judged to be atheism.

If certain areas were forbidden, what was permitted? 'Let men desire knowledge of God, as Solomon did, but not desire knowledge as Eve did.' Knowledge of God could be gleaned from his word and works, and the period has a large number of texts arguing that a study of created things leads men back to the creator. What was forbidden was to emulate Eve by seeking to understand the divine will and to believe that one had the right to strive for a comprehension of existence equal to God's. 'For my selfe', wrote Ralegh,

I am resolved ... that although the effects which follow [God's] wonderfull wayes of working, may in a measure be perceived by mans understanding, yet the manner and first operation of his divine power cannot bee conceived by any minde, or spirit, compassed with a mortall body.

An anonymous author, writing in 1612, agreed that 'it were condemnable curiositie, to search and pry into the mysteries of faith, and to seeke to make them subject to humane apprehension', but went on to say that it is equally inexcusable 'not to search narrowly into such secrets of Nature, and such excellency of the creatures as God hath vouchsafed to reveale in his word.' God condemns negligence in the latter as he does curiosity in the former. Many questors after knowledge, including Bacon, stretched this doctrine as far as they could. Pointing to Adam's and Solomon's extensive knowledge of the natural world, men argued their right to study created things; but, of course, opponents
of learning were quick to perceive that there was no easily definable barrier between such a study and the more dubious areas around the creation and hence the creator himself, and also that, however strait the paths of learning might be, proud man would always find scope for the exercise of his self-esteem.

In expounding Solomon's views on learning, John Serranus was at pains to distinguish between acceptable and unacceptable curiosity, and his approval of the search for knowledge is interlaced with admonitions about the dangers involved. Solomon condemns the abuse of knowledge, Serranus explains, but is careful 'to distinguish and sever out the Wittie and skilfull searching from the vaine and foolish madnesse and curiositie of ignorant persons' [ignorant, that is, in their blindness to God's commands]. The 'searchings & knowledge of nature & naturall things, which are seene in the principles, grounds, causes, and effectes of the same' are valid subjects for the attention of students, but we must condemn 'unmeasurable curiositie' and a devotion to studies which is so excessive as to 'trouble and disquiet our mindes', which gives us a specious sense of self-dependence, and which causes us to 'depart from the simplicitie of the word of God, and from that earnest feeling of his feare, which is the fountaine of all sober knowledge.' However the 'sober marking of order & cunning in the workmanship of the world, being notable testimonies of God, & of his providence' is an occupation 'verie fit for a Christian'.

Solomon was by no means the sole authority to which a writer against curiosity might turn for support: certain Biblical texts (notably Paul's epistle to the Romans) have already been mentioned, and more can be added; people also turned to classical writers and
the Church Fathers, especially Augustine and Bernard, in the search for words that would chasten the aspiring intellects of their brethren. Christ's choice of ignorant fishermen was a significant act for this aspect of the debate on learning, as for others.

In an age renowned for its aspirations in all branches of knowledge, it is not surprising that one should find such persistent warnings about the evils of curiosity and the dangers awaiting the unbridled intellect. But it is important to recognize that the tension between the two impulses - on the one hand the desire to know, and on the other the bid to subdue the inquisitive mind - has an ideological basis: it is in essence a conflict between certain characteristic aspects of the humanist spirit and the radical Protestant view of man's nature and position. Much humanist doctrine rested on a conviction that man is a creature of dignity, capable of every kind of achievement, intellectual and spiritual above all. The Protestant reformers' preoccupation with the corruption and helplessness of man was, in contrast, not likely to engender confidence in our intellectual and spiritual capacities, but resulted in deep suspicion of the intellect, an insistence on the futility of spiritual strivings that were not nurtured by grace, and an attempt to confine man's roaming mind and concentrate its energies on the strait path of godliness. Broadly speaking (and many modifications will have to be made to this view later), Daniel's account of learning and poetry in *Musophilus* is inspired by the humanist conviction, while Greville's in *A Treatise of Humane Learning* is shaped by the Protestant.

The humanist movement in England, as represented by men such as More, Elyot, Starkey, Cheke, Ascham, and Mulcaster, was chiefly
concerned with civic and social issues within a religious perspective that emphasized practical morality, and a philosophical one that valued the *vita activa* above the *vita contemplativa*. These concerns and emphases had much in common with some of the central preoccupations of the Protestant reformers, even though there were fundamental theological and epistemological differences between the two movements. As far as notions of the dignity of man expressed through intellectual and spiritual development are concerned, however, a more striking contrast is that between the Protestant reformers and those humanists who, inspired by the intellectual leadership of such as Ficino and Pico, believed that a person could rise through learning to an exalted spiritual state, could indeed become like a god. In Pico's *Oration* God tells Adam,

> The nature of all other beings is limited and constrained within the bounds of laws prescribed by Us. Thou, constrained by no limits, in accordance with thine own free will, in whose hand We have placed thee, shalt ordain for thyself the limits of thy nature .... Thou shalt have the power, out of thy soul's judgment, to be reborn into the higher forms, which are divine.  

The Italian Neoplatonists, preoccupied with the Hermetic writings, believed that intellectual satisfaction could be achieved through the contemplative use of reason, and that this would carry one to mystical union with the *intellectus divinus*, the divine principle of the universe. In the *Corpus Hermeticum* XI (translated by Ficino in 1464), the divine *Nous* explains to Hermes that man has the capacity to reflect the universe within his mind, to understand the divine essence of the material world,
and to fix it in his psyche, and thus to achieve gnostic experience.\textsuperscript{175}

This would involve him in a spiritual movement away from earth and the level on which men normally live: it would be a process of continual refinement for the individual mind, until it had reached a point where its understanding of the principles on which the workings of creation depend was comparable to that of the deity; indeed at such a stage the mind would be identified with the divine \textit{mens}.\textsuperscript{176}

There was, however, another side to Hermetic philosophy, which has already been touched on in relation to \textit{curiositas}: a preoccupation with magic, astrology, alchemy, and the occult sciences in general.\textsuperscript{177}

The magus could, through his magic, manipulate the intricate web of forces that controlled the universe; he could even, like Faustus, use angels (good and bad) to advance his own cause.\textsuperscript{178} Once the magus understood the overall structure of the cosmos, its order and disorder, its correspondencies and discords, he could interfere with the laws of nature, using them for his own purpose without harming them.\textsuperscript{179}

French notes that Hermetic magic cannot be considered apart from the mystical and religious side of the philosophy, for the gnostic only existed in an astro-magical universe. It was magic that aided and protected the soul on its journey towards the divine \textit{mens}.\textsuperscript{180}

Conversely, in order to manipulate matter and phenomena, the magus must be directly inspired and guided by divine revelation.\textsuperscript{181}

Thus, it was believed, could man become like a god. French concludes that the rediscovery of the Hermetic writings in the fifteenth century changed man's whole view of his role within the universe.\textsuperscript{182}

This side of the European humanist movement figured prominently in English culture too, getting woven into various other intellectual
preoccupations, and influencing the work of poets like Spenser and Chapman. It engendered a different kind of enthusiasm and confidence from that which resulted from the doctrines of Erasmus and Vives, and, with its concentration on the development and possible perfection of the individual, rather than on the good of the state whose polity was to be served by the individual, exposed itself more readily to charges of pride and vanity. Although Daniel is not concerned with Neoplatonic thought, the sense of exhilaration generated by the idea that knowledge can lift an individual suffuses many sections of Musophilus and gives to the poem a current of optimism about learning that contrasts with the prevailing tone of Greville's views on the same subject. Greville is altogether more guarded and sceptical, seeing learning, as every human activity, in the light of Protestant teaching about the vanity of all man's works when they are divorced from God.

V

There has always been what Harbison called a 'deep current of ... anti-intellectualism' in the Christian tradition. Tertullian (c. A.D. 155-222) had preached the doctrine of devout ignorance, Nicholas of Cusa's On Learned Ignorance suggested that God could be known by non-rational means, and Thomas à Kempis (translated into English by Rogers in 1584) spoke forcefully against earthly learning - indeed, many mystics, devoted to escaping from this life, and believing salvation to be totally unconnected to any mundane activity, set themselves implacably against the acquisition of secular learning. The
De Contemptu Mundi of Pope Innocent III denounced the vanity of learning with fanatical zeal. Innocent's treatise was translated into English twice during the sixteenth century. Underwriting all these denunciations were the Preacher's eloquent doubts expressed in Ecclesiastes, several of which I have already recorded, some of Christ's words, and, above all, Paul's pronouncements about knowledge in the first epistle to the Corinthians:

For it is written, I will destroy the wisedome of the wise, and will cast away the understanding of the prudent. Where is the wise? where is the Scribe? where is the disputer of this world? hath not God made the wisedome of this world foolishnesse?

(1 Corinthians 1:19-20)

... the Jewes require a signe, and the Grecians seeke after wisedome. But we preach Christ crucified: unto the Jewes even a stumbling blocke, and unto the Grecians, foolishnesse.

(1 Corinthians 1:22-3)

If any man amongst you seeme to be wise in this world, let him be a foole, that he may be wise. For the wisedome of this world is foolishnesse with God: for it is written, Hee catcheth the wise in their owne craftinesse .... The Lord knoweth that the thoughts of the wise be vaine.

(1 Corinthians 3:18-20)

The Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century were engrossed in the Apostle's writings, and, when they came to discuss the place of the arts and sciences in the godly life, were greatly influenced by
his opinions and rarely failed to quote, amplify, or interpret what he had said.

At the heart of Christian anti-intellectualism lies the opposition between grace and nature, faith and reason. Aquinas had striven to reconcile these opposites, and in the Elizabethan period Hooker too endeavoured to give reason a key role in the realm of faith. But more radical Protestants, taking their lead from Luther and Calvin, held to the antithesis.

Robert Hoopes makes it clear that 'the fissure between reason and faith' had been rendered absolute two hundred years before the Reformation by William of Ockham, but for most Protestants it was Luther and Calvin who had really driven in the immovable wedge. Luther's remark that reason is the devil's whore is notorious. In fact, his view of reason is far more balanced than this much-quoted description suggests; indeed, when he referred to reason in this way, he was thinking of a particular abuse of reason, as Gerrish shows.

Luther made a fundamental division between the earthly and heavenly kingdoms. Natural reason can operate legitimately in the former - Luther praises it highly for the help it gives in daily life - but is useless in the latter, where the only guide is scripture, for nothing that is solely human can bring us near to God. When people carry over the reasoning process into the domain of spiritual affairs, they are acting illegitimately. There is an awkward grey area of moral and religious issues, where reason can play an important role, but caution is necessary here for it is easy to slide into curiosity, as many philosophers have done. The brunt of Luther's attack on reason is borne by those who, in his eyes, have employed reason in
this way. There is also, however, what Luther calls regenerate reason - reason illuminated by faith, and thus working 'with an entirely new set of presuppositions, no longer those derived from experience in worldly affairs, but those which are revealed in the Scriptures.'

Thus, Luther wrote:

Reason corrupted by the Devil is harmful ....
but reason informed by the Spirit is a help in interpreting Holy Scriptures .... Reason is of service to faith when it is enlightened, since it reflects upon things; but without faith it is of no use.

As reason is allowed a role in the spiritual life, so is learning regarded as useful, provided it keeps to its own domain, and provided we do not suppose it can bring us to salvation. Luther in fact devoted much energy to reforming education in Germany, and had a keen appreciation of the importance of learning in both human and divine affairs. 'The languages and other liberal arts,' he wrote, are of great benefit 'both for understanding the Holy Scriptures and carrying on the civil government'. Languages particularly are a wonderful gift from God and a danger to the devil; they are

the scabbard in which the Word of God is sheathed. They are the casket in which this jewel is enshrined; the cask in which this wine is kept.

Luther even went as far as to say that

There has never been a great revelation of the Word of God unless He has first prepared the
way by the rise and prosperity of languages and letters, as though they were John the Baptists.  

He is clearly thinking of the work of Erasmus and the humanists preparing the way for his own revolt.

It is true that Luther attacked the universities and Aristotle, but it must be remembered that the former were instituted by the papacy, while the latter, the god of the schoolmen, dominated the syllabuses, and seemed to have taken the place of studying the Bible. Luther regarded Aristotle as valuable in his proper sphere, and listed his works on logic, rhetoric, and poetry (albeit in condensed forms) in his curriculum.

In short, Luther did not condemn reason and learning out of hand; he applauded them at work in the earthly kingdom, and attacked those people who presumed to apply them to the realm of faith. Man's natural state was corrupt; he could be lifted nearer to God only by grace and faith, not by natural reason. Natural reason could serve religion; regenerate reason could operate within the spiritual domain.

Calvin too allowed reason and learning a relative value. All man's natural gifts were corrupted by sin at the Fall; hence only the 'foule ruines' of reason are now apparent. It was not obliterated because, as 'a naturall gift, it could not be altogether destroyed, but it was partly weakened, partly corrupted':

in ye perverted & degendred nature of man,  
there shine yet some sparks that shew that  
he is a creature having reason, and that he  
differeth from brute beasts, because he is endued  
with understanding;
yet we must always be aware that what light there is 'is choaked with great thickenesse of ignoraunce', and that

Our reason is overwhelmed with so many sortes of being deceived, is subject to so many errours, stumbleth at so many stays, is entangled with so manye streightes, that it is farre from sure directing.

To charge the intellect with perpetual blindness would be repugnant both to the word of God and to common experience. Moreover, people clearly have a natural urge to investigate the truth, and the arts and sciences are not fruitless; it is simply that the desire for truth fails before it reaches its goal, and human learning tends to drift into vain curiosi- ty and useless discussions. As far as salvation is concerned, the most learned of people are as blind as moles, for human nature possesses none of the insights accorded to the elect through the gift of grace: 'mans reason neither approcheth, nor goeth toward, nor once directeth sight unto this trueth, to understand who is the true God'. Similarly, 'the gift of regeneration is one thing, the gift of mere factual knowledge ... is another'. Like Luther, Calvin makes a clear distinction between earth and heaven, and thus separates mundane from divine learning:

there is one understanding of earthly thinges, an other of heavenly thinges. Earthly thinges I call those that doe not concerne God and his Kingdome, true righteousnesse, and the blessednesse of eternall life, but have all their respect and relation to this present life, and are as it were contained within the bounds thereof. Heavenly thinges, I call the pure
knowledge of God, the order of true righteousnesse, 
and the mysteries of the heavenly kingdome.
Of the first sort are policie, governaunce of 
householde, all handy craftes, and liberall 
Sciences. Of the second sorte are the knowledge 
of GOD and Gods will, and the rule to frame 
our life according to it. 201

Having made this distinction, and always reminding us of our 
corrupt state, and of how 'knowledge of all the sciences is so much 
smoke apart from the heavenly science of Christ', 202 Calvin is willing 
to defend human learning. This he does in his interpretation of Paul's 
epistle to the Corinthians.

Paul would not be so very unreasonable as 
to condemn out of hand those arts, which, 
without doubt, are splendid gifts of God, gifts 
which we could call instruments for helping 
men carry out worth-while activities. 203

Yet it does appear that the Apostle 'throws to the ground ... every 
kind of knowledge which exists apart from Christ, and, as it were, 
tramples under his feet what is well known to be the chief gift of 
God in this world.' Calvin answers this by saying that Paul is not 
 inveighing against 'the natural insight of men, or wisdom gained by 
practice and experience, or education of the mind through learning', 
but is simply affirming that 'all these things are useless for obtaining 
spiritual wisdom.' With this Calvin concurs, for learning cannot 
help one to ascend to God - it is necessarily earthbound, and, without 
Christ, futile: 'the man who is well grounded in every aspect of 
learning, but is yet ignorant of God, has nothing.' Furthermore,
mental agility, shrewd judgement, a knowledge of languages and sciences are all marred whenever they become the property of ungodly people.  

This antiphony of statement for and against reason and learning is characteristic not just of Calvin but of many reformers: our faculties are corrupt, yet they are gifts from God and can serve us well in an earthly context, yet, the admonition always returns, they are sinful and dangerous.

Protestant misgivings about reason, and the subordination of it to faith and grace, found support in the sixteenth century's revival of interest in scepticism and the related religious attitude known as fideism. Hoopes suggests that the sceptical and fideistic impulses became combined in the thought of the age to strike at the very heart of the doctrine of right reason.

The best-known statement of scepticism in the century is Montaigne's *Apologie de Raimond Sebond* (1575-80). Montaigne, with uncharacteristic aggressiveness, makes quite clear his determination to crush and trample this humane pride and fiercenesse under foot, to make them feel the emptinesse, vacuitie and no worth of man: and violently to pull out of their hands the silly weapons of their reason; to make them stoope, and bite and snarle at the ground, under the authority and reverence of God's Majesty.

He deploys the customary arguments of scepticism, as expounded by Sextus Empiricus - that the senses are unreliable and give individuals different impressions of the external world, and cannot therefore
provide data on which absolute judgements may be made; and that the
diversity of judgements and patterns of behaviour in different places
precludes our being dogmatic about the rightness of our own beliefs
and customs and the wrongness of other people's. We must therefore
suspend our judgement and accept that all things are relative. Hence
the conclusions of reason are discredited 'because there are no grounds
upon which one can prove true that which reason declares to be true.'

Tightly interwoven with sceptical thought, fideism maintained
that hostility to rational activity and complete trust in the power
of faith provides people with immediate access to religious truth,
reason being vitiated by natural corruption.

Scepticism struck a chord in many sixteenth- and early seventeenth-
century writers - Erasmus, Agrippa, Montaigne, Shakespeare, and Greville,
and contributed much to the misgivings about reason and learning that
were steadily establishing themselves in the dialectic with the
humanist confidence in man's rationality and in his ability to advance
through the arts and sciences. The *Moriae Encomium* (1509), the *De
incertitudine et Vanitate scientiarum* (1526), and the *Apologie de
Raimond Sebond* undermined traditional assumptions about reason and
learning in a lasting fashion. Yet they also injected a spirit of
iconoclasm and intellectual game-playing into the world of ideas that
gave it new dimensions and directions, and in this sense they had a
markedly positive as well as a negative effect.
VI

Students of literature are well aware that the humanist movement generated great interest in learning in England during the sixteenth century - an interest that was manifested not only in the numerous discussions of the subject in all kinds of books, but also practically in the bids to create a schooled society and to ensure that those people who were to be involved in the state administration were well educated and those who were taking up certain professions and trades were properly equipped to do so. What is not so clearly recognized is the extent to which the struggle to establish the Protestant faith in this country also had a profound effect on the development of education and stimulated an intense debate on the place of learning in godly life. This has been touched on here and there throughout the chapter, but the central importance of the debate to the world of learning demands that more concentrated attention be given to the issues that were raised.

Protestant writers of all shades, from conservative to radical, addressed themselves to certain key concerns: the status and role of human learning in mundane life; its relation to divine learning and to spiritual regeneration; the spiritual dangers involved in the pursuit of learning; the kind of knowledge needed by ministers, and the extent to which that knowledge should be employed when they were engaged in their ministry, especially in preaching. Some of these concerns became major points of issue between radicals, moderates, and conservatives. In countless treatises, pamphlets, lectures, and sermons, writers and preachers turned these matters over and over, and there is no doubt that they were debating questions felt by a
substantial number of the population to be of great importance.

The representative voice of the moderates is that of Richard Hooker. In the third Book of *The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (1594) Hooker, defending the Elizabethan *via mediet*, tells how many of his more radical contemporaries disparage reason and look askance at human learning:

A number there are, who think they cannot admire as they ought the power and authority of the word of God, if in things divine they should attribute any force to man's reason.211

Hooker identifies six arguments adopted by those who doubt the competence of man's natural abilities to understand. First, natural man cannot perceive things of the spirit because they seem foolish to him and because they can only be discerned spiritually. Secondly, St Paul warns us against philosophy (Colossians 2:8), 'that is to say, such knowledge as men by natural reason attain unto.' Thirdly, that those who have most troubled the Church with heresy have always been great admirers of human reason: 'their deep and profound skill in secular learning' had made them not 'obedient to the truth' but rather has 'armed them ... against it'. Fourthly, the denigrators of learning recall God's apparently heavy censures against it in 1 Corinthians 1:19. Fifthly, the word of God is absolute in itself, exact and perfect, whereas natural reason and its tools are clumsy and imperfect. Sixthly, if one believes the Gospel, there is no need to reason about it: 'if I do not believe, it must be the Spirit of God and not the
reason of man that shall convert my heart unto him.' Hooker concludes:

By these and the like disputes an opinion hath spread itself very far in the world, as if the way to be ripe in faith were to be raw in wit and judgment; as if reason were an enemy unto religion, childish simplicity the mother of ghostly and divine wisdom.  

Although there is some misrepresentation in what Hooker says, his list of arguments provides a fair summary of the main charges brought against reason and learning by the more radical reformers. Hooker of course regards such views as deluded; for him they are based on the erroneous supposition that, because our mental abilities are limited, they are necessarily to be condemned. What scripture warns us against, he avers, is not sound but unsound learning—a point that was actually made by most of Hooker's opponents. Natural reason can play an important part in making clear certain features of God's creation and purpose, though Hooker admits that some areas of the spiritual domain are forever inaccessible to reason. However, as 'nature hath need of grace', so 'grace hath use of nature.' To detract from various kinds of God-given knowledge, which are illuminated by divine truth, is to offer an insult to our Creator, who being that light which none can approach unto, hath sent out these lights whereof we are capable, even as so many sparkles resembling the bright fountain from which they rise.  

Hooker concedes that there are people who, being wholly addicted unto their own wills, use
their wit, their learning, and all the wisdom they have, to maintain that which their obstinate hearts are delighted with, esteeming in the frantic error of their minds the greatest madness in the world to be wisdom, and the highest wisdom foolishness.  

In this, he is in accord with his more radical brethren, but when he asserts that reason is 'a necessary instrument, without which we could not reap by the Scripture's perfection that fruit and benefit which it yieldeth', he is propounding a notion that was rejected by severer minds.  

In conclusion, he stresses that he is not elevating reason above spiritual enlightenment, but he does believe that

in the nature of reason itself there is no impediment, but that the selfsame Spirit, which revealeth the things that God hath set down in his law, may also be thought to aid and direct men in finding out by the light of reason what laws are expedient to be made for the guiding of his Church, over and besides them that are in Scripture.  

This would have been allowed by many divines, but the more radical, the Puritans, while acknowledging the efficacy of reason in the realm of secular affairs, recoiled from any suggestion that it had more than a restricted serving role in spiritual matters. They were much more concerned with the limits and dangers of reason than with any positive function it might have in the work of edification. Their emphasis fell invariably on the corruption of man and on the conviction that salvation could only be achieved through grace, between which and
reason an unbridgeable gulf was fixed.

It followed that human learning too was denied more than a supportive role in the process of regeneration. That it had an important part to play in personal and public life was readily admitted; some even allowed that in the preparation of the individual for the reception of grace, study of the arts and sciences could be of use. But the acquisition and possession of such knowledge had no bearing at all on whether one was chosen by God to be a recipient of his grace.

Human learning, schooling, and education generally were subjects of major importance for all Protestants and especially for Puritans. This was partly because they could see, as earlier generations of humanists had seen, that education was a means of changing the nation's habits of thought, of establishing a new ideology. Godly schoolmasters and ministers at work in the community at large as well as in the universities might have a profound effect on the rising generations: true doctrine could be instilled in the formative years, and the menace of papism could be thwarted. Indeed, the Elizabethan government saw this advantage of education quickly enough: Charlton has written strongly about sovereigns who 'saw the schools as an important instrument with which to maintain public order and achieve political and religious conformity.'

Instead of acting as breeding grounds for humanist ideas, a distinct possibility at the beginning of the period, the grammar schools became instruments of national policy, a means of strengthening the State against religious innovation.219

An example of this may be seen in a letter from the Privy Council to
Archbishop Grindal in 1580, in which he is asked to ensure that all his bishops examine the schoolmasters in their dioceses to make sure their religious beliefs are acceptable, for 'a great deal of the corruption in religion, grown throughout the realm, proceedeth of lewd schoolmasters'. Any found on examination to be 'corrupt and unworthy' are 'to be displaced'. The main fear the authorities had was of covert Catholic education being given by private tutors (the letter to Grindal referred to teachers in private houses as well as public schools).

In the early 1580s Cecil put a document in front of the Queen advising that Catholic children should be removed from the care of their parents and educated as Protestants: 'schoolmasters ... may be a principal means of diminishing' the number of Catholics; moreover, 'by this means, you shall, under colour of education, have them as hostages of their parents fidelities'. The Puritan, John Stockwood, had proclaimed publicly at Pauls Cross,

> the children of our Papistes, so soone as they be capable of learning, might be taken from them ... and be committed unto the governement of godlye teachers, that woulde learne them the feare of the Lord.

In several cases this actually happened, though the procedure was supported by the royal prerogative and not by statute.

For the Puritans, charged with the task of building a godly society along truly reformed lines, it was important that everyone should achieve a reasonable level of literacy so that the Bible could be read, and perhaps some printed sermons or the numerous catechisms and manuals of instruction for the godly household. As Cleaver said,
all kinds of formal learning 'in the godly are laudable, and praiseworthy, they are profitable and helpefull, they doe assist the Ministery and all good instructions, to make them effectuall, and fruitfull.'

But Cleaver had just prior to this warned that 'Wit, Art, Policy, Sciences, and all manner of learning, unsanctified, are commonly impedi­ments to hinder the successe of the word'. And here is focused the key point: learning fused with godliness was acceptable; learning divorced from godliness was not. Later in the same treatise, Cleaver bemoans the fact that so many of his contemporaries labour zealously for human learning, both academic and practical, yet do not 'move a foote' to acquire spiritual knowledge; hence it is that the times 'doe yeeld so many Artists, Linguists and Learned Clarkes, and so few judicious Christians'.

The influential Cambridge theologian and preacher, William Perkins, regarded it as 'a priviledge to be indued with al kinde of learning, of arts and tongues', but insisted that such skills, however well developed, are worthless unless their possessor 'be found in Christ'; indeed, if he is not, 'he is no better in the sight of God, then a damned wretch.' Many other Puritans concurred.

Bartholomew Batty, specifically concerned with advising parents how to bring up their children in a godly fashion, cautioned that

A yong man to be well seene, in all the sciences, it profiteth nothing, if he be not a regenerate christian, indued with vertues and gentle behaviour.

The continual emphasis on godliness was of paramount importance, for the Puritans were ever mindful of the great spiritual dangers that the pursuit of knowledge involved. Behind the admonitions of Christ,
Paul, and Solomon, so potent in their own right, lay the dire warning of the Garden of Eden story, where Adam and Eve's urge to know had led to disaster. For those who wished to undermine people's confidence in human learning, the evocation of the Fall was a powerful weapon. Bacon, before outlining his schemes for the advancement of learning clearly felt a pressing need to face the charge that the quest for knowledge was to be equated with sinful curiosity, and hence with pride, the Fall, and evil. This he did by making a common distinction, much employed by the Puritans themselves, between the proud knowledge of good and evil, acquired in man's attempt to free himself from God's commandments, and 'the pure knowledge of nature and universality ... by the light whereof man did give names unto the other creatures in Paradise'. Bacon also insisted that this kind of knowledge would not become entirely absorbing, 'for nothing can fill, much less extend, the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of God.' In addition, a sound knowledge of God's creation can only lead one back to the Creator:

opening our belief, in drawing us into a due meditation of the omnipotency of God, which is chiefly signed and engraven upon his works.

Bacon was emphatic that it is wrong for people by inquiry into sensible and material things to try to gain knowledge of the nature or will of God.

That Adam had possessed legitimate knowledge, as well as reaching for what was forbidden, was a factor of cardinal significance both for those who, like Bacon, wanted to pursue their studies of the natural
world unhindered, and for those who were concerned to impose constraints on the pursuit of knowledge without stifling the natural human desire for it. The inhabitants of Eden had an undimmed view of the glories of the visible universe, and, as Bacon noted, Adam had the power to name all the animals - a fact that was appropriated by most of the defenders of science in the late sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries. Greville, in *A Treatise of Humane Learning*, stanza 50, uses the example of Adam's naming of creatures in order to comment on the 'piercing light' of man's soul and intellect before the Fall, and Thomas Jackson was convinced that not even Aristotle himself, 'with the helpe of all the Philosophers which had gone before him ... could so readily have invented names for living creatures, so well expressing their severall natures, as Adam (not a full day old) gave them at their first appearance.'

It was often suggested that Adam's intellectual abilities were the source of all human learning. Luther agrees that

> at the beginning there was planted in man by God him self, a knowledge of his creatures & a law how to rule & govern them, a knowledge of husbandry, of phisicke, and of other artes & sciences .... this is but the strength of humane wisedom created in man at the beginning in Paradise.

Cast out of paradise, Adam retained his secular knowledge, and, although his capacities in this sphere were considerably weakened, he was able 'by experience & great diligence' to 'encrease those gifts which [he] had by nature.' Calvin's successor at Geneva, Theodore Beza, who had a great influence on English theologians, echoed Luther, saying
that 'It is ... most true that Adam had naturallie engrafted in him from his creation the perfit knowledge of all good and profitable learning':

This wisdome though it be very much defaced by mans fall: yet God hath preserved in our minds certeine seedes of knowledge and good arts, without which, of men we should become beasts. Hence it is that the principles and generall notions of all Artes are naturallie imprinted in every mans understanding.235

Beza adds the customary caveat that secular learning must be 'tried and leveled by the rule of the Scriptures, unlesse we will wilfullie depart and wander from the truth.'236

Because Adam's knowledge had been of the natural world, most Protestant reformers encouraged people to make this one of their principal objects of study. Thus Calvin writes:

In the things that He has created God ... holds out to us a clear mirror of His wonderful wisdom. As a result, any man, who has even a spark of sound judgement, and pays attention to the earth and the other works of God, is bound to burst out in admiration of Him. If men were led to true knowledge of God by observation of His works, they would come to know God in a way that is wise, or by a way of acquiring wisdom that is natural and appropriate to them.237

Bacon was only one amongst many who agreed with Calvin, and not all of them were Protestants.238

One of the fullest justifications for the study of the natural
world was written by the Calvinist pastor, Lambert Daneau, whose book, *The Wonderfull Workmanship of the World*, was translated into English in 1578. Daneau gives a five-point list of the reasons why Christians will profit from the study of natural philosophy: it will provide a sense of God's power and mercy, and will elicit our praises; it will give us a better understanding of created things, including ourselves; and it will help us to comprehend obscure passages of scripture.²³⁹

He notes objections to natural philosophy on the basis of such biblical texts as Ecclesiastes 1:13 ('And I have given mine heart to search and finde out wisedome by all things that are done under the heaven: this sore travaile hath God given to the sonnes of men, to humble them thereby'), which the marginal gloss in the Geneva Bible sees as 'the punishment of sinne, to humble man, & to teach him to depend onely upon God.' Daneau counters such doctrines by pointing out that God gave Solomon a true knowledge of the nature of things as a great gift, which, to be sure, is markedly inferior to spiritual knowledge, but not to be despised.²⁴⁰

Paul's strictures are also faced, and turned aside when Daneau maintains that the Apostle 'condemmeth the wisedome of the worlde, not the wisedome concernyng the worlde, and thynges created', an argument derived from Calvin and often repeated.²⁴¹

Daneau deals too with possible criticisms based on remarks in the Fathers,²⁴² and then moves on to expound in detail the reasons why he believes a study of the natural world will consolidate and feed a person's love for God.²⁴³ But he is always scrupulous in imposing constraints, and separating lawful from unlawful studies.²⁴⁴
The general consensus of opinion among Protestant writers seems to have been, as Coverdale said, that 'all manner of learning should be tasted [but] in due season and measure, with good judgment and discretion, under the correction of Christ's doctrine.' And, as Thomas Becon put it, earthly studies should not be mates with God's word, but rather handmaids unto it, and serve to set forth the honour and glory thereof. For unto this end ought all liberal sciences to be studied and learned, even that they might not depress, but advance the true religion of God.

It was always clear where people's priorities should lie: 'better is it to have less knowledge and more love, than much to know, and not to love.'

However, among the more radical reformers, the vein of disquiet about learning ran deep. The period is full of troubled discussions of the spiritual dangers of learning, and of reproof of those people who were judged to have strayed across the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable intellectual activity. The warnings about curiosity, looked at earlier, were only one strand in a web of criticisms. For instance, the Puritan, John Downname, in his well-known book, *The Christian Warfare* (second part, 1611), recorded five major abuses of human learning, and, in doing so, summarized many of the misgivings of his godly brethren. First, we err when we 'wax so proud of this gift of God that we forget the giver', or elevate ourselves over those
who are not learned. Apropos of this last comment, it is interesting to find the Elizabethan musician, Thomas Whythorne, recounting in his autobiography how when he arrived in Cambridge he was struck by the way in which scholars demanded deference in accordance with their level of academic achievement. The second abuse Downame lists is when, 'contenting our selves with an idle theorie and speculation, wee use our knowledge onely to knowe,' and do not employ it to some civil, religious, or personal end. Thirdly, we do wrong when we give too much time and attention to the pursuit of learning, and rest content in it, as if it were our chief purpose in living. It ought in fact 'to bee the way, and not our marke and chiefe scope, and as an handmaide to trimme and adorne us, and so usher us into the presence of vertue and true godlinesse'. The fourth abuse is people's insatiable desire to know, which leads to curiosity: too much learning 'causeth a surfet, and casteth the minde into divers and dangerous diseases which are hardly cured.' Downame cites Seneca's advice about tasting knowledge in moderation. Lastly, 'this learning is abused when we over-value and esteeme it, as when we place therin our chiefe happines, or prefer it before the knowledge of God and his true religion'. In any of these abuses learning is 'of all Gods servants to be contemned and despised, loathed and abhorred.'

The evolution of Downame's discussion is particularly interesting because it illustrates the whole spectrum of Puritan attitudes to learning in a couple of folio pages. He begins with high praise in the humanist fashion, putting stress on the essential goodness of learning, which is a divine gift 'whereby the mind of man is adorned' and his other capacities improved; it is of considerable efficacy
in human affairs; it banishes barbarity and enhances civilization, drawing society towards perfection; it also ploughs up the 'rough fallow grounds of our hearts' and fits them 'to receive the seeds of divine knowledge'. Only 'those who are rude and ignorant' could hate such 'a pearle of price, which is much to be preferred before all the treasures and honors of the world'.

Downname then modulates through the list of abuses to an eighty-line passage in which he surveys the various branches of learning, and shows how specialist abilities carry us no nearer to the truth of existence unless properly applied, unless we 'make a holy use of this knowledge, for the sanctifying of our hearts, and the reforming of our lives and conversations'.

We are then presented with a series of proofs to show that learning often leads to vanity. Reminding us that 'The learnedest Clerkes are not alwayes the wisest men', Downname censures scholars for neglecting 'that practicall knowledge which is chiefly perfected by observation and experience', and for merely possessing knowledge as an ornament. This is vanity, as is the effort scholars often make to attract the applause of their peers. Learning without godliness is, naturally, also empty of meaning.

When religious men condemn learning, Downname says, it is this vanity they have in mind. The charge of vanity, deriving from St Paul (Colossians 2:8), was ubiquitous in late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century discussions of the misuses of learning, and was not confined to Puritans.

Another major fear amongst godly writers was that Satan used people's desire for knowledge for his own ends, and indeed inspired them, to seek for it, as he had inspired Eve. It was also believed
that he played a substantial role in fashioning the content of secular learning and in directing people down the wrong intellectual paths. This is a belief we have encountered already in relation to charges of curiosity, but it had a broader application too and was examined in some detail. Thus Landi sees the devil as the father of worldly wisdom, while Felltham and Dove think that he stimulates the fruitless wrangling over vain questions which characterizes various schools of learning, his aim being to distract people from the true goal of Christ's truth.256

Dove develops this idea for the purpose of attacking scholastic theology, papism, and the Jesuits, whom he sees as Satan's latest weapon in an age-old struggle to corrupt mankind by means of books and learning. This notion clearly rests on misgivings about reason. Dod and Cleaver pinpointed 'the carnal reason of the mind' as one of the major factors in sharpening 'mens appetites to Sathans baites',257 and it was an abiding fear amongst godly writers that this was the case.

A full exposition of the view that learned men are particularly susceptible to the devil's lure is to be found in William Pemble's A Plea for Grace (1627). Pemble warns that

in all the shop of Hell, there is no anvile so well set whereon to forge, no engine so apt whereby to execute any choyce piece of mischiefe, as that man who is learned and lewd.

Pemble gives a detailed description of the ways in which scholars are subject to the devil's influence, and outlines some of the deplorable ways in which they behave. It is vital that learned men should set their house in order and guard against Satan's wiles, for 'Surely, the
divell cannot worke a more compendious mischiefe, than to deforme those that should be the meanes of others reformation.' Scholars should mark and reflect upon the fact that Christ's greatest trouble on earth was with the learned Scribes and Pharisees, who 'most desperately resisted his Ministry', so that our Saviour professed that ignorant publicans would enter heaven before them. The educated must fashion close links between learning and godliness, striving for purity of heart, faith, and humility; restraint in seeking for knowledge is also urged, as is serious study of the scriptures.  

The pursuit of secular learning was, then, fraught with dangers for the godly. On occasions this resulted in their throwing it aside in disgust, as when Dod proclaims that 'the wisedome of the flesh is enimitie to God in all things ... and so long as one followes it, he shall never feare God', or when Webbe bids farewell to 'humanists and artists studies' and all 'affected knowledge and learnings lore': 'my studie shall be in the Librarie of the holie Ghost'. But these were fairly isolated cries, and often prompted by the desire to achieve a rhetorical effect on readers or congregations. That spiritual knowledge was regarded as incomparably superior to secular learning has been abundantly clear throughout this section, and that some regarded the unlearned as being perhaps more likely to receive spiritual illumination is also the case. But, allowing these and the numerous other provisos we have studied, the arts, languages, and all other lawful branches of learning were greatly valued by the godly.

This was especially so where the training of ministers was concerned. Professor Collinson has said that 'No part of the puritan
programme [carries] more weight than the incessant plea for a "learned preaching ministry", and has discussed the preoccupations of the leading Cambridge Puritan, Laurence Chaderton, 'with the ... strategy of harnessing the university to the supply of learned preachers'. Chaderton was conscious that, as Walter Travers put it, the 'universities ought to be the seed and the fry of the holy ministry throughout the realm.'

Not that this was solely a question of Puritan agitation: from the mid sixteenth century it had been a particular concern of the English Church as a whole, and in the first flush of reform in Elizabeth's reign the hierarchy had taken steps to try and ensure that a reasonable supply of well-educated men was available for the ministry. However, as the Puritans grew more insistent about further reforms and the bishops correspondingly more worried about nonconformity, a split took place between those who urged that there should be a godly preaching ministry close to the people, and those who perceived that civil danger lay in such an ideal. Moreover, many bright young men began to regard the learned ministry as a way of bettering their social position, for the university education they received as part of their training ensured them gentle status and possibly a route to important office within the Church.

The Church had traditionally been associated with learning: indeed, as O'Day says, it had been the world of learning. But in general it was not the ordinary parish priest who had been well educated; it was the clerical elite. If the reform of the Church was to be effective in sixteenth-century England this state of affairs had to be rectified, and if possible all ministers of God's word given a sound intellectual foundation on which they could build a knowledge
of true doctrine, and which would enable them to instruct their parishioners adequately, especially by means of preaching. The writings of the Puritans in particular are full of complaints about the ignorance of the clergy, and of demands for the provision of better educational facilities and a training that would be more suitable to the work of reform. Thus Cartwright bemoans the fact that

the spirituall sheepeheardes ... in England are verye rude, unlearned, and unable to teache other men, because they themselves lacke the knowledge and righte understandinge of the holye Scriptures.  

He blames the bishops for this. Similarly, the author of An Abstract of Certain Acts of parliament (? 1583), possibly William Stoughton, says that 'There is nothing that may hurt more the Church of God, then that men unworthie are taken to the govrment of soules'; hence 'a man of insufficient learning ... can not worthily execute his office ... [and] is not to be admitted to Ecclesiasticall dignities'. This applies to ordinary ministers as well as those who hold more important offices, for in the care of people's souls, above all other things, 'greatest knowledge, and greatest cunning is required.' A few years later the writers of the Marprelate Tracts were also demanding that bishops should 'admit none unto the ministry, but such as shall be known both for their godliness and learning, to be fit for the Ministry.' The call for a learned ministry continued throughout our period.

Cosin, in his reply to the Abstract, points out that there simply are not enough men of the right calibre and education to provide ministers of the quality demanded by the Puritans for every parish, and, in any
case, the different levels of the Church hierarchy need men of different standards of academic ability and attainment. But this pragmatism could not be acceptable to those who believed that the Church was required absolutely by God to find a sufficient number of learned ministers. More encouragement of men suitable for the ministry was urged, and reforms of the universities were called for, if this were necessary to provide more effective training grounds, which seemed to be the case. Fulke wrote:

The lacke of learned preachers, must be so farre forth supplied, as it maye presentlye by encouraging and exhorting so many as are able, to take that charge in hand, by overseeing the Readers & schollers in divinity in the Universities, to doe their duties, the one in teaching purely, the other in learning diligently.

Fulke recommends the ejection of the 'drones' from university posts and the appointment of diligent, godly teachers in their stead. Perkins concedes at one point that many men of smaller gifts in the ministerie, doe more further the gospel, by the increase of the knowledge of Christ crucified and true obedience, then those that are enriched with farre greater gifts of knowledge both in tongues and Arts.

However, he is quick to turn aside the idea that university education is unnecessary for intending ministers: 'for as much as may bee, Gods Ministers ought to have knowledge of Schoole-learning, both in Arts.
The call for a learned ministry was primarily a call for men who knew their Bible and reformed doctrine well, but as Perkins's remark indicates, secular learning was also regarded as important. Perkins joins many fellow divines in drawing attention to the fact that Moses and Paul were learned men, and that their books are not only a prime source of learning but also a validation of it, as indeed is the Bible as a whole. That Christ had been prepared to discuss interpretations of scripture with the priests and scribes at the Temple was adduced both as an indication of his learning, albeit divinely inspired, and as a justification of the learned debate on scripture subsequently. Thus, while Perkins urges a very detailed and prolonged study of scripture, and enters the usual caveats that, though secular learning is important, it is no substitute for grace, and that Satan distracts people's attention to corrupt human writings, he also says that every minister must have the 'tongue of the learned' and be well 'furnished with humane learning'.

In his debate with Robert Some in the late 1580s, John Penry set out his ideas about learned ministers. The two men were arguing about preaching, and Penry was concerned to refute the charge often levelled at radicals, that they dismissed learning in the conviction that spiritual illumination alone was sufficient. Penry insists that the ability to teach from the pulpit is not bestowed by Christ 'in these our dayes, without the knowledge of the artes, especially the two handmaydes of all learninge, Rhethoricke and Logick, and the two originall tongues wherein the worde was written.' Penry therefore rejects unlearned preachers who say whatever enters their heads, just as he rejects 'many of our absurd doctors ... who can bring nothing into the pulpit, but that which other men have written'.

and tongues.'
Many writers thought that a knowledge of languages was particularly important for clergymen. Richard Bernard believed this: Hebrew and Greek are necessary for the understanding of scripture in the original, as inspired by the Holy Spirit; Latin because 'most of the learned have written their labours in this Tongue'. Bernard even suggests that Chaldean and Syriac should be acquired. He agrees with Penry that rhetoric and logic are essential, the former so that the minister can interpret the figures used in the Bible and speak forcibly himself, the latter so that his arguments will be coherent and cogent.

Bernard in fact sets out the period's most detailed programme of studies for a minister. He puts the customary emphasis on the absolute necessity of grace, and insists that the liberal arts and languages are only handmaids to divinity, but spends many pages developing his contentions that 'If it were possible, a Minister should bee endued with all manner of knowledge in humanity', and 'that the study of holy Scriptures requireth the use of all manner of learning, and the skill of all sciences'. He runs through a multitude of subjects, suggesting their usefulness to the minister, and provides a lengthy list of books that should be in his library. As well as Bibles in four languages, concordances, dictionaries, commentaries, and catechisms, Bernard includes works on history in general, ecclesiastical history in particular, antiquarian studies, husbandry, herbs, animals, and geography. These will be 'good helps to further his study.'

Part of Bernard's intention is to deflate those who think too highly of their knowledge without sufficient grounds for doing so: even verie youths now a daies, and verie
boyes in a manner, which hold themselves fit enough for the Ministerie if they can get but the first schoole-degree upon their backes, and have memorie to get another mans Sermon without booke, or so much wit, as to picke out of divers mens labours, matter to clap upon their owne selected Texts.  

Another part of his purpose is 'to convince those, whosoever they bee, of a braine-sicke opinion, which hold the knowledge of Arts and humane learning to be of none, or very little use unto Divines, for the study of holy Scripture'. These are also the people who hold the universities in contempt.  

Although many would have agreed with Cosin when he claimed that 'I thinke it may be truelie avowed to the glorie of God, that the two Universities are ... as well stored with sound divines and preachers, as any foure Universities whatsoever in forreine parts', there was a sizeable number of writers who dissented from the view with various degrees of hostility. The more radical the writer the more biting are the criticisms.  

Oxford and Cambridge were both accused of allowing students to indulge in corrupt pastimes. But the main thrust of the case against the two universities was that they were not providing adequate teaching in reformed doctrine, not turning out enough well-trained ministers, and thus not contributing as they should to the building of the true Church. This was the burden of Cartwright's and Travers's famous assaults in the 1570s. Cartwright, for instance, inveighs against the ostentatious 'titles of oure universitie doctors and bachelors
of divinitie, [and] 'the name of master of Arte', which are sought and granted 'for vain glory', as in 'the heathenish tradition of prophane scholes, which seke by suche titles to advaunce learning ... then by their learning to advantage the church of God.'

Travers wishes for some notable excellent man/to teache the use of universities/and to call them back againe to the right ende whereunto they were ordained and appointed : which is this/ that they should be meanes to preserve and make perfitt all other noble artes and sciences and especially divinitie.

At present they are failing lamentably in their task. Even Perkins, so deeply involved in university life in Cambridge late in the century, thought that the stream of learning was not flowing forth into the world as it might.

But the fiercest attacks came from the far left wing of the Puritan Movement - from the Separatists. Henry Barrow, for instance, answering the criticisms of George Gifford, condemns those who live and work in the universities:

these universitie divines have ever bene the professed and most bitter enemies [of Jesus], furnishing Antichrist's hoste in all the rooms and places, even from the pope's chayre, to the parish prieste's pulpit or pue, with fresh servitors continually corrupting the pure fountaines, and perverting the text it self with their gloses, paraphrases, notes, figures, etc., fighting with their schole learning, vayne artes, philosophie, rethericke, and logique against the truth and servantes of God,
striving hereby to uphold Antichriste's ruynous kingdome. 289

The Separatists always insisted that they were not against human learning per se, simply against the abuse of it; they pointed to their own academic qualifications to support this, and did give praise to learning on many occasions. 290 Like many of their more moderate contemporaries, they deplored the element of profane and curious studies in university syllabuses: they are 'unfit for a Christian, much more for a minister of the church'; they have 'not only no warrant in God's worde, but are directly contrarie unto and expresly forbidden in the same'. 291 But those who engaged with the Separatists in print always accused them of wanting to extirpate learning from the realm and close down the universities. 292 This is perhaps understandable, for Barrow and Robert Browne fulminate so aggressively against Oxford and Cambridge and their courses of study. 293 As far as they are concerned, the universities are bastions of privilege, superstition, and ungodliness, blocking the path to true reformation, and in this they epitomize the whole hierarchy of the English Church, which must be overthrown. The same views were repeated by Ainsworth and Johnson in their defence of the Brownists, published in 1604. They also condemn the misuse of learning and the study of profane authors, but praise godly learned men. 294 However, reacting in an especially violent way to the Church hierarchy, the two Separatists claim that when the Apostles 'reformed the errors & abuses crept in', they used no 'other weapons then the sword of the spirit which is the word of God'. This they see as authority for any godly person to preach the gospel, 'though not yet in Office of the Ministery': academic learning has no substantial role
in what is essentially the work of the Spirit.295

One of the major targets for the Separatists was the use of human learning in sermons. Ainsworth and Johnson assail 'divers Preachers [who] stuffe their sermons with the Tales or Testimonies of ... prophane Writers', and Browne too expends much energy in attacking those ministers who use the pulpit to display their education.296 He is particularly concerned to lash those who employ logic and rhetoric in their sermons and conferences, for the use of logic is not countenanced by scripture - indeed both Christ and Paul spoke against it, and 'the people which have not learned Logike, are shutt out and discouraged from talking, pleading, and mutuall edifying in the churche meetinges.'297 Many pages follow inveighing against logic from every angle, and these are interspersed with a comparable attack on rhetoric - 'a covering under which [people] play Bo peepe, and mocke holydaye with the trueth.'298

The issue of whether learning should be used in sermons was not restricted to the Separatists, however. Across the entire spectrum of reformed opinion men discussed the matter, and a very large amount of evidence for and against the employment of the minister's secular and indeed religious knowledge in the pulpit could be adduced. For the Puritans the ministry must be a preaching ministry: 'How can they be called Pastors and teachers, which do not feed, or have no food at al to give to the flock?' asked Thomas Gibson in 1583, discussing St Paul's exhortation in I Corinthians 9:16 to go and preach the gospel.299 The well-known Cambridgeshire Puritan, Richard Greenham who was with Perkins and Dod one of those divines who, outside the universities, took on the responsibility of training young men for
the ministry, also insisted on preaching: a minister

must not keep continually in his studie
filling himselfe with knowledge, till he become
as full as a tunne that will not sound
when one knocketh upon it: but he must
come out of his closet and preach the
word of God .... Let these deepe learned
Clerkes, which bragge and vaunt of such
deep knowledge and abundance of learning,
come forth and shew the same ... for if
they be the servants of the Lord, they
must not have knowledge buried in themselves,
but in their lippes, that Gods children may
be taught thereby to attain unto salvation. 300

Numerous writers of the Protestant persuasion agreed whole-heartedly,
for preaching was regarded as one of the marks of the true Church. 301
Those whom Stoughton called 'bare mumbling ministers' or who were known
by many as 'dumbe dogges' - men who simply read to their congregations -
could not be tolerated. 302

The bone of contention for those who favoured preaching was
what kind of learning should be displayed in the pulpit, or, indeed,
whether any should be displayed at all. Perkins recorded sadly that

Sermons are not in common reputation learned,
neither doe they greatly please the most, unlesse
they be garnished with skill of arts, tongues,
and varietie of reading. 303

He added that 'this curiousnesse and discontentment the Lord condemnes',
and it is certainly the case that many of the preachers condemned it
too, as did godly congregations. In a demand from the common people
to Parliament for a learned ministry, published in 1593 but written earlier, the plea is made that the flock should be taught doctrine, 'in al simplicitie & plaines', for plainness springs from sincerity. Some preachers, it is said, 'take but one word for their text, and afterward runne into the mountaines, that we cannot follow them: not knowing howe they went up, or how they will come downe'. The authors ask that they be spared 'the Latine, Greek, and Hebrew tongues', and references to poets, philosophers, and schoolmen, for 'in these things many preach themselves, and not Christe Jesus', studying to gain admiration rather than providing edification. 304

Many preachers were keenly aware of the need to speak simply to the uneducated. Perkins condemned 'that kinde of preaching ... in which there is used a mixed kinde of varietie of languages, before the unlearned.' 305 Dent said that in a sermon he had preached in Essex he had sought 'especially the salvation of the simple and ignorant', and had therefore stooped 'to their reach and capacity.' 306 Dyke rebuked those ministers who 'affect ... craggie scholasticall disquisitions, as are fitter for the Chaire then for the Pulpit, as not coming within the short and shallow reach of a popular capacitie.' 307

The failure to communicate God's word ranked with the use of sermons for self-aggrandizement as a cardinal sin for the preacher to commit, but underwriting the hostility to the display of learning in sermons was the entire complex of misgivings about learning that we have witnessed in this chapter. With a keen sense of the dangers of learning, many divines spoke strongly against its appearance in sermons at all. Edward Dering warned, 'our preachings are unprofitable to the people, even because we speake in our own fansies, and use
The ideal of plain speaking is set down by Henry Smith, himself renowned as a preacher (he was known popularly as 'silver-tongued Smith'):

to preach simply, is not to preach unlearnedly, nor confusedly; but plainly, not perspicuously, that the simplest which doth heare, may understand what is taught, as if he did heare his name.

Many writers believed that it was permissible to use one's knowledge in sermons. Gerardus (translated into English in 1577), differentiated between what was appropriate for a learned congregation and what for 'the confused multitude, wherein are very many rude, ignorant and unlearned', and this distinction must have been in the minds of many ministers as they prepared their discourses.

Perkins did not banish learning altogether from the pulpit. Supporting material from profane writers was allowable if it helped to convince the conscience of the listener, but it had to be used sparingly. Allegories were acceptable if not dwelt on for too long. Logical and rhetorical devices were in order, but these, like the learned content must be concealed to guard against the impression being given of human skill rather than the glory of God. In his framing of the sermon the minister 'must privately use at his libertie...
the arts, Philosophy, and variety of reading ... but he ought in
publike to conceale all these from the people, and ... make the least
ostentation. 312

Occasionally one encounters the conviction that it is good to
employ the fruits of one's education in preaching, as when Bishop Kinge,
remarking on the liberality of mind of pre-Christian writers, observes:

I am not of opinion with those men who
think that all secular & prophane learning
should be abandoned from the lips of the
preacher ... . Good is good wheresoever I finde
it. 313

The fullest justification of such an attitude is to be found in Egeon
Askew's *An Apologie, of the use of Fathers and Secular learning in
Sermons* (1605). Askew surveys the main criticisms of the position he
is defending, and provides a multitude of references to Biblical,
Patristic, Protestant, and Humanist sources on attitudes to learning
and religion. But one of his central arguments is wholly pragmatic:

To what end learn we in seaven years
the arts? To what purpose Libraries, and
stored studies? to what end tongues?
nay to what end studying twenty yeares
in the Universitie, if a Preacher must
say no more on a text, then an artisan,
a tailor, a shoomaker, and a trades man
can. 314
It is clear that the debate on the nature, role, and scope of human learning was multi-faceted, energetic, and complicated. Attitudes to learning were rooted in and shaped by a variety of entangled concerns - religious, social, economic, political, intellectual, and aesthetic, which can be as perplexing for the modern student as they were for the people of early modern England. Two broad currents of thought are clearly discernible, however: the humanist enthusiasm about reason and learning on the one hand, and the Protestant and sceptical misgivings about them on the other. To say this is not to suggest that many humanists did not urge caution and the necessity of careful direction where both studying and the application of acquired knowledge were concerned. Nor is it to deny that many of the godly, the radicals included, were deeply influenced by humanist doctrines: they had after all come up through the Elizabethan and Jacobean educational system, which was a mixture of the scholastic and the humanist, and were in consequence thoroughly grounded in the liberal arts. Moreover, while emphasizing that only grace and faith could open the way to salvation, and that the exercise of reason and the pursuit of secular knowledge were fraught with spiritual danger, the godly perceived that human learning was a potent weapon both to wield against the papists and to employ in the forging of a truly reformed society. Consequently, they found themselves treading cautiously along the path opened up by the early generations of humanist writers, aware at every step of pitfalls and temptations. Thus a sense of ambivalence marks much Protestant writing about learning, however firmly the quest for knowledge is put in its place on numerous occasions.

Compounded with this is a similar ambivalence on the humanist
side, where the original conviction that learned men could occupy vital positions in the administration, and thus shape society according to humanist ideals, had given way to the recognition that the exigencies of government demanded a compromise between the ideal and the actual, and that other accomplishments than book-learning and the kind of wisdom that resulted from it were needed in the cut and thrust of realpolitik.

But genuine enthusiasm for learning, expressed both in print and action, also abounded. In its most substantial forms it is to be encountered in the expansion of education and in the work of Bacon. The latter retained the pristine humanist fervour, channelled it into the promotion and mapping out of empirical science, and at the same time took full account not only of Protestant doubts and constraints, but also of the reformers' Pauline emphasis on the charitable use of knowledge for the benefit of society at large rather than for the development of the self. This is an aspect of the debate on learning that will be examined later.

It is a commonplace that the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were times of radical change; nowhere is this more true than in the field of learning. One of the principal objects of this dissertation is to examine how Daniel, Greville, and a number of other writers responded to the shifts in thought and attitude that have been charted so far. As the general debate was full of restlessness and tension, so are the two poems around which this study revolves. This is strikingly the case with Daniel's *Musophilus*, and it is to that work we turn next.
Chapter Two

Daniel's *Musophilus*
Lyttle or no writing will now serve .... All writing layd abed, as taedious .... All is now, in bowld Courtly speaking, and bowld Industrious dooing. Activity, praesent, bowld Activity.

(Gabriel Harvey, *Marginalia* (? 1579), ed. G.C. Moore Smith, Stratford, 1913, pp. 144-45.)

It is reserved only for God and angels to be lookers-on.

(Bacon, *Of the Advancement of Learning* (1605), Bk II.)

0 blessed knowledge ! they that have thee, live two lives, whereas others live but one .... Thou art the soule of the world, knitting togethier these present times with ages past: by thee we that are living call to counsel those that are dead and gone. Many huge dumbe heapes, many goodly piles and monuments, had been wronged by forgetfulness but that by thee (0 learning) they survive .... 0 knowledge, how much hast thou woon from the waste of time ? The want of this knowledge unsinewes the powers of a man, and unmannes him quite.

(George Benson, *A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse The Seaventh of May, M. DC. IX, 1609, sigs H4v- II.*)
Samuel Daniel's poem *Musophilus* ('Containing a generall defence of all learning') appeared in 1599, about mid-way through his career as a poet. It is one of his finest achievements - a noble and fluent declaration of love for his calling. Daniel's attitude to poetry changed considerably over the years; he moved from an early interest in pageantry and emblematic modes of expression, through a middle period in which his poetry assumed an intellectual cast, intently serious and reflective, to a later disillusionment with poetic myth and the work of the poet, which was coupled to a growing predilection for history and historical writing as an alternative vehicle of ideas and means of analysis. In *Musophilus* Daniel avows a firm belief in the social, political, and aesthetic efficacy of his art, seeing the poet, as Sidney had done, as embodying the virtues of the truly learned man. But the poem also contains a cogent attack upon the value of poetic knowledge, which, although refuted, retains its place in the overall impression the poem gives, and leaves us with the sense that, appealing as the defence of poetry and the poet's learning is, it represents only a partial view. In this aspect of the work we have an anticipation of Daniel's later movement away from the role of humanist poet as it had been established by Sidney and Spenser.

The poem takes the form of a debate between Musophilus (lover of the Muses) and Philocosmus (lover of the world). Musophilus is the mouthpiece for Daniel's most cherished convictions about poetry and learning; his words are given far more cumulative weight than those of his opponent, and rise to greater heights of persuasive eloquence; the views he puts forward correspond to Daniel's utterances elsewhere; and at the end of the poem the voices of Musophilus and
Daniel openly merge in a direct address to the poet's mentors, Lord Mountjoy and Fulke Greville (ll. 991 and 1000). Although Philocosmus is the antagonist, whose basic attitudes are confuted, he too is occasionally used by Daniel for the expression of personal views, particularly of misgivings about the current state of letters in England. In his third speech, for example, Philocosmus asks

> Do you not see these Pamphlets, Libels, Rymes, These strange confused tumults of the minde, Are growne to be the sicknes of these times, The great disease inflicted on mankind?

(11. 446-49)

This complaint - a common one at the time - was echoed by Daniel in his prefatory verses for Florio's translation of Montaigne in 1603:

> But yet although wee labor with this store And with the presse of writings seeme opprest, And have to many bookes, yet want wee more, Feeling great dearth and scarcenesse of the best.

Daniel's own voice can also be heard in Philocosmus's words at the start of the poem, where he says

> Fond man Musophilus, that thus dost spend In an ungainefull arte thy dearest daies, Tyring thy wits and toiling to no end, But to attaine that idle smoake of praise; Now when this busie world cannot attend Th' untimely musicke of neglected layes. Other delights then these, other desires This wiser profit-seeking age requires.

(11. 6-13)
There is an ambivalent effect here. As the poem is to reveal, Daniel does not consider his art to be 'ungainefull' in Philocosmus's sense, nor is he 'toiling to no end,/But to attaine that idle smoake of praise', and, clearly enough, Daniel intends 'wiser' and 'profit-seeking' to ring ironically. Yet the lyrical cadences of lines 10 and 11 -

Now when this busie world cannot attend
Th' untimely musicke of neglected layes

- suggest Daniel's own regret about the state of affairs that prompted him to write the poem in the first place. This can also be sensed in 'dearest daies' (1. 7) and 'toiling to no end' (1. 8), phrases which take on a different resonance when looked at from Musophilus's angle. Daniel's voice can be heard in Philocosmus's words, then, although generally speaking Daniel dissociates himself from the views propounded by this character.

The debate form of Musophilus points to one of Daniel's characteristic traits - his awareness of the dangers of a single or dogmatic view. And this intellectual scepticism was consolidated in him by a temperamental lack of confidence in his own abilities and chosen profession. In *A Defence of Ryme* (1602) he wrote:

irresolution and a selfe distrust be the most apparent faults of my nature, and ... the least checke of reprehension, if it savour of reason, will as easily shake my resolution as any mans living.

Interestingly, in 1591, Spenser had noted of Daniel that 'his trembling Muse' does 'but lowly flie,/As daring not too rashly mount on hight'. This diffidence, in conjunction with a desire to see and express all
sides of a problem, results on the one hand in a broad and generally fair view of the issues concerning knowledge and its uses which are raised in Musophilus, although Daniel can be resolute enough – even dogmatic – when he wishes. But on the other hand his uncertainty also leads to a failure of confidence at crucial moments in his poetry, and doubts about his métier sometimes result in a strong assertiveness over poetic values and a disregard or riding over of certain factors that would damage his case for learning and poetry.

Musophilus seems to have been in large part a working-out of Daniel's personal attitudes and position at a time when poets and poetry were having to meet a lot of criticism and were concerned to set their house in order. This is a situation I shall discuss in the next chapters. The point to make here is that Daniel was acutely aware of the problems and of his own difficulties in responding to them. He says in the prefatory sonnet to the first edition that he has written the treatise 'to revive my selfe' (1. 10) and to show 'the forme of mine owne heart' (1. 9). His muse is

Striving to make, her now contemned arte
As faire t'her selfe as possiblie she can;
Least seeming of no force, of no desart
She might repent the course that she began.

(Pref. sonnet, 11. 12-15)

The current hostility to poetry is noted in line 12, while line 15 indicates that the idea of repenting of his poetic activity has crossed Daniel's mind. This is something that is amplified twelve years later in the dedicatory lines of the 1611 edition of the poem (as the first
And for my part, I have beene oft constraind
To reexamine this my course herein
And question with my selfe what is containd
Or what solidity there was therein.
And then in casting it with that account
And recknings of the world, I therein found
It came farre short, and neither did amount
In valew with those hopes I did propound
Nor answer'd the expences of my time
Which made me much distrust my selfe & ryme.

This 'distrust' is everywhere apparent: the 1611 dedication opens
with the words:

If I have err'd or run a course unfit
To vent my understanding in this kinde ...

and later (ll. 30-3) Daniel writes:

     And I was flying from my heart and from
     The station I was set in, to remaine :
     And had left all, had not fresh forces come
     And brought me backe unto my selfe againe.

These doubts echo those recorded towards the end of Musophilus itself,
where, in spite of (or perhaps because of) having spoken boldly in
defence of his views, Daniel seems worried that his readers will
'deeme/My will was caried far beyond my force', and that the discursory
nature of his poem will be judged unseemly (ll. 995-98).

In the light of the admissions Daniel makes about his diffidence,
we may interpret the Musophilus-Philocosmus debate in one way as 'a
kind of spiritual autobiography'. And this leads us to reflect that, if he was still unsure of himself as a writer by 1611, as the verses to Greville suggest, the arguments expounded in Musophilus did not serve to convince Daniel of the rightness of his defence of learning and poetry, did not give him confidence, and, indeed, may even have brought him to feel that the terms in which he had defended his calling and the role he had allotted to the learned poet were inadequate in the face of a hostile world.

Following the publication of Musophilus, Daniel was at work on his play Philotas (produced and printed in 1605), and the epistle to Prince Henry, which prefaces the play, reveals that the poet's disquiet was still strong. He speaks of himself as 'the remnant of another time', and complains that

yeeres hath done this wrong,
To make me write too much, and live too long.  

(11. 107-8)

He feels that the times are not propitious for poets, as they had been in Elizabeth's reign (11. 62, 67-70, 79-86, 97), and that although he has laboured diligently and 'done the fairest offices/To vertue and the time', and has pleased 'the gentler that did understand', 'naught prevails,/And all our labours are without successe' (87-97). Daniel's gloom may be partly attributable to the trouble he got into over the play with the Privy Council, who charged him with having written propaganda on behalf of the earl of Essex, tried and executed in 1601. But, as we have seen, Daniel's sense of being out of place in 'these times of dissolution', committed to an art he felt was abused from
Daniel's feelings of uncertainty and alienation were shared by other poets who reflected upon their vocation and the relation of the poet to society. Chapman, who, in his dedicatory epistles and poems, was continually examining and agonizing over his status as learned poet in a corrupt and hostile world, experienced a sense of isolation far more acutely than Daniel, and, in reaction, rejected the social duties and obligations made much of by many Elizabethan and Jacobean poets and critics, withdrew into a world of melancholic solitude and contemplation, and employed an allegorical mode of writing to hide poetic truths from the uninitiated, whom he despised. The poet, as Chapman sees him, is consecrated to an office which involves profound sorrow and suffering. Spenser too saw that the poet was cut off from certain social groups and should not mix with them. For instance, poetry is 'prophaned' by

\[
\text{the base vulgar, that with hands unclean} \\
\text{Dares to pollute her hidden mysterie;} \\
\text{And treadeth under foot her holi\text{e} things.}^{16}
\]

The poet can also feel out of place in the court, and we learn at one point that the true poet 'Doth rather choose to sit in idle cell' than to associate with those who scorn the muse by disregarding decorum and making public anything they have written whether it is worthwhile or not.\(^{18}\)

The relation of the Renaissance poet to other people and the larger question of the poets' conceptions of themselves and their roles is a far wider and more involved topic than is suggested by these brief
references to Chapman and Spenser, and I shall come back to it throughout the thesis; at the moment I simply want to draw attention to the fact that several leading poets in England shared a view of society as, in varying degrees, unfriendly to their work, often because that society was immoral as well as simply hostile to poetry (although the unfriendliness towards poetry was seen as an index of moral corruption).

In addition, the three poets each display a remarkable measure of self-consciousness in their writings - they are continually mulling over what it means to be a poet, what poetry is, and so on - and in this they are characteristic of many sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century writers. As I noted in the previous chapter, the flood of books and pamphlets stimulated by the development of printing and the humanists' demands for the dissemination of learning also brought with it alarm about being overwhelmed by the printed word and urgent questions about the nature and status of literature, posed not only in the treatises on poetry and rhetoric but also in the texts themselves and in their prefaces, prologues and defences. One of the reasons Musophilus is so interesting is precisely because of its self-consciousness, which is a response to the character of the intellectual environment; the sustained analysis of the issues a poet faced in the late Elizabethan period, the rehearsal of the case against the learned poet as well as that for him, gives us an insight into the mind of a sensitive and thoughtful writer of the day.

What we can observe in Daniel, then, is a deep concern for the state of letters at the turn of the century - a concern shared by other poets - but in his case made more acute by a temperamental diffidence about his own abilities: he realized that a strong fight
must be put up, but doubted whether he was a resilient enough champion.

However, this is to view the matter only in the terms established openly by Daniel himself: the question that needs to be posed— and this is one of the tasks of this thesis—is whether Daniel's answers to the problems he saw were adequate or even appropriate to the situation in the world of learning and poetry around 1600, or whether he, and for that matter Chapman and Spenser, were not trying to engage in the fray with weapons that had lost their effectiveness. The words to Greville in 1611 and the epistle before Philotas suggest that Daniel might have felt this at times.

* * * * * *

Towards the end of his final speech Philocosmus states his case against the man of learning in the most straightforward manner:

Men find that action is another thing
Then what they in discoursing papers reade,
The worlds affaires require in managing
More arts then those wher'in you Clerks proceed,
Whilst timorous knowledge stands considering,
Audacious ignorance hath done the deed.
For who knowes most, the more he knows to doubt.

(11. 486-92)

As we have seen, these were common views in the late sixteenth century; the worlds of learning and action are polarized, and the scholar is pictured as a hesitant man left still weighing up the situation when the more resolute person has accomplished what needed to be done. The humanists in the first years of the century were prepared to admit that a mere scholar would probably prove useless in the affairs of
the world, but they thought learning itself an essential aspect of a man's preparation for playing a part in government of some kind. It is therefore unfair of Philocosmus to disparage all learning, and we may reflect that his criticisms could have been made more pertinent and damaging had he asked for details of the exact relation between Musophilus's type of learning, based on ideals of eloquence and self-sufficiency, and practical conduct in everyday business.

The last line of the passage just quoted, with its Socratic resonance ('For who knowes most, the more he knows to doubt'), while providing a partial explanation for the diffidence of the scholar (other more pejorative explanations are implied in the preceding lines), is also a basic insight into the kind of situation in which the highly educated person of sceptical temperament finds himself, and is perhaps especially relevant to Daniel: in *A Defence of Ryme* he wrote:

> I thanke God that I am none of these great Schollers, if thus their hie knowledges doe but give them more eyes to looke out into uncertaintie and confusion, accounting my selfe, rather beholding to my ignorance, that hath set me in so lowe an under-roome of conceipt with other men, and goe alone, but plodding on the plaine tract I finde beaten by Custome and the Time, contenting me with what I see in use.  

Philocosmus continues:

This sweet inchaunting knowledge turnes you cleene  
Out from the fields of naturall delight.

(11. 494-95)

The phrase 'sweet inchaunting knowledge' picks up the tone of Musophilus's
earlier descriptions of his art, while the use of the term 'naturall' in this context suggests that the kind of intellectual pursuits Musophilus has favoured are too rarefied for most men. There are almost certainly undertones of the familiar art versus nature debate here. Philocosmus suggested earlier that devotion to the intellectual life means a severance of connections between a man and the majority of his fellows, and entails a revolt against what is natural to man:

For not discreetly to compose our parts
   Unto the frame of men (which we must be)
   Is to put off our selves, and make our artes
   Rebles to Nature and societie

(11. 80-3)

Philocosmus accuses men like Musophilus of withdrawing from 'th' open concourse of a public sight' (1. 497) because of the attractions of immersing oneself in knowledge - a charge commonly brought against men of learning in the late sixteenth century20 - and concludes that the 'cunning' of the poet's skill 'Unsinewes all your powres, unmans you quite' (1. 499). Philocosmus asserts that

This eloquence, these rymes, these phrases then
Begot in shades, do serve us in no sort,
Th' unmateriall swellings of your pen
Touch not the spirit that action doth import.

(1. 502-5)

He regards 'A manly stile fitted to manlie eares' as the right mode of expression, the repetition of the adjective (recalling 1. 499) suggesting that something with masculine qualities is needed, something
plain, strong, and purposeful. This accords with his concession to
heroic poetry, tales of 'great heroycall deserts/Of brave renowned
spirits, whose exercise/Of worthy deedes may call up others hearts'
(11. 515-17), and his derogatory comments on eloquence,

which goes so gay,
And commonly the gaudie liv'rie weares
Of nice corruptions which the times do sway,
And waites on th' humor of his pulse that beares
His passions set to such a pleasing kay.

(11. 507-11)

Whatever the justice of this description, the gentle sarcasm of the
last two lines is finely achieved and thrusts precisely into Musophilus's
early image of lines of poetry as 'the vaines, the Arteries,/And
undecaying life-strings of those harts/That still shall pant' (11. 183-85),
which is a rather self-conscious metaphor (mocked once before by
Philocosmus - in l. 436). It also embodies a critique of the intimacy
of Musophilus's type of learning and poetry (very much a coterie kind
of affair in many ways) and the over-refined sense of the dependence
of the style of expression on the poet's current mood. The idea of
the small beat of a pulse registering a delicately balanced poetic
sensitivity and tone catches with exactness the sense of a casuistically
ally poised consciousness and manner of composition. Given
Philocosmus's materialistic and utilitarian point of view, the critic-
ism in this section is reasonable in relation to the tone of what
Musophilus has previously said.

The charge brought against Musophilus is therefore a double one:
first, that, as a man of learning, and especially as a poet, he is
inadequate to play a part in the world's active affairs; secondly, that he has deliberately absolved himself from public life in order to concentrate on the development of the self. Both criticisms have their source in the age-old debate on the relative merits of the lives of action and contemplation, and Daniel's poem is a notable contribution to that debate as it was conducted in the sixteenth century. Until the humanists of northern Europe emphasized the superiority of the active life, the contemplative had usually been regarded as the more valuable: the shift in emphasis during the sixteenth century is mirrored in the concerns of Daniel's poem.

The type of contemplative life envisaged by Musophilus is not, unlike Chapman's, a religious or mystical one; Musophilus commends humanist and Stoic ideals of self-knowledge and self-sufficiency, gained through retired reflection and learning, and intended to give strength in the present rather than to prepare the way for some future beatitude. But this still involves chosen isolation and the cultivation of a sense that one is different from, indeed, superior to, many of one's fellows. Philocosmus, speaking out of an experience of the practical exigencies of daily life, considers this apartness, which Musophilus's beliefs demand, to be the debilitating factor for the man who wants to make his mark in the world of action.

Philocosmus's attack on Musophilus continues in a variety of ways, all of which demonstrate an acute knowledge of the possible weaknesses of the idealistic humanist position his opponent espouses. Musophilus is seeking only renown, he suggests (1. 9), and seeking it along a path that leads away from the central forms of human activity: 'this busie world cannot attend/Th' untimely musicke
of neglected layes' (11. 10-11). In any case, poetry means nothing to most people: 'How many thousands never heard the name/Of Sydney, or of Spenser, or their bookes ?' (11. 440-41). If writers of this stature are unknown, what hope is there for those 'of meaner frame,/

On whose indeavours few or none scarce looks ?' (11. 444-45).\(^{23}\) Moreover, as an Englishman, he is confined on a 'scarce discerned Ile,/Thrust from ye world, with whom our speech unknown/Made never any traffike of our stile' (11. 427-29). In addition to this, as I noted earlier, Philocosmus points to the current surfeit of bad writing and the damaging effect this is having on poetry. And even if Musophilus's writing were of value, it needs only a well-aimed aspersion from 'some viperous Creticke' (1. 54) to assign all the fruits of his care and labour to obscurity. More fundamentally, how can Musophilus believe in the objectivity of his judgement and opinion?

\[
\text{every man drawne with delight} \\
\text{Of what he doth, flatters him in his way;} \\
\text{Striving to make his course seeme onely right} \\
\text{Doth his owne rest, and his owne thoughts betray;} \\
\text{Imagination bringing bravely dight} \\
\text{Her pleasing images in best ar\textsuperscript{ay},} \\
\text{With flattering glasses that must shew him faire} \\
\text{And others foule; his skill and his wit best,} \\
\text{Others seduc\textacuteacute;d, deceiv\textacuteacute;d and wrong in their;} \\
\text{His knowledge right, all ignorant the rest,} \\
\text{Not seeing how these minions in the aire} \\
\text{Present a face of things falsely exprest,} \\
\text{And that ye glimmering of these errors shouwne,} \\
\text{Are but a light to let him see his owne.}
\]

(11. 406-19)^{24}\]
These are the main criticisms Philocosmus levels at Musophilus's intellectual position as poet and humanist, and, set against the trends in the world of learning I outlined in the first chapter, they are in general manifestly realistic and cogently presented. They are also partial; not just in the sense that other approaches to the demands of that particular age could be sought, and were in fact found, by poets and men of learning, but also in a deeper, less narrowly temporal sense, that there is far more to man than the principles of materialism and utilitarianism give him scope to show. Musophilus in fact makes the partiality of Philocosmus's thinking abundantly clear and suggests a view of learning and its role which is in many ways more satisfying.

Musophilus is allotted over four times as many lines as his opponent to present the case for learning, and this he does on the whole convincingly and with eloquence. Thus we come across such exhilarating passages as this on the possibilities of knowledge:

Discov'ring dayly more, and more about
In that immense and boundless Ocean
Of Natures riches, never yet found out
Nor fore-clos'd, with the wit of any man;
So far beyond the ordinarie course
That other unindustrious ages ran.

(11. 827-32)

This seems related in spirit to Bacon, and to the voyages of Ralegh, Frobisher, and Drake, which pushed back the physical and intellectual horizons of the western world, and is against the currently growing belief that man had declined in mental powers since antiquity. Such passages have to be set against those I cited earlier when discussing
Daniel's temperamental diffidence, and will need to be borne in mind when his conservatism is examined. 25

Daniel, speaking through Musophilus, also evinces a clear understanding of the ways in which the thirst for knowledge can be a misguided thing, a frantic and heedless tumbling from one subject to the next. He writes of the confusions of the time, and then, having built up an effective simile of the flooding of a creek, whose water moves 'so fast'

Till all be full, and all be at a staie;
And then about, and backe againe doth cast,
Leaving that full to fall another way,

he concludes:

So feares this humorous world, that evermore
Rapt with the Current of a present course,
Runs into that which laie contemnd before;
Then glutted leaves the same, and fails t'a worse.

(11. 280-86)

There are, however, certain features of Musophilus's defence which are disquieting, and one is left with mixed views about his arguments by the end of the poem.

Musophilus rebuts Philocosmus's words about timidity and the gap between knowing and doing by turning to the humanist doctrine, reiterated on numerous occasions throughout the century, that only learning can provide a firm enough centre in a man and in a state out of which adequate kinds of responses and actions may issue to deal efficiently with problems in the normal run of events, and more important, in times of stress:
the weapons of the mind
Are states best strengths, and kingdoms chiefest grace.

(11. 841-42)

What stands one in good stead is a knowledge of men's affairs and ideas over a long period in the civilised development of the world. Such knowledge, acquired by study within the broad framework of the humanist curriculum, brings a freedom from the constraints of the contemporary and immediate context; a breadth of vision, an awareness of alternative modes of procedure, an informed mind, and a mature judgement. Musophilus speaks of

sound deseignes that judgment shal decree
Out of a true discern, of the cleare wayes
That lie direct, with safe-going equitie
Imbroyling not their owne & others dayes.
Extending forth their providence beyond
The circuit of their owne particular.

(11. 887-92)

He commends

grave and learn'd experience
That lookes with th' eyes of all the world beside,
And with all ages holdes intelligence.

(11. 915-17)

The conclusion is firm:

No state standes sure but on the grounds of Right,
Of vertue, knowledge, judgement to preserve,
And all the powres of learnings requisite.

(11. 922-24)
Musophilus's argument is persuasive in maintaining that the learned man can make a valuable contribution to the administration of the state, yet the tenor of his words is idealistic, and, to echo Caspari's remarks on Erasmus's advice to princes, his views suffer from 'a detachment and lack of concreteness which ... [stand] in the way of a practical application of his ideas'. Indeed, Erasmus and Daniel share certain characteristics in these matters. Philocosmus's assertions that men of learning are hesitant and fail to integrate their knowledge with action, that the learned man cannot actually 'both speak and do' (1. 836), have not been fully disproved because not confronted with concrete examples of how ideas are to be translated into action. The rather vague nature of Musophilus's claims becomes apparent if one reflects briefly on the uneasy relation of learning to state service throughout the sixteenth century: the questions posed by Philocosmus prompt this reflection, reaching back as they do into many of the perennial problems faced by the humanist movement.

Historians have shown that the humanists played an important role in the building of the commonwealth, and of the idea of the commonwealth, in the first half of the sixteenth century. Humanist doctrines influenced thinking about a wide range of topics clustered around the notion of the commonwealth, and, more specifically, humanist writers and thinkers themselves often volunteered for or were pressed into state service, notably by Thomas Cromwell in the early 'thirties when the need for an apologetic (in English as well as Latin) for Henry's break with Rome became a matter of urgent necessity, but also whenever the opportunity arose to buttress political designs with the doctrines of reform. The humanists, committed to social and religious
reforms, and convinced that learning was a key factor in bringing them about, took their chances to speak out when they could. But the involvement in the world of politics had certain consequences and produced many problems for the humanists. Naturally of a scholarly predisposition, they had to learn to come out of their studies and engage directly with a world run according to the exigencies of everyday state affairs and thus often far removed from the idealistic principles which lay at the heart of the humanist movement in Northern Europe: the men of learning had to 'adapt' their ideals, and this, as G.K. Hunter has pointed out, placed them in a very weak position.

Since Humanism was concerned to point spiritual energies and enthusiasms into this world, and so to ameliorate its condition, it deprived the scholar of his natural refuge in contempt of the practical world. For this very reason, as English history moves forward, and as the Humanists seem to move nearer to their ideal of a philosophical state, so their involvement in politics becomes more crippling: their natural instinct as scholars is to remain theorists (even if theorists of practical affairs), but the philosophy of scholarship within which they are operating keeps them from retiring altogether. Their position vis-à-vis any opportunist politician (like Wolsey or Henry VIII) who wished to use them as official apologists was thus fatally weak, and was ruthlessly exploited.  

Many humanists were able to make the necessary adjustments, and of course there were many men who did not think of themselves primarily as 'humanists' (in the sense that More, Elyot, or Starkey did: as being part of a corporate group who shared interests, aims, and convictions which shaped their lives), but who had studied many of
the works recommended by the humanists and were interested in a number of the same topics as they were, and such men were quite willing to make what shifts they could within the world of practical politics. This seems often to be the case after the first couple of generations of humanists. The men Daniel admired - Greville and Mountjoy - were able to marry learning and an active political career without undue moral strain; and it is probably the example of Mountjoy that Daniel had in mind when he was framing the arguments about learning and action put forward by Musophilus. 32

For the early humanists, however, the nature of the link between knowledge and action (particularly state service) was a perennial problem and caused a lot of soul-searching. The problem comprised several interwoven questions: what should the balance be between learning and practical activity? can knowledge lead to action? should knowledge be used in a practical way and, if so, can this be done without jeopardizing the integrity of the learned man? to what extent will the advice of the learned man be heeded? These questions were given a thorough airing early on in the sixteenth century in one of the classic humanist texts, More's *Utopia* (1516), where, in Book I, Raphael, More and Giles argue about the degree to which the humanist scholar is compromised by entering the service of the prince. Raphael, taking a hard line, maintains that the scholar always will be put in impossible situations because what he has to say the prince will not want to hear. 33 The other two insist that the humanist should use his learning for the good of the common weal, which was of course a central humanist doctrine, but Raphael will not accept this and talks them down, though their arguments remain in our minds. In one way the problem is solved
in Book II where we are told that the officials in Utopia are drawn from among the learned (the philosophers are kings), but this is only satisfying in terms of Utopian order and provides no solution in More's real world where he was trying to decide whether he should enter the service of Henry or Wolsey. Here is epitomized the crucial gap between fiction and actuality. 34

A similar debate to that in Utopia takes place in another important humanist text, A Dialogue Between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset (1533-36), written by Thomas Starkey, who has been called 'a major thread of continuity' linking Cromwell with the humanist tradition of the More circle. 35 In the Dialogue, Lupset urges Pole to use his learning in state service. Pole defends the contemplative life, but his opponent's arguments are more cogent, and Pole eventually offers himself for action:

albeit that high philosophy and contemplation of nature be of itself a greater perfection of man's mind, as it which is the end of the active life, to the which all men's deeds should ever be referred, yet the meddling with the causes of the common weal is more necessary and ever rather and first to be chosen, as the principal mean whereby we may attain to the other. 36

As Ferguson remarks in his study of these matters, the humanists were faced not so much with a choice between active involvement in worldly affairs and contemplation, as between 'the life of the scholar whose learning is potentially useful, but must be applied in order to realize its potentiality, and that of the learned man who is willing to apply it in the service of the state.' 37
Two other points need to be considered. First, that in entering state service learned men were often exposing themselves to danger: political expediency led to repression of free speech and changes of policy, which could leave the learned frustrated or stranded, and faced with the choice of remaining silent, 'adapting' their views again, or speaking out at risk of punishment. The case of More, though obviously not a straightforward clash between learning and politics, stood as a dire warning here. While humanists in optimistic mood would often claim, like Richard Pace, that 'To serve one's country exceeds all freedom', in more sober moments they were likely to follow Pole in reflecting on how some wise men 'were put in exile and banished from their country, some put in prison and miserably handled, and some to cruel and shameful death.' In the late 'forties, the writer of *A Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England* (probably Sir Thomas Smith), reflecting on the decline in numbers of learned men, asked

> have you not seen how many learned men have been put to trouble of late, within these xii or xvi years, and all for declaring their opinions in things that have risen in controversy? ... A man will rather put his child to that science, that may bring him to better fruit as this, or what scholar shall have any courage to study to come to this end?

The second point is the question of the extent to which the learned did have an influence. The ubiquity of humanist ideas and ways of proceeding by the second half of the century shows clearly enough that there was an influence, but, as my earlier quotation
from Hunter suggests, only at some cost to original humanist ideals. Ferguson remarks on the often illusory nature of the humanists' belief that they were having a real effect on policies, and even Elton, in his study of the connections between learned men and Cromwell, where he emphasizes that 'the situation was more personal and purely intellectual' and 'less exclusively political, than is commonly understood', suggests that there were grave inadequacies in the humanists' presentation of their ideas, a lack of specificity and a misdirection, and that, in spite of certain achievements, 'the bulk of what was done did not bear much relation to the treatises of the ardent intellectuals but dealt with this or that detail of public life, in a manner long familiar.'

Thus, behind such remarks as Elyot's that 'the ende of all doctrine and studie is good counsayle'; or the Doctor's in A Discourse that a kyngdome is not so muche wonne or kept by the manhoode or force of men as it is by wisdome and pollicie, which is gotten chefly by learninge - behind such remarks lay a complex situation that engendered a substantial amount of debate. The type of criticisms Philocosmus levels at Musophilus reminds us of this, yet the terms and tone in which Musophilus deals with the issues raised indicate a failure to acknowledge the problematic nature of humanist claims that the learned man can 'both speak and do', and Musophilus's position seems a somewhat tenuous one, detached, vague, and idealistic.

This becomes more striking if we turn, by way of comparison, to Greville's analysis of Elizabethan politics in the Life of Sidney. Greville's account is realistic and pragmatic; he recognizes, as John Danby noted, that 'Government was the rational use of an assortment of irrationals', and that 'Society is a machine that requires manipulation and control.' For Greville, Elizabeth herself is the
consummate manipulator; she is learned as well as naturally gifted and highly experienced; and these attributes are fully integrated with one another and flexible in their interrelations.

Reflecting on the developing relations between learning and politics in England during the sixteenth century, therefore, leads to some scepticism about the efficacy of Musophilus's prescriptions, and indeed about the actual appropriateness of such ideas to the political and intellectual environment in the late 1590s. If we go further into the poem and its ideas, this sense of the inappropriate increases.

When one looks at the poem overall, the case for learning as something practically efficacious seems in fact to be a secondary concern of Daniel's: his chief interest lies in the notion that through learning one may develop the self and ultimately achieve intellectual freedom from the base values of men in general; one may build up an inner strength and resilience which has its own pure standards and which enables one to see the world with clear eyes for what it is. Knowledge offers to those who serve her 'the privy kay'

To let them in unto the hiest stage
Of causes, secrets, Counceils; to survay
The wits of men, their heats, their colds, their rage,
That build, destroy, praise, hate, say and gainesay;
Believe, and unbelieve, all in one age.

(11. 636-40)

The learned man, dedicated to the pursuit of understanding, is conceived of as being outside or, more accurately, above all the confused and idle occupations of terrestrial existence: we remember that Daniel
speaks of 'these times of dissolution'; the learned man seeks stability in the midst of uncertainty.

Early in the poem Daniel equates poetry with virtue (1. 23), and much of Musophilus's argument rests on the premise that the learned man, the poet in particular, is the virtuous man. It is virtue that 'hath raisd so hie/Those that be hers, that they may sit and see/The earth below them' (ll. 611-13), enabling her chosen ones to measure man 'by himselfe not by his show' (1. 620). Virtue has a distinctive quality of self-sufficiency:

Having reward dwelling within her gate,
And glory of her own to furnish it.
Her selfe a recompense sufficient
Unto her selfe, to give her owne content.

(ll. 607-10)

The source for this view is Seneca, a substantial influence on Daniel, especially in the idea that man can raise himself above humanity and make a citadel of his mind. In the verse epistle, 'To The Lady Margaret, Countesse of Cumberland', Daniel wrote:

He that of such a height hath built his minde,
And rear'd the dwelling of his thoughts so strong
As neither Feare nor Hope can shake the frame
Of his resolved powres, nor al the winde
Of Vanitie or Malice, pierce to wrong
His setled peace, or to disturbe the same
What a faire seate hath he from whence hee may
The boundlesse wastes, and weilds of man survay.

The danger of such a philosophy if acted upon is that it effectively cuts one off from most of the human race. This is what troubled
Cicero, a key figure for the humanists, about Stoic doctrines. He was deeply concerned with the role the learned man could play in the service of the state, and he felt that the orator must not espouse such doctrines as the Stoics propounded because he should be of the people not removed from them. Montaigne too, caught up increasingly by the notion that nothing should usurp a sympathetic involvement with men and affairs as they actually are, refuted this very doctrine of Seneca's in the strongest terms:

'Oh, what a vile and abject thing is man (saith he) unless he raise himselfe above humanity!' Observe here a notable speech and a profitable desire; but likewise absurd .... that man should mount over and above himselfe or humanity; for he cannot see but with his owne eyes, nor take hold but with his owne armes.

Montaigne's thought evolved steadily away from Stoic philosophy simply because it did not accord with his experience of the world and isolated him in his own mind. The questions that must be levelled at Daniel, when he advances his ideals of virtue and self-reliance, are whether he is not closing his mind to a whole range of human activity, and, on the assumption that he is, whether such a position is the best one on which to build a belief that the learned man may play an active part in society. Given the nature of Philocosmus's criticism of Musophilus's beliefs, and the actual social and political conditions which lay behind that criticism, these are questions which may fairly be put. Daniel's conception of learning is in many ways a rich one, but it tends also to be exclusive and therefore in a basic way limited. Moreover, Daniel tends to recoil from many things and to construct small mental
fortresses to keep himself safe.

Near the beginning of the poem Daniel writes:

Be it that my unseasonable song
Come out of time, that fault is in the time,
And I must not do vertue so much wrong
As love her ought the worse for others crime.

(11. 21-4)

This is a confident assumption and shows the degree of faith he is willing to bring to his art. It also bears witness to the basic notion in Daniel's mind of the opposition between those who 'love this sacred arte' (1. 16) and those who do not. The vocabulary employed to describe each group and its concerns conveys strong value-judgements (11. 15-26): poetry is 'sacred', it is equated with virtue, Musophilus calls his mind 'unafflicted', feeding on 'no unholy thoughts'; those who appreciate his poetry are 'blessed spirits', while those who do not are conceived of as committing a 'crime'. He speaks further on of 'th' unnaturall and waiward race/Borne of one wombe with us, but to our shame' (11. 201-2). It is very much a conception of the sanctified and the unsanctified; the former group including presumably people who think like Musophilus about poetry, learning, and an implied range of germane subjects, the latter group being constituted, as far as one can tell (Daniel is never wholly explicit), of materialists and pragmatists, such as Philocosmus, the vulgar people, and generally those whose attitudes do not accord with those endorsed by the poet. This way of looking at poetry and its adherents or enemies is established firmly in the early stages of the poem: Musophilus answers Philocosmus's first criticisms in the following way:
Do not profane the worke of doing well,
Seduced man, that canst not looke so hie
From out that mist of earth as thou canst tell
The wayes of right, which vertue doth descrie,
That over-lookes the base, contemptible,
And low-laid follies of mortalitie:
Nor meate out truth and right-deserving prayse,
By that wrong measure of confusion
The vulgar foote: that never takes his wayes
By reason, but by imitation;
Rowling on with the rest, and never way's
The course which he should go, but what is gone.

Well were it with mankind, if what the most
Did like were best, but ignorance will live
By others square, as by example lost;
And man to man must th' hand of errour give.

(11. 87-102)

This is a key passage. The idea is of the profanation of something sacred, and the inevitable propagation of ignorance and error when matters are pulled down into the 'mist of earth'; it is an idea that is the natural correlative to the fear of confusion and of the vulgar multitude expressed regularly throughout the poem.

The fear of the 'many-headed monster thing' was widespread amongst the educated and upper classes of the sixteenth century, and had a long pedigree. The general hostility to the common people has been well documented in recent years, so there is no need here for a survey of the ground. But what it is pertinent to remark on in this context is the way learned poets, in defending their vocation and defining their role, fell back on the tradition of disdain for the masses. This is a topic I shall discuss fully in the next two chapters,
where it will be observed how and why the Renaissance poet developed an exalted sense of his status; here we need only note that this sense made poets especially hostile towards those who could not understand the sacred calling, and who would inevitably profane it. The common people were not the only threat of course: philistines could be found in any rank of society, and Daniel is undoubtedly concerned to defend standards of excellence against any who would lower them. However, although there were dangers for the true poet from within educated and socially privileged circles — from hack writers, for instance, from those who wrote licentious verse, and from those who wanted learning made more widely available rather than kept the preserve of a cultured élite — the mass of largely uneducated common folk constituted perhaps the most easily identifiable source of profanation. Several factors are involved here: it is partly a matter of the customary defence of their territory, their 'mysteries', by the members of a 'guild' of craftsmen — in this instance, poets; it is also in large measure a question of genuine anxiety about the consequences of expanding educational provision during this period, for to make learning widely available was to enter unknown social, political, and religious domains. Poets adopted a conservative position on these issues, seeing themselves as belonging to an intellectual aristocracy at a time when there was a gathering movement towards at least some measure of democracy. In Spenser's work antidemocratic tendencies, both intellectual and political, are ubiquitous and are closely linked to his sense of being a chosen figure writing for an élite. This is also the case with Chapman, who wrote:
The prophane multitude I hate, & onelie consecrate
my strange Poems to these serching spirits, whom learning
hath made noble, and nobilitie sacred.  

Musophilus's unease about 'the vulgar foote' as a standard of judgement is extended to learning as a whole, and later on he can be found lamenting the overthrow of 'that holy reverent bound/That parted learning and the laiety,/And laid all flat in common' (ll. 691-93); this 'did so much invile the estimate/Of th' opened and invulgard mysteries', which are 'now reduc'd unto the basest rate' (ll. 695-97). As with the general hostility to the common people, this related attitude had a long history. It is to be found in the humanist movement from its beginnings. The sort of attitude embodied in Daniel's lines easily issues out into such prejudice and condescension as Musophilus's remarks about 'some unlettered practique .../Leaving beyond the Alpes faith and respect,/To God and man', and 'impious cunning' (ll. 863-65). Daniel believed that learning was to be guarded from the vulgar, that she was a chaste goddess who admitted only a select group of minds to her presence. Always afraid of disorder, Daniel might have been reacting against what he saw a dangerous radicalism. Christopher Hill has argued that there was a definite network of connections between the growth of learning amongst mechanicians and artisans, the scientists connected with Gresham College, and radical thought in religion, politics, and education. Certainly Daniel, in the sixth book of The Civile Wars (1595-1609), writes angrily about Jack Cade's rebellion ('As if Confusion could Disorder mend' - stanza 1), and shortly after we find his thoughts turning to what he calls 'swelling Sciences, the gifts of griefe' (st. 35), which enable
men to see all things 'but what is right'. He is talking here specifically about an uncontrolled quest for knowledge leading men away from religious truth, and the undisciplined application of learning leading to contention and mischief, but he regularly relates what he judges to be disorder in learning to disorder in the wider sphere of society as a whole—in Musophilus for instance:

- see how soone this rowling world can take 
  Advantage for her dissolution,
  Faine to get loose from this withholding stake
  Of civill science and discretion:
  How glad it would run wilde, that it might make 
  One formelesse forme of one confusion?

(11. 677-82)

He goes on in The Civile Wars to make a firm link between learning in the hands of the wrong people ('the vulgar') and the breaking out of discord and violence. Printing, seen by Bacon as one of those technical achievements which gave evidence of man's great advance in knowledge, and as the vital means of communicating old and new ideas, Daniel sees as an instrument of the forces of dissension, the medium through which contradiction and confusion may be spread abroad with more alacrity than ever before (st. 37): it is the means

- Whereby the vulgar may become so wise,
  That (with a self-presumption over-growne)
  They may of deepest mysteries debate,
  Controule their betters, censure actes of State.

(st. 38)

It is possible that Daniel was speaking directly against Bacon
here, for one of the other inventions the latter applauded was gunpowder, (the third was the compass,61) and Daniel, in the next group of stanzas in Book VI of The Civile Wars, goes on to inveigh against that too.

It is clear then that Daniel related democratic trends in the world of learning to rebellion and discord in society, and in this was defending a traditional position against a new current of thought that was establishing itself during the sixteenth century.62 It is in the nature of his position (as it was of Chapman's and Spenser's) that he should offer his ideal of poetry and learning to us in quasi-religious terms, which indicate the distance between the learned few and 'the idle multitude', 'This many-headed monster' (Civile Wars, II, 12), and which preserve a due sense of mystery around the hallowed truth. But the vocabulary of religious ceremony, merely asserted, has a hollow ring about it, and may be judged to be part of an attempt at mystification where rational argument related to actual circumstances is no longer operating.

I have suggested that Daniel takes up this position because of his fears about anarchy and dissolution in the state. The well-established intellectual tradition of despising the multitude and the uninitiated provides him with a way of expressing his worries and of gaining a sense of security by identifying with a group opposed to those who destroy, a group who adhere to traditional and elitist values. However, his response to notions of what might constitute acceptable or unacceptable advance (intellectual and/or social), and the relation of that advance to concepts of order, rests on a complex state of mind, and one more element - a fundamental one - needs to be noted.
In the first instance we may remember Daniel's pronounced recoil from his age: he speaks in the prefatory sonnet to \textit{Musophilus} of 'these times of dissolution' (1.16), and elsewhere of 'th' infection of distempred daies' (\textit{Musophilus}, 1.172). His response to the times in which he lived was somewhat erratic; I noted earlier his confidence in the powers of the moderns when compared to the ancients, and in the last stages of the poem \textit{Musophilus} talks spiritedly of the role of the learned man in shaping and guiding society. But the counter sense of diffidence and unease over the state of the country and over the general predicament of human kind lies deeper in the poem, and can be felt behind the confident assertions about the powers of eloquence and the continuity of learning from one generation to the next. Such assertions are necessary statements militating against the fear

That all this little All, might ... descend
Into the darke a universall pray.

(11.37-8)\textsuperscript{63}

\textit{Musophilus} discourses at length (in 11.105-30) on the instability of the human condition, and then more particularly on the dissolution of his own times: (he has been writing about Chaucer)

But whereas he came planted in the spring,
    And had the Sun, before him, of respect;
    We set in th' Autumn, in the withering,
    And sullen season of a cold defect,
    Must taste those soure distastes the times do bring,
    Upon the fulnesse of a cloid neglect.

(11.165-70)

These were common feelings in the late sixteenth century, and often
ran deeper than a mere discontent with local conditions. Daniel, like Donne and many others, when speaking of the decline of his age, involves the natural world in his view, as if something had gone wrong fundamentally; so he writes:

For now great Nature hath laid down at last
   That mighty birth, wherewith so long she went
   And overwent the times of ages past,
   Here to lie in, upon our soft content,
   Where fruitful she, hath multiplied so fast,
   That all she hath on these times, seem'd t' have spent.
All that which might have many ages grac'd,
   Is borne in one, to make one cloud with all.

(11. 247-54)

This passage should be related to my earlier remarks about the disquiet felt by writers in the face of the flood of printed matter, and the subsequent concern over standards, directions and purposes in the world of letters.

The workings of Nature recorded in 11. 247-54 have resulted in a state of society

Where plenty hath impressed a deep distaste,
Of best and worst, and all in general:
That goodnes seems, goodnes to have defac't,
And virtue hath to virtue given the fall.

(11. 255-58)

So feares this humorous world, that evermore
Rapt with the Current of a present course,
Runs into that which laie contemned before;
Then glutted leaves the same, and falls t'a worse:

....
Straight all that holie was unhallowed lies,
The scattered carcasses of ruined vowes:
Then truth is false, and now hath blindnes eies,
Then zeale trusts al, now scarcely what it knows.

(11. 283-86 and 289-92)

The vision is one of widespread and powerful confusion, attributable initially to a fault in nature.

In relation to this we may also note the sense of transience of human existence recorded in the poem ('Short-breath'd mortalitie', 1. 33), and the discomfort at the fact of the diversity and contradiction built into the fabric of human existence. Daniel's fear of disorder operates on many levels.

It is because he regards life in this way that he sees learning as assisting men

To hold out with the greatest might they may
Against confusion that hath all in chase,
To make of all a universal pray.

(11. 244-46)

This is the second time he has used this phraseology (see 11. 37-8, quoted above), and he employed it again in the dedication of Cleopatra, which suggests a degree of obsession with the idea.

Against the shifting nature of man's life Daniel asserts in the first place the stoical ideal of the resilient self, the strong inner centre that can withstand the blows of the world:

the stronger constitutions shall
Weare out th' infection of distempred daies.
And come with glory to out-live this fall.

(11. 171-73)
Daniel creates a network of assurances to set against the fear of disorder. Another thread he weaves into this pattern is the notion of poetry being something sure and of relative stability: 'the words thou scornest now', Musophilus tells Philocosmus,

May live, the speaking picture of the mind,
The extract of the soule that laboured how
To leave the image of her selfe behind,
Wherein posteritie that love to know
The just proportion of our spirits may find.

(11. 177-82)

The idea that 'It was the poet who held the key to glory, that is to say to victory over death', is a widely familiar one, not least because of Shakespeare's use of it in the Sonnets.\(^{65}\) It was an idea firmly linked to Cicero's notion, made much of by the humanists in Italy, that literature can create continuity between successive ages.\(^{66}\) Daniel builds this idea into his poem too:

O blessed letters that combine in one
All ages past, and make one live with all,
By you we do confer with who are gone,
And the dead living unto councell call:
By you th' unbome shall have communion
Of what we feele, and what doth us befall.

(11. 189-94)
The learned man is nourished by the writings of those who have gone before, and, in his turn, feeds those who come after: it is a vision of a living community of learned men whose thoughts can direct the progress of the civilised world. Musophilus is caught up by the idea and breaks out eloquently:

Soule of the world, knowledge, without thee,
What hath the earth that truly glorious is?
Why should our pride make such a stir to be,
To be forgot? what good is like to this,
To do worthy the writing, and to write
Worthy the reading, and the worlds delight?

(11. 195-200)\(^7\)

The word 'forgot' in 1. 198 prompts us to recall the other aspect of Daniel's position, the belief that written words—poetry or learning, or both—carry a man's name on into perpetuity. Bacon wrote of the same idea and pinpointed the reason why people are so interested in it:

let us conclude with the dignity and excellency of knowledge and learning in that whereunto man's nature doth most aspire; which is immortality or continuance; for to this tendeth generation, and raising of houses and families; to this buildings, foundations, and monuments; to this tendeth the desire of memory, fame, and celebration; and in effect, the strength of all other human desires.... the images of men's wits and knowledges remain in books, exempted from the wrong of time and capable of perpetual renovation. Neither are they fitly to be called images, because they generate still, and cast their seeds in the minds of others, provoking and causing infinite actions and opinions in succeeding ages.\(^8\)
The same concept of the dynamic force of learning is conveyed in Musophilus, and Daniel is certainly interested in being remembered by his works; in the extended passage about Stonehenge he anticipates Bacon's words when the latter comments that 'the monuments of wit and learning are more durable than the monuments of power or of the hands.' Musophilus remarks too that stones cannot preserve the memory of a man's life and thought as the written word can (see 11. 325 ff). Philocosmus questions this notion, as we saw earlier, and, under the pressure of his scepticism, Musophilus narrows his ambitions a good deal and maintains that it is enough for the poet or learned man to have a select audience, 'the few that onely lend their care' (1. 555). He returns to his aristocratic standpoint again here:

That few is all the world, which with a few
Doth ever live, and move, and worke and stirre,
This is the heart doth feel and onely know
The rest of all, that onely bodies beare
Rowle up and downe, and fill but up the row.
And serve as others members not their own,
The instruments of those that do direct.

(11. 556-62)

The requirement is then further narrowed:

And for my part if onely one allow
The care my labouring spirits take in this,
He is to me a Theatre large ynow,
And his applause only sufficient is:
All my respect is bent but to his brow,
That is my all, and all I am is his.

(11. 567-72)
The distinction being made is between \textit{fama} (reputation) and \textit{oloritas} (the renown which follows virtuous behaviour), and is derived from Seneca: the first is conceived of as a vulgar thing, easily gained, the second as something more refined. The two are not of course mutually exclusive, and, on the evidence of the poem as a whole, it can be said that Musophilus hopes for both, even though the latter is more precious to him. In his strongest moments he can dispense with an audience altogether, viewing himself as a creature of destiny acting out a pre-ordained role:

\begin{quote}
But what if none; it cannot yet undo
The love I beare unto this holy skill:
This is the thing that I was borne to do,
This is my Scene, this part must I fulfill.
\end{quote}

(11. 575-78)

This is to set a high value on the poet, relating him by implication to some divine power. It is a view of the poet which, as I noted earlier, is linked to the references to virtue in the poem: virtue too is self-sufficient:

\begin{quote}
Having reward dwelling within her gate,
And glory of her own to furnish it
Her selfe a recompence sufficient
Unto her selfe, to give her owne content.
\end{quote}

(11. 607-10)

Once more, this is derived from Seneca.\textsuperscript{72} Virtue being pure and in need of nothing outside itself, can only be defiled by contact with the baser world:
Shall she joine hands with such a servile mate,
And prostrate her faire body to commit
Folly with earth, and to defile that state
Of cleereness, for so grosse a benefit?

(11. 603-6)

Daniel's chosen position at some distance from the majority of his fellow men is thus consolidated.

The attitude of mind at the back of these diverse stances is, as I suggested, a complex one. It is in part linked to persistent traits in Daniel's character, but in as much as it indicates a restless searching for assurance and stability in a 'rowling world', it is especially typical of *Musophilus* - a poem written to work out personal attitudes, aims, and beliefs. If we turn to *A Defence of Ryme* (1603), we find Daniel more sanguine, in an Ovidian manner, about the same problems of instability. On the subject of innovation he writes:

But this is but a Character of that perpetuall revolution which we see to be in all things that never remaine the same, and we must heerin be content to submit our selves to the law of time, which in few yeeres wil make al that, for which we now contend, Nothing.

Here he is willing to accept the principle of change that underlies the life of mankind, and it does not disturb him as it seemed to in the passages I have quoted from *Musophilus*. This is more in keeping with the spirit of the prose work, which is a confident piece of writing with an avowed firmness of mind: Daniel is writing with the specific aim of setting Campion to rights. Yet most of his thoughts in this area are cautious, proceeding from a characteristic conservative
temperament:

It is but a fantastike giddinesse to forsake the way of other men, especially where it lies tollerable. 

'But shall we not tend to perfection?' he demands:

Yes, and that ever best by going on in the course we are in, where we have advantage, being so farre onward, of him that is but now setting forth. For we shall never proceede, if we be ever beginning, nor arrive at any certayne Porte, sayling with all windes that blow.

There is a confusion of issues implicit in this: following fashions and every new trend in the world of learning and letters is not the same thing as altering course where it is necessary (in terms of the progress of mankind) to do so. Bacon consistently realized this, saying that men should build on what the classical thinkers or the alchemists had achieved, but should also not hesitate to employ new methods and to reject past procedures. Earlier I noted a couple of occasions on which Daniel said much the same thing, but in the above quotation he does not distinguish between ephemeral preoccupations and fashionable interests on the one hand and the more abiding trends in man's bid for advancement.

Daniel is not against innovation where it is absolutely needed, but, he argues, it is usually gratuitous, and moreover, 'like a Viper, must ever make way into the worlds opinion, thorow the bowelles of her owne breeding', maliciously and only speciously wise. The tendency of thinkers and writers to engage in hostilities with each other is disturbing for Daniel; it is important that, if men of learning are
to affect the world, they should present a united front. We have seen Daniel's fears about 'how soone this rowling world can take/Advantage for her dissolution,'

Faine to get loose from this withholding stake
Of civill science and discretion:
How glad it would run wilde, that it might make
One formless forme of one confusion.

(Musophilus, 11. 677-82)

With chaos lying beneath so dangerously thin a surface order, it is utter folly for 'civill learning', one of the bulwarks of civilization, to 'seeke to wound/And mangle her own members with despight' (11. 207-8). The result can only be that

learning needs must run the common fate
Of all things else, thrust on by her own weight,
Comporting not her selfe in her estate
Under this burthen of a selfe conceipt:
Our own dissentious hands opening the gate
Unto Contempt.

(11. 665-70)

The validity of Daniel's complaints is dependent upon what exactly he has in mind when he writes about strife in the world of learning. If he means the contentious attitude of the later years of the sixteenth century, which issued out into cynicism, satire, and endless quarrelling for its own sake, then his comments are just; but in the light of the deep-seated conservatism of his nature and his general attitude to innovation, it is likely that he is voicing an unease in the presence of the normal cut-and-thrust arguments that
characterize the development of ideas. This latter view gains credence when we consider Daniel's suggestion that

to pull backe th' on-running state of things,

Unto the forme of their first orderings,
Is the best meanes that dissolution stales,
And to go forward backward, right, men brings,
T' observe the line from whence they tooke their waies.

(11. 713 and 715-18)

Bacon's dictum, 'Surely every medicine is an innovation; and he that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils', helps to put Daniel's caution into perspective. Daniel tends to look only backwards, and to rely solely on the medicines concocted by his predecessors.

It must be added, however, that it is not always easy to define exactly what Daniel is recommending: his suggestions are usually lucid and in accord with the general direction in which the poem leads us, but closer scrutiny often results in dissatisfaction over the exact meaning of his words: his recommendations often seem to have a certain hollowness about them. Thus in the last passage quoted, what Daniel writes could well be admirable, if he is, for instance, advising a reconsideration of first principles and the way in which this could help present needs, but we are not carried far enough into the suggestion - its exact purport - to be able to say with assurance that this is what he does mean. We have to rely in the end on our knowledge of Daniel's general characteristics as a thinker in order to place the lines.

Daniel tends then to bring his ideals to a wayward world and to censure that world for its shortcomings: consequently, the learned
man, who embodies the ideals, is not felt to be integrated with the
society he purports to serve. This has been illustrated by reference
to the poem at many points, and is again apparent when we come to the
final seventy or so lines and Musophilus's praise of eloquence and
poetry. Talking of poetry earlier, he had told of 'The love I beare
unto this holy skill':

This is the thing that I was borne to do,
This is my Scene, this part must I fulfill.
(11. 576-78)

Now, in the final stage of his defence against Philocosmus, Musophilus's
praise of poetry is set in the context of a general celebration of
elocuence:

Powre above powres, O heavenly Eloquence,
That with the strong reine of commanding words,
Dost manage, guide, and master th' eminence
Of mens affections, more then all their swords.
(11. 939-42)

Musophilus's trust in eloquence places him (and hence Daniel) in the
main stream of Renaissance humanism. The humanist movement contained
many diverse interests and doctrines, but its identifying characteristic
was the pursuit of eloquence. Moreover, there was a belief amongst
humanists that eloquence and wisdom were not only complementary but
indivisible. The Ciceronian orator, who was for the humanists the
exemplar of what a learned man should be, possessed not just knowledge
but also wide experience and virtue, and these qualities were conveyed
to the world through eloquence; he inspired and influenced men because
of that eloquence: knowledge and understanding uncommunicated, not put
to some practical use, were thought to be barren. The arguments
expounded throughout *Musophilus* about the poet, who is both eloquent
and learned, having something especially valuable to offer society,
are dependent upon these humanist notions, and Daniel often tends to
rely on their familiarity for the cogency of his case when we might
expect him to provide detailed and logically persuasive evidence for
his views.

Hannah Gray points out that the humanists believed that eloquence,
because of its ability to give precepts immediacy, stimulated the will
as well as informing the reason, and so was a more effective instrument
than scholastic logic for shaping people and impelling them towards a
better life. The links between will, reason, and eloquence are clear
in this passage from Vives:

> the Art of Rhetoric ... is of the greatest influence and
weight. It is necessary for all positions in life. For in
man the highest law and government are at the disposal
of will. To the will, reason and judgement are
assigned as counsellors, and the emotions are its torches.
Moreover, the emotions of the mind are enflamed by
the sparks of speech. So, too, the reason is impelled
and moved by speech.

In this section of *Musophilus*, Daniel begins by remarking on
the morally didactic power of eloquence, as we saw in the previous
quotation from the poem (11. 940-42), and again just after:

> Thou that canst do much more with one poor pen
Then all the powres of princes can effect:
And draw, divert, dispose, and fashion men
Better then force or rigour can direct.

(11. 945-48)
The claims he makes are those regularly made for the orator. I have already questioned the practical effectiveness of these notions in late Elizabethan England, and here it is noteworthy that Musophilus once more does not go into detail about the relation of words to deeds but quickly modulates into a sustained burst of patriotic confidence and optimism in English, which, he claims, is at least equal to other languages and might in future 'inrich unknowing Nations' (l. 960) and result in some 'great worke' (l. 963). Joan Rees has called the whole passage (ll. 939-68) 'a superb statement of faith rising to prophecy', and notes its 'sustained passion', but, while acknowledging these characteristics, one might also ask whether, in the light of the problems and questions the poem sets out to tackle, such claims as Musophilus makes are not simply rhetorical (using the word in the depreciatory sense).

Musophilus next moves on to praise poetry, which he calls the 'mother' of eloquence,

That breeds, brings forth, and nourishes this might,  
Teaching it in a loose, yet measured course,  
With comely motions how to go upright :  
And fostering it with bountiful discourse  
Adorns it thus in fashions of delight.  

(ll. 970-74)

Here too, in spite of the attractiveness of the conception, and its currency in the sixteenth century, we are confronted by certain difficulties and inconsistencies in Musophilus's position: a consideration of these will help us to set Daniel's conception of the poet in the right perspective. The learned poet has been presented by
him as a special, rather remote figure, self-sufficient, despising the vulgar, wanting to keep learning from the laity; and this view is confirmed now when Musophilus refers to poetry as 'The speech of heaven' (1. 976), and says that only those who 'seem out of themselves remov'd,
And do with more than humane skils converse' (11. 977-78) are able to have commerce with it. Musophilus, however, while implying the superiority of the poetic use of language over other forms of eloquence, does not make a clear distinction between them: throughout the poem the role Daniel's poet fulfills is close to that of the Ciceronian orator, so admired by the humanists; but was the orator's rhetoric the same as the poet's eloquence? There was some conflation of poetry and rhetoric as forms of eloquence in the sixteenth century, in so far as they employed many of the same rhetorical figures, and to a large extent were described by the same terminology, and in that they shared the same purpose — to teach, to delight, to persuade — for poets a notion derived of course from Horace, but also established by Cicero as the three-fold aim of the orator. It is important to recognize, however, that poetic eloquence differed from that of the orator in certain crucial respects. Looking first at the basic conceptions of the two roles, we should recall that from ancient times it had been remarked that poets are born, and are inspired in a vatic manner, while orators are fashioned; suggesting that poets are naturally eloquent but orators have to learn to be so: Musophilus seems to have such a distinction in mind. Then, Aristotle's doctrine, which was so influential throughout antiquity and in the Renaissance, of poetry as an art of imitation — imitation, not style, being the hallmark of poetry, served to distinguish between the poet and those who expressed themselves
in other forms. On the technical side, writers on rhetoric and poetry had traditionally distinguished between the poet's and the orator's use of ornament and complex language, for the latter aimed always at clarity of expression because he was trying to communicate with as wide and varied an audience as possible, when the former often took no pains over being clear, and indeed at times deliberately chose not to be.

Then again, in the later sixteenth century, books on rhetoric made distinctions between procedures considered appropriate for poets and those for orators or letter-writers. This last point is made by Daniel Javitch in a recent book on Elizabethan poetry and its relation to courtly ideals of conduct. Javitch notes that some modern commentators have confused these procedures, and he goes on to illustrate the essential differences between the poet's and the orator's rhetoric by examining extracts from Puttenham and contrasting them with passages from Peacham, Day, and Hoskins. Javitch remarks particularly on Puttenham's recommendation of indirection and ambiguity in the use of rhetorical figures, while the other handbooks of the period stress the need for clarity of expression. As I noted, this was the traditional distinction made between the arts of the poet and the orator.

Javitch's analysis and conclusions are part of a larger argument about the nature of Elizabethan poetry and the influence on it of the concept of the courtier. Through an examination principally of Cicero's *De oratore*, Castiglione's *Book of the Courtier*, and Puttenham's *Arte of English Poesie*, Javitch shows that the court ethos was inhospitable to the values and purposes of the Ciceronian orator - a man who spoke on democratic principles to all men, and who spoke openly, clearly and often aggressively; but that Castiglione's ideal courtier, with
his interest in the aesthetic presentation of the self through elegant indirection and game-playing, was wholly acceptable in an aristocratic world. Javitch links Puttenham's poetic principles and recommendations to the modes of behaviour propounded by Castiglione, and shows that the Elizabethan court provided amenable circumstances in which contemporary poetry could develop and poets establish a confident sense of their own roles and purposes in late sixteenth-century intellectual life. The claim made by poets that their eloquence was more effective than the orator's, was based on this sense that the upper reaches of society would be more inclined to respond favourably to them than to the politically-motivated orator. Hence Musophilus's animation in the last part of the poem.

What Javitch illustrates is the shift from civic to aesthetic humanism during the sixteenth century in England. It was a shift in emphasis more than in doctrine, though it has to be related to the stifling by the court of the earlier humanists' desire to have political influence and to fashion an ideal state, which I commented on earlier in the chapter. The political, social, religious, and general moral concerns of the first and second generations of English humanists continued to occupy their Elizabethan counterparts, but were articulated in a less zealous and more decorous manner.

I do not want simply to 'place' Daniel as a poet writing within the ideology of the court and courtly poet, as presented by Javitch: it is the mixture of civic and aesthetic humanism and Daniel's uneasy awareness of the often rival demands of each that make Musophilus so interesting. Moreover, the poem does not show an interest in the indirectness of statement, nor in the sophisticated game-playing that Javitch sees as distinguishing characteristics of court-oriented writing.
The poem is also discursive and openly didactic, which sets it at odds with courtly norms, and, in the light of this, it is instructive to consider again Daniel's concluding expressions of disquiet about the nature of the work, which perhaps indicate his sense of the tensions generated by it. Yet, as the evidence presented earlier in this chapter makes clear, the conception of the poet elaborated by Musophilus is an aristocratic one, in that he distinguishes the poet from the ordinary multitude, expresses contempt for them and for the opinion of the world at large, and rejects the demands of Philocosmus that he should take heed of utilitarian issues. The deliberate cultivation of a life-style that would mark him off from the common run of men and ensure that his performance would only be appreciated by his peers was, Javitch maintains, a way for the courtier to consolidate his privileged exclusion.

The life-style associated with the orator, the hero of those humanists with a predominantly civic interest, was markedly different. Cicero, from whom these humanists derived their ideas and inspiration about eloquence as a moral and political instrument, believed that the orator should share the common life of society, accepting its standards and levels of attainment, and speaking in accordance with these and within the intellectual range of the ordinary men who constituted his audience. Consequently, Cicero, as I noted above, rejected the Stoic doctrines Musophilus espouses because he saw they were incompatible with the beliefs of most people. Cicero was primarily concerned with the life of man in society and he was therefore willing to compromise between philosophy, which in its pursuit of truth went beyond the intellectual capacities of most people, and rhetoric, which in the
opinion of philosophers, left the path of truth because of its willingness to operate within the sphere of those with restricted intellectual ability. This is not to say that Cicero did not have a deep interest in the pursuit of wisdom through philosophy - quite the contrary, but he believed in civic responsibility, the involvement of the learned man in society, rather than in a withdrawal from the world to seek the truth, or in an emphasis on the learned man's superiority to his fellows. In contrast, Musophilus is greatly concerned with this superiority, and, although he claims an active social role for the eloquent man, there is much in the poem to suggest that his real sympathies lie first with the fashioning and preservation of the self. While the two concerns (with the self and society) are not of course mutually exclusive - indeed, it was regularly maintained at this time that the two were interdependent and reciprocally nourishing - the amount of time Musophilus gives to establishing the poet's differentness, self-sufficiency, virtue, and, as a corollary, his unease about other people, and the sense of the poet's occupying an embattled position, coupled with the rhetorical cast of Musophilus's professions about the moral power of words, leave one questioning how substantial an answer is really offered to Philocosmus's criticisms. This is the key point. That poetry has moral power is not being denied: it was generally believed from antiquity onwards, and especially in the Renaissance when the moral effects of poetry were often claimed to be its chief purpose. But is poetry as integrated with sixteenth-century society as Musophilus's claims imply? The eloquent and learned poet, as presented in this poem, is not a figure at one with society, and poetic eloquence seems to function at some distance from the concerns of everyday life. Thus,
having spoken of the few who appreciate his poetry, Musophilus refers contemptuously to 'The rest of all, that onely bodies beare', who 'Rowle up and downe, and fill but up the row' (11. 559-60).

Daniel, although aware of the changing requirements of his age, as Philocosmus's arguments show, presents a picture of the poet as a bearer of wisdom for a minority group - a conception which was, by 1599, inappropriate to the broad and rapidly developing character of the world of learning and literature. In his bid to adhere to what he calls 'the left & out-worne course/Of unregarded wayes' (11. 74-5), Daniel stands at the point of change between old and new attitudes to learning and poetry, singing a noble, eloquent, but troubled song to a world moving too quickly to stop and listen.

* * * * * * *

Daniel's dedication of Musophilus to Fulke Greville may, in the light of what I have written, appear rather ironic, for Greville, as the author of A Treatie of Humane Learning, is to be placed in the Philocosmus camp rather than seen as a supporter of Musophilus's views, though one must add that Greville's ideas about learning are worked out in far more detail than Philocosmus's, and are not narrow or merely utilitarian as his are.

Greville, many of whose ideas can be related to those of his contemporary, Bacon, inveighs against 'uselesse dreamers' who only bring a commonwealth to a state of decline. 99 The man who lurks too long in the cobwebs of the arts 'Doth like him that buyes tooles, but never works.' (102)
... the active, necessarie Arts,
ought to be briefe in bookes, in practise longe.

(68)

... Contemplation doth the world distract,
With vaine Ideas, which it cannot act.

(69)

There is probably a play here on the Platonic meaning of 'Ideas':
Greville is at one with Bacon in questioning their validity; and,
like Bacon's, his attitude grows out of a markedly Protestant orient¬
ation with regard to learning, which was in fundamental ways at odds
with humanism in its courtly manifestations, and with the entire
Platonic approach to knowledge and experience. Stanza 118 of
*Humane Learning*, which is one of a group of stanzas in favour of
action and against contemplation, demands that man should

awake that dreaming vaine abuse
Of lines, without breadth; without feathers, wings:
So that their boundlesnesse may be,
In Workes, and Arts of our Humanity.

Elsewhere in the poem (stanzas 1 and 2) Greville mocks Neoplatonic
thories of the gradual ascent of the mind to the divine *mens*, and
these lines from stanza 118 are a sarcastic reference to the supposedly
soaring intellect which knows no limits, but which in Greville's view
is profoundly limited by virtue of man's corruption and God's unfathom¬
able vastness. While I am not suggesting that Daniel was a Platonist,
his inclination towards detachment from mundane affairs would not have
met with the approval of a man who spoke so fiercely against Platonism.
Referring back to the previous quotation, we should note the implications of the words 'dreaming vaine abuse', when evaluated from the Protestant standpoint: vanity, as one sees often enough in writings on learning, was judged by writers of a Protestant cast in intellectual matters to be a fundamental and inevitable weakness of those who sought after knowledge.

The last line of the quotation ("In Workes, and Arts of our Humanity") is also an important one in defining Greville's position in relation to Daniel’s, and indeed to Chapman’s and Spenser’s, as I have claimed an anti-Platonic stance for Greville. Human learning must be applied to human affairs; it is not permitted to stray outside the material world—a notion familiar enough in sixteenth-century writings on learning; 'Workes' are essential: our efforts must be directed outwards for the good of our fellows. 'Humanity' in the line has two functions: it is both restricting and broadening: restricting in the sense that it pulls the contemplative or self-involved mind back to other people and forbids the intellect to wander beyond the bounds of this world and its needs; broadening in as much as it urges the mind to free itself from the prison of the self and of self-advancement through the arts and learning, and to turn to the shared needs of the community, which can be answered by the practical application of knowledge. Here again Greville is to be related to Bacon, not only in terms of the common debt to Protestant teaching regarding learning, but also in the recognition that the use of what we know should be the most important concern to contemporary men of learning, and the germane realisation that knowledge also can be and is being carried forward by a wider variety of people and occupations than the sapiens or scholar. Once
more this puts Greville at odds with Daniel. Greville writes:

The grace, and disgrace of this following traine,
Arithmetike, Geometrie, Astronomy,
Rests in the Artisans industrie, or veine,
Not in the Whole, the Parts, or Symmetrie.

(116)

The reformation of learning, which is what Greville is pressing for, the retention of what vigour it has in it, must be managed through each profession of Humanity, Military, and mysteries Mechanicall:

Whereby their abstract formes yet atomis'd,
May be embodied; and by doing pris'd.

(120)

Knowledge should be applied in the construction of buildings for public and private use, in warfare, surveying, navigation, and husbandry (121).

For thus, these Arts passe, whence they came, to life,
Circle not round in selfe-imagination,
Begetting Lines upon an abstract wife,
As children borne for idle contemplation;
But in the practise of mans wisdome give,
Meanes, for the Worlds inhabitants to live.

(122)

'God made all for use', proclaims Greville (71).

His attitude, then, stems from his religious convictions, but it comes also from social awareness, a willingness to recognize and
further those democratic trends in learning which were beginning to emerge at this time. Greville's commitment to these trends is most clearly stated in stanzas 72 and 73:

where Learning, like a Caspian Sea,  
Hath hitherto receiv'd all little brookes,  
Devour'd their sweetnesse, borne their names away,  
And in her greenesse hid their chrystall lookes;  
Let her turne Ocean now, and give backe more  
To those cleare Springs, than she receiv'd before.

Let her that gather'd rules Emperiall,  
Out of particular experiments,  
And made meere contemplation of them all,  
Apply them now to speciall intents;  
That she, and mutuall Action, may maintaine  
Themselves, by taking, what they give againe.

The orientation is plainly different from the one from which Musophilus speaks.

Also different is Greville's attitude towards eloquence. In stanza 107 he claims that rhetoric

Is growne a Siren in the formes of pleading,  
Captiving reason, with the painted skinne  
Of many words; with empty sounds misleading  
Us to false ends, by these false forms abuse,  
Brings never forth that Truth, whose name they use.

Whereas 'the true Art of Eloquence'

Is not this craft of words, but formes of speech,  
Such as from living wisdomes doe proceed;  
Whose ends are not to flatter, or beseech,  
Insinuate, or perswade, but to declare  
What things in Nature good, or evill are.
Greville's view is a more severely moral one than Daniel's, and geared to his overriding didactic purpose: while Daniel is entranced by words and their power, Greville is deeply suspicious of them because they can be so abused.

Greville's approach to learning and his concept of the poet is as interesting and complex as Daniel's, and in *A Treatie of Humane Learning* one discovers a similar mixture of optimism about learning and a troubled questioning of its value to the one apparent in *Musophilus*. But Greville's poem rests on assumptions, beliefs, and doctrines quite different from those which inform Daniel's. Chapters five, six and seven of this thesis are devoted to exploring the social and intellectual matrix out of which *Humane Learning* arose, and to a close examination of Greville's views on learning and the poet. Before that, however, I want to provide a more detailed context in which to set *Musophilus*, so that Daniel's conception of his role as a learned poet may be more thoroughly understood, and the strengths and weaknesses of his ideas traced to the ideology which generated and nurtured them: hence the next two chapters are a study of certain aspects of the relation between poetry and learning in the sixteenth century. This will also prepare the ground for the interpretation of Greville's ideas in the subsequent chapters.
Chapter Three

Spenser and Chapman
If it may stand with your most wisht content,
I can refell opinion, and approve
The state of poesie, such as it is,
Blessed, aeternall, and most true devine:
Indeede if you will looke on Poesie,
As she appeares in many, poore and lame,
Patcht up in remnants and olde worne ragges,
Halfe starv'd for want of her peculiar foode,
Sacred invention, then I must conferme,
Both your conceite and censure of her merrite.
But view her in her glorious ornaments,
Attired in the maiestie of arte,
Set high in spirite with the precious taste
Of sweete philosophie, and which is most,
Crownd with the rich traditions of a soule,
That hates to have her dignitie prophand,
With any relish of an earthly thought:
Oh then how proud a presence doth she beare.
Then is she like her selfe, fit to be seene
Of none but grave and consecrated eyes:
Nor is it any blemish to her fame,
That such leane, ignorant, and blasted wits,
Such brainlesse guls, should utter their stolne wares
With such aplauses in our vulgar eares:
Or that their slubberd lines have currant passe,
From the fat judgements of the multitude,
But that this barren and infected age,
Should set no difference twixt these empty spirits,
And a true Poet : then which reverend name,
Nothing can more adorne humanitie.

(Ben Jonson, *Every Man in his Humour*, (1598), V,iii, 314-43).
Daniel was not alone among the leading poets of later Elizabethan and Jacobean England in feeling he was in a somewhat isolated and threatened position, and in adopting defensive measures. Spenser and Chapman shared Daniel's troubled awareness that, as learned poets, they needed to ward off a ubiquitous enemy and to consolidate their own sense of belonging to a small, enlightened circle of those with true understanding and virtue. The object of this chapter is to bring this aspect of their writings into focus. I have therefore concentrated on certain texts that best exemplify my argument, though I have also endeavoured not to let selectivity become distortion.

Both Spenser and Chapman sound a note of alarm in a much more strident fashion than Daniel, and at times let their fears intrude into their compositions in a way that becomes artistically damaging, which is something Daniel did not do. (Sidney was probably too poetically confident and socially assured to be deeply troubled by a sense of the surrounding philistines: the Apology for Poetry is relaxed and even playful at times, for all its serious intent, and the real anxieties in Astrophil and Stella are not to be found in those sonnets that concern themselves with literary matters, such as inferior kinds of verse or criticisms of his own poetry.\(^1\)) However, in some of Spenser's and most of Chapman's writings on the subject of the poet, learning, and the role and nature of poetry in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, a sense of the poet occupying a beleaguered citadel is striking. The energy of the defence, and indeed the level of vituperation in the remarks made about the misomousoi, stand in direct relation to the degree of worth accorded to the poet by the defender, and we must therefore consider the two writers' conceptions of the
The poet's role as well as studying their perception of the enemy and how he was to be repelled.

The high estimation Spenser set on the role of the poet is well known, and is not therefore a topic that needs to be discussed at great length here. His most famous statement about his high didactic and moral intentions comes in the letter to Ralegh in 1589 about *The Faerie Queene*, when he talks of fashioning 'a gentleman or noble person in vertuous and gentle discipline', and links himself to some of the foremost classical and Renaissance poets - Homer, Virgil, Ariosto, and Tasso. From the outset of his career he had great designs for himself as a poet, and viewed his calling with reverence. As William Nelson remarked, 'the form of the first publication of *The Shepheardes Calender* was intended to impress the reader with a sense of the importance of the work', while 'Spenser's choice of [pastoral] to introduce himself as the "new poet" betrays his soaring ambition. He had decided to make of his career an *imitatio Vergilis*. His aspirations are evident particularly in the October eclogue, where, although Cuddie does not, as E.K. claims, represent 'the perfecte paterne of a Poete', the characteristics, aims, and orientation of the ideal poet are conveyed. Following the example of Virgil, the poet should serve his apprenticeship in the pastoral mode but then make a transition to writing of higher things - 'of bloody Mars, of wars, of giusts' and those 'that weld the awful crowne';

There may the Muse display her fluttryng wing,
And stretch her selfe at large from East to West.

Piers's reference in the same stanza to Elizabeth and Leicester indicates just how high the poet is intended to reach.
Cuddie, apart from his brief show of interest in Virgil (11. 55-60), is rather despondent, preoccupied with the lack of material reward the poet receives, with the disappearance of the old heroic virtues which poets had once celebrated, and with his own limitations; he talks of his poetry delighting only, and says that inspiration for him would come solely from wine. In contrast, Piers stresses the glory that redounds on the poet, and his ability to act as a moral guide; he evokes Orpheus as an example of the poet's power over other people, and in an apostrophe to 'pierlesse Poesye' sees its origins and goal in heaven. We are thus alerted both to the possibilities that are open to the 'new poet', and to certain aspects of his environment that might be cause for disquiet.

Cuddie and Piers, at the end of the eclogue, stay 'in thys humble shade' (1. 116), but Colin, who in some respects is Spenser himself, has the potential to 'mount as high, and sing as soote as Swanne' (1. 90). Given the links with Orpheus and Virgil, and the suggestion that the prince's palace is the fittest place for the poet (1. 81), it is apparent that an influential moral, social, and perhaps political role is being claimed for him.

Spenser's own confidence rings out at the end of the Calender when he writes:

Loe I have made a Calender for every yeare,
That steele in strength, and time in durance shall outweare:
And if I marked well the starres revolution,
It shall continewe till the worlds dissolution.
To teach the ruder shepheard how to feede his sheepe,
And from the falsers fraud his folded flocke to keepe.
The claim is a large one, and illustrates both Spenser's belief that he had a special gift from which other, lesser poets could benefit, and the notion, conveyed most strikingly in Epithalamion, that the poet asserts the strength of his poem's design against the work of 'tyrant time' (Daniel's phrase) and the uncertainties of human existence; the permanency of words and of their patterned interlacements being a bulwark against the shifting kaleidoscope of the world.

Spenser's subsequent work reveals much more about his concept of the poet, as the studies of two recent critics in particular make clear. Humphrey Tonkin, in his recent study of Book VI of The Faerie Queen, speaks of Spenser's belief in the poet's power to stand as a defence against disorder, and quotes from Book IV, Canto ii, where Spenser refers to Orpheus and David as godlike men able to 'slake' 'wicked discord' and 'confusion'.6 Tonkin points to the identification of disorder with sin in the Elizabethan world, in so far as disorder involved the disturbance of the natural order created by God: if disorder could be eliminated, or at least controlled, then sin would be expunged too.7 If the context described by Tonkin is a valid one, it can be readily appreciated what a key role Spenser was allocating to the poet.

Tonkin goes on to argue that 'The broad outlines of the [Orphic] myth are readily discernible beneath the surface of Spenser's Book VI', the Graces' dance in Canto X being 'the Orphic dance of the natural world', Colin's piping being 'like Orpheus touching the strings of his lute, the dancers like the trees and rocks and wild animals which moved in order to his harmony.' Orpheus is also equated by Tonkin with the Book's two heroes, Calidore and Calepine.8 Several discussions of
the Mount Acidale episode have seen it as an allegory of Spenser's poetics. Tonkin believes that 'The dance of the Graces is the inner truth of poetry, the Platonic Idea from which the poem is, as it were, extrapolated.'

Having referred, via Cassirer, to Ficino's view that it is the artist who can achieve true reformation in a fallen world, Tonkin remarks on how 'overwhelmingly important [a] role in the active life of society' this view gives the poet: 'art itself constitutes a kind of redemption — perhaps a grand term to use, but not too grand for the intensely serious purpose of a Sidney or a Spenser.'

In an even more recent study, Daniel Javitch has outlined how Spenser, in Book VI of The Faerie Queene, and in the context of declining standards amongst courtiers, endeavours to establish the poet's role as a maker of manners by building on the notion that the poet has 'unique inner gifts: poetic inspiration and the privileged vision that comes with it'. This is what is shown to Calidore on Mount Acidale when he comes across Colin piping to the maidens dancing around the Graces. The Graces are the source of both courtesy and poetry, and the poet, having a special relationship with the Graces, and being the mediator between them and mankind, can act as a teacher of true moral, courtly behaviour. Calidore learns from Colin. Javitch, like Tonkin, later remarks on the close resemblance of these allegorized poetics to Sidney's claim that the poet 'doth grow ... into another nature', and to the belief that he can prompt men to reach out for perfection in spite of their fallen state. Javitch concludes that in Book VI Spenser 'seeks, above all, to establish the uniqueness of the poet's social role', which he does by emphasizing 'his power of
insight' and 'the privileged inspiration he is granted from above'.

With such a sense of the poet's high vocation, Spenser is deeply disturbed when he sees his art being abused - from within by bad writers and from without by the ignorant. He is also indignant that poets do not receive the moral and financial support they need and deserve, though it is important to emphasize that Spenser does not make this complaint solely or perhaps even primarily for mercenary reasons, but because he believes in the crucial role the poet can play in the creation of a good society.

We are told in *Mother Hubberds Tale* that the appreciation of poetry is characteristic of 'the brave Courtier', which is what Castiglione had said, while the ape, the bad courtier, amongst other worthless and corrupt activities, pens verses designed to 'allure/Chast Ladies eares to fantasies impure': this activity should not be confused with the composition of true poetry, 'whose onely pride/Is vertue to advance, and vice deride'. The ape also mocks learning and learned men, in terms with which we are thoroughly familiar: the learned are scorned as men who

in darke corners mewd,
Muttred of matters, as their bookes them shewd,
Ne other knowledge ever did attaine

(11. 835-37)

In this poem, as in *Colin Clouts Come home againe* and Book VI of *The Faerie Queene*, Spenser is concerned with the nature of true courtesy and life at court, where he finds both good and bad people, standards, and behaviour. Learning and poetry are considered in the courtly context, and courtiers are to some extent assessed according to the
value they set on them. In the passage from *Colin Clouts Come home againe* expressing disillusionment with the court, we are told that 'arts of schoole have there small countenance' and are 'Counted but toyes to busie ydle braines'; professors are simply 'instruments of others gainses' (11. 703-6). In a passage idealizing the court, however, Spenser claims that 'There learned arts do florish in great honor,/ And Poets wits are had in peerlesse price' (11. 320-21), an assertion which is soon followed by a survey of fine English poets, including Daniel (11. 376ff).

Javitch has argued that it was Castiglione's concept of the ideal courtier and the milieu of the Elizabethan court that provided effective stimuli and favourable circumstances in which the poet, as conceived of by Sidney and Puttenham, could flourish and develop. Spenser clearly appreciated this aspect of the matter at times, but making one's way at court was an arduous and no doubt often frustrating business, and it is not surprising to find him reacting so fiercely against the court in other parts of *Colin Clouts Come home againe* and in *Mother Hubberds Tale*, nor to see him offering an ideal form of courtesy in *The Faerie Queene*. Javitch has suggested that in Book VI Spenser is claiming that the poet is the mentor of the courtier, when, a few years earlier, it had been the ideal of courtliness which had helped fashion the poet. Although it is noteworthy that Book VI closes with the Blatant Beast, at liberty again, attacking 'learned wits' and 'gentle Poets rime' (VI, xii, 40), the general impression given in the book of the poet's role and powers is a strongly positive one.

This is not the case in *The Teares of the Muses*, probably an early work, where Spenser is mainly preoccupied with the enemies of
learning and poetry, and the intellectual wasteland they inhabit, though he does praise the select few who 'esteme' the 'sacred skill' of poetry (1. 583), extols reason and the acquisition of knowledge, and links poetry with learning, virtue, and wisdom. Renwick noted that 'The poem is, in part at least, a literary manifesto' for 'the new school of learned poetry inaugurated by the Pléiade in France and the Sidney-Spenser group in England.'

The Teares of the Muses may be seen as Spenser's Musophilus, though, as Nelson remarked, Daniel's treatment of the battle between the learned poet and the vulgar and ignorant is far more thoughtful, restrained, and noble. Indeed, Spenser's poem is memorable for the degree of vituperation he achieves at times. In the Euterpe section, for instance, we are presented with a whole landscape of chaos, created by Ignorance, (and reminiscent of that described in Sidney's 'Ye gote-herd gods'), where 'fowle Goblins and Shriekowles,/With fearfull howling do all places fill' (11. 283-84), where 'chast bowers, in which all vertue rained' have been 'stained' with 'brutishnesse and beastlie filth' (11. 269-70). The sacred springs of Helicon, once enhanced by the 'learned layes' of the Muses have been 'trampled' with 'fowle footings' (11. 271-76). Melpomene laments this 'wretched world the den of wickednesse,/Deform'd with filth and fowle iniquitie' (11. 121-22), and Thalia speaks of ugly Barbarisme,

And brutish Ignorance, ycrept of late
Out of dredd darkness of the deep Abysme.

(11. 187-89)

The other muses are given equally contemptuous language (see, for example, 11. 333-35, 392-95, 566-68), and the general effect is
to make the poem seem obsessive and bad-tempered. However, further study of the work is profitable for the student of Elizabethan poetry and learning, as Spenser is preoccupied with several important issues that tend to recur whenever the concept of the learned poet is considered by Renaissance writers.

From the first speech (Clio's) onwards, poetry is associated with learning and wisdom, and wisdom with God (see 11. 72-6, 86-90). Then, in Terpsichore's complaint, poetry and learning are, by implication, linked to virtue and industry, for the children of Ignorance, behaving in a manner directly opposite to that of the learned and the poets, 'pipe and sing' to 'the vulgar sort', 'and rymes at random fling' (11. 319 and 321);

The noble hearts to pleasures they allure,
And tell their Prince that learning is but vaine,
Faire Ladies loves they spot with thoughts impure,
And gentle mindes with lewd delights distaine:
Clerks they to loathly idleness entice,
And fill their bookes with discipline of vice.

(11. 331-36)

The nature of true artists and men of learning is, indeed, largely defined by implication throughout the poem, as the intellectual, aesthetic, and moral crimes of their enemies are described. There are direct statements of the high worth of the faithful servants of the muses too: they tend to be confined to mere phrases ('each gentle thought', 'blessed Sapience', 'the worlds chiefe ornament', 'The precious store of this celestiall riches' (11. 64, 72, 74, 146)), which serve to remind the reader of what has been lost; but from time to time more
sustained claims are made. For instance, there is the exaltation of reason in 11. 127-138 - though Spenser turns quickly to the effects of the absence of reason; there is the paean to knowledge in 11. 487-522 (it brings understanding of the self and of creation in general, and leads us to heaven and God) - again, however, the praise is mingled with references to what the lack of knowledge entails; and in Polyhymnia's closing speech there is the remembrance of the past glories of poetry and the belief that a few Elizabethans, including (diplomatically) the Queen herself, value the art - but, once more, this is woven with regrets and alarms.

The overall impression, then, is of a select group of poets and learned men, supported by a few admirers, occupying an embattled position: the parallels with *Musophilus* are clear enough, but no sustained celebration of poetry appears possible for Spenser as it was to be for Daniel; Spenser's claims for poetry seem relatively feeble because set about with descriptions of fiercely hostile foes, and what praise there is tends to modulate into further contemplation of the enemy.

On occasions the language Spenser uses to describe the lovers of poetry and knowledge is as telling as that deployed in the account of their detractors: for example, in 11. 559-64 we are told of poetry that

in ages past none might professe
But Princes and high Priests that secret skill,
The sacred lawes therein they wont expresse, And with deepe Oracles their verses fill:
Then was shee held in soveraigne dignitie, And made the noursling of Nobilitie.
The diction obviously suggests a combination of nobility and royalty, of the sacred and recondite, and the implication is that only a select, gifted band can be expected to appreciate the worth of poetry. The same kind of vocabulary is evident in all the passages of praise, especially in this closing section, and indeed is common to many of the period's discussions of the poet and learning.

In vivid contrast, those who "Can no whit favour this celestially food' are said to be 'borne of salvage brood' (11. 591 and 589): they are 'the base vulgar, that with hands uncleane' dare 'to pollute' the 'hidden mysterie' of poetry (11. 567-68); elsewhere in the poem they are called 'The base-borne brood of blindnes', who, with 'dunghill thoughts ... rime at riot, and ... rage in love' (11. 392, 393, 395).

What we can infer from this polarization of language is the width of the gap Spenser felt existed between the vulgar and the right-thinking few. Although 'the vulgar' could refer to all those who were adjudged to be hostile to poetry and learning, it has for Spenser definite connotations of the common people, as 'base' and 'base-borne' suggest, and as Spenser's depiction of them elsewhere as a source of disorder and a general foe to what is morally right confirms.

We might also see the use of such extreme vocabulary as an index of Spenser's almost obsessional grievance against a world that was failing to support the poet and the learned man in a fitting manner. And here, of course, it is a question of financial as well as moral support, for the poem contains several appeals to the nobility to sustain 'true wisedome', 'And with their noble countenaunce to grace/The learned forheads' (11. 80-2). This is taken from the first speech of the poem, where Spenser raises the old humanist issue of the conflict
between arms and learning, and bemoans the aristocracy's unwarranted preoccupation with the former. The panegyric to Elizabeth and the appreciative minority at the end of the poem no doubt was written with half an eye on possible material rewards:

One onelie lives, her ages ornament,
And myrrour of her Makers majestie;
That with rich bountie and deare cherishment,
Supports the praise of noble Poësie.

(11. 571-74)

But the major complaint about lack of patronage comes in Calliope's lament. The aristocracy nowadays

Their great revenues all in sumptuous pride
They spend, that nought to learning they may spare;
And the rich fee which Poets wont divide,
Now Parasites and Sycophants doo share.

(11. 469-72)

Spenser's own bitterness is surely evident here, as it is in comparable passages in *Mother Hubberds Tale* and *Colin Clouts Come home againe.*

As I remarked earlier, however, to see Spenser's designs as merely mercenary would be to do him an injustice: a deeper cause for his concern is that the failure to support learning and poetry results in the spread of disorder. Polyhymnia tells how she used 'to tie'

'the winged words' with 'sweet numbers and melodious measures' to 'make a tunefull Diapase of pleasures' (11. 547-49); but these words,

being let to runne at libertie
By those which have no skill to rule them right,
Have now quite lost their naturall delight.

(11. 550-52)
Only through decorum, through the ordering of words and thoughts, can
delight - in Elizabethan poetics the means of access to the moral faculty -
be achieved. Erato, earlier in the poem, describes how she rules 'in
measure moderate/The tempest of that stormie passion' (i.e. love),
and is accustomed 'to paint in rimes the troublous state/Of lovers
life in likest fashion'. But Erato has been 'put from practise of
[her] kindlie skill,/Banisht by those that Love with leawdnes fill'
(11. 379-84). In similar fashion Polyhymnia has succumbed to those
who think the 'chiefe praise of Poetry' lies in

Heapes of huge words uphoorded hideously,
With horrid sound though having little sence
...
And thereby wanting due intelligence,
Have mard the face of goodly Poësie,
And made a monster of their fantasie.

(11. 553-58)

It is a vision of poetic anarchy, and, within the poem, should be
related to the fearful crying of the shriek-owls in l. 283, 'the vulgar
sort' whose 'ranke fantasies' spawn 'rymes at randon' in 11. 319-22,
the so-called love poets who 'rime at riot' and 'rage in love' in l. 395,
and the contemporary comic dramatists in whose work one can see 'scoffing
Scurrilitie,/And scornfull Follie with Contempt',

Rolling in rymes of shameles ribaudrie
Without regard, or due Decorum kept.

(11. 211-14)

Chief among Spenser's concerns therefore are the interwoven and
interdependent crimes of immorality and lack of poetic control, which constitute a total abnegation of the poet's responsibility as defined by most of the major thinkers on the subject since antiquity.

Behind this poetic irresponsibility and confusion lies an even broader view of chaos. The poet is learned and treasures reason and knowledge. The person who is bereft of reason 'Is like a ship in midst of tempest left/Withouten helme or Pilot her to sway' (11. 141-42), and Ignorance, the great oppressor of learning and poetry, creates a world of discord, darkness, and hell; it is 'the enemie of grace' (11. 283-88 and 497).

It is a world subject to such destructive forces that Spenser feels he is inhabiting in this poem, and it is no wonder therefore that he describes the true poet as an isolated figure:

But that same gentle Spirit, from whose pen
Large streams of honnie and sweete Nectar flowe,
Scorning the boldnes of such base-borne men,
Which dare their follies forth so rashlie throwe;
Doth rather choose to sit in idle Cell,
Than so himselfe to mockerie to sell.

(11. 217-22)

The Teares of the Muses is very far from being Spenser's best verse, but in a survey of the way Elizabethan poets were thinking about what it meant to be a poet, what the relation of poetry to learning was, and how the poet fitted into society at large and intellectual and courtly societies in particular, it is an important document. Many of its complaints were traditional, but the vehemence with which they are recorded is not. The reasons for that vehemence are open to some speculation: was it due to the disillusionment felt by a young
graduate on his first encounter with an unsympathetic world? Did it grow out of animus against Burghley? Or was it an especially ferocious expression of a harshness noticeable at times in Spenser’s writings, in his evident approval of the work of Talus for instance, or in the anger generally levelled against the immoral and disordered, or in the scene of the bad poet with his tongue nailed to a post for having reviled and blasphemed the Queen 'with bold speeches' and 'lewd poems'?  

That *The Teares of the Muses* may be compared with *Musophilus* was noted earlier: there is a similar linking by Daniel of poetry, learning, virtue, and wisdom, and those are set up against the disorders and ignorance of the vulgar; Daniel's poet is often a solitary figure, necessarily self-sufficient, or at best appreciated by a clear-sighted minority. But the dialogue form of *Musophilus* makes for a much more varied and flexible presentation of arguments, and Philocosmus's points are listened to rather than simply being branded as wicked and so condemned. And then Musophilus's exposition of the merits of the learned and virtuous poet is sustained, eloquent, and noble, whereas Spenser seems merely to assert his beliefs in a strident fashion, not seeing any common ground between the elect and the 'salvage brood', but stressing the irreconcilable nature of their differences.

* * * * * * *

Many of the points made about Spenser's attitudes towards the poet-haters and, indeed, about his conception of the poet as learned, virtuous, and consequently isolated, can be carried over to a discussion of Chapman; though the latter is more obsessed by the thought of the encircling enemy and hence uses a more extreme form of invective. He
saw himself as a man 'borne/To want, and sorrowe, and the Vulgars scorne'. In both his poetry and prose, he returned continually to the topic of what it meant to be a learned poet in a corrupt and hostile world, and was steadily introspective where the issue of poetic inspiration was concerned.

Following Ficino and Plato, he believed the true poet was divinely inspired by 'a perfection directly infused from God', and he that knocks at the Gates of the Muses; sine Musarum furore, is neither to be admitted entrie, nor a touch at their Thresholds.

Even the genuine poet must not 'presume to these doores, without the ... peculiar induction'. Hence to attack the true poet or to use the 'lovely parts' of poetry 'with such rude hate,/As now she suffers under every swaine' is to profane what is sacred. Where poetry and learning are defaced, 'Gods bright image' in man is erased as well. So too, writers who debase 'The manly soules voice (sacred Poesie)' are to be shunned:

Such men, as sideling ride the ambling Muse
....
Whose Raptures are in every Pageant seene,
In every Wassall rime, and Dancing greene
- these are the 'infected Leaders' of the 'common herd', one of the favourite targets for Chapman's invective. 'Truth dwels in Gulphs' and can only be attained by the most laborious search on the part of the learned, who require 'Heavens great fire of fires' to dispel the mists that lie between the everyday world and enlightenment. The
possibility of achieving enlightenment is restricted to a very few.

Chapman's initial exploration of the world inhabited by the learned poet, and of the values to which he was committed, came in *The Shadow of Night* (1594), his first published work. It is by no means Chapman's best poem, but, like Spenser's *Teares*, it reveals a lot about the writer's conceptions of his art, of knowledge, and of the nature of the link between the two, and provides a view of his attitudes to his contemporaries at the time his work first appeared. The poem therefore repays attention.

*The Shadow of Night* - in itself packed with learning of a traditional kind - is divided into two parts, 'Hymnus in Noctem' and 'Hymnus in Cynthia'. The most striking feature of the former is the invocation of night and Chapman's reverence for the darkness (Sorrowes deare soveraigne and the queene of rest'), which is contrary to the customary use of night as a symbol of evil and to Chapman's use of it elsewhere to signify ignorance. Roy Battenhouse, in a detailed and valuable exegesis of the poem, locates the source of Chapman's attitude to night in Platonic mysticism: for the Platonist

there is a primitive metaphysical darkness which is not evil. Various philosophers from Hermes to Paracelsus acknowledged the pre-existence of a celestial chaos - a divine realm not yet illuminated by the light of the sun, and not yet differentiated into clarity by the separating out of the elements. This primordial mystery-land, being God's 'first' creation, was viewed with philosophic reverence.

Battenhouse cites Nicholas of Cusa's concept of learned ignorance as the epistemological development of this view of night, and then goes
on to point out the moral connotation of darkness for the religious mystic; 'Night stands for the blotting out of the sense-world with its beguiling flood of sense impressions. The mystic longs for Night as the bringer of his salvation.'

Chapman describes the primordial night, 'when unlightsome, vast, and indigest/The formelesse matter of this world did lye' ('HN', 11. 30-1), and laments the fact that Night ever permitted the coming of light and order in the cosmos, for it brought only moral ill.

Nothing, as now, remainde so out of kinde,
All things in grosse, were finer than refinde,
Substance was sound within, and had no being,
Now forme gives being; all our essence seeming,
Chaos had soule without a bodie then,
Now bodies live without the soules of men,
Lumps being digested; monsters, in our pride.

('HN', 11. 43-9)

The gap between soul and body is made immediately apparent, and Chapman's distaste for the grossness of the physical begins to show itself.

Now men have descended into a second night, far different from that pre-existent kind for which Chapman longs:

A stepdame Night of minde about us clings,
Who broodes beneath her hell obscuring wings,
Worlds of confusion, where the soule defamde,
The bodie had bene better never framde,
Beneath thy soft, and peacefull covert then,
(Most sacred mother both of Gods and men)
Treasures unknowne, and more unprisde did dwell;
But in the blind borne shadow of this hell,
This horrid stepdame, blindness of the minde,
Nought worth the sight, no sight, but worse then blind,
A Gorgon that with brasse, and snakie brows,
(Most harlot-like) her naked secrets shows.

('HN', 11. 63-74)

The vehemence of Chapman's recoil from the world of men as he sees it is striking. It is a recoil encountered in some of his later work too: in Eugenia (1614), for example, we are told that the 'tenderd broode' of the learned close their windows 'To barre Daies worldly light; and Mens rude Din',

since their chiefe delight
In fixt calme stood: Themselves in quiet still,
Earth's cares to pursue, to skale their high hill.

'Silence, and Night, doe best fit Contemplation', Chapman remarks, and as night descends the learned open their windows. Terrestrial life with its flux, uncertainty, and noise, is unacceptable; the 'fixt' world of the learned man stands directly opposed to it. Chapman's solitary seeker after truth is not an ascetic sage living a life of poverty, but a man of 'aesthetic fastidiousness', yearning for a 'peaceful retreat from the cares of the busy world, away from the noise, ignorance and insensibility of the common herd.'

A corollary to such values as those adhered to in the 'Hymnus in Noctem' is Chapman's angry response to the physical world, which he refers to in terms of corruption and dirt, sometimes resorting to images with direct or latent sexual connotations of a disturbing kind.

The roots of Chapman's discontent can be pinpointed in the following lines:
If then we frame man's figure by his mind,
And that at first, his fashion was assigned,
Erection in such God-like excellence
For his soul's sake, and her intelligence:
She so degenerate, and grown deprest,
Content to share affections with a beast,
The shape wherewith he should be now indude,
Must bear no signe of man's similitude.

('HN', 11. 123-30)

It is the traditional tension between the two aspects of man, reiterated so tirelessly throughout the Renaissance, that supplies the model around which these lines are constructed. The tension was a particularly taut one as far as the Neoplatonist was concerned. Ficino defined man as 'a rational soul participating in the divine mind, employing a body'.

Man is nearest to complete fulfillment when he turns his reason away from the body and the appurtenances of the terrestrial world and towards the Mind which unites him with the intellectus divinus. The chief purpose of man is contemplation.

Man, as Pico proclaimed in his famous Oration, can be as a god. But the faculty of reason, although it is located with the Mind in the anima prima, is also related to the anima secunda in a way the Mind is not, and is therefore subject to the influence of the lower emotions and sensations which it must fight and repress if it is to make progress towards the supercelestial world of truth. Hence man's 'immortal soul is always miserable in the body'.

Chapman, aware of the possibilities in men, is frustrated by their persistent disinclination to escape from the world of the senses and passions to a higher mode of existence. Those who cannot or do not want to achieve freedom from the senses and to develop the life of
reason Chapman refers to as 'manlesse' ('HN', 11. 93 and 166).

In the second hymn Chapman shows the dangers of the sensual in an allegory. Cynthia devises a hunt in which the nymph, Euthymia, who takes on the role of Pride (a panther) and Lust (a boar), is pursued by hunters and hounds. The hunters symbolize the intellect and are led by the hounds, who represent the passions. So led, the hunters are unable to recognize the nature of true wisdom, for this is perceived only if the irrational senses and emotions are subdued. 48

Poets have always urged men to shake off the sensual, Chapman maintains, showing bestial figures in the hope that readers,

Seeing them selves in those Pierean founts,  
Might mend their mindes, asham'd of such accounts.  

('HN', 11. 137-38)

The poet has 'more-then-humane' qualities ('HN', 1. 132); he is, in the Platonic tradition, divinely inspired, and, for Chapman, bears the Promethean fire, which stands for the 'clarity of knowledge infused into the heart of the ignorant'. 49 The poet's function is a didactic and moral one, and Chapman enforces this view by reference to Orpheus's power to bring rude men to love of art and fortitude; Orpheus's gifts were 'for use appleyd,/And in his proper actes exemplified' ('HN', 11. 147-48). 50 Chapman, seeing the poet's role as an exalted one, and being dedicated to his art, calls on all those who wish to be poets to serve darkness:

Come consecrate with me, to sacred Night  
Your whole endeavours, and detest the light,  
Sweete Peaces richest crowne is made of starres,  
Most certaine guides of honord Mariners,
No pen can any thing eternall wright,
That is not steept in humor of the Night. 51

('HN', 11. 372-77)

The use of 'consecrate' and 'sacred' suggest that commitment is a quasi-religious act for the poet.

Chapman describes early in the poem the manner in which one may return from the false night of the mind to the true realm of darkness:

let soft sleepe
(Binding my sences) lose my working soule,
That in her highest pitch, she may controile
The court of skill, compact of misterie,
Wanting but franchisement and memorie
To reach all secrets.

('HN', 11. 10-15)

The sensory world must be shut out — in this instance by sleep — in order that the higher faculties may work unimpeded. This notion, as we have seen, has for Chapman specific Neoplatonic connotations. And the same is true of the line which speaks of freeing the soul with memory. Chapman himself, in his gloss on the word 'franchisement', points to the Platonic origin of the idea that learning is a process of recall, a release of what is already stored deep in our minds and the establishing of it as a part of our conscious knowledge. The physical stands in the way of this process. In Neoplatonic doctrine the first glimmerings of remembrance aid the mind to detach itself from the distracting features of mundane life, although, as I noted earlier, the ambiguous position of the reason between the higher and lower souls ensured that progression towards the spiritual was by no means straightforward.
It should be clear by now that Chapman's notion of learning as evinced in this poem is essentially contemplative and intuitive in nature. It demands a movement away from the actual and towards the ideal, and this can be undertaken only by those who are willing to overcome the physical and the sensual in their make-up, reject the values and pursuits of a blind world, and strive for communion with the divine intellectual principle at the heart of creation. It is learning for an intellectual aristocracy, and stands in stark contrast to such teachings as Bacon's about the democracy of knowledge - the ability of all men to participate in the advancement of learning. While many sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century writers on knowledge and learning agreed that the mind was man's greatest treasure, the ways in which that mind might be employed, the labours and ends towards which it might be directed, were subjects for deep disagreement. As we have seen and shall see, out of the same broad humanist impulse came two recognizably opposed philosophies: knowledge as a medium through which to develop the self, and knowledge as an instrument with which to effect the widespread betterment of mankind. To make this distinction is to re-emphasize the opposition between the active and contemplative lives.

For Chapman

that minde most is bewtiful and hye,
And nearest comes to a Divinitie,
That furthest is from spot of earths delight.

('HC', 11. 466-68)

Wisdom is 'the mindes true bewtie' and 'such bewtie shines in vertuous men' ('HC', 11. 472-73). We are back to the traditional equation of
wisdom and virtue, interpreted in Chapman's distinctive way.

In terms of Neoplatonic doctrine these basic ideas are acceptable as general propositions, but Chapman mars his presentation of them in several ways. The vocabulary he uses to describe the higher world is one of reverence and wonder, often with religious and even magical overtones; while, as we have seen, in sharp contrast, he tends to depict the mundane world in words both angry and derisory. There is for the Neoplatonist a route between the two realms along which he may move, but this connection often seems to be lost sight of by Chapman for whom the fundamental differences between the actual and the ideal are extreme. The sense that they are mutually exclusive is far stronger than the view of them as two stages in a process of development. In this poem there are for Chapman no common points of reference between the daily round of man and the celestial world of the wise. This is something that comes across forcibly when, for example, Chapman tries to show that those who have achieved wisdom through learning can return to influence the ailing world they once left behind. Such is the strength of Chapman's antipathy towards the world that his notion of influence seems to be the imposition of the ideal upon the actual, preceded by a surge of violence to expel the evil of mankind.

Raise thy chast daughters, ministers of night,
The dreadfull and the just Eumenides,
And let them wreake the wrongs of our disease,
Drowning the world in bloud, and staine the skies
With their spilt soules, made drunk with tyrannies.

Fall Hercules from heaven in tempestes hurld,
And cleanse this beastly stable of the world.

('HN', 11. 250-56)
Chapman is intoxicated by the vision; the movement of the lines carries him relentlessly on. The sun is to be destroyed: 'Now make him leave the world to Night and dreams' ('HN', 1.261):

shoothe, shoote, and stoope his pride:
Suffer no more his lustfull rayes to get
The Earth with issue.

('HN', 11.263-65)

What is not in accord with the highest values must be destroyed. No human solution is advanced or even sought to remedy the ills of the world; what is intractable can be moved only by the intervention of non-human agents of revenge who prepare the way for the ministrations of the divinely inspired poet. Chapman, as poet, dedicates himself to the powers of darkness and their work:

Rich-tapird sanctuarie of the blest,
Pallace of Ruth, made all of teares, and rest,
To thy blacke shades and desolation,
I consecrate my life; and living mone,
Where furies shall for ever fighting be,
And adders hisse the world for hating me,
Foxes shall barke, and Night-ravens belch in grones,
And owles shall hollow my confusions:
There will I furnish up my funerall bed,
Strewd with the bones and relickes of the dead.

('HN', 11. 268-77)

Again, the lines have a marked obsessive quality. Chapman does not indicate how the devotee of Night — here specifically the poet — can have direct influence on those around him; he can only 'mone' with the birds of night, and his world is a sorrowful and negative one of
apparent deadness. There is a particularly interesting line in this passage: 'And adders hisse the world for hating me'. The last phrase is most suggestive and could indicate one of the deep-seated reasons for the invective Chapman pours on the world. It also focuses our attention on the pervasive melancholy of the poem as a whole. This feeling moves in and out of the poem as an antiphon to the confidence in man's possibilities and the trust in the powers of Night, which are two of the other main dimensions of the first hymn. MacLure relates Chapman's melancholy to his raging against mankind: the two characteristics are opposite sides of the same coin, 'what we should now call a kind of manic-depressive alternation'.

It seems to me, then, that in this poem Chapman is not only unwilling but also unable to set his ideal of wisdom in an earthly context, or to conceive of the actual life of men as having much value at all. His learning requires a strictly other-worldly milieu in which to exist, and when he writes of terrestrial things he is almost invariably provoked into rage. In the 'Hymnus in Cynthiam' there is an overall sense of joy and contentment as Chapman celebrates the powers of the goddess, and the poem has a more carefully organized form and a more controlled mode of expression. But Chapman has placed the work entirely on the level of allegory, which provides adequate protection against those disturbing features of the quotidian world he could only rail against in the 'Hymnus in Noctem'. He can sing with joy of the powers of the mind only when the intractable and unaccommodated have been left behind.

Cynthia, as soul of the world, can create and dissolve at will the scenes and events that represent the active life of men, and
manipulates the passions with an ease that belies the problems involved. She possesses the ultimate Platonic understanding of Form, and even this she can control ('HC', 11. 182-95). Hence her court was constructed and filled 'By bewtious Forme, as her great mistresse wild' ('HC', 1. 195). In this Neoplatonic world of virtue and wisdom the learned may rest content, and a new temple of intellectual beauty may be raised as evidence of Cynthia's power to subdue sensual desires and elevate intellectual pursuits ('HC', 11. 422-55). But the less perfect existence of most men remains in our minds, irreconcilable with the concept of a sheltered and patterned world of learning. The ideal of knowledge expressed in The Shadow of Night is essentially contemplative and other-worldly; Chapman's notion of active wisdom is not action itself but the repression of senuality and the instructing of others in the ways of virtue.

While most of the concerns and some of the attitudes and beliefs expressed in The Shadow of Night were carried into Chapman's later work, there were some substantial shifts in emphasis, and the introduction of new, formative elements into his thinking. In MacLure's view it is Euthymiae Raptus; or The Teares of Peace (1609), the poem which he rightly sees as 'the centre of Chapman's thought and the clue to his inner life', that marks a major transition, from the view of 'wisdom as the initiation into mysteria', as set out in the two hymns, 'to wisdom as the habit of self-discipline and virtue'. It was a change in emphasis - from a Neoplatonic to a predominantly Stoic orientation, though many features of the former philosophy remain.

Equally as important where Chapman's later thinking about the
learned poet is concerned is his reverence for Homer, a 'Godlike man', whom 'all the world (yet, none enough) hath praisde.' Chapman believed there was a personal bond between himself and the Greek poet, and saw his translations of the *Iliad, Odyssey,* and *Hymns* as 'The Worke that I was borne to doe'. In *Euthymiae Raptus* the vision of Homer tells Chapman, 'thou didst inherit/My true sense ... in my spirit' (ll. 82-3), and it is this inspiration that enables Chapman to translate the greatest of poets for the benefit of English-speaking people. The person who renders Homer into the vernacular will be raised to new heights of poetic skill by the material he is translating.

At his second confrontation with the spirit of Homer, recorded in *Euthymiae Raptus,* Chapman apprehends that though he 'was outward, blind', yet

inward; past, and future things, he sawe;
And was to both, and present times, their lawe.

(ll. 37-8)

Elsewhere, Chapman expands on this, giving us, for example, Pliny's view that Homer's books are 'the most precious worke of all mens minds', and the bard himself is 'The Fount of wit ... Learnings Syre', who 'gave Antiquitie, her living fire.' Chapman assures the earl of Somerset that in Homer's poetry we may discover

the most material, and doctrinall illations of Truth;
both for all manly information of Manners in
the yong; all prescriptions of Justice, and even
Christian pietie, in the most grave and high-
govern'd.

Thus Chapman believes the country needs his translation; the realm
should not lack what is easily available to other nations. He is a poet serving his country in this sense, though his commitment to this role is less fervent than his desire to be a learned poet for its own fascinating sake.

Chapman gained great confidence as a poet from his absorption with Homer, and in the poems accompanying the translations writes about him and about poetry generally with a clarity and cogency that in much of his verse he could not sustain. As the epistle to Prince Henry reveals, Chapman's study of Homer brought him a series of firm assurances about true poetry: it is long-lasting ('how firme Truth builds in Poets faining'); it can raise humanity to great heights, and can move us to virtue; it gives light to learning; and it has power to convey justice and truth. It is more potent than prose in this respect:

Truth, with Poesie grac't, is fairer farre,
More proper, moving, chaste, and regular,
Then when she runnes away with untruss't Prose;

for poetry has

Proportion, that doth orderly dispose
Her vertuous treasure, and is Queene of Graces.

Indeed, poetry brings all subjects to perfection.

Here then, in his conviction that he had been elected to undertake such an important task as translating Homer, was a source of strength and self-assurance, and in Homer's verse was an illustration of what could be successfully encompassed by the poet as by no-one else. Yet, paradoxically, the involvement with Homer might have undermined Chapman's confidence too, for he often depreciates his own efforts as a poet and
wishes for greater inspiration and clarity, perhaps feeling that he can never match his revered master. The best known expression of his yearning for greater abilities comes in the poem 'To M. Harriots, accompanying Achilles Shield' (1598). Having spoken of his 'hard hand [which] hath drest,/In rough integuments' seven of Homer's books, and of the 'long time and labours deepe extensure/Spent to conduct him to our envious light' (11. 8-11), Chapman addresses Harriot:

Rich mine of knowledge, ô that my strange muse
Without this bodies nourishment could use,
Her zealous faculties, onely t'aspire,
Instructive light from your whole Sphere of fire:
But woe is me, what zeale or power soever
My free soule hath, my body will be never
Able t'attend : never shal I enjoy,
Th'end of my happles birth : never employ
That smotherd fervour that in lothed embers,
Lyes swept from light, and no cleare howre remembers.
O had your perfect eye Organs to pierce
Into that Chaos whence this stiffled verse
By violence breaks : where Gloweworme like doth shine
In nights of sorrow, this hid soule of mine :
And how her genuine formes struggle for birth,
Under the claves of this fowle Panther earth;
Then under all those formes you should discerne
My love to you, in my desire to learne.

(11. 31-48, Poems, pp. 381-82)

Chapman feels constrained by his physical body and longs for the pure fire of clear intellect he sees in Harriot. His own creative powers are dim and blocked, fighting against earth and darkness, familiar symbols of ignorance and error in Chapman's writings. Indeed, the
coupling of frustration to darkness, earth, struggle, and violence is characteristic of him, and is some measure of the anguish he felt as a poet about the frustrations that beset him and learning and poetry in general.

Harriot is continually referred to in terms of light and fire, as Homer is. When the latter appears to Chapman in *Euthymiae Raptus*, for instance, we are told that 'sodainely, a comfortable light/Brake through the shade' (11. 33-4), and after it came a figure shining:

His sacred bosome was so full of fire,
That t' was transparent; and made him expire
His breath in flames.

(11. 39-41)

He exhorts Chapman to 'put on/As confident a countnance, as the Sunne' (11. 47-8). Truth, we recall lies in darkness - not that inner darkness of confusion, ignorance, and sorrow, but one of protective obscurity and difficulty, which only those who 'delight in the deepe search of knowledge' can penetrate. Harriot's intellect and perception, his 'true wisdome' won by learning, his 'knowledge most divine', fit him ideally to judge Chapman's efforts in Englishing Homer, for only those who possess 'a radiant, and light-bearing intellect' can understand true poetry, which is ablaze with inspiration. 'Of the divine Furie ... Homer hath ever bene, both first and last Instance; being pronounced absolutely ... the most wise and most divine Poet.'

Chapman, then, holds the learned poet in high esteem, and believes that the best poetry, like the highest knowledge, is accessible only to an élite group. He is part of that group, though unhappy that he falls short of his ideal.
Within the logic of Chapman's thought, certain implications follow from what has been established so far. One is that the writing and reading of poetry are laborious occupations, as is the quest for knowledge, wisdom, and truth in general. A second is that, in consequence of the difficulties involved, these occupations are beyond the capacity of most people: hence, not understanding, they will attack the pursuits of the truly learned and the poets, and will therefore need to be repelled, as ferociously as is judged necessary. A related point is that the sacred realms of knowledge and divine poesie need to be closed to the uninitiated, and traditionally have been. Three groups constitute a particular danger to the truly learned. There are the 'imaginaries in knowledge', who, although they have experience of 'degrees, & termes, and time in schooles', are in life 'worse then fooles', and 'discerne/Nought of the matter, whose good words they learn'. Another group are bad poets who

preferre

For profit, praise, and kepe a squeaking stirre
With cald on muses to unchilde their braines
Of winde and vapor.

These bring true poets into disrepute. The third group are 'the base, ignoble, barbarous, giddie multitude' who 'like curres' are 'alwaies barking at all they know not'.

Each of the implications and points listed in the preceding paragraph requires some amplification and discussion.

The getting of knowledge is a painful business for Chapman. In the epistle to Roydon before The Shadow of Night he speaks of the 'exceeding rapture of delight in the deepe search of knowledge' that
drives people on to 'manfully indure th'extremes incident to that Herculean labour' (11. 1-4, Poems, p. 19). This matches Chapman's own struggles to write, which we saw recorded in the poem to Harriot. Knowledge will not 'prostitutely shew ... her secrets, ... she will scarcely be lookt upon by others but with invocation, fasting, watching; yea not without having drops of their soules like an heavenly familiar' (11. 17-20, Poems, p. 19). Clearly, in this relatively early stage of his career as a writer (1594), the suggestion is of a protracted and demanding religious involvement with something esoteric and well-guarded, open only to a few initiates. 'Prostitutely' anticipates a tone often apparent in the two hymns that follow, imparting both a sense of the defilement of what is sacred and pure, and also, by implication, Chapman's distaste for those he refers to here as 'Butchers', who regard learning merely as 'a pretie toy' (11. 15 and 24, Poems, p. 19).

Roydon, like Harriot, is a 'serching spirit', who will appreciate that 'rich Minerals are digd out of the bowels of the earth, not found in the superficies and dust of it', and he will know that 'charms made of unlearned characters are not consecrate by the Muses which are divine artists'. The mining image is a key one, central to Chapman's belief that true knowledge is hard of access and has almost to be burned out. In the 1595 epistle to Roydon, Chapman is using it to justify the obscurity of his poetry, which is not 'Obscuritie in affection of words, & indigested concets', but the kind that 'shroudeth it selfe in the hart of his subject, utterd with fitnes of figure, and expressive Epethites'. Chapman commits himself to the latter: 'with that darknes wil I still labour to be shadowed' (11. 29-33, Poems, p. 49).
Poetry, Chapman reminds us, is not like oratory to be readily understood by all and sundry; she has her own clarity (Enargia), however, which is the result of skilful limning and heightening of material. The judicious will appreciate this, and will know that what is 'with a little endevour serched, ads a kinde of majestie to Poesie'; but those hostile to learning will be contemptuous (11. 11-23, Poems, p. 49).

Learning and poetry have traditionally been hidden from those who would defile it, as Chapman says at the beginning of the 'Justification of Andromeda Liberata':

As Learning, hath delighted from her Cradle, to hide her selfe from the base and prophane Vulgare, her ancient Enemy; under divers vailes of Hieroglyphickes, Fables, and the like; So hath she pleased her selfe with no disguise more; then in misteries and allegoricall fictions of Poesie.

(11. 1-5, Poems, p. 327)

Chapman then proceeds to defend the poet's ancient right to speak darkly, for he always encloses 'within the Rinde, some fruit of knowledge'. These arguments are commonplace, as is Chapman's complaint that poetry, which used to shine like the sun, now 'like a glow worm' only 'gleams by night'. There are many who would like to destroy poetry:

men, beastly given,
The manly souls voice (sacred Poesie,
Whose Hymnes the Angels ever sing in heaven)
Contemne, and heare not: but when brutish noises
(For Caine, Lust, Honour, in litigious Prose)
Are bellow'd-out, and cracke the barbarous voices
Of Turkish Stentors ... leane to those,
Like itching Horse, to blockes.
It is interesting to speculate about how many of Chapman's readers felt they were being upbraided and how many believed that here was a voice speaking on their behalf against the philistine. Chapman's appeal is certainly always to the enlightened few as distinct from those who are in the grip of 'the barbarous witch/Foule Ignorance'.

The latter fall broadly into two groups: the 'ungodly Vulgars' and the 'mere-learn'd'.

There is no doubt that, as far as Chapman was concerned, 'the vulgar' usually signified the mass of common people. In the 'Justification of Andromeda Liberata', having set up 'nobility' in opposition to 'the vulgar', and referred to the latter as a 'herde' of 'grosse substance', he uses Horace's words about the 'Monster with many heads', and says that this fair title has an ancient pedigree, and is an appropriate way to describe 'the base ... multitude'. He then elaborates on this in a passage of sustained and bitter animosity. It is to a large extent the threat from this 'monster' that Chapman has in mind when he writes of

This skornefull, this despisde, inverted world,
Whose head is furie-like with Adders curlde,  
And all her bulke a poysned porcupine.
Her stings and quilles darting at worthes devine.

This is the world that rejects the poet, and this is why he describes his life as 'friendlesse'.

By 'nobility' Chapman does not mean 'of aristocratic birth', as Spenser usually does: in the 1595 epistle to Roydon, Chapman confirms that 'The prophane multitude I hate', but goes on to say that his 'strange Poems' are consecrated to those 'whom learning hath made noble, and nobilitie sacred'—an old humanist notion. The same
point is made in *Euthymiae Raptus*:

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what doth controule
The rudenesse of the blood, and makes it Noble
...
Is Soule, and learning.
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(11. 339-40 and 344)

Indeed, he remarks here that many of his contemporaries who are of noble birth profess contempt of learning, not esteeming it fit that 'Noblesse should study', and in their lives and objectives are therefore no better than the plebeians (11. 327-36).

While the vulgar constitute a major threat to learning and poetry, a more insidious danger lies nearer at hand. In *Euthymiae Raptus* Chapman identifies 'three sorts' of men 'that most foes be/To Learning': 'Active, Passive, and Intellective men'. The first 'consume their whole lifes fire,/In thirst of State-height', and in the process draw the enmity of Fate; the second are interested merely in good living, and their minds work only on the most superficial of levels; the third study hard but merely to be rewarded and not for true knowledge, of which they gain only a shadow and 'never see/Her true and heavenly face' (*Euthymiae Raptus*, 11. 411-503 and 525-55). In this last group are scholars who have the 'tearmes, and tongues, and Parrating of Arte', which is what has been termed 'learned ignorance', for theirs is worthless knowledge:

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And let a Scholler, all earths volumes carrie,
He will be but a walking dictionarie :
A meere articulate Clocke, that doth but speake
By others arts.
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(11. 530-33)
These men are linked to 'covetous Readers', 'studiers of Phrase', 'Shifters in Art', and those who

obtain degrees
And lye in Learnings bottome, like the Lees,
To be accounted deepe, by shallow men.

(11. 549-54)

Chapman's antagonism towards the formally educated yet in his eyes profoundly ignorant is most memorably recorded in the Epilogue to his translation of Homer's Hymns, where those who have attacked his labours are subjected to an outpouring of satiric venom at times worthy of Marston. In a more restrained passage Chapman accuses the academics of malicious envy because

one not taught like them, should learne to know
Their Greeke rootes, & from thence the Groves that grow,
Casting such rich shades, from great Homers wings:
That first, and last, command the Muses springs.

Chapman asserts

he's best Scholler, that through paines and vows;
Made his owne Master onely; all things know's.

For all their 'vast varied reading', the men of 'pyed Hood, and Hall' come nowhere near the truth, which renders their knowledge 'onely sleight of hand'. They are men 'that all things learne; and nothing know', for they are ostentatious when truth is humble; they seek vainglory when in fact

As Night, the life-enclining starr's, best showes;
So lives obscure, the starriest soules disclose.
The enmity towards those who, he felt, assailed his position as learned poet was clearly nurtured by some of Chapman's own experiences, and this reinforces the sense one often gets when reading his poetry of its having an autobiographical basis.

Elsewhere in *Euthymiae Raptus*, we are given a catalogue of the woes that befall the ignorant (11. 650-711) : without true learning the world is a place of

Ills infinite,
That (like beheaded Hydra's in that Fen
Of bloud, and flesh, in lewd illiterate men) Aunswere their amputations, with supplyes That twist their heads, and ever double rise.

(11. 693-97)

The hydra image evokes Horace's many-headed monster again. Learning (Chapman now calls it 'Herculean Learning' - 1. 698) has the power to conquer what 'the viperous head of benumming ignorance' creates :

Cares vast, and endlesse; miseries, swolne with pride; Vertues despisde, and vices glorified.
All these true Learning calmes, and can subdue.

(11. 710-12)

The problem is, however, that the world of learning is in disarray and therefore stands little chance of attaining true wisdom which could present a powerful front against the forces of destruction. Echoing Daniel's complaint, discussed in the previous chapter, that 'civill learning' is seeking 'to wound/And mangle her own members with despight', Chapman bemoans that the learned 'All pursue/Warre with each other' (11. 713-14) :
So learned men, in controversies spend
(Of tongues, and tearmes, readings, and labours pend)
Their whole lives studies; Glorie, Riches, Place,
In full crie, with the vulgare giving Chase;
And never, with their learnings true use strive
To bridle strifes within them.

....

How can men finde truth, in waies opposite?
And with what force, they must take opposite wayes
When all have opposite objects? Truth displaies
One colourd ensigne; and the world pursues
Ten thousand colours.

(11. 726-31 and 839-43)

Given all these circumstances, it is not surprising when Peace
(personified) says to the poet:

The Foe hayles on thy head; and in thy Face
Insults, and trenches; leaves thee, no worlds grace,
The walles; in which thou art besieged, shake.

(11. 1043-45)

Chapman's response to this state of affairs is similar to Daniel's:

he presents the truly learned man as a stoic figure, and the definition
of learning offered in this poem is largely a Christian-Stoic one,
though tinged with Neoplatonism:

this is Learning; To have skill to throwe
Reignes on your bodies powres, that nothing knowe
And fill the soules powers, so with act, and art,
That she can curbe the bodies angrie part;
All perturbations; all affects that stray
From their one object; which is to obey
Her Soveraigne Empire; as her selfe should force
Their functions onely, to serve her discourse;
And, that; to beat the streight path of one ende
Which is, to make her substance still contend,
To be Gods Image.

hee may still be Center
To all your pleasures; and you, (here) may enter
The next lifes peace; in governing so well
Your sensuall parts, that you, as free may dwell
Of vulgare Raptures, here; as when calme death
Dissolves that learned Empire, with your Breath.
To teach, and live thus, is the onely use,
And end of Learning.

(11. 504-14 and 518-25) 85

This ordering of the self should be mirrored in society at large:
learning, we are told, 'should difference set/Twixt all mens worth'
(11. 327-28); learning gives 'Rules to all the circles of your lives'
(1. 356), which can be proved 'by the Regiment God gives/To man, of
all things' (11. 357-58).

The world as presented to us in the poem despises such an ideal,
however, and most people are prevented from attaining it, even if
they wanted to. The poet is different; he is privileged to know what
other mortals cannot:

Peacefull, and young, Herculean silence bore
His craggie Club; which up, aloft, hee hild;
With which, and his forefingers charme hee stild
All sounds in ayre; and left so free, mine eares,
That I might heare, the musique of the Spheres,
And all the Angels, singing, out of heaven.

(11. 1106-11)

*  *  *  *  *  *  *
As nothing under heaven is more remov'd
From Truth & virtue, then Opinions prov'd
By vulgar Voices: So is nought more true
Nor soundly virtuous then things held by few:
Whom Knowledge (entred by the sacred line,
And govern'd evermore by grace divine,)
Keepes in the narrow path to spacious heaven.  

Daniel and Spenser, reflecting on the character and function of the learned poet, would have concurred with Chapman's sentiments in these lines. Each man, however dissimilar from the other two he might be in many ways, felt that he was occupying an embattled position, and did his best to propound doctrines that would strengthen the claim of poetry to have a respected voice in the worlds of intellect and morality, and in society generally. Paradoxically, this involved a withdrawal from many of the beliefs, attitudes, and habits of that society to the sanctuary of the resilient, virtuous self, and a supportive group of like-minded companions. From this stronghold sorties could be mounted against the foe.

The next chapter seeks to broaden the picture of how people were thinking about poets in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in England, so that the views of the poets studied so far can be located in a specific historical context and ideology. Many of the issues that have emerged from the writings of Daniel, Spenser, and Chapman stemmed from the particular circumstances in which the concept of the learned poet evolved in England, and were the subject of much discussion.
Chapter Four

The Concept of the Learned Poet in Elizabethan and Jacobean England: its Character and Background
It is not sufficient for poets, to be superficial humanists: but they must be exquisite artists, & curious universal schollers.

(Gabriel Harvey, *Marginalia* (? 1574), ed. G.C. Moore Smith, Stratford, 1913, p. 161.)

A man may play the foole every where else, but not in poesie.


... eloquence without godliness is as a ring in a swine's snout ... and, as Tully saith, 'To give a lewd man eloquence without wisdom is none other thing than to give unto him armours to destroy the commonweal.'


Luscus. Young master, master Ovid, doe you heare? gods a mee! away with your songs, and sonnets; and on with your gowne and cappe, quickly .... These verses ... a poysen on 'hem, I cannot abide 'hem, they make mee readie to cast, by the bankes of helicon. Nay looke, what a rascally untoward thing this poetrie is.

(Ben Jonson, *Poetaster* (1601), I, i, 4-11, in *Works*, ed. Herford and Simpson, IV, 206.)
There can be little doubt that the troubled awareness of Daniel, Spenser, and Chapman that they were, as learned and virtuous poets, occupying a beleaguered position in a world hostile to their beliefs, owed much to each man's temperament and personal circumstances. Yet their feelings of unease and their fulminations against the ignorant, vulgar, and uninitiated were part of a more widespread and in many ways traditional expression of discontent and antagonism, just as the claims they made about the poet's high worth were in some respects commonplaces in the perennial defence of the poetic calling against a seemingly implacable foe. If the views of the three poets are to be assessed correctly, one needs to locate them in a broader context than has been provided so far. Hence the principal object of this chapter is to give an account of the concept of the learned poet as it was elaborated in Elizabethan and Jacobean England.

The character and development of the concept owed a lot to the circumstances in which it was fashioned, for the assertion that poets were learned - and learned in a special way - was made to counter accusations that they were immoral, that they told lies, and that their work was intellectually irrelevant. These were old charges, but they were revitalized in the sixteenth century in England, and therefore had to be met with cogent replies. Thus, to understand the concept of *doctus poeta* as it was formulated by English writers, one must be acquainted with the historical and ideological backgrounds to it, and to provide an outline of these is another aim of this chapter. Particular consideration will be given to the charge that poets were immoral and had a pernicious influence, especially on the young, for, as Sidney
remarked, this was the most serious and persistently voiced accusation in his day, and therefore one poets had most urgently to come to terms with. The concept of the learned poet was to a large extent developed in order to counter this charge. My concern is almost exclusively with non-dramatic poetry, and I shall therefore consider the attacks on the immorality of this rather than those on the theatre, which are more familiar to students of the period.

The thrust of Reformation doctrine put much emphasis on the building of the godly society, and for the reformers this included the creation and maintenance of a religiously-oriented culture to offset, indeed if possible to replace the profane culture of secular life. Poets, traditionally arraigned for immorality, were a prime target for criticism here, and had to respond to the offensive. They did so, broadly speaking, in one of three ways: either they scorned the attacks and persisted in writing the verse it pleased them to write; or they acknowledged the justice of the accusations and, convinced of the part poets could play in reforming society according to godly principles, began to write divine poetry; or they set about demonstrating that true poets were essentially guardians and purveyors of sound morality and were in fact more successful in this role than any other group of teachers. Their argument here depended in part upon the humanist linking of knowledge and eloquence with virtue, but it was also rooted in the notion that ancient poets had been the first teachers and had played a crucial part in establishing early civilized communities. A study of the concept of the learned poet in Elizabethan and Jacobean England therefore needs to be cognizant of the traditional bond between learning and poetry, the belief in which stretched from Homer and Hesiod,
through antiquity and the middle ages to the early modern period. I shall in consequence give a brief account of the history of doctus poeta, putting emphasis on those texts made much of by the apologists for poetry in sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century England.

The sense that they were writing within an ancient and revered tradition of learned poetry was especially significant to English poets. In this country, as elsewhere in Europe, there was a growing sense that a vernacular literature worthy the name was now being produced, a literature that could be set alongside that of other nations and ages, and which therefore merited a defence and demanded some kind of theoretical base.² The very existence of so many treatises, poems, and prefices arguing the poet's case, explaining his role, and defending his position, suggests not only the presence of adverse criticism of poets, but also of a persistent need to understand and champion the poet's cause. The examples of ancient Greece and Rome, and of more recent times in Italy and France, were there to be emulated, the poets of those countries providing an inspiration and a pattern. As many of them had been and still were widely revered as men of learning and wisdom, and their writings regarded as compendia of knowledge, to claim that modern English poets were learned was to appeal to a well-established and potent belief.

The ancient poets were regarded as learned not only because of the worldly knowledge to be found in their works, but also because, being divinely inspired or in the grip of poetic fury, they knew what other people could not know. Moreover, their powers with words and with music enabled them to have an extraordinary didactic influence over their audiences. In the Christian tradition too it was the
biblical poets' inspiration by the spirit of God that gave them special knowledge.

It should be evident from what has been said so far that the concept of the learned poet was at the heart of the defence of poetry generally, for the poet's learning was peculiar to his profession, related to his inspiration and special gifts, and it was by emphasizing these characteristics that the defenders of the vocation built their case for the poet as a unique figure who should be given an honoured place in the learned community and in society as a whole. Consequently, a study of the concept of *doctus poeta* will involve giving a general sense of the arguments for and against poetry, though it is not my intention to provide a thorough account of the debate, even if it were possible to reduce so involved a topic to an appropriate scale for the present discussion.

Hence, the second section of this chapter considers those charges other than specifically moral ones, brought against the poet in the sixteenth century, and to some extent looks at the answers made to them. It also touches on various other circumstances and attitudes that were conducive to making poets feel unsure of their ground: I have in mind economic and social considerations that were discouraging to writers. Section three considers the important accusation of immorality and certain aspects of the poets' response to this. With this context firmly established, the fourth section examines the concept of the learned poet - its history, and its development in England. The fifth section deals specifically with Sidney's *Apology for Poetry*, taking this to be the period's most sophisticated statement about the learned poet. Section six looks briefly at some of the implications of what Sidney
wrote when one sets his ideas against certain contemporary notions of what learning entailed. The final section examines the social and cultural aspects of the defence of learned poets, and argues for a specific cultural orientation for the concept of *doctus poeta* in England.

II

Throughout the sixteenth century in England there were many complaints from poets and critics about the hostility directed towards the art: Sidney's remarks in the *Apology* are well known:

Poesy ... embraced in all other places ... [finds] in our time a hard welcome in England ....

.... from almost the highest estimation [it] is fallen to be the laughing-stock of children.

(*Apology*, 131/25-7 and 96/2-3)

As Shepherd notes, Sidney's lament was a humanist common-place: we find it reiterated throughout the Elizabethan period - by Puttenham, for instance, who, as well as noting that poets are despised, remarks on how the word 'poet' has become a term of reproach, even abuse, amongst those 'whose grosse heads not being brought up or acquainted with any excellent Arte ... deride and scorne it in all others as superfluous knowledges and vayne sciences'. Webbe, Wills, Vaughan, and Rainolds all commented on the unfriendly response to poets from their contemporaries, as, earlier in the century, did Vives and Erasmus (themselves hostile to poetry on occasions), and Elyot, who wrote that 'nowe (specially in this realme), men have suche indignation, that they use onely poetes
and poetry in the contempt of eloquence.\(^5\)

Hostility to poets was as old as the expression of reverence for them, and as old as the bond between poetry and learning. Indeed, it had a lot to do with that bond: from the earliest times philosophers had believed that the poets had to be dislodged if intellectual headway was to be made. Plato's attack is well known, but the quarrel between the poets and the philosophers was well established by his time: Curtius notes 'the rebellion of Logos against Myth [and] poetry' from the sixth century B.C., and refers to Plato's broadside as the culmination of the battle.\(^6\) Thus the defenders of poetry in Tudor England were taking up their pens to fight for an old cause: and they knew this well enough: Sidney comments:

>a man might maliciously object that Plato, being a philosopher, was a natural enemy of poets. For indeed, after the philosopher had picked out of the sweet mysteries of Poetry the right discerning true points of knowledge, they forthwith, putting it in method, and making a school-art of that which the poets did only teach by a divine delightfulness [began] to spurn [and] discredit their masters

\textit{(Apology, 128/14-22).}

Sidney distinguished four main lines of attack against 'the poor poets': that other types of knowledge are more fruitful than poetry and might therefore better occupy a person's time; that poetry is 'the mother of lies'; that 'it is the nurse of abuse, infecting us with many pestilent desires', by which Sidney means 'wanton sinfulness and lustful love' - this charge is extended into the claim that 'poets did soften us', destroying 'the pillars of manlike liberty'; and lastly that Plato banished poets from his commonwealth \textit{(Apology, 123/1-15 and...}
It can readily be seen that the 'imputations laid to the poor poets' were not only intellectual, but also social and moral in character, and that all the charges had connections with or bearings upon one another. To Sidney's list we need to add, as other threats to poets, the dangers of ignorance, vulgarity and bad writing, and we must bear in mind the poets' complaints that adequate financial support is difficult to find - all issues we have seen raised continually by the three poets so far studied. To complete the picture two more points should be made: first that there was in the eyes of some a stigma attached to having one's work printed, and secondly that there existed a belief that ancient poets had often suffered cruelly - Orpheus being torn to pieces, Homer having to endure blindness, Aeschylus being killed - and hence that it was traditional for poets in all ages to suffer. Again, this is a belief we have met already, most strikingly in Chapman.

Thus the inability of Daniel, Spenser, and Chapman to feel at ease in their vocation is probably attributable to a complex of reasons, both ancient and contemporary in origin.

Although, as Tonkin has said, 'even relatively mediocre writers seem to have found a market for their wares without too much difficulty,' there was not a great deal of money to be made from writing poetry. Jonson and Daniel are cited by Miller as the only two poets of the period who received continuous support from patrons. Even so, Jonson wrote that

Poetry, in this latter Age, hath prov'd but a meane Mistresse, to such as have wholly addicted themselves to her, or given their names up to her family.
He goes on to remark that those 'who have but saluted [Poetry] on the by, and now and then tendred their visits', have received better rewards from her by being 'advanced in the way of their owne professions'.

Although Spenser can hardly be said to have 'saluted [Poetry] on the by', his achievements as a poet played their part in securing him employment, but his example needs to be weighed against such incidents as Sir Robert Cecil's advice to Greville not to 'dreame out [his] time in writing a story, being as like to rise in this time as any man he knew', and against Donne's years of poverty at Mitcham. In this context it is worth recalling Chamberlain's comments on Donne when Dean of St Paul's:

Chamberlain concedes that the poet's latest verses (or on the death of the marquis of Hamilton) are 'reasonable wittie and well don', yet says he 'could wish a man of his yeares and place to geve over versifieng.' Indeed, Donne himself once wrote that he wished to be seen following 'a graver course than of a poet' because he wanted to keep his dignity. Gabriel Harvey expressed anxieties along similar lines regarding the possible publication of one of his poems:

> What greater and more odious infamy, for one of my standinge in the Universitye and profession abroade then to be reckonid in the Baccheroule of Inglish Rimeres?

Sidney's remark 'that base men with servile wits' are writing poetry, and 'think it enough if they can be rewarded of the printer' (Apology, 132/3-4) may be set in the context, while Puttenham tells us quite plainly that

> very many notable Gentlemen in the Court that have written commendably ... suppressed it agayne, or els
suffred it to be publisht without their owne names to it: as if it were a discredit for a Gentleman, to seeme learned, and to shew him selfe amorous of any good Art.\(^{17}\)

Saunders has shown at some length how volumes of poems were regularly prefaced with excuses and apologies for their publication.\(^{18}\)

It seems therefore that in the later years of the sixteenth century and the early part of the next there were social pressures on poets not to publish and perhaps not to be poets at all. This, however, was countered both by the economic necessities that obliged some men to support themselves by their pens, and by the encouraging of poets to contribute to the elaborate mythology constructed around Elizabeth.\(^{19}\) There was obviously some kind of a market for poetry, and patrons could also be found. The old doctrine that the poet can bestow fame as well as provide entertainment was absorbed by the late Elizabethan nobility and gentry, but both functions were adapted to the needs of the age, most notably in creating the legend of Eliza.\(^{20}\) However, Spenser's call to the nobility for adequate support, and Jonson's remark quoted above, suggest that poets themselves felt they were not getting the backing they required.

The first of the 'imputations laid to the poor poets' listed by Sidney was 'that there being many other more fruitful knowledges [than poetry], a man might better spend his time in them than in this' (Apology, 123/3-4).\(^{21}\) As with the majority of the attacks on poetry this one had its roots in the past. Shepherd remarks that in the either medieval period in England theorists tended to regard poetry as versified story-telling or as the handmaid of theology and philosophy. In either
case poetry was not especially valued as an intellectual activity, and certainly not for its intrinsic qualities as poetry; the subject-matter would retain its value stated in a different form, and the versification was at best regarded as mnemonic. On the technical side, poetry was subsumed into rhetoric, an approach perpetuated in the Elizabethan period by such influential writers as Ascham and Wilson.

As noted above, in antiquity too a struggle occurred over the intellectual status of poetry, and the argument was still raging in fourteenth-century Italy, according to Boccaccio.

The low intellectual estimate put on poetry persisted into the sixteenth century, where, for instance, we find it echoed by one of the leading denigrators of the art, Cornelius Agrippa, whose *De incertitudine & Vanitate Scientiarum* appeared in 1537, and was translated into English in 1569. Agrippa, whose work was familiar to both Sidney and Greville, remarks that poetry is foolish 'excepte it be attired and savoured with some other Discipline.' Elements of the same attitude are discernible in Philocosmus's criticisms of the poet Musophilus, studied earlier, and Musophilus is at pains to prove that poetry is integrated with knowledge of different kinds.

The intellectual credibility of poetry was also undermined by the second charge on Sidney's list, that it is 'the mother of lies', although moral issues are involved here too. Again, the criticism is an ancient one, receiving its best known, but by no means its first expression in *The Republic* (in the second, third, and last books) in relation to Hesiod and Homer. The condemnation of poets on these grounds persisted through the writings of the Church Fathers - Tertullian and Augustine, for instance, and during the Middle Ages, and then on
into the Renaissance, where we find Agrippa making much of it, and concluding that 'all vertuouse men have despised Poetrie, as the mother of lies, seeing that the Poetes doe lie so monstrously'. A proclamation by the Roman Catholic Church in 1563 stated that poets do intend to deceive.

Critics of poetry along these lines either had in mind that poets wrote fictions, which were by definition false when compared to actuality, and therefore misleading and corrupting, or they were echoing Plato's charge that poets only copy a world that is in itself a copy of reality, thus diluting the truth, or moving in the opposite direction to where truth was to be found. The issue was, once more, part of the battle between philosophy and poetry. Osorius's remark that some men will think it 'a thing most unfitt to enterlace the vaine phantasies of Poets with the simple and plaine reasons of Philosophers' reminds us of this. It was partly a question of whether direct statements are to be preferred to poetic elaboration. What may also readily be perceived is that to some extent poets were victims of the complementary nature of the standards of truth adhered to by their attackers: if the poets depicted this world, they were censured; if they created an imaginary world they were also censured. The whole issue revolved around the vexing question of the nature of truth.

In spite of Aristotle's answer to the criticisms of poets as liars — that poetry imitates the universals in the created world, not the particulars, and therefore represents reality and not actuality, and hence neither lies nor is immoral (another of Plato's accusations) — in spite of this, those who subsequently wished to inveigh against the poets found the charge of mendacity a useful weapon. Boccaccio felt
the need to devote a substantial section of his defence of poetry to repudiating the view that poets lie, which he did in a variety of ways: - by insisting that poetic fiction has in most cases nothing at all to do with literal truth; by emphasizing the poet's intention, which is definitely not to deceive, but rather to invent, to deal with myth and fiction, not fact; and by drawing attention to poetry as allegory, explaining that, as truth lies beneath the poetic veil, critics should be chary of looking only at the surface - the stories - and then judging those to be falsehoods. Boccaccio admits that the pre-Christian poets often misrepresented religious truth, but this was owing to their ignorance and not to an intention to utter lies.29

Those inclined to condemn poets were not to be won over in this way, however. Sidney's and Agrippa's comments, as well as the Church's conclusion in 1563, each mentioned above, may be linked to many other discussions of poets as liars in the sixteenth century - by 'non-literary' figures such as Osorius and Coignet, as well as by those more directly concerned with poetry - to illustrate that the issue remained an urgent one.30

III

The many complaints that poetry was under attack, and the resolute defences of the art, seem to suggest that hostility to poets and poetry per se was rife in sixteenth- and early seventeenth century England, but there is little written evidence to support this. Rather it is the case that certain aspects of poetry are censured; wholesale condemnations are very rarely to be found: almost invariably critics
point out that they are not hostile to the best poetry, only to abuses of the art. The most sweeping modern arraignment for Englishmen to read was in Agrippa's *De incertitudine*, either in the original Latin or in Sanford's translation, though even here astute readers thought they detected an Erasmian-type irony in Agrippa's attack on the arts and sciences. The influence of foreign writers whose work was well known in England must not be overlooked, for their opinions helped shape the form of the debate. Erasmus himself had listed poets in his catalogue of fools, and Vives, whose writings were also familiar in this country, concluded that, if one was searching for wisdom, one would not find it in a poet, for his mind was full of foolish and confused mythology.

The loudest and most persistent charge levelled at poets in England was that they had a morally corrupting influence. The stage bore the brunt of the attack, especially in the later years of the sixteenth century and then in the seventeenth, but non-dramatic poetry came in for a lot of criticism too. Because the campaign against immoral verse was serious, consistent, and sustained, it was the line of attack the poets and their defenders were most preoccupied with, and the one that most stimulated the elaboration of the concept of the learned poet.

Discussions of the poet in earlier periods make it clear that his role had traditionally been conceived of as a moral one: the poet's special powers in imparting knowledge gave him great influence over those who listened to his words, and it was important therefore that his teaching should be morally sound, and that poetry should be employed didactically. Naturally, what was morally sound and what unsound
was open to debate; and here charges against poetry, as well as defences of it, were concerned not only with the poets' intentions and professions, but also with their methods and with the content of their works.

Turning first to the moral criticisms made by those who were neither poets nor had a special reason for identifying with the vocation, one notes that the most persistent attacks in sixteenth-century England were directed at the contents of ballads, plays, and erotic poetry, and in each case the gravamen of the charge is that people, especially the young, are corrupted by the immorality of what has been written. Once more, it is important to note the substantial part played by continental thinkers in determining the course of English thought. Agrippa, in his tirade, contended that 'Poetes have always bene the cheefe bawdes' and have corrupted youth, a view the justice of which seemed to be acknowledged by the Privy Council when, in 1582, they tried to substitute poetry 'heroicall and of good instruction' for 'such lascivious poets as are commonly read ... in ... grammar-schooles.'

Apart from Agrippa's, the most telling case made against poetry on moral grounds during the early sixteenth century was that by Vives. In his *Institutio feminae Christianae* (1524), translated by Richard Hyrde in 1540 under the title *A verie Fruitfull and pleasant booke; called the Instruction of a Christian Woman*, Vives condemns those who, calling themselves lovers, damage women by writing bawdy songs. He instances Ovid and applauds his banishment from Rome by Augustus. Discussing the education of girls, Vives says they should not read 'void verses, nor wanton, trifling songs', and he also attacks romances, saying that no learning can be found in such writings and that they are full of lies.
In another work of the same period, Vives is particularly astringent:

As Jerome says, the offspring of the poets is nothing else than the pasture of the demons; those poets who learned to lie to themselves and teach others to do the same; those poets who follow the leadership of that blind and insane and decrepit Homer, the lover of deceit, the maker of Ulysses.  

However, in the *Instruction of a Christian Woman* Vives himself regularly cites and quotes from poets to enforce or illustrate his points, and he commends the learned poets of Greece and Rome, and certain 'Christian poets'.

Hyrde's translation was reprinted in 1541, 1557, and 1592, and altogether there were thirty-one editions of *Institutio feminae Christianae* during the sixteenth century, which meant a wide dissemination of Vives' views. Thus we find the Frenchman, Matthieu Coignet, referring to the book in 1584, when discussing attacks on poets, and, in a work famous for its reference to Marlowe as an atheist, Thomas Beard's *The Theatre of Gods Judgements* (1597), Vives' book is adduced in support of the argument that 'all unhonest songs and Poemes' should be banished.

We again find Vives adopting the dual approach of condemning the lascivious but recommending the learned and moral poets in one of his major works, *De Tradendis Disciplinis* (1531). Vives remarks that the mind draws great refreshment from poetry, but 'because of the subjects which the early poets have chosen to put into song, poetry is suspected by many of corrupting the morals and is openly hated by
certain people.' Vives agrees that poetry should be criticised on the grounds that 'disgraceful subjects are partly described and expressed and partly even commended', which 'can do great harm, if the reader has confidence in the writer, and if his verses gain a lodgment in the listener's mind, unconsciously through the sweetness of the verse.' Ovid, Tibullus, Martial, Propertius, and Catullus are the poets given special mention here. Yet, although he wonders briefly whether poets should be avoided altogether, because many 'add very little to knowledge of the arts, or to life, or indeed to language itself', he eventually concludes, partly in response to Plutarch's teaching on the matter, that poets can be read in expurgated versions rather than being wholly excluded from studies. A little later he provides a list of Latin poets and dramatists who are to be studied by schoolboys.

As some of the above comments suggest, however, Vives is never entirely convinced of the effectiveness of poetry as a branch of learning. He calls it 'very charming because of its harmony, which corresponds with the melody of the human soul'; he praises the language of poetry for being 'lofty, sublime, brilliant'; he says, in words that anticipate Sidney's, that poems contain subjects of extraordinary effectiveness, and they display human passions in a wonderful and vivid manner .... This is called energia. There breathes in them a certain great and lofty spirit so that the readers are themselves caught into it, and seem to rise above their own intellect, and even above their own nature.  

But he punctures the popular myth that the first poets were masters
of all knowledge, doubts whether modern poets are as learned as they make out, and states that poetry is to be relegated 'to the leisure hours of life.' It is not to be consumed as if it were nourishment, but is to be treated as a spice.

Vives' mixed feelings are echoed throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. The most notorious book written against poets and dramatists, Gosson's *The Schoole of Abuse* (1579), has some damming things to say:

> the whole practise of Poets, eyther with fables to shew theyr abuses, or with plaine tearmes to unfold theyr mischeife, [is] to discover theyr shame, discredit themselves, and disperse their poyson through all the worlde.

Poets are accused of vanity, wantonness, and folly, and of deceiving readers into thinking wholesome fare is being offered. But Gosson affirms that some kinds of poetry are acceptable: that containing accounts of brave military deeds, of good counsels, or of virtuous lives, and in *An Apologie of the Schoole of Abuse* (1579) he is at pains to emphasize that he did not condemn poetry entirely in the former book, but was concerned only with the abuses of the art. However, in *The Schoole of Abuse* he does say there are no wise, learned, and skilful poets in England at that time.

Gosson, like Vives, was concerned about the morality of poetry, and the relation of virtue to knowledge and piety, and he believed that if society was to be fashioned by trained, educated men, what was actually or potentially damaging to the moral and intellectual well-being of those men must be shunned. Gosson's orientation may therefore
be more usefully characterized as a humanist and not a Puritan one. The once popular view that the attack on poetry and drama was exclusively Puritan has been firmly rejected. Where writers against poetry are known to be Puritan, there is often little to distinguish their criticisms from those of non-Puritans. Thus the godly minister, Edward Dering, in 1572 censured 'Songes & Sonets ... Pallaces of Pleasure ... unchast Fables, & Tragedies, and such like sorceries' because they are wanton, vain, and encourage idleness. The last vice may have particularly Puritan connotations; Dering's other misgivings were shared by many who wrote about poetry, both for and against. What can be said, though, is that the reformers in the Church had specific reasons for inveighing against immoral poets: they believed them to be a pernicious influence in society, working against the bid to establish a godly commonwealth. Many aspects of secular culture were attacked by the reformers, who systematically attempted to put an alternative, religious culture in its place. Thus, apropos of poetry, we learn that Luther made a collection of hymns 'to give the young ... something to wean them away from love-ballads and carnal verses, and to teach them something of value in their place'. This was echoed in England, where the popular radical divine, Thomas Becon, extolled the Psalms over secular poetry: 'Let all minstrels give place to this our minstrel'. Becon laments people's predilection for 'lascivious, wanton, and unclean' ballads rather than for divine poetry, and exclaims, 'would God that all schoolmasters and teachers of youth would, instead of Virgil, Ovid, Horace, Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius, &c., teach these verses of David! The same plea was heard from Myles Coverdale, John Hall, John Stockwood, William Perkins, and
Thomas Taylor at various points over a period of eighty odd years from 1539, while the popular Sternhold-Hopkins Psalter also proffered the Psalms as an alternative to 'ungodly Songs and Ballads', which nourish vice and corrupt youth. This suggests that many poets continued in their bad old ways despite the exhortations, and moreover were not short of readers. On the other hand, the reformers' admonitions were heeded by a large number of poets, as Lily B. Campbell has demonstrated, and a tradition of divine poetry was firmly established in England. Developing Campbell's work, Barbara Lewalski has recently shown in detail that a distinct Protestant poetics grew up that took the Scriptures as a literary model for genre, language, and symbolism, and saw biblical lyrics as a substitute for secular ones. The Psalms particularly were regarded as 'the compendium par excellence of lyric poetry', though Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs were also very influential, especially in demonstrating that a great variety of lyric kinds was possible. At the heart of the conviction that religious poetry was acceptable in the eyes of God lay St Paul's inspiring verses, Colossians 3:16 and Ephesians 5:18-19; also a verse from James. Acting upon such exhortations, English poets produced metrical versions of the Psalms and collections of biblical lyrics, as well as writing a large body of original religious verse. This, as Lewalski has demonstrated, was underwritten by 'an extensive and widely accessible body of literary theory, chiefly pertaining to the Bible and to fundamental Protestant assumptions about the spiritual life and about art', which can be extrapolated from a wide variety of writings on religious, rhetorical, and artistic matters. Hence the tradition of the English religious lyric, which had its finest flowerings in the seventeenth
century.

A key figure in the establishment of this tradition against that of the shameless poetry of the secular writers, was Du Bartas, whose Urania said that poetry is inspired by a holy fire and cannot result from art or learning. Behind this view is the conviction that the realms of grace and reason are quite distinct from each other, and that human learning cannot therefore provide access to the divine. Greville is to be located in the context of this kind of thinking, and he is particularly interesting in that in his sequence of poems, Caelica, he deliberately turns away from the secular tradition and towards the religious one.

The reaction against profane poetry was not only a Protestant one: Robert Southwell lamented that

Poets by abusing their talent, & making the follies and faynings of love, the customarie subject of their base endeavours, have so discredited this facultie, that a Poet, a lover, and a lyar, are by many reckoned but three words of one signification.

The devil is behind this: seeking 'to have all the complements of Divine honour applied to his service', he has 'possessed ... most Poets with his idle fansies.' However this may be, we have divine authority 'to exercise our devotion in Himnes & spiritual Sonnets' for many parts of the scripture are in verse, including some of Christ's words, and St Paul has encouraged us to compose divine poetry. Scripture gives poets 'a patterne to know the true use of this measured and footed stile.' Southwell hopes his work will encourage 'some skilfuller wits to goe forward in the same, or to begin some finer peece, wherein
it may be seen how well verse and virtue suit together. In an earlier work Southwell had censured those fine wits who 'loose themselves in the vainest follies, spilling much Art in some idle fansie', because they suit 'their labours to the popular vaine', and are 'guided by the gale of vulgar breath' to give pleasure but little profit.

In the passage from Dering, quoted above, 'Songes & Sonets' and 'Pallaces of Pleasure' obviously refer to the collections of Tottel (1557) and Painter (1566). Dering goes on to mention The Courte of Venus as being another corrupting miscellany of poems, and, although the book seems innocent to modern eyes, it sparked off a whole series of attacks. The first came from John Hall in 1550, and he renewed his assault in 1565 when he produced an alternative miscellany called The Court of Vertue. Sir Thomas North added his voice to the criticisms, in the prologue of his translation of Guevara's The Diall of Princes (1557, and reprinted in 1568, 1582, and 1619); Becon attacked the Court, in The booke of Matrimony (1564); Thomas Brice did too, also in the 'sixties; and it is possible Nashe lent his voice to the onslaught in 1589. John Case certainly did three years later, as did Arthur Dent in the popular Plaine mans Path-way to Heaven, published in 1601. The offensive was therefore sustained and widely disseminated, and one can appreciate why poets felt that the enemy were pressing hard.

The condemnation of the Courte followed the usual lines: such books are 'a great occasion to provoke men to the desyre of synne', whereas Solomon's and David's verse offers a lesson in how to flee 'from all wickednes & sinne' and how to embrace 'a pure & godly lyfe' (Hall); 'Tell me is Christ, or Cupide Lord? doth God or Venus reign?' (Brice); such books should be burnt (North and Becon); women who
are interested in reading such matter are the kind who use cosmetics and are preoccupied with their hair, thus evincing a general immorality, which makes them a bad influence on men (Hall). None of this deterred the compilers of the miscellanies, of course, and The Courte of Venus established a pattern for the numerous collections of poetry that followed it during the Elizabethan period.71

The aggressive attitude toward poetry continued into the early seventeenth century, where the most extended discussion of the shortcomings of poets came in a book by Henry Crosse, published as Vertues Commonwealth in 1603, and reissued two years later as The Schoole of Pollicie. Crosse's views are derivative and repetitive, but confirm that poets were not being condemned wholesale, but were arraigned for immorality and lack of good learning.72

Crosse's account is full of familiar invective about the vanity, idleness, and wantonness of some poetry, which enflames 'the concupiscence of youth', though interestingly, he believes that people are now less susceptible to corruption from this source than they are from 'fine phrases, Inkehorn-termes, swelling words ... pollished and new-made eloquence'.73 Such compositions are not only devoid of learning, they corrupt it.74 Possibly the influence of Lyly's Euphues is being criticised, for Crosse goes on to wonder how ladies especially can spend their time with such books when there are so many good things to read, including the Bible.75 He deplores the fact that copies of a 'leaud and bawdy ballad', sung in the market, are quickly bought up by those who flock to listen, whereas books of Christianity 'lieth stil in the Stationers hand as waste paper.'76 He makes the conventional plea for burning immoral poetry books, and desires that no more
should be printed.\textsuperscript{77} Yet in the midst of this tirade comes a profession of faith in the powers of good poetry, which 'in al ages ... hath bin thought necessarie', and if used truly both teaches and shows the way to virtue: '... whosoever shall discent from this true use, is no Poet, but a vaine babler' and unworthy the name of poet.\textsuperscript{78} Such writers are 'Farre from the decorum of Chaucer, Gower, Lidgate ... or our honourable moderne Poets, who are no whit to be touched with this [criticism], but reverently esteemed'.\textsuperscript{79}

The same disquiet over the immoral influence of the poets is to be met with in the writings of those immediately involved in the art or in its defence. Sidney, for instance, acknowledges that in several respects the reproaches levelled against poets are just: some poets do 'infect the fancy with unworthy objects' (Apology, 125/27); 'Poesy may not only be abused, but that being abused ... it can do more hurt than any other army of words' (Apology, 125/35-7); 'I ... do find the very true cause of our wanting estimation is want of desert' (Apology, 132/18-20). Boccaccio had made a similar concession, as, amongst Sidney's contemporaries, had Nashe and Lodge in his reply to Gosson.\textsuperscript{80} Sidney's and Spenser's friend, Lodowick Bryskett, eschewed those poets, 'who being themselves ful of intemperance and wantones, write nothing but dishonest and lascivious rimes and songs, apt to root out all honest and manly thoughts' from the minds of those foolish enough to read them.\textsuperscript{81} Even Elyot, such a staunch defender of poetry against the charge of encouraging immorality, had recommended caution in reading suspect verse.\textsuperscript{82}

It was sometimes urged that, as Philomusus in The Pilgrimage to Parnassus says, the poets do not 'teache a chaste minde lewder
who reades poets with a chaster minde
Shall nere infected be by poesie. 83

But to many people the argument that to the pure all things are pure
was not an acceptable one, for the number of erotic and lascivious poems
was great, and it was difficult to believe that the population in general
could read all things and hold fast to that which is good. Nashe
remains on the number of prefaces to books of poetry that claim profit
is mixed with pleasure, but, he comments, 'there is scarce to be found
one precept pertaining to vertue, but whole quires fraught with amorous
discourses'. 84

Accusations of licentiousness were what the poets of the 1560s
and '70s were regularly trying to fend off. They were aware of Horace's
famous prescription, echoed above by Nashe, but seemed not to be able
to find a way of reconciling profit and delight as Sidney was to do in
so brilliant a manner, weaving together the moral, didactic, and
intellectual roles of the poet and showing how each could function
through a sophisticated form of delight. Sidney's achievement in
presenting the figure of the learned poet can be measured clearly
against the floundering of his predecessors, and their uneasiness and
at times confusion over the exact nature of their role. Moreover,
their concerns support the view that the chief problem to be faced
was one of morality.

George Gascoigne's volume of poetry, A Hundred Sundrie Flowers
(1573), was censured heavily, probably by the Queen's Commissioners,
because of what the poet himself calls 'sundrie wanton speeches and
lascivious phrases'. In the revised volume, *The Posies* (1575), he took rather unconvincing and, as it transpired, unsuccessful measures to try and ensure that his collection got past the censors, partly by 'gelding' the poems 'from all filthie phrases' and 'beautifying' them 'with addition of many moral examples', and partly by explaining his aims in a series of prefatory epistles. What is striking in these is that he proclaims his intention either to instruct or to delight, but does not speak of fusing the two functions in one poem. Indeed, he carefully classifies his poems according to their different aims: they are either 'light', 'more profitable than pleasant', or not pleasant but 'medicinable'. He is clearly conscious of a rift between pleasure and profit.

His concern that his poems should be regarded as serving a moral end is always in evidence: for instance, he stresses that he now delights to exercise his pen 'in morall discourses', and that his intention is to 'serve as a myrrour for unbrydled youth, to avoyde those perilles which I had passed'. The recourse to this latter argument was fairly common as a disingenuous answer to the attacks from the godly that wanton poetry was especially damaging to youth. We encounter it in George Turberville too, for example, though he also quite openly states elsewhere that 'meer desire to pleasure .../Made me in hand to take the painfull pen'.

In spite of the blasts against immoral poetry, such bold assertions of an intention to give pleasure were not uncommon. Robert Jones, the printer of *Brittons Bower of Delights* (1591), was quite happy to say that his miscellany contained poems 'some of worthiness, and some of wantonnes', and the verses of 'The Printer to the Reader' prefacing
A Handfull of pleasant delites (1584) assure us that

Within this booke such may you have,
as Ladies may wel like.
Here may you have such pretie thinges,
as women much desire.\(^3\)

Gascoigne recognizes that such material would be scorned by 'the wiser sort ... as a thing altogether fruitlesse'.\(^4\) In fact, on one occasion, he himself expresses regret 'that our countreymen, have chosen rather to winne a passover praise by the wanton penning of a few loving layes, than to gayne immortall fame by the Clarkely handlings of [a] profitable ... Theame.'\(^5\)

This view comes in a discussion of the poet's role that is more sophisticated than anything noted so far in Gascoigne's writings on poetry. Amongst other points, he defends the moral worth of the poet in a thoughtful manner, and, lamenting that English poets have not tried to emulate either the ancients or, nearer to home, Chaucer, calls upon his fellow writers to produce a didactic poetry written with eloquence and learning, and dependent upon a mastery of technique.\(^6\) His words come near to being a manifesto for English poets, and perhaps inspired Spenser, who seems to have admired Gascoigne's work.\(^7\) But Gascoigne himself seemed only partially aware of the significance of his clarion call - indeed, his subsequent words suggest that he was somewhat surprised by what he had written. This in itself is a telling point about the level of confidence and the purpose of the pre-Sidneian and pre-Spenserian poets: they were clearly preoccupied with their moral position, but in the main offered no rounded or cogent idea of what their role and purpose was, but tended merely to fall back into
complaining about people's uncharitable attitudes to their work or into rather lame excuses for the type of verse being produced. More importantly, by failing to combine the functions of profit and delight, they exposed themselves to thrusts from the misomousi; for if poets intended only to delight, then surely what they were doing was essentially transient and hardly worth over-strenuous effort in composition or prolonged attention when written. If the instructive aspect was stressed, the question could be raised, why poetry at all? And the route then indicated was logically towards prose. In either case the extinction or at least the essentially minor status of poetry is implied, and the poet, far from being the important individual conceived of in the old tradition, was in danger of becoming redundant. The practical answer was to unite profit and delight as simultaneous functions of a poem, and also to convince the world of the special gifts of the poet; to make the art a unique one with its own important contribution to make to the intellectual world. This was what Sidney succeeded in establishing.

My examination of the English poets' concern with morality has so far been largely in relation to lyric, amatory verse. However, on two other fronts poets might have felt threatened by charges of immorality, for the morally severe also looked askance at ballads and the drama. Now while it is true that many of the defenders of learned poetry condemned ballads and at least some aspects of theatre, the castigation rained down on the two art forms by those who were not poets must have seemed a bit close for comfort at times, given the parallel reproaches levelled at erotic poems. For the detractors it would have been an easy step from upbraiding stage comedies and market-place minstrels to disparaging sonnets, epistles, and epyllions,
since differences in form and quality would matter less than the fact that all could be regarded as 'poetry' in the sense of imaginative literature.

I have recorded in passing several examples of divines fulminating against ballads. The charge of the corruption of youth is one we have seen to be commonplace, but balladists were also reviled because they were often linked with petty crime and had the reputation of being beggarly and drunken, something which clearly did not commend them to the morally upright members of the community.

The same disreputable social ambience enveloped the theatres, said to be the haunts of pickpockets and prostitutes, and other immoral folk, and this provided the denigrators of the drama with an obvious avenue of attack, although the actual plays were of course also much criticised. It was the stage that bore the brunt of the clamour against the immorality of poetry. From T.W.'s sermon at Paul's Cross on 3 November 1577 onwards the tirade against plays and theatres was unrelenting until well into the seventeenth century. This is a subject that has been thoroughly investigated. I need do no more here than repeat the view that the attack on plays must have been felt to cast a slur on poetry as a whole; certainly the apologists for poetry often acknowledge the justice of the attack in some respects and are at pains to distinguish morally suspect plays from serious, learned and virtuous poetry. Sidney concedes that comedies can be 'odious' (Apology, 117/8-9), and is deeply concerned that too often 'they stir laughter in sinful things' (Apology, 137/4-5). He discusses plays at length, combining aesthetic with moral considerations, and, although he claims that the drama can have a good didactic purpose, acknowledges
that the genre can be 'pitifully abused' (see Apology, 133/37-137/23).

Sidney's mentioning of 'stage-keepers' in addition to 'play-makers' (Apology, 117/8-9) suggests he recognized that the disrepute which attached to drama was as much to do with the physical environment in which plays were watched as with the contents of the pieces themselves.

IV

It is clear then that English poets of the later sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were working in an environment that was in many ways hostile to them, and also that the issue of morality was central to the controversy over their art. To answer the charges made against poets, those who defended the profession relied heavily on the notion that poets are learned - in a special, as well as a more conventional way, and tried to demonstrate that the poet was the best of teachers. By emphasizing the poet's learning and the didactic element in his verse, and showing how this could lead to the instilling of virtue, the defenders were offering a concept of the poet that was characterized by sobriety and dependability, and were thus repairing the poor reputation poets had as presenters and instigators of immorality. In part this strategy was dependent upon the humanists' binding of knowledge and eloquence with virtue, which was discussed in the second chapter in relation to Daniel, but it was also sustained by the belief that since the earliest times the poet had been regarded as a sage and a teacher, and poetry had been an important part of education.

When one considers what it means to call a poet 'learned', it becomes clear that the knowledge he is supposed to possess is not simply
a familiarity with the various branches of human learning, but also a comprehension of things which it is given to no more than a few individuals to understand, or be able to communicate.

As far as conventional human learning was concerned, one can infer that ideally the Elizabethan or Jacobean poet should have a sound knowledge of classical writings and the scriptures, and probably of later work too, which would both inform his thought and attitudes and provide him with a store of diction, imagery, and allusion; he should be able to employ rhetoric and logic; he should be acquainted with the other arts and sciences—perhaps expert in them, with moral concepts and virtues and their embodiment in particular men and women, and with contemporary, recent, and more distant historical events; some argued that he required the knowledge brought by experience in the world.

It hardly needed to be proved that the leading modern poets were knowledgeable in this sense, even if they could not claim to be philosophers in the way Virgil was regarded as being, and even though their works were not the compendia of all kinds of knowledge that Homer's were, although it could be argued the *The Faerie Queene* approaches the classical epics in terms of the knowledge it embodies. Sidney was widely read, as a perusal of the correspondence with Languet or of Osborn's biography of the poet as a young man makes clear. Dyer, we are told, knew Latin, Italian, French, and Spanish, had studied a variety of authors, and, with Sidney, had attended Dr Dee to learn chemistry. Jonson is reported to have been a man of formidable learning, and the range of Raleigh's, Chapman's, Greville's, Donne's, and Shakespeare's knowledge is as evident from their work as it is
from their biographies or critical studies of them. This prompts the reflection that poets were not being called to account for being unlearned, but, where the transmission of knowledge was involved at all, for presenting it in an unacceptable medium both from the moral and intellectual points of view.

The other aspect of calling a poet learned involved, as I indicated the evocation of the belief in the poet as sage — a notion whose antiquity could be relied on to carry some weight. But as well as being regarded as learned in the practical, worldly sense, the ancient poets were also seen as possessing esoteric knowledge and wisdom, which was a result of their being inspired by the gods or muses, or subject to some kind of daemonic possession. And what the poets knew was bound up with their ability to convey it in a compelling fashion. While not all Elizabethan and Jacobean poets claimed to be inspired in such a manner, or at least put more emphasis on other aspects of their profession, the sense of the esoteric and transcendental remained potent, and was often deliberately evoked to support the argument that the poet had a unique role to play in society by virtue of his special knowledge and powers of conveying it. In the Renaissance the belief that poetry can create in words patterns of order and harmony that reflect those of the cosmos endorsed the idea that the poet had access to knowledge that was beyond the ken of most mortals.

Thus, the concept of the learned poet was multi-dimensional, and, while geared to the particular needs of England in the reigns of Elizabeth and James, owed much to the thought and belief of the ancient world.

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The idea that there is a close bond between poetry and learning is an ancient one, as is the related view of the poet as wise man and teacher, although what was meant by 'learning' and 'wisdom' obviously differed from age to age and from writer to writer. However, as Curtius has said, 'All Antiquity sees the poet as sage, teacher, educator.' As early as the eighth century B.C. we find Hesiod speaking of how the Muses inspired him to explain the past and future to his contemporaries. Just over two centuries later Pindar also was offering himself as an instructor of his fellows ('For the world at large, they need interpreters'), while much later in the fifth century, in his play Frogs (405 B.C), Aristophanes provides a detailed exposition of the poet's role, emphasizing his didactic purpose. Aristophanes makes the character Aeschylus ask: 'for a gift of what kind is it right to admire any poet?' 'For his expertise and his sound advice,' answers the character Euripides, 'and because we improve by our teaching/mankind's civic sense and their natures too.' A little later in the play 'Aeschylus' remarks on how helpful the nobler poets have been - Orpheus teaching about mystical rites, Musaeus about medicinal cures and oracular lore, Hesiod about agriculture, and Homer about arms. 'Aeschylus' then attacks 'Euripides' for portraying in his plays base and immoral behaviour, and thus corrupting his audiences, and concludes: 'the poets alone are the teachers of youth - so, for sure, what we say in our poems/should adhere to what's morally sound.' Here then we see claims being made for poets on two fronts: on the one hand, they convey practical knowledge on a range of topics, including (apropos of Daniel) 'civic sense'; and on the other, they have a moral influence on, and therefore a moral duty towards, their audiences.
Discussions of these two aspects of the poet's role in society—often in relation to each other—became common in subsequent periods, and the notion was established that the poet as learned man had certain kinds of moral responsibility, this being related to the doctrine, mentioned in the chapter on Daniel, that the poet must be a good man.

That Plato fully recognized the kind of intellectual and moral influence a poet could have in Greek society, and the extent of it, is evident from the number of times in his works he turns to an examination of poetry, and by his famous decision to exclude poets from his ideal state, a decision regularly referred to in Renaissance discussions of poetry. Eric Havelock has argued that Plato's attack on Homer and the other poets was inspired by the recognition that they were indeed highly effective teachers, not only of facts and stories, but also of attitudes, customs, ritual, and moral and physical behaviour in general, and were thus an obstacle to the acceptance of Plato's own view of existence, which was radically different from that embodied in the poets: he had to undermine their credibility and influence if his own philosophy was to make the impact he desired.

In spite of Plato's assault, Homer was widely regarded throughout antiquity as the greatest of teachers, until, in the fourth century A.D., he was supplanted by Virgil, who was for generations revered as a philosopher and a mine of knowledge. Curtius says that 'The dignity, the independence, and the pedagogical function of poetry owe their existence to Homer and his influence.' Quintilian, an influential writer for the Renaissance, remarked that in Homer 'we may find ... clear signs of the knowledge of every art', and Macrobius and Servius made the same claim for Virgil. The Greek, Strabo,
well known in the Renaissance for his defence of poetry against Eratosthenes in c. A.D. 17, spent some time demonstrating that in Homer one is given all kinds of knowledge: geography, rhetoric, farming, and generalship. Generally it was agreed that 'Poetry has risen to the heights of glory, thanks to the efforts of ... Homer and Virgil'. The work of the ancient poets, as an extended reading of them makes plain is replete with all sorts of information and with instruction on all manner of subjects in a way that is not usually the case with more modern poets. The Renaissance reader's own experience that this was the case would have been authoritatively confirmed by Plutarch's statements concerning the educative role of poetry, and Horace's remarks in *Ars Poetica* about how Orpheus had first civilized mankind, how Homer prepared men for war, how oracles were uttered in verse, and generally how the poets 'pointed out the path of life'.

There was therefore a traditional linking of poetry and learning—and often morality—in the classical world, and this was to be of great value to the apologists for poetry in sixteenth-century England. Confronted by the attack on poets and beset with uncertainties about their position in intellectual society, the English writers, and those who championed them, turned to the tradition of the poet as learned man and teacher in order to construct a large part of the defences they needed. In doing this, they were following a modern European as well as the classical example, for the notion of the *doctus poeta* was common both in France and Italy: The members of the Pléiade viewed themselves as more learned than their educated contemporaries, and insisted that anyone aspiring to be a true poet must acquire extensive knowledge. In Italy many of the best known literary theorists, including Tasso,
Scaliger, and Fracastoro, argued that poets must be learned. Their claim to be recognized as such was boosted by the publication in Italy of important editions and translations of Aristotle's *Poetics* in 1498 and 1536. The fact that the great philosopher had dealt seriously with poetry gave its defenders confidence that the art was an important branch of learning, on at least an equal footing with the other intellectual disciplines. Moreover, the demonstration by critics that the poet needed a wide range of verbal skills which, it was maintained, could be acquired only by careful training, also gave the profession a sense of status and standards.

In England the conviction was that poetry had been both 'the verie first nurse and ancient grandmother of all learning', 'the first light-giver to ignorance', and the branch of learning which prepares people 'to feed afterwards of tougher knowledges'. Both these notions are commonplace of the period. As we have seen, they derive in part from Horace and Aristophanes, who cited Orpheus and other poets as civilizing, educative influences in primitive society. But statements by Cicero and Strabo were seminal too, and both writers were often cited by English commentators. Cicero says only that 'with the Greeks the poets are the oldest literary class', though he was cited as an authority by many writers on the basis of this brief comment. Strabo is much fuller, though what he is concerned with is the role of poetry as a propaedeutic:

The ancients .... regarded poetry as a sort of primary philosophy, which was supposed to introduce us to life from our childhood, and teach us about character, emotion, and action in a pleasurable way.
My own school, the Stoics, actually said that only the wise man could be a poet. This is why Greek communities give children their first education through poetry, not for simple 'entertainment' of course, but for moral improvement.  

This was a view confirmed by Plutarch at the end of his essay on poets, where he says that a young man needs to be well guided and directed in the reading of poets so that he can move to the study of philosophy with a well prepared mind. In fact it was common to regard poetry as useful early training: Plato refers to teachers instructing children in behaviour by setting them the works of 'good poets' to learn by heart, and to music masters instilling self-control by imbuing their young pupils with the rhythms and melodies of lyrics to make them 'more civilized, more balanced'; and Horace tells us how 'the poet fashions the tender lisping lips of childhood', teaching decorous speech, good morals, and courage. The Roman's words are cited by the Elizabethan defender of poets, Richard Wills, who, with several others, also makes reference to Strabo. The view of poets as 'undoubted true guides to civill life' (Bryskett) is met with in several texts. The defenders of poetry naturally felt that such weighty and ubiquitous opinions should be brought to the attention of those hostile to the art.

Although Sidney nods in passing to the view of poetry as a preliminary form of instruction, it is an idea fundamentally at odds with his central notion of the poet as 'monarch' of all sciences, and consequently he is more concerned at this early stage of the Apology to establish the idea that poets were the first to bring learning and hence civilization to primitive society. This gives them an importance
all their own, and does not encourage us to think of poetry as a mere servant of more demanding types of knowledge. Sidney refers first to Musaeus, Homer, and Hesiod, then to Orpheus, Linus, and Amphion—names that resound again and again through Renaissance writings on poetry, that took on a kind of talismanic quality, potent in the continuing bid to impress the importance of poetry on the world at large. As far as the Elizabethans were concerned, the reliance on such names for rhetorical effect (it was usually no more than this) was underwritten by their regular appearance in the works of admired classical and patristic writers—for example, in Aristophanes and Horace, as we have seen, and also in Cicero and Augustine.

It is Puttenham, determined to justify poets in as many ways as he can, who makes the most of the view that they were key figures in early society. In Book I, Chapters iii and iv of *The Arte of English Poesie*, citing Orpheus and the others, he claims that poets were the first priests, prophets, legislators, politicians, philosophers, astronomers, historiographers, orators, and musicians, though he notes that the stories of Amphion building cities merely by playing his harp, and Orpheus having such control over wild beasts are not literally true, but meant to show figuratively the powers of the poets to mollify hard hearts and to bring 'the rude and savage people to a more civill and orderly life'.

Puttenham's remarks about poets being 'the first Priests and ministers of the holy misteries' are worth a little attention. He argues that they entered into this role because, through their observation of nature, especially of 'the Celestiall courses', and their seeking for the first mover, they came gradually 'to know and consider of ... the divine intelligences or good Angels', and, in response to this
knowledge, instituted all 'the observances and ceremonies of religion'. The result of their involvement was that they endeavoured to live a chaste and holy life of study, contemplation, and abstinence in order to perform their priestly roles better, and this in turn led to them receiving visions and uttering prophecies. This train of thought is interesting, not simply because it is clearly an attempt to invest poets with great worth by claiming for them special knowledge and holy office, but also because it alerts us to the interest of many Renaissance poets and philosophers in the Ancient Theology, the tradition of Christian apologetic theology based on supposedly ancient texts written by Hermes Trismegistus, Orpheus, Pythagoras, and Zoroaster, but believed to go back to Moses, and sometimes Noah, Enoch, and even Adam.

Writing in 1576, Louis Le Roy, Professor of Greek at the College Royal and an exponent of the Ancient Theology, set up the same sequence of ideas as we find in Puttenham:

In auncient time in Greece they which did write first of divine, celestial, naturall, morall, politicke, and military matters were the Poets: and they were commonly Priests, Theologians, Musicians, Astrologians, and Physicians; as Linus, Musaeus, Orpheus, and Amphion.

He goes on to remark that Orpheus is said to be, with Zoroaster, the father and author of 'al the ancient wisdome'.

In his study of Orpheus, Walker notes that the legendary figure was seen in several distinct roles by the Renaissance, but that his reputation as divinely-inspired singer and poetic teacher was bound up with his prestige as a theologian. His name was therefore
a charismatic one to mention, which is no doubt why Puttenham wrote as he did, and why many writers on poetry refer to his name as they suggest the sacred origins of the art. It would be unwise though to suppose that reference to Orpheus is a sign of wholehearted commitment to the Ancient Theology: Sidney, for instance, referring to him for a third time in the *Apology*, remarks that he was 'in a full wrong divinity' (102/6-7). 136

Chapman's and Spenser's conceptions of their calling as poets was deeply influenced by the myth of Orpheus, as I noted earlier, but Daniel, although he shares their views of the consecrated office held by the poet, does not refer to the Greek bard in *Musophilus*, when one might expect him to do so in such passages as those in which he exalts eloquence, and poetry as the mother of eloquence. However, the continual resort by Daniel to religious terminology – for instance, the references to 'this sacred arte' (1. 16), 'this holy skill' (1. 576), and the talk of profanation (e.g. 1. 86) – undoubtedly owes something to the Orphic myth, which was so pervasive in the Renaissance. 138 The high estimation set on the poet by that myth played a notable part in encouraging those who dedicated themselves to the art to make large claims for themselves.

It also led poets to look down on those unable to appreciate the best poetry, and to exclude them from participating in it. There is certainly at least a parallel to be drawn here between the esoteric character of the Ancient Theology and the sacred mystery of poetry, which we have seen Daniel, Spenser, and Chapman elaborating in their several ways. Walker remarks that 'The whole structure of the Ancient Theology rests on the belief that the Ancient Theologians wrote with
deliberate obscurity, veiling the truth', for 'it was an almost universally accepted principle that religious mysteries should be safeguarded from the profane by a disguise that only the initiated can penetrate.' Walker notes that many Renaissance poets were deliberately obscure for this reason.

The vulgar masses and 'prophane wits' (Harington) were traditionally regarded as needing to be excluded from higher knowledge and the arts. I touched on this before apropos of Daniel, who, like Spenser, Chapman, du Bellay, and many other poets, sought to separate himself from the ignorant masses, finding strength in solitude or at least in exclusive company. What Walker is pointing to is the confirmation by the Ancient Theology - especially in the fusion of Orpheus' roles as poet and theologian of the need to defend what was sacred, to keep undesirable people away. These were views revived particularly by the Florentine Platonists, Ficino and Pico.¹⁴⁰

Not that this necessarily involved obscuring the truth by some poetic device. Puttenham wanted the language of poetry to be 'naturall, pure, and the most usuall of all [the poet's] countrey', which for him meant imitating the speech of 'men civill and graciously behavoured and bred' - that is 'the usuall speach of the Court, and that of London and the shires lying about London within 1x myles'.¹⁴¹ Daniel spoke strongly against 'disguising or forging strange or unusuall wordes, as if it were to make our verse seeme an other kind of speach out of the course of our usuall practise'.¹⁴² And Jonson, in making his plea for 'perspicuous' style that does not 'need an Interpreter', stressed that 'Custome is the most certaine Mistresse of Language'.¹⁴³ All three men were hostile enough to vulgar taste, however: Jonson
echoes Puttenham when he qualifies the statement about custom by adding:

Yet ... I understand not the vulgar Custome: For that were a precept no lesse dangerous to Language, then life, if wee should speake or live after the manners of the vulgar: But I call Custome of speech, which is the consent of the Learned. 144

Many poets did endeavour to veil the truth by the way in which they wrote, of course, largely by using allegory. Discussing the origins of poetry, Boccaccio explained that Musaeus, Linus, and Orpheus under the prompting stimulus of the Divine Mind, invented strange songs in regular time and measure, designed for the praise of God. To strengthen the authority of these songs, they enclosed the high mysteries of things divine in a covering of words, with the intention that the adorable majesty of such things should not become an object of too common knowledge, and thus fall into contempt. 145

The other aspect of veiling was that poets make truths which would otherwise cheapen by exposure the object of strong intellectual effort and various interpretation, that in ultimate discovery they shall be more precious. 146

In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries in England such attitudes emerge plainly in the work of Spenser and Chapman. 147

In the Prologue to Book VI of *The Faerie Queene* Spenser asks the Muses to
Revele to me the sacred noursery
Of vertue, which with you doth there remaine,
Where it in silver bowre, does hidden ly
From view of men, and wicked worlds disdaine. 148

And in the dedicatory sonnet to Burghley Spenser refers to the 'ydle rimes'
of his great poem having a 'deeper sence' which is veiled 'from commune
view'. 149

Allegory had a double function: as Harington says, 'the weaker
capacities will feede themselves with the pleasantnes of the historie
and sweetnes of the verse', those with more insight will push on to
an understanding of deeper meanings. But 'such manner of Poeticall
writing [is] an excellent way to preserve all kinde of learning from
... corruption', 150 and in this was an important element in the complex
of defence measures built up by the poets against those who would damage
their profession.

After having introduced Orpheus and the other early poets into
the Apology at an early stage, Sidney continues his preliminary bid
to provide a respectable intellectual pedigree for poetry by appropriating
several classical writers to the art, whom we would not usually think of
as poets: 'the philosophers of Greece durst not a long time appear to
the world but under the masks of poets', we are told.

So Thales, Empedocles, and Parmenides sang their
natural philosophy in verses; so did Pythagoras
and Phocylides their moral counsels; so did Tyrtaeus
in war matters, and Solon in matters of policy:
or rather they, being poets, did exercise their
delightful vein in those points of highest
knowledge, which before them lay hid to the world.

(Apology, 96/38-97/6) 151
Plato too is said to have been a poet, as is Herodotus. Sidney is taking advantage of the broad definitions of 'poetry' available to him to serve a particular end: shortly afterwards he will set out a much narrower view.

So far I have been examining ideas about poetry and learning that were commonplace. Sidney starts out by referring to these ideas in order to give a general impression of the antiquity and worth of poetry, but then moves on fairly rapidly to expound a much more sophisticated, cogent, and, in Elizabethan England, fresh argument in support of poetry as the most important branch of human learning. An Apology for Poetry is the period's finest statement on poetry, and must therefore be examined, though I am not going to offer any new interpretations of it, nor indeed provide a detailed commentary on it. I do, however, want to make certain observations about the concept of the learned poet that emerges from Sidney's arguments, especially about the relation of that concept to contemporary developments in the world of learning: at this point therefore an outline of some of Sidney's ideas will be appropriate:

Sidney distinguishes between 'three several kinds' of poet (Apology, 101/38); the divinely inspired or vatic, the philosophical, and what he terms the 'right' poet. Of the first kind he writes:

The chief, both in antiquity and excellency, were they that did imitate the inconceivable excellencies of God.

(Apology, 101/37-8)
As examples we are offered David 'in his Psalms', Solomon, Moses, Deborah, and the writer of Job, and, from the classical world, Orpheus, Amphion, Homer 'in his Hymns' and 'many other, both Greeks and Romans', although Sidney's Christian faith prompts him to remark, as noted earlier, that the latter group were 'in a full wrong divinity' (Apology, 101/39-102/8). These writers 'may justly be termed vates' (Apology, 102/38-9), a word Sidney has already defined as 'a diviner, foreseer, or prophet', calling it 'so heavenly a title' that was bestowed upon 'this heart-ravishing knowledge' (Apology, 98/20-4). He notes in this context that 'both the oracles of Delphos and Sibylla's prophecies were wholly delivered in verses' (Apology, 99/1-3), and goes on to discuss the Psalms as a divine poem. The first kind of poet, therefore, is divinely inspired. Sidney has mixed feelings about this: he calls such writers 'most noble' (Apology, 102/38) and is full of reverence for them, and he acknowledges in the oracles 'that high flying liberty of conceit proper to the poet' (Apology, 99/4-5), but, on the other hand, he is troubled by what he sees as the Romans' misguided use of Virgil as a prophet (Apology, 98/24ff), and, later in the treatise, he remarks of Plato, apropos of Ion, 'he attributeth unto Poesy more than myself do, namely, to be a very inspiring of a divine force, far above man's wit' (Apology, 130/7-9): Sidney is removing himself here from the doctrine of furor poeticius as well as from the vatic poets.

Sidney's intentions in all this and the effects of what he writes are complex. He is endeavouring to give a general impression of the worth of poetry by referring to such revered figures as David and Orpheus, but he is also preparing the ground for the main part of his argument - that the true poet is the 'maker' - so, although he praises
the vatia poets, he hedges his comments with qualifications. Moreover, he is trying to side-step Plato's charges against poets, which he does by formulating the concept of a new kind of poet, not recognized by Plato, and by letting the Platonic criticisms fall on the other two kinds, whom he makes little attempt to defend, and, indeed, whom he does not wish to emulate. In addition, Sidney, as a firm Protestant, is scrupulous in pointing out the spiritual limitations of 'inspired' classical authors and condemning 'vain and godless superstition' (Apology, 98/35). He remarks later that classical poets 'had not the light of Christ' (Apology, 129/26). He is concerned too that, in the discussion of David's Psalms, he himself has profaned 'that holy name, applying it to Poetry, which is among us thrown down to so ridiculous an estimation' (Apology, 99/22-4). The implication is that the kind of poet wanted by Sidney is neither a David nor an Orpheus. What we see, then, is a sincere acknowledgement that epiphanic writing is beyond the reach of most men, but also that it is not the kind of expression the 'right poet' is aiming at. However, we are left with a firm notion of the exalted status of some poets, who have traditionally been regarded as purveyors of divine knowledge, men standing beyond the world of mere human learning.

The second kind of poet referred to by Sidney deals with 'matters philosophical', and it is doubtful whether such writers can be admitted as poets at all, because they are said to be imprisoned in the subject-matter with which they are concerned and do not, as the 'right poets' essentially do, follow their own invention. Virgil in the Georgics and Lucretius are among the authors mentioned here, and Sidney does say that, whoever dislikes such work, 'the fault is in their judgements
... and not in the sweet food of sweetly uttered knowledge' (Apology, 102/14-25). But we are moved briskly on from a consideration of these writers, partly because, once more, Sidney is eager to expound the concept of the poet as maker, on which he will build the main line of his case, and partly because he believes ultimately that, as Castelvetro put it, 'All works with subject-matter drawn from other arts and sciences are not strictly poetry. In these cases the poet is simply wrapping up other people's work in his own words.' The early poets - and indeed, medieval Italian and English writers - may be called 'fathers in learning' (Apology, 96/24), but this does not mean for Sidney that the poet, defending his role, should claim to be a repository and purveyor of the arts and sciences in the way we saw Homer was considered to be. Doubtless, poets needed to be and were knowledgeable in the conventional sense, but Sidney saw that, to win respect for his calling, poets had to be shown to be unique in what they could give to the world of learning; just to offer an ornamented version of what could be acquired was not enough.

Hence Sidney's third and 'right' kind of poets

be they which most properly do imitate to teach and delight, and to imitate borrow nothing of what is, hath been, or shall be; but range, only reined with learned discretion, into the divine consideration of what may be and should be.

(Apology, 102/33-7)

This, we are told, is 'the noblest scope to which ever any learning was directed,' (Apology, 103/6-7), and thus is far superior to the work of the philosophical poets, who are like 'the meaner sort of
painters, who counterfeit only such faces as are set before them' (Apology, 102/26-8). Both Puttenham and Wills accepted such poets, but generally in the Renaissance the mere representation of the external world by the artist was not rated highly.158

The 'right poet' is what the Greeks, English and Scots call 'a maker' - a 'high and incomparable ... title', for whereas the other arts and sciences have Nature for their principal object, and depend on Nature to the extent of only being able to act out what she prescribes (Apology, 99/34-100/20), the poet

disdaining to be tied to any such subjection, lifted up with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect into another nature, in making things either better than Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in Nature .... so as he goeth hand in hand with Nature, not enclosed within the narrow warrant of her gifts, but freely ranging only within the zodiac of his own wit.

(Apology, 100/21-8)

Nature's world is brazen; 'the poets only deliver a golden' (Apology, 100/32-3). What enables the true poet to transcend nature in this way is his possession of the 'Idea or fore-conceit of the work' (Apology, 101/4): he does not record what he sees before him but projects a conceit from his mind, very much in the way God was said by some to have created the universe:

For, as the Craftsman maketh his worke by the patterne which he had erst conceyved in his mynde, which patterne is his inward word: so God made the World and all that is therein. 159
In his treatise, Sidney refers to 'the force of a divine breath' with which the poet creates things better than Nature, and, using a telling echo, asks for honour to be paid 'to the heavenly Maker of that maker', who has set the poet 'beyond and over all the works' of Nature (Apology, 101/16-21). It is for such reasons that the Greeks gave the poet 'the name above all names of learning' (Apology, 101/27).

These ideas and their pedigrees are familiar enough to students of the Renaissance. The point I want to stress once more is the degree to which the poet is presented as a unique figure, possessed of a very special kind of learning, and god-like in his powers of invention. I quoted earlier Sidney's denial that he set so high a store on the poet as Plato did in referring to divine inspiration, but all in all Sidney asks us to accord the poet a far greater degree of worth than Plato did. It is precisely Sidney's intention to give this view of the poet, to isolate him from and set him way above other representatives of human learning. Such elevation has its precedents: Boccaccio had remarked that

few ... are the souls in whom this gift is born; indeed so wonderful a gift it is that true poets have always been the rarest of men.

And further back lay the great authority of Cicero, who asserted that those who devoted themselves to the Muses and Literature encompassed in their knowledge and observation 'almost boundless range and subject-matter', but added that only a very few poets of this level of attainment are to be found.

History and philosophy are examined by Sidney as alternative modes of knowledge to poetry, representatives of the other arts;
but historians are shown to be 'captivated to the truth of a foolish world' \((\text{Apology}, 111/36)\), and indeed a fallen world, and moreover, do not deal with universals in the Aristotelian sense \((\text{Apology}, 109/23-34)\); while the philosopher 'teacheth obscurely' \((\text{Apology}, 109/12)\). Neither provides 'so sweet a prospect' into knowledge as the poet does \((\text{Apology}, 113/20-1)\), who 'feigning notable images of virtues [and] vices', is able to 'strike, pierce [and] possess the sight of the soul' \((\text{Apology}, 103/29\) and 107/15-16). Concerned to defend the role of the poet in intellectual society, Sidney did not just claim parity with the other disciplines, he asserted complete superiority.

Poetry does, however, share the aim of the other branches of learning: 'to lead and draw us to as high a perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clayey lodgings can be capable of' \((\text{Apology}, 104/6-8)\). The emphases here are Platonic and Christian, and were made much of by the northern humanist movement. Sidney's next claim is thoroughly humanist too: 'the highest end of the mistress-knowledge' is 'the knowledge of a man's self ... with the end of well-doing and not of well-knowing only' \((\text{Apology}, 104/26-30)\). Poetry, in common with other types of human learning, serves these ends, but is far more successful in doing so than any other discipline, because, not bound by Nature, and especially favoured by God, the poet is able to supplement the power of grace to move man's 'infected will' \((\text{Apology}, 101/14-24)\): the poet teaches for a deeply moral - and Christian - purpose. \(^{164}\)

All in all, therefore, poetry is 'void of no gift that ought to be in the noble name of learning' \((\text{Apology}, 141/22-3)\), and in all branches of knowledge the poet is monarch \((\text{Apology}, 113/19)\). But, while he shares common interests and aims with the other arts and
sciences, the 'right poet' goes far beyond them in the effect he can have.

VI

Having outlined Sidney's position, I want now to examine some of the implications discernible when one steps back to view the Apology, and indeed the other cases made for the learned poet, in a broader perspective. This will involve a consideration of the relationship of the vocation to contemporary developments in learning, an examination of further defensive measures taken by the poets because of their high estimation of the art, and a few observations on the cultural significance of the concept of the learned poet.

We have seen that Sidney and Spenser too, whose 'conformity to the idea of the poet presented in Sidney's Apology is so complete that it might be modelled upon it', were committed to instructing their contemporaries in true learning and virtue, but that they did not believe the poet could successfully perform his task if he allowed himself to be restricted to the sense world, which in Christian eyes was fallen, and from the Platonic viewpoint was unreal. The artist, by 'figuring forth' the 'Idea' from his mind, is able to create his own world in which there is a re-forming of the sense world - in Christian-Platonic terms, a reformation or redeeming of it by the imposition of order and right reason on what is disordered and irrational. Because of this it suits Sidney's purpose to follow Agrippa and demonstrate the vanity and uncertainty of the arts and sciences, which are dependent upon the sense world, because he wants
to show that poetry, as fiction, rises above that world, is not imprisoned in its mists and errors, and therefore cannot be criticized for the same reasons as other types of learning.\textsuperscript{167} Although 'our infected will keepeth us from reaching unto' perfection, Sidney says, 'our erected wit maketh us know' what it is (Apology, 101/22-4).\textsuperscript{168} The poet especially has the power to lead us towards perfection. It is significant that at this point in the Apology Sidney refers to 'that first accursed fall of Adam', relates the poet as maker to God as Maker, and speaks of the poet being charged 'with the force of a divine breath' (Apology, 101/16-22), for poetry is being seen as supportive of the work of grace.\textsuperscript{169}

As Tonkin has said, for Sidney and Spenser, the artist occupies 'an overwhelmingly important role in the active life of society', for art is seen as 'the one means towards public, societal redemption', with the artist as mediator between the golden and brazen worlds. Artistic creation is thus a sacred act with deep implications for the health of society.\textsuperscript{170}

However, in an age whose great gain has been said to be 'contact with experience, practical application, confidence in the visible',\textsuperscript{171} the notion of the poet's independence from the world of natural phenomena, and the downgrading of those artists who merely represent the external world, place the concept of the learned poet, as formulated by Sidney, at odds with some of the major realignments of learning generally, as they occurred under certain pressures from the humanist and scientific movements, and the Reformation, each of which in its own way, and subject to qualifications, emphasized the importance of engaging with the quotidian world.
While a detailed discussion of contemporary developments in learning which were out of accord with the notion of what a learned poet was must be left until the next chapter, the poet's position may be thrown into relief if one turns briefly to other areas of learning and thought. A.C. Crombie, for instance, has written that the scientific revolution came about by men asking questions within the range of an experimental answer, by limiting their inquiries to physical rather than metaphysical problems, concentrating their attention on accurate observation of the kinds of things there are in the natural world and the correlation of the behaviour of one with another rather than on their intrinsic natures, on proximate causes rather than substantial forms, and in particular on those aspects of the physical world which could be expressed in terms of mathematics.172

Clearly, mathematical or scientific scrutiny of observable phenomena in the sense world can create a very different kind of certainty in matters of knowledge from the type associated with the creation of a golden world. The inductive method described by Crombie was to provide a lasting basis for the advancement of learning.

Similar attitudes and methods were applied over a wider field than that of science. The humanists' preoccupation with the creature man engendered an interest in the psychology of individual behaviour, as well as investing even the smallest human acts and thoughts with significance. This was an emphasis on particularity, and it was the sum total of particulars, in all their haphazard variety, which constituted man: man was to be understood by an empirical study of the miscellaneous
facts, even the minutiae, that together make up his existence. The fullest expression of this aspect of humanist thought is to be found in Montaigne, whose *Essais* made such an impact on European thought, not least in England. In Book III especially, Montaigne insisted on the validity of all human experience: it is man's fundamental source of knowledge and enlightenment — and this despite, indeed because of, all the vicissitudes and aberrations which characterize it. 'Other fashion man, I repeat him', Montaigne declares, in these six words alone offering a basic challenge to the Platonically-oriented position. He continues:

> Constancy it selfe is nothing but a languishing and wavering dance. I cannot settle my object; it goes so unquietly and staggering, with a naturall drunkennesse; I take it in this plight, as it is at the instant I ammuse my selfe about it, I describe not th'essence but the passage; not a passage from age to age, or as the people reckon, from seaven yeares to seaven, but from day to day, from minute to minute. My history must be fitted to the present.

Auerbach has described Montaigne's attitude and methods as 'in the modern sense' scientific, because he describes his subject 'under as many different experimental conditions as possible' in order to 'determine the limits of possible changes and thus arrive at a comprehensive picture.'

Against this one might set Sidney's notion that 'the more excellent [artists] bestow that in colours upon you which is fittest for the eye to see' (*Apology*, 102/26-30), which suggests a strict
determination by the painter or writer of what in the sense world is appropriate for the beholder to look at or the reader to read. Puttenham too, believing that everyone has an innate desire for 'lovely conformitie or proportion', thinks that the mind cannot be contented if it discovers any illfavorednesse or disproportion ... as for example, when a sound is either too loude or too low or otherwise confuse, the eare is ill affected: so is th'eye if the colour be sad or not liminous and recreative, or the shape of a membred body without his due measures and simmetry, and the like of every other sense in his proper function. These excesses or defectes or confusions and disorders in the sensible objectes are deformities and unseemely to the sence. 176

The attitude evinced by Montaigne towards the sense world and towards one's involvement with it, the manner in which one's perception of its characteristics might be recorded, and the terms in which one might conceive of its significance, are as far from Sidney's and Spenser's notion of the work of the right poet, and from the courtly ideas of proper behaviour and expression described by Puttenham and, behind him, Castiglione, as the scientific attitude, embodied in a writer such as Bacon, is from Platonic doctrines of universal harmony and proportion and the ability of man to ascend through contemplation to the divine essence.

Bacon provides another central point of reference concerning alternative modes of knowledge to those set out in Apology. In Novum Organum, following his principle of retaining old terms but investing them with fresh meaning, 177 he rejects the old concept of
forms as 'figments of the mind', and puts forward a new concept of forms as patterns and laws of motion. As such, forms are 'the true object of knowledge', which Plato saw, 'but lost the real fruit of his opinion, by considering of Forms as absolutely abstracted from matter, and not confined and determined by matter. Bacon sees the whole of the natural world as being comprehensible in its own terms, provided that the empirical method is followed: man must learn to delight 'in the inclosures of particularity' and not, as he is inclined to do, 'in the spacious liberty of generalities', for this is 'to the extreme prejudice of knowledge'. Man must also recognize that 'The human understanding is of its own nature prone to suppose the existence of more order and regularity in the world than it finds. With these points held in mind, man can actually control the natural world and not merely order it by imagination.

The emphases made by Sidney in his description of the right poet's attitude to the sense world were also at odds with some aspects of Calvinist thinking. Certainly Calvin made a clear distinction between earthly and heavenly matters, and impressed upon his readers that their perception of the natural world was marred because of the fall, and these are notions we find in the Apology; but Calvin rejects Plato's idea that knowledge is recollection rather than the result of accumulating empirical experiences, warns that our understanding is 'principally convinced of her owne weaknesse' when it endeavours to climb 'above the compasse of this present life', and urges us to see that God

hath so disclosed himselfe in the whole workemanshippe of the worlde, and daylie so manifestly presenteth
himself, that men can not open their eyes but they
must needs behold him ... he hath in all his
workes graven certaine markes of his glorie, & those
so plaine and notably discernable, that the excuse of
ignorance is taken away from men, be they never so
grosse and dull witted. 186

The Calvinist writer, Lambert Daneau, enlarging on the master's words,
asks how we can suppose 'this whole most beautifull worke of God,
whiche is called the worlde' to be a fantasy, a dream, and not what
we suppose it to be. The Platonic doctrine of Forms is blasphemous,
he says. 187 With some philosophic naivety, Daneau asserts that
'experience it selfe confirmeth the trueth', but more credibly, goes
on to speak of

all those places of holy Scripture in whiche the Lorde
witnesseth that hee founded the earth, and created all
things : and not that hee hath cast before our
eyes vaine representations, and emptie shadowes of
things, to deceive us with all. 188

Scripture makes no mention of an ideal world which this actual world
figures or on which it is modelled. 189 To be sure, the actual world
can readily be seen to be corrupt, fallen away from its original perfection
because of human sin : 'the strength and plentifulness of the earth,
and of all other thinges decreaseth dayly, and are nothing now in
respect as God first created them'; 190 but Daneau, as the title of his
book declares, is keen to impress upon us that 'God hath engraven in
the world greate and wonderfull tokens of his goodness, power, and
wisedome', as a light that shines clearly and cannot be put out. 191

The emphasis on God revealed in his works as well as his word was
common in the period, and is familiar in Bacon, himself influenced by Calvinist thought.\textsuperscript{192} Calvin noted that astronomy, medicine, and 'all naturall Philosophy' serve to help us understand creation and hence the workings of divine wisdom:

\begin{quote}
truely they that have digested, yea or but tasted
the liberall arts, being holpen by the ayde thereof,
do proceed much further to loke into the secrets of
Gods wisdome.\textsuperscript{193}
\end{quote}

Human learning and the apprehension of the sense world can never be a substitute for grace, but they have an important role to play in the godly life: 'Calvinism was ... anchored in thisworldly endeavour', and Calvin attacked those who were otherworldly.\textsuperscript{194} Undoubtedly, Sidney would have endorsed much of what Calvin and perhaps Daneau had to say, but, to the extent that his concept of the learned poet was Platonic in orientation, there existed a tension between it and certain aspects of reformed doctrine.

\section*{VII}

Sidney's desire to justify the pursuit of poetry in the face of adverse criticism led to the expounding of strongly positive ideas about the exalted status of the learned poet. There was, however, a more negative reaction stimulated by the attack, but one which also confirmed the sense of the true poet's occupying an elevated position. Sidney concedes that poetry can be abused by some of its practitioners, and, being abused, can cause a lot of damage: poets are often culpable for mishandling their art and skill (\emph{Apology}, 125/27, 35-7, and 132/18-20).
Part of Sidney's answer to this is to say that 'man's wit abuseth Poetry' (Apology, 125/22-3) as it abuses everything, but that this does not mean poetry itself is bad, any more than the misuse of medicine, the law, or even God's word, means that those things are corrupt in themselves. The other part of his answer is once more to pick up a traditional line of argument and to separate the true poet from the 'poet-apes' (Apology, 141/25), 'base men with servile wits' who are content simply with pecuniary rewards, and who 'by their own disgracefulness disgrace the most graceful Poesy' (Apology, 132/3-9). Like many of his contemporaries, Sidney is on one level simply concerned about the sheer number of authors in his day, but in addition there seems to be a certain amount of animus here from Sidney the aristocratic amateur, directed towards the world of professional writers and those he would have judged to be inferior authors. We recall his praise of Surrey's lyrics for being furnished with 'many things tasting of a noble birth, and worthy of a noble mind' (Apology, 133/24-5). Shepherd remarks that Sidney's poet has aristocratic sympathies, and that 'In origin and in destination, poetry relates to kings and emperors, cardinals and chancellors, great warriors and great men of church and state.' Whatever his prejudices, Sidney is certainly making a distinction between acceptable and unacceptable poets, and laying the blame for the disrepute into which poetry has fallen on the latter. This inevitably has the effect of implying that true poets are a highly select group, and so contributes to the general impression of their superiority to and distance from the more ordinary inhabitants of the world of poetry and learning.

The same distinction and subsequent condemnation of those adjudged to be lesser poets is met with in many Elizabethan and
Jacobean texts. The most familiar instances are in Jonson's writings and in the letter to Harvey prefacing *The Shepheardes Calender* (1579), where E.K., commending Spenser's style, condemns that of 'the rakehellye route of our ragged rymers ... which without learning boste, without judgement jangle, without reason rage and fome, as if some instinct of Poeticall spirite had newly ravished them above the meanesse of commen capacitie.'  

E.K.'s words were echoed by Webbe, and he predicts that soon 'every one that can frame a Booke in Ryme ... wyll catch at the Garlande due to Poets'. Such hostility was undoubtedly due in part to an aesthetic distaste for indifferent versifying, and to a general anger at the trivializing and debasing of an ancient and revered art. But there was also a more particular fear that the better English poets would be tarnished by being associated with those 'who be most busy to stuffe every stall full of grosse devises and unlearned Pamphlets'. Nashe reflects that such writings will 'make men thinke more baselie of the wittes of our Country'. As with most of the ideas held by the English about poetry, the notion of the true poets forming an exclusive group belonged to a European tradition. Horace, Quintilian, and Petronius had all condemned mere versifiers when compared to poets, and Horace had insisted that poets should not be mediocre. Boccaccio distinguished between those poets whom it was right to expel from the state and those who should stay as ornaments; Ariosto separated the few real poets (swans) from the numerous poetasters (crows and vultures); Scaliger rejected 'all that is merely popular (*plebium*) in thought and expression ... for only that which proceeds from solid erudition is proper to art'. Such views were developed by the Pléiade, who believed strongly in
an 'aristocracy of the mind': as Castor says, 'To be a versifier was to be one of a worthless and ignorant rabble, whereas to be a poet was to follow a high and noble calling.'

It was with a keen sense of this tradition that Ben Jonson wrote. Setting such high store on the role of the poet in society, and the importance of using language well, he censured 'the too-much licence of Poetasters, in this time', which hath much deform'd their mistris; that, every day, their manifold, and manifest ignorance, doth sticke unnaturall reproches upon her.

He made severe demands on would-be poets as far as their training was concerned, and scorned those writers 'that will ... make themselves a name with the multitude': 'I choose rather to live grav'd in obscuritie, then share with them, in so preposterous a fame.' For 'the multitude commend Writers, as they doe Fencers, or Wrastlers', and the 'Expectation of the Vulgar is more drawne, and held with newnesse, then goodnesse'. Hence they 'greedily reade' 'Rayling and tinckling Rimers', who are thus overpraised but who in fact 'powre forth Verses' completely lacking in sense. 'A Rymer, and a Poet, are two things': the latter is a good man (as Strabo said), teaching, inspiring, and sustaining, instructing 'to life, as well as puritie of language'; the former, especially in 'stage poetrie', practising 'nothing but ribaldry, profanation, blasphemy, all licence of offence to god, and man'. These are all serious issues for Jonson. His concept of the learned poet has none of the transcendental qualities of Sidney's, but his orientation to the poets of Augustan Rome ensured that he, like Dryden later in the century, invested the office of poet with high moral and social purpose: 'so divine a skill ... should not bee attempted with uncleane hands'. 


At a period when demands were being widely made for the acceptance of the vernacular for serious writing, and when poets felt that English literature could emulate that of Europe, it was vital that poetry, the 'chiefe beginner and maintayner of eloquence', the surest way of informing people 'in the best reason of living' should not be brought into disrepute by those writers who 'come to speake before they come to know', who 'contemne Arts as unprofitable', and 'thinke knowledge a burthen'. Nashe says it was such poets as these whom Plato and Augustine rightly excluded from their commonwealths.

The very insistence on the poet's learning was enough to remove him from a whole mass of people who had little or no access to education. Stanyhurst, in the dedication of his translation of The Aeneid (1582), remarks scornfully on the number of 'wooden rythmours' that swarme in stacioners shops, who neaver enstructed in any grammar schoole, not atayning too thee paringes of thee Latin or Greeke tongue, yeet lyke blynd bayards rush on forward, fostring theyre vayne conceites wyth such overweening silly follyes, as they reck not to bee condemned of thee learned for ignorant, so they bee commended of thee ignorant for learned.

Very occasionally one hears a voice from the other side. Barnabe Rich defended the right of the unlearned to literary expression, while Thomas Cutwode, in the preface to his Caltha Poetarum (1599), claimed that, the end of poetry being to please, unlearned poems can be as effective as learned ones. The famous classical writers, and moderns such as Sidney, Daniel, and Spenser, he says, are admired by 'the wisest, the lernedst, & the deepest sighted into great matters',
but the ignorant are not 'able to attain unto them.' Cutwode, claiming that he is as well known as the more learned writers of his day, says he and those like him compose for the ignorant. 217 For his pains, Cutwode had his book burned by order of the Archbishop of Canterbury. 218

But such voices were mere eddies in an otherwise smoothly-flowing current of thought about the status of learned and unlearned poets. Bryskett's remark about poets raising 'mens thoughts from humble and base things such as the vulgar and common sort delight in' 219 indicates the dominant view, and also alerts us to the degree of social antagonism involved in people's attitudes. It is evident in the kind of contemptuous language used to describe the rascally rout, which one meets on numerous occasions, and the belief that they lack moral and aesthetic discrimination. 220

While the whole issue was an aesthetic, moral and intellectual one, then, it was also very much to do with social standing. This is something apparent in the poetic miscellanies, where the compositions of men of different ranks appeared between the same covers. L.N. informs the readers of Englands Helicon (1600) that

> if any man whatsoever, in prizing of his owne birth or fortune, shall take in scorne, that a far meaner man in the eye of the world, shall be placed by him: I tell him plainly ...
> that mans wit is set by his, not that man by him.

Though he adds:

> the names of Poets ... have beene placed with the names of the greatest Princes of the world, by the
The title page of *The Phoenix Nest* (1593) tells us that the collection is 'Built up with the most rare and refined workes of Noble men, woorthy Knights, gallant Gentlemen, Masters of Arts, and brave Schollers.' Social acceptability always seems to matter as much as learning, delight, and morality. It was clearly an issue for the printer of *Tottel's Miscellany* (1557), who wondered if some readers might 'mislike the statelinesse of stile■removed from the rude skill of common eares', and who thus asked 'help of the learned to defend their learned frendes, the authors of this work', and exhorted 'the unlearned, by reding to learne to be more skilfull, and to purge that swinelike grossenesse' which characterized their taste.

In as much as the fashioning of the concept of the learned poet was a matter of making social distinctions of the kind recorded above, it was part of a wider cultural shift in the later sixteenth century and the early part of the seventeenth. The widespread hostility to rhyming and ballad making, which I referred to earlier as a moral issue, was also a social matter, much of the criticism of ballads being an expression of animosity by the defenders of aristocratic culture towards more popular taste. Louis B. Wright noted this many years ago in *Middle-Class Culture in Elizabethan England*, giving a range of examples. The point was restated more recently in a study of ballads by Friedman, who also remarked that...
the sustained insistence ... that poetry was not poetry without the weight, spice, and embellishment of learning [was] directed mainly towards debarring the impudent uninitiate.226

Friedman tells how the public for ballads was drawn from the least refined strata of society, although ballads were often affectionately referred to by educated writers.227 The slightly ambivalent attitude towards popular literature can be sensed from Sidney's expression of fondness for 'Chevy Chase' (Apology, 118/24-8), and more strikingly from the following passage from one of Sir William Cornwallis's essays, written in the early years of the seventeenth century:

All kinde of bookes are profitable except printed Bawdery; they abuse youth. But Pamphlets and lying Stories and News and twoo penny Poets, I would know them but beware of beeing familiar with them .... I see in them the difference of wits & dispositions, the altertions of Arguments pleasing the world, and the change of stiles. This I have in despight of him, be he never so ignorant. And if he hath any thing good among such store of ill, why that is mine too. I have not been ashamed to adventure mine eares with a ballad-singer, and they have come home loaden to my liking, doubly satisfied with profit and with recreation. The profit - to see earthlings satisfied with such course stuffe, to heare vice rebuked, & to see the power of Vertue that pierceth the head of such a base Historian and vile Auditorie.

The recreation - to see how thoroughly the standers by are affected; what strange gestures come from them; what strayned stuffe from their Poet; what shift they make to stand to heare; what extremities he is driven to for Rime; how they adventure their purses, hee his wits; how well both their paines are
recipients, they with a filthie noise, hee with a base
reward. 228

I have quoted at length because the passage provides a fascinating
glimpse into popular culture in the Jacobean period and also makes
clear the split between that culture and more genteel taste: Cornwallis
is condescending, yet he is obviously very interested in popular taste —
something not obscured by his writing and acting in a way calculated
to show he despises such entertainment (he tells earlier how he reads
the ballad sheets in the privy, then uses them as lavatory paper).

The expression of distaste for the literary predilections of
the unrefined is met with often. The courtier in Breton's *The Court
and Country* says disparagingly to the countryman,

> had you seene but one of our showes in our
> Triumphs, heard one of our Songs on our solemne
dayes ... you would never looke more on a May-game
> [or] listen more to a louzy Ballad.229

Puttenham speaks somewhat disdainfully of 'blind harpers or such like
taverne minstrels that give a fit of mirth for a groat', and who 'glut
the eare'. (It is at this point Puttenham mentions Skelton, 'usurping
the name of a Poet Laureat ... being in deede but a rude rayling
rimer'.)230

The expressions of contempt for ballads and for popular culture
in general have been identified by Peter Burke as an aspect of the
general withdrawal of the upper classes from participation in that
culture. Increasingly persuaded by conduct books - most notably
Castiglione's - that they should cultivate a sense of self-conscious
style and dignity, the nobility and courtiers, aped by the rising middle class, abandoned a culture in which they had once involved themselves, but which they were now being convinced was unseemly. 231

I have shown that the reasons for the antipathy towards the enemies of learned poets were as various and intricately interwoven as the notions of what a poet was; I do not want now to reduce the defence and definition of the poet simply to an expression of social and cultural antagonism. But it was this too. Notwithstanding the claims that he is serving his fellow men and women, we have seen the persistent way in which the poet was isolated from and, as especially learned and virtuous, lifted above the rest of the community. We have also observed many expressions of disquiet over and often contempt for large portions of that community. Whatever their stated intentions, the poets (and their defenders) we have looked at so far were driven by intellectual, social, and cultural circumstances, both contemporary and historical, into a position of elitism, having to distinguish themselves from the vulgar, including inferior writers, and to make large claims for themselves. In some cases this position seems to have been personally congenial to them. They felt threatened by the world they inhabited, and in their defence either lashed out against it, or, to fortify their position, propounded ideas which were hostile to popular culture. Whether they realized it or not — and it is difficult to see how they could have been wholly unaware of it — the poets and their apologists played a major part in establishing a clearer separation of popular and refined, learned culture, which afterwards the upper echelons of society showed little inclination to overcome. 232 For although, as my next chapter will show, there
were continual urgings from several quarters for a broadening and
democratization of learning (which the poets did not contribute to,
by and large), the actual spread did not get too far down through the
ranks of society. The middle classes became more educated, but, as
this happened, they tended to be cut off from those below them socially,
who, generally speaking, remained formally ignorant. An alternative
mode of knowledge - godly learning, which was open to all - established
itself under Puritan motivation, and there were some links between this
and developments in science and the mechanical arts, but culturally
the tendency was towards social division.

The defenders of poetry, as we have seen, created their own
special élite - Daniel's 'few that onely lend their eare' (*Museophilus,
1. 555), which was opposed to the philistinism of the upper reaches
of society as well as to the tastes of the common people, and the point
might therefore be made that, as the concept of the learned poet was
at odds with some aspects of the ethos of the ruling groups in society,
the exposition of that concept cannot be said to have played a major
formative part in the cultural withdrawal of the upper classes. The
argument to counter this is that in its contempt for unlearned poets
and balladists, and in its hostility towards the many-headed monster,
however entangled or submerged in expressions of other anxieties that
might be in some cases, the defence of learned poetry aligned itself
with upper-class concerns and prejudices, as it also did in its claims
to fashion gentlemen and serve the state.

Of special significance here are the close links between the
developing concept of the poet and that of the courtier as presented by
Castiglione. Towards the end of the chapter on Daniel I referred
to the recent study of these links by Javitch, whose ideas it is important to summarize here, even at the expense of a little repetition, if the concept of the learned poet as I have described it is to be set in the right perspective.

Javitch questions the traditional view that the poetic achievements of the Elizabethans were a direct result of earlier humanist emphases on eloquence and rhetorical training; although a general stimulus was given to literature by the humanists' teaching, they aimed to produce articulate citizens and governors, not poets; indeed they were not noticeably interested in poets as a special breed of men. The Elizabethan court, however, provided a favourable milieu for the flourishing of poetry and the development of a sound concept of the poet. This was not only because the court wanted and could afford to pay for entertainment, but also because courtiers were led by the prescriptive handbooks to esteem the aesthetic and to espouse a mode of conduct which, in its artistic elaborateness, game-playing, and indirection, had much in common with the writing of verse. It was not that the court ethos caused the writing of poetry (though obviously to some extent it did), but that it encouraged and enhanced the concurrent development of the art.234

Javitch distinguishes the orator, as presented by Cicero, from the courtier, as described by Castiglione, and in doing so separates civic from aesthetic or court humanism.235 The orator's domain is the public one; the courtier works within a relatively sheltered and exclusive environment.236 He does have a political function, as Ottaviano shows in Book Four of The Courtier, but he works through deception.237 Castiglione's main emphasis falls on the aesthetic
fashioning of the self; the courtier's learning and culture, as presented in the first three books, serve what is largely an ornamental function. 238

Within this context, Javitch shows how the idea of the poet, as expounded by Puttenham, Sidney, and Spenser, has much in common with the 'norms of courtliness':

While the Arte of English Poesie is ostensibly a treatise on poetry, it is at the same time one of the most significant arts of conduct of the Elizabethan age. And in the course of fulfilling both functions the work reveals why the English court could so appreciate the artifices of poetry. They were the same as the artifices esteemed in the comportment of its initiates .... the poet, by virtue of the devices characterizing his art, could satisfy more effectively than other articulate men the stylistic norms desirable at the center of power. 240

Javitch believes that the evolution of the English poet and poetry under the courtly aegis made possible some fine artistic achievements, and he is therefore willing to accept without demur that the influence of the court had a narrowing effect in social and political terms. In a study of the relation of the poet and the world of learning, however, the implications of this narrowing must give more pause for thought. Javitch is in no doubt as to what the implications are:

The democratic considerations that underlie oratorical norms, like clarity, actually serve to illuminate, by contrast, the social basis of the court's predilection for covert and deceptive manners. It is not inconsistent
that an aristocrat, convinced of being above or beyond the reach of the common, should cherish and promote all behavior that refines, obscures, even defies common usage. A basic difference between the orator and the courtier in their use of ornament is that the former aims to captivate the largest possible audience while the latter seeks to exclude all but a privileged few.241

As I remarked when discussing Daniel, I am not claiming total identification of the poet and the courtier, but it seems undeniable that the two roles were closely connected. What we see in the development of the concept of the learned poet within the court ethos is a retreat from an original broad humanist preoccupation with the use of knowledge for the good of the community at large, as propounded by More and Starkey especially,242 and the placing of much more emphasis on an intellectual élite greatly concerned to fashion and strengthen themselves as individuals and to buttress their sense of belonging to a mutually supportive group that can preserve the status quo. This is not to deny that there are many claims that the poet serves the community at large; but the over­riding impression is that those claims are subordinated to other, more circumscribed concerns to do with the assertion of an intellectual aristocracy against the rest of society.

In his book Scholars and Gentlemen, Hugh Kearney discusses the difference between civic and court humanism in England, and argues that the former began to lose its effectiveness once Elyot's Gouvernor appeared (1531) ushering in the latter. The radical criticism of social and political conditions made by More in Utopia (1516) gave way to Elyot's emphasis on 'education with service in view and with
obedience as the prime virtue. Elyot saw the social and political role of the gentleman as being to serve the King. The gentry were to form an educated ruling élite drawn up solidly behind the Crown. Kearney goes on to consider the Tudor use of educated men to establish a bulwark against social and religious unrest.

By contrasting *The Governor* with Lawrence Humfrey's *The Nobles* (1563), Kearney also sketches the way in which in Elizabeth's reign a tradition of godly learning grew up as an alternative to that of the court. He shows Humfrey's hostility to the court, his disinclination to recommend classical poets as part of a programme of studies (Humfrey put the Bible and the works of Seneca and Calvin first), and his emphasis on restraint, sobriety, and humility for the Christian student, all this contrasting markedly with the courtier's display and love of entertainment, and Elyot's well-known defence of the poets.

What we can see, then, are three distinct intellectual traditions: the civic humanism epitomized in More, the tradition of godly learning which developed particularly with the return of the Marian exiles and the growth of the Puritan movement, and courtly humanism, motivated in England by Elyot, and given a pronounced aesthetic orientation later in the century when Hoby's translation of Castiglione (1561) took full effect.

There was a good deal of overlapping between these traditions, but it is useful to perceive their different characteristics when locating the learned poet as described by Daniel, Spenser, Chapman, and Sidney: for to see that their concept of the poet had much in common with courtly and aesthetic humanism rather than with civic humanism or godly learning, is to appreciate the way in which they thought of themselves as amongst the intellectual aristocracy.
Chapter Five

Perspectives on the Broadening of Learning
Learning teacheth more in one year than experience in twentie: And learning teacheth safelie when experience maketh mo miserable then wise.

(Roger Ascham, The Scholemaster (1570), in English Works, ed. W.A. Wright, Cambridge, 1904, p. 214.)

They no doubt are true teachers, who doe soberlie and earnestlie joyne practize unto contemplation of things and knowledge of the same, that is, which are perswaded and assured of that which they teache, by certaine experience .... Away therefore with the vaine speculations of such wizardes as can onelie debate of matters at home in their studies.

(John Serranus, A Godlie and Learned Commentarie upon ... Ecclesiastes, 1585, sig. Cviii.)

... there is a knowledge of the worlde, and they that come to be our schoolemaisters to that, they shall bee had in high estimation.

(Richard Greenham, Workes, 1612, 5th edition, sig. Sss 2.)

All men write not the same matter, nor after the same manner, after the same method, after the same mould .... it hath pleased God to distribute diversly his Divine vertues, as nuptiall dowries to every particular man. Some he inspires with one kind of knowledge, some with another, and all for his honour.

(William Vaughan, The Spirit of Detraction, 1611, sig. P4.)

... arts and sciences should be like mines, where the noise of new works and further advances is heard on every side.

(Bacon, Novum Organum, 1620, XC.)
One of the most striking features of the world of learning, education, and knowledge in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries is its protean character. It follows that anyone in the period who extols a particular type of learning over the numerous other kinds is likely to seem insular, and even at times reactionary, for there was a distinct trend towards broader conceptions of what constitutes desirable knowledge, how it should be acquired, who should possess it, and what uses it should be put to. The object of this chapter is to provide an outline of this trend and thus to recover a further dimension of the context in which Daniel and Greville wrote about learning and the poet.

In spite of the constraints he put upon human learning, Greville was far more responsive than Daniel to the ways in which people's conception of the nature, pursuit, and ends of knowledge was altering. Daniel's view of learning is eloquent and stirring, but, as I have argued, it is also defensive and exclusive, and, despite the poet's claims, he is not shown to be integrated with society, nor is his knowledge clearly transferable to the realm of civic action. In these matters he is out of step with much contemporary thought and practice, which tended to a more democratic view in several respects.

Greville, having little or no interest in the concept of the learned and virtuous poet as we have seen it expounded so far, is not concerned to guard the domains of poetry and learning against innovation. Indeed, he draws diverse arts and sciences into his scheme of learning, sets poetry on the same level as them, and emphasizes many of those aspects of learning that were characteristic of the varied movement to expand the notion of education and its aims. He is clear particularly
about the part learning should play in the building of the godly society and hence in the reciprocal edification of the self and others as encouraged by St Paul.

It is not my intention to picture Daniel, Spenser, Chapman, and Sidney simply as reactionaries in a progressive world, for to do so would be to distort both their attitudes and the character of a society that contained a whole spectrum of attitudes to learning. Yet, as the previous three chapters have shown, in their formulation of the concept of the learned poet and their notion of a fit audience for his work, the poets, and others who defended them, elaborated views that in several important respects ran counter to the idea of broadening the range and availability of knowledge.

It might be argued that, as they wrote in the vernacular and, in the case of Chapman, translated the work of a major author of ancient times into English, the poets were making a notable contribution to the spread of learning, for the argument in favour of the vernacular and the encouraging of translation were staples in the bid to bring learning to a wider audience. But one needs to ask first why the poets wrote in English or undertook translations, and secondly what kind of audience they hoped to reach. I have already remarked on the conviction of sixteenth-century writers that English could emulate classical and modern European languages as a creative medium, and it was surely this and the concomitant desire to explore, develop, and refine the vernacular that motivated poets to employ it rather than Latin. Moreover, for most if not all of them, writing poetry in Latin would have been limiting and frustrating, as the kind of range and spontaneity they could expect in English would not have been
Looking at the situation in this light, one can surmise that it was irrelevant to the poets that English was the language of the population in general, and that it was not part of the poets' purpose to extend the boundaries of learning in social terms, even while they were enlarging and enhancing English culture at its more refined levels. The use of the vernacular by the population at large was in any case judged to be crude, as is shown by the numerous hostile remarks about ballad-mongers, poetasters, and the common people recorded in the previous chapter. The poets made a clear distinction between that kind of language and their own, and probably did not believe there was much chance either of bridging the gap or of gaining an audience drawn from a broad social spectrum.

Thus we should distinguish between intention and result: the composition of first-rate poetry in English meant that the experience of reading it became, theoretically, available to a much wider range of people, but whether this was the aim of the poets writing in English is another matter. The evidence suggests that when they claim poetry is the most potent means of expression, communication and instruction, they have only a restricted audience in mind. The poets I have dealt with offer no statements about their intention to make knowledge more widely available; indeed, they are generally fearful that it will be profaned if this occurs. Sidney comes closest to maintaining that poetry can reach all kinds of people, but this has to be balanced against other, less democratic aspects of his position, and against the fact that, in the customary fashion of courtiers, he made no effort at all to publish his creative work. Daniel, Chapman, and
Spenser wanted, perhaps needed, more public recognition, and no doubt in practice hoped for good sales, in spite of their counter-attacks against the *misomousoi* and their conviction that only a favoured few would understand their work and need serve as an audience. But levels of literacy in the country, to say nothing of cultural differences, meant that their readers would generally be found amongst those in the upper to middle sections of the social scale, who shared the same broad cultural orientation as the writers themselves.

Chapman translated Homer in the first instance because he was convinced the spirit of the Greek poet had called him to do the work. He also believed that England should not be without the two great epics and the hymns, for there was much in them that would benefit the nation. But again, the desire to incorporate the best foreign literature into one's native culture does not necessarily mean a wish to have it read by a large number of people, and certainly does not imply an intention to make it common property. In Chapman's case this is certainly not the intention: readers would have to be drawn up to the appropriate level, to be made noble by learning, as he put it, in order to be able to appreciate Homer's poems. It is even stated in the prefatory verses to the reader before the translation of the *Iliad* that a ritual cleansing should take place before reading can be embarked on. Coupled with Chapman's excoriation of the philistines, particularly the many-headed monster, this makes it unlikely that any part of his intention was to contribute to the advancement of learning by courting a popular readership. Once more, the fact that he was using the common language did theoretically make his work available to any who could read well enough, but this was an inescapable fact, not something that spurred
It is important to make these points, because many Elizabethan and Jacobean translations were undertaken precisely in order to make accessible what would otherwise have been locked away from most of the population, and there was a concerted drive in several quarters to release learning from the grip of social, cultural, and professional élites. While the poets who have been studied did contribute to the expansion of the store of knowledge, as we can see so clearly now, the nature of their contribution needs to be correctly perceived, and one should discriminate between their intentions and their potential and actual effect.

As I remarked earlier, the trend towards a broadening of conceptions about the nature, role, pursuit, and availability of knowledge contained diverse ideas, aims, and points of view, resulting from commitment to different causes. These are not always reconcilable, and, indeed, are often unconnected, and so one must avoid suggesting that there was uniformity of opinion or a widely concerted bid to bring reforms. My object is to draw attention to the presence of the various forces that caused people to think freshly about knowledge and education and prompted them to try and effect certain changes, all of which tended towards the opening up of the world of learning.

One of the most familiar ways in which people's conceptions of the purpose of learning developed during the sixteenth century may be seen in the widespread and continual insistence that knowledge should
not be kept to oneself but be directed outwards for the good of the community. The humanists in the first few decades of the century, reacting against the monastic life and the theology of the schoolmen, and endeavouring to follow Christ's example of virtuous living, had called for a decisive shift in emphasis from the *vita contemplativa* to the *vita activa*, had extolled the practical virtues, and hence, in addition to showing how important learning was for the individual, had argued that it should play a key role in the administration of the common weal at both local and national levels. These doctrines took a firm hold on people's minds for the remainder of the century and beyond, and were the major factor in bringing learning out of the cloister and the study, and encouraging learned men to become involved with everyday affairs and mix their knowledge with experience. Everywhere one looks in the writings of the later sixteenth and earlier seventeenth centuries one encounters the insistence that 'Wisedome and Science are worth nothing, unlesse they be distributive, and declare themselves to the World.' The poets in general added their voices to the chorus and thus were in line with the dominant trend in this respect, though one needs to bear in mind the other aspects of their self-presentation that qualify their calls for the active involvement of the poet in society.

For those who were likely to bear public responsibility there was, naturally, constant admonition to forge links between their learning and their duties. King James advised his son, Henry, not to study 'for knowledge nakedly', but to make his 'principall end' the use of learning in the office of monarch. Cleland, writing a book of instruction for young noblemen, exhorted them to apply what
they had acquired in their studies, and dismissed 'all this booke learning, which cannot be put in use'. In a similar manner, Peacham, seeking to fashion gentlemen, maintained that 'they are hardly to be admitted for noble who, though of never so excellent parts, consume their light as in a dark lanthorn in contemplation and a Stoical retiredness.'

The same views were purveyed in many books of instruction for courtiers and gentlemen. The essayists too sounded an identical note, and though there is truth in Jonson's assertion that they 'write out of what they presently find or meet', extolling in one passage what they have impugned elsewhere, the continual reiteration of the view that 'as invertue, so in artes the chief commendation dependeth of practise' indicates the degree to which the original humanist impulse retained its force.

Behind this doctrine lay the authority of revered classical writers. Both Cicero and Seneca were insistent that unapplied knowledge is a lame thing: 'I am glad to learne, to the end I may teach', wrote Seneca;

and there is not any thing, how rare and commodious soever it be, that can or should yeeld me content, if I might onely know it for my particular profit. If wisedome it selfe were given me upon condition to conceale it, and not to publish it, I would refuse the same.

It is no surprise to find Sidney, whose thinking was deeply influenced by the Roman writers, asking Languet in a letter of March, 1578,
afforded for putting it into practice, so that public advantage may be the result. 10

Sidney's continually frustrated desire for a chance to serve his country is evident here, but he is expressing a principle to which he adhered, as passages from the Apology for Poetry confirm. 11

On a broader front, it can be seen that the middle classes throughout the sixteenth century were putting to functional use much erudite information gleaned from the numerous collections of aphorisms, from the conduct books, and handbooks on every subject, of which there was a proliferation during the period, and that they saw learning as a sound investment as far as personal and class advancement was concerned. 12 Learning, which became increasingly fashionable among the upper levels of society as the century progressed, infiltrated the middle strata just as surely, although often within a more utilitarian context.

The lower classes too were not without friends in these matters: Edmund Coote, the master of the Free School in Bury St Edmunds, told in the Preface of his book, The English Schoole-Maister (1596), of his intention to direct himself to 'the unskilfull; which desire to make use of it for their owne private benefit';

And unto such men and women of trades (as Taylors, Weavers, Shop-keepers, Seamsters, and such other) as have undertaken the charge of teaching others. 13

We may note the significance of this: learning was not only an occupation for those in schools and colleges. Coote says that once people know his book (a teaching manual), they will not need to stop work in order to listen to their pupils. The English Schoole-Maister aims to
provide the common people with learning that will be of immediate use in their daily lives. It must be added, though, that the extent and success of such ventures as Coote's are not at all clear.

There is also evidence to show that the desire for that kind of learning which had an immediately recognizable efficacy in the world at large influenced the 'unofficial' curricula at the universities. Curtis cites a manuscript letter written from Cambridge by Robert Devereux, earl of Essex, to Fulke Greville, in which the unaptness of academic studies to political life is discussed, and a desire expressed for knowledge more appropriate to the intended public career of Devereux. Curtis, giving quotations from Herbert of Cherbury and Gabriel Harvey, which indicate both dissatisfaction with university subjects and a move towards extra-curricula studies, proceeds to trace the development of these matters in the seventeenth century.\(^1\)

Amongst academics themselves there was a desire to impart their knowledge to the world: John Cowell, Professor of Civil Law at Cambridge, speaks for many when he says that he has published his book, *The Interpreter*, 'to impart the good thereof to those young ones that want it', and to contribute to the general advance of learning.\(^2\)

The necessity of applying one's learning to the circumstances of life was only one side of the coin, though: there was a reverse effect in which worldly experience acted upon (or was supposed to act upon) the manner in which one pursued learning:

The other experience whiche is in our propre persones and is of some men called practise, is of no small moment or efficacie in the
acquiring of sapience, in so moche that it seemeth that no operation or affaire may be perfecte, nor no science or arte may be complete, except experience be there unto added, whereby knowledge is ratified, and (as I mought saye) consolidate.  

There should be, then, a reciprocally influential relation of learning to experience. 'Studies themselves do give forth directions too much at large, except they be bounded in by experience', but long experience doth proffet moch ... and almost onlie to him ... that is diligentlie before instructed with preceptes of well doinge. For good precepts of learning, be the eyes of the minde, to looke wiselie before a man, which waie to go right, and which not.

Some writers emphasize that there should be a balance between action and contemplation. Breton's scholar and soldier move steadily in their dialogue away from mutual antipathy and towards the recognition that they share many qualities. They realize too that 'they cannot well be one without the other'. Owen Felltham sums up a common attitude when he writes:

Contemplation generates; Action propagates. Without the first, the latter is defective. Without the last, the first is but abortive, and embrious. Saint Bernard compares contemplation to Rachel, which was the more faire: but action to Leah, which was the more fruitfull. I will neither alwayes be busie, and doing: nor ever shut up in nothing but thoughts.

While this view is generally concurred with, however, the majority
of authors emphasize action and experience, sometimes in a quite pronounced fashion. Greville, for instance, perhaps speaking from the perspective of a practising civil servant, felt that 'the active, necessarie Arts,/Ought to be briefe in bookes, in practise long'.

Cecil, advising his son Robert about the conduct of his life, thought it 'fit and agreeable' to supply 'such advertisements and rules ... as are gained rather by much experience than by long reading', although he himself was famed for his ardent pursuit of knowledge as a young man. And Berowne in Lovers Labour's Lost (1593-94) can see no virtue in the 'barren tasks' the King provides for his scholars, such as avoiding the company of women, fasting, and sleeping for only three hours each night, all for the benefit of their intellectual capacities: it is 'Flat treason 'gainst the kingly state of youth'. For Berowne love is the true leader whose doctrines shine from women's eyes:

They are the ground, the books, the academes,
From whence doth spring the true Promethean fire.

Shakespeare's play is one of the period's most powerful testimonies on behalf of the philosophy of active involvement in the everyday world as opposed to the idea of withdrawing to a life of study and contemplation; hence the supposition that it is probably a counter-statement to Chapman's The Shadow of Night.

One of the fullest secular statements outside the writings of Bacon of the doctrine that learning must be directed outwards from the educated man towards his fellows and not hidden inside him, was made at the end of the period under review here, and can thus stand as a summary of the general attitude by 1630. In The English Gentleman Richard Brathwait gives full acknowledgement to the value of contemplation
(it 'indeed affords infinite content to the Spirituall man') and pleads in the usual way for an interaction between it and action; this makes for 'the fruitfullest knowledge'. But in the course of making this point Brathwait's bias towards the vita activa is quite clear: he speaks of contemplative men as relishing 'more of the Cloister, than societie of Nature; more of the Cell or frocke, than Communitie which affords the most fruite' - damming parallels to draw in an anti-monastic/anti-Catholic environment - and remarks that such people 'never extend further than satisfying their owne disconsorting humour.' Echoing the prejudice of generations, Brathwait notes that it is particularly inappropriate for gentlemen, 'whose education hath beene liberty, conversation, publike society, and who hold good fellowship an appendice to gentry' to live solely under the aegis of scholars, 'deprived of common aire ... remote from all company, passing the remainder of their dayes in a wildernesse'.

Brathwait urges throughout his treatise that 'it is a barren faith ... that is not attended on by good workes', and he argues that we should be aware that in the aims and occupations of those who follow the life of contemplation or study alone there is, in Solomon's words, much 'vanity and affliction of spirit'.

Action is the life of man, and example the direction of his life. How much then doe such men prejudice those who live in the world, that betake themselves to a private or retired life, estranged from humane societie, and ending their dayes in some solitary cave, as men divided from the world?

Again the prejudice about scholars, again the commitment to the belief that knowledge should be shared. Brathwait continues:
howsoever their manner of life be religious, their disciplines strict and rigorous, and in their devotion fervent and zealous; yet they deprive others of the benefit, which they might reap by their example.

If nothing else, those men inclined to a contemplative existence, should aim to lead that existence within their minds only, and continue to live in society; thus 'in the meane time, whatsoever they know or can doe, that may any way tend to the common good, benefit or utilitie of humane societie', must be offered to their fellows, 'which rule they are to observe after the example of the most holy and excellent men of both Orders, Ecclesiasticall ... and Secular.'

The pure religious life of contemplation and struggle for perfection, holiness in itself, a disciplined and godly life of study and reflection - these modes of living, accepted for hundreds of years as essentially good, are considered by Brathwait and those in the tradition for which he is the spokesman as only partially good, as incomplete without the further dimension of contact with other men and the application of mental and spiritual gifts to the needs of society.

The view that studies should be directed not only to 'private pleasure, but also publique commoditie' received a tremendous boost from the doctrines of the Protestant reformers, who while on the one hand directing people's attention to the spiritual world and attempting to convince them of the helplessness of their unaided abilities where matters of salvation were concerned, were on the other astute enough to realize that what gifts we have must be employed to full extent in the work of reformation, the building of a godly society, and the
practical administration of worldly affairs. In England, where the reformers were especially eager to combat the Catholic doctrine of ignorance being the mother of devotion, and were intent upon giving everybody the means to read the Bible, to understand sound doctrine, and to participate in the work of further reformation, learning and education were of particular importance in a number of different ways, and the need to use and share knowledge, and to ensure that more people had access to it was vital. The ideology that in part nourished and in part was fashioned by the reformers' view of learning was in fundamental ways alien to that within which the concept of the learned poet was expounded, though this is not to say there were not points of contact and shared convictions. Greville's work, however, is properly understood when set in the context of the reformers' ideas.

The Puritan divine, Richard Rogers, wrote in his diary, 'I woulde not chooze to be partaked of all knowledge, as some excell others therein, without the comfortable use of it through love'. John Serranus was in accord with this view, as we see in his commentary on Ecclesiastes, translated into English by the well-known Puritan teacher and minister, John Stockwood, in 1585. These were the customary views of the godly. The prolific writing partnership of John Dod and Robert Cleaver concluded that 'unlesse there be profitable use of knowledge both in our generall and particular callings, it hath neither the sense nor the savour of heavenly wisdome.'

Turning specifically to teaching about deliverance from sin and the saving of the soul, they warn that

The Lord will not have the doctrine of salvation dealt with, as many use some of the Liberall
sciences, to be studied onely for contemplation: but he requireth all that seeke for the knowledge of it, to resolve of practise.  

Obviously such important matters demand a special effort, but it must be stressed that, in the eyes of these zealous men, there was no boundary to godly concerns and activities; the saints were supposed to approach all matters with comparable diligence and piety, and thus a recommended mode of behaviour regarding the teaching of true doctrine was equally applicable in the conveying of any information.

When the reformers refer to learning, they sometimes have in mind the gaining of secular knowledge, sometimes the acquisition of religious knowledge. The latter was essential for all people, for, as John Knewstub told his congregation at Paul's Cross, we are all scholars of Christ, and the gospels are our teacher. Secular knowledge was necessary in so far as it enabled one to read the scriptures, or at least to develop the capacities to listen well and to master the fundamentals of reformed theology. Cleaver wrote, 'hee that hath Learning, although it be but small, shall much better understand the Preachers, and take more profit by hearing of them, to his great and endesse comfort, then he that hath no learning'; though it is important to recall what I showed in the first chapter, that the godly were always mindful that divine knowledge 'lies rather in the hart, then in the head: and it is not great Learning, gotten by extreame studie; but, an inward feeling, sent from God (by his Spirit) unto good men.'

The true doctrine was presented in treatises, sermons, lectures, catechisms, and even charts, all of which had large audiences.
Instruction by means of charts was the most that could be hoped for in many cases, for although the higher authorities of the state as well as the godly in local communities made efforts to extend functional literacy, their success was patchy, and illiteracy levels remained quite high, especially in the lower reaches of society. Those members of society, both clerical and lay, who had received a substantial amount of education at home, school, and perhaps university, could engage with doctrine on various levels of sophistication, but others, less fortunate in their circumstances, could usually not be expected to proceed beyond a grasp of the basic tenets of reformed teaching. The recognition that this group in particular needed to have their educational level raised and their religious awareness heightened, was a major factor behind much Protestant polemic calling for reforms in the world of learning, for a learned ministry, and for the use of knowledge for godly purposes by those who did possess it.

The godly were often involved in the founding and maintaining of schools and colleges, but extra-mural instruction was also called for - indeed, in some cases it was the only, or the only acceptable form of instruction available. Thus Puritan manuals of household government, and treatises that dealt with the family and the duties of parents insisted that, where the level of literacy permitted, the father and/or mother should instruct their children in true doctrine from the earliest possible age. Richard Greenham, the popular minister of Dry Drayton in Cambridgeshire from 1570, wrote: 'If ever we would have the church of God to continue among us, we must bring it into our households, and nourish it in our families.' In addition, masters and mistresses were to ensure that their servants and apprentices
were taught the true word of God. The diary of Lady Margaret Hoby reveals not only her strict personal régime of prayer, fasting, reading the Bible, attending sermons and lectures, and having private conference with ministers, but also her efforts to ensure that the members of her household were made aware of the principles of reformed doctrine.

The number of Bibles and of books and pamphlets containing reformed doctrine coming off the presses meant that those households where at least one person was able to read could if they wished immerse themselves in religious educational matter. Obviously the Bible was the most important reading matter, and within the Bible the Gospels and Paul's letters, but Cleaver suggests that Proverbs is a book suitable for simple and unlearned folk as well as for scholars: it will sharpen their minds but in a way that 'is harmlesse and holy'. He reminds us that 'the Lord hath elected, and doth love [the simple] no lesse then others of greater gifts and learning, and therefore causeth his word to yeeld as much vertue to their soules.'

Attendance at sermons was enjoined upon parishioners, even insisted upon in some places, and catechizing - by the minister, teacher, or parent - was a common form of indoctrination for all age groups. There were numerous catechisms as well as such books as John Lyster's *A rule how To Bring Up Children* (1588) or G.E.'s *The Christian Schoole-Maister* (1613), which provided the necessary information in an appropriate form and the correct method of procedure.

For those who would find it difficult to understand the fundamental points of reformed theology in any other way, William Perkins, at the front of his treatise *A Golden Chaine* (1592), provided
A Survey, or Table declaring the order of the causes of Salvation and Damnation, according to God's word. It may be in stead of an ocular Catechisme to them which cannot read: for by the pointing of the finger they may sensibly perceive the chief points of religion, and the order of them. 43

Thomas Taylor, commending Perkins's 'profound knowledge in all learning', also remarks on his ability to write so clearly that 'even amongst our common people' it would be difficult to find one who could not grasp what England's leading Calvinist theologian and preacher wrote. 44

Even the handful of examples I have provided from an enormous range of comparable utterances and practices, make it quite clear that the reformers were determined to reach all levels of society and that they wanted religious knowledge to become common property. It followed that those who had knowledge must impart it, and that everyone should be educated at least to the point where they could achieve a basic comprehension of scripture and the correct approach to it. The needs for human and divine learning are thus tied together. The skills of those who have progressed to an advanced stage in their formal education enable them to master the intricacies of theology and to convey the essential doctrines in an appropriate form to those who need instruction. Perkins says that in the study of divinity one should use 'a grammatical, rhetorical, and logical analysis, and the help of the rest of the arts'. 45 William Gouge believes that to find out the true meaning of scripture, one needs knowledge of the languages in which it was originally written, and skill in the arts
which enable one to perceive and assess arguments. The learned must
help the unlearned in these matters. 46 This last admonition was
tirelessly made, 47 and was supported by equally numerous urgings for
'Reproofe of Ministers, and private persons that studie hard, and
take great paines in reading, or hearing, but to little or no profit
for themselves, or their brethren.' 48 Cleaver, whose words these
are, is all in favour of learning and the occupation of learned writer
(onto which category, after all, he himself fitted), provided the
results of studious labour are published for the benefit and use of
people:

the tongue that is exercised in speaking fruitfully, and
the hand that is applied to write usefully, doe manifest
an heart that is stored with love, and other graces ...
out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh ....
when men publish, or utter such points as may utter
instruction to the Readers, or hearers, they shew forth
their owne understanding, and knowledge, though without
ostentation or purpose of boasting. 49

The last phrase reminds us of the charge that learning leads to pride,
a vice that formed part of a complex of concerns amongst the reformers,
being related to vanity and antithetical to charity. The demand for
an active use of learning owed much to the preoccupation of the godly
with these matters, and particularly to St Paul's teaching about charity.
In a famous passage the Apostle scorned the possession of knowledge
without the humane complement of charity (1 Corinthians 13:1-2),
and elsewhere said that knowledge gives people an inflated sense of
themselves, while charity edifies (1 Corinthians 8:1). In a third
passage Paul had censured the wisdom of this world (1 Corinthians 1:19-20),
and the marginal gloss on this and adjacent verses in the Geneva Bible, which was widely used in godly households, takes the opportunity to put great emphasis on the pride of learned men and the vanity of their knowledge.

Good works, although in the orthodox Calvinist theology that informed a major part of religious thought in England during the period, not essential to salvation, were commonly seen as a sign of grace, if not a cause. In some revised forms of Protestant theology emphasis was put on preparation for the reception of grace, and here good works played a key role. The exhortations to use one's knowledge to help others and to build the godly community must be seen in this context as well as in the others I have outlined.

St Paul was not the only authority for the godly regarding the use of knowledge: the continual insistence that learning must be actively employed was strongly supported by the life and teaching of Solomon. Serranus for one was quick to point this out:

By the example of Solomon, we do learn that that is true prudence or wisedome, whiche is referred unto the necessarie use of life.

Serranus hammers home the inevitable point:

Doubtlesse the idle contemplation of Philosophers in their studies at home, is nothing else but meere trifling of idle and foolish men.

The Protestant pamphleteer, Thomas Scott, follows the same line, reminding his readers that Solomon instructed his people 'in all necessarie knowledge', and noting that Ecclesiastes contains strictures
on the hoarding of wisdom. Echoing Pauline doctrine in the way Greville does, Scott encourages us to 'provide for others as well as for thy selfe, provide for thy selfe with respect to all'. He conceives of the truly learned man as a vital figure in society - a watch-dog, a guide, and a bringer of edification. Scott, whose treatise is an exhortation to godly English people to emulate the diligence of Protestants in the Low Countries, sees purely acquisitive learning as part of the larger evil of privacy, which the Christian must labour to counteract by selfless works for the good of his fellows.\footnote{51}

One of the main charges laid against Catholics was that, as Cleaver says, they 'are all opposite to the purpose of Salomon':

For they locke up the Scriptures in a strange language, they permit them not to be truly translated with knowne tongues, they forbid the people upon penalties, to reade them in their native speech, that they should not understand so much as the signification of the words: and so they resist the holy Ghost, by prohibiting, and punishing that as an hainous crime, which hee commandeth as a needfull dutie.\footnote{52}

Thomas Taylor, making the same accusation, points out that in preventing people from having the scripture in their native language, the Catholics are going against 'the example of Christ and the Apostles', who taught in a language familiar to their auditors, and in the Apostles' case were actually given the power to speak in different tongues.\footnote{53} Perkins inveighs against Catholics on these grounds too, saying they have blocked the path to 'knowledge of the fundamentall points of religion', thus ensuring that 'the case of the common people of all nations, is miserable': 'the people of the world perish for lacke of knowledge.'\footnote{54}

The Protestant clergy did not escape reprimand on a similar score.
As we saw in chapter one, it was a common complaint from some quarters that in their sermons many divines were speaking English in a manner beyond the capabilities of the common folk, thus erecting a similar barrier to that set up by the Papists between God's word and his people. Scott censures ministers who 'study ... to finde out pleasant wordes and parables, as Apothecaries, picke sallads every Spring'. In contrast, Solomon applied his knowledge 'to countrie capacities': 'he speakes and sings in their key; therefore he deserves serious attention, and he had it.'

There were also other social and even political aspects to the discussion of learning by various factions of the Protestant Church in England. Learning was both a weapon and a major point of issue in the struggle between these factions; a weapon in that the members of different groups exercised their erudition in the cause of their own version of religious truth; a point of issue because learning of a traditional type was a cornerstone of the established Church, a mark of and a means to retain its power, and thus was rightly seen by dissenters as a bastion of reaction and a chief means of ensuring that the hierarchy of the ruling dispensation was consolidated at the expense of the ideal Christian equality of a truly reformed Church.

Christina Garrett, in her study of the Marian Exiles, commented on the increased sense of worth gained by artisans and servants in the small exiled communities in Europe, where their opinions and votes counted equally with those of their former superiors. There was no ecclesiastic of high rank in the Frankfort community for instance, and the English divines there, in accord with the reformed opinion of
continental Protestantism, rejected episcopacy in March 1555. Garrett remarked that 'the rapid evolution of that congregation towards ecclesiastical democracy must be attributed in part to some ... awakened sense of equality'. As I noted earlier, this sense of equality in the sight of God was one of the hall-marks of the more radical Protestants. The building of a reformed English Church upon the continental model after the accession of Elizabeth did not proceed very far, and equality definitely did not become a feature of the English Church, a religion fashioned in accordance with the existing power structure of the Tudor state. Many of the returned exiles felt out of place, and successive generations of their more radical Puritan descendants grew progressively more estranged from a dispensation which, in comparison with the new godly mode of life, seemed near feudal in character.

As one would expect, it was at the far left wing of the Puritan spectrum where the fiercest animosity against the hierarchy was kindled. The Separatist, Henry Barrow, was one of the most determined assailants of the national Church, and was most bitter about the gap between the ruling classes and the mass of people within that Church. He pinpoints the attitude to and use of learning as a crucial feature in the division of rulers from ruled and the intention of the former group to retain the status quo in their own interests. Thus he attacks the use of Latin in university debates in divinity, calling it 'syllogistical and Romish': theological debate has to be in Latin 'lest the follie of these prophets should be laied open to all men, and these gamsters be hissed off the stage by the people.' The shade of Erasmus is to be sensed lurking here, when Barrow portraits learning as a specious shell of meaningless words covering a deep folly, a means of guarding the vested interests of a select few by ceremonial mystification of
empty noises and procedures. The same theme had already occupied Barrow at some length in his major work, *A Brief Discoverie of the False Church* (1590). Talking of the exposition of scripture in sermons or in other ways, Barrow insisted that the establishment abuse this heavenly glorious exercise, in that they shut it up amongst a few of them, shut out the people from it utterly, making it like Osyris mysteries: besides that they heere amongst themselves unsufferably corrupt all the Scriptures they intreate of, by their rhetorical figures, divisions, demonstration, humane and traditional writings, wherin all their universitie learning consisteth. [They assume] heerby into their owne hands the key of al knowledg ... shutting up the Scripturs, yea all God's graces, even the Holy Ghost it self, amongst themselves in these their schooles of prophets.  

Barrow, with the underlying intention of breaking down the prevailing social order and of establishing Christian equality, attacks the anti-democratic views of the learned clerical hierarchy, asserts the parity of all men before God, and demands recognition for the authority of the inner light of the spirit, which must supersede such external criteria as the extent of a man's academic knowledge. It will be objected, he claims 

that the common people are ignorant, not able to judg betwixt truth and error, disordered, variable, easie to be devided and led into sects; and therefore they are not to intermedle with the judgement and reproof of faults and errors escaped in the ministerie, or with the censuring their persons. 

People brought up within the auspices of a corrupt Church are 'blind, ignorant, seditious, headstrong', to be sure; 'neither can it be otherwise, having such blind guides and corrupt teachers'. And such
corrupt persons, whether teachers or taught, can have no valid opinion about religious matters.

But for the people of Christ, they are all inlightned with that bright morning star, that sonne of righteousness .... To them [God] hath committed the charge and keeping of his holy oracles; to them and everie one of them he hath given his holy sanctifying spirit, to open unto them and to lead them into al truth.

God's grace imparts understanding and authority; yet Barrow is not in favour of complete liberty for the godly in religious concerns: they must not transgress the limits of their own personal knowledge by reproving that which they do not rightly understand, or by initiating actions that would damage the true Church. But people should not be deprived of the right to censure the false Church merely because 'they are not so learned as the priests, and have not beene at the universitie, etc.' for,

by that popish reason were the word of God to be shut up from al lay men (as they cal them) that no man might reade or speake thereof in his house or family, because they have not knowledge to understand it and open it after their schoole maner.

If one is to concede the right to interpret scripture only to those who are called wise, then no man will attain that right in God's eyes, 'For he that knoweth here but in part, yea, and of that part he knoweth nothing as he ought to know.' In fact, in the true exposition of God's word, 'the basenes or ignorance of the speaker is not to be regarded' for it in 'no way diminisheth anything from the dignitie and truth of the word'.
As for these learned divines of our age, I refer them unto, or rather oppose unto them the wisdome and word of God, who you see hath given unto al his servantes this libertie and power; yea rather hath layd upon them this charge and duty, to reprove and censure any error or transgression which is committed by the whole church or any member of the church contrarie to the word of God, by the same word. 60

It should be emphasized that by far the majority of those who called for the dissemination of knowledge (both religious and secular) amongst society at large were not seeking to alter the traditional structure of that society: Dod, Cleaver, and Perkins, for example, all agree on the rightness of the existing order, and they are entirely representative in this, for, as Wrightson has recently said, 'the most fundamental structural characteristic of English society was its high degree of stratification, its distinctive and all-pervasive system of social inequality .... Order, degree, rank and hierarchy seemed self-evident, even natural.' 61 When the godly talked about equality, they generally had in mind spiritual not social equality, the levelling of society as group of sinful creatures in the eyes of God, with the labourer as likely as the lord to be amongst the elect or the reprobate. The bid to educate society as a whole was prompted by the desire to enable everyone to understand true doctrine, not by the wish to raise the social and political consciousness of the lower classes, although, as some recognized, this was always a possible, and dangerous side-effect.

Moreover, hostility to anti-establishment views about learning is often met with. Richard Cosin, for example, replying to the anonymous *An Abstract of Certain Acts of parliament* (1584), is provoked
by the author's belief that the true and perhaps only inspiration for a minister is an inner light given by the Holy Ghost, which makes redundant the academic training a would-be clergyman was ideally supposed to receive. Cosin perceives that such a belief is a clear threat to the established order of Church and State, for not only does it propose a new (and uncontrollable) authority, it also implies a contempt for the existing hierarchy and its dependence upon traditional learning. The Abstract was in fact attacking bishops and the failings of the English Church, and suggested that current university studies were not the only, perhaps not even the best way to prepare a man for the ministry. Cosin's deeply ingrained prejudice is evident as he is stung to a sarcastic response:

Belike a weaver may come from the shuttle, and a bare English clearke, or one with a little smacke of French, that never was in Grammar schoole, nor tooke degree but at Botley, or in a scriveners shop, so he be bold and zealous (as they terme it) to gird at his superiours, and the orders of our church, may be allowed ... for a sufficient and a well qualified preacher: but if a graduate come from the Universitie, he must be cast againe and new founded, and have some countrie schooling. 62

He has, clearly, related the demand for ecclesiastical reforms to the fear that society is to be turned upside down.

Plenty of evidence was brought forward in the previous chapter to illustrate how class prejudice was drawn into the debate about the learned poet. The same pattern is observable in the wider discussion
of learning as a whole. Thus Ralegh speaks contemptuously of the
views of the lower orders as far as matters of learning are concerned, as do Howson and Vaughan. Others wish to put limits on who is to be given an education or on how far they are to be allowed to proceed with it. For instance, when Cranmer wanted the sons of ploughmen and artificers to be considered for places at Canterbury Cathedral Grammar School, he met with stiff resistance from his fellow commissioners, who said 'That it was meet for the ploughman's son to go to plough, and the artificer's son to apply the trade of his parent's vocation', and that, as it was the gentleman's children who were to govern, they should receive the education. Cranmer had to argue eloquently that God 'giveth his gifts both of learning, and other perfections in all sciences, unto all kinds and states of people indifferently', and that it was not the business of the commissioners to frustrate the divine purpose. Cranmer also reminded them that they had all risen up from base families 'through the benefit of learning, and other civil knowledge'. His criterion for selection to school places was aptitude for learning, not social position.

Even the liberal schoolmaster, Richard Mulcaster, was cautious about who should be educated and how much: 'the best instrument wold allwaie be handled by the fittest person, & not by everie one, that hath a fantasie to handle it.' Proceeding on this principle, Mulcaster deals with the question of whether all children should be educated, and formulates an elaborate answer which turns on the body-politic theory - the belief that each member of society has a specific part to play and that the recognition and acceptance of one's own role ensures balance and proportion and the safe existence of all men.
This is obviously in his mind when he says that having too many learned people in a state leads to sedition, for only a limited number of them can be appropriately employed, and the remainder who are 'misplaced' will be 'most unquiet'. Thus he calls on parents to suppress their desire to have their offspring educated 'if their countrie say either they shall serve in this trade, without the booke : of if shee say I may not allow any more booke men without my to much trouble.'

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This sense of what is best for the country dictates Mulcaster's attitudes at all times. His elaboration of the view that members of certain trades and professions require a smaller amount of education than others is made with one eye on the economic needs of the Elizabethan polity and the other on the existing hierarchial order and hence stability of society. He writes, for example:

I dare not venture to allow so many the latin tongue nor any other language, unless it be in cases, where their trades be knowne, and those tongues be founde to be necessarie for them. For all the fear is ... least having such benefits of schole, they will not be content with the state which is for them, but bycause they have some petie smak of their booke, they will thinke any state be it never so high to be low ynough for them.

He encourages those who find large obstacles (whether monetary, physical, or mental) between themselves and education to be content with their lot ('keepe your childe at home'), and, like many who urge people to remain in their present social position, says that 'He that governeth all seeth what is your best.' Although Mulcaster feels sure that
'the reasonable parent' will yield to the demands of the state, he warns that 'he shall yeelde perforce, if he will not by entreatie', for 'it is much better to nip misorder in the verie ground, that it may not take hold, then when it is growen up, then to hacke it downe.' Elsewhere Mulcaster added his voice to the demand that learning must be applied, not pursued for private satisfaction; the former being 'the naturall use of all learning', the latter a 'private abuse of a publik good'. In Positions he contrasts public and private notions of learning, 'the one in her kinde, a libertie, a broade feild, an open aire, the other in the contrarie kinde, a pinfold, a cage, a cloister.' And 'private is sworne enemy to publike in all eventes, as it doth appeare when private gaine undoeth the common'. But these views, while indicating Mulcaster's concern for communal welfare, are set in a framework of political and social conformity, and are clearly distinct from the idea that the population in general should be given as much education as they want, which, as we have seen, he does not subscribe to. In his call for the sphere of learning to be widened in the one way but kept within strict bounds in the other, he is representative of many writers of his day.

Mulcaster does argue, however, that the country should make provision for the advancement of the clever poor, the group most likely to suffer in the dispensation to which he was committed; but, ever wary of placing power in the wrong hands, he insists that the onus for ensuring such advancement belongs to the country (by which he means here teachers) and not to the poor themselves. Selection of who should proceed beyond the elementary stage should begin early, and the criterion for selection must be an intellectual one:
Whether he be riche or poore, that makes no matter ... whether he be quicke or slow, therein is somewhat and requireth good regard.

The less able are to be diverted 'to some other course, more agreeing with their naturall, then learning is'. Bishop Barnes, in his injunctions to the diocese of Durham in 1577 had 'followed the same line, instructing his clergy to give free teaching to the children of their parishes, and to persuade the parents of the brightest pupils to let them go further in the 'learning of the good and liberall sciences'. In the case of those who show no aptitude, however, the clergy

shall move and require their parents to set to learn husbandry, or other good crafts, that yet so they may grow to be good members to the Country and commonweal.

One of the major restrictions placed on the extent to which the number of people receiving education could be broadened concerned the instruction of girls. Even Mulcaster, who is at some pains to defend the rights of women to study, distinguishes between the different callings of male and female, and it is clear that his conception of women's education is worked out according to the demands made on them by marriage. Ruth Kelso concludes that there is during the period 'general agreement ... that the desired effects [of women's studies] are sound moral habits and the prudence to perform worthily their duties in the vocation of marriage.' Some writers spoke of women's incapacity for learning, others of the unsuitability of a
liberal education for the female sex. All agreed that women should be subservient to men, and the main aim seemed to be to suppress women's individuality and to channel their energies into such controllable virtues as courage and chastity.

There was a certain amount of schooling for girls, but of a restricted nature, and many people believed that they could learn all they needed to know at home.

The age was not without its learned women, of course: Margaret Beaufort, Elizabeth, Cecilia and Margaret More, Mary Sidney, the daughters of Sir Anthony Cooke, the Countess of Bedford, Mary Tudor, and Elizabeth herself—these were all renowned for their learning. And Ascham's story of his visiting Lady Jane Grey and finding her 'in her Chamber, reading Phaedon Platonis in Greeke, and that with as moch delite, as som jentlemen wold read a merie tale in Bocase' is well known.

Women of high rank, such as these, studied at home with a private tutor, or under the guidance of their parents, as indeed was the case with some men, especially amongst the aristocracy, although the tendency for the latter to receive a public education increased as the sixteenth century progressed. The family, however, continued to be an important educational institution, and not simply for the Puritans I discussed earlier.

The picture that emerges as one studies attitudes to learning is, therefore, a complex one: a mixture of reform and reaction, of the extension of boundaries but also of the imposition of limits, of an impulse towards innovation yet a balancing caution that sometimes
gave way to prejudice. But, overall, as educational and social historians agree, there was expansion and advance.

One of the chief factors in promoting this advance was the development of scientific method, and particularly the work of Bacon. J.A. Mazzeo noted that the biggest blow Bacon gave to the older traditions of learning lay in his insistence on the fact that even average minds and uneducated men could make contributions to the communal store of knowledge, and inventions of the first importance, when they adopted other methods for dealing with the world than the highly educated and cultured were accustomed to use. This belief went hand-in-hand with the recommendation that university exercises on a theoretical level should be 'framed as near as may be to the life of practice; for otherwise they do pervert the motions and faculties of the mind and not prepare them.' Bacon goes on to remark that

when scholars come to the practices of professions, or other actions of civil life ... this want is soon found by themselves, and sooner by others.

Bacon is applying to learning criteria drawn from the world at large as he sees it actually is: scholars are not to be assessed according to the traditional values propounded by men of their own caste, but must be measured against the broad and practical requirements of daily life outside the universities. We have seen some of the forces at work in the late sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century world which would have fashioned such an attitude as Bacon's, but to these should be added the growing respect for the artisan and the skilled practitioner. Thus we find Harvey praising a group of 'expert artisans' and 'industrious Practitioner[s]', though they are 'Unlectured in Schooles'
and 'Unlettered in bookes'; he names a 'Mathematical Mechanician', a shipwright, an architect, a navigator, a gunner, and a chemist, points out that eminent mathematicians such Digges, Hariot, and Dee esteem these 'subtile Empirique[s]', and concludes,

Let every man in his degree enjoy his due; and let ... every Master of his craft, and every Doctour of his mystery, be respected according to the uttermost extent of his publique service, or private industry. 90

Greville too, urging the necessity of the application of knowledge to the shared needs of the community, stressed that

The grace, and disgrace of this following traine, Arithmetike, Geometrie, Astronomy, Rests in the Artisans industrie, or veine. 91

One of the men named by Harvey was Robert Norman, a sailor and compass maker. Norman published a book in 1581, called The New Attractive, and in his epistle to the reader, he asserts non-scholarly, technical knowledge against the traditional masters of learning. Assuring us that he does not mean to derogate from the labours of learned or ancient writers, nor to exalt himself, he tells how he intends 'to set downe a late experimented truth', grounding his arguments 'only uppon experience, reason, and demonstration, which are the grounds of Arts.' 92 It was on this basis that William Gilbert too wanted scientific learning to proceed, rather than in terms of philosophical speculation. 93 Norman admits that the learned may feel that the subject he is dealing with 'is no question or matter for a Mechanitian or Mariner to meddle with'; indeed, some have given their opinion to this effect in writing,
for 'they would have all Mechanitians and Sea-men to be ignorant, or at leaste insufficientlie furnished to performe such a matter'. Nonetheless, he asks for recognition that 'there are in this land divers Mechanicians, that in their severall faculties and professions, have the use of [certain] Artes at their fingers endes', which gives them a great advantage over those who simply sit in their studies and who can only 'imagine greate matters, and set downe their farre fetcht conceits, in faire showe, and with plawsible wordes'. The practical men can apply their knowledge as effectively and more readily than those who condemn them. Norman refers to Recorde's works and the English translation of Euclid, as well as many other scientific writings in the vernacular, which are of great help to the artisans, who do not generally know Latin and Greek. The compass maker concludes firmly, even aggressively,

I woulde wish the learned to use modesty in publishing their conceits, and not disdainfully to condemme men that will search out the secrets of their Artes and professions, and publish the same to the behoofe and use of others, no more then they woulde that others should judge of them, for promising much and performing little or nothing at all.\(^9^4\)

Norman's words are a manifesto for a new school of learning, a challenge and a rebuke. They tell us a good deal about attitudes in both camps, and give an idea of the kind of values the artisans held to, the sort of abilities they possessed, and the manner in which they believed they could refine and direct their talents.

Prejudice against such men as Norman was still rife, and can
be met with in many of the books about the nobility and the gentry. Grimaldus, for instance, denies administrative office to 'anye of the multitude, as Plowemen, Artizanes, and other persons of vile occupation', whose 'trade of life is ... voyde of vertue .... albeit they are necessarie for the societie of men'. In Ferne's The Blazon of Gentrie (1586), when the Ploughman complains of ill-treatment by the gentry, he is silenced, and there are remarks made about the 'murmuring and grutching words of the common people', and about how 'the Asse that beareth the burthen, must have leave to bray under his loade'. Ferne says how free a life the common people are permitted to have in England compared with other countries, but expends many words on casuistical arguments designed to counter the assertion that all men are equal.

Ferne's attitude overall is somewhat ambivalent: in another place he allows that on occasions the 'excellencye of some one man, professed in mechanical artes' might obtain him a coat of arms, though he will always 'be debarred the prehemince of Gentrye'; yet on the same page he refers to 'Artificers' as 'the dregges, refuse, and scumme of Cities', who are, 'in respect of the excellencye of other members' of society (the gentle classes, who are 'the eyes, mouthe, handes, breste, and other beautifull partes, of the bodye'), 'as the base and more filthye partes, ordayned for the necessity of natures worke'. Soon after this, however, we are being assured that such people 'are not ... to be banished, from the name, or number, of honest, laudable, and good things'.

What is clear is Ferne's categorization of polite and practical learning. Falling back on ancient doctrine, he tells us that one of the reasons for the seven divisions of learning (the trivium and the
quadrivium) being termed *liberal* sciences was to put a difference betwenee them, and the other servile Artes, (fit for the profession of bondemen and churles) called Mechanicall, whereunto the artisans or professours of them, do attend more with the service of the bodye, then with the travaile of the witte.  

This kind of prejudice parallels that we saw expressed by the poets and their defenders, and it too shows the extent to which ideas about learning were interwoven with social antagonism.

Perhaps the most vigorous effort to bring traditionally recondite knowledge to a much wider range of people was made by those who defended writing books in English rather than Latin, and justified translating classical works into the vernacular. In part, this has to do with the economic demands of the printing trade, which could hardly have survived by selling books only in Latin and Greek. The ability to print books in large numbers led to the need for a greatly increased reading public, and therefore to the necessity of having works in the vernacular.  

It would, however, be wrong to suggest that people's reasons for writing in English and for translating the classics can generally be attributed to such base motives: dozens of prefaces and epistles testify to a strong current of idealism that sought to enhance English culture and bring the writings of Greece, Rome and modern Europe to readers who had no or little understanding of foreign languages. There was also a desire that the middle to lower orders of society should be lifted to a higher level of education and be given knowledge that had traditionally been kept from them.
Naturally, those who made a case for writing in the vernacular, and those who undertook translations met with much hostile criticism from some of their learned brethren. This is evident from the remarks of Philemon Holland, the famous translator of Livy, Suetonius, Pliny, and Plutarch; Holland wrote:

Why should any man therefore take offence hereat, and envie this good to his natural country...? And yet some there be so grosse as to give out, That these and such like books ought not to be published in the vulgar tongue. It is a shame (quoth one) that Livie speaketh English as hee doth: Latinists onely are to bee acquainted with him.... What should Plinie (saith another) bee read in English, and the mysteries couched in his books divulged: as if the husbandman, the mason, carpenter, goldsmith, painter, lapidarier, and engraver, with other artificers, were bound to seeke unto great clearks or linguists for instructions in their several arts.103

John Dolman had expressed the same fears in 1561, foreseeing criticism for his 'prophaning of the secretes of Philosophy, whiche are esteemed onelye of the learned, and neglected of the multitude.... [and] therefore, unmeete, to be made commen for everye man.'104 Holland condemns those who adopt such a narrow-minded attitude, they are mistaken in wanting to restrict learning to an educated minority, and they underrate the resources and abilities of the English language. In opposition to 'such Momi as these' Holland asserts his 'intention and... scope... to do a pleasure unto them that could not read these authors in the originall'. His book contains 'discourses of all matters, not appropiat to the learned only, but accommodat to the rude paisant of the countrey; fitted for the painefull artizan
Dolman had remarked that his translation of Cicero was for the 'meane sort of men' half way between 'the raskall multitude, and the learned sages', who 'although they be not learned, yet, by the quicknes of their wits, can conceive al such poyntes of arte, as nature coulde give.' However, in spite of his later assurance that 'thou unlearned reader: for as much as, whatsoever I dyd, I dyd it for the desyre I had to profyte thee', Dolman was distinctly uneasy about revealing the secrets of philosophy to anyone below the middle ranks of the population. Others who used English had more confidence: Thomas Wilson stated that, in using the vernacular, he was acting on the premise that the liberal sciences should not be hidden in foreign tongues but should be available to all men; Thomas Blundeville stressed his hope that 'every man of a meane capacitie' might understand his book; Arthur Golding maintained that he had endeavoured 'too lay foorth things plainly ... too the understanding of many, than too indyte things curiously too the pleasing of a fewe. For in this and suche other workes, the rude and ignorant have more interest, than the learned and skilful.

Prominent among those who called for the sharing of knowledge through the medium of translation was Sir Thomas Hoby: ' ... learning is il bestowed where others be not profited by it', states the famous translator:

As I therefore have to my small skill bestowed some labour about this peec of worke, even so could I wish with all my heart, profound learned men in the Greeke and Latin should make the like prooфе.
tongue, there are the best learned men'.

... to be skilfull and exercised in authours translated, is no lesse to be called learning, then is the very same in the Latin or Greeke tongue. Therefore the translation of Latin or Greeke authours, doth not onely not hinder learning, but furthereth it, it is learning itselfe.\textsuperscript{109}

He accuses English scholars of having 'a perfect knowledge, to no other end, but to profit themselves, and (as it were) after much paynes in breaking up a gap bestow no lesse to close it up againe, that others may with like travaile followe after.\textsuperscript{110} Another translator, Thomas James, echoed Hoby, wishing that

these men which think they have S. Paules learning, had S. Paules zeale ... to seeke other mens good and not their own; for now marchants do not monopolize the goods of a citie more then these do appropriate unto themselves the learning of whole universities, & when they have it, what do they do with it, but keep it unto themselves?\textsuperscript{111}

Learning is to be shared amongst men in general, and must be thought of as a communal effort.

Florio's words to the reader of his translation of Montaigne's

\textit{Essais} (1603) summed up a firmly growing conviction:

Learning cannot be too common, and the commoner the better .... this Mistresse is like ayre, fire, water, the more breathed the clearer; the more extended the warmer; the more drawne the sweeter. It were inhumanitie to coope her up.\textsuperscript{112}

The best known translation of the age is of course the Authorized version of the Bible. The conflict over the rendering of the scriptures
into the vernacular had been fought throughout the sixteenth century, and had drawn notable defences by Tyndale, More, Becon, Fulke, and Cranmer. The argument revolved partly around the adequacy of English as a medium for the divine word, and partly around hostility to the vain eloquence of much humanist writing in Latin, but some also believed that the scripture should not be available 'to the Ungodly, Unlearned, Rascal people', and that God had deliberately kept the Bible in ancient foreign tongues in order to prevent his word being profaned by 'the riffraff of the people'. However, as I said earlier, the drive to bring God's word to each individual was a powerful one, and it became firmly established in the Protestant Church that the Bible must be available in English. The desire for this not to happen was rightly seen as a characteristic of the papists, part of their obscurantist belief that ignorance is the mother of devotion. Hence Pemble's sarcasm when, examining the view that it is 'not for plaine folk to understand the Bible', he remarks, 'is it not ? Then God is too blame that hath written a word for the instruction of all, which yet none but schollers could understand'.

The fact that scripture contains passages that are not easily comprehended was made much of by those who wished to keep it from the uneducated, and those who defended translation had to deal with the difficulty. Cranmer, in the preface to the 1540 Bible, writes:

> Suppose thou understand not the deep and profound mysteries of scripture; yet can it not be, but that much fruit and holiness must come and grow unto thee by the reading .... For the Holy Ghost hath so ordered and attempered the scriptures, that in them as well publicans, fishers, and shepherds may find their edification, as great doctors their erudition.
Cranmer distinguishes between the writings of Gentile philosophers and rhetoricians and those of the apostles and prophets, the former written to bring admiration for their authors, the latter to edify and amend the lives of their readers. Cranmer speaks for many reformers as he encourages everyone to read the Bible and discuss any difficulties with their ministers, for the general conviction was that

The reading of scriptures is a great and strong bulwark or fortress against sin; the ignorance of the same is the greater ruin and destruction of them that will not know it. That is the thing that bringeth in heresies, that is it that causeth all corrupt and perverse living, that it is that bringeth all things out of good order.

In addition, the Bible contains a comprehensive range of practical knowledge, appropriate for all types of men and women at every level of society and in diverse occupations. One can only conclude therefore 'that it is convenient and good the scripture to be read of all sorts and kinds of people, and in the vulgar tongue'.

Cranmer does impose certain constraints, however, including restricting discussion of 'the high questions of divinity' to those who have been carefully prepared both intellectually and spiritually, and the setting of the limits on the extent to which difficult matters may be investigated: the over-use of reason in such matters can be dangerous.

Despite such common circumscription, the central impulse of Cranmer's preface is towards greater democracy in the world of divine learning, and in this he is representative of Protestant opinion in
An additional factor in the gradual establishment of democratic principles in the world of learning was the influence of Ramism. In his removal of what he considered to be the superfluous features of Aristotelian logic, Ramus had fashioned a relatively simple method of thought, capable of being understood and applied by people who would not normally have tasted or benefited from academic learning by reason of their limited opportunity, time, and capacity. The fact that Ramist logic could be wielded by ordinary people seems to have been a cause for alarm amongst conservative scholars, who, according to Abraham Fraunce, complained of the destruction of traditional methods, and the usurping of the master/pupil hierarchy in whose upper levels they themselves dwelt.

Hereby it comes to passe that every Cobler can cogge a Syllogisme, every Carter crake of Propositions. Hereby is Logike prophaned, and lyeth prostitute, remooved out of her Sanctuary, robbed of her honour, left of her lovers, ravyshed of straungers, and made common to all, which before was proper to Schoolemen, and only consecrated to Philosophers.

Fraunce counters this on the democratic premise that 'Coblers bee men, why therefore not Logicians ? and Carters have reason, why therefore not Logike ?' Fraunce begs many questions and his partial standpoint does not permit him to explore and answer the serious objections to Ramist logic which were raised at the time, but his concern with the democratic trends in knowledge and the reaction to them does indicate that this was a leading issue of the day.
The wide and varied selection of texts I have cited bears witness to the emergence during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries of a broad view of what learning involves, who can participate in it, and how it should be used. When we speak of learning, education, and knowledge, we can either mean those things in the relatively narrow sense of formal school- or university-based studies (open only to a minority four hundred years ago), or the whole range of experience a person can have, which he or she may learn from. What the Tudor and early Stuart periods saw was a willingness to extend the boundaries of education in several different ways, and a correlative dissatisfaction with purely academic learning that was not clearly integrated with the needs and concerns of the community at large, and that tried to maintain its superiority and exclusiveness.

It was perhaps because of this trend towards conceiving of education as something more than book-learning that so much derision was aimed at scholars. As Harvey, perhaps thinking of his own uncomfortable experiences, wrote,

the name of A good schollar, was never so much contemn'd, & abjectid of princes, Pragmaticals, & common Gallants, as nowadays. 122

Although the humanists of the early sixteenth century had in their own eyes been against the man who occupied himself solely with learning, there was, as Joan Simon notes, 'much in the humanist programme to encourage concentration on books, to reinforce an already prevailing tendency for studies to remain of the study, preoccupied with words'; for as long as humanistic learning was cultivated inside
the old university framework (by Elizabeth's reign a basically scholastic mode of learning still prevailed in most colleges), it was likely to become restricted rather than functioning as an instrument of reform and progress. Thus while humanistic programmes of education won steady acceptance in the nation's schools, and various ideas of the efficacy of knowledge percolated society across a wide range, the professional man of learning, if that is all he was, could still easily be isolated from other people, for he was immersed in abstruse texts, and cut off by the extent of his learning, his temperament, and his social position from the rest of society. Bolgar concludes that by the later years of Elizabeth's reign there were no great scholars who could show 'how the classics could help man so solve contemporary problems', and that the classical discipline had come to be regarded as a mere pedagogic instrument, while scholarship, divorced from education and from life, found itself transformed into a specialised interest, the most highly skilled of all intellectual crafts, whose devotees were delighted to escape from the present in order to add their mite to the service of posterity.

There is a great deal of evidence to suggest that scholars, and, by extension, teachers, were widely ridiculed, though the high praise given to good schoolmasters by many writers must also be recalled, as must the way in which the office of teacher was often regarded with reverence. The comic fools of teachers in Shakespeare's plays are familiar, and Michael Hattaway, in a wide-ranging study of attitudes to scholars in the drama of the period, says that the literary image of this stock figure is almost invariably unfavourable or satiric.
Outside the play-houses too the attitude is often one of mockery or contempt. The scholar was regarded as an unworldly fool, narrow-minded, socially incompetent, politically inept - 'a silly fellow in blacke, that speaks sentences more familiarly than sense'. Burton comments on the scorn directed at scholars by worldly young men, Felltham agrees that they lack discretion in social relations and often appear ridiculous, and Charron, with obvious humanist concerns in mind, pictures the scholar in a public assembly, 'wherein the affaires of the state are consulted of, or matter of policie, or household husbandry':

you never saw a man more astonished, he waxeth pale, blusheth, cougheth, and at last knowes not what to say .... Marke in the selfe-same counsel, a merchant, a burgesse, that never heard speak of Aristotle, he will yeeld a better reason, give a sounder judgement, and more to purpose than these scholasticall Doctors.  

Charron notes too 'that when a man would describe a foole or an untowardly person, he calleth him Clerke, Pedante', for it seems 'that learning doth intoxicate, and as it were hammer a mans braines, and makes him to turne sot and foole'. 

Hostility towards men of learning was also fed by men such as Thomas Milles, who in his compendium of knowledge attacked philosophers as vain, covetous, proud, hypocritical, and given to endless wrangling: 'An unprofitable masse of men'. Milles makes the usual criticism that they speak from no first-hand knowledge of worldly matters, but more originally, also remarks on the disparity between their ascetic teachings and physically indulgent private lives. The involvement of scholars in the black arts is dwelt on, too, the author being fascinated by
the occult. 129

Scholars were ridiculed in the main, it seems, precisely because they were not making that vital connection between books and actual experience: 'Too much to retire to ... Studies,' wrote Johnson, 'doth not accord with state or gravitie; but by separating a man from more worthy devoires, bringeth him into contempt'. 130 Many others agreed. 131

The myopic scholar was especially unwelcome as a teacher. Peacham, commenting that teachers are regularly lampooned on the stage, paints a picture of schoolmasters as bad-tempered, foolish, ignorant, and inadequate, and says it is no wonder they are generally considered as 'ridiculous and contemptible both in school and abroad.' 132 On the basis of a similar assessment of men of learning, Cleland warned gentlemen against seeking a tutor 'in the Schools': for a good education, choose a man learned in the ways of the world as well as in academic subjects; 'admit not a Pedaunt, a simple Schoolemaster to be a patterne of your sonnes behaviour'. 133

Gabriel Harvey, writing to Spenser, depicted the scholars' world as an unenviable one:

> You suppose us students happye, and thinke the aire praeferrid that breathithe on thes same greate lernid philosophers and profonde clarkes. Would to God you were on of these men but a sennighte. I dowbte not but you would sweare ere Sundaye nexte, that there were not the like wofull and miserable creatures to be fownde within the cumpas of the whole worlde agayne.

He paints a discouraging picture of men who are self-destructive, niggardly, tyrannical in a petty fashion, unsociable, ill-endowed,
and unprofitable to the common weal.\textsuperscript{134} For this last reason, purists in the concept of gentility hesitated in allowing the title of gentleman to those who devoted themselves solely to learning,\textsuperscript{135} though in actuality the title could be claimed by a university graduate, a student of the Inns of Court, or anyone who studied the liberal arts seriously.\textsuperscript{136}

In striking contrast to this image of the scholar was the character of London's intellectual life, the general quality of which prompted Sir George Buck to describe it in 1612 as 'The Third University of England'.\textsuperscript{137} Harrison had written in 1587:

\begin{quote}
In my time there are three noble universities in England, to wit, one at Oxford, the second at Cambridge, and the third in London.\textsuperscript{138}
\end{quote}

Harrison was referring to the Inns of Court where men came to study law, but where a good general education was also to be had.\textsuperscript{139} Buck, however, meant that London itself was a university:

\begin{quote}
not onely those Arts, which are called liberall, but also all, or the most part of all other Arts and Sciences, proper and fit for ingenuous and liberall persons ... are in this Cittie professed, taught, and studied: which is ... as much as can be sayd, for the name and authority of any University, and which can be rightly sayd of very fewe other Universities of Christendome.\textsuperscript{140}
\end{quote}

In his table of subjects taught in London, Buck lists thirty-six branches of learning, from the customary grammar, logic, civil law, and so on, to swimming, languages, navigation, pyrotechnics, and dancing.\textsuperscript{141} Theology especially, he maintains, 'is no where better
nor more plentifully taught then in this Cittie':

many and dayly lectures being read thereof, not onely in
the chiefe and Cathedrall Churches of Saint Paul, and
Saint Peter, but also in all the Parish Churches, and
Temples: and particularly and Academically also in
Gresham College.¹⁴²

Gresham College had opened in 1596, although its founder, Sir
Thomas Gresham, had made plans and provision for it twenty years or
so earlier. The College offered lectures in the seven liberal sciences,
and these were to be given in English and aimed to 'best serve the
good liking and capacity' of an intended audience of merchants and
other citizens. There was much emphasis on the practical application
of the various subjects; thus the professor of astronomy had to explain
'the principles of the spheres and theoriques of the planets and ...
the use of common instruments for the capacity of mariners'.¹⁴³

The city also had its learned societies, but these seemed to be made up from among the higher ranks of Londoners.¹⁴⁴ Gair says
that one of the factors that encouraged the formation of these societies
and various coterie groups was the doctrine, derived from Castiglione
and contemporary literary theorists, that literature was a subject
only for the socially fit and intellectually competent, and should
therefore be kept away from the corroding influence of the untutored
public.¹⁴⁵ But he also points out that such groups, and learned
academies, rapidly became anachronistic as the seventeenth century
unfolded and the importance of the professional writer increased.¹⁴⁶

Buck carefully enumerates all the centres of learning in London
and describes what they offer and who attends them. He also notes
the prevalence of musicians, poets, dramatists, and artists. And this reminds us that much intellectual stimulation was to be found outside the places of formal instruction in the city: London was a city of education in a general sense; not only did most of the country's intellectuals and writers gravitate there, it was one of the chief centres of European trade and thus full of travellers and merchants who knew other languages and who could impart stories of other lands. The presence of merchants and sailors also meant a lively interest in cartography, navigation, astronomy, and geography at a non-academic level. London was, in addition, a centre for the printing and selling of books - an important factor in setting up a high level of intellectual activity. There were, in addition several pleas for the setting up of a national library. 147

In 1570 Sir Humphrey Gilbert had suggested the foundation of an academy for the education of wards and others, 'And whearas in the universities men study onely schole learninges, in this Achademy they shall study matters of accion meet for present practize, both of peace and warre.' 148 Gilbert was not satisfied that a suitable form of education was available for the sons of gentlemen, and he wanted a broader range of studies placed before them. On Buck's evidence, we may conclude that such a range of learning did become available in the London of the early seventeenth century, and not merely for gentlemen, as Gilbert had envisaged, but for the citizens in general.

We may also turn in this context of non- or extra-academic education to the Elizabethan nobleman's and gentleman's belief in travel as a way of gaining knowledge.

Amongst all the trades of life practised in sundrye sorte,
since the beginning of the world, there is none more ancient and agreeable unto the Nature of man than Travel.\textsuperscript{149}

The belief in the educative powers of travel was part of the insistence on the necessity of acquiring active experience as well as contemplative: 'who doth not see [in travel] howe sure and skilful a schoolmastres is experience?\textsuperscript{150}

Since Experience is the greatest parte of humane wisedome, and the same is increased by travel: I suppose there is no man will deney, but that a man may become the wiser by travelling.\textsuperscript{151}

Bacon wrote that 'Travel, in the younger sort, is a part of education; in the elder, a part of experience.'\textsuperscript{152} We can see what he means by comparing the account of Sidney's sojourn in various European cities in the early 'seventies with Montaigne's journey to Italy in 1580-81.\textsuperscript{153} Sidney's intention was to further his education, and partly under the guidance of Languet, who occupied the role of mentor recommended by most writers on travel, he not only observed the mores and conditions of foreign lands, but made specific efforts to consolidate his reading. As we look through his letters to Languet and others, it becomes obvious that learning is one of his principal concerns. Montaigne on the other hand is content merely to open himself to whatever experience comes his way. This is to a certain extent a result of his personality, but it is not only that; the whole approach is more relaxed: Montaigne measures what he sees by what he already knows. Sidney's activities are by contrast more calculated and directed, and the idea that his experiences are intended to mould a relatively young mind is to be sensed throughout.
Foreign journeys had first been undertaken by scholars eager to meet their contemporaries in other lands, to be taught by masters of international repute, to learn or perfect languages, to acquire particular degrees, or merely to see at first hand exactly what a renowned country such as Italy was really like. As the sixteenth century progressed, however, and humanist doctrines regarding the importance of education for the ruling classes of the nation took effect, a wider section of Englishmen set out for the continent where they could gain the practical knowledge necessary to a future administrator, courtier, and possible ambassador: wide experience of other peoples, languages, attitudes, terrain, and resources, and a general sense of independence and savoir faire. Mulcaster makes the point that travellers returning from abroad are 'better able to serve their owne countrie here with ... such wisedom, as they gathered by observing things there.' This was a common line to take.

In 1561 William Cecil wrote to Throgmorton that he was disposed to send his son Thomas abroad for a year. 'I mean not to have him scholarly learned but civilly trained [we may note the distinction], and to have either the French or the Italian tongue'. Cecil asks Throgmorton for advice as to where Thomas should be sent, himself favouring France: 'If he might without corruption of life have been in that Court three months I think he should thereby learn more both in tongue and knowledge than otherwhere in double space.' Cecil notes that he is thinking of sending his secretary with Thomas, because he can speak both French and Italian. In his reply Throgmorton recommended that Thomas should also learn to play the lute, dance, ride, and play tennis, 'and use such exercises as are noted ornaments
to courtiers'. He suggested that a trip to Italy would be useful too. Thomas, as it happened, wasted his time and got into some trouble, but the intentions of the older men show what was expected and sought. What was not looked for was scholarly learning: we may compare Sidney's remark to his friend regarding learning: 'one thinge is fitte to be knowne by a scoller that will reed in the scools and an other by Ned Denny', the sense of what was appropriate to different stations and professions was a keen one.

There was not complete agreement about where one should travel, or even if one should travel at all. Ascham's attack on Italy and his advice that English youth should be kept away from that country is well known, but Ascham was not alone; Cecil himself continued elsewhere:

Suffer not thy sons to pass the Alps, for they shall learn nothing but pride, blasphemy, and atheism.

Objections were usually made on moral and religious grounds, though in the case of Italy there grew up a dislike of Italian customs and manners even though Italian ideas about literature and courtesy still held sway in certain circles in England.

Travel was, moreover, not suitable for everyone; a man needed to be well-prepared and in any case must have the right qualities if he were to benefit from his journeys—understanding, knowledge, and judgement:

For ... without judgement men cannot gather the best things in travaile .... therefore it behoveth everie one, so intending to travaile, to be endued with learning and discretion .... For, he that travaileth to see experiences in other Nations,
and hath not power to discern, what are needful to be gathered, commeth home as a body to the grave without a soule. In which plight we see daily experience in this Land: for many travaile young that want both: others of more understanding that want judgement: and others whose judgements are active, yet faile in learning. 162

But, all in all, it was generally agreed that 'One that is learned, honest, and travaile'd is the best compound of man; and so corrects the Vice of one Countrey, with the Vertues of another, that like Mithridate, he growes a perfect mixture, and an Antidote.'163

This chapter has been deliberately wide-ranging because I wanted to demonstrate that the world of learning was full of diverse energies and impulses that caused ideas about knowledge and its availability, and the acquisition of it, to be revised or broadened. The sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries were far from creating an educational Utopia. It cannot even be said that there was a concerted movement towards a democracy of learning, for, although there were vigorous efforts by some individuals and groups to make certain kinds of knowledge freely available to all, the practical circumstances of daily life, and traditional habits of thought and behaviour, prevented the majority of people in the lower ranks of society from acquiring anything more than a smattering of learning, whether religious or secular. This is even more true of the extra-mural education available in London and abroad than it is of formal studies in the schools, colleges, and universities. The instruction in true doctrine offered by the reformers in numerous parishes seems to be the nearest approach to widespread
democratic notions of education in the period, though even here constraints were imposed and teaching took place within the framework of an established social, economic, and political order that did not allow any notable measure of equality and did not encourage the independent development of the self and one's ideas. The civic and religious dangers of educating everyone were clearly perceived, and many who urged reforms in learning were also quick to speak in favour of the existing order and to remind people of their duties to their superiors and the need for obedience.

What can be said, however, is that by the Elizabethan period many people had come a long way from the belief that learning was the prerogative of a select few who lived a secluded life of reading and contemplation. In addition, the view that much more than book-learning was required for success in the world was firmly established. But, against this, it must be remembered that a current of reactionary thought still persisted strongly. Drawing on long-established notions that certain kinds of knowledge are reserved for an intellectual, social, and cultural elite, and expounding these in terms of the Elizabethan and Jacobean class structure, some men inveighed against the 'rascal multitude' and closed the academy doors against those who would profane learning.

It is in this current that the poets whose work has been considered so far are to be located - in a general way, if not in every particular. While it is not my intention to present Fulke Greville as a poet who was responsive to every aspect of the broadening views of learning in his time - to do so would be to distort his character and writings, I feel there is evidence that he responded positively to several of
the reforming ideas I have outlined. Certainly, he could not easily identify with the ideology within which the concept of the learned poet was formulated; indeed, he sought to withdraw from it, and to align himself in preference with those who concentrated their energies on the building of a godly society. This resulted in his setting a low estimation on many of the values of his fellow poets - their faith in secular learning and eloquence, their belief in the special status of the poet, and their conviction that the learned poet could play an important role in the reformation of fallen mankind. The precise nature of the difference in orientation between Greville and those poets who extolled the learned and virtuous poet can be clearly discerned in *A Treatie of Humane Learning*. It is to this poem that the next chapter is devoted.
Chapter Six

Greville's *A Treatie of Humane Learning*
There is nothing in this world which is not corrupted, nor any learning which is not abused, notwithstanding the whole circle or compass of Learning ... is not to be neglected, & all humane Artes rejected: for like as diseased bodies, having some infirmitie, are not to be abandoned, but to be recured, preserved, and cherished, so ought Sciences and knowledges (though there lurke in them some abuse) not to bee despised, but with all indevour ought to bee purged from theyr chaffe, & brought to their former perfection.

(James Sanford, 'To the Reader', before his translation of Agrippa's De incertitudine, 1569.)

And I woulde have thee understande, that I wrote not these thinges for hatred, for ambition, for deceite, or for erroure: neither a wicked desire, nor the arrogancie of a lewde minde, hath moved me to write this: but the cause of all men, moste juste and righteous, bycause I see many ware proude in Humane learning and knowledge, that therefore they do despise and lothe the Sacred and Canonickal Scriptures of the Holie Ghoste.

(Agrippa to the reader, before the De incertitudine.)

... my purpose is to teach not to entice thee: To profite, not to please thee: To make thee blush, rather than smile: And to make thee penitent, not insolent .... Wherefore looke not hereafter of me for Roses, Oyles, or Pepper: but for thornes, launcing tooles, wormwood, and sharp vineger.

(Justus Lipsius, Two Bookes of Constancies trans. John Stradling, 1595, sig. D3v.)

Therefore if any man bee in Christ, let him be a new creature.

(2 Corinthians 5 : 17.)
'Que scay-je ?' Montaigne's famous question was echoed everywhere throughout the period, and was indicative not only of a resurgence of scepticism, whether merely fashionable or philosophically serious, but also of a more fundamental sense of epistemological trepidation and uncertainty. *Hamlet* and the other plays of Shakespeare's middle period are archetypal in presenting us with a world built on intellectual quicksands. Odette de Mourgues has suggested that Greville's mind was haunted by the metaphysical problem of knowledge, and she describes his 'feelings of passionate uncertainty as to the condition of humanity or of bitter mistrust of man's reason.' It is true that for Greville, as for many of his contemporaries, the questions, What can we really know? What can we be sure of? were fundamental. We see his doubts at work everywhere and, as a counter-movement to them we can observe in his writings a perpetual striving after certainty and stability, after some kind of order to which he might adhere. We may say initially in a simple way that he found the reassurance he was seeking in the doctrines of the Protestant Church - its teachings about the nature of man, his place and role in the world, his relation to God, and the necessity of discipline and obedience in the individual and in society. It was a reassurance that was neither easily arrived at nor comfortably held, for it was in the nature both of Greville's personality and character and of reformed doctrine to make the religious experience a taxing one.

That Greville was preoccupied with and deeply influenced by the doctrines of the Reformed Church is commonly agreed, although there are differences of opinion over the exact nature of his beliefs and his precise doctrinal orientation. Cases have been made for him
as a conformist to the relatively conservative position of the established Church in England, as a man committed to Calvinist doctrines, as someone who has affinities with Luther, Tyndale, and Hooker, and as a subscriber to English covenant theology. Usually he is called a Calvinist, but while a commentator like Buncombe arrives at this definition by tracing in detail the links between Greville's utterances and the writings of Calvin (both the *Institutes* and *Commentaries*), other critics seem to use the term more loosely to characterize a cast of mind given to gloomy reflection on natural corruption and the gulf that separates earth from heaven and human endeavour from the work of grace. Greville certainly follows Calvin's doctrines quite specifically at times, but on other occasions he diverges from them. Moreover, the whole question of the overlaps and distinctions between the various shades of Protestant opinion is a complex one, and, as the historian A.G. Dickens cautions, 'before we proceed to study English Protestants, we must ... be on our guard against attaching tidy "Lutheran", Zwinglian", "Calvinist" and other labels to these very eclectic Englishmen'. Doctrinally speaking, therefore, it seems wise to use the term 'Calvinist' about Greville only when his views are in accord with the basic tenets of Calvinism, and otherwise to speak more generally of him as a committed Protestant and to try and describe precisely the character of his religious views when they play a significant role in the ideas or attitudes he is advancing in a particular passage.

The dominant feature of Greville's religious perspective is his preoccupation with human corruption as a result of the fall. This shapes all his views and consequently colours all his writings. Thus in his *A Letter to an Honorable Lady* he states:
remember that the metall you are made of is Earth, your habitation a world; both mortall, and so no perfection at all to be expected in them: those petty shadowes of rest which are there being full of temptation, lets, or dangers.

He warns that 'Ever since the curse of bondage, which God breathed out upon the first sinne, each degree of life in it is onely a change, and variety of servitude.' Writing with a marked assurance and directness that is not always present when he is discussing issues he found less clear-cut, Greville says that the world is to man as the sea is to an island:

full of stormes, uncertainties, violence; whose confusions have neither justice, nor mercy in them .... So as since no estate can priviledge this life from death, sickness, paine ... must we not thinke to gather our roses among thornes, and consequently the World to be a flattering glasse, wherein man rather sees how to change or adorne his evils, than any way to reduce, or amend them?

Following Calvin, Greville sees the natural state as one of corruption and helplessness: to escape we need God's saving grace, but this is not simply there for the taking, and often the gulf between grace and nature seems uncrossable:

Mixe not in functions God, and earth together;
The wisdome of the world, and his, are two;
One latitude can well agree to neither;
In each, men have their beinges, as they doe:

The world doth build without, our God within;
He traffiques goodnesse, and she traffiques sinne.
This is the burden of Greville's best known cry de profundis:

Oh wearisome Condition of Humanity!
Borne under one Law, to another bound:
Vainely begot, and yet forbidden vanity,
Created sicke, commanded to be sound:
What meaneth Nature by these diverse Lawes?
Passion and Reason, selfe-division cause:
Is it the marke, of Majesty and Power
To make offences that it may forgive?\(^{11}\)

The deep irony is that our reason perceives where salvation lies but does not help us one jot to achieve it; indeed, reason contributes to our misery. It follows that all human activities, including learning and poetry, are essentially limited in the effects they can have, and are in fact more likely to create difficulties than to resolve them. As Greville writes in *A Treatise of Religion*, arts are the 'riddles of the sinne/Which error first creates, and then inherits' (stanza 107). It is on these premisses that *A Treatise of Humane Learning* is constructed.

* * * * * * *

*A Treatise of Humane Learning* first appeared in *Certaine Learned and Elegant Works* (1633), but the actual date of its composition can only be surmized. Bullough suggested that it was written in response to Bacon's *Advancement of Learning* (1603-5),\(^{12}\) and certainly Greville's concerns parallel those of his friend on many occasions; often, similar responses to particular problems may be discerned, or Greville's words seem to modify Bacon's - and to intend to so so. As Joan Rees has pointed out, however, this is not a sufficient ground on which to establish a definite link between the two texts such as Bullough.
posits, for the ideas discussed in them were common fare in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Given the acquaintance of the two men, it is probable that Greville was stimulated in several respects by Bacon's work, but there do not seem to be any firmer links than this. If some of Greville's ideas seem to echo those of the *Advancement of Learning*, it must also be said that the spirit that underlies *A Treatise of Humane Learning* is alien to Bacon. Greville avows a deep-rooted distrust of earthly knowledge, counting it as nothing compared to the wisdom of those who know God, and allowing it only a relative value in the practical world of affairs. Bacon, on the other hand, as we have seen, is keenly optimistic about the possibilities opened up to man by a right application of learning, and views his role as herald of the new methods with confidence and zest. And whereas Bacon eases the realms of God and man apart as far as learning is concerned, conceiving of the relation between the two rather loosely in terms of everything being ultimately attributable to God and all human activity being undertaken for his glory, Greville ties up learning closely to religious matters, believing that knowledge must be pursued only with God's laws and purposes firmly in mind and only with religious ends in view; it is 'A Spirituall worke, raising Gods Image, rased/By our transgression .... A Light divine' (*Humane Learning*, st. 150). Both writers agree that people have mistaken or misplaced 'the last or furthest end of knowledge' which is 'the greatest error of all the rest', but in the optimistic tone of such claims as Bacon's that learning can be 'a rich storehouse, for the glory of the Creator and the relief of man's estate', we note an emphasis not often made by Greville.
A Treatise of Humane Learning falls into two parts, stanzas 1-59 and 60-151. In the first part Greville breaks down our trust in human faculties, abilities, and occupations; in the second part he rebuilds the edifice, but with many provisos and constraints. However, it is also important to appreciate that the poem is a unified whole; a reading of it in one sitting reveals the continuity of the ideas and the presence of the same premisses throughout. What we must aim to know, Greville argues constantly, is the truth about ourselves: first the fact of our corruption—this for Greville, as we have seen, the central characteristic of man's life on earth, and therefore fundamental to the poet's epistemology and to the attitude he adopts towards human learning.

Greville leaves us in no doubt as to the all-pervasive nature of corruption:

all mans fleshly Organs rest
Under that curse ...

Skie, Sea, Earth, lye under it opprest,
As tainted with that tast of errors too.

(Humane Learning, st. 48)

This is a view that is put before us time and again during the treatise, and it provokes in Greville the inevitable conclusion:

where the Judge is false, what truth abides?
False both the objects, Judge, and method be;
What be those Arts then of Humanity?

(st. 51)

Related to the notion of a pervasive corruption in the universe, yet making a slightly different emphasis, is the familiar idea of the
world being in decline, 'Both from the truth, and wisedome of Creation ... making hast to her last declination' (st. 63). This in its turn is connected to another group of statements concerning the lack of permanence in things, their transmutatory nature:

all Mans fleshly idols ...
Confusedly doe weave within our hearts,
Their owne advancement, state, and declination,
As things whoe beings are but transmutation.
Subject not onely therein unto time,
And all obstructions of Misgovernment;
But in themselves, when they are most sublime,
Like fleshly visions, never permanent:
Rising to fall, falling to rise againe,
And never can, where they are knowne, remaine.

(sts 55 and 56)

In order to impress our hopelessness upon us in every way he can, Creville has mixed three contemporary theories: that of pervasive corruption incurred in one moment at Adam's fall from grace; that of a steady decline towards final dissolution; and that of the vicissitude of human activities - an idea that owes much to the old concept of the wheel of fortune.

The clearest evidence of man's corruption is his arrogant sense of self-sufficiency, his pride:

Thus, till Man end, his Vanities goe round,
Striving to binde, and never to be bound,
To governe God, and not bee governed:
Which is the cause his life is thus confused,
In his corruption, by these Arts abused.

(st. 59)
The Protestant timbre of these lines is also evident in stanza 3, where, lest we should be in any doubt about his assessment of the worth of knowledge and the perspective from which he views it, Greville evokes Eden, the attractions of knowledge, and, by implication, the fall:

This Knowledge is the same forbidden tree,
Which man lusts after to be made his Maker;
For Knowledge is of Powers eternity,
And perfect Glory, the true image-taker;
So as what doth the infinite containe,
Must be as infinite as it againe.

Such words recall various poems in Caelica; LXXXVIII for example:

Man, dreame no more of curious mysteries,
As what was here before the world was made,
The first Mans life, the state of Paradise,
Where heaven is, or hells eternal shade,
For Gods works are like him, all infinite;
And curious search, but craftie sinnes delight.

Goodnesse onely doth God comprehend,
Knowes what was first, and what shall be the end.

(11. 1-6 and 17-18)18

In stanza 4 of Humane Learning, Greville concludes

No marvell then, if proud desires reflexion,
By gazing on this Sunne, doe make us blinde.

He then goes on to demonstrate the futility of a search for God through knowledge by revealing, according to sceptical tenets, the weakness of men's faculties.
Yet, having recorded all this, it cannot be said that Greville was unattracted by the concept of the power and range of the human mind and the excitement engendered by the quest for knowledge. The first few stanzas of *Humane Learning* also turn in part on the traditional paradox of man ('I know my Soule hath power to know all things,/Yet is shee blinde and ignorant in all'). The first twelve lines of the treatise are therefore ambivalent in effect, and while there is no doubt that Greville does censure unrestrained intellectual activity, the two stanzas do also convey a sense of the animation kindled by the reminder of human potential.

The overall effect of the poem, especially of stanzas 1-59, however, works against any such enthusiasm, for Greville is chiefly concerned to undermine confidence in learning. One of the main charges Greville lays against it is that it is based on and perpetuates our self-assurance and the idea that we can achieve things without God. We have seen in an earlier chapter that many people did laud man's potential to an excessive degree, and it is therefore worth dwelling for a moment on the manner in which Greville formulates his attack on egocentricity.

In *A Treatise of Religion* Greville makes an acute analysis of the reasons why man is preoccupied with himself, and explores the consequences of such a preoccupation. The principal motivation of our self-involvement and self-orientation is fear. Greville remarked elsewhere that 'whatsoever is created, is afraid of dissolution, and so in love with it selfe.' All men have an innate awareness of God (*Religion*, st. 9) - a basic doctrine of Calvin himself - and, with our consciences activated by this, we discern our inner guilt in
relation to God's justice and are consumed with self-horror (22). This agony of conscience forces us to evolve a religion, but it is a religion that by its very nature tries to reduce God to manageable proportions; a God is desperately needed, but one with whom frightened man can cope (19). Fear only produces fear, and so increasingly undermines man's ability to open himself to the demands the real God makes on him. Fear 'Hopes not for grace, but prays to shunne the rod', thus fashioning a negative rather than the required positive approach to the Deity, and of such anxieties, Greville says, is the retreat into superstition, where, at the mercy of 'Magicke', 'Starr-Divines, Wizards, Imposters' (21), man translates 'Gods true Religion ... To bottomless hypocrisie' (18), 'buying shadowes with the soules expence' (17). Greville's description is acute and penetrating: he pin-points the origins of man's religious guilt, and, with a keen sense of the primitive forces at work in human psychology, accurately records the reasons for man's practice of translating strong psychic pressures into manageable terms. We do not have the strength to meet the demands of God, and we therefore try to contain him by considering him in our terms not his. Luther had made the same point: 'The natural man cannot want God to be God. Rather he wants himself to be God, and God not to be God.'23 Whereas 'To love God is to hate oneself and to know nothing apart from God.'24 Sin for Luther, as for Augustine, was 'a self-centredness which destroyed the capacity freely to will the good.' The will was enslaved to the self and had no true spiritual freedom.25 Greville follows the teachings of the theologians, and he sees man as trapped in a circular movement of fear and deceit from which all attempts to escape are meaningless.
unless reference is made to the redeeming agency of Christ. It is
from such a position that Greville moves out to repudiate the Stoic
ideal he himself praised in *A Letter to an Honorable Lady*. In Stoic
philosophy, again, man is still self-involved, a slave to fame, to
inward caution, to outward form and pride (36-9). The total destructive
involvement with the self is caught by Greville in an image of
Shakespearean compactness: 'evill with it selfe both starv'd and fedde',
which advances the idea of a circular preoccupation with the self to a
monstrous vision of simultaneous self-perpetuation and consumption.

Bids to achieve understanding of our condition through the arts
Greville dismisses: arts continue and consolidate the error they have
first established (107). What we do in our art, as in all other merely
human endeavours to solve our problems is in effect to fill ourselves
with our own self-awareness once more, so preventing the inward
illumination which is our only hope. This view of art is one Greville
reiterates in *A Treatise of Humane Learning* where, turning to the sciences
and arts men employ to shore up their defective abilities, he concludes
that all such aids take men no nearer to the truth of their existence.
To try to help what cannot be helped, except by God himself, is foolish,
and far from leading us to wisdom, learning usually carries us away
from it, and always stands between man and God. It is obvious from
what he writes in several places in the treatise that Greville regards
the schoolmen as particularly culpable in this matter; they offended
by mixing God's word with profane learning (corrupting 'God's true
Religion, in a heathen mould' (st. 44), and by filling men with false
confidence. Greville, like most critics of learning, turns to St Paul's
dictum about philosophy being vain deceit in order to strengthen his
case. Considering logic, the chief weapon of the schoolmen, Greville says it

Confounds of reall truth the harmony,
Distracts the judgement, multiplies commotion
In memory, mans wit, imagination,
To dimme the cleare light of his own creation.

(st. 104)

In this it is archetypal of learning in general. Finally, Greville talks of the schoolmen's 'sleepy speculation'

Dreaming to comprehend the Deity
In humane reasons finite elevation.

This is pernicious because 'While they make Sense seat of Eternity', they

Must bury Faith, whose proper objects are
Gods mysteries, above our Reason farre.

(st. 82)

By its very nature human learning as we know it assures man of his abilities and the power of his understanding, whereas what it should impart is an awareness of his corruption. Greville is always committed to tearing away the shields and covers men build around their weaknesses and difficulties.

Then what is our high-prais 'd Philosophie,
But bookes of Poesie, in Prose compil'd ?
Farre more delightful than they fruitfull be,
Witty apparance, Guile that is beguil'd;
Corrupting minds much rather than directing,
The allay of Duty, and our Prides erecting.

(st. 29)
We are unable to approach God by any other means than faith inspired by grace; 'For without these, the minde of man growes numbe/ The body darknesse, to the soule a tombe' (st. 149) and 'wisedome onely can be found/By seeking God, even in the Faith he gives' (st. 138): it is the possession of this wisdom that distinguishes the elect from their fellow men. All other knowledge can only be of relative and limited value as an aid to organizing our practical and mental lives as best we may.

Having stressed the way in which Greville's chief ideas pervade and shape the treatise as a whole, one can then go on to say that the first fifty-nine stanzas constitute a deliberate attempt on his part to impress upon us the weakness of those foundations upon which we build our learning. Considering the central aim of the treatise - to bring home to us the profound limitations of our much-vaunted learning and the inconceivable superiority of true wisdom - it is essential that Greville should force us to recognize the instability of our position. We must understand this, not only to come to terms with our weakness and arrogance, but also in order that we may be enabled to select what is worthwhile in our learning and reject the rest. Hence Greville has a lot to say about the subjective nature of man's knowledge, and, in an account that owes much to Seneca, Agrippa, Sextus Empiricus, and the sceptical tradition, as well as to scripture and Protestant theology, is ruthless in disparaging the human faculties. 27

Greville sums up his attitude clearly in two strong stanzas:

For if Mans wisedomes, lawes, arts, legends, schooles, Be built upon the knowledge of the evill;
And if these Trophies be the onely tooles,
Which doe maintaine the kingdome of the Divell;
If all these Babels had the curse of tongues,
So as confusion still to them belongs:

Then can these moulds never containe their Maker,
Nor those nice formes, and different beings show,
Which figure in his works, truth, wisdome, nature,
The onely objects for the soule to know:

These Arts, moulds, workes can but expresse the sinne,
Whence by mans follie, his fall did beginne.

(sts 46 and 47)

After stanza 60, however, on the Calvinistic premise that man must exercise what gifts he has for the good of the world, Greville admits the limited value of learning and examines the ways it can be most profitably directed. Ignorance is 'Mother unto every lust' (61), Greville now tells us, but he is not offering man a carte blanche with regard to the acquisition of knowledge: man must 'choose, and read with care; since Learning is/A bunch of grapes sprung up among the thornes' (62). We are reminded that learning can easily become foolish and ostentatious (63), and the first task to which Greville addresses himself is the slicing away of what is irrelevant, mischievous, and evil in man's knowledge (see 65 and 66). The remainder of the poem is given over to a systematic scrutiny both of the various attitudes that may be adopted towards knowledge in general and particular, and of the ways in which learning can be usefully applied in different departments of human activity.

The bi-partite structure of the treatise mirrors the mental process Greville wants the reader to go through: the palace of learning
is systematically demolished, and all confidence in our abilities is undermined until we are left with nothing; Greville then carefully rebuilds the edifice and shows how the individual and society can profit from learning. He limits its functions and gives it precise tasks to fulfill. The whole process is analogous to religious renewal: the breaking down and the rebuilding on solid foundations: 'if any man be in Christ, let him be a new creature'.

The building metaphor was an important one for Greville, and it also stood at the heart of St Paul's teaching. The Reformation in England saw what has been called a 'Pauline Renaissance', for the Apostle's teachings were seminal in the development of reformed doctrine. For Paul, renewal actually involved the building or edification of the self and the Christian community in the body of Christ, a notion that became central to Puritan thought in England in the later sixteenth century: the task of the ministers, wrote Robert Crowley in 1566, is to 'edifie or build up the Church of Christ'. 2 Corinthians 13, Ephesians 2 and 4, and 1 Corinthians 14 were the authoritative texts, with 1 Corinthians 14:26 ('let all things be done unto edifying') being the most potent exhortation. The metaphor of building had always been important in Hebrew history, but Paul revitalized it when he fused it with the notion of the Christians building the Church being 'one bodie in Christ, and every one, one anothers members'. As this verse makes clear, there is a crucial interdependence between each individual and the community, and the edification of the one was part of the edification of the other. The body of Christ became the basic metaphor describing the social form of Christianity, and Paul's use of 'to build', 'to build a house', or 'building'
concerned 'particularly the relation between individual and communal religious life'.

Greville uses the image of building on numerous occasions in *Humane Learning*. Until late in the poem he is concerned with misguided bids to build on the wrong foundations or the propensity to overbuild. He refers to the Tower of Babel several times to impress upon us how misconceived are many of man's attempts at improving his condition.

In stanza 46, for example, having just spoken scornfully of the notion that people can be like gods, and having linked this to Satan's pride and our vanity, Greville suggests that our learning is 'built upon the knowledge of the evill', and says that we still suffer from a Babel-like confusion. In stanza 36 Babel is implied when Greville criticizes those 'who with Bookes their nature over-build', a point that is consolidated in stanza 70 where we are told that contemplation and overmuch attention to the arts leads to disintegration and so 'builds not'. In stanza 83 the schoolmen are accused of 'Building a Babel upon faithlesse merits'. However, in a sequence of stanzas in the closing stages of the treatise (144-47) true edification is described. We must build on a firm ground:

Our chiefe endeavour must be to effect
A sound foundation, not on sandy parts
Of light Opinion, Selfenesse, Words of men,
But that sure rocke of truth; Gods Word, or Penne.

(145)

We must not overbuild, but should

measure first our own Humanity;
Then on our gifts impose an equall rate,
And so seeke wisedome with sobriety.

(146)
True building requires us not to

erect
Theaters, nor plant our Paradise in dust
Nor build up Babels for the Divels elect,

but to 'Make temples of our hearts to God' (147).

Greville comes closest to St Paul in stanza 144 where he condemns those who seek knowledge for the wrong reasons – idle curiosity, personal advantage, reputation – when it should be sought either 'to build others, which is Charity', or to build the self according to true Christian beliefs. Echoing behind this stanza is one of the Apostle’s most famous passages:

Though I speake with the tongues of men and Angels, and have not love [caritas], I am as sounding brasse, or a tinckling cymball. And though I had the gift of prophecie, and knew all secrets and all knowledge, yea, if I had all faith, so that I could remoove mountaines, and had not love, I were nothing .... Love suffereth long : it is bountifull : love envieth not : love doeth not boast it selfe : it is not puffed up : It doeth no uncomely thing : it seeketh not her owne things : it is not provoked to anger : it thinketh not evil. 40

We have been told earlier, in equally famous words, that it is knowledge that 'puffeth up', whereas 'love [or charity] edifieth' (1 Corinthians 8 : 1). For Paul the building of the Church is a communal enterprise, and what binds the participants to each other is charity. 41 And, as I noted earlier, the mutual dependence of the members of the Church means that self-edification and edification of others are tightly
interwoven.

Although Paul's influence is clearly discernible in *Humane Learning*, stanza 144, and although in previous stanzas Greville had followed the Apostle in his judgements of knowledge as merely wind and philosophy as vain deceit, the poet's emphasis falls somewhat differently, and he allows knowledge a contributory role in the building process. But it has to be remembered that the right uses of knowledge have by this stage of the treatise been very clearly described. In this binding of knowledge and charity Greville parallels Bacon, who understood St Paul to mean that charity is the 'corrective spice' for knowledge, ensuring that it is 'referred to the good of men and mankind'.\footnote{Greville's orientation therefore is deliberately a Protestant one: he rejects proud and vain knowledge, and the misuse of learning for the purpose of self-aggrandizement. The right ordering of the self \textit{is} important to him, but only in so far as it brings the individual nearer to God. Moreover, the self-building is related to the building of others through the key Pauline concept of charity, and the resonance of the Apostle's words in Greville's text suggests the balancing of individual and communal needs.}

It is important to note that in stanza 64, before entering on his discussion of the role of learning in worldly affairs, Greville makes a point of distinguishing the elect from the rest of mankind. What he is to write has no relevance for them. Infused with grace, they

\begin{quote}
Have no Art, but Obedience, for their test:

A mystery betweene God, and the man,

Asking, and giving farre more than we can.
\end{quote}
We may remark here on the emphasis Greville places on an individual relationship between God and each man, and the nature of that relationship, defined not only by God's 'asking' but also by man's active participation in 'giving': this is the covenant between the deity and those chosen by him for regeneration.

The elect are few, Greville tells us in *A Treatise of Religion*, (st. 63), for only a handful of people seem able to commit themselves to following the way to regeneration:

Offer these truthes to fleshe in generall;
God in his power, and truth they doe confesse,
But want of faith, that venom of their fall
Despayres to undergoe his righteousnesse:
They thincke God good, and so his mercie trust;
Yet hold good life impossible to dust.

(st. 110)

Even when one is making an honest endeavour to gain assurance of election, the struggle is a desperate one, a fight 'wherein the man despayres/Betwene the sinne, and his regeneration' (st. 104). The problem of how to know one was amongst the elect exercised the minds of reformed theologians, ministers, and no doubt all godly people endlessly. Greville is clearly aware of the difficulty and counsels prayer and a commitment to belief (42), patience in waiting for 'the degrees of thy regeneration' (79), and a watching for certain signs which indicate regeneration - pride giving way to meekness, atheism to zeal, lust to continence, and anger to charity (44). What exactly were Greville's views on election it is difficult to decide. He affirms on numerous occasions in *Religion* that salvation comes only through grace (e.g. stanzas 2-3), and that grace is a gift, 'not gotte,
but given' (34), yet he does not mention predestination, and grace seems to be available to those who have sufficient faith (see stanzas 42, 43, 110, 114), though whether faith is a sign of the working of grace or something that can earn it is not wholly clear. At key points Greville is somewhat cryptic: for instance, in stanza 79 he says 'fayth hath her mediation, Aske for thy selfe, that spirit which may judge'; and in stanza 35 he tells us that 'God dwelleth neare about us, even within'. Such lines seem to suggest the availability of grace to those who truly desire it, but one cannot be sure about this. What is clear is that mankind's fallen state prevents our arriving at perfection in this life; we are always 'refininge' that gold we have, and achieve 'Rest in our deathes, and untill then a strife' (52).

Another point that should be made is that Greville's remarks about election are often compassionate ones, less likely to engender despair in the majority of the population than stricter doctrinaire formulations. To say this is to emphasize an aspect of Greville as a treatise writer that has received little attention from commentators, many of whom are content to reveal only his 'characteristic gloom'.

Greville also shows purposeful optimism on many occasions, which may be linked to his understanding of and empathy with his fellows. These qualities in him are ones not always shared by contemporary poets.

Against Greville's continual emphasis on natural corruption and the futility of man's wholly self-orientated efforts to improve his lot must be set certain expressions of joy in man's relationship to God, and a firmly expressed optimism over the efficacy of God's word propagated on earth and over the possibilities open to a man for guiding and helping his fellows. In A Treatise of Religion Greville
spends a lot of time tracing the consequences of man's fall from grace, and the plight of the human race cut off from God is a motif that moves throughout the poem, yet in counterpoint to those views runs a belief in the redeeming powers of Christ and the chance he provides for regeneration. The way to Christ is hard, but it seems to have for Greville a fundamental sense of joy about it, connected, I think, with his deep trust in God expressed in Caelica XCI ( 'Even there appeares this saving God of mine'). It is a mark of his own hard-won spiritual strength that he is able to conceive of regeneration in the terms he does: he uses images of love, birth, infancy, death, and simplicity that embrace the whole spectrum of man's emotional life; and he holds the images firmly and calmly, without surrendering his intellect to their emotional connotations. His conception of the possible relationship with God has great beauty in it: faith is seen as 'both our wooinge, and our mariage ringe', a preliminary to love, 'A given hand that feeleth heavenlie things' (55), and the elect are 'Like Lovers, still admiringe, ever woeinge/Their God' (64); man is referred to as 'this twice-borne child of heaven' (42), and regenerated men are 'new-borne babes' (65); people need to be 'Fedde first with milke' because they are 'too weake for stronger foode' (53). The images, while emphasizing man's frailty, establish the delicacy of his position in relation to the Deity, his dependency and yet his own efforts to make and maintain contact. Their physical basis is vital, ruling out any transcendental conception of man's role, keeping him, although blessed by God and moving in the end away from the terrestrial, at this stage firmly placed in the milieu of common things. Greville's mind is not one that can reject mundane matters; he is drawn back to them, either directly to try to understand and improve them, or through
the poetic impulse to form ideas in terms of metaphor and simile. In themselves, then, such formulations of Greville's attitude make a full contribution to his conception of what regeneration can mean, suggesting to us what he meant when he spoke of the 'abilitie to walke over the deepe sea of Gods Commandements, which while they seem impossible prove easie'; and in their context in the treatise of his steady acceptance of the rigours of earthly life (for those with or without grace), the images do much to establish a positive alternative to the awareness of man's corruption and the inquisition on its results, which form the other main dimensions of the poem.

Walzer makes the interesting point that in Puritan literature one may see a marked tendency to replace the old image of man as God's child with images of man as a divine instrument, something which may be taken up and discarded again as God wills. God is essentially a commander, a master, while man is a servant to be used as God wishes. A turn to such metaphors was an aspect of the new conception of the command/obedience relationship between Creator and created, a part of the assault upon traditional views of order. The imagery of love and care Greville employs in A Treatise of Religion to convey his understanding of man's relation to God is quite different from the metaphor of the instrument or that of the commander - less severe, more sensitive to people's need for benign assurance and their tendency to evolve sophisticated links with their God. It is also worth noting that Greville lies closer in attitude to Luther than to Calvin over this.

Greville's awareness of human needs is also apparent in A Treatise of Humane Learning, and his recommendations there are based as much on that awareness as on his conviction that people are in a
state of sin. Hence his epistemology, though set in a heavenly perspective, is suited to earthly existence, and his views of learning are aimed at supplying the practical needs of mankind. It follows that, unlike Spenser, Chapman, and Daniel, he is not concerned with exclusive cultural groups, esoteric knowledge, and the enhancement of learning, poetry, and the inspired individual — indeed, he deliberately sets about undermining such things, which he regarded as specious forms of self-gratification. An observation by Maclean is relevant here:

when Greville speaks of poetry as an agent of moral virtue he thinks of it as operating, not inwardly and in a sense vertically (drawing men to as high a perfection as they 'can be capable of') but as it were socially and horizontally (enabling man to endure the trials of a fallen world with Stoic calm)

It is within the context of his concluding discussion of the status of the elect that Greville makes clear the basis of his ideas on the function of learning in the world. As in A Treatise of Religion, a two-sided and well-balanced viewpoint is apparent. The elect are 'in the world, not of it,' Greville comments (Humane Learning, st. 129), all their aims and attributes are 'stamp'd and moulded in th' Eternall breast; /Beyond which truth, what can be worth their seeing,/That as false wisdomes all things else detest?' (st. 131). Thus Greville reminds us of the relative perspective we must take on the matter of human knowledge; but having done this, he goes on to affirm his belief that the elect must 'love Humane kinde' even though they 'Abhorre the error' man has committed. The emphases fall quite differently from those made by Chapman, Spenser, and Daniel when they are considering
the relation of an elite group to the 'unregenerate'.

On the one hand, then, in stanza 132 Greville will write:

For earth, and earthiness it is alone
Which envies, strives, hates, or malecontent

but on the other he notes that the elect may 'Study Sea, Skie, Ayre, Earth, as they enjoy them' (133), and reflects that 'Salomon knew Nature both in herbes, plants, beasts;/Us'd them for health, for honour, pleasure, gaine' (134). Learning is seen by Greville as a natural thing if used properly (see stanzas 75 and 76). This was a fairly common line to take among radical Protestants. The end of the learning, Greville can say, with complete integrity, is to 'nurse the World with charitable food' (142):

The chiefe Use then in man of that he knowes,
Is his paines taking for the good of all,
Not fleshly weeping for our owne made woes,
Not laughing from a Melancholy gall,
Not hating from a soule that overflowes
With bitternesse, breath'd out from inward thrall:
    But sweetly rather to ease, loose, or binde
As need requires, this fraile fall'n humane kinde.

(st. 143)

Greville emphatically denounces some of the moods we have seen his fellow poets surrendering to at times. This is a key stanza. The firm and purposeful attitude behind these words may be discerned in the technical structure of the stanzas: there is an onward push and confidence in the rhythm of the first six lines; the reiterated 'Not' gives a sense of decisiveness, the syllabic and stress patterns back
this up. In the seventh line the pace is arrested by 'But', and while
the firmness of intention is retained in the meaning of the words, the
stress patterns and the values of the syllabic groups are modulated to
produce a milder tone. Greville writes with tact and control, amply
showing his humanity and delicacy of feeling for his fellow men. The
conception of an application of knowledge that can 'ease, loose, or binde,
As need requires' is a fine one, humane without being sentimental,
strong-minded without being ruthless. The words, taken from a passage
in Matthew's Gospel (18: 18-19), work with the adjacent Pauline
emphases to place the conception in a specifically religious context,
particularly consolidating Greville's bid to establish valid connections
between earth and heaven in terms of high moral integrity. Learning
must be directed outwards, Greville insists, and not used as a vehicle
for what he sees as various kinds of self-indulgent behaviour.

Rebholz, in accord with his theory of Greville's growing pessimism
during the early 1600s, chooses to count as nothing the insistence on
the charitable application of knowledge, and to emphasize, in a quite
arbitrary fashion designed to bring the ideas in the treatise into
line with his own general interpretation of the poet's intellectual
life, only the single line in stanza 144 where Greville, listing some
of the reasons why men seek knowledge, says that wise men seek it
'to build themselves'. The stanza concerned repays attention.

Yet Some seeke knowledge, meerely but to know,
And idle Curiositie that is;
Some but to sell, not freely to bestow,
These gaine and spend both time, and wealth amisse;
Embasing Arts, by basely deeming so :
Some to be knowne, and vanity is this:
Some to build others, which is Charity;
But those to build themselves, who wise men be.

Rebholz wants to persuade us that

Greville seems to be saying that 'self-building' knowledge — and it alone — matters, while service is not ultimately important to salvation. Implicit in that brief slip is a disillusionment with the career of service to which he had devoted his life.\(^\text{49}\)

Bullough, more soberly, but to a certain extent along the same lines, remarked that 'It is astonishing to find so direct a statement of the Puritan view which sets the salvation of one's own soul above all other works, even above altruism,\(^\text{50}\) Both critics are giving a distorted reading of this stanza. In my earlier discussion of some of the lines I showed the significance of the building metaphor in Pauline terms, and how the edification of the self and others was interdependent. In stanza 145 Greville assumes parity between the two functions of learning, insisting that there is a deeper concern than these any way: 'to effect/A sound foundation' on 'that sure rocke of truth; Gods Word'. And in stanza 148 he again sets the development of the self and service to others on the same level of importance and implies that they can be concurrent:

Our selves we may observe,
To humble us: Others, to exercise
Our love and patience, wherein Duty lies.

Nor is there any reason to be surprised by Greville's reiteration in stanza 144 of the standard doctrine that the right ordering of the self is of paramount importance, especially since this did not in
any way preclude the practice of good works. In *A Treatise of Religion*, stanza 46, Greville reminds us that we have a duty to be observant of and affectionate towards our fellow creatures: we must be 'To others good; not to our selves alone.' In addition, it may be remembered that the idea that the improvement of the self is an essential basis for any right action whatsoever was a common one, not confined to those who adhered to radical Protestant doctrine. It is also worth recalling in response to what Rebholz wrote that good works were not, according to some theologians, essential to salvation, even though they were often construed as a sign of it. Even if Greville had not committed himself so resolutely to an outgoing and altruistic use of knowledge, Rebholz's comment about a 'brief slip' would be irrelevant, and one begins to question some aspects of his interpretation of Greville's later years. Moreover, the pattern of ideas and words in stanza 144 is one with a well established tradition behind it. Bullough himself noted a similar passage in Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*:

> men have entered into a desire of learning and knowledge, sometimes upon a natural curiosity and inquisitive appetite; sometimes to entertain their minds with variety and delight; sometimes for ornament and reputation; and sometimes to enable them to victory of wit and contradiction; and most times for lucre and profession; and seldom sincerely to give a true account of their gift of reason, to the benefit and use of men.

It is possible that Bacon influenced Greville here, which would support Bullough's contention that the *Advancement* was a general influence on *Humane Learning*, but in fact Greville's words are closer to those of St Bernard, Abbot of Clairvaux in the twelfth century, who, in
one of his sermons on the Song of Songs, said we should not learn

in order to satisfy vainglory, to indulge curiosity, or any
motive like that, but only for our own edification or that
of our neighbour. For there are those who wish to learn
merely in order that they may know, and such curiosity
is blamable. There are others who wish to learn for no
other reason than that they may be looked upon as
learned, which is a ridiculous vanity .... And others,
again, desire to learn only that they may make merchandise
of their knowledge, for example, in order to gain money or
honours; and such trafficking is ignoble. But there are
those who desire to learn that they may edify others;
that is charity. And, lastly, there are some who wish to
learn that they may be themselves edified; and that is
prudence.52

Bernard's use of the word 'edify' ('aedificare') links with Greville's
'build' and, in connection with Greville's stanza, we may also note
that Bernard goes on to remark that of these reasons for pursuing
knowledge only the last two do not fall into an abuse of it, since
the people who are thus motivated wish to know only that they may do
good.

A direct link between Greville and the twelfth-century preacher
cannot be proved: the point to be established is that there was a
continuity of thought and expression in these views. John of Salisbury,
a contemporary of Bernard's, reflecting on the reasons why people
pursue philosophy, wrote in the same vein: people are driven by
'Curiosity to know', 'vanity under the goad of pride', and 'greed of
gain', but

Rare is the person who essays in humility and love
('charitas') the path of wisdom that he may be taught himself or may teach others.53

Sir Thomas More and Luis Vives wrote in a similar fashion.54

Collected editions of Bernard's writings were published regularly throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and the Abbot was cited frequently by Protestant theologians and preachers. The Puritan, John Downname, writing in 1611, followed closely the passage I have quoted in the course of his own discussion of learning; indeed, he was indebted to Bernard for several of the points he made about the acquisition and use of knowledge.55

The intellectual pedigree of stanza 144 of *Humane Learning* provides a salutary reminder not only of the eclecticism of writers in Elizabethan and Jacobean England but also of the debt owed by them to the supposedly neglected thought of the medieval period. Greville is to be placed in a central channel of Christian doctrine regarding knowledge, which demanded its charitable use and outlawed those who hoarded their learning or used it solely to benefit themselves in worldly affairs.

It is in this context that one should set the series of stanzas inveighing against contemplation and advising the practical application of the arts and sciences (36-7, 68-75, 102, 116-22). I discussed these at the end of the second chapter, and here need only recall the salient points of Greville's views. Practice must outweigh study and reflection, which has often made the arts 'tedious, Intricate, vaine, endlessse' (sts 68 and 70; and see 118-21); 'uselesse dreamers' are a bad, even destructive influence in a state that wants to be
strong (st. 68); practical ability will always triumph over unapplied learning (st. 69); we must follow the empirical method and 'Forme Art directly under Natures Lawes' (sts 74 and 75). At the heart of Greville's attitudes is the conviction that 'God made all for use' (st. 71). Hence he calls for learning to nourish the world rather than feeding off it (sts 72-3 and 120-22):

For thus, these Arts passe, whence they came, to life,  
Circle not round in selfe-imagination,  
Begetting Lines upon an abstract wife,  
As children borne for idle contemplation;  
But in the practise of mans wisedome give,  
Meanes, for the Worlds inhabitants to live.  

(st. 122)

Greville wants a reformation in the world of learning, and this involves a movement away from inwardness, theory, and intricacy, and towards a charitable application of knowledge, empiricism, and plain statement. This is completely in accord with the general character of his thinking.

I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that Greville, aware of the shifting nature of his age, sought after order and stability. In A Treatie of Humane Learning he seems in some measure at least to have found them, for he pronounces with assurance on the rights and wrongs of human attitudes to knowledge and contemporary habits of learning. Yet he also knew disturbing problems at the very heart of his own intellectual position, as the Caelica poems show, and behind the prescriptive and dogmatic tone of the treatise we may perhaps sense the intellectual uncertainty which seeks refuge
in assertion and confidence. Greville does not actually open himself to any possibilities of disorder, any fundamental intellectual anarchy, during the treatise; he seems to introduce disturbing ideas from the Protestant and sceptical canons largely in order that he may counter them with assurances later on, and, while fully aware of evil and its force in all man's works, is never at a loss to find in his religion doctrines that can oppose and control it.

Protestant doctrines provided the explanation for the corrupt state of the world, and they also supplied ideas about how that corruption might be combatted. The chief of these, as I noted, were the doctrines of obedience and discipline. As Milton was to testify in 1641,

The flourishing and decaying of all civil societies,
all the movements and turnings of human occasions are moved to and fro upon the axle of discipline.
Discipline is not only the removal of disorder, but if any visible shape can be given to divine things, the very visible shape and image of virtue. 56

Discipline was recommended to the elect for personal rectification, and brought to the rest of the population through a detailed system of state organization in which members were responsible for the behaviour of their fellows. 57 For the elect, discipline could provide a framework in which to consolidate their belief and trust in God, but 'to the mass of the population, the unregenerate, discipline turns a harsher face: for them it was not quite so clearly liberating.' 58 Greville shows both faces in *Humane Learning*.

The problem of the unregenerate seemed particularly acute in England, where there was a large population of wandering beggars -
ex-soldiers, peasants and retainers who had been forced out of their former livelihoods by agrarian upheaval and the breakdown of the old feudal system; where the number of people in the country was increasing rapidly; where the urbanization of hundreds of uprooted countrymen threatened the stable communities of the old boroughs, not just economically but in terms of fire, plague, and crime; where the decline and collapse of the old Church left a spiritual vacuum (with related social losses); and where the major changes in manorial and parochial systems throughout the land provided a basic and widespread problem of social disruption and organization. When a Puritan looked about him in the sixteenth or early seventeenth centuries, he saw everywhere the work of the old Adam. Puritanism, especially where it was directly inspired by Calvin's ideas, was deeply concerned to understand and resolve this state of affairs. The means to understand was readily available:

Calvinist theology ... mirrored the new social reality and suggested a general explanation: nothing but disorder could possibly follow from the activity of fallen men, restless, lustful, and disobedient.

The resolution of the problems was more difficult. The puritan movement ... is always groping towards a form of organization which will fulfil the functions of a political party, to remake society as God wished to see it, but the factors involved, being embedded in a complex of social and economic change, could not be accounted for simply in theological terms, and the area of operations had to be extended into wider fields in order for progress to be made. However,
part of the answer was thought to lie in discipline, to which the
greatest emphasis was attached by radical Protestants. The main
source of the doctrine of discipline was Calvinist theology, and it
is therefore no surprise that Greville is so concerned with it.

As far as obedience is concerned, Greville makes his attitude
clear in *A Letter to an Honorable Lady*. He stresses that 'all
Fortunes, and Misfortunes are but moulds of momentary Affections,
spunne out with proportion, or disproportion of Time, Place, and
Natures.' If our lives may be directed from within ourselves (rather
then by some external power like Fortune), then it is incumbent upon
us to follow the best pattern available; this is obedience, which
saves our 'misty understandings' from 'this false Paradise' (the
sensuous world), from 'perdition'.

For Obedience, not curiosity; as in heavenly, so
in earthly things is the most acceptable sacrifice
of mankind. Because this inherent tribute of Nature
unto Power (like a revealed light of universall Grace)
refines Mans reason, rectifies his will, turnes his
industries, and learnings inward againe, and reduceth
both of them to their first things. To conclude,
this is that inward fabri eke, by which we doe what we
thinke, and speake what wee doe.  

Here obedience is an inner quality, a kind of self-discipline aimed
at combatting the temptations of the sensuous world, a medium through
which man can control and fashion himself in hostile circumstances.

When Greville says that the elect 'Have no Art, but Obedience, for
their test' (st. 64), we may think of obedience in this way, as a
deep moral quality, developed in response to the demands of God and
the trials of the world. It could perhaps be said that, for Greville, the virtuous man is no longer the wise man but the well-disciplined one.

Where knowledge is concerned, Greville remarks that true obedience to God's commandments provides the only way to wisdom (st. 138).

But while the elect, strengthened by grace, can shape a strong moral centre to their lives out of which virtuous thoughts and action can proceed, the unregenerate, motivated and guided solely by their corrupt natures, can only be held in check by a tightly-drawn rein, and perhaps be led to some semblance of virtuous behaviour along a very narrow path; their discipline is astringent and can only be imposed from without.

Man-made institutions can never produce an elect soul, of course, ('the World, and Man can never frame/These outward moulds, to cast Gods chosen in', st. 87), but in the society Greville could see around him, where all kinds of pressures encouraged disorder, some kind of authoritarian administration was usually deemed essential, not least by those who subscribed to the theory of natural corruption. Hence it is no surprise that, when in A Treatie of Humane Learning Greville turns to an examination of individual human sciences, his first consideration is the science of government, the hub of all earthly activites (st. 79), and the two chief agents of government, the outward Churches and the Law.67 The former, as Greville observes them, are corrupt:

So mixt with power, and craft in every part,
As any shape, but Truth, may enter there.

(st. 80)68
Greville is back again to his fundamental concern for the state of the inner man. Stanzas 82 and 83 make it clear that Greville has the Church of Rome in mind when he makes these censures. It was a common target for him, but as a radical Protestant it is likely that some of his dissatisfaction was levelled at the English Church too. As Croll noted, true religion for Greville could never be expressed in an institution, but had to be 'purely an aspiration of the individual souls of the elect'. Where this ideal state was not attainable, however, some kind of organizational control had to be exercised. Greville himself seems to have taken for granted his own personal freedom to fashion his spiritual state as best he could, allowing himself flexibility and letting his soul remain in a state of becoming or growth. But he could not conceive of this attitude as a principle upon which the nature of a society in general might be founded; he is far stricter.

It is in his treatment of the Law that we see Greville at his harshest. Earthly laws, 'as shadowes of those Lawes divine',

must assist Church-censure, punish Error,
Since when, from Order, Nature would decline,
There is no other native cure but terror;
By Discipline, to keepe the Doctrine free,
That Faith and Power still relatives may be.

(st. 92)

It will be noted that Greville says 'There is no other native cure but terror'; that is, nothing effective can be produced by men but terror; God can work in different ways.

The distinction between the elect and the unregenerate is
re-emphasized here: what is appropriate to the former does not suit the latter.

Earthly laws, fashioned by the needs of the time, tend to move away from the ten commandments — the kernel of all law — and so often cause more trouble than they prevent (sts 90-91). Yet they are essential to combat disorder, to ensure 'That private hearts may unto publike ends/Still govern'd be' (st. 93). Greville cannot tolerate disobedience that might cause disruption in the state. The whole tenor of stanzas 79-95 is towards the recommendation of uniformity of opinion among people — encouraged or, if necessary, enforced. In part, the concern behind his view is political and social (sts 94-5), but it has other dimensions too; a religious one naturally, and particularly in stanza 85 where Greville commends the censuring of 'that Disobedience [which] ... would deale/With hidden knowledge, to prophane her Maker': from his admiration for the willingness of the early Church to condemn and overrule whatever threatened to disrupt the polity, there grows the recommendation that Synods should be established in 'each Kingdome' to 'mould' 'Seditions, Schismes, and strange Opinions ... to a settled unity' (st. 86). Greville believes in an absolute truth, which those inspired by God may administer and establish amongst their fellow men. It is important to appreciate this, as the same attitudes are extended into ideas about learning too. Greville argues for a stable terminology in the arts; definitions should be taught in youth and should be known to be reliable. Too often Art is 'like a Curtizan ... [changing] habits, dressing graces every day' (st. 77) — a popular image. In relation to this demand, Greville asks that 'One, or two Authors be selected out' in
each subject, 'To cast the learners in a constant mould',

Who if not falsely, yet else goe about;
   And as the Babes by many Nurses doe,
   Oft change conditions, and complexions too.

(st. 78)

Bacon and Hobbes, as acutely aware as Greville of the intellectual and moral turbulence just beneath the surface of early seventeenth-century civilization, made similar pleas for stability in the foundations of knowledge. But while they felt confident enough of the bases of their own positions to build elaborate theories of knowledge and political science on them, Greville could not recognize anything more than a relative value in terrestrial ideas and activities; and for him the instability of the human position was at root unalterable. He comes back to this belief time and again:

the universall corruption of inferior Elements is such, as even worldly wisdome it selfe workes but as our vulgar Physicke doth, which passing through the imperfections, & contrarieties of our natures, and diseases, doth helpe and hurt together; still multiplying the curse of our fall, in the false changes of diseases, and cures, appetites and opinions. Neither can the confluence of worldly things yeeld any other rest or stability, than such as is in the Kingdome of sleepe, where the best is but a dreame. Because where imperfection is, there disquiet must be; and where disquiet governes, there Nature is as apt to wander, as to be weary.
It has been suggested, apropos of the religious poems towards the end of Caelica, that Greville's gloomy view of the world and mankind caused him to be attracted to 'the profound and intense dualistic otherworldliness of Platonism':

The world of Greville is the cave of Plato; and his task as a writer is constantly to show how all ideals are there either perverted or false.\(^{75}\)

Certainly there is a similar strain in Platonic and Protestant thought regarding the valuation of this world; as C.S. Lewis remarked, few pagan systems adapt themselves so nearly to total depravity and contemptus mundi as the Platonic. The emotional overtones of the words 'Renaissance Platonism' perhaps help us to forget that Plato's thought is at bottom otherworldly, pessimistic, and ascetic; far more ascetic than Protestantism.\(^{76}\)

But to pursue the comparison more than a short distance or to suppose that the Platonic elements in Greville's thought and language are an essential complement to his Protestant convictions would be misleading. To a certain extent we may see in Humane Learning a legacy from Greville's early involvement with Sidney and with those modes of writing and thinking that were substantially influenced by Renaissance Platonism, but in the treatise he has wholeheartedly committed himself to radical Protestant thought, and has allowed doctrines of the corruption of man and of people's vital need for God to shape his views and fashion his epistemology into a form alien to Platonism. The ways in which he approaches particular subjects sometimes reverberate with Platonic overtones, and many of the important words in the vocabulary employed
carry Platonic significations. So we find such words as 'proportion', 'well-framed', 'ordered', 'set', 'foundation', 'fashion', 'form', and particularly 'mould', which is used nearly a score of times. These words resound throughout the treatise like an antiphon against the recurrent use of 'stained' and a cluster of terms which revolve around the idea of corruption. It is as if the intensive preoccupation with man's fallen state provokes not only a conscious but also a semi-conscious need on Greville's part to think in terms of certainty and order. Reformed theology provided for him the conscious answer to man's predicament, being well-furnished with policies to prop up what was shown to be weak in the light of its own devastating doctrines, while, on the semi-conscious level of Greville's mind vestiges of Platonism crept through to consolidate his position against disorder. In stanza 47 Greville writes:

Then can these moulds never containe their Maker,  
Nor those nice formes, and different beings show,  
Which figure in his works, truth, wisdome, nature,  
The onely objects for the soule to know:  
These Arts, moulds, workes can but expresse the sinne,  
Whence by mans follie, his fall did beginne.

The intention of the verse is to tell us that the works of man can only demonstrate his weakness and inability to do anything good; it is therefore basically Protestant in thought and as such may readily be connected to the main themes of the treatise. Yet in his comparison of man's efforts with those of God, Greville uses the words 'formes' and 'beings' - to mean, as far as one can judge, 'essence', or even 'perfect achievements in physical creation'. These words, then, pull the meaning towards Platonism in as much as we are invited to consider
God's creations in terms of Platonic forms.

Greville certainly seemed to be attracted by the notion that there existed somewhere an ideal world, or perhaps it should be called a world of ideals, against which the actual world might be measured, but I think it is misleading to consider him as a Platonist because of this, or to place wholly or even markedly Platonic constructions on various parts of the treatise. There is a tinge of Platonic thought and language, no more; it is a mistake to be led away by this from the central core of Protestant ideas and towards an epistemology that, as I showed in the fifth chapter, was fundamentally alien to the Calvinist one. Plato's philosopher moved progressively out of the cave into the light, the world of pure form; true objects of knowledge were not to be perceived in the everyday life of most men. The Calvinist saw God's great handiwork all around him, testifying to the omnipotence of its creator, and in spite of recognizing the corruption of terrestrial life, knew that one of his immediate purposes was to understand and control his quotidian existence: escape into a world of truth came only with death.

In contrast, the sceptical and stoical ideas, which move in and out of the poem, especially in the first sixty or so stanzas, being similar in various ways to Protestant thought (in the devaluation of man's abilities and the need for endurance, for example), do not rest uneasily within the overall pattern of the work.

Platonism, especially in its fifteenth- and sixteenth-century manifestations was essentially preoccupied with ways of transcending a mundane existence which was thought to be a mere shadow of the 'real' world, and Platonic epistemology rested on a conviction of
people's innate abilities and capacity to progress upwards through various stages of knowledge towards the life of the spirit: it was fundamentally an avowal of confidence in people's unaided powers. But Protestant theology elaborated a view of man as helpless, corrupt, and miserable, incapable of any right action unless inspired by some form of grace, and its epistemology, as we have seen with Greville, was based on these premisses.

As far as the Neoplatonic attitude to knowledge is concerned, Greville undermines it right at the start of the treatise:

The Mind of Man is this worlds true dimension;  
And Knowledge is the measure of the minde;  
And as the minde, in her vaste comprehension,  
Contains more worlds than all the world can finde:  
So Knowledge doth it selfe farre more extend,  
Than all the minds of Men can comprehend.

A climing Height it is without a head,  
Depth without bottome, Way without an end,  
A Circle with no line invironed;  
Not comprehended, all it comprehends;  
Worth infinite, yet satisfies no minde,  
Till it that infinite of the God-head finde.

*(Humane Learning, sts 1 and 2)*

In his commentary on the treatise, Michael Hattaway has pointed out that these two stanzas suggest a Neoplatonic ascent towards the infinite but that this is ironically negated by the argument of the lines. By punning on the word 'comprehend' (meaning 'contain' and 'understand'), Greville suggests that while each concept—world, mind, knowledge—is contained and understood by the one above it, each
gazes without understanding on that which contains it. Satisfactory progress upwards is therefore not possible. Such a reading of the stanzas may be extended to the further, detriment of the Platonic and Neoplatonic notion of a continuum between earth and disembodied intellect. It may be noted first that Greville is talking about an approach to the infinite, to God, through knowledge, and this must be distinguished from the early humanist ideas of knowledge as a gift from God (an idea echoed by Calvin), which together with faith and the study of Holy Writ, can help to bring men to divine truth, and of worldly learning as a preparation for the higher learning of scripture. The suggestion of an ascent by stages is more specifically relatable to the Platonic variants of humanist thought.

The stanzas are ambivalent in effect: against the sense of progression, ascent, and expansion provided by the series of statements Greville makes, runs a counter argument, conveyed skilfully by phraseology one suspects from the start to be ambiguous (a suspicion that is quickly confirmed), as well as by direct criticism in a following stanza. The way in which one takes Greville's words depends to a certain extent upon one's sympathies: to the Neoplatonist the notions of infinite knowledge and the vast comprehension of the mind (to take two examples) would have favourable and even exciting associations; but to the confirmed Protestant (such as Greville), whose thought is structured around beliefs in the corruption of man and pride, the absolute necessity of grace and the immediate proximity of God to the regenerate man, the same words would describe misguided and unnecessary concepts.

If we read the lines as Protestants, the emphasis to be made
comes from 'Way without an end' (2/2) and 'satisfies no minde' (2/5). People search through knowledge for an end which is not there. The different impact of the word 'infinite' in successive lines may be noted too: the infinite worth of knowledge cannot bring satisfaction, but the infinite being that is God can. The second use of the word renders the first ironical. We may compare Bacon's words in the *Advancement of Learning*: 'Neither is it any quantity of knowledge how great soever that can make the mind of man to swell; for nothing can fill, much less extend, the soul of man, but God and the contemplation of God'. The underlying meaning is that there is no point in striving endlessly for truth in the vast spaces of knowledge and the mind. Sidney's words are to the point:

such is to humane mindes the infinitenes of them, that to swallow them up is impossible. Well may a man be swallowed in them, and fruitelesly, if he have not the better lyne to guide him in the Laberinthe.

* * * * * *

Geoffrey Bullough rightly said that Greville was 'earthbound'. From the artistic point of view this could be seen as a limitation in him, for while his later poetry at its best has a resonant power, it is relatively limited in its range, especially when compared to Spenser's or Sidney's. But in many other ways his mundane focus is a great strength. He tried to see the world as it was, to face its problems and limitations, especially as these were perceived from a radical Protestant perspective, and he attempted to suggest some remedies for its ills. Thus, like Daniel, Spenser, and Chapman,
he counsels stoic self-sufficiency, but it is not of a kind conducive
to self-satisfaction and exclusiveness: strength is needed to cope
with life's burden, but to enable one to engage with the problems,
not to erect a strong shield to keep them out. His commitment as a
writer to the tasks of confronting the reader with unpalatable truths,
but also of easing the situation by indicating how these could be
accepted and acted upon, resulted in a typically strenuous and honest
attempt to understand what the best use of knowledge was, and how the
learned might fashion and direct their work in the most advantageous
way for the community. Hence the hostility to the vita contemplativa
and the insistence on the practical application of learning; hence,
too, the embracing of a broader range of subjects and occupations than
traditional book-learning as appropriate forms of knowledge and areas
for advancement.

Greville recognizes the importance of the individual's experience
and development, but is hostile to egocentricity in matters of
knowledge and the arts. He himself is not self-absorbed in Humane
Learning, in the way the other poets who have been studied are
preoccupied with their personal circumstances in their writings about
learning and poetry; rather he is purposefully outward looking. His
belief in the social importance of human learning, coupled to his
aversion to the use of the arts and sciences for mere personal enhancement
mean that certain issues do not arise in his work. For instance,
one gets no impression from Humane Learning of an exclusive culture
or an antagonism towards what is threatening it: Greville has no
interest in a mutually appreciative and supportive group of intellectuals
with the same philosophic, aesthetic, and social concerns, which need
to be defended against the philistine. Similarly, although he writes about the small flock of God's elect, who possess divine knowledge, he certainly does not revile the rest of the population in comparison with these favoured few. What precludes such emphases being made is the belief that the trials of the world and fortune press upon each man and woman, and therefore that everyone stands in need of aid.

Nor does Greville make high claims for men of learning; on the contrary, he undermines, or at best qualifies, their traditional self-esteem, and asks that the arts and sciences be refashioned within the constraints of radical Protestant teaching regarding the corruption of man and the opposition of grace and reason. This is to deflate the humanistic optimism that characterizes Musophilus's speeches in Daniel's poem, and to try and ensure that the cardinal faults of learning — pride and vanity — are not manifested. Greville does not, however, discard Christian- and civic-humanist principles regarding the use of knowledge for the right ordering of the self and the building of the common weal — concerns that also lie at the centre of Musophilus, but which have been overlaid with other preoccupations that have evolved out of courtly, aesthetic humanism. Greville, motivated by reformed doctrine, cuts through the aesthetic and social accretions the original humanist impulse acquired during the sixteenth century, and tries to re-establish its pristine values within the context of radical Protestant philosophy.

In all these ways Greville is at odds with the culture and ideology that inform Musophilus. This is not to say that the two poets do not share similar concerns, for ideologies and cultures are not one-dimensional and static, but multi-faceted, kinetic, and complex,
and to withdraw from one or even many aspects of them does not necessarily mean a rejection of every feature. But, as I hope I have shown, Greville's orientation and mode of discussion where human learning is concerned is fundamentally different from Daniel's. This is also true in the case of poetry, as the next chapter seeks to demonstrate.
Chapter Seven

Greville's Poetic
Life is the Wisdome, Art is but the letter,
Or shell, which oft men for the kernell take.

(Greville, A Treatie of Humane Learning, st. 35.)

My advice to the skilled imitator will be to keep his eye on the model of life and manners, and draw his speech living from there.


You writers must choose material equal to your powers. Consider long what your shoulders will bear and what they will refuse. The man who chooses his subject with full control will not be abandoned by eloquence or lucidity of arrangement.

(Horace, Ars Poetica, 11. 38-41. ed. cit., p. 280.)

But we must beware of the man who abounds in eloquent nonsense, and so much the more if the hearer is pleased with what is not worth listening to, and thinks that because the speaker is eloquent what he says must be true .... for ... 'though wisdom without eloquence is of little service to states, yet eloquence without wisdom is frequently a positive injury, and is of service never.'

The question of what exactly Greville’s aesthetic philosophy was has proved a vexing one for modern critics, and this is not surprising, for the problems confronting anyone who attempts to define Greville’s views about literature are numerous. For a start, his statements about aesthetic matters are scattered around his works (they are mostly in *A Treatie of Humane Learning* and *The Life of Sir Philip Sidney*), and have to be pieced together by the student endeavouring to discover a coherent and consistent standpoint. But while a substantial degree of coherence and consistency can be found, many of the poet’s remarks are cryptic and bewildering, and sometimes seem to contradict what he has said elsewhere. The reader is thus obliged to unravel meanings, to define in accordance with what is clear key words and phrases Greville himself did not define, at least not directly and immediately, and sometimes not at all. The two phrases, ‘images of life’ and ‘images of wit’ are especially troublesome. The difficulty is increased because on occasions Greville speaks so decisively and deliberately about aesthetic matters, and is able to assess his own aims and achievement so astutely, that one is inclined to suppose that his views are cut and dried, having been scrutinized, sifted, and weighed with his customary analytical rigour.

The overall impression made by Greville when discussing aesthetics is therefore an ambivalent one: at times he is lucid and settled, at others he is restless and unclear. In *Humane Learning* the moments of obscurity result in the main from grammatical and semantic ambiguity, which suggests that Greville was not absolutely clear in his own mind about his views of poetry. In *The Life of Sidney* the factor that usually makes for the difference between clarity and obscurity is the
degree to which Greville is preoccupied with Sidney at any given moment. When Greville is discussing his friend's writings, when he employs Sidneian concepts and terminology, or ponders the relation of his own literary compositions to Sidney's, ambiguity and confusion creep in. When he breaks free from Sidney's influence, which he often seems to be striving to do, the independent views he expresses are generally clear and straightforward. The confusions in Greville's poetic seem to me an index of the extent to which, striving to establish his own aesthetic position, he yet failed to shed wholly the influence of his charismatic friend. In the practice of his craft Greville did quite clearly evolve away from Sidney to write a poetry distinctly his own: this evolution has been studied by Richard Waswo, who charts in detail Greville's gradual and deliberate shedding of Petrarchan and Platonic modes of writing. In his practice Greville endeavoured increasingly to follow exactly those clear prescriptions laid down in his theoretical statements about the language of poetry needing to be carefully controlled and the content of poetry needing to be of a morally edifying nature, and both needing to be tied in directly to actual experience.

These prescriptions were shaped and sustained by Greville's religious beliefs. Preoccupied with the essential corruption of mankind, he was convinced that, although human arts and sciences could have a supportive function, helping us to make the best of this life, they were of only relative worth, and when it came to the all-important issue of salvation were useless. When used in a supportive fashion, they had to be tightly controlled and geared to the actual needs of fallen man. Greville's religious beliefs, often in tandem with his predilection for sceptical philosophy, underwrite all he says about
poetry, and account for his almost exclusive concentration on a moral purpose in literature, and on a moral interpretation of Sidney's works. Sidney himself, as Greville stresses in the Life, was a staunch Protestant, and would doubtless have concurred with the essential doctrines espoused by his friend, and certainly did with the idea that the poet is primarily a moral teacher: but, although Sidney is careful to impress upon us that poetry can never be a substitute for grace and, compared with divine matters, is inferior, he still rates the poet much higher than Greville ever did, and accords him powers, including the ability to re-form the world and to operate as an auxiliary to the work of grace, that Greville would not conceive of allowing. As Maclean says, Sidney is concerned with human potential, Greville with human limitation.

There is, therefore, a clearly perceivable difference between the respective orientations of the two poets. Sidney wants to persuade us that the poet, disdaining to be subjected to the sense world but 'lifted up with the vigour of his own invention, doth grow in effect into another nature' and creates a golden world: Greville writes about his art, as Waswo puts it, 'with that overwhelming "sense of declination" which sees man as lost beyond his own remedy in a maze of evil, and the writer as but the cartographer of these nether regions.'

Yet, much as he sought to strike a different chord from Sidney, the latter's influence was too great to allow Greville to release himself entirely from his friend's orbit, and what we find, side by side with Greville's own notions about literary composition are traces of Sidney's, which he has not been able to discard. Moreover, when he is discussing the Arcadia, Greville often seems
uneasy and over-assertive about the work's moral intentions and effects. My aim in examining Greville's statements about aesthetic matters, especially about poetry, is to assess the degree to which he established an independent position and to show what the ideological bases of that position were. This will entail further commentary on parts of *Humane Learning*, and, to support this, a consideration of Sidney's influence on Greville, for, as I have suggested, he sought to move away from Sidney's viewpoint, and in that bid, as in the attitudes to learning studied in the previous chapter, one can perceive a withdrawal from the ideology within which Daniel formulated his concept of the learned poet.

In studying Greville's aesthetic in *A Treatie of Humane Learning*, it is important to appreciate that the poem is a sustained argument, a sequence of interdependent views: his attitude to literary composition rests on his epistemology, which in turn evolves out of his religious beliefs, and what he says about poetry must be related to statements about other branches of human learning. I shall therefore briefly trace those ideas in the treatise which have a particular bearing upon Greville's attitude to poetry, and set his poetic firmly in the context of his overall attitude to the arts and sciences. He does not speak directly about the learned poet, and it is significant that he does not. It was, as we have seen, a concept embedded in humanist notions of the worth and potential of man, learning, and literature, and these are precisely what Greville could not allow. He himself was well-educated and his learning is evident in his poetry. But while he might have argued that the presence of learning in literary compositions
made them more effective (within their limited scope), he would not have drawn attention to it in order that the poet should be held in high esteem and separated from the rest of the population as specially gifted. Poetry, like all the arts, was the product of sinful man, and the poet was as corrupt and helpless as anyone else; indeed, if Greville took notice of the attacks on poets, he might well have been convinced that they were more corrupt than their fellow human beings. Given the attacks on poetry as immoral, and the related development of a religious poetics and a tradition of divine poetry, one might have expected Greville to say more about the situation and possibly to recommend the writing of religious poetry, and to discuss translations and versions of the scriptures, especially Sidney's Psalms. He might have followed Du Bartas and, rejecting human learning as a foundation for poetry, have developed the idea of the poet being inspired by God. But he did none of these things, and this in itself constitutes negative evidence for his attitude to poets and poetry. His own work reveals his knowledge of the scriptures and contemporary theology, so he was learned in divine matters as well as human; but he probably did not count himself amongst the elect (he refers to them in the third person), and would have shrunk from suggesting his writings had any particular merit or efficacy. In any case, he would not have praised poets or advanced their cause as Daniel, Spenser, Chapman, and Sidney did, no matter how learned they were. His eulogy of Sidney was sincere and intense, but the praise is primarily for the man (unique among his contemporaries); the commendation of the poetry is for its practical moral usefulness, and, in any case, tends to be modulated once more into praise of the writer rather than being dwelt on for
itself. It is interesting that *Astrophil and Stella* and Sidney's other lyric work is not considered.

Thus although the concept of the learned poet is not directly discussed by Greville, one can deduce a lot from what he does not say. Moreover, his views of learning and poetry individually are *expounded*, so inferences can reliably be drawn about his attitudes to the use of learning by poets. In an earlier chapter I noted that the extent to which poets felt threatened by the *misomousoi*, and the level of resolve with which they defended poetry and attacked the enemy, stood in direct relation to the degree of worth accorded to the figure of the poet. Rating poetry on a similar level to the other branches of human learning, and thus allowing it only a restricted usefulness, Greville clearly felt no inclination to secure the poet's position or to elaborate doctrines of special virtue, poetic wisdom, and exclusiveness.

As we have seen, the first fifty-nine stanzas of *A Treatie of Humane Learning* constitute a sustained bid to demonstrate

the Vainesse, and Defect
Of Schooles, Arts, and all else that man doth know.

(st. 60)

Knowledge is 'the ... forbidden tree', our 'proud desires' serve only to blind us, and our lust to know produces only 'clouds, and winde': we can therefore merely 'waile' our 'native impotence' (sts 3-5). Our senses and faculties are corrupted and provide an erroneous account of the world (sts 6-20). Greville asks ironically whether 'these naturall Defects .../May be supplyed by Sciences, and Arts': we certainly 'thirst after, study, admire advance' them, 'As if restore our fall, recure
our smarts/They could, bring in perfection', 'make us like our Gods' (st. 21). In fact, although we make great claims for human learning and for our capacities to know, we display our ignorance and folly at every turn. For all the arts and sciences are 'Seas of errors'

In whose depths who sound,
Of truth finde onely shadowes, and no ground.
(st. 34)

None of them teaches what we really need to know: 'how to show/No weeping voyce for losse of Fortunes goods', 'how to measure/What is enough for need, what fit for pleasure' (st. 32), and, underlying these stoical notions, the religious desire to

know how first Mans minde did fall,
How great it was, how little now it is,
And what that knowledge was which wrought us this!
(st. 33)

Sounding rather like Daniel's Philocosmus, Greville asserts that those

who with Bookes their nature over-build,
Lose that in practise, which in Arts they gaine.
(st. 36)

Books and arts actually prevent us from achieving what we might naturally have been able to accomplish; the pursuit of knowledge either blinds us, or we get lost in fruitless wrangling (st. 38). Falling back on the most potent statements against the pursuit of knowledge from the Old and New Testament (Ecclesiastes 1:18 and 1 Corinthians 8:1), Greville tells us that, in the best of men,
where Science multiplies,
Man multiplies with it his care of minde:
While in the worst, these swelling harmonies,
Like bellows, fill unquiet hearts with winde.

(st. 39)

Paul was right to censure vain philosophy, for the arts are 'built upon the knowledge of the evill', 'maintain the kingdome of the Divell', and thus 'can but expresse the sinne, Whence by mans follie, his fall did beginne' (sts 46 and 47).

In sum, as we and the world we inhabit are cursed, the only accurate knowledge we can attain is a 'sense of declination' (st. 48). Our arts are only 'strange Chimeras borne of mortall sense', formed somewhere between our reason and our senses (st. 52), and even though the Truth implanted in our hearts refines us,

These dreames embody, and engrosse the minde,
To make the nobler serve the baser kind.

(st. 53)

Human wisdom, science, the arts, built 'Upon the false foundation of [our] Guilt',

Confusedly doe weave within our hearts,
Their owne advancement, state, and declination,
As things whose beings are but transmutation.

(st. 55)

The first fifty-nine stanzas contain a thorough-going deflation of people's pride in human learning, and although the remainder of the poem allows the arts and sciences a certain amount of usefulness,
the impression of their deep limitations where essential matters of faith are concerned stays firmly with us. Thus when we arrive at the group of stanzas where Greville is to discuss the 'instrumental following Arts' (st. 102), amongst which poetry is included, we expect to discover that he will permit them only a restricted function. Moreover, by the time we get to stanza 111, where the topic of poetry is introduced, its potential has been circumscribed in several other ways too.

Because poetry is dependent upon the imagination and the understanding, it is very likely to paint false pictures, for these two faculties rely on the senses, which are to Greville fundamental sources of error. Thus the imagination must

from the sense
Be misinformed, while our affections cast
False shapes, and formes on their intelligence.

(st. 12)

The understanding

though it containe
Some ruinous notions, which our Nature showes,
Of generall truths, yet have they such a staine
From our corruption, as all light they lose;
    Save to convince of ignorance, and sinne,
Which where they raigne let no perfection in.

(st. 15)

In addition, Greville approaches the evaluation of poetry via a series of comments on rhetoric and eloquence, and what he says there puts constraints on the ways in which language may be used which have obvious implications for poetry. It is important to examine this
group of stanzas carefully, for focused in them are various influences to which Greville was subject, and which shaped or confirmed his ideas in a general way. By studying Greville's views and their analogues, we can come to understand more precisely how he conceived of poetry and the poet's role, and how his conceptions differed from those of the other poets who have been looked at.

Rhetoric, Greville proclaims,

Rhetoric, Greville proclaims,

*Is grewne a Siren in the formes of pleading,*
*Captiving reason, with the painted skinne*
*Of many words; with empty sounds misleading*
*Us to false ends, by these false forms abuse,*
*Brings never forth that Truth, whose name they use.*

(st. 107)

A preoccupation with rhetoric lay at the heart of sixteenth-century humanist culture. The books of Cicero and Quintilian especially were esteemed, and many treatises on rhetoric appeared in Tudor England, Wilson's being the best known. In Greville's day rhetoric was the main subject for first-year undergraduates at Oxford and Cambridge, and the techniques of rhetoric were deployed by poets, Greville amongst them. However, rhetoric had always been a subject that was regarded with some misgivings, for it was open to abuse. Vives was worried about the misuse of rhetorical skills for evil ends, and by the early seventeenth century there was a well-established suspicion of rhetoric as an instrument of deception.

In Greville's case the suspicion seems to have been fed from a variety of sources. For instance, Cornelius Agrippa had accused rhetoric of being 'nothing else, but the arte of fauning flatterie,
and as some more boldly speake, of lying'. In words possibly echoed
directly by Greville, Agrippa had referred to the 'painted glosse of
talke'. But Greville is not actually as severe as the man from
Cologne; like Bacon and Jonson, he distinguishes between the art
properly used and the abuse of it: it has 'growne' into its present
state and is not essentially misleading. Greville sees how

scarcity of words

Forc'd her, at first, to Metaphorike wings,
Because no Language in the earth affords
Sufficient Characters to expresse all things.

The trouble is that rhetoric has gone beyond this; she now

plays the wanton with this need,
And Staines the Matrone with the Harlots weed.

(st. 108)

In his development of the notion of the Siren, through the 'painted
skinne' image of stanza 107, to the idea of covering what is sound
'with the Harlots weed', we can see Greville's abiding concern with
the temptations offered by outward appearances, and in this case with
the quality of what they have hidden.

Greville's use of the image of the seductive woman helps to
clarify a little further the kind of language he would countenance
and the kind he would not; for we may compare his use of the imagery
with Sidney's. The latter, alluding to the contemporary state of
poetry, censured 'such a kind of eloquence' that produces 'an opinion
of a seeming fineness', but nothing that will persuade the majority
of readers. He lamented that 'honey-flowing matron eloquence'
was too often 'apparelled, or rather disguised, in a courtesan-like painted affectation'. A subsequent passage from the Apology shows that Sidney was concerned about the use of too many words as well as the emptiness of the verbal structures they composed.

Greville clearly shares his friend's hostility to indulgence in 'figures and flowers', but is stricter in the limits he wishes to impose on eloquence. The right use of language for him is plainly described in two interesting stanzas:

those words in every tongue are best,  
Which doe most properly expresse the thought;  
For as of pictures, which should manifest  
The life, we say not that is fineliest wrought,  
Which fairest simply showes, but faire and like:  
So words must sparkes be of those fires they strike.

(st. 109)

Greville wants aptness not ornamentation as the criterion of choice where vocabulary is concerned: beauty is not enough; words must 'limn out ... exact pictures', and the reader must be left with no doubt as to the meaning the writer intends. This strikes a quite different note from that sounded by Puttenham when he avers that language is never 'so well appointed for all purposes of the excellent poet, as when it is gallantly arrayed in all its colours which figure can set upon it'.

At bottom Greville's is a moral attitude, which he makes clear in the following stanza, connecting the right use of language to 'life' rather than 'wit', and giving eloquence a precise didactic role.

For the true Art of Eloquence indeed
Is not this craft of words, but formes of speech,
Such as from living wisdomes doe proceed;
Whose end are not to flatter, or beseech,
Insinuate, or perswade, but to declare
What things in Nature good, or evill are.

(st. 110)

Again, Agrippa's words may be cited in comparison:

for the seate of the Truth is in the harte, & not
in the toung .... the speache of Truth ... is simple,
not seeking for painted and coloured wordes. 22

It is not always sufficiently emphasized that, in his attack
on the arts and sciences, Agrippa was motivated by the Christian
tradition of contempt for human learning, and that he was concerned
that pride in knowledge caused people to turn their backs on the word
of God.23 This surely attracted Greville's interest at least as much
as Agrippa's scepticism did.

Greville's views on the right use of language also echo St Paul
and the Protestant theologians who discussed eloquence. Calvin, in
his exposition of the Apostle's influential remarks, refers to the
simple way in which God has recorded his word in the scriptures. The
great reformer is, however, prepared to accept true eloquence, 'which
does not aim at captivating ... with an outward brilliancy of words,
or at intoxicating ... with empty delights', but 'which consists in
skilful choice of subjects, in clever arrangement, and fineness of
style'. True eloquence, he says, is just as much a gift from God
as simplicity of speech is: it contains 'sound learning' and depends
on 'principles of truth'. And 'since [it is] useful and suitable
for the general affairs of human society, there is no doubt [it has] come from the Holy Spirit.⁴

The passage Calvin is expounding is 1 Corinthians 1:17:

For Christ sent me not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel, not with wisedome of words, lest the crosse of Christ should be made of none effect.

The marginal annotations in the popular Geneva Bible explain that 'Paul casteth off [eloquence] from him not onely as not necessarie, but also as flat contrary to the office of his Apostleship'.²⁵ Paul was an eloquent man, we are told, but his eloquence was heavenly, not of man, and void of painted wordes' ('painted' is the word Greville used). The reason why Paul 'used not the pompe of wordes, and painted speech' was because God wanted everyone, even the simplest to understand his word; hence clarity of utterance was vital. The emphasis on the need for all people to be able to understand God's word is customary in Protestant writing, and it could well be one of the points in Greville's mind when he inveighs against the 'craft of words'.

Similar views were conveyed to a large audience by the leading Cambridge preacher and theologian, William Perkins. What he says throws particular light on Greville's attitude to words and their use, and indeed on Greville's conception of the work of the poet who has renounced 'images of wit' and is seeking after 'living wisdomes'. In a discussion of figurative language in the Bible, Perkins concludes that since 'it is ordinarie in all Writers, and even in common speech: so it is not refused by the holy Ghost'.²⁶ It follows that

Rhetorike is warrantable, good, and lawful Art;

and it ariseth thus: That which the holy Ghost
practiseth, must needes be not onely not evill, but good and warrantable.

Perkins instances St Paul's Epistles, Christ's sermons, St John's Gospel, and many of the Prophets, especially Isaiah, as having 'as much and as elegant Rhetorike in them, as any writers in the world', and containing 'figures and ornaments of Art' that 'match any Oratours'. 'Nor would it be any hard task to undertake to proove, and illustrate every approoved rule of Rhetorike, out of some part of Scripture.'

On these grounds Perkins defends the use of rhetoric and eloquence in sermons - a contentious issue at the time, as we saw in an earlier chapter. In this defence, however, Perkins is at pains to warn ministers against the misuse of language. Eloquence must be natural, not affected, it must be grave, sober, and modest, and it must serve the Word and not draw attention to itself. It should also not 'deceive and overreach by craftie words ... double meanings, and equivocal phrases', for this is 'not beseeming Christianity.' For the Christian

the fountaine of ... eloquence is ... in the Scriptures of the olde and newe Testament. Which beeing compiled by the wisedome of God ... containe in them true wisedome of all sorts.

Ideally, human eloquence

must be brought home to divinitie, and be pared, and shaved with spirituall wisedome, and then may lawfully and profitably be used.

In the doctrines of the reformers Greville could find authority for the use of rhetoric and eloquence but at the same time instruction
about employing words in a restrained manner, and directing them to morally, religiously acceptable ends. There was also encouragement to see that the Bible was a source and example of eloquence as well as the repository of God's truth. In his turning away from courtly poetry and his discontent with 'images of wit', Greville had only to look to Protestant teaching to discover alternative attitudes to both language and experience which were rooted in a theology that fashioned and directed his intellectual life. That he followed reformed doctrine in these matters is plain when one looks at the later stages of the Caelica sequence and at the treatises, and it is no surprise to learn that Richard Baxter commended Greville's poetry for reading by the godly.27

In a discussion of the stanzas of A Treatie of Humane Learning in which Greville deals directly with poetry (111-12 and 114-15) one is beset by the problem that Greville often writes obscurely and ambiguously. This means that interpretation must be tentative and suggestive, but cannot be definitive. Some points are clear though: for instance, the religious basis of his ideas is, as one would expect, immediately apparent, and results in some straightforward statements. In stanza 115 we are told that poetry is not of value per se; that, while it 'Teaches, and makes, it hath no power to binde'; that it is an ornament 'to life and other Arts', provided it serves and does not possess us.

In stanza 112 Greville asks:

if the matter be in Nature vile, How can it be made pretious by a stile?
And stanza 114 makes it clear that the poet has a moral obligation to write in a didactic vein about subjects of undoubted worth, so that his work will guide people by offering them direct advice as well as proposing images of order to them which might indicate ways of showing 'Nature how to fashion/Her selfe againe'.

However, as this last quotation indicates, Greville also makes claims for poetry that are at odds with the relatively low status he accords it elsewhere, and this results in a sense of contradiction and confusion that is intensified by occasional complexity of tone and a grammatical and semantic ambiguity that is the hallmark of many of Greville's statements about his art. Whatever logically coherent pattern of meaning one tries to elicit from this group of stanzas, one is always left with a feeling of frustration, and is likely to conclude that Greville was not clear in his own mind about what precisely he believed the function of poetry to be.

Stanza 114 has been called by Maclean 'the confused heart of Greville's theory'.

[Poetry], if to describe, or praise Goodnesse, or God, she her Ideas frame, And like a Maker, her creations raise On lines of truth, it beautifies the same; And while it seemeth onely but to please, Teacheth us order under pleasures name; Which in a glasse, showes Nature how to fashion Her selfe againe, by ballancing of passion.

As Joan Rees says, Greville here is giving poetry 'an exclusively moral function of a high order'. The language echoes Sidney's in the Apology, and Greville thus seems to be allowing poetry much
more scope and effectiveness than he does anywhere else. It could well be that, as Maclean suggests, Greville 'is making a place within his poetic for Sidney, and for others like him, if any appear.'³⁰ Whether this is so or not, the initial effect of the stanza is to contradict the impression given in the treatise so far of all human arts as deeply limited in what they can achieve, especially in divine matters. However, the 'Sidneian' phrasing is possibly a bit misleading: Greville is still characteristically giving poetry a very pronounced moral role; he says in the last four lines of the stanza, where he is closest to Sidney, that poetry is only able to show, not to lead and direct; and he appears to conceive of poetry as having an external, ornamental function, beautifying a content that is in itself of far greater value. This last view does not accord with Sidney's notions. Nor does it agree with what Greville wrote in stanza 109, and it is possible that what we are seeing is Greville trying to make concessions to those who employed 'images of wit'.

Much earlier in the treatise Greville seems, if only by implication, to be casting doubts on the kind of claims he is now making in stanza 114. In stanzas 24 and 25 he says that people fall a long way short of grasping true forms, or 'characteristicall Ideas' - the goal of the Platonist. This phrase is worth pausing over, for in The Life of Sidney Greville referred to 'this Characteristicall kind of Poesie: in defence whereof [Sidney] hath written so much'.³¹ The OED, citing Humane Learning, stanza 25, defines 'characteristical' as 'that serves to indicate the essential quality or nature of persons or things', and the word is therefore an apt description of one aspect of the type of poetry Sidney claimed the 'right' poet could create. Now, in
Humane Learning, Greville doubts people's ability to conceive of these 'characteristicall Ideas', and suggests that

in their stead we raise, and mould Tropheas,
Formes of Opinion, Wit, and Vanity,
Which we call Arts; and fall in love with these,
As did Pygmalion with his carved tree.

(st. 25)

One can say no more than that there is possibly an implicit criticism of one of Sidney's tenets here, and even then it has to be remembered that in these earlier stages of the treatise all pretensions to understanding through human learning are demolished. However, it should also be remarked that in stanza 27 Greville complains that we are foolish enough to suppose that Nature can be understood and enhanced by being drawn into a relationship with art and science, when actually Nature 'then forsakes/To be herselfe'. We need to recognize that Nature

in the secrets of her owne wombe makes
The Load-stone, Sea, the Soules of men, and windes.

There is a sense of awe in this that creates a tone quite different from that of Sidney's claims about the poet being able to 'grow ... into another nature, in making things either better than Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never were in Nature'. 32 One stanza later Greville makes by implication a damaging comment about poetry:

Then what is our high-prais'd Philosophie,
But bookes of Poesie, in Prose compil'd?
Farre more delightfull than they fruitfull be,
Witty apparance, Guile that is beguil'd,
Corrupting minds much rather than directing
The allay of Duty, and our Prides erecting.

(st. 29)33

We can thus perceive a pattern of related ideas in this section of *Humane Learning* that seem to confirm Greville's misgivings about those who confidently assume they have some measure of ability to understand and even go beyond the works of Nature.

If stanza 114 is problematic, 111 is doubly so.

Poesie and Musicke, Arts of Recreation,
Succeed, esteem'd as idle mens profession;
Because their scope, being meerely contentation,
Can move, but not remove, or make impression
Really, either to enrich the Wit,
Or, which is lesse, to mend our states by it.

Here the problem is one of tone as well as meaning. It is difficult to believe that Greville did not intend a play on the word 'Recreation' in the first line, meaning either something that entertains and so refreshes, or something that creates anew in the sense that Sidney and many others who wrote on the role of the artist believed that he could recreate and repair fallen mankind through the ordering processes of art. This is the notion that Greville is referring to at the end of stanza 114, and it is possibly hinted at in the last line of 111. The idea of re-creation gains credence because of the linking of poetry and music, for the harmony and order of music was supposed to reflect the greater harmonies and order of God's creation, as witnessed in the music of the spheres: thus E.K. refers to 'the secrete working of Musick ... in the myndes of men', and says that 'the mynd [is]
made of a certaine harmonie and musicall nombers'. But if 'Recreation' is ambiguous, an ironic tone is generated in the first two lines which invites us to see ambiguity in 'succeed' and 'esteem'd' too. This is not confirmed, however, and the net result is that we cannot tell whether the view(s) of poetry being expressed is/are Greville's or not. In fact, a coherent meaning cannot be abstracted from the stanza at all. Given that Greville is usually being derogatory when he uses the word 'wit', and that 'mend our states' in this poem especially has connotations of repairing the damage done by the fall, it is hard not to see the last two lines of the stanza as ironic: can Greville really be suggesting that the enriching of the wit is a higher task than mending our fallen state? But it is impossible to be sure about any of this, for we are not provided with the necessary signals which would enable us to see whether the words and lines are deliberately ambiguous and ironic or not, and, if they are not, where Greville's actual views are located.

Again, in stanza 112, while the last two lines definitely seem to express Greville's convictions stated elsewhere, it is not certain that the previous four do.

This makes the solid Judgements give them place,
Onely as pleasing sauce to dainty food;
Fine foyles for jewels, or enamrels grace,
Cast upon things which in themselves are good;
Since, if the matter be in Nature vile,
How can it be made pretious by a stile?

There is the possibility of irony in line 1, depending on how stanza 111 was construed. The following three lines seem to reverse the view expressed by Greville in stanzas 109-10.

When Greville's poetic is examined at close quarters in
Humane Learning, then, it proves to be fraught with inconsistency and obscurity, and it is difficult not to conclude that he failed to define satisfactorily in detail what function poetry should have and what it could achieve. The same impression is given by comments made elsewhere in his work. At times, his poetic bears the marks of something semi-developed; it seems an uneasy weaving of the familiar and the novel, as if Greville is struggling to formulate his own discrete views but has not yet discovered the concepts and terminology he needs. Maclean has argued that for Greville 'the quality or character of the imitative process [appears to bear] a direct relation to the passage of time through declining history', for in A Treatise of Monarchy he refers to a time when poets were 'in Ideas farr more free,/Then any other arts of mortall brest' (st. 476), and compares this to his own age, 'when tymes iron days' have seen to it that 'The art of writing should no longer last' (st. 488). If this was a settled view, one can see why Greville tried to evolve a poetic based on his religious convictions, which accounted for the sorry state of the world, and why he attempted to replace Sidney's formulations with his own.

* * * * *

Greville's other main discussion of literature takes place in The Life of Sidney. Here too there are problematic passages, attributable, as I suggested earlier, to a certain amount of ambivalence in Greville's attitude to Sidney himself.

That Greville revered Sidney is well known. 'For my own part,' he writes, 'I observed, honoured, and loved him so much'; in him 'the
life itself of true worth, did (by way of example) far exceed the pictures of it in any moral Precepts.' Hence, in the account of Sidney's life, Greville will aim to show the nation 'a Sea-mark, rais'd upon their native coast', so that they will be able 'by a right Meridian line ... to sayl through the straits of true vertue, into a calm and spacious Ocean of humane honour' (Life, pp. 2-3). Greville's high estimation of his friend is plain, as is the emphasis he places on Sidney as a moral exemplar. This is something that is always at the heart of the picture Greville draws, and it is particularly important when one is considering the way in which Greville presents Sidney as a poet, for the moral purpose of Sidney's creative writing is continually linked by Greville to the moral example of Sidney's life, and indeed the writing is validated by the life. Mark Caldwell has rightly argued that in this text 'History, political analysis ..., personal memoir, biography ... are all tailored to serve a consistent end: to connect the disembodied being of the poetry with the flux of practical affairs', for Greville distrusted purely literary expression, and did not believe that poetry could or should stand alone.

In comparison with Sidney, Greville pictures himself as the lesser man and poet:

(if my creation had been equal) it would have proved as easie for me, to have followed his patern, in the practice of reall vertue, as to engage my self into this Characteristicall kind of Poesie: in defence whereof he hath written so much, as I shall not need to say any thing.

(Life, p. 2)

There is some ambiguity here, though: Sidney is certainly being
elevated, but it is noticeable that Greville detaches himself both from Sidney's mode of writing and from his defence of it. In spite of Greville's hero-worshipping Sidney, and the spotlight naturally played upon him in the *Life*, there is continually a sense of Greville's independent personality and tone of voice, inviting us to look at matters from a certain angle, to assess things according to particular standards. This is most obviously the case in the continual harping on the moral aim and effect of Sidney's literary work, and the Stoical cast of Greville's evaluation. So we are assured that Sidney's purpose

> was to limn out such exact pictures, of every posture in the minde, that any man being forced, in the straines of this life, to pass through any straights, or latitudes of good, or ill fortune, might (as in a glasse) see how to set a good countenance upon all the discountenances of adversitie, and a stay upon the exorbitant smilings of chance.

(*Life*, p. 16)

To be sure, Sidney believed that poetry could 'lead and draw us to as high a perfection as our degenerate souls, made worse by their clayey lodgings can be capable of', but such statements in the *Apology* have a confident ring in keeping with the work as a whole, while Greville's comparable pronouncements are sober in tone; moreover, in the *Apology*, the emphasis on the poet's moral purpose is integrated into a web of concerns, whereas in the discussions of literary matters in Greville's *Life* the stress on moral intentions and effects colours everything.

What produces this colouring is, clearly enough, Greville's preoccupation with the doctrines of the reformed Church, which
encouraged his rather bleak view of existence and the concomitant need to be stoical when facing the world. These are traits we can see, for instance, in his best known statement about his position and intentions as a writer:

For my own part, I found my creeping Genius more fixed upon the Images of Life, than the Images of Wit, and therefore chose not to write to them on whose foot the blacke Oxe had not already trod, as the Proverbe is, but to those only, that are weather-beaten in the Sea of this World, such as having lost the sight of their Gardens, and groves, study to saile on a right course among Rocks, and quick-sands.

(Life, p. 224)

Greville resolutely locates himself and his work in the actual world; a place where one is exposed and threatened (the metaphors, though conventional, convey this well). He dissociates himself from 'Images of Wit', for, as he says on the previous page, 'witty Fictions' may provide 'exercise, and entertainment' for 'the affections, or imagination', but do not enrich the memory and judgement at all (Life, p. 223).

Although the passage begins with a self-deprecating reference to 'my creeping Genius' (in contrast to an immediately preceding remark about Sidney's pre-eminence), it quickly grows in assurance, which we can see registered in its purposeful syntactic strength and directness.

The reference to gardens and groves is interesting in its multiple suggestiveness: there is the resonance of that common seventeenth-century sense of the lost garden, of Eden, but the context here does not allow sentimental feelings of nostalgia to develop, for the dominant impression by the end of the passage is of fortitude and
resolution in the face of difficulty, and this makes the gardens and
groves seem, by contrast, almost too safe - a pastoral retreat which
is no place for those with actual experience of the world. What is
also intriguing about this is that the preceding paragraph was an uneasy
and notoriously cryptic discussion of Sidney's pastoral, Arcadia. It
is a paragraph that is restless and full of contradictory signals to
the reader. Greville hovers between admiration of the genius evinced
in that work, and his sense that its moral intentions and effects need
to be played up if it is to be wholly acceptable. Greville is concerned
that we should not be misled by superficial impressions of Arcadia,
and tries to ensure that we recognize its didactic qualities; yet
much of what he writes suggests that he perceived it was a book with
many features alien to his own notions of what function literature
should have. It is a key passage in the study of Greville's relation
to Sidney, and must be quoted in full. A few more preliminary remarks
are necessary, though.

In a recent article, June Dwyer has made some important obser­
vations about Greville's aesthetic that question certain commonly held
notions. In particular, Dwyer suggests that readers have been too
quick to believe that in the Life Greville makes a simple contrast
between his work and Sidney's, and to assume 'that Greville meant for
Sidney's poetry to exemplify "images of wit" while his own is an example
of the more humble "images of life". Dwyer shows that the term
'wit' is invariably used by Greville with pejorative connotations: it
is the enemy of reason and is associated in his mind with the sin of
pride. In Caelica LXIII Greville says that 'The greatest pride of
humane kind is Wit'. Sidney did use "images of wit", but his genius
meant he was able to moralize them and make them serve a higher purpose than merely providing transient pleasure: that is, he transformed them to 'images of life'. In her discussion of what Greville meant by 'images of life', Dwyer concludes that they embody 'old truths' as opposed to novel ways of looking at the world and our activities in it, that they project simple and obvious truths, felt to be true when measured against the experience of everyday living; they are almost like proverbial wisdom. Dwyer does not quote a telling passage that would endorse this definition: Greville says at the end of the *Life* that his own tragedies are to be rightly understood by the reader's looking on

> that Stage wherein himself is an Actor, even the state he lives in, and for every part he may perchance find a Player, and for every Line (it may be) an instance of life.

(*Life*, pp. 224-25)

Greville turns constantly from literature to life to confirm the relevance of the former. On occasions he measures all arts against life, and find them empty:

> Life is the Wisdome, Art is but the letter, Or shell, which oft men for the kernell take.

(*Humane Learning*, st. 35)

Dwyer's paper is helpful in many ways, but she tends to make Greville's relation to Sidney too comfortable, as if Greville really believed his style and the assumptions that underlay it were the same as his friend's. In fact, most students of Greville feel, and
rightly in my view, that the relation is a troubled one. The continual insistence on Sidney's moral purpose, the playing down of his 'witty Fictions', the emphases on the relevance to life of Sidney's work, and the assertions that the work could have been better if revised, and in any case was bound to be inferior to the man — all these factors in Greville's presentation of Sidney's writings suggest a fear on Greville's part that the character and purpose of them could be misconstrued by an unguided reader.

An analysis of the passage on which Dwyer bases her arguments will bring out the problematic nature of Greville's attitude.

... the Arguments of these Tragedies ... [are] nearer Level'd to those humours, counsels, and practices, wherein I thought fitter to hold the attention of the Reader, than in the strangeness, or perplexedness of witty Fictions; in which the affections, or imagination, may perchance find exercise, and entertainment, but the memory and judgement no enriching at all; Besides, I conceived these delicate Images to be over-abundantly furnished in all Languages already.

And though my Noble Friend had that dexterity, even with the dashes of his pen to make the Arcadian Antiques beautifie the Margents of his works; yet the honour which (I beare him record) he never affected, I leave unto him, with this addition, that his end in them was not vanishing pleasure alone, but morall Images, and Examples, (as directing threds) to guide every man through the confused Labyrinth of his own desires, and life: So that howsoever I liked them too well (even in that unperfected shape they were) to condescend that such delicate (though inferior) Pictures of himselfe, should be suppressed; yet I do wish that work may
be the last in this kind, presuming no man that
followes can ever reach, much lesse go beyond that
excellent intended patterne of his.

(Life, pp. 222-24)

Although the passage is not easy to follow in places, careful reading
does reveal a steady progression of thought, which it is important to
pursue step by step if one is to understand what Greville is saying
and what his attitude is. He has rejected 'the strangeness, or
perplexedness of witty Fictions' from his own work because, while they
exercise and entertain the affections or imagination, they do not
enrich the memory or judgement (Greville's priorities here are worth
noting). Moreover, there are too many 'witty fictions' already. The
transition from these statements to a discussion of Sidney's Arcadia
is no accident. Sidney had the ability to employ 'witty Fictions'
to 'beautifie' the appearance of his text ('Margents' suggesting
something peripheral), but the core of what he wrote was moral in
intention: the 'images of wit' were meant to give pleasure, but not
only pleasure: Sidney was able to make them enhance his central didactic
purpose and effect. There is a distinct echo here of that passage
in the Apology where Sidney speaks of how the poet 'doth not only show
the way, but giveth so sweet a prospect into the way, as will entice
any man to enter into it.'

Greville is not easy about this
characteristic of his friend's writing—he has after all just rejected
'witty Fictions', and the question of suppressing Sidney's book seems
to have crossed his mind; hence he puts particular emphasis on the
moral aspect of Sidney's work and insists on honouring his friend
in spite of his 'dexterity' with 'the Arcadian Antiques'. Hence too
his subsequent plea that the *Arcadia* should be 'the last in this kind', for what Sidney's genius enabled him to get away with, the talents of other people will not allow.

The implication is then that Sidney was able to fuse 'images of life' and 'images of wit' without being taken over by the latter in the way other writers have been and would be. Greville himself, recognizing his 'creeping Genius', prudently opts for 'images of life'.

This is the abstracted meaning of the passage, but equally important to consider is the way in which Greville expresses himself, especially in the second paragraph, because stylistically the lines betray his unease as he evaluates Sidney's work. What we have seen so far is Greville wanting to praise Sidney but harbouring misgivings about his mode of composition, expressing his own fondness for the *Arcadia* but concerned to make sure that we, the readers, see the work in its true colours and are not misled by surface appearances, not wanting to follow Sidney in this manner of writing himself, and hoping that others will not want to either. It is an ambivalent series of statements, and the syntax and semantics of the passage reflect that ambivalence. The single sentence of the second paragraph ('And though my Noble Friend ...'), beginning as periodic, becomes rather confusingly loose as we are taken through a rambling sequence of different types of clause. This, in the context, gives the impression of a writer not sure of his direction and perhaps not confident in his views. It takes the reader some time to identify the main propositions of the sentence, because they are not clearly marked, but are often relegated to subordinate positions grammatically, or introduced by somewhat misleading semantic signals that generate expectations in the reader which are then frustrated rather than satisfied.
There are five propositions: 1) that Sidney had the skill to make his work beautiful; 2) that Greville accords him the honour he himself never affected; 3) that Sidney's intention was to serve a moral purpose, not simply to delight; 4) that his work should not be suppressed; 5) that it should be the last of its kind.

It is the relation of the first and second propositions that is most troubling. The first clause ('And though ... works'), embodying the first proposition, invites us simultaneously to praise and have reservations about Sidney: we respond positively to his dexterity in beautifying his work, but we know from the preceding sentence that Greville looks askance at such skills, and any way the 'though' suggests some subsequent qualification of this first praise. When the qualification comes, however, in the 'yet' clause, it suggests Sidney is to be honoured, which semantically cancels the element of praise in the 'though' clause and allows only the meaning, 'in spite of his seemingly effortless ability to write beautifully, Sidney is to be honoured': it makes little sense to say 'though he wrote well, he is to be honoured'.

Significant too is the fact that it is Sidney's honour and modesty (wholly acceptable to Greville) that are recorded in the main 'yet' clause, while his ability to make his writings beautiful (troubling to Greville) is noted in the subordinate clause. The third proposition - that Sidney had basically moral intentions and effects - is allotted another main clause, as is the fifth, stating that Sidney's work should not be repeated. But the reference to Greville's liking for Sidney's 'delicate pictures', and his intention to publish them is again put into a subordinate (concession) clause, and, moreover, is interrupted twice by qualifications (in parentheses) designed to let us know that
the work could have been better if revised, and is in any case inferior
to Sidney himself.

All in all, the passage is rather difficult to read at first
sight because it lacks that semantic coherence which enables the reader
to anticipate what kind of statements are coming next, and thus to
read fluently.

In contrast, the single sentence of the 'black Oxe' passage,
although equally replete with different types of clause, and unfolding
in an elaborate manner, is semantically clear and coherent, as well as
being grammatically cohesive and balanced; the expectations created
in the reader by semantic signals being satisfyingly confirmed.

Greville, then, though assured when discussing his own work, is
ill at ease when dealing with Sidney's. He is always making excuses
about it, and assuring us that the Arcadia is

both in form, and matter, as much inferior to that
unbounded spirit of his, as the industry and Images
of other mens works, are many times raised above
the writers capacities.

(Life, p. 17)

Sidney did not particularly want 'to leave his memory in books':

both his wit, and understanding bent upon his heart,
to make himself and others, not in words or opinion,
but in life, and action, good and great.

(Life, pp. 17-18)

In Greville's eyes, literature must not be given too significant a role,
and it is perhaps partly because of this that he tells us Sidney 'scribled' his compositions 'as pamphlets for the entertainment of time and friends' (Life, p. 17), and that he himself, copying Sidney, learned 'to steale minutes of time from [his] daily services, and employ them in ... writing' (Life, p. 150). We are not to suppose that writing involved the kind of rigorous application someone like Jonson prescribed. No doubt there is an element of *sprezzatura* in Greville's attitude here, but the denial of too much significance to literature *per se* has also to be attributed both to Greville's religious sense of its strictly relative worth, and, where appropriate, to his desire to guard Sidney from accusations that he had invested seriously in producing only 'witty Fictions', a charge the appropriateness of which seems to flicker across Greville's mind quite often. It is the religious element that is the most significant factor, however: it leads also to such comments as, 'the truth is: [Sidney's] end was not writing, even while he wrote' (Life, p. 18), which contains no hint of *sprezzatura*, but suggests a belief on Sidney's part that literary composition as an end in itself is empty and fruitless. This, we are told, is something Sidney recognized particularly at the end of his life, which is why he wanted the *Arcadia* burned:

> when his body declined, and his piercing inward powers were lifted up to a purer Horizon, he then discovered, not onely the imperfection, but the vanitie of these shadowes, how daintily soever limned: as seeing that even beauty it self, in all earthly complexions, was more apt to allure men to evill, than to fashion any goodness in them.  

*Life, p. 16*
I am not suggesting that Greville is misrepresenting Sidney's views and beliefs; I am trying to show that Greville's emphasis falls consistently on points that bring out the moral aspects of literature, and remind us of its relative unimportance.

The material examined so far makes it abundantly clear that Greville did not rate literary endeavour highly, because he measured it against the bid to understand man's spiritual condition and to live in accordance with God's holy laws as interpreted by the Reformers. It is important therefore to adjust the focus slightly by making two obvious points: first, that Greville did give serious and sustained consideration to poetry and poetics, and, secondly, that he continued to work on his own verse with great care, even when he was expressing reservations about the worth and state of literature. As a member of the group of writers around Sidney, the young Greville could hardly have avoided thinking seriously about poetry while he was working on his first poems, and indeed his careful craftsmanship, his experiments with form and metre, and his developing dissatisfaction with the ideology within which the earlier Caelica poems were produced, all indicate that he reflected deeply on what he was doing, and in a determinedly individual manner - remarkably so when one thinks of the influence Sidney had on him in so many ways. That he continued to ponder his art has been evident in the preceding pages, and that he found his own distinctive voice as a poet is obvious from the most cursory of glances at the later poems of Caelica or at the treatises and plays.

In spite of all the qualifications he set up around literary
composition, then, Greville continued to give time to it. Partly this was because he believed it could have some force as a moral influence and as a medium for the dissemination of religious truth, and partly it was because he found it an appropriate vehicle for his own ideas and thoughts, and for his own methods of analysing the human condition. But we may also discern a fondness for and interest in writing for its own sake. For example, discussing his 'Changling', the Treatise of Monarchy, he can talk of looking back on his works 'with a fathers eye', and refers to himself elsewhere as 'a fond mother'. Continuing the image, he writes:

then did I (like an old, and fond Parent, unlike to get any more children) take pains rather to cover the dandled deformities of these creatures with a coat of many seames, then carelessly to drive them away, as birds doe their young ones.

The image is a suggestive one in all its divagations. On the next page, extending it further, Greville offers us the reason why he should be so concerned with his written works, thus also acknowledging that he does actually care for their existence and condition:

But the familiar self-love, which is more or lesse born in every man, to live, and dye with him, presently moved me to take this Bear-whelp up againe and lике it.

(Life, pp. 151-53)

Self-love, it will be recalled, is one of the fundamental errors the Protestant reformers insisted should be overcome, and one of Greville's own main targets, yet he is indulgent about it here, apparently resigned
to its inevitability and not loath to admit its presence in his attitude to his written work.

In spite of his claim that he was not interested in 'being an exact Artisan in [the] Poetical Mystery' (Life, p. 151), Greville did not merely string together in his treatises a series of doctrines and opinions in doggerel verse; he was concerned with the technical problems of expression and the ways in which poetry could embody ideas effectively. A Treatise of Humane Learning is occasionally stark in the sense that it is bare of images, and it does fall into prescriptive and dogmatic assertiveness about some subjects, but to suggest, as some critics have done, that Greville sacrificed poetry to prose is unjust. The treatise reveals a blend of poet and moralist; the latter is the guiding force but chooses to express itself for the most part through devices of allusion, metaphor, and simile, and to give much attention to effects of rhythm and sound. We may look briefly at one example:

No marvell then, if proud desires reflexion,
By gazing on this Sunne, doe make us blinde,
Nor if our Lust, Our Centaure-like Affection,
Instead of Nature, fadome clouds, and winde,
So adding to original defection,
As no man knowes his owne unknowing minde:
And our AEgyptian darkness growes so grosse,
As we may easily in it, feele our losse.

(st. 4)

Greville's aim is a didactic one, but built with a medley of images which enforce the point. The Ixion fable, which he used on other occasions, suggests well how man deludes himself. Its immediate impact of light airiness and insubstantiality stands in marked contrast
to the heavy darkness spoken of later in the stanza, but the underlying idea of self-deception is something each has in common. The key line is the sixth: 'As no man knowes his owne unknowing minde'. These words, as those about the sun, probably derive from Calvin's Institutes, I, xiii, 21. The passage thus has theological reverberations, both in these allusions and in the comments about pride and 'original defection', and also in the references to the darkness spread by God throughout Egypt. This last image gives the idea of spiritual blindness an almost palpable immediacy.

Other stanzas or groups of stanzas are, admittedly, stark by contrast, almost entirely given over to a polemic that might just as well have been written in prose. Stanzas 20-24 are good examples of this, while stanza 25, which returns to classical imagery, comes across strongly in consequence. But bare, prose-like writing does not predominate in the treatise taken as a whole.

On the other hand, Greville's didactic intentions did carry him away from a use of language such as can be seen attempted in (say) Caelica XXXVIII ('Caelica, I overnight was finely used'), where the inherent power of metaphor is permitted to shape and guide the progression of the poet's thoughts. In A Treatie of Humane Learning Greville does not think through images, rather he has certain firm ideas to convey, and he chooses to enhance them, or impress them upon the reader's mind, by adding imagery to them. This, in effect, is a reversion to the idea that poetry is a handmaid to more serious disciplines, and is employed only for its power to illuminate and fix ideas that are valuable in themselves. It is also more in line with the purpose and method of the orator than with the poet as presented
by Sidney, and this is appropriate, for Greville wants above all to teach and persuade; he has no real interest in giving delight.

Towards the end of the second chapter I drew a distinction between the orator and the poet in terms of the differences between the civic and aesthetic strands of the humanist movement, and, in the light of this, argued that Musophilus has an ambiguous effect on the reader. Daniel is chiefly interested in the fashioning and preservation of the learned and virtuous poet and in the transcendent power of eloquence, and makes claims for the civic responsibilities of the poet in an equivocal way. Greville, in contrast, preoccupied with the essential corruption of mankind, is deeply suspicious of poetry and of unbridled eloquence, and is hostile to the elevation of the individual over the concerns of society. Hence, he does not touch on many of the issues that were so important to Daniel, or to Sidney, Spenser, and Chapman: he does not deal with the threat from misomousoi, or share in the attempt to arm the learned poet against this by claiming special knowledge and virtue, and by placing him among a small band of like-minded and supportive companions. Rather, he allows poetry a role only as a serving science, which, like other kinds of learning, is for use and for the communal good. In making such emphases, he is committing himself to values that, broadly speaking, were characteristic of civic as opposed to aesthetic humanism. This is wholly in accord with his religious convictions, for, as we have seen, he was strongly influenced by Pauline doctrines regarding the edification of the self and others as part of the process of personal renewal and the building of the godly community. This is the work to which the Christian poet must give himself.
However, it is manifest that Greville did not hold this position as clearly as my summary so far suggests, for the legacy of the alternative ideology - of aesthetic humanism - embodied particularly in Sidney, is apparent in Greville's work, preventing him from arriving at a coherent formulation of the poet's character and task that is wholly consistent with the central line of his intellectual commitments and belief. This coexistence of different interests and inclinations is one of things that makes Greville's work so compelling and gives it such an important position historically as a focal point of ideological change.
Notes
Full title, place, and date of publication of all books, dissertations, and articles will be given only in the first citation in each chapter; thereafter an abbreviated form will be used. Place of publication is assumed to be London, unless otherwise stated. The following abbreviations have been used for titles of journals in both the notes and the bibliography:

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<th>Abbreviation</th>
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<td>HJ</td>
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<td>HLQ</td>
<td>Huntington Library Quarterly</td>
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<td>JEH</td>
<td>The Journal of Ecclesiastical History</td>
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<td>JHI</td>
<td>Journal of the History of Ideas</td>
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<td>TSLL</td>
<td>Texas Studies in Literature and Language</td>
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Introduction


4 See O'Day, Education and Society, Introduction et passim.

5 In the body of the thesis I have often used the word 'Puritan' to describe the more radical English Protestants. Historians cannot agree on what precisely a Puritan was - indeed, there is a great deal of scholarly argument about the term, and I have in consequence had certain misgivings about using it. However, I intend it to signify those members of the English Church who, motivated by spiritual fervour, tried to live godly lives, as St Paul especially had taught them to; people who believed in the complete sufficiency of Scripture, and who knew that faith and grace were the only true ways to God; people who also put particular emphasis on the importance of the preaching ministry and were intensely hostile to Catholics; in all this is a varying degree of discontent with the extent of the Reformation in England, and a correlative desire for further reforms. This is not intended to be a definition, but is an identification of characteristics; hence it covers a broad range of opinions within the more radical wings of the Protestant faith. It does not, however, include the Separatists, men such as Barrow and Browne.


8 In sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century writings one invariably meets with references to 'humane learning': it should be remembered that 'humane' was the original spelling of 'human', and that the two words as we now understand them were not differentiated until the early eighteenth century. Thus 'humane' does not necessarily refer to 'those branches of literature which tend to humanize
or refine, as the ancient classics, rhetoric, and poetry' (OED, s.v. 'human' and 'humane').


10 Pierre Charron, Of Wisdome Three Bookes, trans. Samson Lennard (1612), edition of 1630, sigs Kk2V-Kk3; see also S.I., Bromleion, 1595, sig. B4V.

11 See also 1 Corinthians 4:10, and Romans 1:22.


13 Sir Walter Ralegh, The History of the World, 1614, sig. Vv4; see also Charron, Of Wisdome, sig. Kk2V; also Nicholas Ling, Politeuphuta, Wits Common-Wealth (1597), edition of 1661, sig. C6, where knowledge is defined as 'that understanding which we have both of our Creator, and of his works and will, and of our own selves; it is the store-house of all wisdome, and the beginning of our salvation.'

14 See, for example, Bibliotheca Eliotae: Eliotes Dictionarie, by Thomas Cooper the third tyme corrected, and with a great number of phrases enriched, 1559; Thomas Thomas, Dictionarium, 1587; John Florio, A Worlde of Wordes, 1598, and Queen Anna's New World of Words, 1611; for the Stoic definition of wisdom, on which many of the Renaissance definitions were founded, see Cicero, Tusculan Disputations, IV, xxvi: 'rerum humanarum divinarunque scientia'. For definitions of 'sapientia' and 'scientia' that do bring out the difference, see Charron, Of Wisdome, sig. Kk3.


17 Ibid., p. 2.

Chapter One: The Debate on Learning

1 Richard Mulcaster, Positions, 1581, sig. Siii.

2 John Lyly, Euphues, The Anatomy of Wit (1578), ed. M.W. Croll and H. Clemons, 1916, p. 124; see also John Florio, His firste Fruites, 1578, sig. Qi\textsuperscript{i}; and for a contrasting view that learning brings no release from the vagaries of fortune, see Sir Richard Barckley, A Discourse Of The Felicitie Of Man, 1598, 'To the Reader'.

3 Proverbs 18: 15.


5 A President for Parentes, a translation with augmentations by Ed. Grant, 1571, of Plutarch's De educatione puerorum, sig. Dv; and passim for absolute faith in learning. Plutarch's treatise had previously been translated by Elyot, c. 1533, and it was drawn on by William Kempe and John Lyly in their writings about education. The first essay in Holland's translation of the Moralia is a version of the treatise too. For Seneca's view, see Epistles XVI, XVII, LIII, LXXXVIII. For the Stoic view as transmitted to the sixteenth century, see Guillaume Du Vair, The Moral Philosophie of the Stoicks, trans. Thomas James, 1598, sig. C8\textsuperscript{v}.


7 It has been estimated that, on average, 300,000 books were printed on the London presses each year, between 1576 and 1640: see O'Day, Education and Society, p. 17; H.S. Bennett, English Books and
Readers 1588-1803, Cambridge, 1965, p. 104, notes that a 'careful (but probably far from complete) search shows that over one thousand items were translated in Elizabeth's reign'.


10 The Institution of the Christian Religion, trans. Thomas Norton, edition of 1582 ('According to the Authors Last Edition'), sig. M7 (II, ii, 17). This edition will be used throughout and referred to as 'Institutes'.

11 Ibid., sig. M6 (II, ii, 14).


13 Robert Hoopes, Right Reason in the English Renaissance, Cambridge, Mass., 1962, p. 4; also on reason, see Baker, Wars of Truth, and Haydn, Counter-Renaissance.

14 Wars of Truth, pp. 4-5.

15 Hoopes, Right Reason, p. 95.


17 Barnabe Rich, Faules, Faults, And nothing else but Faultes, 1606, sig. Li; see also Erasmus concerning Education, p. 181; Primaudaye,
French Académie, sigs Nn2 - Nn2v; Brinsley, Consolation, sigs B1, B2, D1; Thomas Morrice, An Apology for Schoole-Masters, 1619, sig. D1v.


19 Education of Children, p. 212.

20 Consolation, dedicatory epistle.


22 William Vaughan, The Golden-grove (1600), second edition, enlarged, 1608, sig. N6v (the importance Vaughan attaches to the role of learning in the state is indicated by the way he sets its possible extirpation in the midst of images of cosmic disorder: sig. N6); see also Thomas Gibson, A Fruitful Sermon preached at Oocham in the County of Rutland, the Second of November, 1583, 1584, sigs E3v–E4.

23 Vaughan, Golden-grove, sig. X5v.

24 Quotation from the school statutes, in Simon, Education and Society in Tudor England, p. 80; the same emphasis was still being made in the Jacobean period: see the Deed of Foundation of Paston Grammar School, in C.R. Forder, A History of the Paston Grammar School, North Walsham, 1934, pp. 198-99; see also the statutes for the refoundation of Canterbury Cathedral and Grammar School in 1541, in A.F. Leach, Educational Charters and Documents, 598-1909, Cambridge, 1911, p. 457.


26 Juan Luis Vives, Preface to De Disciplinis, in Vives: On Education, a translation of De Tradendis Disciplinis (1531), by Foster Watson, Cambridge, 1913, p. 6; and see Watson's Introduction, p. clvi: for Vives 'Education implicitly ... concerns itself with the whole outlook of the soul on its way back to God'.


28 Faultes, sigs L1 – L1v.

29 The mischiefs of ignorance, in Five Godly, and Profitable Sermons, 1628, sig. A2v (preached earlier); see also Primaudaye, French Académie, sig. F3v; the immoderate desire for learning and some of its effects are interestingly discussed in: Scipio du Plesis,

30 The Second part of the Booke of Christian exercise (1590), edition of 1592, sigs D2v- D3 and C9 - C9v.

31 A Treatise ... of Unbeliefe, 1625, sig. Gg7v.

32 Ibid., sig. Gg5.

33 Ibid., sig. G8.

34 Ibid., sig. Gg2v; see also Gg5.

35 Ibid., sig. H1; and Parsons, Second part of Christian exercise, sigs C9 - C9v; see also John Serranus, A Godlie and Learned Commentarie upon ... Ecclesiastes, trans. John Stockwood, 1585, sigs Di - Diiv.


37 Plutarch, President for Parentes, sigs Bi - Bii; Primaudaye, French Academie, sig. F3v; Dee, Preface to Henry Billingsley's translation of Euclid: The Elements of Geometrie of the most auncient Philosopher Euclide, 1570, sig. *iiiv; Recorde, The Castle of Knowledge (1556), edition of 1596, sig. Cl; see also Joseph Hall, Works, sig. Gg3 (Epistles).

38 Works, III, 317 (Advancement, Bk I).


42 Theodore Beza, Ecclesiastes ... With a Paraphrase or short exposition, Cambridge, ? 1593, sig. A6v.

43 S.I., Bromleion, 1595, sig. B4v.

44 See Works, III, 266-67 and IV, 19-20.

45 Ibid., III, 294; see also IV, 21.

46 See ibid., III, 220 (Of the Interpretation of Nature); cf.


48 Ibid., I, 5 and 34. For a depiction of Cecil as an ideal man of learning and experience in the humanist mould, see I, 20 and 50-52.


54 Timber, or Discoveries, in Ben Jonson (The Complete Works), ed. C.H. Herford and P. and E. Simpson, 11 vols, corrected edition, Oxford, 1965-70, VIII, 589: the image of the bow was a popular one: it was used in the same context by Lyly in Euphues, ed. Croll and Clemons, p. 132, by Richard Brathwait in The English Gentleman, 1630, sigs Z3 - 23v, and by Martyn, Youth's Instruction, sigs E4 - F1; see also Brathwait, Schollers Medley, sig. G4.

55 Haly Heron, The Kayes of Counsaile: A Newe Discourse of Morall Philosophie (1579), ed. Virgil B. Heltzel, Liverpool, 1954, p. 79. I have used the word 'gargantuan' deliberately, bearing in mind the incredible educative routine Ponocrates imposes upon Gargantua in Rabelais' comic masterpiece (Bk I, ch. XXIII).

56 Positions, sig. Ggi: he recommended 7.00 - 11.50 a.m. and 2.00 - 5.00 p.m. Henry Peacham also complained about long hours for

57 House-holder, sigs G1 - Gl^; see also Erasmus, The Praise of Folly (1509), in The Essential Erasmus, selected and trans. by John P. Dolan, New York, 1964, p. 140, caricaturing the scholar as a secluded man buying praise 'of only a handful' and this 'at the great expense of long hours, no sleep, so much sweat, and so many vexations'.


59 Ortensio Landi, The Defence of Contraries, trans. Anthony Mundy, 1593, sigs El^ and E2; cf. Hall, Works, sig. Gg3 (Epistles) for the opposing view that study is always recreation and that the impossibility of ever being wholly satisfied by what one knows is a cause for delight.

60 Compleat Statesman, in Desiderata Curiosa, I, 4.

61 Cecil to Throgmorton, quoted by Conyers Read, Mr Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth, 1955, p. 212; see also Geoffrey Fenton, A forme of Christian pollicie, 1574, sig. Bbii^ for the same view; also Brathwaite, English Gentleman, sig. Zv; Burton, Anatomy of Melancholy, pp. 259 et seq. (Pt I, Sect. 2, Memb. 3, Subs. xv); Abraham Fraunce, The Lawiers Logike, 1588, 'To the Learned Lawyers of England'.


63 A Very Godly letter ... unto Phillip Sidney his Sonne (first printed 1591, but written between 1564-68), repr. Oxford, 1929, sigs A2 - A2^; see also the programme set out for the young Cranmer: John Strype, Memorials of Thomas Cranmer, 3 vols, Oxford, 1848-54, I, 2.

64 Faultes, sigs L2 - L2^.


66 Anatomy of Melancholy, p. 263 (Pt I, Sect. 2, Memb. 3, Subs. xv);

67 Mulcaster makes a plea on behalf of grammar school masters, that, as they have so much responsibility, they should be well looked after: 'such nurses to studie, must needs be maintained with great allowance, to make their heaven there, where ye meane to use them': *Positions* sigs ii iii - ii iv; Mulcaster himself had financial difficulties: see O'Day, *Education and Society*, p. 171; see also Greaves, *Society and Religion*, p. 348.


71 *Apology for Schoole-Masters*, sigs C8 - C8; see also Landi, *Defence of Contraries*, sigs E3 - E4.


73 See O'Day, *Education and Society*, ch. IX.


75 Ibid., pp. 117-18; on Percy's hostility to 'empirics' and his sense that the practical application of learning is something for artificers not scholars, see pp. 118-19.


79 *Microcosmographie* (1628), repr. Temple Classics, 1899, pp. 32-4;
see also Morrice, Apology for Schoole-Masters, sig. D1; and Luis Le Roy, Of the Interchangeable Course, or Variety of things, trans. Robert Ashley, 1594, sig. Y5v.


Ibid., sigs D2v - D3.

Christian pollicie, Bk V, ch. XIII.

A Briefe and plaine declaration, 1584 (but written in 1572), sigs B4V- C1; the New Testament texts cited are Acts 11 : 26, 1 Corinthians 12 : 28, Romans 12 : 7-8, Ephesians 4 : 11.

For examples of the Puritan emphasis on the importance of scholars, see Josias Nichols, An Order of Houshold Instruction, 1596, 'To the Reader'; Robert Cleaver, A Godlie Forme Of Householde Government (1598), edition of 1612, newly perused, amended, and augmented by John Dod and Cleaver, sig. X5V; William Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties (1622), in Workes, 1627, sigs Ee2v- Ee3.

A Godly Treatise containing and deciding certaine questions .... Whereunto one Proposition more is added, 1588, sigs BiiiV and Ci; see also Lawrence Humfrey, The Nobles, 1563, sigs piv - pv.

A parte of a register, Edinburgh or Middleburg, 1593, sig. Ff3v.


A Godly Sermon preached at Paules Crosse the 31. day of October 1591, 1592, sigs C3v- C4. For details of the maintenance of preachers at Paul's Cross, see Millar Maclure, The Paul's Cross Sermons 1534-1642, Toronto, 1958, pp. 11-12.

A Fruitfull and Godly Sermon, preached at Paules Crosse, 1592, sigs C3v- C4. For an example of patronage extended in order to aid the propagation of true Christian doctrine, see John Dove's dedicatory epistle to Egerton before A Sermon preached at Paules Crosse, the sixt of February 1596, 1597; there is a similar testimony to Egerton in Vaughan's Golden-grove, sig N5. On
actual support given, see Greaves, Society and Religion, pp. 362-69.

93 Londons New-Yeeres Gift .... A godly Sermon Preached at Pauls Crosse, the first of Januarie. 1608, 1609, sigs C3V- C4.


95 A Sermon preached at Paules Crosse the 4. of December. 1597, 1597, sigs D3 - ElV; see also F2V; also Thomas Morton, A Treatise of the Nature of God, 1599, sig. B2.

96 Sermon 1597, sig. D3V.


98 See, for example, Curtis, Oxford and Cambridge in Transition, pp. 37, 47-8, 282; and Simon, Education and Society in Tudor England, passim. The necessity of supporting scholars and learning was proclaimed in treatises exhorting philanthropy: see Louis B. Wright, Middle-Class Culture in Elisabethan England, Chapel Hill, 1935, p. 242; see also Brinsley, Consolation, sig. D1.


102 Harrison, Description of England, pp. 70-1; Stubbes, Anatomie of Abuses, pp. 19-20; see also Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Queene Elisabethes Achaemey (1570), ed. F.J. Furnivall, EEETS, 1869, p. 10; for a general discussion, see J.H. Hexter, Reappraisals in History, ch. IV; also Simon, Education and Society in Tudor England, pp. 249-50 and 359; also D.A. Cressy, 'Education and Literacy in London and East Anglia, 1580-1700', Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Cambridge, 1972, p. 52.
103 Positions, sig. VII
104 Ibid., sig. VIII.
105 Ibid., sig. VIII
106 Ibid., sig. XI
109 The Letters and the Life of Francis Bacon, including all his Occasional Works, ed. J. Spedding, 7 vols, 1861-74, IV, 252-53.
110 Bacon, 'Of Seditious and Trouble', Works, VI, 410, and 'Of Ambition', ibid., 465; Mulcaster, Positions, sig. RIII; see also Sir Edward Hoby, A Letter to Mr. T.H. Late Minister: Now Fugitive, 1609, sigs D4 - D4
115 Cf. Gervase Markham, Hobson's Horse-load of Letters (1613), quoted by Wright, Middle-Class Culture, pp. 142-43.
116 Scholler and Souldiour, in Works, II, 23.
117 Virgidemiarn, II, ii, 43-6.
118 This was especially the case with some of the poets, as subsequent chapters will demonstrate.
119 Youths Instruction, sigs E4 - F1.
120 Anatomy of Melancholy, pp. 259 et seq. (Pt I, Sect. 2, Memb. 3, Subs. xv).
121 Commentarie upon Ecclesiastes, sig. Dv.
Serranus remarks on the continual recurrence of the words 'wisdom', 'knowledge', 'madness', and 'foolishness' in Ecclesiastes: see ibid., sig. Dvii.

Of the Imitation of Christ (3 books), trans. Thomas Rogers (1580), edition of 1617, sig. C2v; it should be noted that Rogers says he has translated only what he considers to be doctrinally sound, leaving out what is 'corrupt'.

Bernard's words are cited by John Kinge, Lectures Upon Jonas (1594), edition of 1597, sig. Mm2; for Seneca, see The Epistles, in Workes, trans. Thomas Lodge (1614), newly enlarged and corrected, 1620, sigs I3v–I4; see also Hieronymous Zanchius, H. Zanchius His Confession of Christian Religion, Cambridge, 1599, 'The Epistle'.


Thomas Morton, A Treatise of the Three-Fold State of Man, 1629, 'To the Reader'. On superfluous writings distracting people from scripture, see Stephen Egerton, A Lecture preached ... at the Blaake-friers, 1589, 1589, 'To the Christian Reader'; Laurence Chaderton, An Excellent and godly sermon .... Preached at Pauls Cross the xxvi day of October, An. 1578, 1580, 'To the Christian Reader'; Robert Hill's 'Epistle Dedicatorie' before Thomas Newhouse's A Learned And Fruitfull Sermon. Preached in Christ's Church in Norwich, 1612.

Robert Cleaver, A Plaine and Familiar Exposition of the First and Second Chapters of the Proverbs of Salomon, 1614, sig. D1.

R.W., Martine Mar-Sixtus : A second replie against the defensory and Apology of Sixtus the Fift late Pope of Rome, 1591, 'The Epistle Dedicatorie'. R.W.'s polemic continues in this way for half a page. See also Ferne, Blazon of Gentrie, sig. Av; and Burton, 'Democritus Junior to the Reader', Anatomy of Melancholy, pp. 17-19.

Chaderton, 'To the Christian Reader', Excellent and godly sermon.

The Tranquilitie And Peace Of The Minde, in Workes, trans. Lodge, sig. Ii5; Seneca said the same thing to Lucilius, ibid., sig. P6v (Epistle II).

'To the Christian Reader', Excellent and godly sermon.

An Advertisement to the English Seminaries, and Jesuites, 1610, dedicatory epistle.

'The Epistle' before William Pemble's A Plea for Grace (1627), edition of 1629.

'Epistle to the Reader', The Whole Armour of God (1616), in Workes.


137 *Interchangeable Course*, sig. Z1\(^\uparrow\). Le Roy, partly contradicting his earlier view, argues that it takes a long time for knowledge to develop; it is a continuous process, contributed to by each age. There is therefore no reason to believe that our age has nothing to add to the bank of learning: sig Z1ff. See also Thomas Cooper, *Certaine Sermons*, 1580, sig. Qi.


139 Seneca, Epistle LXXXVIII, *Workes*, trans. Lodge, sig. I3\(^\uparrow\).

140 Felltham, *Resolves*, sigs G6\(^\uparrow\) and G6.

141 *Donne's Sermons: Selected Passages*, p. 93.


143 See *Humane Learning*, st. 15; also Morton, *Treatise of the Nature of God*, sig. B3: 'it is a plain case, that any one man may move more questions in an hour, then all the learned men in the world can answer and resolve, all the daies of their lives.'

144 See, for example, Robert Mason, *A New Post*, 1620, sigs B6 - B6\(^\uparrow\).


146 *Commentarie upon Ecclesiastes*, sigs Dviii-E1\(^\uparrow\); *Of Wisdome*, sig. Kk3\(^\uparrow\).

147 *Humane Learning*, st. 39; *Musophilus*, 1. 492.

148 *King Lear and the Gods*, San Marino, 1966, pp. 269-70; the quotation from Webster is from III, v, 65-8.


Prometheus and Icarus by compilers of emblem books.


152 *Institutes*, sig. Hl^v (I, xiv, 4).

153 *English Gentleman*, sigs Sl^v - S2.

154 *Immortalitie of the Soule*, sig. Diii^v.


158 *Passions of the Minde*, sigs X5^v and X6.

159 *A Guide to Godlynesse*, 1629, sig. Xx5; and see Ecclesiastics 3: 22-6: 'Seeke not out the things that are too hard for thee, neither search the things rashly which are too mightie for thee. But what God hath commanded thee, thinke upon that with reverence, and be not curious in many of his workes: for it is not needfull for thee to see with thine eyes the things that are secret. Bee not curious in superfluous things: for many things are shewed unto thee aboute the capacitie of men. The meddling with such hath beguiled many, and an evill opinion hath deceived their judgement. Thou canst not see without eyes: profess not the knowledge therefore that thou hast not.' See also Sir Walter Ralegh, *The History of the World*, 1614, sigs B4 and E3; Greville, *Humane Learning*, sts 4 and 146; Primaudaye, *French Academie*, sig. F3^v; Felltham, *Resolves*, sig. C6^v; Vives, *On Education*, pp. 166-67; Philbert of Vienne, *The Philosopher of the Court*, trans. George North, 1575, sig. Cl.

160 *Institutes*, sig. Hl^v (I, xiv, 4).

161 *Ecclesiastes*, sigs C4^v - C5.


VIO - V10V and V8ff.; see also Kocher, *Science and Religion*, pp. 64-5.

164 *The Sermons*, sig. Ffl.

165 *An Exposition Of The ... Creed, Workes*, 3 vols, 1616-18, sig. N3; Perkins cites Augustine as an authority here.


168 *History of the World*, sig. B3V.

169 *A Theological and Philosophical Treatise of the nature and goodnesse of Salt*, 1612, sig. B4V.

170 *Commentarie upon Ecclesiastes*, sig. DiiV.

171 Ibid., sigs DiiV-Diii.


177 French, *John Dee*, p. 69. French notes that Festugière, the editor of the *Corpus Hermeticum*, distinguishes two types of Hermetic treatise; that concerned with the occult sciences, and that which revolves around mystical religion of the type
I have outlined.

178 French, *John Dee*, pp. 87 and 91.
179 Ibid., pp. 93-4 and 91.
180 Ibid., p. 82.
181 Ibid., p. 70.
182 Ibid., p. 89.
185 On the *contemptus mundi* tradition, see Baker, *Wars of Truth*, pp. 43-50.
186 Matthew 11: 25: (Jesus said) 'I give thee thankes, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and men of understanding, and hast opened them unto babes.' The same words are found in Luke 10 : 21.
187 The whole of 1 Corinthians 1 is relevant in its contrasting of the wisdom of God with the foolishness of the world. See also Romans 1 : 22: 'When they professed themselves to be wise, they became fooles'; also 1 Timothy 6: 20-1; 1 Corinthians 4: 10; 1 Corinthians 8: 1; Colossians 2: 8.
190 Gerrish, *Grace and Reason*, pp. 22-3; my summary of Luther's views is based on Gerrish, pp. 13, 14, 16, 18, 30, 71, 170.
191 Quoted by Harbison, *Christian Scholar*, p. 123.
193 'Letter to the Mayors and Aldermen of all the Cities of Germany in Behalf of Christian Schools' (1524) in *Early Protestant Educators*,
ed. Frederick Eby, New York, 1931, pp. 57-8; and see pp. 21-176 passim for Luther's continually stated belief in the importance of learning in the administration of society as well as in the interpretation of scripture.

194 Quoted by Hunter, Lyly, ch. I, n. 35.

195 See Early Protestant Educators, pp. 35-43; and p. 77 for other types of writing to be stocked in a good library; see also Gerrish, Grace and Reason, pp. 32-42.

196 Institutes, sig. M5 (II, ii, 12); at the end of II, ii, 16 Calvin makes the point that natural gifts are not polluted in themselves since they proceed from God, but that they have ceased to be pure to corrupted men and women.


198 See ibid., II, ii, 12-13.

199 See ibid., II, ii, 18 and 20; quotation from sig. M7V.


201 Institutes, sig. M5V (II, ii, 13).

202 Commentary on Corinthians, p. 38.

203 Ibid., p. 33; see also p. 81; and see Institutes, sig. M6V (II, ii, 16) on the importance of using the great store of knowledge provided by pre-Christian writers.

204 Commentary on Corinthians, pp. 38-9.

205 See R.H. Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Descartes, Assen, 1960; also E.A. Strathmann, Sir Walter Ralegh: A Study in Elizabethan Skepticism, New York, 1951, pp. 219ff.; and R.A. Sayce, The Essays of Montaigne: a Critical Exploration, 1972, pp. 170ff. The key texts of sceptical philosophy for the Renaissance were by Cicero, Sextus Empiricus, Nicholas of Cusa, Erasmus, Gianfresco Pico, and Agrippa, and the roots of Renaissance scepticism were in Socrates' profession of ignorance and Paul's remarks on wisdom and folly. Greville was influenced by the sceptical tradition. Because sceptical thought implied a God who had deliberately set people in a world they could not understand, it was rejected by many theologians, including Calvin: see Kocher, Science and Religion, pp. 47-8.

206 Right Reason, pp. 96-7. Some writers preached the virtues of ignorance (see, for example, Felltham, Resolves, sigs G6 - G6V; Landi, Defence of Contraries, sigs d4 - d4V, E2, E4V; Montaigne,
Sebond, Essayes, ed. cit., II, 206-12, and 'Of Experience', ibid., III, 379; Charron, Of Wisdome, sig. Kk3v). But the doctrine of ignorance was more often rejected with great fervour (see, for example, Jonson, Timber, in Works, VIII, 588; Ling, Politeuphuias, sig. C7v; Donne's Sermons: Selected Passages, p. 93; Brinsley, Consolation, sigs B2 - B2v; Morrice, Apology for Schoole-Masters, sig. C4; Mulcaster, Elementarie, pp. 49 and 51-4; Kempe, Education of children, p. 212; Primaudaye, French Academie, sigs C3 - C4, D6v, E1, E2, Pp1v).

207 Sebond, Essayes, ed. cit., II, 153; this involves setting man on a level with and even lower than the animals, which is the reverse of standard arguments in favour of reason. Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus also write of the powers of the animals.

208 Hoopes, Right Reason, pp. 96-7.

209 On the interrelation of scepticism and fideism, see ibid., p. 116.


212 Ibid., I, 365-66 (III, viii, 4).

213 Ibid., I, 366 (III, viii, 5).

214 Ibid., I, 367 (III, viii, 6).

215 Ibid., I, 370 (III, viii, 9).

216 Ibid., I, 370-71 (III, viii, 9).

217 Ibid., I, 371 (III, viii, 10); see also I, 375-76 (III, viii, 13); I, 376-77 (III, viii, 14); I, 378 (III, viii, 15 and 16).

218 Ibid., I, 380 (III, viii, 18); when Hooker says elsewhere that 'the right helps of true art and learning' can assist us to attain 'perfection of knowledge' equal to that of the angels, ibid., I, 217 (I, vi, 1), he is making claims that would have caused deep disquiet in many godly minds.

219 Education in Renaissance England, p. 130; this view is supported by Simon, Education and Society in Tudor England, p. 124, and
Kearney, Scholars and Gentlemen, p. 79.


221 Advice to Queen Elizabeth in Matters of Religion and State (? 1583), in Harleian Miscellany, 10 vols, 1808-13, VII, 60; and see A.C.F. Beales, Education Under Penalty: English Catholic Education from the Reformation to the Fall of James II, 1547-1689, 1963, pp. 59ff. and 91-2.

222 A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse on Barthelmevd day, being the 24. of August. 1578, 1578, sig. GiiiV; see also the radical A parte of a register, sig. V2V, which prints a letter of 1583 demanding that Catholic children should be taught in public schools by Protestant teachers; also The Seconde Parte of a Register, Being a Calendar of Manuscripts under that title intended for publication by the Puritans about 1593, 2 vols, ed. Albert Peel, Cambridge, 1915, I, 192 and II, 14, quoting documents of 1584 and 1586.


224 Exposition of First and Second Proverbes, sig. D4V; see also Samuel Wright, Divers Godly and Learned Sermons, 1612, sigs Dd7V-Dd8; Robert Shelford, Lectures Or Readings upon the 6. verse of the 22. Chapter of the Proverbs, concerning the vertuous education of Youth (1602), edition of 1606, sig. A8V.

225 Exposition of First and Second Proverbes, sigs N1 - NlV; see also George Webbe, Gods Controversie with England (a sermon preached at Paul's Cross, 11 June, 1609), 1609, sigs F4V-F5.

226 The True Gaine, Workes, I, sig. Iii4V; see also A Cloud of Faithfull Witnesses, Workes, III, sigs Bb3V-Bb4; also John Carpenter, dedicatory epistle to The Plaine Mans Spirituall Plough, 1607; Some, A Godly Treatise (1588), sig. Aa1i; Serranus, Commentarie upon Ecclesiastes, sigs HivV-Hv; Thomas Taylor, Davids Learning, Or The Way to True Happinesse (1617), edition of 1618, sigs B2-B2V; Smith, The Sermons, sig. Ee4ff.; Thomas Adams, The Workes, 1630, sigs Bb4-Bb4V.


228 Works, III, 264-65 (Advancement); see also III, 294.

229 Ibid., III, 301; also III, 268.

230 Ibid., III, 267.

231 See Schultz, Milton and Forbidden Knowledge, p. 20; see Genesis 2: 19-20.

233 A Commentarie upon the Fiftene Psalmes, called the Psalmi Graduum, that is Psalmes of Degrees, trans. Henry Bull, 1577, sig. II; cf. Caxton, Mirrour of the World, p. 153: 'Adam knewe all the seven scyences lyberall entyerly, without fayling in a worde, as he that the creatour made and fourmed with his propre handes.'

234 Fiftene Psalmes, sig. IIv and II; see also Pemble, The mischiefe of ignorance, sigs A2 - A2v.


236 Ibid., sig. B6v.

237 Commentary on Corinthians, p. 39.


239 The Wonderfull Woorkmanship of the World, trans. Thomas Twyne, 1578, sgs biiiv - biii. Daneau defines natural philosophy as 'the true knowledge or discourse concerning the Creation and distinction of all this whole worlde with the partes thereof, of the causes by whiche it was so wrought, and likewise of the effectes whiche followe thereon, apperteinyng to the praise of God the Creatour' (sig. bi).

240 Ibid., sgs biiiiv - biv.

241 Ibid., sig. biv; and see Peter Martyr, The Common Places, 'Translated and partlie gathered' by Anthonie Marten, 1583, sig. Hhiiiiv.

242 Wonderfull Woorkmanship, sgs biv and bivv - cii.

243 See, for example, ibid., sgs Diiiv - Diii, cli, cii, Siv.

244 See, for example, ibid., sgs Diiiv - Diii, civ, Siiiiv.


246 The Catechism (1563), ed. Ayre, p. 382.

247 Coverdale, Shorte Recapitulation, p. 510.
Christian Warfare, sig. L15; there is a particularly strong attack in William Burton's *The Rousing of the Staggard, In Seven Sermons*, 1598, sigs 18V–K1; see also Smith, *The Sermons*, sig. Ee8; and William Ames, *Conscience With The Power And Cases Thereof* (1632), trans. from Latin, 1639, sig. H2; and cf. Fenton, *Christian pollicie*, sig. Ddiii, who commends the desire for emulation as a source of motivation in learning; Daniel refers to emulation as 'the strongest pulse that beats in high mindes': *A Defence of Ryme*, ed. Sprague, p. 148.


Christian Warfare, sig. L15; a similar list of criticisms is given by Carpenter, *Preparative to Contentation*, sigs K4V–K5V.

Christian Warfare, sig. L15V.

Ibid., sig. L15.

Ibid., sig. L15V.

Ibid. sigs L15V–L16; see also Vives, *On Education*, pp. 167 and 275 et seq.


George Webbe, *A Posie of Spirituall Flowers*, 1610, sigs F6V–F7; Webbe bids farewell to many different branches of learning, but does not reject it completely: see sig. E6V; moreover, he was a teacher in a grammar school. See also Dod and Cleaver, *Ten Commandments*, sig. G2; and Kinge, *Lectures Upon Jonas*, sig. L3V.

For specific comments to this effect, see Taylor, *Chris[tis Combate*, sigs C5, G4, H7; Kinge, *Lectures Upon Jonas*, sig. MmV; Stockwood, *Sermon 1578*, sigs FviiV–Gi, and Gii; Chaderton, *Excellent and godly sermon*, sig. FviiV; Greenham, *Workes*, sigs Dd6 and Ee4V.
(the eleventh sermon); Collins, *Sermon upon All-Saints Day*, sigs F2v–F3; Kempis, *Imitation of Christ*, sigs L12v–M1, and C5.


263 See O'Day, *Education and Society*, ch. VII.


268 Richard Cosin, *An Answer To the two first and principall Treatises ... put forth ... under the title of An Abstract of ceretaine Acts of Parliament*, 1584, sigs Bvii, Cv–Cvi, also Ivv; see also Hooker, *Ecclesiastical Polity*, in *Works*, II, 516–18 (V, lxxxii, 5).

269 See, for example, Fulke, *Briefs and Plain Declaration*, sigs D3–D3v.

270 Ibid., sigs E3v–E4; see also *Seconde Parte of a Register*, I, 169 ('Of Discipline'); and II, 185–87 ('A Supplication of Some of the Students of the Universitie of Cambridge to the Parliament', 1586). Emmanuel and Sidney Sussex Colleges, Cambridge were both established expressly for the purpose of training up a preaching ministry (in 1584 and 1596). Travers, *Ecclesiastical Discipline*, sigs Nii–Niii, demands schools and colleges in which future ministers may be educated to the high standard required for their calling.

271 *A Godly And Learned Exposition or Commentarie upon the three first Chapters of the Revelation*, *Works*, III, sigs Hhh3–Hhh3v.

See John Howson, A Second Sermon, preached at Paules Crosse, the 21. of May, 1598, 1598, sigs A4 - A4v and B4 - C1.


See, for example, Barckley's sneers in Felicitie Of Man, sig. Ee2; and cf. Perkins' rejection of 'Anabaptisticall fancies, and revelations, which are nothing, but either dreames of their owne, or illusions of the Devil', and which cause people to 'contemne both humane learning, and the study of the Scripture, & trust wholly to revelations of the spirit': Calling of the Ministerie, Workes, III, sig. Rrr4.

A defence of that which hath bin written in the questions of the ignorant ministerie, 1588, sigs G2v- G3; also in support of logic and rhetoric, see Perkins, Cloud of Witnesses, Workes, III, sigs Ii5 and Aaa3; and Travers, Ecclesiasticall Discipline, prefatory epistle.

See, for example, Batty, Christian mans Closet, sig. X2; Henry Bullinger, The Decades (1577 and 1587), ed. T. Harding, 4 vols, Parker Society, Cambridge, 1849-52, IV, 483; John Rainolds, A Letter Of Dr. Rainolds to his friend, concerning his advice for the study of Divinity, 1613 (written in 1577), sigs A5 - A5v.

The Faithfull Shepherd, Wholy transposed and made anew, 1621, sigs C12v- D8. In the first version of his book (1607), Bernard was slightly less demanding, saying only that 'Knowledge of the toongs in some measure is required': sig. F2.

Faithfull Shepherd (1621), sigs E2v- E3, D8, H2v- H3.


Faithfull Shepheard (1607), sigs F2 - G1v, and 1621 version, sigs H4 - H9v.

Ibid. (1621), sigs C11v - C12.

Answer To An Abstract, sig. Ivv; see also Benson, Sermon at Paules Crosse, sig. Ii; William Camden, Britain, trans. Philemon Holland, 1610, sig. III on Oxford and sig. Ss1v on Cambridge.

See, for example, William Allen, An Apologie and True Declaration of the Institution and endeavours of the two English Colleges,


287 Ecclesiasticall Discipline, sigs Sii\(^{-}\) Tii\(^{v}\); quotation from Siii\(^{v}\); on the universities generally, see O'Day, Education and Society, chs V and VI.

288 Exposition Of The ... Creed, Workes, I, sig. Yl\(^{v}\).


291 Ibid., pp. 214-17; for similar statements from more moderate writers, see Becon, Early Works, ed. Ayre, p. 10, and Catechism, ed. Ayre, p. 350; and Stockwood, Sermon at Paules Crosse 1579, sigs A7 - A8 and K5 - K6\(^{v}\).

292 See, for example, George Gifford, A Short Treatise against the Donatists of England, whom we call Brownists, 1590, sig. L3; and Robert Some, A Godly Treatise, 1589, sigs Bi - Biiv. Hooker suggested to the Puritans generally that many people feared for learning as a whole because of the nature of the radicals' demands for reformation: Preface to Ecclesiastical Polity, in Works, I, 178-79 (viii,3).


294 Henry Ainsworth and Francis Johnson, An Apologie or Defence of Such True Christians As are commonly (but unjustly) called
Brownists, ? Amsterdam, 1604, sigs K3 – K3v, K4, F3v.

295 Ibid., sigs *iv, F1, F3 – F3v.

296 Ibid., sigs K3v – K4; Browne, Writings, pp. 172-73.

297 Ibid., pp. 174-75.

298 Ibid., pp. 176-93.

299 Fruitful Sermon, sig. C3 et passim.

300 Workes, sig. Gg5 ('The Fourteenth Sermon'); see Morgan, 'Godly Learning', pp. 337-49 for training of young men by such as Greenham.

301 See, for example, the admonition to Parliament, in Puritan Manifestoes, p. 9; Perkins, Exposition Of The Creed, Workes, I, sig. S1v; Abstract of Certain Acts of parliament, sigs El – E2; Fulke, Briefe and plaine declaration, sigs D2v, D3 and D4v; Cleaver, Exposition of First and Second Proverbs, sigs K4 – K4v; Dod and Cleaver, Exposition of Ninth and Tenth Proverbs, passim; Becon, Catechism, pp. 420-22; Latimer, Sermons and Remains, I, 273; certain Biblical verses were customarily cited as exhortations to preach: 1 Corinthians 9:16; Hosea 4:6; Matthew 5:13 and 15:4.


303 A Commentarie Upon The Epistle To The Galatians, Workes, II, sig. O5v.

304 A parte of a register, sigs Cc3v – Cc4; see also Samuel Hieron, The Preachers Plea (1613), appended to All The Sermons, 1614, sig. Bbb4.

305 Commentarie Upon Galatians, Workes, II, sig. T3v.

306 Arthur Dent, A Sermon of Repentance ... preached at Lee in Essex, 1613, 'To the Reader'; Dod and Cleaver make the same point, Exposition of Ninth and Tenth Proverbs, 'To the Christian Reader', and sigs B4v, Cl, C3v.

307 Jeremiah Dyke, A Caveat For Archippus : A Sermon preached at a Visitation at White-Chappel Church in London, Septem. 23. 1618, 1619, sig. D1v; see also Cartwright, A Christian Letter ...
unto ... Mr. R[iochard] Hoo[ker], Middleburg, 1599, sig. C4; Cleaver, Exposition of First and Second Proverbs, sig. K4V; Ames, Conscience, sigs Kk1V – Kk2; and see Keith Thomas's comment, Religion and the Decline of Magic (1971), repr. Harmondsworth, 1973, p. 193, on those who sought preferment by displaying their wit and learning in sermons, and on their lack of comprehension of the intellectual capacities of their congregations.

308 XXVII Lectures Or Readings, upon part of the Epistle written to the Hebrues (1576), in Maister Derings Workes, 1590, sigs X7V – X8.


310 The Art of Hearing, in The Sermons, sig. V8; see also Travers, Ecclesiastical Discipline, sig. NiiiV; and Christopher Wilson, Selfe Deniall, 1625, sig. H3.

311 Andreas Gerardus, The Practise of preaching, trans. John Ludhama, 1577, sig. Bi et seq.; the whole treatise is relevant to this discussion.

312 The Arte of Prophecying, Workes, II, sigs Kkk2V, Kkk5V, Kkk6; see also Exposition of Sermon in the Mount, Workes, III, sig. C3; see also Taylor, Christ's Combate, sigs Q6V – Q7; Ames, Conscience, sigs Kk1 – Kk2; Hieron, Preachers Plea, sigs Bbb3V – Bbb4.

313 Lectures Upon Jonas, sig. Lk7.


Chapter Two : Daniel's Musophilus

1 See Joan Rees, _Samuel Daniel : A Critical and Biographical Study_, Liverpool, 1964, pp. 144-45 and 175, et passim. And see 'The Epistle Dedicatorium' before Daniel's _The Civil Wars_, 1609 : 'For mine owne part, I am not so far in love with this forme of Writing (nor have I sworne Fealtie onely to Ryme) but that I may serve in any other state of Invention, with what weapon of utterance I will : and, so it may make good my minde, I care not. For, I see, Judgement and Discretion ... carry their owne Ornaments, and are grac't with their owne beauties; be they apparyled in what fashion they will. And because I finde the common tongue of the world is Prose; I purpose in that kind to write the Historie of England'.

2 I have used the text of _Musophilus_ printed in Daniel's _Poems and A Defence of Ryme_, ed. A.C. Sprague (1930), repr. Chicago, 1965, referred to hereafter as 'Sprague'. All subsequent quotations from Daniel's works will be taken from this edition unless otherwise stated. Line numbers for _Musophilus_ will be given within the text.


4 See Rees, _Daniel_, p. 173. The fourth eclogue in Lodge's _A Fig for Momus_ (1595), which is addressed to Daniel, takes the form of a debate on the relative merits of arms and learning.

5 Sprague, p. 130.


7 See Rees, _Daniel_, p. 172. Dr Rees suggests plausibly that Daniel's preoccupation with the form of his work, manifested in an excessive zeal in revising, was a refuge from his own neuroses regarding self-criticism and hostile comment on his work : 'his incessant care to perfect [his work] becomes a release for frustrated energies' (p. 173).

8 Sprague, p. 67.

9 Ibid., p. 204, 11. 20-9.

10 Raymond Himelick, Introduction to his edition of _Musophilus_, West Lafayette, Indiana, 1965, p. 15. Himelick's account of the poem and its background is the most detailed that has so far been published. See also Pierre Spriet, _Samuel Daniel : Sa Vie - Son Oeuvre_, Paris, 1968, p. 551 : 'le dialogue qui s'engage entre Musophilus et Philocosmus
ressemble fort à la discussion que le poète pourrait tenir avec lui-même.'


13 Prefatory verses to the 1599 edition of Musophilus, l. 16 (Sprague, p. 67).

14 See, for example, the epistles before The Shadow of Night, Ovid's Banquet of Sense, The Iliads, and The Odysseys, as well as the Poems Prefatory and Dedicatory to the translations of Homer; also 'A Free and Offenceles Justification of Andromeda liberata', and the poems, The Shadow of Night, and Euthymiae Raptus. I shall be dealing with this material in Chapter Four.


16 The Teares of the Muses, II. 567-69.

17 See Mother Hubberds Tale, II. 892-918, and Colin Clouts Come home againe, II. 680-730.

18 The Teares of the Muses, II. 175-234 (Thalia's complaint).

19 Sprague, p. 147.

20. See Chapters One and Five passim.

21 Gosson, in his attack on poets, concedes that 'The right use of auncient Poetrie' was to record 'notable exploytes of woorthy Captaines' in order to 'chalke out the way to do the like': The Schoole of Abuse (1579), sig. A7v, in Markets of Bawdrie : The Dramatic Criticism of Stephen Gosson, ed. Arthur F. Kinney, Salzburg, 1974, p. 82. The topic derives ultimately from Book X of Plato's Republic.

22 For the history of the debate about the vita activa and the vita contemplativa, see Jacob Zeitlin's Introduction to his translation of The Life of Solitude by Petrarch, Illinois, 1924, and Peter Bement, Chapman : Action and Contemplation, Salzburg, 1974, ch. I.


He now is dead, and all his glorie gone,
And all his greatnes vapoured to nought,
That as a glasse upon the water shone,
Which vanish't quite, so soon as it was sought,
His name is worn already out of thought,
Ne anie Poet seekes him to revive;
Yet manie Poets honourd him alive.

24 The understanding that the subjective element in man's perception and interpretation of things calls all views and ideas into doubt is of course a basic tenet of Montaigne's, with whose Essais Daniel was well acquainted and on which he drew from time to time: see Himelick, Introduction to Musophilus, pp. 30ff.

25 See also Defence of Ryme, Sprague, p. 139: 'Me thinkes we should not so soon yeeld our consents captive to the authoritie of Antiquitie, unlesse we saw more reason: all our understandings are not to be built by the square of Greece and Italie. We are the children of nature as well as they, we are not so placed out of the way of judgement, but that the same Sunne of Discretion shineth upon us, wee have our portion of the same vertues as well as of the same vices'. There is an equally strong passage on pp. 143-44. Similar stands are taken by Vives, Bacon, and Hakewill.

26 For an eloquent statement of the idea that the learned man makes the best citizen, see A Discourse of the Common Weal of this Realm of England (1581), ed. Elizabeth Lamond, Cambridge, 1893, p. 28: 'Tell me what counsel can be perfect, what common weal can be ordered and upright, where none of the rulers or counsellors have studied any philosophy, and specially that part that teacheth of manners? ... What part of the common weal is neglected by moral philosophy? Doth it not teach first how every man should govern him self honestly and profitably? Secondly, how he should guide his family wisely; and thirdly, it showeth how a City or Realm or any other common weal should be well ordered and governed, both in time of peace and also in war. What common weal can be without either a governor, or counsellor, that should be expert in this kind of learning? This concerneth the point that we now talk of; if men expert in this science were counselled and followed, the common weal should be ordered as few should have cause to complain. Therefore Plato, that divine philosopher, said that happy is that common weal where either the king is a philosopher, or where a philosopher is the king.'


28 Fritz Caspari, Humanism and the Social Order in Tudor England, Chicago, 1954, p. 76; cf. Johan Huizinga, Erasmus of Rotterdam, trans. F. Hopman, 1952, p. 17: 'Contact with the world of politics and ambition had probably unsettled Erasmus. He never had an aptitude for it. The hard realities of life frightened and distressed him. When forced to occupy himself with them he
saw nothing but bitterness and confusion about him.' As far as Erasmus is concerned, it is clear from his letters that his chief interest was in scholarship; the actual mechanics of converting doctrine to practice did not draw his zeal.


30 The case for Cromwell as an intellectual, and not only an employer of other intellectuals but as a man who encouraged and even initiated their courses of study, is set out by Elton, *Reform and Renewal*, especially pp. 28, 64, and 160; and on Cromwell as 'a man passionante for reform' and his search for propagandists to urge it, see p. 63. Ferguson, *Articulate Citizen*, p. 136, comments: 'it is remarkable that a government with little experience in courting public opinion beyond Parliament should have recognized with such speed and clarity the need for appealing to the increasingly broad reading public by means of printed pamphlets.' On p. 140 Ferguson remarks that, during the reign of Edward VI, Somerset used humanists as consultants rather than as propagandists.


32 Rees, *Daniel*, pp. 68-9, for the poet's assessment of and admiration for Mountjoy as both scholar and man of affairs. Elyot, in refuting the charge that learning makes man 'unapt to the ministra

33 This was not a new idea: Seneca says it would be difficult to find a state 'which the wise man could endure, or which could endure the wise man': *De Otio*, quoted by Zeitlin, *Introduction to Life of Solitude* by Petrarch, p. 33. cf. Thomas Starkey, *A Dialogue Between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset* (1533-36), ed. Kathleen Burton, 1948, p. 36: Pole remarks that in time of tyranny or corruption the counsel of a wise man is laughed at. Starkey's *Dialogue* echoes many ideas from *Utopia*.

35 Whitney Jones, *Tudor Commonwealth*, p. 27.


40 *Discourse*, ed. Lamond, p. 31. The *Discourse* is dated by the editor as 1549: see Introduction, p. xiv. There has been some debate about the author's identity: it is now generally accepted to be Smith: see Ferguson, *Articulate Citizen*, p. 151, n. 45, and Skinner, *Foundations*, I, 225, n. 1.

41 *Articulate Citizen*, p. 141.

42 *Reform and Renewal*, pp. 26, 66ff. and 158.


44 *Discourse*, p. 22.


46 This is a familiar idea, originating with Strabo: 'one cannot be a good poet without first being a good man': *Geography* (c. A.D. 17), I, 2, 5, in *Ancient Literary Criticism*, ed. D.A. Russell and M. Winterbottom, Oxford, 1972, p. 302. See also Quintilian, *Institutio Oratoria* (c. A.D. 95), 12, I, in *Ancient Literary Criticism*, pp. 417-23, on the notion, central to his thought, that the orator must be a morally good man. Also Horace, *Ars Poetica* (68-65 B.C.), 309-19, in *Ancient Literary Criticism*, p. 288; and Ben Jonson, *The Epistle to Volpone* (1605), ll. 18-19 and 22-3 et seq. See also L.P. Wilkinson, *Horace and His Lyric Poetry*, repr. 1968, p. 100.

47 See Himelick, Introduction to *Musophilus*, p. 95, n. 609. For Daniel's relation to Seneca, see Himelick, pp. 40-3.

48 Sprague, p. 111.

See Tusculan Disputations, II, i, 4, quoted by Seigel, pp. 7-8.

The Essayes of Michel Lord of Montaigne, trans. John Florio (1603), 3 vols, Oxford, 1904 and 1906, II, 367-68 (II, xii, Sebond), (I have used this edition when quoting from the essays themselves; the 1613 edition is referred to only for Daniel's prefatory verses.) cf. Daniel's 'To The Lady Margaret, Countesse of Cumberland', 11. 98-9 : 'unlesse above himselfe he can/Erect himselfe, how poore a thing is man?' (Sprague, p. 114).

The words are Horace's in Epistles, I, i, 76, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough, Loeb Classical Library, revised 1929, p. 257.

Paul Green, 'Spenser and the Masses : Social Commentary in The Faerie Queene', JHI, XXXV (1974), 389-406; Christopher Hill, 'The Many-Headed Monster in Late Tudor and Early Stuart Political Thinking', in From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation : Essays in Honour of Garrett Mattingly, ed. Charles Carter, 1966, pp. 296-324; Stephen Hilliard, 'Stephen Gosson and the Elizabethan Distrust of the Effects of Drama', ELR, IX (1979), 225-39; Merritt Hughes, 'Spenser and Utopia', SP, XVII (1920), 132-46; C.A. Patrides, "The Beast with Many Heads": Renaissance Views on the Multitude', SQ, XVI (1965), 241-46. On the conservative nature of the humanist movement in Northern Europe, see Skinner, Foundations, I, 238-41, and Caspari, Humanism and the Social Order, passim; see also Ferguson's comment, Articulate Citizen, p. 158, about the conservative course followed by the humanists regarding who was eligible to govern; also p. 188; also Jones, Tudor Commonwealth, pp. 25-6, and pp. 90ff. on the reverse attitude - the common people's hostility to gentlemen and the nobility; Elyot's fears of the lower classes are noted by Major, Elyot, p. 197.

See Green, 'Spenser and the Masses', and Hughes, 'Spenser and Utopia'.


On Petrarch's worries about learning being marred by contact with common people, see Seigel, Rhetoric and Philosophy, p. 43. Ferguson, Articulate Citizen, p. 189, notes the view of northern humanists that education was for the aristocracy and gentry. An acceptance of a rigid class system as the basis of educational thinking is to be seen throughout Erasmus's De Pueris Instituendis (1529) - in Desiderius Erasmus concerning the Aim and Method of Education, trans. William Woodward, Cambridge, 1904; and see Erasmus's reference to 'the rabble', quoted by Roland H. Bainton, Erasmus of Christendom, 1970, p. 112. This topic will come up again in Chapter Five.
Elsewhere, however, Daniel does show sympathy for the people as victims of disorder and confusion in government: see Michel, Introduction to Philotas, p. 16.


All quotations are taken from the edition of 1609. Daniel said that his purpose in The Civile Wars was 'to shewe the deformities of Civil Dissension, and the miserable events of Rebellions, Conspiracies, and bloody Revengements, which followed (as in a circle) upon that breach of the due course of Succession, by the Usurpation of Hen. 4'.

See Rees's comments, Daniel, p. 74.

Novum Organum, CXXIX, in Works, ed. J. Spedding, R.L. Ellis, D.D. Heath, 7 vols, 1857-59, IV, 114; the three inventions were, however, given prominence on many lists: see Elizabeth L. Eisenstein, The Printing Press as an Agent of Change, Cambridge, 1979, p. 21.

See Chapter Five.

Cf. Greville's Caelica, LXIX, 'When all this All'; 11. 161-62 of Musophilus ('the fury of that threatening rage, Which in confused crowdes gastly appeares'), although somewhat cryptic, confirm the sense that Daniel has fears.

In his lines on Montaigne, Daniel wrote of 'most rich pieces and extracts of man;/Though in a troubled frame confus'dly set' (Essaves, trans. Florio, 1613, sig. A3): did Daniel really understand what Montaigne's 'confusion' was?


Daniel's phrasing echoes that of George Pettie in the preface to his translation of The Civile Conversation of M. Steeven Guazzo (1581), 2 vols, 1925, I, 9: 'never ... be ashamed to shewe your learnyng .... it is onely it whiche maketh you Gentlemen .... and ... the only way to win immortality is either to doe things woorth the writing, or to write thynges woorthy the readyng'; cf. Sidney's phrasing in An Apology for Poetry, ed. G. Shepherd, 1965, p. 126: 'doing things worthy to be written, than writing things fit to be done.'

Works, III, 318 (Advancement of Learning, Bk I).
Ibid., III, 318; but cf. Vives: On Education (a translation by Foster Watson of De Tradendis Disciplinis (1531), Cambridge, 1913), p. 281: 'But, put the case that you have obtained renown, praise, glory; what good will it be to you when you come to die?'


Ibid, XCIV (Loeb, III, 19); see Montaigne for a different emphasis: 'the prize, the glorie, and height of true vertue, consisted in the facilitie, profit, and pleasure of his exercises': Essays, I, xcv ("Of the Institution and Education of Children"), (ed. cit., I, 185).

Sprague, p. 158.

Ibid., p. 146. The same argument is advanced by another conservative poet, Dryden, in Absalom and Achitophel, 11. 800-8.

Sprague, pp. 146-47.

See ibid., p. 155 (Defence, 11. 927-30), and Musophilus, 11. 522-25; although the concession in the Defence is a comparatively minor one, and the assertion in Musophilus is not supported by Musophilus's attitude to Philocosmus anywhere in the poem.

Sprague, p. 146 (Defence, 11. 600-2).

A reason for the hostilities is given by Philocosmus, 11. 452 ff. The topic of strife caused by learning was discussed in the previous chapter.


See also Sprague, p. 147: 'it is ever the misfortune of Learning, to be wounded by her owne hand .... and when there is not abilitie to match what is, malice wil finde out ingines, either to disgrace or ruine it, with a perverse incounter of some new impression' (Defence, 11. 651-56).


Works, VI, 433 ("Of Innovations").


84 It might be noted here, however, that English humanists were not particularly interested in literature - a point made by C.S. Lewis, *English Literature in the Sixteenth Century*, Excluding Drama, Oxford, 1954, p. 19.

85 'Pursuit of Eloquence', pp. 500-1. The emphasis on eloquence was part of the humanist campaign against scholasticism, especially in northern Europe.


87 Daniel, p. 71.


89 Himelick, in his edition of *Musophilus*, refers to these lines as Daniel's one nod towards Platonism : p. 98, n. 976.

See Hamilton, *Two Harmonies*, pp. 50-1. W.S. Howell has recently rapped the knuckles of modern commentators who have failed to recognize that Renaissance critics envisaged poetry as a particularly gifted way of revealing truth through the linguistic forms of stories or fictions, whereas oratory and learned argument revealed truth through statement and proofs - 'The Arts of Literary Criticism in Renaissance Britain: A Comprehensive View', in *Poetics, Rhetoric, and Logic*, Ithaca and London, 1975, p. 87.


See Javitch on this point too: ibid., pp. 76-8.

Ibid., pp. 26-7; see also p. 38.

The humanist notion of the orator as hero is referred to by Hanna Gray, 'Pursuit of Eloquence', p. 504.


A comment made by Sloane, ibid., p. 311, is relevant here, especially for the bearing it has on Daniel: 'One sign of apparently irreconcilable difference between philosophers and rhetoricians is life style. The philosopher's life is contemplative and withdrawn, the rhetorician's engaged and public. Renaissance humanists, who tried to combine philosophy and rhetoric, held the correlative life styles in uneasy balance, preaching engagement while practising contemplation.'


This topic is studied in later chapters. At this stage I am only referring to some of Greville's attitudes in order to establish his differentness from Daniel: Greville's ideas and the contexts in which they can be profitably set will be examined thoroughly in Chapters Six and Seven.
Chapter Three: Spenser and Chapman

1. e.g. *Astrophil and Stella* nos 1, 3, 6, 15, 74.


4. *October*, 11. 39-40 and 43-4. This and all subsequent citations of Spenser's poetry, other than *The Faerie Queene*, are from *Minor Poems*, ed. de Séliencourt; henceforth line numbers will be given within the text where a series of quotations from one work occurs.

5. Ibid., p. 121.


7. See Tonkin, ibid., pp. 178-98 for a survey of Elizabethan views of nature and the relation of disorder and sin, and p. 191, especially, for the specific point I have just cited.

8. Ibid., pp. 215-16.

9. Ibid., p. 217. On p. 136 Tonkin had referred to the dance as 'the intellectual and poetic centre of the Legend of Courtesy.'

10. Ibid., p. 209.


12. Ibid., p. 148.


15. Ibid., p. 158.


17 *Poetry and Courtliness*, passim.


20 Ibid, p. 204.

21 *Poetry of Spenser*, p. 71.


25 See Renwick's commentary in his edition of *Complaints*, pp. 204-18.

26 This is Renwick's supposition, ibid., p. 182.


28 *Euthymiae Raptus; or The Teares of Peace* (1609), 11. 266-67. This and all subsequent citations of Chapman's writings are from *The Poems*, ed. Phyllis Brooks Bartlett, New York and London, 1941 (referred to hereafter as 'Poems'). Where a series of quotations from one work occurs, line numbers will be given within the text.


34 'To Somerset', epistle with the *Odyssey*, 11.1 and 3-4, and 11. 96-8, *Poems*, p. 408.

35 Ibid., 11. 7-10, p. 409.


37 Chapman's interest in the exclusiveness of his particular kind of learning, the sense given by *The Shadow of Night* and its epistle of the esoteric and cryptic nature of his 'true' knowledge, which was sought by a group of like-minded men, and the commitment to darkness - these things led to the speculations about the so-called 'School of Night'. Chapman's poem was seen as the manifesto of this school, while *Love's Labour's Lost* was interpreted as an attack on it, and the whole affair construed as part of general hostilities between two factions. The evidence for this has not been convincing, however. For a sensible survey and discussion, see Richard David's Introduction to the New Arden *Love's Labour's Lost*, 1951, pp. xxxvii - 1; also E.A. Strathmann, *Sir Walter Ralegh: A Study in Elizabethan Skepticism*, New York, 1951, pp. 262-71.


39 Ibid., pp. 585-86.

40 I shall abbreviate 'Hymnus in Noctem' and 'Hymnus in Cynthiam' to 'HN' and 'HC' respectively.

41 Chapman's cosmology follows Plato's in *Timaeus*, but Chapman probably imbibed his ideas from commentaries on that work rather than from direct knowledge of it: see Battenhouse, 'Chapman's Shadow', p. 586, n. 16.

42 All the quotations from *Eugenia* are taken from 11. 451-70.

43 The words and the distinction are Kenneth Charlton's, in *Education in Renaissance England*, London and Toronto, 1965, pp. 23-4; see also Bement, *Chapman: Action and Contemplation*.

44 See e.g. 'HN', 11. 224, 249, 325, 329-31.


49 Panofsky, *Iconology*, p. 50. Panofsky also notes that for later mythographers, especially Boccaccio, 'this very clarity [of knowledge] can only be attained at the expense of happiness and peace of mind', which is a relevant statement for Chapman. On the divine inspiration of the poet, see E.N. Tigerstedt, *The Poet as Creator : Origins of a Metaphor*, CLS, V (1968), 455-88.


51 Cf. Berowne's lines, *Love's Labours Lost*, IV, iii, 342-43:

Never durst poet touch a pen to write
Until his ink were temper'd with Love's sighs.

The words are perhaps a specific answer to Chapman's. See also IV, iii, 300 in relation to 'HN', 1. 131.

52 On these doctrines, see Panofsky, *Iconology*, p. 138.

53 The classic statements about the link between the lower and higher realms are to be found in Plato's *Symposium* and the fourth book of Castiglione's *Courtier*.

54 Chapman, p. 35. MacLure quotes the following from Thomas Walkington's *A Discourse of the Preservation of the Sight* (1599) : 'The melancholic man is said of the wise to be aut Deus aut Daemon, either angel of heaven or fiend of hell, for in whomsoever this humour hath dominion, the soule is either wrapt up into an Elysium and paradise of blisse by a heavenly contemplation, or into a direfull hellish purgatory by a cynicall meditation.' Again, this casts an interesting light on Chapman's concept of the learned poet.

55 Chapman, pp. 70 and 75.


To The Reader', epistle with the Iliad, 11. 117-21, Poems, p. 394.


'To Somerset', epistle with the Odyssey, 11. 44-7, Poems, p. 407; cf. the poem to the Lord Chancellor, Poems, p. 396.

'To Prince Henrie', dedicatory epistle with the Iliad, 11. 60-1, 39, 29-31, 78, 92-3, Poems, pp. 385-86.

Ibid., 11. 102-4, 105-6, 114-23, Poems, p. 387.

See Barlett's Introduction to Poems, pp. 3-4.

Phrasing from the epistle to Roydon before The Shadow of Night, 11. 1-2, Poems, p. 19.

Phrasing from 'To M. Harriots', 11. 75 and 86, Poems, pp. 382 and 383, and the epistle to Roydon before Ovid's Banquet of Sense (1595), 1. 49, Poems, p. 50.

'To Somerset', epistle with the Odyssey, 11. 86-9, Poems, p. 408.

'To yong imaginaries in knowledge', 11. 45-6 and 31-2, Poems, pp. 245-46.

'To M. Harriots', 11. 105-8; cf. 11. 133-40: Poems, pp. 383 and 384.

'A Free and Offenceles Justification of Andromeda Liberata' (1614), 11. 64-5 and 74-5, Poems, p. 328.

Epistle to Roydon before Ovid's Banquet, 11. 33-6, Poems, p. 49.

See 'To Somerset', epistle with the Odyssey, 11. 5-11, Poems, pp. 408-9.

'To Robert Earle of Sommerset and the Ladie Frances', dedicatory epistle before Andromeda Liberata (1614), 11. 45-7, Poems, p. 306.

'To The Reader', epistle with the Iliad, 11. 150-57, Poems, p. 395. The whole passage (11. 123-78) about these 'sonnes of the earth' is a powerful one.

'To The Earle of Pembroke', 11. 6-7, Poems, pp. 398-99.

Andromeda Liberata, 1. 1, Poems, p. 310, and 'To The Earle of Somerset', epistle with Homer's Hymns, 1. 127, Poems, p. 416.

11. 58-88, Poems, p. 328. For the original passage in Horace, and modern studies of the 'many-headed monster' tradition, see above, ch. III, notes 52 and 53. Andromeda Liberata itself
contains a fierce attack on 'the ravenous multitude'.

77 'To M. Harriot, 11. 113-14, Poems, p. 383.

78 See ibid., 1. 124, and Euthymiae Raptus, 1. 1034.

79 11. 4-6, Poems, p. 49 (my italics). It is worth noting in passing that the first three (of four) dedicatory poems before William Jones's translation of John Nenna's Nennioo, Or A Treatise of Nobility, 1595, are by Spenser, Daniel, and Chapman. The translation is dedicated to the earl of Essex. The conclusion of the book is that true nobility does not lie in 'bloud and riches'; 'nobility of bloud is not onlie cause of pride, and ignorance, but of unsufferable evill' (sigs S3v and X4); 'nobilitie of the minde, is farre more true, and farre more perfect' (sig. Ce4v). See also John Ferne, The Blazon of Gentry, 1586, sigs CiV-Cii.


81 The phrase is from the epistle to Roydon before The Shadow of Night, 1. 9, Poems, p. 19. The sequence of thought that joins mistrust of the common people to the dangers of ignorance, which leads to all kinds of folly and misjudgement, is not uncommon: see, for example, William Vaughan, The Spirit of Detraction, 1611, sig. Q1. Vaughan sees learning as a bulwark against Satan.

82 Musophilus, 11. 207-8.

83 See also 11. 802-7. These views are often met with: see, for example, Dudley Fenner, The Artes of Logike And Rethorike, Middleburg, 1584, sigs A2-A2v; Henry Crosse, The Schools of Politie, 1605, sigs N2v-N3v; J.L. Vives, De Tradendis Disciplinis (1531), trans. as Vives : On Education, by Foster Watson, Cambridge, 1913, p. 58.

84 Epictetus probably provides Chapman's inspiration here: see MacLure, Chapman, pp. 77-8.

85 See also 11. 556-60; and cf. 'To young imaginaries in knowledge', Poems, pp. 245-48.


87 A comparison may be made with Jonson, in whose writings we find a similar pattern of thinking to that observed in Chapman, Spenser, and Daniel: the belief in the special powers of the poet, hostility to the vulgar, and the importance of a mutually supportive group.
Chapter Four: The Concept of the Learned Poet in Elizabethan and Jacobean England: its Character and Background

1 Sir Philip Sidney, *An Apology for Poetry* (?1581-83), ed. Geoffrey Shepherd, 1965, p. 125, 11. 3-4. This edition will be cited throughout the chapter, page and line numbers being given within the text, thus: 125/3-4. Shepherd's learned introduction and notes have been particularly helpful.


4 *Arte*, p.18 (I, viii): the whole chapter is relevant. See also Ben Jonson, 'To My Lord Ignorant': 'Thou call'st me Poet, as a terme of shame': in *Ben Jonson (The Complete Works)*, ed. C.H. Herford and P. and E. Simpson, 11 vols, corrected edition, Oxford, 1965-70, VIII, 29; and *Timber, or Discoveries*, ibid., 572: 'Hee is upbrayingly call'd a Poet, as if it were a most contemptible Nick-name.


7 As Shepherd says, Boccaccio and Wills assembled and answered these charges before Sidney: see Shepherd's note 1 on pp. 197-98 of Sidney's *Apology*. Clements, *Pléiade*, p. 22, notes that Du Bellay reflected on the futility of passing one's time reading Petrarch, Virgil, Horace, and Ovid.


Timber, in Works, VIII, 583. See Miller, Professional Writer, pp. 9-14 on the degree to which a range of writers were able to support themselves, and ch. I, 'Authors in their Milieu', for conditions and backgrounds of writers. See also Puttenham, Arte, pp. 20-1 (I, viii).

Timber, in Works, VIII, 583.


The Letters of John Chamberlain, ed. with an Intro. by N.E. McClure, 2 vols, Philadelphia, 1939, II, 611. See also the comment on Gascoigne as 'a common Rymer', quoted by Miller, Professional Writer, p. 15.

Quoted by John Carey, John Donne: Life, Mind and Art, 1981, p. 70. Saunders, 'Stigma of Print', p. 144, notes that many poets excused their printed work by saying it was executed in their youth.


Arte, p. 21 (I, viii).

'Stigma of Print', pp. 143-50.


See Rosenberg, Leicester, p. 7.

Cf. the early part of Jonson's Poetaster.
22 See Shepherd's Introduction to Sidney's *Apology*, pp. 17-18; cf. Wills, *De Re Poetica*, p. 87; also Curtius, *European Literature*, pp. 147-54.


26 Of the Vanitie, sig. DivV; he repeats the charge several times: see sigs Diii and Ci. For surveys of opinions that poets are liars, see Shepherd's note 28 on pp. 199-200 of Sidney's *Apology*, and pp. 71ff of the Introduction for a discussion of the issue; also Clements, *Pléiade*, pp. 7-11; and Baxter Hattaway, *The Age of Criticism: The Late Renaissance in Italy*, Ithaca, 1962, ch. X.


33 Vives, *Praelectio in Sapientiam* (1522), cited by Eugene F. Rice,

34 Agrippa, Of the Vanitie, sig. Cci^; the Privy Council's words are quoted by Shepherd, p. 201, n. 125/2, in Sidney's Apology.


37 Quoted by Carlos G. Norena, Juan Luis Vives, The Hague, 1970, p. 44, from a work called Veritas Fusata, where Vives is emphasizing the dangers of classical literature.

38 Vives and the Renascence Education of Women, ed. Watson, p. 60; see also 'The Learning of Women', ibid. p. 205.

39 See Noreña, Vives, p. 304, for a list of editions.

40 Coignet, Politique Discourse, Gregory Smith, I, 342; Beard, Theatre, sig. Aa^.

41 De Tradendis Disciplinis, trans. as Vives: On Education, by Foster Watson, Cambridge, 1913, p. 126. There were three editions of this work up to 1612, none in English: see Noreña, Vives, p. 307. For poetry as refreshment and relaxation, see Vives' 'The Plan of Studies for a Boy' (1523), in Vives and the Renascence Education of Women, ed. Watson.

42 Vives: On Education, p. 126. Vives says the subjects of poetry 'do not harm the mind, unless authority and example from the author are added to them'.

43 Ibid., p. 127.

44 Ibid., p. 128.


46 Ibid., p. 126.

48 Ibid., p. 138. See also p. 136, and 'The Plan of Studies for a Boy'.


50 Ibid., p. 77 (sig. A2v).

51 Ibid., p. 82 (sig. A7v).

52 *An Apologie*, ibid., p. 124 (sig. L2v).


54 See Kinney's Introduction to *Markets of Bawdrie*, pp. 1-2 and 32-5.

55 See ibid., pp. 27-8; Russell Fraser, *The War Against Poetry*, Princeton, 1970, pp. 6-7; Ringler, Gosson, p. 80.

56 *A Briefe And Necessarie Catachisme Or Instruction* (1572), reprinted in *Maister Derings Workes*, 1590, sig. A1v. It is only a passing comment from Dering, who is primarily concerned with the multitude of books being published.


60 See ibid.

Ibid., p. 39; see pp. 39-53 for a discussion of the Psalms; also Campbell, Divine Poetry, pp. 34-54.

See Lewalski, Protestant Poetics, pp. 53-69; also Campbell, Divine Poetry, pp. 55-73.


See Lewalski, Protestant Poetics, pp. 32-6.

Ibid., p. 5.

See Campbell, Divine Poetry, pp. 78-80; for her complete discussion of Du Bartas, see pp. 74-92.

'The Author To His loving Cosin', Saint Peters complaynt, 1595; see also 'The Author to the Reader', first poem; cf. Joseph Hall, dedicatory epistle before Davids Psalms Metaphrased, Collected Poems, p. 127: 'if this kinde of composition had beene unfit, God woulde never have made choice of numbers wherein to expresse himselfe.'

'To the Reader', before Marie Magdalens funerall Teares (1591), ed. of 1609.

There is a problem about the date of The Courte of Venus, which exists in three fragments: see R.A. Fraser (ed.), The Courte of Venus, Durham, N.C., 1955, pp. 12-26. My subsequent discussion draws on what Fraser says in his introduction; see especially pp. 56-65 and 69-71. Subsequent citations of writers who attacked The Courte are taken from Fraser.

See ibid., pp. 65-9 and 72-3; also Campbell, Divine Poetry, pp. 46-8.

See Th: Schoole of Pollicie, 1605, N4v and 01 for echoes of Sidney, and sig. N4 for an echo of Ascham.

Ibid., sig. N4; see also sig. O4.

Ibid., sig. O2v.
Lyly had written: 'Euphues had rather be shut in a lady's casket then open in a scholar's study.' *Euphues*, ed. M.W. Croll and H. Clemons, 1916, p. 200.

Ibid., sigs 03 and 04; cf. Thomas Salter, *A Mirror mete for all Mothers, Matrones, and Maidens* (1574), quoted by Louis B. Wright, *Middle-Class Culture in Elizabethan England*, Chapel Hill, 1935, p. 106; and see ibid., p. 112 on condemnation of women for reading amorous poems; Joan Grundy, *The Spenserian Poets*, 1969, p. 66, remarks on how the poets were 'distinctly aware of their women-readers, and of their own duties and responsibilities towards them', and consequently emphasized the purity of their poetry.

*Schoole of Pollicie*, sigs Q3-Q3v.

Ibid., sigs 01-01v.

Ibid., sig. Pl.

*Boccacio on Poetry*, p. 38; Thomas Nashe, *The Anatomie of Absurditie* (1589), Gregory Smith, I, 332; Thomas Lodge, *Deffence of Poetry* (1579), Gregory Smith, I, 76.


*Anatomie of Absurditie*, Gregory Smith, I, 323.


*The Posies* was seized by the Commissioners in 1576: see Prouty, *Gascoigne*, p. 79.

The words are Gascoigne's, *Complete Works*, I, 6.

Ibid., I, 12-13. In practice, it is not easy to see the principle on which Gascoigne groups the actual poems. See also 'The Printer to the Reader', in *A Hundred Sundrie Flowers*, ed. C.T. Prouty, *University of Missouri Studies*, XVII (1942), no. 2, pp. 47 and 48 (hereafter referred to as 'Flowers'.)*
Although attributed to the printer, the epistle is by Gascoigne, who composed all the introductory epistles: see Prouty's Introduction, p. 25.

90 Complete Works, I, 5.

91 'To the Reader', Epitaphs, Epigrams, Songs and Sonets (1567), edition of 1570; cf. Webbe, Discourse of English Poetrie, Gregory Smith, I, 251. Prose writers followed the same line: see Adlington in the dedicatory epistle before his translation of The Golden Asse (1566), Abbey Classics edition, ? 1922, p. 2; Painter, in the dedication of The Palace of Pleasure (1566), ed. J. Jacobs, 1890, p. 5; Pettie, A pettie Pallace of Pettie his pleasure (1576), ed. I. Gollancz, 1908, pp. 5-7; and see Nashe, Anatomie of Absurditie, Gregory Smith, I, 332. The range of references indicates the continual need of writers to claim that their work was moral, even though in many instances it quite clearly was not.


94 Flowres, p. 49; cf. Owen Roydon's dismissal of those who 'have not known the height of Hellicon: Yet, carpingly, they needes must spit their spite': A gorgious Gallery of gallant Inventions (1578), ed. H.E. Rollins, Harvard, 1928, pp. 3-4.

95 Flowres, p. 50.

96 Ibid.

97 Gabriel Harvey, who thought highly of Gascoigne's work, mentions him and makes references to him in a familiar way in his letters to Spenser (see Letter-Book, ed. E.J.L. Scott, Camden Society, 1884, passim), and this suggests 'the new Poete' was also well acquainted with Gascoigne's writing. E.K.'s epistle with The Shepheardes Calender is concerned with several of the issues Gascoigne raises.

98 See, for example, Flowres, p. 47; Barnabe Googe, Eglogs, Epytaphes, and Sonnettes (1563), facsimile, with introduction by F.B. Fieler, Gainesville, 1968, p. 9: Googe 'feared and mistrusted the disdaynfull myndes of a nombre both scornefull and carpyng Correctours, whose Heades are ever busyed in tauntyng Judgements'; Gascoigne, Complete Works, I, 12 and 15; George Whetstone, 'The Epistle Dedicatorie' before Promos and Cassandra (1578), Tudor Facsimile Texts, New York, 1970, sig. Aii; and Prouty's Introduction to Flowres, pp. 21-5, and Miller, Professional Writer, pp. 142-49, for relevant discussions.
For additional information, see Lawrence A. Sasek, *The Literary Temper of the English Puritans*, Baton Rouge, 1961, ch. IV; but note that his examples are drawn largely, and without much chronological discrimination, from the whole of the seventeenth century. Sasek also uses the term 'Puritan' rather loosely. See also Wright, *Middle-Class Culture*, pp. 95ff. and 418-35. Wright notes that there were in fact a great many moral and religious ballads.


*European Literature*, p. 203.


*Olympian*, 2, in *Ancient Literary Criticism*, p. 4.


The best-known discussions of poets and poetry in Plato are in *Ion, Republic, Phaedrus, Laws* (see *Ancient Literary Criticism*, pp. 39-84); but see also *Lysis*, 214, and *Timaeus*, as discussed by S.K. Heninger, *Touches of Sweet Harmony: Pythagorean Cosmology and Renaissance Poetics*, San Marino, 1974, pp. 287-324.


113 Curtius, European Literature, p. 36.

114 Institutio Oratoria, XII, xi, 21, trans. H.E. Butler, 4 vols, Loeb Classical Library, 1920-22, IV, 507. See also Jonson, Timber, in Works, VIII, 618; and J.W.H. Atkins, English Literary Criticism: The Renaissance (1947), repr. 1968, p. 28. Louis Le Roy, Of the Interchangeable Course, or Variety of things, trans. Robert Ashley, 1594, sig. L6, remarks that 'Homer without controversie hath gotten the first and chiefe place amongst all the Poets of al Nations; and ages which ever were', and refers to Pliny's praise of Homer's range of knowledge: the Greeks saw him as the source of knowledge of all things.

115 Curtius, European Literature, p. 206.

116 Geography, 1.2.4-9, in Ancient Literary Criticism, pp. 301-5. Puttenham follows the same line: Ars, p. 4 (I,1).

117 Quintilian, Institutio, XII, xi, 26, (Loeb, IV, 511). He is discussing the need for wide knowledge if one is to reach the top of any profession.

118 'How A Yoong Man Ought To Heare Poets, And How He May Take Profit By Reading Poemes', in The Morals, trans. Philemon Holland, 1603, sigs B4-B4v; see also Shepherd's note 37 on p. 236 of Sidney's Apology.

119 Ars Poetica, 391-405, in Ancient Literary Criticism, p. 290. See also Quintilian, Institutio, I, x, 9 (Loeb, I, 165).

120 See Clements, Pléiade, passim. For Du Bellay's ideal of the learned poet, see Castor, Pléiade Poetics, pp. 46-7.

121 See Spingarn, Criticism in the Renaissance, pp. 18, 22, 25, 43, 145.

122 See ibid., pp. 126ff.


125 Geography, I.2.3, in Ancient Literary Criticism, p. 300, et seq.


130 For Cicero, see Tusculan Disputations, I,xli,98(Loeb, p. 117); also Boccacio on Poetry, pp. 44-6, and Osgood's notes; Agrippa, Of the Vanitie, sig. Riv; for Elizabethan citations, see Rainolds, Oratio, p. 45; John Ferne, The Blason of Gentrie, 1586, EiiiV, who notes that Augustine lists the names in The City of God; Wills, De Re Poetica, pp. 61, 89, 91; Fenton, Golden Epistles, sig. YviiV- Aaiv; Le Roy, Interchangeable Course, sig. L5v, who notes that in Aeneid VI Musaeus is in bliss; Philip of Mornay, A Woorke concerning the trewnesse of the Christian Religion, trans. Sir Philip Sidney and Arthur Golding (1587), in vol. III of The Complete Works of Sidney, ed. Albert Feuillerat, Cambridge, 1923, pp. 273 and 305-7; for Italy, see Spingarn, Criticism in the Renaissance, pp. 20, 21, 269, on Daniello and Minturno.

131 Arte, p. 6 (I,iii); see Fenton, Golden Epistles, sig. Aaiv; for a view of Ovid as an astrologer, philosopher, and politician; Fenton talks of Ovid's 'resolute knowledge in all disciplines'.


133 See D.P. Walker, The Ancient Theology, 1972, pp. 1-2, from whom my phrasing is taken.

134 Interchangeable Course, sig. L5v.

135 Ancient Theology, pp. 22-3.
Walker discusses the extent to which Sidney was interested in the Ancient Theology in ch. IV of his book.


Walker, *Ancient Theology*, pp. 85-7 et seq. Walker also notes that Greek poetic mythology was often condemned by Renaissance poets as 'a bad, over-elaborate kind of veiling' (p. 96). Le Roy said that Orpheus 'folded up' his secrets in fables (Interchangeable Course, sig. L5v). See also Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man* (1486), in *The Renaissance Philosophy of Man*, ed. Ernst Cassirer et al., Chicago, 1948, pp. 250-51.


*Arte*, pp. 144-45 (III, iv).


Ibid.

*Boccaccio on Poetry*, p. 44; see also pp. 59-60 and 62.

Ibid., p. 60.

For Chapman, see Waddington, *Mind's Empire*, passim, and my previous chapter. See also Bryskett, *Civil Life*, sig. V3.

*Faerie Queene*, VI, Prologue, 3; this is quoted by Grundy, *Spenserian Poets*, p. 22.


152 On Sidney's divergence from Scaliger and his 'new' ideas about the poet, see A.C. Hamilton, 'Sidney's Idea of the "Right Poet"', CL, VI (1954), 138-47.


154 On poetic fury, see Hathaway, Age of Criticism, Part V.


156 Related to this is the idea, expressed first by Pindar, that the poet and his subject could achieve immortal fame: see Clements, Pléiade, p. 42.

157 Quoted by Shepherd, Sidney's Apology, p. 162, note 21. See also the other works cited in that note.

158 See ibid., p. 162, notes 21 and 25. See also Ronsard, quoted by Clements, Pléiade, p. 6; and Girolamo Fracastoro, Naugerius, sive De poética dialogus, trans. Ruth Kelso, Introduction by M.W. Bundy, Univ. of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, IX, iii, Urbana, 1924, p. 60; cf. Puttenham, Arte, p. 3 (I,i), and Wills, De Re Poetica, p. 121.


160 Cf. Landino, quoted by Heninger, Touches of Sweet Harmony, p. 292: 'God is the supreme poet, and the world is His poem'. See p. 287 for Sidney's relation to Landino.

161 Cf. Hamilton, 'Right Poet', p. 54. See also Tigerstedt, 'Poet as Creator', p. 460.

162 Boccaccio on Poetry, p. 39.


See Calvin, *Institutes*, II, ii, 12: 'the natural gifts were corrupted in man by sinne ... For though there remaine somewhat left of understanding and judgement together with will, yet can we not say, that our understanding is sound and perfect, which is both feeble and drowned in many darknesses.' I am quoting from Thomas Norton's translation, in the 1582 edition, sig. M5.

Not as a substitute for it: see *Apology*, 106/17-20.

See *Courteous Pastoral*, p. 209.


*Works*, IV, 58 (Novum Organum, I, 1i).


*Works*, III, 359 (Advancement, II).


Institutes, II, ii, 12 and 13.

Ibid., II, ii, 14. On Calvin's use of Plato, see Francois Wendel, *Calvin: The Origins and Development of his Religious


Ibid., I, v, 1, sig. C3.


Ibid, sig. givv.

Ibid, sigs hi-hii.

Ibid., sig. yii.

Ibid., sig. siv; see also sigs bi and si.


Institutes, I, v, 2, sig. C3.


See Apology, 132/9-17; and see Thompson, Elizabethan Criticism of Poetry, p. 18, for the large numbers of poets writing.

Introduction to Sidney's Apology, p. 76. See also Daniel Javitch, Poetry and Courtliness in Renaissance England, Princeton, 1978, pp. 97-8; and Tonkin, Courteous Pastoral, pp. 160-62 and 219-25, for discussion of the degree to which Spenser saw true courtesy as being dependent upon noble birth.


Discourse of English Poetrie, Gregory Smith, I, 246-47; see also Byskett, Civill Life, sig. V2v.

Webbe, Discourse of English Poetrie, Gregory Smith, I, 246.

Anatomie of Absurditie, Gregory Smith, I, 327.

Curtius, European Literature, p. 469.

Ars Poetica, 372-73, Ancient Literary Criticism, p. 289.

Boccaccio on Poetry, pp. 93-4.


Spingarn, Criticism in the Renaissance, pp. 128-29.

207 Epistle before Volpone, in Works, V, 17.

208 See Timber, in Works, VIII, 615ff, especially 637–40.

209 Epistle before Volpone, in Works, V, 19.

210 Timber, in Works, VIII, 583 and 576.

211 Ibid, 572, 581–82, 638.

212 Ibid., 638, and Epistle before Volpone, in Works, V, 17, 20, 18; cf. Poetaster (1601), I, ii, 240–46 (Works, IV) on the necessity of distinguishing between good and bad poets.

213 Epistle before Volpone, in Works, V, 17.


217 Barnabe Rich, Allarme to England (1578), sig. *3v, quoted by Wright, Middle-Class Culture, p. 94; Thomas Cutwode, Caltha Poetarum (1599), Roxburghe Club, 1815, sigs A4*- A5.

218 DNB, s.v. 'Cutwode'.

219 Civill Life, sig. VI^-.

220 See, for example, Crosse, Schoole of Pollicie, sigs P4^- Q1; Webbe, Discourse of English Poetrie, Gregory Smith, I, 298; Puttenham, Arte, p. 87 (II, x).


222 The Phoenix Nest, Scolar Press fascimile; cf. the title page of Sidney's Apology (Olney's edition): 'Written by the right noble, vertuous, and learned, Sir Phillip Sidney, Knight.'

Print', pp. 155-57, for some poets' insistence on their social rank to dispel the idea that they might be on a level with ballad writers.

224 I am using the word 'aristocratic' to suggest primarily intellectual aristocracy, but, as we have seen, this was often preoccupied with and gained support from the social aristocracy and those close to them in the hierarchy.

225 See ch. IV, especially pp. 91-100.

226 Ballad Revival, p. 64.


228 Essays (1600-10), ed. D.C. Allen, Baltimore, 1946, pp. 50-1, 'Of the observation and use of things'.

229 The Court and Country (1618), in Inedited Tracts, ed. W.C. Hazlitt, 1868, p. 204.


231 Burke, Popular Culture, pp. 270-81. Burke defines 'culture' as 'a system of shared meanings, attitudes and values, and the symbolic forms (performances, artifacts) in which they are expressed or embodied' (p. xi).

232 See ibid., passim.


234 See Poetry and Courtliness, pp. 3-9.

235 A distinction that has its origin in Hans Baron, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance, 1955.


239 Poetry and Courtliness, p. 15; and see ch. II.

240 Ibid., p. 68; cf. Puttenham, Arte, p. 276 (III, xxiii): 'there
is a decency to be observed in every man's action & behaviour as well as in his speech & writing .... the good maker or poet who is in decent speech & good terms to describe all things and with praise or dispraise to report every man's behaviour, ought to know the comeliness of an action as well as of a word'.


242 In *Utopia* (1516), and *A Dialogue Between Reginald Pole and Thomas Lupset* (? 1533-36). G.K. Hunter's discussion of Lyly is relevant here: see John Lyly: *The Humanist as Courtier*, 1962, especially pp. 85-8; also ch. I. See too Puttenham's careful distinction between what is fit for clerks and what for courtiers: the latter find doctrines and scholarly methods tedious and cumbersome. Poets have much in common with courtiers, we are told, even though earlier in the treatise Puttenham had continually and automatically related poetry to learning: *Arte*, pp. 158-59 (III,x).

243 *Scholars and Gentlemen*: *Universities and Society in Pre-Industrial Britain, 1500-1700*, 1970, p. 35.

244 Ibid., pp. 36-7.

245 Ibid., pp. 38-43.
Chapter Five : Perspectives on the Broadening of Learning

1 Robert Cleaver, A Plaine and Familiar Exposition of the First and Second Chapters of the Proverbes of Salomon, 1614, sig. C4v.


3 James Cleland, The Institution of a Young Noble Man (1607), Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprints, intro. by Max Molyneux, New York, 1948, M3v - M4.


5 See, for example, The Institution of a gentleman, 1555, sigs Dvv - Dvi, Fvi - Fviv (on the necessity of learning for an ambassador), and Giff (on the J.P.'s need to be well educated); Philip Bert of Vienne, The Philosopher of the Court, trans. George North, 1575, sig. Biiii; Laurentius Grimaldus, The Counsellor, trans. 1598, sigs B3v - B4v, C1 - Clv, E3, E6, F6, and H5ff; Federico Furio Cerio, A very briefe and profitable Treatise declaring howe manye counsellors, and what manner of Counsellors a Prince that will governe well ought to have, trans. Thomas Blundeville, 1570, sigs D2v - D3.


8 John Chamber, 'The praise of Astronomie', 1601, sig. E3v (appended to *A Treatise Against Judicial Astrologie*, 1601.)


19 Nicholas Breton, *The Scholler and the Souliour* (1599), in *The Works in Verse and Prose*, ed. A.B. Grosart, 2 vols, Chertsey Worthies' Library, 1879, II, 30; cf. Haniball Romel, *The Courtiers Academie*, trans. I.K., 1598, in which the seventh day's discourse is a debate on whether arts or letters should take precedence. After lengthy arguments for and against each, the countess who has been invited to pass judgement on which is
the better commends both equally: the learned man is revered, the soldier is honourable.


23 *Love's Labour's Lost*, ed. Richard David, 1951, I, i, 33-48; IV, iii, 289 and 299-300; cf. John Sturmius, *A rich Storehouse or Treasure for Nobilitye and Gentlemen*, trans. T.B., 1570, sig. CviiV: scholars must 'constantly continue in diligent reading and hearing of other, which rule if we kepe, we must chiefly avoyde three kinds of vices ... intemperance in eating and drinking ... the unseasonable companying with our friends, and much conversation with ydle persons ... walking abrode ... even those that be painfull and industrious by this evill custome in gadding are drawne to sloth.' Sturmius's work was well enough known for Shakespeare to have had it in mind.

24 *The English Gentleman*, 1630, sigs O2v-03; and see the whole of the last section of the book, entitled 'Perfection'.


26 Ibid., sigs Fff2 and Kkk2.

27 Ibid., sig. Gggl.

28 Ibid., sig. Gggl.


A Plaine and Familiar Exposition of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Chapter of the Proverbs of Salomon (1609), edition of 1615, sigs M4v and N1.

A Sermon preached at Paules Crosse the Fryday before Easter ... 1579, 1579, passim.


See, for example, Cleaver, Household Government; Josias Nichols, An Order Of Household Instrucion, 1596; William Gouge, Of Domesticall Duties (1622), in The Workes, 1627; The Office of Christian Parents, Cambridge, 1616; R.C., A godly Exhortation, and fruitfull admonition to vertuous parents, 1584; and, for modern studies, Greaves, Society and Religion, ch. VII; Christopher Hill, Society and Puritanism in Pre-Revolutionary England, 1964, ch. XIII.

Quoted by Hill, ibid., p. 443.

Diary of Lady Margaret Hoby, 1599-1605, ed. Dorothy M. Meads, 1930, passim. See also Greaves, Society and Religion, pp. 308-11, on the spiritual role of women in the household.

Exposition of First and Second Proverbes, sigs D3v- D4v.


Folded between sigs B2 and B3 of vol.I of The Workes, 3 vols, 1616-18; cf. Robert Browne's A Booke which sheweth the life and manners of all true Christians (1582), which is printed across two pages in four columns : the unlearned need study only column one, or one and two; columns three and four are for the learned.

The Arte of Propheeying, Workes, II, sig. Iii1v.

The Whole Armour of God (1616), Workes, sig. k5v.

See also, for example, William Fulke, A Briefe and plaine declaration, 1584, sigs B4 - B4v; and Nicholas Hemminge, The Preacher, or Methode of preaching, trans. I.H., 1574, sigs C3 - C6v et passim.

Cleaver, Exposition of First and Second Proverbs, sig. D1.

Ibid., sig. C4v.


The Belgicke Pismire, 1622, sigs F3, F3v, G2, B3v, F2v; cf. Ecclesiastes 12 : 9 : 'And the more wise the preacher was, the more hee taught the people knowledge'.

Exposition of First and Second Proverbs, sig. D2; see also Dod and Cleaver, A Plaine and Familiar Exposition of the Ninth and Tenth Chapters of the Proverbs of Salomon (1606), edition of 1612, sig. C3v.


Belgicke Pismire, sigs B3v- B4.

The Marian Exiles : A Study in the Origins of Elizabethan Puritanism (1938), repr. Cambridge, 1966, p. 22; and see Walter Travers, A full and plaine declaration of Ecclesiasticall Discipline, trans. Thomas Cartwright, ? Zurich or Heidelberg, 1574, sigs fivv- Gi : Christ's kingdom is not like those of this world 'wherin some one hathe the chiefe authoritie to whom the rest ought to obey and whom they call ther Lord and master. But he had appointed none greatest or greater then his fellows/ they had lerned that he was only king/to whom all ought to be obedient/and that they ought to lyve together like fellows in equal place and degree one with an other.' See also Collinson, Elizabethan Puritan Movement, pp. 93-4.


60 All these references have been to, and the quotations from, Brief Discoverie, Writings of Barrow, 1587-90, pp. 522-24.

61 English Society, p. 17; Dod and Cleaver, Ten Sermons, 1610, sig. M1 et seq.; A Plaine and familiar Exposition of the Ten Commandments (1603), edition of 1604, sig. M6; Exposition of Ninth and Tenth Proverbs, sig K1v; Perkins, A Treatise Of the Vocations, Workes, I, sig. Sss4; and Nehemiah Rogers, Christian Curtesie, 1621, sig. C3; for a classic statement of the need for order, see Elyot, Governour, I, 3-5; for acceptance of hierarchy in household relationships, see the Georges' discussion of Puritan manuals of household instruction: Charles H. and Katherine George, The Protestant Mind of the English Reformation 1570-1640, Princeton, 1961, pp. 297-305; see also 92-5 and 244-45.

62 An Answer To the two first and principall Treatises ... put forth ... under the title of An Abstract of certeine Acts of Parlement, 1584, sig. Iv⁵. (Cosin is the probable author.)


65 Elementarie, pp. 12-13; and see Vives, On Education, Bk II, chs III and IV for discussion of the same topic.

66 Positions, 1581, sigs Rii - Riii⁵.

67 Ibid., sig. Rii⁵; cf. sig. Siv⁵.

68 Ibid., sigs Siii - Siii⁵.

69 See ibid., sigs Siii⁵ - Siv.

70 Ibid., sig. Siv; though Mulcaster is well aware that enmity can arise between the common people and the learned, the former full of spite and disdain, the latter of pride and scorn: see ibid., sig. Aa1i; cf. Vives, On Education, Bk II, ch. II.

71 Positions, sig. Siv.

72 Ibid., sig. Siii⁵.

73 Ibid., sig. Siv⁵.
Elementarie, pp. 13-14.

Ibid., sig. Aai

Ibid., sigs Aai - Aai^.

Ibid., sig. TiV; though Mulcaster is always pleading for more consultation between teachers and parents: see, for example, ibid., sig. Vii.

Ibid., sigs Vi - Vi^.


See Positions, sigs Xiii^ - Ziv; also Edward Hake, A Touchstone for this time present, 1574, sigs C3^ - C5.

Positions, sig. Xiv^.


See Kelso, Lady, ch. IV.

Scholemaster, English Works, p. 201. On Elizabeth's ability as a scholar, see ibid., p. 219; also Bacon, Works, III, 306-7, and Francis Peck (ed.), Desiderata Curiosa, 2 vols, 1732 and 1735, I, 61-2; but the extent of Elizabeth's learning has been questioned by T.W. Baldwin, William Shakespeare's Small Latine and lesse Greekke, 2 vols, Urbana, 1944, I, 284 and ch. XII passim.


See Charlton, Education in Renaissance England, ch. VII.


Works, III, 326-27 (Advancement of Learning, Bk II).


Gabriel Harvey, Pierces Supererogation, 1593, sig. Aa4^.

Humane Learning, st. 116.

On the Loadstone and Magnetic Bodies, and on the Great Magnet the Earth (1600), trans. P. Fleury Mottelay, 1893, p. xlvi: 'in the discovery of secret things and in the investigation of hidden causes, stronger reasons are obtained from sure experiments and demonstrated arguments than from probable conjectures and the opinions of philosophical speculators of the common sort.'


Counsellor, sig. C5.

John Ferne, The Blazon of Gentrie, 1586, sigs Cii - Ciiii.

Ibid., sig. Avi.

Ibid., sig. BiVff.

Ibid., sigs Fii - FiiV.

Ibid., sig. FiiV.

Ibid., sig. CviiiV.

See Richard Foster Jones, The Triumph of the English Language (1953), repr. 1966, pp. 32-3; and passim for discussion of attitudes to the vernacular.


'The preface to the Reader' before his translation of Cicero's Tuscanian Disputations, entitled Those fyve Questions, 1561; see also Thomas Gale, Certaine Workes of Galens, 1586, quoted by Eleanor Rosenberg, Leicester, Patron of Letters, New York, p. 34.

Preface before Historie of the World; see also Thomas Phaer's preface to his translation of Goeurot's The Regiment of Lyfe (1544), edition of 1567.

Preface before Those fyve Questions.

Wilson, 'The Epistle to the Kyng', The rule of Reason, 1551;


109 Ibid., p. 4.


111 'The Translateur to the courteous and Christian Reader', before James's translation of Antonio Brucioli's *A Commentary upon the Canticle of Canticles*, 1598.

112 'To the curteous Reader', before *The Essayes... of... Montaigne*, edition of 1613; James had used much the same phrasing to make the same point in his preface to his translation of Brucioli. For a general discussion of the translators, their aims, and their defences of translating, and of their place in the movement to extend the audience for classical writings, see Louis B. Wright, *Middle-Class Culture in Elizabethan England*, Chapel Hill, 1935, pp. 339-53; on the translators in general, see C.H. Conley, *The First English Translators of the Classics*, New Haven, 1927, and H.B. Lathrop, *Translations from the Classics into English from Caxton to Chapman*, 1477-1620, *University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature*, XXXV, Madison, 1933.

113 For a survey see Jones, *Triumph of the English Language*, pp. 53-65 (he deals with Tyndale, More, and Becon).

114 Ibid., pp. 63-4; the quotation is from Thomas Harding.


117 Ibid., p. 121.

118 Ibid., p. 122.

120 *The Lawiers Logike*, 1588, sigs qq2*-qq3.*


128 *Of Wisdome*, sig. Kk5.

129 *The Treasurie of Auncient and Moderne Times*, trans. by Milles
out of Pedro Mexio, Francesco Sansovino, et al., 2 vols, 1613 and 1619, I, sigs Cccl - Ccc5v.

130 Essaies, sig. C5; Johnson's words were repeated by Richard Brathwait, The Schollers Medley, 1614, sig. G4.


132 Complete Gentleman, p. 37.

133 Noble Man, sigs D1v - D2.


139 On the Inns, see Wilfred R. Prest, The Inns of Court under Elizabeth I and the Early Stuarts, 1972; on the liberal education available there, see ch. VII.

140 Annales, sig. Oooo3.

141 Ibid., sig. Oooo2v.

142 Ibid., sig. Oooo3; he expands on this later: sigs Oooo4 - Oooo5v.

143 Statutes, quoted by Simon, Education and Society in Tudor England, p. 388; my information is derived from Simon. See also Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution, pp. 34ff., and Buck's account, Annales, sigs Pppp5 - Pppp5v.


146 Ibid., pp. 7-8.

147 Ibid., ch. II.

148 Queen Elizabethes Academ[y (1570), ed. F.J. Furnival, EETS, 1869, p. 10.

149 Heron, The kayes of Counsaile, p. 63.

150 Ibid., p. 69.

151 Jerome Turler, The Traveller, 1575, sig. Aiisii; this view is amplified by Johnson, Essaies, sig. E2v.

152 Works, VI, 417 ('Of Travel').


154 For types of travellers and their purposes, see Thomas Palmer, An Essay of the Meanes how to make our Travailes, into forraine Countries, the more profitable and honourable, 1606; typical itinerary, aims, and cautions are set out by Turler, Traveller, esp. Pt I; and see Lawrence Stone, The Crisis of the Aristocracy, 1558—1641, Oxford, 1965, pp. 692-702.

155 Positions, sigs Ddii - DdiiV.

156 See, for example, Heron, The kayes of Counsaile, p. 79; Robert Dallington, A Method For Travell, preceding The View Of France, ? 1605, sig. B1; Grimaldus, Counsellor, sigs Fl - FlV; Fulke Greville, A Letter of Travell, in Certaine Learned and Elegant Workes, 1633, sig. Rr5. (It is not certain that Greville wrote this: see N.K. Farmer, 'Fulke Greville's Letter to a Cousin in France and the Problem of Authorship in Cases of Formula Writing, RQ, XXII (1969), 140-47.)

157 Episode recounted and letters quoted by Conyers Read, Mr. Secretary Cecil and Queen Elizabeth, 1955, pp. 212-13. On the range of learning acceptable for a gentleman, see Kelso, English Gentleman, pp. 42-57.

158 Sidney to Denny, 22nd May 1580, in Osborn, Young Sidney, p. 538; see also John Earle, Microcosmographie (1628), repr. Temple Classics, 1899, pp. 39-40.

159 See, for example, Joseph Hall, Quo vadis ? A Just Censure Of Travell,


161 Certain Precepts, in *Advice to a Son*, ed. Wright, p. 11. Cecil wanted to send Thomas to France, 'because religion is in some good state' there: Conyers Read, *Mr. Secretary Cecil*, p. 212. On the dangers of travel, see also Palmer, *Essay of the Meanes*, sig. G2; Greville, *Letter of Travell*, sig. Rr4; Harrison, *Description*, pp. 74-5 on dangers of Italy; and for a specifically religious point of view, the anonymous *Office of Christian Parents*, sig. X2. On the need to be accompanied by a reliable tutor, see Cleland, *Noble Man*, sigs Iii1- Ii2, and *Office of Christian Parents*, sig. V4ff.


Chapter Six: Greville's *A Treatise of Humane Learning*


6 See Richard Waswo, *The Fatal Mirror: Themes and Techniques in the Poetry of Fulke Greville*, Charlottesville, 1972, pp. 6-13: while acknowledging the importance of the doctrinal differences of the various stances taken by Protestants, Waswo points to the substantial area of shared ground between the moderate and more radical reformers, and suggests that the distinction between Anglican and Calvinist can be fruitfully considered as 'a matter of differing temperamental valuations of the natural world and of man's natural capacities'. This is a distinction that 'depends not on doctrine as such, but rather on the quality and habits of the minds that react to and develop the doctrine' (p. 11).


8 These are listed by R.T. Kendall, *Calvin and English Calvinism to 1649*, Oxford, 1979, p. 1, n. 4: total depravity, unconditional election, limited atonement, irresistible grace, perseverance of the saints.

9 *A Letter to an Honorable Lady*, in *Certaine Learned and Elegant Workes*, 1633, sigs Oo 3r, and Oo4-Oo4v; cf. *A Treatise of Religion*, st. 13.

10 Ibid., st. 98. Hereafter stanza numbers of *A Treatise of Religion* will, where practicable, be recorded within the text. The edition of the treatise used is that edited by G.A. Wilkes in *The Remains* (of Greville), 1965. Cf. Romans 7:18-19: 'For I know, that in me, that is, in my flesh dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with mee: but I find no meane to performe that which is good: For I doe not the good thing, which I would, but the evill, which I would not, that doe I.'


12 See ibid., I, 52-56, especially 54-5. The problem of dating Greville's works is a vexed one: see Rebholz, *Life of Greville*,...

13 Ibid., p. 195.

14 See ibid., pp. 193-44.

15 Hereafter stanza numbers of *A Treatie of Humane Learning* will be given within the text. I have used Bullough's edition in *Poems and Dramas*, I.


17 John Sturmius's *A rich Storehouse or Treasure for Nobilitye and Gentleman*, trans. T.B., 1570, was a familiar and commended text in this period.

18 See also *Caelica*, XXXIX, 'The pride of Flesh by reach of humane wit, / Did purpose once to over-reach the skye'; and *Caelica*, CII, 'The Serpent, Sinne, by shewing humane lust'. I have used Bullough's edition of *Caelica* in *Poems and Dramas*, I.


20 *Honorable Lady, Certaine Learned and Elegant Workes*, sig. Pp2.

21 See The *Institution of the Christian Religion*, trans. Thomas Norton, edition of 1582 ('According to the Authors Last Edition'), sig. C2v (I, iv, 4): 'there is a feeling of godhead naturally graven in the heartes of men'. I, iii is devoted to showing 'That the knowledge of God is naturallie planted in the mindes of men' (sigs B8v-C1). I shall refer to Calvin's book hereafter as 'Institutes'.


24 Thesis 95, ibid., p. 136.
Atkinson, ibid., p. 82. Self-love was an inevitable consequence of the Fall for Calvin: see Wendel, Calvin, p. 132.

Cf. An Inquisition upon Fame and Honor (in Poems and Dramas, I), stanza 12, where Greville writes: 'Horrors of sinne cannot be free'd by art'.

For painstaking identifications of source material and parallel thoughts in Seneca, Agrippa, Bacon, Sextus Empiricus, and Calvin, see the studies already cited by Bullough, Buncombe, Carter, and Hattaway; I have not thought it necessary to repeat their work.

See Institutes, II, ii, 14-16.

Rather than 'the mother of Devotion' (stanza 60), which was a Catholic, and later a radical Puritan doctrine.

For fairly straightforward summaries, see Bullough's introduction to the treatise in Poems and Dramas, I, and Rees, Greville, pp. 188-98.

2 Corinthians 5:17; cf. Colossians 3:9-10: 'yee have put off the olde man with his works, And have put on the new, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him'; cf. A Treatise of Religion, st. 50, and Caelica, XCVI, 11. 47-8; also 1 Corinthians 5:7 and Religion, st. 96: renewal was a continual preoccupation of Greville's.


For Puritan talk of building, see Coolidge, ibid., pp. 44-54.

Romans 12:5; cf. 1 Corinthians 3:9: 'For we together are ... Gods building'; and 3:10: 'According to the grace of God given to me, as a skilfull master builder, I have laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereon: but let every man take heed how he buildeth upon it'; and 3:11: 'For other foundation can no man lay, then that which is laide, which is Jesus Christ.'


Ibid., pp. 36 and 27.

June Dwyer, 'Fulke Greville's Aesthetic: Another Perspective', SP, LXXVIII (1981), 255-74, pp. 259-61, briefly discusses Greville's use of building metaphors and the image of Babel, especially in relation to his view of the right use of language, but she makes no mention of the Pauline texts.

Cf. A Treatise of Religion, st. 93.
Cf. 1 Corinthians 3:16: 'Know ye not that ye are the Temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwelleth in you?'

1 Corinthians 13:1-2, 4-5. The annotations to this passage in the Geneva Bible, from which I am quoting, employ the more familiar word 'charity' instead of 'love'. The Authorized version uses 'charity'.


Works, III, 294 (Advancement, Bk I).

I have taken the phrase from Hugh Maclean, 'Fulke Greville: Kingship and Sovereignty', HLQ, XVI (1953), 237-71, p. 242, but it is a typical comment.

Some of the images are from 1 Corinthians 3:1-2: 'And I could not speake unto you, brethren, as unto spirituall men, but as unto carnall, even as unto babes in Christ. I gave you milke to drinke, and not meate.'

Honorable Lady, Certayne Learned and Elegant Workes, sig. Pp2.


'Verely I say unto you, Whatsoever ye binde on earth, shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever yee loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven.'


Poems and Dramas, I, 310 (note to Humane Learning, st. 144).

Works, III, 294; cf. IV, 20-1 (Preface to Great Instauration); for Bullough, see Poems and Dramas, I, 310.


Privilities of Courtiers and Footprints of Philosophers, a translation of the First, Second, and Third Books, and selections from the Seventh and Eighth Books of the Policraticus, by Joseph B. Pike, Minneapolis, 1938, p. 275. For the original Latin text, see Policraticus, Leiden, 1595, sig. b7 (Lib. VII, Cap. XV).

See More's letter to Gonell, 22 May, 1518(?), in Selected Letters, ed. Elizabeth F. Rogers, New Haven and Yale, repr. 1967,
p. 104; and Juan Luis Vives, De Tradendis Disciplinis (1531), trans. as Vives: On Education by Foster Watson, Cambridge, 1913, p. 26; what Vives says is particularly close to the views expressed by Creville and the other writers quoted. See also Richard Greenham, An Exposition on the 119 Psalme, The Workes, 1612, sig. Go1v.

55 See The Christian Warfare, The Second Part (1611), edition of 1634 (containing all four parts), sig. Mm1v for the parallel passage; and also compare, for example, sig. Mm2 with Bernard's Sermons on the Song of Songs, ed. cit., 235 and 236. Richard Braithwait, The English Gentleman, 1630, sig. L2v, called Bernard 'that honey-tongued Father'. Howard Schultz, Milton and Forbidden Knowledge, New York, 1955, p. 73 and notes, and pp. 8-11, observes that Bernard was often called as a witness against contemplation and curiosity.


57 On concepts of discipline, see Hill, ibid., pp. 219-58, and Walzer, Revolution of the Saints (especially on political and social implications), pp. 22-65 and 199-231.

58 Hill, Society and Puritanism, p. 225; and see pp. 242-49. Walzer sees the Calvinist state, founded upon the doctrine of discipline, as 'an order of repression'.

59 For a fuller discussion of these features of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-century life, and for references to detailed examinations of individual aspects of the problems involved, see Walzer, Revolution of the Saints, pp. 199-203.

60 Ibid., p. 204.

61 Ibid. p. 203.

62 Ibid. p. 204.

63 Hill, Society and Puritanism, p. 223.

64 On doctrines concerning discipline, see Hill, ibid., pp. 219-58, and Walzer, Revolution of the Saints, pp. 199-231.

65 Hill, Society and Puritanism, p. 220: 'it is one of the few components of English Protestantism which is not to be found in the popular native heresy, Lollardy.'

66 Certaine Learned and Elegant Workes, sigs Oo4v-Pp1.

67 It is not sufficient to say that Greville turned to government first because he was a politician. Cf. Calvin, Institutes, sigs M5v-M6 (II, ii, 13), on the necessity of law among companies of men.


71  Cf. *Monarchy*, section VII.

72  Cf. 'anti-terror' comments in *Monarchy*, sts 238 and 246.


74  *Honorable Lady, Certaine Learned and Elegant Workes*, sigs Oo3'-Oo4.


77  'Morality of Knowledge', pp. 259-60.

78  *Works*, III, 265.

79  Sidney to Denny, 22nd May 1580, in J.M. Osborn, *Young Philip Sidney, 1572-77*, New Haven, 1972, p. 538; cf. Florio's 'none know all: would all know all? they must breake ere they be so bigge.' ('To the courteous Reader' before Florio's translation of Montaigne's *Essays*, 1603).

80  *Poems and Dramas*, I, 46.
Chapter Seven: Greville's Poetic


3 'Greville's "Poetic"', p. 176.


5 Fatal Mirror, p. 39.


7 See Waswo, Fatal Mirror, p. 37; Rees, Greville, p. 199; Maclean, 'Greville's "poetic"', passim.

8 Ecclesiastes 1:18: 'For in the multitude of wisdom is much grief, and he that increaseth knowledge, increaseth sorrow. 1 Corinthians 8:1: 'wee knowe that wee all have knowledge: knowledge puffeth up, but love edifieth.'

9 See Colossians 2:8: 'Beware lest there bee any man that spoile you through philosophie, and vaine deceit, through the traditions of men, according to the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.'


11 See Waswo, Fatal Mirror, ch. III.


The Vigniture of Man, 1612, sig. D²v.

14 Of the Vanitie and uncertaintie of Artes and Sciences, trans. James San[ford] (1569), edition of 1575, sig. Fiii

15 Ibid.


18 Ibid., p. 138, 11. 6-9. The courtesan image had appeared earlier in Humane Learning (st. 77), and seems to have been a popular image, for Bacon uses it in the same manner (Works, III, 295), as does Daniel (Musophilus, 11. 591 ff.).


20 The words are Greville's, in Life of Sir Philip Sidney, ed. Nowell Smith, Oxford, 1907, p. 16.


22 Of the Vanitie, sig. Bi


25 I have used the 1607 edition of the Geneva Bible, with Laurence Tomson's translation of the New Testament. See also 1 Corinthians 2 : 4 : 'Neither stood my word, and my preaching in the entising
speech of mans wisedome, but in plaine evidence of the Spirit and of power.'

26 A Clowd Of Faithfull Witnesses ... Or, A Commentarie upon the 11. Chapter to the Hebrewes (1607), in The Workes, 3 vols, 1616-18, III, sig. ii4v. Subsequent quotations are from sigs ii5 and ii5v.


28 'Greville's "Poetic''', p. 188.

29 Greville, p. 192.

30 'Greville's "Poetic''', p. 188.

31 Life of Sidney, p. 2.

32 Apology, p. 100, 11. 22-5.

33 Cf. Life of Sidney, pp. 16, 46, and 50, where Greville uses the adjective 'poetical' in contrast to what is actual, and refers to literature as shadows.


36 See Caelica, LXXX and XXIV.


38 See also pp. 127-28. Hereafter The Life of Sidney will be cited in the text as 'Life', with page numbers following.


40 Apology, p. 104, 11. 6-8.

41 Greville possibly has Henry Peacham's The Garden of Eloquence (1577) in mind. The rocks and quicksand image is also used by Samuel Collins, A Sermon Preached at Paules Crosse, upon the 1. of November, Being All-Saints Day, Anno 1607, 1608, sig. M1v.

42 'Greville's Aesthetic', p. 264.

43 Ibid., pp. 258-59.

44 Ibid., p. 264.

Dwyer writes (p. 265): 'Once one has accepted the notion that Greville considers Sidney a poet who chooses "images of life", a great many problems are cleared away.' I would contend that the problems are the vital issue.

Apology, p. 113, ll. 20-1.

In fact Greville laboured diligently over a long period on his work: see Life of Sidney, pp. 151-53, and Sidney affirmed that 'Art, Imitation, and Exercise' were all necessary for the poet: Apology, pp. 132-33.

See Caelica, XLII, and A Letter to an Honorable Lady, in Certaine Learned and Elegant Works, 1633, sig. Nn4. It was a common image: see, for example, William Cornwallis, Essayes (1600-10), ed. D.C. Allen, Baltimore, 1946, p. 132; also Sir John Davies, cited by Bullough in his note to Humane Learning, st. 4.

The Institution of the Christian Religion, trans. Thomas Norton, edition of 1582 ("According to the Authors Last Edition"), sig. G3: 'For howe may the minde of man by his capacity define the immeasurable essence of God, which never yet could certainly determine how great is the body of the Sunne which yet he daily seeth with his eyes? Yea how may she by her own guiding attaine to discusso the substance of God, that cannot reach to know her owne substance?'

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