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Misrepresentation in Demosthenes' Deliberative Speeches.
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A Thesis submitted by
Athanassios-Vassiliou Vertsetis
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this study is to examine the cases of misrepresentation in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches in so far as the existing evidence permits such an examination.

The method of investigation was firstly to find references to the particular event described by Demosthenes in any other author, either contemporary with the event or of a later time, and then to compare these references with Demosthenes' information; secondly, to check the objectivity of our sources, and then to determine how and to what degree Demosthenes has misrepresented the facts. There follows a discussion on whether the misrepresentation was deliberate or unconscious, and on the reasons behind this deviation from the truth, considering Demosthenes' knowledge of the events, his aims, and his policy at the time he was addressing his fellow-citizens.

The historical events to which Demosthenes refers have been classified as events of earlier history, and events of Demosthenes' own time. The early history is sub-divided into Macedonian history and Athenian history.

The value of such a work, the reliability of the authors referred to, and the reasons why preference was given to the deliberative speeches, are examined in the introduction.

Concerning the early Macedonian history, the subjects considered are: Demosthenes' information on Alexander I and Perdiccas II; their relations with Athens; and matters
concerning the affinities between Macedonia and Greece.

For early Athenian history, we have examined events and personalities of the Persian wars, and of the subsequent inter-war years.

The study of Demosthenes' own time covers Philip's activities in Amphipolis, Poteidæa, Thrace, the Chersonose, and Phocis; facts concerning Philip's character; and the conditions among the Macedonians.

A classification of the cases of misrepresentation, followed by an interpretation, is presented in the conclusion.

The work closes with an appendix dealing with the sources of Demosthenes' historical knowledge.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I should like to express my gratitude to Dr. S. Usher, whom I was fortunate enough to have as my supervisor. His extensive knowledge and profound understanding of both Greek oratory and Greek history, were of great value to me in my work on a subject which required not only an acquaintance with oratorical argumentation, but also a knowledge of the historical sources.

I also wish to thank all those who gave me their help in reading and commenting on the paper.
Abbreviations

Aelian, VH  = Aelian, Varia Historia.
Aesch.  = Aeschines.
Andoc.  = Andocides.
Ar.  = Aristophanes.
(Ach. = Acharnians).
Arist.  = Aristotle.
Aristeido  = Aristeides.
Aristod.  = Aristodemus.
CAH  = The Cambridge Ancient History, Cambridge, 1923-
D  = Dindorf.
Dem.  = Demosthenes.
Deinarch.  = Deinarchus.
Diod.  = Diodorus of Sicily.
FGrH  = F. Jacoby, Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker, Berlin and Leyden, 1923-
Herod.  = Herodotus.
I.G.  = Inscriptiones Graecae. I.G.i²,ii² = Editio Minor.
Isocr.  = Isocrates.
(Antid. = Antidosis).
Lys.  = Lysias.
Nepos  = Cornelius Nepos.
(Alcib., Cim. = Alcibiades, Cimon).
Paus.  = Pausanias.
Plut.  = Plutarch.
(Αθ. Πολ. = 'Ἀθηναίων πολιτείας).
R  = Reiske.
RE  = Paully-Wissowa-Kroll, Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1894-
Theop.  = Theopompus.
Thuc.  = Thucydides.
Xen.  = Xenophon.
(Cyrop., Hell. = Cyropaedia, Hellenica).
INTRODUCTION

PART ONE: MISREPRESENTATION CONCERNING PAST EVENTS

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Introduction

I Demosthenes is an historical figure who, from his own time until today, has been treated with either great approbation or violent disapproval. In the past the pendulum of judgement on Demosthenes' character and principles has swung violently between the opposing extremities, and Demosthenes has been considered either as a champion of human liberty or as a representative of the most reactionary narrow-mindedness.

His supporters admired his policy and generally approved the methods he employed to achieve his aims 1). His

1) Plutarch says of Demosthenes: "πολύ μεγάλων θεμιστοκλέους και Ἀλκιβίαδου παρά τάς αύτὰς τάς τύχας φανείς πολίτης ", Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero, iv (2). Cf. Dem. xiii (4) and xxii(4). Likewise Lucian: "Ὁ Δημοσθένης ἐφάμιλλος θεμιστοκλεί μέν τήν σύνεσιν, Περικλεί δέ τὸ φρόνημα (ἐγένετο) ", In praise of Demosthenes, 37. The rhetorician Libanius considered Demosthenes more consistent in his patriotism than Themistocles, since the latter took refuge in the court of his declared enemy, the King of Persia, while the former chose to die honourably rather than spend his life under his enemies' domination. "Progymnasmata", In praise of Demosthenes, 17 (R IV 952).

Of the modern historians, Niebuhr considered Philip as the Napoleon of ancient times, and Demosthenes as his real persecutor. G. Grote admired Demosthenes and expressed the opinion that he "towers above the greatest of his predecessors for half a century before his birth - Pericles, (cont'd.)
opponents see in his work a narrow-minded parochialism and a not entirely honest pursuit of success 1).

Whether the policy which Demosthenes maintained is right or otherwise, need not concern us. Previous historians and scholars dealing with this subject have reached no agreement, and justifiably so, since it is difficult for us to form a disinterested opinion about a person's policy "a posteriori", especially when this policy did not have good results, because we are usually influenced by the outcome and we frequently have the tendency to approve an effort in proportion to its success. The logical fallacy of "post hoc, propter hoc" applies in this case, and from ancient times

(cont'd.).


1) Theopompus, the historian contemporary of Demosthenes, described him as "ἀδέσποτον τῷ τρόπῳ γεγονόντα καὶ μήτε πράγματι μήτ' ἀνθρώποις πολὺν χρόνον τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιμένειν δυνάμενον "; Plut. Dem. xiii (1). The contemporary politician Demades says: "'Ὁ Δημοσθένης ὁ πισχός συνοφάντης ", and "'Ὁ Δημοσθένης ἀνθρωπάριον ἐν συλλαβῶν καὶ γλάσσης συγκείμενος ", On the twelve years 33, 51. Also Deinarchus "τούτο τὸ κάθαρμα ", "διορθόδοκον ὃντα καὶ κλέπτην καὶ προδότην τῶν φίλων καὶ τῆς πόλεως ἀνάξιον ", "μιαρόν...θηρίου ", Against Dem. 16,41,50, and the Latin rhetorician Quintilian "malum virum accipi mus" XII 1(14).

The historian Polybius also criticized Demosthenes' political attitude "δ.66 (Δημοσθένης) πάντα μετρών πρὸς τὸ τῆς ἱδίας πατρίδος συμφέρον...ἀγνοεῖν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ πολὺ παραπαίειν τῆς ἀνθρεῖας "(17). For a systematic collection of these opinions see E.Drerup, Demosthenes im Urteile des Altertums (von Theopomp bis Tzetzes), Würzburg 1923. Demosthenes also has accusers amongst the modern historians, for instance J.Droysen, A.Holm, E.Meyer, E.Drerup etc.
its application in the specific case of Demosthenes is quoted by Aristotle 1). Of course, this is not a true method of judgement, for sometimes a collective enterprise is unsuccessful in outcome, as happens in political affairs, due to the failure of a particular section of society to perform its part in it. Demosthenes' policy no doubt failed in its final goal, but no one would be able to prove that it was of necessity bound to fail 2).

There is also another difficulty in drawing a firm conclusion about Demosthenes' political attitude: For many, Demosthenes' struggle against Philip typifies the conflict between democracy and autocracy; thus, this struggle is perpetuated, in part, by modern adherents to those systems. Also, the contrasting political views of Demosthenes and Isocrates have given rise to persistently opposed attitudes among many scholars.

Thus, the influence of contemporary political affairs, and possibly the private political bent of certain scholars, which was revealed 3) no matter how impartial they tried to be, has affected many modern scholars, especially those

1) Rhct. II 24(8) - 1401 b (29-34).
2) See A.W. Gomme, Essays in Greek History and Literature, 1937, pp. 204-247.
3) For an interesting analysis of these phenomena, see A. Momigliano, "George Grote and the Study of Greek History". Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici I, Rome, 1935, pp. 213-231.
amongst the Germans 1), who, because of the many political crises of their past, have carried out much work under this influence.

However, although the final judgement on Demosthenes' political attitude appears difficult because it is based on no stable ground 2), there is nevertheless one reliable method of arriving at a firm conclusion about his responsibility as a politician and adviser of the people. To arrive at this conclusion we must first decide whether the methods employed by Demosthenes were constant and also honest. But, since even in this case it is not always possible to examine these methods thoroughly, owing to the fact that we do not know today all the intentions and objectives of the political personages and factions of that period, we must examine especially one particular part of the methods, something which forms a more definite and substantial element: that is, the historical material 3).

1) Droysen, E.Meyer, Drerup, Kaerst, Kahrstedt, Pöhlmann, Wendland etc., especially as regards their defence of Isocrates. For an account of the motives behind this trend see J.Knipfing, German historians and Macedonian imperialism, AHR 26 (1920), pp.657-671.

2) For example, it was hardly possible for any of the Greeks of that time to appreciate that the period of the city-state was at an end, whereas the assessment of the modern historian is inevitably coloured by the weight of later knowledge of the evolution of the events, and the particular influences of his age and situation.

3) The employment of historical examples in the orators generally has been discussed in broad terms, mainly by L.Pearson in "Historical allusions in the Attic orators", CP 36 (1941), pp.209-229, and by S.Perlman in "The historical (cont'd.)
which Demosthenes, like any other speaker, introduced into his argument in order to shape the will of his fellow-citizens, and consequently, the decisions of his state.

A scrupulous examination of the way in which Demosthenes used the historical elements and the conclusions drawn on this point will greatly influence our final judgement upon Demosthenes' purposes as a trustworthy statesman and also his sincerity as a responsible orator. A decision on this question of details will throw more light on the study of those problems concerning Demosthenes' general policy than any examination proceeding from the wider aspects of his attitudes.

Historical material is an objective, firm and unchanging element 1), which can show us the reliability of an author,

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(cont'd).....

example, its use and importance as political propaganda in the Attic orators", Scripta Hierosolymitana VII (1961), pp.150-166. A work on the use made by the Attic orators and historians of the ancestors as an historical example and model is that of K. Jost, "Das Beispiel und Vorbild der Vorfahren bei den attischen Rednern und Geschichtsschreibern bis auf Demosthenes", Rhetorische Studien 19, Paderborn 1936.

As far as I know, the only specific work on one orator alone is that on Isocrates by G. Schmitz-Kahlmann, "Das Beispiel der Geschichte im politischen Denken des Isocrates", Philologus Supplementband XXXI (1939).

1) The part which the historical example plays in the oratory and its relation to the enthymema is pointed out by Aristotle in Rhet. II 20(9) - 1394 a 10.
especially if his misrepresentation and misuse of this material is considered in particular.

II Nevertheless, there are difficulties to be found, as usually happens with historical affairs ¹), and in this survey there is in particular the problem of the sources with which the information given by Demosthenes is to be compared. That is, the problem of the adequacy of the sources we are bound to use, and, further, of how certain events of history actually happened, and consequently, of how far from the truth Demosthenes deviates in his narration of these events.

In considering, for instance, such information as we have on the Macedonian past, we must bear in mind that no history of Macedonia was written before Philip's time, and the only information we have on the subject is that given in passing reference by the authors of southern Greece. As concerns the orators, it is clear enough that they tended to draw their examples exclusively from the Athenian past rather than from the history of other states ²):

Examples from this usually provided the basis for the accusation of an opponent, and Demosthenes in particular refers to the Macedonian history only when he wishes to

¹) "Οὔτως ἐξομα πάντη χ λ ε π ὅ ν εἶναι καὶ ὅ ν σ ῥ α - τ ο ν ἱστορία τάληθες, ἦταν οἱ μὲν ὑστερον γεγονότες τῶν χρόνων ἔχωσιν ἐπιπροσθούντα τῇ γνώσει τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ βίων ἡλικίωτις ἱστορία τὰ μὲν φθόνοις καὶ ὑσυμνεῖαις τὰ δὲ χαριζομένη καὶ κολακεύουσα λ ν μ α ἡ ν τ α ν καὶ διὰ στρεφθέντος ἄλγειαν " Plut. Per. xiii (16).

²) E.g. Isocr. V 113; Dem. III 23ff, XIII 21ff, XIX 196ff, etc.
discover new factors for his case against Philip. Therefore, our information on the past history of Macedonia is scanty and frequently one-sided.

As a main source for the Persian wars we have the narrative of Herodotus, which, although written with industry and honesty, still contains mistakes and shows omissions. Moreover, as the need frequently occurs to investigate particular details, we must have recourse to the writings of later authors, such as Diodorus, Plutarch, and others, the defects of which are considerable, as will be demonstrated in this introduction.

For the "pentecontaetia", that is, the inter-war years, we have the brief excursus of Thucydides' History (I 89-117 and 123-138), which, although written by an historical authority, as Thucydides was, is none the less inadequate and is treated from a one-sided point of view. The main purpose of Thucydides' work was to show that the real reason behind the outbreak of the war was the growth of the

1) Some of the mistakes are that myth and history are confused in his chapter on Egypt; the numbers he gives for Xerxes' forces in 480 are false; his account of the Ionians is distorted, because of his Samian sources; in the Greek affairs, the Athenian influence on him in general can be seen. He has highly flattered Athenian pride. Even in his own day, Herodotus' work was harshly criticized; he himself felt the need to answer this criticism (VI 42). Thucydides (I 20) challenged Herodotus' statements (VI 57, IX 53), Aristophanes (Ach. 513ff) parodied his preface, and Plutarch (On the malice of Herodotus) accused him of deliberate falsification of the facts (κακοφησίας ἢμας ἔργων, 7). Of the modern historians, A.H.Sayce, The ancient empires of the East, Herodotus I-III (1883), repeated the anti-Herodotean attitude and was followed by other historians.
Athenian power 1), and thus the excursus contains some amazing omissions 2), and we must turn to other sources for its completion. Also the objectivity of Thucydides' judgement at this point has been questioned 3) and so care must be taken, even in this case.

The narrative of Diodorus must again be used, as it is the only complete account of this period.

The above mentioned historical periods are those to which Demosthenes in his deliberative speeches almost exclusively refers, because these periods offer him the rhetorically effective examples from the past which he needs. That is, Demosthenes turns to the past mainly when he wishes to discover standards of comparison with contemporary political situations and his fellow-citizens. Within these limits, he resorts almost always to the glorious moments of the Athenian past, and he refers almost exclusively to persons and situations of the Persian wars and of the following inter-war years when the Athenians established their Empire and enjoyed moments of glory and superiority, attested by the trophies and the other monuments of genius and art known to Demosthenes' contemporaries.

1) "τὴν μὲν γὰρ ἀλήθειαν πρὸς τὴν πρὸς τὴν, ἄφανεστά-

τὴν ἐξ ἀληθείας, τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡγούμενος μεγάλους ἱστορικοὺς ὁμοσποδόμους καὶ φόρον παρεχόμενος τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ὑπὸ σιωπᾶν ἐκ τῶν πολιτικῶν " I 23(6).

2) See A.W.Gomme, A historical commentary on Thucydides, I (1945), pp. 365-70.

Demosthenes' policy is inspired by a strong and deep sensitivity to the past grandeur of Athens, and the period of the Persian wars and after most suited his requirements 1).

Concerning Demosthenes' own times, the difficulties of the sources are more considerable. Unfortunately, there is no complete exposition still extant of the historical events of this age by a contemporary historian, but only fragments of Theopompus 2), Ephorus 3), Demophilus 4), Anaximenes of Lampsacus 5), and also of Duris 6), Diylus 7), and Philochorus 8), who lived slightly later.

The "Library of History" of Diodorus of Sicily, which is the first continuous narration of this period, is much later, and although some events are treated in great detail, others of great importance are compressed in the extreme, or even omitted entirely 9). We are also handicapped by the fact that he was careless in his composition and was a man of little judgement.

The epitome of Justin, which is also a continuous exposition of the events, is meagre and of no special value.

1) Demosthenes is alone amongst the Greek orators in that he takes almost none of his examples from mythology. The only reference he makes to mythology is in XXIII 65-74.
2) FGrH II B, 115, pp.526-617.
3) FGrH II A; 70, pp.37-109.
4) FGrH II A, 70, pp.65-67.
5) FGrH II A, 72, pp.112-130.
6) FGrH II A, 76, pp.136-158.
7) FGrH II A, 73, pp.130-132.
8) FGrH III B, 328, pp. 97-160.
9) See C. Wachsmuth, Einleitung in das Studium der alten Geschichte, pp.94 ff.
Plutarch and Strabo give us some information, but their intentions were not purely historical 1). Other later writers, such as Polyaeon, Aelian, and the various Scholiasts etc., are less informative and of no particular importance.

As for the work of the historians contemporary with Demosthenes, the fact that such fragments as we have are preserved in insufficient quantity to allow any comparative examination into the details, cannot be said to be the only drawback. In the final analysis the narratives of Diodorus and the other later authors contain excerpts and information from their works. These contemporary historians were the chief authorities for all the later writers. One main problem is that of the quality of the historical information given by these historians, who wrote in an age which was notoriously interested more in style and rhetorical devices in writing than in the objective presentation of events.

Theopompus, though a learned and industrious worker 2), is considered politically biased and prejudiced 3), and

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1) Plutarch says of himself: "Οὐ τε γὰρ ἐστιν ὁλὸς ὁ ἐπιφανεστάταις πρόκειται πάντως ἔνοχος ἀδελφός ἡ λαϊκής ἡ καπελος, ἄλλα πράγμα βραχύ πολλάς καὶ βῆμα καὶ παράδο τῆς ἐμφασιν ἤθους ἐπόησε μᾶλλον ἢ μάχαι μυριδ-νεκροι."Alex. I(2). Strabo is known to us from his geographical work.

2) See Dionysius of Hal., Letter to Gn. Pompeius c.6; and also Athenaeus III 85 a.

violent in thought and expression 1). His moralizing is somewhat ineffective and his judgment often deliberately misleading 2). He was also an orator 3).

Ephorus, highly respected among many later authors 4), had a background of research, but educated as he was 5) with an Isocratean outlook on history 6), was unable to rise

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1) That Theopompus was "maledicentissimus" is attested by: Dionysius of Hal., The Roman Antiquities I(1), Letter to Gn.Pompeius c.6(8-9); Polybius VIII 17(1)-13(2); Lucian, How to write History, 59; Cicero. Letters to Atticus II 6(2); Nepos, Alcib. xi; Plutarch, Lysand. XXX; Suda s.v. "Εφορος and others.


3) See Theopompus' fr.25; Dionysius of Hal., Letter to Gn. Pompeius, c.6(1); Quintilian, Education of an orator, X i 74; Suda s.v. Οἰκόμων. Cf. Cicero, Brutus 66.

4) Polybius had some respect for Ephorus, especially for his narrative of the fourth century (XII 25f, cf.VI 45(1) and IX 1). Strabo had a high regard for him (XIII 3(6), c.622. Cf. VIII 1(1), c.332 and X 3(5), c.465). Plutarch often quotes him.

5) He was, like Theopompus, a pupil of Isocrates (Strabo XIII 3(6), c.622, and others). For the influence of Isocrates on Ephorus and Theopompus see R. von Scala, "Isocrates und die Geschichtsschreibung", Verhandlungen etc. (1892), pp. 102-121; G.L.Barber, The Historian Ephorus (1935),pp.75-83; G.Murray, op.cit., pp.150-153. For an opposite view, see F.Jacoby, FGrH III b 2, p.90 n.84.

6) The Isocratean view of history was that it was the handmaid of politics. See IV 9. Cf. C.Bradford Welles, "Isocrates' view of History", in "The Classical tradition" (1966), Cornell Univ. press, pp.3-25.
above the general tendencies of his epoch to use rhetorical power in order to exaggerate virtue and vice 1). It is probable that he also started out on the career of a public orator 2). But in general he is held to be honest 3), and it is regrettable that his work has not come down to us. Diodorus preserved much of Ephorus' work.

The value of Diodorus, who is the most informative author, depends in every case on which historian he has copied 4), and on the presence or lack of further authorities. It is to be regretted that he was a careless compiler and an historian of little judgement. Contradictions in his writing are a common occurrence. There is a striking unevenness in book XVI, which deals with the events of

1) See Wilamowitz, "Greek Historical writing " , p.10 (translation G.Murray); also G.L.Barber, op.cit., pp.84-105.
2) See Seneca, On the tranquillity of mind, vii (2).
3) G.L.Barber, op.cit., p.35; also S,Usher, op.cit , p. 102.
4) Diodorus has used Ephorus continuously for books XI-XV (see Jacoby FGrH II c, p.33), that is, for the fifth century and the first half of the fourth century B.C., and he followed Ephorus and Duris according to A.Monigiano (Rendiconti Instituto Lombardo LXV (1932),pp.523-543), or Ephorus and Diyllus according to N.G.L.Hammond (CQ XXXI (1937),pp.79-91) for book XVI, and for the chapters referring to the events in the Greek homeland. C.Bradford Welles, in his introduction to the Loeb edition of Diodorus, Vol. VIII (p.5), holds that Diodorus' portrait of Philip is taken from Theopompus. Another work on Diodorus' sources in book XVI is that of P.Treves, Annali della R.Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa; Lettere, Storia e Filosofia, II 6(1937), pp.255-79. See also R.Drews,"Diodorus and his sources ", AJPh 82(1962), p.383ff. Of the earlier works, the more important are: Volquardsen, Untersuchungen etc. (1868), pp.107-118, and Pack, in Hermes XI (1876), pp.179-20.
Demosthenes' time 1). Nevertheless, his lack of originality has some advantage for us: we frequently have the borrowed passage in almost its original form, always, of course, provided that there are no mistakes in the copying or rephrasing of the original 2), since Diodorus is considered as having followed his sources closely.

So, it is with these historical sources that we must compare Demosthenes' representation of the facts, both past and contemporary, in order to draw as firm a conclusion as our sources permit about his reliability and sincerity.

Generally speaking, an historian, even if he belongs to a later age, must be considered more trustworthy than a

1) Some of Diodorus' contradictions in book XVI are:
Philip is said to have been educated with Epaminondas (2 (3) ), although the former was born in 383 and the latter in 411 B.C.. The duration of the Sacred War is said to be eleven years at 14(3), nine at 23(1) and ten years at 59(1). Different deaths are attributed to Onomarchus and his soldiers at 35(6) and 61(2). Onomarchus is described as the instigator of the Sacred War (38 (6) ), although this action has been ascribed to Philomelus in three other passages, 23, 32, 61. The latter is described as having touched the dedications of Delphi at 28(2) and 56(5), although at 30(1) Diodorus said the opposite. The Athenian general Chabrias died twice, XV 34(4) and XVI 7(3), Torone, Chalcidice and the battle of Embata are placed in Hellespont, 53(2), 53-55, 7 and 21-22. The Peace of Philocrates is not mentioned at all. For some other cases see A.Schaefer, I 170 and 486, II 180-1 etc..

2) J.Palm, Uber Sprache und Stil des Diodorus von Sizilien (1955), has shown that Diodorus often rephrased his sources and sometimes distorted them. The fact that Diodorus created a style of his own is also shown by S.Usher in "Development of Post-Attic Prose Narrative Style "(1955)p. 138.
political orator, due to the difference in their aims:
"παραπλησιόν γάρ φαίνεται μαθηματικόν τε πιθανολογούντος ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικόν ἀποδείξεις ἀπαίτειν" ¹).

On the other hand, the orator has some advantages on his side: he addresses his fellow citizens who, aware of the contemporary events, will not accept blindly any deviation from the real facts. The narrative must not be in error concerning events known to the audience ²). In this respect there is considerable pressure on the orator not to stray far from the truth.

Also, the speeches of the orator lead us into direct contact with the public and private affairs of the people by their references and allusions to facts which formal histories sometimes gloss over or mitigate and thus force

¹) The orators sometimes show themselves to be amazingly ignorant of history, and insufficient attention is paid by many modern Scholars to the historical examples in their narratives. G. Grote (V,p.6,n.1) remarked: "We have many specimens of the careless manner in which ancient Greek orators deal with past history". F. Jacoby (FGrH III b 1,p. 95) speaks of the "astonishing ignorance of most of the Attic orators...". However, an appreciation of the historical value of Andicides may be found in A. W. Gomme, op. cit.I,p.39.

²) Demosthenes says: "έσται...γνώριμος ὃμιν ὁ λόγος", III 23, and Deinarchus: "ταῦτα ὤμεις ὅρωντες καὶ ἐπιστάμενοι πολὺ βέλτιον ἦ ἔγνω" Against Demosthenes 33.

On the subject of how far an orator was taking the historical knowledge of his audience into consideration, see L. Pearson, loc. cit. and previously H. Crosby, "Athenian history and the Athenian public ", Classical Studies, presented to E. Capps (Princeton 1936), esp. pp. 82-84.
us to misinterpret the facts or to be misled by them 1).

Therefore, in our comparison between the information Demosthenes gives us and that of other historians, certain rules must be followed in order to achieve reliable results: Where Demosthenes contradicts primary sources, we must reject his information unless we have strong reason to believe that his view is the more feasible. When a derivative later author represents the facts differently from Demosthenes, we have always to take into consideration the authenticity of the writer, and furthermore, to try to find out the opinions of other writers on him.

In the case of two derivative later historians contradicting each other with the result that one rejects Demosthenes while the other agrees with him, we must estimate the value of each of these sources and furthermore we must decide whether the better source gives plausible information. Generally speaking, we have tried to collect more than one source opposing Demosthenes' views.

1) In addition to this, we must remember that the orators, as politicians, must have had a good knowledge of history. Books of travel, and books of history, were, according to Aristotle, necessary for a politician (Rhet. 1360 a 25ff). Quintilian, in his advice on the education of an orator, considers the knowledge of history to be an essential part of the orator's abilities (Institutes of Oratory XII 4). Cicero remarked: "Nam quis nescit, primum esse historiae legem, ne quid falsi dicere audeat " (On Oratory II 62). In fact, history must have been part of the educational curriculum of an orator.
Any information given by another orator, even Isocrates, cannot be considered as necessarily better or worse without adequate reason. Every time Demosthenes contradicts himself, there is obviously some inaccuracy. In each of these cases we must try to discover where the orator has told the truth and where he has done otherwise, or why possibly in both cases he is wrong, and whether the inaccuracy was deliberate or not.

III Some clarification is required concerning Demosthenes' misrepresentation of historical facts in his deliberative speeches: First of all, with the term "misrepresentation" we do not exclude mistaken opinions. This term is considered as covering better than any other the contents of this work. Secondly, when we say that we are examining the misrepresentations in Demosthenes' deliberative speeches, rather than other speeches, we do not exclude any other references to the same event which can be found in any other speeches. This means that we start from passages of Demosthenes' deliberative speeches, but we examine and verify all other references which can be found in his other speeches. We do not examine independent cases which occur in other speeches, but do not appear in the deliberative speeches. This was decided upon with the aim of considering, if possible, all the cases of misrepresentation in Demosthenes' speeches delivered in the "ecclesia". That is, in the orations which Demosthenes pronounced to stir up
the Athenians both against Philip of Macedon, and on occasions of public deliberation.

No artistic elements were taken into consideration when the material to be examined was selected. In such a case the speech "On the Crown", for instance, would have held priority of place; but, since a narrative concerning a statesman's policy in later years is politically less important than a speech delivered in a certain case which is relevant to the formation of the State's policy, Demosthenes' historical references were considered to be of no special significance in this, or any other forensic speech.

The deliberative speeches, on the other hand, delivered in front of the people at any crucial moment for the State, when the people were obliged to decide the best for their city, are considered as including historical material more pertinent to our judgement of a political man. This is because better evidence can be extracted from statements made in a deliberative harangue than in an accusatory speech. The orator must on the whole be more discreet, according to the rules which governed deliberative oratory. Aristotle has remarked:

"καλλίωνος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας οὔσης ἢ τῆς περὶ τὰ συναλλάγματα " ¹), and also " ήττόν ἦστι πρὸ ἔργου τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν ἐν τοῖς δημηγορικοῖς καὶ ήττόν ἦστι κακούργουν ἢ δημηγορία δικαιολογίας, ὅτι κοινότερον " ²).

Also, the deliberative speeches are totally connected

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1) Rhet. 1354 b (20).
2) Rhet. 1354 b (25).
with the particular occasions on which they were delivered, and the speaker who gave them holds considerable responsibility for whatever solution was proposed for a political problem.

In short, the historical material in the forensic speeches is used especially for justification of past events, but in the deliberative speeches it is an element of argumentation during a period of vivid political action. This applies especially when reference is made to the ancient Greek democracy, where the system of the immediate participation of the people in the final decision of the city had given the orator the possibility to shape the policy of his country.

In the present time, representation of the people through members of parliament belonging to a party with certain precepts predetermines the decision of the parliament and quite often renders discussion useless.

In the ancient Greek "ecclesia", a decision from the people "a priori" was almost impossible, and the speech of the orator was necessary to form the will of the people, that is, to form the final decision of the State. Under such circumstances the responsibility of the orator for the material he used in a deliberative speech is obvious, and any attempt to mislead the people with false information with regard to the basic elements for the formation of their decision would clearly be obnoxious. The orator may

1) Isocrates laid stress on the important part the spoken and written word can play in politics:

"οἱ λόγοι τοιαύτην ἔχουσι τὴν φύσιν ἐσθ' οἷον τ' εἶναι περὶ τῶν (cont'd.)
misjudge the situation, and in some cases the people could easily follow his false line of reasoning, but the misrepresentation of the historical facts by the occasional exploitation of the people's ignorance appears as a cold-blooded injury to the city.

As far as this concerns Demosthenes, Aeschines strongly maintains that the former frequently falsified the facts:

"ἡγεῖται δ' ὅταν τι φεύγῃ (ὅ Δημοσθένης) τῶν λόγων ἄρκος κατὰ τῶν ἀναισχύντων ὕθελαιμον, καὶ τὰ μὴ γεγενημένα οὐ μόνον. δ' εἰς τί λέγει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν, ἐν ὃ ψησι γενέσθαι καὶ προστίθησι τινος ὄνομα πλασάμενος, ὡς ἔτυχε παρὰ, μιμοῦμενος τοῦς τάληθ᾿ λέγοντας " 1).

Demosthenes, far from accepting such an accusation, emphasizes the importance of speaking truthfully in a society which was dependent on the speeches of the orators:

"οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστῃ τί μὲν ὡς ὅ τι τοῖς μιμοῦσις μέγεθος περιθείναι, καὶ τὰ τῶν παλαιών καινώς διελθεῖν καὶ περὶ τῶν νεωτέρῳ γεγενημένων ἀρχαῖος εἶπείν " IV 8.

(cont'd.)...

1) On the Embassy 153. And again "Δημοσθένης δ' ὅταν ἀλαζόνει ἤται (cheats you) πρῶτον μὲν μεθ' ἄρκον φεύγῃ, ἐξῆλειαν ἐπαράμενος εὐαυτῷ, δεῦτερον δὲ, ἡ εὖ οὐδέν οὔδέποτε ἔκαμενα, τολμᾷ λέγειν εἰς ὅπερ ἔσται, καὶ δὲν τὰ σωματα σοὶ ἔδρατε, τοῦτον τὰ ὀνόματα λέγει, κλέπτει γὰρ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ μιμοῦμενος τοῖς τάληθ᾽ λέγοντας " Against Ctesiphon 99. Also Deinarchus "Δημοσθένης τῷ φεύγῃ καὶ μηδὲν ὄγεις λέγειν ἐτοίμως χρηται, καὶ οὕτ᾽ αἰσχύνης οὕτ᾽ ἐλέγχου οὕτ᾽ ἀράς οὐδέν αὐτῷ μέλει " Against Demosthenes 48.

2) XIX 184.
It is hoped that, in the subsequent detailed examination of the cases of misrepresentation on the part of Demosthenes, much light will be thrown on his purposes as a statesman and his sincerity as an orator, and also that this examination will lead to a deep penetration of the thoughts and the profound intentions of Demosthenes.

IV. The titles of the works of the ancient authors are given in the English translation, mostly as they appear in the Loeb Classical series.

When square brackets are required for the clarification of the Greek passages, parentheses are used for technical reasons.

Demosthenes' speeches are mostly given with their Latin enumeration.

Proper names are mostly written with the Latin spelling.

When the title of a modern Scholar's work is not written in full, the complete title can be found in the bibliography at the end of this thesis.

Quotations derived from those speeches which are considered spurious have been treated with great caution.

Since it is understood that the procedure of proving something by using quotations from authors is frequently invalid if the quotation does not convey the genuine ideas of the writers, care has been taken that our excerpts from the ancient authors should always be representative of their precepts, as expressed in their writings.

The attempt has been made to support all information given in the argument with actual evidence.
Any conclusion formed on the true occurrence of events is usually based on more than two quotations.

The abbreviations of the periodicals are those of L'Année Philologique.

When the title of a work by a modern Scholar is not mentioned, and more than one book is given under his name in the bibliography, it is in this case the first book to which reference has been made.
PART ONE
MISREPRESENTATION CONCERNING PAST EVENTS

I. Macedonian history before Demosthenes' time.

Chapter One
Honours granted to the reigning Macedonian King at the time of the Persian Wars.

In the above passages, Demosthenes twice attributes the honour of the attack on the remnants of the Persian army, which were in retreat after their defeat at Plataea, to the later Macedonian King, Perdikkas II, instead of to Alexander I, and he also contradicts himself in that on
one occasion he considers Perdiccas (and not, as it should be, Alexander) as having been honoured by the Athenians with "citizenship", but on a second occasion as having been granted only "immunity from taxes" and not "citizenship".

We shall examine first the mistake concerning the name of the Macedonian King, and secondly the contradiction.

The narrative of Herodotus leaves no doubt that during the Persian invasions of Greece the King of Macedonia was Alexander I.

Also, Plutarch confirms that Alexander was still in power in 453 B.C., when Cimon recovered Thassos.

Perdiccas, as is apparent from Thucydides, was King at the time of the Peloponnesian war, and it was he who instigated the rebellion of Poteidaea, one of the events which led to the downfall of the Athenian Empire.

Such misrepresentation is certainly surprising, because there is a lapse of thirty to forty years between the Persian invasion and the time when Perdiccas came to power.

In any case, there is no plausible reason for Demosthenes to lay the honour of the attack on the Persians at the

1) See Herod. V 17ff; VII 173-4; VIII 34, 121, 136ff; IX 44ff.
2) Cimon xiv(2).
4) I 57.
5) We do not know the exact point at which Perdiccas came to power. See Athenaeus V 217 d-e, and J. Papastavru, Α' ἱδρυσις βασιλείς Περσικῶν τοῦ Β'(1939); Beloch III 2 49-72; Geyer, s.v. Macedonia in R.E. and "Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II", in Historische Zeitschrift, Beiheft 19 (1930).
feet of Perdiccas, since an accurate account of the events would serve his argumentation equally well. Perdiccas could not be more popular amongst the Athenians on account of the role he played in the rebellion of Poteidaea, and his conduct on the whole during the Peloponnesian war 1).

Any suggestion that Demosthenes attributed the honour of this attack to Perdiccas so that he could later strike at Alexander, as he really did in 344 B.C. 2), does not appear at all plausible. Surely Demosthenes could not foresee what he would claim in an argument made six years in the future (or eight, if we count from the earlier passage), and it is even more unlikely that he could have planned so far ahead.

Therefore, since the above arguments have been discounted, the only plausible reason which remains for Demosthenes' error is that his memory was at fault.

The fact that Demosthenes uses the correct name in a speech delivered later in 344 B.C. 3) means that as he became older, the orator could have attained a deeper understanding of the historical events of the past.

On the subject of Demosthenes' self-contradiction, the following is worth noting:
Since Demosthenes contradicts himself in particular when dealing with one short period of time and in speeches where he had a reason for representing the facts in the way which he does, he is guilty of distorting the truth.

1) See p. 39
2) VI 11. Cf. chapter four.
3) VI 11.
There are also other reasons in addition to this which reinforce the above view:

Firstly, Demosthenes in the speech "On Organization" has copied almost word for word the whole paragraph (24), which he had first written two years previously in his speech "Against Aristocrates" (200), only changing the term "citizenship" to "immunity from taxes", using the words to suit his purpose in both cases.

Secondly, he has made just the same alteration in the preceding narration with regards to Meno of Pharsalus. This excludes the possibility of a lapse of memory on his part when referring to the Macedonian King.

The reason for the misrepresentation is obviously Demosthenes' wish to create rhetorically effective examples.

As for the subject of the honours attributed to Alexander I, we learn from Herodotus that the Athenians bestowed on him the title of "proxenus and benefactor", but, since the privileges granted to the "proxenoi" by the Athenians were not always the same, we cannot be certain of when Demosthenes is right and when

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1) XIII, 23; XXIII, 199. Dem. also speaks of Meno as having supported the Athenians in one case with three hundred cavalrymen from his own vassals, while in the other case he speaks of two hundred horsemen.
2) VIII 136(1). Cf. 143(3).
3) For privileges granted to proxenoi by the Athenians, see ML GHI, 70, 80, 82, 87, 90. Literary examples of proxenoi are listed in Liddell-Scott's Lexicon, s.v. πρόξενος. Cf. C. Phillipson, The international Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (1911), Chapter 6.
he is not. However, a granting of "citizenship" seems to be somewhat improbable, because the Athenians, especially in former times, were very reluctant to bestow such a privilege\(^1\), while immunity from taxes, real or honorary \(^2\), was a common privilege for proxenoi \(^3\). Thus, Demosthenes seems to be wrong when he speaks of "citizenship" granted to Alexander.

Demosthenes is once again inaccurate in attributing any honours to the Macedonian King with the idea that Alexander gained these privileges through his attack against the remnants of the Persian army:

Firstly, because Herodotus mentions attacks against the retreating Persians by the Thracians only, and not by the Macedonians \(^4\); secondly, because Alexander had been granted

\(^1\) From the numerous Attic inscriptions on proxeny, not one mentions citizenship as a privilege bestowed on proxenoi.
\(^2\) The fact that immunity from taxes was bestowed as an honorary distinction on foreign kings, states etc., is attested by a part of a law quoted by Demosthenes in XX 29, and also by other sources. Thus, Croesus is known to have had immunity from taxes at Delphi (Herod.I 54(2)), the Deceleans at Sparta (Herod.IX 73(3)), Leucon, the ruler of Bosporus, in Athens (Dem.XX 29ff). In these cases, \(\delta\tau\epsilon\lambda\varepsilon\rho\upsilon\) amounted to an exemption from custom duties.
\(^3\) In ML GHI 70, we read "...καὶ \(\alpha\)\(\delta\)\(\lambda\)\(\epsilon\)λειαν καὶ \(\theta\)\(\alpha\)\(π\)(ε \(\rho\) τοῖς \(\zeta\)λλοις προξένοις)".
\(^4\) Herod. IX 89(4).
the honourable title of "proxenus and benefactor" before the Persian expedition 1), and owing to this a misunderstanding could easily occur later on; finally, because Alexander's conduct during his mission in Athens was not entirely appropriate: Herodotus, who is considered by modern historians to have been to some extent misled or perhaps biased in favour of Alexander 2), presents the Macedonian King as an ardent supporter of Mardonius' proposition: Alexander is said to have brought his influence to bear upon the Athenians to accept the offered alliance 3).

This misrepresentation, that is, the reason for which Alexander was granted such an honour by the Athenians, seems again to be a lapse of memory, or perhaps an ignorance of the real facts 4).

Of course, an inaccurate account would serve Demosthenes' argument a little better in both of the passages which are under consideration. For then the contrast between on

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1) VIII 136(1). Cf. 143(3).
3) Herodotus represents Alexander as saying: "Εγώ...προσχρησίζω ὡς ὑμέων πελευθεροι Μαρδώνις" VIII 140b.
4) Unfortunately, although we are informed that Demosthenes knew Thucydides (See p. 102, n.), we do not know if he also knew Herodotus. Of course, the knowledge of history was part of the orator's background (see Introduction p. 22 note). Nevertheless, exact knowledge of certain details of some events of the past is a matter of being acquainted with the special historical works dealing with them, and unfortunately in Demosthenes' case we do not know how well he was acquainted with Herodotus' History.
the one hand the great services offered to the Athenians by the "proxenoī" and on the other the meagre privileges granted to them in return would be stronger 1). But the fact that the improvement to Demosthenes' argument caused by this inaccuracy is so slight, and also that a lapse of memory on the part of Demosthenes concerning the Macedonian King has already been established, leads us to the conclusion that in this case again Demosthenes has fallen into involuntary error.

1) In the particular case of Alexander, the Athenians would have bestowed honours for such an important service as his aid during the Persian Wars.
Introduction to chapters two and three

In the above passage from the speech delivered in 349 B.C. Demosthenes refers to the relationship between Athens and Macedonia during the time of the "pentecontaetia", in particular during the reign of Perdiccas II, and also to the ethnic affinities of the royal house of Macedonia with the Greeks.

Demosthenes has stated that Perdiccas II was a subject of the Athenians, and also that, as King of Macedonia, he was a barbarian.

In our examination of Demosthenes' statements on the subjects mentioned above, the following headings will be used:

1. The relations of Perdiccas II with Athens during those years of his reign which coincide with the "pentecontaetia".
2. The barbarism of the royal house of Macedonia.
The relations of Perdiccas II with Athens during those years of his reign which coincide with the "pentecontaetia".

The first subject to be considered is Demosthenes' information that the Macedonians were subject to Athens in the reign of Perdiccas II (ca. 450-413).

The same information is given by Pseudo-Demosthenes in 342 B.C. and also in 340 B.C., with the additional claim that Macedonia gave tribute to Athens throughout the reigns of Philip's immediate ancestors.

Perdiccas' predecessor, Alexander I, had on the whole enjoyed good relations with Athens, and as a result had been given the title "proxenus and benefactor". During the last years of his reign, however, his attitude must have been an unfriendly one, since Plutarch tells us that he was involved in the revolt of Thasos against the Athenians. There is no mention made in the sources, and we can find no other evidence to suggest that he was

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1) As far as I know, all the commentators (Weil, Sandys, Abbott and Matheson, MacGregor, Vince etc.) think that the king referred to in Demosthenes' phrase "υπήκοος δ' ὀ ταύτην τὴν χάραν ἔχων αὐτοῖς βασιλέως" is Perdiccas II.
2) "ἐ τ' ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἡ Μακεδονία καὶ φ δρον ὅς ἔφη, ἡξερον," VII, 12 and "καὶ εἶναι μὲν Ἀθηναίοις φ δρον ὅς ἔφη, ἡξερον," XI 16.
3) Herodotus, VIII 136.
4) Cimon, XIV (3). According to Plutarch, Cimon had been charged because he had avoided attacking Alexander for his involvement in this revolt.
in any way dependent on Athens 1).

The early years of Perdiccas' reign were generally a time of good relations with Athens, and, as Thucydides tells us 2), Perdiccas formed an alliance with her, probably in the early thirties 3).

Also, the evidence which remains from a treaty between Athens and Perdiccas must probably be dated to this alliance 4).

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1) Although Demosthenes' commentators (see preceding page n.1) thought that Perdiccas was the king referred to by Demosthenes, one could also understand the reference as including Alexander I, because the word βασιλεύς could possibly be a synecdoche, and also because Demosthenes refers in broad terms to the "pentecontaetia". To enable us to draw a firm conclusion, we have here dealt also with Alexander's relations with Athens, although it has been necessary to deal with this briefly owing to the shortage of existing evidence, which is nevertheless sufficient for the purpose of drawing a conclusion.

2) "ἐπεκλέψατο (ἐν 433 B.C.) και ομοκράτησεν και ἐν τῷ ζήν." Ι 57(2).


4) Ι.Ο., Ι, 71. This inscription had been traditionally dated as 423/22 B.C.. In the edition of the Athenian Tribute Lists (III, 313 footnote 61), Professor B.D. Meritt and his colleagues strongly express the opinion that this decree should be identified with this alliance. This suggestion seems to have been accepted by R.Meiggs cont'd...
Soon afterwards, however, there must have been a distinct
deterioration of these good relations, since we are told
by Thucydides 1) that the Athenians later became allied
both to Perdiccas’ brother Philip, a pretender to the
throne, and to Derdas, a Macedonian chieftain.

In 432 B.C. the atmosphere between Perdiccas and Athens
was openly hostile, as was made manifest when Poteidaea
broke away from the Athenian domination.2) During the next
years of Perdiccas’ reign, a period which coincides with
the first part of the Peloponnesian war, he joined forces
with one or other of the belligerent parties, according to
his own advantage, but almost always retained his covert
hostility towards the Athenians 3).

Given that such was the nature of Perdiccas’ relations
with Athens, one would scarcely be correct in interpreting
the early good relations they shared as implying the
subjection of the former to the latter.

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and D.M. Lewis in their recent edition of the Greek
Historical Inscriptions in Oxford’s editions (see p. 179).
The inscription reads: (οὐ στρατευομένος ἔπι πόλιν ὀδέμ(λαν),
ʰῶν Π(ερδικίας κρατεῖ) for the Athenians, and το(ς) ἁγίου
φίλος νομίζω καὶ ἐχθρ(ὸς, καὶ...πρὸς Ἀθηναίος δικαίος καὶ ἢδιος κα...
(καὶ σύνεν νῦν ὅτι ἐπί ἑξαγενή λάσο λάμ μὲ Ἀθηναίος)
for Perdiccas.
1)Thuc. I 57(3). It also seems highly probable that I.G.,
II, 53 must be identified with this alliance. See Bauer,
Klio, XV, 1918, 193-195, and a new restoration by Schweigert,
Hesperia, VIII, 1939, 170/71. It was a treaty of ἐπιμαχία
See Papastavrou, Λ’ ἄρχα τῆς βασιλείας Περδίκκου τοῦ Β’,
Ἀθηναῖοι, 1939, p. 9. This alliance was probably concluded
in 434 B.C. See ATL, III, 319.
2)Thuc. I 57-58 and Diod. XII 34. Cf. Papastavrou ‘Ὁ Περδίκκας
Β’ εἰς τὰς παραμονὰς τοῦ πελοποννησιακοῦ πολέμου, εἰς Ηἐρας Ἀντ.
Κεραμοπόλεως (1953), pp. 113-139.
3) Thuc. I 61(3); II 29(6), 80(7); IV 79 82 83 103 (cont’d)
From a fragment of Theopompus' historical work we are informed that (in 445 B.C.) the inhabitants of Histiaea in Euboea, who were forced to evacuate their city by the Athenians, were given refuge "by arrangement" in Macedonia. It seems likely that this arrangement was a friendly gesture on the part of Perdiccas toward the exiles, since it seems somewhat improbable that Athens should have made arrangements with Perdiccas to benefit her opponents.

As for the subsequent period, during which time Athens and Perdiccas were in alliance, if it is true, as Professor Meritt insists, that the I.G., 2, 71 (see page 38, n. 4) refers to this occasion, we see that the Athenians, according to the terms of the treaty, undertook to avoid marching against the cities ruled by Perdiccas, while Perdiccas undertook to export timber exclusively to Athens.

Even if this inscription refers to events of 423/22, as had been the belief before Meritt stated his hypothesis, we can safely conclude, however, that it must give a general indication of the nature of the relations between

cont'd.....
107 124-128 132; V 80 83; VI 7; VII 9. Cf. Papastavrou, Σχέσεις Μακεδόνων μα/ Αθηναίων κατά τὸν Β' αἰῶνα π.X., Προσφορά εἰς Στ. Κυριακίδην, Θεσσαλονίκη 1953, pp. 525-531. Also, The foreign policy of Perdiccas II during the archidamian war, in the Ελληνικά 5 (1957), pp. 256-265. Δ. Κανατσόβη, Ιστορία τῆς Μακεδο-νίας...Θεσ.1964, pp. 15-20. A. Momigliano, Filippo... p. 19. 1) Strabo X 1(3), and in Jacoby's FGrH B (115) Theop.. 387. 2) A. Toynbee thinks that it was the policy of the Argead kingdom at this time to consolidate its conquests by giving foreign refugees asylum on conquered territories. See his book "Some problems of Greek History" 1969, p. 139.
Perdiccas and Athens at the time of their alliance.

Are we to think that an alliance under the abovementioned terms recorded the subjection of Macedonia to Athens? This would not seem to be a reasonable conclusion.

Moreover, we see from a fragment of Hermippus 1) that Perdiccas did not execute even this undertaking.

And if we consider the period following the beginning of the Peloponnesian war, we find that both the information contained in Thucydides' narrative, on the whole, and the ease with which Perdiccas joined one or other of the belligerents 2), always according to the dictates of his own interests, prove Perdiccas' independence from the Strong Powers.

Therefore, judging from the evidence available, it is apparent that Perdiccas ruled independently in his own country, though not without showing a certain respect for the Athenians and making some other concessions, and there is no evidence that the Macedonians were subject to Athens 3).

Furthermore, it seems very probable that not only

1) "ους περίδικος ϕεύ & έ & η ναυσί πάντα πολλαίς " (that is, instead of timber), Phormophoroi, fr. 63(8).
2) He allied himself with Athens five times. See Thuc. I 57(2), in 436(?). B.C.; I 61(3), in 432; II 29(6), in 431; IV 132, in 423; VII 9, in 414.
3) Professor Meritt with his co-editors of ATL has remarked: "The true relative strengths of Athens and Macedon were perhaps seriously misconceived in the fifth century......; the language of D3 (i.e. ML GHI, 65, l. 27-29), which to readers of Demosthenes sounds ridiculous, will not have seemed ridiculous to contemporaries." III, p.319.
Macedonia, but even the Greek cities within Macedonia, such as Pydna, Dion and Therme were never members of the Delian League, with the exception of Methone, which became a member by special arrangement only in the late thirties.

Athens must, therefore, have respected Perdiccas' sphere of influence in this area.

As for the information that Macedonia paid tribute to the Athenians, there is some evidence in support of this in later authors.

In Arrian, Alexander the Great in an address to his soldiers rhetorically speaks of the Macedonians as having paid tribute to the Athenians in the past, and as having at one time been subject to the Thebans.

The scholiast of Demosthenes has repeated this piece of information.

A Schäfer has expressed the opinion that this information may relate to the time in which King Perdiccas belonged

1) See ML, GHI, 65.
2) In 434 B.C. according to ATL, III, 319. Cf. ML, GHI, p.179.
3) "Ἀθηναίοις τοι καὶ Θηβαίοις ἑφεδρέσοντας ἄνει τῇ Μακεδονίᾳ ἔς τοσόν δὲ ἐταπείνωσεν (Φιλίππος), ἣδε ταῦτα γε καὶ ἡμῶν ἔμπροσθεν, ἀς ἀνίλφρο σε τελείταιν ἄθναίοις καὶ δὲ πρὸ ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ μέρει ἑκείνους τῆν ἀφάλλειαν σφιτι τὸν ἐος ἐσθελιν ὑποτελείαιν..." VII, 9, 4.
4) See schol. in I 9 and III 24. Appian, the later historian, also mentioned subjection of the Macedonians during the time preceding Philip's reign, but said nothing of any tribute paid by them: "Τὰ δὲ δὴ Μακεδόνων, τὰ μὲν πρὸ Φιλίππου τού Αμβροτου καὶ πάνυ σιμορά ἤν, καὶ ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ τοῦ τοῦ π ή κ ο ν σ α ν." Roman History, Preface 10.
to the Athenian alliance, although he recognizes that, "in den attischen Tributlisten kommen nur Küstenstädte von Bottiaea und Piorien vor" ¹).

The recent exhaustive survey made by the editors of the Athenian Tribute Lists proved that there were some remote, and mainly coastal towns of Macedonia which were obliged to pay tribute to the Athenians ²), but there is no evidence to suggest that any town under Perdiccas' undisputed sovereignty paid any tribute to the Athenians.

As for Arrian's allusion, made not in his own person, but in a rhetorical speech delivered by Alexander the Great in a difficult moment of his life ³), we cannot share Schäfer's view that this information can be connected with Perdiccas' reign. On the contrary, if we must find an occasion to which to ascribe the mentioned tribute, the connection of this tribute with the Theban invasion of Macedonia ⁴), together with the fact that Philip is mentioned as having released the Macedonians from these misfortunes, could lead us to ascribe the information to a time directly preceding Philip's reign ⁵).

¹) Schäfer II, p.6 n.1
²) For particulars see ATL, III, 318-319, 324. See also Gomme I, p. 201.
³) His soldiers had threatened to leave him and to return to Macedonia. VII, 9.
⁴) I.e. Pelopidas' invasion of Macedonia in 368, when Philip had been taken as hostage in Thebes. See Diod. XV 67(4), XVI 2(2); Plut. Pelopidas 26, and Justin VI 9(6), VII 5(1).
⁵) The period of the reign of Amyntas III (393-370 B.C.) seems to me more probable.
The scoliast can be considered as echoing the previous evidence.

The conclusions to be drawn from a survey of this evidence must be firstly that Demosthenes is definitely historically inaccurate when he says that Macedonia was subject to Athens in the time of Perdiccas' reign, and secondly that the general Pseudo-Demosthenic claim that the Macedonian kings paid tribute to Athens seems highly improbable for the period of Perdiccas' reign.

All that can be fairly said is that Perdiccas paid Athens as much respect as was fitting for the leader of a relatively weak state to show towards a stronger one.

The question which now arises is whether Demosthenes consciously or unconsciously misrepresented the facts.

It has already been shown that some coastal Macedonian cities paid tribute to Athens in the time of Perdiccas' reign, and it is also certain that Macedonia was one of the main suppliers of timber to Athens, when the two states were on friendly terms.

1) In the treaty between Perdiccas and Athens mentioned previously (I.G.,I^2,71) we see that one of the principle points concerned Perdiccas' undertaking to supply timber to Athens exclusively.
Andocides (II,11) informs us that because of his friendship with Archelaus, oars were supplied by him to the Athenian fleet at Samos in 411 B.C..
Archelaus was afterwards honoured with the title "proxenous and benefactor" (in 411/10 according to Wilhelm, in 407/6 according to Moritt), because he had supplied the Athenians with the necessary timber. See ML, GHI, 91.
Finally, in Xenophon's Hellenica (VI,1,2) we find: "...Μακε-δονίαν, η ν θ ε ν καί Ἄθηναίοι τά ξύλα ἄγονται."
It seems likely that this timber, which belonged exclusively to the King\(^1\), was usually offered at any critical moment, in an attempt to avoid possible trouble from the strong states of southern Greece.

The bestowing of the title "proxenus and benefactor" on some of the Macedonian kings must be mainly accounted for by this offering of timber.

In my opinion, the respect paid by the Macedonian King to Athens, the supply of timber from Macedonia, the tribute paid by some remote cities on the Macedonian coast during the "pentecontaetia", and tribute possibly paid occasionally by some Macedonian kings\(^2\) in the time before Philip's reign, must have given Demosthenes the confused impression that Macedonia really was subject to Athens.

This confused impression, as well as the rhetorical exaggeration as a result of Demosthenes' wish to stress the antithesis between Athens' superior ancestors and Philip's submissive predecessors, is consequently responsible for the use of the term Δημοκρατία which apparently misrepresents the real facts.

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1) "Timber in Macedon was a royal monopoly" according to ML, GHI, p. 278.
2) See p. 43 n.5.
Chapter three

The Barbarism of the Royal House of Macedonia.

The next question to arise is Demosthenes' assertion that the Macedonian kings were "barbarians".

In the quotation under consideration, Demosthenes calls King Perdiccas II "barbarian", and in three other cases\(^1\) he uses this same term in reference to Philip II. In this way, Demosthenes restricts the use of this appellation to the Macedonian kings, and in particular, to Philip II\(^2\).

We must first of all make it clear that it is beyond the scope of this work to discuss the true racial connections between the Macedonian people and the Hellenes, using either the philological or the archaeological evidence provided by present-day comparative science;

\(^1\) III 17, IX 31, XIX 305 and 308.
\(^2\) This means that he was not referring to the Macedonians generally, although it could be said that this was possibly implied. However, since Demosthenes clearly refers only to the royal family, and not to the Macedonians as a whole, in order to reach a firm conclusion, our argument will deal only with the direct meaning of the appellation, while the possible implication will be dealt with only in footnotes. If we consider the subject, accepting that the term "barbarian" applies to all of the Macedonians, this generalization would have a serious effect on our conclusion. Firstly, there would be the objection that no firm conclusion can be based on implications, and secondly, this would involve the various discussions of modern historians and critics, who are not in full agreement.
that is, in terms of modern ethnology, what degree of racial kinship there was between the Macedonians and the Hellenes.

This subject has already been much discussed\(^1\), and, furthermore, does not fall within the limits of this essay.

It must be pointed out that the veracity of these opinions does not concern us. In this matter, as often in historical affairs, the fact that an event possibly did not occur is far less important than the fact that it was thought to have happened. Thus, it has more bearing on our case to know the belief of the Greeks in the time of Demosthenes, than to know whether this belief is correct.

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\(^1\) For the most recent discussion of the kinship between the Macedonians and the Greeks, see:

a) A. Keramopoullos, Οι βάρβαροι-Μακεδόνες τοῦ Δημοσέτους, ης μνήμην Σπυρίδ. Λάμπρου, Athens 1935, 64-67, in which he holds that the Macedonians were members of the Greek race.

also, 'Η σημερινή γερμανική έπιστήμη περί της φυλετικής καταγωγής τῶν ἀρχαίων Μακεδόνων, 'Αθήνα 1945.

b) B. Serboni, Eleni e barbari nelle orazioni di Demosthene, A & R 8, 1940, 117-132, in which he says that the contrasting terms, Hellenes and barbarians, define cultural distinctions.

c) J. Luccioni, Démosthène et la panhellénisme, Paris 1961, in which he holds that the Macedonians were not recognized as members of the Greek race.

d) A. Daskalakis, The Hellenism of the ancient Macedonians, Salonica, 1965, where he expresses his belief about the Hellenism of the ancient Macedonians.

e) A. Toynbee, Some problems of Greek history, pp.64-79 'What was the ancestral language of the Macedones?' and pp.136-151, 'The expansion of the Argead Kingdom of lower Macedon', where he speaks of the Macedonians as being Greeks.
in the light of modern scientific examination. 1)

Demosthenes was, of course, limited to the knowledge of his age 2).

It must also be remembered that the words "barbarians" and "Hellenes" had a double meaning in ancient Greek literature, which marked not only racial but also cultural and political distinctions. 3)

As modern commentators and historians do not agree fully on the special meaning of these words in Demosthenes' speeches, we shall examine Demosthenes' attitude in his description, taking into consideration both possible meanings, in order to arrive at a firm conclusion.

To deal first with the racial connotation:

The royal house of Macedonia claimed to be descended from the Heracleids of Argos, and from the evidence we possess it can be seen that the Greek origin of the royal family of Macedonia was universally accepted.

Herodotus narrates the manner in which the Argead kingdom of Macedonia was established 4), and, furthermore,

1) It may be worthwhile to point out that even Thucydides could not discover the connection of the Greek dialect of the Aetolians with the Attic one, and thus described the Aetolians as ἀγνωστάτατοι γλῶσσαι. III 94(5).
2) Demosthenes must be considered as misrepresenting the truth, even in cases when an opinion he supported for political reasons has been proved today to be true, but in his time was universally believed to be false.
4) VIII 137-139
offers assurance of his personal knowledge on the Hellenic lineage of the royal family of Macedonia:

"Ε λ η ν α είναι τούτους τούς ἀπὸ Περσικέων γεγονότας, κατὰ περ αὐτοῖ λέγουσι, α ὅ τ ὤ τε ὡ ὦ τυγχάνω ἐπιστάμενος καὶ ὄ γ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἐπισθε λόγοις ά π ὦ ὦ έ ε ζ ο δε είσιν "Ε λ η ν ε ζ. " 1)

Thucydides explicitly corroborates that the ancestors of the Macedonian king Perdiccas were Argive in origin:

"Αλέξανδρος ὁ Περσικέων πατήρ καὶ οἱ πρόγονοι αὐτοῦ, Τ η μ ζ – ν ί δ α ι τὸ ἀρχαῖον δντες έξ "Αργοῦ ους. " 2)

as did Isocrates in his address "To Philip:"

"Αργοῦ ους μέν γάρ ἐστι σ οι πατρίς. " 3)

Theopompus gave the genealogy from Heracles down to Caranus, who, according to another version, was considered as the first of the Argead house of Macedonia. 4)

Oracles as well were known with reference to the Argive origin of the Argead house. One Delphic oracle given to Perdiccas I by the Pythian priestess was known to have said:

"Εστὶ κράτος βασιλείου ἄγαυος Τ η μ ζ ι δ α ι σ ι γαίης πλουτόφοροι δίδωσι γάρ αὐγίθοχος ζέβς.

ἀλλ' έθα ἐπειγόμενος Β ο τ τ η ι δ α πρός πολύμηλον'

ἐνθα δ' ἀν ἄργικέρωτας ίδης χιονώδεας αἴγας

1) V 22 cf. I 56

2) II 99(3). Likewise also in V 80(2) : " ἦν δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς (Περσικέως) τὸ ἀρχαῖον έξ "Αργοῦ ους. "

3) "To Philip", 32 . cf. 105.

and also another Sibylline prophecy, saying:

"αὐχοῦντες βασιλεῖσα μακεδόνες Ἄργες ἔσται δὴ ν

There is other evidence as well, from ancient authors which leads us to the same conclusion:

Herodotus quotes a formal decision of the Hellanodicae at Olympia, which confirmed that Alexander I was of Hellenic descent. This decision enabled Alexander to participate in the Olympic games, a privilege enjoyed only by Greeks.

This participation on the part of the Macedonian kings is also mentioned during Demosthenes' time: Plutarch relates how Philip's chariots competed successfully in these games in 356 B.C.

After the conclusion of the Second Sacred War (346 B.C.)

2) Pausanias VII 8(9). We also know of another oracle, given to Caranus, which ordered him to "ducibus capris imperium quaerere" VII 1(8). We emphasize these prophecies because of the influence which religious belief usually has on the people.
3) We do not mention in the argument many writers subsequent to Demosthenes' time, because we are interested only in knowing what was the belief up until Demosthenes' age. But, as they usually echo the opinion of previous authors, we quote them for additional information: Diod. XVII 1; Plut. Alex. II; Justin VII 1; Strabo VII 9; Livy XLV 9; Appian Syr. 63; Arrian I II(8) etc.
5) Alex. III (5). He says of the tradition concerning the Greek origin of the Macedonian kings, that in his age it was "τὸν πάνυ πεπληστευμένων." Alex. II. Cf. Eth. 179 A, 143 F, 457 F.
the Amphictyons accepted Philip into the Amphictyonic council and offered him the two votes of the defeated Phocians. This participation also was a privilege granted only to Hellenes.

The only evidence we have in support of Demosthenes' opinion comes from the sophist and rhetorician Thrasymachus (ca.430-400), found in a quotation from Clement of Alexandria. Thrasymachus, who played a leading role in the development of oratory by his elaboration of the technique of appeal to the emotions, says in a rhetorical speech in defence of the people of Larisa against Archelaus of Macedon:

"Αρχελάφ δουλεύομεν, "Ελληνες οίντες βαρος αρ παρατηρήσας μήν;

but there is no reason to justify Demosthenes on the basis of this sole quotation, and ignore the mass of evidence provided by the ancient authors, some of whom, such as Thucydides, are the most reliable sources.

Would Demosthenes be justified in considering the story of the Hellenic origin of the Argead royal house of Macedonia as merely a folk-tale? That is, an artistic creation intended to connect the Macedonian and Argive dynasties?

1) Clement of Alexandria, "Miscellanies" VI 16 (Diels, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, II p.324 )
2) Of the modern critics, Niebuhr first expressed this opinion and was followed by some others. He says that the term 'Αργάδα in the prophecy which had been given to Perdiccas I (see p.50 ) must be the reason behind the creation of the story of the Argive origin of the royal house of Macedonia. Bishop Thirlwall ( A History of Greece, V 322,n.2) has remarked that the reverse is more reasonable. Whatever the truth is, what concerns us is whether this story was the belief held by the Greeks of Demosthenes' age, and moreover, whether Demosthenes had the necessary knowledge to overcome this belief.
It is known to modern historians that considerations of race and origin were sometimes advanced by ancient authors as motives for political action, and sometimes too, these authors were unwittingly misled into giving debatable information; however, there is a considerable difference between this practice and that of rejecting an overwhelming tradition which had been handed down to Demosthenes' age by the most eminent historians.

Demosthenes should not refer to the Macedonian kings with the term "barbarians" without at least occasionally stating his reasons for doing so. Of course, since he was not an historian, he was not required to give such explanations, but it would be highly irregular for him to present the opposite view to those of the most prominent historians, among whom Thucydides featured, as completely reasonable. This would be a blatant repudiation of the most important historical authorities.

Thus, after an examination of the evidence, it does not seem reasonable to accept Demosthenes' appellation of the Macedonian kings as "barbarians 1)", from a racial point

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of view 1).

As for the possibility that Demosthenes used the term "barbarian" to signify cultural and political, rather than racial distinction, it appears that Demosthenes would not be correct in applying this term to all of the Macedonian kings.

Refinement and Hellenization of the royal court of Macedonia must have gained considerable ground from the

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1) If we accept the implication that Demosthenes was also referring to the Macedonian people, it must be pointed out that, according to the opinion of the majority of modern historians, Demosthenes would be wrong in terms of modern ethnology to call the Macedonians "barbarians" (see page 47, note ). However, as our concern is with the knowledge of Demosthenes' time, and not of our own, the following will show that Demosthenes was not in conflict with the belief of the majority of his contemporaries. Isocrates, in his address to Philip, says: "μόνος γάρ ἠλλήνων (ὁ κτησάμενος τὴν ἀρχήν τῶν Μακεδόνων) ο θ' χ' 
δομοὶ φύλον γένους ἀρχεῖν ἐξελάσας..."

Phil. 103, and Thucydides puts this speech in the mouth of the Spartan general Brasidas:

"μαραθώνος δέ οὖν ἢν ἀπειρίᾳ δέδιτε μαθέαν χρὴ, ἢν ὡς τε προ-
ηγώνιος τοῖς Μακεδονίων τόποις μακάριος ἀνθρώπων. IV, 126(3).

In Demosthenes' time the Amphictyons transferred to Philip personally, not to the Macedonians as a tribe, the two votes of the Amphictyonic council, of which the Phocians had been deprived after the end of the Second Sacred war (346 B.C.)

Also the "hieromnemones" who were sent by Philip to the assemblies of the Amphictyonic council were registered in the catalogues as "οἱ ἄριστοι ἀρχεῖ τοῦ πολεμοῦ" not from the Macedonians, although all the other representatives of the Greek tribes were listed as from the Thessalians, the Boeotians etc. Tod 172; Diod. XVI 60(1); Speusippus' letter, 9; Pausanias X 3(3), cf. Vüst p.19; Busolt, Staatskunde, p.1296; Käst, Geschichte des Hellenismus, Band I, 3rd. edition (1927) p.233, n.3.

Thus, in speaking of the Macedonians as "barbarians" Demosthenes would not be in disagreement with the belief of the majority of his contemporaries, although the opposite opinion that the Macedonians were Greeks must have had some follow."ers (cont'd.)
time of Alexander I, as he participated in the Olympic Games and attracted the admiration of such a poet as Pindar\(^1\).

Perdiccas, Alexander's successor, in fact, had no Hellenic culture, but from the time of his successor, Archelaus I, the Macedonian court at Pella became a centre for famous artists and poets. Euripides, Agathon and Choerilus, the tragic poets, Timotheus, the famous musician, Zeuxis, the painter whose paintings adorned the royal palace, and probably others, worked towards the complete hellenization of Archelaus' court.\(^2\)

Plato also seemed to be on friendly terms with Archelaus.\(^3\)

According to Aristotle, Socrates himself received an invitation from Archelaus.\(^4\)

Amyntas III, Philip's father, also appears to have cultivated friendships among the leading Athenians, and

(cont'd) A Holm (History of Greece, III p.206) says that it was Demosthenes who involuntarily proved that the Greeks did not consider the Macedonians "barbarians" in saying that, from Macedonia: "οὐδὲν ἀνθρώπων σπουδαῖον οὐδὲν ἦν πρότερον." IX 31.

Thucydides also in his own narrative (II 99) informs us that the Macedonians had occupied their country after the expulsion of the native population. That is, the Macedonians who had been led from southern Greece by the chief of the Argead Kingdom were the only inhabitants of the new country.

1) Herodotus V 22 and Justin VII 2(14). Also Dio Chrysost., or.2, 33 (or Pindar, Fr. 106a)
2) Aelian's, Var. Hist., II 21; XIII 4; XIV 17 and schol. in Aristophanes' Frogs 85.
3) "ἄν (Πλάτωνα) Σπεύσιππος θησι φ ι λ η τα τον άντη Αρχε-λάφ. "Athenaeus, XI 506 c.
4) Rhet. II 23 (8).
in particular with Iphicrates and Timotheus\(^1\).

It also seems that Perdiccas III, Amyntas' successor and Philip's predecessor, was an admirer of intellectual men, since he was in correspondence with Plato, and had also engaged the latter's pupil, Euphreus of Oreus, as his personal adviser\(^2\).

Philip himself must be considered as being fond of Greek literature and science. As a youth he had spent three years in Thebes\(^3\), where he must have leaned much, since, according to Diodorus, he was educated by a Pythagorean tutor\(^4\). As a king he proved his appreciation of the great minds by his connection with Aristotle, to whom he trusted the education of his son, Alexander the Great\(^5\).

Also theatrical performances were taking place in Philip's palace quite frequently, as Demosthenes himself indirectly informs us\(^6\).

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1) Amyntas had adopted Iphicrates as his son. See Aeschines, On the Embassy, 28.
2) Plato's fifth letter was addressed to Perdiccas, partly in recommendation of Euphreus. See also Athenaeus XI 508c.
3) Diod. XV 67(4), XVI 2(2); Plut. Pelopidas XXVI (4); Justin VI 9(7) and VII 5(1).
4) "δ ἅλιππος μετέσχεν ἐπὶ πλεῖον τῶν Πολεμάρχων "XVI 2(3).
5) See Plut. Alex. VII (2), according to which, Philip paid Aristotle a noble and appropriate tuition-fee. A relationship between Philip and Plato has also been presumed. See Athenaeus XI 506f .
6) \(V 6\).
Thus, even where Demosthenes uses the term "barbarian" with a cultural and political meaning, its application is historically unfounded in the case of Philip and of the kings who immediately preceded him\(^1\).

Did Demosthenes present the royal house of Macedonia in this way in the belief that he was depicting the true situation, or did he do so for political reasons?

It has already been demonstrated that there is overwhelming evidence in support of the opinion that Argos was believed to be the home of the Macedonian kings\(^2\) and, of course, of their followers, because no king could successfully establish himself without the backing of his battalions. No one during the fourth century seriously questioned the tradition of Hellenic origin of the Macedonian kings, although this is not so in the case of the Macedonian people. Here, on the contrary, the Greek authors tended to make a distinction between the terms "Hellenes" and "Macedonians"\(^3\), although

\(^1\) If we accept the implication that Demosthenes was also referring to the Macedonian people, it must be pointed out that Demosthenes, judging from the Athenian point of view, would be right to consider the Macedonian people as uneducated, but there were surely other remote highland areas in Greece which were almost in the same situation as Macedonia, for instance, Aetolia, Acarnania etc.

\(^2\) O. Abel, relying on Appian (Roman History : the Syrian wars, 63) has expressed the theory that the other Argos in Lyncestis (Orestea) was really the origin of the Macedonian royal family. But, whatever the truth is, the fact remains that the ancient Greeks believed that it was the Peloponnesian Argos.

\(^3\) See J. Luccioni, Demosthene et le panhellenisme, Paris 1961, for relevant quotations.
many of them took care not to identify the latter group with the "barbarians".

It also seems likely that during Demosthenes' time, there was among the majority of Greek people, the opinion that the Macedonians were not, on the whole, members of Greek society\(^1\). This idea must have arisen, firstly, because the Macedonians were geographically isolated beyond Mount Olympus and so were not involved in the evolution of southern Greece, and secondly, because the Athenians as soldiers usually came into contact with Thracians and other non-Greek tribes of the northern coasts, but rarely with the Macedonians themselves\(^2\).

In this way, until the time of Demosthenes, in the literary tradition to some extent, as well as in the common opinion, the Macedonians as a people (not the royal family) were distinguished from the other Greeks.

What Demosthenes has done is to generalize this opinion and apply it also to the Macedonian kings, about whom literary evidence was quite clear. Demosthenes has attempted to suppress a fact which had been clearly alluded to by the ancient authors, and which had also been accepted by his contemporaries, by extending its range of reference into the realms of a related, but not comparable subject, on which his contemporaries had, on the whole, a different opinion.

In my opinion, Demosthenes has done this deliberately, firstly because it is rather unlikely that he could have been ignorant of all the existing literary evidence,

1) See p.53, note.
2) See A. Keramopoulous, " Οἱ βασιλεῖς Μακεδόνες τοῦ Δημοσθένους, Εἴς μνήμην ἑπ. Λάμπρου, Athens, 1935, pp. 64-67."
and secondly, because, even if all the remarks of previous authors relevant to the origin of the Macedonian kings had escaped his notice, Philip would have advertised this evidence in his attempt to become the leader of the Greeks, and therefore one can presume that Deosthenes was aware of it.

This being so, it seems that Demosthenes uses the term "barbarian" for reasons of rhetorical expediency. Thus, in this case Demosthenes proved himself a good follower of Thrasyvichus, who had developed the technique of appealing to the emotions, and who was the first author to label a Macedonian king "barbarian".

We do not know if Demosthenes knew, and so consciously followed, the example of Thrasyvichus in this particular case, but it must be considered as almost certain that he used the same term with the idea of achieving the same effect: to appeal to the emotions of the people. In particular, Demosthenes was trying to create a strong anti-Macedonian feeling by stirring up the Athenians' traditional hatred of everyone and everything considered as "barbarian". He attempted to implicate Philip and his ancestors in the distinction between the "Hellenes" on the one hand with their glorious past, and the "barbarians" on the other with their tradition of subjection. By using this method, Demosthenes tried to arouse nationalistic feelings in a people who were

1) According to C.D. Adams, "Demosthenes' method is to make a point by brief and rapid argument, and then to reinforce it by emotional appeal and often by attack on his opponent." Demosthenes and his influence, p. 58
especially proud of their hellenic culture and who were also trained to consider anything "barbarian" as inferior. In fact, this term could almost be the by-word of a pan-Hellenic crusade against Philip, who, characterised as "barbarian" with his ancestors, could be taken to be the epitome of the common enemy of the Greeks.
II. Athenian history before Demosthenes' time.

Introduction to chapters four and five

"εὑρίσκει γάρ (Ὡλιππος), οἶμαι, καὶ ἐκοῦσε τοὺς ὑμετέρους προγόνους, ἔξεσθαι τῶν λοιπῶν ἄρχειν ὦ ἐκλήρων ὅσιατ' αὐτοῖς ὑπεκούσειν βασιλείᾳ, οὐ μόνον οὐκ ἀνασχομένους τῶν λόγων τούτων, ἦ νά κ α λ θ ε ν ἅ λ ἕ ε ρ στό τό τό ἄρχον πρόγονος κερι τό τό τόν κήρυξ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν χώραν ἐκκυμεῖν προελεύμονας καὶ παθεῖν ὑπέρ τοῦ ὑπομείναντας, καὶ μὲ τὰ τὰ τὰ τὰ πράξανθας ταῦτα' εὶ πάντες ἵπ ἄλλονται λέγειν, ἀξίως δ' ὅδε τις εἰπεῖν δεδομένη "

Second Philippic, 11.

In this quotation, Demosthenes refers to the mission of Alexander I, King of Macedonia, to Athens, to persuade the Athenians to form an alliance with the Persians against the other Greek cities, during the second Persian invasion of Greece (480-479).

According to Demosthenes' narrative, Alexander's mission was made before the battle of Salamis. This becomes clear from the phrase: "μετὰ τοῦτα πράξαντες ταῦτα' εἰ πάντες ἵπ ἄλλονται λέγειν "Since the battle of Salamis was considered by the Athenians as their crowning glory 1) and

1) Herod. VII 139; Thuc. I 73(4-5); Aeschylus, Persae, 728, 951, 975, 1010 and 1025; Isocr. Panegyric, 98. The battle of Marathon which is also a triumph for the Athenians has no connection with any proposal, as it took place ten years previously.
their main offering to the Greek world (while the victory at Plataea was mostly held to be a Spartan achievement 1), the implication is clear: In Demosthenes' view, the proposal made by the Persians through Alexander I of Macedon, was made before the battle of Salamis 2).

In his final speech, "On the Crown", fourteen years later, Demosthenes again relates the same events in the same way. He says:

"παρὰ τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως μετὰ πολλῆς χάριτος τοῦτ' ἂν ἀσμένως ἔδωκα τῇ πόλει, ὥς τι βούλεται λαβὸν καὶ τὰ ἑαυτῆς ἐχόμεν τὸ κελευθέρως ποιεῖν καὶ εάν ἔτερον τῶν 'Ελλήνων προστάναι..."...τις γάρ οὖν ἐν ἀγάσιτο τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐκείνων τῆς ἄρετῆς, οὐ καὶ τὴν χάριν καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἐκλιπείν ὕπηκολον εἰς τὰς τριήμερας ἐμβάντες ὑπὲρ τοῦ μὴ τὸ κελευθέρως ποιῆσαι, τὸν μὲν ταῦτα συμβουλεύοντα θεμιστοκλῆσσα στρατηγὸν ἐξέδιδον, τὸν δ' ὑπακούον ἀποφημάτων τοῖς ἐπιταττομένοις Κυρσίλου καταλιθώσαντες, οὗ μόνον αὐτὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ άι γυναῖκες αἱ ἴμετέραι τὴν γυναῖκ' αὐτοῦ " 4).

The narration of the events here proves beyond any shadow of a doubt that the orator is referring to a proposition which was made before the battle of Salamis.

The stoning at this time of a person whom Demosthenes called Cyrsilus (Χυρσίλος), who had advocated the adoption of the proposals of the Persians, is also mentioned in this

1) Aeschylus, Persae, 817.
2) A second proposal is mentioned by Herodotus, made through a certain Murychides before the battle of Plataea, which has no connection with our case, as it has no bearing on Alexander's envoy. See Herod. IX 4.
3) XVIII 202.
4) Ibid. 204.
quotation, while Herodotus narrates a similar episode and speaks of a certain Lycidas (Λυκίδας) ¹).

Since this is the nature of the information given by Demosthenes, we shall first attempt to verify the facts, and secondly to consider Demosthenes' presentation of them, dividing our discussion in each case into the following headings:

1. The timing of the Athenians' rejection of the Persians' proposal sent through Alexander I of Macedon.

2. The case of Gyrilimou.

¹) IX 5
Chapter four

The timing of the Athenians' rejection of the Persians' proposal sent through Alexander I of Macedon.

According to Herodotus, Xerxes had not sent envoys to Athens before the battle of Salamis, but he had excluded Athens and Sparta from the number of cities from which he demanded "earth and water" as signs of their submission. He says:

"Ες δὲ Ἀθήνας καὶ Σπάρτην οὐκ ἀπέστειλε Ερέχθης ἐπὶ γῆς αἰτήσεως κήρυκας τῶν Εὐνακῆν προτέρου δαρείου πέμψας ἐπ’ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν τοὺς αἰτεόντας ἔς τὸ βάραθρον, οἱ δ’ ἐς φρέαρ ἐμπαλάντες ἐκέλευον γῆν τε καὶ ὕδωρ ἐκ τούτων φέρειν παρὰ βασιλέα."¹)

In fact, the first proposals to the Athenians were made by Mardonius, through Alexander I of Macedon in 479 B.C., when Xerxes had already left Greece and just before Mardonius left Thessalia, where he had spent the winter, for his final campaign in Attica and Boeotia. Herodotus again says:

"Μαρδώνιος...μετὰ ταῦτα ἐπέμψει ἄγγελον ἐς Ἀθήνας Ἀλέξανδρον τῶν Ἀμυντεω άνδρα Μακεδόνα, Ἦμα μὲν ὅτι οἱ προσκήνες οἱ πέρσαι ἦσαν... Ἦμα δὲ ὁ Μαρδώνιος πυθόμενος ὅτι πρὸς εἰς εἰς τε εἰς καὶ εἰς εἰς τε εἰς ἐπεργήτης (ὁ Ἀλέξανδρος τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις)"²)

The proposals to the Athenians, made by Mardonius from Thessalia, are also mentioned by later authors:

1) Herod. VII, 133(1).
2) VIII, 136(1).
Pausanias, the traveller, says:

"...'Αλεξάνδρου, ὃ Μαρδόνιος ὁ Γαβρίου τὴν ἀγγέλλαν ἐπιστευείς ἐκ 'Αθηναίων ἀπαγγέλλαι 1).

Diodorus also:

"οὶ μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ τῶν Περσῶν ἀποσταλέντες ἔφασαν τὸν στρατηγὸν Ἔπαφον ἐπαγγέλλεσθαι τοῖς 'Αθηναίοις...δώσειν χάραν ἢν ἂν βούλωνται τῆς 'Ελλάδος 2).

Likewise Plutarch:

"πρὸς δὲ 'Αθηναίους ἔπεμψε (Μαρδόνιος) ἱδία γράμματα καὶ λόγους παρὰ βασιλέως 3).

This being so, we must consider the information given by Demosthenes on Alexander's mission to Athens before the battle of Salamis to be wrong. However, relying on certain factors to be found in ancient Greek authors, we can say without reservation that this misrepresentation is due to error, and not to any desire to distort the facts. It seems very probable that Demosthenes' mistake arises from a common error made by a certain number of authors of his own and the preceding period.

First of all, Thucydides puts in the mouth of the

1) Description of Greece, VII, 25(6).
2) XI, 23(1). The plural ἄποσταλέντες must be considered as referring to Alexander and his companion.
3) Aristeid. X. According to Herodotus, Alexander I read out to the Athenians a letter sent by Mardonius. In this letter was written: "ἐμοί (Μαρδόνιφ) ἀγγελίη ἥμει παρὰ βασιλέως λέγουσα οὕτως..." VIII 140α.

Other writers also mention Alexander's mission: The rhetorician Aristides says: "ἐπηρώθηνε δὲ 'Ἀλέξανδρος βασιλέως Μακεδόνις (Panath. 144D), Harpocratio, s.v. 'Ἀλέξανδρος states: "ἐστατεύτω (Ἀλέξανδρος) ὑπὸ Μαρδόνιφ, ἢρ' οὗ καὶ ἐπέμφη ἐπὶ γῆς καὶ θανατός αἰτήσειν πρὸς 'Αθηναίους "
Athenian ambassadors, sent to Sparta in 432, that Athens could have joined the Persians before the battle of Salamis if they had wished to do so:

"εἰ δὲ προσεχωρήσαμεν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) πρότερον τῷ Μῆδῃ δείσαντες, ἄστερ οὖν ἄλλοι, περὶ τῷ χάρῳ, ή μὴ ἐτολῆσαμεν ὡς τοιοῦτον ἔσθηναι ἐς τὰς ναυς..." ¹)

This implies that, according to the Athenians ²), some proposals had been made to them by the Persians before the battle of Salamis.

Isocrates also, who had no wish to blacken the Macedonians, refers to the same events in his Panegyric speech, published in 380 B.C. - thirty six years before Demosthenes' second Philippic:

"προσπελεούσαν δὲ τριήμερων διακοσίων καὶ χιλίων καὶ πεσῆς στρατιῶς ἀναρρημένου μελλοῦσιν εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν εἰσβάλλειν,...ἐξὸν αὐτοῖς (τοῖς Ἀθηναῖοις) μὴ μόνον τοῦς παρόντας κινδύνους διαφυγεῖν ἄλλα καὶ τιμᾶς ἐξαιρέτους λαβεῖν, ἢς αὐτοῖς ἐδίδοσαν βασιλεῖς καὶ τὴν παρολειπον θεοφράτος..." ³).

This means that Demosthenes' mistake is the same as the one which Isocrates made some years earlier.

The orator Lycurgus also makes the same mistake:

"τὸν παράδον ἐπὶ τῆς Ἀλέξανδρον, φίλον ἐντα αὐτοῖς

1) I 74(4).
2) It does not however mean that Thucydides accepts this view, but simply puts in the mouth of the Athenians an assertion which was a commonplace (τόπος) in their speeches. For these "topoi", see following page, n.3. For the speeches" in Thucydides' History see p.74 n.3.
3) IV 94.
For all these reasons it can be said that Demosthenes made this mistake unknowingly, owing to the fact that he must have been influenced by the narratives of Thucydides and Isocrates, which reflect the common erroneous belief of the Athenians concerning these historical events.

The narratives of Thucydides and Isocrates, in accordance with a widespread popular belief, must have created in Demosthenes' mind a mistaken idea about the details of the events of that period.

The fact that these victories were a commonplace topic in the everyday conversation of a proud people, such as the Athenians, and were also readily exploited by statesmen and orators for political and rhetorical ends, is well attested in the existing evidence of Greek passages.

Thus it seems most likely that minor details of their achievements would have been distorted, especially those which did not serve to magnify the victories.

With reference to the orators and politicians, it is

1) Against Leocrates, 71.
2) It is considered fairly certain that Demosthenes knew Thucydides. See pp.102-103, footnote. Demosthenes' knowledge of Thucydides' narrative, especially for this part of his History, is attested by the influence Thucydides has to some extent exerted on Demosthenes' phraseology. For instance, Thuc. I, 96(1) on Dem. III, 24, XIII, 26. Cf. Weil's commentary on Demosthenes' first passage. "τῶν 'Ελλήνων ἱρεῖαν ἀκόντων ".
obvious from their speeches that they tried not only to employ rhetorically effective historical examples, but also that they strongly desired to exhibit their patriotism by frequent respectful and admiring references to the forefathers.

This fact must have created a tendency among these men to seek the most fitting way of relating their ancestors' feats; but this method, in my opinion, must have pushed each of them further and further into exaggeration 1).

Thus, the conduct of their predecessors became for the orators the yardstick for all judgements.

The funeral speeches should be mentioned as presenting another occasion on which the tendency towards exaggeration was encouraged: In these speeches the orators utilized the victories to heighten the glory of their city, and justify the deaths of the citizens before their relations, and furthermore to trace some connection between those who died during the Persian wars, and those who died during the present war.

This justification would be adequate only if the city for which they had died was a magnificent one 2).

1) Isocrates for instance, in his Panegyric speech, 83-85, has reached the point when he speaks of the ancestors as demigods. In 82 he says: "οὐτως ἀνήρας ἀγαθοῦ ἀπέδειξαν τούς πολεμίσαντας πρός τούς ἐν τῇ 'Άσίᾳ ἐντε μηδένα πάποτε δυνηθήναι περὶ αὐτῶν μήτε τῶν ποιητῶν μήτε τῶν σοφιστῶν ἄξως τῶν ἱκείνοις περιμεγέων εἰπεῖν ".

Cf. K. Jost, pp. 119-159, and also G. Schmitz-Kahlmann, Das Beispiel der Geschichte im politischen Denken des Isocrates, 1939. Demosthenes makes the same statement in the quotation now under consideration.

2) This method of argument is obvious in Pericles' funeral speech.
Considering the fact that these exaggerations would have been repeated frequently, it appears reasonable to think of them as established in the common opinion of Demosthenes' time as real historical facts.

On the other hand, the constraint upon the orators to speak respectfully of the ancestors drove them also to omit events which could not add to the glory of their achievements. To mention, for instance, that the rejection of the Persian proposal took place in the middle of the war, and after the victory at Salamis, when Mardonius no longer held the upper hand, and not at the beginning, when Xerxes was powerful and dreaded, could hardly help to amplify their victory.

Thucydides has remarked that in his own time the representation of the Athenians' victories over the Persians had begun to annoy the Spartans:

"τά δὲ Μικρικά...και δε' ἕχλου μᾶλλον ἐσται αἴτι προβαλλομένοις" 1).

This being the case, it seems certain that by Demosthenes' time some details of these events were by tradition incorrectly represented.

Amongst other elements, Thucydides' narrative, and later, Isocrates' mistaken presentation of the facts, must have played a leading role in the formation of this tradition.

The facts that Demosthenes knew Thucydides and was a theoretical opponent of Isocrates, are factors which argue

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1) I, 74(4).
strongly for the influence of their works upon him 1).

1) The so-called "rhetorical" approach to the historical material in the works of the ancient authors, which in each historical example admits hardly any alteration of the traditional use of the example as a "topos", no longer had a great following, and such a rigid repetition of the example on the part of Demosthenes must be considered highly improbable. However, the general influence of the historical references of previous authors upon him must be considered as a fact.
Chapter five

The case of Cyrsilus.

Concerning the difference in the name of the stoned Senator as it appears in the narratives of Herodotus and Demosthenes, an examination of the details of the event, as related by each author, makes it quite clear that they are dealing with the same event.

The fact that Demosthenes puts this event before the battle of Salamis can be explained in the same way as the case of Alexander's mission to Athens, mentioned in the previous chapter. The same misrepresentation of the timing can be seen here.

Lycurgus also makes this mistake when he mentions this event, just as he did in the case of Alexander's mission: "Ἄξιον τούν ἄκοιτα καὶ τοῦ περὶ τοῦ ἐν Σαλαμίνι τελευτήσαντος γενομένου φησίδαμος, δὲν ἡ βουλὴ περιελεμένη τούς στεφάνους αὐτο-χειρί ἀπέκτεινεν" 1).

To turn to the name "Γυρσίλος": This is found in Cicero as well, in his description of the same event, but it is fairly obvious that he derives his information from Demosthenes. Cicero says: "Cyrsilum quendam, suadentem ut in urbe manerent Xerxemque recipenter, lapidibus obruerunt" 2).

In looking through every lexicon of the Greek language

1) Lycurgus, Against Leocrates, 122.
2) Cicero, On Duties, III, 48. He is also wrong concerning the timing.
(especially Liddell and Scott), it is noticeable that every word which could have the same root as "κυρσάμος" has a contemptuous meaning. These words are:

κυρσάνιος = Lacon word, = νεανίας contemptible whippersnapper
κυρσίων = μειράκιον, lad
κορσκιός = πρωκτός, anus
κυρσδος = gibberous
and a name for an "εταρα" κυριονεφέλη.

And so, it seems to me that this name "κυρσάμος" must be a defamatory nickname for the correct name "Λυκίδος" which is mentioned by the historian Herodotus.

The Athenians are quite likely to have coined such a name for a person they considered worthy of death by stoning. The tendency to use contemptuous nicknames is still very common in Greece today, especially for hated political characters.

Demosthenes uses this name before the Athenians, rather than the official name, firstly, because it was probably the only name by which this Senator was known to the man in the street, and secondly because it was his aim to condemn this Senator. This is a common occurrence in modern Greece as well.

The historian Herodotus, on the other hand, could only use the Senator's official name.

Therefore, in my opinion, the name κυρσάμος is not an invention on Demosthenes' part, and its use does not show any effort towards misrepresentation in Demosthenes' narrative.

1) It is known that Demosthenes tended to use depreciatory names for anyone he disliked.
The number of the Greek and Athenian ships participating in the naval battle of Salamis.

"οἶδε μέν (ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς) "πρῶτον μὲν ἀγνοεῖς ὅτι καὶ γε δὲ ἡ ἄροσί ἃ ἄρας τριήμεσιν, πρῶτον τῶν ὕπερ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐν ἔ κα τὸ ὑ παρεσχόμεθ' ἡμεῖς, ἐκεῖνων ἀγωνισμένων τριήμερων, τούς προγόνους αὐτοῦ χιλιάς τρία καὶ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀπολλευματικὸς ναῦς "

On the Navy-Boards, 29

On the Crown, 238

The subject under discussion in this case is the number of vessels which took part in the naval battle of Salamis (480 B.C.) and those which represented the part played by the Athenians.

In the first of the political speeches which Demosthenes delivered in 354 B.C., it appears that the Greeks provided two hundred ships, one hundred of which belonged to the Athenians. Twenty four years later, supporting himself in the last speech of his political career "On the Crown", Demosthenes mentions that the Greeks provided three hundred vessels in the naval battle, out of which two hundred were Athenian. From this contradiction we can assume that one of the statements, or perhaps both, must be false.

In our search for the true figure it is necessary to consider all the historical sources. Fortunately there is adequate evidence for this period and for such an important event.
First of all there is the evidence of Herodotus:

" ἂριθμὸς δὲ ἐγένετο δ' πάς τῶν νεῶν, παρέξ τῶν πεντηκοντῶν, τριάκοσια καὶ ἐβδομήκοντα καὶ δ' ὥτε ὥμη" ¹.

But if we count the number of ships mentioned for each city, the number arrived at is only three hundred and sixty six.

He has also stated previously:

" Αθηναίοι (ἐστρατεύοντο) μὲν πρὸς πάντας τοὺς ἀλλοὺς παρεχόμενοι νέας ὥγδοκοντα καὶ ἐκατόν, μόνον ὦ" ².

It is possible to increase the number of the Athenian contribution to two hundred if we take into account the following quotation from Themistocles' speech in the Corinthian congress:

" ἐστι δὲ ἐν διεσχιστείᾳ νέας σφὶ ἐξωσὶ πεπληρωμέναι ὥμη" ³.

We could consider this to be an over-estimation, since this account would have served Themistocles' purpose, if once more we did not know from Herodotus that the Chalcideans' contribution at Artemisium and in this battle consisted of twenty Athenian ships ⁴. It was very natural for the Athenians to count these ships in with their own contribution.

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¹) VIII, 48.
²) VIII, 44(1).
³) VIII, 61(2).
⁴) " Οἱ δὲ Ἑλλήνων ἐς τὸν ναυτικὸν στρατὸν ταχθέντες ἤσαν οἶδε, Αθηναίοι...καὶ Ἀλκιδίδες ἐπήρουν εἰς κοσμίᾳ, Ἀθηναίων σφὶ παρεχόμενον τὰς νέας "Ηεροδ. VIII 7(1), and " μετὰ δὲ Ἀιγινήτας Ἀλκιδίδες τὰς ἵπ τ' Ἀρτεμίσῃ εἶκοςι παρεχόμενοι "VIII 46(2).
Therefore, according to Herodotus, the total number of Greek ships was three hundred and seventy eight, two hundred of which were Athenian.

On the other hand, Thucydides states in a speech of the Athenians to the Spartans, recalling past services:

"τρία τά φυσαλιμάτα ἑς αὐτό (τό ἔμβατα) παρεσχόμεθα, ἀριθμὸν τε νεῶν πλείστον...ναῦς μὲν γάρ ἐς τάς τέρας τέτρακα ἄρα τά ἑως ἀετῶν λίπων διὰ λήγειν ἐς τῶν δύο μοίρῶν"

In this Thucydides, while basically agreeing with Herodotus, possibly exaggerates the figure (though this is uncertain, since we do not know the number of πεντηκοντάρων) as it would be in the interest of the Athenians to try to magnify their contribution.

Nevertheless, Aeschylus, who participated in the battle, counts the number of the Greek ships as three hundred and ten. However, if we take into consideration the fact

1) I, 74 (1).
2) Herod. VIII, 48.
3) The problem presented by the speeches in Thucydides' History of whether the author himself has given his personal opinion is old and persistent. Modern historians have not come to an acceptable conclusion about Thucydides' personal implication in presenting the content of the speeches. Perhaps the truth is a compromise between the two extremes. At any rate, Thucydides' phrase "δὲ δὲ ἔν ἱδέοιον μοι ἔκαστον περὶ τῶν δὲ παράντων τά δέοντα μάλιστ᾿ εἰπεῖν" (I, 22(1)), proves that the historian included, to some extent at least, elements which could reasonably have been words spoken by the Athenians. See F.E. Adcock, Thucydides and his History (1963), pp. 27-42. Cf. H. Nissen, Historische Zeitschrift, XXVII (1889), p. 386.
4) Paus. I, 14(5).
5) "...καὶ γάρ ἔλλησι μὲν ἡν
δὲ πᾶς ἄριστος ἐς τρίς τέρας τά δέοντα μάλιστ᾿ εἰπεῖν

Persae, 338-40.
that in Aeschylus' narrative the estimation has been made by a messenger, who tries to amplify the Greek achievement by stressing the contrast between the small number of the victorious Greeks on the one hand, and the large number of the defeated Persians on the other, we may reasonably infer that this calculation has been compressed to the lowest figure.

In respect of this, we can note that Demosthenes in his speech "On the Crown" displays complete numerical accuracy as to the number of the Athenian ships, while his presentation of the Greek ships is not quite accurate. But if we consider the fact that this number differs only slightly from the one stated by Aeschylus, and also that by the time of Demosthenes this would have become the conventional number,\(^1\) it is reasonable to conclude that this inaccuracy is an unconscious mistake in Demosthenes' narrative.

In the speech "On the Navy-Boards", Demosthenes is obviously far out in his calculation, both of the Athenian and of the Greek participation, and so the inaccuracy is apparent.\(^2\)

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1) See Isocr. IV, 107 and XII, 50, Lysias II, 42. Cf. Nepos Them. 3, Diod. XV, 78(4). There is a reading "τριάκοσιαίς" even in the text of Thucydides, which is followed by some scholars (for example Thirlwall, Poppo, Stahl). Cf. Gomme I p. 234.

2) The variant "διακοσίαίς", which is provided by the Parisinus codex 2934 and the ancient scholia is disputed by some modern scholars (e.g. Dobson) who are in favour of Vulgata's variant "τριάκοσιαίς". This could be interpreted as being close to the actual number, but it cannot be (cont'd.)
We must now ascertain whether this inaccuracy appeared for reasons of rhetorical exploitation or as a result of ignorance of the real number on the part of the young Demosthenes, who later acquired a better knowledge of the events.

It has already been mentioned that the battles of Marathon and Salamis were a great source of pride to the Athenians. Afterwards the events of the battles must have been a popular topic of discussion among the ordinary people, as it was among the authors, and it must be taken into consideration that the common people were liable to confuse fact with rumour. It is known that people with strong national feelings will readily accept a mixture of fact and rumour in their beliefs, since this can serve their national pride. Thus, an uncritical popular

(Cont'd.)...

accepted as a plausible reading. In view of the fact that the Athenians provided one hundred ships, which is confirmed by the text, it appears that two hundred is the only acceptable figure. It may furthermore be argued that three hundred suits neither Demosthenes' general policy nor his present argument. He obviously does not want to diminish the Athenian contribution, but he wishes to diminish the overall number of ships. Therefore the reading seems to be correct.

1) See p.60, n.1.
2) See pp. 66-67, and n.3 on p.66.
3) That the Athenians had such strong national feelings is proved by the fact that in Demosthenes' argumentation the example of the ancestors is the main means of stimulating his contemporaries.
tradition 1) must have existed in Demosthenes' time as well.

Owing to this, the Athenian achievements must always have been presented by the ordinary people in such a way that emphasis was invariably placed on the magnitude of their forefathers' successes. Thus, with this intention in mind, it would be better if the number of ships could be reduced whenever a contrast was to be stressed between the Persian ineffectiveness in spite of their wealth of resources, and the Greek prowess in spite of their lack of them.

As for Demosthenes, it appears that, as a young orator, he had found it easy to use such a popular estimation to suit the requirements of his speech and to achieve his

1) The untrustworthiness of oral tradition is often clearly revealed in Greek literature, especially in poetry and oratory. We have many examples which demonstrate the unreliability of the popular tradition and the rapidity and certainty with which historical facts become confused and full of errors, even to persons contemporary with the events, and sometimes to those present, or even prominent at the time of their enactment. For an example of this, see Andocides "On the Peace" 3ff, and Aeschines "On the Embassy" 172-176. Cf. E.Meyer, Forschungen zur Alten Geschichte, ii 132 ff.

Thucydides has already noticed the untrustworthiness of the oral tradition in his own times:

"τά μὲν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ἦδρον, χαλκὰ ἄντα παντὶ ἐξῆς τεκμηρίῳ πιστεύσαι. οἳ γὰρ ἄνθρωποι τὰς ἄκος τῶν προηγενεμένων, καὶ ἦν ἐπιχώρια σφάζων ἧ, ὁμοίως ἀ β ζ α ν ι σ τ ως π α ρ' ἀ λ - λ ἦ λ ὦ ν δ ἔ χ ο ν τ α i. " Ι 20(1).
present aim, which was to persuade the Athenians to prepare three hundred ships. Since an accurate account would not be such a benefit to his argument, it seems fairly certain that he deliberately misrepresented the numbers in order to reach his goal.

Demosthenes' line of reasoning is as follows: The ancestors of the Persian King had lost the war when the Athenians possessed only one hundred ships; therefore, how much more had they to fear if the Athenians prepared three hundred ships? The significant difference between one and three hundred is useful for Demosthenes' argument, for the Athenians would have the impression that their strenuous preparations would deter the Persians, since the latter would bear in mind the proportion of the Athenian ships at Salamis to the present contingent.
Chapter seven

The political morality and the modest lives of Themistocles and Cimon.

"τὴν θεμιστοκλῆσας καὶ τὴν Κλίμανος καὶ τὴν Ἀριστείδον καὶ τῶν τότε λαμπρῶν οἰκίας, ἐν τίς ἡμῶν οἴκες ὡσαύτων ἔστιν, ὥς τῆς τοῦ γελτονος οὐ δέ εἶναι σε μνοτεράν νοτοῦ σαν τόν νῦν ἐε..."

On Organization, 29.

In the above quotation, which is an attempt to illustrate the high standards of political morality adhered to by the famous statesmen of the fifth century, Demosthenes speaks of the unpretentious domestic arrangements of Themistocles, Cimon and Aristeides, and consequently of the unassuming and politically uncorrupted life which they led. He says that the homes of these famous men "were not a whit more splendid than those of their neighbours" 1).

All the existing sources are in agreement with Demosthenes when he holds Aristeides, who enjoyed the title of "the just" 2), to be a modest man, though we notice that he is the last to be mentioned by Demosthenes.

The way of life of Themistocles, however, although we have no details of his domestic establishments, was not considered to be so unblemished, and the general sense of

1) Loeb translation.
2) Herod. VIII 79(1), 95; Plato, Gorgias 526 a-b; Aeschines, I 25, II 23, III 181.
Demosthenes' statement is in conflict with the historical evidence. For although Themistocles embarked upon his political career with a property of only three \(^1\) or five \(^2\) talents, he increased his wealth during the course of his public career to such an extent, that the sum found and gathered into the exchequer after his flight to Persia was eighty talents, according to Theophrastus \(^3\), while Theopompus speaks of a hundred talents \(^4\), and Cretias of more than a hundred \(^5\). This amount was purely what remained to be recovered by the State, because much of Themistocles' property was conveyed secretly to Asia. Such an enormous increase, of course, does not create a good impression of Themistocles' integrity.

It is also suggested in many other sources that Themistocles accepted bribes:
Herodotus says that he accepted a bribe of thirty talents from the Euboeans \(^6\), and he adds that he collected great sums from the islanders by threatening to move the Greek fleet against them \(^7\).
Diodorus states that the Athenians deprived Themistocles of the generalship because he accepted a bribe from the

\(^1\) Plut., Them. XXV(3), Ctesias in Aelian, VH 10(17); Note also Timocreon of Rhodes fr. 4.
\(^2\) Plut., comparison of Cato with Aristeides i.
\(^3\) Plut., Them. XXV(3).
\(^4\) Ibid.
\(^5\) Ctesias in Aelian, VH 10(17).
\(^6\) Herod. VIII 4(2). Plutarch says that Themistocles gave the money to Eurybiades, Them. vii(5).
\(^7\) Herod. VIII 112(1).
Lacedaemonians 1). The comic poet Eupolis is in agreement with these views 2).

Themistocles was undoubtedly an extremely talented statesman 3), but it is clear, to a certain extent, that he was not an honest man. He seemed to be a clever man with little morality, a man of dubious patriotism and weakness in financial affairs 4). Thus it is plain to see that Themistocles was not particularly honourable in his public career.

Nor was Cimon's reputation on this score completely spotless, and tales of his extravagance abound in ancient Greek sources. His most avid accuser is Theopompus:

" γρ' ρει δε περι αυτου θεόπομπος, ως και κλεπτιστατος γενοιτο τις και λημματων αισχρων ηττωμενοσ υυχ άπαξ εξηλεγκηται, και το της δωροδοξιας μαθημα παρ' αυτου και πρατον τοις 'Αθηναιοι στρατηγοις δραται ενικηθαι " 5).

However, we need not accept Theopompus' treatment of Cimon as the complete historical truth 6), since it is known that he tended to exaggerate vice 7). In addition, the refusal of Plutarch and Nepos to follow Theopompus in all of his interpretations of Cimon's life would seem to

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1) Diodorus XI 27(3).
2) In Plut.'s Aristeides iv " σοφος γαρ άνηρ, της δε χειρος ου κραταιν ".
3) See Thuc. I 138(3) and C. Hude, ad loc. for further passages.
4) See A. W. Gomme I, p. 444.
5) St. Cyril of Alexandria, Against Julian, Migne, PG 76, pp. 785 ff.
support this view 1). Nevertheless, there are certain other
facts which lead us to the conclusion that Cimon did not
lead a very reputable life: He was charged with accepting
a bribe from Alexander I of Macedon 2), and also with
having made money by arranging the marriage of his sister
Elpinice to the wealthy Callias, an extravagant and
dissolute man of low birth 3). Moreover, a sexual
relationship with his sister is referred to as a reason
behind his being ostracized by the Athenians 4).

As for the information that Cimon's private home was in
no way different from those of his neighbours, this does
not conform to the widely attested report 5) that he
opened his fields and gardens to the public, gave assistance
to the poor and provided meals for many of his fellow-
citizens.

It is very probable that the underlying attitude in
this report conveys the petty rivalries between ambitious

1) For Plutarch's sources for his "Cimon", see P. Rühl, Die
   Quellen Plutarchs im Leben des Kimon" (1867), and for his
direct use of Theopompus, P. von der Muehl, "Direkte
Benützung des Ephorus und des Theopomp bei Plutarch" MH
11(1954), pp. 243-244.
2) Plut. 'Cimon xiv(2). Cf. A. E. Raubitschek, "Theophrastos
   on Ostracism", C&M 19(1958), 91, n. 7, and G. Busolt III 1,
   255, n. 1.
3) Plut. Cimon iv(3), Nepos 1, Athenaeus XIII 589 d. For
   Callias, see D. MacDowell, "Andokides, On the mysteries", p. 10.
4) Andocides, Against Alcibiades 33, Plut. Cimon iv and
   xiv, Nepos 1, Athenaeus XIII 589 e.
5) Theop. in Athenaeus XII 533 a, Aristotle, Ath. Pol. xviii
   (3) and in Plut.'s Cimon x(2), Athenaeus XII 533 a,
   Theophrastus in Cicero, "On Duties", ii 64.
statesmen who, while being ostensibly generous, used politically inspired donations as a means to political exploitation.)

After regaining his patrimony and some spoils of war, Cimon became a rich man and lavished his wealth on entertainment and public work (2). He was of a cheerful and convivial temperament (3).

Among many of the fourth century authors, he maintained the position he had gained probably at the end of the fifth century, of a controversial figure (4).

Thus, Demosthenes' inclusion of Cimon amongst the unpretentious and thrifty statesmen of the glorious Athenian past is not based on the real facts, and his representation of Cimon as a temperate and frugal person is historically unfounded (5).

1) The stress laid on Cimon's demagogy by these fragments has been noted by L. Holzapfel, Untersuchungen über die Darstellung der Griechischen Geschichte (1879), p.133; G. Busolt III 1 239 n.4, 255 n.3; G. Lombardo, Cimone (1934), p.42; W. R. Connor GRBS 4(1963), p.112. For an opposite view, see T. B. L. Webster, Art and literature in fourth century Athens (1956), p.97.


3) "μισθοδότης καὶ δομαθητής" according to Eupolis (in Plut.'s Cimon xv(4)). Cf. Plut.'s Cimon iv(4).

4) The Attic orators rarely mention him, while Isocrates never speaks of him at all. Plato criticized him in the Gorgias (503 c-d, 515 d). That he was not highly appreciated by many of the intellectuals can perhaps be inferred from the strange dearth of references to his military successes against Persia.

5) It is worth noting that Demosthenes refers only once (cont'd.)
In a later speech 1) Demosthenes repeats this estimation which was first made in 352 B.C. 2), but on this later occasion he does not mention Themistocles, the omission of whom is a possible indication, provided by Demosthenes himself, of his own inaccuracy. He has also replaced Cimon in the other references by his father Miltiades.

Demosthenes attempts to show high standards of political morality because he needs examples for imitation. We have already mentioned that for this purpose the glorious moments of the Athenians' history and the persons who served the city at that time are the best examples 3). However, although there were great men at that time who were honest and incorrupt, they were not all of that calibre, and many of these also followed opportunistic, self-interested policies and financial manoeuvres and made use of opportunities for disreputable profit making.

Demosthenes' generalization is apparently a deliberate effort to employ facts which are contradicted by the historical evidence to fit the requirements of his argument.

It seems very probable that he exploited the fact that the Athenians of his time must have forgotten or ignored the bad qualities of their "Empire-building" politicians,

(cont'd.)....
more to Cimon and is again historically inaccurate in that in XXIII 205 he reproaches Cimon with a fine which had been imposed on his father.
1) III 26.
2) XIII 207.
3) See Introduction, p.15.
out of nostalgia for the glorious past of Athens and under
the influence of the favourable opinion which was later held
of former statesmen 1).

In periods of decline, people usually remember the
successful results of the policies of the former politicians,
even when it was circumstances rather than politicians
which were the reason behind the success, and thus by
comparison with the present statesmen (always in connection
with political situations), they praise their former
leaders 2).

The public men at the height of Athenian history must
have been remembered among the people of Demosthenes' time
only as outstanding politicians. The more sinister memories
attached to their names must have been forgotten by the
people, and ignored by many intellectuals 3).

Demosthenes seems to have exploited this forgetfulness
of the seamier sides of the lives of the former politicians,
and, by using the favourable opinion which prevailed
generally, he referred to these forgotten (or ignored)
facts as elements of their excellence. The logical fallacy
of "the consequent" (παρέ τό ἢπομνον ) applies in this

1) The historical knowledge of the Athenian public is
considered as being very slight. See S. Perlman p.152 with n.9.
2) Plato has noted that people suffering from past
indulgence quarrel with their present advisers: and by
comparison they praise their older leaders. See Gorgias 519a.
3) For instance Plato in Theages 126a; Isocr., On the Peace
75, Antid. 233ff; Lys. XXX 28; Dem. III 23 ff, XIII 21ff,
XXIII 196ff.
1) That is, the assumption that antecedent and consequent are interchangeable; or: the fallacy of inverting the cause and the effect in the explanation. See Arist. Rhet. 1401 b, and On Sophistical Refutations, V, 167 b.
Chapter eight

The decree concerning Arthmius.

"ἐκείνου (οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν) Ζελείτην τινὰ Ἀρθμίου δοῦλον βασιλέως
...ὅτι τῷ δεσπότῃ διακόνων χρυσίον ήγαγεν εἰς Πελοπόννησον, οὐ καὶ
'Αθηναῖον εὶς Πελοπόννησον καὶ τῶν συμμάχων αὐτῶν καὶ
γένος καὶ ἀτιμίας. τούτῳ δὲ ἓστ' οὔχ ἦν οὔτως τις ἄν φῆσαιν
ἀν μὴ διδῷ φόνου δικαίωσαι, ἄλλ' εἰ σὺ ἄρα γάρ καὶ θέλῃ,
...

Third Philippic, 43-44.

Demosthenes relates the case of Arthmius of Zelea 1), an
Athenian "proxenus" 2), who was punished with ἀτιμία for his
conveyance of sums of money from the Persian King to the
Peloponnese in an attempt, according to Demosthenes, to turn
the other Greeks against the Athenians during Xerxes'
invasion of Greece. Demosthenes' assessment of the facts
seems to be wrong on two points: Firstly, the punishment
imposed on Arthmius does not seems to have been correctly
interpreted by Demosthenes. His interpretation that Arthmius,
as ἀτιμίας , might be killed with impunity, would involve
an archaic usage of the word ἀτιμία 3).

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1) The same example, viewed in the same way, is repeated in
XIX 271.
2) Aeschines III 258.
3) H. Swoboda, in Beiträge zur griechischen Rechtsgeschichte,
Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung, Romanist. Abt. 26 (1905),
p.153 and 161, has shown that the term ἀτιμίας was used, even
by Solon, with its narrow meaning, that is, the "loss of
civic rights ".

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Of course, the committing of lawful homicide for the killing of an ἀτιμος (when the word had the connotation of "outlawed") is attested in the ancient sources 1). However, this condition can hardly be extended to cover such action against a foreigner, who was expelled from Athenian territory. In addition to this, the fact that Aeschines and Deinarchus mention only exile for Arthmius when they narrate the same event 2), along with the omission of the phrase "μαί νησιονεί τεσθάναι" in Arthmius' case, which can be found in similar cases 3), make it clear that Demosthenes went too far in his interpretation 4).

Secondly, Arthmius' mission cannot have taken place at the time of Xerxes' invasion of Greece, as Demosthenes would have us believe, but rather, later, during the Athenian expedition to Egypt (in 459 B.C.). A scholium in Aelius Aristeides reveals that Craterus, a collector of decrees, included this decree in

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2) Aeschines III 258, Deinarchus II 24-5.
3) See Andoc., On the Mysteries, 96 (with MacDowell's comment, ad loc.), Dem. XXIII 60, Tod II 150 etc..
4) Demosthenes' interpretation of this decree has evoked much dispute among modern scholars. L. Spengel in "Die Δημηγορία des Demosthenes"(1860), p.69f, has opposed Demosthenes' interpretation. Weil, comment. ad loc., thinks that Demosthenes' explanation of the word ἀτιμος is incorrect, but that his explanation of the purpose of the decree is valid, because the proscription of Arthmius appears certain from the phrase "πολέμιος τοῦ δῆμου τῶν Αθηναίων". E. Müller in Westermann's edition in 1875, pp.412-424, supported Demosthenes' view. G. Colin in "La deformation d'un document historique dans un argumentation d'orateur", RPh 7 (1933), pp.237-260, believes that Demosthenes has misrepresented the judgement against Arthmius.
the column of those proposed by Cimon 1). This information conflicts with that given by Plutarch, who is the first to mention the name of the proposer, whom he calls Themistocles 2).

But for certain reasons the connection between the decree and the Persian wars must be rejected 3): Firstly, it includes the phrase "καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ", which presupposes the existence of the Delian League, founded in 478/77 B.C. 4). Secondly, Herodotus makes no mention of any money offered to the Peloponnesians, and the reference to the offer which Diodorus 5) alleged had been made before the battle of Plataea cannot be reconciled with the phrase "καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ". Finally, further evidence found in other authors confirms that an embassy to the Peloponnesian was sent much later than the Persian wars, at a time when the Athenians had marched to Egypt against the interests of the Persians.

1) "Κρατερὸς τις ἐγένετο, ὥς συνήψε πάντα τὰ φησίσματα τὰ γραφέντα ἐν τῇ Ἑλλάδι καὶ τούτῳ τὸ γραφὲν εἰς τὴν στήλην (the Arthmius decree) Κιμωνός ἐστιν ". Schol. in Aristeides xlvi, II, 218 (D).
2) Them. vi(3).
3) Modern scholars do not seem to agree about the dating of the decree. G.Grote (V p.124 note), trying to connect it with the period of the Persian wars, suggested the years 477/6, when Pausanias was involved in an intrigue with the Persians in Troad. G.Busolt (II p.653 n.3) traced it to the years between 457-50. The latest view is that of G.Colin(loc.cit.), who places it in 457 or 456, which seems to be the most reasonable.
5) XI 28(3).
Thucydides says:

"...καὶ βασιλεὺς πέμπει ἐς Λακεδαιμόνα Μεγάβαζον ἁνδρῇ πέρσην χρήματα ἔχοντα, ὡς ἐς τὴν Ἀττικὴν εὐβολεῖν πεισθέντων τῶν Πελοποννησίων ἀπ' Ἁγόπτου ἀπαγάγων Ἀθηναίους " ¹).

Diodorus also relates the same information ²).

As concerns Demosthenes' misrepresentation, it seems to me that he has deliberately misinterpreted the information on the punishment imposed on Arthmius, while he must be mistaken in the dating of the decree. That Demosthenes must have deliberately misinterpreted the decree becomes clear from the fact that he has given a somewhat unorthodox explanation, which also differs from his contemporaries' representation of the event. But his view of the date of the decree must be a genuine mistake, first of all, because an accurate account of the event would serve his argument just as well, and secondly, because the other orators' attitude on this point seems to be the same ³).

The reason for the misrepresentation of the sentence imposed can be found in Demosthenes' wish to stress the antithesis between the extreme patriotic commitment of the Athenians' ancestors and the apathy of his contemporaries.

The reason for the error concerning the dating of the decree seems to be as follows: The incident was repeated as a "topos" ⁴), and vaguely attributed to a certain period, so that in the mistaken conjecture of later authors, it

¹) I 109(2).
²) XI 74(5).
³) See p.88, n.2.
⁴) For the "topoi", see p.66,n.3.
became established, wrongly, in connection with that topic much exploited as an example of Athenian superiority – the Persian wars. We can assume, therefore, that Demosthenes must have been the victim of the erroneous repetition of the timing of the event.
Introduction to chapters nine, ten and eleven

"ἔκεινοι τοῖς (οἱ πρόγονοι ἡμῶν)...π ἐν τε μ ἐν καὶ τ ἐν τα ᾿αρά κοντ' ἐν τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἱράνεν ἐν δὲντων"

Third Olynthiac, 24.

"καὶ τοὺς προστάται μὲν ὑμῶν ἐβδομὴν κοντ' ἐν τῇ καὶ τρὶς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐγένεσθε, προστάται δὲν ὑδακοντ' ἐνδὲς ἐνοντα λαμπεδαιμόνιοι ἐχθρισαν δὲ τι καὶ θηβαίοι τούτους τοὺς τελευταίους χρόνους μετὰ τῇ ἐν λευκὸς ντομοὶ καθήνεν"

Third Philippic, 23.

"καὶ τοὺς πάντα ὑπ’ ὑερὴμάρτηται καὶ λαμπεδαιμόνιος ἐν τοῖς τρὶς κοντ' ἐκείνοι και τοῖς ἡμετέροις προγόνοις ἐν τοῖς ἐβδομὴν κοντα..."

Third Philippic, 25.

In the above texts Demosthenes refers to the relationship between the Athenians and their allies during the time of the First Athenian Confederacy, and he also denotes the duration both of the Athenian and of the Spartan supremacy over the Greeks, giving at the same time the "terminus ante quem" the Theban ascendancy over the Greeks began.

Demosthenes has asserted that the Athenians were enjoying the willing obedience of their allies during the inter-war years (pentecontaetia), and he has also stated different figures for the length of the Athenian and Spartan leadership over the Greeks.
For our convenience in the subsequent examination of the information given by Demosthenes, we must point out that the first passage, being part of the Third Olynthiac speech, was delivered in 349 B.C., but that the other two passages, taken from the Third Philippic speech and following each other closely (they are the paragraphs 23 and 25 of the same speech), were delivered in 341 B.C.

In our examination of the above information, the following headings will be used:
1. The relationship between Athens and her allies during the time of the First Athenian Confederacy.
2. The duration of the Athenian hegemony.
3. The duration of the Spartan hegemony.
Chapter nine

The relationship between Athens and her allies during the time of the First Athenian Confederacy.

It must now be questioned whether, in fact, as Demosthenes asserts, the Athenians were enjoying the willing obedience of their Greek allies during the interval between the Persian and Peloponnesian wars.

It is an established fact that the Athenians, at the beginning of their leadership over the Greeks, had formed a voluntary confederacy, as can be seen in Thucydides' report on these events:

"Παραλαβόντες δέ ο ε 'Αθηναίοι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν τοῦτο τῷ τρόπῳ εἶ δὲ τῷ τῶν ἐμμάχων διὰ τῷ Πανασανίου μίσος..." 3)

and in all other ancient sources which agree with that

1) The same opinion had been expressed by Demosthenes a short time before (350/49 B.C.) in his speech "On Organization" (XII 26), which, though formerly considered spurious, has been confirmed by the discovery of Didymus' commentary as being one of Demosthenes' speeches.

In this passage from "On Organization", as in the other passage under consideration, where exactly the same terms are used, we can observe the emphasis upon εἶ δὲ τῷ τῶν which is afforded by its position in the text.

2) The voluntary participation of the allies however does not apply to all the other members who joined the Confederacy in later times. For instance Carystos was forced to join the Delian Confederacy only six years (472/71) after the formation of the voluntary League. See Thucydides I 98(3) and VII 57(4); Herod. IX 105.

3) I 96. Cf. I 75 and VI 76(3)
of Thucydides.

Nevertheless, the historical evidence contradicts the information given by Demosthenes that the voluntary participation of the allies existed throughout the period stated.

The ancient sources are almost unanimous in presenting the Athenian Empire as a despotism concerned only with its own interests, deplored by the subjects whom it dominated and exploited: Thucydides refers to the attitude of the allies towards the Athenians after the beginning of their revolts against them and personally states:

"οἱ γὰρ Ἀθηναῖοι ἀκριβῶς ἔπρασσον καὶ ἀνθρώποι ἤσαν οὖν εἰσαχθέν τὸν βουλομένων ταλαιπωρεῖν προσάγοντες τὰς ἀνάγκας. ἤσαν δὲ πως καὶ ἄλλως οἱ 'Ἀθηναίοι ὁ νῦν ἰτι ὁ μοὶ ὁ ως ἐν ὑπὲρ ἡ δον θ' ἀρχοντες καὶ σετε χειρεστάτους ἀπὸ τοῦ ζον μιν βδιον τε προσάγονται ἦν αὐτοὶς ἀρισταμένους." 2)

He also puts the accusation in the mouths of no less than nine of his speakers that the Athenians enslaved their allies or wished to enslave other states. 3)

1) See Andok. III 37-38; Isocr. IV 72, VII 17, VIII 30 and 76, XII 67; Aesch. III 58; Arist. Ath. Pol. XXIII (2); Deinarch. I 18 and 38; Diod. XI 46 (4-5); Plut. Aristeid. XXIII; Justin XV and Aristod. VII.

2) I 99. See also II 8(5) and VII 75(7).

3) The Corinthians I 68(3) 69(1) 121(5) 122(2) 124(3), the Mytileneans III 10(3-5) and 13(6), the Thebans III 63(3), the Corcyreans III 70(3) 71(1), Brasidas IV 86(1) 87(3) V 9(9), Pagondas IV 92(4), the Melians V 86 92 100, Hermocrates VI 76(2-4) 77(1) 80(5), Cylippus and the Syracusan generals VII 66(2) 68(2).
Thucydides even depicts the Athenians themselves as being fully aware that their rule was a tyranny.\(^1\)

The comedian Aristophanes, who is also a primary source for this period, presents the allies as forming conspiracies against the Athenians, and, furthermore, as bribing the leading Spartans to make war against the Athenians:

"καὶ ἐπειδὴ γνώσαν ὅμιχις αἱ πόλεις ὅν ἤρχετε ἀγριωμένους ἐπὶ ἀλλήλουσι καὶ συσπήρτας,
πάντ' ἐ μ η ἧς η ἄν ν ὦ τ' ἐφ' ὑμῖν τὸνός φόρους φοβοῦμενα,
καὶ ν ἤ π ἔ θ ὦ τὸν λαβώνων τός μεγίστους χρήματι.\(^2\)

Ps-Xenophon speaks of the enslavement of the allies by the Athenians:

"Οἱ σύμμαχοι δὲ ὅλοι τοῦ δήμου τῶν Ἀθηναίοις καθεστάσαι μᾶλλον."\(^3\)

Isocrates mentions the Athenians' ill-treatment of their allies:

"Τῆς γάρ ἄν ὑπέμεινε τὴν ἀ σ ἔ λ γο τοῦ τῶν πατέρων τῶν ἡμετέρων, οἱ...ἀ π η ἢ θ ὅ υ ν τὸ τοῖς Ἐλλησί..."\(^4\)

Aristotle in his "Constitution of Athens" refers to the

1) In I 75(3) and 76(2) he presents the Athenians as describing the evolution of the Delian League in the frank expression δέος, τιμή, ἄφελα. Inherent in the word ἄφελα is the forthright expression of selfish imperialism. See Gomme, Commentary ad loc.. Cf. I 75(1).

One year later Thucydides presents Pericles as calling the Athenian Empire a tyranny, as did Cleon in 427:

"δὲ τι ρο ᾁ ν ν ὢ δα γάρ ἐχετε αὐτὴν, ἣν λαβεῖν μὲν ἄδικον ὄνομα εἶναι, ἄφειναι δὲ ἐπικλῆναιν. " II 63(2). "τι ρο ᾁ ν ν ὢ δα ἐχετε τὴν ἀρχὴν καὶ πρὸς... ἡ ν ὄ ν τ α ς ἀρχηγείους." III 37(2).


3) I 18. In II 2 Ps-Xenophon alludes to the difficult situation of the insular allies of Athens in protecting themselves from her high-handed act. Cf. Thuc. VI 85 (2).

4) VIII 79. Cf. VII 65, VIII 105, XII 57 and 97.
despotic dominance of the Athenians over their allies:

"λαβόντες τὴν ἀρχήν (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) τοῖς τε συμμάχοις δὲ σὺ πὸ τὰ ἐρωμένο. "\(^1\)

Diodorus, referring to the attitude of the majority of the allies after the first revolts against the Confederacy, speaks of the Athenians' harshness and arrogance, and of the efforts of the allies to rebel against the Athenian domination:

"παθόλοο γὰρ ἐπὶ πολὺ τῇ δυνάμει προκάτοπτοντες (οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι) οὖντε τοῖς συμμάχοις ὅσπερ πρῶτον ἐπεικισάμεν, ἀλλὰ β ι α ι ως καὶ Ὡ π ι η ϒ ἄ ν ως ήρχον. διότι πο ὁ λ ο ἴ τῶν συμμάχων τὴν βαρύτητα φέρειν ἀδυνατούντες ἀλλήλους δ ι ε λ �alles γ ο ν - το π ηρ ἴ δ π ο σ τ ἀ σ ε ὐς, καὶ τινὲς τοῖς κοινοὶ συνεβράου καταφρονήσαντες κατ' ἰδίῳν ἐτάττοντο."\(^2\)

Plutarch speaks of a complete enslavement of the allies:

"Ελαθὼν ἀντὶ συμμάχων ὅ π ο σ τ ἀ σ ε ὐς καὶ δο ὁ ν λ ο ἴ γεγονότες\(^3\)

Demosthenes himself, in 341 B.C., acknowledged the fact that the Athenians of that period behaved unjustly towards some of the Greeks:

"τοῖς τὸν ὅσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ἔκειδὴ τις ὁ υ μ ητρεῖ ως ἐκδικούν προσφέρεσθαι, πάντες ἤτοι δὲ τά ..α ἐμακρανίων πολέμεων. \(^4\)

Furthermore, all the members who had endeavoured to break away from the Athenian Confederacy were not only forced to rejoin it, but were deprived of their autonomy and were mostly obliged to pay a higher tribute\(^5\).

\(^1\) XXIV (2-3).
\(^2\) XI 70(4).
\(^3\) Cimon XI (3). Nepos in his "Cimon" II (4) also refers to the great resentment of the allies towards the Athenians.
\(^4\) IX 24.
\(^5\) See ATL III 244. Also Gomme’s commentary in I 58 for an account of how some of the seditious members were compelled to pay a higher tribute.
Examples of this can be seen in the cases of Naxos, Thasos, Euboea, Samos, Byzantium etc.. 1)

In Naxos, the Athenians brought the inhabitants of the island into subjection and posted five hundred Athenian cleruchs on the island.

Thucydides writes concerning Naxos and the other allies who revolted later:

"πρώτη τε αυτή πόλις ξυμμαχής παρά τὸ καθεστημένος ἢ δον λόθη ἐκείνα δὲ καὶ τῶν άλλων ώς ἐκζωτη ξυνέβη." 2)

In the case of Thasos, stiff terms were likewise imposed by the Athenians: the Thaseans were compelled to destroy their fortifications, to surrender their warships, to yield their continental possessions, and, in addition to their annual tribute, to pay immediate monetary reparations. 3)

In Euboea, Pericles established cleruchies 4), took hostages 5), and settled an Athenian colony in Hestiaea by driving the inhabitants of the city out of their land 6).

Samos was forced to surrender her fleet, tear down

1) For other cases, see ML GHI 40, 43, 47, and ATL Ἑρυθραῖοι, Μελίσσαι, Κολοκώνια.

2)I 98(4); here Thucydides uses the word ἐσουλᾶθε to describe the situation of Naxos and the other allied cities. On ἐσουλᾶθε see ATL III 155; J.de Romily, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism, p. 99 n.2; Gomme I 282 and III 646.


5) ML GHI 52 (for Chalcis) and I.G. I 2, p. 284 (for Eretria).

her city-walls and pay a heavy indemnity \(^1\).

In the case of Byzantium, Thucydides uses the term ἄπειρος in describing the situation of the people \(^2\).

It is worth noting that it was not more than eight years after the formation of the Delian League when the first ally, Naxos, was forced to rejoin the League, and only six years after its formation when a non-member city, Carystos, had unwelcome membership thrust upon it \(^3\).

As for the other States which remained loyal to the Athenians, there is certainly no justification in inferring that they did so because they were in agreement with the Athenian rule over them. On the contrary, there is explicit and weighty support in the sources mentioned above for the conclusion that the majority of the allies considered the Athenian rule as politically oppressive and unwelcome, and their loyalty seems to have amounted to little more than fear of the Athenians.

To the subjects of Athens themselves, the facts that they had to carry the tribute and the "first fruits" to Athens every spring \(^4\), that in some cases they had to appear before an Athenian court \(^5\), that the Athenian

\(^1\) See ML GHI 56, Thuc. I 115(3-5) and 117(3), Diod. XII 28(3-4), Plut. Per. XXVIII (1-3), information which he derived from Duris.

\(^2\) I 117(3).

\(^3\) For Naxos, see preceding page, n.2, for Carystos, see Thuc. I 98(3).

\(^4\) See ML GHI 39 and ATL list I, and lists 12-16, and 17 ff. Cf. ML GHI 60 and 65.

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coinage was imposed upon them 1), that temples to the Athenian gods were established in their midst 2), and that ἀρχοντες 3), ἐπίσκοποι 4), φροδοραχεία and Athenian garrisons 5) were present among them, were all strong signs of their loss of freedom and autonomy.

Consequently, there is no doubt that the Delian League began as a voluntary alliance on the basis of the sovereign city-state 6), but afterwards gradually deviated from its original purpose 7), and took the form of an Athenian Empire 3), which was opposed to the political sentiments of the majority of the allies.

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2) See Aelian VH VI 1, and Hill's sources 2, pp. 318-20 for various inscriptions.
8) The transference of the treasury of the League from Delos to Athens in 454 B.C. must be considered as the final act, leading to the League's assuming the form of an Athenian Empire. See Ephorus fr. 196; Diod. XII 38(2) and 54(3), and XIII 21(3); Plut. Per. XII (1). (cont'd)
On the evidence given, therefore, Demosthenes' information that the willing obedience of the allies to Athens existed until the beginning of the Peloponnesian war must be considered as historically inaccurate.

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cont'd....

The older term for the relations between Athens and the allies was "alliance" (see ML GHI 40 1.22-24), the newer term was "Empire" (see Thuc. V 18(7) and 47(2). Some of the terms used to describe the allies are: φόρον ἰσοτελείς (Thuc. I 19, 56(2), 65, 80(3) and VII 57(4); ἰσοτελείς (Thuc. II 9(4), ἰσοχρόις (Thuc. III 11(1); συντελείς (Diod. XI 78(4).

1) From among the ancient sources it is Lysias who, in his funeral speech holds the same view as Demosthenes. He says: "ἀστασίαν ἀστούς ἀνάμεσά τους συμμάχους..." II 55.

Isocrates, although he occasionally (VII 65, VIII 79 and 105, XII 57 and 97) accuses his ancestors of being oppressive towards their allies, had nevertheless previously expressed the opinion (IV 104 and 109, in 380 B.C.) that the allies enjoyed complete freedom at home.

The majority of modern scholars are unanimous in considering the Athenian rule as oppressive and unpopular.

A few voices raised in opposition to this judgement: See G. Grote IV 517-20, A. Jones; "Athenian Democracy and its Critics " CHJ 11(1953), 1-26, and G. de Ste Croix, "The character of the Athenian Empire " Historia 3 (1954-55), 1-41, where he says that Thucydides " is guilty of serious misrepresentation in his judgement on the Athenian Empire ", p. 16. For a refutation of this argument, see D. W. Bradeen: "The popularity of the Athenian Empire " Historia 9 (1960), pp. 257-269.

It must now be considered whether Demosthenes was in fact merely mistaken in his belief. It would seem highly unlikely that he was uninformed about the events of the period in question, for the simple reason that this would presuppose his ignorance 1) of the most basic events concerning such an illustrious period in the history of Athens.

1) On the contrary, we must consider it as most likely that Demosthenes was well acquainted with the events of the period in question: Those events are known primarily from Thucydides' History (I 89-118), which, according to the ancient sources, was well known to Demosthenes.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in his work "On Thucydides" (53), says that Demosthenes "θοῦ νυ δί δο ν ζη λω . . . τής ἕγένετο κατά πολλά", and he also says elsewhere (Letter to Cn. Pompeius p. 777) that Caecilius was of the same opinion: "ἐμοὶ μέντοι καὶ τῇ φιλτάτῳ Κακυλήφ δοκεῖ τά ἐνεμόματα αὐτοῦ (θουκυδίδου) μάλιστα μι μή σα σάλα τε καὶ ζηλόσαι δημοσθένης" Plutarch, in his account of Demosthenes' life, which is included in his "Lives of the ten Orators" (384 B), states: "ζη λων θο νυ δί δὲ η ν καὶ Πλάτωνα."

Lucian in his address "Against the uneducated",4, says that Demosthenes had rewritten the History of Thucydides eight times: "...τά τοῦ θουκυδίδου, ὅσα παρὰ δημοσθένους καὶ αὐτά ὅ κτά καὶς μεταγεγραμμένα εὐρέθη καλῶς."

Ulpian says in his "Prolegomena" that Demosthenes imitated Thucydides to such an extent that the former paraphrased passages of the latter's History: "Πλείστην δοκοῦσαν ὅ μοι ο τή τα σώζειν οἱ φιλιππικοὶ λόγοι πρῶς τάς θο νυ δί δο ν δημιουργίας. ...καὶ πολλά τῶν νομιμάτων π α ρ α π ε ϕ ρ σ μέ να."

Zosimus of Ascalon recounts that when an Athenian library had been burned and Thucydides' History had been destroyed, it was Demosthenes who rewrote the History from memory. There is obviously a great deal of fiction in this account, but the basic fact emerges that Demosthenes knew Thucydides well. (cont'd)
However, it seems to me that Demosthenes must have interpreted these events in a different way, and in giving this information, he must have been guided by his personal attitude towards these historical events.

We may reasonably infer that, for Demosthenes, it was only when the Greeks took arms that they indicated the change in their feelings. The relative calm which had previously reigned in Greece would appear to this ardent Athenian patriot as a sign of voluntary acceptance of Athenian rule.

This belief was no doubt influenced by the general current of opinion held among the Athenians as a result of official Attic propaganda about the

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(Cont'd....)

Finally, Demosthenes himself speaks of the "good education" he received in his youth, and this "good education" could hardly have excluded one of the most famous authors who had recounted the glory of the Athenians in the recent past. It was a past of which Demosthenes was particularly proud. He says: "ἐμοὶ τούτων ὄπηρες παιδὶ μὲν ὡντι φοιτάν εἰς τὰ προσόμοντα διδασκαιτείκα XVIII, 257." See P. Blass III, p. 19f 87f 96 144 150f 154 220; A. W. Pickard-Cambridge, pp. 16-18.

For what is a close imitation of Thucydides in a speech attributed to Demosthenes, compare (Dem.) LIX 99ff with Thuc. II 2(2)ff. Cf. C. Walther, Num quae imitationis Thucydidiae vestigia in Demosthenis orationibus inveniri possint. Diss. 1886. See also p. 66 n. 2 of this work.
Athenian policy towards the other Greeks 1). This propaganda must have created the impression that the allies' efforts to shake off the Athenian leadership were isolated incidents, organized by a handful of extremists who, in an attempt to satisfy their own ambitions, had succeeded through false promises in misleading the people for a short time 2).

This explanation must have been welcomed and adopted by the defeated allies also, by both the new authorities and the people; by the new authorities because of their political attitude and because of their role as leaders who had been imposed on the people and who at the same time were subservient to the views of the principal power; and by the people, at least during the period immediately after the failure of their revolt, who, anxious to avoid reprisals, placed all responsibility on their leaders.

1) The funeral speech of Pericles is a characteristic example of this. In this speech the leader of the State tries to persuade his fellow-citizens of the superiority of Athens and of the magnanimity of the Athenians in their behaviour towards the other Greeks: "οὐ γὰρ πάσχοντες εἴδ, ἀλλὰ δραίνετε κατώτερα τοῦς φίλους." This argument, which of course is fitting in this particular case (that is, in a funeral speech), must have been at the same time a part of the official propaganda directed towards the Athenians.

2) Even in cases where revolutions were successful, the official Attic propaganda must have ascribed these seditions to the fact that the people of the revolted cities were misled by false promises, and consequently they had acted against their own interests. For instance, when the Rhodians, who a short time before had broken away from the Second Athenian Confederacy (377-355 B.C.), applied to the Athenians for assistance, Demosthenes says of them: "τοῦ ὅπως ἐίνα τὴν αὐτῶν ψυχὴν ὑμῖν πολεμήσαντας." He does not consider the anti-Athenian revolution as a part of the Rhodians' efforts to win their autonomy.
As these are the impressions which seemed to abound, we must accept it as most probable that Demosthenes, who was generally prone to favour his ancestors, did not consider that uprisings among some of the allies of Athens were indicative of a change in their feelings. As far as he was concerned, this change only came about when the Greeks as a whole went to war on Athens.

This attitude, which had developed in Demosthenes' mind, was projected onto the minds of the Athenian audience as an instrument of his argumentation.

We have already mentioned in the other chapters that Demosthenes held up the ancestors as the constant standard against which the modern Athenians were compared ¹).

Consequently, Demosthenes, who was fighting to convince the people that Philip was attempting to destroy the independence of the Greeks, could not have accepted that exactly the same set of circumstances had arisen in the past when the Athenians had ruled over the Greeks.

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¹) In this speech the comparison is made in the paragraphs 23-29. The praise of the ancestors occurs in paragraphs 24-26; the accusation against his contemporaries in paragraphs 27-29. In both cases, Demosthenes deals with their behaviour both at home and abroad. In the case of their behaviour at home, he distinguishes between their behaviour in public and in private.
The duration of the Athenian hegemony.

On the subject of the duration of the Athenian ascendency, Isocrates, in his Panegyricus speech in 380 B.C., calculates the years as 70, a figure with which Plato in his seventh letter is in accordance, as is Lysias in his funeral speech. Isocrates however, in his Panathenaicus speech forty one years later, in 339 B.C., reckons the duration as only sixty five years.

Other contemporary authors disagree with these calculations: Andocides says the years numbered eighty five, and Lycurgus believes the time to be as long as ninety years.

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1. "Μετὰ γὰρ ταύτης (τῆς πολιτείας) οἰκοδύνετες ἔ βδομὼν τ' ἐτη διετέλεσαν ἀκείροι μὲν τυμπανίδινην, ἔλεοσθεροι δὲ πρὸς τοὺς βαρβάρους, ἀστασίαστοι δὲ πρὸς σφᾶς αὐτούς..." IV 106.
2. "Εἰς δὲ Αθηναίοι... ἐ βδομὼν τ' ἐτη διεφθάραν τὴν ἀρχήν " Letter VII 332b.
3. "... ἐ βδομὸν τ' ἐτη τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχαντες, ἀστασίαστοι δὲ παρασχόντες τοὺς συμμάχους " Epitaph.(II) 55.
The phrase "τῆς θαλάττης ἀρχαντες" is quite accurate, but the phrase "ἀστασίαστοι δὲ παρασχόντες τοὺς συμμάχους" is historically inaccurate, as has already been shown in the preceding chapter.
4. "ἡμεῖς δὲ πέντε καὶ ἕ ἢ κοντα συνεχῶς κατέσχομεν τὴν ἀρχήν " XIII 56.
5. "...καὶ ταύτα τά αγαθά ἐν δύο ἢ κοντα καὶ πέντε... ἡμῖν ἐτεσίν ἐγένετο " On the Peace with Sparta 38.
6. "... καὶ κοντα μὲν ἐτη τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἡγεμόνες κατέστησαν " Against Leocrates 72.
Of the later authors, Dionysius of Halicarnassus reckons the period as being sixty eight years, while the rhetorician Aristeides as more than seventy years.

Thus, owing to this confusing discrepancy between the figures, due mainly to the desire of the Athenian authors to glorify their city by occasionally exaggerating the duration of the Athenian hegemony, we must examine the historical sources in order to define with the greatest possible accuracy the beginning and the end of the Athenian supremacy, which starts with the foundation of the Confederacy of Delos, formed shortly after the end of the Persian wars, and finishes with the Peloponnesian war.

Both Herodotus and Thucydides inform us that the Lacedaemonians, who were in command of the Greeks when the Persians were expelled from Greek territory, lost their leadership over the Greeks because of the reprehensible behaviour of their king Pausanias, and this leadership passed to the Athenians during the years subsequent to the end of the Persian war.

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1) "Αθηναίοι μὲν γ' αὐτῆς μόνοιν ἦν τῆς παραλλού δυσβίν διένεν τά ἐβδομήκοντα ἔτη." Roman Ant. I(3).
2) "καὶ μὴν οἱ μὲν πλέον ἦν ἑβδομήκοντα ἔτη κατέσχον." Panath. 170 C).
3) "Ὅς γὰρ ἄδαμενοι τὸν Πέρσην περὶ τῆς ἑκέλουν ἤδη τὸν ἄγενα ἐποιεύοντο, πρόφασιν τὴν Παυσανίσσω ὑβριν προ σχόμενοι (οἱ Ἀθηναίοι) ἀπὲλθοντο. τὴν ἂ γεμού ἡν τὸ δέ Λακεδαίμονι οὐ.

VIII 3(2).
4) "Συνέβη...τοὺς ξυμμάχους τοῦ ἑκέλου (Παυσανίσσω) ἔχει παρ' Αθηναίοι μετατάξασα γε φόβο." I 95(4).

For the resentment of the Greek allies against Pausanias and their negotiations with the Athenian commander, see Thuc. I 95(1-2); Diod. XI, 44(5-6) and 46(4-5); Plut., Aristiad. xxiii and Cim. vi(2-3); Nepos, Aristii(2-3); Aristod. iv(2) and vii.
Furthermore, we know from Thucydides and other later writers that Pausanias was in command of the Greek allies when, after the end of the above mentioned war, they had marched to release firstly Cyprus and soon afterwards Byzantium from Persian control.  

It was in Byzantium that the Greek allies decided to transfer the command from the Spartans to the Athenians.  

Unfortunately, Herodotus and Thucydides do not give us the exact date of this transference of the leadership to the Athenians, nor the exact time of the formation of the Confederacy of Delos.  

We have two other later derivative sources, the philosopher Aristotle and the later historian Diodorus, relating to these dates, although we find some discrepancy between them. From the comparative examination of their narratives, it has been mostly accepted that the

1) See Thuc. I 94 and 128(5), Diod. XI 44(1-3), Justin II 15(13-14), Nepos Paus. ii(1-2) and Arist.iii(2), Paus. III 4(9), and possibly Simonides fr. 89.  

2) Aristotle, in his Constitution of Athens, states: "Επὶ δὲ τὴν ἀρχήν ἐστὶν τὴν τῶν Ἰδόνων ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν Ακαδαιμονίων συμμαχίας ἄριστελής ἦν τοῦ προτέρους, τηρηματὸς τοῦ Δίκαιος διαβεβλημένους διὰ Παυσανίαν, διὸ καὶ τοὺς φόρους οὕτως ἦν δὲ τάξια ταῖς πόλεις τοῖς πρώτοις ζητέω ἐπὶ τῇ ἐν Σαλαμίνι ναυμαχίᾳ ἐπὶ Τιμοσθένους ἀρχοντος, καὶ τοὺς ἄριστους ἐμφανές". The mention of the Archon Timosthenes and the phrase "ζητεί τρίτη μετά τὴν ἐν Σαλαμίνι ναυμαχίᾳ bring us up to the year 478/77 B.C., that is, to the second half of 478 and the first half of 477 B.C.  

However, Diodorus (XI 41) speaks of the Eponymous Archon as being Adeimantus, who succeeds Timosthenes in the Archonship in Athens. But, since he mentions the Roman consuls M. Fabius and L. Valerius, who were in office in the spring of 377 B.C., while Timosthenes still held the
movements of the Greek allies to transfer the command to
the Athenians must have been made before the end of the
summer of 478 B.C., while the first steps in the foundation
of the Confederacy must have been taken not before the end
of 478 B.C., and the formation itself must have been
completed not later than the summer of 477 B.C..

In order to draw the most accurate conclusion, the

Archonship, A. Gomme (I p. 272) concludes that Diodorus is
in basic agreement with Aristotle's date. Be that as it
may, we can use Diodorus' information in order to denote
the latter part of Timosthenes' Archonship as giving more
precisely the required date.

This estimation is in agreement with the fact that the
transference of the leadership could not be effected until
Pausanias was about to start on his return journey to
Sparta, and also with the fact that the formation of the
League must have been completed in the winter that followed
the capture of Byzantium.

It is worth noting that, before Aristotle's Constitution
of Athens was discovered in 1890 A.D., our only source
for the date was Diodorus. Thus, modern historians writing
before that year and relying on Diodorus' information
about the Archonship of Adeimantus usually assigned the
movement towards the transference of the command to the
Athenians to the year 477 B.C., and the formation of the
Confederacy to 476 B.C., but, after this discovery,
present-day authors have mostly accepted that these events
occurred one year earlier, that is, in 478 and 477 B.C.
respectively. For instance, A. Gomme, in his commentary on
Thucydides I, 94; K. Beloch in his Griechische Geschichte,
II, p. 61; E. Walker in the Cambridge Ancient History, Vp. 40;
J. Bury in his History of Greece, p. 324; N. Hammond in his
History of Greece, p. 256 and 260; V. Ehrenberg in From
Solon to Socrates, p. 187; R. Meiggs s.v. "Delian League" in
the Oxford Classical Dictionary; all these authors accept
the new dates, although there are still some followers
(continue...)
possibility that each of these dates marked the beginning of the Athenian ascendency will be examined in our investigation, although the year 477 B.C. will always be considered as the most likely.

The year 405 B.C. must be considered as marking the end of the Athenian Empire. That is, the year in which the Athenian fleet had been completely destroyed by the Spartans at Aegospotami and when Lysander had captured all the Athenian allies.

Xenophon states:

"επεθες δὲ καὶ τῇ Ἀθηναίων μετά τὴν ναυμαχίαν πλὴν Ἐλέατων ²).

Therefore, having defined the limits of the Athenian "Arche", we shall proceed to a consideration of Demosthenes' calculation concerning the Athenian supremacy over the Greeks:

In 349 B.C., Demosthenes reckoned the years of the

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(cont'd.)


Two good articles on the Delian League are those of H.Nesselhauf, Klio, Beiheft XXX (1933) and H.D.Neyer, Historia, 12(1963), pp.405-446.

1) Some of the modern commentators on Demosthenes, for example Sandys, G.Davies etc., writing before the discovery of Aristotle's Constitution of Athens, considered the year 404 B.C. as denoting the end of the Athenian Empire, in order to justify Demosthenes' calculation. But obviously no one could speak about the existence of the Athenian Empire after the disaster of Aegospotami (405 B.C.).

2) Xenophon Hell. II 2(6). Cf. Lysias' funeral speech, 58.
Athenian ascendancy as forty five, obviously excluding the years of the Peloponnesian war.

Dempsthames does not, of course, estimate the termination of the Athenian supremacy as occurring at the beginning of the Great War between the two main Greek states, but he restricts his calculation of the length of their supremacy to the duration of the willing participation of the Greek allies in the Athenian leadership.

Bearing this in mind, we see that Demosthenes failed in his estimation by only one year, or possibly two, if we calculate from 473 B.C..

This failure to give the right figure is of no great significance.

In 341 B.C., Demosthenes calculates the years as being seventy three. In this case he is inaccurate by one year, if we reckon the beginning of the Athenian supremacy as 477, but he is completely accurate if we calculate from 473 B.C..

But since it is more likely that the Athenian ascendancy began in the year 477, we must accept as most probable the view that, in this case, Demosthenes is inaccurate by one year.

This inaccuracy can be considered as a very insignificant historical fault, and, if we bear in mind that no other source contemporary with Demosthenes comes so close to the truth, we should take this very slight inaccuracy as being a point in Demosthenes' favour.

1) "τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἦργαν ἐκόμισαν". Cf. preceding chapter. The fact that Demosthenes was wrong in his consideration of the popularity of the Athenian Empire, does not influence this calculation.
In the third case, again from the Third Philippic speech in 341 B.C., Demosthenes refers to the years of the Athenian supremacy as numbering seventy. It is apparent that he is not quite accurate, but the reason for this is obvious: The orator, having only two paragraphs before mentioned the precise figure, tries to avoid a tiring detail in a deliberative speech, and therefore mentions the figure in a round number. Thus, this figure is connected with the other figure mentioned in the previous case, that is, with the number seventy three.
Chapter eleven

The duration of the Spartan hegemony.

The ancient sources concerning the duration of the Spartan supremacy over the Greeks are equally confused:

In his speeches, Isocrates again gives different dates for this period:

In his Panegyricus (380 B.C.) he had first expressed the opinion that Sparta had lost the hegemony in 394 B.C., that is, after the Athenians had gained a victory in the naval battle at Cnidus 1).

The same opinion was repeated in 355 B.C. 2).

One year previously, in 356, Isocrates suggested that the Lacedaemonians were deprived of the control of Greece as a result of the Peace of Antalcidas (387/6 B.C.) 3).

In 353 B.C. he stressed the dire significance of the battle of Leuctra (371 B.C.) for the Lacedaemonians 4), and in 346 B.C. he revealed that he considered this battle as denoting the end of the Spartan hegemony 5), which had thus

1) "Οδ Κώνωνα μέν δε υπέρ τῆς 'Ασιας στρατηγήσας τήν ἀ ρ χ ή ν τήν. Ά λ ν η μ ο ν ι ω ν κατέλυσεν...." IV 154.
2) "'Απάσης γάρ τῆς 'Ελλάδος ὑπὸ τὴν πόλιν ἡμῶν ὑποποιός καὶ μετάτην Κόνωνος ναυμαχίας ηλικίας...." VII 12.
3) VIII 68.
4) XV 110.
5) "Οδ τοι γάρ ἀρχοντες τῶν 'Ελλήνων...ἐπειδή τήν μάχην ἠττήθησαν τήν ἐν Λευκτρώις....α π ε σ τ ι τ Ῥ θ η σ α ν μέν τῆς ἐν τοῖς 'Ελληνοι...δυναστείας...." V 47.
lasted thirty four years. One year before his death (339 B.C.), Isocrates calculated the period of the Spartan ascendancy over the Greeks as having lasted only ten years 1), obviously now considering the outbreak of the Corinthian war (396/5 B.C.) as the end of the Spartan hegemony.

The historian Polybius reckons the duration as being twelve years, judging the Spartan defeat at Cnidus (394 B.C.) as marking the end of their undisputed supremacy over the Greeks 2).

Both Justin and Nepos agree with this estimation 3).

Demosthenes too, in 354 B.C., referring to this defeat of the Spartans, alludes to an end of their authority in Greece 4).

Dionysius of Halicarnassus considers the years of the Spartan hegemony as being just under thirty 5), while the

1) "Επαρτιταίαι μὲν γὰρ ζήτησαν αὐτῶν (τῶν πόλεων) " XII 56.
2) " Λακεδαιμόνιοι πολλοίς ἀμφισβητήσαντες χρόνους ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν Ἐλλήνων ἡγεμονίας, ἐπειδή ἡτοί ἱκανότησαν, μὴ λέγεις ζήτῃς δὲ ὡς ἐν αὐτῇ ἁκελεύθηναν ἐν δὲ ἐν τούτῳ ἦν τοῦ τῶν " I,2.
   It is worth noting that Polybius' estimation refers only to the length of the undisputed (ἀδήριτων) hegemony.
3) Justin, VI, 4(1) and Nepos, Conon iv.
The historian Theopompus also seems to consider this year important, as it was at this point that he concluded his history (Diodorus, XIV, 84(7)).
4) " Λακεδαιμόνιοι...πρὸ τῆς ἀλλίως ἐπιτάττοντας εἰθέσεων (Κόνων) ἀνευθείας ἐν ταύτῃ τῶν νῆσων " XX 68, and " ἤγοντο γὰρ οὖν μικρὰν τυραννίδα καὶ τοῦτον (Κόνωνα), τὴν τὴν ἄλαθε ἰμον ὦν ἄρχῃν κατακαλύπτω " Roman Ant. I(3).
5) " Λακεδαιμόνιοι...ἐπαύθυσαν ὅπε θηραίων, ὅποια ἔλθας, ἐν τῷ δὲ ἀρχήν κατασχόντες " Roman Ant. I(3).
rhetorician Aristides reckons them to be less than three Olympiads 1).

Thus, as there is also a remarkable divergence of opinions as regards the Spartan supremacy, we must again endeavour to determine its duration:

It has already been stated that in the year 405 B.C. the Athenian empire had been destroyed by the Lacedaemonians, who consequently became the rulers of Greece 2).

It remains for us to define the end of Sparta's controlling influence over the Greeks:

Let us first examine the year 394 B.C. as a possible end of the Spartan hegemony:

In this year, Sparta's supremacy did in effect suffer a set-back 3), and apparently her command over the sea was lost for some years 4).

However, as Sparta did not lose her superiority on land, and King Agesilaus, who had been recalled from Asia, retained to a large extent the control of Greek territory, this year cannot be said to mark the end of Sparta's ascendancy 5).

1) "οὐ δὲ (Ἀκαδαμίαν ὁ) ὁ ὄρος τῷ ἔθνει τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐλπίδα δοθεῖν " Panath. 120(D).
2) See preceding chapter, p. 110.
3) See Xenophon's Hellen., IV, 7(1) and Diodorus, XIV, 84(4).
4) According to Diodorus (XV, 23(3)), the Spartans in 380/79 B.C. had regained the control of the sea. And Xenophon speaks of an empire "excellently and securely established" in this year, Hell. V, 3(27). See p. 117, n. 1.
5) Polybius speaks of only twelve years of undisputed rule, which does not mean that the Spartan hegemony ended at the end of the twelfth year, but rather it implies that the Spartans continued to be dominant after that time, although they were harrassed by other contestants for power.

(cont'd.)
There are two other dates which would more reasonably define the end of the Spartan hegemony; either the year 387/6 B.C., when the Peace of Antalcidas proclaimed the autonomy of the Greek cities, or the year 371 B.C., when the Spartans were disastrously defeated at Leuctra and the Thebans appeared as the new commanding power in Greece.

As concerns the Peace of Antalcides, it must be pointed out that although the autonomy of the Greek states was officially recognized, the Spartans did not really relinquish their control over the other cities, since they retained their role of guardian of the peace 1). This being

(continuation)

Also, when Isocrates (IV,154) and Demosthenes (XX,70) speak of this year as marking the end of Spartan power, they are obviously speaking of a termination of an uncontested ascendancy.

Of the modern historians, Bury, History, p.516, thinks that Sparta lost the hegemony in the year 394, but regained it in 386 B.C..

1) Since it is often difficult to define the exact beginning and end of an historical period, it is hardly surprising that the modern historians are not quite positive about the exact date of the breakdown of the Spartan hegemony. However, there is a tendency among some authors who have written Greek Histories to conclude the chapter with the general heading "Supremacy of Sparta " , which covers the period after the Peloponnesian war, in the year 387/6 B.C., and to continue with another chapter whose title usually refers to the revival of Athenian power, although they do not mention an end to Sparta's supremacy. M. Cary, by preferring the title "The second Athenian League" for his chapter in the Cambridge Ancient History (Vol.VI) which follows the chapter on the supremacy of Sparta, and by employing the secondary title "Athenian thalassocracy" when speaking of the second half of the seventies, implies that the Spartan hegemony ended in this year.
the case, when the Peace was broken a few years later, the
Spartans appeared to be the possessors of an empire almost
equal in size to the one they had held before the Peace,
and they also seemed to have regained their superiority
at sea 1).

The year 371 B.C. is the most plausible date to mark
the end of this hegemony.

The Spartan regular army (hoplites), long since unbeaten,
was disastrously defeated in a pitched battle in Leuctra,
and this constituted the fatal blow, as the following years
were to prove. For it was on this account that they
retreated and confined themselves to the Peloponnese,
having lost all their allies in other areas, and furthermore,
having forfeited their reputation of invincibility 2).

1) In 380/79, after Sparta's victory against the Olynthians,
her power is described by Xenophon as "excellently and
securely established", while Diodorus speaks of Sparta's
supreme power and leadership over Greece, both on land and
sea.

Xenophon says : "παντιάπασιν Ἡθῇ καὶ λέως καὶ ἀσφαλε前所未有 οικὲς Ἀλεππιόνασθαι" Hell. V,3(27) and
Diodorus:"πολλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τόλμων ἔστευσαν εἰς τὴν τῶν λακε-
δαιμονίων ἡγεμονίαν καταλεῖθήναι. διὸ καὶ κατά τούτους τοὺς καρδός
πλείον ἀισχρὸν λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ τῆς Ελλάδος ἔσχον τὴν
ἡ γεμονίαν καὶ κατὰ γῆν ἢ μα καὶ κατὰ θάλατταν" XV 23(3).

Isocrates in 380 B.C. (IV,132-136) mentions Sparta as
exacting a tribute from the islands, and as quarrelling
with Athens on account of Cyclades.

2) The fact that Leuctra ended Sparta's domination is
shown in the narratives of the ancient authors :
Xenophon says:" ἔσαν μὲν τίνες οἱ ἀν δρα σ τὸν τὴν συμμο-
ράν ἤγομενοι." VI,4(14); and Diodorus "μικρόν δ' ἔστηρον
 HttpServletResponse εἰς ἑκτὸς τοὺς Ἐπαφιτάτας παραδόξως μεγάλη μάχη τὴν ἡ γε-
μονίαν καὶ ἀπὸ δὲ βαλον ἄνεβα λήγον καὶ στῶς" XV,50(2);
he also says twice, in XV 39(2) and XV 56(3), that up
(cont'd.)
Since we have defined the duration of the Lacedaemonian Empire, we shall now proceed to examine Demosthenes' calculations:

Demosthenes on one occasion reckons the length of the Spartan supremacy as twenty nine years, and at a later point, as thirty.

This second figure is the first figure rounded upwards, and the remarks made in the previous chapter as to whether the duration of the Athenian supremacy was seventy or seventy three years, also apply in this case.

Therefore, since Demosthenes calculates the Lacedaemonian hegemony as having lasted twenty nine years, we must conclude that he puts the end of the Spartan ascendancy in the year 376 B.C.

(cont'd)...

until the battle at Leuctra, the Spartans were invincible; Pausanias says: "θηβαιοίς μὲν ἡ νίκη κατέργασε ἐπιφανέστατα πασῶν ἐπόσας κατὰ Ἑλλήνων ἀνείλοντο "Ἑλλήνες " Descr. of Greece IX,13(11); Plutarch states: "Συμβάντος δὲ τοῖς τε λα-κεδαιμονίοις παίζοματο ἀπροσδόκητο καί τοῖς θηβαίοις παρὰ δδεκαν εὐτυχήματος ὁ οὖν οῦ γὲ γὰρ οὖς ἀλλοις."Ελλησι πρὸς "Ἐλλη-νας ἀγωνισμένοις" Agosil.xxix; and Libanius says: "θηβαίοι λακεδαιμονίους ἀρχοντας τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ μεγάλην δύναμιν ἔχοντας ἐν λεκτροῖς τοῖς Βοιωτίας μάχη νικήσαντες αὐτοὶ πρὸ ἡ λ-
θὸν εἰς ἧεὶς ἡ ἧσαν ὡς " Argument in Demosthenes' speeches 8.

The majority of modern historians accept the view that this particular year fits better than any other for denoting the end of the Spartan hegemony. See Beloch,III 1, p.173, H.Parke JHS 50 p.37, etc., M.Leister, History... from 479 to 323, p.203, N.Hammond,p. 495 ; Beloch says: "Da zerstörte der Tag von Leuctra diesen Nimbus der Unbesiegbarkeit, und mit Spartas herrschender Stellung war es für immer vorbei." III 1 p.173.
This means that he does not consider any of the aforementioned dates as marking the end of Sparta's hegemony; he is, however, the only author who believes that her power finished in this particular year 1).

Obviously, the main reason for his choice of this year must be the Athenian victory at Naxos, which they gained in this year under the command of Chabrias, and which proved their superiority at sea. This, together with other historical events 2), must have led Demosthenes to believe that it was in 376 B.C. that there appeared the change in the balance of power in Greece.

1) The opinion that Demosthenes' calculation is the result of his considering the year 376 B.C. as denoting the end of the Spartan domination, is commonly held among modern commentators, for example Weil, Sandys, Heslop, Abbott and Matheson, Davies etc. in their commentaries in the Third Philippic, 23.

The possible opinion that Demosthenes in fact calculates the year 371 B.C. as the end of the Spartan supremacy, and counts the years as twenty nine, because he subtracts the period between 394 and 386 B.C. (as, for instance, does Bury), when the Spartan ascendancy was not effective, does not seem reasonable.

2) The power of the Athenians seemed revived following the formation of the Second Athenian Confederacy and Timotheus' victorious campaigns on the Ionian sea; also, the power of the Thebans appeared strong enough to force Agesilaus to stop his annual invasions of Boeotia. Concerning Theban power during this period, Diodorus says: "ψυχήματος ἐπιμπλαντο Θηβαῖοι, καὶ τὴν ἄνδρείαν εἶχον μᾶλλον περιβάλλον, καὶ φανέροι καθεστήμενοι ἀμφισβητήσοντες τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἡγεμονίας " XV 37(2).
However, Demosthenes' attempt to take this year as marking the end of the Lacedaemonian hegemony over the Greeks cannot be historically substantiated 1).

In the same speech and, moreover, in the same paragraph, Demosthenes reckons the end of the Peloponnesian war, that is, the year in which Athenian power was finally destroyed, as denoting the end of the Athenian Empire. He does not consider any of the preceding years, when on occasion Athenian power seemed surpassed by Spartan, as marking the end.

Demosthenes should therefore have followed the same method when considering the length of the Spartan supremacy. That is, he should have singled out the fatal blow which put an end to Sparta's superiority, and not the year in which there emerged powers capable of depriving Sparta of the hegemony of Greece 2).

1) T.T.B.Ryder, in his recent publication "Koine Eirene", is, as far as I know, the only modern historian to describe the era between 375 and 371 without reservation as the period of Athenian leadership, (see chapter IV, pp.58-78). In my opinion the existing evidence does not support this judgement.

2) It seems to me that in 576 B.C. the Spartans were in the same position as the Athenians had been in the years 413-411; for in each case, after these decisive years, there was a loss of strength and allies, which led to the last stage of their Empires.

Isocrates in 553/52 B.C. had expressed the opinion that it was the year 375/4 B.C. which introduced the last stage of the Spartan hegemony, but that it was in 371 B.C. that the fatal blow was struck.

He says: "(Τιμόθεος) ἤναγκασεν αὐτοῦς (Δαμεσδαμονίους) συνθέσθαι τὴν εἱρήνην, ἢ τοσαύτην μεταβολήν ἐκατέρφ τῶν πόλεων ἐποίησον, ἢς' (cont'd.)
Demosthenes' determining of the year 376 B.C. as marking the end of Lacedaemonian ascendancy is wrong for the following reason also: In the text under consideration, Demosthenes himself states that the superiority of Thebes begins in the year 371 B.C.. It is known that Athens did not regain her control over the land. It is also known that Thebes had begun to dispute the supremacy on land \(^1\), but even in 371 B.C., before the battle of Leuctra, it was Sparta that was thought to be incomparably superior. Diodorus says that before the battle the enemies of Thebes were overjoyed at the thought of her imminent destruction, while her allies regretted what they felt would be her certain defeat \(^2\).

Who then deprived Sparta of her supremacy on land?

Since Sparta was mainly a land-power, the loss of her all-important command over the land must be considered as

(cont'd.).....

1) Diodorus says: "Οί δὲ θηβαῖοι, τῇ τε βάσι τῶν σωμάτων καὶ ταῖς ἀλκαῖς διαφέροντες καὶ πολλαίς μάχαις προνεικηκότες τοὺς Λακεδαιμόνιους, μετέωροι τοῖς φρονήμασιν ὑπήρξον καὶ τῆς κατά γῆν ἡγεμονί- ας ἡμισφήτουν " ΧV. 109-1:ο.

2) " Ἐπαντες ύπελάμβανον αὐτοὺς ῥηθὼς ὑπὸ τῶν Ἐπαρτιατῶν καταπλη- μηθοῦσαί τιν. διὸ παρὰ οἱ μὲν εὐνοίκισις ἔχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων πρὸς τοὺς θηβαίους συνῆλθον ἀυτοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς προσδοκιμέναις συμφοραῖς, οἱ δὲ ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντες περιχαρεῖς ἤσαν, ὡς αὐτίκα μᾶλα τῶν θηβαίων ἔκαν- ὅρατοσθῆσομένων " ΧV. 51(3). See also ΧV. 50 and Plut. Agesilaios xxix.
having led inevitably to the end of her hegemony.

For these reasons it appears that Demosthenes' opinion that it was in 376 B.C. that the Spartan domination over the Greeks ended, is unsound, and consequently, his calculation of his hegemony as having lasted twenty nine years is historically inaccurate.

The question of whether Demosthenes is deliberately inaccurate or not must now be raised: The sequence of thought in this passage leads us to believe that any effort on the part of Demosthenes to diminish the length of Lacedaemonian domination in Greece would be contrary to his argumentation.

In paragraph 25, where Demosthenes applies his calculations, he makes a comparison between Philip's superiority over the Greeks and the leadership of the other cities which had controlled Greece in the past.

He says that, although Philip had been ruling for only thirteen years, he had committed more cruel deeds than had the other cities in a much longer period. The contrast between them would be emphasized if he extended the duration of the power of the Greek cities.

It seems likely that Demosthenes may have been led into some kind of error on this point because of his ardent patriotism. More than any other event which had taken place without Athenian participation, no matter how great had been the resulting change in the balance of power in Greece (for example in the battle at Leuctra), the victorious

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1) See chapter twenty, p. 183ff.
battle at Naxos must have seemed, to the eyes of an Athenian patriot, to have marked the beginning of a new era in the balance of Greek power.
PART TWO

MISREPRESENTATION CONCERNING EVENTS OF DEMOSTHENES' OWN TIME

Chapter twelve

The capture of Amphipolis.

"...καὶ ὑσασίν (Ὁλύνοιοι) "...προσαγαγών δὲ (δ Ἀλίππος) τοῖς τείχε- ᾅ τ᾽ Ἀμφιπολίτῶν ἐποίησε σι μηχανάς καὶ προσβολάς ἐνεργοῖς καὶ συνε- τούς π α ρ α δ ὅ ν τ ας καὶ σις ποιησάμενος κατέλαβε μὲν τοῖς κριόις αὐτῷ τὸν πόλιν καὶ Πυδναί- μέρος τι τοῦ τείχους, παρεισελθὼν δ᾽ εἰς ὄν τούς δ ὅ ν ὅ ξα καὶ τὴν πόλιν διὰ τοῦ πτώματος καὶ τῶν ἀντι- μέ ν ο ν ζ στάντων πολλοῖς καταλαβὼν ἐκφέρεσε τῆς πόλεως καὶ τούς ἄλλοις πρὸς αὐτῶν δια- κειμένους ἐφυγάδευσε, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις φι- 

First Olynthiac, 5.

According to the texts, Demosthenes says that Amphipolis was captured as a result of treachery; the same can be said of Pydna, of which the milder word "ὑποδεξαμένους" is used, although even in this case, Demosthenes has previously (in 354 B.C.) used the term "προδόντες" 1).

Diodorus of Sicily describes a regular siege in the case of Amphipolis, and presents the city besieged after a breach was made by means of battering-rams (κροὶ). In the case of Pydna, he simply states that the city was besieged.

1) XX 63, "οἱ προδόντες τὴν Πυδναν καὶ τῆλα χωρία τῷ Φιλίππῳ".
The two authors also contradict one another when they deal with the subject of Philip's conduct towards the people of the besieged cities:

Demosthenes, in saying "ά τ᾿ Ἀμφιπολιτῶν ἐποίησε τοῦς παραδόντας ", alludes to the fact that Philip, instead of rewarding his partisans in Amphipolis, inflicted great suffering on them, although he does not describe the actual suffering.

Diodorus says that Philip expelled his political opponents from the city, but treated the others charitably: "τοὺς μὲν ἄλλοις ὑπὲρ τῶν διακεμένων ἐφυγάδευσε, τοῖς δ᾿ ἄλλοις φιλανθράπως προσηνέχθη ".

Given these differences in the information of the orator and the later historian, we shall now avail ourselves of any surviving evidence and try to ascertain firstly, the real way in which Amphipolis and Pydna were besieged, and secondly, the nature of Philip's conduct towards the people of the captured cities.

In reinforcement of Demosthenes' view we have the references of the ancient scholiast, here probably the orator Aristeides, and also the evidence of the rhetorician Libanus (314–393 A.D.), who agrees with the view of Demosthenes and the scholiast.

The scholiast says the following with reference to Amphipolis:

"εἰςελθὼν γὰρ αὐτοῦς (τοὺς ἀνοίξαντας τὰς πύλας) πρῶτος ἐφονεύσε λέγων· εἰ τῶν ἱσίων πολιτῶν οὐκ ἐφελθασθέ, πόσφ γε πλέον οὐ μέλλετε περὶ ἑμὲ οὐστερον τοιούτου γενήσεσθαι ".

1) Scholia in Dem. ed. by Baiter and Sauppe (Oratores Attici), p. 50.
and in the case of Pydna:

"νάκει τινες προδεδήμασιν, εἰς' ὑστερον γνώντες ὅτι οὐκ ἦν αὐτῶν
φείδατο, ἔψυγον ἐπὶ τὸ 'Αμφύτιον ἱερόν τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ ....
δῆσες οὖν ἐκεῖτε καταφρυγόντων ἐφείδατο, ἀλλ' ἀναστήσας αὐτὸς
ἐςκοι ἐπὶ τῷ μηδὲν ποιήσαι ἐξελθόντας ἀνείλεν " 1).

Likewise Libanius:

"'Αμφιπολίτων τινας θεραπεύσας εἶχεν 'Αμφύτιον. ὡς δὲ ἦν ἰδιοπότης,
δὲν εἰλήφει τὴν πόλιν, τούτους ἔξηλαμνε. πρὸς δὲ γε πηδένατος
οὐ διέστησέν ἀπὸ τῶν σπουδών τὰς σφαγὰς, ἀλλ' ἀνέμιξέν
ἀμφότερα " 2).

Some connection with Diodorus' information can be found
in a decree still extant in the area of ancient Amphipolis.
The inscription reads:

"'Εδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ Φίλωνα καὶ Επτακόλλεα φεύγειν 'Αμφύτιον
καὶ τὴν γῆν τὴν 'Αμφιπολιτέων ἀειφυγήν καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ
τὰς παῖδας, καὶ ἢμπο ἀλλοικον, πάσχειν αὐτὸς ὡς πολέ-
μιος καὶ νηπιαίες τεθνάναι, τὰ δὲ χρήματα αὐτῶν ὑμέδοσα
εἶναι ...." 3).

If we compare this text with Demosthenes' First Olynthiac
speech (8) and Theopompus' fr.47, we shall find confirmation
that Stratocles, who is mentioned here, was a political
opponent of Philip. This inscription proves the validity
of Diodorus' view of Philip's political opponents, while

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1) Scholia in Dem. ed.by Baiter and Sauppe (Oratores Attici),
p.50.
2) Progymnasmata, vituperationes, Condemnation of Philip,
7-8.
3) Tod II 150.
Demosthenes' information of the "παραδότων τὴν πόλιν" remains doubtful.

Also, a quotation given in general terms in "The Letter of Philip" 1) (which is usually considered spurious 2)), strengthens Diodorus' information about the capture of Amphipolis, and from other passages in Demosthenes' own speeches we learn that a siege really did take place both in Amphipolis and Pydna 3).

Before drawing any conclusions, we must examine the objectivity of our sources:

We must first acknowledge that the reliability of the scholiast is highly questionable, not only because he was an orator, who lived some centuries after the event, but

1) XII 21.
2) This letter is traditionally considered spurious. The last articles to be written on this problem are those of M. Pohlenz and A. Momigliano. M. Pohlenz, in "Der Ausbruch des zweiten Krieges zwischen Philipp und Athen", NGG 1924, pp. 38-42, and also in "Philipp's Schreiben an Athen", Hermes 64 (1929), pp. 41-62, rejects this traditional opinion and believes that the letter is an authentic document. A. Momigliano, in "Due problemi storiografici", RIL 65 (1932), pp. 569-578, retains the traditional view and attributes the letter to Anaximenes of Lampsacus. Whichever view is correct, there is no satisfactory reason for doubting that the letter accurately represents Philip's opinions. Cf. Pickard-Cambridge, p. 356, n. 6.
3) For Amphipolis, Demosthenes says: "ὅτε μὲν Ἄμφιπολιν ἐπολιοντικαὶ Ἐξωτερικαὶ (Φίλιππος)" XXIII 116, and again "ὅτε Ἀμφιπολιν ἐπολιοντικαὶ Ἐξωτερικαὶ" VII 27. For Pydna he also states "καὶ πάλιν ἡνίκα Ἑλλάδα.......προηγομένοι ἀπηγγέλλετο" I 9.
also because he usually offers mainly conjectural explanations of the text rather than historical investigations on the subject 1).

The information of Libanius is also to be treated with extreme caution, since he was writing under exactly the same conditions as the scholiast, and moreover, he was strongly prejudiced against Philip 2).

Generally speaking, we must consider Aristeides and Libanius as having relied on Demosthenes' speeches for their information. Thus, while they cannot be taken as trustworthy sources on which to base our judgement, Diodorus, however, in this particular passage, is regarded as sufficiently trustworthy.

Both A. Momigliano and N. Hammond, though in disagreement on many other points, agree on the fact that this passage

1) The scholiasts, in their efforts to interpret passages, did not always render their meaning accurately. Three serious historical mistakes have been noted in Demosthenes' scholia owing to misinterpretation. These are: the death penalty for anyone proposing to alter the law about "εκτιμάων" alleged by Libanius in the Argument of the First Olynthiac, arising from the misinterpretation of the word "ἀπολέσθω " in the Third Olynthiac, 12; the concession of independence for all the allies in 355 B.C., owing to misinterpretation of "εἰρήνης οὕτως " in the Third Olynthiac, 28; and the allegation that Timotheus hanged himself, owing to misinterpretation of "τὸν μὲν ἀνήρηκε " in the speech "On the fraudulent Embassy ", 2.

2) For example, he has written books such as: Condemnation of Philip, Condemnation of Aeschines, Laudation of Demosthenes, etc.
is derived from Ephorus 1). N.Hammond lists it among the finest passages of Diodorus' narratives 2).

For the above reasons, and owing to the fact that the inscription we have mentioned, which is of obvious historical value, indirectly supports to some extent Diodorus' information, Demosthenes' view on the events at Amphipolis must be considered as historically inaccurate 3).

In the case of Pydna, there is no evidence on the strength of which we could reject Demosthenes' information 4).

It seems reasonable to suppose that behind his inaccuracy concerning the events at Amphipolis lies the attitude of Demosthenes the politician, who basically was not so much interested in the outcome of the political conflict between Philip and the Amphipolitans in the military field, as in

3) Among the modern historians, A. W. Pickard-Cambridge thinks that it was through treachery as well as by means of seize-engines that Philip took the town, (Demosthenes, p. 156, and CAH VI, p. 207). G. Grote believes that Philip had indeed made a breach in the walls, but not without the aid of partisans within (IX p. 38). D. Hogarth p. 48, K. Beloch III 1 p. 229, N. Hammond p. 538-9, and M. Laistner p. 227, all think that it was Philip's battering-rams which breached the walls of Amphipolis.
how this outcome was politically prepared "a priori", and who also looked for the deepest political reasons behind it. Demosthenes must have seen that Philip's party, which surely existed in Amphipolis as well as in every other city, had prepared the way for the occupation of this city; consequently, he believed that this party had corrupted the minds of the citizens. It is therefore very possible that he regarded this as treachery, and it is interesting to note that he says "παραδόντας" and not "προδόντας".

On the other hand, it is well known that during the year 349/8 B.C., when Demosthenes delivered the First Olynthiac speech 1), he upheld the opinion that Philip was not really strong, but merely seemed so because of the attentions he enjoyed from his partisans everywhere. It fell within his general policy to persuade the Athenians that Philip was not a formidable opponent.

Therefore Demosthenes, by using the words "παραδόντας" and "δυσδέξαμένους", must restrict his interest to the political, rather than to the military field.

In addition to this, it would not seem impossible for a military enterprise to result in a kind of surrender, since some men, when they saw that Philip had besieged a part of the wall, thought it would be of no avail to continue their defence, and surrendered to save their lives. Such a conclusion to a battle is not unusual, and it is certain that this was regarded as treachery by a particular

1) Dionysius of Halicarnassus, First letter to Ammaeus, 4.
group of the Amphipolitans. Such an interpretation would be quite acceptable to Demosthenes, in order to account for Philip's progress.

Concerning Philip's conduct towards the people of the captured cities, the following points should be observed: It seems very probable that, at the moment of occupation, there would be much violence and bloodshed in the ensuing military and political confusion and rioting, which could have given Demosthenes the opportunity of criticizing Philip's behaviour. It is worth noting that the two later authors Aristeides and Libanius, who elucidate Demosthenes' opinion, contradict one another. Aristeides states that Philip killed the "μαρασδήντας", while Libanius claims that he merely expelled them.

Demosthenes however, while retaining an element of truth in his speech, is mindful of his own purposes when he interprets the affair, and so he exaggerates to a certain extent in order to create a rhetorically effective description.
The capture of Poteidaea.

""Ὅλως μὲν γάρ ἡ Μακεδονικὴ δύναμις ἔκεινος (Φίλιππος) ἔκεινος καὶ ἀρχὴ ἐν μὲν προσθήκῃ μερὶς ἔστι (Ολυνθῖος) Ποτειδαίαν οὐχὶ τις οὐ μικρὰ, οἶον ὑπήρξε ποτ' ὡμὲν τηνικαύτ' ἀπέδωκεν, ἥνικ' ἀπο- ἐπὶ Τιμοθέου πρὸς 'Ολυνθῖος' πά - στερεῖν οὐκέθ' οἵς τ' ἦν...

λ ι ν α θ ρ ο ς Π ο τ ε ᾃ ὀλλά πρός ὅμας πολεμῶν χρήματα δ α ι α ν 'Ο λ υ ν θ ι ο ς ἐ - πολλά ἀναλύσας, ἔλὼν καὶ ὑπνη- φάνη τί τοῦτο σύ μα μεθές ἂν αὐτὸς ἔχειν, εἴπερ ἐ- φότερον"..." boulethē, parðexhe...


Referring to the capture of Poteidaea (356 B.C.) in his Second Olynthiac speech (349 B.C.), Demosthenes speaks of this town as having been captured mainly by the Olynthians, with Philip playing a secondary role, as a reinforcement to the Olynthians.

This narration of the event differs from that given three years before in the speech "Against Aristocrates", 352 B.C., where Demosthenes credits Philip with the capture of the city.

This contradiction leads us to assume that Demosthenes must be wrong in one case, or possibly in both. We shall try to discover where, and to what extent he is inaccurate, and to establish whether his inaccuracy was deliberate or unintentional.
Demosthenes himself throws considerable light upon this subject, since this event features frequently in his narrative as one of his favourite arguments to prove Philip's unreliability in his dealings with the Olynthians. In all his other references to this event he attributes the capture of the city to Philip, making no mention of the part played by the Olynthians. An example of this can be found in a later passage of his speech (now under consideration) "Against Aristocrates": "ἐπειδὴ δ' ἔλαβε (Φίλιππος Ἀμφίπολιν), καὶ Ποτείδαιαν προσαφείλετο" 1).

Even in his Second Olynthiac speech, before he had treated the capture of Poteidæa as mainly the work of the Olynthians, he had already stated: "...μετὰ ταῦτα τῷ Ποτείδαιαν οὖσαν ὑμετέραν ἐξελεῖν (Φίλιππον)" 2).

Again in 344, in his Second Philippic speech, he says: "Ποτείδαιαν δ' ἔδειξον (Φίλιππος τοῖς Ὀλυμπίοις) τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἀποικίως ἐκβάλλων" 3).

In short, this is found to be the case in all other passages 4). Therefore, according to the main part of the evidence given by Demosthenes, (that is, everything except for one reference), the capture of Poteidæa must have been mainly the work of Philip, and not of the Olynthians.

Diodorus also confirms the fact that it was Philip who

1) XXIII 116.
2) II 7.
3) VI 20.
4) I 9 and 12; IV 4; VI 17; (VII 10); VIII 62 and 65; X 64.
captured the city:

" Ο Φίλιππος Ποτίδαιαν ἐκπολιορκήσας τὴν τῶν Ἀθηναίων
φοροῦσαν ἔξηγαγεν ἐν τῆς πόλεως...τὴν ὑέ πόλιν ἔξανθραποδισά-
μενος παρέδωκε τοῖς 'Ολυμβίοις, δωρισάμενος ἀμα καὶ τὰς κατὰ
τὴν χώραν πηθερεῖς " 1).

This information is also supported by other authors:
Plutarch says that Philip himself had captured the city,
and had at the same time sent the general Parmenion on an
expedition against the Illyrians:

" Φιλίππη δὲ ἄρτι Ποτίδαιαν ὑηκιότι τρεῖς ἤκον ἀγγελίαι κατὰ
τὸν αὐτόν χρόνον" ἢ μὲν 'Ἰλλυρίοος ἡττᾶσθαι μάχῃ μεγάλῃ διὰ
Παρμενίωνος..." 2).

Pausanias also says:

" Ποτίδαιατάς δὲ δὲς μὲν ἐπέλαβεν ἀναζήτως ἐν τῆς σφετέρας
ὑπὸ Φιλίππου τε γενέσθαι τοῦ 'Αμόντου μ" 3).

Later writers relate the event in a similar way 4).

Therefore, Demosthenes' information that the Olynthians
were the main force behind the capture of Poteidæa seems
to be wrong, and we can accept that it was Philip who
played the greater part.

However, the information given by Demosthenes concerning

1) XVI 3(5).
2) Alexander iii(5).
3) V 23(3).
4) In his argument at the beginning of the First Olynthiac
speech, Libanius states : " Ποτίδαιαν, ἢν Ἀθηναίων ἐξόντων
ἐκπολιορκήσας Φιλίππος 'Ολυμβίοις παρέδωκεν " . And also the
rhetorician Aristeides says : " Ποτίδαιαν ἡμῶν ἀποστρήσας ἤκοι-
νοις ἔδωκεν " . Symmach. I 479, p. 713 (Dindorf). Again, in
Suda s.v. Κάρανος : " 'Ολυμβίοις, σις Ποτίδαιαν ἀφελέμενος 'Αθη-
ναίων ἐδωρήσατο ".

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the movements of the Olynthians does not seem to be entirely wrong.

It is known from an inscription that before the capture of the city, Philip had concluded an alliance with the Chalcidian League 1), and it is known from Diodorus that he had promised his help to the Olynthians in releasing the Poteidaians from the power of the Athenians. Diodorus says: "πρὸς δὲ 'Ολυνθέως συμμαχίαν ἔθετο καὶ Ποτίδαιων ἡμιλήσει περιποίησαν αὐτοῖς" 2).

It is therefore very likely that Philip would have asked for assistance from his new allies for political reasons, and also because the city was going to be handed over to them.

It was evidently in Philip's interest to create a feeling of enmity between Olynthus and Athens, and it seems fairly certain that he would have liked to represent the Olynthians to the Athenians as participating in a campaign against Athenian interests. This must surely have been Philip's policy, if we remember that, according to Demosthenes 3), the Olynthians had wished to become allies of the Athenians before their alliance with Philip, but had been refused this alliance because of the promises the Athenians had received from Philip concerning Amphipolis 4).

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1) See Tod II 158 and Dem. XXIII 108.
2) XVI 8(3).
3) II 6.
4) For further information concerning these events, see: A. West, History of the Chalcidian League, 115ff; Beloch III 1, 228ff; Pickard-Cambridge CAH VI 200ff; Momigliano, (cont'd.)
According to Diodorus, Olynthus was an object of contention between those who wished to extend their power, and also between Philip and the Athenians, since each endeavoured to increase their power, because the city had a large population and wielded great influence in war. 1)

Therefore, by taking the Olynthians with him on an enterprise which was contrary to the Athenian interests, Philip would have diminished the likelihood of a future alliance between the Olynthians and the Athenians, although, as we know 2), this did in fact take place later on, in spite of Philip's intrigues. But it is still certain that he would have done all in his power to prevent this alliance.

There is yet another reason behind Philip's wish for the Olynthians' participation in the capture of the city: The Olynthians had lost Poteidaea only seven years previously, after an uninterrupted occupation which lasted

(cont'd.)....

p.47f; M. Gude, A History of Olynthus, 32ff; D. Robinson and P. Clement, Excavations at Olynthus, IX 154ff.

1) XVI 8(4).

2) Philochorus says: "Καλλίμαχος Περγαμητής ἔφη τοῦτον ἔν' ὀλυνθίταις πολεμοῦμένοις ὧνς ψίλληκτον καὶ πρόσφεις Ἀθηναῖος πέμπασιν ἦν Ἀθηναίοι συμβαχθάν τε ἐποιήσαντο" FGrH III b, 328, fr. 49.

See also Tod II 119 and Dittenberger, Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum, I 143. A treaty between Athens and Olynthus is also clearly implied by Demosthenes' phraseology in the Third Olynthiac speech: "τούς συμμάχους σάσομεν", 2; "παντὶ σέλενι κατὰ τὸ ὄνοματον ", 6 etc.. See Sandys' comment. ad loc.. Cf. Libanius' argument at the beginning of this speech, and also Dem. XXIII 109.
at least from 382 1) to 363 2), a fact which would have rendered their claims to the city more justifiable than those of the Athenians.

In this way, Philip could justify his action by cooperating with the Olynthians, and, by finally handing the city back to them, he obviously wished to avoid the accusation that he was working openly against the interests of the Athenians 3). It is obvious that, in the attack on Poteidaea, he tried to exonerate himself by professing that he was acting with the Olynthians as their ally and in their interests.

Also, according to the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech "On Halonnesus", Philip had come to terms with Poteidaea 4), in which case he would have taken care to show that he was not breaking the alliance by acting on his own and out of self-interest.

There is also a passage in Demosthenes' Second Olynthiac speech where Demosthenes himself may be referring to this alliance 5).

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1) Xenoph. Hell. V 2(15). Xenophon says that in 382 B.C. Poteidaea was already under the domination of the Olynthians, which possibly means that the domination may have begun in 405/4.
2) Isocr. Antid. 108, Diod. XV 81(5).
3) Demosthenes' argument that Philip always acted in this way in order to find partisans in the cities, may be yet another reason. See VI 21-22, VIII 64-65, and X 64.
4) (VII),10.
5) "τὴν δ' Ὀλυνθίων φιλίαν μετὰ ταῦτα τῇ Ποτείδαιᾳν ὀδαν ὑμετέραν ἐξέλειν καὶ τοὺς μὲν πρῶτουν συμμάχους (ὑμᾶς) ἐδικήσαι, παραδοῦναι δ' ἐκείνους" II 7; If we believe the scholiast, whom (cont'd.)
If this alliance really existed, then Philip obviously needed the Olynthians' cooperation to justify his action, as he always endeavoured to show that he did not violate his agreements 1).

Moreover, it was in the Olynthians' interest to participate in the siege, because this would ensure them against a possible refusal by Philip to carry out his promise 2).

Finally, Demosthenes himself, in 352, when he says that it was Philip who had captured Poteidæa, mentions at the same time that the Olynthians had participated in the...

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(cont'd.)...
F. Blass follows in bracketing the word "μακ", then Demosthenes is referring with the word "συμμακάνος" to the Poteidæans, not the Athenians.

1) Demosthenes has bitterly accused Philip of always breaking the terms of any agreement he made, but this does not seem quite right. Demosthenes' accusation that the Olynthians were the innocent victims of Philip's rapacity when later on he attacked them, seems groundless. The Olynthians were the first to violate the alliance signed with Philip in 356, by coming to terms with the Athenians, as this was forbidden according to the terms of this alliance. See Tod II 158; Dem. XXIII 108, and Libanius' argument at the beginning of the First Olynthiac speech. Nor was Philip's action against the Phocians a violation of the Peace of 346, since Philip had openly excluded them from the Peace (see p. 157, n. 2). Philip's action, again, against Cersobleptes was not an infringement of the Peace of 346, since the latter had not sworn to the Peace (see p. 2)

2) In addition to this, we must point out that the cooperation seems most likely if we remember that Philip's (cont'd.)
war which Philip had waged against the Athenians 1), and, as no other case is known when the Olynthians had acted with Philip against the Athenians, it is reasonable to assume that Demosthenes refers to the case of Poteidæa 2).

This being so, Philip must be considered as having been the main force behind the capture of Poteidæa, as all the evidence given by ancient authors suggests this, and the Olynthians must have been an auxiliary force in the siege, because this is proved by Demosthenes' passages in general and also by logical thought 3).

(path towards Poteidæa lay close to Olynthus, which in its turn was only sixty stades away from Poteidæa. (See Thuc. I 63(2). Strabo says seventy stades, VII 28).

1) XXIII 108.
2) The fact that Philip preferred to enlist the cooperation of his new allies in the movement against his enemies is also shown in the case of Phocis. Philip, shortly after his alliance with the Athenians in 346, demanded that these new allies should join him against Phocis, (see Aeschines II 137).
3) Modern historians are not unanimous in their assessment of the Olynthians' participation in the capture of Poteidæa: A. Schäfer, II p. 24, D. Hogarth, p. 65, A. Holm, III p. 213, A. West, The early diplomacy of Philip II of Macedon illustrated by his coins, Numismatic Chronicle 3(1923), p. 207, N. Hammond, p. 539, and J. Bury, p. 687, do not mention any Olynthian participation in the capture of the city. K. Beloch, III 1 p. 230, seems to be of the same opinion, but he expresses himself in a noncommittal manner. He says: "Diese Stadt fiel denn auch bald darauf in Philipps Hand". G. Grote, XI p. 41, speaks of a "siege, carried on jointly by Philip and the Olynthians", which, "was both long and costly". He does not make clear in what way he means (cont'd.)
Therefore, Demosthenes' passages, where he says that it was Philip who captured Poteidaea, are not sufficiently explicit, and his other statement, that Philip was a secondary agent in the capture of the city, is quite wrong, but the remaining section of this information, which concerns the general participation of the Olynthians, is correct.

The fact that this piece of information concerning the participation of the Olynthians is not mentioned in other passages does not mean that Demosthenes himself proves this information to be wrong. It seems that in the other cases he does not mention details which would not be of interest to his audience. Thus, these statements could be considered as being not entirely precise, but still not historically inaccurate.

On the other hand, Demosthenes has obviously exaggerated in his Second Olynthiac speech, in an attempt to stress one detail which was then important for him: that is, his wish to present the Olynthians as the main force behind the capture of Poteidaea. As Demosthenes was trying throughout his Second Olynthiac speech to persuade the Athenians that Philip was not a powerful rival, he used

(cont'd.)....

"jointly", and his source for the information concerning the length of the siege is unknown. A. Pickard-Cambridge, p.157, says that "(Philip) joined the Olynthians in an attack upon Poteidaea", but in his chapter in the CAH, VI, p.208, he speaks of the capture carried out by Philip with the assistance of the Olynthians, which seems to me more probable. But he does not explain how he arrived at this conclusion.
this historical event in such a way as to create a rhetorically effective example in order to reinforce his argument, and he deliberately misrepresented the event.

This means that in the case under discussion, Demosthenes consciously tried to make Philip's contribution towards the capture of the city seem as small as possible, and the Olynthians' contribution as large as possible, and he has done this in such a way, that he has upset the ratio of the participating forces.
Introduction to chapters fourteen and fifteen

"...καὶ δορίσκον ἔλαμβανε καὶ τοὺς ἐκ Σερρείου τεῖχους καὶ Ἰεροῦ ὄρους στρατιώτας ἔξεβαλλεν, οὕς ὁ ὑμέτερος στρατηγὸς κατέστησεν, καὶ τοὺς ταύτα πράττων τὰ ἐποίει; εἷς ὕμνης ἐν ἔν αρ ὃ μ ὑ μ ὅ ἐ κ ἐ..."

...φέρε δὴ νῦν, ἢνίκε ἐκς Χερρόνησου, ἢν βασιλεὺς καὶ οὗ "Ελλήνες ὑμετέραν ἐγνώκασιν εἶναι, καὶ εὐσεβεῖς ἐνσέμπεπται καὶ βοηθεῖν ὑμολογεῖ καὶ ἐπιστέλλει ταύτα, τι ποιεῖ; φησὶ μὲν γὰρ οὐ πολεμεῖν, ἐγὼ δὲ τοσοῦτον δὲ ταύτα ποιοῦντ’ ἐκεῖνον ἑγεῖν ὑμολογεῖν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρήνην." Third Philippic, 15-16.

According to this account by Demosthenes, although the Peace of Philocrates (346 B.C.) had been concluded, and Philip had sworn oaths to the Athenians, he had violated this Peace by occupying the Thracian towns of Serreum and Doriscus, and also the fort of Serreum, and the Sacred Mountain.

Demosthenes adds that at the time of the delivery of his Third Philippic speech, 341 B.C., Philip had again broken this Peace by sending Macedonian troops to the Chersonese, which had been declared Athenian territory.

Demosthenes' narration is in direct contradiction with the other evidence we have concerning these events, and in some points also contradicts other statements he made, either earlier or later.
His statement that Philip had already sworn the oaths of the Peace when he took over the Thracian towns mentioned previously, contrasts in particular with information given elsewhere about where and when Philip had sworn the oaths.

This contradiction in the representation of the events has led F. Blass to attempt, to my mind unsuccessfully, to reconcile these statements by changing the reading of "ὁμωσώσει " to "ὁμωσώσετο " ¹), a word which does not appear in any codex.

These events, which constitute one of Demosthenes' favourite arguments against Philip ²), are to be examined under the following headings:

I. The timing of the oaths of the Peace of Philocrates in relation to Philip's occupation of the Thracian strongholds.

II. The information concerning the Chersonese.

¹) F. Blass III 1 p. 380, n. 2.
²) This can be seen under the following references: VIII 64, X 8 and 65, XVIII 27 and 70, XIX 156.
Chapter fourteen

The timing of the oaths of the Peace of Philocrates in relation to Philip's occupation of the Thracian strongholds.

Demosthenes' statement that Philip had already sworn the oaths when, in the interval between the first and Second Embassies sent by the Athenians, he was in occupation of the Thracian towns, contradicts his information relating to the details of these Embassies.

Two years earlier, in his speech "On the Fraudulent Embassy", Demosthenes says:

"ἐν τῷ πανδοκείῳ τῷ πρὸ τοῦ Διονυσιακοῦ (ἐὰν τις ὑμᾶς εἰς θεράς ἀφίκατο, οἶδ' ὡς λέγω), ἐνταῦθ' ἔγγυνοθ' οἱ δροκοί, οἱ δὲ ἐξ' ἡδή τὸ στράτευμ' ἐγὼν ἐβάδιζε Φιλίππος." 1)

This shows that Philip had sworn the oaths at a much later time, when he had not only returned to Pella, but had reached Pherae on his southward march, a short time before his attack on the Phocians 2).

Eleven years later, in his final speech "On the Crown", Demosthenes says of this event:

"ἐγὼ μὲν τοῖς ἔγγυα βουλεύων ἀποπλεῖν τὴν ταχύτητα τοῦς πρέσβεις ἐπὶ τοὺς τόπους ἐν οἷς ἂν ἄντα Φιλίππον πυνθάνωντα, καὶ τοὺς ἄρχους

1) XIX 158.
2) This piece of information is repeated later, in the Second Argument of Dem.' speech "On the Fraudulent Embassy":

"ἐξελέductedος αὐτοῦ (Φιλίππου) ἐπὶ Φωκᾶς, ἀντὶ τοῦ παρασχεῖν ἐν ἱερῷ τοὺς ἄρχους, ἐν πανδοκείῳ παρέσχε." 7.
And yet again "ἐπειδή γὰρ ὃ μο σ ε τ ἦ ν ε ἶ ρ ἦ ν ἦ ν ὃ Φίλιππος προλαβὼν τὴν Θρᾴκην" 4).

Aeschines also confirms that Philip had taken the oaths after his return from Thrace and his occupation of the strongholds mentioned by Demosthenes:

"Ἡ δ' ἦμεν ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ καὶ συνήλθομεν εἰς ταύταν, καὶ Φίλιππον ἐκ Θρᾴκης παρόντα κατειλήφσαμεν.... πρὸς τῷ τούς ὄρκους ἀπολαβεῖν συνηριθμοῦμενα" 5).

Some light is also thrown on this subject by Philip's own reply, given later to the Athenian representative.

1) XVIII 25.
2) Demosthenes' statement that the Embassy lasted for three months is not quite accurate. See G. Grote IX p. 214, n. 4.
3) XVIII 50.
4) Ibid. 32. In this passage Demosthenes implies that Philip had sworn the oaths at Pella, and not at Pherae, as he previously said in his speech "On the Fraudulent Embassy". He would otherwise have no foundation for the following statement that the ambassadors should have left Pella instead of accompanying him on his march to the south.

Whether Philip had taken the oaths at Pella or at Pherae is a matter of dispute. The fact that the Athenians and the other ambassadors followed him on his march southwards is an indication that he must have sworn the oaths at Pherae rather than Pella. However, it is sufficient for this discussion that Philip evidently swore the oaths after his return from Thrace.

5) II 101.
Eucleides, whose visit is mentioned by Demosthenes \(^1\). The content of this reply is preserved by the rhetorician Ulpian :

"Διούσσα σα η πόλις ἀπολωλέναι τῶν Κερσοβλέπτην, ἀπέστειλεν ὕστερον Ἐνδυλιδήν αἰτιασόμενον Φίλιππον διὰ τὰ ἐν θρήσκῃ γενόμενα. ὦ δὲ ἀπεκρίνατο μηδὲν ἣμαρτηκέναι. ὡς γάρ ποτὲ συντυχεῖν τοῖς πρέσβεσι, καὶ πρὸ τὸν ὀν ὅ ὁ κωνωάλεϊν αὐτά " \(^2\).

The fact that Demosthenes, throughout his speeches against Aeschines, bitterly reproaches this man for his refusal to lead the Second Athenian Embassy to Thrace to register Philip's oaths, is also irrefutable evidence that Philip had not sworn the oaths of the Peace when he was in Thrace in command of the towns already mentioned.

As the Embassy had not been to Thrace, how was it possible for Philip to have sworn the oaths during his stay there?

The historical inaccuracy is so clear that, as mentioned before, F.Blass has tried to correct the text by reading "ἐμόμοτο ", which means that the Athenians had already sworn the oath, but not Philip; but even if Blass were correct, in my opinion the misrepresentation still exists.

The details given by Aeschines concerning the time when the Athenians took the oaths of the Peace, show that Philip had already captured the Sacred Mountain, and the Thracian King Cersobleptes had lost his power.

Aeschines quotes a letter sent by General Chares, who at the time was in Thrace supporting Cersobleptes, which

\(^1\) XIX 162.
\(^2\) Ulpian's scholion in Dem. XIX 162.
corroborates the information that Philip's occupation took place one day before the Athenians themselves took the oaths.

Aeschines states:

"Ακούσατε δὴ τῆς Χάρητος ἑπιστολῆς, ἧν ἐπέστειλε τότε τῷ δήμῳ, ὅτι Κερσοβλέπτης ἀπολάβει τὴν ἀρχήν καὶ Ἰερόν ὄρος κατείληφε Φιλιππος ἑλαφηβολίων μηνὸς ἔκ της φθέγγων τοῦ τοῦτος. Αὐτὸς δὲ ἐν τῷ δήμῳ προήδρευε τοῦτον τοῦ μηνὸς, εἰς ὁ γὰρ τῶν πρέσβεων, ἔπειτα μὴ φθέγγων τοῦτος. ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΗ "1).

It does not seem likely that this letter, sent to the Athenian Assembly itself, would have been altered by Aeschines.

The date given for the Athenians' oaths - "ἐκ τῆς φθέγγων τοῦ ἑλαφηβολίων", that is, the 25th of Elaphibolion, is mentioned again by Aeschines in his later speech "Against Ctesiphon" 2).

Therefore the inaccuracy remains in spite of Blass's attempt at correction.

But, even if Aeschines' dates are false, it cannot be denied that Demosthenes' representation of these events, at least

1) Aeschines II 90.
2)§73. Chapter 37 of the Pseudo-Demosthenic speech "On Halonnesus" represents the timing in a different way, and in more general terms: "ἀπαντας γὰρ ἵσμεν τίνι μηνί καὶ τίνι ἡμέρᾳ ἡ εἰρήνη ἐγένετο. Ὡσπέρ δὲ ταύτα ἵσμεν, κάκενα ἵσμεν, τίνι μηνί καὶ τίνι ἡμέρᾳ ἐνρατιον τείχως καὶ ἑργάσιμη καὶ Ἰερὸν ὄρος ἐκάλω", but does not prove it.

Demosthenes, in his speech "On the Fraudulent Embassy", does not give dates, but generally speaks about Aeschines' treachery against Cersobleptes.
as it is found in the original text, is false; and regrettably, it seems that this misrepresentation is deliberate. As Demosthenes himself had taken part in both Embassies, and two years earlier had prosecuted Aeschines on account of these, he could not have been ignorant of when and where Philip swore the oaths.

It is worth considering whether Philip's occupation of these Thracian strongholds, even if he had sworn the oaths, as Demosthenes claims, was a violation of the terms of the Peace.

Philip marched to Thrace when the First Athenian Embassy left Macedonia to return to Athens, and he had promised the Athenians that he would not attack the Chersonese during the negotiations.

Aeschines says:

"συνέβαινε δ' ὅτε τὴν προτέραν ἐπεσβέσθησαν προσβείαν, ἐμοὶ μὲν μετὰ τῶν συμπρέσβων ἐπιέναι δεύορ, συλλίπηθε δ' ἐπὶ φρίην ἐξέναι, πρὸς δ' ἡμᾶς ὕμολογηκέναι, ἐὼς ἄν ὡμεῖς περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης βουλεῦσθε, μὴ ἐπιβήσεται μεθ' ὑπλῶν Χερσονήσου."¹)

There is no reason to doubt this information, as it has no bearing on Aeschines' own case.

This meant that Philip undertook to make no attack on the Chersonese, and he kept this promise, as the captured places were not on the Chersonese, but in Thrace.

Doriscus and Serreum are known to us from Herodotus, who relates the counting of Xerxes' army there, before his

¹) II 82.
invasion of Greece. He says:

"δὲ δευτέρου εστὶ τῆς θρησκείας αἰγιαλὸς τοι νοῦν μέγα, διὰ δὲ αὐτοῦ ῥέει ποταμὸς μέγας "Εβρος " 1). And again " ἐν τῷ (δορίσκῳ) Σάλη τε Σαμοθρητικὴ πεπλήστα τόλις καὶ Ζώνη, τελευταία δὲ αὐτοῦ Σέρρειον ἄφρη ὄνομαστὴ " 2).

Strabo gives the definite location of the Sacred Mountain:

" εἶτα τὸ Μαυρὸν τεῖχος καὶ Λευκὴ ἀκτὴ καὶ τὸ 'Ιερὸν ὄρος καὶ Πέρινθος, Σαμίων κτίσμα εἰτα Σηλυβία " 3).

At this time all these places were part of the kingdom of Cersobleptes, who had wished to swear the oaths of the Peace as an Athenian ally, at the time when the Athenians brought the oaths to Philip's ambassadors in Athens, but the representative of Cersobleptes was not allowed to take part in the pledging of the oaths 4).

1) VII 59(1).
2) VII 59(2).
3) Strabo VII fr. 56.
4) G.Grote IX p.206, and D.Hogarth, p.91, both maintain that Cersobleptes' representative had taken the oaths of the Peace in Athens as an Athenian ally, but this does not seem to agree with the evidence: In his Letter to the Athenians, Philip is alleged to have said: "κερασμένην δὲ (οἶδα) τοῖς παρ' ἐμοί πρεσβευταῖς ἱδίᾳ μὲν τοὺς ὄρκους ὑμᾶς προ-θυμομένου, καυληθέντα δ' ὑπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων στρατηγῶν ἀποφαίνωντων αὐ-τῶν 'Ἀθηναίων ἔξωρόν" XII 8. Although the Letter is considered spurious, there is no satisfactory reason for doubting that it accurately represents Philip's opinions (see p.127,n.2). In the Second Argument of Demosthenes' speech: "On the Fraudulent Embassy" is written: "δὲ Δημοσθένης...λέγει τοῖς '.Ἀθηναίοις ταχέως δοῦναι τοὺς ὄρκους, καὶ μὴ παρόντος κερασμένου". Aeschines describes this event both in "On the Embassy" 82-86 and in "Against Ctesiphon" 73-75, and although in many points the two narrations contradict each other, the (cont'd.)
Therefore Philip cannot be said to have violated the Peace by occupying these Thracian strongholds, firstly, because the Athenians had not taken the oaths when Philip captured the area, secondly, because, even if Aeschines' dates are inaccurate, Philip himself had not yet taken the oaths, and finally, because even if Philip had sworn, as Demosthenes falsely asserts he had, Cersobleptes had not participated in the Peace.

That Demosthenes is wrong in indicting Philip for the occupation of these strongholds and for the capture of Cersobleptes is shown again by the fact that, in his speeches against Aeschines, he considers Aeschines' refusal to go to Thrace and receive Philip's oaths as the only reason behind their loss of the area. Therefore, if the Athenians' ambassadors were to blame, Demosthenes should not have censured Philip, since only one of these two parties could have been responsible. It must either be that the Athenian ambassadors failed to act in the interest of Athens, and Philip was free to move without infringing the Peace, or that they had performed their duty, and Philip was breaking the agreement.

Therefore, Demosthenes is wrong in saying that Philip had broken the Peace by his occupation of the Thracian strongholds, and furthermore, is distorting the truth in conclusion at which they both arrive is that Cersobleptes' representative did not swear the oaths. Demosthenes agrees (XIX 174) that Philip had excluded Cersobleptes from the Peace, but he does not mention when and how. Cf. Pickard-Cambridge, p.263.
saying that Philip had taken the oaths when he was in Thrace.

All these events were well known to Demosthenes, so this misrepresentation can only be deliberate.

It seems to me that in the last period of Demosthenes' political career, when he was engaged in personal conflict with Aeschines, his chief opponent, and was at the same time making a final, almost vain attempt to rouse an apathetic people against a grave danger which was threatening Athens, he exerted his rhetorical abilities most admirably to their limits in order to achieve his political aims, but, in an attempt to employ equally effective historical examples, he sometimes appears to have shown little respect for historical accuracy. Demosthenes' Third Philippic speech has more historical mistakes than any other of his deliberative speeches, and the only plausible reason for this is surely the almost desperate attempt which he was making in one of the most crucial moments in the Athenians' history.

Thus, the misrepresentation concerning the timing of the oaths taken by Philip for the ratification of the Peace of Philocrates seems to be a deliberate distortion of the truth, committed for reasons of political necessity which forced Demosthenes in this direction.

1) A. Holm called this speech a "masterpiece of sophistry". See G. Murray, Ancient Greek Literature, p. 365.
Chapter fifteen

The information concerning the Chersonese.

Demosthenes' condemnation of Philip's actions in the Chersonese arises from Philip's interference in the affairs of the city of Cardia. Not long previously, Demosthenes has stated:

"καὶ ἄλλα πολλά Φίλιππος ἔχει τῶν τῆς πόλεως καὶ νῦν εἶς Καρδίαν πέπομψε βοηθεῖν" 1).

And also in a later passage of the same speech from which this quotation is taken, he says:

"οὐχ ἡμέν, ἔῳ τάλλα, ᾧλά ξερρονήσου τὴν μεγάστην ἔχει πόλιν Καρδίαν;" 2).

Indeed, Philip admits in his Letter to the Athenians that he sent troops to Cardia:

"Καρδιανοίς ἐς φημι βοηθεῖν, γεγονός αὕτοις πρὸ τῆς εἰρήνης σύμμαχος" 3),

and his assertion that Cardia was his ally and was included in the Peace of Philocrates, is true.

The very same year, after the conclusion of the Peace, Demosthenes states in his speech "On the Peace":

"καὶ Φιλίππῳ νυνὶ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας ἀληφιπόδεως παρακεχώρηκας, καὶ Καρδιανοῦς ἐξῆκεν ἔξω ξερρονησιτῶν τῶν ἄλλων τετάχθαι" 4)

and he reaffirms this information in 343:

1) VIII 58 and X 60.
2) IX 35.
3) XII 11.
4) V 25.
"εἶτα καρδιανοῦς συλλίππη συμμέχοις ἐνέγραφαν " 1).

Therefore, as the city was an ally of Philip, he did not violate the Peace by sending troops there.

It is worth noting that in the quotation under consideration Demosthenes does not mention Cardia, but speaks only of the Chersonese. If Philip had really interfered in the affairs of the Chersonese, he would indeed have been breaking the Peace, because the Chersonese was recognized Athenian territory, according to the Peace of 346.

As there is no further information concerning Philip's intervention in the Chersonese itself, but only in Cardia, which was situated on the northern borders of the Chersonese, and was Philip's ally, we cannot accept Demosthenes' assertion as being true.

Demosthenes' strategy of using the term "Chersonese" rather than "Cardia" is to be noted. He uses the wider term "Chersonese" without mentioning the fact that the city of Cardia had been excluded from the Chersonese in the terms of the Peace. Therefore he considers the despatch of the troops as a violation of the Peace, without mentioning the fact that this mission had been made to a place which was not part of Athenian territory, according to the terms of the Peace. The logical fallacy of "παρὰ τὸ ἄλλος τόδε ἐὰν πᾶ λέγεσθαι καὶ μὴ κυρίως 2) applies in this case.

Nevertheless, Demosthenes does not use this technique

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1) XIX 174.
2) Arist. "On Sophistical Refutations" 166 b.
of word-play elsewhere 1), and he speaks openly of Philip's despatching of troops to Cardia as a violation of the Peace. Consequently his accusation against Philip for his interference in the affairs of Cardia is groundless.

The motive behind his attitude is the fact that he could not bring himself to acknowledge Philip's authority over the places he had captured, even if the terms of the Peace allowed this. To Demosthenes, the Peace of Philocrates was a break in the struggle between Philip and the Athenians, an interval in which the Athenians should prepare themselves to renew the war to a greater effect 2) He would have believed the legitimacy of the previous régime to be stronger than the terms of the Peace, which was imposed on them through necessity 3). But this attitude is incorrect and unacceptable if we consider the facts from a legal viewpoint. For, as this Peace was still valid in 341, Demosthenes should have borne its terms in mind.

If Philip was increasing his domination by exploiting these terms of the Peace, which allowed him to occupy places out of Athenian territories and those of her allies, Demosthenes should have proposed the abolition of the Peace because he regarded it as something unprofitable for the Athenians, and not because Philip was breaking their agreement.

1) VIII 58; IX 35; X 60.
2) See J. Beloch, Die Attische Politic seit Pericles, p. 176.
3) VII 26.
Unfortunately, in his attempt to arouse an indifferent audience, Demosthenes was compelled to employ measures which were not part of an entirely honourable practice in political affairs.

But, as it is a well-known fact that the terms of any such agreements are imposed by the stronger on the weaker, Demosthenes could have believed that he was justified in disregarding this privilege of the superior opponent, as being one derived from the dishonourable principle of force.
Chapter sixteen

Philip's march towards Phociis.

"τούτο δ' εἰς Φωκάς ὅς πρὸς συμμάχους ἡμῶν προεύρετο, καὶ πρόσεβεις ἠκολούθεσαν αὐτῷ πορευόμενῳ, καὶ παρ' ἑκάστων οἱ πολλοὶ θεμαίροντες οὐ λυσιτελήσειν τὴν ἐκείνου πάροδον."

Third Philippic, 11.

In this quotation Demosthenes presents us with two pieces of information: Firstly, that Philip, on his march against the Phocians before the conclusion of the Third Sacred war, pretended that they were his allies, and secondly, that he was accompanied in his march by Phocian ambassadors.

Demosthenes' second statement is indirectly endorsed by the later author Justin, who attests the presence of Phocian ambassadors at Pella before Philip's march southwards. It is reasonable to conclude that these ambassadors also attended Philip on his march, if we remember that the Athenian ambassadors accompanied Philip as far as Pherae.

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1) "Contra Phocensium legati, adhibitis Lacedaemoniis et Atheniensibus, bellum deprecabantur, cuius ab eo dilationem ter jam emerant " VIII 4(6). Aeschines also, confirms that during the time that the Second Athenian Embassy was at Pella, representatives from almost all the Greek cities were present, and this presumably includes Phocis. He says: "Ἐπειδὴ τοῖς, ὃς ἀνδρεῖς Ἀθηναίοι, συνελέγατοι μὲν εἰς Πελλαν αἱ προσβείαι, παρὴν δὲ ὁ Φίλιππος..." II 108.
where he took the oath of the alliance with the Athenians (346 B.C.) 1). The Phocian representatives probably accompanied Philip as part of their final effort to be included in the Peace of Philocrates, from which they were nevertheless ultimately excluded.

However, the facts cause us to doubt the accuracy of the first part of the quotation, that Philip pretended to be an ally of the Phocians as he marched southwards.

First of all, we know that Philip insisted on excluding the Phocians from the Peace of Philocrates, as Demosthenes himself says:

"ἐντεῦθεν οἱ μὲν παρ’ ἐκεῖνον πρόσβεις προσδέχουσαν δεῖν ὅτι φωκάς οὐ προσδέχεται Φιλίππος συμμάχους " 2).

Secondly, it is very probable that from 354 B.C. Philip had a formal alliance with the Thebans. Pausanias says:

"μετὰ δὲ Φιλίππηλον τελευτῶσαν ὁμολόγως μὲν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν διδόσκων οἱ Φωκεῖς, ἃς δὲ τῶν Θηβαίων τὴν συμμαχίαν ἔχον καὶ τὴν συμμαχίαν τῆς ἀπὸ τῆς Θεσσαλίας τοῦτον οὗτος ἔχει " 3).

Finally, Philip had more than once entered into a fierce struggle against the Phocian army in support of the Thessalians, who were his best allies 4).

With all this evidence at our disposal, is it possible for us to conclude that Philip could betray all his allies and assent to whatever the Athenians wished? Could the

1) Dem. XIX 158. See also p. 144 and 145 n.2.
2) XIX 321. And finally he really did exclude them. See Dem. XIX 44, 174, 278 and 322.
3) X 2(5).
4) see Diod. XVI 35.
Athenians have expected this?

Aeschines says that it was indeed so. He maintains that the Athenians believed that Philip was going to act against the interests of the Thebans. Aeschines himself has assured the Athenians of this, as he had been informed to this effect by some of Philip's companions. He says:

"οὐ πάντες προσέσκηκατε Φίλιππον ταπείνώσειν θηβαίους, δρόμα τ' αὐτῶν τὴν θρασύτητα... αὐτὸί δὲ οὐκ ἦπόρουν καὶ ἐφοβοῦντο οἱ τῶν θηβαίων πρέσβεις; ...τῶν δ' ἐταῦρων τινές τῶν Φίλιππον οὐ διαρρήκην πρὸς τινὰς ἦμᾶς ἔλεγον ὅτι τὰς ἐν Βωιστοῖς πόλεις κατοικεῖ Φίλιππος; " 1).

In the passage under consideration, Demosthenes also confirms these hopes of the Athenian people, but at the same time he informs us that Philip had given them no cause to draw such a conclusion:

"ταῦτ' οὐτ' οἶδα οὕτως προσέκει, νομίζω δὲ τῶν λέγοντα λησθείν" 2).

Since our only evidence is the unfounded hopes of the Athenians — judged unfounded by Demosthenes himself — can we believe his information that Philip pretended the Phocians were his allies during his march southwards? Such a conclusion would not seem to be reasonable.

Philip, of course, was a shrewd (one might even say cunning) man, who could always find a way to outwit his enemies, but in this particular case he could do no more than keep his plans under cover.

The Phocians could only hope to avoid a harsh punishment,

1) II 136-37.
2) V 10. See also XIX 23.
and must have concentrated all their attention to this end. On the other hand, there was no reason for Philip to be disloyal to his allies, the Amphictyones, and to exacerbate them by showing favour to a State whose power was apparently on the wane.

Thus, Demosthenes' information that Philip "δς πρδς συμμάχους ἐπορεύετο", when in 346 he was marching against the Phocians, is clearly an exaggeration, if not a misrepresentation of the true facts.

If Aeschines had misinformed the Athenians about Philip's real intention, it is he, and not Philip, whom Demosthenes should blame. Demosthenes, of course, accuses Aeschines elsewhere as having misled the Athenians with false promises; and therefore he should not denounce Philip, if the blame for the wrong conclusion which the Athenians drew about Philip's intentions lay in Aeschines' hands.

But it is apparent that Demosthenes has made use of the possibility of adapting the real events to fit the requirements of his argumentation. He has used the historical material for the benefit of his argument, and has elaborated his portrayal of Philip with a charge against him, which other evidence has proved unjustified.

It must be remembered that this information is given in a speech, delivered in 341, when Demosthenes was desperately fighting to arouse his fellow-citizens against Philip, and it seems that he cared more for the results of his efforts than for the details of the preceding historical events.

2) See also p. 151.
Introduction to chapters seventeen, eighteen and nineteen

"Μὴ γάρ οὔσις...τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὕλιππον τε χαρέτων καὶ τοὺς ἀρχομένους, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν δέξις ἐπειθείς..., τοῖς δὲ τής μὲν φιλοτιμής τῆς ἀπό τοῦτων οὐ μέτεστι, κοπτόμενοι δ' ἀεὶ ταῖς στρατεύσεις ταῦταις ταῖς ἕως κατώ λ ὑ π ϋ τ ἄ γιος καὶ συνεχῶς ταλαιπωροῦσιν, οὕτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐργαῖς οὕτ' ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτῶν ἐόισις ἐκόμενοι ὑιατρίβειν, οὕθ' ὀν πολίσσωμεν οὕτως ὑπος ἐν δύνανται, ταύτ' ἠχοντες διαδέσθαι κεκλειμένων τῶν ἐμπορίων τῶν ἐν τῇ χώρᾳ διὰ τῶν πολέμων, οἷον ὑπὲρ οἱ ο ὁ ἡ Παλαιάνων πόσ εἴχοι τιλίκην, ἐν τῷ δὲ τω ν ἀντὶς 

Οἱ δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν ἄντες ἔξιναι καὶ πεζεταιροὶ δέχαν μὲν ἐξουσίαν, ὡς εἰσὶ θεαμαστοὶ καὶ συγκεκροτημένοι τὰ τοῦ πολέμου, ὡς δ' ἔγγι δέντων ἐν εὐθῇ τῇ χώρᾳ γεγενημένων τινῶς ἱκουν, ἀνδρός αὐτοῖς ὡς οὕτως οἷον τε 

Εἰ δὲ τις σφόντων ἐκ δήλωσις ἐλλες, τὴν καθ' ἡμέραν ἐκ ρ ἀ σ ἓ α ν τοῦ βίου καὶ μὲ θὴν καὶ κωφὸς αὐτῶν ὡς οὐν ὄνοματος φέρειν, παρεῖς καὶ ἐν αὐτοίς εἰναι μέρει τῶν τοιούτων. λοιπῶς 

Second Olynthiac, 15-18.

Philip is described in Demosthenes' speech above as an intemperate man, and his companions as licentious and corrupt men. Also, although Philip's men are represented as
enjoying glory, it is shown that, whenever anyone displays some special ability in martial matters, he is pushed aside due to Philip's unlimited ambition. This implies that, as Philip could not bear the thought of anyone but himself partaking in the glory, there was some disunion of spirit between him and his men.

Demosthenes also mentions discontent among Philip's subjects on account of the disturbance to their everyday lives, the hardship of the continuous expeditions, and the closure of the harbours for the duration of the war.

It is worth pointing out that Demosthenes does not repeat these accusations many times in his speeches, but only once more \(^1\) (or twice, if we count a spurious speech \(^2\)) does he refer to these, and then only in evasive terms, while he often mentions Philip's political and military behaviour, depicting him as cunning, faithless, scornful, meddlesome, iniquitous, wily \(^3\), etc.

It is also noticeable that the orator does not give any definite source for his information, but vaguely says:

"δς ένώ των ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ χώρᾳ (Μακεδονίᾳ) γεγενημένων τινός ε'νο

\(^1\) Six years later, in 343, he says: "Ἰνα τοίνυν εἰδήθη ὅτι οὐ μόνον τῶν δημοσίων πόποτε ἐλθόντων δς Φίλιππον ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἱδίων καὶ πάντων οὔτοι φαυλότατοι καὶ πονηρότατοι γεγόνασι..." XIX 192.


\(^3\) Some of the characteristics ascribed to Philip are: πανούργος, δεινός, δεσπότης, φιλοπάγης, ἐπορκος, ἀκιστός, φαύλος, ἔξαπατῶν, ἀδικόν, φευδέμενος, φενακίζων, φοβερός, ἐχθρός, βάρβαρος, ἀσελγής, ὁδριστής, παρακρούμενος, κακόνους, μεγάλ' ἐπαγγελλόμενος.
F. Blass conjectures that Demosthenes' authority may have been the contemporary historian Theopompus of Chios, who later wrote a history of Philip's reign. Others suggest that Theopompus borrowed some of the vocabulary from Demosthenes' speech 1).

Bearing these facts in mind, we shall now try to investigate the following subjects:
I. The private lives of Philip and his companions.
II. Philip's treatment of his men.
III. The attitude of the Macedonian people towards Philip's military policy.

1) See Sandys, comment ad loc.
Chapter seventeen

The private lives of Philip and his companions.

To deal firstly with the private life of Philip, we find that the contemporary historian Theopompus not only confirms Demosthenes' accusations, but, furthermore, indicts Philip with far more severe charges, which Demosthenes does not choose to mention, confining himself to the phrase "ταλαφ' οἶ' ἐγὼ νῦν ὅκνω πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὄνομάσαι " .

Concerning Philip, Theopompus states:

"Φιλίππος ἀφένειν αὐτοῖς ἐπειράτο καὶ ὀρχυδεμοῦ καὶ κωμάξων καὶ πᾶσαν ἀκρασίαν ὑπομένων-νὴν δὲ καὶ φήσει βωμολόχος καὶ καθ' ἡμέραν μεθυσκόμενος..." 1) And "ἀκρατέστατον αὐτὸν...πρὸς γυναῖκας... ἐμπάθη...πρὸς τὰς ἀκρατοποιας " 2).

The Peripatetic biographer Satyrus, in the writings of Athenaeus, speaks of the large number of wives and mistresses which Philip possessed, saying that "δ Φιλίππος ἄξι κατὰ πόλεμον ἐγάμει" 3). The following part of this narrative makes it clear that Philip's own temperament as well as the dictates of his policy inclined him towards these numerous connections.

Other later writers, usually echoing the charges of the fourth century authors, repeat the accusations that Philip...

1) In Athenaeus VI 260 b-c.
2) In Polybius VIII 9(11).
3) In Athenaeus XIII 557 b.
led an intemperate life 1).

The charges which Theopompus puts upon Philip's men are even more severe:

"δικαίως ἐν τις αὐτοὺς οὐχ ἔταιρος ἄλλ' ἔταιρας ὑπελάμβανον οὐδὲ στρατιώτας ἄλλα χαμαιστάς προσηγορεύεσσαν' ἀνδρόφονοι γὰρ τὴν ψύχαν ὄντες, ἀνδρόφονοι τὸν τρόπον ἦσαν " 2). Ἀν' ἠγούμεθα θηρία γεγονέναι...οὕς οὕτε τὸς Κενταύρους,...οὕτε τὸς Λαστρυγόνας " 3).

On the same subject, Diodorus' description of the treatment and following indignation of Pausanias, Philip's assassin, throws some light on the matter:

"ἐκάλεσεν ("Ατταλός) ἐπὶ δεινὸν τὸν Παυσανίαν καὶ πολὺν ἐμφορῆς ἄκρατον παρέδωκεν αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα τοῖς δρεκόμοις εἰς ύβριν καὶ

1) Lucian claims: "καὶ τὸ μὲν οἶνορραφὲς πρὸς τὰς Φιλίππου μέθας καὶ πορθαύσιμος καὶ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν " In Praise of Dem. 5. Justin says the same concerning Philip's inclination to drink: "Vini nimis uterque (Philip and Alexander) avidus" IX 8(15), but conversely: "Fuit (Philippus) rex armorum quam conviviorum appartibus studiosior, cui maxime opes erant instrumenta bellorum " IX 8(4). Diodorus alludes to homosexual relationships between Philip and his body-guards: "τοῦ ὑπ' Βασιλέως σωματοφύλαξ (Δ Παυσανίας) καὶ διὰ τὸ κάλλος φίλος γεγονᾶς τοῦ Φιλίππου οὗτος δρῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ἀγαπῶμενον ἑτέρον Παυσανίαν...ἀνεπίστικος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐχρῆσατο λόγοις, φήμας ἀνδρόγυνων εἶναι καὶ τοὺς τῶν βουλομένων ἔρωτας ἑτούμως προσθέχεσθαι " XVI 93(3-4).

The rhetorician Libanius accused Philip of having had a homosexual relationship with the Theban Pammenes: "ἐμενεν αὐτοῦ Παμμένους ἐρώμενος καὶ νέος ἐρατής " Progymnasmata, Condemnation of Philip 4. Cf. 3 and 9, and also Suda s.v. Κάρανος.

2) In Athenaeus VI 260f.

3) In Polybius VIII 9(13).
Opposing these views are those of Isocrates and the later historian Polybius, who hold diametrically opposite opinions concerning these accusations.

Isocrates describes those of Philip's retinue as the most important persons in Macedonia:

Isocrates describes those of Philip's retinue as the most important persons in Macedonia: "καὶ Μακεδόνων ἦχει περὶ αὐτῶν τοῖς σπουδαῖοι τών ἔτων πολλά "1).

Polybius bitterly and vehemently attacks Theopompus, calling him: "φεύγειν καὶ κάλαμα " σο "ἄνθρωπος καὶ μεταβατικὴ "2)

Polybius' explanation for his rejection of Theopompus' information is as follows: It is impossible, he contends, for anyone to lay such charges against people who took an insignificant country, such as Macedonia, and whose bravery, industry and virtue raised it to glory and power 6).

Polybius reminds us that these same men were the comrades of Alexander the Great when he captured Asia, and not only were their achievements magnificent, but they also proved themselves indeed to be truly noble by virtue of their magnanimity, self-restraint, and courage. Nor did they

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1) XVI 93(7).
2) V 19.
3) VIII 11(2).
4) Ibid. 10(2).
5) Ibid. 10(5).
6) Ibid. 10(6).
gratify any passion for malpractices and licentiousness as long as they lived with Philip, and afterwards with Alexander 1).

Before we come to any conclusion, it is necessary to examine our main authorities:

In general, Theopompus is considered pro-Philip, and he is mentioned as having written a book entitled "An Encomium of Philip" 2). But his reputation as a judge of moral matters is so low 3), that the view that he must be believed when he praises rather than when he accuses, can be adopted as a good standard for our estimation of his information.

Polybius is evidently a shrewd historian, but he is of a later age, and has also been influenced by the general atmosphere of admiration for Alexander the Great and his successors. He also shows himself to be biased against some individuals 4).

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1) VIII 10(9).
3) See Introduction p. 18 with n. 1. That Theopompus loved writing about vice is also indicated from the fact that a large number of his extant fragments deal with this subject. For instance, frs. 62, 81, 121, 143, 204, 213, 224-5, 227, 236 etc.. The only man who is described as being above the temptations of sensual pleasures is the Spartan leader Lysader - see fr. 20, which comes from the Hellenica, not the "History of Philip", which is full of descriptions of acts of intemperance. See W. R. Connor, Theopompus and fifth-century Athens, pp. 13-14. For judgements on Theopompus, see FGrH III B, pp. 529-34.
Isocrates is evidently pro-Philip, and furthermore, this particular information about Philip's companions is given in an address to Philip himself.

It is therefore reasonable to conclude that Theopompus exaggerates to a great extent, especially when he compares Philip's men with the Centaurs and Laestrygons, and because of this he has transferred his work from the historical to the fictitious realm. Consequently, the defamatory details in his narration must not be accepted as valid.

Yet Polybius is quite justified in considering the conquests of Philip and Alexander the Great as proof of the bravery and diligence of both them and their men, but this does not prove that they were blameless in every aspect of their private lives. On the other hand, Polybius neither states any concrete facts, nor mentions any other contemporary authority to support his complete refutation of Theopompus' narration, and, as we know that dissipation was not unknown in ancient Greek societies during this period 1), it is unreasonable to indiscriminately reject any information relevant to this.

Bearing all this in mind, it can be said that Theopompus

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1) The Theban Sacred Band, for instance, was formed on a sexual basis. (See Plut. Pelopidas xviii and Eth. 761B, Athenaeus XIII 561f and 602a, Polyaenus II 5.(1).) Even the Athenians at this time are said to have led a life of dissipation. Theopompus says of them: "καὶ γὰρ αὐτῷ τοῖς τὸν τρόπον ἔζων, ὡστε τοὺς μὲν νέους ἐν αὐλητρίδοις καὶ παρὰ ταῖς ἐταίραις διατρέψειν, τοὺς δὲ μικρὸν ἔκειν πρεσβυτέρους ἐν πότοις, κόβοις καὶ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἀσωτίαις, τὸν δὲ ὁμον ἀπαντὰ πλεῖον κατα-ναλίσκειν εἰς τάς κοινάς ἐστιάσεις καὶ κρεατονομίας ἢ εἰς τὴν τῆς πόλεως διοίκησιν." Athenaeus XII 532b-d.
exaggerates in his excessive attribution of every kind of lust to Philip and his men, and Polybius must also be wrong in his estimation, when he says that Philip's men "κατὰ τὰς φυλήνας ὁμός οὕτων ζῶσιν οὐκον οὐδεν' ὑπελγῆς ἐπετήευσαν" 1).

Demosthenes, in comparison with Theopompus, seems to be closer to the truth, in that he does not mention such dreadful debauchery as is described by the latter; but even to the extent that he does refer to this kind of behaviour, he is misleading when he attributes it in particular to Philip and his companions, and not to the general populace of a comparatively primitive society, such as that of Macedonia 2). Moreover, Demosthenes seems to misemploy the real facts in that he allows inferences to be drawn from such phrases as "τοιαῦτα ὁδόν ἔγνων ὡς πρὸς ὁμάς ὑμᾶς ὑπομάςαν". This phrase is surely a product of rhetorical exaggeration, since Demosthenes knew that he would only have to stimulate the imagination of his audience with a few subtle hints, and they would distort much of what they had heard and produce as a result whatever charges they pleased. Thus he tries to achieve his objective by using this rhetorical device to exaggerate Philip's vices, while at the same time he

1) VIII 10(9).
2) The Macedonians, like the Thracians, consumed alcohol in large quantities. The Bacchic mysteries had been introduced there, and it was in Macedonia that Euripides completed, if not conceived, his "Bacchae", which was possibly written for a Macedonian audience. See Plut. Alex. ii, and E.R. Dodds, Bacchae, Introduction, pp. xxii-xxiii and xxxix-xl. Also Bacchae 1.409 and 568 (with Dodds' commentaries).
ingeniously ensures that no responsibility can be placed on him for any outlandish conclusions which could be arrived at by his audience.

In addition to this, we must point out that there is also a weak point in Demosthenes' line of reasoning: for the conclusion to which he tries to lead his audience, namely that a low standard of morality automatically produces inability in the political and military fields, is incorrect. It cannot be denied that morally degenerate acts do finally destroy the power of an organized society, especially when this corruption has reached the point at which social order is demolished. But this dissolution does not take place as quickly as Demosthenes would have us believe. Often the force of barbarity behind these military groups is strong enough to raise them to their final goals before the destruction begins as a result of moral corruption in the group.

Thus, while Demosthenes' statement that Philip and his companions were intemperate and consequently liable to immediate decay evidently serves his argumentation admirably, the argument itself does not seem to be based on firm reasoning.
Chapter eighteen

Philip's treatment of his men.

Unfortunately there is no explicit evidence relevant to this subject in any authors contemporary with Demosthenes and Philip, and the references of the later writers are scanty and do not refer directly to our subject matter.

Diodorus of Sicily relates that Philip always preferred a political to a military victory, because then he alone would enjoy the fruits of success:

"Φασὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν Φίλιππον σεμνόνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἐπὶ τῇ στρατηγικῇ συνέσει καὶ τοῖς διὰ τῆς δύναμις ἐπιτεθύμασιν ἦπερ ἐπὶ τῇ κατὰ τὰς μάχας ἀνθρεφτῇ τῶν μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τοὺς ἀγῶνας κατορθωμάτων μετέχειν ἔπαντας τοὺς στρατευμένους, τῶν δὲ διὰ τῆς δύναμις γινομένων ἐπιτευγμάτων αὐτὸν μόνον λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιγραφήν" 1).

The later rhetorician Polyaenus, in his collection of "Stratagems" repeats this piece of information in a similar way, so that it is quite clear either that he was influenced by Diodorus or that there existed a source common to both authors. Polyaenus says:

"Φίλιππος οὖν ἐλάττω δὲ, δύναμις ἡ διὰ μάχης κατειργάζετο. καὶ νὴ Δία μεῖζον ἐφρόνει ἐφ' όις διὰ λόγων ἐκτάτο ἡ διὰ τῶν ὅπλων' τῶν μὲν γάρ κοινωνεῖν αὐτῷ τοὺς στρατιώτας, τῶν δὲ αὐτῷ μόνῳ μετείναι " 2).

1) XVI 95(3).
2) Stratagems IV 2(9).
The information of Justin is also relevant to this topic, in that he states: "Regnare ille (Philippus) cum amicis nolebat" 1).

A certain incident involving the dismissal of some bodyguards is described by Plutarch, but this was not the result of jealousy of his officers on the part of Philip 2).

Can we therefore conclude - using these references as a possible reinforcement to Demosthenes' claim that Philip was jealous of his men - that Demosthenes is right when he speaks of Philip's attempts to prevent the recognition of any man outstanding in military matters? This would surely not be justifiable.

In the above passages, Philip is indeed shown to be an ambitious man, but nowhere is there even the slightest indication that he ignored the abilities of his men. On the contrary, there is information in the later authors whom we have already mentioned, and even in Demosthenes' own passages, which supports the view that Philip granted full recognition to the accomplishments of his men. Demosthenes, speaking of Philip's celebrations after the

1) IX 8(17).
2) The dismissed body-guards were found to have supported Alexander, Philip's son, in activities which were not in accordance with Philip's wishes and which led to a confrontation between father and son. Plutarch says: ""Αρκαλον καὶ Νέαρχον, ἐτὶ δ’ Εριγύδον καὶ Πτολεμαῖον ἐκ Μακεδονίας μετέστησεν..." Alex. x(3).

The same event is mentioned by Arrian in The Anabasis of Alexander III 6(5). Cf. Quintus Curtius, History of Alexander X i(45).
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capture of Olynthus, says:
"ἐπειδὴ γάρ εἶλεν "Ολυνθὸν Φίλιππος, 'Ολομπο' ἔπολεν στεφάνῳ τοῦ τοῦ κατά

καὶ ἔφη "(1).

Diodorus also relates that Philip rewarded his men for their successful efforts in the siege of Olynthus:
"τοὺς δὲ ἀνδραγαθήσαντας τῶν στρατιωτῶν κατά τὴν μάχην ἔστησεν στεφάνοις τῷ μὴ σαλπινθὶστὸν αὐτοῖς δοθέντος τῷ μήσῳ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν τῶι τρίτοις...." (2).

and again after the battle of Chanoneia:
"τοὺς ἀνδραγαθήσαντας κατὰ τὴν μάχην ἔστησεν στεφάνοις τῷ μὴ σαλπινθὶστὸν αὐτοῖς δοθέντος τῷ μήσῳ τοῖς δοκοῦσιν τῶι τρίτοις...." (3).

It is also known that Philip fraternized with his men and spoke to them in a friendly fashion (4), and also that he sent his leading generals, Antipater and Parmenio, alone on expeditions (5), and fully appreciated their abilities (6).

Boaring all this in mind, it is worth pointing out that the fact that Philip preferred a political to a military victory cannot be said to be at variance with the conduct of a good politician, or, furthermore, that this could be a reason for disunion between Philip and his men. It is true that the Macedonian King initially used political means to achieve his ends, but he also used military force to a great extent in the form of continuous enterprises in all directions, and it is Demosthenes who gives more explicit information about Philip's indefatigable military activity

(1) XIX 193.
(2) XVI 53(3).
(3) XVI 86(6).
(4) Diodorus XVI 93(3), Polyaeon IV ii.
(5) Dem. IX 58, XIX 163; Diodorus XVI 91(2); Plutarch Alex. iii (5).
(6) See Pickard-Cambridge, p.152.
The fact that Philip did not like to share his authority with his generals, as Justin asserts, cannot be said to be a reason for ill-feeling between them. Also, the fact that he was an ambitious King does not necessarily mean that this produced conflict between him and his officers. Philip's career proved that as a King he was an organizing genius, and consequently he would naturally treat his officers in such a way that he could retain his control over them without arousing bitterness in them because of negligence. Justin, by saying "amari pater (Philippus) malle," confirms this judgement.

In addition to this, the facts that Philip is referred to as being renowned amongst his people, that the Macedonians always obeyed their King, that he fought in the front rank as a simple soldier, and that he was a generous man, are reasons why we cannot justify the statement that there existed any disunion between Philip and his men, or that he prevented the recognition of his

1) I 4 13 14, II 23, IV 5 6 9 31 34 41-2, VI 4, VIII 6 11 43 56, IX 49-50 etc.
2) Dem. II 18, Diodorus XVI 95(1) "ἐκατόν τοῖς δῶδεκα θέοις συνθρονον καταριθμῆςας...", Plut. Alex. iv(5).
3) See also Diod. XVI 1(6) "ἄγχινοι στρατηγικῇ καὶ ἀνδρείᾳ καὶ λαμπρότητι φυχῆς διαφέρων ", Justin VII 6(1), Polyaeus IV ii. 4) IX 8(18).
5) Diod. XVI 8(1), Justin VII 5(10) and VII 6(1).
6) Plutarch says "ἄει μὲν οὖν λέγονται φιλοσοφίειοι Μακεδόνες " Λεμ. Paulus xxiv(1).
7) Diod. XVI 3(3) and XVI 4(6), Justin IX 8(15).
8) Diod. XVI 3(3) and XVI 55(2).
experienced military men.

If the state of affairs was such as Demosthenes describes it, how was it possible for Philip's military force to be in such superlative fighting condition without experienced leaders?

We must also take into account the fact that Demosthenes had not, at the time of the delivery of his speech in 349 B.C. actually been to Macedonia himself, but, as he informs us, had obtained his information from someone else. Although F. Blass has conjectured that his source may have been Theopompus 1), it is more reasonable to assume that Demosthenes' informant was either a mere visitor to Macedonia, or was invented by him as a rhetorical device to serve his line of persuasion. But even if the source is trustworthy, as Demosthenes assures us it is, that is no reason to suppose that this reliability in itself is adequate. For information of this kind is not always necessarily of great value, not because a visitor would be likely to be intentionally malicious, but because it is not unusual for him to give a false impression, or more likely still, for his personal feelings to influence his judgement. The "ipse dixit" of a visitor is therefore not the best evidence 2). For this reason Demosthenes' assurance of the

1) See p. 162.
2) For a modern example of this we can look to Matthew Arnold's judgement of the abilities of the German and French troops before the conflict of 1870. (See his letters).
credibility of his source has no real value for us. On the contrary, it is reasonable to suppose that he preferred the phrase "

\[
\text{"άντρος οὐδεμῶς οίου τε φεύγεσθαι"}
\]

because his source was not especially trustworthy, or was even non-existent.

The problem which now arises is whether Demosthenes has or has not intentionally misrepresented the relationship between Philip and his men.

It has been said already that Demosthenes' main aim throughout his Second Olynthiac speech was to persuade the Athenians that Philip was not a formidable opponent. If this was his true opinion about Philip, then it is understandable that he considered his power as having inherent weaknesses. Unfortunately Demosthenes seems to be inconsistent on this point, because two years previously (in 351 B.C.) he had stated quite explicitly that "

\[
\text{"εί δέ τις ἀλλ' ὕπολεμσαν οὔτε τὸν \text{Φιλίππον} εἶναί...δρο} \ θ \ ού \ ως \ μὲν \ οὕτως."}
\]

But obviously Philip, being "

\[
\text{"δυσπολέμητος"},
\]

must have had a well organized force, without any severe internal weaknesses such as discord between the men and their leader or the refusal to recognize the abilities in his experienced military men.

For these reasons it seems that Demosthenes deliberately misrepresented the facts, thinking more of his own argumentation that of the complete historical accuracy of the situations he described.

1) See also p. 140.

2) IV 4.
The attitude of the Macedonian people towards Philip's military policy.

Demosthenes states that the majority of the Macedonian people disliked Philip's military policy, firstly because it hindered the course of their everyday lives, also because the expeditions caused them much hardship, and finally because they were unable to sell their produce due to the closure of the harbours because of the war.

However, this account does not compare favourably with the historical sources: Diodorus of Sicily presents us with a different state of affairs when he says:

"περιβολής τε ὑπάρχων (ὁ Φίλιππος) παρὰ τοῖς Μακεδόνιοι ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁδοῖς ἀναστάτως κατὰ τὴν ἔρευναν" 1).

Here we learn that Philip had a good reputation among his subjects on account of all that he had achieved through his courage.

Justin gives us a clearer picture of this matter: He relates that Philip came to power "compulsas a populo" 2), which suggests that he had the sympathy of the people before he became King, and they pressed him to accept the kingship. Another statement of Justin also indicates that Philip became King under the most favourable omens:

1) XVI 8(1).
2) VII 5(10).
"Ut est ingressus imperium, magna de illo spes omnibus fuit et propter ipsius ingenium, quod magnum spondebat virum, et propter vetera Macedoniae fata: quae cecinerant, uno ex Amyntae filiis regnante florentissimum fore Macedoniae statum: cui spei scelus matris hunc residuum fecerat." 1)

It would seem almost certain from this information that Philip, in the eyes of the Macedonians, must have appeared as the King under whose rule their race would reach the zenith of its achievements.

It is also worth noting that during Philip's reign the standard of living among the Macedonians must have risen considerably: Now, although they were still to some extent a rough and primitive people, their way of life began gradually to resemble the life in other regions of southern Greece.

Alexander the Great, a few months before his death, addressed his men, who were discontented with his insolence and orientalism, in the following terms:

"Φιλίππος γὰρ παραλαβὼν ὅμιλος πλάνητας καὶ ἀπόρους, ἐν διψήφροις τούς πολλοὺς νέμοντας ἀνά τὰ δρῆ πρὸβατα ὑλίγα καὶ ἐπέρ τοῖς μακρῷς μαχομένους...χλαμῦδας μὲν ὅμιλον ἀντὶ τῶν διψηφρῶν φορεῖν ἐδώκεν, κατηγαγε δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὄρων ὡς τὰ πεδία ἀξιομάχους καταστήσας...πόλεων τε οἰκήτορας ἀπέφηγεν καὶ νόμοις καὶ ἔθεις χρηστοῖς ἐκδόμησεν." 2)

1) VII 6(1).
This information has particular value because these conditions were mentioned in a speech to the Macedonians themselves, whom they directly affected.

In the light of this information and, furthermore, because in the writings of other authors contemporary with Demosthenes or of a later age, there is not even the slightest indication of displeasure amongst the Macedonians because of Philip's activities, we must consider Demosthenes' view of the Macedonians' feelings towards Philip to be biased, especially as he considers these feelings to be representative of those of the majority. Some of course, as happens in every State, would disagree with their leader, but the majority of the Macedonians must be considered as having been proud of their King.

Concerning the effect of the war on everyday life, it is reasonable to suppose that this would inconvenience some people; but, when we remember that, even when the whole army set out on a march, Philip's soldiers numbered no more than twenty to thirty thousand ¹), many of whom would love the glory which went hand-in-hand with a military campaign, we may rest assured that the number of people who resented leaving their occupations to take part in the expedition would be comparatively small. At least, Demosthenes must be wrong in assuming that he was speaking for the majority of

¹) Philip defeated Onomarchus at Crocus Field (352 B.C.) having, including his allies, about twenty thousand soldiers (Diod. XVI 35(4)), and at Haeroneia, having about thirty thousand, including his confederates, (Diod. XVI 85(5)).
the Macedonians.

As concerns the sufferings of the people during the expeditions, it seems most unlikely that such men as were in Philip's service - mountaineers of a bellicose nature 1), who were expertly trained in the matters of war 2) - would pay any particular attention to the discomforts of hard labour. For their efforts would be compensated by the pride they felt because of their successes, - a pride which had undoubtedly been instilled into their minds by the masterful eloquence of Philip 3). Alexander the Great, in his speech mentioned previously 4) concerning his father's deeds on behalf of the Macedonians, says:

"οὐχ ἐαυτῷ μᾶλλον τι τὴν δόξαν τὴν δοκεῖ ἢ τῷ κοινῷ τῶν Μακεδόνων.

1) Aristotle mentions that it was a custom among some Macedonian tribes to mark anyone who had not killed an enemy in battle with a distinctive badge. See Politics 1324 b.

2) Diodorus says: "τὸς ἀνδρὰς τοὺς πολεμικοὺς ὀπλοὺς ἐνδυτὸς κοσμήσας, συνεχεῖς ἐξοπλασίας καὶ γυμνασίας ἐναγωγόνως ἐποιεῖτο ΧΙΠΠ(1). Likewise Polyaeusus: "ὁλίππος ἦσσε τοὺς Μακεδόνας πρὸ τῶν κηδεμῶν, ἀναλαβόντας τὰ ὀπλα τριακάστα στάθμα πολλάκις ὀδύσειν φέροντας ὧμοι κράνη, πέλτας, κηνμίδας, σαρίσας καὶ μετὰ ὀπλῶν ἐπιστεισμόν καὶ ὀςα σινεν καθημερινῆς διαλέξης "Stratagems IV 2(10). Also "ὁλίππος ἐν Χαιρωνείᾳ γεγονός ἔτος μὲν Ἀθηναίους ἄξεις καὶ ἀγμαστοὺς, τοὺς δὲ Μακεδόνας ἑκατέρτας καὶ γεγυμνασμένους...." IV 2(7).

3) Diodorus says:"ὁ ἰλιππος ...τοὺς Μακεδόνας ἐν συνεχέσιν ἐνκηλπόταις συνέχον καὶ τῷ τοῦ λόγου δειλότατι προτρεπόμενος ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν εὐθαρσεῖς ἐκοίησε"ΧΠΠ(1). The Athenian orators themselves felt the power of Philip's eloquence. See Aeschines, On the Embassy 42-43. Cf. Plut. Alex.iv(5), and Justin IX 8(10) "Inter haec eloquentia et insignis oratio."

4) See p.177n.2.
Concerning the closure of the harbours, the following is worth noting:

Philip was the first Macedonian King to achieve real control over the coast of Macedon and furthermore to create a fleet of considerable size. Of course, he did not ever surpass the Athenians in naval force, but in 351 B.C. he was in a position to move against Athenian galleys in the Aegean Sea, to plague the islands allied to Athens, and even to land in the territory of Attica.

Therefore it would surely be easier for the Macedonians, with this change in the status quo, to send their products to their new allies, than it would have been in the past when they did not have the same access to the Aegean Sea.

2) This opinion was expressed again by Demosthenes in his speech "On the Fraudulent Embassy" in 343 B.C. See para. 315.
3) Philip's fleet was established early in 355 B.C. For information on this fleet, see A. Schäfer II p. 28, n. 2.
4) "πρὸς τῷ Γεραίστῳ τὰ πλοῖα συλλαβὼν ἀμφήθητα χρήματα ἔξελεξεν" Dem. IV 34.
5) "τὸν παρελθόντα χρόνον εἰς Ἀθήναν καὶ Ἰμβρόν ἐμβαλὼν αὐχμαλωτοὺς πολίτας ὑμετέρους ὠχέτ' ἔχων "Dem. IV 34, and "ἀπὸ τῶν ὑμετέρων ὑμῖν πολεμεῖ συμμάχων, ἄγων καὶ φέρων τοὺς πλέοντας τὴν θαλατταν " Dem. IV 34.
6) "τὰ τελευταῖα' εἰς Μαραθῶν' ἀπέβη καὶ τὴν ἵερᾶν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας ὠχέτ' ἔχων τριήρη " Dem. IV 34.
Also, after Philip's conquests they would most certainly have found new markets which had formerly been closed to them, while they were still only a small inland community.

Alexander the Great, in the same reference to his father's contributions, states:

"τὸν ἐπὶ θαλάττη χωρίων τὰ ἐπικαιρότατα καταλαβόμενος τὴν ἐμπορίαν τῇ χώρᾳ ἄναπταις, καὶ τὸν μετέλλων τὴν ἐργασίαν ἀδεῖ παρέσχε " 1).

It seems likely that neither the new and extensive scope for trade created by the acquisition of these new territories, nor the exploitation of the auriferous regions of Mount Pangaeus, would have passed unnoticed by the majority of the people.

Finally, the Macedonians must surely have felt considerable national pride at seeing their country becoming an important power for the first time in its history.

Therefore, for the reasons stated above, we must conclude that Demosthenes had intentionally exaggerated the facts for rhetorical purposes.

We have already mentioned that Demosthenes' policy at this time (349 B.C.) was to persuade the Athenians that Philip was not undefeatable 2). His Second Olynthiac speech, from which the passage we have examined has been taken, gives clear indication of the tactics which Demosthenes used in order to fully achieve his final objective:

He first of all represents Philip as having obtained his

1) Arrian, Anabasis of Alexander, VII 9(3).
2) See p. 140 and 175.
present advantageous position by cheating his allies 1), and he continues by refuting the faith of the allies in Philip 2). He then attempts to deny that Philip possessed either the favour of the Macedonians 3) or the support of his army 4). He concludes by claiming that Philip had neither soundness of mind 5) nor good fortune 6), which, he claims, looked favourably upon the Athenians rather than the Macedonians.

It is apparent from these numerous accusations by Demosthenes that he became carried away in his effort to speak disparagingly of Philip. However, it is impossible for anyone endeavouring to rouse his fellow-citizens against an enemy to avoid mentioning the enemy's inherent weaknesses. Demosthenes has done exactly this, but in doing so has been excessive in his general exaggerations about Philip's less admirable qualities. This would suggest that either he had no concrete evidence on which to base his remarks, or he felt that by these generalizations he could more easily convince an indifferent and apathetic audience, such as were the Athenians of this period, of the possibility of overthrowing their opponent.

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1) §§6-8.
2) §§9-14.
3) §§15-17.
4) §§17-18.
5) §§18-21.
6) §§22-23.
Chapter twenty

Philip's cruelty.

"καίντου πάνε' ὡς' ἰξηπάρτηται καὶ λαυράιμοντεῖς ἐν τοῖς τρικοντὶ ἔκεινοις ἔτεσιν καὶ τοῖς ἰμετέρωις ἐν τοῖς ἐβδομῆνται, ἐλάττων εὔτειν, ὡς ἄνδρες Ἁθηναῖοι, ἰὸν Φίλιππος ἐν τοῖς τρισὶ καὶ ἄκι ὁ ὅλοις ἔτεσιν, οἷς ἐπικολάζει, ἡδίκησε τοῦς Ἐλλήνας, μᾶλλον ἐ' οὖδέ μέρος τοῖς ἐκεῖνοι, καὶ τούτ' ἐκ βαθέως λόγου δέχθων ἠεξίασον. Ἡ Ὀλυνθοῦν μὲν δὴ καὶ Ἕθηνυν καὶ Ἀπολλωνίαν καὶ ὅλο καὶ τρικοντα πόλεις ἐπὶ θρηκής ἐκ, ὡς ἐκάσιας οὕτως ὁμίχλεν ἀνθρηκέν. Ἐστε μηδ' ἐ' πάσοθε φυλασσοντο κοσμελήσει' εἶναι δέχθων εἰπεῖς καὶ τὸ ᾿Ωκέαν ἰδνος τοσοῦτον ἀνθρημένον σωπά."


In the above quotation Demosthenes argues that Philip was an especially savage and unjust ruler and that during his thirteen\(^1\) years of supremacy, he inflicted injuries upon the Greeks far greater than any they had received at the hands of either the Athenians and the Spartans, or the Thebans, although the first two of these had been in control for a much longer period.

This assertion, with special reference to Philip's cruelty, was first made by Demosthenes in a passage referring to Philip's treatment of the Phocians in 346 B.C.

\(^1\) Demosthenes would be more correct to say "just over twelve years," instead of saying "thirteen incomplete years". G. Griffith does not seem convinced that Demosthenes is accurate in these calculations. See CQ, XX (1970), p. 80.
contained in his forensic speech "On the fraudulent Embassy", which was delivered two years previously:

"Τοστων, ὣς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅ ἐ ἦ ν ὅ τ ἐ ρ’ ὅ γέγονεν οὔθε μ ὑ τ ἦ ρ ὑ ματ’ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, οἴμαι ὅ ὅδ’ ἐν τῷ πρόσετεν χρόνῳ." 2) Demosthenes expresses the reasons behind his opinion quite explicitly: He gives two examples of Philip's cruelty, the first being his treatment of Olynthus and the other members of the Chalcidean Confederacy, and of Methone and Apollonia in the north, and the second being Philip's treatment of the Phocians in the south, after the end of the second sacred war 3).

In order to reach as firm a conclusion as the sources permit about Philip's behaviour in the above mentioned cases, it is necessary to examine the existing evidence and investigate the exact circumstances of Philip's conduct in these instances.

In the case of Olynthus, Philip plundered the city, according to Diodorus, enslaved the inhabitants, and then sold both men and property as booty:

1) See also XVIII 231, where Demosthenes speaks of Philip's ἡμῖν τοῖς
2) XIX 64. In the continuation of this passage, Demosthenes gives such a vivid narration of the fate of the Phocians, that, because of its wonderful beauty, it is mentioned by many of the rhetoricians as a specimen of the best kind of narrative. See Reiske's note in Appar. Critic. cf. Justin VIII 5.
3) Demosthenes makes no mention of the three thousand captured soldiers of Onomarchus who were drowned in the sea as temple-robbers by Philip, since this incident, in spite of its brutality, was a military action, and not an act of vengeance towards innocent civilians. See Diod. XVI 35(6).
Appian and Strabo add that Philip completely destroyed the cities of the confederacy 2).

At Methone, Philip occupied the city, stipulating that the citizens should all leave, taking with them only a single garment each. He then razed the city and divided the territory among the Macedonians 3).

Unfortunately, the circumstances under which Apollonia fell into Philip's hands, and his treatment of the city, are unknown.

In the case of the Phocians, the Amphictyonic council itself had stated as the main points of its resolution that the Phocian towns should be split up, and the inhabitants re-housed in villages of not more than fifty houses, repaying the value of the temple-treasuries at Delphi in annual instalments 4).

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1) XVI 33(3)
2) Appian says: "μακύντοι τοὺς τε ἀλλοὺς καὶ χαλκείδες ἄνευς ἔστων σε, διὸς μηδὲν ἐτί πλὴν οἰκίσειν μόνον ἱερῶν ὁμάδαις." Roman History, Civil wars, IV 102.
And Strabo: "Ερέτρια μὲν γὰρ συνήνυσε τὰς περὶ Παλλήνην καὶ τὸν Ἀθηναίους, ἢ δὲ χαλκείτας τὰς ὑπ’ Ὀλυνήθη, ὡς Φίλιππος ἀνελυμεναντον." X 8.
3) "καὶ μέχρι μὲν τῶν οὓς Ἰταλίων διεκαρτέρειν, ἐπειτα κατισχύμενοι συνηναγκάσθησαν παραδοθοῦν τὴν πόλιν τῷ βασιλεῖ ἐστε ἀνελυμεναντον, δὲ ἀνελυμεναντον κατέσκαφε τὴν δὲ τὸν εἰς ὁμοραντὸν, ἐν ἔμαθε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἰερῶν εἴχοντας ἐν ἔμαθε τοὺς ἐκ τῆς ἰερῶν ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοὺς ἐκ τοushima
As we have defined Philip's cruelty towards his enemies, we must also deal briefly with the actions of the Athenians, the Spartans, and the Thebans in similar cases. This seems necessary, since Demosthenes has stated that those powers had committed injustices which hardly amount to a fraction\(^1\) of those committed by Philip.

Thucydides speaks of the Athenians as having brutally enslaved the people of Mytilene after their revolt against the Athenian Empire in 428 B.C., and, although the first dreadful decision of the Athenian assembly was finally overruled\(^2\), more than one thousand men were executed, and their territory was occupied by Athenian cleruchs etc.\(^3\).

Again Thucydides, referring to the occupation of Scione by the Athenians in 421 B.C. states that they slaughtered all the adult male inhabitants of the city and sold the women and children into slavery\(^4\).

Similar treatment of the Melians is also referred

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1) The readings of the codices for this part of the text are various: "πέμπτον μέρος" is the reading of \(S^1\) and \(L^1\), "πολλοστάν πέμπτον μέρος" of \(B\) and \(Y\), "πολλοστάν μέρος" of \(A\) and Vulgata, "μέρος" of \(O\). I have adopted this last reading which is also followed by Weil, Blass, Butcher, etc., although Dindorf prefers the "vulgar" reading, and E. Müller printed this. I prefer this reading, because from among all of them, only this one excludes the possibility of a wrong conclusion.

2) III 36 (2)

3) III 50

4) "Εκείνθαυτου μέν Ἀθηναῖων ἐκπολιορκηθέντες δ' ἐκ τε εἰς πάντα τοῦ ὅπερ αὐτός, παῖς δεκατριῶν μέν τῆς γυναικὸς, ἡ δέ ἡ ἀνδρόν ἐκεῖνον νέμεσθαι." V 32(1)
to by Thucydides\(^1\).

Other acts of atrocity committed by the Athenians at Thyrea and Torone are referred to \(^2\).

In Demosthenes' own time, the very same year that Methone was occupied by Philip (353 B.C.), the Athenian general Chares captured Sestus and treated the people with extreme brutality, by putting all the men of military age to death and by enslaving the remaining population\(^3\).

The Spartans also do not appear to have been any more lenient in the treatment of their opponents: According to Thucydides, during the Peloponnesian war the Spartans were the first to begin the practice of slaying the traders they caught at sea, even those from neutral lands\(^4\).

We are told again by Thucydides that the Plataeans, who surrendered their city to the Spartans in 427 B.C. were murdered in cold blood and that the women were enslaved\(^5\).

\(^1\) "οἱ δὲ ('Αθηναίοι) δὲ πέντε πόλεις ἔσσωσιν ἡ βῶν τὰς ἔλαβον, παιδίας δὲ καὶ γυναικῶν ἡ νεῖον ἔρται πολλὰς διὰ τὸ πολὺ κυρίον αὐτῶν φιλοσοφίαν, ἀπολύουσας δωματίαν πεπλακόσσες πέμψαντες." Diod. XII 80 and Strabo X 3, 1(c.484).

\(^2\) See Thucydides IV 57 (3–4) for Thyrea, and Thuc. V 3(4), Diod. XII 73(3) for Torone.

\(^3\) "Χάρης δὲ δὲ τῶν Ἀθηναίων στρατηγὸς εὐσπλέσας εἰς Ἑλλάσποντον καὶ ἔστάλην τόλμην ἔλαβεν τοὺς μὲν ἡ βῶν τὰς ἔλαβεν, δὲ πέντε πολὺς τὰς ἔρται δὲ πολὺς τὰς ἔρται. " Diod. XVI 34.

\(^4\) II 67(4).

\(^5\) "διεφθείραν δὲ (Δανεάδαμνοι) Πλαταιῶν μὲν αὐτῶν ὧν ἔλαβον διὰ γυναικῶν, Ἀθηναίων δὲ πέντε πολὺς καὶ εἰκοσιᾶς, οἱ ξυνεπολιορκοῦντο γυναικῶν δὲ ἡ νεῖον ἔρται πολὺς τὰς ἔρται. " III 68(2). cf. Isocr. XII 93.
In 424 B.C. when the Spartans considered that the Helots constituted a danger for them, they secretly and treacherously massacred two thousand of their best men

The Spartans also slaughtered all the free men whom they took prisoner when they occupied the Argive city of Hysiae in 417 B.C.

In 412 B.C. when Lysander took Iasus in Caria by storm, he massacred the eight hundred male inhabitants and sold the women and children into slavery, while in 405, during his occupation of Cedreæ in Caria, he sold the whole population as slaves.

More recently still, in 395 B.C., the Spartans had executed five hundred men at Heracleia in Trachis and had forced the inhabitants of Oete to evacuate their land.

According to Isocrates' argument, both Athens and Sparta had committed extreme atrocities against the weak states of Greece, but Sparta exceeded even the Athenians in acts of brutality.

As for the Thebans, it was Demosthenes who gave the

1) Thuc. IV 80(3-4), Diod. XII 67(3-4).
2) Thuc. V 83(2).
3) "ι μεν ὁ β ὁ ν τ α ς ὀ κτακοσίους ὄ ντας ἀ π ἐ σφαλην (Ἀδανδρος), παῖδας δὲ καὶ γυναικας λαψφωμιλήσας κατέσκαψε τὴν πόλιν." Diod. XIII 104 (7). cf. Thuc. VIII 28(2-3).
4) Xen. Hell. II 1(15).
5) Diod. XIV 38(4-5).
6) "πῶς οὖ μισεῖν καὶ ψευδεῖν (τὴν ἄρχην) τὴν πολιορκεῖ, καὶ δὲ εἰ ν ᾧ ποιεῖν ἀμφότερας τὰς πόλεις ἐπάρασαν." VIII 105.

For the comparison between the Athenians and the Spartans, see Panathenaicus 62 ff.
most vivid portrayal of their cruelty and brutality:

"οθηματοι φρονοσι έπ' ά μ ι δ η η η ρ ( q. n 1)

In fact, the Thcbans had shown extreme brutality, and, as Xenophon informs us, they had even taken the children of the Plataeans they had killed, and had massacred them 2).

Plataea and Thespiae indeed suffered greatly from the violent enmity of the Thebans 3), and Orchomenos in 364 B.C. was razed to the ground, while its male inhabitants were

1) XX 109. Throughout his speeches, Demosthenes emphatically expresses his contempt for the insensitivity and the severity of the Thebans. Thus he calls them "διαλεπτον" in V 15 and XVIII 43, and speaks of their "διαλυζόντα" and "διαβείς" in XVIII 35, and of their "σκαλος τρόπων" in VI 19. In fact, from ancient times up until the present day, the Boeotians were considered on the whole to be insensitive and overbearing in their demeanour. It is interesting to note that the proverb "Βοιωτία υς" (Boeotian swine), which clearly illustrates the Greeks' low opinion of them, is first found in the writings of a Boeotian, Pindar (Olymp. VI 90). For a full discussion of the Boeotian character, see W. Roberts, The Ancient Boeotian, 1895.

2) "οι μέντοι οθηματοι καί τοῦς πα ι ι δας των α ι πο θαν - ν ό ν των, θυσις ηθαι, λαβοντες δα πες φαξαν." Hellenica V 4(12).

3) These small towns of Boeotia were captured in 373 B.C. by the Thebans, and their inhabitants were expelled and forbidden to set foot on Boeotian soil ever again. See Isocrates' Plataicus, Diod. XV 46 and Pausanias IX 1(5-8) for Plataea, and Xen. Hell. VI 3(1), Diod. XV 46 and Paus. IX 14(2) for Thespiae.
put to the sword and the women and children were sold into slavery 1).

Sufficient evidence, I think, has now been produced to prove that Demosthenes' portrayal of Philip as being especially cruel and as having perpetrated deeds unknown before among the Greeks, is historically indefensible.

The truth is that Philip, in comparison with the other leading Greek powers, was no more cruel or brutal, and in many cases he was even particularly lenient. No executions of civilians had been ordered by Philip, and, as for the case of the Olynthians who were sold into slavery, this was not out of accordance with the normal Greek procedure as regards the law of the war 2), since it had been first established long ago by the Athenians and the Spartans.

1) See Dem. XX 109, Diod. XV 79 (5), Paus. IX 15(3), and Plutarch, Comparison of Polopidas and Marcellus I. The city was destroyed by the Thebans for a second time and its inhabitants were sold as slaves in 346 B.C.. See Dem. V 22, VI 13, XIX 112, 141, 325, and Aesch. II 141, III 80.

2) The following passages illustrate the violence inherent in the law of the war: "νόμος γάρ ἐν πάσιν ἀνθρώποις ἀδίκως εἴστιν, ἐκεῖνοι πολεμοῦσιν πόλεις ἄλλοις, τῶν ἐλάλητοι εἴναι καὶ τὰ σώματα τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὰ χρήματα ταῦτα.
" Xen. Cyrop. VII 5(73) and "Τί δ'; ἐὰν τις στρατηγὸς αἱρεθεὶς ἀδικόν τε καὶ ἑκράν πόλιν ἐξανθραποδίσῃ ταύτα, φήσομεν τοῦτον ἄδικον; οὐ δὲ ἦτα, ἐφη... Τί δ'; ἐὰν ἰς αὶ τ ἐκ τις πολεμῶν αὐτοῖς; Δ ἰ - καὶ ν ἐκ τοῦτο, ἐφη...Αὐτὸ τὸ τούτον, οὐ δίκαια ποιήσει; Καὶ ἰ μὲν λα ὑπερδείκνυτον. " Xen. Memor. IV 2(15). "Τὸ μὲν γὰρ παραπείσθαι τῶν πολεμίων καὶ ἀθὰνα τοῦτον φρονήμας λιμένας πόλεις ἄν δὲ τοὺς ναὸς καταστρέψας, τάλλα τὰ τοῦτος παραπλήσθαι, δι' ἄν τοὺς μὲν ὑπενενεπέτειους ἀθέθεσθερας ἄν τις ποιήσατο, τὰ δὲ σφαέτα πράγματα καὶ τὰς ἐπιβολὰς δύναμικωτέρας, τὰ δὲ τοῦτος παραπλήσθαι, δί τοῦτο πολὺς ὁ μονή ὁ μου νὸς μοι καὶ τὰ τοῦτον δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς δρᾶν." Polyb. V 11(3).
Furthermore, the Olynthians can be held largely responsible for their own fate: they occasioned this themselves by breaking the terms of their previous alliance with Philip, and also by giving refuge to Philip's brothers who were his enemies 1). They endeavoured to use Philip to their own advantage 2), and, when they failed, they broke their oaths and acted as enemies against him.

The Olynthians were not, therefore, the innocent victims that Demosthenes would have them appear to be.

Judging by Greek standards 3), the treatment of Methone was not especially cruel, and the fact that Philip lost his right eye there as a result of the resistance of the townspeople emphasizes his leniency towards the people as a whole 4).

The fate that was inflicted on the Phocians was not at all cruel, if we remember that for ten whole years they had struggled against the majority of the states in Central Greece, and, furthermore, were considered by most of the Greeks as having committed sacrilege. It is also important to remember that the Amphictyonic council had reassembled for the first time after these ten years of

1) Justin VIII 3(10).
2) Demosthenes, 107-108.
3) See preceding page, n.2.
4) Diod. XVI 34(3). Justin in VII 6(14) says: "Quo vulnere nec sognior in bellum nec iracundior adversus hostes factus est, adeo ut interiectis diebus pacem deprecantibus dederit, nec moderatus tantum, verum etiam mitis adversus victos fuerit."
most bitter struggling, and they understandably had feelings of vindictive antipathy towards the conquered people, while the Thebans and the Thessalians also craved revenge on them. The sentence which was finally imposed was carried out by the Thebans, while more violent enmity was shown by the tribes of Mount Oote, who had proposed that the ultimate punishment for sacrilege should be inflicted on the whole adult male population, that is, that they should be cast down from the Phaedriads rocks 1).

The fact that the payments to the temple began within three years and continued uninterrupted for a further twenty one years 2), shows that the Phocians must soon have partially recovered some degree of economic stability from the hardship which they must have suffered after the end of the war. In addition, the fact that they were dispersed to small villages does not seem a particularly harsh punishment, if we consider that the Phocians were a people of mostly peasant stock.

The absence of executions and of the selling of people into slavery is the most convincing proof of the leniency with which the Phocians were treated, along with the fact that they had not even been deprived of the possession of their territory 3).

As for Philip, his commanding position among the

1) Aesch. II 142.
2) See Tod, GHI, II 172 and E. Bourguet, L'administration financière du sanctuaire pythique, 37 ff. The last instalment was paid in 322 B.C. See I.G. ix (1) 115.
3) "Εδοξεν οὖν τοῖς συνέδροις.... ἐνὶ ἐν ὑπὸ καὶ εἰς τὴν χώραν." Diod. XVI 60(1-2).
victors can be held to have played a part in preventing the destruction of the Phocians, since no one else among the Amphictyons seems to have felt any compassion for them.

Demosthenes elsewhere unwittingly shows Philip's placatory role when he speaks of the confidence which the Phocians had that Philip, in comparison with the other victors, was of a favourable disposition 1).

This being so, I fail to see how G. Grote, A. Schäfer, and more recently P. Cloché, did not acknowledge Philip's leniency, and how they endorsed Demosthenes' verdict on the treatment of the Phocians 2).

1) In XIX 61-62, Demosthenes speaks of the Phocians as having signed the treaty with Philip and not with the other victors, and in IX 11 he speaks of Philip as having marched towards the Phocians as an ally. Cf. Justin VIII 4.

2) G. Grote says: "Well might Demosthenes say that events more terrific and momentous had never occurred in the Grecian world, either in his own time or in that of his predecessors " History of Greece XI p. 232., and A. Schäfer: "Mit seinen Feinden hat Philipp nie Erbarmen gehabt, seine Siegesbahn ist mit zerstörten Städten und in Knechtschaft verkauften Volksgemeinden bezeichnet...... so hat er auch seinen Arm dargeboten, das letzte Amphiktyonenurteil zu vollstrecken : er hat das phokische Volk ins Elend gebracht." II p. 290.

See also P. Cloché, La politique extérieure d'Athènes de 404 a 338 (1934), p. 237. But such a judgement seems unjustifiable and is not based on the evidence of the sources. On the contrary, many other ancient and modern historians are of the opposite opinion and acknowledge Philip's leniency in his treatment of the Phocians.

Polybius says: "μὲν χρι τοῦτον πολεμῶν καὶ φιλονικῶν(Φίλιππος), ἐν τούτῳ λαβέειν ἄφορμας πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τῆς αὐτοῦ προφητείας καὶ τοῦ καλοῦ να γαθεῖν. " V 10(3). Cf. IX 33, (cont'd)
Philip was more adroit, possibly more cunning, but certainly not more cruel than the other powers who had previously held the leadership of Greece.

Thus, Demosthenes' portrayal of Philip's deeds as being especially cruel, is historically unjustifiable.

Now we must decide whether Demosthenes' picture of Philip was drawn for reasons of rhetorical exploitation of the situation, or out of a genuine belief on his part in the truth of his account.

It seems that rhetorical reasons, and also psychological ones are behind this misrepresentation. Firstly, Demosthenes does not seem to have suppressed his desire to invoke strong anti-Macedonian feelings among the Athenians, by exaggerating, to some extent, the whole situation.

On the other hand, it seems to me that a psychological motive will be found to account for Demosthenes' attitude:

It is not an uncommon phenomenon to find people believing that a present bad situation is the worst they have ever experienced, and that in comparison with it the horror of preceding situations pales considerably. During winter, for instance, people will complain that it is the coldest winter they have ever known, whereas in fact this is a delusion - it is merely very cold. It seems

(cont'd)

therefore, that the explanation is a psychological one - we live with the feelings of the moment, and our judgement is influenced by these feelings. In more general terms this happens when we judge the events of our age in relationship to the events of the past.

The influence exerted by these temporary feelings is obviously stronger among a people who are passionate, fanatic, and, on occasion, sentimental by nature. Demosthenes, often passionate in his verbal battle against Philip, and personally involved in the incidents under consideration, was bound to have been greatly affected by the repercussions arising from the destruction of the places mentioned.

Thus, rhetorical exaggeration, along with his own fervent attitude, led Demosthenes to represent Philip as an extremely cruel person, and, furthermore, to make some inappropriate comparisons between Philip and the former leading powers of Greece, although the real facts did not support his attitude.
CONCLUSION

It is the duty of the historian to record history truthfully and in its entirety; but, for the orator, history is only a means, not an end. Like the historian, the orator must interpret events, but that is not to say that his interpretations will always be either consistent or objective. This observation, which applies in general to the attitude of orators towards historical events, is equally applicable to Demosthenes.

Demosthenes aimed to persuade, as does every orator, and, in his efforts to satisfy the requirements of his argumentation, he occasionally deviated from the accurate narration of the events.

These departures from the truth were either deliberate or unconscious. They appeared either for reasons of rhetorical exploitation, or as genuine mistakes owing to a lapse of memory; or they stemmed from a sincere belief of the orator in his own judgment or interpretation of the facts. Occasionally, indifference towards details which were inappropriate to the rhetorical speech were the reason behind the deviations.

These deviations in Demosthenes' narrative which were considered to be the most important ones and which can to some extent be checked against other existing evidence, can be classified as follows:
I. Lapses of memory.
1) Ch. One, p.31.
2) Ch. One, p.34.

II. Errors due usually to an erroneous tradition, oral or written.
1) Ch. Four, p.64.
2) Ch. Six, p.75.
3) Ch. Eight, p.90.

III. Deliberate misrepresentations for reasons of rhetorical exploitation.
1) Ch. One, pp.31-32.
2) Ch. Three, pp.57-58.
3) Ch. Six, p.78.
4) Ch. Seven, pp.84-85.
5) Ch. Eight, p.90.
6) Ch. Thirteen, pp.140-141.
7) Ch. Fourteen, pp.150-151.
9) Ch. Sixteen, p.159.
11) Ch. Eighteen, p.175.

IV. Personal attitudes or interpretations of the events.
1) Ch. Two, p.45.
2) Ch. Nine, pp.103-104.
3) Ch. Eleven, pp.122-123.
4) Ch. Twelve, pp.129-130.
5) Ch. Twelve, p.131.
6) Ch. Fourteen, p.150.
7) Ch. Twenty, pp.194-195.

V. Indifference to details.
1) Ch. Ten, p.111.
2) Ch. Ten, p.111.
3) Ch. Ten, p.112
4) Ch. Eleven, p.118.
5) Ch. Thirteen, p.140.
Expressed as percentages, the deviations appear thus:

I. Lapses of memory - 6.7%
II. Mistaken beliefs - 10%
III. Deliberate misrepresentations - 43.3%
IV. Personal interpretations - 23.3%
V. Indifference to detail - 16.7%

It must be remembered that these percentages are taken only from those cases which were examined in this work, because the evidence of the extant historical sources is not sufficient to permit a thorough examination of each and every application of historical events in Demosthenes' speeches.

In addition, Demosthenes' general estimations of political situations are open to dispute, and it is therefore not certain whether they constitute misrepresentations.

An observation of the cases of misrepresentation as they appear in each category of this classification reveals the following:— The lapses of memory appear in the narration of events of early Macedonian history, and of events which brought honours to the Macedonians. The errors owing to mistaken traditions appear in cases of early Athenian history. The erroneous personal interpretations usually appear in cases where Demosthenes considers the relationships between Athens and other states in earlier or in contemporary times. The deliberate misrepresentations occur mostly in accusations against Philip, and occasionally in subjects which amount to testimonies in favour of the ancestors of the Athenians. Indifference to detail is found mostly in numerical matters.

It can be seen from the percentages of the groups under examination that the deliberate misrepresentations appear

most frequently, with the personal interpretations in second place, and the cases of lapse of memory appearing the most seldom.

Demosthenes usually refers to the Macedonian past as part of an accusation against Philip.

The excursus of Demosthenes on earlier Athenian history extends no further back than the Persian wars, which initiated the Athenians' era of greatness. Many of the mistakes concerning the Athenian past were a result of Demosthenes' idealizing his past, which provided him with an unchanging paragon with which to rouse the spirits of his indifferent compatriots.

Of Demosthenes' early speeches, the one entitled "On Organization" seems to contain the most historical inaccuracies in comparison with the other speeches of this period 1).

Of all the deliberative speeches, the Third Philippic appears to contain the most historical mistakes 2). In 341 B.C., Demosthenes seems to have been concerned not so much with the details of the preceding historical events, as with the results of his exhaustive attempt to alert his fellow-citizens to the impending danger. As in the Third Philippic, Demosthenes has stretched his rhetorical abilities to their limits, in a most praiseworthy fashion, in order to achieve his political aims. But at the same time he has somewhat neglected historical accuracy.

Generally, Demosthenes displays some liberality, inconsistency, and, on occasion, even bad faith 3) in his use of historical material, but it cannot be denied that a

1) §§ 23-24, 26, 29 (pp.29, 32 n.1, 79, 94 n.1 of this work.)
2) §§ 11, 15-16, 23, 25-26, 31-32, 43-44 (pp.87, 92, 142, 156, 183 of this work.)
3) See category III in the classification.
certain respect for historical truth is revealed by his work as a whole.

This last statement demands elucidation - namely, that, since the object of this work was to discover misrepresentations in Demosthenes' narrative, and not to deal with all his references to historical events, it would be wrong to conclude that his speeches consist predominately of misrepresentations.

It is unfortunate that Demosthenes cannot be viewed satisfactorily in relation to the other orators, since there are no similar works on their speeches with which this work on Demosthenes' misrepresentations could be compared. But it is my general impression, acquired from the study of the works of the other orators, viewed from the angle of the way in which they used the historical material, that, in most cases, such a comparison would not disfavour Demosthenes.

It can be said as a final assessment of Demosthenes' merits in the fields of oratory and politics, that, as an orator, his sincerity is not on the whole irreproachable, but that in none of the cases of misrepresentation which have been examined, can any doubt be cast upon the consistency of his aims as a politician, who, even when he deviated from the truth, interpreted and formulated reality in such a way that it emerged in his work as an undeviating line of political thought and action.
APPENDIX

The sources of Demosthenes' historical knowledge.

Throughout this research, Demosthenes' misrepresentation of events has always been judged as either deliberate or unconscious, according to the degree of historical knowledge that he was thought to have possessed on the events. Although an attempt has been made in each case to clarify the exact procedure by which the conclusion was reached, our judgement has always been influenced by the general belief concerning Demosthenes' historical knowledge, as expressed in the following terms:

Firstly, it appeared that Demosthenes, like any of the other orators, employed historical sources in a different manner from the historians. Of course, Demosthenes is regarded as having had a good knowledge of historical as well as of contemporary events, but it is considered as most probable that his account of past history was drawn mainly from his own memory, without his having made use, in any given case, of the appropriate historical sources. This remark can be illustrated in the following example: Demosthenes was acquainted with the narrative of Thucydides, but it was his own recollection and not the book itself, which he took into consideration in his writings.

Demosthenes' historical knowledge is considered as having been derived also from two other sources: the oral tradition of his own time, and the impressions he gained from his travels around Greece.
Of these three sources, the knowledge acquired through the works of earlier historians is considered as the most sound, but references made to these narratives from memory alone are believed to contain serious drawbacks in the matter of details. Oral tradition has always been considered as representing the facts in an exaggerated way. Finally, while personal impressions are comparatively valuable in the judging of the situation of a country at any particular time, they are thought to be of little use for providing the orator with any specific knowledge of past history, especially when it is remembered that the orator's travels were not made for the purpose of historical research.
Special works connected with certain chapters of my thesis are mentioned in the footnotes. The same applies to all the articles of the periodicals, with the exception of those which relate directly to Demosthenes' argumentation, and to appreciation and evaluation of him.

**General studies on Demosthenes**


Works on Argumentation


* In this article, M. Schoenfeld examines the variations in three different speeches in Demosthenes' presentation of the same event (V 10, VI 29-30, XIX 23 25 49), namely, his humiliation by Aeschines and Philocrates at the meeting of the Assembly where the vote was taken on the Peace of Philocrates, after their return from Macedonia as members of the Second Athenian Embassy. M. Schoenfeld shows how Demosthenes in each case adapted the narrative to fit the requirements of the special rhetorical genre and those of his argumentation.
11. Weiske B., De Hyperbole, errorum in Historia Philippi commissorum genitrice, Meissen, 1819.

Works on Appreciation and Evaluation


General historical works

2. Beloch K.J., Griechische Geschichte, Vols. II¹, II², III¹, III², Strassburg, Berlin und Leipzig, 1914-23.
22. Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, Stuttgart, 1894-.
Historical works referring to Philip II, and to Macedonia in general