Motivations and Response to Crusades in the Aegean: c.1300-1350

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Declaration of Authorship

I Michael Carr hereby declare that this thesis and the work presented in it is entirely my own. Where I have consulted the work of others, this is always clearly stated.

Signed:

Date:
Abstract

This thesis examines the interaction between the conflicting ideologies of crusade and commerce, during the period when the Turkish maritime emirates of Anatolia became the primary target of western crusading endeavour. Through the close study of papal documents and archival evidence from the Italian mercantile republics, two principal areas are focussed on: firstly, the extent to which the temporal and spiritual mechanisms (e.g. trade licences and indulgences) introduced by the popes of the fourteenth century encouraged the Italian mercantile republics to participate in a crusade; secondly, the analysis of the policies of commercial exchange and military opposition adopted by the Latin states with regard to the Turks in the Aegean. The crusades in the Aegean are discussed in six chapters which broadly reflect the activities of the principal participants: 1) crusade negotiations during the pontificates of Clement V and John XXII: distractions to an Aegean crusade under Clement V; extrication from French influence under John XXII; gradual replacement of Byzantium as a target of the Aegean crusades during the 1320s; and the temporal and spiritual concessions granted by the popes to those Latin resisting the Turks in the Aegean; 2) the Zaccaria of Chios: their defence of the Aegean from Turkish attacks and the privileges they received from the papacy for this; 3) Venetian commercial activities in the Aegean: their alliances with and activities against the various Turkish emirates; 4) the 1334 naval league: the first anti-Turkish coalition; 5) the neglect of the Aegean crusades under Pope Benedict XII (1335-1342); 6) the Crusade of Smyrna and the climax of Latin efforts against the Turks in the first half of the fourteenth century (1343-1351). Although trade and crusade have often been regarded as incompatible by historians of the crusades (such as Stephen Runciman and Aziz Atiya), they both formed an integral, and inseparable, aspect of crusade policy and of western perceptions of the Turks.
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Introduction

The Aegean Sea was of the greatest strategic importance for whoever controlled it; without it, no state could establish itself as the supreme power in the eastern Mediterranean, as the Byzantines had done before 1204 and the Ottomans were to do after 1453. It lay at the heart of the great trade routes extending from Egypt and Syria to the south, and from the kingdoms of Mediterranean Europe in the west. These trade routes passed through Aegean waters – by way of Constantinople – to the lucrative markets of the Black Sea. Many important harbour-cities in Greece, Thrace and Asia Minor also lay on its shores, and allowed access to the interiors of those lands and beyond. Moreover, Asia Minor and the Aegean islands were the sources of much natural wealth, such as alum from Phokaia and mastic from Chios, which were produced in these lands and exported to the West. The Aegean islands gained heightened significance because of their proximity to one another and their strategic location; Rhodes, for example, was within eyesight of the Turkish coast and commanded the trade routes running from Famagusta and Alexandria in the south, to Constantinople and the Black Sea in the north.¹ The high concentration of islands within the Aegean did, however, make the region notoriously difficult to police and as a result shipping was vulnerable to piracy. This was compounded by the lack of a dominant power in the region, where the Latins, Greeks and Turks all vied for control, but rarely enjoyed supremacy.

Since the Fourth Crusade, there had been a permanent Latin settlement in the Aegean made up primarily of the Venetians who had fought alongside the Frankish knights in 1204. By 1261 the Byzantine emperor had opened up the Black Sea trade routes to the Genoese and, in the following years, also to the Venetians. Control of the Aegean islands thus became an essential prerequisite for the fulfilment of the commercial ambitions of the maritime republics.² The expansion of Latin trade in the Aegean and Black Sea coincided with the emergence of Turkish warrior-nomads on the old Seljuk frontier in Anatolia, who replaced Byzantine control of that region with a

¹ See the relevant photographs in Appendix V.
patchwork of Turkish emirates. These Turks, ‘with great demographic potential and a heightened holy-war ideology’ began to make incursions into the Aegean and directly threaten the Latin colonies there. It is not surprising, therefore, that in this region of trade, conflicting cultures and religious beliefs, the Crusade emerged as an essential component for the defence and expansion of Latin possessions. But unlike in previous centuries, the main participants in these crusades were the Italian mercantile republics and not the kings and knights of western Europe. It was the Italian merchants who formed the bulwark of Christian resistance to, and contact with, the Turkish maritime emirates.

The priorities of the mercantile republics contrasted greatly to those of the papacy and, some would say, with the traditional ideals of crusading. This thesis, therefore, has two objectives: firstly, to look at the changing attitude towards the Turks in this period, as they began to dominate western crusade thinking; and secondly, to study the relationship between the papacy and the maritime republics in the context of an Aegean crusade, or in other words, the relationship between mercantile objectives and the crusading ideals of the popes.

The interplay between “religious” and “commercial” motivations is central to the understanding of holy war. However, in the context of the maritime republics, it has not often received the balanced assessment which it deserves. This view is in part influenced by the Venetian involvement in the Fourth Crusade, but also the result of the critical accounts of contemporary writers. Those accounts written before the loss of Jerusalem in 1187 paint a generally positive image of the Italian republics, but afterwards this portrayal changed. This is illustrated by James of Vitry, the Bishop of Acre in the years 1216-28, who wrote that the Italian merchants at Acre ‘rarely if ever

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4 I generally adhere to the ‘pluralist’ definition of the Crusade. This is summed up by Jonathan Riley-Smith: ‘A crusade was a penitential war which ranked as, and had many attributes of, a pilgrimage. It manifested itself in many theatres of war: Palestine and the eastern Mediterranean regions […] also North Africa, Spain, the Baltic shores, Poland, Hungary, the Balkans and even Western Europe’. J.S.C. Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 3rd ed. (Basingstoke, 2002), 87. Also see N. Housley, Contesting the Crusades (Oxford, 2006), 2-13.
listened to the Word of God’. Moreover, they fought against each other rather than against the ‘treacherous infidels’. In Vitry’s view, they had ‘more to do with trade and merchandise than with warring for Christ’. Contemporaries closely associated with the Crusade in the fourteenth century sometimes shared this view. The Venetian crusade theorist Marino Sanudo Torsello accused the Genoese of accruing great wealth in their lands in Greece, which they kept against the will of God. This sentiment was echoed by another crusade propagandist, Pierre Dubois, who wrote that if a Catholic ruler were able to recover the lands of the East, he should control trade and regulate prices in order to curb the ‘daily increasing greed of the merchants’.

Some historians, influenced by these accounts, have subsequently portrayed trade and crusade as two contrasting concepts which cannot be reconciled. This is illustrated by Aziz Atiya, who remarked that ‘The Italian citizen, whether in Venice, Genoa or elsewhere, had lost or almost lost his medieval religious scruples in view of his material gains from trade. This is exemplified by the famous Venetian saying which is often quoted – *Siamo Veneziani, poi Christiani*’. The author summed up that by the fourteenth century ‘Piety alone [had become] helpless in the face of economic motives and interests’. The fervently pro-Byzantine Stephen Runciman, also, not surprisingly, adopted a similar view. He wrote in his *History of the Crusades* that ‘one of the difficulties in organising the later Crusades was the lack of economic inducement’, and that ‘the Italian maritime merchants [...] were the shrewdest money-makers of all time’. The author concluded that ‘their arrogance, their rivalries and the cynicism of their policy, caused irreparable harm [to the crusades]’.

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7 James of Vitry, *Historia Orientalis*, ed. F. Moschus (Douai, 1597), 136; Schein, ‘“milites Christi”’, 683.
However, these claims of a total division of spiritual and commercial motives are far too simplistic. They paint an overly negative view of the maritime republics, who by the fourteenth century had come to form the backbone of crusading against the Turks in the Aegean. To say that the maritime republics were devoid of any pious motivations would be to take the Namierite view that principles and ideas are rarely determinants of human action. In Namier’s view, it would be ‘an ironic habit of mind to believe that the wishes of men are expressed by their utterances; even more ironical, or naive, to judge of the essence of mass movements by the pronouncements or professions of those who manage to filch them’. As Quentin Skinner has shown in quite another context, separating supposedly contrasting motivations is an impossible task for the historian – professed principles, even if they were insincere, still acted as a causal motivation for actions.

Thus, when the Venetians and the Genoese cited the defence of Christendom as the motivations for their actions – as they often did – this still affected their deeds, even if the defence of their trade routes was the priority. As shall be seen, in the fourteenth century Aegean, the papacy relied on the mercantile republics for the successful execution of a crusade and they, in turn, were eager to couch their actions in the language of the Crusade; thus trade and crusade became blended together as commercial interests became amalgamated with the defence of the faith.

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Economic or religious history? The historiography for the Aegean crusades

In some senses this separation of the “commercial” and “religious” aspects of later medieval crusading is reflected in the historiography of the Aegean crusades. The works most extensively employed in this thesis fall into the following categories: those which focus on the mercantile activities of the Latin states in the East, especially the economic histories of the maritime republics of Venice and Genoa (e.g. the works of Zachariadou, Balard and Lopez); and those which focus on the crusades from the perspective of the Church, especially the implementation of “crusade mechanisms” (such as the granting of tithes, indulgences, and other privileges)\(^{14}\) in the kingdoms of western Christendom (e.g. the works of Housley, Setton and Tyerman); in addition to this it is also necessary to make mention of the work of those specialising in the Turkish emirates and Byzantium during this period (e.g. the works of Lemerle, Inalcik and Laiou). For this reason, this thesis aims to blend together, where possible, both commercial and crusade history, and the sources which go with them, in an effort to produce a balanced assessment of the motivations of the principal players in these crusades – the Venetians, the Genoese and the papacy.

Many of the works which focus on trade in the eastern Mediterranean provide vital information on the activities of the Latins in the Aegean and their contact with the Turks, either in terms of commercial exchange or military opposition. For instance, the monograph of Elizabeth Zachariadou, *Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin (1300-1415)*, appears to be the closest work to this research question.\(^{15}\) Indeed, the author provides a thorough treatment of Venetian-Turkish commerce in the southern Aegean, especially the commercial agreements between the Cretans and the emirates of Aydin and Menteshe, the trading patterns of the Venetians during the times of a crusade, and the influence of Black Sea trade on the economies of the Aegean, which are all highly relevant to this investigation.

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\(^{14}\) Chrissis has defined these “crusade mechanisms” as ‘the sum of all the distinguishing characteristics connected with the Crusade’. I have found this definition a useful one to adopt for this study: N.G. Chrissis, *Crusading in Romania: A Study of Byzantine-Western Relations and Attitudes, 1204-1282* (University of London, PhD thesis, 2008), 10, n. 5.

\(^{15}\) Zachariadou has published a number of other highly relevant articles, e.g. ‘The Catalans of Athens and the beginning of Turkish expansion in the Aegean area’, *SM* 21.2 (1980), 821-38; ‘Holy war in the Aegean during the fourteenth century’, *LGEM*, 212-25; and a useful edited volume: *The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389): Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon, 11-13 January 1991*, ed. E.A. Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 1993).
Judging by the title alone one may even assume that a study into the integration of commercial and religious motivations has already been made. However, under closer inspection, it becomes clear that the assessment of the crusading motivation during this period takes a secondary role when compared to the analysis of mercantile activities in Zachariadou’s work. This is primarily because the focus of the work is on Venetian Crete and not the papacy. Therefore, a crucial detailed analysis of the Crusade from the perspective of the Church is not undertaken. Consequently, the historical background, which is where the Crusade is dealt with in most detail, offers little explanation as to why people took the cross and how the crusades were organised on the part of the Church, especially in relation to preaching, finance and recruitment. For example, the indulgences granted to those fighting in the Aegean – integral to the understanding of the crusades – are not discussed in detail.

Apart from Zachariadou, detailed investigations of the Venetians and Genoese in the eastern Mediterranean have also been provided by Michel Balard, Robert Lopez, Eliyahu Ashtor and Kate Fleet, who have all focussed, to some extent, on commercial relations between the Latins and Turks. Their studies are extremely useful for understanding east-west commerce, in particular the minutiae of commercial activity. In the case of Balard and Lopez, their work also provides useful information on the Genoese in the Aegean, especially the lords of Chios, which is supplemented by the articles of Miller and Gatto. The detail provided by these studies is essential for understanding the reality of the life for the Latins in the Aegean, especially the political and economic context in which they decided to either participate in a crusade or not. However, the focus of the work is not on the Crusade, thus there is little assessment of wider Christian-Muslim interaction outside of the sphere of mercantile activity, especially in the form of papal policy towards the Turkish emirates and the changing

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16 Ibid., 1-89. This historical background does, however, help to make sense of the political turmoil in the Aegean during the early fourteenth century and provides a wealth of detailed references.
17 E.g. Ibid., 9, 30, 34-5.
perception of the Turks within western Christendom, both of which had a significant influence on Christian-Muslim relations within this period.

The work of historians who specialise in the crusades has filled the other side of this gap. Unlike the work of the economic historians, the work of the crusade historians rarely focuses on the detail of daily activity in the Aegean, but is instead important for the understanding of the political situation in Europe and the effect which that had on western perception of, and participation in, campaigns in the East. One of the most extensive studies is that of Kenneth Setton, in his four-volume work, *The Papacy and the Levant* (1204-1571).\(^{20}\) As the title suggests, Setton’s research is primarily concerned with the political situation in western Europe and the papal domain, especially the relations between the papacy, the French Crown and the Venetians. Setton is extremely thorough in describing some aspects of crusade preparation, in particular, papal crusade funding and the organisation of Humbert of Vienne’s crusade of 1346.\(^{21}\) Despite this, the possible motivations of the crusaders are not discussed in as much detail. For example, while Setton mentions that the Smyrna crusaders were given some ‘quite unusual’ spiritual privileges, he does not divulge what these privileges were.\(^{22}\)

A more detailed analysis of the crusade mechanisms introduced by the popes of the fourteenth century has been provided by Housley.\(^{23}\) Housley’s monograph on the Avignon Papacy and the crusades, in particular, gives an especially lucid account of the different crusade policies adopted by the Avignon popes and covers a detailed discussion of the spiritual privileges they introduced (both of which are lacking in the studies of Zachariadou and Setton) as well as financial aspects of the Curia’s crusade

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\(^{20}\) Volume one contains two chapters which are relevant to this topic: Setton, *PL*, i. 163-223. Also see his: *Catalan Domination of Athens: 1311-1388* (Cambridge, MA, 1948); ‘The Catalans in Greece, 1311-1380’, *HC*, iii. 167-224. Setton has also published a work in Spanish, which in contradiction to what is stated in the inside cover, is not a translation of an earlier work: *Los catalanes en Grecia* (Barcelona, 1975).

\(^{21}\) E.g. Setton, *PL*, i. 165, 169. 196.

\(^{22}\) *Ibid.*, i. 196.

policy. In this work, the author also makes the important link between the expeditions to the Aegean, such as the naval league of 1334, and the change in crusade policy from proposals originating in Paris and Avignon, to those propagated by the local Aegean powers who had political and economic interests in the region. This is a theme that has been adopted and expanded on throughout this thesis.

The works of Housley and Setton have been supplemented by those of Christopher Tyerman and Sylvia Schein, who have studied the attempts of the papacy and the French Crown to recover the Holy Land. Tyerman has predominantly explored the crusader ideologies of the French monarchy, who are often depicted as expressing sincere devotion to crusade despite their inability to participate. Schein, likewise, has provided detailed information on the motivations of the French kings, as well as the crusade policies of Pope Clement V. These works are useful, although they are not specifically concerned with crusades against the Turks in the Aegean. In addition to this, it is worth mentioning those works closely related to crusade history, such as studies dedicated to the ideology and impact of the crusade theorists who operated in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century; works dedicated specifically to the Avignon popes and, at times, their crusade policies; and the studies on individual expeditions to the East, such as the Crusade of Smyrna.

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25 Ibid., 14, 25.
Standing somewhere in between those works dedicated to the Crusade and to the commercial history of the East, is the work of Anthony Luttrell, David Jacoby and Stefan Stantchev. Luttrell has published a large number of articles and chapters which focus on particular aspects of Hospitaller Rhodes, nearly all of which are connected to crusades in the Aegean in some way.  

Jacoby, similarly, has contributed numerous studies dedicated to the political, economic and social life of the Latins in the East. Stantchev, on the other hand, has focussed on the economic policies of the medieval papacy, especially their implementation of the trade embargo. Stantchev’s thesis, therefore, bridges the gap between church and economic history, which this study also aims to do. However, his main concern is for the use of the embargo within the context of the assertion of papal primacy, and not as an instrument of crusading policy per se (i.e. it is not used to denote the changing perceptions of the Turks, or the justifications for crusading against them).

Finally, there is the work of those historians specialising in the Turkish emirates of Anatolia and the restored Byzantine empire: Lemerle, Inalcik and Wittek have all studied the Turkish emirates, especially those of Aydin and Menteshe. Aydin became the principal target of crusading aggression, so Lemerle’s work on the emirate of Aydin is of particular relevance to this study.

31 Luttrell’s works are too numerous to cite individually. Most of his publications can be found in five volumes of Variorum Reprints, listed as LVR1; VR2; LVR3; LVR4; LVR5 in the bibliography.
of Aydin, is especially useful for this study, not least because it provides a critical assessment of Düstûrnâme of Enveri – one of the key Turkish sources for this period. These works also help to shed light on the often confusing political situation in Asia Minor during the early fourteenth century. The Byzantinists, in a similar vein, fill in the gaps for Latin interaction with the Greeks during this period. The most important of these being the studies of Laiou, Geanakoplos and Gill. Laiou, in particular, is helpful for the earlier part of this thesis, where crusades against the Byzantines had yet to be replaced by crusades against the Turks. These works also provide a detailed treatment of discussions over Church Union and Byzantine participation in the naval league of 1334.

Sources for the Aegean crusades

The historiographic gap found between those works dedicated to the commercial activities of the Latins in the Aegean and those discussing the Crusade in a more Euro-centric context is, in many ways, a result of the sources which tend to be relevant for events in the Aegean or for the discussions of the Crusade in Europe. The prevalence of archival sources for the fourteenth century means that they often form the core of research for this period, including the crusades. Unfortunately chronicles and letters from the crusaders themselves are often hard to come by for the later crusades, thus it is often necessary to fill the gaps left in the documentary sources with that provided by the dryer archival evidence. For this reason, an assessment of crusader motivations usually takes an unavoidably high-diplomatic slant.

The Vatican Archivio segreto contains many documents integral for the understanding of papal crusade policy. Of especial importance to this study are the papal letters in the Registra Avenionensia and the Registra Vaticana. The majority of

38 D.J. Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium and the crusades: 1261-1354’, HC, iii. 27-68.
40 E.g. Housley, Avignon, 7.
41 The Registra Avenionensia letters are drafts, rather than copies of the original letters. The Registra Vaticana registers are parchment copies of the common letters in the Registra Avenionensia series. They are thus at least two removes from the original letters, which are drafted or registered in the Registra Avenionensia. The Registra Vaticana are, however, more legible and easier to handle. Where possible I
the letters in these registers are so-called common letters – those issued in response to written petitions submitted to and approved by the Roman Curia. They consist usually of favours of some kind being conferred on individuals or institutions. Amongst the other letters found in these registers are ‘secret’ letters. These usually contain political correspondence and were not issued as a result of a petition, but from curial initiative. Most of the registers of the popes relevant to this study (Benedict XI to Clement VI) have been published by the Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome amongst others. However, it is worth noting that these publications are not always complete. This is illustrated by the common letters of John XXII which are only published in calendar form, therefore, important documents such as the granting of indulgences (on petition) in Achaia and for the naval league of 1334 are not printed in full. When this is the case, it has been necessary to consult the original manuscripts. Overall, the papal registers are extremely useful for portraying the papal reaction to events in the Aegean and European crusading trends in general. They are also the sources which provide the most detail about the spiritual privileges which were granted for the crusades – an important aspect in identifying crusader motivations. When used in conjunction with other sources, they can also help to clarify specific details of a crusade, such as: dates, finance, numbers of men involved, galleys contributed, etc. Throughout this study, emphasis has been placed on the problem of


Some texts are printed in full in Appendix III. The registers of Clement VI also contain some very inadequate summaries of important documents, take for example the bull Insurgentibus contra fidem, proclaiming the Crusade of Smyrna: CVI France, i. nr. 433. In addition to this, substantial lacunae exist in the Vatican Archives, partly as a result of losses suffered and partly because documents have been omitted from the papal registers (only those seemed especially significant were copied into bound volumes). Moreover, some of the registers are based on letters which were never dispatched, or were re-worded at a later date: Boyle, Vatican Archives, 105-7; Housley, Italian Crusades, 9-12; A.J. Andrea, Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade (Leiden, 2000), 7-8.
using common letters as an indicator of papal policy. The initiative in issuing them did not lie with the pope, so they are in many senses, more informative about the motivations of those making the petitions than of the papacy.\textsuperscript{46}

The other core body of archival sources for this study are those from the Venetian State Archives, namely the deliberations of the Venetian Great Council and of the Senate. Many of these have been summarised, although when the summaries have proved to be insufficient, manuscripts, such as those from the \textit{Deliberazioni del Maggior Consiglio} and the \textit{Deliberazioni Misti del Senato}, have been consulted.\textsuperscript{47} The Venetian archives provide a clear picture of Venetian state policy in the Aegean, as they describe the decisions of the various councils, either in Venice or on Crete, often regarding the Turkish emirates, the Byzantines, and the other Latin powers in the Aegean. They thus provide a valuable account of Venetian attitudes towards these different groups in the context of crusading or commercial exchange. In particular, they (at times) give names to the various Turkish emirs whom the Venetians were dealing with. This is helpful as many other sources often use the cumbersome blanket term of \textit{Turchi} and rarely make any distinction as to which emirate a particular group of Turks originate from.\textsuperscript{48} Like the papal documents, the Venetian archives also provide specific details and dates for the intricate preparations precluding a crusade.\textsuperscript{49}

However, the Venetian archives do not give the full picture of Latin involvement in the Aegean, as they do not concern the other great maritime republic of Genoa, whose activities are partially held in the Genoese State Archives. These would ideally provide more information on the involvement of the Commune of Genoa in the Aegean crusades, but unfortunately for the early fourteenth century many of

\textsuperscript{46} Zutshi, ‘letters of the Avignon popes’, 266-7.
\textsuperscript{48} Where possible I have tried to identify which Turks are being referred to, but because of the vagueness in many of the western sources, this is often unavoidable: Setton, \textit{PL}, i. 181-2, n. 88; Zachariadou, \textit{JC}, 117-21. I have used \textit{Turkey} to refer to Turkish ruled \textit{Asia Minor}.
\textsuperscript{49} A detailed discussion of the relevant Venetian archival sources can be found in D. Jacoby, ‘Social Evolution in Latin Greece’, \textit{HC}, vi. 175-221, at n. 1, pp. 175-80, esp. 176-7.
the records are notoriously fragmented. Nevertheless, publications of Genoese archival material for this period, mostly notarial records, do contain some documents which are of use to this study. Notably those which record alum shipments from the Genoese colonies in the East, or evidence of Genoese trade with the Turks in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. In addition to the archives of Venice and Genoa, published archival documents relating to the Hospitallers of Rhodes and the Catalans in the Aegean have also be utilised for this study. As have the accounts of merchants, such as Francesco Pegolotti and Pignol Zucchello.

This substantial archival evidence has been supplemented by the use of chronicle sources. These are common for the period, but sporadic in their coverage of the Crusade and thus vary greatly in importance. For the earlier part of this study, the chronicle of Ramon Muntaner is invaluable, both as a source for the expansion of the Turkish emirates, and as one for the Catalan involvement in the crusade plans of the early fourteenth century. His work is unusual in that it described events in the East from someone who was there at the time. Many other western chronicles also report on events in the Aegean, but they can be of dubious reliability because of their distance from events, their primary focus is also often on events in Europe. Nevertheless, these sources can still be used to provide an example of European perceptions of the Turks. In contrast, the work of the crusade theorist Marino Sanudo Torsello, is that of one familiar with events in the Aegean and extremely well informed on crusading matters. He gives an insight into papal crusade policy as well

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51 E.g. Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1356, 1357, 1530, 1667, 1675, 1723.
52 E.g. CGH; DOC.
56 The most important of Sanudo's works for this study are the *Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis* and the collection of letters, printed in *Gesta Die per Francos*, ed. J. Bongars, 2 vols (Hannover, 1661), ii.
as developments in the Aegean, which is mirrored by some of the other theorists operating at this time.\(^{57}\)

In addition to the western sources, a number of Greek and Turkish sources are also of importance. The Greek authors George Pachymeres, Nikephoros Gregoras and John Kantakouzenos all give accounts of Byzantine relations with the Turks at this time, such as the Ottoman advances and Greek alliances with certain emirs.\(^{58}\) On the Turkish side, the epic poem, the *Düstūrnāme* by the poet-chronicler Enveri (the Brilliant) contains a vast amount of information on the life of Umur of Aydin, such as the frequent Turkish raids in the 1330s, treaties with Christian powers, the alliance with Kantakouzenos and the Crusade of Smyrna.\(^{59}\)

**Structure of thesis**

In order to provide a balanced assessment of the motivations and response of the principal players in the Aegean crusades, this thesis has blended together commercial and crusade historiography and sources. It is divided into 6 chapters, and in 2 parts: the first part focuses on the ‘The Emergence of a Crusade to the Aegean: 1300-1327’, namely the change in perception of the Turkish emirates throughout this period, as they became a principal motivating factor for a crusade; the second part is dedicated to ‘The Response to the Turks in the Aegean: 1327-1351’, which covers the western response to the threat from the Turkish emirates, namely the 1334 naval league and the Crusade of Smyrna. These parts are preceded by a historical background, which provides a brief survey of crusading since the fall of Acre and the emergence of the Turks in western Anatolia and the Aegean.

Although it would be tempting to begin this thesis with the first instances of crusading mechanisms being introduced for action specifically against the Turkish

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\(^{57}\) E.g. William Adam, ‘De Modo Sarraecenos Extirpandi’, *RHC Ar*, ii. 519-55; ‘Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum’, *RHC Ar*, ii. 367-517.


emirates in the Aegean (during the early 1320s), it is instead necessary to start by analysing the context in which a crusade against the Turks emerged during the early fourteenth century. Thus Chapter 1 begins with a study of the crusade policies of Popes Benedict XI and Clement V, with specific reference to those instances where the Turks were mentioned in crusade negotiation, but did not form the primary target of a crusade, and to those instances where alternative crusading proposals were discussed in preference to an Aegean expedition. In this chapter it is shown that changes in attitudes towards the Turks, and subsequently in crusading policy, were brought about as much by events in western Europe as by the activities of the Turks in the Aegean.

During the pontificate of Clement V (1305-1314), the strong French influence over the papacy resulted in a crusade to the Holy Land and Constantinople taking precedence over a crusade against the Turks in the Aegean. This changed in the 1320s, during the pontificate of John XXII (1316-1332), when, partly in order to extricate itself from French influence, the papacy turned towards the Latin mercantile republics of the Aegean to launch a smaller-scale crusade against the Turks. This reliance on the mercantile republics meant that the papacy began to integrate more economic mechanisms into its crusading policy.

In contrast to Chapter 1, Chapters 2 and 3 focus on military action (sometimes in the form of a crusade) and commercial exchange “on the ground” in the Aegean, from the perspectives of the Genoese and the Venetians respectively. Chapter 2 focuses predominantly on the Zaccaria lords of Chios (c.1300-1329); their commercial activity in the Aegean, the ways in which they resisted the Turks, and their relationship with the Avignon popes in this regard. This involves a discussion of the various economic and spiritual privileges they received from John XXII and the success of these measures in facilitating the defence of the Aegean. Chapter 3 studies the activities of the Venetian government and merchants in the Aegean (1300-1327). It is during these years where Venetian policy changed from one of indifference towards the Turks to one of active opposition. Thus the Republic’s dealings with the Aegean powers and the papacy are discussed in detail. Especially the complex web of commercial treaties and truces formed with the Catalans of Athens and the Byzantines, who were both cited by the popes as allies of the Turks and legitimate targets for a crusade.
Chapter 4 continues with an assessment of the role of Venice in a crusade against the Turks; namely the evolution of plans for an anti-Turkish coalition (1327-1334) and the attempts of the Republic to persuade the papacy and France to participate in this expedition. It is shown that the Venetians were the prime movers behind the formation of this league. In contrast, John XXII was reluctant to follow the lead of Venice until the very last moment. The reasons for the belated response of the papacy and France towards the naval league are therefore discussed as well as the activities of the league in the Aegean. Chapter 5, focuses on the pontificate of Benedict XII (1334-1342), where there was a reduction of crusade impetus. The reasons for the pope’s apathetic Aegean policies are discussed, as well as the measures taken by the Latin states in the Aegean to preserve their possessions, without papal support. As will be seen, it is during this period, that crusade impetus shifted even further to the Latins of the East.

Chapter 6 makes up the final part of this thesis and the climax of negotiations for an anti-Turkish crusade during the Crusade of Smyrna (1343-1351). This crusade has been documented in rich detail in the sources, thus a background of events is provided. After this, a discussion of the papal, Venetian and Genoese contributions towards the crusade are undertaken. Here it is discovered that Pope Clement VI, as John XXII had done before him, granted wide-ranging spiritual and temporal privileges to crusaders in order to encourage participation, including to Venice, which had previously been refused economic concessions. Finally the reasons for the decline and end of the Crusade of Smyrna are explained, including the dire economic situation in the Aegean and the outbreak of the Black Death. The Thesis ends with a conclusion summing up the main points of the thesis and an assessment of the motivations to, and response of, the Latins and the papacy to the Aegean crusades.
Historical Background: 1291-1300

Crusading after the fall of Acre

The fall of Acre on 18 May 1291 brought to an end almost 200 years of Latin settlement in the Levant. Not surprisingly, the news of the collapse of the city re-awakened crusade fervour in western Christendom and ushered in a period of heightened enthusiasm for the recovery of the Holy Land. As will be shown, the strategies formed during these years would continue to influence crusade thinking throughout the fourteenth century.

One of the most significant developments in crusade planning after 1291 was the growth of interest in the use of economic apparatus to facilitate the recovery of the Holy Land, as propagated by a number of the crusade theorists in their *De recuperatione terrae sanctae* treatises. These proposals were not often overly new in themselves, but they nevertheless triggered some widespread changes in crusade strategy, in that existing plans, such as the apostolic embargo on trade with Muslims, and efforts to aid the kingdoms of Cyprus and Lesser Armenia, would be given more attention than before. It was assumed at this time that the naval superiority of the West and an economic blockade of Mamluk trade, which depended on the cooperation of the maritime republics, would pave the way for the liberation of the Holy Places. Therefore, in August 1291 Pope Nicholas IV urged Genoa and Venice to make peace with one another in order to prevent any trade with Egypt. This was followed by the proclamation of a total ban on all trade with Muslims, which would form the backbone of papal decrees for the rest of the Avignon period. Of the theorists, Fidenzio of Padua was amongst the first to adopt this strategy; he wrote that the Mamluks were especially vulnerable to a trade embargo because they depended on the import of war materials, such as timber and pitch from the West. Moreover,

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3 Stantchev, *Embargo*, 183; Housley, *Avignon*, 201. The origins of the trade embargo can be traced back to the Third Lateran Council of 1179. This is discussed in detail by Stantchev, *Embargo*, 26-7, 45-71. Also see Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, 17; Schein, “‘milites Christi’”, 685.
they relied on Christian imports of other goods and the tariffs levied on Christian merchants, as well as slaves to sustain their army. According to Fidenzio a fleet of no less than 30 galleys would be needed to cut off Egypt in preparation for a general crusade.\(^4\) This idea of economic warfare was henceforth adopted by many other theorists, including Charles II of Anjou and Ramon Lull.\(^5\) The immediate defence of the remaining Christian strongholds in the Levant – Cyprus and Armenia – was also actively propagated by the popes and theorists at this time. These states had assumed increased importance as it was widely believed that they could be used as stepping stone to the Holy Land. Moreover, since the loss of Acre, they had grown in commercial importance, despite being surrounded by powerful Muslim rulers and vulnerable to attack.\(^6\)

A handful of small-scale expeditions were launched at this time in an attempt to implement the strategies of the theorists. In 1293, Nicholas IV placed Manuel Zaccaria in charge of a fleet which raid the ports of Candelore (Alanya), on the southern coast of Asia Minor, and Alexandria in Egypt.\(^7\) In the same year the Templars also equipped six galleys in Venice for the defence of Cyprus.\(^8\) This was also the case in 1304 when Frederick III of Sicily, who had previously refused to spearhead a crusade to Constantinople, asked for and received papal permission to send ten ships under the command of his half-brother Sancho of Aragon to capture Byzantine islands in the Aegean, which were to be used as a base for enforcing the embargo.\(^9\) Throughout the pontificate of Clement V, the crusading strategies formulated during the last years of the thirteenth century, concerning Cyprus, Armenia and the embargo, would continue to predominate.\(^10\) Even as the Turks began to take precedence over the Mamluks, as the target of crusading aggression, this line of thinking – as is demonstrated by the work of Marino Sanudo – never really disappeared. In fact, as the menace of the Turks


\(^7\) Tedisio Doria was co-captain of the Genoese fleet, it was joined by galleys from Cyprus: J. Richard, ‘Le royaume de Chypre et l’embargo sur le commerce avec l’Égypte (fin XIII\(^{\text{e}}\)-début XIV\(^{\text{e}}\) siècle’, \textit{Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres} (1984), 120-34, at 123; Schein, \textit{Fideles}, 77-8.

\(^8\) Schein, \textit{Fideles}, 78.


\(^10\) E.g. the treatises of Fulk of Villaret and James of Molay: ch. 1, pp. 46-7.
A new enemy: the emergence of the Turks in the early fourteenth century

We have seen how crusading strategy developed in the final decade of the thirteenth century, but it must be remembered that crusade planners in Europe were largely unaware of events in the Aegean. These would eventually come to the fore as the Turks became the primary target of western crusading endeavour. This section will briefly outline the formation of the Turkish emirates in the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries.

The disintegration of Byzantine control in Asia Minor during the last decades of the thirteenth century was coupled with, and exacerbated by, a period of extreme violence and disorder for the Turkish tribes of the region. Demographic pressure from the East and the weakness of the Byzantine Asia Minor frontier drew many Turkish tribes further into western Anatolia. Before the end of the thirteenth century, this widespread political fragmentation had led to the emergence of numerous small principalities and relatively autonomous tribal domains in parts of Anatolia. These formulated into the establishment of various emirates, or beyliks, centred around the ruling house of a head Turkish chieftain. By the end of the century these emirates had occupied the Anatolian coastal regions of the Aegean – something which had not been achieved since the initial Seljuk expansion of the eleventh century. Among these was the emirate of Menteshe which by 1269, already

11 C. Kafadar, Between the Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State (Berkeley, CA, 1995), 5. The last decades of the eleventh century had signified the beginning of the Islamization of Asia Minor, where Byzantine control and military power were gradually ceded to Turkic émigrés arriving in Anatolia. For a detailed discussion of this: S. Vryonis, The Decline of Medieval Hellenism in Asia Minor and the Process of Islamization from the Eleventh through the Fifteenth Century (Los Angeles, CA, 1971), passim; C. Cahen, Pre-Ottoman Turkey: A General Survey of the Material and Spiritual Culture and History c.1071-1330, trans. J. Jones-Williams (London, 1968), 1-32, 64-72; W.L. Langer, & R.P. Blake, ‘The rise of the Ottoman Turks and its historical background’, American Historical Review 37 (1932), 477-80.

12 It is necessary to point out here that the Turkish inhabitants of Anatolia in the late thirteenth century were ethnically and linguistically different from those of the eleventh century. The inhabitants of Turchia, or Rûm, were divided into different communities of religious, linguistic and political affiliation. The Ottomans, for example, were mostly Muslim and mostly Turkish speaking (although not all as a native tongue): Kafadar, Between the Two Worlds, 4.

13 Ibid., 6.

14 For more on this: Zachariadou, TC, 105-14.
controlled the coastal region of Caria.\textsuperscript{15} By the late 1270s there is evidence of these emirates participating in trade with the Venetians of the Aegean and by the early 1300s they had began to encroach upon both Latin and Byzantine possessions in the Sea.\textsuperscript{16}

Contemporary Byzantine sources give a vivid testimony to the plight which was befalling the empire at this time. A letter from the Patriarch of Constantinople Athanasios I, dated 1299-1300, urged Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos to return to Constantinople from Thessalonica as soon as possible because of the impending threat from the Turks:

My lord emperor, if you had not been here, such terrible misfortunes would not have befallen my Christian brethren, nor would the patrimony of Christ [...] have ended up being devoured by the murderous Ishmaelites.\textsuperscript{17}

By 1302 the first references to Turkish incursions into the Aegean appear. George Pachymeres, when mentioning the resignation of patriarch John Kosmas in July 1302,\textsuperscript{18} reported that the Turks (Persians), who came from the interior of Asia Minor, had moved to the coastal regions. There they had constructed boats and forced the native inhabitants to flee. According to Pachymeres, it is with these boats that the Turks had attacked and plundered the Cyclades and proceeded to raid a number of other Aegean islands including Chios, Samos, Karpathos and Rhodes. These assaults were so severe that they deprived the islands of almost all their inhabitants and caused great suffering to those who were left on the islands and on the mainland. Even the lands of the interior were being rapidly destroyed by the Turks and every day new

\textsuperscript{16} Zachariadou, TC, 3-7.
disasters were being announced to the emperor, who was unable to deal with one tragedy after another.  

This bleak picture was corroborated by the account of the Catalan chronicler Ramon Muntaner, who when referring to the winter of 1302-3, commented that the Catalan general Roger of Flor had ordered his army and fleet to winter in Chios ‘since the Turks were in the habit of raiding all these islands with their boats’.  

The contemporary writer Marino Sanudo also commented that the Turks had bought the ‘cruellest destruction’ to the islands near the Turkish mainland, to such an extent that the whole area was devastated. The Turkish advance was so swift that by c.1305 the important Byzantine city of Ephesos on the Aegean coast had fallen to the Turks of Menteshe, possibly under the leadership of the emir’s son-in-law Sasa. It is in this political vacuum that the first instances of Latin contact with, and resistance against the Turkish emirates would be made.

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19 George Pachymeres, iv. bk. x, pp. 376-7.
20 Ramon Muntaner, 52.
22 This is the date argued by A. Failler, ‘Éphèse fut-elle prise en 1304 par les Turcs de Sasan?’, Revue des études byzantines 54 (1996), 245-8. Lemerle has given the date as 24 October 1304: Lemerle, Aydin, 20-1. For more on Sasa and the problematic dating of his reign, see Ibid., 19-24.
Part I: The Beginning of Crusades to the Aegean: 1302-1327

Chapter 1. The Role of the Papacy in the Aegean Crusades

1.1. The Focus of Crusading during the Pontificates of Benedict XI and Clement V: The Role of France and Distractions to an Aegean Crusade

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the popes and the rulers of France remained the two chief supporters of the crusading tradition. During the first half of the century the target of a crusade shifted from the Holy Land and Constantinople to the Aegean and the Turkish maritime emirates of Anatolia. This shift was brought about initially by the Franks in the Aegean, primarily the Venetians, Genoese and Hospitallers, but was later adopted and supported by the papacy and, to a lesser degree, the French Crown. However, this change was not quick in coming: despite the acknowledgment of the threat posed by the Turks in the early 1300s, it took another twenty years for indulgences and other privileges to be granted specifically to those fighting against them.

This chapter will explore the process of this change in crusade strategy and the context in which it occurred, in an effort to establish the reasons why a crusade in the Aegean against the Turks came to prominence during the mid-fourteenth century. It will focus on the following areas: i) the influence of the French Crown on papal crusading policy, especially the presence of pre-existing crusading traditions to Constantinople and Jerusalem; ii) the methods in which John XXII attempted to extricate himself from dependency on the French over crusade planning; iii) the implementation of crusade mechanisms in the Aegean, such as during the Hospitaller passagium of 1308-10 and in Achaia during the 1320s.
1.1.1. *French influence on the papacy at the turn of the fourteenth century*

The split between the French Crown and the Curia arising during the conflict between King Philip IV of France (1285-1314) and Pope Boniface VIII (1294-1303) in the 1290s, would jeopardise crusade proposals for the opening years of the fourteenth century. The dispute arose in 1296 over church taxation in France and escalated into a contest over temporal-spiritual supremacy. During this time, Boniface VIII excommunicated the French king, who in turn accused the pope of, amongst other crimes, murder, sodomy and heresy. At the time of Boniface’s death, Philip had emerged triumphant and, after defeating the Flemings and English, had asserted himself as the dominant force in international affairs. For the papacy, the scandal over the conflict with Boniface VIII, in particular the charges levelled at the pope, would mar papal prestige and ultimately compromise the independence of Benedict XI and his successor, the first of the Avignon popes, Clement V. For Philip IV, the conflict gave him the confidence to elevate his position to that of protector of both Church and pope, as well as champion of the Holy Land.

The influence which the French Crown had over the early Avignon Popes, especially Clement V, has been well documented in papal historiography. Ludwig Pastor, in his monumental work on the history of the popes, commented that:

> The essential character of that new epoch in the history of the Papacy, which begins with Clement V. and John XXII., consists in the lasting separation from the traditional home of the Holy See and from the

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Italian soil, which brought the Popes into such pernicious dependence on France and seriously endangered the universal nature of their position.  

The importance of the relationship between the papacy and French kings has also been emphasised by more recent scholars, such as Norman Housley, who stated that:

The election of Bertrand de Got as Pope [Clement V] in June 1305 was a diplomatic triumph for the French monarchy [...] for Bertrand had always had good relations with Philip IV and showed that he could be amenable to the wishes of the French King [...] Throughout Clement V’s reign the influence exercised over papal affairs by Philip and his counsellors was profound and far reaching.  

The personal crusading ambitions of the French kings were almost always associated with the Holy Land and Philip IV was no exception. The Capetian tradition of crusading which Philip inherited had been amplified by the canonisation of his grandfather Louis IX in 1297. As Joseph Strayer has shown, the involvement of the Capetian kings in the crusade had begun to form an integral part of royal propaganda and to become the rex Christianissimus Philip IV had to uphold the crusading tradition. The king expressed his interest in the Holy Land in a number of ways: he supported his brother Charles of Valois’s plans to recapture Constantinople (as a stepping stone to the eventual recovery of the Holy Land), and proposed to lead a crusade to the Holy Land in person (such as was discussed at the Council of Vienne). As will be shown, both of these had a

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9 Schein, ‘Philip IV’, 123. Charles, as a Capetian prince, also shared in his brother’s ancestral obligation to go on the crusade and was urged to pursue the deeds of his ancestors: CV, ii. nr. 1768 (March 1307).
profound effect on the crusading policies of Popes Benedict XI (1303-4) and Clement V (1305-14).

1.1.2. Franco-papal plans to recover Constantinople: the proposed crusade of Charles of Valois

The popes of the late thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries were aware of the decline of Byzantine power in Asia Minor at the hands of the emerging Anatolian Turkish emirates. However, since the pontificate of Pope Martin IV (1281-5), the Curia had shown that it was more willing to organise a crusade against the Greeks than to promote an alliance with them – a policy favoured during the pontificate of Gregory X (1271-6) and his immediate successors. Because the papal policy of aggression towards Byzantium had become firmly established by the end of the thirteenth century, in the early years of the fourteenth century the desire of the Curia to proclaim a crusade against the Byzantine empire, often with the further objective of liberating the Holy Land, took precedence over a crusade against the Turks.10

The treaty of Caltabellota ended the war in Sicily, which involved the houses of Anjou and Aragon, and marked a turning point in relations between the Byzantine empire and Latin Christendom.11 It released the competing kingdoms of Europe from the conflict in Sicily and enabled them to turn their attention towards the Byzantine empire. After the treaty of Caltabellota was agreed, Charles of Valois, who had married the titular Latin Empress of Constantinople Catherine of Courtenay in 1301,12 legitimised his claim to the Latin empire of Constantinople by renewing the Treaties of Viterbo; he could now regain an empire which was considered rightfully his by law.13 In 1303 Nicola Boccasini, who came from a poor family with no connection to the

10 Schein, Fideles, 158-60; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 43-4.
11 Laiou, Constantinople, 130.
12 The marriage took place on 28 January 1301. For a background of Charles of Valois’s claims to Constantinople, see Laiou, Constantinople, 52-4; Schein, Fideles, 159-60; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 42-4; Setton, PL, i. 164.
quarrelling factions of Rome, was elected as Pope Benedict XI. He was quick to renounce Boniface VIII’s excommunication of Philip IV, returning all privileges to him, and turned his attention towards the East in the hope that the leading powers of Europe would side with him and heed his call for a crusade. Consequently, in the early years of the fourteenth century, plans to recover Constantinople became fervently upheld in the courts of both Paris and Avignon.

Pope Benedict XI, King Philip of France and his brother Charles of Valois all recognised that Franco-papal cooperation was essential for the realisation of a successful mission to Constantinople. Without it no expedition would carry the appropriate crusade mechanisms imposed by the Holy See, such as indulgences and church tithes, or enjoy the recruitment benefits which often resulted from an association with the crusade. This was demonstrated on 20 June 1304, when Benedict XI issued two bulls concerning the proposed recovery of Constantinople to be led by Charles of Valois. These bulls gave details of the first instances of crusade mechanisms being applied to the Aegean area in the fourteenth century. The first bull, *In supreme preeminentia*, urged Bishop Guy of Senlis to make available to Charles of Valois all the legacies, redemptions of vows and other revenues which had been allocated to the kingdom of France for the aid of the Holy Land, with the exception of tithes.

The second bull, addressed to all of the Christian faithful, granted them the same indulgences for accompanying Charles as they would gain from making the passage to the Holy Land. This was a reiteration of the crusading indulgence first issued by Pope Innocent III – and more specifically by Honorius III in 1222 – which was used throughout the period of the Avignon Papacy (1309-78).

15 BXI, nr. 1006, cols. 606-7; Setton, *PL*, i. 164, n. 7. The rulers of the fourteenth century, especially the French, were no doubt aware of the extraordinary cost of crusading and the need to secure church subsidies. Louis IX’s crusade of 1248-54, for example, cost the king six times the average annual revenue of France. Of this amount, two thirds came from proceeds from the French Church: J. Richard, *Saint Louis: Crusader King of France*, trans. J. Birrell (Cambridge, 1992), 111-12. A half-yearly French royal account of 1316 demonstrates that at times almost half of the revenue of the French Crown came from church taxes: Tyerman, ‘*Sed nihil fecit*’, 172.
16 BXI, nr. 1007, col. 608 (*in eiusdem Terrae subsidium transfretarent*). This was repeated by Clement V in a bull issued in January 1306: CV, i. nr. 247, p. 45 (*transfretaretis in Terre sancte subsidium*).
17 Housley, *Avignon*, 128-9. For the implementation of the crusade indulgence in *Romania* specifically, see Chrissis, *Crusading in Romania*, 234.
The full remission of the poena which arose from sin, together with a promise of greater joy from heaven, provided that the crusader was truly repentant and had submitted to canonical confession, thus being absolved of the culpa (guilt) of his sins [...] The point was that a proper administered crusade indulgence amounted to a guarantee of the immediate admission of the crucesignatus to heaven after death.¹⁸

Furthermore Benedict XI also granted a full remission of penance, with the exception of heavenly reward, to those who were not able to travel overseas in person, but who could pay for someone else to travel at their expense.¹⁹ As shall be seen, indulgences of this magnitude were only extended to crusades specifically against the Turks during the Smyrna crusades of the 1340s.

Only seven days after issuing the preliminary crusade bulls, another letter was dispatched from the Curia to Charles of Valois stating that the proclamation of the cross and the concession of the tithe on church proceeds, which had been granted to him, were now being suspended. Although Benedict stated in the letter that the privileges and apostolic protection would be re-issued at the opportune time, namely once the situation in France had improved, it is hard to gauge how realistic his plans for a crusade were.²⁰ After all, the pope had only granted Charles the levying of lesser church proceeds in France which were extremely limited when compared to the generous tithes issued by his successor Clement V. Benedict’s attitude towards a crusade is hard to determine as he died only weeks after the original letters were written. Nevertheless, considering the precarious position of the Curia at Benedict’s accession, it would be fair to assume that the pope’s main priority lay in the restoration

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¹⁹ BXI, nr. 1007, col. 608. Again, this was repeated by Clement V in 1306: CV, i. nr. 247, p. 45. The prevailing theme in these bulls was the wish to re-establish the Latin empire of Constantinople and by doing this, to reunite the Catholic and Greek churches and save the schismatic Greeks from their erroneous ways. For further discussion on crusade aggression against Byzantium: Chrissis, *Crusading in Romania*, 17-19, 30-1.

²⁰ BXI, nr. 1008 (27 June 1304); Setton, *PL*, i. 164, n. 7.
of papal prestige and reconciliation with the French Crown. His provisional plans of a crusade to Constantinople were probably regarded as an ideal way of achieving this.\textsuperscript{21}

With specific reference to this study, the crusade bulls of Benedict XI’s pontificate are of particular significance because they demonstrate that the Curia was aware of the threat from the Turkish emirates of Anatolia to the Byzantine empire as early as the summer of 1304. Indication of this is given in the bull \textit{In supreme preeminentia} where Benedict stated that:

Certainly, zeal itself for the faith should fire the hearts of the faithful to free the empire itself from the hands of hostile sons. For if (which God forbid!) it should happen that that same empire fell to the Turks and other Saracens and infidels, by whom the said Andronikos is being continually attacked, it would not thereafter be able to be easily rescued from the hands of those same peoples. O what serious danger and huge confusion the whole Roman mother Church and the whole Christian religion would suffer if (which may God avert!) such a loss were to occur!\textsuperscript{22}

This acknowledgement of the Turkish threat is important because it suggests that the papacy was willing to sanction a crusade against the Greeks as a way of defending Christian lands in the East from the Turks.\textsuperscript{23} It seems that Benedict’s words were wholly original in their use of the Turkish threat as a justification for crusading against the Greeks. Some have argued that Benedict’s words merely repeated those of earlier popes, who had also mentioned the threat by the Turks to Byzantium during the reign of Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos. However, it is important to understand that the threat posed by the Anatolian Turks was not used by previous popes as a justification for a crusade \textit{against} the Greeks, in the way it was used by Benedict XI.\textsuperscript{24} The only

\textsuperscript{21} Schein, \textit{Fideles}, 175-7.
\textsuperscript{22} BXI, nr. 1006, col. 606.
\textsuperscript{23} Zachariadou, \textit{TC}, 7, n. 21.
\textsuperscript{24} This is mentioned by Laiou, \textit{Constantinople}, 202-3. Laiou’s words are copied and expanded by Schein, \textit{Fideles}, 177. Indeed, both authors appear to be confused in their assertion that Benedict XI was referring to the Turkish threat ‘as other popes had done during the reign of Michael VIII’. There is no mention in the relevant sources that the Turkish threat was used to justify a crusade against Byzantium.
mention of the Turkish threat by the papacy during the reign of Michael VIII was in connection with Theodore Metochites’s negotiations with Pope Gregory X (1271-6) for a joint crusade against the Anatolian Turks, and not when referring to a crusade against the Greeks.  

Eleven months after the death of Benedict XI, Bertrand of Got was elected Pope Clement V, on 5 June 1305. Clement came from a well-known Gascon family and had excellent political connections with the Curia and the kings of England and France. His association with the crusade existed before becoming pope; during his time as bishop of Albano he was dispatched by Boniface VIII to England to negotiate peace with France in an effort to facilitate a crusade to the Holy Land. Clement’s concern for the Holy Land is evident in an encyclical issued after his coronation, in which he stated that he wished to organise a crusade to rid the Holy Land of the ‘Babylonian enemy’. This attitude towards the Crusade is reflected by the dramatic increase in crusade proposals during his reign. Clement’s primary crusade objective was the recovery of Jerusalem, but for the majority of his pontificate Charles of Valois’s crusade to Constantinople took precedence, both as a crusade in its own right and as part of an expedition to the Holy Land.  

Clement was quick to reverse the decision, taken by Benedict XI in June 1304, to postpone the proclamation of Charles of Valois’s crusade to Constantinople. On 14 Jan 1306, the new pope issued a series of crusade bulls, granting indulgences, tithes and other privileges, which were elaborations of those issued by Benedict XI in 1304, with one, addressed to Bishop Guy of Senlis, being almost an exact copy of Benedict’s bull *In supreme preeminentia*. Yet despite these similarities, Clement’s initial crusade preparations seem to suggest that he was more serious about launching a crusade than

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25 In 1276 Metochites, on the orders of Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, had suggested to Gregory X that a crusade could take the landward route through Asia Minor and rid the region of Turkish occupation before marching to the Holy Land, as the First Crusade had done. The pope was apparently enthusiastic about the idea, but his death, at a time when the negotiations were still at the provisional stage meant that nothing came of this plan: V. Laurent, ‘Grégoire X (1271-1276) et le projet d’une ligue antiturque’, *Echos d’Orient* 37 (1938), 257-73; Geanakoplos, *Michael Palaeologus*, 286-90; Chrissis, *Romania*, 214, n. 162.

26 For Bertrand’s early ecclesiastical career, see Menache, *Clement V*, 6-13.


29 CV, i. nr. 243 (14 Jan 1306).
his predecessor. One indication of this can be found in the extent of the tithes which Clement granted for the proposed crusade to Constantinople. Unlike Benedict, who had specifically excluded church tithes from those revenues conceded to Charles of Valois, and had limited the concession to France, the financial grants made by Clement were far more generous. The registers stipulate that in the kingdoms of France, Naples and Sicily a two-year tithe on all ecclesiastical incomes was to be collected for the crusade to Constantinople, with the exception of the Hospitalers and Templars who were exempted in each case.

Clement also went to great efforts to encourage fuller participation in the crusade from those Mediterranean states whose assistance was deemed most important for the project to succeed. He stated that Frederick of Sicily and Philip of Taranto, the younger brother of King Robert of Naples, could receive the proceeds from tithes collected in Sicily and Naples respectively if they accompanied Charles on crusade. He also dispatched letters to the doges of Venice and Genoa encouraging them to provide maritime assistance for the forthcoming expedition. The letters had some success as, on 19 December 1306, Venice concluded a treaty with Charles, which stipulated that the crusader fleet was to depart from Brindisi between March 1307 and March 1308.

In the letters of 1306 Clement V clearly expressed his anguish at the activities of the schismatic Greek Church and he called for many barons and counts to join Charles ‘fervently and powerfully’ in the recovery of Constantinople. It is clear that the overwhelming stimulus for the mission, as was indicated in Benedict XI’s letters, was the unification of the Churches and the recovery of Constantinople. The justification of seizing Byzantine lands to defend them from Turkish attacks was also apparent, although this was copied word-for-word from a previous letter of Benedict XI. Anti-Turkish motivations were also cited in another bull, that written to the doge of Venice...

30 For an assessment of Clement’s relationship with the French Crown in regard to crusade finance, see Menache, Clement V, 91-7.
31 CV, i. nr. 244 (Sicily), nr. 245 (France), nr. 246 (Naples). These letters are discussed in detail by Setton, PL, i. 165. See below, 40.
32 CV, i. nr. 244, 246.
33 CV, i. nr. 248 (14 January 1306).
34 DVL, i. nr. 27; Laiou, Constantinople, 206; Setton, PL, i. 166-7.
35 CV, i. nr. 248, p. 46.
36 CV, i. nr. 243, p. 40, copied from: BXI, nr. 1006, col. 606.
granting the Republic indulgences if they were to join the crusade. In the letter Clement V suggested that by conquering Constantinople the crusaders would cause the ‘souls of the Parthians or the Turks’ neighbouring the empire to be broken and that ‘trembling Arabs’ would flee from the appearance of the Christian armies. However, the overall rhetoric of the letter places far more emphasis on correcting the errors of the Greeks, than defending the East from Turkish aggression.\(^{37}\)

Interestingly, Angeliki Laiou has shown that the equivalent letter sent by Clement V to Genoa, which urged the Commune to join Charles of Valois’s expedition, made far more of the Turkish threat to the Byzantine empire than that sent to Venice. According to Laiou, the letter to Genoa made the threat of the Turks to the empire the primary justification for the mission. She has rightly attributed this to the ‘special position of the Genoese in the Byzantine empire’ at that time. The Commune had vested interests in Byzantium and was a rare Latin ally of Andronikos II, thus, it had far more to lose from the recapture of Constantinople, than Venice, which was openly hostile to the empire. As Laiou has shown, Clement V therefore ‘very intelligently insisted on the one thing that the Genoese feared above all, the possible Turkish domination of the East’.\(^{38}\)

On 3 June 1307, Clement V further advanced the crusade to Constantinople by issuing a bull of excommunication against ‘the supporter of the ancient schism’ Emperor Andronikos II Palaiologos and his allies.\(^{39}\) In the months preceding the excommunication, the pope extended the preaching of the crusade from Southern Italy, Sicily, the Veneto, the March of Ancona and the diocese of Città di Castello to include Romagna and Ravenna.\(^{40}\) In addition to this, Philip of Taranto was granted a two year tithe on all ecclesiastical proceeds in the principality of Achaia, in *Romania*

\(^{37}\) CV, i, nr. 248, p. 46; Setton, PL, i. 165; Laiou, *Constantinople*, 204-5.

\(^{38}\) Laiou, *Constantinople*, 205. I have checked the manuscript of the papal letter sent to Venice in 1306, the scribal note at the end of the manuscript states that the letter was *eodum modo scribitur potestati, abbati, consilio et comuni Ianuensi*: RV, reg. 52, f. 43v. However, as Laiou has shown, this is incorrect as the letter sent to Genoa contained certain differences regarding the Turks: Laiou, *Constantinople*, 204, n. 18. Unfortunately, I have been unable to consult the original manuscript of the letter sent to Genoa which Laiou uses (Paris, archive Nationale, J509, nr. 16). Therefore, my comments regarding this letter are reiterations of those made by Laiou.


\(^{40}\) CV, ii. nr. 1768 (10 March 1307).
and other lands, for the recovery of occupied Angevin lands from the Greeks. The excommunication was supplemented on the same day by a re-imposition of the tithe in Sicily which had been initially postponed. Once again, Frederick of Sicily was allowed to keep the proceeds of the tithe, if he decided to accompany Charles of Valois on crusade. Furthermore, Charles was granted financial aid by his brother King Philip IV who conceded the French tithe to him because the ‘business of the aforesaid empire’ needed to be accelerated. Clement rewarded Philip for his generosity with an additional tithe for one year.

By the beginning of 1308 the project had, in theory, the support of the major Latin powers of the Mediterranean, with the exception of Genoa. At the same time the search for suitable allies in the East had also begun in earnest, and it is in the dealings between Charles of Valois and the Christians in the East that more information can be gleaned about the role of the Anatolian Turks in providing a motivation for this crusade. One such ally for the crusade was the Catalan Grand Company who had been fighting the Byzantines with notable success since May 1305. The Company had originally been employed as mercenaries to fight the Turks in Anatolia by the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II, but had turned against their employers after disputes over payment. Charles, after being informed of this turn of events, no doubt identified the Catalans as a potential means of conquering Constantinople inexpensively and quickly. Accordingly, in 1307 Theobald of Cepoy, acting as Charles’s ambassador, was dispatched to the Aegean to negotiate an alliance with the leader of the Catalans, Berengar of Rocafort. In the summer of the same year Ramon Muntaner, one of the leaders of the Catalan expedition, reported that Berengar ‘swore alliance to Sir Charles

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41 CV, ii. nr. 1604-5, p. 17 (15 May 1307); Setton, PL, i. 165, n. 9. For a background of Philip’s claim to Achaea and the Morea, see P. Topping, ‘The Morea, 1311-1364’, HC (Madison, WI, 1975), iii. 104-40, at 104-7.
42 CV, ii. nr. 1755 (3 June 1307); Setton, PL, i. 165, n. 8.
43 CV, ii. nr. 1758, p. 55 (3 June 1307).
44 Berengar of Entença wrote to Venice in May 1305 informing them that the Catalans were at war with the Byzantine empire on account of the assassination of their leader Roger of Flor. For background information on the Catalan Company’s dealings with the Byzantines and the subsequent conflict, see Ramon Muntaner, 21-80; Setton, Domination, 1-5; R.I. Burns, ‘The Catalan Company and the European powers, 1305-1311’, Speculum 29 (1954), 751-71, at 753-4.
45 Laiou, Constantinople, 208; Burns, ‘Catalan Company’, 755.
46 Ramon Muntaner, 130-1.
and made the entire Company do the same’. 47 Robert Burns has even claimed that the Catalans ‘counted in their number elements of a genuine crusade’. 48 Indeed, according to Ramon Muntaner they flew the banner of the Holy Apostolic Father ‘in the name of God and the Holy Catholic faith […] against the emperor and his soldiers, who were schismatics’. 49

However, as Muntaner explains, the Catalans took little notice of Charles of Valois as their new overlord and, more importantly, received no papal sanction for their actions. 50 In fact, it would be difficult to argue that the Catalans were motivated by a desire to fight the enemies of the Church. Muntaner’s account hints at both anti-Greek and anti-Muslim sentiments within the Company, but does little to counterbalance his admission that the Catalans began their eastern expedition under the employment of the Greeks and later allied with the Turks. Furthermore, Muntaner does not disguise the fact that after the Catalans had allied themselves with the Turks, they conquered the Latin duchy of Athens, killing its Catholic ruler, for which they were later excommunicated. 51

As well as the Catalans, Charles of Valois also sought the support of non-Catholic powers in the Aegean area and the Balkans. In 1307, there is evidence to suggest that he also opened negotiations with Greek conspirators unhappy with the rule of Emperor Andronikos II. 52 It is interesting to note that some of the Greeks involved – notably John Monomachos, Constantine Limpidaris and the monk Sophronias (who were all from Asia Minor) 53 – appear to have been motivated by the need for a powerful outside ruler to defend the empire against the Turks. In particular,

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47 Ramon Muntaner, 133-4. This is corroborated by a document of 31 August 1307 in which the Catalans refer to Charles as their emperor: DOC, nr. 34, p. 42. For more on the Franco-Catalan treaty: Laiou, Constantinople, 208-9; Burns, ‘Catalan Company’, 754.
50 Ramon Muntaner, 134.
51 ibid., 46, 103.
53 For more on the identity of the collaborators: Laiou, Constantinople, 213-6.
Sophronias lamented the invasions of the Turks and the destruction of the cities of Asia Minor;\textsuperscript{54} Limpidaris wrote that many Christians of Asia Minor would defect to the Turks and convert to Islam unless help was forthcoming;\textsuperscript{55} and Monomachos stated that Anatolia was being ‘ravaged by the pagans and by other enemies’ which put the rest of the empire in danger of being lost.\textsuperscript{56} This concern is understandable considering the inability of the Byzantine government to provide for the defence of the eastern regions of the empire. Moreover, the regions under Turkish attack – in Asia Minor – were those native to the conspirators.

For his part, Charles was no doubt aware of his position as a possible saviour of the Eastern empire and he may well have used this as a bargaining chip to gain Greek support for his planned crusade. This would certainly fit into the pattern of justifying the crusade as a means of defending eastern lands from Turkish attacks, as had at times been expressed in the crusade bulls issued by Benedict XI and Clement V. However, determining the exact level of anti-Turkish motivation in the negotiations with the Greek conspirators is hard to establish as the sources only give evidence for the Greek side of the negotiations. Charles was certainly aware of the potential of using the Turkish threat for a motivation for his crusade, but it can only be speculated as to what extent he did this. Certainly, in regard to negotiation with his Latin counterparts, the Turks usually only played a minor role in justifying the mission. This is the case in the documents concerning the confirmation of the Valois-Venetian alliance, which make no further reference to the Turkish threat as a justification for the crusade.\textsuperscript{57} In the end, the exact outcomes of Charles’s negotiations with the Greek conspirators remain obscure and it seems that they ultimately came to nothing.

Despite the stepping up of crusade efforts in the spring and summer of 1307, and negotiations with foreign parties, the approaching deadline in the alliance between Charles of Valois and Venice, which stipulated that a crusade should not depart after March 1308, was never met. In the end, the proposed expedition did not materialise, despite the best efforts of the pope. This was in part due to the death of Charles of Valois’s wife Catherine of Courtenay in October 1307, which resulted in his claim to the

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 215-6; Moranvillé, ‘Les projets de Charles de Valois’, 85-7 (doc. 3).
\textsuperscript{55} Laiou, Constantinople, 217.
\textsuperscript{56} Laiou, Constantinople, 217, text at Appendix II, p. 342.
\textsuperscript{57} DVL, i. nr. 27, 41-3.
Latin empire being transferred to his daughter Catherine of Valois, but also in part due to the escalating conflict in Flanders. This prevented much of the French nobility from leaving the kingdom on crusade and restricted Charles’s access to the tithes he had previously been granted by his brother in France. As shown earlier, at times Charles of Valois’s planned crusade to Constantinople was linked to the defence of the East from Turkish attack, but this only seemed to form a subsidiary motivation. It probably played more of a role in negotiations with those in the East than between Charles and the papacy, who were mostly concerned with rectifying the errors of the Greek Church and fulfilling dynastic ambitions.

1.1.3. Franco-papal plans to recover the Holy Land: the Council of Vienne

The last great crusade initiative of Clement V’s pontificate – the Council of Vienne – marked a confirmation of French influence over crusade negotiation. The rulers of western Europe were invited to attend the Council, along with the ecclesiastical hierarchy of Christendom, but only Philip IV of France attended in person. This reflected the mood of the whole Council, where Franco-papal negotiations dominated affairs. For Philip IV, the papal adoption of the suppression of the Templars, which had been undertaken in France since 1307, was an integral prerequisite to the launching of a crusade to the Holy Land. In a sense, the king used the Templar affair as a bargaining chip at Vienne; he would participate in a forthcoming crusade, but only once the suppression of the Order had been ratified by the pope. Thus Philip IV’s promise to take the cross was only made after the bull *Vox in excelso*, which promulgated the suppression of the Temple, had been issued. On 3 April 1312 the pope issued the bull

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58 Schein, *Fideles*, 186.
59 Charles was no longer permitted by King Philip IV to levy tithes in France, as they were needed in case the situation in Flanders erupted into all-out war: Laiou, *Constantinople*, 234. Also see Marino Sanudo, ‘Hopf’s so-called “Fragmentum”’, 153.
60 CV, iii. nr. 3626. The Council began on 16 October 1311. During the second session, January 1312, the fathers of the Council began discussing the Holy Land: N.P. Tanner, *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils: Nicaea I to Vatican II*, 2 vols (London, 1990), i. 333. Also see Menache, *Clement V*, 279-305.
Redemptor noster to levy a six-year tenth on the entire Catholic Church for a forthcoming passagium generale to the Holy Land. This was to be led by Philip IV and was to depart no later than March 1319. The correspondence concerning this crusade reflected the influence of the French Crown on the proceedings of the Council and no reference to the Turkish presence in the Aegean was made.

However, Clement’s attention was not only focussed on the Holy Land. On the 30 April the proceeds of the Vienne tenth were extended to include Philip of Taranto’s defence of the principality of Achaia from the Greeks. In December of the same year Clement had revived Valois plans to recover Constantinople by authorising a marriage between Philip of Taranto and Catherine, the daughter of Charles of Valois. A bull issued to Philip on 7 May 1312 stated that Philip would travel overseas with 2,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry to areas of Romania against the schismatic Greeks residing there. Moreover, all who accompanied Philip to fight against the schismatics would receive the same indulgences as those going in aid of the Holy Land. Thus Clement’s policy at Vienne, mirrored that of the earlier years of his pontificate: the support of an expedition to recover Constantinople, as a passagium particulare paving the way for a general French-led expedition to the Holy Land. Clement took further measures to protect Philip’s lands in the build up to his passagium by threatening the Catalans of Athens with excommunication if they did not cease to harass him.

against Boniface VIII were also used by Philip IV to urge the pope to suppress the Templars at Vienne: Mollat, Popes, 236-49.

63 Tanner, Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, i. 334, n. 18; Housley, Avignon, 14-15; Menache, Clement V, 93-6; Schein, Fideles, 242. For details on the fate of the Vienne Tenth see Housley, Avignon, 190, 189-94.

64 CV, vii-viii. nr. 8781-3, 8964, 8986-7.

65 CV, vii-viii. nr. 7759-65, 8863-8, 8913-6. The aim of the Vienne tenth was extended in 1314 from ‘in aid of the Holy Land’ to include ‘aid for the Holy Land, or elsewhere against the unfaithful or the enemies of the Catholic faith’: Housley, Italian Crusades, 104; Menache, Clement V, 93-6.

66 CV, viii. nr. 8897-8. The marriage took place at Fontainebleau on July 29, 1313. The dispensation of marriage was issued on 19 May 1313: CV, viii. nr. 9276. Catherine’s engagement to Hugh of Burgundy in 1307 was called off on the grounds that he was not a strong enough candidate for the recovery of the Latin empire: CV, ii. nr. 1766-7. For Charles Valois’s role behind the marriage, see Topping, ‘Morea’, 108-10; Muldoon, ‘Vatican Register 62’, 158-9.

67 CV, vii. nr. 7893.


69 The Hospitallers were called on by the pope to help expel the Catalans from Athens, but they ignored this request so as to not jeopardise the special relationship they had forged with the Catalans through their joint efforts in the re-conquest of Spain: CV, vii. 7890-1; Setton, Domination, 23; Setton, ‘Catalans’, 181-2; Topping, ‘Morea’, 108; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers of Catalunya’, 156.
The crusading zeal shown by the French crown was not, however, shared by everyone. Paulino Veneto, when commenting on the Council, remarked that nothing followed the passage, except for a ‘great scandal of the Christian people’. This view was shared by the anonymous author of the *Vita Edwardi Secundi* who wrote that:

It escapes my memory how Clement’s rule has profited the Church: he gathered men at Vienne and granted indulgences for the Holy Land, collected a vast amount of money, but it has not profited the Holy Land at all. He has granted tenths to kings and plundered the churches of the poor, it would be better for rectors to not have a pope than be subjected to so many daily exactions. Among all the provinces, England alone feels the burden.

Although this accusation is overly harsh on Clement V, it is clear that many prelates, especially those from England, found the pope’s taxation oppressive. Moreover, comments such as these may reflect general dissatisfaction over the protracted, expensive, and ultimately fruitless negotiations with the French over a grand crusade to the Holy Land. In the end Clement V was unable to launch a *passagium generale* or even a *passagium particulare* to the Aegean or the Holy Land, despite having finally managed to gain active crusade participation from the most powerful ruler in Europe – in the following months the plans for a crusade fell apart, after the deaths of Clement V (20 April 1314) and King Philip of France (29 November 1314).

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70 Paulino Veneto, ‘Clement V Quinta Vita’, *VPA*, i. 80-106, at 82.
73 Schein, *Fideles*, 256.
1.1.4. The first Aegean crusade: the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes

Plans for a crusade to Constantinople and the Holy Land were the principal areas of Franco-papal crusade negotiation during the pontificate of Clement V. As noted before, even these plans were at times blended with wider Latin operations in Frankish Greece and the Aegean, such as the defence of Achaia from the Greeks or the defence of Asia Minor from Turkish expansion. This diversion of impetus from the two principal areas of crusading is even more starkly represented in the Hospitaller seizure of Rhodes, in particular the *passagium* to the Aegean in 1310. This mission constituted the first papal-supported expedition to the East and also an anomaly in Clement V’s pontificate. It signified a crusade that was organised with limited influence from the French, but was ultimately carried out without much control from the papacy either.

The origins of the expedition, at least from a papal perspective, were disconnected from the Aegean. In fact, by the beginning of 1306 the issue of providing defence for the kingdoms of Cyprus and Lesser Armenia, had come to prominence in the Curia. Clement V requested that the masters of the military orders meet with him at Poitiers to advise him on the most effective way of liberating the Holy Land, which, in turn could also provide a way of aiding Armenia and Cyprus. It is in this regard that, on 6 June 1306, Clement V wrote to the masters of the two military orders, Fulk of Villaret of the Hospital and James of Molay of the Temple. The tracts written in response to this request were quite different: James of Molay advocated a full-scale *passagium generale* to Egypt or Syria; while Fulk of Villaret suggested a more realistic

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74 The island was an ideal base for the Hospitallers for a number of reasons. It was positioned well enough for intervention in three of the principal areas of crusading in the East at this time: the reconquest of Constantinople, the defence of Armenia and Cyprus, and even the recovery of the Holy Land. The island was also comparatively large and fertile and was situated off the coast nearest to the emirate of Menteshe – the most aggressive of the emirates in the early fourteenth century. It was thus ideally suited to fighting the Turks as well as policing shipping in the region: Housley, *Avignon*, 11. Also see the description of Rhodes by Ludolph of Sudheim, *Description of the Holy Land, and of the Way Thither*, trans. A. Stewart, PPTS 12 (London, 1895), 34. For more information on the initial missions to the island, see Ch. 2, pp. 78-9.


76 They were to meet on 1 November 1306: CV, i. nr. 1033 (6 June 1306); A.T. Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers and the papacy, 1305-1314’, *Forschungen zur Reichs-, Papst-, und Landesgeschichte: Peter Herde zum 65. Geburtstag*, ed. K. Borchardt & E. Bunz, 2 vols (Stuttgart, 1998), ii. 595-622, at 599-602 (reprinted in LVR5, item V).

smaller-scale expedition, or passagium particulare, which would enforce the embargo on Mamluk trade and harass the coasts of Egypt and Syria in preparation for a later passagium generale. In the end, Fulk of Villaret was unable to attend the meeting with the pope in 1306 because he was engaged in his mission to Rhodes. Nevertheless, the master arrived in France the following year where he was apparently well received by the pope. On 5 September 1307 Clement V granted the Hospitallers the island of Rhodes in perpetuum.

The objectives of the passagium being discussed by Villaret and the pope are unclear at this point. The Hospitaller expedition to Rhodes in 1306 and the arrest of the Templars in 1307 certainly would have made any possible intervention in Armenia seem unlikely, especially considering that neither master had provided much advice on the aid of Cyprus and Armenia in the treatises of 1306. Moreover, as neither master had proposed a crusade in conjunction with French attempts to recover Constantinople – which in either case was beginning to founder by 1307 – it is possible that a limited expedition to the Aegean was beginning to emerge as the most likely outcome of the negotiations. Clement V may have even viewed a Hospital passagium as a means of launching a semi-independent, minor crusade, without interference from the French Crown. Indeed, in either 1307 or 1308, Villaret submitted a redrafted proposal to the

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79 William of Nangis, i. 359.
80 They met at Poitiers on 31 August 1307.
81 CV, ii. nr. 2148 (5 September 1307); Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers and Papacy’, 602. As a reward for the success of the expedition, Clement also renewed the privileges of the Hospital in a series of registers issued on 21 Dec 1307: CV, iii. nr. 2351-2, 2371, 2387, 2614. These were followed by more renewals and protections: Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers and the papacy’, 603, n. 36.
82 The arrests of members of the Knights Templar began on 13 October 1307: Barber, Templars, 46.
83 In 1305-6 Clement V also looked to the other rulers of Europe for a crusade to the East, including Edward I of England, Albert I of Germany and James II of Aragon. However, the unexpected deaths of Edward in 1307, and Albert in 1308, coupled with James’s reluctance to crusade outside of Iberia, meant that Clement had to rely on initiatives from the French, the military orders, or from those Christians resident in the East: Schein, Fideles, 187-99.
84 Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers and the papacy’, 599.
pope which emphasised that the recovery of Jerusalem could be achieved without the participation of a western monarch.\textsuperscript{85}

The reaction of the rulers of Europe to the Hospitaller \textit{passagium} also suggest that it may have been intended by Villaret and the pope as primarily a papal-Hospitaller enterprise with minimal outside interference. This seems to have been why Philip IV of France, who had initially promised to support the expedition with a payment of 100,000 gold florins,\textsuperscript{86} later withdrew his support.\textsuperscript{87} The inability of rulers to tie the Hospitaller campaign to their own objectives may also provide a reason for why James II of Aragon opposed the Hospitaller campaign. He correctly assumed that it would only be used to consolidate the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes and was wary of any expedition that might divert valuable Hospitaller revenues and men from the ongoing conflict with the Moors in Iberia.\textsuperscript{88} According to the king, the island was too far from Egypt to be used as an effective base against the Mamluk Sultan and, moreover, it did not lie on the sailing routes to Alexandria.\textsuperscript{89}

Eventually, in the summer of 1308, it was decided that an expedition of 1,000 knights, 4,000 infantry and 40 galleys should depart from Brindisi on 24 June 1309. Papal letters stated that it was intended as a preliminary \textit{passagium} for the defence of Cyprus and Armenia, to be followed at a later date by a general crusade to the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{90} Papal support for the expedition was indicated by the appointment of a special

\textsuperscript{85} Kedar & Schein, ‘Un projet de “passage particuliare”’, 224.
\textsuperscript{87} Philip IV complained that Fulk of Villaret had not recruited enough men from France and even suggested than an Englishman, Robert Fitzpayn, should replace Villaret as leader of the crusade: A.J. Forey, ‘The military orders in the crusading proposals of the late-thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries’, \textit{Traditio} 36 (1980), 317-45 at 342; Schein, ‘Philip IV’, 123.
\textsuperscript{89} \textit{En aquesta conquest de Rodes e de les illes e aguardar, que null hom no navegaria de les parts Dolxandria}. \textit{AA}, iii. nr. 91, p. 198 (17 March 1309). Also see Housley, ‘Clement V’, 33; Schein, \textit{Fideles}, 228.
\textsuperscript{90} \textit{CGH}, iv. nr. 4807; CV, iii. nr. 2986-90, 2994-7, 3010, 3218-19, 3219. Also see \textit{AA}, iii. no. 88, p. 191 (8 January 1309); CV, iii. nr. 3218-9 (20 September 1308); A.T. Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers at Rhodes: 1306-1421’, \textit{HC}, iii. 278-313, at 285 (reprinted in \textit{LVR1}, item I); Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers and the papacy’, 603;
legate, Pierre of Pleine Chassagne, bishop of Rodez. In addition to these measures, Clement V proclaimed a total embargo on trade with Mamluk Egypt. The passagium eventually departed from Brindisi in early 1310. The latter stages of the crusade are obscure, but the enterprise ended up consolidating the Hospitaler possession of Rhodes without ever coming close to recovering the Holy Land or providing aid for Cyprus and Armenia. Clement V may well have felt that the passagium never fulfilled its intended objectives, but as has been noted, these are extremely hard to identify. It is also hard to determine exactly what role Fulk of Villaret played in the diversion of the passagium; considering the plight of the Templars at this time, it seems plausible that he may have deliberately misled the pope in order to gain support for his enterprise and ensure the survival of the Order.

Although the passagium was almost certainly not envisaged by Clement as a means of defending the Latins of the Aegean from Turkish attack, some evidence of anti-Turkish motivations in the sources do exist. For example, the accounts of Bernard of Gui and Amalric Auger both stated that the island was inhabited by the ‘impious Turks’ who were dwelling there under the rule of the emperor of Constantinople. Furthermore, Bernard of Gui also claimed that ‘from that time, the island of Rhodes and other surrounding islands were brought back under the power and rule of the Christians, with the Turks utterly subjugated. Furthermore, there were many harbours in that place and from there lies open a suitable passage for Christians to the Holy Land’. The papal document confirming the possession of Rhodes in 1307 also made

Menache, *Clement V*, 105-6. In 1309 more letters were dispatched from the Curia concerning its organisation: CV, iv. nr. 3752, 3825, 4392, 4410-11, 4496, 4769, 4986; Schein, *Fideles*, 225-6, n. 17.

Pierre regarded the expedition as a success and was appointed as patriarch of Jerusalem for his services in 1314: Menache, *Clement V*, 110, n. 56.


The references to the Turks during the Hospitaller conquest of Rhodes highlight the increasing threat which the Turks posed to the islands of the eastern Aegean by 1307. The vulnerability of Rhodes was certainly recognised by Fulk of Villaret who had tried unsuccessfully to negotiate a treaty with Andronikos II which would allow the Hospitallers to hold Rhodes as his subjects on condition that they defend the island from Turkish attack.99

Whether the Hospitallers engaged in any effective action against the Turkish emirates in the early years of their occupation of Rhodes is hard to determine. The gestes des Chiprois reported that some of the Turkish emirates had been forced to pay the Hospitallers tribute, after the Order had reduced areas of the Anatolian mainland to obedience.100 It is also possible that the Order held various castles on the Anatolian coast, although this remains unclear.101 However, as Elizabeth Zachariadou has pointed out, the relations between the Hospitallers of Rhodes and the neighbouring Turkish emirates were, on the whole, friendly and peaceful in these early years.102 It is likely that the newly established order on Rhodes was wary of antagonising its neighbours in the Aegean. Indeed, the need for security and the financial constraints imposed by the subjugation of Rhodes seem to have led the Hospitallers to adopt a policy of cooperation in regard to the neighbouring emirates, which seems to have involved the

97 CV, ii. nr. 2148, p. 134.
99 George Pachymeres, iv. bk. xiii. pp. 698-701; Luttrell, Town of Rhodes, 198; Zachariadou, TC, 10; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 83.
100 ont sousmis de lor obedianss e pluyzours leus de la Turquie quy dounerent truage: ‘Les gestes des Chiprois’, RHC Ar, ii. 651-872, at 865.
102 Zachariadou, TC, 11.
conclusion of some trade agreements.\textsuperscript{103} In fact, in 1311 it is reported that 250 merchants from Rhodes were visiting the ports of Menteshe to purchase provisions and animals.\textsuperscript{104} The Hospitallers may even have acquired some territories on the Anatolian mainland through their alliance with the emir of Menteshe.\textsuperscript{105}

Certain rulers of Europe may not have been enthusiastic about the Hospitaller passagium, but the popular response was certainly favourable. The so-called “Crusade of the Poor” of 1309 – the most significant outbreak of popular enthusiasm during Clement V’s pontificate – was, according to contemporaries, partly a reaction to the Hospitaller expedition. It is likely that the Clement V’s proclamation of the preliminary Hospitaller passagium in 1308-10, combined with the issuing of indulgences at that time, led to the misinterpretation of the expedition as being one general crusade.\textsuperscript{106} This resulted in thousands of ‘simple folk’ from England, Picardy, Flanders, Brabant, and Germany taking the cross and marching on Rome.\textsuperscript{107} Even though the destination of the expedition was still unknown at this stage, the Chronicon Elwacense and the Annals of Ghent both suggested that the participants wished to liberate the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{108} As the destination of the expedition remained unclear, it is also possible that some of the participants, who were well informed of Hospitaller activities, may have considered that the mission would travel to Rhodes. As has been shown, James of Aragon predicted that the passagium would be used to secure Rhodes and certain members of the Venetian Senate also believed that the mission was destined for the Aegean.\textsuperscript{109} In addition to this, the contemporary chronicler Ptolemy of Lucca wrote that the Hospitallers were going to capture the island of Rhodes and made no

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid., 11.
\textsuperscript{104} CV, vii. nr. 7631.
\textsuperscript{105} Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 754. It is difficult to determine the exact identity of which Turks the Hospitallers were dealing with at this time. They may have been under the command of Sasa, of the son-in-law of the emir of Menteshe, who was using the alliance to fight against his father: Luttrell, ‘Prospectives, problems, possibilities’, 250, n. 27; Luttrell, ‘Hospitaliers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 83-6.
\textsuperscript{106} The indulgences were issued on 11 August 1308: CV, ii. nr. 2989-90. It is also likely that, as Cohn suggests, a severe famine in Picardy, the Low Countries and the lower Rhine helped trigger the rising: N.C.C. Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium: Revolutionary Millennials and Mystical Anarchists of the Middle Ages (London, 1970), 102. Also see M. Barber, ‘The pastoureaux of 1320’, JEH 32 (1981), 143-66, at 158.
\textsuperscript{107} Annals of Ghent, ed. & trans. H. Johnstone (London, 1951), 97. Also see Housley, Avignon, 144-5.
\textsuperscript{109} TD, i. nr. 192-3, 195, 200-1.
reference to Jerusalem as the target of the crusade. The author of the *Annales Paulini* also specified that the pope granted indulgences for the aid of Cyprus and Armenia. Furthermore, the attraction of resistance against either the Greeks or Turks was regarded as a sufficient motivating factor by Fulk of Villaret, who, in 1313, wrote an appeal to Latin colonists from the West to help defend Rhodes from schismatic Greek and impious Turks. These indicate that the Hospitaller crusade may have still attracted a large response, even if it was known by some that it was not destined for Jerusalem.

The lack of clarity surrounding the target of the Hospitaller *passagium* makes it impossible to say whether the Crusade of the Poor represented a popular response to crusades in the Aegean or not. Nevertheless, the episode still proved that a crusade and the granting of indulgences which went with it could inspire a dramatic expression of zeal amongst the populace. Various chroniclers from France, England and Germany all commented on the great and generous indulgences issued by Clement V to the crusaders who would go in aid of the Holy Land (and in some instances Cyprus and Armenia). This is corroborated by the *Annales Paulini* which suggested that the pope conceded ‘indulgences of faults and penalties such as have not been heard of in this generation’. Indeed, some of the indulgences issued by Clement V in 1308 for the Hospitaller *passagium* were generous. To raise funds for the crusade, the pope decreed that those who donated a sum of money for the expedition could gain an indulgence: the full crusade indulgence for those who paid the full cost of partaking in the crusade to Jerusalem or a lesser indulgence for those who contributed smaller

110 Ptolemy of Lucca, ‘Historia Ecclesiastica’, *RIS* 11 (Milan, 1727), cols. 740-1242, at col. 1232. The Hospitallers were apparently unwilling to receive the pilgrims because they already had sufficient men. Clement V dismissed these ‘crusaders’ from Rome and issued each pilgrim with a hundred year indulgence. He claimed that they were unable to participate because of a lack of vessels: CV, iv. nr. 4400; Schein, *Fideles*, 237.
112 Luttrell, ‘Feudal tenure’, 757-9; the document is printed at 771-3. According to this document, the Hospitallers had captured a number of castles on the Turkish mainland.
sums of money. Contemporaries were certainly impressed by the amounts of money raised for the campaign, and although the intention of the pope was to keep the number of volunteers low whilst at the same time raising sufficient funds for the *passagium*, the indulgences still seem to have the undesired effect of triggering an outburst of popular enthusiasm. The actual crusade indulgence itself, as issued by Clement V, remained no more liberal than those issued in the past, but the common understanding of the indulgence was that it formed a complete quittance of former sins, and it is possible in this instance that the chroniclers were merely commenting on the supreme value of the crusader indulgence, rather than making any educated comment on the particular form granted by the pope.

The reaction given by contemporary chroniclers to the Crusade of the Poor is a mixed one. Many reflect ecclesiastical disapproval and condemn the ill-discipline of the army, such as the anonymous author of the *Annales et Notae Colbazienses*, who commented that the army was like a headless tribe running through the world. In contrast to this, Ptolemy of Lucca, reported that the Hospitaller fleet was destroyed by a disastrous storm after leaving Italy, which the author claimed was an act of divine vengeance for the mistreatment of the common crusaders by the papacy and the Hospitallers. The whole episode clearly contrasts with the view, held by some, that Europe experienced a fall in crusading zeal during the late medieval period.

Therefore, it is evident that Clement V’s pontificate marked the domination of the French over crusade policy, as seen by the papal support of plans to recover Constantinople and the Holy Land, even though the Turks did feature as a subsidiary motivation for these enterprises at times. The Hospitaller *passagium* was, in contrast, to be discussed in detail by Housley, *Avignon*, 135-9; Menache, *Clement V*, 107-9. Redemption of crusade vows for money, or the making of donations in return for partial indulgences had been a feature since the pontificate of Innocent III, see C. Maier, *Preaching the Crusades: Mendicant Friars and the Cross in the Thirteenth Century* (Cambridge, 1994), 123-60, esp. 123, 135-6, 145-6.


119 Ptolemy of Lucca, col. 1232.

the first and only expedition to travel to the Aegean, but, as noted earlier, it did this almost independently of papal control. The papal registers for the last years of Clement’s pontificate reflect the Curia’s contrasting priorities: on the one hand they describe the plight of the Holy Land and the need to necessitate its liberation ‘from the hands of the Agarenes’, \(^{121}\) on the other hand they report the reality which faced the Latin states in the Aegean, who were ‘labouring to oppose the schismatic Greeks’. \(^{122}\) In both cases, however, they ignored the far more pressing need to protect these lands against the emerging Turkish maritime emirates which would come to the fore during the pontificate of Pope John XXII (1316-34).

\(^{121}\) CV, viii. nr. 10043, p. 463 (14 September 1313).
\(^{122}\) CV, ix. nr. 10167, p. 45 (14 Jan 1314).
1.2. **The Extrication from French Influence over Crusade Organisation during the Pontificate of John XXII**

1.2.1. **The situation in Europe during the apostolic vacancy of 1314-1316**

Although the pontificate of John XXII signified a shift of impetus for a crusade towards the Aegean and the Turks, in the years immediately after Clement V’s death a number of incidents occurred, ranging from political turmoil to natural disaster, which tempered the enthusiasm of the papacy and the rulers of Europe for a crusade. When these problems escalated, the pope and kings alike became distracted from organising a crusade to either the Holy Land or Aegean. The first of these problems arose from the convoluted accession of both John XXII and Philip V of France, which contributed to a vacancy in the Apostolic See and a struggle for the French Crown, lasting for almost two years, in which a discussion of a crusade was put to one side.

The problems of the election of the next pontiff arose from a sharp division amongst the cardinals charged with the task of appointing the new pope. The cardinals, 23 in total, arranged themselves loosely into three opposing factions; those of the Gascon, Italian and Provençal parties. The smaller Italian and Provençal groups joined forces to block the election of the Gascon candidates, this resulted in a stalemate as neither side could obtain the required two-thirds majority. On 28 June 1316, after almost two years of fruitless negotiation, Philip of Poitiers intervened and forced the cardinals to arrive at a decision by sealing off the Dominican convent at Lyon, where the cardinals were housed. Over a month later, on 7 August, the name of Cardinal Jacques Duèse, the favourite of Philip of Poitiers and King Robert of Naples, was accepted. Pope John XXII, ‘born in Cahors and of base lineage’, was crowned in Lyon on 5 September, 1316. The apostolic vacancy also coincided with a period of turmoil for the French Crown, in which two kings, Louis X (November 1314 – June 1316) and his son John I (November 15 – 20, 1316) died within two years. Although Philip IV’s brothers Charles of Valois and Louis of Evreux wielded great authority over the

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124 Giovanni Villani, ii. bk. 10, ch. 81, p. 285.
kingdom during this period, it was Philip of Poitiers, the brother of Louis X, who became the new king in November 1316.

In addition to the Franco-papal succession disputes, large areas of Northern Europe were inflicted with widespread hardship and suffering after the outbreak of the Great Famine in 1315-22. The famine may have contributed to a rise in crusade zeal, but it is more likely that the economic decline of the regions most affected by crop failure did more to interfere with a crusade than inspire it. The situation in the Low Countries and Northern France was made worse than in other areas because of the outbreak of war between France and Flanders in 1316, which worsened the effects of the famine.

These intermittent Franco-Flemish clashes constituted another major threat to the realisation of a crusade as the pontificate of John XXII progressed and were exacerbated as the English began to interfere in the disputes. This would reach a climax in the later 1330s with the outbreak of the Hundred Years War. Signs of growing Franco-Flemish tension were already evident in the earliest Franco-papal correspondences of 1316, when it was clear that for the French the quelling of disturbances in Flanders would take precedence over a crusade. Likewise, after the breakdown of Anglo-French relations during the Saint Sardos incident in October 1323, French crusade negotiations were shelved by Charles IV. A good example of the diversion from the crusade is illustrated by the actions of Charles of Valois – he was the primary candidate to lead a passagium in 1323 but two years later he was placed in command of French troops in Gascony, where he led them against the English.

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126 Cohn has suggested that the Great Famine may have contributed to a rise in millenarianism amongst the populace, which in turn led to a rise in crusade zeal, culminating in the Shepherd’s Crusade in 1320: Cohn, Pursuit of the Millennium, 102-3.

127 Setton, Papacy, i. 173.


129 E.g. JXXII Secrètes, i. nr. 53-7, 67-4, 74-5. Dated September-November 1316. Also see Housley, ‘France, England and the “national crusade”:’, 186-8.

130 P. Chaplais, The War of Saint-Sardos (1323-1325): Gascon Correspondence and Diplomatic Documents (London, 1954), Ix-xiii; and the relevant documents, e.g. nr. 22, 214.
If the attention of the French was drawn away from the crusade by Flanders and England, then the papacy was equally distracted by the escalation of the conflict in Northern Italy between Guelph and Ghibelline factions. During the papal vacancy the pro-imperial rulers of Lombardy had united to threaten the papal partisans in the area, so on his accession, John XXII adopted a more aggressive policy than his predecessor in an attempt to rally his supporters.\(^{131}\) The conflict became focussed into a contest over the control of Genoa, after the outbreak of civil-war in the city in 1317.\(^{132}\) On the accession of Charles IV the war in Italy intensified and in January 1322 Milan was placed under interdict and indulgences were promised to those who would fight against the city.\(^{133}\) In general, the French kings opposed papal engagement in Italy because it was seen as a distraction from a crusade, but despite their protests, they were unable to prevent the pope from committing to increased military and financial involvement in the conflict, which characterised the mid 1320s.\(^{134}\)

Finally, after 1313, nearly all of Latin Europe became involved in the contest between the newly elected Holy Roman Emperor, Louis IV of Bavaria (1314-1347) and the pope.\(^{135}\) This gave new virulence to the Guelph-Ghibelline conflict in areas of Northern Italy, especially Lombardy and Tuscany, after Louis IV sided with the Visconti of Milan against the papal Guelphs in 1323.\(^{136}\) In response to this action John XXII vowed to depose the emperor; the ensuing struggle saw Louis accuse the pope of heresy in 1324, the pope excommunicate the emperor in the same year, and the election of an antipope in 1328.\(^{137}\) Because of these events, recent historians have rightly observed that much of John XXII’s pontificate, especially the early years, were marked by the dilution of the crusade to the Holy Land as it jostled for attention.

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\(^{133}\) JXXII *Communes*, iv, nr. 16197, 16213; v, nr. 20362; Mollat, *Popes*, 91; P. Partner, *The Lands of St Peter: The Papal States in the Middle Ages and Early Renaissance* (London, 1972), 315.

\(^{134}\) Housley, *Italian Crusades*, 85-6.

\(^{135}\) Laiou, *Constantinople*, 250.


amongst more pressing matters such as the Franco-Flemish war and the worsening conflict in Italy.\textsuperscript{138}

1.2.2. The decline of Franco-papal crusades to Constantinople and the Holy Land and the emergence of the passagium particulare

Clement V’s pontificate was marred by the reliance on the French Crown for a crusade, to either Constantinople or the Holy Land, which never materialised. He was willing to grant generous church tithes which enabled these proposals to develop, even though they eventually failed. In fact, the only expedition which did travel to the East was the Hospitaller passagium of 1308-10, which had no direct input from the French Crown and minimal control from the pope. John XXII, in contrast to Clement V, was far more autonomous in his approach to the crusade. In financial matters he was unwilling to grant church tithes to the French kings for a crusade on the level which his predecessor had. Consequently over the course of John XXII’s pontificate, in dealing with the French Kings Philip V and Charles IV, a more affordable and realistic passagium particulare began to take precedence over a general crusade to the Holy Land. Likewise, the reigns of Philip V and Charles IV witnessed a decline of interest in re-establishing the Latin empire of Constantinople. This change in strategy, coupled with the growing reports of Turkish attacks on the Latins in the Aegean, led to a formation of crusade policy which was no longer reliant on French influence and could be directed to serve the immediate needs of the Latins in the Aegean.

Upon his coronation John XXII expressed a wish to recover the Holy Land from the infidels, as many popes had done before him.\textsuperscript{139} This was to be achieved through a general passage to be led in person by Philip V of France.\textsuperscript{140} Meanwhile, reports of

\textsuperscript{138} Tyerman, ‘Sed nihil fecit?’, 173; Housley, Avignon, 20.
\textsuperscript{139} AE, xxiv. nr. 9, pp. 33-4; Housley, Avignon, 20.
\textsuperscript{140} John XXII wrote in a letter of November 1316 that French power was only second to that of God in meeting the demands and expectations of the Holy Land: Housley, Avignon, 18; JXXII Secrètes, i. nr. 53, col. 41-2. Two papal letters were written to Philip of Poitiers expressing that a general passage to the Holy Land ought to be led by him: JXXII Secrètes, i. nr. 23, 27 (6 and 14 September 1316); Housley, Avignon, 20-1. Philip made crusade plans when he was regent: Brown, ‘Louis X’, 269; and renewed his promise to become a crusignatus once he was crowned: AA, i. nr. 314-5; JXXII Secrètes, i. nr. 471-2.
defeats suffered by the Christians of the East circulated in western Europe, \(^{141}\) meaning that a *passagium particulare* in aid of these Christians, to be led by Philip’s cousin, Louis of Clermont, also ran parallel to the discussions of a general crusade.\(^ {142}\) For Philip V, the crusade represented an opportunity to push for new crusade tithes at a time when the six-year Vienne tithes issued by Clement V in 1312 were coming to an end. Indeed, this must have been a pressing matter as in 1316 just under fifty percent of royal receipts came from church taxes.\(^ {143}\) Initially John XXII ceded to some of Philip’s financial demands; in September 1316 he confirmed a four-year tithe levied on the French Church by Clement V and introduced a new four-year grant of annates.\(^ {144}\) However, as time progressed it became clear that instability in Europe, especially the protraction of the conflict in Flanders, and renewed pleas for aid from Cyprus and Armenia, would render a general crusade to the Holy Land untenable.\(^ {145}\) As this happened, and the likelihood of Philip going on crusade in person diminished, John XXII made efforts to limit the amount of church funding that the king could receive for his planned general passage.\(^ {146}\) Philip V did receive some papal grants during this time, but, as Tyerman has shown, these were not specifically for the crusade and were, nevertheless, not as extensive as those issued by Clement V.\(^ {147}\) On 21 March 1318, John XXII wrote to Philip V that ‘on account of reasons which are relevant to the usefulness of the aforementioned general *passagium* overseas and which concern your


\(^{142}\) Louis, took the cross in September 1316, along with over 5,000 French nobles: AA, i. nr. 145; William of Nangis, i. 427-8; John of St Victor, 257; ‘Chronique parisienne anonyme’, 25-6. Louis’s fleet was to leave Marseille in April 1318 with the objective of sailing to Alexandria to disrupt Muslim convoys. It was to obtain fresh supplies in Cyprus where the leaders could cooperate with the kings of Cyprus and Armenia and the grand-master of the Hospitallers. The flotilla would then return to blockade Rosetta, Damietta and Tripoli, where it would then be time for the main crusader army to depart. For more on this, see A. de Boislisle, ‘Projet de croisade du premier duc de Bourbon (1316-1333)’, *Annuaire-Bulletin de la Société de l’Histoire de France* 9 (1872), 246-55, at 248-55; C.B. de la Roncière, ‘(1318-1320)’, *Mélanges d’archéologie et d’histoire publiés par l’École française de Rome* 13 (1893), 5-26, at 7-8; Leopold, *Recover*, 37-8, 46, 71, 127, 152, 167; Durholder, *Kreuzzugspolitik*, 15.

\(^{143}\) Tyerman, ‘Sed nihil fecit?’, 172.

\(^{144}\) *JXII Secrètes*, i. nr. 23, 27 (6 and 14 September 1316); Housley, *Avignon*, 20-1; Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 166-7. It is not surprising to learn that since the time of John XXII’s coronation, Philip and his brother Charles had been pressuring the pope to grant them new clerical tithes: AA, i. nr. 145.


\(^{146}\) Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 167.

participation, let the *passagium particulare* [instead] take place at present*.\(^{148}\) In September of the same year, Philip appointed Louis of Clermont as the captain-general of this proposed *passagium particulare*.\(^{149}\)

The change in strategy did not, however, help to expedite the crusade. Within months Louis of Clermont’s *passagium* also became bogged down by haggling over the necessary finances for the expedition, such as in 1319, when funding was refused by the pope on the grounds that the French needed to provide more concrete plans before any tithes would be granted.\(^{150}\) Eventually funding for both Louis of Clermont’s *passagium particulare* and the Philip V’s general crusade were granted in June 1321, but these concessions were strictly limited by the pope; he refused to grant a new tenth for the *passagium particulare* and only agreed to grant church proceeds for Philip’s crusade on condition that the king swore to go on crusade in person – if he failed to do so, the proceeds would be returned to the Church.\(^{151}\) But by that time the king had contracted a fatal illness which would lead to his death in January 1322.\(^{152}\)

John XXII’s financial dealings with the next French king, Charles IV, were very much a continuation of his policy towards Philip V. Towards the end of 1322 and the beginning of 1323 the decision was made to launch a preliminary *passagium* to the eastern Mediterranean for the aid of Cyprus and Armenia and the disruption of trade with Egypt.\(^{153}\) This was to be followed by a larger *passagium particulare*, which would be used to bolster the preliminary expedition, and then, in the distant future, a *passagium generale* to the Holy Land.\(^{154}\) From two letters sent by Charles IV to the pope, it can be seen that the king was willing to levy a lay tax to fund part of the

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\(^{148}\) *JXII Secrètes*, i. nr. 511, col. 432.


\(^{150}\) *Registres du Trésor des Chartes*, ii. nr. 2796, 3470; *JXII Secrètes*, i. nr. 933, 946; Tyerman, ‘Philip V’, 20.

\(^{151}\) *JXII Secrètes*, i. nr. 1262; Tyerman, ‘Philip V’, 16-17. The last two years of the Vienne tenth and proceeds from legacies and indulgences in France were granted for the *passagium particulare*. The *passagium generale* was to receive a four year tenth in France, plus a tenth for every year the king remained on crusade: *JXII Secrètes*, i. nr. 1262 (5 June 1321); Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 166-7.


\(^{153}\) The papal letters stated that indulgences were to be issued, collection chests placed in churches and sermons be preached for the forthcoming expedition: *JXII Secrètes*, ii. 1571-3.

preliminary *passagium*.\textsuperscript{155} However, the French Crown was in severe debt,\textsuperscript{156} and it is evident that Charles IV still expected the Church to front the majority of the cost for his project,\textsuperscript{157} as well as conform to a number of other demands issued by the king.\textsuperscript{158} Because of these factors, it comes as no surprise that the project was rejected by the cardinals in the Curia.\textsuperscript{159} To make matters worse, the king failed to adequately outline the details for the following *passagium particulare* and once again demanded a disproportionate amount of funding from the Church.\textsuperscript{160} Negotiations progressed more smoothly after Charles of Valois put himself forward as the captain of the *passagium particulare* in 1323, and John XXII agreed to grant a two-year tenth for the preliminary *passagium*.\textsuperscript{161} However, this tenth was no greater than that issued to Philip V, and the pope still refused to contribute funds from the papal Camera.\textsuperscript{162} Subsequently, in the following months events fell into a predictable routine as the king rejected a renewed offer from the pope, who in turn refused to improve his previous proposal.\textsuperscript{163} Finally, after almost two years of fruitless negotiations and wrangling over who was to fund the crusade, the negotiations died out. On 7 November 1323, John XXII wrote to Charles IV informing him that the Armenians had agreed a fifteen-year truce with the Mamluk sultan.\textsuperscript{164}

The failure of these negotiations was a reflection of three things. Firstly, for the pope the time was wrong for a crusade – Europe was wracked by warfare, the Spanish

\textsuperscript{155} JXXII Secrètes, i. 1683, 1685, dated 7 and 17 February 1323.


\textsuperscript{157} JXXII Secrètes, ii. 1683, 1685; Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 172.

\textsuperscript{158} For example the pope was requested to be more liberal in his granting of indulgences and to publish more decrees against those trading with Muslims: JXXII Secrètes, ii. 1683, 1685; Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 172. Tyerman ignores the other demands issued by the king: Tyerman, ‘Sed nihil fecit?’, 177; *Idem*, ‘Marino Sanudo’, 62.

\textsuperscript{159} Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 171-4.

\textsuperscript{160} Arnald, the Cardinal-deacon of St Eustace wrote that the whole burden of the passage would rest on the pope: JXXII Secrètes, ii. 1699; Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 175. In spite of this, the pope did consent to grant Charles some tenths and other proceeds if he sent enough troops for a successful crusade, or a greater subsidy if he went in person, provided that the details of the *passagium particulare* were cleared up: JXXII Secrètes, ii. 1692; Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 177.

\textsuperscript{161} JXXII Secrètes, ii. nr. 1686-9. At this time, Louis of Clermont was still technically leader of the previous *passagium particulare*, but his proposals were superseded by those of Charles of Valois: JXXII Secrètes, ii. nr. 1683-5; Tyerman, ‘Sed nihil fecit?’, 175.

\textsuperscript{162} John reiterated that the Church was to only offer Charles a two year tenth in France and Navarre, an annual tenth while the king was on crusade and the proceeds of alms and legacies: Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 179; JXXII Secrètes, ii. 1710.

\textsuperscript{163} Housley, ‘Franco-papal’, 180-1.

\textsuperscript{164} JXXII Secrètes, ii. nr. 1850.
kings were fighting the Moors and the Hospitallers were disabled by debts. Secondly, even when John XXII granted Philip V and Charles IV crusade tithes, he tempered them by restraints and clauses far stricter than had been imposed previously; he questioned their ability to go on crusade in person and was unwilling to let the Church bear the brunt of crusade expenses as it had done under Clement V. Thirdly, by imposing restraints upon crusade finance John XXII showed that he was reluctant to allow the French to dominate crusade policy; i.e. by limiting the amount of crusade revenue the French were entitled to, the papacy was beginning to distance crusade negotiations from the French Crown altogether. Furthermore, in the one instance when a Franco-papal crusading fleet did materialise, in 1319, John XXII was willing to divert it to further his own interests in Italy, contrary to French desires. This may have spelled the inglorious end of one particular expedition, but it did symbolise a degree of papal independence from the French Crown in crusading matters. As will be shown, John XXII was also busy focussing his attention elsewhere in the East: towards the Latins of Achaia and the Aegean islands, who were defending the faith far more effectively than the French could at this point and required minimal expenditure of church revenue.

In fact, by the 1320s there were signs that the threat posed by the Turks was beginning to filter into the crusade negotiations with the French kings. This was the case in 1322 and 1323 when John XXII issued a number of letters concerning the passagium particulare to Armenia, in which he lamented the repeated attacks suffered by the Armenians at the hands of the Saracens, Tartars and Turks. These references to the Turks are brief, but (rather surprisingly for a papal letter of this early period) there is specific mention of a certain Haramano Turcomanorum domino, who had invaded

166 JXXII Secrètes, i. nr. 1262; Taylor, ‘French assemblies and subsidy’, 222-3.
167 The motives of the French Crown in these crusade negotiations have been an area of much historical debate, which is not the focus of this study.
168 For more on this fleet, see JXXII Secrètes, i. nr. 511-5, 531, 672-3, 705, 780, 928, 983; JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 10267; John of St Victor, 669; Housley, Italian Crusades, 100; Tyerman, French and the Crusade, 64-5; Tyerman, ‘Sed nihil fecit?’, 176; de la Roncière, ‘Une escadre Franco-papale’, 5-26. As Tyerman has rightly pointed out there is no discernable connection between this fleet and Louis of Clermont’s passagium: Tyerman, French and the Crusade, 63-7, 79-80; Idem, ‘Philip V’, 19; Idem, ‘Sed nihil fecit?’, 176.
This is of course a reference to the Karaman Turks who occupied the south-easter region of Anatolia. The Karaman Turks were a threat to Cyprus and Armenia, but not to the Latins in the Aegean, who were mostly dealing with Menteshe and Aydin. Reports of attacks from the Turks of Menteshe and Aydin in the Aegean and Greece had, by the 1320s, become more widely known in western Christendom, from the reports of the Hospitalers, the Zaccaria and the Venetians, but the pope seems to have made no effort to associate these events with an Armenian or Holy Land crusade at this time.

Because of the financial constraints imposed on these Franco-papal crusade negotiations, a general crusade to the Holy Land had begun to give way to a passagium particulare, either to the East in general or to aid Cyprus and Armenia (as a stepping stone to the Holy Land). Throughout this time, it is not surprising that the recovery of Constantinople also began to feature less and less in the Franco-papal crusade proposals. Louis of Clermont had supplanted Charles of Valois as the leader of a passagium for most of Philip V’s reign and even when Charles of Valois had regained his previous prominence under Charles IV, his former interest in an anti-Greek crusade was not rekindled. He was, of course, no longer the titular Latin emperor of Constantinople. His indifference to his former title, and that of his Angevin son-in-law Philip of Taranto, also shows how little a crusade against Byzantium was now supported in the French court. This change in attitude is demonstrated in a proposal made by Charles IV to the pope in 1323 that the Byzantine emperor should be requested to help with any forthcoming crusade.170

It has, however, been suggested by some scholars that the Franco-papal crusading fleets were, at times, intended for an attack on Constantinople.171 For example, Walter Norden, the strongest proponent of this view, claimed that Amaury of Narbonne’s flotilla of 1323 was to be used against the Greeks. His argument centred around the theory that Louis of Clermont was to be designated captain of the fleet which was to be diverted to Constantinople, following the advice proposed by the

169 JXXII Secrètes, ii. nr. 1571-3 (20 December 1322), esp. 1572, col. 208. Also see nr. 1691, col. 280 (dated April, or later, 1323).
171 Gill has suggested that the 1321 fleet was destined for Byzantium: Gill, Byzantium, 192. Likewise, Geanakoplos has claimed that Charles IV’s assumption of the cross led Andronikos II to fear a crusade against Constantinople: Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 48.
bishop of León in his crusade treatise.\textsuperscript{172} However, as Laiou has pointed out, there is no evidence to suggest that Louis of Clermont was to be made captain of the galleys of the 1323 fleet, or that the fleet was associated with the bishop of León, who in any instance advocated a land and not seaborne crusade.\textsuperscript{173} In fact, unlike the bishop of León, many of the crusade theorists of the 1320s began to lose interest in a crusade to Byzantium as Latin aggression towards the empire began to peter out.\textsuperscript{174} It has also been shown that the Franco-papal crusade negotiations during the first decade of John XXII’s pontificate focussed on the recovery of the Holy Land or the defence of Cyprus and Armenia and not on the recapture of Constantinople.

\textsuperscript{172} W. Norden, \textit{Das Papsttum und Byzanz: Die Trennung der beiden Mächte und das Problem ihrer Wiedervereinigung bis zum Untergange des byzantinischen Reichs (1453)} (Berlin, 1903), 683-4. For the bishop of León, see Leopold, \textit{Recover}, 141.
1.3. Papal Support of “Local” Resistance Against the Turks Under John XXII

1.3.1. Papal-endorsed campaigns in Achaia

French interest in the Byzantine empire may have petered out by the 1320s, but this was not the case for the Angevin lords of Frankish Greece. It has been seen that, throughout the pontificate of Clement V, Philip of Taranto involved himself in the planned crusade of Charles of Valois to recover Constantinople and then actively pursued his own claims to the Latin empire, once he had been made titular Latin Emperor (through his marriage to Catherine of Valois).\(^{175}\) Once he had become titular emperor, Philip granted the principality of Achaia to Louis of Burgundy, who in return, promised to assist his liege in a campaign to recover the Latin empire.\(^{176}\) Louis’s expedition to Achaia in 1316 lacked papal backing, but in the following years, John XXII would make attempts to form an Angevin coalition in Achaia, for which indulgences were granted and the Turks were specifically cited as a target.

In 1318 the pope wrote the first of many letters to try and form a papal-endorsed alliance between Venice and the Angevin rulers of the principality of Achaia. The motivating factor for this was a wish to defend areas of Angevin controlled Greece from the repeated attacks of the Catalan Grand Company, who in 1311, had killed the Duke of Athens Walter of V Brienne at the battle of Cephissus, and seized his duchy for themselves.\(^{177}\) The duchy of Athens, as a vassal state of Achaia, was obviously a concern for the Angevins, and later their attempts to protect the Morea would be interwoven with the papal-endorsed campaigns of Walter VI of Brienne to re-establish his duchy. In 1318 John XXII sent two letters to the doge of Venice urging the Republic to join this coalition, after the Angevins Robert of Naples, Philip of Taranto and their younger brother John of Gravina, had written in a similar vain to the doge in the previous year.\(^{178}\) In these documents the pope cited the Catalan alliance with the Turks

\(^{175}\) See above, p. 43.

\(^{176}\) After Philip of Taranto had married Catherine of Valois on 29 July 1313, he ceded the principality of Achaia to Matilda of Hainault. Probably on the same day Louis of Burgundy married Matilda, thus inheriting the principality himself. For these events see Topping, ‘Morea’, 109-10; Laiou, Constantinople, 254; R. Caggese, Roberto d’Angiò e i suoi tempi, 2 vols (Florence, 1922-30), ii. 309-12.

\(^{177}\) Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 223-4.

\(^{178}\) \textit{DOC}, nr. 94, dated 8 May 1318; \textit{Commerce et expéditions militaires de la France et de Venise au moyen âge}, ed. L. de Mas Latrie, \textit{Extrait de collection de documents inédits sur l’histoire de France: Mélanges historiques}, 5 vols (Paris, 1873-86), iii. nr. 8, pp. 43-4 (4 September 1319). See also: Setton,
and the schismatic Greeks as a justification for opposing them. In one letter the pope claimed that the newly appointed Catalan Vicar-General, Alfonso Fadrique, had been responsible for introducing Turks into the island of Negroponte which they were now plundering at will.\(^{179}\) In the other letter the pope claimed that the Catalan Company had increased its strength by adding schismatic Greeks and Turks to its numbers ‘in alliance and in friendship’.\(^{180}\) This, claimed the pope, had enabled the Catalans to ravage Greece unchecked and inflict irreparable harm on the Christians in the area.\(^{181}\) As has been noted, the primary purpose of these letters was to enlist the Venetians in a papal-Angevin coalition against the Catalans; for this reason the Turks and Greeks were not identified in the papal documents as the main target of the forthcoming campaign, unlike in the correspondence with the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers where they remained the principal enemy of the Latins. Therefore, although the Greeks and Turks did play a part in the justification for a campaign to Achaia, they were only a subsidiary motivation, mentioned in the context of their alliance with the Catalans.

Despite the pope’s exhortations, the Venetians refused to commit to an Angevin-papal coalition. In June 1320 Philip of Taranto, who had been at the papal court in Avignon since 1318,\(^{182}\) wrote another letter to the doge, this time requesting that the Venice assist in the recovery of the Latin empire.\(^{183}\) In the letter, Philip informed the doge that Angevin ambassadors were being sent to Venice discuss the renewal of the treaty originally agreed between the Republic and Charles of Valois in 1307.\(^{184}\) The doge replied to Philip of Taranto in November 1320; his exact answer remains unknown, but it was probably negative as the 1307 treaty was never renewed.\(^{185}\) Nevertheless, Angevin attempts to recruit Venetian assistance for an expedition to Achaia continued; in September 1324 Robert of Naples requested a Veneto-Angevin alliance against the schismatic Greeks, and the ‘impious society’ of the

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\(^{179}\) _DOC_, nr. 94, p. 114.

\(^{180}\) _Commerce et expéditions_, iii. nr. 8, p. 43. Also see _AA_, i. nr. 421, pp. 687-8.

\(^{181}\) _Commerce et expéditions_, iii. nr. 8, p. 43.

\(^{182}\) Philip was requesting help for the Italian Guelphs on behalf of his brother Robert of Naples: _JXXII Secrètes_, i. nr. 862, 1170, 1199; Laiou, _Constantinople_, 253.

\(^{183}\) _DVL_, i. nr. 82, p. 170.

\(^{184}\) The ambassadors were Belletto Faller and Philip Belligno: _DVL_, i. nr. 83.

\(^{185}\) _Le deliberazioni (Senato)_ i. bk. 5, nr. 62, 66, p. 226; Laiou, _Constantinople_, 253.
Catalans.\textsuperscript{186} The reply from the doge showed where the priorities of the Republic lay: ‘the lord doge answers that he [already] has a treaty with the lord emperor of the Greeks and with those from the [Catalan] Company. Because of this, he is not able to make any union against them’.\textsuperscript{187} A month later, the pope also wrote to the doge, this time commending the interests of Walter of Brienne, the titular Duke of Athens, but Venice refused to support his claims.\textsuperscript{188} Ultimately, these Angevin pleas proved to be in vain and Venice never again formed an alliance against the Byzantine empire. Evidently for the *Serenissima*, the ending of a valuable trade agreement with the Byzantines and the severing of a truce with the Catalans at a time when piracy was on the increase in the Aegean, was too great a sacrifice to make.

In the early 1320s, unperturbed by Venice’s continued rejection of an anti-Catalan alliance, Philip of Taranto continued the preparations for his forthcoming campaign to Achaia: in 1321 and 1322 he sent provisions to his forts in Corfu and the Morea, and in May 1323 he pledged mutual assistance with his brother John of Gravina in their efforts to protect the principality.\textsuperscript{189} The Angevin registers showed that during 1322-4 great amounts of money and provisions were sent to the Morea in preparation for an expedition.\textsuperscript{190} Philip eventually made two attempts to lead an army to the Morea, but both had to be aborted, once in 1323 when he lacked sufficient money,\textsuperscript{191} and again in 1324 when he did not have enough men.\textsuperscript{192} In the end Philip was restricted by the wars in Italy. The task then fell to John of Gravina who, in January

\textsuperscript{186} *DOC*, nr. 122, p. 151.
\textsuperscript{187} *DOC*, nr. 123.
\textsuperscript{188} Vatican, Archivio segreto, *Registra Vaticana*, reg. 113, f. 100v, ep. 714 (27 October 1324). Also see Setton, *Domination*, 38.
\textsuperscript{189} Caggese, *Roberto d’Angiò*, ii. 306-7. Caggese provides a detailed account on the preparations for Gravina’s expedition, based on the Angevin registers of Naples destroyed in 1943: pp. 302-17. Unfortunately, the reconstruction of the Angevin archives do not yet extend to this period: *I registri della Cancelleria angioina: ricostruiti da Riccardo Filangieri con la collaborazione degli archivisti napoletani*, ed. R. Filangieri et al. (Naples, 1950-2006 ongoing). Also see Topping, ‘Morea’, 122-3; Laiou, *Constantinople*, 318. In the same year, Louis of Clermont showed his intention to expand interests in Achaia and the kingdom of Thessalonica, by wedding his daughter Beatrix to Philip of Taranto’s eldest son, Philip, the despot of Romania. Some have suggested that Louis may have harboured hopes that his passagium to the East could be diverted to the Morea, or to Constantinople itself, although there are no sources to support this view: Laiou, *Constantinople*, 254-5; Topping, ‘Morea’, 115-16; Gill, *Byzantium*, 192. See above, p. 64.
\textsuperscript{190} Caggese, *Roberto d’Angiò*, ii. 306-7; 312-17; Topping, ‘Morea’, 122-3.
\textsuperscript{191} Caggese, *Roberto d’Angiò*, ii. 307, n. 5.
\textsuperscript{192} Caggese, *Roberto d’Angiò*, ii. 316.
1325, successfully led a fleet of 20 galleys from Brindisi to Frankish Greece. After stopping off at Cephalonia and Zante, the fleet arrived in Clarentza, the chief port of the Morea (opposite Zante). Here John secured the allegiance of numerous Frankish lords, amongst them two of lords of Negroponte, the duke of Naxos, Niccolò Sanudo, and the lord of Chios, Martino Zaccaria. The army laid siege to the Greek fortress of Karytaina in the centre of the Morea but had to turn back to Clarentza as the weather worsened in the winter of 1325. In the spring of 1326, probably because of financial constraints, John was forced to return with his army to Italy. He was never to return to Greece. Despite the effort that had gone in to planning and funding the expedition, it appears that John of Gravina achieved very little whilst in Achaia.

Throughout all this, it is necessary to consider whether any of these Angevin operations constituted a crusade or not. Unlike the expedition of Louis of Burgundy, the campaigns of Philip of Taranto and John of Gravina did receive papal backing and there are many examples of the pope making a concerted effort to drum up support for the forthcoming Angevin operation. In 1319 John XXII asked that the Frankish nobles in Greece remain loyal to their Angevin overlords, in 1323 he urged the Patriarch of Constantinople and the archbishop of Patras to protect their people in the Morea from becoming enslaved by the Catalans and Turks, and in October 1325 he once again tempted Venice with the chance of participating in the enterprise by commending the interests of Walter of Brienne, the rightful heir to the duchy of Athens. More importantly, on 29 November 1322, the pope issued a bull granting indulgences for three years to all the faithful who were in the principality of Achaia and would die in action or of wounds received against ‘the schismatic Greeks, the Bulgars, the Alans and the Turks and other diverse nations of infidels’ (these are indulgences granted in articulo mortis). John XXII wrote that the faithful had endured attacks, plunder, imprisonment and other manifold torments at the hands of these ‘people who

193 AE, xxiv. nr. 31, p. 292.
197 For 1319: DOC, nr. 110; summary in JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 9879. For 1323: DOC, nr. 120. The date has been corrected to 1 October 1323: Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 147, n. 182. For 1325: DOC, nr. 128.
disregard God’. Therefore, in return for their defence of the faith, the following spiritual concession was granted:

[S]o that you and the other faithful of Christ may, in this temporal world which you hope to exchange for live everlasting, be the more greatly encouraged in the defence of the Catholic Faith against the schismatics and those same infidels, we, trusting in the mercy of almighty God and, by His approval, of the blessed apostles Peter and Paul, grant to all of you and other faithful of Christ to whom it shall happen that, in defence of the Catholic Faith, they die in war or battle, or subsequently from wounds received in such war or battle against the schismatic Greeks, the Bulgars, the Alans and the Turks and other aforesaid diverse nations of Infidels, in the principality of Achaia and in other territories and lands of the faithful adjacent to that same principality or in those same nearby inhabited [lands], full remission of all your sins about which you are truly contrite and have made confession. The present communication to be valid for a period of at least three years hereafter. 198

The bull was issued in response to a petition at the Curia and not at the behest of the pope, but unfortunately the original petition does not exist. 199 Therefore, the exact identity of those who were granted the indulgences, and the exact context of the papal decision remains ambiguous. It would seem from circumstantial evidence that the indulgences were issued in conjunction with the Angevin campaigns to the Morea and probably to Angevin vassals who would take part in Philip of Taranto and John of

198 Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 74, f. 93v, ep. 209; Registra Avenionensia, reg. 18, f. 152v, ep. 209 (this copy of the manuscript has been damaged by water); summary in JXXII Communes, iv. nr. 16672. The two manuscripts, transcription and translation of this document can be found in Appendix II and III, nr. 1.

199 The document was issued from the papal Chancery and copied into the Chancery registers of common letters. Common letters were almost always issued on petition. Unfortunately, the register of the petitions (Registra Supplicationum) does not exist before the pontificate of Clement VI (1342-1352): Zutshi, ‘personal role of the pope’, 227; Boyle, Survey of the Vatican Archives, 150-1. For a study into the Registra Supplicationum of Clement VI’s pontificate and the Hospitallers, see K. Borchardt, ‘Kurie und Orden: Johanniter in den päpstlichen Supplikenregistern 1342-1352’, Kurie und Region: Festschrift für Brigide Schwarz zum 65. Geburstag, ed. B. Flug, M. Matheus & A. Rehberg (Stuttgart, 2005), 17-39, but even these registers have still been under studied: Ibid., 17-18. Also see Introduction, pp. 19-20.
Gravina’s planned expeditions to the region. The dating and length of the indulgence certainly suggest this (the indulgence was valid from November 1322 to November 1325, the years in which the Angevin plans reached their zenith). However, the purpose of the Angevin expeditions, as clearly stipulated in other papal correspondence, was to defend the region from the Catalans of Athens, who do not feature anywhere in the papal document issuing the indulgences, which were granted only to those fighting against ‘the schismatic Greeks, the Bulgars, the Alans and the Turks and other diverse nations of infidels’. Although it is known that the Greeks and Turks had often been cited in papal documents as allies of the Catalans, there is still no concrete link to the Catalans. Consequently, connecting these indulgences to the Angevin campaigns against the Catalans remains problematic, even if the dating of the document and the citing of the schismatic Greeks and Turks suggests a connection with the Angevin defence of Achaia.\(^{200}\) It appears as if the mention of the schismatic Greeks was justification enough for these indulgences. The Turks and the other infidels were, in turn, legitimate targets in association with the Greeks.

1.3.2. The granting of papal privileges to the Zaccaria of Chios

Running parallel to the privileges granted to those fighting the Greeks and Turks in Achaia was John XXII’s support of the Latins against the Turks in the Aegean. This came in the form of indulgences and other privileges granted to the Latin rulers of Chios, the Genoese brothers Martino and Benedetto II Zaccaria. The activities of the brothers against the Turks and the consequences of the papal support they received for this will be discussed in greater depth in the next chapter, but now it is important to analyse the nature of the privileges granted by the pope.

By 1319, news had arrived at the Curia of one, or maybe more, Latin victories against the Turks in the Aegean led by the Zaccaria of Chios in alliance with the Hospitallers of Rhodes. Sometime before March 1320, a petition had been made at the Curia by representatives of the Zaccaria, asking for a licence to ship mastic, the unique

\(^{200}\) According to Housley these indulgences were granted for John of Gravina’s 1325 expedition, on the grounds that the defence of the Morea was necessary for the recovery of the Holy Land, as had been the case with the indulgences granted by Clement V in 1312: Housley, ‘Angevin Naples’, 549, n. 6; CV, vii. nr. 7893. The document does not, however, make this link.
product of Chios, to Mamluk Egypt. The original petition no longer exists, but from the papal response some details of the justification and specifications of the licence can be gleaned, these are as follows: The island of Chios was surrounded by the Turks (presumably from Aydin) who sought to conquer it. Until now the brothers had been able to defend the island through the maintenance of a garrison (armatam militiam) on Chios, which was derived from mastic ‘which originates on that said island’. However, the Genoese civil war had prevented the Zaccaria from selling mastic to Christian merchants and this lack of revenue led to the soldiers of the garrison being sent home. This meant that ‘great dangers of destruction’ threatened Chios and ‘all of the faithful’ on the neighbouring islands. In response to this petition, on 5 March 1320, John XXII dispatched a letter to Benedetto II and Martino Zaccaria allowing them ‘by special favour [...] the unrestricted right to carry mastic to parts of Alexandria and Egypt [...] for a period of up to at least two years’. Furthermore, the Zaccaria would be permitted to carry back, on the same ships, any merchandise they wished on their return from Mamluk lands. The licence was renewed for a further four years in 1322 and again for three years in 1325.

The timing of this licence is important in the context of John XXII’s eastern policy. The 1320s saw the beginning of papal licences allowing limited trade with Mamluk Egypt, as well as the granting of absolutions to those who had incurred ecclesiastic censure for illicit trade. However, the mastic concession was not only granted within this framework, but actually formed one of the earliest examples of this change in strategy: John XXII granted licences throughout his pontificate, but these were more commonly issued in the late 1320s and early 1330s. In fact, the mastic licence was issued a time when the total embargo on all trade with Mamluk Egypt was

201 Full text in J. Delaville le Roulx, Les Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 1310-1421 (Paris, 1913), 367-8; summary in JXXII Communes, iii. nr. 11081. Also see Stantchev, Embargo, 237-8; Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 9-10.
202 The first renewal was issued on 25 June 1322: Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Avenionensia, reg. 17, ff. 242-242v; Registra Vaticana, reg. 73, ep. 1071; summary in JXXII Communes, iv. nr. 15644. The second renewal was issued on 29 January 1325: Registra Avenionensia, reg. 23, f. 143; Registra Vaticana, reg. 79, ep. 1449; summary in JXXII Communes, v. nr. 21494.
204 For example, we know that he granted three licences before 1327 and at least five afterwards: J.T. Odena, “De Alexandrinis” (El comercio prohibido con los Musulmanes y el papado de Avinon durante la primera mitad del siglo XIV), Anuario de estudios medievales 10 (1980), 237-320, at 269-70; Stantchev, Embargo, 514-5.
being reinforced, which, in turn, impeded the mastic trade. This was the case in 1318 when a shipment of mastic from Chios, apparently destined for Egypt, had been seized off Cyprus by the galleys of the Lusignan kings. The mastic licence was, therefore, one of the earliest trade licences to signify a change in the papal policy in the East, away from one aimed at limiting the power of Mamluk Egypt.

The full importance of this licence in understanding the papal perception of the Turkish threat has not yet been fully realised by historians. Many scholars have commented on the concession granted to the Zaccaria, suggesting that it was a reward for their fight against the Turks, but none link it to the change in papal policy which it clearly represented. It can be interpreted as signifying a shift in crusade impetus from plans focussed on the recovery of the Holy Land to a strategy based on immediate defence of Christian lands from the Turkish emirates, as it specifically links resistance against the Turkish maritime emirates on the one hand (the maintenance of the garrison on Chios), with limited trade with Mamluk lands on the other. It is easy to see from the perspective of the Curia why this licence was granted: after all, the money gained from the increase in the mastic trade would, in theory, enable Chios to be defended properly, without seriously strengthening the Mamluk sultanate (mastic was regarded as a ‘clean merchandise’ and its export did not have the same implications as military materials, which still remained strictly forbidden). Nevertheless, it implied for Pope John XXII, that limited trade with Egypt was less undesirable than the loss of a Christian-ruled territory to the Turks. This use of economics by the popes to implement policies in the east would be continued by John XXII and expanded on by Clement VI.

The change of the perception of the Turks is further illustrated by the implementation of other crusade mechanisms in the Aegean by John XXII. In 1323, and

205 As Stantchev has pointed out, both John XXII and Boniface VIII were ‘supporters of the total embargo from the first until the last year of their pontificates’: Stantchev, *Embargo*, 197-230, esp. 228-9. Also see Ashtor, *Levant Trade*, 44; G. Ortalli, ‘Venice and papal bans on trade with the Levant: The role of the jurist’ *Mediterranean Historical Review* 10 (1995), 242-58, at 244-8; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 241.
209 This point is also made by Stantchev, *Embargo*, 237-8.
again in 1325, the pope supplemented the Zaccaria trade privileges with an important spiritual concession: the granting of three-year indulgences to Martino Zaccaria and all his followers (*stipendiarii dicte catholice fidei professores ac omnes Christifideles*).\(^{210}\)

These indulgences were to be granted *in articulo mortis*:

> [T]o you and to the aforesaid paid troops (*stipendiarii*) and faithful to whom it shall happen that, in the defence of the oft-mentioned faith, they die in war or battle against the Turks and other aforesaid nations of infidels on Chios and other inhabited islands or lands adjacent or near to that Island of Chios or subsequently die from wounds received in such war or battle, we grant remission of all your sins about which you are contrite in heart and have made oral confession.\(^{211}\)

The indulgences were specifically to be granted to those ‘who could be found from the island of Crete all the way to the state of Caffa’ and who, ‘fired by the zeal of devotion’, wished to assist Martino ‘in pursuing such an endeavour against those Turks’.\(^{212}\) An example of the issuing of indulgences *in articulo mortis*, to those fighting in Achaia in 1322 was seen earlier. As Housley has suggested, this kind of concession had become the standard papal response to a situation which required some spiritual reward for military service, but could not be afforded full-scale crusade preaching; either because it would not benefit from such a measure, or because the Church could not allow for the necessary expense or organisation. As a result, the Curia was far more liberal in its granting of indulgences *in articulo mortis* than in preaching a general crusade. These indulgences were also less complicated for the recipient; it is unlikely that any took the cross, since the legal framework of the vow would be hard to implement. Instead the

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\(^{210}\) The first grant was made on 20 February 1323: Full text: Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 344-5; Vatican, Archivio segreto, *Registra Avenionensia*, reg. 18, f. 380r-v; *Registra Vaticana*, reg. 74, f. 186r-v, ep. 515; summary in JXXII Communes, iv. nr. 16977. The second grant was issued on 28 April 1325: Vatican, Archivio segreto, *Registra Avenionensia*, reg. 22, f. 450v; *Registra Vaticana*, reg. 78, f. 301r, ep. 882; summary in JXXII Communes, v. nr. 22117.

\(^{211}\) Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 345.

\(^{212}\) *Ibid.*, 345.
soldier would be granted the indulgence at the point of death, after a priest had heard his confession.²¹³

Even though these indulgences can be seen as a downgrading of the privileges afforded to a full-scale crusade, the ones that have been seen nevertheless constituted the first examples of indulgences being granted specifically for fighting against the Turks alone (the Achaia indulgences issued a year earlier included Greeks and other infidels). This, in conjunction with the trade licences granted in 1320, and, to a lesser extent the 1322 Achaia indulgences, gives the overall impression that John XXII’s wider eastern policy was starting to come to terms with the growing menace of the Turks in the Aegean. Even though these concessions had been granted on petition from those Latins in the East, and not at the behest of the pope, they still indicate that the Curia was aware of the growing power of the Turkish maritime emirates, probably those of Menteshe and Aydin, and that it agreed with those Latins in the East that a boost in personnel and economic incentives were needed to oppose them. Furthermore, the papacy was coming to the realisation that a coalition of the Latins in the East, independent of French influence, was the most effective way of combating the Turks.

Chapter 1 Overview

This chapter has shown how the influence of the French Crown had a profound effect on the crusade policies of the popes in the early fourteenth century. Both Clement V and his predecessor Benedict XI recognised that the Turks were posing a threat to Christians in the Aegean, but their presence alone was not enough to justify launching a crusade against them. This was a result of two main factors: firstly, reports in the West of Turkish incursions in the Aegean were patchy and infrequent; secondly, the pre-existing traditions of planning a crusade to Constantinople or to the Holy Land, championed by the French King Philip IV and his brother Charles of Valois, took precedent. The exception to this was the Hospitaller passagium of 1308-10 which was carried out independently of French influence and with minimal papal control.

The deaths of Clement V and Philip IV in 1314 came at a time when Turkish aggression in the Aegean was on the increase and by 1320 reports of major attacks on Venetian, Genoese and Hospitaller possessions had reached the Curia. The heightened awareness of the Turkish threat, coupled with the repeated failure of the French to launch a crusade to either Constantinople or the Holy Land, contributed to the recognition of the Turks as a legitimate target of a crusade. This was manifested not in a large-scale *passagium* to the Aegean, organised by the papacy and nobility of Europe, but in response to requests for support of small-scale “local” resistance against the Turks. This came in the form of indulgences granted *in articulo mortis* by John XXII to those fighting against the Turks and other enemies of the faith in Achaia, and of similar indulgences and trade licences granted to the Zaccaria lords of Chios. The indulgences granted to the latter marked the first issued specifically for fighting against the Turks.

These papal privileges were still relatively minor and not comparable to the tithes and indulgences granted to major expeditions, such as the planned crusade of Charles of Valois or the Crusade of Smyrna, but they still demonstrate a turning point in papal crusade strategy. By the 1320s support of the Latins in the East, at their request, against the Turks was beginning to replace a policy of organising a major French-led expedition to either Constantinople or the Holy Land.
Chapter 2. The Zaccaria of Chios: Resistance Against the Turks

2.1. Genoese Establishment and Activity in the Aegean during the Early Decades of the Fourteenth Century

After helping the Greeks recapture Constantinople in 1261, the Genoese enjoyed favoured status in Romania and controlled access to the Black Sea, a new source of wealth in eastern trade. Just over a decade later, the Genoese brothers Benedetto I and Manuel Zaccaria were granted the town of Old Phokaia by the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos, situated on the Asia Minor coast, some 50 kilometres northwest of the gulf of Smyrna. During this time the Genoese also had colonies at Pera opposite Constantinople, and Caffa in the Black Sea, amongst others. Genoese dominance in the Aegean was enhanced after a victory over her great maritime rival Venice at Curzola in 1299 and it could be said that by 1300 the Commune of Genoa was at its prime. It is important to understand that unlike the Venetians, the Genoese in the eastern Mediterranean often acted independently of the Commune: the colonies were usually governed with limited interference from the doge and administration of the homeland and the ships used by Genoese sailors and merchants were often constructed and owned by private individuals. Because the Genoese often acted alone or as vassals of other states, it is far harder to establish a definitive Genoese ‘policy’ towards events in the Aegean. Nevertheless, the Genoese did maintain some form of unity in the area and often shared common interests and, more importantly, common enemies. Although the private nature of Genoese operations in the Aegean makes it difficult to assess an overall Genoese policy, it does not necessarily limit an understanding of the policies of the Genoese privateers.

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1 Epstein, Genoa, 142.
2 Ramon Muntaner provides one of the first accounts of Genoese activity in the Aegean during the early fourteenth century. He gives an insightful account of the Byzantine reliance on the Genoese. According to Muntaner, Emperor Andronikos II claimed that: ‘if they [the Catalans] sack Pera, the empire will be ruined, since the Genoese have possession of a great deal of our wealth’: Ramon Muntaner, 45.
themselves. The Zaccaria lords of Chios, for example, were principal players in the early Latin contact with, and resistance against, the Turkish maritime emirates. A great deal of information regarding their activities in the Aegean exists, mostly from the Papal Archives, consequently this chapter will focus largely on their activities.

2.1.1. The Genoese in the Aegean during the early 1300s: the crusade of Charles of Valois, the Hospitaller passagium and first contact with the Turks

Before outlining the establishment of the Zaccaria on Chios, it is worth exploring the role of the Genoese in the crusading plans of Clement V’s pontificate, especially the planned expedition of Charles of Valois and the Hospitaller passagium of 1310, to gain an appreciation of the attitude of the Genoese towards the crusading plans which dominated the early fourteenth century.

The reliance of Byzantium on Genoese maritime support made the Commune a potentially invaluable ally for Charles of Valois’s planned crusade to Constantinople. In contrast to Venice, Genoa was already firmly established in the eastern Aegean and her naval support was therefore sought in preference to that of her maritime rival. Accordingly, Charles of Valois dispatched ambassadors to Genoa, who were present in the city at the end of 1305, some weeks before he wrote to Venice. A letter from Christiano Spinola, a friend of James I of Aragon, who also acted as his informer, reported that the Valois ambassadors at Genoa were seeking information about the number of vessels which would be needed for the conquest of Constantinople and whether the Commune would allow Charles to hire them. As an incentive, the Genoese were apparently promised ‘every liberty and everything which will seem best for the commune’ if the mission was a success. As was seen in the previous chapter, Clement V augmented Charles’s appeals to Genoa by also writing to the government of the city on 14 January 1306, urging them to partake in the forthcoming crusade and warning them of the perils of Turkish domination in the Aegean. Despite the papal admonitions and Charles of Valois’s generous offers of trade privileges to the Genoese,

4 AA, iii. nr. 69 (5 December 1305); Laiou, Constantinople, 205, n. 20.
5 DOC, nr. 31, p. 37.
6 See above, ch. 1, p. 39; Laiou, Constantinople, 204, n. 18.
the Commune refused the proposal later in 1306. Evidently for Genoa the strategic benefits gained from the recapture Constantinople would not outweigh the expense and risk of participating in a crusade. This was in contrast to the Venetians, who allied themselves with Charles of Valois in December 1306. The decision of the Venetians, in turn, naturally changed the Genoese stance in regard to the crusade from one of non-involvement to active opposition; the ongoing conflict between the two maritime republics resulted in various clashes during the years of Charles of Valois’s crusade preparations, and in this sense, it could be said that the Genoese were (theoretically) obstructing the crusade.

The Valois-Venetian alliance of 1306, as well as making the Genoese opponents of the planned crusade to Constantinople, also led them to form closer ties with the newly established Hospitallers of Rhodes, who, in the early 1300s, were in almost perpetual confrontation with the Venetians. Already in May 1306 the Genoese corsair Vignolo de Vignoli had agreed to assist the Hospitallers of Cyprus in their conquest of Rhodes. On 23 June the Hospitallers fleet left Limassol to rendez-vous with the Genoese galleys belonging to Baldo Spinola and Michael della Volta. The joint forces advanced on Rhodes where Vignolo had gone ahead to reconnoitre the situation. The attack was a partial success and by 1307 the Hospital had gained a foothold on the island. In return for their assistance, Vignolo and the other Genoese received certain privileges from the Hospital. For Vignolo, these included the retention of a casale on Rhodes, already granted by the emperor of Constantinople, and the grant of another casale on the island, as well as one third of the revenue and produce from the surrounding islands. The Genoese continued to support the Hospitaller enterprise to

7 DOC, nr. 31, as Laiou has stated, the author of this letter, Christiano Spinola, thought that Genoa would decline Charles’s offer of an alliance: Laiou, Constantiopile, 205, n. 21.
9 The text of the original Hospitaller agreement of 1306 is in J. Delaville le Roulx, Les Hospitaliers en Terre Sainte et à Chypre: 1100-1310 (Paris, 1904), 274-276, n. 2.
10 For details of the initial expedition, see Luttrell, Town of Rhodes, 76; Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 745-9; Luttrell, ‘Feudal tenure’, 756-7; Zachariadou, TC, 10-11. The main town held out for several years, apparently until its surrender in August 1309. The conquest was not fully completed until after the arrival of Master Fulk of Villaret with a fleet from the West in 1310: Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers and the papacy’, 596-7.
Rhodes and in 1308-9 the Commune had begun to build galleys for Fulk of Villaret’s *passagium*.\(^{12}\)

However, once the conquest of Rhodes had been completed by the Hospitallers, relations with the Genoese deteriorated. This was largely a result of the Hospitaller enforcement of the papal ban on trade with Egypt. Initially the Genoese had exploited the embargo as a cover to legitimise attacks on rival merchant vessels, but once the Hospitallers had established themselves on Rhodes, they had begun to seize Genoese ships in an effort to enforce the embargo.\(^{13}\) Genoese reprisals ensued, and from this point onwards each side began to seize the vessels belonging to the other.\(^{14}\) By 1311 the conflict had escalated to a point where certain Genoese corsairs, under the command of Antonio Spinola, offered the Turkish emir of Menteshe, probably Masud, 50,000 florins to attack Rhodes and seize Hospitaller brethren in Turkey.\(^{15}\) A papal letter of 26 November 1311 addressed to the citizens of Genoa ordered them to repay the Hospitallers for the damage this caused. The letter is clear evidence of Clement’s exasperation at the deeds of the Genoese:

Antonio [Spinola] [...] by his evil suggestions incited a certain Saracen of those lands, *Madachia* by name, strengthened by much support, to an extent that he caused to be captured and wickedly detained several merchants and some others, about 250 in number, who had come with their vessels to those same lands of Turkey [...] to the serious detriment

\(^{12}\) *CGH*, iv. nr. 4830, 4840-1. In one document, Fulk of Villaret gave a list of ports where the Hospitaller galleys were being constructed, which included Genoa: *Janue duodecim [galeas] et navem unam, ultra aliam magnam*: nr. 4841 (27 January 1309). Also see TD, i. nr. 192.

\(^{13}\) For example, in 1313 the Genoese merchant Jacob of Nerono had his goods *arestata et detenta in Rodo* by the Hospitallers: Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1813, p. 1107. For more examples of this, see Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 757-61.

\(^{14}\) For example, in the crusading proposals made by Henry II of Cyprus in 1311, it is reported that during the winter of 1310, the Hospitallers had seized a Genoese galley returning from Alexandria. The Genoese retaliated by seizing Hospitaller vessels off Rhodes, which were taken to *Turchia* and sold to the Turks: text in L. de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l’île de Chypre sous le regne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, 3 vols (Paris, 1852-61), iii. 118-25. The event is described in Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 757-8.

\(^{15}\) CV, vii. nr. 7631-2. 26; Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 759-60; Zachariadou, *TC*, 12. This letter marks the first specific reference to a Turkish emir. He is named *Madachia*, this was probably Masud, the Menteshe-oglu: Zachariadou, *TC*, 109.
of that same Hospital and also to the immense loss of the aforesaid faith and island.\textsuperscript{16}

The letter went on to suggest that the continuous Genoese conflict with the Hospitallers had seriously begun to threaten the existence of the Order on Rhodes.\textsuperscript{17}

Despite protests from the pope, the hostilities between the Hospitallers and the Genoese allied with Menteshe continued for at least two more years. In 1312 a Turkish fleet of 23 vessels, presumably from Menteshe, was sighted near Rhodes and pursued by the knights to Amorgos. There the ships of the Turks were burned and almost the entire force of over 800 men was destroyed. The Hospitallers themselves also took serious losses of 57 brethren and 300 foot soldiers.\textsuperscript{18} The willingness of the Genoese and Hospitallers to side with the Turks at this point can be attributed to the great instability of the region in the early years of the fourteenth century. In the immediate aftermath of Byzantine losses in Asia Minor and the Aegean, neither the Hospitallers, the Genoese privateers, nor the Turks were firmly established in the area. Thus each side sought alliances to maximise their own security. In this fragmented political situation papal policies, such as the enforcement of the trade embargo with Egypt, were used more as a pretext to pursue personal interests and rivalries rather than anything else.

During this time the civil strife in Genoa, which had been rumbling for some years, erupted into all-out conflict. In 1313, after the death of Emperor Henry VII, the leaderless city became consumed by fighting amongst the two leading Ghibelline families, the Doria and the Spinola. By 1316 the whole of Liguria was preoccupied by civil war. Although this devastated Genoese trade and further accentuated the detachment between the homeland and the colonists in the East, many of the Genoese in the Aegean, such as those on Chios, were able to prosper despite the problems in mainland Italy.\textsuperscript{19}

\textsuperscript{16} CV, vii. nr. 7631, p. 5.
\textsuperscript{17} CV, vii. nr. 7631, pp. 5-6.
\textsuperscript{18} Chroniques d'Amadi et de Strambaldi, ed. R. de Mas Latrie, 2 vols (Paris, 1891-3), i. 393; Luttrell, ‘Genoese’, 760; Zachariadou, TC, 12.
\textsuperscript{19} Epstein, Genoa, 194-5. For contemporary accounts of the early civil-war, see for example: Giovanni Villani, ii. bk. 10, ch. 87-118, pp. 294-322; Giorgio Stella, Annales Genuenses, ed. G.P. Balbi, RISNS 17.2 (Bologna, 1975), 82-102.
2.1.2. Establishment of the Zaccaria on Chios and participation in the alum and mastic trades

The Zaccaria family came to international prominence during the mid to late thirteenth century, when the brothers Benedetto I and Manuel Zaccaria formed ties with the Byzantine imperial family.\textsuperscript{20} This began in around 1264 when Benedetto I Zaccaria was sent as an ambassador to the Byzantine Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos.\textsuperscript{21} A few years later, the Zaccaria were granted imperial permission to mine alum in the mountains to the east of the town of New Phokaia.\textsuperscript{22} Alum was vital for the textile industry as it formed the most effective fabric mordant – or fixative for dyes – known at the time.\textsuperscript{23} According to the manual of Francesco Pegolotti, Phokaia alum was amongst the best available and most extensively mined.\textsuperscript{24} The sources attest to the strenuous activities of the brothers in the extraction of the chemical, if Muntaner is to be believed, by 1305 they had some 3,000 Greek miners working for them.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{20} For more on the Zaccaria during the early thirteenth century, see Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 43; Lopez, Benedetto Zaccaria, passim; Idem, ‘Familiari, procuratori e dipendenti di Benedetto Zaccaria’, \textit{Miscellanea di Storia Ligure in onore di Giorgio Falco} (Milan, 1962), 209-49, at 209-20.


\textsuperscript{23} Alum also had a number of other uses, for more information see C.S. Singer, \textit{The Earliest Chemical Industry: An Essay in the Historical Relations of Economics & Technology illustrated from the Alum Trade} (London, 1948), xvi-xviii; R. Lopez, ‘Majorcans and Genoese on the North Sea route in the thirteenth century’, \textit{Revue belge le philologie et d’histoire} 29 (1951), 1163-79, at 1167-70; A.A.M. Breyer, ‘The question of the Byzantine mines in the Pontos: Chalybian iron, Chaldian silver, Koloneian alum and the mummy of Cheriana’, \textit{Anatolian Studies} 32 (1982), 133-50, at 146-7.

\textsuperscript{24} Phokaia alum was apparently the second best, after that of Karahissar (Koloeia). It was mined at around 14,000 cantara a year, which equates to roughly 800 metric tons per year: Francesco Pegolotti, 367-70; Lopez & Raymond, \textit{Medieval Trade}, 353-5; Breyer, ‘Byzantine mines’, 148. For contemporary accounts on how alum was refined, see Singer, \textit{Earliest Chemical Industry}, 92-4.

\textsuperscript{25} Ramon Muntaner, 127-8; cf. George Pachymeres, ii. bk. v, pp. 534-8; Lopez & Raymond, \textit{Medieval Trade}, 127-8.
prosperity from the export of this product to the West in the same way. Evidence of this can be found in archival records which attest to the Zaccaria exporting sizeable quantities of alum from Phokaia to northern Europe in 1268, 1278 and in 1298.

During this time, the Zaccaria brothers also became renowned for their daring maritime exploits against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt. In 1288 Benedetto Zaccaria was instrumental in helping evacuate the citizens of Tripoli to Cyprus, before its capture a year later, and in 1293 Manuel Zaccaria was placed in charge of a fleet by Pope Nicholas IV, which raided the ports of Candelore (Alanya), on the southern coast of Asia Minor, and Alexandria in Egypt. Their accomplishments reached their zenith in the early fourteenth century, when the brothers were granted the island of Chios by the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos II. The island was important for a number of reasons: strategically it lay at the crossroads of shipping routes between Constantinople and the Black Sea in the North, to Syria and Alexandria in the South, by way of Rhodes and Famagusta. It also protected New Phokaia and provided an important repository for alum, where it could be held until ferried to northern Europe. Finally, the island was rich and fertile: it provided an abundance of wine and other agricultural produce, the most important of which was mastic gum, a product

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26 William of Rubruck, *The Mission of Friar William of Rubruck: His Journey to the Court of the Great Khan Mongke*, 1253-1255, trans. P. Jackson (London, 1990), 273. The Asia Minor alum trade became more important after 1291 when the economic blockage of Egypt, where alum was also mined, was strengthened: Jacoby, ‘Creta e Venezia’, 95-9; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 241.

27 This is a letter from Benedetto Zaccaria appointing Daniele de Mari to sell 201 sacks of alum and 1 pondus of mastic: Lopez & Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, 219-20.


30 Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 44. For more on this, see Lopez, *Benedetto Zaccaria*, 131-60.


32 Zachariadou, TC, 7-9. Chios was going to be granted to Manuel Zaccaria in c.1305, but nothing came of the agreement. A few years later Benedetto seized the island which was then officially granted to him by the emperor. He almost definitely held it by 1309.


derived from trees native to Chios and extremely popular in the East. Mastic was listed as one of the items held by the Zaccaria in Genoa, for export to France, in 1268 and was exchanged for cloth with a merchant on Rhodes in 1309.

The granting of the island was significant because the Zaccaria of Chios were to come into intense conflict with the Anatolian Turks, mostly from the emirate of Aydin, in the following decades of the century. Pachymeres suggested that by c.1305 the Turks had occupied the whole of the Anatolian coastal region uninterrupted, except for the area of Adramyttion and Phokaia, which were held by the Zaccaria. According to Pachymeres, the Genoese had been able to preserve these regions because of their military boldness. Manuel had, in fact, previously asked Andronikos II if he could be given control of some of the Aegean islands (including Chios) and granted a levy to equip boats for their defence against the Turks, although this did not come to anything. It is interesting that the reason given by Pachymeres for Manuel’s request to hold Chios from the emperor was a desire to defend the island against the Turks, which tallies with the motivations of the Greek conspirators who dealt with Charles of Valois in 1307. At this point it is difficult to outline deeds of the Zaccaria against the Turks. Benedetto I died in 1307 and the island passed to the control of his son and heir, Palaiologos Zaccaria, who ruled jointly with Manuel Zaccaria until the latter’s death in 1309/10. Palaiologos, in turn, died in 1314. After his death, joint-control was assumed by his two sons Benedetto II and Martino Zaccaria, while Phokaia passed to the stewardship of Andreolo Cattaneo della Volta and his family.

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36 Lopez & Raymond, *Medieval Trade*, 219-20 (1268); Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1675 (1309).

37 George Pachymeres, iv. bk. xii, pp. 608-9.

38 The della Volta probably still owed fealty to the Zaccaria of Chios. The Cattaneo were shipping alum to Bruges in 1311: Doehaerd, iii. nr. 1723; also in ‘Les Galères génoises’, ed. Doehaerd, nr. 25; M.-L. Heers, ‘Les Génois et le commerce de l’alun à la fin du Moyen Age’, *Revue d’histoire economique et sociale* 32 (1954), 31-53, at 33-4; Argenti, *Chios*, i. 57; Lemerle, *Aydin*, 52. Miller incorrectly named Benedetto II and Martino as the sons of Benedetto I, when in fact they were the sons of Palaiologos: Miller,
It is hard to prove whether Chios was more prosperous in the first years of Martino and Benedetto II’s rule than it had been under their predecessors, primarily because of the lack of notarial documents relating to Chios. Nevertheless, some indication of the increased prosperity of the island can be found in the high level coinage issued by the brothers. Similarly, the granting of canonries in England to three sons of Palaiologos Zaccaria – Anthony, Aufredo and John, in May 1317, might also provide evidence of the growth of the Zaccaria trade to north-western Europe during this time, most probably from the increased shipment of alum to the cloth manufacturers of England and Flanders. Already in these early years, Martino Zaccaria’s efforts to distance himself from his legitimate overlord, the Byzantine emperor, and form stronger links to the crusade plans of the Latins of Romania can be seen. For example, in 1317 he spread the Zaccaria domain into the Frankish lands of Achaia by purchasing the district of Chalandritsa situated in the hinterland of Patras in the Peloponnese. It is also likely that in these years the brothers came to control the fortress of Smyrna on the Turkish mainland, which may have been in Genoese hands.

since as early as 1304. Consequently, the rule of Benedetto II and especially Martino, can be seen as the golden age of the Zaccaria dominion in the Aegean.  

Zachariadou, TC, 8, wrote that Martino had been the lord of the fortress since at least 1326. William Adam, writing in around 1316-17 mentions a fortress on the Turkish mainland controlled by the lords of Chios, this probably refers to the fortress at Smyrna. There is a possibility that he was referring to the fortress at Phokaia, but that was under the command of the Cattaneo della Volta family, not the Zaccaria: William Adam, 537 (Est eciam quoddam castrum in terra firma Turchorum [...] cuius dominium partim est predictorum dominorum qui in supradicta insula dominantur). Our knowledge of the actual domain of the Genoese on the Turkish mainland remains patchy, for a discussion see Lemarle, Aydin, 53-4; H. Ahrweiler, ‘L’histoire et la géographie de la région de Smyrne entre les deux occupations Turques (1081-1317), particulièrement au XIIIe siècle’, Travaux et Mémoires 1 (1965), 1-165, at 10, 41.  

Balard, Romanie génoise, l. 468.
2.2. **Resistance of the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers to Turkish Expansion in the Eastern Aegean**

2.2.1. *The earliest major conflict with the Turks: an important naval battle near Chios in 1319*

By the end of the second decade of the fourteenth century, Martino Zaccaria had begun to eclipse the deeds of his brother and become the real figurehead of the Zaccaria family in the Aegean, and it is through his military exploits against the Turks, more than anything else, that Martino gained his great reputation. One of the earliest and most explicit demonstrations of this can be found in the summer of 1319 where his force, allied with that of the Hospitallers of Rhodes under the command of Albert III of Schwarzburg, the Grand Preceptor of the Hospital, destroyed a superior Turkish force, probably dispatched by Emir Mehmed of Aydin, off the coast of Chios.\(^{46}\)

The battle is recorded in two letters written to the pope, one from Albert of Schwarzburg himself, the other from Gerard of Pins, who was acting as the temporary papal governor (*vicarius*) of the Order. These letters, which describe the encounter in great detail and provide an unusually descriptive account of a Turkish-Christian naval conflict in the Aegean, have been published in full by Joseph Delaville le Roulx and Ludwig Gatto.\(^{47}\) Because of the notable richness of each account, the event is worth recounting here in detail.

In June the Hospitallers at Rhodes learned that the Turks of Ephesos (Aydin) had assembled a fleet of 32 vessels which were to be used for an imminent attack on Chios and the neighbouring islands:

<p align="center"></p>

Certainly, most holy father, in those past days the perfidious Turkish enemies of the Christian faith have newly arrived in some areas of

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\(^{46}\) For Mehmed see Lemerle, *Aydin*, 30. Mehmed ruled from c.1308-25.

\(^{47}\) The letters are summarised in JXXII *Communes*, ii. nr. 8374, 10269. The full text of the letter of Gerard of Pins (nr. 8374) is published in Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 337-8. The full text of the letter of Albert of Schwarzburg (nr. 10269) is published in Delaville le Roux, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, 365-7. An account of the episode is also given by Delaville le Roux, *Hospitaliers à Rhodes*, 8-9; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 331-2; Argenti, *Chios*, 57-8; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers at Rhodes’, 288-9. For a more fanciful account, with apparently no bearing on the sources, and the misidentification of Orkhan the son of Osman as the leader of the Turkish fleet, see W. Porter, *A History of the Knights of Malta or the Order of the Hospital of St. John of Jerusalem*, 2 vols (London, 1858), i. 222-3.
Rhodes and have armed 32 vessels, as was publicly said, to destroy the island of Chios and they intend to go subsequently to the other islands of Romania.48

From the two letters it is evident that in the same month Albert of Schwarzburg raised a fleet of around 24 ships to be used for the impending conflict. The force probably consisted of three galleys, two horse transports (uxeriae) and nineteen other vessels (a combination of parescalmi, barcae and lignae) together with eighty brethren and other mounted soldiers.49 According to Schwarzburg’s letter, the Hospitallers arranged to rendez-vous with Martino Zaccaria and his fleet of ‘one galley and six to eight [other] boats and ships’ at Chios at the end of June.50 Whilst at Chios, Schwarzburg learned that the Turks were preparing to sail from Ephesos with 2,600 men, ten galleys, and nineteen other armed vessels of sixty-eighty oarsmen each.51 Both sources agree that the Christian fleet remained at Chios for some time, until it advanced from the port on Monday 23 July, the day of the battle.52

Upon hearing news of the advance of the Turkish fleet, the Hospitallers, along with Martino Zaccaria and his vessels, sailed out to a distance of two miles looking for the Turks and ‘found them near the lands of Chios at about the hour of Vespers’.53 At this point, a fleet of eleven galleys ‘arrived unexpectedly from Genoa’. At first the Hospitallers were wary that these may have been Byzantine vessels, taking the side of the Turks, but after sending out scouts, they were identified as allies. Once the Christians had received this reassurance, they ‘bravely proceeded in battle line against the Turks and attacked them immediately at that hour’.54 According to Gerard of Pins the battle was ‘hard and cruel’, but the Christian galleys gained the upper hand after

49 Albert’s letter reads: ‘galleys, husseria cum equis [horse transports], lignae, parescalmi, and armed barcas both large and small, numbering 24, with 80 brethren and other mounted soldiers’: Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365; Gerard of Pins’s letter reads: ‘three galleys and two uxeria with some other parastalmi’. Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 337.
50 una sua galea et VI vel VIII barcis et lignis: Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 366.
51 Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365.
54 Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 366; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 338.
the first blow. The Turkish armada was heavily defeated; Schwarzburg claimed that 3,000 Turks were killed or captured and only 400 managed to escape with six small vessels because of the approaching darkness. These figures are probably exaggerated and Gerard of Pins has suggested the more plausible figure of 2,000 Turks killed or wounded and 20 ships lost, with twelve escaping in the night. After the battle, the Hospitaller fleet put in at Leros on their return to Rhodes. Here the Knights re-took the castle on the island, which had been previously under their control but had been seized by over 2,000 Greek rebels earlier in the year. Once the castle had been captured, the Greek survivors were brought back to Rhodes and sold into captivity.

2.2.2. Dating of the battle

As this battle constituted one of the largest Latin conflicts with the Turks before the victory at Adramyttion by the fleet of the naval league in 1334, it is important to determine exactly when it occurred. Despite the battle being extremely well documented, with two detailed accounts surviving, some confusion over the exact year of the encounter still exists. This ambiguity has stemmed from the inaccurate dating of one of the two principal sources for the battle, which have been used in the calendar of common letters for John XXII. The first being the letter of Gerard of Pins to the pope, dated 1 September 1318. The second being the letter of Albert of Schwarzburg to the pope, dated 3 September 1319. There is no doubt that the two letters recount the same event, which means that one of the letters has been incorrectly dated. These dates have, in turn, influenced the descriptions of historians, with the majority of scholars favouring 1319, but some, such as Gatto, Hill and Pistarino favouring 1318.

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56 Delaville le Roux, Hospitalliers à Rhodes, 366.
57 Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 338, 332, n. 1; Argenti, Chios, 58, n. 2.
60 JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 10269; Delaville le Roux, Hospitalliers à Rhodes, 365-7.
To add to the confusion, both letters have been published in full: the letter of Albert of Schwarzburg in the early twentieth century, by Delaville le Roulx, and the letter of Gerard of Pins by Gatto in the 1950s. Delaville le Roulx did not refer to Gerard of Pins’s letter in his work, Gatto, on the other hand, referred to both letters in his work but has made no effort to rectify the obvious discrepancy in the dates, instead maintaining that the battle was fought on 23 July 1318, and that both letters were written in September 1318. Likewise, Philip Argenti, has referenced both letters, dating them to 1319, but has provided no explanation for the anomaly in the two documents. The confusion over the year of the battle has led certain scholars to assume that there were in fact two separate battles which were reported to the pope. Housley has referenced the letter of Gerard of Pins in the papal registers (1318) and Delaville le Roulx’s transcript of Albert of Schwarzburg’s letter (1319) as providing details of two different battles, when in fact they recount the same event. Similarly, Anthony Luttrell has, at times, claimed that more than one battle took place.

Thus the discrepancy in the dating of the sources needs to be explained. Both documents recall that the battle was fought on 23 July of the second Indiction of their respective years; this can be 1318 if the Greek indiction is used (commencing on 1 September), or 1319 if the Bedan indiction is adopted (commencing on 24 September). However, one particular passage of Albert of Schwarzburg’s letter states that the battle was fought on Monday the 23 July – as the 23 July only fell on a Monday in 1319, then it must be assumed that the battle was fought in 1319 and not 1318 (the date used for Gerard of Pins’s letter in the papal registers and that given by Gatto). To clarify the sequence of events: the battle took place on Monday 23 July 1319. In September of that year both Gerard of Pins and Albert of Schwarzburg wrote

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(Thorbecke, 1980), 243-66, at 253, n. 39 (reprinted in LVR2, item I); Zachariadou, Trade, 14, n. 54; Idem, ‘Holy war in the Aegean’, 215, n. 20.


64 Argenti, Chios, 58, n. 3.

65 Housley, Avignon, 289, n. 126.

66 Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers at Rhodes’, 288-9, who claims there were three battles in 1318, 1319 and 1320. This is altered to two battles in 1318 and 1319: Luttrell, ‘Corrigenda et Addenda’, 288-9 (LVR1 item XXV). This is corrected to one battle in Luttrell, ‘Prospectives’, 253, n. 39.

67 This has been discussed by Luttrell, ‘Cos’, 404, n. 30; Luttrell, ‘Prospectives’, 253, n. 39.

68 Luttrell, ‘Chios’, 404, n. 30; see also Sources for Turkish History in the Hospitallers’ Rhodian Archive, 31.

69 die lune de mane XXIII mensis juli, secunda indictione: Delaville le Roulx, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 365.
to Pope John XXII to announce the victory, the letter of Gerard of Pins has been mistakenly dated to 1318. It is even possible that a coin minted by Martino Zaccaria displayed the figure of St John in specific reference to the battle, which was fought on the eve of the Feast of St John.\footnote{This is claimed by Mazarakis, ‘Chios mint’, 49, 52.}

\subsection*{2.2.3. Additional conflicts with the Turks}

Although it is clear that only one major naval battle took place off Chios in 1319, there is evidence to suggest that other encounters between the Hospitallers, Genoese and Turks occurred in the years immediately before and after this year. The problematic dating of many of these accounts merely highlights the ambiguity surrounding the early conflicts between the forces of the Turkish emirates and the Christians. This is especially the case with any Hospitaller operations against the Turks between the years 1313-1319, where evidence is particularly scarce.

In a letter sent by John XXII to Albert of Schwarzburg, dated 1 March 1319, the pope wrote that he had recently been informed of a victory of the Hospitaller fleet ‘against the enemies of the Christian faith’.\footnote{The pope wrote that Albert had ‘carried back the palm of victory’, in reference to this victory. Full text in Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 343-4, quote at 343; summary in JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 9026.} This allusion to an earlier encounter may be a reference to the Hospitaller battles with the allied Genoese and Menteshe Turks in 1312-13 (the years when Schwarzburg was probably Grand Preceptor), but the tenor of the letter suggests that Schwarzburg had achieved other more recent victories over the Turks, possibly allied with the Zaccaria in 1317 or 1318. This is certainly plausible, and is supported by the account of William Adam who, writing sometime before 1319, noted that the Turks did not dare to inhabit parts of the Asia Minor coast ‘because of the said lords of the said island [of Chios] who do not permit them to rest there’.\footnote{William Adam, 537; Lemerle, Aydin, 53.}

Furthermore, a similar battle to that of 1319 has been described by Giovanni Villani, but is dated to 1320. He wrote that a Turkish admiral, with a fleet of over eighty galleys and other vessels, went to attack the island of Rhodes. The Hospitaller commander of Rhodes, with four galleys and 20 smaller ships and accompanied by six Genoese galleys, who were returning from Armenia (Erminia), intercepted the Turkish
fleet. They fought with the Turks and defeated them, capturing a large part of their fleet and sinking the rest. Next, they went to a small island where there were around 5,000-10,000 Turks. Here the Christians captured them all and, after killing the old, sold the young into slavery.\textsuperscript{73} The numbers of the fleet given by Villani are very similar to the battle of 1319 – the Hospitallers had ‘four galleys and 20 smaller vessels’ allied with ‘six Genoese galleys’.\textsuperscript{74} As in 1319, they were far outnumbered by the Turkish forces, which consisted of ‘eighty galleys and other vessels’.\textsuperscript{75} The similarities between this battle and that of 1319 suggest that Villani may have been recounting the same event, but had incorrectly dated the battle of 1319 to 1320.\textsuperscript{76} This is possible as Villani probably began recording what he saw in the later 1320s, and not at the time when he would have heard of the news of the battle.\textsuperscript{77}

A Latin version of the travels of Ludolf of Sudheim, a pilgrim who visited the East between 1336 and 1341, describes another Hospitaller-Genoese victory over the Turks. According to Sudheim, 50 Turkish vessels were chased to Kos (Lango) by the Hospitallers, who were then defeated by their Turkish opponents and pursued into the hinterland of the island. On hearing this, Martino Zaccaria of Chios (Nycolao de Sya) sailed to rescue the Christians. According to the author 6,260 Turks were killed (with an English woman killing over 1,000 of them!).\textsuperscript{78} Sudheim provides no date for this battle, and his account is obviously highly unreliable, not least because his journey to

\textsuperscript{73} The numbers of Turks captured varies according to what edition of Villani is used. 5,000 is given in the Porta edition (vol. ii. bk. 10, p. 323), 10,000 is given in the Muratori edition: Florentini Historia Universalis, ed. L.A. Muratori, RIS 13 (Milan, 1728), cols. 1-1002, at 501.

\textsuperscript{74} il comandator di Rodi con IIII galee e con XX piccioli legni, e coll’aiuto di VI galee de’ Genovesi: Villani, ii. bk. 10, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{75} LXXX tra galee e altri legni: Villani, ii. bk. 10, p. 323.

\textsuperscript{76} Luttrell has adopted this view by suggesting that ‘the battle mistakenly described as occurring in 1320 derives from a wrongly dated account of that of 1319’: Luttrell, ‘Corrigenda et addenda’, 288-9, at 288. The battle is also reported in the Annales Ecclesiastici, where Villani is the source, and dated to 1322. The author mentions that the island was attacked by the Turks throughout these times and that historians are in disagreement about date of this battle, suggesting that there perhaps only one battle occurred: AE, xxiv. nr. 47, p. 187. Wittek has dated the battle to 1320/21: Wittek, Mentescche, 65-6. The battle is also mentioned by a number of authors who accept Villani’s date of 1320: Delaville le Rouix, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 79, n. 1; Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 330, n. 4; Zachariadou, TC, 14, n. 55; Idem, ‘Holy war in the Aegean’, 215, n. 21.

\textsuperscript{77} Villani probably began recording what he saw after 1322 and began writing his account sometime between the mid 1320s and early 1330s. The narrative of Villani’s work for these years also focuses primarily on factional conflicts within Florence, and not on events in the wider world (i.e. the Aegean): L. Green, Chronicle Into History: An Essay on the Interpretation of History in Florentine Fourteenth-Century Chronicles (Cambridge, 1972), 164-9.

the East and composition of his work began at least a decade after the events he was recounting. Luttrell has suggested that Sudheim’s account may be a garbled version of the account given by a Cypriot source. This account is brief, and merely stated that in 1319 the vessels of the Knights of Rhodes had defeated a Turkish fleet off Chios, leaving 3,000 Turks dead or wounded. Neither of these descriptions provide any further clue regarding the date of another battle with the Turks, in fact these reports, and that of Villani, were all probably recounting a confused version of the original battle of 1319.

However, the account of William Adam and the allusions to past conflicts in the papal letters do suggest that the Hospitallers and the Zaccaria of Chios were engaged in more widespread military action against the Turkish emirates, rather than just the one isolated battle which occurred in 1319. In the context of the emerging power of the emirate of Aydin these conflicts are extremely important. They are evidence that the Aydin Turks had sufficient maritime capabilities and manpower to consider the possible conquest of Chios, and that the Latins too were able to mobilise significant forces to resist them. In an effort to do this more effectively, the Genoese and the Hospitallers had also put aside their differences to form a united front against the Turks. Furthermore, these events had not escaped the notice of those in western Europe: the various garbled and misdated reports of battles between the Turks and Christians at this time undoubtedly stemmed from the accounts given to Pope John XXII in September 1319.

This contests Zachariadou’s argument that the Turks did not pose a significant threat to the Latins before their alliance with the Catalans of Athens in 1318, and that their raids off the coast of Asia Minor at this time were ‘rare and on a small scale’. The letter of congratulations from the pope in March 1319 and the battle off Chios later in that year are evidence of the important role which the Genoese and the Hospitallers played in combating Turkish incursions into the Aegean. These events challenge the presumption that Venice was the first of the Christian Aegean powers to

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79 Luttrell, Town of Rhodes, 216; Idem, ‘Cos’, 403-4.
80 Chroniques d’Amadi et de Strambaldí, i. 400.
81 Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 822-3.
feel the brunt of the Turkish attacks.\textsuperscript{82} Indeed, from the above accounts, it is clear that the Turkish attacks were more than just an effort to create a deserted buffer-zone.\textsuperscript{83} The geographical position of Rhodes and Chios alone, both of which lie within eyesight of the Turkish coast, provide a reason for why these islands, and not those of the Venetians who occupied the territories towards the west of the Aegean, came under more sustained attack from the Turks in the second decade of the fourteenth century.

2.3. Relations with the Papacy and the Rise of Martino Zaccaria

2.3.1. Papal support for the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers

Pope John XXII clearly understood the importance of the Hospitaller and Genoese naval victories and rewarded the participants for their efforts. Albert of Schwarzburg, in particular, benefitted from the concessions of the pontiff. Since 1312, when he was granted the grand-preceptorship of Cyprus for half of its value by Fulk of Villaret (30,000 instead of 60,000 bezants per year), Schwarzburg had been on bad terms with his fellow brethren. After refusing to pay the required rent for his position he was removed from Cyprus by John XXII in 1317. Schwarzburg was only restored to his former position once the pope had learned of his successes against the Turks in March 1319. This was at the same time as the pope granted him the Commandery of Kos (Lango), if he could recover it from the infidel Turks. In addition to this, he allowed the Hospitallers to split the Grand Commandery of Cyprus in half so that Schwarzburg could continue his role there. John XXII also took measures to protect the Hospitallers from potential bankruptcy, possibly because he realised the importance of their role in the Aegean and understood that their actions against the Turks and the conquest of Rhodes had cost the Order dearly. So, in order to save the Hospitallers, John XXII introduced a series of financial reforms on their behalf and, in 1319, intervened to instate Hélion of Villeneuve, an able administrator, as the next grand master (1319-46).

It has been seen in the previous chapter that John XXII also granted the Zaccaria spiritual and temporal rewards for the services against the Turks, in the form of the mastic trade licence in 1320 and grant of indulgences in 1323. Both of these

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84 Hill, Cyprus, ii. 274.
85 Full text in Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 341-3; JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 9025; Luttrell, ‘Cos’, 403. Also see Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 343-4; summary in JXXII Communes, ii. nr. 9026.
86 The other half of the Grand Commandery of Cyprus was granted to Maurice of Pagnac. Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 339-44; JXII Communes, ii. 9022-3, 9025-6; Hill, Cyprus, ii. 274-5.
87 A detailed study of Hospitaller debts has been carried out by A.T. Luttrell, ‘The Hospitallers and their Florentine bankers: 1306-1346’, Karrissime Gotifide: Historical Essays Presented to Professor Godfrey Wettinger on his Seventieth Birthday, ed. P. Xuereb, (Msida, 1999), 17-24, at 18-19 (reprinted in LVR5, item VI). See also: Mollat, Popes, 19-20; Housley, Avignon, 284-5. There is much material in the papal registers relating to Hospitaller debts, see for example: JXXII Secrètes, i. nr. 236, 320, 453-4, 728, 917-8; JXXII Communes, i. nr. 4450-72; ii. nr. 5691, 6929, 7316-23, 7596, 7604; iii. nr. 13407; iv. nr. 14454.
88 See above, ch. 1, pp. 70-3.
privileges were granted through petitions from the Zaccaria, which were summarised in the papal responses. These documents are consequently very informative for establishing how the Zaccaria projected their own motivations to the papacy and the rest of Europe. It is sometimes claimed that mercantile families such as the Zaccaria were devoid of pious motivations; Runciman and Atiya would have it that they used the Crusade merely a veneer to exploit economic advantage.\(^\text{89}\) This, in some senses, may be true. After all, the Zaccaria, in defending the Christians of the Aegean, were also defending their own interests – the mastic farms on Chios, the alum mines at Phokaia and the trade routes which their industry relied upon. It is natural for any state to defend itself when attacked and the Zaccaria may have just been fortunate that in protecting their own realm they were also acting as defenders of the faith. Whether this is the case or not, will never be known, but it is clear that the brothers were aware of their position in the Aegean, and made a conscious attempt to portray their actions as being motivated by a willingness to defend Christian lands from the Turks. This is most clearly represented in Martino Zaccaria’s petition for indulgences in 1323:

Since your petition, as presented to us, indeed stated that you and the island of Chios, which you command, are placed in the midst of the Turks and other infidel nations from whom it happens that you frequently suffer hostile taunts and many attacks, in which you have had numerous fine successes with strength granted to you by the right hand of the Lord, to whom we accordingly give humble expressions of thanks; and since it may thus sometimes happen that some of those faithful to Christ and paid troops (stipendiarii), whom you retain, at your own expense, with a view to suppressing the audacious deeds and heinous assaults of those same Turks and infidels, are wounded and die in encounters and battles with those same Turks and infidels, you have humbly requested

\(^{89}\) See Introduction, p. 11, for more on this.
us that we compassionately deign to make provision in this regard both for you and for them.  

Here, the petitioners had clearly made much of the numerous victories won by the Zaccaria over the Turks (presumably referring to events around 1319), that the family were paying for the employment of various soldiers from their own funds, and that the purpose of this force was to hold back the Turkish advances. The couching of their deeds in the language of the Crusade was evidently a success as the pope approved the request. The possibility that Martino Zaccaria had some genuine concern for his own spiritual wellbeing and that of his followers must also not be discounted. It is not known exactly what spiritual concessions Martino had requested, but those he received (indulgences in articulo mortis) had less of a recruitment benefit than those granted for participation alone, so they cannot be dismissed as being solely requested for practical reasons.

The high standing of Martino Zaccaria in the Aegean at this time is further illustrated by the final clause of the letter, which decreed that anyone attacking his possessions would incur sentence of excommunication:

[W]e determine and decree by the authority of the present communication that each and every person who presumes to make attacks or hostile assaults with those same Turks and infidels against you, or with them, against those same paid troops (stipendiarios) and faithful on the aforesaid Chios or other islands and lands adjacent or near to the Island of Chios or, with them, against that same Island of Chios, if they, as is foreseen, form any alliance, association or coalition with those Turks and infidels for the purpose of making such attacks or hostile assaults against you and the aforesaid paid troops (stipendiarios)

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91 It still must have been thought that participants would fight better if they had a guarantee of spiritual and material “wages”. Unfortunately it is extremely hard to gauge the response to these indulgences: Housley, Avignon, 133.
and faithful or knowingly give them help, advice or support in this regard, by that very deed shall incur sentence of excommunication.\textsuperscript{92}

This further demonstrates the importance attached to the Zaccaria for the defence of the faith by the Curia. It is also interesting to note that Venetian territories were included amongst those where the indulgences could be granted. The suggestion that some Venetians might fight for the Genoese Zaccaria is perhaps a reflection of the high regard with which they were considered by the pope at this time – the Venetians were also suffering from Turkish attacks in these years, but they did not receive the same levels of papal support for their anti-Turkish actions.\textsuperscript{93}

2.3.2. \textit{The effect of the papal concessions and the rise of Martino Zaccaria}

The amount of extra revenue the papal concession for mastic generated for the Zaccaria is extremely difficult to determine as very few records of mastic shipments exist for the period in question, especially to Mamluk lands.\textsuperscript{94} Nevertheless, various different sources provide glimpses of the wealth and prosperity of Chios and the Zaccaria in these years, which could plausibly have been a result of the papal privileges. Firstly, the trading concession must have been regarded as being effective by both the Zaccaria and the papacy, as it was renewed for four years in 1322 and for a further three years in 1325.\textsuperscript{95} At this time, the high quality of gold and silver coinage struck on the island also reflects a strong degree of economic prosperity, which David Metcalf has suggested was attributed to the ‘steady inflow of Byzantine and Italian money from the sale of mastic’.\textsuperscript{96} The contemporary Turkish \textit{Manaqeb al-‘arefin} also stated that Umur of Aydin had subjugated Chios (\textit{Saqez Adasi}) under the final years of

\textsuperscript{92} Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 345.
\textsuperscript{93} It is also surprising that they were asked to fight for the Zaccaria and not to participate in the campaigns against the Greeks and infidels in Achaia, where indulgences had been issued in the previous year.
\textsuperscript{94} For example, we know that a merchant traded mastic in Savona in 1327: \textit{Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l’Outremon: d’après les archives notariales génoises (1320-1400)}, ed. L. Liagre-de Sturler, 2 vols (Brussels, 1969), i. nr. 46.
\textsuperscript{95} For examples of the money the mastic trade brought to the Mahona of Chios, see Argenti, \textit{Chios}, i. 125, 268, 305.
\textsuperscript{96} Metcalf, \textit{Coinage of the Crusades}, 289-90. Also see G. Lunardi, \textit{Le monete delle colonie Genovesi} (Genoa, 1980), 179-88; Mazarakis, ‘Chios mint’, 51.
Martino’s rule, where the Turks carried away ‘more mastic than can be described’. In addition to this, it must also be considered that the brothers were still gaining significant funds from the shipment of alum to the West – as with mastic, records giving precise details of the alum trade at this time are scarce, but it is known that in 1322 and 1323 consignments were shipped to Southampton and Pisa, which may well have originated from Phokaia. Moreover, John Kantakouzenos wrote that during the late 1320s the income of Martino Zaccaria had reached 120,000 hyperpyra per year.

The size of the Zaccaria forces, as given by some of the crusade theorists, also suggest that the island was economically prosperous at this time. According to the *De Modo Sarracenos Extirpandi*, written by the Dominican friar William Adam in around 1316-17, the Turks were afraid to approach within twelve miles of Chios, because of the Zaccaria, who ‘maintained at all times and at their own expense, around one thousand infantry, one hundred cavalry, and two galleys, well equipped and choicely armed, for use against the Turks and the nearby Saracens’. In another tract, the *Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum*, written in 1331-2, the anonymous author commented on the modified galleys used by Martino Zaccaria in his fight against the Turks; these vessels were surrounded with a defensive wall and protected by large towers, capable of housing 400 men or more, and were armed with ballistae of different types. According to Nikephoros Gregoras, Martino had become so powerful that, by the late 1320s, he had forced several of the Turkish emirates to pay him tribute. The ability of Martino to afford such an army at his own expense was

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98 In 1322 alum was mentioned as one of the chief commodities confiscated from two Genoese dromonds which put into Southampton: A.A. Ruddock, *Italian Merchants and Shipping in Medieval Southampton: 1270-1600* (Southampton, 1951), 81, 142-3. Pegolotti mentioned that rock alum was sold at Pisa in 1323: Francesco Pegolotti, 208.
99 John Kantakouzenos, i. 371, 380; Lemerle, *Aydin*, 53; Pistorino, ‘Chio’, 15; Argenti, *Chios*, i. 61. This was roughly one fifth of Andronikos III’s annual revenue: Belles, *Mastiha Island*, 75-6.
100 For the dating of William Adam’s work, see Leopold, *Recover*, 39.
101 William Adam, 531.
102 ‘Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum’, 457. Also see R.C. Beazley, ‘Directorium ad faciendum passagium transmarinum II’, *The American Historical Review* 13.1 (1907), 66-115, at 75. The identification of the author of the *Directorium* remains unknown. It is unlikely to be Burcard of Mount Sion as some have claimed. The similarities between the work and the *De Modo Sarracenos Extirpandi* might suggest that William Adam was the author, but the evidence remains circumstantial. Full discussion in Leopold, *Recover*, 2-3; 43-4.
103 Nikephoros Gregoras, l. 438; Argenti, *Chios*, 60; Pistorino, ‘Chio’, 15; Zachariadou, TC, 9.
certainly a reflection of the prosperity of Chios during his reign, and it can be presumed that the benefits of the papal trade licence played a part in enabling him to maintain the force for over a decade.

There can be no doubt that the Zaccaria brothers, especially Martino, also benefitted from the heroic reputation which their exploits against the Turks gave rise to in the West. As has been seen, by the 1320s Martino’s fame had spread across Europe thanks to reports of his naval victories over the Turks. Praise for their exploits also came from the crusade theorists, in particular William Adam, who stated that ‘neither man nor woman, nor dog or cat, nor any living animal’ would have remained on any island near the Turks, ‘had not the said lords opposed [the Turks] manfully and powerfully’. To confirm this perception, the influential Marino Sanudo Torsello named Martino Zaccaria as a key player in his provisional anti-Turkish fleet sometime in the early 1320s. By this time, the Genoese of Chios were clearly considered by many in Europe, as well as in the East, as the ‘shield of defence’ against Turkish expansion.

Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that Martino took steps to cement his reputation as the principal Latin ruler in the Aegean, by forming stronger links with the Frankish lords of Greece and carving out his own dynasty in the area. By the mid 1320s he was referred to as the lord of Damalâ (on the eastern tip of the Argolid in the Morea) which he acquired sometime before 1325 through his marriage to Jacqueline de la Roche, and lord of Chalandritsa (in the north-east of the Morea), which he acquired in 1317, as well as the lord of Chios. In addition to these territories, he had also acquired the lordship of Veligosti (just south of the centre of the Morea) also through his marriage to Jacqueline de la Roche and seems to have controlled the harbour fortress of Smyrna. Martino’s eldest son, Bartolommeo also held land in Greece; he became marquis of Boudonitza in 1327 and was appointed lord of Damalâ.

105 Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber Secretorum’, ii. 30-1 (marginal note).
106 William Adam, 532.
by his father.\textsuperscript{108} The acquisition of these minor lordships must have improved Martino’s standing amongst the nobility of East and West, seeing as, in May 1325, Philip of Taranto and his wife Catherine of Valois bestowed upon him the grand title of King and Despot of Asia Minor. In doing so, they promised to grant him the islands of Chios (which he already governed), Marmara, Oenoussai (Fenosia), Tenedos, Lesbos, Samos, Icaria and Kos, in return for his assistance in conquering the Byzantine empire (Martino promised to provide Philip or his successors with 500 knights and six galleys a year for the campaign).\textsuperscript{109} Although this granting of titles was a somewhat hollow gesture, as Philip did not possess the territories to bestow them in the first place, the decision of Philip and his wife (with their strong links to the French and Angevin royal families) to trust their dynastic ambitions to Martino Zaccaria demonstrates how powerful he had become in the Aegean and how widely his reputation had spread.

At the same time as forming ties with the nobility of Frankish Greece, Martino also took overt steps to free himself from Byzantine suzerainty and exclude his brother from the co-rulership of Chios. He made clear attempts to extend his realm beyond the emperor’s patrimony in Chios by issuing coinage bearing his name alone in Damalâ, which bore no reference to imperial sovereignty.\textsuperscript{110} He also minted a new currency, bearing only his name in Chios, thus scrapping the dual-name coinage he had shared with his brother before.\textsuperscript{111} By 1322 papal letters exist addressed only to Martino

\textsuperscript{108} Bartolommeo died in c.1334 and was succeeded by his younger brother, Centurione: Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 325. Bartolommeo received half of Boudonitza in 1312 when he married the daughter of Maria, the Marchioness of Boudonitza: W. Miller, Essays on the Latin Orient (Cambridge, 1921), 250. Also see Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 12, nr. 38, 40, 194, 202.

\textsuperscript{109} The full text of this document is published in Saggio di codice diplomatico, ii. nr. 60, pp. 75-7. Minieri Riccio gives the date as 1315, but ‘MCCCXV’ does not agree with ‘Octave Indictionis’, instead the date should read 1325: A discussion of the correct dating for the document is provided in Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 48, n. 27; A.T. Luttrell, ‘The Latins of Argos and Nauplia: 1311-1394’, PBSR 34 (1966), 34-55, at 52, n. 128. Recently Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 326, and R.-J. Loenertz, Les Ghisi: Dynastes vénitiens dans l’archipel, 1207-1390 (Florence, 1975), 108, have adopted the incorrect dating of this document. As well as the fact that 1315 and the eight indiction do not tally, it makes far more sense for Martino Zaccaria to have been made Despot of Asia Minor in 1325, when the Angevin expedition to Morea was underway and Martino had gained a reputation for himself, than in 1315, when he had only become co-ruler of Chios a year before, and was not yet renowned for his exploits in the Aegean. For more on this in general, see Laiou, Constantinople, 318-9; Topping, ‘Morea’, 120; Argenti, Chios, i. 59; Pistorino, ‘Chio’, 16.

\textsuperscript{110} They had ‘M.ZACHARIE’ on one side, and ‘CIVITAS SYI’ on the other: Promis, Zecca, 37; Schlumberger, Numismatique, ii. 326.

\textsuperscript{111} Variants of: ‘M.Z.S.IMPATOR’, (Martinus Zaccarie servus imperatoris): Schlumberger, Numismatique, ii. 326, 415-6; Mazarakis, ‘Martinello’, 117; idem, ‘Chios mint’, 46-9, 52; Promis, Zecca, 36-7. See also: Argenti, Chios, i. 59-60; Lemerle, Aydin, 53.
Zaccaria, and not with his brother as before. Eventually Martino attempted to force his brother to renounce his co-governance of Chios in return for an annuity of 6000 gold coins from the revenue of the island. The discord between the two brothers had become so great that, in 1328, John XXII wrote to the brothers urging them to settle their differences.

### 2.3.3. The collapse of the Zaccaria dominion in the Aegean

Martino Zaccaria may have been exacting tribute from some of the Turks in the latter 1320s, but this does not mean to say that he was at peace with all of them. In the years immediately preceding the loss of Chios in 1329, cracks in the Zaccaria Aegean empire were beginning to show. From around 1326 Umur, the son of Emir Mehmed of Aydin, laid siege to the Genoese castle in the harbour of Smyrna, which he took in 1328/9. In 1327 he also launched naval attacks on the Zaccaria lands in the Morea (primarily Damalâ), in an effort to draw military resources away from the conflict in Smyrna. Martino was obviously weakened from the concerted attacks of Umur, and although he had the resources to begin the construction of a castle in Chios town, he was unable to resist the arrival of an army, under the command of the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos and apparently allied with the Venetian duke of Naxos, which took the island in September 1329. According to Kantakouzenos,

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112 This is the renewal of the mastic licence, the first document was addressed to Martino and Benedetto II: ch. 1, pp. 70-3; Mazarakis, ‘Martinello’, 117.
113 Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 49.
115 The upper fortress of Smyrna, Palaion-Kastron, was taken by Mehmed beg, father of Umur in 1317. The castle in the harbour remained in Genoese hands until before the Byzantine expedition to Chios in September 1329: Inalcik, ‘The rise of the Turkish maritime principalities in Anatolia’, 189, n. 37; Zachariadou, *TC*, 16; Lemerle, *Aydin*, 54-56; Ahrweiler, ‘Smyrne’, 41. Ibn Battuta visited Smyrna in 1333 and reported that it was mostly in ruins. This was probably a result of Umur’s siege of the port and citadel a few years before: Ibn Battuta, *The Travels*, trans. H.A.R. Gibb et al., 5 vols (Cambridge, 1958-2000), ii. 445.
Martino would have been torn to pieces by the disgruntled Greek population if he had not been taken to Constantinople, where he was imprisoned until 1337. It is not surprising that Andronikos III wished to seize Chios from Martino: his construction of the castle at Chios town, which was in breach of the terms of his investiture, and willingness to side with Philip of Taranto, the titular Latin emperor of Constantinople, were open provocations of the Greeks. The attacks by Umur of Aydin, provided the emperor with the ideal opportunity.

The loss of Smyrna and Chios within such a short amount of time somewhat contradicts the strong image of Martino Zaccaria as portrayed in the western sources, perhaps calling into question the effectiveness of the papal favours granted to him. However, if the Greek and Turkish sources are analysed closely, some explanations for why Martino’s dominion collapsed so quickly can be formulated. Firstly, it is clear from the Düstûrnâme of the Turkish poet Enveri that Martino deliberately withdrew his forces from the citadel of Smyrna, before it fell to the forces of Aydin. This was done either in an effort to bolster the garrison at Chios, as suggested by Lemerle, or because Martino had reached an agreement with Umur. Secondly, it is clear from the account of John Kantakouzenos that the island of Chios fell to the treachery of Benedetto II Zaccaria more than any military weakness on behalf of his brother. According to Kantakouzenos, once the imperial forces had disembarked and approached Chios town, Benedetto II, who was in command of one of the fortresses, handed it over to the emperor. Martino duly surrendered in the face of overwhelming opposition. The fact that Martino had initially refused to surrender to Andronikos III,

118 Kantakouzenos, i. 385; Lemerle, Aydin, 57. Leon Kalothetos, a friend of Kantakouzenos, became the new governor of Chios.
119 Enveri, verses 139-44.
120 Lemerle has suggested that the fortress of Smyrna was impregnable and otherwise would have remained in Genoese hands: Lemerle, Aydin, 57. Inalcik uses a passage from the contemporary Manaqeb al-‘arefin to argue that Martino had sought Umur’s protection: Inalcik, ‘Turkish maritime principalities’, 190-1. However, it seems unlikely, as the Manaqeb states, that Umur had conquered Chios before the arrival of Andronikos III: Shams al-Din Ahmad-e Aflaki, 665. He had attacked the island after the Byzantine recapture in 1329, this assault was repelled by the Greeks, but the brothers still managed to gain much booty: Lemerle, Aydin, 59-61. Ibn Battuta was sold a Greek slave girl by Umur, she was probably captured from Chios at the time of the Turkish attack: Ibn Battuta, 446.
121 Once the imperial forces had disembarked and approached the town, Benedetto II, who was in command of one of the fortresses, handed it over to the emperor. Martino duly surrendered in the face of overwhelming opposition: Kantakouzenos, i. 370-91; Argenti, Chios, i. 62-8. The betrayal of Benedetto is corroborated by Jacob of Voragine Continuator, ‘Anonymous Continuation of Jacopo de Voragine: 1296-1332’, ed. G. Monleone, Cronica di Genova dalle origini al 1247, FSI 84, 3 vols (Rome, 1941), i. 485.
suggests that he was confident of victory over the Greeks. This account seems plausible and agrees with what is known about the fractured relationship between the two brothers. Martino Zaccaria may well have maintained a force capable of defending Chios alone from external attack, but it is likely that manpower shortages prevented him from being able to adequately extend his protection to the other Zaccaria possessions in the region (this was clearly the case at Smyrna). Thus Pope John XXII’s call for men to aid the Zaccaria against the Turks in exchange for indulgences would seem to be a necessary but ultimately unsuccessful measure. More than anything, it was Martino’s neglect of his brother, coupled with the appearance of two highly competent generals in Andronikos III and Umur of Aydin, which caused the ultimate collapse of Martino Zaccaria’s dominion in the Aegean.122

Chapter 2 Overview

As has been seen in this chapter, the defence of the Aegean was reliant on the close cooperation of the papacy and those Latins operating in the region. This was demonstrated by the Zaccaria, a powerful family of Genoese merchants who became rulers of Chios and, in alliance with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, formed the backbone of Latin resistance against the Turks. In contrast to what is often assumed, it was they who most effectively resisted Turkish attacks during this period and not the Venetians. This was recognised by the pope, who granted the brothers Martino and Benedetto II a trade licence allowing them to export mastic to the Mamluk sultanate. The trade licence is of the utmost importance to this study for two reasons: firstly, it shows that the defence of Latin colonies from the attacks of the Turkish maritime emirates was considered as more important than enforcing the trade embargo on Egypt, meaning that the Turks were starting to become regarded as the primary Muslim threat in the eastern Mediterranean; secondly, the concepts of trade and crusade were becoming blended together in the thinking of the Curia and the merchants operating in the East:

122 Benedetto II refused Andronikos’s offer to govern Chios. After falling out with the emperor, he attempted to retake the island by force. This failed and Benedetto died shortly after. For these events, see Argenti, Chios, i. 66-8; Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 49-50.
the Zaccaria couched the defence of their trade routes as the defence of the faith, and
the pope granted commercial privileges, alongside spiritual rewards, to facilitate the
merchants’ anti-Turkish activities.

The success of these measures is hard to establish. Martino Zaccaria certainly
accrued much wealth during his time as lord of Chios. He even extended his Aegean
empire into the Morea and was made King and Despot of Asia Minor by Philip of
Taranto. However, Martino overextended himself and lost his territories after
successive attacks from Umur of Aydin and the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III. The
Zaccaria control of Chios demonstrated that mercantile families could survive in the
region and prosper against the Turks with papal support, but there were limits to this.
The alienation of both Greeks and Turks was evidently too great to bear.
Chapter 3. The Venetians in the Aegean: Conflicts and Alliances

3.1. Venetian Establishment and Activity in the Aegean during the Early Decades of the Fourteenth Century

By the end of the thirteenth century, Venetian possessions in the Aegean area included the large islands of Crete in the southern Aegean, Negroponte in the western Aegean and the district of Modon-Coron on the south-eastern tip of the Morea, as well as a scattering of other smaller islands and districts. These regions were extremely important for the defence and expansion of Venetian trade in the eastern Mediterranean, primarily because they offered protection for the trade routes running from Constantinople to the western Mediterranean. In the context of the highly fragmented political situation in Romania, the size of the Venetian possessions, coupled with the power of a maritime empire behind them, made Venice of great importance. Crete, in particular, was the dominant island in the region, and was said to be the most prized of Venetian colonies overseas. For this reason, Venetian assistance in any crusade to the Aegean was highly valued.

Venice, in contrast to Genoa, had a strongly centralised government arranged into various councils and headed by the doge. These councils made decisions based on news from abroad and sent orders to their citizens in the East to carry out. Fortunately many of the deliberations surrounding the decisions made by the administration have been preserved in the archives of Venice, and it is therefore possible to provide a detailed outline of Venetian policy in the Aegean.\(^1\) Over the course of this chapter it shall be shown how this policy shifted from one based on participation in a crusade to recover Constantinople, and indifference to the Turks, to one based on mutual cooperation with the Byzantines and other Latin states in the Aegean, against the Turks and their Catalan allies. Although the Venetians did not always cooperate with the papacy in Aegean affairs, their plans for a naval league, as suggested by the likes of Marino Sanudo Torsello, would come to dictate crusading policy in the Aegean for the time period covered in this study.

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\(^1\) The Venetian archives have been discussed in more detail in Introduction, p. 20.
3.1.1. Early Venetian contact with the Turks

As Zachariadou has pointed out, materials which shed light on Venetian relations with the Turkish emirates during the first decades of the fourteenth century are extremely scarce. Two important sources for this, the deliberations of the Venetian Senate and the decisions of the Cretan Great Council do not survive before 1332 and 1344 respectively. Nevertheless, some examples of commercial exchange between Venetian merchants and those from the Turkish emirates do survive for the first years of the century. In 1301 and 1302 Venetian traders were present in the port of Makre on the Turkish mainland, where they exchanged various commodities. In the same years, two rulings of the Venetian Senate showed that horses were being imported from Turkey to Crete: one from 3 November 1300 stated that money coming from penalties imposed on Cretan feudatories was to be reserved for the purchase of horses from Turkey; the other, from 3 June 1302, approved the loan of money to those Cretans who wished to import Turkish horses to the island. It is also likely that the Venetian authorities on Crete concluded a commercial agreement with the emirate of Menteshe sometime before 1318. This treaty, as with others later in the century, was almost certainly delegated by the mother city to the Venetian authorities on Crete.

After a long period of peaceful coexistence the Venetians suffered the first Turkish attacks on their colonies in the summer of 1318. One explanation for the peaceful coexistence before this time is that many of the Turkish emirates were busy fighting the Byzantines on land and the Genoese and Hospitallers in the eastern Aegean islands. The Venetians, situated as they were in the west of the Aegean and on the mainland of Greece, were not convenient targets at this stage. It is also worth noting that the Venetians were pursuing the most beneficial policy for the Republic at this point; the Byzantines, Genoese and Hospitallers who were resisting the Turks were rivals of the Venetians, so whilst they were struggling against the Turks in Asia Minor and along the Aegean coast, Venice was trading peacefully with their enemies. Despite this, Venice had not always been on good terms with the Turks. The joint Byzantine-

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2 Zachariadou, TC, 3-5, esp. 5, n. 14.
3 Ibid., 4, n. 10.
4 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 1, nr. 20, 32, pp. 10, 16-17; Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 1, nr. 81, 205, pp. 20-1, 57; summary in TD, i. nr. 12, 59; Zachariadou, TC, 5.
5 Zachariadou, TC, 5.
Turkish defeats of the Venetians at Kos in 1283 and 1284 are examples of how both sides were willing to revert to force to protect their commercial interests. This policy was adopted by the Republic once Turkish maritime power had grown to the extent where attacks on Venetian territories were commonplace, after this point Venice became one of the primary advocates of an anti-Turkish crusade.

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6 Luttrell, ‘Cos’, 401.
3.2. **Truces and Alliances with the Turks and Catalans, 1302-1321**

3.2.1. **Combating Catalan piracy in the Aegean, 1314-1318**

Because of the concentration of her possessions in the western Aegean, Venice was involved to some extent in almost all of the campaigns launched in Frankish Greece during the first half of the fourteenth century. In these early years the primary enemy of Venice was the Catalan Company, which after seizing Athens in 1311, began to make ever more penetrating incursions into Venetian-ruled colonies (especially Negroponte) and to disrupt the Republic’s shipping in the Aegean. It was to be the Catalan alliance with the Turks which would signify the first Turkish attacks on Venetian possessions and a change in Venetian policy in the Aegean. For this reason, it is important to outline the pattern of Venetian conflict with the Catalans prior to 1318.

Since their arrival in the Aegean, the Catalans had made intermittent contact with the Venetians in the area. This developed into negotiations in 1307, when Venice, as an ally of Charles of Valois, helped to recruit the services of the Catalan Company for the crusade to Constantinople. From the outset, relations between the two sides were turbulent. A good example of this is given by Ramon Muntaner, who reported that the Venetian galleys carrying Charles’s ambassador, Theobald of Cepoy, attacked a contingent of Catalans at Negroponte before agreeing an alliance with them in the summer of 1307. Even after the Catalans had allied themselves to the cause of Charles of Valois, Venice, although now theoretically allied with the Company, still viewed them with suspicion. This would prove to be justifiable as in early September 1308 the Serenissima heard of Catalan plans to attack Negroponte and agreed to arm galleys for the defence of the island.

After the Catalans had seized the duchy of Athens in 1311, their piratical depredations against Venetian possessions in Greece and the Aegean increased. Andrea Dandolo wrote that in 1314 vessels were being sent by Venice for the ‘conservation of the island of Negroponte’ from these attacks. Two years later, the

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7 Ramon Muntaner, 130-4.
8 TD, i. nr. 150; Ramon Muntaner, 142-4.
9 Andrea Dandolo, *Chronica Brevis: 46-1342*, ed. E. Pastorello, RISNS 12.1 (Bologna, 1938), 329-73, at 371; cf. TD, nr. 227; Ptolemy of Lucca, ‘Clement V Secunda Vita (excerpt from *Historia Ecclesiastica*)’, *VPA*, i. 24-53, at 40 (in this edition of Ptolemy of Lucca the Turks are mentioned as allies of the Catalans
security of the area had declined further as the government took steps to reinforce the region with various dispatches of galleys: in April 1316 the Great Council agreed to send more ships to Negroponte and Crete, ‘for the persecution of pirates and the salvation of our people’, ¹⁰ and in December the Council of the Eighteen were given the task of preparing the armament of a fleet for the protection Negroponte and Romania from piracy. ¹¹ By 1318, clashes between the two sides were commonplace, such as in April, when a Venetian soldier, Albertino Barbaro, was seriously injured whilst ‘fighting manfully in the city of Negroponte against the Catalans’. He was later granted service in the Giustizia nuova in recognition of his service. ¹²

The Republic’s initial willingness to support the dynastic rights of certain Frankish lords in the region in an effort to defend Venetian territories from further Catalan attacks can be seen when, in 1315, the Venetian Senate agreed to assist Louis of Burgundy, who had been granted the principality of Achaia by Philip of Taranto, in his mission to relieve Angevin Morea from further depredations of the Company. ¹³

Since the lord prince of Achaia has written to us that he is intending to travel through our city to his principality and has sent messengers to enquire about his undermentioned voyage; the motion has been passed that four armed galleys of our commune, together with their fittings and weapons, be lent to him, with our commune being given good security that the galleys and our arms and items which he receives on loan from us be returned to our commune within two months after he departs from Venice and that the galleys themselves, when leaving and returning, may not be used to carry or bring any merchandise. Also, that the prince himself be granted licence to buy in Venice and take away 100 helmets, 200 crossbows, 40,000 arrows (falsatores), 300 shields and 20,000 horseshoes and 60,000 horseshoe nails, and wine and grain

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¹⁰ Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Clericus-Civicus, f. 38; summary in TD, i. nr. 347.
¹¹ Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Clericus-Civicus, f. 72; summary in TD, i. nr. 363.
¹² Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Clericus-Civicus, f. 147; summary in TD, i. nr. 399 (full text in Appendix, p. 305).
¹³ See above, ch. 1, p. 65.
appropriate for himself and his people and the horses, except that, for biscuits for the crews of the galleys, we shall have biscuits of the commune given to them. Also, that he may charter ships suitable for 150 horses.  

Louis, with Venetian assistance, reached his territories in Greece at around February 1316, after a delay of two years. His military expedition was a success as he defeated a Catalan army, under the command of Ferdinand of Majorca, at Manolada on 5 July, 1316. However, Venetian hopes that this would put an end to the Catalan domination of the region were dashed after Louis died of a fever only weeks after the battle and the principality fell to his widow Matilda of Hainault. Over the following two years Achaia reverted back to Angevin control as Matilda was forced to marry John of Gravina who became the new overlord of the principality.

As was shown in an earlier chapter, the Angevins, following Louis of Burgundy’s example, also attempted to secure Venetian aid for their planned campaigns to Achaia. In March 1317 the three brothers, Robert of Naples, Philip of Taranto and John of Gravina, wrote to Doge Giovanni Soranzo urging him to take action against the ravages of the Catalans in the Morea. Their pursuit of a Venetian alliance was supported by John XXII who also sent two letters to the doge exhorting the Republic to join an anti-Catalan coalition in the Aegean, but these offers were rejected. The refusal of the Republic to support Frankish action against the Catalans, as it had done in 1315-16, can be explained by the conclusion of a peace treaty sometime between 1316-17, between Venice and the Catalan Company. The details of the treaty remain obscure, but it seems to have applied to Venetian possessions in general, with the exception of those

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14 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Presbiter, f. 142; summary in TD, i. nr. 320 (full text in Appendix, p. 300).
15 Ferdinand was the younger son of James I of Majorca: Topping, ‘Morea’, 110-11; Laiou, Constantinople, 255.
18 DOC, nr. 89-91.
19 DOC, nr. 94, dated 8 May 1318; Commerce et expéditions, iii. nr. 8, pp. 43-4, dated 4 September 1319. See also: Setton, Domination, 26; Idem, Los catalanes, 21. The Angevin expeditions to Achaia and the papal support for these enterprises are discussed in ch. 1, pp. 65-70.
in the Morea, or those which had previously been at war with the Company (presumably including the Venetians of Negroponte).\textsuperscript{20} Despite this treaty, relations between the two sides worsened after the Catalan Company appointed a new and more aggressive vicar-general, Alfonso Fadrique, the illegitimate son of Frederick II of Sicily, in 1317.\textsuperscript{21} In March of that year, John of Gravina, Philip of Taranto and Robert of Sicily again wrote to the doge, informing him of the devastation inflicted by the Catalans under the command of Alfonso Fadrique, but as was the case before, no alliance was forthcoming.\textsuperscript{22} Venice was evidently confident of being able to deal with the Catalans on its own terms, and not get dragged into Angevin struggles in Achaia.

3.2.2. The Catalan-Turkish alliance and the first attacks on Venetian possessions

In contrast to the Catalans, Venetian interaction with the Turks for these early years, although very thinly illustrated in the sources, appears to have been carried out in an amiable manner. However, the policy of the Serenissima with regards to the Turks changed in the summer of 1318 after the Catalans formed a military alliance with the most powerful Turkish maritime emirates, especially that of Aydin.\textsuperscript{23}

In two letters dated June and July 1318, from the Duke of Crete, Niccolò Ziani, to the doge, attacks of the Turks and the Catalans on the Aegean islands are reported. These letters are especially important because they mark the first point at which the Venetians came into direct conflict with the fleets of the Turkish emirates. The first letter, dated 21 June 1318, reports that the Turks had inflicted ‘damage, depredation and much plunder on the islands of the Archipelago’.\textsuperscript{24} This included a raid on Santorini (ruled by Andre Borozi) where ‘many beasts and other things’ had been seized, as well as goods from Cretan merchants; and the sack of Karpathos (ruled by Andrea Corner) where the Turks, using a fleet of sixteen armed ships, had captured around three hundred men and animals and taken them back to Asia Minor. Finally, the duke of

\textsuperscript{20} The text of the treaty has not been preserved, although it is mentioned in a document of June 1318: \textit{DOC}, nr. 95; Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 241-2; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 825; Loenertz, \textit{Ghisi}, 136-7.
\textsuperscript{21} Setton, ‘Catalans’, 173; \textit{Idem, Domination}, 27.
\textsuperscript{22} \textit{DOC}, nr. 89-91 (17 and 18 March 1317).
\textsuperscript{23} Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 824. The Catalans had first formed ties with the Turks of Aydin during their campaigns in Asian Minor: Ramon Muntaner, 109-10; Enveri, verses 1085-1116.
\textsuperscript{24} \textit{DVL}, i. nr. 61, p. 107; \textit{DOC}, nr. 96, p. 115.
Crete warned that the Turks were preparing an attack on his island with 26 ships, five of which were thought to be Catalan vessels. In the second letter, written almost a month later, it is learned that the Turks had launched another attack on Santorini and were planning an attack on Negroponte with 24 small boats and armed vessels, which were to be complemented by two armed galleys supplied by ‘Lord Alfonso [Fadrique], the brother of King Frederick [of Sicily].’

The Catalan-Turkish alliance was corroborated in a report sent from the baillie of Negroponte, to the doge in June 1318:

On June 21 we learned from a trustworthy source that a ship of 48 oars has been armed at Athens. It is to carry two ambassadors [...] to the [Greek] emperor, and is to leave Athens tonight. We have also learned from the same reliable informant that another ship is being armed at Athens, which is to take [another] two ambassadors of Don Alfonso [Fadrique] [...] with two Turkish ambassadors into Turkey. They are going to enlist a goodly number of Turks, from 1,000 to 1,500.

However, the Turkish and Catalan attacks in these years did not trigger an immediate policy change from Venice. The Serenissima continued to refuse overtures from the pope and his Angevin allies for an anti-Catalan coalition in the Morea and instead preferred to negotiate peace with the Catalans. Examples of this can be found in June 1319 when a peace treaty was concluded for six months and again in 1321 and 1331, when the same treaty was renewed. But in the years between these treaties, Catalan piracy remained widespread and by the winter of 1321 piratical attacks against Venetian possessions had become intolerable. As before, these attacks were carried out by the Catalans with Turkish assistance, and once again, Venice aimed to negate them through a peace treaty with the Catalans, which was agreed in May 1321. The

25 DVL, i. nr. 61; DOC, nr. 96.
26 DVL, i. nr. 63, p. 110 (16 July 1318); DOC, nr. 101, p. 122.
29 DVL, i. nr. 70; DOC, nr. 109; Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 244-5; Loenertz, Ghisi, 144-6; Setton, Domination, 27, 34-5; Idem, ‘Catalans’, 179-80; Idem, Los catalanes, 14-15; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 829.
30 Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 5, nr. 205, p. 238.
clauses of this treaty give clear evidence of Catalan collusion with the Turks. They stipulated that Alfonso Fadrique was to not ally himself with the Turks ‘the enemies of the Catholic faith’. He was also forbidden from allowing the Turks into his territories, or aiding them in any way. Furthermore, Alfonso was required to inform the Republic if he knew of any preparations the Turks were making for an attack on Venetian territories.  

Venetian contact with the Turkish emirates may have been relatively peaceful before 1318, but within three years, the Republic was beginning to regard them as a serious threat to the security of its colonies and trade in Greece and the Aegean. As has been shown, the Hospitallers, the Zaccaria and the Byzantines already shared this view. The papacy too was also beginning to acknowledge the vulnerability of the Christians of the East in the face of Turkish expansion. Although Venice was still unwilling to participate in a papal-led expedition to the Morea, now that it was not immune from Turkish attacks, it would begin to lay the foundations of a common anti-Turkish league in the Aegean.

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31 Alfonso was, however, permitted to maintain his current agreements with the Turks, as long as he did not contract any new ones: DOC, nr. 116, p. 142; Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 244-5; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 829; Idem, TC, 15.
3.3. Reconciliation with Byzantium

3.3.1. Initial hostility: Venice and the crusade of Charles of Valois

Before analysing Latin negotiations for an anti-Turkish coalition, which came to dominate crusading policy against the Turks for the remainder of the period, it is necessary to first take a look at the relationship between Venice and Byzantium. This began to take on a more conciliatory approach after the collapse of Franco-papal plans to recover the Latin empire. As shall be seen, this change in attitude, coupled with the mutual threat posed by the Catalans and Turks in the Aegean, eventually led to Byzantine inclusion in crusade negotiations.

In 1302 Venice agreed a peace treaty with the Byzantines, after being at war with the empire and the Genoese, since the 1290s. However, this treaty proved to be a temporary measure as the Republic was quick to cooperate in the proposed crusade to Constantinople being organised by Charles of Valois. As well as being granted the full crusader indulgence for their participation, the Venetians were also to be guaranteed a renewal of the privileges which they had held in the Latin empire of Constantinople before 1261. This agreement provided a necessary commercial incentive for the Republic, which would have to break the treaty with the Byzantines and jeopardise the security of its galleys in preparation for the crusade. As was outlined in an earlier chapter, the crusade was primarily justified by the pope as a means of ending the Church schism, although interestingly, the excommunication of Emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos by Pope Martin IV in 1281 was also mentioned, possibly in the hope that the Venetians would recognise the parallels between Charles

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32 TD, i. nr. 73-5. The treaty was confirmed by a Venetian copy of the contract, dated October 1302, and a Byzantine imperial response, dated March 1303: DVL, i. nr. 7-8. Also see Lane, 'Venetian merchant galleys', 186-7. For more on the Veneto-Genoese war, see TD, i. nr. 10, 13, 16, 28-30, 39, 48, 50, 65, 67-70; DVL, i. nr. 1-2; F.C. Lane, Venice: A Maritime Republic (London, 1973), 83-5; Laiou, Constantinople, 101-14; Nicol, Byzantium and Venice: A Study in Diplomatic and Cultural Relations (Cambridge, 1988), 220.

33 CV, i. nr. 248; DVL, i. nr. 21, 24, 27-8 (January 1306 to March 1307). The Venetian Senate decided to delay a meeting with Charles of Valois’s embassy in July 1301. It is possible that Charles wished to seek an alliance with the Venetians from this date, although the document is inconclusive. TD, i. nr. 30.

34 CV, i. nr. 248; DVL, i. nr. 27; Setton, PL, i. 165-6.

35 In the Venetian response the crusade was justified as a defence of the true faith and the recovery of the Latin empire. In reflection of the anti-Greek motivations behind the crusade, no mention of the Turkish expansion into the Aegean was made: DVL, i. nr. 27, p. 50.
of Valois’s efforts and those of his great uncle Charles of Anjou over 30 years earlier.\(^{36}\)

It is worth noting that the Turkish threat to Christian lands in the East was not used as a motivation for the crusade, probably because the Venetians, with their colonies situated towards the west of the Aegean and without such close links to the Byzantines as the Genoese, were not as concerned about the loss of Greek territories to the Turks.

As was to be expected from such an expedition, the Venetians soon disagreed with Charles of Valois over the organisation of his crusade. In May 1307 the Senate reported that Charles had complained about the increased price demanded by the Republic for the transport of men and arms for the crusade. The Venetians had justified the price by maintaining that without adequate investment, the campaign would cause more harm than good for the Venetians in the Aegean.\(^{37}\) This was no understatement as from 1307 Venetian merchants in the region began to experience increased disruption to their trade as a result of their alliance with Charles of Valois, primarily from sailors in the pay of the Byzantine emperor, such as the Genoese commander Andrea Morisco.\(^{38}\) Consequently, from 1307 to 1308 the Senate took measures to reinforce its outposts in the Aegean and ensure greater security of trade: in one instance, they allocated 2,000 *hyperpyra* for the rebuilding of the fortifications at Modon-Coron and Negroponte; in another, they agreed to dispatch all available ships to Modon for the care of maritime defence.\(^{39}\)

The decline of security in the Aegean meant that Venice was eager for a crusade to embark as soon as possible. Charles of Valois was, however, running into delays in his preparations. In July 1309 he informed the *Serenissima* that the crusade was to be delayed until the following February, because of problems in securing subsidies from the pope and the French king.\(^{40}\) The doge replied to Charles in September claiming that, because the expenses and the dangers threatening Venetian

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\(^{36}\) CV, i. nr. 248. This may have been a reference to the Treaty of Orvieto which heralded an alliance between the two powers in 1281: W.A. Percy, ‘A reappraisal of the Sicilian Vespers and of the role of Sicily in European history’, *Italian Quarterly* 22 (1981), 77-96, at 90; J.B. Holloway, *Twice-Told Tales: Brunetto Latino and Dante Alighieri* (New York, NY, 1993), 126-8.

\(^{37}\) TD, i. nr. 133; DVL, i. nr. 32.

\(^{38}\) TD, i. nr. 138. Also see Laiou, *Constantinople*, 235.

\(^{39}\) TD, i. nr. 138, 146, 151, 168-9. Orders to ensure naval security were also issued to the commanders of the other Venetian fleets in the region. These were Petro Contarini, captain of the galleys of Cyprus-Syria, Michele Morosini, captain of the galleys of Alexandria, and Marco Minotto, captain of galleys for the care of the colonies of Romania: TD, i. nr. 151.

\(^{40}\) DVL, i. nr. 41, p. 75; Setton, *PL*, i. 167.
sailors were too great to bear, the postponement until February was the final one that could be tolerated. But even this delay proved too great and, in May 1309, the Serenissima decided that negotiations for a truce with the Byzantine empire could be opened. A treaty was finally agreed with the Byzantines which was to last for 12 years from 14 August 1310, thus effectively putting an end to Charles of Valois’s crusade plans.

3.3.2. The change in Venetian relations with Byzantium and the discussion of Church Union

The Venetian policy towards Byzantium softened even further after the large-scale Catalan and Turkish raids in 1318. This was a reflection of the changed attitudes of both emperor and doge; Andronikos II was beginning to express a new flexibility towards western diplomacy, and Giovanni Soranzo was starting to accept the position of the restored Byzantine empire in the Aegean. A good example of this new-found amity can be found in the decision of the Venetian Great Council in 1318 to grant two galleys to Theodore I Montferrat-Palaiologos (the son of the Andronikos II) on ‘account of the respect and love of the said emperor and his son’. In 1321, negotiations between the two sides were put on hold after the outbreak of civil war in the Byzantine empire, between Andronikos II and his grandson, the future Emperor

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41 DVL, i. nr. 42; Laiou, Constantinople, 235; Setton, PL, i. 168. This view was shared by Clement V who, in October 1309, forwarded the doge’s letter to Philip of France reminding him that it was necessary, for the honour of the house of France, for him to continue working for the successful completion of the crusade: DVL, i. nr. 43; Laiou, Constantinople, 235; Setton, PL, i. 168.
42 TD, i. nr. 174, 181.
43 TD, i. nr. 207, 216, 225, 228; DVL, i. nr. 46. Also see Marino Sanudo, ‘Hopf’s so-called “Fragmentum”’, 153.
44 DVL, i. nr. 72-9. For more details on these negotiations see Laiou, Constantinople, 273-7.
45 This included Venice giving up the hope of re-establishing the Latin empire of Constantinople. In October 1320 the Republic agreed that Charles of Valois should abandon his claim to six ships which had been equipped in Venice for his crusade against Byzantium: Laiou, Constantinople, 253, 267-9.
46 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Maggior Consiglio, reg. Fronesis, f. 8 (23 November 1318); summary in TD, i. nr. 408 (full text in Appendix, p. 306). For more on Theodore’s mission, see DVL, i. nr. 68-9, 73; Laiou, Constantinople, 265; Idem, ‘A Byzantine prince Latinized: Theodore Palaeologus, Marquis of Montferrat’, Byzantion 38 (1968), 386-410.
Andronikos III, but were resumed again in 1323-4 when Andronikos II granted the Venetians a new five-year treaty.\(^{47}\)

During these years, Andronikos II also began to court the idea of Church Union with the West in an effort to further secure western favour.\(^{48}\) In 1324 he sent the Genoese Bishop Hieronymus of Caffa to Avignon to open up Union negotiations with Pope John XXII and Charles IV of France. Soon after, the Venetian crusade theorist Marino Sanudo put himself forward as an ambassador for the Union negotiations.\(^{49}\) The negotiations ended in 1327 when the re-ignition of the civil war forced Andronikos II to terminate negotiations; although Union was a useful tool in international diplomacy, it still risked triggering widespread domestic anger.\(^{50}\)

It has been argued that Union negotiations were undertaken by Andronikos to stave off western crusading aggression, but this has been convincingly challenged by Laiou on the grounds that there was no longer a western threat to Byzantium.\(^{51}\) As has already been noted, John XXII did not launch any campaigns against Byzantine Constantinople during the 1320s and even the abortive Angevin plans to defend Achaia were intended as small-scale campaigns against the schismatic Greeks of the Morea and not as major expeditions against Andronikos II. Philip of Taranto still harboured hopes of restoring the Latin empire during these years, but his plans received little support in Europe and never got beyond the planning stage. Moreover, as has been seen, the Franco-papal crusade negotiations of the 1320s were not aimed at the recovery of Constantinople.\(^{52}\)

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\(^{49}\) Two of Sanudo’s letters from 1324 concerning the union are published in Marino Sanudo Torsello, ‘Epistolae’, *Gesta Dei per Francos*, ed. J. Bongars, 2 vols (Hannover, 1661), ii. 289-316, at 299 (letter 7), 299-300 (letter 8); Laiou, *Constantinople*, 321-2.

\(^{50}\) Laiou, *Constantinople*, 322-9.


\(^{52}\) See above, pp. 58-64.
A more convincing reason for the opening of Union negotiations at this time was the dramatic loss of the Byzantine held territory in Asia Minor at the expense of the Ottoman Turks and other emirates.\textsuperscript{53} Indeed, the plight of the Greeks in these regions was so dire that even some Latin sources, not usually sympathetic to the Greeks, commented on the extent to which the Turks had ravaged the empire.\textsuperscript{54} The documents relating to the Union negotiations do not specifically link these discussions with an alliance against the Turks at this stage, but is highly likely that the weakness of Andronikos’s Anatolia border had a decided influence on his decision to court the West.\textsuperscript{55} From the papal perspective, the schismatic Greeks would certainly need to be reconciled with the Church of Rome before any alliance could take place and Andronikos was evidently aware of this. The emperor was also in close contact with Marino Sanudo for most of these negotiations. Sanudo himself viewed Church Union as an essential prerequisite for a crusade – it is likely that his opinion had influenced Andronikos II.\textsuperscript{56}

\textsuperscript{53} Brusa, one of the last major cities left in Greek hands fell to the Ottomans in 1326: P. Charanis, ‘An important short chronicle of the fourteenth century’, Byzantion 13 (1938), 335-62, at 341-3; Laiou, Constantinople, 291-3; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 379.

\textsuperscript{54} ‘Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum’, 448-51; William Adam, 539-40.

\textsuperscript{55} Laiou, Constantinople, 328-9; Nicol, Last Centuries of Byzantium, 178; Harris, ‘Edward II, Andronicus II and Giles of Argenteim’, 77.

\textsuperscript{56} This is discussed in detail by Laiou, Constantinople, 320-9.
3.4. Marino Sanudo and Initial Plans for an Anti-Turkish League, 1321-1327

3.4.1. Marino Sanudo Torsello and the first mention of a league against the Turks

So far a two-fold change in Venetian policy in the Aegean has been outlined. On the one hand, the Republic’s attitude towards the Byzantine empire had changed from one of involvement in a crusade against the Greeks, to one of reconciliation, signified by the widespread discussion of treaties and agreements which can be seen as a step towards the Union negotiations of the 1320s. On the other, the Venetian stance towards the Turks had shifted from one of amicable indifference, to one of serious concern over the threat they posed to Venetian possessions and trade overseas. This change in attitude was reflected in the work of the Venetian merchant, politician and crusade theorist Marino Sanudo Torsello. His work gives an insight into the perspective and motivations of a Venetian statesmen and a well-informed European aristocrat to crusades in the Aegean. In particular, his work can be extremely informative in reflecting the Venetian policy towards the Turks and Byzantium in the years building up to the anti-Turkish league of 1334. Therefore, it is necessary to take a look at Sanudo’s background and early work before discussing the earliest discussions for an a coalition against the Turks.

Sanudo was one of the few fourteenth-century crusade propagandists to possess an intimate knowledge of both European politics and the Latin East, descended as he was from a powerful family of politicians and merchants. He first laid out his proposal for a crusade in his Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis written sometime between 1306-21. He spent much of this time travelling around the courts of Europe and the eastern Mediterranean, where he acquainted himself with popes, kings and crusaders (such as the Master of the Hospital Fulk of Villaret). On 24 September 1321, he presented a copy of the Liber Secretorum to John XXII. The papal appointed commission gave his work a favourable assessment, and although his plans were

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57 This has been suggested by Laiou, Constantinople, 308.
58 Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 374-5. Laiou has argued that Sanudo had Venice’s interests at heart. As a Venetian, Sanudo certainly had an innate bias towards the Republic, but he maintained that he worked for no-one. It is important to remember, as Tyerman has suggested, that Sanudo was devoted to the crusade, rather than a particular patron or employer: Tyerman, ‘Sanudo’, 171-2.
shelved for the immediate future, Sanudo was to play an important role in reshaping Aegean crusade policy.\(^{59}\)

For the majority of the years 1306-12, when Sanudo wrote the first two books of the *Liber Secretorum*, Venice had been willing to adopt a hostile policy towards Byzantium – she had agreed to participate in Charles of Valois’s crusade preparations until 1310 and was open to the idea of a crusade to recover Constantinople at the Council of Vienne. Even so, in his early work, Sanudo was not primarily concerned with a crusade against Byzantium, but rather a crusade to liberate the Holy Land by way of Egypt.\(^{60}\) On the rare occasions where Sanudo did discuss the possible conquest of the Byzantine empire, he cited the Church schism as the primary motivation for this.\(^{61}\)

The Anatolian Turks were also largely overlooked in the earlier part of the *Liber Secretorum*, probably because they did not constitute a direct threat to Venice at this time. In a reflection of the Venetian policy of cooperation with the Turks in this early period, Sanudo even went as far as to suggest that Venice and the papacy could negotiate ‘in a friendly manner’ the purchase of provisions for a crusade from the Turks ‘who hold the entire land from Candeloro to Makre’.\(^{62}\) But as relations between Venice and the Turks deteriorated after 1318, Sanudo’s attitude towards the emirates also changed. Around the years 1322/3 he wrote a marginal note in the *Liber Secretorum* amongst his discussion of a fleet of galleys to be used for the blockade of Egyptian trade.\(^{63}\) In the note, Sanudo suggested that the fleet ought to be made up of ships belonging to Martino Zaccaria of Chios, Guglielmo Sanudo of Naxos, the

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\(^{60}\) Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 375-7.


\(^{63}\) Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber Secretorum’, 30-1 (marginal note). The dating of this note is uncertain, but most probably 1322/3: Guglielmo Sanudo, the duke of Naxos, was named by Sanudo as a possible member of the league, he died in 1323 so the marginal note must have been written before then. The Catalans were also named as posing a threat to the Latins, so the note was probably not written in the year of the renewed Veneto-Catalan treaty of 1321, but afterwards. See Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 247, n. 181; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 823, n. 6. Other authors differ in the dating of this passage, Laiou has given 1321: ‘Sanudo’, 378, n. 15; Cocci has given 1325, which would be incorrect given the mention of Guglielmo Sanudo: ‘Le projet de blocus naval’, 185.
Hospitallers of Rhodes, and the forces of the Ghisi, Crete, Cyprus, and the titular Latin Patriarch of Constantinople. Sanudo added that if this Christian fleet were formed, the Latins of Greece and the Aegean ‘would be more secure from Turkish raids and the inroads of other Saracens’, and ‘protected from the Society of Catalans and other evil doers’. As can be seen, the interest of this passage lies in the future history of a united Christian fleet to be used against the Turks in the Aegean. In a few years time the government of Venice would adopt the same approach as Sanudo and western crusading policy would also follow suit.

3.4.2. Initial anti-Turkish league discussions

Sanudo spent the years 1322-3 at the papal and French courts advising them on the best ways of launching a crusade to aid Armenia and liberate the Holy Land. During this time he made tentative efforts to combine the Franco-papal proposals to aid Armenia with a crusade against the Turks in the Aegean, probably airing his idea of a common union against them. In the years following the breakdown of the Franco-papal negotiations, the pope placed more attention of the anti-Turkish efforts of the Latins in the Aegean, such as the issuing of indulgences in 1322-3, and efforts to recruit Venice for a Angevin alliance in Achaia. In March 1325, as John of Gravina’s fleet was crossing to the Morea, the first discussion by the Serenissima of the possibility of forming a societas against the Turks was made. Around the same time a letter from Sanudo was sent to the Bishop of Capua and the Chancellor of the kingdom of Naples informing them of renewed Turkish hostilities towards the Republic. In it, Sanudo reported that a Turkish fleet had attacked Naxos and Negroponte, seizing many captives from the latter.

Hereafter, an increasing number of Turkish attacks on Venetian possessions were reported. For these events, Sanudo, who produced numerous letters about the

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64 Marino Sanudo, ‘Liber Secretorum’, 30-1 (marginal note).
65 Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 378.
66 For example: Sanudo suggested that reinforcements for the Armenia passagia should be made available from Rhodes and Romania: Tyerman, ‘Sanudo’, 63-4.
67 Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 8, nr. 175, p. 296; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 379-80; Idem, Constantinople, 313-4; Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 248; Zachariadou, TC, 15; Idem, ‘Catalans’, 830.
Turkish and Catalan raids in Romania, remains the primary source of information. In 1326-7 he warned that the Turks and Catalans were close to seizing Achaia, Negroponte and other areas of Latin Greece. The below account vividly describes the feeling of urgency with which Sanudo reported these attacks:

[R]everently and having to speak with great need; it behoves our Lord to be aware of the Turks, who rule over and reside in Asia Minor, and who are swiftly infesting the islands of Romania and especially those lands which are part of the principality of the Morea; in this way if they do not have aid, they will be lost; and especially the island of Negroponte which will emerge in the hands of those from the [Catalan] Company, and if they come, they will themselves hold the principality of the Morea.

The Catalans had clearly formed a strong alliance with the Turks at this time and Sanudo wrote in the same year that Alfonso Fadrique had refused to hand over Turkish soldiers who had taken refuge in Karystos to the Venetian authorities. These Turks were likely to have been from the emirate of Aydin who in early 1327 had launched raids on parts of the Morea, including Martino Zaccaria’s territories in Damalâ. By April of that year the war had spread to Negroponte and in May the Senate agreed to commission nine sapientes to organise reinforcements for the region. This was followed up by the granting of 3000 ducats to Marco Gradenigo, the new Baillie of Negroponte, for the defence of the island. However, this offer came too late as Negroponte was lost to the Catalans by the end of the year. The Catalan victory was probably facilitated by their Turkish allies, who, according to Sanudo had earlier in that year ‘risen in great magnitude’ on the island.

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69 Marino Sanudo, ‘Epistolae’, 297-8 (letter 5), 304-7(letter 16); these are partially published in DOC, nr. 133, 136. Both letters are dated 1326, but letter 5 is more likely to be early 1327: Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 831, n. 48.
70 Marino Sanudo, ‘Epistolae’, 298 (letter 5); DOC, nr. 136, p. 167.
73 TD, i. nr. 457-9. Also see Cerlini, ‘Nuovo lettere’, 358 (letter 5).
75 Marino Sanudo, ‘Epistolae’, 313 (letter 20); DOC, nr. 142, p. 173; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 832.
Probably because of the intensification of the war in the Morea and Negroponte, the *Serenissima* began to act upon its decision to form an alliance against the Turks two years earlier. In July 1327 the Senate decided to dispatch letters to the duke of Crete and the baillies of Negroponte and Constantinople, instructing them to discuss with Andronikos II, Martino Zaccaria, the Master of the Hospitallers, and others about the possibility of forming ‘a *societas* against the Turks for the defence of our lands’. Unfortunately the text of the discussion has been lost, but it is known that in December of that year, ten Venetian galleys were dispatched for the protection of the Adriatic and *Romania*, which were certainly for defence against the Turks and may have been connected to the union. Likewise, ambassadors were sent between Constantinople and Venice, but the sources are silent as to their specific mission. It must be remembered though that these embryonic negotiations over some form of coalition against the Turks were at this stage being carried out at the behest of the *Serenissima* and not Sanudo. He was certainly keeping the Senate informed on events in the Aegean, but with the exception of the marginal note in the *Liber Secretorum* written in the early 1320s, there is nothing to suggest in his writing that he was actively promote a full anti-Turkish league. This would not be reflected in Sanudo’s writings until 1329-30, in the intervening years he was acting some years behind official Venetian state policy.

What can be seen from the events of the 1320s is that throughout the decade Venice had become increasingly embroiled in a war with the Turks and Catalans in the Aegean (primarily the Morea and Negroponte). On most occasions this consisted of fighting against the Catalans who had recruited Turkish assistance. This differed from the Zaccaria and the Hospitallers, whose lands were far enough to the east to avoid repeated conflict with the Catalans (with the exception of Martino Zaccaria’s possessions in the Morea), but who instead suffered raids from the Turks alone. It could be said that in these years the concept of a naval blockade on Muslim trade, which was proposed by Sanudo and many other theorists, had evolved into a Christian fleet to be used to fight against the Turks; the blockade required a flotilla of Christian

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76 *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, i. bk. 10, nr. 194, p. 341. Also see *Ibid.*, i. bk. 10, nr. 202, p. 342.
78 *Le deliberazioni (Senato)*, i. bk. 10, nr. 284, 315, pp. 349, 351; Laiou, *Constantinople*, 314.
79 Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 381.
galleys, as did the naval league. This, as shall be seen, became more clearly articulated in 1332. Moreover, as the threat of the Turks increased, the importance of an embargo on the Mamluk sultanate had decreased. The pope had signified as much by allowing the Zaccaria to trade mastic with the Mamluks a few years earlier. In 1326 Sanudo adopted a similar stance when he wrote that Christians should be allowed to trade in omnibus mercibus with the Saracens, with the exception of ‘iron, weapons, timber, pitch, [slave] boys and girls, and any other commodities formerly banned’. This opinion was also voiced by contemporary Venetians who, unlike the Zaccaria, were fiercely punished for illicit trade by the pope.

In fact, the Venetians, like the Zaccaria, had repeatedly requested permission from the Curia to export clean merchandise to Egypt (made in 1317, 1319 and 1327), but had been refused on each occasion. These requests were made on the grounds that the Venetians were different from other nations: their livelihood stemmed from foreign trade and not from agriculture, thus they needed free trade with Egypt in order to survive. Unlike the Zaccaria, they had not portrayed their actions in the Aegean as being motivated by the defence of the faith, suggesting that the Serenissima may have been slightly out of touch with the changing attitude of the papacy towards the Turks. Another factor in the papal refusal may have been the Republic’s repeated reluctance to participate in an Angevin expedition to the Morea, which would, as the letters stated, also combat the Turks.

As has been seen, the papacy had been actively pursuing the idea of an alliance against Catalans and Turks in the early 1320s. Venice had rejected these overtures because on most occasions a Catalan truce was more favourable, and more

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81 Marino Sanudo, ‘Epistolae’, 297 (letter 5).
83 I libri commemoriali, i. bk. 2, nr. 64-5 (pp. 183-184); Stantchev, Embargo, 197-9.
84 Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 5, nr. 277, 353 (pp. 201, 207); Stantchev, Embargo, 212.
85 Le deliberazioni del Consiglio dei Rogati, i. bk. 11, nr. 31, 98, 127, 137, 138 (pp. 361-71); DVL, i. nr. 105; Stantchev, Embargo, 234-5.
86 The Venetians were probably trading with Egypt for some of this time anyway, despite the apostolic embargo. In 1322 John XXII took the decision to send legates to pronounce excommunication on those Venetians ignoring the ban, and in January 1323 the Republic finally backed the full embargo on Egypt: I Libri commemoriali, i. nr. 340 (p. 245); Housley, Avignon, 203-4; Ortalli, ‘Venice and papal bans’, 248; Stantchev, Embargo, 216.
importantly, the Republic did not want to jeopardise peace with the Byzantines who had proved to be reliable and submissive allies since 1310. Despite the Serenissima’s repeated refusal to join the papacy and the Angevins, in 1328 John XXII once again tried to revive an alliance in Achaia.\(^{87}\) Again Venice declined the offer, proving that it only wished to participate in a union on its own terms, i.e. when the Turks were the primary target (not the Catalans) and when the Byzantines were regarded as possible allies. In contrast, the papacy had probably not yet envisaged an alliance of this scale by this stage and was not yet ready to consider the inclusion of Byzantium. Nevertheless, the pope’s repeated attempts to form an Veneto-Angevin coalition in the Morea, during the years where Venice was proposing an anti-Turkish league, does show that the Curia had warmed to the concept of a Christian alliance against the Turks.

**Chapter 3 Overview**

As was seen in the early part of this chapter, the Venetians maintained relatively peaceful relations with the Turkish maritime emirates during the early years of the fourteenth century. However, in 1318, when the Republic began to suffer from the attacks of the Turks, who were allied with the Catalans of Athens, the attitude of the Serenissima began to change. Venice favoured a policy of negotiation with the Catalans, and repeatedly refused to join in a papal-led expedition against them, but it took steps to form an Aegean coalition against the Turks, first advocated by Marino Sanudo.

Running parallel to the change in attitude towards the Turks was also a new policy of reconciliation with Byzantium. During the first decade of the century, the Republic had agreed to assist Charles of Valois in his crusade to Constantinople, but after this collapsed, and the Catalans and Turks emerged as another hostile force in the Aegean, the Venetians began to consider the Byzantines, who had also suffered at

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the hands of the Turks and Catalans, as possible allies. In the mid 1320s, as the Senate began to discuss the initial plans for an anti-Turkish naval league, its original proponent, Marino Sanudo, was acting as an ambassador for Church Union negotiations. The Venetians were unable to receive papal support for their naval league against the Turks, probably because of their willingness to come to peace with the Catalans, but in the following decade this would change.
Chapter 4. The Anti-Turkish League, 1327-1334

4.1. The Venetian Search for Allies

4.1.1. The Rise of the emirate of Aydin

We have already seen that in the late 1320s Venice made efforts to organise a Christian alliance against the Turks, but for various reasons these initial proposals came to nothing: the French were more interested in a Holy Land or Armenian crusade, Martino Zaccaria had lost Chios and was held captive in Constantinople, Byzantium was weakened by almost a decade of civil war, and the pope, despite showing a willingness to support the Latins in Achaia, Chios and Rhodes, was more preoccupied with events in Italy and Germany. Nevertheless, despite of these setbacks Venice persevered with the idea of a Christian alliance against the Turks and in 1332 the Republic embarked upon another series of negotiations that would eventually lead to the successful forming of the 1334 anti-Turkish league. This chapter aims to explore the motivations of the individual states who were courted for this league. It explains why they participated, how their aims differed, and how their involvement manifested itself in practice.

However, before this explanation is undertaken, it is necessary to analyse what happened in the Aegean during the late 1320s and early 1330s, which made the proposition of a league more favourable to the West, and allowed the Latins to single out which of the Turkish emirates needed to be checked. This was the continued rise in power of the maritime emirates of Anatolia, especially those of Aydin, situated in the fertile Meander Valley, and Karasi, in the north-west of Anatolia, near the Gulf of Adramyttion.¹ It has already been shown, from the large Turkish fleets raised in the

¹ The greatest victory of the naval league was against the fleet of Karasi in 1334, although less is known of their actions against the Latins in the Aegean than that of Aydin, who would come to dominate the region in the following years. A detailed study of Karasi is given by E.A. Zachariadou, ‘The emirate of Karasi and that of the Ottomans: two rival states’, The Ottoman Emirate (1300-1389): Halcyon Days in Crete I: A Symposium Held in Rethymnon, 11-13 January 1991, ed. E.A. Zachariadou (Rethymnon, 1993), 225-36, esp. 229-30.
second and third decades of the century, that these particular emirates experienced a
dramatic growth in authority and confidence during this period.\textsuperscript{2} Especially in the case
of the emirate of Aydin, which launched numerous raids from its Aegean ports,
particularly Smyrna and Ephesos, the former Byzantine cities that had grown into
prosperous trade-centres under the House of Aydin.\textsuperscript{3}

During this time it has been shown that Aydin and other of the Turkish emirates
allied themselves with the Catalans and also maintained amicable relations with some
of the other Latin Aegean states. However, this changed in the summer of 1329 when
Aydin broke the alliance it had held with the Catalan Company.\textsuperscript{4} During these months,
Turkish corsairs (probably from Aydin) attacked Athens, prompting Alfonso Fadrique to
agree a peace treaty with Venice in April 1331. As with the Veneto-Catalan treaties of
1319 and 1321, clauses were included in the treaty preventing Alfonso from forming
any new alliances with the Turks or aiding them in any way,\textsuperscript{5} but unlike on previous
occasions, the Catalans, who had now suffered the depredations of the Turks first
hand, showed greater sincerity in their desire to maintain good relations with Venice.\textsuperscript{6}
Therefore, by 1330 the first reports of the Turks acting alone and attacking all of the
Latin possessions in the Aegean, including those of the Catalans, are made. This played
into the hands of the Venetians who had always proposed that the Turks, in particular
those of Aydin, should be the primary target of a Christian league.\textsuperscript{7}

In 1333, on a visit to the coast of Asia Minor, Ibn Battuta commented on the
strength and prosperity of the Turkish kingdoms there, in particular the emirate of

\textsuperscript{2} Zachariadou, ‘Holy war’, 215.
\textsuperscript{3} C. Foss, Ephesus after Antiquity, A Late Antique, Byzantine and Turkish City (Cambridge, 1979), 144-5.
\textsuperscript{4} Marino Sanudo, ‘Epistolae’, 315-16 (letter 22); part published in DOC, nr. 149; Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’,
833; Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 259-61. Many Latin coins have been found in Ephesos, dating from the
fourteenth century, which suggest a high-level of trade with the West at this time: J.T. Wood,
Discoveries at Ephesus: Including the Site and Remains of the Great Temple of Diana (London, 1877),
181-4.
\textsuperscript{5} DVL, i. nr. 108; DOC, nr. 153; the truce is also mentioned in TR, i. nr. 21. Also see Lemerle, Aydin, 79;
Jacoby, ‘Catalans’, 259-60; Loenertz, Ghisi, 153-4; Setton, Domination, 35.
\textsuperscript{6} The Catalans may have even assisted the Latins against the Turks, which would explain why they are
mentioned by Enveri as helping the Franks in their defence of Boudonitza from Umur: Enveri, verses
533-4; Lemerle, Aydin, 79.
\textsuperscript{7} The Venetians still maintained trade agreements with other Turkish emirates. For example in April
1331, the Duke of Crete concluded a treaty with the emir Menteshe, Orkhan, at a time when
Negroponte was coming under sustained attack from the Turks of Aydin. The text of this treaty (minus
the oaths) has been published and analysed by Zachariadou: Zachariadou, TC, 18-20, 177-86; text at
This emirate had been founded by the Aydin-oglu Mehmed beg, whose sons Hizir and Umur ruled Ephesos and Smyrna respectively. The reign of Mehmed saw the establishment of Aydin as a major Anatolian power, but it is Umur who gained the most illustrious reputation in the family, primarily from his audacious raids against the Latin states of the Aegean. Umur’s exploits became so legendary that an epic poem was written documenting his life, in it the emir was depicted as a brave jihad warrior and scourge of the Latins in the Aegean. The sense of the power and wealth of Aydin is indicated by their construction of the Great Mosque at Birgi in 1312, which still stands today. Alongside the mosque can be found a family türbe, dated to 1334, where Mehmed and Umur were buried.

We already know that from the second decade of the fourteenth century the Aydin-oglus had been able to construct large fleets to assault Latin possessions in the Aegean. After the seizure of Smyrna from the Genoese in 1328/9, the fleets of Aydin, under the command of Umur, were able to launch raids into the Aegean with increasing regularity and destructiveness. It is not surprising that Venice, the principal advocate of an anti-Turkish league, bore the brunt of these attacks. This situation had become so desperate that by April 1332 the Duke of Naxos, Niccolò Sanudo, had concluded a treaty with the Turks. Again in June the Venetian Senate discussed whether Negroponte should also conclude ‘some arrangement with the Turks’. Unsurprisingly, the island became a tributary of the Aydin-oglus later in that year.

Marino Sanudo confirmed the increasing threat which the Turks now posed to
the Latins in the Mediterranean and even warned that they now posed a threat to the Adriatic Sea and the European kingdoms beyond.\(^{16}\) Further evidence of Turkish supremacy may be seen in the cost of Turkish slaves which had rocketed during the 1330s because of their scarcity, this was in contrast to Greek slaves who were numerous and cheap.\(^{17}\) The concern over the Turkish threat was further expressed in numerous papal letters written in the years 1333-4,\(^{18}\) by which time it was clear that, contrary to the claims of William Adam and the Directorium, the Turks could not be easily subjugated.\(^{19}\) By this point, it was evident that only an alliance of the Christian powers could put an end to Turkish expansion into the Aegean.

4.1.2. ***Venetian attempts to organise a local Aegean league***

During this period of escalating conflict with the Turks, Venice first and foremost attempted to protect its commerce in the Aegean. A good example of this was given in April 1331 when the duke of Crete concluded an agreement with Emir Orkhan of Menteshe. Venice seems to have been on relatively good terms with the emir, allowing trade to be conducted between the two sides.\(^{20}\) Grain and other foodstuffs had been imported to the Venetian colonies throughout the 1320s, and the 1331 treaty was probably intended to guarantee some form of imported food security for the Venetians at a time when the repeated Turkish raids made the Serenissima anxious of future food shortages.\(^{21}\) This concern was not without good reason; the Aegean had become even more turbulent and insecure than before, as was clearly indicated by the absence of a clause in the treaty which ensured the mutual protection of Venetian and Menteshe merchants. Evidently neither the duke of Crete nor Orkhan could guarantee

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\(^{16}\) Writing to Bertrand, the bishop of Ostia and papal legate in 1330: F. Kunstmann, ‘Studien über Marino Sanudo Torsello den Aelteren’, *Abhandlungen der Historischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 7 (Munich, 1855), 695-819, at 778 (letter 2).

\(^{17}\) Fleet, *European and Islamic Trade*, 49; Ibn Battuta, ii. 444-5.

\(^{18}\) For example: JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5207, 5247, 5269-76, 5324, 5329, 5404, 5423, 5429, 5438, 5442, 5485, 5486, 5495. Also see DVL, i. nr. 115; AE, xxiv. nr. 31 (pp. 292-3), 22-4 (pp. 499-500), 13-16 (pp. 511-14); xxv. nr. 3-5 (pp. 7-11).

\(^{19}\) William Adam, 540; ‘Directorium ad Passagium Faciendum’, 502-5, 511, 513.

\(^{20}\) Zachariadou, TC, 18-20, 177-86; text at 187-9. Venice had also made a treaty with Menteshe sometime before 1318: above, ch. 3, p. 106.

\(^{21}\) For example, in 1324, 1327, and 1329, we have evidence of Venetian merchants importing grain (*frumentum*) from *Turchia: Duca di Candia: Bandi* (1313-1329), ed. P. Ratti-Vidulich (Venice, 1965), nr. 375 (1324), nr. 491 (1329); Zachariadou, TC, 18, n. 71.
protection for the other’s traders.\textsuperscript{22} If the treaty was intended to bolster the Republic’s failing trade networks then it failed. A year later, the Senate banned trade with all of the Turks on account that it aided the cause of the enemy, who ‘continuously arm and march to the offence and detriment of the Christians’.\textsuperscript{23} However, the trade ban did not take into account the desperate situation of the Venetian colonies in the Aegean, many of which had come under such sustained attack that they had been forced to conclude separate treaties with the emirates. The Duke of Naxos, Niccolò Sanudo, had taken this measure in April 1332, as had the baillies of Negroponte later in the year and also possibly Bartolommeo II Ghisi, the lord of Tenos and Mykonos.\textsuperscript{24} By this time the Venetian archipelago and Negroponte were paying tribute to the Turks and most of the remaining Venetian colonies were on the brink of doing likewise.

It is therefore not surprising to learn that in these years the Senate had been making urgent attempts to organise a naval league to fight the Turks, consisting of local Aegean powers, such as Byzantium and the Hospitallers. In 1331 the Senate urged the baillies of Negroponte and the duke of Crete to unite in opposition to the Turks.\textsuperscript{25} This was followed on 7 July 1332 by the doge urging Crete and Negroponte to form a union with the Hospitallers, Niccolò Sanudo and Bartolommeo II Ghisi.\textsuperscript{26} When the initial agreement for a league was drawn up in September 1333, Niccolò Sanudo and Bartolommeo II Ghisi were not mentioned and their names had disappeared from the documents concerning the league. This may have been because they did not want to compromise the peace they had agreed with the Turks through the payment of tribute.\textsuperscript{27}

The unwillingness of many of the Venetian colonies to compromise their tenuous peace agreements with the Turks meant that the Republic also turned its attention towards the Byzantine empire. It has been shown that Venice had previously

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{22} Zachariadou, TC, 19.  \\
\textsuperscript{23} Loenertz, \textit{Ghisi}, nr. 40, pp. 214-5, dated 22 June. Summary in TR, i. nr. 17. Also see \textit{Le deliberazioni (Senato)}, ii. bk. 15, nr. 144, p. 44.  \\
\textsuperscript{24} Merchants from the Ghisi and Sanudo had been trading in \textit{Turchia} in 1332: Zachariadou, TC, 22, 25; Loenertz, \textit{Ghisi}, nr. 40, 215; TR, i. nr. 17.  \\
\textsuperscript{25} \textit{Le deliberazioni (Senato)}, i. bk. 13, nr. 264, 302, 36, 159, 159; pp. 434, 437, 444, 453; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 384.  \\
\textsuperscript{26} ‘\textit{Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’}, ii.i, bk. 15, nr. 5, pp. 108-9; \textit{Le deliberazioni (Senato)}, ii. bk. 15, nr. 158, pp. 46-7.  \\
\textsuperscript{27} Zachariadou, TC, 25.
\end{flushright}
made attempts to maintain close relations with Byzantium in the 1320s, but after the deposition of Andronikos II in 1328, the new emperor Andronikos III had adopted a policy of collaboration with the Turks; in the first three years of his reign he had concluded treaties with the emirates of Karasi, Sarukhan and Aydin. Andronikos III also adopted an aggressive policy towards the Latins – he was responsible for the deposition and imprisonment of Martino Zaccaria in 1329 and he had also forced the Genoese lords of Phokaia to recognise his suzerainty, but by recruiting Niccolò Sanudo in his siege of Chios, the emperor had proved that individual Latin states could be persuaded to side with him if it served their interests. This was definitely the case for Venice, which still regarded the Byzantine empire as a powerful entity in the Aegean and made efforts to extend a policy of rapprochement to the new emperor. This was signified on 4 July 1332 when the Republic agreed a six-year treaty with Andronikos III, and three days later when envoys were dispatched to Constantinople to discuss the possibility of Byzantine involvement in an anti-Turkish league. On 18 July Petro Zeno, the Baillie of Negroponte and Petro de Canale, Captain of the Adriatic Gulf, were given full powers to create a union with all interested parties, especially the Byzantines and Hospitallers.

In early 1332, the Senate had also ordered emissaries to be sent to Naples in order to recruit King Robert for the alliance. At the same time Marino Sanudo wrote that he too had been at the court of Naples discussing with King Robert, Philip of Taranto and the Master of the Hospitallers, Hélion of Villeneuve, the problem of the Turks. The Republic was aware that the Angevins had a vested interest in Latin Greece and must have regarded them as being open to the proposed alliance. In

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28 For more on the alliances between Aydin and Andronikos III see Zachariadou, TC, 16-17, 37-40; Inalcik, “Turkish maritime principalities”, 192-6; Nicol, Last Centuries, 177-83.  
29 Zachariadou, TC, 16-17; Lemerle, Aydin, 66.  
30 See above, ch. 2, p. 101, n. 117.  
31 Many of Sanudo’s letters also reflect an attitude of rapprochement towards the Greeks. For example, he wrote in 1330 that the Church schism was primarily the fault of the West: Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 778 (letter 2); Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 388-92.  
32 DVL, i. nr. 112. Ratified in November: nr. 118.  
33 Loenertz, Ghisi, nr. 41, 215-6. Also see Loenertz, Ghisi, 157; Lemerle, Aydin, 91-2; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 386.  
34 DVL, i. nr. 113-14, 116. Also see TR, i. nr. 22.  
contrast, at this stage Venice had not even broached the subject of a league with the French, another traditional crusading ally. In the end, Robert of Naples failed to commit himself to the league.\(^37\) On the other hand, the Catalans stated that they were willing to assist Venice against the Turks, but the Republic, probably still suspicious of their motives, rejected the offer.\(^38\)

4.1.3. The papacy and negotiations for a naval league against the Turks

From 1329-31 the Venetian Republic negotiated with papal representatives for support of a naval league against the Turks. Unfortunately in most of these cases the full texts of these requests have not been left and it is therefore hard to establish exactly what was discussed or if anything was agreed. For example, in December 1328, Isnard the Archbishop of Thebes was sent by the pope to Venice with the task of promoting the Angevin union against the schismatics in Achaia.\(^39\) As had been the case in previous years, the Republic was not interested in participating in this venture. But a month later, Marino Sanudo reported that Isnard had been in Venice asking on behalf of the pope that the Republic arm galleys for use against the Turks \((pro facto Turchorum)\).\(^40\) The following month Sanudo wrote again that the archbishop was still in Venice, making his case for aid against the Turks and that the Senate had been ordered to respond to his requests.\(^41\) At some point, the Senate appointed two people to talk with Isnard, but nothing is known of the outcome of these negotiations.\(^42\) Again in 1330 and

\(^{37}\) The failure of Robert of Naples to participate in the league has been discussed in detail by Housley, ‘Robert the Wise’, 548-56. Also see Abulafia, ‘Venice and the kingdom of Naples’, 189-90.

\(^{38}\) Zachariadou, ‘Catalans’, 834-5.

\(^{39}\) The document specified that the union was to be between Robert Naples, the prince of Taranto and Achaia, the doge and commune of Venice and other Christian rulers, for the defence of the Christians against the schismatics and the infidels: Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 115, ff. 93v-4r, ep. 413 (9 December); summary in ‘Athènes’, ed. Loenertz, nr. 34. Loenertz has claimed that these schismatics were partisans of the antipope Nicholas V, but seeing as previous attempts from the pope to organise an alliance in Achaia were focussed on combating the schismatic Greeks and (later when they were excommunicated) the Catalans, then it seems likely that these were still the targets. The document does not specify by name who the schismatics and infidels were: gentes perfidi que deum ignorant, infidelium et scismaticorum ipsorum, etc.

\(^{40}\) Marino Sanudo, ‘Epistolae’, 312-13 (letter 20); \(DOC\), nr. 142, p. 173 (19 January 1329); summary in ‘Athènes’, ed. Loenertz, nr. 35.

\(^{41}\) Marino Sanudo, ‘Epistolae’, 315-16 (letter 22); \(DOC\), nr. 144; summary in ‘Athènes’, ed. Loenertz, nr. 36-7.

\(^{42}\) Le deliberazioni \((Senato)\), i. bk. 11, nr. 129, p. 370. At this time, the Senate also received representatives from Negroponte, who reported on the danger posed by the Turks and began discussing
1331 other sources report that Doge Giovanni Soranzo had written to the pope to secure papal support for a naval league, but again the exact details or results of these correspondences are not known. All that is known is that negotiations between the Venetians and the pope were ultimately fruitless as John XXII did not commit to a Venetian organised anti-Turkish league until 1333, some eight years since Marino Sanudo had first proposed a provisional naval league and six years since the Venetians had adopted the same strategy.

To understand the reasons for the delay in papal participation in a naval league, it is necessary to study the Aegean in the wider context of papal policy in Europe and Frankish Greece. Up until the late 1320s, the pope had been distracted by wars in Italy. Marino Sanudo had written that these wars were responsible for Christian disunity and the diversion of papal resources, which prevented a common front from being established against the Turks. However, by the end of the decade, and after the failure of John XXII’s Guelph policy, the attention of the pope once again shifted back to the East. But this did not immediately result in a crusade against the Turks in the Aegean. Instead, the papacy shifted its focus towards Jerusalem and the new French King, Philip VI of Valois, who had been crowned in 1328. French dealings with the Venetians over the forthcoming crusade are dealt with in more detail later, but for now it is worth noting that Philip VI immediately showed an enthusiasm for a crusade to recover the Holy Land, and that the pope, although now aware of the threat being posed by the Turks in the Aegean, did not ignore such an opportunity. Accordingly, Philip VI was granted church tithes in 1328 and 1330 and in 1331 he received indulgences for a crusade which was to depart before March 1334. As shall be seen, this general passage was to play an important role in the eventual realisation of an anti-Turkish fleet.

the necessity of arming a fleet against them: Marino Sanudo, ‘Epistolae’, 312-13 (letter 20); DOC, nr. 142, p. 173 (19 January 1329); Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 11, nr. 247, 274-6, pp. 380, 382 (March 1329). Also see Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 383-4.

43 Le deliberazioni (Senato), i. bk. 13, p. 434 (January, 1331); Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 779 (letter 2); Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 384.
44 Housley, Italian Crusades, 87-90. The financial records from the Curia show that spending in Italy reduced after 1330 in contrast to increased spending on eastern matters.
As well as focussing on the Holy Land, in the early 1330s John XXII also continued his attempts to re-establish Angevin control of Greece, by supporting the campaign of Walter VI of Brienne, the titular Duke of Athens and son-in-law of Philip of Taranto, to recover his duchy from the Catalan Company. As in the previous decade these proposals were not designed to be compatible with a Venetian coalition against the Turks but were instead intended as an alternative to it. On 14 June 1330 John XXII wrote to the Latin bishops in Romania ordering them to preach a crusade to support Walter’s expedition, for which indulgences were granted. A ban of excommunication was also to be proclaimed against the entire Catalan Company if they did not return Athens to Walter within six months. In July, Robert of Naples released his feudatories from their obligations so they could partake in Walter’s forthcoming crusade and in November he published the crusade bull (issued on 14 June) throughout his kingdom. The participants in the crusade were granted the same indulgences as those which the Apostolic See had granted for going in aid of the Holy Land. Unlike in the letters associated with the papal-Angevin attempts to recover the Morea in the 1320s, the pope did not use a Catalan alliance with the Turks and Greeks as a motivation for a crusade against them. Instead the excommunicate Catalans were identified as the sole targets of the crusade, in one instance they were labelled as ‘schismatics, sons of destruction, and pupils of iniquity’.

In late August 1331 Walter of Brienne departed from Brindisi with a sizeable army consisting of 800 French knights and 500 Tuscan infantry, gathered at considerable personal expense. He headed to Greece, occupying the island of Leukas, and the towns of Vonitzia and Arta in the south of Epirus. In February 1332 the pope ordered the archbishop of Patras to reiterate the excommunication of the Catalans

46 Walter married Philip’s daughter Beatrix in December 1325: Setton, Domination, 39.
49 Setton, Domination, 39; Du Cange, Histoire de l’Empire de Constantinople, ii. 203; Loenertz, Ghisi, 154-5.
50 DOC, nr. 151 (21 July 1330); DOC, nr. 152 (22 November 1330), partial trans. in DLC, nr. 15, p. 63.
51 DOC, nr. 150, p. 190; Setton, Domination, 38; Setton, ‘Catalans’, 189.
52 Giovanni Villani, ii. bk. 11, pp. 753-4. Walter mortgaged many of his holdings and his wife’s dowry: Setton, Domination, 39; Setton, ‘Catalans’, 189.
issued in 1330.\textsuperscript{53} The army crossed the peninsula with the aim of engaging the Catalans under the command of the new Vicar General, Nicholas Lancia, but this strategy failed as the Catalans refused to meet Walter in open battle. Consequently the Frankish army ran out of funds and was forced to return to Brindisi in late summer 1332.\textsuperscript{54} Walter and the pope had hoped for Venetian assistance in the campaign, but as was the case in the previous decade, the \textit{Serenissima} showed no desire to jeopardise the chance of peace with the Catalans for the re-establishment of Angevin prominence in Greece.\textsuperscript{55} To prove this, the Republic agreed a truce with the Catalans in April 1331, at a point where Walter was near the end of his preparations for the Athenian campaign. As Setton has pointed out, at no point did the native Greek population of the Morea, clearly not too dissatisfied with Catalan rule, offer assistance to Walter of Brienne.\textsuperscript{56}

This episode was not dissimilar to the campaign of John of Gravina in 1325; the pope had tried and failed to reassert Angevin power in the Greece by encouraging a prince to fulfil his dynastic ambitions at the expense of the Catalans. For both campaigns papal support was provided to encourage participation and a sizeable army was recruited for each expedition, but in 1325 and again in 1331, the pope failed to gain crucial Venetian support for the enterprise.\textsuperscript{57} Moreover, both expeditions suffered from a lack of coherent planning whilst in Greece and were forced to withdraw because of shortages of money without achieving anything of significance.

Papal interest in re-establishing Angevin supremacy in the Morea was not surprising in the 1320s, when the Catalans were wreaking havoc on the Latin states there, but for the pope to persist in supporting a failed policy at a time when he was aware of the danger posed by Turkish incursions into the Aegean, shows that even as late as 1331 John XXII was still unwilling to participate in a Venetian led coalition against the Turks. In fact, it seems as if the repeated refusal of Venice to participate in


\textsuperscript{54} Giovanni Villani, ii. bk. 11, ch. 189, pp. 753-4, reported that Walter would have beaten the Catalans if he met them in the open field. Also see \textit{AE}, xxiv. nr. 54 (p. 459), 30 (p. 480). This episode is described in detail by Setton, \textit{Domination}, 39-41; Setton, ‘Catalans’, 189-90; Setton, \textit{Los catalanes}, 26-8; Du Cange, \textit{Constantinople}, ii. 202-4.

\textsuperscript{55} \textit{Le deliberazioni (Senato)}, ii. bk. 15, nr. 126, pp. 38-9; Housley, ‘Robert the Wise’, 551.

\textsuperscript{56} Setton, ‘Catalans’, 190.

\textsuperscript{57} It is unclear whether the indulgences issued in 1322 to those fighting in Achaia were connected to Angevin campaigns, although the pope provided other methods of support at that time: see above, ch. 1, pp. 65-70.
a papal-endorsed Angevin expedition to the Morea, and the tendency of the Republic to side with the Catalans was one of the main reasons for the slow adoption of the naval league by the Pope. This is reflected in a letter written by John XXII to the doge of Venice in July 1332, only months before the final agreement to take part in the league:

Bitter was the blow which your letters dispatched to us have delivered: indeed, through them we have learned most displeasingly how that wild Turkish beast has cruelly oppressed you in persons and property during these times. We have held deliberation on this with our brothers and, with their advice, have arranged for certain means of support [...] and, upon the arrival of envoys of our most blessed son of Christ, Philip, illustrious king of the Franks, [...] we shall also arrange for more extensive support.

However, take heed, sons, you who harbour (tenetis) and welcome (recipitis) schismatics and enemies of God in your lands, that those things do not occur because of your remissness: for we read that, by the enemies of God and of the Israelite people, the Lord scourged that same Israelite people most harshly. Be zealous, therefore, to throw schismatics and heretics out of your lands or to lead them back to the unity of the Church; if you do this, we trust in the Lord that he may return to your defence, because the father of mercies himself had prepared these things for your deliverance: otherwise we fear that he may have to turn his hand more harshly against you.58

This thinly veiled threat is a clear indication that the pope believed that the depredations being inflicted on Venetian possessions were a result of divine retribution for continued failure to resist the Catalans. Punishment for intermittent Venetian treaties with the Turks and reconciliation with Byzantium may have also been an underlying theme in this letter. Venice was, after all, at war with an enemy that it

58 AE, xxiv, nr. 23, p. 499 (23 July 1332).
had been trading intermittently with in the past – in direct contravention of the apostolic ban on all commerce with Muslims. It is interesting to note at this point that John XXII had in the previous year granted Walter of Brienne permission to trade with Mamluk Egypt, possibly in order to better finance his expedition.\textsuperscript{59} When this is contrasted with repeated refusals to grant Venetian subjects a similar licence, it is easy to see how papal economic mechanisms directly reflected the priorities and attitude of the pope himself.

Finally, another aspect of papal policy which further separated Venetian and papal thinking before 1332 was the attitude towards Byzantium. As has been noted, at this stage Venice’s plans for a Christian alliance against the Turks depended on the involvement of Andronikos III. John XXII, on the other hand, did not yet regard the Greeks as trustworthy allies; it is true that Union negotiations had thawed relations between the Greek and Latin Churches during the 1320s, but the pope still labelled the schismatic Greeks as enemies of the Latins in the East. It has already been shown that in the papal-Angevin attempts to recover the Morea from 1318-28, the Greeks had been cited as schismatic allies of the Catalans. This attitude prevailed into the 1330s where, in a letter dated April 1330 to Philip VI, the pope claimed that the schismatic Greeks were threatening Hospitaller Rhodes.\textsuperscript{60} This document was written shortly after the conquest of Chios by Andronikos III so it is not surprising that the new emperor was deemed as a potential threat to the island. However, Venice did not share this view, and these fundamental differences in Venetian and papal policy explain why John XXII was still unwilling to commit himself to a Venetian-led anti-Turkish league at this time.


\textsuperscript{60} \textit{JXXII Secrètes}, iv. nr. 4174 (21 April). Attempts to send aid to Rhodes were made in October 1330, but in these letters the identity of those threatening the island is not stated: \textit{JXXII Secrètes}, iv. nr. 4308-10, 4604 (6 October).
4.1.4. The French and negotiations for a naval league against the Turks

Philip VI ascended the French throne in 1328 and within a year rumours had reached Venice that he was planning to launch a crusade to the Levant. He had initially entertained ideas of a crusade to fight the Moors in Granada, but a rousing sermon by the Patriarch of Jerusalem Pierre de la Palud, after his return from Cairo, had reignited traditional French zeal for a crusade to liberate the Holy Land and the king’s thoughts turned to Jerusalem.61 As Henneman has suggested, Philip’s energetic crusade plans helped to secure church subsidies.62 From 1328-31, the king was granted tithes and indulgences for the forthcoming crusade.63 The preparations for the crusade were still focussed on the Holy Land and did not share the objectives held by the Venetian in their plans for a naval league. The French court was aware that the threat of the Turks had gown in recent years,64 but their interest outside of the Holy Land, if existent at all, was primarily restricted to Armenia.65 This attitude was reflected in the findings of a crusade committee in February 1332 which concluded that a sea route, consisting of one general crusade to the Holy Land, would be more preferable than a passagium particulare to blockade trade in the East or fight the Turks.66 Unlike Venice, anti-Byzantine feeling also prevailed within the French court in these years, although this was to change in the near future.67

There is no evidence that Venice courted the French for a league against the Turks in these early years. Rather surprisingly it was Philip VI who first brokered negotiations between the two sides over a crusade, suggesting that Venice did not regard the French as playing an important role in an anti-Turkish alliance at this stage. In November 1331 Philip wrote to Doge Giovanni Soranzo to ask him for logistical advice for his proposed crusade to the Holy Land. In the letter, Philip requested that

62 Henneman, Taxation, 92.
63 See above, p. 134.
64 Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 35; G. Tabacco, La casa di Francia nell’azione politica di Papa Giovanni XXII (Rome, 1953), 333.
65 In June 1332 Philip made a grant of 10,000 gold florins to the king of Armenia: Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 26-7, 36; Henneman, Taxation, 92.
67 The dismissal of the Directorium, a fiercely anti-Greek crusade polemic, by a royal appointed commission was an indication in the change in attitude that was to progress after 1332: Tyerman, French and the Crusade, 148-9; Leopold, Recover, 43; J. Delaville le Roulx, La France en Orient au XIVe siècle, 2 vols (Paris, 1886), i. 7-11.
the Republic send envoys to Paris, to inform him of the likely number and cost of ships and supplies needed for a crusade, and whether Venice was prepared to provide them. The doge took this opportunity to expand his plans for the naval league by linking it to the forthcoming French expedition. In his reply of 11 May 1332, Giovanni Soranzo provided the king with the advice he requested for the recovery of the Holy Land and also stressed the need to protect the Aegean from the Turks:

[T]hat as from now, 20 or 30 armed galleys are to be sent to hold firm and persist in that place in order, as will be seen, to inflict damage on the sultan and his lands and people and on the ships and vessels of the Turks, who are the most evil persecutors of the Christian faith, and also to prevent the supply of timber, arms and other items to the said sultan and so that non enter or leave his lands. And truly, unless this fleet and protection are sent ahead, we do not see how the passagium could succeed, especially because the iniquity and audacity of the Turks is increasing daily and, as they increase, provisions from parts of the Black Sea, where they are most readily available, have become unobtainable. Indeed, very great damage can and will, both now and hereafter, befall the Christian lands and the peoples of those regions and the aforesaid voyage. If the aforesaid fleet and protection are sent ahead, the ships and the incursions of the Turks will, with Christ’s grace favouring us, thus be defeated, because they will be forced to abandon the sea and coastal regions, and every advantage will result for the aforesaid passagium and the Christian people.

Here the doge suggested that before a passagium was to depart for the Holy Land, a fleet of ships was needed to blockade trade in the East. This notion was not original in itself, but for the first time it is reported that the fleet being used to combat Turkish piracy could be used to pave the way for a Holy Land crusade. Thus the doge directly linked the Turkish expansion into the Aegean with the liberation of Jerusalem – the

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68 *DVL*, i. nr. 109, dated 18 November 1331; Setton, *PL*, i. 178, n. 75.
69 *DVL*, i. nr. 110, p. 221.
clearest example yet that the concept of fleet intended to enforce the trade embargo had evolved into an anti-Turkish league. According to the doge, provisions would be needed from the Black Sea if a passagium was to succeed, and therefore, the Turks and their fleets which dominated the Aegean, would need to be driven from the coast of Asia Minor before a general passagium could depart. This is very informative for both French and Venetian policy towards a crusade at this time. For Venice, the letter confirms what is already known; that a crusade to the Holy Land was to take second place behind a crusade to the Aegean – the Republic agreed to help Philip in his enterprise, but it stressed that the Turks needed to be subdued before this could happen. For the French, the letter shows that a crusade to Jerusalem was paramount, and that a crusade to the Aegean would only be considered if it was advantageous to the passagium generale. The Venetians were aware of the French obsession with the Holy Land and the letter is also an example of the adroit diplomacy of the doge, who had found a way of reconciling the conflicting agendas of the two sides.

Shortly before this letter was written, Marino Sanudo also wrote to Philip VI. This document, as the letter written by Giovanni Soranzo, was drawn up in response to the passagium generale proposed by the king. In a similar vein to the doge, Sanudo lamented the expansion of the Turks into the Aegean and proposed that a ‘first army’ of 10-15 well-armed galleys with three hundred men on each be used against the Turks, the Mamluk sultan and other enemies. In addition to this, Sanudo advised the king on the numbers of men and ships he would need for the main crusade. On both accounts he recommended a smaller force than in the official letter from the doge. Whether or not Sanudo was acting as an official spokesman for Venice is hard to say, but either way he had a difficult job persuading the king to participate in a crusade to the Aegean. Interestingly, he adopted a similar tactic to the doge in that he attempted to link the passagium generale with a preliminary passagium to fight the Turks. However, Sanudo was less explicit about the reasons why the Turks needed to be subdued and did not justify it on the grounds that Black Sea provisions would be needed for the crusade army. Either way, by the time Venice had replied to Philip VI’s

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70 Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 794-7 (letter 5), dated 3 April 1332.
72 Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 387.
73 Tyerman, French and the Crusade, 301-2.
original letter, in May 1332, a local Venetian-led anti-Turkish league with the participation of the Hospitallers and Byzantium was nearly at the point of completion. The Serenissima had demonstrated that although it wished for both French and papal involvement in an alliance against the Turks, it would proceed without their help if the situation in the Aegean warranted immediate action.
4.2. The Initial Formation of the Anti-Turkish League, 1332-1334

4.2.1. First agreement of the anti-Turkish league at Rhodes, September 1332

The preparations for an anti-Turkish league progressed quickly in the late summer of 1332. On 20 July, the Senate agreed to order the captain of the galleys of Romania to transport as much biscuit as possible from Modon to Negroponte for the fleet which was gathering against the Turks. On 26 August Andronikos III informed the doge that he was open to the idea of ‘union, alliance and league, for the persecution of the Turks and defence of the Orthodox faith’. The emperor also reported that he had asked Petro de Canale, the Venetian ambassador who had been ordered to organise a union by the Senate in the previous month, to act as an imperial agent in the forthcoming discussions. On 6 September, Canale, now a representative of both Venice and Byzantium, met with the Master of the Hospitaller Hélion of Villeneuve and a number Venetian plenipotentiaries at Rhodes to finalise the arrangements for the league. The record of the meeting began by listing the damages which the Turks had inflicted upon the Latins and Greeks of Romania. It then reported that the envoys had entered mutually and harmoniously into a ‘union, confederation, league and alliance [...] for the exaltation and praise of the divine name and the confusion of the said Agarenes’. It was decided that 20 armed galleys would be furnished for a period of five years; of these the Greek emperor would provide ten, Venice six and the Hospitallers four. This fleet was to gather in the harbour of Negroponte by 15 April 1333, then it would be ready to proceed against the naval and land forces of the ‘Agarenes and Turks’ for the defence of the Christians. On the next day Canale and Villeneuve agreed that the captain-general of the fleet should be a Venetian. In the following months the Venetian Senate acted on its commitment to the league and decreed that the duke of

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74 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Misti del Senato, reg. 15, f. 24v; TR, i. nr. 23.
75 unione, societate et liga ad persecutionem Turchorum et fidei defensionem orthodoxe: DVL, i. nr. 116, p. 227.
76 DVL, i. nr. 116, p. 227. Also see Setton, Pl, i. 180; Lemerle, Aydin, 91.
77 DVL, i. nr. 116, pp. 225-7. The September 1333 agreement of the league is described by a host of scholars, namely: Lemerle, Aydin, 91-2; Setton, Pl, i. 180-1; Zachariadou, TC, 24-5; Housley, Avignon, 25-6; Delaville le Roux, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 87-8; Loenertz, Ghisi, 157-8. For Byzantine, Hospitaller and Catalan perspectives, see Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 50-1; Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 386; Nicol, Last Centuries, 177-9; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers at Rhodes’, 293; Setton, Domination, 36. 
78 DVL, i. nr. 116, p. 226. 
79 DVL, i. nr. 117, p. 229.
Crete must raise the necessary money to arm two galleys ‘for the union against the Turks’.  

4.2.1. The rebellion on Crete and the delay of the league, 1333

The date of the mobilisation of the fleet at Negroponte in April 1333 came and went with no sign of action. One reason for this was the beginning of an uprising on Crete in the summer of 1333, which was discussed in detail by the Venetian Senate. The first record of the rebellion dates from 29 September 1333, where the Senate, after hearing of the uprising, agreed to dispatch one armed galley to assist the duke of Crete. Only weeks later, in mid October, news had reached Venice of the spread of the revolt causing the Senate to order the two galleys which were intended to be used for the anti-Turkish league to remain at Crete to combat the rebels. Although this action was decided almost six months after the original muster date for the league on 15 April, the trouble on Crete had been brewing since late 1332. This provides some explanation as to why the fleet did not take action in the spring of 1333, and certainly why it was not ready again until 1334. Ironically, the Cretan rebellion was probably triggered by the taxes levied on the island to fund the construction of two of the league’s galleys in 1332.

During the midst of the Cretan uprising the Serenissima received news from the duke of Crete and the Hospitallers of quarrels among the Turks. Hélion of Villeneuve suggested to Venice that it should form an agreement with Orkhan, the Emir of Menteshe, against other Turks, probably those of Aydin. The Senate instructed the duke of Crete to investigate this prospect and, with the consent of the other members of the league, to come to an agreement with the emir. In November 1333 the Senate accepted the Cretan proposal for an alliance with Menteshe for the import of horses,

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80 Venice, Archivio di Stato, Misti del Senato, reg. 15, f. 50; summary in TR, i. nr. 25 (15 December, 1332).
81 For the rebellion, see F. Thiriet, ‘Sui dissidi sorti tra il Comune di Venezia e i suoi feudatari di Creta nel Trecento’, Archivio Storico Italiano 114 (1956), 699-712, at 702-5.
82 TR, i. nr. 34.
83 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii,i, bk. 16, nr. 7, pp. 123-4; TR, i. nr. 35-6.
84 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii,i, bk. 15, nr. 12, pp. 111-14; Zachariadou, TC, 26.
85 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii,i, bk. 16, nr. 13, pp. 129-30; Le deliberazioni (Senato), ii. bk. 16, nr. 235, p. 234; Zachariadou, TC, 28; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 89; TR, i. nr. 38. Thiriet incorrectly identifies Orkhan as the emir of the Ottomans and not as the emir of Menteshe.
animals and wheat to Crete, on the condition that the Hospitallers also took part in the treaty.\textsuperscript{86} Towards the end of the month Marino Morosini, the Captain of the league, informed the Senate of another possible pact, this time with an emir named \textit{Carmignanus}, possibly from Germiyan or Karaman.\textsuperscript{87} At the beginning of December, the Senate instructed a Venetian ambassador to the Hospitallers to inform the Order that Venice had no objections to this treaty.\textsuperscript{88} As Zachariadou has explained, the proposed treaty with Germiyan, a land-locked emirate, was less strange than first thought, as it could provide the Latins with vital assistance by attacking Aydin along its eastern landward border.\textsuperscript{89} In the end the outcome of these negotiations is not known, but they do show that even in the midst of forming an anti-Turkish alliance, Venice was not adverse to the prospect of allying with one Turkish emirate against the other.

As well as negotiating with the Turks, Venice also continued efforts to promote the league during 1333 and reassure the Hospitallers that the clauses of the alliance were still valid.\textsuperscript{90} By the end of the year the insurrection on Crete was coming to an end,\textsuperscript{91} and the Senate decided that the galleys of the league should be made ready for May of 1334.\textsuperscript{92} At this time, the \textit{Serenissima} made efforts to extend the league to other interested parties. In September 1333 the doge dispatched embassies to Philip VI of France to seek French participation in the league and passed on this news to Hélion of Villeneuve and Andronikos III.\textsuperscript{93} In the same month the doge also asked Hugh IV, the King of Cyprus, to participate in the league as well.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{86} TR, i. nr. 38. The Venetian ban on all trade with the Turks in June 1332 was amended to allow this: Zachariadou, \textit{TC}, 28. Also see \textit{`Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias'}, ii,i, bk. 16, nr. 14, pp. 130-3, esp. pp. 132-3 (16 November).
\textsuperscript{87} \textit{`Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias'}, ii,i, bk. 16, nr. 23, p. 138 (29 November); Theotokes, \textit{`E próte summachia'}, 287. Thiriet and Lemerle state that \textit{Carmignanus} was the emir of Karaman: TR, i. nr. 39; Lemerle, \textit{Aydin}, 91-3. However, Zachariadou makes a good case for him being the emir of Germiyan: Zachariadou, \textit{TC}, 28-9, using an alliance between the Byzantines and Germiyan from Kantakouzenos as her source: John Kantakouzenos, ii. 82.
\textsuperscript{88} TR, i. nr. 39 (2 December); Zachariadou, \textit{TC}, 28, n. 104.
\textsuperscript{89} Zachariadou, \textit{TC}, 28-9.
\textsuperscript{90} TR, i. nr. 36; \textit{Le deliberazioni (Senato)}, bk. 16, nr. 232, p. 231 (16 October).
\textsuperscript{91} Reports that the rebellion was over had reached Venice before 4 January 1334: TR, i. nr. 42.
\textsuperscript{92} TR, i. nr. 37 (11-13 November, 1333).
\textsuperscript{93} JXXII Secrètes, lv. nr. 5276 (15 September); TR, i. nr. 37(11-13 November).
\textsuperscript{94} Edbury, \textit{Cyprus}, 157.
4.3. The Completion of the Anti-Turkish League and the Aegean Campaign, 1333-1334

4.3.1. Involvement of France and the papacy in the league

Both John XXII and Philip VI committed to the Venetian led anti-Turkish league at the time when their preparations for a crusade to the Holy Land were beginning to bear fruit. After months of drawn out negotiations and the customary wrangling over finance, Philip VI was appointed as general captain of his crusade by the pope on 26 July 1333. On the same day, numerous letters were dispatched from the Curia outlining all aspects of the expedition, from finance to spiritual benefits. Zachariadou has misleadingly connected these bulls with the anti-Turkish league, when they only related specifically to Philip VI's passagium generale. This confusion is understandable as the passagium generale and the anti-Turkish league were in the process of being incorporated by the French and the papacy into a wider, three tiered crusade. It was suggested that the first wave of this crusade was to be the anti-Turkish league, this was to be followed by another passagium particulare, to land a provisional force of troops in Asia Minor, and finally King Philip himself was to take part in the final passagium generale, which was to depart for the Holy Land on 1 August 1336. Evidently, the king and pope recognised that the chance to participate in a league against the Turks, for which the Venetians had already done the majority of the organisation, was too good an opportunity to miss, especially when, as Venice had proposed in 1332, the league could help pave the way for a successful passagium generale to the Holy Land.

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95 JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5207. Full translation in DLC, nr. 18, pp. 68-70. Also see Chronique des quatre premiers Valois, 1327-1393, ed. M.S. Luce (Paris, 1862), 5-6; Tyerman, 'Philip VI', 29-30. The negotiations for papal finance from February 1332 to July 1333 were especially laborious. Philip wanted free control of legacies, tithes and other funds raised outside France, while the pope refused to grant the king non-French revenues. John required constant reassurance of Philip's sincerity for crusade. Eventually agreements were finalised in May and June of 1333: Tyerman, 'Philip VI', 28-30. Philip took the cross in October 1333: ‘Chronique parisienne’, 154; William of Nangis, ii. 154-5; Chronique des quatre premiers Valois, 5-6; Henry Dapifer of Dissenhoven, ‘John XXII Quinta Vita’, VPA, i. 172-7, at 174; AE, xxiv. nr. 1-7, pp. 487-90.
96 JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5207-27.
97 Zachariadou, TC, 30, n. 110-12.
98 Housley, Avignon, 24, 26.
In late August 1333 John XXII took the first active steps in assisting the Venetian league by appealing for more rulers to join the Christian alliance, in particular Philip VI and Hugh of Cyprus. At the same time the pope wrote to the doge that the Latin territories in the East were in a perilous position and that clerical ambassadors had been dispatched to Venice to discuss the participation of the Curia in the coalition. During this time, the pope also urged Andronikos III to accept the Union of Churches and a common front against the Turks. Finally, on 10 October John XXII wrote a letter warning of the Turkish threat to the archbishop of Embrun, whom he sent to negotiate the formation of a league with the doge and Robert of Naples. In it the pope lamented the raids of the Turks and wrote that the Christians ought to repel and crush their wickedness, arrogance and insults.

The embassy from the Curia arrived in Venice in December 1333, where they asked the Serenissima three questions: i) how they would resist the Turks; ii) if they genuinely wished to save the territories of Romania; iii) whose help would they need to succeed. The response to the first question was that a force of fifty horse-transports, forty galleys and 2,400 mounted soldiers would be needed to defeat the Turks. To the second question, the Venetians replied that their power was inferior to the Turks, but they would defend the faith with all the zeal that their hearts could inspire. To the third question, they stated that the aim of the Republic was only to help the Christians defeat the Turks, and not to increase the power of their state. For that reason they were ready to contribute ten galleys, twelve horse-transports as well as a number of transport ships for food, animals and other provisions, which would be

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100 Full text in AE, xxiv. nr. 13, pp. 511-12; summarised in DVL, i. 115. The document is incorrectly dated to 1332 by Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 386, Lemerle, Aydin, 191 and the DVL. It is correctly dated to 1333 in the Annales Ecclesiastici and by Setton, PL, i. 181, n. 86. The document is dated: V Kal. Septembris anno XVII. So this is the 28 August of the 17th pontifical year. That year was 5 September 1332 to 4 September 1333. So the date is 28 August 1333.

101 JXXII Communes, xii. nr. 60898-900; AE, xxiv. nr. 19, pp. 515-16.

102 AE, xxiv. nr. 15, pp. 513-14.

103 ‘[T]herefore [the doge and his government] believe that fifty horse transports, in each of which there should be at least 120 rowers and 20 men-at-arms with the horses and arms they need, and forty armed galleys, in each of which there should be 200 men, would suffice to check the Turkish savagery’: DVL, i. nr. 124, p. 241; ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii,i, bk. 16, nr. 27, p. 140. Partial translation in Setton, PL, i. 181-2, n. 88. Also see Theotokes, ‘E próte summachia’, 287-8.
available for the next eight months. With these measures taken, the fleet and soldiers would be able to attack the Turks on land and sea, meaning that ‘the Christians in Romania would be secure, and the power of the Agarenes themselves would be almost entirely broken’. The Serenissima further encouraged the pope by highlighting that the Turks were divided amongst themselves and would not therefore be able to help each other: ‘although the power of the perfidious Turks is great, nevertheless there are several Turkish states in those regions, of which each one is distinct from the others, and one could not quickly render aid to another.’ From this embassy, the Venetians were able to evaluate the interest of the papacy in the anti-Turkish league. They decided to send Blasio Zeno to the Holy See, who reaffirmed that Venice was eager and willing to participate in the league as they had previously stated. In the early months of 1334, Venetian and Hospitaller ambassadors at the Curia finally settled the arrangements for the league with the pope.

On 3 November 1333, after repeated appeals from the Curia and the Venetian government, Philip VI also informed the doge that he would assist the Venetians in the league against the Turks. The king claimed that in spite of the burden which the preparation of the passagium generale imposed upon him, he would send in the spring of 1334 a certain number of vessels to join those of the Venetians, the Greeks and the Hospitallers. The king probably viewed his participation in the league as a bargaining chip by which he could call on Venetian assistance for the passagium generale, as eight days later he announced to the Venetians that the pope had made him captain of the crusade to the Holy Land, and asked them to send to Paris new ambassadors to help with this expedition. The Holy Land crusade certainly took precedence over the naval league and the king made it clear that he was only willing to participate in the league if it did not interfere with the passagium generale.

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104 DVL, i. nr. 124, p. 242; Theotokes, ‘E próte summachia’, 287-8; Zachariadou, TC, 31.
105 DVL, i. nr. 124, p. 241; Setton, PL, i. 181-2, n. 88.
106 DVL, i. nr. 124; Setton, PL, i. 181-2, n. 88; Zachariadou, TC, 31.
108 Commerce et expéditions militaires de la France et de Venise au moyen âge, nr. 3, pp. 101-2; Lemerle, Aydin, 93; Delaville Le Roux, Hospitaliers à Rhodes, 88.
109 DVL, i. nr. 122; also published in Commerce et expéditions, nr. 4, pp. 103-4.
110 Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 37; Tabacco, La casa di Francia, 333.
It has been suggested that Venice had received papal backing for the anti-Turkish league before this time, but it seems that it is in these months, and not earlier, that the anti-Turkish league began to be directed under the auspices of the pope.\footnote{For example, Housley, 'Robert the Wise', 551, wrote that Venice prepared the league ‘under the papal aegis’ in 1330-1; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 51, n. 77, also commented that the pope’s role before 1334 had been ‘decisive behind the scenes during earlier negotiations’; and Nicol, Last Centuries, 177, implied that the initiative of organising the league fell to the pope after Venice’s initial proposals of 1327. However, Nicol has also asserted that the pope only gave the league his ‘stamp of holiness’ in 1334: Nicol, Byzantium and Venice, 254. Also see Heyd, Histoire du commerce du Levant, i. 539. See, for example, the negotiations between the Senate and the archbishop of Thebes in 1329-30: above, pp. 133-4. The most detailed treatment of this is by Lemerle, Aydin, 94-6. ‘Die Protokollbücher der päpstlichen Kammerkleriker: 1329-1347’, ed. H. Schröder, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 27 (1937), 121-286, at 256-62 (7 March 1334); DVL, i. nr. 126 (8 March 1334), nr. 127; JXXII Secrètes, iv. 5485 (19 May 1334); ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 27, pp. 139-41 (21 December 1333), nr. 36, p. 144 (7 March 1334), nr. 41, pp. 145-7 (3 April 1334).}

The complex negotiations do provide evidence, as has been seen earlier, that the two sides had undertaken some negotiations pro facto Turchorum before 1333, but the actual details of these discussions remain ambiguous and they appear to have come to nothing. Consequently, there are no sources that specifically link the pope to the Venetian plans for a naval league before 1333; John XXII had certainly not agreed to contribute galleys for the league, nor had he granted any papal privileges for the project before this time. In other words, without concrete papal backing, the league cannot be considered to have been a crusade until the very last stage of its organisation – up until this point it had been strictly a Venetian-led enterprise.

Now that the papacy and France had committed themselves to the anti-Turkish league and the rebellion on Crete had ended, preparations for the alliance quickly progressed.\footnote{See, for example, the negotiations between the Senate and the archbishop of Thebes in 1329-30: above, pp. 133-4. The most detailed treatment of this is by Lemerle, Aydin, 94-6. ‘Die Protokollbücher der päpstlichen Kammerkleriker: 1329-1347’, ed. H. Schröder, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 27 (1937), 121-286, at 256-62 (7 March 1334); DVL, i. nr. 126 (8 March 1334), nr. 127; JXXII Secrètes, iv. 5485 (19 May 1334); ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 27, pp. 139-41 (21 December 1333), nr. 36, p. 144 (7 March 1334), nr. 41, pp. 145-7 (3 April 1334).} In the first months of 1334, the participants agreed that the fleet would consist of forty galleys; ten to be provided by Venice, ten from the Hospitallers, six from the Byzantines, six from Cyprus (which had entered into the league before March) and eight from the papacy and France together. The fleet was to assemble at Negroponte in May and serve for five months.\footnote{See, for example, the negotiations between the Senate and the archbishop of Thebes in 1329-30: above, pp. 133-4. The most detailed treatment of this is by Lemerle, Aydin, 94-6. ‘Die Protokollbücher der päpstlichen Kammerkleriker: 1329-1347’, ed. H. Schröder, Archiv für Kulturgeschichte 27 (1937), 121-286, at 256-62 (7 March 1334); DVL, i. nr. 126 (8 March 1334), nr. 127; JXXII Secrètes, iv. 5485 (19 May 1334); ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 27, pp. 139-41 (21 December 1333), nr. 36, p. 144 (7 March 1334), nr. 41, pp. 145-7 (3 April 1334).} On 7 March a contract was drawn up on behalf of the pope which commissioned the construction and armament of four galleys in Marseille for the league. The document outlined in detail the conditions of the contract. Amongst other things, each galley was to consist of between 174 and 180 oars and was to carry 25 marines plus retinues, scribes and other suitable officials, and adequate provisions and equipment were to be supplied. The papal chamberlain and
treasurer agreed to pay to the knights and people of Marseille 12,000 gold florins over the course of five months for the four galleys. Moreover, the crews were expected to fight on land and sea and to obey every command of the pope.\footnote{Die Protokollbücher, 256-62; full translation in Housley, DLC, nr. 20, pp. 71-4.} Initially the galleys were permitted to carry merchandise, half of the profits from which were to be given to the pope. However, in May 1334 John XXII ruled that no goods were to be carried as they might hold up the progress of the galleys.\footnote{JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5495; Housley, DLC, nr. 20, p. 74, n. 4.} In the same month John of Cepoy was appointed as the captain for the Franco-papal galleys and indulgences were granted to him and his followers.\footnote{Three documents announcing Cepoy’s appointment as captain was dispatched on 19 May 1334, one is printed in AE, xxv. nr. 10, p. 4 (summaries in JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5484; JXXII Communtes, xiii. nr. 63890); the other two: JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5485-6; cf. 5495 (30 May).} These indulgences had been requested by John of Cepoy and were granted \textit{in articulo mortis} for death in battle and wounds received thereafter. The bull granting the indulgences lamented the wretched state of \textit{Romania} and other eastern lands and the need to curb the growing power of the Turks.\footnote{The indulgences to John of Cepoy were issued on 19 May, see Appendix III, nr. 2; Vatican, Archivio segreto, \textit{Registra Avienionensis}, reg. 46, f. 560v; \textit{Registra Vaticana}, reg. 107, f. 243r, ep. 729-30; summaries in JXXII Communtes, xiii. nr. 63170-1.} Shortly after these documents were issued the flotilla left for the Aegean where it joined with the rest of the fleet in the summer of 1334.

In the previous year, the Venetians had named Marino Morosini, the former duke of Crete as the captain of their galleys for the league. He had acted as Venetian ambassador to the French king in 1332, in the Republic’s attempts to secure French participation, and had apparently been active against the Turks in late 1333 and early 1334.\footnote{Andrea Navagiero, ‘Storia della Repubblica Veneziana’, \textit{RIS} 23 (Milan 1733), cols. 923-1216, at cols. 1024-5; ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 15, 21 pp. 133-4, 138; \textit{Le deliberazioni (Senato)}, ii. bk. 16, nr. 120a, pp. 188-9; Petro Giustinian, \textit{Venetiarum Historia Vulgo Petro Iustiniano Iustiniani Filio Adiiudicata}, ed. R. Cessi & F. Bennato (Venice, 1964), 217. Morosini was later made captain-general of the entire league: Zachariadou, TC, 30.} Morosini was replaced as captain by Petro Zeno sometime in 1334 and in April the Venetian Senate decided that the duke of Crete and baillies of Negroponte should borrow money for the armament of four galleys for the league.\footnote{Three galleys provided by Crete, one by Negroponte: TR, i. nr. 48; \textit{Le deliberazioni (Senato)}, ii. bk. 16, nr. 427, pp. 296-7. Zeno was named as Venetian captain of the league in November 1334: ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 36, 52, pp. 140, 154-5; \textit{Le deliberazioni (Senato)}, ii. bk. 16, nr. 677, pp. 371-2; Zachariadou, TC, 29-30. Blasio Zeno was made captain of the Venetian galleys of the}
4.3.2. **The Battle of Adramyttion**

Whilst the Franco-papal fleet was under construction in France, the Venetian galleys already in the Aegean engaged the united Turkish forces of Umur of Aydin, and Suleiman, the Emir of Sarukhan, near the Morea. On 7 March the Venetian Senate commanded Petro Zeno, the captain of the league, and Petro de Canale, the captain of the Gulf to sail to Modon to engage a Slavonic pirate named Zassi who was disrupting trade there and possibly in league with the Turks. Shortly after this, Enveri reported that ten Latin galleys, probably those of Zeno or Canale, had attacked the fleet of Suleiman, who had needed to be rescued by Umur. By the summer of 1334 the Franco-papal force had joined that of the Venetians, Hospitallers and Cypriots in the Aegean and the anti-Turkish league, which with the exception of Byzantium had now reached full strength, embarked on a series of campaigns against the Turks.

Although some of the actions of the league are documented in the sources, it is hard to recreate a precise chronology of events. What is known is that the league took part in the burning and seizing of Turkish ships throughout the summer of 1334 and that the crusaders attacked the emirates of Aydin, Karasi and Sarukhan along the north-eastern coast of Asia Minor. Smyrna was probably assaulted at some point during this time; Umur remained the primary target of the Latins and Enveri reported that the Christians attacked the port (incorrectly dating it to late 1333). In the autumn of 1334 a major battle took place near the Gulf of Adramyttion, opposite Lesbos, and on the land nearby, where a fleet belonging to Yashi, the Emir of Karasi, league and Petro Zeno was made captain-general in July 1334: ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i, bk. 16, nr. 52, pp. 154-5; Zachariadou, TC, 33.

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121 Lemerle, *Aydin*, 95.
123 TR, i. nr. 45; Zachariadou, *TC*, 31-2.
124 Enveri, verses 961-76; Zachariadou, *TC*, 32, n. 119.
126 Menteshe was at peace with Venice and trading with the emirate throughout 1334: Zachariadou, *TC*, 33, n. 125; Theotokes, ‘E prôte summachia’, 286.
127 Enveri, verses 833-48. He placed the raid before the death of Mehmed in January 1334 and reported that 30 ships attacked Smyrna: ten from Andronikos III, ten from Rhodes and ten from Cyprus. This is confused, as the Cypriots were not part of the league at this stage. If the attack took place, it was probably after the death of Mehmed and during a time when the Cypriots were active in the league. See Lemerle, *Aydin*, 93-4; Zachariadou, *TC*, 29, n. 107. Interestingly the Genoese were trading with Aydin in September 1334: L. Balletto, *Genova Mediterraneo Mar Nero (Secc. XIII-XV)* (Genoa, 1976), 173.
was defeated. Giovanni Villani provides some indication of the numbers involved, according to him around 5,000 Turks were killed and 150 ships destroyed.\textsuperscript{128} Marino Sanudo also described the Christian victory in a letter to Hugh of Cyprus. In the document, now badly damaged, the author claimed that the crusaders destroyed a number of Turkish vessels on the feast of the Nativity of the Virgin (8 September), and again on the 11, 14, and 17 of September. In the letter, the son-in-law of Emir Yashi was named as one of those killed.\textsuperscript{129} Laurent has attempted to argue that two battles took place at Adramyttion in 1334, one in September and one in November, although Laiou has since shown that this was not the case.\textsuperscript{130} The more Franco-papal oriented account of William of Nangis unsurprisingly attributed the success of the league to John of Cepoy and emphasised that the purpose of the expedition was to prepare the way for the \textit{passagium} to the Holy Land.\textsuperscript{131} Interestingly according to the other sources the \textit{raison d’être} of the naval league was to destroy the power of the Turks, rather than to pave the way for a Holy Land expedition. These accounts obviously reflect the contrasting priorities of those involved.

The formation of the league, at a time when most other attempts to form any kind of coherent front against the Turks had failed, was in many ways a remarkable success. It proved that by the 1330s the threat of the Turks had permeated beyond those Latin states with a presence in the Aegean, to include France and the papacy. However, for both John XXII and Philip VI, a crusade against the Turks was still ranked far below a crusade to Jerusalem. Venice had after all been forced to connect the naval league to the recovery of the Holy Land in order to secure the participation of the pope and king. In terms of spiritual rewards granted to the participants of the enterprise, it is also interesting to note that John XXII only granted the participants of the naval league indulgences \textit{in articulo mortis} for death in battle or wounds received thereafter, whereas Walter of Brienne’s crusade to the Morea had been granted the full Holy Land

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{128} Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 12, ch. 18, p. 58. Also see Ludovico Bonconte Monaldesco, ‘Fragmenta Annalium Romanorum’, \textit{RIS} 12 (Milan, 1728), cols. 527-42, at col. 537; \textit{AE}, xxv. nr. 11, p. 5 (in which 250 ships were destroyed); Lemerle, \textit{Aydin}, 97.
\textsuperscript{131} William of Nangis, ii. 145.
\end{footnotesize}
indulgence four years earlier.\textsuperscript{132} In fact, in spiritual terms, the papal privileges granted for the naval league were no different from those granted in Achaia and Chios during the 1320s. The real change in the stance of the papacy related to the league was that it agreed to contribute and finance four of its own galleys – a commitment which suggests this campaign against the Turks was more important than those in previous years.

As Housley has suggested, the 1334 league also constitutes the strongest evidence yet of the shift in crusade strategy from complicated and expensive plans to recover the Holy Land to expeditions organised first and foremost by the Latin powers with a vested interest in the East – in this case Venice.\textsuperscript{133} It has been shown that this anti-Turkish league was a Venetian project up until a few months before it sailed to the Aegean, contesting the hitherto overstated role of John XXII in the planning of the project.

Laiou was, therefore, probably overly harsh in stating that the anti-Turkish league ‘accomplished very little’.\textsuperscript{134} Moreover, the formation of the league contradicts Atiya’s claim that before 1343-4, ‘no enterprise of worth was undertaken against the Muhammadans’.\textsuperscript{135} In actual fact, when compared to other crusade projects of the early fourteenth century, the league accomplished a great deal in a relatively short period of time. The number of chroniclers who reported the battle at Adramyttion suggest that it was undoubtedly an important Latin victory and in the months that the fleet patrolled the Aegean, the Latins enjoyed a level of security not yet experienced in the fourteenth century.\textsuperscript{136} However, as many of the sources suggest, after John XXII’s untimely death in December 1334 and the disbanding of the league, the Turks were able to reoccupy the Aegean and resume their raiding activities with ease, meaning that any successes were quickly reversed.\textsuperscript{137}

\textsuperscript{132} These indulgences were granted specifically to John of Cepoy and his followers. He was the captain of the Franco-papal galleys, so it remains unclear as to whether the Venetians or Cypriots were granted indulgences for their participation as well.

\textsuperscript{133} Housley, Avignon, 25; Idem, ‘Franco-papal’, 184.

\textsuperscript{134} Laiou, ‘Sanudo’, 387.

\textsuperscript{135} Atiya, Crusade, 290.

\textsuperscript{136} This view is shared by Lemerle, Aydin, 98; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 51.

\textsuperscript{137} This worry was voiced by Sanudo: Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 812 (letter 7); Andrea Dandolo, 372; DVL, i. nr. 126, pp. 246-7 (this is an extract from: Giorgio Delfino, Chronicon, f. 104).
4.3.3. Reasons for Byzantine absence from the league

From the sources it is likely that the galleys promised by Andronikos III did not participate in the operations of the anti-Turkish league.\(^{138}\) The western sources appear to be silent as to why the Byzantines failed to take part in the league, but the Byzantine author Nikephoros Gregoras perhaps provides a suitable answer when he commented that there was insufficient money in the imperial treasury to construct a fleet. The empire had after all been wracked by civil war for the past decade and even though Andronikos III attempted to levy new taxes, many regions had trouble raising the money as they had been devastated by previous Turkish attacks.\(^{139}\) It is also worth noting that the Ottoman Turks had made serious inroads into what remained of Byzantine Asia Minor in the late 1320s and early 1330s and this undoubtedly diverted resources away from the construction of a fleet.\(^{140}\) Furthermore, the emperor had to turn his attention to the military conflict in the Balkans and Macedonia in 1333-4.\(^{141}\)

Gregoras also claimed that the Latins blackmailed Andronikos into joining the league and threatened to launch a crusade against him if he did not participate. This is probably inaccurate, as the Venetians were on friendly enough terms with the emperor not to have to resort to blackmail. However, the pope did use the Turkish threat and the proposal of a league to try and push the Greeks to accept the Union of Churches.\(^{142}\) Thus, it would not be surprising to learn, considering the history of the two sides and recent Byzantine alliances with the Turks, that the emperor felt compelled to join the league as otherwise he would be labelled as a target for the crusade. Nicol has claimed that John XXII effectively blocked Byzantine participation in the league, but a close reading of the sources shows that the pope anticipated the involvement of Andronikos III as late as May 1333.\(^{143}\) A more plausible reason is given

\(^{138}\) Inalcik is alone is assuming that the Byzantines actually participated in the league: Inalcik, ‘Turkish maritime principalities’, 192.
\(^{139}\) Nikephoros Gregoras, i. 523-5.
\(^{140}\) Andronikos III had been defeated at the battle of Pelekanon in 1329 and Nicaea had fallen to Ottomans in 1331. Umur attacked Gallipoli a year later. In 1333 the emperor made a peace treaty with the Ottoman emir Orkhan at Nikomedia. See Nicol, Last Centuries, 175-8.
\(^{141}\) Zachariadou, TC, 37-8.
\(^{143}\) JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5485; Nicol, Last Centuries, 177-9.
by Zachariadou, who suggested that the Greeks refused to participate because they were upset by the seizure of Byzantine Lesbos by the Hospitallers and the Genoese of Phokaia in 1333 or early 1334.\textsuperscript{144} If Gregoras is to believed, Andronikos actually managed to raise a fleet of 20 ships for the league in 1335, but by then the coalition had disbanded.\textsuperscript{145} Despite the failure of Byzantium to actually participate in the coalition, the proposed involvement of the schismatic Greeks in a Latin crusading expedition still signified a major change in western perceptions of Byzantium.

\textbf{Chapter 4 Overview}

The formation of the anti-Turkish league owed a lot to the persistence of the Venetians. As was shown in the previous chapter, it is they who first set in motion plans for a naval league and first considered the Byzantines as possible allies. In contrast to what is often assumed, the papacy played little role in the formation of the league: the Venetians and the pope had discussed the league in the late 1320s and early 1330s, but before the summer of 1333 there is no evidence that the pope had agreed to participate in the league or had played any part in its organisation. On the contrary, in 1332 John XXII had written to the doge expressing his displeasure at the welcome which ‘schismatics and heretics’ were given in Venetian lands. In the context of repeated Venetian refusals to cooperate in a papal-endorsed Angevin expedition to the Morea, such as Walter of Brienne’s crusade against the Catalans of Athens in 1331, it is reasonable to assume that the factious Venetian relationship with John XXII prevented the papacy from committing to a Venetian-led coalition in the Aegean. In the summer of 1333 this changed, but only after Venice had formed a provisional league with the Byzantines and Hospitallers.

The Venetians also successfully secured French participation in the league. For this the doge had specifically appealed to the French desire to lead a crusade to Jerusalem, by suggesting that the naval league could help pave the way for the general crusade to the Holy Land being planned by Philip VI and the pope. This demonstrates

\textsuperscript{144} Zachariadou, TC, 37-8; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 89.  
\textsuperscript{145} Nikephoros Gregoras, i. 524-5.
that even at the time of the first Latin coalition against the Turks, a crusade to the Holy Land was still the priority for the French. When the galleys of the league eventually gathered in the Aegean, they achieved some successes against the Turks, the most notable being the naval victory over a fleet from the emirate of Karasi at Adramyttion. The league did not attract the same level of spiritual benefits as the Crusade of Smyrna, but it still constituted the first instance in which Church funds had been contributed for an expedition against the Turks. The successful formation of the league is further evidence of how the initiative of organising an expedition for the defence of the faith had shifted to the Latins in the East, but the eventual participation of the French and papacy also suggests that the Turks were now perceived as a threat in both the Latin East and in Europe.
Chapter 5. Neglect of the Aegean Crusades under Benedict XII, 1334-1342

5.1. Benedict XII and the Crusade

5.1.1. Continuation of the anti-Turkish league

It will be argued in this chapter that the pontificate of Benedict XII (1335-1342) marked a reduction in the impetus of the crusade, signified in 1335-6 by the scrapping of the second wave of the anti-Turkish league and the Holy Land crusade of King Philip VI. In contrast to his predecessor Pope John XXII and his successor Clement VI, Benedict took less of an interest in the Aegean and the threat posed by the Turks in the region. Consequently, the Latins of the East were forced to continue their struggle against the Turks largely without papal support. Benedict XII’s pontificate can therefore be seen as an anomaly in the Aegean crusades, standing as it does between the pontificates of two popes who were both highly active in promoting a crusade in the Aegean.

The first year of Benedict XII’s pontificate was the only time when papal policy lay was odds with the above statement. It is in this year where the pope adopted and continued to support the plans already laid by John XXII for a second wave of the anti-Turkish league and a crusade to the Holy Land to be led by Philip VI. When Benedict was elected pope on 8 January 1335 the planning for the next wave of crusades had already reached an advanced stage and as shall be seen, his support of these projects was born out of pragmatism more than anything else. Once they had collapsed, Benedict was unwilling to devote the time and resources necessary for planning a new crusade to the Aegean.

Details of the second phase of the anti-Turkish crusade had already been outlined by John XXII shortly before his death in December 1334. The pope had written to Robert of Naples urging him to participate in the forthcoming offensive, which was to involve transporting an army across the Mediterranean to fight the Turks on land and to deliver aid to Armenia. The force was to consist of a total of 800 men: 400 provided by the papacy and Philip VI of France, 200 by the Hospitallers, 100 by Hugh IV of Cyprus and 100 by the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III, as well as galleys and
horse transports to be provided by the same powers, and also from Venice and Naples.¹ Louis of Clermont, at his own request, was originally appointed to lead this expedition, but was replaced by Hugh Quiéret as the captain of the French galleys in October 1334.²

In March 1335, two months after his coronation, Benedict XII wrote to Robert of Naples reiterating the appeal made by John XXII in the previous May. He informed Robert that the representatives of the French, the Hospitallers and the Venetians had already met with the pope at the Curia to prepare for the new crusade, which was now considered as a solely maritime operation against the Turks in the Aegean:

Having heard, not without great bitterness of heart, about the terrible oppression which the infidel Turks are striving to inflict, as they have hitherto inflicted, on the Christians of parts of Romania, we and the envoys of our most beloved son in Christ, Philip, illustrious King of France, as well as the members of the Hospital of St John of Jerusalem and the ambassadors of these beloved sons .. of the doge and the Republic of Venice, presently appointed to the Apostolic See, have arranged that certain galleys be sent for the defence of those Christians and the repression of the aforesaid Turks; under certain ways and means, that has been arranged for this year, as it was done for the previous year.³

The interest shown in the project from the rulers of France, Venice and the Hospitallers, coupled with the recent success of the 1334 campaign, meant that the second wave of the anti-Turkish league had a realistic chance of materialising and thus dealing another blow to the Turks of the Aegean. Even if Benedict was not as enthusiastic about this crusade as John XXII had been, it would have been

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¹ The exact numbers of ships are: sixteen horse transports from Philip VI, four horse transports and six galleys from Hugh of Cyprus, four horse transports and four galleys from Robert of Naples, ten galleys from Venice, six galleys from the Hospitallers, and six galleys from Andronikos III: JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5485 (19 May, 1334); also see nr. 5406, 5412. Housley, Avignon, 26; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 37-8.

² JXXII Secrètes, iv. nr. 5485. According to a letter of Marino Sanudo, King Philip had cancelled Louis’s appointment because he required his services for the Holy Land crusade, which is perhaps a reflection of the king’s priorities: Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 809 (letter 7); Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 38, n. 5.

³ BXII France, nr. 28, p. 15; AE, xxv. nr. 29, p. 31; Housley, Avignon, 28; Giunta, ‘Benedetto XII’, 217-8.
counterproductive for him to cancel the project at this stage, considering the propitious signs coming from other rulers of Europe and the East. 4

To demonstrate his support for this crusade, Benedict ordered the construction of four papal galleys in Marseille during April, 5 supplemented by five galleys hired by Philip VI in Marseille and Nice. 6 The galleys were to set out at mid May and serve for 5 months at a total cost of 11,500 florins, which was an affordable sum considering that John XXII had left the papal Camera with a surplus of around 750,000 florins. 7 Contrary to what Jenkins has written, this fleet was to be used to combat the Turks in Aegean and was not intended to travel to the Holy Land as part of the crusade being organised by the French king. 8 The next month Benedict issued indulgences to the new captain-general of the French galleys Hugh Quiéret and to those who were to accompany him on the expedition. 9 The bulls stipulated that Hugh and his followers would receive indulgences in articulo mortis for fighting against the Turks in Romania providing that they were contrite of heart and had made oral confession. The same participants were

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4 Contrary to what Geanakoplos has claimed, there is no evidence to suggest that in 1335, the Greek emperor Andronikos III had consented to help the general passage to the Holy Land being organised by the papacy and the French Crown: ‘In 1335, in order to demonstrate his good will and at the same time to not lose the possibility of future western help, Andronicus III consented to participate in a new crusade to recover the Holy Land, being organised under the leadership of the new pope Benedict XII and Philip VI, king of France’. Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 53. The only reference the author provides is to: Runciman, History of the Crusades, iii. 440. This only concerns the sincerity of King Philip’s crusading motivations and not the supposed promise made by Andronikos to help the Holy Land crusade. According to Nikephoros Gregoras, Andronikos III did arm 20 ships in 1335-6, but these were almost certainly designated for anti-Turkish operations and not for a Holy Land crusade: Nikephoros Gregoras, i. 524-5; Housley, Avignon, 28, n. 98. Also see above, ch. 4, pp. 154-5.

5 BXII France, nr. 28, 40, 54; BXII Communes, i. nr. 2467.

6 A letter from Philip VI to the shipbuilders of Marseille and Nice commissioning the construction of the galleys is printed in A. Jal, Archéologie navale, 2 vols (Paris, 1840), ii. 326-33. The fleet was to be dispatched apud Rodum sive partes ultra marinis (p. 327). Also see Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 38, n. 6; Delaville le Roux, France, i. 101.

7 BXII France, nr. 40 (6,900 florins), 54 (4,600 florins). For papal finances at the death of John XXII, see Housley, Italian Crusades, 251; Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 12, pp. 61-3.

8 H. Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace under Benedict XII: 1334-1342 (University of Pennsylvania, PhD thesis, 1933), 24. The sources relating to the construction and hire of the fleet only suggest that the fleet would be used to fight the Turks in Romania: BXII France, nr. 40, 54; Jal, Archéologie navale, ii. 326-33. The correct sequence and destination of these passagia is given by Housley, Avignon, 28.

9 Hugh had replaced Louis of Clermont as the captain-general of the French galleys in the previous year: Kunstmann, ‘Studien’, 809 (letter 7); Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 38, n. 5. He was the lord of Tours in Vimeu, an adviser of the king, and seneschal of Beaucaire and Nimes. The king gave him, in reward for his role during the crusade preparations four hundred pounds pension in 1335, and in 1339 this private income was allocated on the city and fortress of Hélicourt. Hugh died in 1340 from the wounds received in a naval fight against the English: Delaville le Roux, France, i. 101, n. 1.
also granted permission to celebrate divine offices in regions placed under interdict. Although these actions seem to contradict the theory that Benedict was disinterested in an Aegean crusade, it must be remembered that the pope was still only enforcing the plans originally put in place by John XXII for a second wave of the anti-Turkish league.

Benedict XII also lent support to John XXII’s other crusade plan: the general passage being organized by Philip VI to the Holy Land. In January 1335, the pope confirmed his predecessor’s bulls relating to the crusade, including the continuation of the clerical tenth for the expedition. If William of Nangis is to be believed, in this year John of Cepoy was dispatched by the French king to the Aegean to secure provisioning and reconnoitre the route for the forthcoming passage during which he apparently gained some noteworthy victories over the Turks. Again, it is not surprising that Benedict agreed to support this crusade: the plans had already been drawn up by John XXII and King Phillip; the Turks were on the back foot in Romania; and, more importantly, a crusade to the Holy Land could be used by the pope as a means of distracting the Christian rulers from their quarrels. This last point is crucial to understanding Benedict’s attitude to the Crusade at this time. As has been outlined, the second wave of the anti-Turkish league and the Holy Land crusade together had already attracted the participation of the French, Venetians and Hospitallers. To add to this, the pope had also made attempts to persuade Robert of Naples to join the crusade. Furthermore, it is possible that these crusades were considered by Benedict as

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10 The bulls issuing the indulgences are almost word-for-word copies of those issued to John of Cepoy in 1334: Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registrar Vaticana, reg. 119, ff. 132-3, ep. 343-8 (esp. ep. 343-4, 347). Summaries in BXII Communes, i. nr. 2247-50, 2253. The letters do not specify which regions had been placed under interdict. These may have been Milan, parts of the empire and the Catalan duchy of Athens. The latter, according to Setton, had been placed under interdict before 1347, but no reference is provided: Setton, Domination, 48. The Company had certainly been excommunicated by that time, but the bulls of excommunication make no mention of interdict. John of Cepoy was also granted permission to celebrate divine offices in places under interdict in 1334, but the document does not state who this referred to in particular. The Catalans had not yet been excommunicated by this time: Registrar Vaticana, reg. 107, f. 262v, ep. 839; summary in JXXII Communes, xiii. nr. 63173. For more on the interdict, see P.D. Clarke, The Interdict in the Thirteenth Century: A Question of Collective Guilt (Oxford, 2007), 130-68, esp. 138.

11 BXII Communes, i. nr. 2453, 2466, 2469; BXII France, nr. 19, 66. Also see Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace, 23.

12 William of Nangis, ii. 145; Delaville le Roux, France, i. 101. It is possible that Nangis was only recounting the victories of the 1334 anti-Turkish league, mistakenly dated to 1335: Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 37.

13 Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace, 23-5; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 45.
a way of encouraging enemies of the Church, such as Louis of Bavaria and the Visconti of Milan, to reconcile themselves to the new Pope. Also see Jenkins, *Papal Efforts for Peace*, 22-3. Matthew Visconti had, after all, promised to go on crusade in 1321 and Louis of Bavaria included the promise of crusade participation in a peace proposal offered to the pope in October 1336. When these factors are considered, it is not surprising that Benedict made initial efforts to support the crusades of John XXII, even if he was to scrap them in the following year.

**5.1.2. Crusade planning in 1335-1336: diversion and subsequent abandonment**

From a letter of April 1335, it is learned that the French fleet under the command of Hugh Quiéret was still on course to be dispatched to Rhodes and other areas of Romania. However, after this date there is no mention in the sources that these French galleys, or the four papal galleys commissioned in Marseille, ever left the French ports for the Aegean. It is almost certainly the case that the fleet did not embark for the East, as it is known that in early 1336 the crusade fleet commanded by Hugh Quiéret still lay at anchor in Marseille. At this time Philip VI revealed his true intentions for the dormant fleet by commanding Hugh Quiéret to sail to the English Channel to pre-empt hostility there. Philip had taken the decision to help the Scottish against the English in the previous year and his decision to divert the crusade fleet was probably taken in the winter of 1335-6. By prioritising the war against the English over any crusade, Philip VI had effectively put paid to any hopes of a second wave of the anti-Turkish league sailing to the Aegean.

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14 This conformed with the conciliatory attitude adopted by Benedict towards Louis and the Italian Ghibellines: Mollat, *Popes*, 110-19, 221-4. Also see Housley, *Italian Crusades*, 80, 84-5.
15 Housley, *Italian Crusades*, 80, 84-5.
19 Edward III of England had launched a naval expedition against Scotland in July 1335, Philip VI decided to intervene in this conflict soon after. In February 1336 Philip was in Beziers and shortly after, when at Marseille, he unveiled his fleet to be used against the English, which included those galleys which had been designated for the crusade: Roncière, *Maritime Française*, i. 389-91; *Les Grandes Chroniques de France*, v. 364.
At this point, the preparations for Philip VI’s general passage to the Holy Land also began to founder, predictably on the grounds of finance and the emerging Anglo-French war. For the papacy and the French Crown, this was a repeat of the same old story; King Philip required security with England and sufficient Church finance before fully committing to a general passage, but Benedict was unwilling to allow the crusade tenth to be used for purposes not directly linked with the crusade, especially when Europe was in such a state of disorder. Even if the French considered their own security as an integral prerequisite for the general passage, the papacy had shown that it was unwilling to grant Church tenths for the defence of France.\footnote{20 For this in general see Jenkins, \textit{Papal Efforts for Peace}, 5-25, 34-5.} In the previous April (1335) the pope had refused to grant Philip access to any crusade tenths levied on the Church outside of France,\footnote{21 BXII \textit{France}, i. nr. 44; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 44, n. 4.} and in the following year all preparations for the general passage and the crusade tenths associated with it were cancelled.\footnote{22 The letters informing Philip of the cancellation of the crusade were dispatched from Avignon on 13 March 1336: BXII \textit{Autres}, 786; CPR, ii. 560 (also published in Depréz, \textit{Préliminaires}, 410-13). In November-December 1336 the collection of the crusade tenth was cancelled and it was decreed that the proceeds be restored to the Church: BXII \textit{France}, nr. 240, 251, 280; BXII \textit{Communes}, 3954-5, 3998-9, 5139-40 (January 1337); vol. ii. nr. 6302 (June 1338). Also see Jenkins, \textit{Papal Efforts for Peace}, 23-5; Depréz, \textit{Préliminaires}, 23-4; Henneman, \textit{Taxation}, 107; Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 29, 180-1; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 45-7.} Echoing John XXII’s words in the early 1320s,\footnote{23 See above, ch. 1, pp. 58-64.} Benedict informed the French king that the crusade had been cancelled because of the situation in Europe – England and Scotland were in perpetual conflict, Germany was at war, and Tuscany, Lombardy, Apulia and Sicily, were all in a state of anarchy.\footnote{24 13 March 1336. BXII \textit{Autres}, 786; CPR, ii. 560; Depréz, \textit{Préliminaires}, 410-13; AE, xxv. nr. 44, p. 78. Also see Depréz, \textit{Préliminaires}, 123-4; Jenkins, \textit{Papal Efforts for Peace}, 24.}

Throughout the greater part of 1335 Benedict had clearly supported the crusades originally planned by John XXII. This was partly because the processes had already been set in motion by the previous pope and also because Benedict realised that a successful crusade would help maintain peace within Christendom – especially by diverting French attention from the Anglo-Scottish conflict. It seems that Philip VI’s decision to help the Scottish against the English in late 1335 and his diversion of Hugh Quiéret’s crusade fleet to the English Channel put an end to this. It is probably because of these factors that the pope decided to cancel the Holy Land crusade. After this point,
as Tyerman has suggested, the Crusade was considered by Benedict as separate from attempts to gain peace in the West and consequently all plans for it were shelved.25

Benedict XII’s attitude towards the Crusade was also indicative of his personal priorities, which lay in internal Church reform and the eradication of heresy, rather than international diplomacy and the defence of Christendom from the infidel which had been skilfully pursued by John XXII. Benedict, named Jacques Fournier before his coronation, was an ascetic Cistercian and renowned inquisitor. During his time as Bishop of Pamiers, he had ardently pursued Waldensian, Catharist and Albigensian heretics, presiding over his court of justice for no less than three hundred and seventy days between 1318 and 1325. He earned the respect of John XXII and was placed in charge of the appeals of the Inquisition at Avignon from 1330-4. When elected pope, he turned his attention to reforming the religious orders and implementing a strict discipline within the Church.26 Benedict XII’s priorities therefore contrasted to those of John XXII and Clement VI. His austere attitude, coupled with the problems affecting the crusade plans in 1335-6 provide another reason for why those designs were dropped and why a new crusade was not fostered during his pontificate.

5.1.3. Benedict XII’s policies in the Eastern Mediterranean

The collapse of the crusade plans of 1335-6 did not mark the end of joint Christian resistance against the Turks in the Aegean, or the requests for papal support in the East, but Benedict’s policy was almost always driven by direct appeals from the Latins overseas and often lacked a degree of continuity. In some senses, this was not dissimilar to John XXII, whose eastern policy had also been largely formulated after the initiative others, but in contrast to his predecessor, Benedict XI did not go to great lengths to support the defence of those resident in the Aegean against the Turks. Instead, when he did take action, this usually reflected his concern over false doctrine, such as his dealings with the Armenians, the Catalans and the Byzantines.

26 For more on the career and character of Jacques Fournier, see Mollat, Popes, 26-36; Jenkins, Papal Efforts for Peace, 15-17.
Consequently, the shift in the impetus of planning for the crusade swung further towards the rulers of the East and the maritime republics of Europe.

Papal policy towards Cyprus was often driven by the rulers of the island, thus Benedict XII took his cue from King Hugh IV of Cyprus on many occasions. This was the case in 1336, when the pope was willing to oblige when Hugh called for the cessation of preaching for the Holy Land crusade in his kingdom on the basis that it would incite the Muslims on the Anatolian mainland. The Cypriot prelates were informed that preaching for the general passage was prohibited and could only recommence once the crusade was ready. The fact that the Holy Land crusade did not have the support of the rulers in the East may also provide another explanation for why it was cancelled in 1336. This event also highlights the priorities of the Cypriot rulers, who were busy penning the Turks in on the nearby mainland of Anatolia, probably from the emirates of Hamid and Karaman, and did not have the inclination to dedicate resources for a Holy Land crusade. In 1338, the pope formally recognised the efforts of King Hugh and wrote a letter congratulating him on a victory over the Turks. Despite this action, there is no evidence to suggest that Benedict ever took measures to support the Cypriots in this regard.

Unlike Cyprus, Armenia did benefit from some papal support during the pontificate of Benedict XII. In October 1335, in response to King Leo of Armenia’s repeated appeals for aid, the pope granted the king a plenary indulgence to cover all the occasions where he had fought against Muslims. The next year, in May 1336, the pope went one step further and issued plenary indulgences to all the Christian faithful, from Sicily, Cyprus and the Aegean islands, who would fight for the Armenians or send soldiers and money for their aid against the Muslims, but, as was the case in Cyprus, the decisions made in Avignon regarding Armenia appear to have been driven by the

27 Housley, Avignon, 31; Idem, ‘Cyprus and the Crusades, 1291-1571’, Cyprus and the Crusades: Papers Given at the International Conference ‘Cyprus and the Crusades’, ed. N. Coureas & J.S.C. Riley-Smith (Nicosia, 1995), 187-206, at 192. Cyprus and Armenia had both been coming under increasing Muslim pressure since the early 1330s. Jacob of Verona provides a rich account of Armenian refugees seeking shelter in Famagusta after an attack from the Mamluk sultan in the summer of 1335: Jacob of Verona, Liber Peregrinationis, ed. U.M. Villard (Rome, 1950), 17-18.
28 BXII Autres, nr. 732-3 (3 January); Hill, Cyprus, ii. 299, n. 1; Edbury, Cyprus, 157.
29 This is discussed in detail below, 170-3.
requests of King Leo, rather than by any foresight on behalf of the pope.\textsuperscript{31} As Housley has convincingly stated, the pope adopted more of a reactionary approach to Armenia, rather than forming any clearly defined policy.\textsuperscript{32} This is illustrated in 1341 where, after hearing of widespread errors within the Armenian Church, Benedict refused to send aid to the kingdom until orthodoxy was restored.\textsuperscript{33}

The indulgences Benedict issued in Cyprus, Armenia and the Aegean in 1336 are also informative of where the pope’s priorities lay. Under close inspection, the papal bulls granting the indulgences specifically state that full remission of sins was to be granted to those fighting against the forces of the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, in and around Armenia. It is known that the Cypriots were actively fighting the Turks in the region at this time, but the indulgences make no allowance for those fighting anyone other than the Mamluks. Since 1334 there had been no indulgence issued to those fighting the Turks in the Aegean, and as Benedict did not issue any during his pontificate he was potentially diverting men and resources from fighting the Turks in the Aegean to fighting the Mamluks further east. Thus Benedict risked indirectly discouraging military participation in the Aegean theatre, regardless of whether this was his intention or not.\textsuperscript{34}

A more explicit example of how papal policy under Benedict XII hindered the Aegean crusades is given by the restriction on finances made available to the Hospitallers for their Aegean activities. As described in earlier chapters, the Order had amassed massive debts during its seizure of Rhodes. This debt was gradually alleviated with the help of John XXII, and in 1335 the Hospitallers became solvent once again, but despite this, the Order continued to make payments to the Florentine banking houses of the Bardi, Peruzzi and Acciajuoli.\textsuperscript{35} Until at least 1339 these houses also acted as the official bankers to the papacy and the pope was therefore unwilling to allow the Order to expend the credit it had amassed on a prolonged campaign against the Turks.

\textsuperscript{31} BXII \textit{France}, nr. 175-6 (1 May); BXII \textit{Communes}, i. nr. 3971. Also see Zachariadou, TC, 34-5; Hill, \textit{Cyprus, ii.} 299, n. 1; Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 30; Luttrell, ‘Crusade in the fourteenth century’, 134. In April 1336 Benedict also allocated 10,000 florins for the purchase of grain, to be sent to Armenia to help ease the famine there: BXII \textit{France}, nr. 155; Tyerman, ‘Philip VI’, 47; Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 30-1.

\textsuperscript{32} Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 30.

\textsuperscript{33} Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 31; BXII \textit{Autres}, nr. 3149-55 (1 August).

\textsuperscript{34} This point is made by Elizabeth Zachariadou: TC, 35, n. 135.

\textsuperscript{35} Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers at Rhodes’, 293-4.
especially considering the difficulties experienced by these banking houses at the time. Bearing this in mind, it is not surprising that Benedict refused to help finance a joint Venetian-Hospitaller fleet for the Aegean in May 1336. According to the reports of the Venetian Senate, Hospitaller and Venetian ambassadors had been unable to obtain aid from the pope for use against the Turks. The Venetians were unable to sustain the expenses alone, but with the help of the Hospitallers it was agreed that preparations for a fleet should continue. Apparently the Venetian and Rhodian ships had assembled at Crete in the summer of 1336, but after failing to receive support from the West, they undertook no concerted action in the Aegean.

With regards to papal policy in Frankish Greece, Benedict XII maintained throughout his pontificate the same aggressive strategy towards the Catalans of Athens as that adopted by his predecessor. On the one hand this shows that Benedict was not completely disinterested in the defence of Frankish Greece and the Aegean, but on the other hand it suggests that the pope’s priorities lay in supporting Walter of Brienne’s claim to the duchy of Athens and opposing the Catalan Company, rather than defending the region from the Turks. In December 1335, Benedict permitted the archbishop of Patras to excommunicate the Catalans. This came after they had failed to comply with the papal demand, issued by John XXII in the previous year, that the Company restore Athens to Walter of Brienne or suffer ecclesiastical censure. In the following years, the pope continued to support the dynastic ambitions of Walter despite the refusal of Venice to participate in any Brienne expedition to the Morea. This is illustrated, in 1339, when Benedict summoned Archbishop Isnard of Thebes to

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37 Appendix III, nr. 4; Venice, Archivio di Stato, *Deliberazioni Misti del Senato*, reg. 17, f. 60v.


40 On 12 August 1334: *DOC*, nr. 158 (incorrectly dated to 1333); IXXII *Communes*, xiii. nr. 63752. Also see Setton, *Domination*, 41; Setton, ‘Catalans’, 190; Setton, *Los catalanes*, 27.

41 Venice refused to help Walter, except to grant him permission to use state galleys to sail across to Clarentza on the north-western tip of the Morea: *DOC*, nr. 162-3 (4 November 1335), 165 (11 March 1336); Setton, *Domination*, 42; Setton, ‘Catalans’, 190-1.
Avignon to stand trial for consorting with Catalans and falsely relaxing their ban of excommunication.  

This action seems to have been initiated by a letter to the pope from Walter Brienne requesting that Isnard be denounced for failing to enforce the previous excommunication on the Company.

There is evidence that during these years, and as a result of Walter of Brienne’s continued preparations to launch an expedition to the Morea, the Catalan Company called on Umur of Aydin to provide them with military assistance against a Brienne-led invasion.

Enveri, the source for this alliance, goes into some detail. Umur, after receiving a plea of help from the Catalan commander and with the help of Ehad beg, sailed with a force of 110 vessels to Athens. However, once he had arrived at the city, the Catalan commanders informed Umur that Walter of Brienne had abandoned his attack after he had learned of the Turkish reinforcements. Enraged by this news, the emir raided the surrounding country belonging to the Brienne and returned to Smyrna. Considering this evidence, and the Catalan record of allying with the Turks in the past, it is surprising to learn that Benedict XII did not make much of the Catalan-Turkish alliance in his bulls ordering their excommunication. In one letter, that of 1339 instructing Isnard return to Avignon, the pope did accuse the Catalans of forging a partnership with the ‘schismatics, Turks and other enemies of the Christian faith’, but this accusation is almost a word-for-word copy of that used by John XXII in a bull issued in 1334, which in turn, was a small comment in the context of a far longer letter, and not overly dissimilar from the rhetoric used in letters condemning the Catalans dating back to 1318. So it seems that the pope was only repeating and not elaborating on the accusations made by John XXII.

In 1341, Benedict eventually relaxed his policy towards the Catalan Company after it became clear that Walter of Brienne was going to be unsuccessful in recovering

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44 This hypothesis is made by Lemerle, who uses Enveri as his source: Lemerle, *Aydin*, 122.
45 Ehad Şubaşi, beg of Smyrna: Enveri, 50, n. 1.
46 Enveri, verses 1085-1118.
48 *DOC*, nr. 158 (12 August 1334).
his kingdom and that peace with the Catalans was integral for the protection of the Latins of Greece. On 10 February, after hearing that the Catalans wished to seek reconciliation with Rome, Benedict instructed them to send their officials to Avignon, where they would be met with ‘willingness and favour’. Benedict’s insistence on the orthodoxy of the Armenians, the excommunication of the Catalans and eventual eagerness for them to return to the fold of Rome, was perhaps a reflection of his priorities – he was, after all, more concerned with Church reform than fighting the infidel and because of this, dealing with the schismatic Catalans in the Morea took precedence over the Turks.

Benedict XII’s desire to combat false doctrine over the infidel is also acutely apparent in his policy towards the Byzantines. In 1337 Emperor Andronikos III dispatched the Venetian ambassador Stephen Dandolo, followed by the Calabrian monk, Barlaam, in 1339, to the papal Curia to reopen discussions of Church Union. Their mission was twofold: to convince the pope to hold a general council to discuss the filioque question, and to secure aid for the recovery of the Byzantine provinces of Asia Minor which had been captured by the Turks. With regards to the latter objective, Barlaam insisted that the West should send aid to the East, as the Turks were not just harming the Greeks, but also the Armenians, Cypriots and Rhodians, who were all subjects of the pope. He also informed Benedict that many Greeks in Asia Minor, who had been forced to adopt the Islamic faith, would return to Christianity once their cities were recovered. Moreover, the defence of the East from the Turks would be made far easier with Greek support. In short, Barlaam proposed that if the West would agree to help the Christians of the East before Union was implemented, then Greek minds would be won over, thus making Church Union more palatable for the Greek people. This, combined with the ruling of a general council to accept Union, but only after the aid had been sent to the East, would provide the best possible way of achieving Union. Barlaam also offered another less effective strategy for Union in case the first proposals were rejected: that the king of France send aid to the places named; that all Greek slaves owned by Latins be freed and the slave trade be stopped; and that

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49 Dated 10 Feb 1341: BXII France, nr. 810; DOC, nr. 177; ‘Athênes’, ed. Loenertz, nr. 74. Also see Setton, Domination, 47; Setton, ‘Catalans’, 192; Housley, Avignon, 31; Giunta, ‘Benedetto XII’, 230.
50 Gill, Byzantium, 197; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 54-5.
51 AE, xxv. nr. 22-3, pp. 160-1.
the pope should grant the crusade indulgence to all those fighting for the Greeks, helping materially, or who died in war against the Turks. This might win the trust of the Greek people, who would then be more inclined to accept Union even without a general council.

All of these proposals were declined by the pope and the cardinals at the Curia. They stated that eastern prelates should be sent to the West for instruction, not discussion, as the *filioque* (an article of faith that had already been defined) could not be called into question, regardless of Byzantine problems with the Turks. This was obviously unacceptable to the Greeks and the negotiations crumbled. The papal decision was not altogether surprising, nor out of character for this period. However, these discussions are especially important to this study because they placed far more emphasis on the necessity for aid against the Turks as a prerequisite for Union than in previous negotiations. In fact, every proposal was conditional to the immediate consignment of help for Andronikos III and therefore overlooked the specific theological problems which had hindered negotiations in the past. According to Geanakoplos, this reflected the papal attitude towards the Greeks at this time: ‘the west would not really begin to interest itself in the fate of the east until the Turks had approached so close as to begin to threaten the western European territories’. This may be true to some extent, but it would seem that, considering the active anti-Turkish policies of Popes John XXII and Clement VI, Geanakoplos’s remark is more applicable to the pontificate of Benedict XII than to the West as a whole during this time: Benedict’s refusal to implement a crusade against the Turks at the specific request of the Byzantines because of theological differences is, after all, illustrative of where his priorities lay.

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52 AE, xxv. nr. 24, pp. 161-2.
53 Barlaam’s proposals for Union have been discussed in detail by Gill, *Byzantium*, 196-9; Geanakoplos, ‘*Byzantium*’, 54-7; Giunta, ‘Benedetto XII’, 230-3; M. Viller, ‘La question de l’union des églises entre grecs et latins depuis le concile de Lyon jusqu’à celui de Florence (1274-1438)’, *Revue d’histoire ecclésiastique* 18 (1922), 20-60, at 20-6. The relevant documents are printed in AE, xxv. nr. 19-32, pp. 159-64; ‘Acta Benedicti XII’, viii. nr. 42-3; BXII *France*, nr. 634-5.
54 AE, xxv. nr. 28, pp. 162-3; Gill, *Byzantium*, 198; Geanakoplos, ‘*Byzantium*’, 56; Viller, ‘L’union des églises’, 23.
56 Geanakoplos, ‘*Byzantium*’, 56.
This discussion of Benedict XII’s eastern policy has confirmed a number of things. The pope was made aware of the Turkish attacks in Asia Minor by the appeals of the Armenians, Cypriots, Hospitallers and Byzantines, and when he did act, it was usually on the recommendation of those rulers. On the rare occasions when the Curia did provide aid, such as to Armenia in the mid 1330s, it took the form of a stop-gap measure and lacked any continuity. For various reasons, largely related to his preoccupation in ensuring the orthodoxy of the Christians of the East, support was not often forthcoming. The Turks were, in particular, low on his agenda – he made no effort to support the anti-Turkish cause in the East and he possibly weakened it by granting indulgences to those fighting the Mamluks in south-eastern Anatolia, but not against the Turks elsewhere. More importantly, the pope was asked, but refused, to help fund a Venetian-Hospitaller fleet for the defence of the Aegean.

5.1.4. The further shift of crusade impetus to the East

The lack of papal support did not deter the Latins in the East from continuing to defend their lands and commercial interests from the expanding Turkish emirates. Hugh of Cyprus, in particular, was actively resisting the Turks for some time. According to a sixteenth-century continuation of the Liber Pontificalis, King Hugh sent twelve galleys and other armed ships against the Turks in August 1336, which caused much damage and killed many, and again, in July 1337, he sent another fleet of 21 galleys and other vessels, which managed to kill a Turkish captain amongst others.57 Finally, another victory (or possibly the same one) is reported in a letter of February 1338 sent by Benedict XII to the king. Here the pope congratulates Hugh over a ‘glorious victory against the Turks, the blasphemers of the Christian name’ and the ‘degenerate Christians and enemies of the Catholic faith’, who had been assisting the them.58 The pope may have been responding to news of one of the victories listed in the Liber Pontificalis, but the scant details on the battle mentioned in the letter to Hugh render

58 The letter is dated 9 February. BXII Autres, nr. 1673; AE, xxv. nr. 72, p. 140; Coureas, ‘Naval leagues’, 108; Delaville le Roulx, France, i. 91; Hill, Cyprus, ii. 299; Housley, Avignon, 31; Giunta, ‘Benedetto XII’, 230. The identity of the Christians fighting with the Turks remains unclear, although Hill suggests they may have been Genoese: Hill, Cyprus, ii. 299.
this inconclusive. Nevertheless, it is clear that the king was engaged in fighting the Anatolian Turks throughout the later 1330s. He was evidently successful as the travel writer Ludolf of Sudheim reported that by 1341 many of the Turkish coastal towns of southern Asia Minor paid tribute to him.⁵⁹ As Coureas has suggested, Hugh’s request that the preaching for the crusade to the Holy Land be cancelled in 1336 may have been made so that he could concentrate his forces on the more pressing matter of the Turks from the nearby Anatolian emirates.⁶⁰

In 1341, because of the increasing threat from the Turks and the lack of support from Avignon, Hugh took the initiative of dispatching Lambertino Baldwin della Cecca, the bishop of Limassol, to Rhodes and Venice. His mission was to urge the grand master and the doge to add their voices to Hugh’s in a joint appeal to the pope for help in stopping the Turks in the eastern Mediterranean:

He [Hugh] clearly indicates to the lord pope the state of Christianity in overseas lands and the grave danger of Christianity itself, which on account of the power and hostility of the Turks, has grown so much and been increased because the said Turks are destroying, looting, despoiling and molesting all surrounding lands and the people living in them and thus, unless provision can be made for support by our lord pope and other faithful, standing firm everywhere, whom the said matter affects, all the said lands, being shortly occupied by the said Turks, will be destroyed and lost and all Christians dwelling in those same lands destroyed; beseeching the said lord our pope that it may please him to make provision, in consideration of his duty, for suitable support concerning the aforesaid lands, especially since he may look to be involved in such support, both for his own part and as the head of the whole of Christendom.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Ludolf of Sudheim, Description of the Holy Land, 44; Coureas, ‘Naval leagues’, 109.
⁶¹ The letter is printed in full in Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, ii. 180-1. Summary in Libri Commemoriali, ii. nr. 563. For more on Lambertino, see Edbury, Cyprus, 158 and references.
The Cypriot king voiced his belief that if the Hospitallers and Venetians should ‘jointly with our lord the king himself’ entreat the pope over the matter of the Turks, then he would ‘be more quickly and readily urged on’ and more willing to give support ‘on the entreaty of three and of many than of one alone’. It is also learned that the Hospitallers had already sent a message concerning the Turkish problem to the pope, and that they would repeat the appeal again after the request from the Cypriot king. This need for a combined appeal to Avignon is again evidence of the unwillingness of Curia to help defend the East from the growing menace of the Turks. On 22 November 1341, the Venetian Senate made a favourable reply, albeit in a vague manner, to Hugh’s request:

[B]ecause the illustrious lord king desires to foreknow our intention, we are declaring it [...] and it can be clear to all that we have been and are ready, for the reverence of God and the Holy Mother Church and her holy faith, with support of the Christians forthcoming, for our part to offer and do to good effect that which will be right and appropriate in support of so holy an undertaking and service, as true faithful servants and guardians of the holy Christian faith and just as we have always been accustomed to do.

Unfortunately Hugh of Cyprus’s appeal to the pope came too late, and in April 1342, before any action could be taken, Benedict XII died. Benedict’s death means that his response to Lambertino’s embassy is unknown, or even whether the embassy had reached the Curia in time. All that is known is that the unwillingness of the pope to contribute to any concerted effort to help defend the Latins of the eastern Mediterranean had resulted in the Cypriot king taking the initiative for himself. In a sense, this was not dissimilar to the formation of the 1334 anti-Turkish league, where Venice negotiated with Pope John XXII for many years before he committed to the expedition. Unlike John, who supported other Latin lords in Romania against the Turks,

63 Full text in G. Fedalto, La chiesa latina in Oriente, 3 vols (Verona, 1973-8), iii. 51. Partial text in Mas Latrie, Histoire de l’île de Chypre, ii. 181. Also see Edbury, Cyprus, 158; Hill, Cyprus, ii. 299.
Benedict XII did not implement an alternative strategy for combating them in the Aegean region or elsewhere. The nearest Benedict came to action was to offer aid to Armenia and support to some of the Latins in the Morea – neither offer was made on the grounds of defending the region from Turkish attack. It will never be known if Benedict planned to send aid to the East, in response to the Cypriot, Venetian and Hospitaller requests, but it seems unlikely that he would have, judging by his previous policies. It was not until a new Pope, Clement VI, was elected at Avignon in May 1342, that Hugh’s plan was realised. The formation of this new anti-Turkish naval league in the Aegean would eventually form the first wave of the Crusade of Smyrna.
5.2. **Venice and the Turks, 1334-1342**

5.2.1. **Continuation of the anti-Turkish league**

The Latin victory at Adramyttion in the autumn of 1334 did not limit Turkish aggression in the Aegean for long. In fact the Turkish raiding parties appear to have increased their activities after the death of Pope John XXII. In response to this, the Venetian Senate agreed to dispatch ten galleys to the Gulf and *Romania* in November 1334, six of which were to be used by the league. In the following January, the *Serenissima* also decided to send an embassy to Benedict XII urging him to continue John XXII’s support of the union, and to renew contact with the king of France if necessary. In June 1335 the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the Senate decided to issue a new decree prohibiting the import of grain from Turkish territories. This was followed in 1337 by an unsuccessful petition at the Curia to reopen the prohibited Mamluk trade markets to Venetian merchants. Over the following years galleys were dispatched to the Aegean and castles were re-fortified in the region to help protect the Venetian colonies from Turkish attack. In April 1335 it is reported that the captain of the league, was permitted to arm some small vessels in Negroponte and in February of the next year he was to transfer one galley to Crete. The concern caused by the Turks to the Venetian authorities in the Aegean even gave the *Serenissima* reason to continue their pact with the Catalans of Athens in an effort to counterbalance the threat from the Turks. The agreement with the Catalans was used by the doge to justify his refusal

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64 For example: Andrea Dandolo, 372.
65 ‘Thespismata tès Benetikès gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 16, nr. 52, pp. 154-5; Zachariadou, TC, 33, n. 126.
66 *Le deliberazioni*, ii. bk. 16, nr. 726, p. 389 (19 January); ‘Thespismata tès Benetikès gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 16, nr. 54, pp. 155-6, bk. 17, nr. 1, p. 159; Zachariadou, TC, 34, n. 128.
68 TR, i. nr. 65 (15 February 1336), nr. 73 (12 July 1337).
69 ‘Thespismata tès Benetikès gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 4, p. 160 (8 April 1335); TR, i. nr. 65 (15 February 1336); Zachariadou, TC, 34, n. 129.
70 On 26 March the Senate instructed the baillie of Negroponte to renew the treaty with the Catalans: TR, i. nr. 58. Later that year, the Senate also instructed the lord of Kythera to recompense the Catalans for damages inflicted by his people on Catalan ships: TR, i. nr. 62 (17 October), 103 (28 March 1340).
to support Walter of Brienne against the Company in 1335. In two Venetian Senate hearings concerning the matter it is reported that the Senate could not agree to Walter’s request because of the state of Romania, the threat of the Turks and the needs of Venetian trade in the region.

5.2.2. Peace with the Turks, 1337-1339

By 1335 the Venetian fleet in the Aegean had seen almost continuous action for two years; many of the participants had fought against the Turks, and some had helped suppress the rebellion on Crete. During 1333-4, when the conflict was at its greatest and the Venetian galleys joined those of the league, the Republic’s trade in Romania had undoubtedly been disrupted. In addition to this, the intense conflict would have prevented many galleys from subsidising their expense by partaking in small-scale trade. In fact measures had been taken by John XXII in 1334 to prevent the galleys of the league from carrying merchandise, as this would slow their progress. With this in mind, it is reasonable to assume that the continued maintenance of a large anti-Turkish fleet in the Aegean was becoming a considerable financial burden on the Republic. Perhaps as a response to this, the Senate granted the captain of the league permission in 1335 to transport passengers within the Aegean, possibly to subsidise the expense of the galleys. Furthermore, in 1336 Venice issued new orders which specifically instructed the captain of the league to capture as many Turkish ships as possible. This order was probably issued to help alleviate the expense of maintaining the galleys through the increase of prize money gained from the captured Turkish vessels and their cargoes.

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71 See above, pp. 166-7.
72 DOC, nr. 162-3 (both dated 4 November 1335).
73 See above, ch. 4, p. 150.
74 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 1, p. 159 (6 March 1335); Zachariadou, TC, 34, n. 129. On 30 August 1335 Nicholas Contarini and his family were granted permission to travel from Crete to Venice in one of the galleys of the league: ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 21, p. 168.
75 ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 21, p. 168.
76 Naval forces were often expected to partially pay for themselves through the capture of enemy ships: J.F. Guilmartin Jr., Gunpowder and Galleys: Changing Technology and Mediterranean Warfare at Sea in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1974), 60.
These financial constraints coupled with the discouraging signs coming from Avignon led the _Serenissima_ to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the Turks. Similarly, the Turks of Aydin and Menteshe, some of whom were severely weakened by the operations of the league in 1334, also wished to come to terms with Venice.\(^77\) Consequently in 1337, at a time when the Venetians had been refused permission by the pope to trade with Mamluk Egypt,\(^78\) Giovanni Sanudo, the Duke of Crete, confirmed two peace treaties with the Turks: one with Emir Ibrahim of Menteshe, the other with Emir Hizir of Aydin.\(^79\) From the treaty with Ibrahim, it is apparent that relations between Menteshe and the Venetians were not especially fractious before 1337. The two sides were trading in late 1334,\(^80\) and although the Senate had introduced a ban on trade with the Turks in 1335, the clauses of the Menteshe treaty suggest that the Venetian merchants were mostly concerned with amending their trading rights in the emirate. Two clauses clearly expressed this. The first stipulated that the capacity of the _shinik_, a local measure used by some of the Turkish emirates for cereals, should be restored to its previous status.\(^81\) The second was that the Turks cease the construction of dwellings in an area allocated to the Venetians in the emirate.\(^82\) Moreover, Ibrahim promised to abolish the _appalto_ tax,\(^83\) on all merchandise except wine.\(^84\) From the agreement it is also apparent that Ibrahim was more concerned about the threat posed by the neighbouring emirate of Aydin rather than from the Venetians. He clearly knew that parallel negotiations had been undertaken between the duke of Crete and Hizir of Aydin at this time.\(^85\) Ibrahim, therefore included a final clause in the Menteshe treaty stipulating that Giovanni Sanudo was to remain at peace with his emirate at all times, and was not to form an alliance with his enemies (i.e. Aydin) or aid them in any way.\(^86\)

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\(^77\) Zachariadou, _TC_, 35.
\(^78\) See above, p. 174, n. 67.
\(^79\) The treaties are studied in detail by Zachariadou, _TC_, 35-7, full text at 190-200 (doc. 2-3).
\(^80\) _Le deliberazioni (Senato)_ ii. bk. 16, nr. 697, p. 379-80; Zachariadou, _TC_, 33, n. 125.
\(^81\) Zachariadou, _TC_, 35, 146, text at 198 (doc. 3), clause nr. 23.
\(^82\) _Ibid._, 35, text at 197 (doc. 3), clause nr. 17.
\(^83\) The _appalto_ was a restriction imposed on merchandise in Menteshe and Aydin, similar to the _gabella_. According to Pegolotti the _appalto_ and _gabella_ were the same thing: Francesco Pegolotti, 56; Zachariadou, _TC_, 134. The _appalto_ was not necessarily a monopoly: Fleet, _European and Islamic Trade_, 109, n. 125.
\(^84\) Zachariadou, _TC_, 198 (doc. 3), clause nr. 22; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 246.
\(^85\) For example: Zachariadou, _TC_, 198-200 (doc. 3), clause nr. 24, 28.
\(^86\) _Ibid._, 35, text at 200 (doc. 3), clause nr. 29.
Unlike the agreement made with Menteshe, the treaty concluded between Giovanni Sanudo and Aydin, addressed to Hizir, but which also included Umur as a co-recipient, was the first to be made between the two parties. This in itself is evidence that since the 1320s the Venetians of the Aegean had mostly been in conflict with Aydin and had not engaged in the same level of trade with the emirate, as they had done with Menteshe. The majority of the clauses of the treaty refer to settling the conditions necessary for commercial exchange, such as the fixing of customs duties, the establishment of a consul in Theologo and the granting of an area for Venetian merchants. As Zachariadou has shown, one clause in particular demonstrated the weak position of the rulers of Aydin as a result of the Latin offensives against them: this stated that Hizir, Umur and all of their other brothers should ‘not arm nor cause to arm, nor sail or cause to be sailed, nor put or cause to be put to sea, any of their ships or small boats or any of their vessels for the whole time during which this agreement will continue’. As Zachariadou has shown, one clause in particular demonstrated the weak position of the rulers of Aydin as a result of the Latin offensives against them: this stated that Hizir, Umur and all of their other brothers should ‘not arm nor cause to arm, nor sail or cause to be sailed, nor put or cause to be put to sea, any of their ships or small boats or any of their vessels for the whole time during which this agreement will continue’. 88

It has already been noted that, through their control of Chios, Phokaia and the Egyptian alum market, the Genoese had become the dominant merchants in the alum trade. This dominance stimulated the Venetians to search for alternative sources of alum and thus import the product without the use of Genoese intermediaries. Once these imports had arrived in Venice, the citizens had been careful to conserve them. The emirates of Menteshe and Aydin which possessed two of the primary maritime markets of the Aegean Sea – Altoluogo (Ephesos) and Palatia respectively – provided a clear opening to one of the most productive alum mines of the period, that of Kutahya, in the emirate of Germiyan. The majority of this alum at this time was transported from Kutahya to the ports of Altoluogo and Palatia, where it was then exported to the West. Therefore, the treaties of 1337 provided the Venetians with the perfect opportunity to extend their independence in the alum trade. This was reflected in the

87 Ibid., 36, text at 190-4 (doc. 2).
88 Ibid., 36; text at 190 (doc. 2), clause nr. 3.
89 See above, ch. 2, pp. 81-5; Jacoby, ‘Production et commerce de l’alun’, 246. Alum shipments to Venice were not common enough to have been listed as a taxable commodity in 1334, this was changed in 1388: Singer, Earliest Chemical Industry, 99.
90 According to Pegolotti, Kutahya produced around 12,000 cantara of alum per year, compared to 14,000 in Phokaia: Francesco Pegolotti, 367-70; Lopez & Raymond, Medieval Trade, 353-5.
clauses of both agreements where Giovanni Sanudo insisted that neither emirate would impose an *appalto* on the alum passing through its territories, from Kutahya to the ports of Altoluogo and Palatia. Menteshe, for its part, had not placed an *appalto* on alum in the past, but it was agreed that Emir Ibrahim could impose one, if the Venetians were unable to persuade Hizir to abolish the existing *appalto* on alum in Aydin. The duke of Crete was, however, successful in his dealings with Hizir and in that treaty the emir consented to abolish the *appalto* on alum and other food articles in his territories. Giovanni Sanudo had therefore succeeded in securing free trade on alum for Venetian merchants in both Aydin and Menteshe. This is an indicator of the strong position of Venice in comparison to the Turkish emirates at this stage and also reflects the priorities of the Republic which were to secure the best possible trade agreements with the Anatolian Turks, especially with regards to alum.

Although the Senate continued to dispatch galleys to defend *Romania* in the following years, it appears that the Venetians had achieved some degree of security in the region and were satisfied with the position which their merchants held in the trade markets of the Aegean and Anatolia. The evidence for this may be found in two decisions of the Venetian Senate in the summer and winter of 1338 which rejected a Genoese proposal to form a union, presumably against the Turks. The documents from the Venetian archives do not provide much information regarding this matter only that in August the Senate made a reply to an ambassador of Genoa which excused them ‘by reason of circumstances and business’ from holding talks in a neutral place with a view to entering into a union. In December, the Senate ordered that the offer from the Genoese ambassador should again be refused, this time ‘in fine words,
excusing ourselves from the making of a union’. The Serenissima’s refusal to negotiate with the Genoese was also a reflection of the contrasting fortunes of Genoese and Venetian traders in the Aegean at this time: after the treaties of 1337 the Venetian merchants enjoyed beneficial trade privileges in Menteshe and Aydin, and access to tax-free alum, whilst the Genoese were enjoying a far less prominent position in the Aegean since the loss of Chios in 1329, and the submission of Phokaia to the emperor.

5.2.3. Renewed conflict with the Turks and the reappearance of Umur of Aydin

The security which the Venetians of the Aegean enjoyed following the agreements of 1337 did not last for long. In the spring of 1339, after hearing that Venetian ships were becoming easy prey to pirates in Romania, the Senate instructed crews to take measures to defend themselves. In the same year, the Senate ordered 30 galleys to be sent to the East, with fifteen of them destined for the Aegean. Moreover, on 4 March the Serenissima decided to call upon the Catalans of Athens for assistance in defending Negroponte, which appears to have been suffering most from the Turkish attacks. The Senate records report that the bailie of Negroponte was authorised to receive from the Catalans an amount of money for a fleet which would be used to defend the island. These sources do not name the Turks specifically as the cause of the trouble in Romania, but a selection of letters sent from the governors of Negroponte to Venice in the summer of 1339, and preserved in the Senate archives, do suggest that the Turks were primarily responsible for inflicting damage on the island and for the turmoil in the Aegean. In response, the Senate decided to send 100 men

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97 Appendix III, nr. 6; Venice, Archivio di Stato, Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 17, f. 115 (17 December); Lopez, ‘Italiani in estremo oriente’, 89, n. 16.
98 Balard, Romanie génoise, ii. 778.
99 TR, i. nr. 92 (18 May); also see the report of a Venetian trader whose ship had been raided by a Genoese pirate (TR, i. nr. 89). The are many other contemporary accounts of piracy in Romania. For example, Archbishop Matthew of Ephesus wrote of his fear of pirates when travelling from Chios to Asia Minor in c.1339: Matthew, Archbishop of Ephesus, Die Briefe des Matthaios von Ephesos im Codex Vindobonensis Theol. Gr. 174, ed. D. Reinsch (Berlin, 1974), 344. Jacob of Verona fled from one Bartolommeo Malopulos, a ‘cruel robber’ of the sea near Rhodes: Jacob of Verona, 16.
100 TR, i. nr. 91 (April), 96 (2-9 December). Three were destined for the Black Sea, eight for Cyprus and four for the Adriatic. The galleys dispatched in April were armed merchant galleys, those in December were presumably war galleys.
101 DOC, nr. 173.
and 300 lira di grossi to the island. Furthermore, the Senate gave the baillie of Negroponte permission to conclude an understanding with certain Turkish bands, because the Turks as a whole were too numerous to overcome. This was a similar tactic to that adopted by the lords of Negroponte in 1332 and provides a clear example of the sudden increase in Turkish raiding since the beginning of 1339. Evidently, the negotiations which the baillie of Negroponte opened with the Turks were fruitless, as in 1340-1 the situation had worsened further. Around this time Umur apparently launched an attack on Niccolò Sanudo’s lands of the Archipelago, and also on the Catalan city of Thebes of Phthiotis (near the Pagasitic Gulf, north of Negroponte).

The difficulties the Senate faced in identifying the different bands of Turks attacking its colonies also highlights a common problem experienced by the Latins in the Aegean in dealing with the Turks: the different emirates were often in conflict with one another and some emirs were willing to make agreements with Venetians only for their subordinates to break them. For example in the treaty of 1337, Giovanni Sanudo had formed a peace with Hizir, as Emir of Aydin, but the agreement had also included Umur, his younger brother and lord of Smyrna, as a co-signatory. Umur’s attack on Venetian territories in 1340-1 was thus in direct contravention of the treaty, but it is unclear as to whether Hizir was compliant in this. Likewise, the pirates attacking Negroponte in 1339 may have been under orders from Aydin, but the Venetian sources show that the Serenissima was at a loss as to where these Turks originated from. In fact they could have sailed from any of the other emirates of the north-eastern Asia Minor coast – Menteshe, Sarukhan or Karasi. The unpredictability in dealing with the Turks perhaps provides another reason for why Venice was forced to take military action against them and also why it had to utilise the crusade in order to defend itself.

The Turkish attacks and the failure of diplomacy persuaded the Serenissima to consider arming galleys in Crete for the revival of a league against the Turks in

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102 TR, i. 93; Zachariadou, TC, 41, n. 159. In March and July the baillie of Negroponte was also instructed to purchase the castle of Karystos, to prevent it from falling into enemy hands: DOC, nr. 172, 175; TR, i. nr. 87.

103 See above, ch. 4, pp. 129-30.

104 Niccolò Sanudo is named as the duke of the Archipelago, he died in 1341. Lemerle dates these raids to 1339-40: Lemerle, Aydin, 123-8.
summer of 1340. Preparations began on the island but for financial reasons the Senate hesitated to take action and it prohibited any immediate attack on the Turks. The following winter the Senate decided to entrust the rulers of Crete with the decision to assign ships to those who wished to fight the Turks, if they were willing, but the Cretan administration declined this offer. Although the Venetian authorities were still reluctant to take concerted action against the Turks at this time, some of the Venetians in the Aegean were being forced to resist them. As noted, Negroponte was bearing the brunt of the Turkish attacks and it continued to receive reinforcements from Crete and Venice: the duke of Crete sent soldiers to the island but these were apparently of poor quality, so the Senate ordered that 80 more soldiers be dispatched from Venice on the galleys destined for Romania, plus 2,000 ducats and military hardware. A papal document of May 1341 shows that Niccolò Sanudo, in reaction to continued attack on his territories, continued to resist the ‘perfidious Turks’ with ‘naval vessels and armed galleys’. By 1341, the Duke of Naxos had joined with the rulers of Negroponte, and in July, together with Bartolommeo Ghisi, Lord of one third of Negroponte, a petition was made to the doge for the purchase of one galley from Venice, to be used for the defence of that island.

By now the defence of the Aegean was imposing a significant strain on the Republic’s resources and had even begun to affect its other policies overseas. In April 1340, the Serenissima was forced to refuse a request from Edward III of England for a subsidy of 40 or more galleys because the fear of a Turkish armada of 230 sails

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105 On 6 July the Senate mentioned that galleys were being equipped to reinforce the league against the Turks: ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 19, nr. 9-11, pp. 198-9, esp. nr. 9.

106 The rectors of Crete were not authorised to equip a fleet against the Turks without the consent of the duke and the two councillors. Furthermore, the arming against the Turks was not to be carried out by the rectors, unless the fief-holders of Crete contributed half of the expenses, as Venice had only agreed to pay the other half: ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 19, nr. 12-13 (17 August), pp. 199-200; Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum (1340-1350), ed. P. Ratti-Vidulich (Venice, 1976), nr. 2, p. 5 (30 November); Zachariadou, TC, 41.

107 TR, i. nr. 115 (9 January 1341), 123 (6 March 1341).

108 TR, i. nr. 108 (27 June 1340).


110 Loenertz, Ghisi, 162, document at 224-5 (8 July 1341); Zachariadou, TC, 43. Both men had died by 1342 and nothing is known of their request for the galley.
rendered it impossible for the Republic to concede any naval subsidy. The severity of the Turkish threat was also attested to in several other sources, which confirmed that the forces of Aydin had devastated all of Romania. The size of the Turkish armadas had increased to such an extent the Venetian government now began to fear the permanent loss of its eastern Mediterranean possessions. This is clearly evident in a decree of the Venetian Great Council, from 14 January 1341 which stated that:

Since the island of Crete is among the best and most honourable possessions of our empire and, therefore, the empire has always been earnestly watchful for its defence and safeguarding, by providing assets and men; and if there is ever a time and need to take care of the safeguarding of that island, it is especially pressing now because of the Turks, whose power at sea has been greatly increased, with the result that they have destroyed all of the islands and districts of Romania and, not being able to make gains against the Christians elsewhere, they are threatening to come with an armada to the island of Crete and have already begun, and, unless provision is made for defence against these Turks, grave danger could threaten the island itself and may perhaps arise through action wrongly taken belatedly.

In order to raise the necessary money for the defence of Crete, the Great Council decided that a one percent duty tax should be imposed on all imports and exports, except cloth, to and from the island:

[I]n order that money may be had on every appropriate occasion for the defence and safeguarding of the aforesaid island, let it be passed that all foreign merchants and foreign people can come in safety to the said island with whatsoever merchandise and articles brought from all parts,

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111 Summaries in CSP, i. nr. 25, pp. 8-9; I libri commemoriali, ii. nr. 489.
112 TD, i. nr. 480 (full text in Appendix, p. 309); full text also printed in ‘Apophaseis meizos symvouliou Venetias, 1255-1669’, i.ii. nr. 14, pp. 118-19. Partial translation in Setton, PL, i. 182.
except for cloth, paying one per cent on entry and, for merchandise which they have taken from the said island, another one per cent on departure; such money to be assigned for the expenses necessary for the defence and safeguarding of the said island from a surprise attack from the Turks, and in all other appropriate cases, as will seem fitting to be arranged for our empire.\(^{113}\)

But the *Serenissima* was not yet willing to commit to further action against the Turks. It has been shown previously that the Venetian Senate had replied sympathetically to Hugh IV of Cyprus’s request for a revival of an anti-Turkish force in November 1341, but in reality it hesitated to take any action. The reply to Hugh was in fact very vague; the Senate expressed grief for the suffering of the Latins at the hands of the Turks, and agreed that the Turks needed to be combated before their power grew out of hand, but the Venetian response stopped short at outlining any definite plan of action despite hinting at a willingness to participate in another offensive against the Turks.\(^{114}\) This ambiguous reply may seem strange considering the plight of the Venetians in the Aegean at this time, but it may be possible that the Republic did not wish to jeopardise the existing treaties they had with the emirs by attacking Turkish pirates. Nevertheless, by 1342 the attitude of the *Serenissima* had changed and it took steps to fortify Crete,\(^{115}\) to send aid to the archbishop of Patras,\(^{116}\) and to help the new Duke of Naxos, Januli Sanudo, by granting him license to import arms and naval materials.\(^{117}\) Nevertheless, the Senate would wait until the beginning of 1343 until formerly committing itself to another league in the Aegean.

\(^{113}\) TD, i. nr. 480 (full text in Appendix, p. 309); full text also printed in ‘Apophaseis meizonos symvouliou Venetias, 1255-1669’, i.ii. nr. 14, pp. 118-19.


\(^{115}\) ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 20, nr. 10, pp. 220-1 (22 June), nr. 16, pp. 228-30 (8 August); TR, i. nr. 143 (22 June); Zachariadou, *TC*, 43, n. 167.

\(^{116}\) On the 22nd of June 1342 the Venetian Senate granted to the archbishop of Patras weapons and ships for the fortification of his castle, which the Turks were often attacking: Full text in Fedalto, *La chiesa latina in Oriente*, iii. 52, nr. 104. Also see E. Gerland, *Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Erzbistums Patras* (Leipzig, 1903), 30, n. 2.

\(^{117}\) TR, i. nr. 135 (23 February 1342).
5.2.4. The growth in the power of Aydin

Kantakouzenos claimed that by 1341 the Turks had managed to reduce many of the of the Aegean islands to tribute status and had devastated Thrace, Macedonia, Greece and the Peloponnese. Many others sources also attest to the supremacy of Aydin, which had now surpassed any of the Turkish emirates of the period. This is illustrated by the two western travel writers William of Boldensele and Ludolf of Sudheim, who travelled to the East between 1335-41. They both commented on the wealth and prosperity of Ephesos and its Turkish inhabitants, in contrast to the impoverished Christian minority who still resided there. Another eyewitness, Matthew, Archbishop of Ephesos, commented on the large size of Smyrna, which he said provided the ideal refuge for pirates. In economic terms Aydin was booming at this time; coins were struck at Ephesos for the first time in a thousand years, and the emirate regularly featured in the Italian trading manual of Francesco Pegolotti, who was one of the first to provide specific information about trade with the Turks. He described the weights and measures used by the Aydin oglus and compared them to those used in the Italian states and the Aegean islands. From his handbook it is known that at Altoluogo the Turks sold raw materials, such as alum, grain and rice, and sold finished products, especially died European fabrics of azure, vermilion and emerald.

It has been shown that it was Umur, with his aggressive policy towards the Latins in the Aegean who really contributed to the growth in the power of Aydin. According to Gregoras, Umur was frequently raiding the Latin territories at this time, with such severity that he was able to enforce tribute on many of them. Enveri, when referring to events a year later, even stated, in an exaggerated manner, that Umur occupied all of the Morea and the land of the Franks. Such were his deeds that the cult of Umur, which sprung up after his death and was especially promoted by the

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118 John Kantakouzenos, i. 537; Zachariadou, TC, 42, n. 162.
119 William of Boldensele, 31-3; Ludolf of Sudheim, ed. Neumann, 33; Foss, Ephesus, 147.
120 Matthew of Ephesos, 344. For more on Matthew and his visit to Smyrna and Ephesos, see Vryonis, Decline, 342-8, esp. 345; Foss, Ephesus, 148-9.
121 The coins were Latin imitations, a silver coin minted in Ephesos was modelled on the gigliati of Robert of Naples. Similar coins were also struck by the emirs of Sarukhan and Menteshe: Foss, Ephesus, 150-1; Wood, Discoveries at Ephesus, 181-9.
122 Francesco Pegolotti, 55-7, 92, 104, 367-70; Lopez & Raymond, Medieval Trade, 353-5; Foss, Ephesus, 149.
123 Nikephoros Gregoras, ii. 597; Zachariadou, TC, 42, n. 163.
124 Enveri, verse 1420; Zachariadou, TC, 42, n. 164.
Ottomans, continued amongst Turkish sailors of the Aegean for many centuries.\textsuperscript{125} Even the Byzantine contemporary Nikephoros Gregoras praised Umur, as being more civilized than barbarian and possessing some Hellenic culture.\textsuperscript{126} It is not surprising that Umur and his stronghold at Smyrna would become the objective of the next Latin league to be formed in the Aegean.

\textbf{Chapter 5 Overview}

It has been shown how Benedict XII’s eastern policy was dictated by events in Europe and a preoccupation with internal Church reform, both of which hindered plans for a crusade against the Turks in the Aegean. The escalation of the conflict between England and France effectively ended the second wave of the anti-Turkish league, through the diversion of the crusade fleet to the English Channel. Nevertheless, the pope did formulate an eastern strategy that was driven by appeals from the Latins in the East, as John XXII’s had been in many instances. However, the crucial difference between the two popes was that Benedict rarely, if ever, answered favourably to the appeals of those Latins resisting the Turks in the Aegean. He was receptive to appeals from Cyprus, Armenia and Walter of Brienne, but refused to support a Venetian and Hospitaller league for the Aegean in 1336. In this case, the financial difficulties experienced by the Italian banking houses may have prevented the pope from committing to any enterprise.

The lack of papal support forced the Latins in the Aegean to formulate their own strategies independent of papal influence. The Venetians resorted to peace with the Turks of Aydin and Menteshe in 1337, after failing to secure papal support for an Aegean league. The treaties secured various trade privileges for the Republic’s merchants in the Aegean and crucially allowed them to gain a firmer foothold in the alum trade. However, these treaties did not guarantee secure trade or the safeguarding of Venetian colonies: peace with the Turks was short lived and within two

\textsuperscript{125} Kafadar, \textit{Between the Two Worlds}, 69.
\textsuperscript{126} Nikephoros Gregoras, i. 649-50; D.M. Nicol, \textit{The Reluctant Emperor: A biography of John Cantacuzene, Byzantine Emperor and Monk, c.1295-1383} (Cambridge, 1996), 34-5.
years raids against Venetian lands had resumed. The inability of the Venetian authorities to identify the perpetrator of these raids, and the lack of cohesion amongst the Turks themselves, meant that the Republic once again turned to the Latins in the East for the formation of a new coalition in the Aegean.

Unlike in the previous decade, in the late 1330s the Cypriots and not the Venetians were the ones driving for a new naval league. King Hugh of Cyprus had been struggling against the Turks of Hamid and Karaman and sent an embassy to the Venetians and Hospitallers in 1341 to encourage them to petition the pope for support against the Turks. This coincided with an increase in raids launched from Aydin into the Aegean, which threatened Crete amongst other islands. The death of Benedict XII in 1342 and the cohesion of Cypriot, Venetian and Hospitaller policies lay the ground for the resumption of a crusade against the Turks under Clement VI.


Chapter 6. The Crusade of Smyrna, 1342-1351

6.1. Sequence of Events for the Crusade of Smyrna

6.1.1. Preparations for the naval league in 1342-1343

The Crusade of Smyrna, which for the purposes of this study will include the planning of the naval league in 1343, Humbert of Vienne’s expedition of 1346-7 and the activities of the Christian coalition in the Aegean until the disbanding of the league in 1351, was one of the main events of the fourteenth century. It can be seen as a major Latin success as it reduced the sea power of the emirate of Aydin more than any previous crusade had managed. As a result of this, the Crusade has been the focus of a considerable number of diplomatic documents and attracted the attention of many medieval chroniclers.¹ The vast array of sources relating to the Crusade of Smyrna and the complexities surrounding the planning and execution of the many facets of this enterprise, make it necessary firstly to provide a detailed historical background of events before discussing the role of the papacy, the Venetians and the Genoese in the expedition.

The catalyst for the crusade was the election of Pierre Roger as Pope Clement VI, to the Apostolic See in May 1342. In the early months of his pontificate the new pope wrote to the doge of Venice asking his advice on the best way to combat the menace posed by the emirate of Aydin and the other Turkish emirates of Anatolia. On 10 June the Venetians gave their response. According to their information, Umur of Aydin had a fleet of 200 or 300 vessels, including many large galleys; the Senate considered that 30 armed galleys and 60 horse transports, with 1,200 horsemen, 6,000 soldiers and 7,200 rowers, would be sufficient to resist him.² In November Henry of Asti, the Patriarch of Constantinople, arrived at Venice with a letter asking the Republic to join a naval league currently being organised by the papacy, Cypriots and the

¹ Coureas, ‘Naval leagues’, 111.
² Full text in ‘Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 20, nr. 9, pp. 216-9; TR, i. nr. 142; Setton, PL, i. 183, n. 95; Zachariadou, TC, 43, n. 169. In 1333 the Senate had replied to the same question posed by John XXII, although their estimate then was for: 40 galleys, 50 horse transports, 1,000 horsemen, 8,000 soldiers and 6,000 rowers. See above, ch. 4, pp. 147-8; DVL, i. nr. 124.
Hospitallers. In January 1343 the Venetian Senate accepted the offer from the
Patriarch, but reduced the number of galleys required from 30 to (at least) 25,
suggesting that it would be able to contribute one quarter of the total amount. The
Senate suggested that this flotilla should serve in the summer months for three years,
or at least one full year. In July the pope responded favourably to a Cypriot embassy
regarding the league and began to set in motion plans for the forthcoming campaign.

In August a series of letters outlining the need to take action against the
Turkish emirates was dispatched from the Curia to the Grand Master of the
Hospitallers, Hélion of Villeneuve, representatives of the doge of Venice, Andrea
Dandolo, and King Hugh IV of Cyprus. In total 20 galleys were to be fitted
out for the league: four provided by the papacy, six from Venice (one of these from the heir of
Niccolò Sanudo), six from the Hospitallers and four from Cyprus. A total number
slightly lower than that originally recommended by Venice.

Clement VI also approached other interested parties in the hope that they too
would contribute to the newly formed naval league. Letters were sent in this regard to
the Angevin Queen Joanna of Naples, Prince Robert of Achaia and their various
relatives on 8 August 1343. Three other letters were sent on 16 September to
Giovanni Sanudo, Duke of the Archipelago, Giorgino Ghisi, Lord of Tenos and Mykonos
and one third of Negroponte, and Lady Balzana dalle Carceri, Regent of two thirds of
Negroponte, asking them to contribute galleys. On the same day letters were
dispatched to Genoa and other cities in northern Italy urging them to make financial

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3 I libri commemoriali, ii. bk. 4, nr. 18, p. 117; Setton, PL, 183, n. 96.
4 DVL, i. nr. 136; TR, i. nr. 149; Setton, PL, i. 184. Oddly, in this letter the Senate suggested that the
number of galleys be reduced to no less than 25, but the original number quoted is the same as that
used in the letter to John XXII in 1333, and not those quoted in the letter to Clement VI in June 1342: see
above, p. 187, n. 2.
5 The Cypriot embassy at the Curia had renewed requests previously made to Benedict XII for help
against the Turkish emirates: CVI France, i. nr. 311; Coureas, ‘Naval leagues’, 110. A detailed background
to the formation of the naval league in 1343 is given by Setton, PL, i. 182-90; Gay, Clément VI, 32-54;
6 Dated 8 August, 1343. Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 157, ff. 1v-3r, ep. 19, 23-4; reg.
62, ff. 48r, 49v-50r; CVI France, i. nr. 332, 336, 337 (summaries), 341 (full text); ‘Athènes’, ed. Loenertz,
nr. 79. Also see Setton, PL, i. 185, 188; Geanakoplos, ‘Byzantium’, 58, n. 101; Lemerle, Aydin, 182;
7 Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 157, ff. 2r-2v, 3v, ep. 20-22, 25; reg. 62, ff. 48r-50v;
CVI France, i. nr. 333-5, 338 (summaries); ‘Athènes’, ed. Loenertz, nr. 79.
8 Giovanni Sanudo had apparently already agreed to supply one galley. Summaries in CVI France, i. nr.
414-16. Also see Loenertz, Ghisi, 162-3, full text of the letters to Giorgino Ghisi and Balzana dalle Carceri
at 306-7.
contributions to the expedition. The fleet was to gather at Negroponte on the Feast of All Saints (1 November) 1343.

On 31 August 1343 Clement officially designated the Patriarch of Constantinople, Henry of Asti, as Apostolic Legate overseas and placed him as the head of the naval league. Shortly after, letters were sent to the various ecclesiastical and lay authorities involved in the enterprise ordering them to accept the authority of the newly appointed papal legate. The captains and patrons of the galleys were instructed to accept his authority under penalty of ecclesiastic censure. Martino Zaccaria, who had been freed from prison in Constantinople in 1337, was appointed as captain of the papal galleys for the league. Petro Zeno was made captain of the Venetian galleys, and Conrad Piccamiglio captain of those from Cyprus.

Matters relating to the financing of the expedition were also dealt with. It was decided that the Apostolic Camera would pay for the first year of service and the proceeds of the tenth levied in December 1343 would be used thereafter. The Hospitallers would be placed in charge of transferring papal funds to the East and, on 24 August, Clement informed Hélion of Villeneuve that the necessary wages for the first four months of service had been paid to Martino Zaccaria and the owners of the galleys. The remaining money for the next eight months service, was to be paid to the Hospitallers and to be transferred by them at a later date to Martino Zaccaria and the galleys owners at the command of Henry of Asti.

9 CVI France, i. nr. 417 (summary); Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 209; Setton, PL, i. 188, n. 120.
10 CVI France, i. nr. 341.
11 DOC, nr. 181. Summary in CVI France, i. nr. 340; ‘Athènes’, ed. Loenertz, nr. 80. Also see Setton, PL, i. 186, n. 107; Lemerle, Aydin, 185.
12 See the summaries in CVI France, i. nr. 340, 388-90, 404-13. Also see Muldoon, ‘Vatican Register 62’, 164-6.
13 CVI France, i. nr. 368 (24 August 1343). Letters were dispatched to Martino Zaccaria and Henry of Asti in this regard on 16 September 1343: Appendix III nr. 3; Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 137, ff. 102v-103r, ep. 323-4; summaries in CVI France, i. nr. 404-5.
14 Delaville le Roux, France, i. 104; Lemerle, Aydin, 185.
15 On 1 December a three year tithe was levied on ecclesiastical benefices in over sixty provinces in Europe and the east: DVL, i. nr. 140; CVI France, i. 559 (summary).
16 CVI France, i. nr. 368-70, 464. 12,800 florins were being paid for the first four months of salaries and expenses, 25,600 florins for the next eight months. In 1344 Clement wrote to Henry of Asti informing him of the difficulties in collecting the funds from the tenth and finding creditors to transfer the money to the east. Because of this, Cameral funds and not those of the tenth were transferred directly to the Aegean. The Hospitallers were asked to lend Henry of Asti extra money if he needed it: Housley, Avignon, 196-7; Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 210-11; Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers and their Florentine bankers’, 21-2.
To ensure the success of the expedition the pope also made attempts to encourage peace within Europe before the fleet set out: he urged the government of Genoa to cease hostilities against King Hugh of Cyprus, who was apparently willing to make amends for past injustices, in the interests of the faith; he wrote to Henry of Asti in a similar vein, asking the legate to try and pacify relations between the Catalans of Athens and Duke Walter of Brienne; he repeatedly called for the Greek authorities to put an end to the Church schism; and, above all, he urged the kings of France and England to respect the recently signed Truce of Malestroit and stem the rising tide of war which threatened to engulf great swathes of Europe.

On 30 September 1343, after the above measures had been put in place, Clement VI issued the bull *Insurgentibus contra fidem* to the archbishops and bishops from the kingdoms of Italy, Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and Romania. The bull instructed the prelates to begin publicly preaching the word of the cross to the faithful in their individual cities and dioceses. The sign of the cross was to be given to all of the faithful who wished to receive it, in order that they could ‘rise up manfully against the said unbelievers, assume the cause with fervour, and pursue it even more fervently’. To pay for the fleet, tenths of Church revenues and incomes were granted as well as certain other subsidies, but since the matter entailed ‘extraordinary expenditure’, even greater assistance was required. It was hoped that this would take the form of charitable help from the faithful. Accordingly spiritual rewards, in the form of indulgences and remission of sins, were granted to those who wished to participate or contribute in another way. Those who accompanied the fleet in person at their own expense and who remained on campaign for one year, within the three-year period after the Feast of All Saints, were to receive full remission of sins (*veniam peccatorum*) and an additional increase of heavenly reward (*salutis eterne augmentum*). This was the same as the indulgences ‘granted to those who cross over in aid of the Holy Land’

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17 29 August 1343. *CVI France*, nr. 360; Coureas, ‘Naval leagues’, 110.
19 *CVI France*, i. nr. 466-71, 490-3, 522-3, 547; Lemerle, *Aydin*, 182-3; Setton, *PL*, i. 189, n. 127; Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 211.
20 *CVI France*, i. nr. 448-52; Setton, *PL*, i. 189, n. 125; Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 211.
22 *Acta pontificale suecica*, i. nr. 337, p. 370; *DLC*, nr. 22, p. 79.
(transfretantibus in subsidium Terre Sancte). \(^{23}\) Those who died whilst on campaign, or afterwards from wounds received on the campaign, would also receive the same indulgence. In addition to this, and because of the need to secure extra finances for the expedition, a similar, but slightly lesser privilege, was granted to those faithful who contributed to the expedition but who could not take part in person. This referred specifically to those who sent suitable soldiers at their own expense, in accordance to their means; those who took part at another’s expense; and those who offered as much from their own goods as they would have spent on campaign for one year. The difference in this indulgence being that the recipients were promised the same remission of sins (concedimus eandem veniam peccatorum), but without the salutis eterne augmentum clause relating to an increase in their heavenly reward. \(^{24}\) Chests were also to be placed in churches and proceeds collected by papal agents.

6.1.2. The first wave of the Crusade of Smyrna: the victory at Pallena, the capture of the harbour and fortress at Smyrna and the death of the crusade leaders, 1344-1345

Once the league had assembled at Negroponte, concerns arose over the intentions of the Captain of the papal galleys, Martino Zaccaria, who may have had his eyes on his former domain, the island of Chios. These concerns were certainly voiced by the Venetians, who took measures to warn the Byzantine emperor to defend Chios from possible attack, and by the Pope, who commanded the legate Henry of Asti not to allow the Genoese captain to divert the papal galleys to the island. Clement also gave the legate permission to replace Zaccaria if he was not deemed to be acting suitably as commander of the fleet. \(^{25}\) Nevertheless, no attack on Chios appears to have been

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\(^{24}\) *Acta pontifical suecica*, i. nr. 337, p. 371; *DLC*, nr. 22, p. 80; Housley, *Avignon*, 138. This indulgence was promulgated in the Fourth Lateran Council. For details see Housley, *Avignon*, 129-30; Purcell, *Papal Crusading Policy*, 23-31; Brundage, *Canon Law and the Crusader*, 154. The exchange of indulgences for money was last introduced by Clement V for the Hospitaller passagium of 1308-9, although in that instance a scale of lesser indulgences was established with a specific sum to be paid for each: see above, ch. 1, pp. 52-3; Housley, *Avignon*, 135-9.

\(^{25}\) TR, i. nr. 171; *CVI France*, i. nr. 1113-4.
made by the forces of the league and in the spring of 1344 naval operations began against the Turks as planned.\(^\text{26}\)

In the opening months of the campaign, the crusading fleet achieved a similar level of success as the anti-Turkish league had done in 1334. In one encounter in May, the crusaders won a notable victory against a Turkish fleet at Longos, a harbour on Pallena, on the western prong of the Chalkidike peninsula.\(^\text{27}\) According to John Kantakouzenos, the Latin fleet of 24 ships, after learning that sixty Turkish vessels were sheltered in the harbour, attacked and captured them. The Turkish troops fled to land and the Latins dismantled their boats and burned them.\(^\text{28}\) The *Historia Cortusiorum* also mentions this battle, which apparently occurred on Ascension Day (13 May). According to the author, the Christian fleet ‘burned and sank fifty-two Turkish vessels’.\(^\text{29}\) Another, rather fantastical account of John Winterthur, put the number of Christian dead at only 300, compared to over 18,000 on the Turkish side.\(^\text{30}\)

It is probably this encounter which led Clement VI to send three letters, in July and August 1344, congratulating the crusaders on their progress oversees. On 25 July, Hélion of Villeneuve was praised for the support he had shown Henry of Asti in ‘the matter of the defence of the faith [...] against the ferocious rage of the infidel Turks’.\(^\text{31}\) On the same day, the Clement wrote to the legate himself who had apparently sent a number of letters to the pope updating him on the recent successes of the crusade:

> [W]e have attentively acquainted ourselves with the contents of those letters, the reading of which has been pleasing to us, and we commend abundantly in the Lord the industrious efforts of your vigilance shown concerning the aforesaid matters, which, to the praise and glory of God and the exaltation of the Catholic faith and to the benefit of the

\(^{26}\) The significance of Chios and the role of Martino Zaccaria in the Crusade of Smyrna is discussed in more detail below, 227-33.


\(^{28}\) John Kantakouzenos, ii. 422-3.

\(^{29}\) ‘Historia Gulielmi et Albrigeti Cortusiorum de novitatibus Paduae, et Lombardiae’, *RIS* 12 (Milan, 1728), cols. 767-954, at col. 914.


\(^{31}\) *CVI France*, i. nr. 987, col. 108.
On 12 August a letter was also despatched to the doge of Venice, who, like Henry of Asti, had informed Clement of a recent victory over the Turks, in which the Venetian contingent of galleys had apparently played a part.  

Then on 28 October 1344 the crusaders achieved their most impressive victory by capturing the harbour and harbour fortress of Smyrna from the forces of Umur of Aydin. The western chroniclers who mention the event do not provide a sufficient explanation as to how the Latins were able to seize such a valuable prize from their most feared enemy. The Greek and Turkish sources, on the other hand, do provide some indication. According to the *Düstûrnâme* of Enveri, Umur was taken completely by surprise by the Latin attack: he had apparently been informed of the danger in a letter written to him by Kantakouzenos at Didymoteichon, but by the time this letter arrived it was too late as the vessels of the naval league had already entered the Bay of Smyrna. Umur did not have enough troops at his disposal to repel the assault and the Latins were able to chase the Turks from the fortress of the harbour. They then secured themselves in the fortress before reinforcements from Umur’s brothers could arrive.

The account of Nikephoros Gregoras also attests to the unforeseen nature of the Latin attack on Smyrna. According to him, the crusaders arrived unexpectedly at the harbour and, after securing the area, rushed to take the fortress. Gregoras added that the Franks believed they could use Smyrna as a foundation to push the Turks from the Aegean coast, but that they were unable to do this as future events did not progress as well as they hoped. Another Greek author, John Kantakouzenos, mentioned that after the Latins had captured the harbour and fortress, Umur resisted them as best as he could but was unable to gain the upper hand. What is clear is that, firstly, Umur had been taken by surprise by the Latin attack, and secondly, the

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32 CVI France, i. nr. 988, col. 109.
33 CVI France, i. nr. 1027. This was probably the same battle as that fought at Longos.
34 For example: John of Winterthur, 252-3; Petro Giustinian, 226; Giorgio Stella, 139-40.
36 Nikephoros Gregoras, ii. 689; Lemerle, *Aydin*, 189-90; Setton, PL, i. 191.
37 John Kantakouzenos, ii. 419-20; Lemerle, *Aydin*, 190; Setton, PL, i. 191.
crusaders had only managed to capture the harbour and the harbour fortress (*Smirnae inferiores*). The upper city and the Acropolis (*Smirnae superiores*) remained in the hands of Umur and his forces and would do so for the duration of the Latin presence in the city. The land between the two castles, consisting of the ancient city, lay in ruins and was deserted.\(^\text{38}\) As one Italian chronicler wrote: ‘The Christians held one small place, which is called Smyrna, on the shore of the sea [...] But the Turks held another castle above which was similarly called Smyrna’.\(^\text{39}\)

News of the victory reached the Curia during the autumn of 1344 and on 23 December, Clement VI wrote to the doge of Venice congratulating him on the success at Smyrna:

> We have heard and learned through your letters, which were recently presented at our papal court, the happy and celebrated reports of that glorious victory concerning the seizure and triumphal and victorious capture of that very strong and important castle of Smyrna, together with its seaport and fortifications, from the hands of the Turks, infidels and enemies of the Christian faith, and the overthrow of the stinking people of the nation of those same Turks who dwelt or were in that place, just as the letters themselves describe in detail, on the feast of the apostles Simon and Jude last. A victory which that high and mighty king, who, encompassing all things, both heavenly and earthly, in his palm, rules them in His omnipotence, has, by His mercy, conferred on the Christian people through the service of our venerable brother, Henry, Patriarch of Constantinople and Legate of the Holy See, together with our and your galleys and their equipment and those of our beloved sons, the master and brothers of the Hospital of Saint John of Jerusalem, sent for that purpose a little while ago to those parts, and, of course, the vigorous Catholic men on board them.\(^\text{40}\)

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\(^\text{38}\) Lemerle, *Aydin*, 190; Giorgio Stella, 140.


\(^\text{40}\) CVI *France*, i. nr. 1350, cols. 335-6; DVL, i. nr. 150.
On the same day Clement VI also wrote to the king of France about the Christian victory and on 13 January, he sent a letter to the wife of Edward of Beaujeu, praising her husband for the valour he had shown in the attack.\(^{41}\) Two days later, Clement wrote to Humbert, the Dauphin of Vienne, commending the deeds of Henry of Asti and the army of the faithful:

> [F]inally, after various conflicts and encounters held on this side and on that between the armies of the Christians and of the aforesaid infidel Turks, [...] with that same Umur and the other enemies of the faith completely defeated and triumphantly put to flight, the aforesaid patriarch, with the victorious army of Catholics, occupied the aforesaid castle together with its harbour and fortifications and [still] occupies it in our name and that of the Roman Church. There he arranged that the castle itself be strengthened for the period of the time during which it will seem right for him to reside, hoping, nevertheless, to then be able, with the army of the faithful, cavalry and infantry – he is widely known to be in need of these – with the aid of divine virtue assisting, to gain many other infidel lands of the surrounding area and their observance of the Catholic faith, to the praise and glory of the divine name; then with the filth of the pagan error eradicated, to extend that castle, although at present it may lack fortification and a vigilant and faithful guard.\(^{42}\)

Clement closed the letter by suggesting to Humbert that, after hearing of the good news, he might be ‘more strongly fired to help, support and pursue such a pious endeavour’.\(^{43}\) Indeed, it seems from the communication that Humbert, even at this early stage, may have been predisposed to the idea of taking the cross and that Clement was aware of this.

\(^{41}\) CVI France, i. nr. 1351, 1395; Setton, PL, i. 191.
\(^{42}\) CVI France, i. nr. 1397, col. 366.
\(^{43}\) CVI France, i. nr. 1397, col. 366; Setton, PL, i. 194. Also see Wood, Clement VI, 189.
On 1 February, Clement also wrote to Edward III of England about the Christian victory, almost five weeks after Philip of France had been notified. On the same day, Henry of Asti was finally congratulated for his efforts in writing by the pope. In this letter, Clement reminded Henry of the financial difficulties besetting the crusade, especially because the merchants tasked with transporting money from the west to the Levant could not navigate well in the winter. The legate was asked whether he could make savings by reducing the galley crews, without endangering the expedition. Clement also enquired as to whether Martino Zaccaria, the captain-general of the papal galleys, had performed with any notable valour in the attack on Smyrna. Henry was reminded, as he had been in the previous September, that he was permitted to replace Martino Zaccaria with a more suitable commander if he was not performing satisfactorily.

As Clement suggested in his letter to Humbert of Vienne, Henri of Asti and the rest of the Christian force took up their position firmly in the castle and harbour of Smyrna; the Turks were unable to attack them nor were the Christians able to take the Acropolis. It is likely that the crusaders ensured the security of the harbour and ships by encircling this area with new defences. An anonymous Roman chronicle reports that the Venetians constructed a large wall, preceded by a broad trench leading to the sea, and adds that under this wall traders, shopkeepers and money changers became established. The author also recounted the capture of Mustafa, one of Umur’s captains, who had attacked the Venetian galleys. The possession of the harbour was as much an advantage for the Latins, as it was a loss for Umur. Umur’s power and wealth were largely derived from his ability to launch raids into the Aegean, the restriction of his access to the sea thus compromised the prosperity of his emirate. The Düstūrnāme of Enveri is, therefore, probably accurate when it describes the great lengths Umur went to in his attempts to expel the crusaders from the harbour of Smyrna. According to the account, the Muslim army bombarded the Christian area with

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44 CVI France, i. nr. 1462; Foedera, Conventiones, Litterae et cujuscumque Generis Acta publica inter Reges Angliae et alios quosvis Imperatores, Reges, Pontifices, Principes, vel Comunitates, 1110-1654, ed. T. Rymer et al., 4 vols (London, 1816-69), iii. 28-9; CPL, iii. nr. 15; Setton, PL, i. 191-2.
45 CVI France, i. nr. 1464.
46 Vedesi capanne fare, la piazza, lo mercatale, lo cagno della moneta: Anonimo Romano, 105; Lemerle, Aydin, 190; Setton, PL, i. 192.
47 Anonimo Romano, 108; Zachariadou, TC, 50, n. 194.
mangonels, some of which had been constructed by specialist craftsmen drafted in from the emirate of Eretna and from Africa. These machines destroyed some of the crusaders’ boats and killed many.\textsuperscript{48} The diversity of Umur’s army is corroborated by one western account which claimed that \textit{multi infideles} from the other emirates of Asia Minor had flocked to Umur’s side.\textsuperscript{49}

In response to the continued bombardment, the Christians launched counter attacks against Umur’s forces. It was during one of these offensives, in January 1345, that the crusader army suffered a most disastrous blow when the leaders of the Crusade Henry of Asti, Martino Zaccaria and Petro Zeno, were killed by Umur’s men.\textsuperscript{50} That the crusade leaders died at this time is certain; numerous sources, in Latin, Turkish and Greek, both chronicles and letters, attest to this, but unfortunately the sources are less clear as to the exact circumstances of the death of the patriarch and his companions. Most of the sources seem to agree that the Latins first launched a successful sortie from the harbour walls, during which the Frankish forces, led by Henry of Asti, Martino Zaccaria and Petro Zeno burned the poorly guarded Turkish mangonels.\textsuperscript{51} Shortly afterwards, the crusade leaders, led by Henry of Asti, left the safety of the harbour fortress to celebrate mass in an abandoned church, which stood between the harbour and the acropolis.\textsuperscript{52} The church may well have been the Church of St John, the seat of the ancient bishopric of Smyrna, which might explain the legate’s decision to venture beyond the safety of the harbour walls.\textsuperscript{53} After this point, there seems to be two alternative versions of subsequent events.\textsuperscript{54} In the version related by the majority of the sources, Umur appeared unexpectedly with his army as the service was being celebrated in the church. The bulk of the Latin force, after seeing the Turks advancing, retreated to the harbour fortress, but the patriarch, dressed in the liturgical clothes, was slaughtered by the Turks, as well as Martino Zaccaria and the other

\textsuperscript{48} Enveri, verses 1997-2012, 2091-2; Lemerle, \textit{Aydin}, 190; Zachariadou, \textit{TC}, 50, n. 193.
\textsuperscript{49} Marco Battagli of Rimini, 51; Zachariadou, \textit{TC}, 50, n. 193.
\textsuperscript{50} Dated to St Anthony’s day, 17 January 1345, by Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 13, ch. 39, p. 389.
\textsuperscript{51} Enveri, verses 2013-86; Lemerle, \textit{Aydin}, 191.
\textsuperscript{52} According to an anonymous Roman chronicler the church stood two catapult shots from the harbour walls: Anonimo Romano, 110.
\textsuperscript{53} John Kantakouzenos, ii. 582-3; Anonimo Romano, 110. Kantakouzenos suggests that the other crusade leaders objected to the legate’s decision to go to the church as it was deemed too dangerous.
\textsuperscript{54} For more on this, see Gay, \textit{Clément VI}, 56-7; Lemerle, \textit{Aydin}, 191-3; Setton, \textit{PL}, i. 192-3.
In the other seemingly less-reliable version, allegedly from an eyewitness and retold by the anonymous Roman chronicler, after the sermon, Henry of Asti, dressed in rich and elaborate armour and accompanied by the other crusade leaders, made a reckless charge on the advancing Turks. Needless to say, this proved to be highly imprudent and all were slaughtered. According to a letter of the merchant Pignol Zucchello, the Turks also suffered heavy casualties. Umur and his brother Hizir, the ruler of Ephesos, were apparently wounded and their brother Ibrahim Bahadur was killed.

Clement VI was informed of the disaster in a letter from the doge of Venice, probably received in February or early March 1345. On 17 March the pope wrote to the Grand Master of the Hospitallers Hélion of Villeneuve about the ‘lamentable and disturbing news’. In the letter, Clement informed the Master of his new appointments for the crusading fleet. Raymond, Archbishop of Thérouanne, ‘a cautious, virtuous and prudent man’, was to be appointed as Legate of the Apostolic See and the Lord of Courthezon, Bertrand of Beaux, an expert in the art of war, was to be made captain of the papal galleys. As well as this, Clement urged the master to console those crusaders and Hospitallers who remained in Smyrna and, in order that the progress made by the crusading force be not lost, he also exhorted Hélion of Villeneuve ‘to be steadfast with all vigilance and diligence concerning the secure defence of the place and other matters which need to be done there’.

However, despite Clement’s words, it became apparent in the following months that neither Archbishop Raymond of Thérouanne nor Bertrand of Beaux would be able to fulfil their appointments as legate and captain of the army at Smyrna. The reason for this is given in a letter sent from Clement to King Philip VI of France on 11 May. In the text, it is clear that Philip did not wish Raymond and Bertrand, who were his subjects,

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55 This version of events is related by John Kantakouzenos, ii. 582-3; Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 13, ch. 39, pp. 389-90; Enveri, verses, 2067-80; John of Winterthur, 252-3; Petro Giustinian, 225-6; Anonimo Romano, 109-10 (who gives two different accounts).
56 Anonimo Romano, 110-114. For more on this, also see Setton, PL, i. 192, n. 154; Gay, Clément VI, 57.
57 Pignol Zucchello, nr. 13, pp. 31-2.
58 The Cretan administration mentioned the disaster in a deliberation of 24 January: Duca di Candia: Quaternus consilorum, nr. 18.
59 CVI France, i. nr. 1570, col. 462. Clement also wrote in a similar manner to the doge of Venice on the same day: CVI France, i. nr. 1569; and to Edward III of England on 18 March: CVI France, i. nr. 1582.
60 CVI France, i. nr. 1570, col. 463; nr. 1582, col. 408.
61 CVI France, i. nr. 1570, col. 463.
to travel overseas at a time when war was brewing with England. At Philip’s request, the pope had even cancelled the preaching of indulgences in France because of the imminent conflict: ‘we will that the indulgences we have granted for those going to the aforesaid lands to the aid of the faithful dwelling there be specifically not extended to those of your kingdom’. However, despite making these concessions to the king, Clement clearly voiced his displeasure at Philip’s request, which he implied was brought about by various rumours, ‘lacking any basis of truth’, from the royal advisors who suggested that the crusade had done more harm than good in the Aegean. In fact, Clement’s repost acts as an eloquent example of the growing menace which the Turks now posed to the Latins of the Aegean and beyond:

It is in fact certain that the Turks, blasphemers and cruel persecutors of the name of Christian, began most harshly to trouble and even assault the faithful peoples dwelling in Romania and in other neighbouring overseas lands. They came even as far as the lands of our beloved son, the noble man Robert, Prince of Achaia, your nephew, so that, with the Christians placed in the midst of the devastation of the enemy and stripped of their goods by conflagrations of fire and brutal robberies, some were led away as captives by those same Turks and sold like cattle and were compelled – o anguish! – to abjure the Catholic Faith to the dishonour of our Saviour; some in truth were subjected to tributary servitude; and thus the said enemy had roused themselves to audacity of such great arrogance and were becoming ever more bold that, if they had not faced the opposition which the aforesaid fleet of the Faithful thither presented to them, not only would they have expunged the name of Christianity from those lands, as the view of trustworthy people has it, but perhaps, [even] to the shameful undoing of Christianity, they would have advanced as far as Naples and beyond; wherefore, with the written and oral outcry of the Christian people dwelling both in Romania and on Cyprus and Rhodes and in other nearby lands having been heard,

62 CVI France, l. nr. 1704, col. 531.
and ourselves inwardly moved in sorrow of heart by such great distress of the people themselves, paternal compassion has compelled us and the duty of pastoral office has prompted us, on account of so many and such great afflictions of the same people, to arrange for the support of some sort of defence and comfort to be provided to them.\textsuperscript{63}

The pope ended his letter by warning Philip to listen only to those advisors who were well versed about happenings in Romania, and by questioning whether it was fitting for a monarch to withhold permission for a bishop to travel overseas on such a pious endeavour.\textsuperscript{64} As a result of Philip’s decision, Archbishop Francesco Michiel of Crete was appointed as the papal vicelegate overseas, John of Biandrate, prior of Hospitallers in Lombardy, was made captain-general of the fleet and Conrad Piccamiglio was appointed as the successor of Martino Zaccaria.\textsuperscript{65}

Fortunately for the crusaders, the Aegean powers sent immediate reinforcements to Smyrna: Hélion of Villeneuve dispatched war machines and material for the defence of the harbour fortress and three galleys carrying ammunition and reinforcements were sent from Crete.\textsuperscript{66} Although these forces appear to have enabled the crusaders to maintain control of the harbour of Smyrna, they were unable to prevent Umur and his brothers from resuming their raids in the Aegean. In the spring and summer of 1345 numerous reports from the Cretan government attest to Turkish raids, many launched from Ephesos, against the Latin islands of the Aegean, especially Crete and Santorini.\textsuperscript{67} Thus, despite the crusaders’ resounding success at Smyrna in October 1344, less than a year later the crusade had lost its principal leaders, was failing in its objective and was in need of revival.

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{63} CVI France, i. nr. 1704, col. 531-2.
\item \textsuperscript{64} CVI France, i. nr. 1704, col. 532.
\item \textsuperscript{65} CVI France, i. nr. 1582, 1603-9, 1668, 1673-6; Setton, PL, i. 194, n. 163; Housley, Avignon, 290, n. 135.
\item \textsuperscript{66} CVI France, i. nr. 1669 (summary); Pignol Zucchello, nr. 13, pp. 31-2; Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 18-32. The Cretan reinforcements consisted of two well-armed galleys and one ship of 100 oars, Paolo Zeno was elected as captain TD, i. nr. 509-12 (full text in Appendix, pp. 310-11). The Cretan contingent was to include two physicians and one surgeon: Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 23-5; Zachariadou, TC, 51, n. 198.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Reports of attacks on Crete were made in April: Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 34-5. Those against Santorini in July: Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 49-50, 53-4; TD, i. nr. 513; Zachariadou, TC, 51, n. 199. The feudatories of Crete decided to arm two galleys for the interception of the Turkish ships and to send reinforcements of men to Santorini. TD, i. nr. 513.
\end{itemize}
6.1.3. The second wave of the Crusade of Smyrna: Humbert of Vienne’s expedition, 1345-1347

It has previously been shown that Clement VI wrote to Humbert, the Dauphin of Vienne, in January 1345 and mentioned that he might be inclined to take the cross in aid of the crusaders at Smyrna. Humbert heeded this request and sent his ambassador William of Royn to Avignon to issue a proposal to Clement. In the proposal, Humbert offered to lead a force of 300 men-at-arms and 1000 archers, and to maintain five galleys, at his own expense, if the pope was willing to name him as captain-general of the ‘holy voyage’ against the Turks. If Clement gave a prompt reply, then Humbert could be ready to depart on the nativity of St John the Baptist (24 June). Towards the end of April, Humbert made his way to the papal court to discuss matters with the pope in person. On 26 May, after a month of negotiation, Humbert took the cross and was officially named as captain-general of the Christian army against the Turks, he was to set out before 2 August and the captains overseas were notified of his appointment.

Humbert began to make preparations for his expedition: he hired four galleys in Marseille, each of which were to be fully armed and carry 200 men to the East. The cost of the galleys would be 650 florins a month, the first two months were paid by the Dauphin in advance. In addition, he swore to maintain 100 knights and squires in his retinue, they were to serve with him for as long as the naval league stayed in action against the Turks, or at least three years. Whilst at Avignon Humbert also opened negotiations with Venice about the provision of vessels for his passage to Romania.

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68 See above, p. 195.
69 Text in J.P. de Valbonnais, Histoire de dauphine et des princes qui ont porté le nom de dauphins, 2 vols (Geneva, 1721-2), ii. nr. 208, p. 507. Also see Gay, Clément VI, 62; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 511-12; Setton, PL, i. 195.
70 Setton, PL, i. 195.
71 Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 169, ff. 1-2, ep. 2-3; reg. 217, ff. 1-3, ep. 2-3 (the folios of this register are extremely damaged); CVI France, ii. nr. 1747-50 (summaries); full text of nr. 1747 in Valbonnais, Histoire de dauphine, ii. nr. 211, p. 511; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 545-48; AE, xxv. nr. 6, pp. 358-9 (1345); Setton, PL, i. 195. Also see Wood, Clement VI, 186-9. In July the vicelegate and captains overseas were instructed to receive Humbert appropriately: CVI Autres, nr. 714. On 23 July Humbert’s departure date was extended by one month to 2 September: CVI France, ii. 1846; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, doc. 4, pp. 549-550.
72 1345, 23 May. Valbonnais, Histoire de dauphine, ii. nr. 210, p. 510. For more on this see Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 512-4; Setton, PL, i. 195, n. 13.
73 On 26 Oct 1345, the Venetian Senate greed to ship Humbert as far as Clarentza: TR, i. nr. 184; DVL, i. nr. 156-60; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 517-20, 523-6, 554; Setton, PL, i. 197-200. In July and August the pope
After dealing with the logistics of the expedition, Humbert began to plan his route from Avignon to Venice, where he planned to set sail for the Aegean. The first leg of his journey would take him from Avignon to Marseille, there Humbert, with his flotilla of commissioned galleys, would sail to Genoa, after which he would make his way across northern Italy to Venice. On 18 July letters were sent by the pope to the rulers of the northern Italian communes asking them to receive Humbert appropriately. Humbert set sail from Marseille on 3 September in his galley Santa Crux and arrived in Genoa eleven days later. He left Genoa on 15 September and sailed to Porto Pisa, after which he made his way overland through Florence, Bologna and Ferrara to Venice which he reached on 24 October.

Humbert sailed from Venice on or around 12 November and reached Negroponte in Christmas of that year. There he joined up with six galleys from the league: the four papal galleys, one from the Hospitallers and one from Venice. He stayed in Negroponte for the following six months before setting out for Smyrna, during which he communicated with the pope over the most suitable course of action for the final leg of the Crusade. The letters of Clement VI suggest that he and Humbert discussed various different strategies during this time. Firstly, on 18 December, Clement wrote to Humbert asking whether he ought to aid the Genoese galleys defending the colony of Caffa in the Crimea, which had been besieged by the Tatars since 1343, but only if he could do this without jeopardising the position of those crusaders at Smyrna. This was evidently not carried out, as Humbert’s force was never diverted to the Black Sea. After this plan of action had been dismissed, the second plan of action was discussed: the utilisation of the island of Chios as a base of operations, for which Clement opened up negotiations with the Byzantine emperor. However, any hopes of requisitioning Chios were dashed, when on 8 June, the Genoese wrote to Robert of St Severino in the hope that he too would lead a flotilla of ten galleys to the east, but nothing came of this plan: CVI Autres, i. nr. 725-9, 7345, 739-41; Setton, PL, i. 197.

CVI France, ii. nr. 1838.

For more on Humbert’s itinerary, see Setton, PL, i. 197, 199-200; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 520-3.

CVI France, ii. nr. 2149 (summary); full text in Faure, ‘Humbert II’, doc. 10, pp. 557-8; Setton, PL, i. 201-2.

In November, shortly before Humbert of Vienne’s force reached the Aegean, the Senate agreed to fit out three galleys to be used for the league. Two of these vessels were to be fitted in Crete, they were to have 15-20 good crossbowmen on each: TR, i. nr. 186; cf. TD, i. nr. 513.

CVI France, ii. nr. 2216. The siege of Caffa and its consequences are discussed below, 221.
commander, Simone Vignoso, appeared off Negroponte with a fleet of galleys. After a skirmish with Humbert’s force, they seized Chios before the Dauphin’s fleet could arrive at the island. In the same letter, Clement also agreed to suspend the sentences of excommunication and interdict imposed on the Catalan Company for three years in the hope that they too would contribute to the aid of the crusaders at Smyrna. In addition to this, the pope permitted Humbert to coin money for the use of the league, reassured him that he would not recall the papal galleys or replace his vice-legate, and informed him that he would urge Venice and Cyprus to continue maintaining their galleys for the league.

The anonymous chronicler of Pistoia recounts one battle which Humbert supposedly fought against the Turks in February after his arrival at Negroponte. In the narrative, Humbert, after travelling from Venice, camped on Lesbos for fifteen days before encountering a Turkish force of 1,500 men and 26 vessels. According to the chronicler, Humbert with an army of 2,300 infantry and 70 cavalry, defeated the Turkish force and burned their ships. The Dauphin later executed 150 Turkish prisoners, including a ‘baron’ named Muhammad, after they refused to abjure their faith. However, as many have pointed out, this battle is unlikely to have taken place. It is not mentioned in any of the correspondence between Humbert and the pope and is probably more a product of the chronicler of Pistoia’s lively imagination than anything else. In fact, according to the letters circulating between Negroponte and the Curia during the first half of 1346, it does not appear as if Humbert achieved anything other than planning and preparation during his stay on the island.

In the end, Humbert had to resort to the original plan of action and set sail for Smyrna, where he arrived later in June, 1346. The sources for Humbert’s actions at Smyrna are scant, with only the Roman chronicler providing any real detail of events. According to him, Humbert arrived with no more than 30 knights: he secured the

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79 This is discussed in more detail below, 230-1.
80 CVI France, ii. nr. 2580-1. Letters were also sent on the same day to others who these measures concerned: CVI France, ii. nr. 2582-95; DOC, 188-9. Also see Setton, PL, i. 205-6; Housley, Avignon, 255-6; Setton, Domination, 48.
81 Storie pistoresi (1300-1348), ed. S.A. Barbi, RISNS 11.5 (Città di Castello, 1927), 219-20. For more details on the battle at Lesbos, see M.S. Mazzi, ‘Pistoia e la Terrasanta’, Toscana e Terrasanta nel Medioevo, ed. F. Cardini (Florence, 1982), 103-115, at 109; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 258-9; Setton, PL, i. 204; Lemerle, Aydin, 196, n. 1.
harbour area, restored order, and launched sorties against the Turkish forces, taking many prisoners. Unfortunately after these initial successes the heat of the summer set in and the crusaders began to suffer heavily from disease and starvation and many died. Humbert re-fortified the harbour area with high walls, towers, gates and ditches and, seeing that nothing more could be done, departed from Smyrna to ‘his country’.82

The Düstürnâme of Enveri also gives a similar account of events: according to the author, about a month after Humbert’s arrival in Smyrna, a battle took place between the troops of the dauphin and those of Umur and Hizir. In the battle some Frankish knights fell, amongst them was perhaps a close relative or friend of the Dauphin. Following this unsuccessful engagement, Humbert was confined to the fortress of the harbour and did not advance until he left Smyrna.83 The information from other sources, although scarce, does suggest that the accounts of the Roman chronicler and Enveri contain some truth: news of one of skirmish in which Humbert defeated a Turkish force but lost five knights reached Grenoble in September 1346;84 and it is known that Humbert himself took no more action in the latter months of the summer as he was suffering from illness.85

Humbert left Smyrna around September 1346, but went not to his home country as the Roman chronicler claimed, but instead to Rhodes where he stayed for the winter of 1346-7. In the autumn he discussed with the pope the possibility of forming a truce with the Aydin-oglus. The Dauphin wrote letters about this to the pope which reached Avignon in October or early November. Clement replied in two letters on 28 November. In one letter, matters of finance were discussed and Clement warned Humbert that future crusaders were unlikely to be recruited in the West because of the wars which consumed the continent.86 In the other letter, Clement reiterated his lamentation that the great kingdoms of Europe were consumed by warfare which

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82 Anonimo Romano, 116-7; Setton, PL, i. 207.
83 Enveri, verses 2173-2276; Lemerle, Aydin, 197-9.
85 CVI France, ii. nr. 2956; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, doc. 11, pp. 559-62.
86 Payment to the captains and crew of the papal galleys had been delayed and Humbert had been forced to cover their wages, he was to be reimbursed for this expense. The Venetian doge had been asked by the pope to not impede the passage of any crusaders who could be recruited. CVI France, ii. nr. 2956; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, doc. 11, pp. 559-62. Also see Setton, PL, i. 208-9; Housley, Avignon, 83, n. 5, 198, n. 173, 224, n. 145, 257, n. 72; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 534-5.
prevented would-be crusaders from travelling to the East. In regard to the question of a truce with the Turks, Clement agreed with Humbert that it was ‘not only expedient but also entirely necessary to proceed to make and enter into the truces [...] in the best, most honourable and safest way possible’ presumably with the Turks of Aydin. Humbert was to discuss the matter with the representatives of the Venetians, Cypriots and Hospitallers and to proceed in the best manner he saw fit. One condition Clement imposed, was that the truce ought to last no more than ten years, as after that time it was hoped that Europe would be at peace. In the meantime the pope could send no more money to the East as the tithes and other church subsidies could not be collected ‘while the evil of the present time persists’. Finally, Clement warned Humbert to keep the discussions for the truce confidential ‘because we did not wish to disclose them to many or to even any one of your envoys’. These two letters were followed by a number of others sent to the other parties involved in the crusade in the following days, confirming the measures taken by Humbert and the pope. On 29 January 1347 Humbert wrote his will whilst on Rhodes and over the following months he began to make plans for his return to Europe. His oath to remain on crusade for three years was waived by the pope, who, on 19 March, granted him a confessor to absolve him of the vow and gave him safe conduct for his return home. In that month, Humbert’s wife Mary died, which probably increased his desire to return to Europe. The Dauphin departed soon after and arrived at Venice in the last week of May. The extent to which negotiations for a truce had progressed is not known, but it is clear that in the end no truce was ever agreed between Humbert and the Turks of Aydin.

87 Humbert was also warned not to intervene in the Byzantine civil war on the behalf of Anna of Savoy against John Kantakouzenos. CVI France, ii. nr. 2957; Setton, PL, i. 209; Housley, Avignon, 257, n. 72; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 534-5.
88 CVI France, ii. nr. 2958-60, 2962-3, 2974, 2982.
89 CVI France, ii. nr. 3179-81; Setton, PL, i. 210; Housley, Avignon, 257.
90 Setton, PL, i. 210.
6.1.4. The end of the Crusade of Smyrna: the Black Death, economic crisis and truces with Aydin, 1347-1351

Sometime in the spring of 1347, after Humbert’s departure from Rhodes, the galleys of the naval league won a notable victory against the Turks of Aydin and Sarukhan off the island of Imbros. The event is described in a papal letter of 24 June and in the deliberations of the Cretan government on 21 June. The Christian flotilla came unexpectedly upon a fleet of 118 Turkish vessels off Imbros, they captured the vessels and pursued the Turks onto the island where they had fled for safely. The crusaders surrounded them and, after receiving reinforcements of ‘horses, arms, foot soldiers, men and other appropriate aid’ from the grand master at Rhodes, captured the remaining Turks on the island. Despite this victory, the support of the crusading force in the Aegean and at Smyrna would wind down over the next few years and eventually come to an end. One factor which undoubtedly contributed to this was the outbreak of the Black Death, one of the most virulent and destructive pandemics in history. The Mongol army suffered from this plague during the siege of Caffa in 1346-7. By 1347 it had reached the Aegean and Sicily, and by 1348 it was devastating Italy and southern Europe. Avignon, in particular, suffered heavily from the Black Death, where it is estimated that up to half of the population died during a seven-month period in 1348. It is thought that during this time, Clement VI spent over a quarter of his revenue on charity, compared to only 5% on war.

Bearing this in mind, it is no surprise that after the victory at Imbros, negotiations with Umur over a possible truce, as proposed by Humbert in the previous year, were undertaken. Bartolommeo of Tomari, a canon of Negroponte and Octavian Zaccaria, possibly the son or nephew of the late Martino, had been undertaking

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91 Zachariadou convincingly argues that these were the Turks from Aydin and Sarukhan and not elsewhere: Zachariadou, TC, 53, n. 213.
94 Mollat, Popes, 40.
95 Setton, Pl, i. 187, n. 113.
96 Lemerle, Aydin, 226.
negotiations with Umur and his brother Hizir. According to a papal letter of 20 January 1348, they had reached a provisional agreement whereby the old harbour fortress would be dismantled by the crusaders in return for peace. Clement wrote to thank them for their efforts in trying to find a compromise, and encouraged them to persist, but rejected the current proposal on the grounds that it entailed the destruction of the harbour fortress.  

Clement wrote in a similar manner to Francesco Michiel and Dieudonné of Gozon on 5 February stressing that the fortress must remain standing if any agreement was to be reached, but he added that it was imperative that negotiations should continue. To help move matters forward, Clement suggested that as part of the truce, the Christians could grant the Turks access to the port for commercial reasons if they so wished.  

Nothing seems to have come of these negotiations and hostilities between the two sides resumed. In the spring of 1348, Umur, who had seen his demand for the dismantlement of the harbour fortress in return for peace rejected by the pope, attempted to oust the crusaders by force once and for all. According to the account of Nikephoros Gregoras, it is during the subsequent attack that Umur, the hero of Aydin and bane of the crusaders, was killed by a Christian arrow fired from the wall of the harbour fortress.

On 17 August Clement wrote to the archbishop of Smyrna and the captain of the city to acknowledge their letters informing him of the death of Umur. It was joyful news, but the pope was adamant that any forthcoming truce with the Aydin, now ruled solely by Hizir at Ephesos, must not include the demolition of the fortress. Fortunately for the crusaders, Hizir was more inclined to reach a compromise than his brother had been and on 18 August 1348 the draft of a truce was agreed between the emir and the Latins of the league. Hizir stated that he would send his own ambassadors to the pope to finalise the treaty. According to the emir, Clement would

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97 CVI Autres, nr. 1563-4; Setton, PL, i. 214; Housley, Avignon, 257.
98 CVI France, ii. nr. 3728; Lemerle, Aydin, 226-8; Setton, PL, i. 214.
99 Lemerle, Aydin, 228.
100 Nikephoros Gregoras, ii. 834-5. The accounts of Enveri and Doukas also agree that Umur was struck by an arrow when assaulting the walls: Lemerle, Aydin, 227-9; Doukas, Historia Byzantina, ed. I. Bekker (Bonn, 1834), 29-30; Setton, PL, i. 215.
101 CVI Autres, nr. 1697; Setton, PL, i. 216.
102 The Christians were represented by Francesco Michiel, the papal legate and Archbishop of Crete, and by the Hospitaller Dragonet of Joyeuse, who were themselves acting as representatives of the pope: Zachariadou, TC, 55.
be allowed to amend the treaty as he saw fit and he swore in advance to accept any
modifications the pope might make. Amongst the clauses of the draft treaty Hizir had
agreed to accept were the following generous concessions: to grant the Latins one half
of the customs dues (commerulum) of Ephesos and the other cities of Aydin; to treat
the Christians at Smyrna well and with honour; to allow freedom of trade for Christian
merchants in Aydin; to put the fleet of Aydin in dry dock; to refrain from attacks against
the Christians; to punish pirates and corsairs from other emirates; to restore to the
archbishops of Smyrna and Ephesos all their churches and to provide revenues and
protection for them. These generous concessions suggest that Hizir must have been
hard pressed to agree a truce with the Christians after the death of his brother.

Hizir’s embassy, accompanied by Bartolommeo of Tomari and Octavian
Zaccaria, reached Avignon in March 1349. They remained in the city discussing the
treaty with papal officials until early July. When the Turkish embassy returned to
Aydin, Clement gave them a letter, addressed to Hizir and dated 1 July 1349, which
informed the emir that before officially accepting the truce, the pope would need to
consult with the Venetians and Cypriots, who had not been party to the negotiations,
meanwhile the emir was to observe the draft treaty until Christmas 1349. Afterwards,
Clement wrote to the Venetians and Cypriots, asking them to send officials
to Avignon for May 1350 to discuss the proposed truce. However, the Venetians
informed the pope that the Turks of Aydin, now allied with those of Menteshe, had
already broken the truce and were once again threatening the Latins in Smyrna and the
Aegean. Not surprisingly the Venetian embassy reached Avignon ready to tear up the
proposed treaty with Hizir and to resume the naval league, despite Clement’s
assertions that the Curia would no longer help fund an anti-Turkish fleet. In August
1350 the naval league was officially renewed, but only a few weeks later war broke out
between Venice and Genoa, thus ending any hopes of a Venetian contribution to the
league.\textsuperscript{107} Due to the Venetian-Genoese war, the lack of funds and the ravages of the Black Death, less than a year after it was re-formed, the league was officially dissolved by the pope in the summer of 1351 and any mention of it in papal correspondence disappeared thereafter.\textsuperscript{108} On 6 December 1352 Clement VI, who had done so much to facilitate the formation of the naval league and the various expeditions to Smyrna, died.

\textsuperscript{107} For the renewed league, Venice and the Hospitallers promised three galleys and Cyprus two: CVI Autres, nr. 2193; CVI France, iii. nr. 4661; Setton, PL, i. 220-1.

\textsuperscript{108} CVI France, iii. 5051-4, 5056; Setton, PL, i. 222-3; Zachariadou, TC, 57-8.
6.2. The Role of the Papacy, Venice and Genoa in the Crusade of Smyrna

6.2.1. Clement VI and the Crusade of Smyrna

Many have regarded Clement VI as the key figure behind the successful formation of the naval league and management of the Crusade of Smyrna. Mollat has suggested that the pope’s qualities of patience and cunning helped progress negotiations for the expedition.\(^{109}\) Moreover, Housley has stated that Clement’s role was ‘decisive’ in making the Crusade happen.\(^{110}\) Indeed, as may be seen in the large amount of correspondence preserved in the papal registers between the pope and the participants of the league, the pope’s skills as a diplomat undoubtedly enabled him to succeed in launching a successful crusade to the East where many others had failed. In fact, this exceptional dedication to the Crusade had been evident in Clement’s earlier life when, as Archbishop of Rouen, he had acted as a crusade negotiator for King Philip VI of France. He preached a sermon in Paris in 1332, after which Philip took the cross for the aborted crusade to the Holy Land in 1333. Moreover, he exhorted John XXII to sanction the same expedition.\(^{111}\) It is now appropriate to assess the ways in which Clement VI specifically aided the formation of the Crusade of Smyrna; how these methods compared to his Avignon predecessors; what the level of response was; and what these factors suggest about the changing western perception of the Turks.

Firstly, the close personal attachment to the crusade shown during his earlier life, combined with an extravagant nature, which was in contrast to that of his frugal predecessor Benedict XII, made Clement VI more inclined to raise and contribute papal funds towards the crusade.\(^{112}\) In terms of funds, it has been shown that in 1343 and 1345 the pope levied a tithe on ecclesiastical benefices in over sixty dioceses in Europe.

\(^{109}\) Mollat, *Popes*, 42.


\(^{112}\) According to Mollat, Clement VI was ‘accustomed to live like a lord’ and squandered the wealth amassed by Benedict XII. The completion of the papal palace at Avignon, the reconstruction of the abbey of Chaise-Dieu, at a cost of 30,000 florins, the upkeep of a luxurious court and loans to the kings and lords of France, are all evidence of this. Overall, contemporaries seem to have admired his ostentatious way of life: Mollat, *Popes*, 38-9; cf. Wood, *Clement VI*, 3-4, 64-8.
and the East for the expedition against the Turks.\textsuperscript{113} This was greater than any crusade tithe levied since the Vienne tenth of 1312 and constituted the first to be levied especially for a crusade against the Turks. Clement also went to greater lengths than just levying tithes: in the bull \textit{Insurgentibus contra fidem}, issued in September 1343, the pope explicitly expressed that spiritual privileges would be made available to raise money for the crusade, as the ‘extraordinary expenditure’ called for larger revenues than the tenth alone.\textsuperscript{114} In particular Clement offered a plenary indulgence to all who would make a financial contribution to the expedition equal to that which they would have spent if they had campaigned for one year.\textsuperscript{115} In terms of contribution, according to Housley, the money Clement spent on the maintenance of the papal galleys for the expedition ‘represented the most substantial papal contribution to the defence of the Christian East’ for the entire period of the Avignon Papacy.\textsuperscript{116} The specific amount spent on the Smyrna expedition was probably in the region of 110,000-150,000 florins and although considerably less than the amount spent on the Italian wars, it still constituted a significant proportion of the overall papal budget.\textsuperscript{117} In fact, during the latter years of the 1340s, Clement claimed that he could no longer continue the crusade because ‘the tithes and other subsidies’ could no longer be ‘enforced or raised’.

In addition to being used to raise money for the crusade, the indulgences granted in the bull \textit{Insurgentibus contra fidem} were also introduced to encourage a specific level of specialist recruitment and not the unmanageable and unwanted level of non-combatant participation, such as that attracted to the Hospital \textit{passagium} of 1308-10.\textsuperscript{119} In this sense, many of the concessions made in the bull, such as the

\textsuperscript{113} See above, pp. 187-91. This tithe was extended for 2 years in December 1345: CVI France, ii. 2203-6 (summaries); cf. nr. 1855-6.
\textsuperscript{114} DLC, nr. 22, p. 79; Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 138.
\textsuperscript{115} See above, pp. 190-1.
\textsuperscript{116} Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 198.
\textsuperscript{117} Housley has calculated that Clement VI spent between 112,846 and 144,346 florins on the papal galleys for three years’ service (December 1343 to summer 1347): Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 301-2. The over-inflated amount of 200,000 florins has been calculated by Schäfer: \textit{Die Ausgaben der Apostolischen Kammer unter Benedikt XII., Klemens VI. und Innocenz VI. (1335-1362)}, ed. K.H. Schäfer (Paderborn, 1914), 170. This amount is used by Setton: Setton, \textit{PL}, i. 184-7. Clement’s annual income was said to be in the region of 188,500 florins: Setton, \textit{PL}, i. 187.
\textsuperscript{118} CVI France, ii. nr. 2957; CVI Autres, nr. 2024, 2060. Also see Setton, \textit{PL}, i. 218.
\textsuperscript{119} The indulgences granted for the Hospitaller \textit{passagium} have been discussed above, ch. 1, pp. 52-3; Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 144-5, 148.
indulgence granted to those who sent suitable soldiers at their own expense and those who took part at another’s expense, seem to have been introduced in order to attract participation from appropriately skilled soldiers and seamen. Although it is extremely difficult to measure the response to the 1343 indulgences, they were evidently sufficient to necessitate the recruitment of troops to supplement the papal, Venetian and Cypriot contingents, as they all appear to have participated at full strength for the majority of the campaign.\textsuperscript{120} They may have also contributed to the widespread outbreaks of popular enthusiasm in 1346, which will be discussed later.

But perhaps the most striking feature of the indulgences of 1343, was the granting of the full crusade indulgence to those who could participate in person on the crusade (the same as that ‘granted to those who cross over in aid of the Holy Land’).\textsuperscript{121} This degree of indulgence was the greatest yet awarded to those fighting specifically against the Turks: the indulgences given to those fighting the Turks in Achaia in 1322, for the Zaccaria of Chios in 1323 and 1325, for the anti-Turkish league in 1334, and to Hugh of Quiéret and his followers in 1335, were all granted \textit{in articulo mortis}: they only constituted remission of sins for those who died in action and wounds received thereafter and not for participation alone. In fact, the full crusade indulgence for participation alone had never been issued for a crusade launched specifically against the Turks. It had been made available by previous popes, but these were either for crusades against the Saracens of the Holy Land, or against the Greeks, Catalans or Tartars.\textsuperscript{122} As it is unlikely that the pope used the full crusade indulgence in 1343 to attract a large-scale response of unskilled men, it can perhaps instead be used to gauge the importance of the crusade. This factor makes the indulgence of 1343 especially pertinent to the understanding of the change in the papal perception of the Turks. If the \textit{in articulo mortis} indulgences of the 1320s and 1330s can be classed as a form of lesser crusade indulgence – often introduced as a result of a petition and granted by the pope because they required less organisation from the Church – then this suggests that at the time when these were issued, the threat of the Turks was deemed as high enough to warrant minor assistance from the Church, but not high enough for the full

\textsuperscript{120} Demurger cites a number of French and English knights who are known to have taken the cross for the expedition: Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 212.

\textsuperscript{121} See above, pp. 190-1.

\textsuperscript{122} These have been discussed in previous chapters. Also see Appendix IV: Table of Indulgences.
Holy Land crusade indulgence to be issued.\textsuperscript{123} If this is the case, then granting of the full crusade indulgence in 1343 indicated that the expedition against the Turks was now considered of the utmost importance. The rising power of Aydin in the years immediately preceding Clement’s coronation would support this view. Moreover, setting the terms of the indulgence as the same as an indulgence for going to the Holy Land, may have been a deliberate move to bring the anti-Turkish league on a par with Jerusalem, or at least, to remind would-be crusaders of the importance of the task at hand. The pope certainly believed that those fighting the Turks warranted the highest level of spiritual support that the Church was able to provide.

According to Alain Demurger, the Crusade of Smyrna was not a crusade at all but a separate Christian endeavour which ran parallel to the maintenance of the idea of a crusade always being centred on Jerusalem. He has argued that Clement VI applied the indulgences, and other mechanisms usually associated with a crusade to the Holy Land, to the 1343 league primarily for it to be used to implement peace within Christendom, with the hope of undertaking a crusade to Jerusalem at a later date.\textsuperscript{124} There is no doubt that in the early 1340s, when the situation within Europe was critical, Clement would have regarded a naval league as a useful tool to diffuse the conflicts raging at the time, and during the Crusade of Smyrna, there is also evidence to suggest that he appealed to the rulers of Europe to make peace to facilitate the continuation of the Crusade.\textsuperscript{125} However, Demurger’s theory does not assess the 1343 league in the context of previous papal authorised expeditions against the Turks. To say that the primary cause of promoting the 1343 league was to promote peace within Christendom, and thus make conditions conducive to a crusade to the Holy Land, is perhaps underestimating the anxiety in which the pontiff, and those likely to take the cross, regarded the growing expansion of Aydin and the other Turkish emirates at this

\textsuperscript{123} The implementation of lesser indulgences is discussed by Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 132-3.
\textsuperscript{124} \textit{La ligue navale n’est pas une croisade, mais en faisant comme si elle l’est, Clément VI espère s’en servir comme d’un puissant instrument de sa politique de paix entre les chrétiens. Avec l’espoir alors d’entreprendre la croisade vers Jérusalem}: Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 212-4. Unlike Housley, Demurger does not consider the league to have constituted an autonomous crusade at all. Instead, he has claimed the league was a completely separate Christian endeavour, unlike the Crusade which always centred on Jerusalem. This is in contrast to Housley, who wrote that the central achievement of Clement VI’s pontificate ‘was the organisation of a Latin naval league against the Turkish emirates in Anatolia, a league totally unconnected with the recovery of the Holy Land’: Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 32.
\textsuperscript{125} For example: Demurger, ‘Clément VI’, 212.
time. The granting of the Holy Land indulgence and the popular response to this, which
will be shown later, is evidence that the expedition was regarded as a crusade by
contemporaries. Moreover, there is little to suggest that a parallel crusade to
Jerusalem was high in the pope’s mind at this time.126

During the latter stages of the Crusade of Smyrna, especially during the
expedition of Humbert of Vienne, Clement continued to show full support for the
expedition. Towards the end of July, he increased the preaching campaign in support of
the second wave of the Smyrna expedition led by Humbert. The same indulgence as
that issued in 1343 was offered to participants or contributors, and Franciscan,
Augustinian, Dominican and Carmelite friars were ordered to preach the crusade. The
preaching campaign was also extended to England where it had not taken place as
yet.127 The response to this preaching campaign was, according to contemporaries,
exceptionally high. As Housley has pointed out, the Smyrna campaign as a whole,
especially in the period from the death of the crusade leaders in January 1345 until
Humbert’s departure from Venice in November, inspired an outburst of widespread
popular enthusiasm on a similar scale to that shown for the People’s Crusade in 1309
and the Shepherd’s Crusade in 1320.128 This was partly a result of the crusaders’
successful capture of Smyrna harbour and the sale of indulgences for the expedition,
but also a result of various “miracle stories” which circulated in the west during the
summer of 1345.

One such “miracle story” can be found in a letter, purporting to be written by
King Hugh IV of Cyprus to Queen Joanna I of Sicily, which was probably disseminated in
parts of Italy and France at this time. In the letter an exaggerated Christian victory over
the Turks is described. The story begins on 24 June, when an army of 200,000
\textit{crucisignatis} assembled on a plain between Smyrna and Ephesos, massively

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item[126] Clement only twice mentioned the possibility of recovering the Holy Land at the time of the Smyrna
      expedition, in letters of June 1344 and March 1348: \textit{CVI France}, i. nr. 914; \textit{Autres}, nr. 1605. It also seems
      unusual that if the league was primarily allocated the Holy Land crusade mechanisms in order to
      promote peace within Europe, that Clement should agree to cancel the preaching of indulgences in
      France in 1345, specifically on the grounds that men were being drawn to the crusade and away from
      the defence of their kingdom. This action seem at odds with one who was trying to use the league to
      alleviate tensions between France and England: \textit{CVI France}, i. nr. 1704.
\item[127] \textit{CVI France}, ii. nr. 1855-6; Lunt, \textit{Financial Relations of the Papacy with England}, ii. 531-2; Setton, \textit{PL}, i.
      197; Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 138.
\item[128] Housley, \textit{Avignon}, 145-6.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
outnumbered by a Turkish force of 1,200,000. The battle lasted until the evening, and,
as the Turks, thirsting to drink the blood of their enemies, came upon the exhausted
Christian army, the crusaders prepared to receive martyrdom. They cried out to the
Lord saying, ““Lord Jesus, you who were willing to be crucified for us, give us firm faith
and strengthen our hearts within us, so that we may be able to receive the palm of
martyrdom in your name, since we are unable to resist them””. Then suddenly a figure
appeared above the army ‘sitting on a white horse, holding a white banner on which
the cross was of a red colour, remarkable for its astonishing redness’. He was clad in
camel-hair and had a long thin face, with a flowing beard. He proclaimed in a loud
voice: ““O, faithful, do not fear, because the divine majesty will open the heavens and
send invisible help to you. Arise, be strengthened and come manfully to battle with me,
since the few of you who will die will receive eternal life””. The Christians arose as if
they had never done battle and attacked the Turks again and again. A ray of light like
the sun illuminated the battlefield for the whole night and, by divine aid, the crusader
army prevailed. In the morning, the Christians celebrated mass and the figure appeared
to them again saying, ““What you have sought you have achieved and you will obtain
more than these things if you remain true to the faith””. When the crusaders asked him
who he was, he responded: ““I am he who said: Behold the lamb of God, behold He who
takes away the sins of the world””. With these words, he disappeared, sending forth a
very sweet smell, by which the Christians were ‘wonderfully refreshed that whole night
and day, even without actual food and drink’. The figure was of course St John the
Baptist. The next day, when the crusaders came to the battlefield to count the Christian
dead they heard ‘voices without number’ chanting the verse: ““Come, blessed of the
Father, inherit the Kingdom to the very end””. After the bodies of the Christians had
been buried, those of the Turks were counted and said to have numbered 70,000.129

Another miracle, reported by the chronicler of Pistoia recounts the appearance
of the Virgin in a small church at L’Aquila in Abruzzo. The Virgin appeared above the
church altar carrying the infant Christ, holding a cross in his hand. On hearing of this, all

129 The letter is published in full by N. Jorga, ‘Une lettre apocryphe sur la bataille de Smyrne’, Revue
d’orient Latin 3 (1895), 27-31, at 28-31. It is discussed in detail by Setton, PL, i. 201-2; Gay, Clément VI, 66-7; N. Jorga, Philippe de Mézières, 1327-1405, et la croisade au XVe siècle (Paris, 1896), 51-6; Housley,
Avignon, 146; Atiya, Crusade, 308-9. The chronicler of Pistoia recounted the same battle, probably after
having read the letter or heard it read to him. In his version the number of Turkish dead was increased
to 700,000 and the Christian dead was given as 3,053: Storie pistoresi, 215-16; Setton, PL, i. 202.
of the townsfolk flocked to the church, where the Virgin remained until the third hour, more resplendent and beautiful than the sun. According to the chronicler, all of the children born that day in L’Aquila had the imprint of the cross on their right shoulder. These stories no doubt inspired people to take the cross. The letter of the exaggerated Christian victory may even have been intended as a recruitment aid for preachers. After all, St John, like the pope, had promised the crusaders eternal reward for their services, as many contemporaries noted.

Indeed, many contemporary authors attest to the large numbers of people taking the cross for the second wave of the Smyrna expedition. The chronicler of Pistoia mentioned that because of the miracle in L’Aquila, ‘many Aquilani and others from the countryside took the cross and went to fight against the Infidels’. The Florentine author Giovanni Villani wrote that 400 men from Florence, 350 from Siena, and many others from Tuscany and Lombardy set out towards the east. The chronicler from Bologna commented that three groups set out from his city between October 1345 to April 1346, the first two consisting of 40 men, the last of over 100.

The necrology of the convent of Santa Maria Novella at Florence also named six Dominicans who took the cross for the crusade. However, the claim of the anonymous Roman chronicler that there was not a city, town or state in the whole of Christendom from which innumerable men did not flock to take the cross was certainly an exaggeration.

As Housley has suggested, Clement VI evidently approved of the popular enthusiasm shown towards the crusade and the miracle stories which helped to inspire it. On 21 July, Clement wrote in a letter to Edward III of England that ‘it is clear from

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130 Storie pistoresi, 214.
131 As suggested in Setton, PL, i. 202.
132 For example, Giovanni Villani and the chronicler from Bologna both commented on the great privileges offered by the pope: Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 13, ch. 39, pp. 390-1; ‘Cronica di Bologna’, RIS 18 (Milan, 1731), cols. 242-792, at 393.
133 Storie pistoresi, 214; Setton, PL, i. 202; Housley, Avignon, 146; Gay, Clément VI, 65.
134 Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 13, ch. 39, pp. 390-1; Housley, Avignon, 146, n. 107; Setton, PL, i. 193, n. 158.
137 Anonimo Romano, 115; Housley, Avignon, 147, n. 110.
amazing miracles that the mercy of divine goodness is working in various lands in favour of the said task’. The pope went on to describe the appearance of ‘shining crosses’ in very many lands, which had given ‘many benefits of health’ to those who were ‘burdened with ailments’. Moreover, he wrote that an ‘innumerable multitude’ of nobles and powerful people, especially from Italy, were preparing to go on crusade against the Turks ‘to avenge the injuries of the crucified Redeemer’. Evidently, Clement went to great lengths to foster the enthusiasm for this crusade and the high level of response can in part be attributed to him.

In addition to this, only days before Humbert was due to set out for the East, Clement granted the Dauphin 34 different petitions at the Curia, relating to spiritual privileges. To bolster recruitment, Clement also wrote to the archbishop of Smyrna in 1346, granting him the power to commute vows, except those of religion and chastity, to participation in the Smyrna expedition. He also made other compromises which his predecessors had been unwilling to make in the interests of the crusade. In June 1346, at Humbert’s request, the pope agreed to suspend the sentences of excommunication and interdict imposed on the Catalan Company for three years in the hope that they too would contribute to the aid of the crusaders at Smyrna. This is in stark contrast to Benedict XII, who obstinately refused to incorporate the Catalan Company into any plan for the defence of the Latin East, and in 1339 even summoned Archbishop Isnard of Thebes to Avignon to stand trial for falsely relaxing the ban of excommunication.

Clement was also not ignorant of the restrictions on trade caused by the Crusade of Smyrna and the aggressive Tartar policies in the Black Sea. The effect these had on Venetian and Genoese participation in the crusade will be discussed later in this chapter, but at this stage it is important to study Clement’s understanding of the economic situation in the eastern Mediterranean. As shall be shown, his approach was

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138 CVI France, ii. nr. 1844, p. 26; Housley, Avignon, 146.
139 CVI France, ii. nr. 1844, p. 26; Housley, Avignon, 147.
140 Setton, PL, i. 196.
141 Dated 6 May, 1346. CVI Autres, i. 980 (summary).
142 CVI France, ii. nr. 2580-1. Letters were also sent on the same day to others who these measures concerned: CVI France, ii. nr. 2582-95; DOC, 188-9. Also see Setton, PL, i. 205-6; Housley, Avignon, 255-6; Setton, Domination, 48.
143 See above, ch. 5, pp. 166-7.
pragmatic – in particular, he understood that stable overseas trade was necessary to ensure the participation of the Venetians in the expedition. A good example of this is found in April 1344, when Clement granted the Republic permission to send six galleys and four cogs to Mamluk lands over a five-year period.\textsuperscript{144} According to Lane, Venetian involvement in the Smyrna crusade combined with the large payments for papal trade licences moved the pope to grant the Venetians permission to trade with the Mamluks.\textsuperscript{145} Indeed, Venetian participation in the league against the Turkish emirates certainly seems to have influenced the papal decision to grant the trade concession. This is illustrated in the document issuing the trade licence, where reference is made to the Venetian petitioning committee at the Curia who had stated to the pope that the Republic had being incurring ‘very great and intolerable labours against the Turks’ in the service of the faith. Clement responded to the petitioners that, after considering these matters, and wishing the Venetians to ‘proceed favourably in this respect’ (i.e. to continue these labours against the Turks) then the requested licence would be granted ‘in acknowledgement of the sincere zeal and firm purpose which you [the Venetians] have held and do hold, with total devotion of heart, for the work of the holy faith and also for the exaltation and increase of God’s Church’.\textsuperscript{146} These \textit{laboribus contra Turchos} were almost certainly a reference to the Venetian participation in the naval league and possibly the victories it had achieved in early 1343.

Another factor which links the granting of this licence to resistance against the Turks can be found in the records of previously refused petitions for trade licences. It has already been shown that Popes John XXII and Benedict XII had refused a total of four similar requests from Venetian embassies for licences to trade in non war materials with Mamluk Egypt (made in 1317, 1319, 1327 and 1337).\textsuperscript{147} These requests were made on the grounds that the Venetians were different from other nations: their livelihood stemmed from foreign trade and not from agriculture. Thus they needed free

\textsuperscript{144} ‘we grant to you, by the apostolic authority of special favour, full and free licence to sail or cause to be sailed, at least once within a five year period, four ships and six galleys to Alexandria and to other overseas regions and lands subject to the sultan of Babylon’: \textit{DVL}, i. nr. 144, p. 277. Also see Petro Giustinian, 226-7; Ashtor, \textit{Levant Trade}, 66-7; \textit{Idem}, ‘Observations on Venetian trade in the Levant’, 538-9; Stantchev, \textit{Embargo}, 243.
\textsuperscript{145} Lane, \textit{Venice}, 131.
\textsuperscript{146} \textit{DVL}, i. nr. 144, p. 277.
\textsuperscript{147} See ch. 3, p. 124.
trade with Egypt in order to survive. Similar words had been repeated in the 1344 petition, but with the difference being that in the previous, unsuccessful petitions, no reference to resistance against the Turks had been made. In fact, Venetian merchants were actively engaged in trade with the Turks in the years when the previous petitions had been submitted, and in the final unsuccessful petition of 1337, Venice had formed a trade agreement with the emirs of Aydin and Menteshe – if this was known to the popes, then these factors may well have hindered the petitioners’ cause. If this is the case, then Clement VI was effectively expanding the policy adopted by John XXII of permitting trade with the Mamluks in order to encourage resistance to the Turks, as was demonstrated by the licences for mastic issued to the Zaccaria of Chios in the 1320s.148

The granting of the licence for allowing the Venetians to trade with the Mamluks was, therefore, a tool with which the pope facilitated Venetian participation in the Crusade of Smyrna.149 It may have also been the motivating factor in the issuing of two other licences, one of March 1347, where Clement allowed Humbert’s vessels to trade with the lands subject to the Mamluk sultan,150 and another of July 1350, were the pope also allowed Octavian Zaccaria to trade with the Egyptians.151 However, unlike the licence issued to Venice, these licences do not make the explicit link to resistance against the Turks, so it is only possible to speculate in this regard. Nevertheless, these concessions still suggest that the Turks had well and truly replaced the Mamluks as the greatest Muslim threat in the eastern Mediterranean. Moreover, they provide further evidence that the Avignon popes were willing to use trade exemptions to encourage participation in a crusade against the Turks and to perhaps

148 A similar concession had been made to the Venetians by Pope Innocent III in 1198. The Republic had been suffering losses of trade from the embargo, and the pope granted them permission to trade with Cairo and Alexandria for a short period (‘the time being’) in order to persuade them to participate in a forthcoming crusade: A.J. Andrea, Contemporary Sources for the Fourth Crusade (Leiden, 2000), 23.
149 It is possible that the Venetians may have paid money for this licence, although to my knowledge no evidence exists in the relevant papal or Venetian archives to suggest this was the case.
150 Humbert was allocated two cogs and twelve galleys (duas naves et duedecim galeas): Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 140, f. 246, ep. 1072; summary in CVI France, ii. nr. 3181.
151 This was granted for three years and applied to merchandise up to the value of 25,000 florins, but not war materials: Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 143, ff. 38-38v; summary in CVI Autres, nr. 2028. This was a considerable sum, cf. Stantchev, Embargo, 244, n. 233, Appendix B, pp. 514-22.
instil a perception that this new foe should be regarded as the primary enemy of Christendom.

6.2.2. Venetian participation in the Crusade of Smyrna

As seen in the previous chapter, by 1342 the Venetian government had taken steps to reinforce its colonies in the Aegean in the face of the increasing threat posed by Umur of Aydin. After the election of the new pope in May 1342, discussions were undertaken between the Venice and the Curia over the best way in which to oppose the Aydin Turks. In August Venice was forced to confront a new revolt on Crete, probably over the tax imposed to pay for the Venetian contingent of the forthcoming naval league, as had been the case in 1333. The feudatories of the island had previously declared that they would pay no more than a third of the expenses, although they were eventually forced to pay half. Once this matter had been dealt with, the Serenissima agreed to contribute six out of a total of 20 galleys for the league and to make the necessary preparations: in the autumn and winter of 1343 the Senate decreed that one galley was to be armed in Negroponte and the remaining five in the arsenal at Venice. At the same time, the Great Council elected Petro Zeno as the captain of the Venetian galleys for the league, his position was to be reviewed after six months. In November more preparations were made for the departure of the galleys and in December the Council of the Forty took measures to help Zeno in his recruitment of crossbowmen for the campaign.

It can be seen from this that the Venetians, although not the instigators of the naval league in 1342-3, were eager to participate in it when called to do so by the
pope. This is not surprising considering that during the pontificate of Benedict XII no support against the Turks had been forthcoming from the pope and the Venetians had instead resorted to making peace treaties with the Turks of Menteshe and Aydin, which in the case of the latter, lasted for barely two years before piratical raids resumed. It is also worth remembering that negotiations with the Cypriots over the revival of a league against the Turks had been ongoing since 1340, even though no agreement had been made. Thus it seems that the election of an energetic new pope in 1342, who showed a dedication to a crusade against the Turks, had given Venice the impetus it needed to commit itself to the enterprise.

Another factor in the Republic’s eagerness to participate in a league was the increasing problem of the importing of grain to Venice and her colonies at this time. As Zachariadou has pointed out, ‘the organisation of the crusade coincided with a period in which the Christians were cut off from the Black Sea with the result that there was a great famine in Romania and the Balkans’.\(^\text{157}\) Latin traders from Venice and Genoa had frequently imported vast amounts of grain from the domain of the Tatars, especially Tana and the Crimea, to supply European markets.\(^\text{158}\) Just as the naval league had begun to take shape, in 1343, the Tatar khan had expelled all Latin merchants from Tana and his other territories, prohibiting all grain exports. A shortage in grain and consequently a general rise in prices were the immediate results.\(^\text{159}\) To make matters worse, the activities of the league in the Aegean rendered grain import from Turkey a rarity after 1343. As outlined in previous chapters, reliable grain import from the certain Turkish emirates was a serious concern for the Serenissima. The treaty of 1337 between the Republic and Menteshe, for example, contained a clause which specifically stipulated that the shinik, the measure commonly used for cereals, be

\(^{157}\) Zachariadou, TC, 45-6.

\(^{158}\) Matteo Villani reported that the Florentines imported grain from Turkey: Matteo Villani, Chronica con la continuazione di Filippo Villani, ed. G. Porta, 11 books & continuation in 2 vols (Parma, 1995), i. bk. 3, ch. 76, pp. 415-16; Zachariadou, TC, 48, n. 184.

\(^{159}\) Zachariadou, TC, 46; Balard, Romanie génoise, i. 75-6; S. Karpov, ‘Black Sea and the crisis of the mid XIVth century: an underestimated turning point’, Thesaurismata 27 (1997), 65-78; Epstein, Genoa, 209; Fleet, European and Islamic Trade, 59, 67; Ashtor, Levant Trade, 63; Ashtor, ‘Observations on Venetian trade in the Levant’, 538. The crisis was serious enough for Clement VI and Humbert of Vienne to consider diverting the crusading fleet to Caffa in December 1345: see above, p. 202. In that month Clement also granted the Genoese indulgences for a year spent in the defence of Caffa against Tartar attack: CVI Autres, nr. 847.
restored to its previous status. It was only when trade in the Black Sea remained unhindered, as was the case in 1335, that the Senate was able to decree that all merchants be prohibited from importing grain from Turkey to Crete. In the early 1340s there is evidence of the Venetians importing grain from the area of Phokaia in Turkey, and there is also evidence to suggest that Venetian merchants were allowed to continue some limited grain exchange with the emirate of Menteshe, but these examples seem to be the exception. In October 1344 a group of traders reported to Pignol Zucchello that it was impossible to either ‘come or to go’ in Turkey. By September 1345 the Cretan administration stated that the island was suffering from a scarcity of corn.

Two contemporary Italian sources even go as far as to say that the Crusade of Smyrna was launched because of fears over trade. The anonymous Roman chronicler reported that Umur had begun to raise the taxes on Venetian merchants without just cause prior to the crusade. Moreover, Marco Battagli suggested that the crusade was fought ‘on account of agreements of corn (bladus), which had existed between the Venetians and the Turks, and because of other depredations of the Turks carried out by them tyrannically’. Clement was not ignorant of the economic problems caused by the Crusade of Smyrna and on 27 April 1345 he granted the Venetians permission to send six galleys and four cogs to Mamluk lands over a five-year period. This concession was broadened in 1345, when the Venetians obtained permission to send seven galleys for every four cogs (because of the greater tonnage of the latter).

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160 See above, ch. 5, 176. Zachariadou, TC, 35, text at 198 (doc. 3), clause nr. 23.
161 As in 1335: see above, ch. 5, p. 176. Venice, Archivio di Stato, Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 17, f. 13; summary in ‘Thesismata tês Benetikês gerousias’, ii.i. bk. 17, nr. 6, p. 160; Zachariadou, TC, 34.
162 The Venetians complained to the Byzantine authorities that they were attempting to impose a tax on grain exports in a region where imperial authorities no longer had any jurisdiction: TR, i. nr. 137, 164, 174; DVL, i. nr. 151. Full text of these deliberations in J. Chrysostomides, ‘Venetian commercial privileges under the Palaeologi’, Studi Veneziani 12 (1970), 267-356, at 330-3.
163 Pignol Zucchello, nr. 8, p. 23; Zachariadou, TC, 49, n. 189.
164 Pignol Zucchello, nr. 9, p. 25; Zachariadou, TC, 46, n. 180.
165 Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 67.
166 Anonimo Romano, 103.
167 Marco Battagli of Rimini, 50-1. This argument has been propagated by Zachariadou and Fleet: Zachariadou, TC, 44; Fleet, European and Islamic Trade, 59, 70; cf. Abulafia, ‘Venice and the kingdom of Naples ’, 204, who suggests that security of grain was the primary concern of the Republic at this time.
168 DVL, i. nr. 144, 153-5; and above, pp. 217-19.
169 Although this was not as generous as Venice had hoped for and requested, which was for 8-10 galleys for every four cogs. DVL, i. nr. 162, 172; Ashtor, Levant Trade, 66-7; Housley, Avignon, 204; Ortalli, ‘Venice and papal bans on trade with the Levant’, 256.
According to Jacoby, the relaxing of the trade ban facilitated direct trade between the West and Egypt on a grand scale, the level of which had not been seen since the early fourteenth century. This was the case in 1346, when the Sienese trader Francesco Bartolomei sent 18 barrels and a *balle* of Egyptian alum from Crete to Venice, weighing a total of 17,257 *livres gross* of Candia, or about 9.1 tons.\(^{170}\)

However, despite the papal trade licence, some of the actions of the Venetians in the Crusade do seem to suggest that these commercial privileges were not sufficient for the Republic to commit itself unreservedly to the Crusade. In early 1346 the Cretan government once again permitted its merchants to import grain from the emirate of Menteshe, although this was sold at a high price.\(^{171}\) According to the account of the anonymous Roman chronicler, at sometime before the arrival of Humbert at Smyrna, the Venetians also sent an embassy to Umur at Ephesos to seek a truce and demand the whole city of Smyrna. In this story, the embassy found Umur reclining on the ground, eating abundantly from a golden spoon, his stomach protruding like a barrel. After hearing the proposal from the embassy, Umur explained that he had no fear of the Christians, as long as the Guelph and Ghibelline factions were still thriving.\(^{172}\) The account is obviously fantastical, but after this point it does seem likely that the Venetians had cooled in their dedication to the crusade. For example, after Humbert had reached Negroponte, the Cretan government found various reasons to refuse him vessels to transport his army to Smyrna, before finally agreeing to provide assistance in May 1346.\(^{173}\) Similarly, it is known that in November the Venetian authorities had been ordered by the pope to stop detaining those who wish to go to fight in *Romania*\(^{174}\) if the anonymous Roman chronicler is to be believed, they may have even prevented supplies from reaching the city and fleeced the crusaders of all their money.\(^{175}\) In the

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\(^{171}\) ‘*Thespismata tês Benetikês gerousias*’, ii.i. bk. 23, nr. 13, p. 278; Pignol Zuchello, nr. 24, p. 54; Zachariadou, *TC*, 52, n. 204.

\(^{172}\) Anonimo Romano, 116. More detail of this rather amusing tale is given by Setton, *PL*, i. 207; Faure, ‘*Humbert II*’, 531-2.


\(^{174}\) *CVI France*, ii. nr. 2956; *CVI Autres*, nr. 1273.

\(^{175}\) Anonimo Romano, 115.
winter of 1346-7 commercial relations between Venice and the Hospitallers also declined: after the Order had imposed a new customs duties on Venetian merchants, the Cretan government decreed that all trade with Hospitaller islands be prohibited. This may be what the anonymous Roman chronicler was referring to when he added that rivalries existed between the Venetians and the Hospitallers, who were preventing Venetian ships from coming to Smyrna and providing supplies and weapons to the Turks.

It has been shown that the Republic was eager to participate in the league and had made a substantial commitment to it, at least until Humbert’s mission to Smyrna in 1346. The granting of the licence to trade with Egypt in 1344 undoubtedly eased the restrictions on the Republic’s overseas trade and may have facilitated continued Venetian participation at a time when it might have ended. But even the capture of Smyrna and the granting of the licence to trade with Egypt were not enough to alleviate the dire economic situation. As Zachariadou has stated, the Crusade of Smyrna was destined to fail because it coincided with the closing of the Black Sea markets by the Mongols. To say the crusade was a failure is perhaps too strong a suggestion, but full Venetian commitment was obviously hampered by the restrictions on trade in the Black Sea. Ultimately these were too great and the Republic and was forced to reopen commercial negotiations with the Anatolian emirates when possible, which provides a reason for Venice’s rather half-hearted commitment to the crusade in 1346-7, although even during these years, Venetian participation did not cease altogether.

So should this affect the view of Venetian involvement in the Crusade of Smyrna? Firstly, to say that the Venice had withdrawn from the league altogether at this point would be misleading. It is known that in January 1347 the Senate took the decision to arm five more galleys for the league and in December two more were promised. This was probably because of the renewal of Turkish raids in that year.

176 TD, i. nr. 532, 533, 539; Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 124, 126, 128, 132, 138, 147, 149; Zachariadou, TC, 48-9. Also see Pignol Zucchello (nr. 36, p. 73) who wrote in May 1347 that viaggio di Rodi è serato.
177 Anonimo Romano, 371.
178 Zachariadou, TC, 45-6.
179 TR, i. nr. 194; Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 180. The governors of Negroponte had also sent 100 men for the aid of the league: TR, i. nr. 208 (dated 22 January 1348).
Similarly, to say that the Venetians lacked long-term commitment to the crusade is also probably not true for the Crusade of Smyrna.¹⁸¹ The commitment of the Venetians wavered at the time of the greatest economic hardship in 1346-7, but they were the ones who pushed for a resumption of the league in 1350, after piratical attacks from Aydin had resumed once more. This indicates that at the least, the Venetians must have deemed the league to be effective for them to petition for it to be reformed. Moreover, Atiya’s claim that the Venetians did not fight for the papal cause, but rather for the trade privileges they attained from the Turks after the capture of Smyrna, is both overly-cynical and inaccurate, as the initiative in seeking a truce with Aydin did not come from the Venetians, but rather from Humbert of Vienne and it was then agreed to by Clement VI in November 1346.¹⁸² Furthermore, later negotiations between the crusaders and Hizir of Aydin in 1348-9 were not undertaken by the Venetians, but by the papal representatives Bartolommeo of Tomari and Octavian Zaccaria, the latter being a citizen of Genoa.¹⁸³ At this stage the Venetians were suspicious that Octavian would push for Genoese interests and even wrote letters of protest to the pope over their exclusion from these negotiations.¹⁸⁴ The clauses of the treaties certainly benefitted the maritime states in the Aegean, but not specifically the Venetians. In reality the treaties mirrored the makeup of the crusade and the interests of the participants as they included a mixture of ecclesiastical benefits for the Christians in Smyrna and concessions relating to trade in the Aegean. The only source which may back of Atiya’s claim is the story from the anonymous Roman chronicler of a Venetian embassy sent to Umur in early 1346, but as previously stated, this appears to be a highly fantastical tale told by a source which can be of dubious reliability.¹⁸⁵ Zachariadou has claimed that the situation in 1346 gave the chronicler’s account ‘great credibility’, but this does not explain why the Venetian archives, which provide so much information about Venetian treaties with the Turks, made no mention of what would

¹⁸⁰ Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 145-6, 150-1, 158; TD, i. nr. 538; Zachariadou, TC, 53, n. 212.
¹⁸¹ This point is argued by Housley, Avignon, 213-4; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 541-2.
¹⁸² See Atiya, Crusade, 316.
¹⁸³ See above, pp. 206-7.
¹⁸⁵ See above, p. 223.
have been an important decision by either the Venetian or Cretan governments.\textsuperscript{186} Having considered these factors it seems that none of the trade privileges gained by the crusaders from Aydin were exacted at the behest of the Venetians, and thus, any claim that they fought only for these privileges must be treated with caution.

In the final years of the crusade, from 1348 until the truce of 1351, Venetian participation in the crusade did dwindle and eventually end. But as shall be shown, this was partly due to factors out of the Republic’s control. On 5 July 1348, after the death of Umur, the Senate ordered that the Venetian galleys for the league be recalled because of the heavy expense and a lack of eagerness from other participants to support the common cause.\textsuperscript{187} This must have been a reference to the pope’s comments that a truce with the Turks was needed, because of problems in financing and recruiting caused by the wars in Europe.\textsuperscript{188} Shortly after this a temporary truce was agreed with Hizir until mid 1349.\textsuperscript{189} At this time, the Black Death had also begun to take its toll on Venetian possessions, making any concerted action against the Turks difficult to undertake.\textsuperscript{190} Although raids from Aydin against Venetian territories did resume in 1349-50,\textsuperscript{191} another more serious enemy, the great maritime rival of Genoa had begun to prepare for an attack on Venetian colonies.\textsuperscript{192} This meant that even though the Venetians had managed to force the renewal of the league in response to attacks from Aydin in 1350, war with Genoa broke out before any action could be undertaken.\textsuperscript{193} Consequently, in 1351 the league was officially dissolved.\textsuperscript{194}

\textsuperscript{186} Zachariadou, TC, 52, n. 205; cf. Luttrell, ‘Hospitaliers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 92. It is worth remembering that the chronicler was decidedly anti-Venetian: Setton, PL, i. 207; Lemerle, 197, n. 1; Faure, ‘Humbert II’, 541. The Hospitaliers, on the other hand, may have made a truce with the Turks in that year: Zachariadou, TC, 53.

\textsuperscript{187} TR, i. nr. 212

\textsuperscript{188} The pope stated that church subsidies for the crusade could no longer be collected and would-be crusaders no longer recruited: see above, pp. 204-5; CVI France, ii. nr. 2956-7.

\textsuperscript{189} See above, pp. 206-8.

\textsuperscript{190} Throughout 1348 news of the ravages of the plague in Crete and the other Aegean islands reached Venice. See for example: TD, i. nr. 545-7, 553.

\textsuperscript{191} For example: TD, i. nr. 577-80; Duca di Candia: Quaternus consiliorum, nr. 271-2, pp. 161-2; Zachariadou, TC, 58, n. 233. The Turks of Aydin were now allied with those from Menteshe: Zachariadou, TC, 57, n. 230.

\textsuperscript{192} In October 1350 the Cretan administration reported that the Turks should not be the primary concern, as disturbing movements of Genoese galleys had been noticed off the coast of western Crete: TD, i. nr. 581; Zachariadou, TC, 57-8.

\textsuperscript{193} See above, pp. 208-9; Petro Giustinian, 232-3.

\textsuperscript{194} Zachariadou, TC, 58.
Therefore, it seems that Venetian participation in the Crusade of Smyrna was dictated by the economic situation in the eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. The initial response and involvement of the Republic in the crusade was high up to 1344, despite the economic difficulties experienced by Venice at this time, but the security of the grain trade was always the primary concern of the Republic. Therefore, by the time of Humbert of Vienne’s passage east, during which the economic pressure had become unbearable, the commitment of the Republic declined. Even so, Venice never withdrew itself from the crusade and when Turkish forces resumed their raiding in the later 1340s, it was the one to push for the league to be reformed. But, by this time other factors meant that no other state was able to fully commit to a crusade.

6.2.3. Genoese participation in the Crusade of Smyrna

The position of the Genoese in the Aegean was weakened after the loss of Chios in 1329 and suffered a further blow in 1336, when the Genoese of Phokaia had been forced to surrender to the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III after a failed invasion of Lesbos. Alum was still being mined and exported from Phokaia to Genoa after this point, but Genoese traders had been forced to instead expand their trade in the Black Sea and elsewhere. In these regions, the Genoese had intermittent contact with the Turks, but unlike Venice, their concern did not lie in the protection of overseas colonies from the raids of Umur of Aydin. It is probably for this reason that the Commune of Genoa did not fully participate in the Crusade of Smyrna, as Venice had done, despite

195 In 1334, worried by the aggressive strategy of Andronikos III, Domenico Cattaneo, the lord of Phokaia, with the help of the duke of Naxos and the Hospitallers, attempted to occupy the island of Lesbos. By the summer of 1335 the Latins had managed to seize the port of Mytilene and other regions, leaving a garrison at Phokaia. Andronikos allied himself with the emir of Sarukhan, whose son was being held hostage in Phokaia, and also with the Turks of Aydin (Umur, Hizir and Suleymanshah). The combined forces marched on Phokaia, while the Byzantine fleet besieged the Genoese at Mytilene. By the spring of 1336 New Phokaia and Mytilene had surrendered to the Byzantines. The conditions of their surrender allowed the Genoese to maintain their governance of Phokaia in exchange for the return of Turkish hostages to the emir of Sarukhan and sworn obedience to the emperor. For more on this episode, see Lemerle, Aydin, 108-15; Zachariadou, TC, 38-9; Balard, Romane génoise, i. 72-3.

196 For example, in April 1343, a Genoese notarial record mentions the shipment of 158 cantara of Turkish alum to Europe: Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, ed. L. Liagre-de Sturler, ii. nr. 127, pp. 155-8.

197 For example, in 1340 a fleet of Genoese galleys defeated and captured a fleet of Turkish ships in the Black Sea: Giovanni Villani, iii. bk. 12, ch. 117, p. 230; Giorgio Stella, 134.
papal appeals for it to do so. As a result of this, an assessment of Genoese involvement in the crusade will focus on the role of Martino Zaccaria in the naval league and of the other notable Genoese influence on the expedition – the seizure of Chios by Simone Vignoso.

In 1337 Martino Zaccaria was released from prison in Constantinople after eight years of incarceration in response to the petition of Pope Benedict XII and King Philip VI of France. As a condition of his release he had been forced to swear an oath to the Byzantine Emperor Andronikos III promising never to attack Byzantine lands. In 1343 Clement VI absolved Martino from this oath and made him captain of the papal galleys for the naval league against the Turks. It is likely that Martino saw the crusade as an opportunity to recover Chios and he may well have recommended the island to the pope as a strategic base for an attack on Smyrna. The island was obviously attractive to the crusaders – it commanded the trade routes in and out of the Bay of Smyrna and Martino Zaccaria, as Lord of Chios, had successfully resisted the Turks from Aydin and elsewhere for over thirteen years from the island.

Martino was certainly focussed on the recapture of Chios and once the league reached Negroponte he began planning for an attack on his former domain, against papal wishes. The appointment of Martino as captain of the papal galleys and the absolution granted to him from his vow not to attack the empire was an uncharacteristically naive move by the pope, who seems to have regretted his decision once the fleet reached the Aegean. In a letter of September 1344 Clement ordered Henry of Asti to prevent Martino from attempting to seize the island. According to the letter, Clement had received a ‘displeasing and troubling report’ that Martino Zaccaria had directed the fleet ‘for the taking by force of the island of Chios’ rather than the defence of the faith. Moreover, Martino had asked the archbishop of Thebes, the master of the Hospitallers and the Cypriots ‘to send their own galleys for this purpose’.

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198 Some Genoese sailors took the cross in 1344, but deserted after receiving advances of their wages: CVI France, i. nr. 815-17; Setton, PL, i. 190. Clement VI also asked Genoa to aid Humbert in his enterprise in February 1346: CVI Autres, nr. 911.
199 BXII, France, nr. 283; Argenti, Chios, i. 68-9; Miller, ‘Zaccaria’, 50.
200 Martino was made captain on 24 August: CVI France, i. nr. 368. He was absolved from his vow on 12 October: ‘Acta Clementis VI’, Pontificia Commissio ad Redigendum Codicem Iuris Canonici Orientalis, ed. A.L. Tautu, 14 vols (Rome, 1943-80), nr. 23.
201 As Loenertz has noted, the plans to allocate a Latin bishop to the absent see of Chios in April 1343, reflects the optimism for a crusade that might recover the island: ‘Athènes’, ed. Loenertz, nr. 78.
with the archbishop forcing the Cypriots to this by sentences of excommunication. This had caused anxiety amongst the Greeks, who had previously been willing to contribute to the league and had instead led them to enter into negotiations with the Turks.²⁰² It appears that certain Byzantine agents communicated their anxiety to Venice about the large Latin force which was active in the Aegean. This led the Venetian Senate to declare to the emperor that they had no designs on Chios, but at the same time to warn him to defend it properly so that it could not be taken.²⁰³

Unfortunately, precise details on the actions of Martino Zaccaria are hard to trace because of the vagueness of the sources. The wording of the letter from Clement VI to Henry Asti makes it unclear as to whether Martino had already made a attack on Chios, or was just in the process of organising one. As no other sources mention a definite assault on Chios by Martino, which would have been a major event, it can be assumed that the pope was referring to Martino’s intentions and not his actions. As it is known that the crusade fleet captured Smyrna only weeks after the letter was dispatched to Henry of Asti, and that Chios remained in Greek hands until 1346. Still from Clement VI’s correspondence with Henry of Asti it is plausible that Martino was only serving his own interests in the Aegean, as the pope twice stated to his legate that he had not heard of any notable performance from Martino and asked whether he should be replaced by the end of the year. The second of these enquiries came after the crusaders had captured Smyrna.²⁰⁴ Whether Martino Zaccaria would have been replaced as captain will never be known as on 17 January 1345 he was killed outside Smyrna, along with the other crusade leaders.²⁰⁵ However, the evidence indicates that his actions as captain of the papal galleys were dictated by self-serving interests,

²⁰² CVI France, i. nr. 1113, col. 185.
²⁰³ At this time the Senate also voted against the possibility of purchasing the island from the emperor: TR, i. nr. 171 (dated 31 May 1344); Lemerle, Aydin, 187, n. 3. The Venetians even seem to have considered purchasing New Phokaia as well, as on 24 July 1345, the Senate instructed the new baillie of Constantinople to revisit the question of the purchase of fogium novum, which had been put on hold since the death of the megadux Apokaukos in June: TR, i. nr. 182; Inalcik, ‘Turkish maritime principalities’, 196.
²⁰⁴ CVI France, i. nr. 1114 (18 September 1344), 1464 (1 February 1345). The passage regarding Martino Zaccaria in the second letter is almost an exact repeat of the first. When Martino had been appointed as captain, Clement had also suggested he could be replaced if needed: Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 137, f. 103r, ep. 324; summary in CVI France, i. nr. 405.
²⁰⁵ See above, p. 197.
especially his attempted diversion to Chios, which was considered as being detrimental to the outcome of the crusade.

The other major Genoese impact on the Crusade of Smyrna was Simone Vignoso’s seizure of Chios in 1346. Chios, and the decision whether to use it as a base of operations or not, was prominent in the plans of the crusade leaders ever since Martino Zaccaria had been appointed as a papal captain of the league. Humbert of Vienne also toyed with the idea whether to take the island or not, and wrote to Clement VI about this in 1346. The pope, at Humbert’s request, then wrote to Anna of Savoy, the Dowager Empress and Regent of Emperor John V Palaiologos in Constantinople, to ask if the island could be allocated to the crusaders as a base for three years, which would also enable Humbert to try and pave the way for future Church Union negotiations with the Greeks. Humbert has been accused of procrastinating over the requisitioning of Chios, but considering Clement’s reservations at Martino Zaccaria’s intention to divert the fleet to the island, and the possible harm this would do to relations with the Greeks, his reluctance should be regarded as prudent. Moreover, Humbert was not to know that during the time of his communication with the Curia over Chios, the Genoese commander Simone Vignoso would appear off Negroponte with a fleet of 29 galleys, with the intention of capturing the island.

According to Giorgio Stella, Vignoso found Humbert’s fleet of 26 galleys, mostly belonging to Venice and the Hospitallers, preparing for an attack on Chios. Humbert offered the Genoese money and jewels if they would join him in an attack on the island, but they refused. After a scuffle with Humbert’s force, Vignoso seized Chios before the Dauphin’s fleet could arrive at the island. Within a week, the whole island had apparently been conquered, save the castle of Chios Town, which submitted in

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206 The importance of Chios in Humbert’s crusade has been discussed in detail by Lemerle, Aydin, 196, n. 3, 200, n. 1, 202; Thiriet, La Romanie vénitienne, 167; Housley, Avignon, 255, n. 67.
207 CVI France, ii. nr. 2580-6.
208 Vignoso arrived at Negroponte on 8 June 1346. His fleet had originally been assembled for an attack on rebel ships and men in Monaco, but these were absent from the city when the fleet arrived. Vignoso was unable to achieve much and on 3 May he set sail to the eastern Mediterranean to recoup the expense in arming the fleet, possibly with the intention of going on to Caffa: Giorgio Stella, 145-7; Argenti, Chios, i. 88-9, 103; Epstein, Genoa, 209-10; Lopez, Storia delle colonie Genovesi, 338; W. Miller, ‘The Genoese in Chios, 1346-1566’, EHR 30 (1915), 418-32, at 418-19; T.S. Miller, ‘Chios, Byzantium and the Genoese (1346-1352)’, Byzantine Studies 2.2 (1975), 132-8, at 133.
September. By 17 September the towns of Old and New Phokaia, along with the alum mines had also been taken. The administration set up by Vignoso, which became known as the Mahona of Chios, was to rule the island until 1566. Although the Mahona became a significant force in the Aegean, they do not seem to have played any part in last years of the Crusade of Smyrna.

One explanation for the hostility shown by the Genoese towards Humbert and the Crusade of Smyrna in general can be found in the composition of the crusade fleet, which they may have viewed as being predominantly a Venetian enterprise. This has been argued by Atiya, who claims that Vignoso’s fleet was sent specifically for the purpose of seizing Chios before Humbert did. However, Argenti has argued convincingly that the Genoese could not have known of Humbert’s intentions until they had reached the Aegean, meaning that Vignoso had not specifically planned to disrupt the crusade by capturing Chios. Nevertheless, other evidence of Genoese suspicion over Venetian participation in the crusade does exist: there is a letter purporting to be written by Umur of Aydin and his brothers to Pope Clement VI, which is steeped in anti-Venetian rhetoric and was certainly written by enemies of the Republic, most probably the Genoese. In the letter, the emir explained that the pope should not ‘incite Christians, and especially Italians distinguished by the sign of the cross’ to fight him, as the ‘Turkish people are innocent of the death and injury of your Christ’ and did not occupy ‘the lands and places where there are holy sites’. Instead the Turks were ancestors of the Italians ‘because they and their origins stemmed from the bloodline of the Trojans’ and maintained a hidden affection for them. The only exception to this were the Venetians who ‘by their arrogance and audacity’ had long ago occupied lands which were promised to the Turks. Furthermore, the emir wrote that:

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209 Giorgio Stella, 147; Pignol Zucchello, nr. 34, p. 69; Setton, PL, i. 206-7; T.S. Miller, ‘Chios, Byzantium and the Genoese’, 134; Argenti, Chios, i. 93-5, 100; P.P. Argenti, ‘The Mahona of the Giustiniani: Genoese colonialism and the Genoese relationship with Chios’, BF 6 (1979), 1-35, at 2-3.

210 For more on the establishment of the Mahona, see Argenti, Chios, i. 95-105; Miller, ‘The Genoese in Chios’, 418-32; and the references provided in Setton, PL, i. 207, n. 66. Vignoso was for the most part preoccupied with establishing control of Chios and quelling a rebellion of the Chian noble Tzybos: John Kantakouzenos, iii. 81-5.

211 Atiya, Crusade, 312.

212 Argenti, Chios, i. 103.
Because of these and other factors you will justly be able to cease from your undertakings, and especially since we have heard that the Venetian people themselves are strangers to the way of life and morals of the Romans because among themselves they live with neither law nor morals, but think that they alone are better than all the surrounding peoples, whose frenzy and arrogance [we shall crush] by the aid of our gods and of Jupiter most high.

This letter, even though written by a Genoese, does provide an explanation for their reluctance to contribute to the crusade: they were maritime rivals with Venice and the participation of one city in a crusade meant the alienation of the other. In fact, during these years when the Genoese had not yet firmly re-established themselves in the Aegean, they were more concerned with trade in the Black Sea than resistance against the Turks. After the Venetians began to send ships once again to trade in Tana, which the Genoese believed to be in contravention of a joint Genoese-Venetian embargo of the port, the doge of Genoa ordered that Venetian ships be seized and war followed.

In the following years the Genoese began to directly assault Venetian possessions in the Aegean, and in early 1351 they attacked Naxos, capturing Duke Januli Sanudo. At this time the Genoese also began to form their own treaties with the Turks. In May 1351 they sent an embassy to Hizir at Ephesos, and asked the Genoese consul and merchants at Ephesos to provisions from the city to Chios when required. With the

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213 Here a word is missing. The verb has been deduced from ridurre in the Italian version, which reads: La quale sciocca superbia con l'aiuto de nostri idii e del sommo Giove a fine riduceremo [whose foolishness and pride we shall crush with the help of our gods and the mighty Jove in the end].

214 The text is published in Gay, Clément VI, 172-4. It is discussed by Housley, Avignon, 232; Foss, Ephesus, 152. Copies of this letter, which was originally written in Italian, were circulated in Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. These versions were re-dated and the names of the pope addressed were changed. These inspired many later authors who commented on the Trojan ancestry of the Turks. For more on this, see M. Meserve, Empires of Islam in Renaissance Historical Thought (Cambridge, MA, 2008), 35-7; T. Spencer, ‘Turks and Trojans in the Renaissance’, The Modern Language Review 47 (1952), 330-333.

215 Lane, Venice, 175.

216 TR, i. 242, 250; TD, i. nr. 581.

217 CVI Autres, 2417; Setton, PL, i. 221-2.

218 ‘Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova coll’impero Bizantino’, ed. A. Sanguinetti & G. Bertolotto, Atti della Società Ligure di Storia Patria 28 (1896), 337-573, at 550-9 (doc. 23, 26 May 1351); Setton, PL, i. 222. Also see Zachariadou, TC, 58. A treaty may have also been made between Sarukhan and the Genoese lord of Old Phokaia in the late 1340s: Fleet, European and Islamic Trade, 11; Idem, ‘The
Genoese so willing to undermine the position of the naval league in the Aegean it is easy to see why the crusade ended in that year.

Chapter 6 Overview

The Crusade of Smyrna signifies the climax of crusading against the Turks in this period. Its successful organisation was largely a result of the diplomatic astuteness and tenacity of Clement VI. It is true that at the time of the pope’s coronation the situation in the Aegean was favourable for a crusade against the Turks: raids from Aydin were seriously threatening Latin territories in the Aegean and the Cypriots, Venetians and Hospitallers all favoured military action, but the pope went to greater lengths in organising the crusade than any of his predecessors. This can be judged by the mechanisms introduced for this crusade, many of which had never been used for an expedition against the Turks before. This was the case for finance and recruitment, where Clement was the first pope to decree that preaching be carried out for a crusade against the Turks and that church tithes be used to fund it. Moreover, the indulgences Clement granted for the crusade were the most generous yet granted for action against the Turks. Although the primary purpose of these indulgences was to secure more funding for the crusade, it is also reasonable to suggest that the high level of spiritual rewards reflected the importance of the crusade. The fact that the Crusade of Smyrna attracted such a high level of Church organisation and financial contribution is evidence that the Turks were now considered as the most serious threat the Latins in the East. This view was shared by contemporaries in Europe, who responded enthusiastically to the call for a crusade against the Turks, most notably Humbert of Vienne, a prominent European knight with no vested interests in the Aegean.

The pope was also aware of the concerns and interests of the maritime republics in the crusade: he granted Venice permission to trade with Egypt in order to facilitate her continued participation in the naval league, at a time of economic hardship, and was wary of Martino Zaccaria’s designs on Chios. The Venetians, for their treaty of 1387 between Murad I and the Genoese’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 56 (1993), 13-33, at 21-2.
part, were eager participants in the league up to 1346 when the dire economic situation, due to the closing of the Black Sea markets, made it difficult to maintain a consistent level of participation. Nevertheless, it should be remembered that the Venetians never withdrew from the crusade. Their commitment wavered and they came into conflict with the Hospitallers, but they were the ones who pushed for a resumption of the league in 1350. The Genoese, on the other hand, at times disrupted the crusade. Martino Zaccaria’s motivations were treated with suspicion by the pope who thought that he would divert the crusade to Chios and, although this never happened, his countryman Simone Vignoso was able to capture the island in September 1346; an action which obstructed Humbert of Vienne’s expedition. Moreover, the escalating conflict between the Genoese and the Venetians put an end to the continuation of the naval league in the early 1350s.

However, it should be remembered that by this stage the crusaders at Smyrna had reached a stalemate with the Turks and as early as November 1346 negotiations for a truce with Aydin had been given official papal sanction. From this point it was unlikely that the Latins would be able to build upon their foothold in Smyrna. Nevertheless, the achievements of the crusade, especially the naval victories at Longos and Imbros, and the capture of the harbour of Smyrna in 1345, were all significant feats. The fact that the Latins managed to maintain control of parts of Smyrna after the death of the crusade leaders in 1345 and throughout a period of economic hardship, plague, and wars amongst the Christians in Europe and the East was remarkable.
Conclusion

In the period covered in this study various small scale enterprises and major crusades were launched against the Turkish maritime emirates. It has hopefully been shown that the first half of the fourteenth century was not a period of aborted expeditions and idleness, as some have claimed, but one in which the target of a crusade and the motivations of those who participated in them changed dramatically. In the first half of the fourteenth century the western attitude towards the Anatolian Turkish emirates, as manifested in crusading strategy, changed from one of ambivalence to one of open opposition. In line with this shift in crusade policy, the relationship between the papacy and the Latins in the Aegean changed, as they began to be regarded as forming the bulwark of Christian resistance to the expansion of the maritime emirates. At this final stage it is time to come to some conclusions about the motivations to, and response of, the Latins and the papacy to the Aegean crusades. Firstly an assessment of the change in papal crusade strategy, and what motivated the actions of the different popes will be carried out. After this, the specific role and motivations of the Genoese and Venetians in these expeditions will be undertaken.

As demonstrated in Chapter 1 of this study, the first important point to note is that papal crusade strategy in the Aegean should not be viewed in isolation and was as much dictated by events in Europe as those in the East. This was especially the case in the early years of the century when the Turks were noted as posing a threat to the Byzantine empire, as documented in various papal letters, but were not yet regarded as an adequate justification for a crusade of their own. This is illustrated by the crusade bulls of Benedict XI and Clement V; these mentioned that a crusade to recover Constantinople would help drive the Turks from western Anatolia, but the rhetoric they contained undoubtedly suggested that the primary “target” of the crusade was still the schismatic Greeks. The focus of these crusades was largely a result of the French influence over the papacy, which dictated crusade policy in these years. Hence a crusade to Constantinople and to the Holy Land, spearheaded by Philip IV of France

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1 See, for example, Atiya’s comment in ch. 4, p. 153; and Delaville le Roulx, France en Orient, i. 110.
2 Ch. 1, pp. 30-43, 74-5.
and his brother Charles of Valois, took precedence over any other expedition to the Aegean. Similarly, in the 1320s, at a time when crusade strategy was beginning to shift slowly towards the Aegean, John XXII still harboured hopes of launching a crusade with the kings of France to the Holy Land. However, as negotiations with the French became increasingly hindered by financial constraints and the escalating conflict with England, an Aegean crusade began to be considered as a more likely alternative. Under Benedict XII events in Europe became so critical that an Aegean policy was abandoned altogether. Hereafter, a pope with political shrewdness and exceptional commitment to the Crusade was needed for an expedition to be realised. This was the case during the pontificate of Clement VI, but even during the Crusade of Smyrna, problems of finance and recruitment, as a result of the wars in Europe, prevented the pope from sustaining a consistent level of support.

The gradual abandonment of a Franco-papal crusade during the 1320s coincided with increased reports of Turkish aggression in the Aegean, especially when the Zaccaria of Chios, allied with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, began to oppose raids from the maritime emirates in the eastern Aegean. The Zaccaria and Hospitallers won several naval battles at this time, such as the defeat of a fleet from Aydin in 1319. This triggered a major shift in the Curia’s crusade policy when John XXII granted the Zaccaria and other Latins in the East trade licences (1320 and 1325) and indulgences *in articulo mortis* (1322, 1323 and 1325) for fighting against the Turks in Achaia and on Chios. This signified an important development in crusade thinking as the papacy began to recognise that the Latins in the Aegean, who also had mercantile interests, needed support in a “temporal” as well as spiritual manner in order to continue to defend Latin lands – and trade routes – from Muslim attack. Henceforth, the popes showed greater economic awareness towards their strategy in the East. However, at this time the papacy was still acting one step behind the Latins in the Aegean as these papal privileges were granted on petition and not the at the behest of the Curia. Moreover, these privileges were still relatively minor when compared to those granted for planned crusades to the Holy Land and elsewhere by John XXII and his predecessors. The papacy and the French Crown still harboured hopes of launching a

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3 Ch. 1, pp. 65-74; ch. 2, pp. 94-7.
 crusade to the Holy Land and this was the priority, but by the 1320s the Turks in the Aegean had appeared on the Curia’s “crusade radar” so to speak.

Interestingly the next instance of papal support against the Turks was not to come until 1333, when John XXII agreed to contribute galleys to the Venetian-organised naval league. There are two clear reasons for this delay: firstly, the Zaccaria, whom the papacy had formed close ties with during the early 1320s, had lost Chios to the Byzantines in 1329 and were no longer a force in the Aegean; secondly, the Venetians, the other major Latin power in the Aegean, were less willing to uphold papal policy in the Aegean as the Zaccaria had done. Venice had suffered from raids of the allied Turks and Catalans since the summer of 1318, but had repeatedly refused offers to join a papal-Angevin expedition to the Morea against the Catalans, made in 1318, 1322, 1324, 1328 and 1331.\(^4\) Instead the Republic had formed a series of truces with the Catalans and occasional peace agreements with the Turks. In addition to this, they had embarked upon a policy of reconciliation with Byzantium and regarded them as a potential ally in the Aegean. John XXII had criticised the Venetians for their soft policy towards the ‘schismatics and enemies of God’ in 1332 and it seems likely that this factious relationship with the Venetians prevented the pope from committing to a naval league against the Turks until 1333.\(^5\) The contribution of the papacy towards the naval league was an important development in crusade strategy: it now recognised that a primarily maritime expedition, organised by the Latins in the East, was the most effective form of defence of the region. Nevertheless, the \textit{in articulo mortis} indulgences granted to John of Cepoy and his contingent for the league were still less generous than those granted for a Holy Land crusade. Moreover, preaching was not ordered and church tithes were not levied for the league.

The 1334 naval league did not, however, usher in a period of cooperation between the Latins in the East and the papacy in regard to the Turkish threat. As was seen in Chapter 5, the escalation of the conflict between France and England and the financial difficulties experienced by the Florentine banking houses undoubtedly distracted papal attention from the East. That the Turks were posing a threat to the Latins is undoubted – the Hospitallers, Venetians, Cypriots and Armenians all

\(^4\) Ch. 1, pp. 65-70; ch. 3, pp. 121-5; ch. 4, pp. 133-9.
\(^5\) Ch. 4, p. 137.
petitioned the pope for aid, but this was rarely forthcoming. In particular, Benedict made no effort to support the anti-Turkish cause in the Aegean and he potentially weakened it by granting indulgences to those fighting the Mamluks in Anatolia, but not against the Turks elsewhere. The lack of papal involvement in Aegean affairs was further demonstrated by the refusal of Benedict XII to assist the Venetians and the Hospitallers in the formation of another league against the Turks in 1336. The pontificate of Benedict XII thus signified the reversal of the strategy of increased involvement in the Aegean, witnessed during the pontificate of John XXII.

Benedict XII died before any response could be made to the appeals from the Cypriots and the Hospitallers, but his successor Clement VI was quick to take action. The Crusade of Smyrna can be seen as the high point of crusading against the Turks in this period – both in terms of papal support and the achievement of the crusade, as seen in the final chapter of this thesis. Like the Latins in the East, Clement considered a naval league as the most effective way of stemming the Turkish advance. Housley is right to suggest that the pope’s role in the Crusade of Smyrna was decisive: he secured Venetian participation in the league in early 1343 and published crusade bulls for the expedition in that summer. These bulls announced a level of papal support greater than any previously received for a crusade solely aimed at the Turks: preaching of the crusade was ordered, church tithes were used to fund it and the full crusade indulgence was issued for participation on the campaign alone, or to those who could make financial contributions. That the Crusade of Smyrna was allocated such a high level of Church involvement was both a reflection on Clement’s commitment to the Crusade and of the change of perception of the Turks, who were now regarded as representing the most serious threat to Christendom. This was mirrored in the enthusiastic response to the crusade which came from those, such as in northern Italy and Vienne, who had no commercial interests in the Aegean. Like John XXII, Clement VI also recognised the concerns and interests of the maritime republics in the crusade: he was aware of the difficult economic situation in the Aegean after the closing of the Black Sea markets and granted the Venetians permission to trade with Egypt in order to facilitate continued participation in the naval league.

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6 Ch. 6, pp. 187-91.
The league, like that of 1334, inflicted a number of significant naval victories over the Turks and managed unexpectedly to capture the harbour and harbour fortress of Smyrna from Umur of Aydin, the main culprit of Turkish maritime aggression. Umur’s ability to threaten the Latin presence in the Aegean was greatly reduced by the capture of the harbour at Smyrna, but the crusaders were unable to build on their initial success. The crusade suffered a massive setback when the leaders died outside the city walls in 1345, and although a second wave of the crusade led by Humbert of Vienne reached Smyrna in 1346, and Umur was himself killed in 1348, the crusade had reached a stalemate. Negotiations for a truce were expedited in the later 1340s, when the Black Death and the dire economic situation in the Aegean began to take its toll on both Turks and crusaders. As the crusade began to peter out, the emerging conflict between Venice and Genoa put an end to the revival of the league. The death of Clement VI in December 1352 was the final nail in the coffin for the crusade.

In terms of the role of the Genoese in an Aegean crusade, it is first necessary to state that the Genoese government never committed to an Aegean crusade. Nevertheless, certain Genoese citizens, such as the Zaccaria family, played a significant role in helping to steer papal crusading focus towards the Turks. As was seen in Chapter 2, the Zaccaria, often in alliance with the Hospitallers of Rhodes, formed the mainstay of Christian resistance to the Turks in the 1320s. Their control of the rich island of Chios and the participation of the family in the alum trade bought them much wealth, but without the resources of a maritime empire as the Venetians enjoyed, the Zaccaria needed papal support in order to maintain a hostile policy against the Turks. As a result of this, the Zaccaria petitioned the Curia for a licence to trade with the Mamluk sultanate and Martino Zaccaria requested indulgences for himself and those who would fight for him. For these petitions, the Zaccaria specifically linked the maintenance of secure trade with protection of the Christians in the Aegean. Thus for both the Zaccaria and the papacy, trade and crusade had begun to be perceived and

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7 Ch. 2, pp. 94-7.
projected as two complimentary facets in the defence of the faith. They were clearly not mutually exclusive as some scholars have maintained.\(^8\)

In the following years Martino Zaccaria, probably aided by the close support of the papacy, managed to form a small empire in *Romania*. He enjoyed the acclaim of the crusade theorists and made close links with the nobility of Frankish Greece. However, by furthering his own personal interests, Martino antagonised his overlord Emperor Andronikos III and his own brother Benedetto II, eventually losing Chios to the Byzantines in 1329. Martino did reappear during the Crusade of Smyrna as the captain of the papal galleys, but his participation was viewed with suspicion by the pope, he died outside the city walls in 1345. The involvement of other Genoese in the Crusade of Smyrna was similarly undistinguished: Simone Vignoso’s capture of Chios caused problems from Humbert of Vienne and Genoese conflicts with Venice in the early 1350s eventually ended any hope of re-forming the naval league. Although the crusade had reached a stalemate by this point, it is clear that the rivalries between the two great maritime republics still remained a potentially devastating obstacle to any crusade.

A consistent Venetian policy towards the crusades in the Aegean, and especially towards the Turks, is hard to identify. As outlined in Chapter 3, the Republic enjoyed peaceful relations with the Turks, especially from Menteshe, for the early years of the fourteenth century. However, after the joint attacks of the Catalans and Aydin Turks in 1318 this changed and the *Serenissima* began to take measures to defend its colonies from future depredations. Unlike the Zaccaria of Chios, the Venetians were the dominant power in the Aegean – they had significant territories in the region, a highly organised administration at the mother city and the power of a maritime empire behind them. Thus, unlike the Zaccaria, the Venetians in the Aegean did not rely on papal support for the security of their trade in the region. The unwillingness of the Republic to participate in papal-Angevin attempts to recover parts of the Morea and its willingness to form peace treaties with the Catalans, who were the prime focus of papal-Angevin aggression, led to the Venetians forming their own policy of resistance to the Turks, independent of papal control. In Chapters 3 and 4 the

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\(^8\) See Runciman and Atiya’s statements in Introduction, p. 11.
formation of a naval league against the Turks was discussed. It was shown that the Venetians, acting initially on the advice of Marino Sanudo, were the primary organisers of a naval league and, in this sense, they led the way in formulating a new crusade strategy. A provisional league was formed with the Byzantines and Hospitallers in 1332 and the papacy, France and Cyprus joined the league in 1333. The successful formation of the league demonstrated that after the Genoese loss of Chios in 1329, a crusade in the Aegean depended on Venetian participation.

However, it is clear that the Venetians did not always oppose the Turks: they formed agreements with Menteshe (1318, 1331 and 1337) and Aydin (1337), and during the Crusade of Smyrna, their commitment also lessened. So what effect does this inconsistent policy have on an assessment of Venetian crusade enthusiasm and does it justify arguments, held by some, that the Venetians opposed the Crusade, or only fought for trade privileges and personal gain? Firstly, the Venetians recognised that to confront numerous Turkish emirates simultaneously would be militarily unsustainable, thus treaties were formed with Menteshe, which was not usually the perpetrator of raids against Venetian colonies; secondly, Venice usually supported action against the Turks when other allies could participate, such as in the naval league of 1334. The continued resistance of Venice alone was often considered too costly and counter-productive for maintaining secure trade in the Aegean. Thus the Venetians made peace with the Turks in 1337 primarily because papal support for a naval league was not forthcoming; thirdly, it has been shown that during the Crusade of Smyrna the negotiations for a truce, including trade privileges, undertaken by the crusaders were not initiated at the behest of the Venetians, but rather papal representatives. In contrast, the Venetians were the ones who pushed for a resumption of the naval league in 1350.

It even seems the case that the Venetians, like the Zaccaria, realised the importance of terming their military actions in the Aegean as being motivated by defence of the faith. This appears to have been the case when they gained papal permission to trade with the Mamluk sultanate in 1344, at a time of Venetian participation in the naval league. In this instance, the Venetian petitioners at the Curia

9 Ch. 3, pp. 106-7; ch. 5, pp. 175-9.
10 Ch. 6, pp. 225-6.
had lauded the actions of their countrymen in fighting the Turks for the defence of the faith, a point not made in previously unsuccessful requests for licences.\textsuperscript{11}

Bearing these things in mind, it may be necessary for a reappraisal of the role of the maritime republics in the crusades. This study has hopefully shown that motivations of the papacy, the Genoese and the Venetians towards the Crusade were multi-faceted and inseparable. Unlike the seemingly Namierite assertions of Runciman and Atiya, it appears that in the fourteenth-century Aegean, as the maritime states became the primary participants in a crusade against the Turks, motivating factors of religion and commerce became blended together. The Zaccaria and the Venetians were no doubt fighting for the preservation of their trade routes, but they were also fighting for the defence of the faith. This was understood by the papacy and the merchants alike. As Benjamin Braude has explained, the idea of “religious ideology” positing consistent fanaticism and zealotry, such as Gibbon’s myth of the possessed Muslim riding out of the desert offering the cowering infidel the Quran or the sword, seldom reflects the complexity of human religious and material motivations.\textsuperscript{12} It must be remembered that religion can play a variety of roles for confrontation, as can commerce, and that motives can rarely be separated.\textsuperscript{13} In the second half of the century, as the Turks increased their expansion into the Aegean and the Ottomans emerged as the dominant power in the eastern Mediterranean, the maritime republics would begin to play an even greater role in the defence of the faith. The strategies and motivations developed in the first half of the fourteenth century would henceforth come to dominate western thinking in resistance to this new Muslim threat.

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\textsuperscript{11} Ch. 6, pp. 217-20, 222-3.
\textsuperscript{13} Luttrell, ‘Hospitallers of Rhodes confront the Turks’, 80.
Abbreviations


BEC  Bibliothèque de l’École des chartes

BEFAR  Bibliothèque des Écoles françaises d’Athènes et de Rome

BF  Byzantinische Forschungen

BMGS  Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies

BVIII  Boniface VIII, Registres de Boniface VIII, ed. G. Digard et al., BEFAR, 4 vols (Paris, 1907).


BZ  Byzantinische Zeitschrift


CSP  Calendar of State Papers and Manuscripts, Relating to English Affairs,

CV

CVI France
Clement VI, Lettres closes, patentes et curiales du pape Clément VI se rapportant à la France, ed. E. Depréz et al., BEFAR, 3 vols (Paris, 1901-61).

CVI Autres

DLC

DOC
Diplomatari de l’Orient català, 1301-1409: colleció de documents per a la història de l’expedició catalana a Orient i dels ducats d’Atenes i Neopàtria, ed. A. Rubio y Lluch (Barcelona, 1947).

Doehaerd
Les relations commerciales entre Gênes, la Belgique et l’Outremont d’après les archives notariales génoises aux XIII et XIV siècles, ed. R. Doehaerd, 3 vols (Brussels, 1941).

DVL

EHR
English Historical Review

HC

HVR

JEH
Journal of Ecclesiastical History

JMH
Journal of Medieval History

JXXII Secrètes
JXXII Communes


MGHSS Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, 38 vols (Hannover, etc., 1826-1934).

MGHSSNS Monumenta Germaniae Historica: Scriptores, Nova Series, 23 vols (Berlin, etc., 1922-2008).


PBSR Papers of the British School at Rome


RS  *The Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland During the Middle Ages: Published by the authority of her Majesty’s treasury, under the direction of the Master of the Rolls*, 97 vols (London, 1858-91).


RISNS  *Rerum Italicarum Scriptores*, new series, ed. G. Carducci *et al.*, 34 vols (Bologna, etc., 1904-75).


SM  Studi Medievali


TRHS  *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*

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**Book Reviews**


Appendix I: Map
Appendix II: Manuscripts

Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Avenionensia, reg. 18, f. 152v, ep. 209

Vatican, Archivio segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 74, f. 93v, ep. 209
Appendix III: Texts

1.

Indulgences for three years are granted to those fighting against the schismatic Greeks and all infidels in the principality of Achaia

29 November, 1322

Vatican, Archivio Segreto, Registra Avenionensia, reg. 18, f. 152v; Registra Vaticana, reg. 74, f. 93v, ep. 209

Universalis Christiani fidelibus per principatu Achaye constitutis.

Inter alia que salutem fidelium operant ad illa libenter dirigimus mentem nostram per que fides catholica roboretur et gentes que Deum ignorant et in sua confidunt potencia consternantur. Cum itaque sicut ex parte vestra fuit nobis expositum vos et Ecclesiae Romaniem fideles [et] aliarum partium adjacenunci Romania a scismaticis Grecis, Bulgaris, Alanis et Turchis aliisque permixtis infidelium nationibus, impugnatores, depopulatores, captivitatores, servitores, et carceratores et alias diversorum generum penas et cruciatus multiplices patiamini, quibus nec obviare potestis nec resistere per vos ipsos. Nos huiusmodi vestris tantis calamitatibus, miseriis et pressuris, affectu paterno compatientes ab intimis, libenter vobis illo quo possimus spirituali subsidio quod cuilibet temporali prevaleat misericorditer subvenimus. Ut igitur vos alique Christi fideles ad defensionem catholice fidei contra scismaticos, et infideles eosdem, eo amplius animemini, quo temporale in hoc vitam sperabitis in perpetuam commutare, nos de omnipotentis Dei misericordia et beatorum Petri et Pauli apostolorum eius auctoritate confisi, vobis omnibus, ceterisque Chrisiti fidelibus, quos pro defensione catholice fidei in bello, seu pugna in principatu Achaye, aliisque fidelium terris et partibus eidem principatu adjacentibus supractictis, aut vicinis eisdem habitis, contra scismaticos Grecos, Bulgaros, Alanos et Turchos aliasque permixtas nationes infidelium supracticis, aut ex vulneribus in eisdem bello, vel pugna receptis postmodum mori contigerit vestrorum omnium de quibus vere contriti fuistis et confessi, plenam concedimus veniam peccatorum. Presentibus post triennium minime valituris. Datum Avinione, iii kalendas Decembris, anno septio.
2.

*John of Cepoy receives plenary indulgences in articulo mortis*¹

19 May, 1334


*Dilecto filio nobili viro Johanni domino de Cepeyo militi Belvacensem diocesis salutem, etc.*

Provenit ex tue devotionis affectu quo nos et Romanam Ecclesiam revereris, ut petitiones tuas illas presertim que anime tue salutem respiciunt, ad exauditionis gratiam admittamus. Nos itaque tuis supplicationibus inclinati, ut confessor tuus quem duxeris eligendum, omnium peccatorum tuorum de quibus corde contritus, et ore confessus fueris, semel tantum in mortis articulo, eam plenam remissionem quam Romani pontifices consueverunt interdum per speciale privilegeum personis aliquibus imperti, tibi in sinceritate fidei, et devotione sancte matris ecclesie persistenti, quatinus claves ecclesie se extendunt, et gratum in occulis divine majestatis extiterit, auctoritate apostolica concedere valeat, devotioni tue tenore presentium indulgemus, sic tamen quod idem confessor de hiis de quibus fuerit alteri satisfactio impendenda, eam tibi per te si supervixeris, vel per heredes tuos si tunc forte transieris faciendi iniungat, quam tu vel illi facere teneamini ut prefertur. Et ne quod absit propter huiusmodi gratiam reddaris proclivior ad illicita imposterum commitenda, volumus quod si ex confidentia remissionis huiusmodi aliqua forte committeres, quo ad illa predicta remissio tibi nullatenus suffragentur. Nulli ergo etc. Nostre concessionis et voluntatis infringere etc.

Datum Avinione, xiii kalendas Junii, anno decimo octavo.

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¹ This is the standard grant of *in articulo mortis* indulgences. It was repeated to Hugh of Quiéret in 1335.
Martino Zaccaria is made captain of the papal galleys to fight the Turks

16 Sept, 1343

Vatican, Archivio Segreto, Registra Vaticana, reg. 137, ff. 102v-103r, ep. 323

Dilecto filio nobili viro Martino Zacharie civitati Januensi.

Commotis paterno pietatis visceribus erga fideles in Romanie et aliis partibus et insulis adjacentibus commorantibus quos diris afflictionibus et persecutionibus Turchorum infidelium molestari et lacerari nos sine mentis amaritudine audivimus et audimus pro ipsorum defensione ac tuitione fidelium et repressione infidelium eorumdem, certum galeras armatarum et munitiarum subsidium ordinavimus in eisdem partibus, per nos, et quosdam fideles alios usque ad certi temporis spaciae exhibendum. Cum autem pro eodem subsidio quatuor galeas armatas et munitas decenter, viris et ecclesie Romane sumptibus et expensis tenendas illuc per unum annum continuum, faciamus transmitti. Nos cupientes galeas ipsas una cum aliis que per fideles alios ut premissitutur destinantur sic prudenter et utili gubernari, quod ad dei laudem et gloriæ fidei exaltationem catholice ac predictorum consolationem fidelium, fructus exinde proveniant uberes et votum, ac de tue fidelitatis et pervie probate in talibus industria pleni in domino confidentes, te predictarum quatuor galearum generalem capitaneum usuque ad nostrum beneplacitum consistuimus tenore presentium ac etiam deputamus faciendi gerendi et exercendi omnia et singula que spectant ad officium capitaneatus huiusmodi potestatem tibi plenariam concedentes. Volumus cum quod venerabili fratri nostro Henrico Patriarche Constantinopolitano Apostolice Sedis Legato cuisque mandatis et beneplacitis, super hiis pareas et intendas. Quocirca nobilitati tue per apostolica scripta mandamus quatenus super predictis sic te gerere studens fideliter et prudenter, quod exinde preter mercedes perennius premium nostrorum et apostolice sedis gratiam uberioris merearis.

Datum apud Villamnovam Avenionensis dioecesis, xvi kalendas Octobris, anno secundo.
Decision of the Venetian Senate concerning a Venetian-Hospitaller fleet in the Aegean.

6 June, 1336.

Venice, Archivio di Stato, Deliberazioni Misti del Senato, reg. 17, f. 60v.

Capta.

Item quod scribatur cum plorabilibus (?) verbis magistro Hospitale de ambaxatoris nostris qui redidit de curia ut non potuit obtinere aliquod subsidium contra Turchos cum domino papa, de quo valde dolumus pro reverencia fidei et Christianorum ipsarum partium Romanie, sed nos soli non possimus sustinere tot omnibus (?) expensis. Verum tamen pro bono fidei prelibate, sumus contenti, quod quantumcumque videretur ipsi magistro et duche nostro Cretensis de armando contra Turchos, quod id fiat et procedat (?) sicut alium extitit ordinatum. Et sic iterum damus in mandatis duche nostro Cretensis et baiullo Nigropontis ut pro continue stent ita parati de generalis, ut aliiis opportunis (?), quod ad laudem Dei id qualis fuerit ordinatum valeat et . a conpleri.
5.

*Decision of the Venetian Senate concerning a request for a union with the Genoese.*

18 August, 1338.

Venice, Archivio di Stato, *Deliberazioni Misti del Senato*, reg. 17, f. 82v.

Capta. Quod respondeatur nuncio Communis Ianue excusando nos propter conditiones et occupationes nostras cum illis convenientibus verbis que videbuntur, qui petebat quod ambaxatores sui et nostri conversarent loco communi pro unione tractanda.

6.

*Decision of the Venetian Senate concerning a request for a union with the Genoese.*

17 December, 1338.

Venice, Archivio di Stato, *Deliberazioni Misti del Senato*, reg. 17, f. 115r.

Capta. Quod respondeatur ambaxator Communis Ianue cum pulcris verbis excusando nos a facto unionis sicut alias responsum fuit. Nota quod illud quod fuit alias responsum est supra in cartis LXXXIII.
Appendix IV: Indulgences Table

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1 This is not intended as a complete record of crusading indulgences issued during this period, only those of specific relevance to this study.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Recipient</th>
<th>Location / Against</th>
<th>Type of indulgence</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1304</td>
<td>Universi Christi fidelibus</td>
<td>In Romania against the schismatic Greeks</td>
<td>veniam peccatorum [...] quam haberant si in eiusdem Terre subsidium transfretarent</td>
<td>BXI, nr. 1007. CV, i. nr. 247.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(reissued 1306)</td>
<td>(ad recuperandum [Romanie] imperium)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1308</td>
<td>Clergy of Europe and the Levant</td>
<td>In the Holy Land against the Saracens</td>
<td>plenam veniam peccatorum - for one year’s service</td>
<td>CV, ii. nr. 2988-90.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(pro liberatione Terre [Sancte] de manibus impiorum)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1312</td>
<td>Philip of Taranto and his followers</td>
<td>In Romania against the schismatic Greeks</td>
<td>illam indulgentiam que transfretantibus in dicte Terre Sancte subsidium</td>
<td>CV, vii. nr. 7893.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(ad partes Romanie [...] contra scismaticos illarum partium)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1322</td>
<td>Universalis Christi fidelibus per principatu Achaye constitutis</td>
<td>In the principality of Achaia and the surrounding lands contra scismaticos Grecos, Bulgaros, Alanos et Turchos aliasque permixtas nationes infidelium</td>
<td>plenam veniam peccatorum - for death on campaign or wounds received thereafter (postmodum mori contigerit), valid for three years</td>
<td>Vatican, Archivio segreto, Reg. Aven. 18, f. 152v; Reg. Vat. 74, f. 93v, ep. 209.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1322</td>
<td>The faithful in the dioceses of Reims, Toulouse and Paris</td>
<td>In Armenia and Cyprus against the Mongols, Mamluks and Karaman Turks (Haramanus Turcomanorum) (in succursum et auxilium regnorum Armenie et Cipri)</td>
<td>veniam peccatorum [...] que proficiscentibus in Terre Sancte concedi per sedem apostolicam consuevit - for one year’s service</td>
<td>John XXII Secrètes, ii. nr. 1571-3.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Leader and Followers</td>
<td>Location and Mission</td>
<td>Promised Remission</td>
<td>Source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1323</td>
<td>Martino Zaccaria and his followers</td>
<td>In Chios and the surrounding area against the Turks and other infidels (in Chio vel aliis insulis seu terris eodem insule Chio adiacentibus) contra Turchos et infideles eosdem</td>
<td>omnium veniam peccatorum - for death on campaign or wounds received thereafter (postmodum mori contigerit), valid for three years</td>
<td>Gatto, ‘Martino Zaccaria’, 344-5.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(renewed 1325)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1330</td>
<td>Walter of Brienne and his followers</td>
<td>In Romania against the schismatic Catalans (ad partes Romanie cum dicto Duce contra scismaticos invasores et detentores eiusdem ducatus)</td>
<td>plenam veniam omnium peccatorum [...] que per sedem eandem concessi consuevit transfretantibus in subsidium Terre Sancte - for one year’s service</td>
<td>DOC, nr. 150.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1334</td>
<td>John of Cepoy and his followers</td>
<td>In the Aegean against the Turks (pro defensione et tuitione christicolarum dictarum partium)</td>
<td>omnium peccatorum [...] plenam remissionem [...] in mortis articulo - for death on campaign or wounds received thereafter (mori contingit)</td>
<td>Vatican, Archivio segreto, Reg. Aven. 46, f. 560v; Reg. Vat. 107, f. 243r, ep. 729-30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1335</td>
<td>Hugh Quiéret and his followers</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>As above</td>
<td>Vatican, Archivio segreto, Reg. Aven. 48, f. 194r-v; Reg. Vat. 119, f. 132v-3r, ep. 343-7.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1336</td>
<td>All the faithful on the islands of Sicily and further east</td>
<td>In Armenia against the Mamluks (in Armeniorum succursum contra [Saracenos])</td>
<td>plenam veniam peccatorum - for one year’s service</td>
<td>BXII France, nr. 175.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Action</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------</td>
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<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1343</td>
<td>The kingdoms of Italy, Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and Romania</td>
<td>In Romania against the Turks</td>
<td><em>veniam peccaminum [...] que coceditur transfretantibus in subsidium Terre Sancte</em> - for one year’s service</td>
<td>DLC, nr. 22, pp. 78-80.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1345</td>
<td>Citizens and people of Genoa</td>
<td>In the city of Caffa against the Tartars and Saracens</td>
<td><em>veniam peccaminum [...] que concedi consuevit transfretantibus in subsidium Terre Sancte</em> - for one year’s service</td>
<td>CVI Autres, nr. 847.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix V: Photos

New Phokaia (Yeni Foça) from the Şaphanedağ alum mine, with the island of Lesbos just visible in the background.
The Turkish coast from Chios Town with remnants of the fifteenth-century Genoese fortress in the foreground.

The Turkish coast from Rhodes Town, with the Palace of the Grand Master in the foreground.
The Great Mosque at Birgi, constructed by Mehmed Aydin-oglu in 1312.

The reconstructed Aydin family türbe, with the headstones of Umur, Mehmed, Bahadur and Isa (left-right).