XI.—THE ORIGIN AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS.

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The object of this paper is to consider very briefly whether, if the Theory of Descriptions be accepted, and with it the Principle of Acquaintance, it must also be held that any proposition I understand (independently of its being considered as certainly true) is not only verifiable by reference to facts about my sense-contents,* but, if true, would be verified by such facts, in the sense of being made true by them. I think that Bertrand Russell, particularly in The Problems of Philosophy, maintained two distinct positions both of which can easily be read into the Principle of Acquaintance. Neither of these alone entails the conclusion suggested above. It would, however, be implied by a confusion of the two positions, provided that such a confusion were coupled with the restriction of the objects of acquaintance to sense-contents, and that this restriction implied that there are no 'universals' in the sense in which Russell understood the term. It is difficult to show clearly that Russell did maintain two positions unless we refer to the questions which the Theory of Descriptions was originally concerned to answer. Partly because of this, and also in order to emphasize that any form of methodological solipsism would be a very odd conclusion to follow from the premisses with which Russell started, I have outlined the original problems and the solution that the Theory of Descriptions provides. In the second

* This question was suggested by the President's article Constructions.
part of this paper I have tried to make clear the distinction between the two views and to show that though individually they do not entail methodological solipsism, yet if they were confused, and a certain theory of universals rejected, this conclusion would follow.

I.

There are at least six distinct propositions which seem to have been held at the outset, either explicitly or implicitly, by Russell and Professor G. E. Moore. They are all, to my mind, propositions which either we should naturally hold in unphilosophic moments, or such as would be supported, if reflected upon, by our everyday habits of thinking. I would state this simply as a fact, not specially by way of recommendation. They are:

(1) There are no such things as chimeras or kings of Utopia.

(2) There could not be round squares nor flaming snow. More generally, it is a fact that there are not certain objects and a fact that there could not be others.*

(3) Such propositions as "man is mortal" or "cat loves fish" are about neither man nor cat; but are made true, if they are true, by the dying of particular humans and the affections of particular cats. Cat loves not fish any more than man died at Tooting in 1903.

* Cf. Findlay, Meinong's Theory of Objects, p. 44. I think it is impossible, and it is certainly difficult, to formulate this point without apparent contradiction. Findlay quotes Meinong's 'es gibt Gegenstände, von denen gilt, dass es dergleichen Gegenstände nicht gibt.' My statement does not improve matters; but in this context I do not think this constitutes an objection, since it is the apparent contradiction of the commonsense view that suggests there is a problem.
(4) There are significant false propositions.

(5) The objects of perception are. It would be a mistake to ask whether I mean by these, sense-data or common sense things, because I think the distinction only became prominent in this connexion owing to difficulties involved in the first somewhat vague position.

(6) The possibility of any common world*—and there is one—presupposes that different people can perceive and, by implication, make judgments about the same object. Hence if propositions and the constituents of propositions are the accusatives of such judgments, they must be public and neutral entities, in no sense part of the mind that perceives or judges.

The view of the nature of propositions, or the accusatives of judgment, derived by Russell, largely from Professor Moore, seems to have been consistent with (5) and (6). One is tempted to say it was based upon them, but this might imply that they were made more explicit than there is evidence to suggest. It was inconsistent with (1), (2), (3) and (4). This is not difficult to see. Professor Moore, in The Nature of Judgment, had held that there was a plurality of simple immutable concepts, and that propositions and these concepts of which they were composed were alike in being independently of being objects of thought. Russell adopted a position in all relevant respects the same. He used terms† as the constituents of propositions and described them as simple and immutable and as having being as a pre-condition not a result of being objects of thought. Propositions both for Russell and for Moore played the part of the accusatives of judgment. There are two possible sources of confusion which


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it is important to avoid. In the first place, Russell used "term" where Moore had used "concept": the latter, as used by Russell, stood for a special kind of term, the most interesting property of which was a connexion with denoting. Secondly, Russell used "term" in two different senses: namely, in a wide sense where it stood for anything that had being and in which it seems to have meant something in all relevant respects the same as Moore's concept; the second usage was a narrower one, in which "term" stood for those terms (in the wide sense) which could only occur as logical subjects. It is this wide usage that is important for us.

The inconsistency of such a view of propositions and their constituents with (1), (2), (3) and (4) I suggest is fairly obvious. (i) It is contradictory to suppose a proposition is 'about' a chimera when there are no such entities, if the proposition is, in the same sense, 'about' its constituents and those constituents have being. (ii) If we say a proposition is about a round square, we are either involved in the same kind of contradiction as in (i) or, on the supposition that the round square is a constituent of a given proposition, we must admit there are self-contradictory entities. (iii) If "man is mortal" were about a concept man it would be simply false. (iv) If in the face of the difficulties on (i) and (ii) we say propositions cannot be about non-entities or about self-contradictory ones, then we are involved in a problem similar to the more general problem how any proposition can be significant when its falsity lies in the fact that the entities which it is apparently 'about' have not being.

The difficulties under all four headings are obvious or familiar and probably both; at any rate, they do not require much elaboration. There are, however, three points worth noting before we turn to Russell's attempt to avoid these difficulties. The first concerns Russell's use of "proposition." As far as I
know, Mr. Findlay is right in suggesting that 'philosophers who have discussed a theory of propositions have regarded them as entities which might correspond to or accord with facts, but never as entities which could be identical with facts.'* At the same time, as Mr. Findlay admits, Russell at one time explicitly identified true propositions with facts. In my opinion (and here, though very tentatively, I would disagree with Mr. Findlay) such an identification was a fair indication of the kind of view Russell was holding prior to 1905. I think that the acceptance of the Theory of Descriptions entailed a change in the relatively simple view of propositions with which Russell started, and that it was probably due to this theory that propositions came to be regarded as Zwischendinge, at any rate by Russell and those following him. The question of what precise conception of propositions (if any) should replace Russell's early one, is difficult, and beyond my ability to discuss.

The second point is that though Russell may not be open to the accusation of regarding elements as making up facts, or constituents as making up propositions, in the same sense as bricks make up a house, yet I think that there is no doubt he regarded propositions and their constituents as both having being.†

The third point is raised by the use of the word "subsistence." According to Mr. Findlay, Russell and Meinong do not mean the same by their use of this word.‡ If this is correct, probably Russell's denial that there are subsistent self-contradictions is inapplicable to Meinong's view. At the same time, I think this leaves unaffected the nature of the problem Russell was in fact considering, namely, how there can be significant true or false

* Meinong's Theory of Objects, pp. 84 and 85.
† Loc. cit., p. 49.
‡ Loc. cit., p. 47.
statements apparently about objects which have not or could not have a vestige of being. Also, I do not see, at any rate at the moment, that Meinong's conception of Aussersein would fall outside this problem.

The beginning of the answer to this problem was suggested, I think, by the consideration of general propositions and (in 1904) by that of false ones, although Russell only worked it out more fully in later articles. There is a significant passage, in his article on Meinong, to the effect that given any false proposition, e.g., "A. is father of B.," if A. is not father of B., then the proposition affirms the being of that which by hypothesis has not being. Hence it affirms nothing and should be meaningless. 'In other words: every constituent of a proposition, whether this proposition be true or false, must have being: consequently, if the particularized relation is a constituent of the proposition in which it is supposed to occur, then, since such a proposition is significant though false, the particularized relation has being even when the terms are not related by the relation in question. Hence the being of the particularized relation is not what is asserted.'* I do not say that Russell saw the significance of this in 1904, but that, whether he saw it or not, it is interesting in relation to the view he developed in 1905.

Broadly speaking, Russell's solution of the difficulties was to depose the King of Utopia and round squares alike from being constituents of the propositions apparently about them. Perhaps the most important point to notice about this is that it introduced the consideration of the way in which we use symbols to refer to things. I am not forgetting that Russell had once been willing to take grammar as a guide, nor that from the first

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he had a taste for problems puzzling to the symbolic mind; but rather I am suggesting that in 1905 we have the most serious doubt thrown on the reliability of grammatical considerations, and that this was a revolutionary move on Russell’s part. The introduction of a denoting phrase which is essentially part of a sentence, to solve a problem which on the existing assumptions was both a metaphysical and epistemological one, was the first step towards recognizing that there may be many problems incomprehensible to philosophers, that are in fact problems only because ‘we do not understand the logic of our language.’*

Whereas in The Principles of Mathematics Russell had used denoting concepts, in 1905 this was replaced by denoting phrases. The important fact he emphasized about symbols was that some, i.e., purely demonstrative symbols, may be so used that they would not be significant were there no entity indicated by them. Others such as “man” in “Man is mortal” are not used to name any particular element in the facts that make the proposition true. They refer indirectly to such elements, if there are any, by means of the property or properties they have. Further, and very important, these elements that are referred to indirectly are not constituents of the propositions apparently about them, however much they may be elements in the facts that make the sentences expressing such propositions true. This is what I understand Russell to mean by saying that a variable is involved in the expression of such propositions as all men are mortal. We have got a symbol standing for any one, though not a specific one, of the class of entities defined by the properties of humanity and mortality. In order to understand the proposition we have to be acquainted with entities of the kind that can fill the empty place reserved by

* Cf. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4,003.
the variable. In other words, we must be acquainted with the properties of humanity and mortality. But in order to understand the sentence “All men are mortal” we need not be acquainted with the values of the variable, i.e., innumerable humans; and such values are not constituents of the proposition expressed.

Applying this to “chimeras are monsters” or “the round square is blue,” it is clear that, on the supposition that “chimeras” or “the round square” are names for particulars, we are either involved in contradiction or it is unintelligible that such propositions are significant. If, on the other hand, neither “chimeras” nor “the round square” are here used as names for particulars, but in each case a variable is involved, then, since the significance of the sentence for us depends not on acquaintance with the values of the variable but on acquaintance with the properties defining the class of entities for any one of which it stands, the sentence may well be significant independently of whether or not there are values for the variable. On these lines we can account, at least in principle, for the significance of both the given sentences, although in fact there are not chimeras and there could not be round squares. In my opinion Russell did not deny that chimeras and round squares are constituents of propositions apparently about them because he had discovered the utility of variables, but for the common-sense reason that there are no such objects: such common sense may, of course, be due to ‘prehistoric metaphysicians.’* The discovery of different kinds of symbols made it possible to show how sentences apparently about non-entities are significant, and the same treatment is applicable to false sentences. A point worth mentioning is that this solution of Russell’s does not involve the assumption that there are properties in abstraction.

from objects which they characterize. There is no difficulty in supposing that a set of properties might collectively belong to nothing, i.e., might define the null class, although individually, in order to be acquainted with them, we must have been acquainted with them as qualifying particular things.

If this is correct, the question that should at once arise is: If the apparent constituents of propositions of the kind we have been discussing, are not constituents, then what entities are the genuine constituents. I think the obvious and the correct answer to this question should be that properties are the genuine constituents, only I think the answer would be better given in the form 'the immediate reference of the sentence, e.g., "ghosts squeak and gibber" is to properties.' In this sense the proposition expressed is directly about the properties connoted by "ghost," not directly about the object, if any, which has these properties. With this remark in mind I think we can continue to talk of the constituents of propositions without too great a danger of confusion.

In connexion with the view that, for Russell, the genuine as opposed to the apparent constituents of certain propositions should be properties, it is interesting to quote from his own summing up of the Mind 1905 article,* viz.:—'When there is anything with which we do not have immediate acquaintance, but only definition by denoting phrases, then the propositions in which this thing is introduced by means of a denoting phrase, do not really contain this thing as a constituent, but contain instead the constituents expressed by the several words of the denoting phrase. Thus, in every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e., not only in those whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about) all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate

acquaintance.'* This by itself does not entail that the constituents of propositions we understand should be properties, but if we remember (1) that the objects of acquaintance were for Russell sense-data and universals, (2) that the constituents of propositions were originally regarded as elements common to the judgments of different people (and in my opinion there is no reason to reject this view), then, if it be also held that you and I cannot be acquainted with the same sense-datum, we can only maintain that we understand the same proposition of its constituents are universals. I do not think Russell ever argued in this way, but I think it would be consistent with everything he did say; unless he would maintain that two people could understand a proposition in whose expression "this" occurred as a purely demonstrative symbol for a particular. The above argument would be inconsistent with this, since it follows from that argument that if there are purely demonstrative symbols so used, they are useless for the purposes of communication. In other words if we admit that (1) the theory of Descriptions should be accepted, (2) the constituents of propositions we understand are objects of acquaintance, (3) the objects of acquaintance are either sense-data or universals, (4) sense-data are private to those who sense them; then it follows that any proposition understood by different people must be composed of constituents that are universals.

We might proceed to question some of these premisses, particularly that of the 'privacy' of sense-data; but what I want to suggest is that, even with so unfavourable an interpretation of the theory, it does not follow that the whole meaning of any proposition I understand is to be found in a set of if

* It is interesting to compare this with the two other formulations of the Principle of Acquaintance. Cf. Mysticism and Logic, pp. 219 and 221; The Problems of Philosophy, p. 91.
then propositions about my own sense-data.* More shortly it does not entail any view which could be legitimately described as a form of solipsism, methodological or otherwise. At the same time I think the whole theory—and this is clearly seen in the fact that it claims to account for how we can refer beyond objects with which we are acquainted—depends at least on the assumption that there are universals in the sense in which Russell assumed there were.

II.

There is one important consequence that follows from the acceptance of the Theory of Descriptions—at least as I have interpreted it. That is that any proposition I understand must be about facts of the same kind as those I experience. I mean by this that the facts that would verify the proposition in the sense that they are the facts that would make the proposition true, if it were true, must be facts of the same kind as I experience. It is true that I do not understand a given sentence unless I know what kind of facts would make it true. In other words, if I am to make a statement about a set of entities with which I am not now acquainted I must refer to them by means of properties that belong to them, and I must be acquainted with those properties. It follows that I can only make or understand statements about objects of the same kind as those I experience

* I mean by this a view which I think may be held by Mr. Ayer, viz., the meaning of any empirical proposition I understand, is to be found in a set of conditional propositions about (my) experience, and to the effect that if I get into a certain situation I shall be aware of certain sense contents. I am well aware this is not solipsism in any ordinary sense and I think it might be interpreted in a way which made even the epithet of methodological solipsism inappropriate. My point is that no view to which the name of solipsism, in any sense, is applicable, is entailed by Russell's position, however much it may have been suggested.
or have experienced. But this is not in the least the same as saying that the facts that would make any proposition I understand true must, in any other sense, be facts about my own past, present, or future experience. Hence either it is also different from saying that the whole meaning of any proposition I understand is to be found in a set of if then propositions about my own experience, or else the latter is simply a misleading way of expressing the fact that I admit. For instance, supposing we grant that you and I can never experience the same—numerically identical—sense-datum. Then if I am to understand or make statements about your datum I can only do so by referring to it by means of properties which belong to it. That is, I can only refer to it by means of properties that I am or have been acquainted with as qualifying one of my own sense-data. But the fact that I could do this would in no sense turn your sense-datum into one of mine. In other words, and more clearly, the fact that I can, in this way, make or understand a statement about your sense-datum does not entail that the facts that would make that statement true would be facts about my experience. In my opinion, my statement that your sense-datum is pea-green would be made true, if it were true, simply by your sense-datum being pea-green. I am quite prepared to admit that in principle I ought never to be certain that my statement is true. I think Russell meant something of this sort when he said that 'no fact about any particular existing thing can be self-evident to more than one person.'*

The introduction of the question of self-evidence, or the certainty of the truth of the statements we make, brings us to the other view which, at the beginning of this paper, I said might be read into the Principle of Acquaintance. At the same time as Russell was maintaining 'that it seems scarcely possible

* Problems of Philosophy, p. 213.
to believe that we can make a judgment or entertain a supposition without knowing what it is we are judging or supposing about * and therefore the constituents of propositions we understand must be objects of acquaintance, he was also maintaining something else. That is, we can only be quite certain of facts immediately about objects of acquaintance. In other words, we can only be certain of facts about sense-data or universals. Hence, for example, we can only be assured of the truth of our judgment "The first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomatist" in virtue of something with which we are acquainted—usually a testimony heard or read. Quite consistently, in the Lowell Lectures, Russell held that "in so far as physics or common sense is verifiable it must be capable of interpretation in terms of actual sense-data alone." It would follow from this that any proposition of which I am completely certain should in principle be translatable into a set of propositions about my own sense-data or universals with which I am acquainted. The very facts that make such a proposition true would be facts about these objects of my experience. This is because, in the extreme case, only acquaintance with the facts that make a proposition true constitutes a complete verification of its truth. Also only in this extreme case is the meaning of the proposition identical with the facts that we regard as verifying it, in the sense of being evidence for it. It does not follow from this that the meaning of any proposition I understand, as distinct from one which I regard as self-evident, is to be found in the facts about my experience that convince me of its truth, as distinct from the facts that make the proposition true. It would have been

† Cf. Problems of Philosophy, p. 87.
‡ Lowell Lectures, p. 88.
perfectly consistent of Russell to have maintained that if I accept any non-self-evident proposition of physics or common-sense I must show how far, in principle, it can be interpreted in terms of my sense-data, and yet that the meaning of the proposition, or the facts that make it true, are facts about non-sensible objects which could never be objects of my experience. As a matter of fact he seems to have found that, however satisfactory a solipsistic basis would be, such propositions required interpretation at least in terms of yours as well as my sense-data, together with unsensed sensibilia. He then went on to maintain the further and distinct position that if the set of facts about sensibilia,* i.e., the class of appearances of a thing, will fulfil the purposes for which the thing was invented,† it is expedient to identify the thing with the class of its appearances and to avoid assuming an unnecessary substance or substratum underlying them. If we make this identification, in order to avoid assuming such non-sensible objects, then, it does seem that the whole meaning of any common-sense or physical proposition I understand, should lie in a set of propositions about sensibilia, or of if then propositions about sense-data. But even then there is no reason to suppose, as long as there are propositions I can understand but which are not self-evident, that these if then propositions are about my sense-data. I quite admit that the facts which I regard as evidence for the truth of propositions I merely understand, will have to be facts about my sense-data. Further such facts (if there are such in a given case) may

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* My use of "sensibilia," here and subsequently, follows Russell's in Mysticism and Logic, p. 149. Namely: 'it will be seen that all sense-data are sensibilia. It is a metaphysical question whether all sensibilia are sense data, and an epistemological question whether there exist means of inferring sensibilia which are not data from those that are.' The italics are his, not mine.

† Cf. Mysticism and Logic, p. 155.
not supply all the 'hard' evidence necessary for asserting the propositions to be indubitably true. In that sense of verify no complete 'verification' may be possible. But as Russell himself said 'Verifiability is by no means the same thing as truth.'*

Since Russell was, I think, committed to holding all the above positions, and further, for two other reasons, I think it would be very easy so to interpret the Principle of Acquaintance as it was formulated in _The Problems of Philosophy_ that it was equivalent to: any sentence we can understand is in principle translatable into a set of sentences every element (word) of which is used demonstratively to indicate an object of acquaintance, i.e., a sense datum or a universal. In other words not only, as on the first interpretation, is the immediate reference of the sentence to objects of acquaintance but also the elements referred to indirectly (i.e., the elements in the facts that make the proposition true) are either sense-data or universals. The two other reasons for supposing this are, in the first place, that for Russell, at any rate at one time, the kind of objects given in acquaintance turn up at both 'ends' of a sentence expressing an empirical proposition. We refer by means of properties very indirectly to particular elements in the facts that make the proposition true. But these facts in the last analysis turn out to be facts about sensibilia. The other reason is that propositions, for Professor Moore and Russell, started by being uncommonly like facts. Though, if we accept the Theory of Descriptions, we ought not to be in danger of supposing that particular elements in facts referred to indirectly are constituents of a given proposition, yet it would be easy to go to the opposite extreme and suppose that the constituents of the proposition are always really the elements 'about' which the proposition is, in the sense

that it is facts about these that make the proposition true, if it is true.

I think the Principle of Acquaintance could be held in the way it is first used, where it simply means the immediate reference of sentences we understand is to objects of acquaintance, i.e., (if sense-data are private) universals, without it being held in the second sense that I have suggested it might have. I think that neither view that Russell held, whether or not the second may be read into the Principle of Acquaintance, entails that any empirical proposition I understand would be made true by facts about my own sense-data. The first entails that the facts that make any empirical proposition (or sentence) I understand true must be facts of the same kind as those I have experienced. The second entails that any sentence whose truth is self-evident to me must be 'about' facts of my own experience. It also entails that, for me, the evidence for the truth of any empirical proposition I understand must be found in facts about my experience. If we want to avoid assuming objects of a kind other than sensibilia, this view also entails that any empirical proposition we or I understand is made true by facts about sensibilia and hence the meaning of such propositions lies in such facts. It does not entail that any empirical proposition I understand is 'about,' in this sense of 'about,' facts concerning my sensibilia only.

I now want to suggest how a confusion of these two views of Russell's would entail not only that any empirical proposition I understand and accept should be in principle 'verifiable' by my own experience, and any empirical proposition I understand must be about facts of the same kind as those I experience, but also that any empirical proposition I understand would be verified by my experience alone, in the sense that it is facts about my experience that would make the proposition true. The confusion is fairly simple and if it were made the argument
would run: (1) Any proposition I understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which I am acquainted; (2) the facts that make any empirical proposition I understand true, are facts about sensibilia; (3) but sensibilia are possible objects of acquaintance; therefore (4) the facts that make any empirical proposition I understand true are facts about the constituents with which I must be acquainted in order to understand it; but (omitting universals either by accident or on purpose) the objects I am acquainted with, i.e., sensibilia, are private to me; therefore (6) the facts that would make any empirical proposition I understand true (i.e., the meaning of any empirical proposition I understand) must be found in facts about my experience. In my opinion, without universals the facts should be about my experience now* since I do not see how without universals I can refer beyond objects with which I am acquainted, even as far as objects with which I shall be acquainted to-morrow.

It is not difficult to see the flaws in this argument, although I think to call them flaws presupposes the acceptance of a theory of universals of the Moore-Russell type. Accepting such a view, then, the first mistake is to restrict the objects of acquaintance to sensibilia. This, in my opinion, makes unintelligible the reference to anything beyond that which is now presented. The second mistake, which is probably due to the first, is to identify the sensibilia which are elements in the facts that would make the proposition true with the constituents of the proposition. Since we are granting that sensibilia are private to

* This point has been emphasized from a different angle by Miss MacDonald, in saying that to know what facts would verify a proposition presupposes understanding of the proposition. Cf. Verification and Understanding, this volume, pp. 145–6. My debt to this paper in another respect is obvious. Still more obvious is the use made of a distinction between verifiability and verification suggested by Professor Stebbing during the discussion of Miss MacDonald’s paper; though I am doubtful of my understanding of this point.
those who sense them, this identification would yield the conclusion that the facts that would make any empirical proposition I understand true are facts about my sensibilia. If, on the other hand, the facts that make such a proposition true are not necessarily facts about the constituents with which I must be acquainted in order to understand it, then however much those facts are about sensibilia private to those who own them, they are not necessarily about sensibilia private to me. The reason for this is that if the objects with which I am acquainted include both sense-data and universals, then the constituents of any proposition I understand may be universals, and I can refer by means of these to any sensibilia whether my own, yours or unsensed ones, as long as I can assume they are of the same kind* as mine. I am willing to admit this is a perfectly enormous assumption.

In my opinion, if we accept the Theory of Descriptions at all and with it the Principle of Acquaintance (first interpretation) and the privacy of sense-data, then the constituents of propositions understood by different people should be universals. If this is correct it is simply false to maintain that the facts that would make any (all) propositions I understand true are facts about the constituents. With the possible exception of a priori propositions, if there are such, the facts that make propositions we understand true, are facts about objects characterized by the properties by means of which we refer to those objects indirectly. To return to the old example, "Man is mortal" is made true by the dying of particular humans. That such a statement may be capable of analysis into statements about still more specific facts is irrelevant as long as the main point is clear. In one sense of 'about' the facts that make the sentence in question true are facts about the properties of

* Cf. Russell, Mysticism and Logic, p. 159.
humanity and mortality. In another sense, and at this juncture the most important sense, they are clearly not so, but are 'about' the particulars which have the properties. It may be that the ultimate particular elements to which indirect reference is made are sensibilia and are such that no two people can be acquainted with any one of them. Russell, as I have suggested, at one time held such a view. To ask if he were correct in this would be an enormous question. I think that possibly the view that the objects of acquaintance are sense-data and universals, and the view that any proposition I understand would be made true by facts about objects of the same kind as those with which I am or have been acquainted, jointly entail that the particulars indirectly referred to by an empirical proposition are sensibilia. This conclusion is so entailed if the phrase "of the same kind" is given a strict interpretation. If all that is implied is that if we refer to entities with which we are not acquainted, we can only do so by means of properties that 'belong' to them (where 'belong' does not necessarily mean the simple relation which a specific shade is meant to have to a sense-datum) then I do not think the two views entail the conclusion put forward, however much they may suggest it.

In conclusion, there are three points I should like to emphasize. In the first place it would indeed be odd if the acceptance of a theory which assumed originally that there were elements common to different people's judgments, and claimed to show how we can refer beyond objects with which we are acquainted, should land any one of us in the position of holding that all the empirical propositions I understand would be 'verified' or 'made true by' or 'are ultimately about' my own private sense-data. The second point is that we cannot over-emphasize the importance, for the Theory of Descriptions, of a theory of universals. Throughout I have assumed familiarity with Russell's views on universals; and, as far as I can see, universals as he conceived
them, would satisfy the demands made of them by the Theory of Descriptions. Finally, I have throughout assumed, rightly or wrongly I do not know, but at least, I think, in accordance with Russell,* that there are final facts which simply make sentences true or false.

* Cf. L. S. Stebbing, *Logical Positivism and Analysis*, pp. 35-36, though I am doubtful if I have understood this.
THE ORIGIN AND THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE

LOGICS - ANALYTIC METHOD IN METAPHYSICS

THESIS

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I. THE ORIGIN AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOGICO-ANALYTIC METHOD.

The object of this thesis is to consider the method to which reference is made by Bertrand Russell in The Lowell Lectures.

Russell himself does not make clear the exact nature of the Logico-Analytic method. A study has therefore been made of Russell's earlier work in relation to that of Professor G.E. Moore. It is seen that Russell derived a certain theory of propositions from Moore. No doubt Russell was greatly influenced by Frege and Meinong but in this thesis it is his relation to Moore that has been considered. Certain difficulties entailed by the acceptance of this theory of propositions, led Russell to formulate the Theory of Descriptions, and the Multiple relation theory of Judgment.

The study of both of these theories, and the consideration of the general position Russell was holding by 1911, indicate the importance of the nature of the objects of acquaintance. These, namely sense-data and special reference to Professor Moore.

The foregoing considerations suggest that for Russell, at least at this time, the objects of acquaintance were both metaphysically and epistemologically ultimate. Moreover it appears that the Logico-Analytic method is a way of approaching metaphysical and epistemological questions by
the analysis of sentences expressing common-sense views into statements which refer immediately to objects of acquaintance. The conception of physical objects which Russell believed that he would reach by this method is illustrated by reference to the Lowell Lectures and certain articles in Mysticism and Logic.

In conclusion an attempt is made to state clearly the assumptions upon which the use of the method is based, perhaps the most important of which are: 1) There are certain common sense propositions which we all understand and which are certainly true. 2) There are final facts which make sentences expressing these propositions true; which final facts are absolutely specific facts about entities which should be regarded as incapable of further analysis. Some estimate of the significance of the method can be made in the light of its assumptions. Its more obvious value lies in stressing the importance of knowing exactly the reference of statements accepted as true, both to the facts that make them true, and to those facts we may regard as evidence for their truth. More shortly it suggests both the importance of avoiding, and a way of avoiding, mistakes and confusions due to the misunderstanding of language.
The Questions raised in Moore's early Articles.

Hasan in Realism has shown intentionally that Professor Moore's articles, early and late, are of very great importance in modern philosophical writings. He has shown unintentionally how very difficult it is to deal at all adequately with those articles. Moore seems to be a peculiarly easy person over which to make the Historian's mistake. His own conclusions are put forward very tentatively and other people - more 'inveterate system makers' - have found those tentative conclusions very suggestive. Hence it is easy when stressing this aspect of Moore's work to treat him too much in the light of the more spectacular theories based on his suggestions. If Moore's influence on other writers is the concern of the moment this may not look like a mistake. In point of fact it is a serious one, since it is the precise nature of the questions Moore asks and the precise way in which he asks them that are as important, if not more important, than the tentative answers he gives to those questions.

In The Nature of Judgment Moore officially raises the three closely allied questions of the constituents of judgments, and what is meant by the truth and falsity of judgments. Bradley in his Logic had put forward the view that an idea could be regarded 1) as having existence quâ a mental occurrence 2) as having content 3) quâ its use in a judgment as being a symbol or sign of an existence other than itself.
Judgment involved the use of ideas as symbols, and truth and falsehood depend upon the relation of ideas so used to reality. That which these complicated symbols symbolize consists of a part of the content (original or acquired) cut off, fixed by the mind, and considered apart from the existence of the sign. But Bradley shifts from the assertion that Logic is primarily concerned with ideas qua signs signifying something to the assertion that it is primarily concerned with what is signified, 'one portion of the content which the mind has fixed and which is not in any sense an event in time'. Moreover he decides to use "idea" mainly for this fixed content or 'universal meaning'. Moore accepts the position that 'the idea in judgment is the universal meaning'. But so far as this 'universal meaning' is a portion of the content of 'ideas' (used in Bradley's first sense) 'it would be intelligible that truth and falsehood should still be said to "depend on the relation of our ideas to reality"'. It is Moore's 'endeavour to show on the contrary, that the idea used in judgment is not part of the content of our ideas, nor produced by any action of our minds, and that hence truth and falsehood are not dependent on the relation of our ideas to reality'.

In other words Moore agrees with Bradley in so far as he denies that the constituents of judgments are individual

Bradley. Logic p.4.

and essentially momentary psychological states) and asserts that the idea used in judgment is a 'universal meaning'. But Moore would deny that 'this 'universal meaning' can be described as part of the content of any psychological idea whatever'. Moore's 'concept' which supplants Bradley's 'universal meaning' is 'not a mental fact nor any part of a mental fact'. 'Concepts are possible objects of thought' but 'it is indifferent to their nature whether anybody thinks them or not. They are incapable of change; and the relation into which they enter when the knowing subject implies no action or reaction. It is a unique relation which can begin or cease with a change in the subject; but the concept is neither cause nor effect in such a change'. Again 'concepts may come into relation with a thinker; and in order that they may do anything they must already be something'. In what precise of 'are' concepts are is a fundamental question that is raised much later on. For the moment that concepts are is a basic assumption, and the point to get hold of is that whatever kind of 'being' concepts have, they are not dependent for it on being thought by a given thinker at a given moment, nor it would seem upon any thinker at any moment.

It was obvious from his rejection of Bradley that Moore would require a new conception of the nature of truth and falsehood, this becomes more and more evident as Moore discusses propositions in the light of what he has said about concepts. Propositions may be distinguished from concepts in the first place by the fact that concepts are
simple. Propositions are composed of concepts, in them 'certain concepts stand in specific relations with one another'. According to the nature of the relation the proposition may be either true or false. Existence is a concept and existential propositions are, equally, true or false according to the relation that holds between the concepts - of which existence is one - of which they are composed. What kind of a relation makes a proposition true or false must, according to Moore, be immediately recognised. Elsewhere he says that truth itself is a simple concept logically prior to any proposition. On this view it becomes very difficult to assign a precise meaning to the assertions "this proposition is true" and "this proposition is false" and equally difficult to see what is the precise nature of the distinction between a true and a false proposition. But these again are questions that come up much later.

So much for a very superficial outline of the view Moore puts forward in the first part of The Nature of Judgment. The profound metaphysical significance of the view can only be appreciated if we recognise, as we must, that for Moore concepts are not only the elements of which propositions are composed but are also the elements into which - to use a more modern terminology - 'facts' are to be analysed. The radical opposition between Moore and Bradley cannot be seen either, unless the metaphysical significance of Moore's treatment of

* For further discussion of this point see section on Universals p. 43.
The Nature of Judgment is understood. That propositions may be analysed into simple constituents standing in certain relations implies the denial of monism in two ways. In the first place that there are certain immutable elements to be related implies that there is numerical diversity. In the second place that there are relational facts at all implies that there must be at least two irreducibly different kinds of entity in the universe viz those which are related and those which relate. The point perhaps is better put by saying, granted there are relational facts numerical diversity between the elements related is implied, and granting two numerically diverse entities, those entities are different in kind from the relation of numerical diversity holding between them. Which is the best place to start off this obviously circular tour is difficult to determine, but we are fairly safe if we assert that the admission of a relational fact is incompatible with monism and as Moore admits relational facts we gain the immediate point - which is to show that his analysis of judgment implies pluralism. It is possible to ask at this stage whether the relations which hold between Moore's concepts are internal or external. It would seem to be the case that granting A (a concept) is in fact related to B (another concept) we cannot infer A must be related to B on the ground that the relational property P of having R. to B is a defining property of A (i.e. A wouldn't be A if it hadn't got P). Because 1) A is

for further discussion of this point see section on Universals p.11.
immutable in the sense that being combined in a certain relational fact doesn’t affect A: hence 2) any property it has in virtue of being so combined (or which it would lose by being disconnected) is so to speak a courtesy title and not to be included in the definition of A: hence 3) that A has the property P does not follow from the fact that A is A: but 4) A has the property P is entailed by "A R B". Therefore 5) the necessity of "A R B" does not follow from the fact that A is A. The nice point is whether, granting ‘A has the property P’ is not entailed by ‘A is A’, we are justified in asserting 1) ‘A has the property P’ is a mere matter of fact 2) ‘A has the property P’ is entailed by ‘A R B’ and therefore 3) ‘A R B’ is a mere matter of fact. If we are justified in this then from Moore’s assertion of a plurality of immutable concepts; terms there follows the dogma that all relations are external—concepts the crucial assumption being the immutability of the terms.

We can still ask, out of the context of The Nature of Judgment, whether to assert a plurality of ‘immutable’ elements, i.e. disconnectable elements. If of course, to return to Moore, we assert that though ‘A has the property P’ is not entailed by ‘A is A’, we are still not justified in asserting that A has the property P as a mere ‘adventitious excrescence’, we are under the obligation to show what entails that A has the property P.

To return to the more specific questions raised in the
Nature of Judgment. Moore develops the notion of the world being formed of concepts with reference to the nature of 'things'; the notion of the material diversity of things, perception, and the 'objectivity' that is felt to belong to the relation between premisses and conclusion in inference. 'Things', and the same is true of 'ideas', are composed of nothing but concepts. The identity of a concept in different things, and that their 'material diversity', is to be taken as a starting point, and things are to be differentiated by the different relations in which their common concepts stand to other concepts. An existent is nothing but a concept or complex of concepts standing in a unique relation to the concept of existence. Granting the description of a proposition as a combination of concepts which is affirmed, an existent may be regarded as a proposition; and perception becomes the cognition of an existential proposition. As long as the terms in an inference might, in some obscure sense, be said to depend for their existence on being thought, and the relation of premisses to conclusion held independently of being thought, there was a problem to account either for the 'existence' of the objective relation of premiss to conclusion or for the 'objectivity' of the existent and, by definition, mind dependent terms. For Moore 'terms', i.e. concepts, are about as 'objective' as they can be. Logical connexions are fundamental, and to say something exists is to say it stands in a certain logical connexion. In that case it is impossible to ask if logical connexions exist.
Moore seems to be saying so many things in this one short paragraph that he can say none of them thoroughly, hence it is rash to start drawing precise implications. The fact remains that there are three big questions raised: 1) the analysis of "this is a thing", 2) the analysis of "this thing is identical with, or materially diverse from, that" 3) the analysis of perception - with the 'realistic' suggestion that it is the cognition of an existential proposition. Further there is the emphasis upon the 'objectivity' of concepts and of the relations in which they stand (e.g. the premisses and conclusion of an inference are propositions) of the relations between propositions or 'related concepts'.

Comparing his own view, with that of Kant, Moore raises the question of the 'necessity' of propositions. It is very difficult to see exactly what view Moore is advocating. He seems to hold, in opposition to Kant, that a division of propositions into 'a priori' and 'empirical' corresponding to 'necessary' and 'contingent' is untenable. By contrast a division, if there is one, should be based on the nature of the concepts which occur in propositions. Some concepts may be said to exist in time; while others e.g. 'attribute' and 'two' are in a sense timeless, and can only claim a precarious sort of existence in so far as they are necessarily related to those other notions of which properly existential propositions...

*Note: "The conception of a thing as involving multiplicity seems to have been suggested from the first, and to have been intimately bound up with the assertion of a plurality of simples."
can be made. There seems to be for Moore some obscure connexion between the 'timeless' concepts and the necessity of the propositions in which they occur, since he concludes all propositions are necessary for apparently no other reason than that in all propositions a 'timeless' concept is involved. This may be a misrepresentation of Moore's view but his whole discussion is very difficult to follow. The three points that definitely emerge in this second half of the paper, however, are that two fundamentally different kinds of concepts are to be distinguished: secondly the truth of a proposition is something different from its necessity: and thirdly in some queer sense of "necessary" Moore holds all propositions are necessary. Hence a new analysis of "this is necessary" is obviously required.

Moore proceeds to deal with necessity in Mind 1900. Here he describes his main object as 'not to discover whether any or all propositions of the form 'A is necessary' are true or false, nor yet whether they are correctly expressed; but what their meaning is'. Three classes of entity are commonly called necessary: 1) connexions 2) things 3) propositions. 'Being forced upon the mind' may be a property common to all three. But the feeling of compulsion, though probably the origin of ideas of necessity, cannot be identified with them, since it accompanies different beliefs at different times and in different persons. "Necessary" is often so used as to exclude the possibility of such identification. "Necessary truths it would be said, are truths which are always necessary:
and whether there are any such or not, we certainly mean by them something different from truths which are generally accompanied by such a feeling.

Moore's answer to the question what do we mean when we assert of a true proposition that it is necessary, is that it is logically prior to some other true proposition. 'Any truth which is logically prior to some other true proposition is so far necessary; but as you get more and more true propositions to which a given truth is logically prior, so you approach that region within which the given truth will be said to be absolutely necessary or a priori. There will, then, be only a difference of degree between necessary truths and many others, namely a difference in the number of propositions to which they bear a certain logical relation; but there will be a difference in kind between the logical relation and any other of the notions by means of which it has been sought to give a definition to necessity. If there be any truths which have this logical relation to all other propositions then, indeed, the application of these would be not merely wide but absolutely universal; such, it would seem, is the Law of Contradiction and perhaps some others: and these perhaps might be said to differ in kind from all others in this respect also.'

I have quoted Moore in full here partly because he puts the points more clearly than any summary could, and partly

* Necessity. Mind. 1900 p. 300.
because what he says is obviously so very important in connexion with the nature of demonstration that it useful to see the exact way in which the question arises. The ramifications of his analysis of the necessity of true propositions can only be seen later, but the data for the view that all demonstration is completely formal i.e. relative to a selected set of premises and principles, is clearly given. Further it is very important to notice that Moore's analysis of "this is a necessary proposition" is in a sense a development of the view in The Nature of Judgment that the connexions between elements (logical or metaphysical) are logical connexions.

The relation of logical priority (e.g. \(2 + 2 = 4\) is logically prior to here are two chairs and there are two chairs, therefore there are four chairs) is not itself necessary except in the sense that the 'general principles that what follows from a truth is itself true' is implied in every argument. Necessary propositions are therefore those logically prior to a number of other true propositions. The connexion of logical priority is not itself necessary, but the proposition 'the truth of what is implied follows from the truth of that which implies it' is necessary in the sense defined. This means of course that logical priority is for Moore a fundamental notion.

Turning to the 'necessity of things', according to Moore to say of a thing that it is necessary is to say that it is cause or effect of something else. The question then becomes what kind of necessity has the relation of cause and effect: granting, that is, that the causal relation is necessary in some sense. Moore attempts to reduce the necessity of the causal relation to
12.

logical necessity. What he says is very brief and though it is clear that the question whether the two are the same is raised, and Moore wants to hold that they are, his arguments in favour of this are difficult to follow.

In his reference to Moore's analysis of necessity, Hasan seems to be very mistaken. In the first place he asserts a proposition which Moore explicitly denies, namely that the relation of logical priority is itself "necessary". In the second place through a wholly unwarranted identification of "true" with "necessary" he accuses Moore of implying a coherence theory of truth, though he seems willing to admit that Moore would dislike such a theory.

In Identity Moore by implication is contending for a pluralistic metaphysic. "Identity in Difference" must mean something other than mere complexity. When we assert identity we may be asserting of two things that they have the same predicate and yet are different from one another. If we mean by "different" having different predicates it follows it is nonsense to talk of two things exactly alike. If we admit numerical difference between A and B, may not the soi-disant common property itself be two.

The principle question then, for the moment, is whether there is numerical difference. If we deny numerical difference we are bound to admit there is only one subject of which all predicates are predicated. As long as we admit that there are certain incompatible predicates we must admit numerical difference. By implication as soon as we admit numerical
difference we can get a pluralistic metaphysic, and the relevance of Identity to The Nature of Judgment is obvious.

Granting numerical difference two positions follow: 1) The main reason for asserting that there cannot be two exactly similar things is gone. Moore’s claims are much more sweeping than this but it is difficult to see their justification. 2) We must admit in the absence of the recognition of a universal as something of which it is nonsense to assert or deny numerical difference - a soi-disant common predicate may be two similar predicates.

Granting there are two exactly similar predicates, Moore avoids an infinite regress of similar predicates to explain the similarity of the initial pair by saying that wherever two predicates are exactly similar their relation to that which is the same in each of them is quite different from the relation of each to that of which it is the predicate. ‘That there may be in each an identical element I admit. But this identical element appears to me to be not only the same but one and the same’. He avoids the objection that to define the similarity of two predicates by means of their similarity to a universal is circular, by making the relation of the predicates to the universal peculiar and fundamental. Hence to say two predicates are similar, is to say that they both have a ‘nameless’ relation to one and the same universal. "Similarity" remains the name for the relation of predicate to predicate in virtue of both having the nameless relation to the universal.

As Russell pointed out later, one cannot significantly talk of a subject predicate monism since a distinction is implied between the subject and its predicates.
Moore uses "particular" where I have used "predicate"; perhaps "instance" would be a better substitute than "predicate" except that an instance e.g. of 'billiard ball red' may be 'this red billiard ball' or 'the specific quality red this billiard ball has'. Moore seems to be concerned primarily with the relation of the red(s) of two billiard balls to billiard ball red. Otherwise his distinction between this relation and that of a member of a class to a class concept loses half its point and so does Russell's criticism of Moore in *The Principles of Mathematics* Chapter IV. The distinction between the relation of an:instance to a universal and the relation of a member of a class to a class Moore makes very definitely. 'This nameless relation which each particular has to one and only one universal is not the same as the relation of a member of a class to its class concept; since the member of a class may differ conceptually from its class concept and since also two universals may both belong to the same class'. Further on - 'if a number of reds of the same tint are said to have in common the fact that they are all just that red, we are liable to suppose that a number of reds of different tints also have in common in the same way the fact that they are all red', the implication being that the supposition is wrong. From the context it seems essential to suppose that the number of reds of the same tint have the nameless relation to 'this red' and that this is to be distinguished from the relation of a number of reds of the same tint to red. Moore seems to hold that the last relation is that of class membership; but whether it is or not is an
entirely different question.

It seems plausible that in Moore's paper there are three entirely different questions in hand. Supposing we take \((A \varphi')\) and \((B \varphi'')\) for two characterised things which are similar. Then, granting \(\varphi' \neq \varphi''\) are numerically distinct though conceptually identical, we may ask a) What is the relation of \(\varphi' \neq \varphi''\) to \(\varphi\), and Moore's answer is "nameless". b) What is the relation of \((A \varphi')\) and \((B \varphi'')\) to \(\varphi\) the answer, probably, is that it is class membership. c) What is the relation of \(\varphi\), e.g., a specific shade of red to other shades of red and to Red. If we assert that to say \(\varphi' = \varphi''\) are numerically the same or distinct is equally nonsensical then question a) drops out but b) and c) are still of immense importance. This account of Moore may be incorrect and in fact he may have more questions than b) and c) on hand simultaneously. However that may be, we have some very important questions raised, and it is significant for Moore's metaphysical position that he seems throughout to be aiming for a clear distinction in kind among his fundamental 'elements'.

By means of the distinction between the 'nameless' relation and that of a member of a class to a class concept Moore turns a neat argument against anybody asserting the world is an individual. The relevance is again obvious. The last fundamental point to come up is the identity of complex things. Moore says 'when the same identical thing is said to persist, it is always meant that two or more particulars conceptually identical, are continuous in time; and the change resolves itself into the fact that each of two conceptually different
particulars has the same relation to each at a different time. Thus the "material identity" of a thing may be said to consist in the continuous existence of conceptually identical particulars which have at different times the same relation to different particulars. This is interesting in connection with the question of the 'material diversity' of things, that Moore raised in the Nature of Judgment.

There are probably many important topics raised by Moore which have been overlooked. But whether there are any more or not, the whole position Moore indicates in these articles is very important, and the gradual working out of the implications of even this collection of questions and suggestions, by Moore and Russell, is equally so.
The Position Russell adapted from Moore, and its difficulties.

It is obvious that in *The Nature of Judgment* the notion of a concept is absolutely fundamental. Concepts are the elements into which propositions and facts alike are to be analysed. I say propositions and facts alike, because I am not sure whether or not Moore identified propositions with facts at this point, although it is quite clear that concepts, the constituents of propositions, have 'being' in a fundamental sense. It is clear also that propositions, as Russell took them over from Moore, have all the properties one would attribute to facts.

Concepts not only are in this unique sense, but in no way depend for this peculiar 'being' that they have, upon being thought of by anybody. They are simple and incapable of change, in the sense that being brought into relation with a thinker, or for that matter into any relation, makes no difference to them. There is the suggestion that there are two radically different kinds of concepts, those that exist in time and those that do not e.g. 'attribute' and 'two'. This is relevant when we come to discuss the topic of universals. Propositions are composed of concepts and by contrast are complex: in them certain concepts stand in specific relations with one another. According to the nature of the relation the proposition may be either true or false.


2.

Turning to Russell we find 'Whatever may be an object of thought or may occur in any true or false proposition or can be counted as one, I call a term. I shall use as synonyms with it the words unit, individual, entity. The first two emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that every term has being i.e. it is in some sense '. (2) 'Whatever can be thought of has being, and its being is a precondition, not a result of its being thought of'. (3) 'A man, a moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, or anything else that can be mentioned is sure to be a term; and to deny that such and such a thing is a term must always be false...... a term is in fact possessed of all the properties commonly assigned to substances or substantives. Every term to begin with is a logical subject.... again every term is immutable and indestructible. What a term is, it is, and no change can be conceived in it which would not destroy its identity and make it another term'.

The resemblance of Russell's terms and Moore's concepts here is obvious. Russell too holds that not all propositions are of the subject predicate form, and relations and relational propositions must be admitted. Further 'no relation ever modifies either of its terms. For if it holds between A and B, then it is between A and B that it holds; and to say that it modifies A and B is to say that it really holds between different terms C and D. To say that two terms which are related would be different if they were not related is to say something perfectly barren: for if they were different they would be other and would not be the terms in question, but a

X See back of sheet I.
different pair that would be related. The notion that a term can be modified arises from neglect to observe the eternal self-identity of all terms and all logical concepts which alone form the constituents of propositions. What is called modification consists merely in having at one time but not at another, some specific relation to some other specific term; but the term which sometimes has & sometimes has not the relation in question must be unchanged, otherwise it would not be that term, which had ceased to have the relation'. (1) Add to this the remark: - (2) 'Where we validly infer one proposition from another we do so in virtue of a relation which holds between the two propositions whether we perceive it or not: the mind in fact is as purely receptive in inference as common sense supposes it to be in the perception of sensible objects' - and we have the data for asserting that Russell takes over from Moore the following fundamental positions:

1) The assertion of a plurality of simple immutable terms which all have being in a peculiar sense.
2) These terms are independently of being thought of.
3) These terms enter into relations all of which are external.
4) Terms are constituents of propositions.
5) Propositions and the relations between propositions exist independently of being objects of thought.

We could at this point discuss the question of universals and particulars in relation to the nature of 'terms'; but it is more relevant and more interesting to notice the difficulties

1. Principles of Mathematics Ch. 51.
2. " " Ch. 5.
with which such a position as Russell's is faced, and the suggestions he makes for meeting these difficulties.

In the first place, while holding that it is a confusion to think that propositions are essentially mental; and are to be identified with cognitions; 'and that this confusion accounts for the notion that words occur in propositions, whereas a proposition, unless it happens to be linguistic, does not itself contain words; it contains the entities indicated by words'; Russell admits that 'if I say "I met a man" the proposition is not about a man: this is a concept which does not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of the logic-books. What I met was a thing, not a concept, an actual man with a tailor and a bank-account or a public house and a drunken wife. Again the proposition "any finite number is odd or even" is plainly true; yet the concept "any finite number" is neither odd nor even. It is only particular numbers that are odd or even; there is not in addition to these, another entity, any number, which is either odd or even, and if there were, it is plain that it could not be odd and could not be even'. Hence to meet the obvious difficulty Russell introduces the notion of denoting and suggests that for example 'when a man occurs in a proposition (e.g. I met a man in the street) the proposition is not about the concept a man, but about something quite different, some actual bi-ped denoted by the concept'.

It is important for the understanding of the implications of this passage to note that Russell's use of "concept" is not the same as Moore's. Concepts for Russell are one of the two kinds of entities into which terms are to be distinguished
The other kind of terms are 'things' or terms indicated by proper names; whereas concepts are those indicated by all other words. There are two kinds of concepts at least; namely, those indicated by adjectives and those indicated by verbs. The former kind will often be called predicates or class-concepts; the latter are always or almost always relations'. Russell emphasises the distinction between concepts and things, which, in later terminology, can only occur as the logical subjects of propositions, and of which in the Principles of Mathematics 'points, instants, bits of matter, particular states of mind, and particular existents generally' are examples; and so are many terms which do not exist, for example, the points in a non-Euclidean space and the pseudo-existents of a novel.

Concepts in contrast to things are capable of a twofold use: for example, in "Socrates is human" and "Humanity belongs to Socrates" human and humanity occur in a different way. It is predicates, that is concepts, other than verbs, which occur in propositions, having only one term or subject that have the 'very interesting property' of a connexion with denoting.

That it is predicates which first denote is worth remembering in the light of what is to follow in the development of the theory of Descriptions; but for the time being Russell is faced with holding that the constituents of propositions are terms in the wide and fundamental sense of entities that 'are';

* 'Note at this time Russell would hold that though non-existent they yet might have being.'
and also though 'people often assert that man is mortal; but what is mortal will die, yet we should be surprised to find in the "Times" such a notice as the following: Died at his residence of Camelot Gladstone Road Upper Tooting on the 18th of June 19_ man, eldest son of Death and Sin. Man in fact does not die; hence if "man is mortal" were, as it appears to be, a proposition about man it would be simply false. His first attempt at a solution is to hold that 'the proposition is about men; and here again, it is not about the concept men but about what this concept denotes'. The point which is easy to overlook but important to remember, is that consistently Russell must still hold that concepts are kinds of terms; i.e. are entities which are.

The same problem, approached from the epistemological rather than the logical side, arises in the article entitled Meinong's theory of complexes and assumptions in Mind 1904. Here Russell, acknowledging his debt to Moore, as for that matter he always does, indicates his position by saying: 'That every presentation and every belief must have an object other than itself and, except in certain cases where mental existents happen to be concerned, extra mental; that what is commonly called perception has as its object an existential proposition, 


Mr. Findlay suggests that Russell misunderstood Meinong. This may well be the case. I think this leaves unaffected the nature of the problem Russell believed himself to be considering; namely, how true can be significant true or false statements apparently about objects which have not or could not have being.
into which enters as a constituent that whose existence is concerned, and not the idea of this existent; that truth and falsehood apply not to beliefs, but to their objects; and that the object of a thought, even when this object does not exist, has a Being which is in no way dependent upon its being an object of thought: all these are theses which, though generally rejected, can nevertheless be supported by arguments which deserve at least a refutation*. He is concerned, mainly, in this article to expound Meinong's view which, with the exception of Frege's, is the nearest known by Russell to his own, and, further, to advocate the latter.

With the resemblance of Meinong's and Russell's views we are not here concerned; also it would be confusing at this point to deal in detail with Russell's Theory of Knowledge at this period. We are concerned here mainly with propositions and granting, for discussion, Russell's position that "the proposition known is not identical with the knowledge of it", it 'becomes plain that the question as to the nature of propositions is distinct from all questions as to knowledge'. So that as an account of this article in Mind this is intentionally one sided being concerned more with the light thrown on the nature of propositions, than on epistemological questions.

Assuming that the object of perception is an existential

* See footnote p.6.
proposition - a view derived from Meinong or Moore or more probably from both, Russell is concerned to advocate what is presumably, the distinguishing feature of a common-sense philosophy, namely, that the object of a presentation is the actual external object itself, and not any part of the presentation. The reasons in favour of this common-sense view are briefly the following. As regards the external perception, if two people can perceive the same object, as the possibility of any common world requires, then the object of an external perception is not in the mind of the percipient. Consequently in this case, and therefore possibly in every case, the perception consists only of act and content, the object being an outside related entity, or rather proposition (namely the proposition that what is loosely called the object exists). As regards internal perception, it must be admitted that, in its pure form, it is exceedingly difficult: contents, as Meinong himself confesses, are "wahrnehmungsfluchtig". Thus when we mean to think only of what is psychical, we are almost inevitably led to think instead of the cognitive complex, consisting of the knowledge together with what is known; hence what is known (the proposition) comes to be believed as also psychical, in spite of the highly inconvenient consequence that two people, in that case, cannot know the same proposition.

The importance of this is obvious, but before we follow its development it is worth side-tracking very slightly to

notice a suggestion Russell makes in, so to speak, the next 
breath: viz:- that there is not only awareness of propositions 
but it seems undeniable that there is also a mere awareness, in 
which the object is not a proposition; for unless we were aware 
what redness is, we could not know that redness exists. Except, 
however, for this a priori argument, it would be more natural, 
as the result of inspection, to deny any such awareness; when 
we try to think of redness, we seem only to succeed in thinking 
of redness as existing....but however this may be, mere aware­ 
ness, having as its object something neither true nor false, 
is widely different from cognition; and perception in its 
usual significance, is a kind of cognition, namely cognition of existence¹. This is so important when we come to discuss 
acquaintance and knowledge by description, and the whole later 
development of the theory of propositions in the light of the 
principle that we can only understand those propositions with 
whose constituents we are acquainted, that it is worth noting.

To return to the main thread:- according to Russell¹ the 
doctrine that the object forms no part of the presentation must 
be extended to the case where the object is what we call 
imaginary, i.e. does not exist¹. It is important to notice here 
that Russell makes a distinction between existence and subsis­ 
tence, so that although Golden Mountains are in mind - not in 

¹ Cf. Moore. Experience and Empiricism.
the Berkeleian sense but merely up for consideration - we have
not met full in the face the problem of accounting for a galaxy
of unicorns, round squares and bewigged kings of France: 'that is
for entities that are not only non-existent but have not being
in any sense'. The important point to notice is that the
relation between presentation and object, like all relations for
Russell at this stage, is external; so that he does in fact at
this point ask straight out 'is it possible to have a presenta-
tion or belief to which no object corresponds? The converse
possibility, except by those (of whom Meinong is not one) who
hold that there can be nothing that is not known to some mind,
will be at once admitted; but the idea of a belief which is
a belief in nothing seems at first sight quite inadmissible.
Yet, by all analogy, it ought to be possible, if content and
object are related as externally as I have contended, for either
to subsist without the other'. Here we are, as Russell points
out, raising a question of fundamental importance in regard to
error. 'What in fact do we believe when we believe a false
proposition? We believe in a relation (say) between two terms
which, as a matter of fact, are not so related. Thus we seem
to believe in nothing: for if there were such a relation as
we believe in, the belief would not be erroneous.' The point
that is of the utmost importance, for us, is that Russell is
coming here straight against the problem of accounting for how
propositions, all of whose constituents have "being", are yet
apparently about entities which are non-existent e.g. relations,
this question is to suggest the problem of accounting for how
propositions can apparently be about non-entities e.g. unicorns and kings of France. That there is a problem at all is because Russell by a deliverance of common-sense recognises that there simply aren't unicorns (say) while he is still holding propositions are apparently about them and the constituents of propositions are. This perhaps anticipates too much of the later work, but it is difficult to indicate the most significant parts of the earlier work, except in the light of what follows.

To return to the matter of relational propositions: Meinong appears to have held that when a relation R is affirmed to hold between a and b as in (say) "a is the father of b" what is really affirmed is the being or subsistence of the relation. Russell produces an argument, against this position, derived from false propositions, which is of the utmost importance for appreciating his own position. 'If what is actually meant by a relational proposition is the being of the particularised relation, then, when the proposition in question is not true, it must be meaningless: for it affirms the being of what ex hypothesi does not have being, and therefore it affirms nothing and is meaningless. In other words: every constituent of a proposition, whether this proposition be true or false, must have being; consequently, if the particularised relation is a constituent of the proposition in which it is supposed to occur, then since such a proposition is significant when it is false, the particularised relation has being even when the terms are not related by the relation in question. Hence the being of the particularised relation is not what is asserted'. Russell
uses this to argue that since neither A nor B nor the relation is the object, therefore, if there is an object, it must be the whole proposition. This may, or may not, answer Meinong; and it evades the main difficulty in Russell's own theory in a way that suggests he had not yet fully appreciated that there was one. At the same time his argument against Meinong is sufficiently suggestive to be extraordinarily interesting in relation to the view Russell developed in 1905.

In the third section of this article Russell re-emphasizes that the objects of judgments, that is to say propositions, are not immanent but presumably have 'being' independently of being judged about; and he attempts to deal with the difficulties over false propositions that such a view entails. Broadly we have the choice of holding either that a presentation or judgment may be wholly destitute of an object, or else false propositions subsist just as much as true ones do. 'Direct inspection seems to leave no room whatever for doubt that, in all presentations and judgments, there is necessarily an object; so that we here meet a problem of great difficulty if we admit at the same time, as Russell does, that to say there is no problem and that some propositions are true and some false, just as some roses are red and some white' is unsatisfactory. Since we are now mainly concerned to indicate the difficulties with which Russell's position at this point is faced and afterwards to try to understand how he deals with them, to give his discussion in detail now would be confusing.

To sum up, there are three big problems arising out of the
situation. The first, raised in The Principles of Mathematics is that granting the constituents of propositions are, how is it that true propositions are apparently about constituents when, by a deliverance of common-sense, if they were in fact about those constituents, the propositions would be false. This becomes modified by the discussion in Mind into how it is that propositions, the constituents of which are, remain significant when their apparent constituents flagrantly aren't. Incidentally it is important not to suppose that Russell stated the problems, at any rate at this stage, so explicitly, but, in spite of that, it is these problems which the Theory of Descriptions - the next development - is concerned to solve. The other two big problems are, granting the object of a judgment has being independently of being judged, to give a satisfactory account of error from the epistemological standpoint: and from the logical to provide a theory as to the nature of true and false propositions.

There are two general points which must be recognised. One is that it is easy to say there are problems which at this stage must be dealt with, years after Russell himself has pointed them out. Secondly the problems are, for the most part, those of providing theories, whether of logic or epistemology, which will square with the confused and unanalysed convictions of a 'robust sense of reality' as to what there is, or is not, in the universe. That there are not, say, unicorns is obviously a common-sense view, but it is easy to overlook the fact that, for Russell, the proposition that the
constituents of propositions 'are', follows from the common-sense position that propositions are the objects of judgments, and exist or rather have being independently of being such objects of judgment.
IV.

Russell's Theory of Descriptions.

Perhaps the most useful general statement of the problem Russell tries to solve in 1905 is that of explaining how propositions are apparently about entities which common sense recognises they cannot be about. In more detail, we have the question how it is that the true proposition 'man is mortal' is not falsified by the fact that man does not die. Secondly how it is that such propositions as "the king of France is bald" and the "round square is preposterous" remain significant though there is no king of France and there could be no round-square. Further there are two points clearly recognised in 1905 in contrast to the 1904 article. In the first place it is self-contradictory to deny the being of anything since if we say "there is no king of France" and the king of France is a constituent of the proposition in question it has being. While if we suggest that there are subsistent kings of France and round-squares we are in the difficult position of having to admit that there are subsistent self-contradictions.

Russell's discussion is worth following in detail, but before we attempt to do that there are three very important points to notice. In the first place, broadly speaking, Russell's solution of the main problem takes the form of deposing e.g. the king from the position of the constituent of the proposition in question, 'man' in 'man is mortal' suffering the same fate. This gives rise to the question: if the apparent constituents of the proposition are in fact not constit-
uents, what entities are the constituents. This is not to be confused with another very important question, which does not however arise for the moment, viz. what do we mean by saying of \( x \) that it is a constituent of a proposition. Secondly there is the question what is the relation of the genuine constituents of the proposition to the ex-constituents: which is one way of asking what sort of an entity is the deposed king - or cat or pumpkin, for that matter, since we do not want to assume the ex-constituents are all what common sense would call non-existent. Thirdly, since the initial problem, in its most startling form, is to account for how propositions whose constituents 'are' by definition, can apparently be about entities which either flatly are not, or else would be self-contradictory 'beings', it would be easy to assume not only that the constituents of propositions are, but its converse, and, hence, to conclude that the ex-constituents are in some sense or other fictions. This would lead to serious confusion in the consideration of ex-constituents that 'are', Piccadilly and Roumania for example. How far this is a source of confusion, if at all, I do not know, but it is a confusion at any rate to avoid. These three points are worth keeping in mind although the separate and careful discussion they obviously require would be out of place now.

To return to 1905: perhaps the most fundamental idea introduced into the situation is the importance of considering

\[ x \]  Cf. Section VIII, p. 7.
the way in which we use symbols to refer to things, more shortly the importance of the bearing of language on philosophical problems. I am not forgetting that in The Principles of Mathematics Russell was willing to take 'grammar as our guide' nor that from the start he had a taste for problems puzzling to the symbolic mind, but rather suggesting that in 1905 we have the first serious doubts thrown on the reliability of grammatical considerations, and that this is a revolutionary move on Russell's part. The introduction of a denoting phrase which is 'essentially part of a sentence' to solve a problem that, on the existing assumptions as to the nature of propositions, is both a metaphysical and epistemological one, is the first step towards recognising that there may be many problems only because 'we do not understand the logic of our language'.

Where in The Principles of Mathematics Russell had used denoting concepts, in 1905 this is replaced by denoting phrases. A denoting phrase is essentially part of a sentence, that is to say it is part of the mechanism by means of which we communicate, not to be confused with what is communicated. A machine can consist of different 'parts' which can function in different ways according to what is required to be done. By analogy a given word - i.e. sound or shape - can at one time be used in one way, and at another time in a different way, to refer to its referend, and we make serious mistakes if we suppose it being used in one way when in fact it is being used in another.

*Cf. Wittgenstein. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. 4.003.*
More short[ ...] we are liable to serious confusion about the nature of their referenda if we confound totally different kinds of symbols.

In order to see how Russell was led to this we require to understand his epistemological distinction between 'acquaintance' and 'knowledge about', which he introduces for the first time at the beginning of the 1905 article. Incidentally there has been considerable confusion about the theory of Descriptions because it has never been made clear whether the phrase was meant, or is meant, to refer to the strictly logical theory about the way in which symbols are used, or the part played by the distinction between 'acquaintance' and 'knowledge about' or 'knowledge by description' in Russell's epistemology or both. The two are different so that the Theory of Descriptions is liable to be a misleading phrase. Nevertheless in Russell's work the development of the one seems often to have been conditioned by that of the other, and we should recognise this at the same time keeping clear the distinction between the two.

Perhaps the easiest method is to keep in mind the questions each is concerned to answer, but as Russell often explains one theory in terms of the other e.g. 'the distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about is the distinction between the things we have presentations of, and the things we only reach by means of denoting phrases' this needs care, quite apart from the difficulties due to Russell being careless in his use of language.
'All thinking,' according to Russell, 'has to start from acquaintance, but it succeeds in thinking about many things with which we have no acquaintance'. We have acquaintance with the things we have presentations of, in perception with the objects of perception and in thought with objects of a more abstract logical character. But for example though there seems no reason to believe we are ever acquainted with other people's minds, seeing that these are not directly perceived I could know Russell's mind as that having a certain property e.g. of thinking out the Theory of Descriptions. More precisely, as it is doubtful if I am acquainted with the theory of Descriptions, I can know the inside of my pen, with which I am not acquainted. As it is possible to disagree as to the precise nature of acquaintance, or direct presentation, and about what entities stand in either or both of these relations (or in "this relation" if they are identical) I have only said enough to suggest the kind of distinction Russell makes in 1905, and have purposely tried not to make it more precise than he does there.

Granting that we understand the broad distinction between acquaintance and knowledge about, it becomes easier to see how we could have symbols which are used simply to demonstrate or indicate entities directly presented, of which it would be nonsense to ask whether there are or are not such entities, and also symbols which refer indirectly. The detailed working

out of the Theory of Descriptions (and henceforth I shall try to use this phrase exclusively for the logical theory as to the use of symbols) consists in showing how all propositions in whose expression denoting phrases occur (that is, phrases used to refer indirectly) can be expressed in forms in which these phrases do not occur. It is deduced from this that the entities originally apparently indicated are in fact referred to indirectly, if there are such entities at all, and at any rate are not constituents of the propositions in question.

As far as I understand this argument, which is not very far, I think it is based on the assumption that if a symbol e.g. "Smith", demonstrates a constituent of the proposition Smith is wise, then although in order to express that proposition you could use any symbol which succeeded in demonstrating Smith you could not get rid of a demonstrative symbol in the expression of that given proposition and still express the same proposition. Further a demonstrative symbol is such that it would be non-significant if it has no referent. Hence, if a given phrase can both be deleted from the expression of a proposition, and is also significant though there is no entity to which it refers, it is not being used as a demonstrative symbol for any particular that is a constituent of the proposition. The constituents of propositions still remain on this view those entities without which the proposition could not be conceived. At the same time a rather formidable difficulty arises as to the nature of propositions, which we will discuss later.
To return to 1905 - the gist of Russell's argument is that though we can be acquainted with various things we do not necessarily have acquaintance with the objects denoted by phrases composed of words with whose meanings we are acquainted. The reason for this is that in the expression of many propositions a variable is involved. This notion of the variable is fundamental, and though in order to understand the proposition we must be acquainted with the kind of entities that can fill the empty place reserved by the variable (for example to understand the expressed proposition "all men are mortal" we must be acquainted with the properties "humanity" and "mortal") we need not be acquainted with the values for the variable involved. Further the values for the variable are not constituents of the proposition expressed, although there must be such values for the proposition expressed to be true. "All men are mortal" on this view is capable of analysis into "'x is human' implies 'x is mortal' for all values of x" and the denoting phrase 'all men' has disappeared. A basic assumption of course of this position is that we can be acquainted with properties in abstraction from the things that have them. It is obvious how extremely useful the theory is for explaining how it is that phrases can be significant though there are no entities having the properties in question. It simply means that there are no values for the variable involved.

It is unnecessary to deal in detail with Russell's other examples, and too much explanation is liable to be confusing, at the same time a very neat summary of his own at the end of the paper is worth quoting. 'When there is anything with which
we do not have immediate acquaintance, but only definition by denoting phrases, then the propositions in which this thing is introduced by means of a denoting phrase, do not really contain this thing as a constituent, but contain instead the constituents expressed by the several words of the denoting phrase. Thus in every proposition that we can apprehend (i.e. not only in those whose truth or falsehood we can judge of, but in all that we can think about) all the constituents are really entities with which we have immediate acquaintance.

Assuming it is clear that Russell solves his original problem by showing that apparent constituents are not in fact constituents of the propositions in whose expression denoting phrases occur, there remains a difficulty to raise before we follow the discussion of Descriptions in *Principia Mathematica*. The difficulty is this:

On the face of it it looks as though the individual words of sentences, if we are acquainted with their referends, should all be 'names', in the sense that had they no referends they would be simply noises or marks with no significance. This view, that we are acquainted with the referends of individual words is supported, I suppose, by the fact that the understanding of any expressed proposition obviously involves acquaintance somewhere. We can see this at once when translating a sentence from one language to another, more especially if there is no exact equivalent in the two languages and we are driven to pointing. But on the other hand it seems impossible
to accept the view that, at least ordinarily, individual words are used as 'names' as they must be if we do assume acquaintance with their referents. It is un plausible, for example, to suggest that 'author' and 'Waverley' are ever used as 'names' in this sense, however readily we grant that acquaintance is involved somehow in their understanding. If this is so then it becomes very important to ask at what point in the expression of a proposition this naming element comes in, and this, in a way, is the other side of a question already raised viz. what entities are the constituents of any given proposition.

A further and extremely difficult point to discuss is what the introduction of a variable, or more generally the importance of the structure of language, implies as to the nature of propositions. Russell is not very enlightening here as he is liable to use "sentences" "propositions" and the "verbal expression of propositions" indiscriminately. The difficulty, precisely, is that propositions were originally the objective public element common to different people's judgments. They were objective and public because Russell assumed the common sense position that different people could perceive and by implication make judgments about the same thing. This, further, seems to be the strongest argument for saying the constituents of propositions 'are'. But this view in its simplest form led, as we have seen, to difficulties; since, although the constituents of propositions are propositions, and by implication judgments, were apparently about non-entities.
This difficulty is avoided by saying we were confused about what were the constituents of the propositions because we had not recognised the presence of a variable in — and here is the difficulty — do we say "propositions in whose verbal expression denoting phrases occur" or do we say in "the expression of propositions etc." If the first alternative is correct a proposition is a queer sort of entity. If the second alternative is correct, then, since A can understand B when B says "the king of France is bald", not only are the constituents of the proposition such that A and B are both acquainted with them, but A and B must also have in common certain conventions as to the use of symbols. On the whole this seems far the more plausible view of the two, but it makes one wonder if it would not be very much simplified if there were only facts and sentences: and at any rate it is doubtful if there are unexpressed propositions. Be that as it may, I do not think the acceptance of the Theory of Descriptions entails the rejection of the simple conception of the nature of propositions with which Russell started, though what alternative should be put in its place I do not know.

There is one other point which is too important to leave unstressed. That is, whatever the new constituents of propositions are, if to understand the proposition we must be acquainted with them, it looks as though for two people to understand the same proposition the constituents must be such that two people can be acquainted with them. It would follow from this that, if sense-data are private to those who own
them, then, for Russell, propositions understood by different people should be composed of constituents that are universals. All this is extremely important in relation to later developments of Russell's position.

Although Russell was led to formulate the Theory of Descriptions partly by epistemological considerations and the study of these throws light on the theory, yet it is of the utmost importance not to be confused about the precise relation between acquaintance and knowledge about the logical problems connected with the use of language.

In my opinion, we should take at its face value the suggestion, in 1905, that the constituents of propositions are the immediate reference of sentences; and the detailed development of the theory in *Principia Mathematica* should be regarded as an attempt to show how indirect is the reference of most true sentences to the particular elements in the facts that make them true. It becomes intelligible, then, why such sentences should be capable of being regarded as in principle translatable into a set of sentences every element (word) of which could be used demonstratively. It is perfectly consistent with this to hold that for Russell ‘a given object A, cannot be said to be a constituent of a given proposition p, unless it would be logically impossible that o should be asserted, or believed, or considered at all, if there were no such object as A'. It is useful from this point of view to study the purely logical formulation of the theory in *Principia Mathematica* out of relation to its epistemological and metaphysical associations.
In Chapter III of the Introduction Russell is concerned to show that if the grammatical subject of a sentence is not the words but what we should ordinarily take the words to stand for - can be supposed not to exist, while the sentence remains significant, then it is plain that the grammatical subject - the words this time - is not a proper name i.e. is not a name directly representing some object. Thus in all such cases what the sentence expresses must be so analysable that what was the grammatical subject (words) of the sentence disappears, and by implication the non-existent entity it apparently named does not turn up in the final analysis of what the sentence expresses. In other words the non-existent round square is not a constituent of any fact which must be the case if the given sentence is true. 'Thus' according to Russell, 'when we say the round square does not exist' we may, as a first attempt at such analysis, substitute 'it is false that there is an object which is both round and square'. Generally, when "the so and so" is said not to exist, we have a proposition of the form \( \sim E! (\exists x) (Qx) \)
\( \forall E \cap \{ (\exists x) : Qx \equiv x = \exists \} \) or some such equivalent. Here the grammatical subject \((\exists x) (Qx)\) has completely disappeared; thus in "\( \sim E! (\exists x) (Qx) \)" \((\exists x) (Qx)\) is an incomplete symbol.

According to Russell, by an extension of this argument it can be shown that \((\exists x) (Qx)\) is always an incomplete symbol; because, for example, in the proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" here "the author of Waverley" is \((\exists x) (x wrote \) Waverley\).
Waverley) which expresses an identity, if the author of Waverley "could be taken as a proper name, and supposed to stand for some object C, the proposition would be Scott is C. But if C is any one except Scott this proposition is false; while if C is Scott, the proposition is "Scott is Scott" which is trivial and plainly different from "Scott is the author of Waverley". Generalizing, we see that the proposition is one which may be true or may be false, but it is never merely trivial like a=a. We may express this by saying that a = (\forall x)(q x) is not a value of the propositional function a = y, from which it follows that (\forall x)(q x) is not a value of y. But since y may be anything, it follows that (\forall x)(q x) is nothing. Hence since in use it has meaning it must be an incomplete symbol'.

'It might be suggested that "Scott is the author of Waverley" asserts that "Scott" and "the author of Waverley" are two names for the same object. But a little reflection will show that this would be a mistake. For if that were the meaning of "Scott is the author of Waverley" what would be required for its truth would be that Scott should have been called the author of Waverley; if he had been so called, the proposition would be true, even if someone else had written Waverley; while if no one called him so, the proposition would be false even if he had written Waverley. But in fact he was the author of Waverley at a time when no one called him so, and he would not have been the author if every one had called him so.
but someone else had written Waverley. Thus the proposition "Scott is the author of Waverley" is not a proposition about names, like "Napoleon is Bonaparte"; and this illustrates the sense in which "the author of Waverley" differs from a true proper name.

I have quoted this in full because Russell makes clear what he wants to say, and further as Professor Moore and after him Mr. J. Wisdom, have made important criticisms of Russell's use of "incomplete symbol", we want to keep in mind Russell's original statement. To keep however to Russell for a moment, there is one other important point that he makes, viz: any proposition of the form \( a = (\forall x)(q x) \) presupposes a proposition of the form \( E! (\forall x) (q x) \). In symbols and quoting: - 'taking \( q x \) to replace "x wrote Waverley" it is plain that any statement apparently about \( (\forall x)(q x) \) requires 1) \( (\exists x) \cdot (q x) \) and 2) \( q x \cdot q y \). If \( x = y \); here 1) states that at least one object satisfies \( q x \) while 2) states that at most one object satisfies \( q x \).

The two together are equivalent to \( (\exists x) \cdot q x = \text{true} \cdot x \in \mathbb{C} \) which we defined as \( E! (\forall x) (q x) \). Thus "\( E! (\forall x) (q x) \) must be a part of what is affirmed by any proposition about \( (\forall x)(q x) \)".

So much for Russell's own statements. We want now to summarize very briefly the main points, and then to see Moore's criticism. In the first place there are symbols whose sole function is to name, and which would be senseless were there nothing they named. Secondly there are symbols which are not-
names, and any sentence in which they occur can be so analysed that they disappear, and any proposition so expressed can be so analysed as to show that the entities apparently named are not particular constituents of any fact which must be the case for the sentence expressing the proposition to be true.

Russell uses this argument for all symbols that are not-names, and shows it in any case for \((\forall x)(qx)\) as it occurs in \(E!(\forall x)(q\bar{x})\). The latter is presupposed in any proposition of the form \(a = (\forall x)(q\bar{x})\) so that, on the face of it, it looks as though \((\forall x)(q\bar{x})\) is in any usage an incomplete symbol, not only in the sense of being other than a name, but of occurring always as it occurs in \(E!(\forall x)(q\bar{x})\). But it will be remembered that one of Russell’s chief examples of the distinction between direct (naming) and indirect (not-naming) reference is that of the difference between the reference of “Scott” and of “the author of Waverley” to Scott, where the latter phrase refers to an entity by means of a certain property belonging to that entity. It is here that Professor Moore’s criticism is important, because he pointed out that the reference of “the author of Waverley” to Scott, where Scott is an entity that could be named, is not the same kind of indirect reference as is involved in the usage of “The author of Waverley” in “The author of Waverley exists”. More precisely, the sense in which “\((\forall x)(q\bar{x})\)” in “\(a = (\forall x)(q\bar{x})\)” is an incomplete symbol, is not necessarily the same as the sense in which “\((\forall x)(q\bar{x})\)” in “\(E!(\forall x)(q\bar{x})\)” is incomplete: it will only be the same if “\(a\)” in “\(a = (\forall x)(q\bar{x})\)” neither names nor refers by description (i.e. refers to an entity by means of a property which is a simple predicate of
that entity) to any constituent of any fact which must be the case if the sentence in which "a" occurs is true. If we accept \[ a = (\forall x)(Qx) \] as the symbolic form of "Scott is the author of Waverley", then we require some extra-logical knowledge in order to decide whether \( (\forall x)(Qx) \) in this usage is incomplete, because the disappearance test applicable to \( (\forall x)(Qx) \) in \( E!(\forall x)(Qx) \) does not apply to "a" in \[ a = (\forall x)(Qx) \] and \( (\forall x)(Qx) \) is not incomplete here unless "a" is also. Russell could, I think, avoid this criticism by maintaining that if "Scott" in "Scott is the author of Waverley" is an incomplete symbol, \[ a = (\forall x)(Qx) \] is not the form of the proposition; but this suggestion is more than probably based on a misunderstanding of the symbolism. Be that as it may, the important point is that Russell should have distinguished, and did not distinguish, two kinds of indirect reference: namely 1) referring by description (or referring by means of a property which is simply predicated of an entity) to any particular constituent of a fact necessary to the truth of the sentence in which the descriptive phrase occurs, 2) neither naming nor referring by description etc, etc.

It is important now to discuss the nature of this second kind of indirect reference; since it is in terms of this rather than in terms of symbols that refer by description (and are incomplete simply because they are not-names) that logical constructions are generally defined. It is obvious that if "Scott is the author of Waverley" is a simple subject predicate proposition, "The author of Waverley" though it does not name Scott, for if it did the proposition would be of the \( a = a \) form, yet, on the metaphysical assumption that there are no disembodied
properties, does refer to Scott. In "the author of Waverley exists", by contrast, the presence of a variable is obvious, and the whole proposition is concerned to assert that there is a value for it. I.e. the property of being the author of Waverley belongs to something. This is not to suggest that initially the phrase "the author of Waverley" like any descriptive phrase does not involve a variable, but rather that the phrase as it is used in "Scott is the author of Waverley" refers in a peculiar and definite way to Scott since by the very assertion of the proposition we assign a definite value to the variable. In other words the very assertion of the proposition, so to speak, gets rid of the variable by replacing it by a definite value. In "The author of Waverley exists" we have not got rid of the variable but merely asserted that there is a value for it. In which case the reference of "the author of Waverley" to the constituents of any facts necessary to the truth of the two sentences is fundamentally different in the two cases. It is obvious, and should be still more so later, that it is \((\forall x)(Qx)\) as it occurs in \(E!((x)(Qx))\) that is the most important for explaining the significance of descriptive phrases that describe nothing. We can emphasize this, if necessary, by pointing to the fact that we could not - given no disembodied properties - strictly refer by description unless the entity referred to could be demonstrated; that is to say, unless there were such an entity, and over and above that an entity with which we could be acquainted.

With the possible developments of the logic of expression, however interesting and important, we are not, at any rate for
the moment, concerned: but it is worth quoting Russell's remark, "the first result of analysis, when applied to propositions whose grammatical subject is "the so and so" is to substitute a variable as subject; i.e. we obtain a proposition of the form: "There is something which alone is so and so, and that something is such and such". The further analysis of propositions concerning "the so and so" is thus merged in the problem of the nature of the variable i.e. of the meanings of some, any and all; which is a 'difficult problem'.

The truth and falsity of propositions.

In 1904 Russell had been concerned to establish, if this were possible, 'the principle that all presentations and all judgments have an object which is not merely immanent'. Here, although the favourable arguments had appeared to him overwhelming, he had fully admitted the grave difficulties presented by the problem of falsity. The nature of these difficulties and their possible solution have - needless to say - an interest in themselves, without special reference to their part in Russell's work. But it is very confusing to attempt to deal with problems in, so to speak, their own philosophical right, at the same time as trying to show their position in the development of a line of thought. Hence any discussion of the remains of the topic left over by Russell, will be kept to the end.

According to Russell, Meinong held that the object of a presentation is sometimes immanent but at other times not so; while the object of a judgment - which he calls an objective and Russell calls a proposition - is always merely immanent. Russell had in opposition to show both that presentations and judgments have objects, and, that the objects both of presentations and judgments are not merely immanent. This may look a lengthy way of stating the case, but I want to emphasise

that Russell was concerned to establish a number of independent facts. For instance, one might hold all presentations have objects which are public and mental, and consistently maintain that some judgments have no object at all. Further this emphasis is needed because Russell's discussion does seem very unshapely. Although his arguments in isolation are, for the most part, clear, he has put them together in a form that suggests he was not clear at the outset how many logically independent things he was trying to establish at once. Rashly perhaps, I am going to sort out his arguments under the following headings: 1) Presentations have objects. 2) Judgments have objects. 3) the objects of Presentations are not merely immanent. 4) The objects of true judgments are not merely immanent. 5) The objects of false judgments are not immanent.

That in all presentations there is an object, direct inspection seems to leave no room whatever for doubt. 

'A presentation must have an object; and it seems plain that every awareness must be awareness of something'. (Incidentally this is a point which Moore has made in nearly all of his published articles and which is very important when we come to deal with his views on sense-data) To return to Russell: if awareness is always of something and if there were no object; then the awareness would be of nothing, which seems impossible. We could put the whole thing more shortly, and avoid the


** " " p.515.
suggestion of tautology, by saying that awareness is at least a dual relation, and so by the nature of the case it has a term which is the object. Judgments have objects is also a proposition supported by direct inspection. According to Russell, 'if I believe that A is the father of B, I believe something; the subsistence of the something, if not directly obvious, seems to follow from the fact that, if it did not subsist, I should be believing nothing and therefore not believing'. His use of 'subsist' could be avoided without in the least affecting his argument. This argument to my mind, as also in the case of presentations, is really of the form - what we mean by awareness, or presentation, and what we mean by judging involves that there should be an object of some kind in both cases. Stated this way the position is rather strong. Moreover the obvious difficulty of avoiding tautologies suggests that 'direct inspection' in this case supplies a position difficult to avoid.

But though it may be part of the meaning of presentation, and judging, that something should be presented and judged; we have yet to establish that in both cases the object is not merely immanent. In the case of presentations Russell argues that, in the first place, there is a distinction between presentation and the object of presentation, since the awareness of red is not itself red. I am not quite sure how far he meant this to show there is an object at all, and how far it was in favour of the object being distinct from the presentation.
Probably he only meant to establish the first point here.

Quite obviously against the immanence of objects of presentations, he produces the following considerations: 1) The general argument that it is difficult to see how an immanent object differs from no object at all. Meinong admitted the immanent object does not exist and therefore it is no part of the mental state whose object it is; for this mental state exists. Yet although it is not part of a mental state, it is supposed to be in some sense psychical. This makes it difficult to see how the object is an object at all. Also, the relation between the mental state and the so-called object is very mysterious. 2) It seems impossible to explain any judgment of identity unless there are public and mental objects with which something is said to be identical. To argue we cannot say A and B are similar, unless there is some mental standard of reference, would I think be an argument of the same kind. Granting these considerations, and in addition assuming, as Russell does, that in presentation error does not arise, there are some arguments in favour of, and no good arguments against, holding there are public and mental objects to presentations. I think all these arguments should be regarded as persuasive rather than pretending to be strictly deducing a conclusion from accepted premisses. That in presentation there is acquaintance with a public and mental object, or perhaps better, with an object which in no way depends for its existence on the fact that it is cognised, is a position one holds or does not hold - if the latter it is difficult to prove anything, because one goes round in circles. In my opinion what Russell ought
to have done, and did not, was to start with the set of common sense views he in fact held all the time, and then find out what such views involved. That he did not, illustrates how the method of Moore and Russell, if their procedure can even now be given so definite a name as "The logico analytic method", was very gradually evolved.

Russell brought forward two more considerations in favour of non-immanent objects. In the first place that objects of presentations are immanent entails there is only awareness of the present psychical state. Hence arises the enormous difficulty of accounting for the relation of the immanent to the transcendent object, if there is one. Secondly Russell remarks, several times, that an object of presentation can be presented more than once. This, if it be regarded as proving that there are public objects, obviously begs the question. Even if we admit Russell was confused and in consequence oscillated between analysing his assumptions and trying to use them to prove themselves, we can still grant that to stress the fact that we assume two people can judge the same thing was enormously important. The same holds good of Russell's emphasis on the fact that numerically the same object may be presented more than once. I do not want now to consider whether we are correct in making these assumptions but only to emphasize that they are natural to common sense.

We now come to the question are there objects to judgments, and if so what sort of objects are they. Since in the case of presentation there is no question of error, it is here that the problem of the truth and falsity of propositions really arises.
In favour of the view that true judgments have objects which are facts, Russell says first straight out, and rightly, that it seems undeniable that there is a 'transcendent' object to correct judgments. 'There is a fact of which we are aware, and the judgment is correct because of that fact. Things which exist, for example, really do exist, and are not merely judged to exist; for, if so, the judgment that they exist would only exist if some one judged that it existed, and so on through a vicious regress'. Again 'suppose for the sake of definiteness, that our judgment is "A exists" where A is something that does as a matter of fact exist. Then A's existence, it seems plain subsists independently of its being judged to subsist; for, if this were not so, the judgment would be erroneous'. In other words, what we mean by saying a judgment is true is that there is a fact which somehow corresponds to what is judged. The judgment would be false if that particular fact judged to be the case were not the case. He produced one other consideration which is very unclear viz: that granting there are objects 'independent' of presentation in virtue of which we make judgments of identity, those judgments at least have objects that are not immanent.

We are now, as Russell says, apparently faced with two alternatives: 'Either a presentation or judgment may be wholly destitute of an object or else false propositions subsist just as much as true ones do. For false propositions may be assumed
and even (unfortunately) believed. We have already noted one general argument in favour of all judgments having objects, namely, that were there no object of a judgment we should be judging nothing and therefore not judging. We have also summed up the evidence for objects of true judgments being non-immanent. So that the position really is how can we hold both 1) that there are facts which make true judgments true and which are the objects of those judgments 2) there are false judgments.

Common sense would at once make false judgments those that have no object, but there are difficulties on this view. Hence we have to ask whether false judgments have no object, have an immanent object, or have transcendent objects just like true ones.

An essential premiss for showing false judgments must have some objects - immanent or otherwise - is that there is no obvious difference between true judgments and false. Russell argues, for instance, if (p implies q) implies (¬q implies ¬p) and (p implies q) is true, then there should be a gap between (p implies q) and (¬q implies ¬p). There is no sign of such a gap. Another point is that though when e.g. "A is the father of B" is false we would naturally say it is false because there is no fact - A is the father of B - yet, 'there seems to be involved something which is not a fact, and this something seems to be other than our judgment and independent of it.'

An argument against the object being merely immanent is that,

* Loc Cit. p. 510.
** " " p. 511.
*** " " p. 517.
since there is no obvious difference between true and false judgments, if false judgments have immanent objects true ones must also. This for no very convincing reason Russell rejects: 'if so we have the reduplication of immanent and transcendant objects which we found inadmissible in the case of presentations'. It seems to me that presentation and judgment are so utterly different that this argument has little force. In fact a general criticism that could be made of Russell's whole conception of the problem is that he assumes the relations of presentations and judging made more similar than they are. The relation of an object, or better still a fact, to the judgment that that fact is the case, is obviously extremely complicated. We could put this another way by quoting Russell against himself: 'the symbol for a fact is not a name' and add - it never could be. By contrast it seems we could name the object of a presentation, though if language that is expressive must always be general, we could not express that object. But as this criticism is partly implied later, by Russell's own view that the relation of judging is multiple, it is not a very valuable one.

The further considerations against immanent objects are:
1) that other people can believe the same thing 2) we can count propositions and make classes of them and include false ones in the list 3) p implies q may be true though p is false. If the proposition p is merely immanent the whole thing, p implies q,

Loc. Cit. p.516.
9.

should be. This however is a true proposition which we have supposed as not 'immanent' to the judgment \( p \) implies \( q. \)

Most of the arguments against immanent objects to false judgments apply in favour of there being no object at all. Further in favour of this view, as Russell says, when judgments are erroneous the error seems to consist precisely in the absence of 'objects' in the sense of facts that must be the case if the judgment is correct. At this point, therefore, we are faced with common sense convictions that it is the absence of certain facts that make false propositions false, and the presence of public objects that makes it possible for \( A \) and \( B \) both to believe a false proposition. Perhaps it would be better to say it is the presence of certain public objects that makes it possible for \( A \) and \( B \) to make the same false judgment. At this point Russell raises a final dust of assumptions, presentations, and blacknesses of tables that don't exist, monarchies, predestination and parliaments, through which I simply cannot see. He finally emerges on the side of there being public objects to judgments, on the grounds, apparently, that "To advance is to die, to retreat is dishonour; better death than dishonour" is true whether we advance or retreat. This conclusion entails because he has assumed throughout that judgment is a dual relation that there must be false propositions or single objects, so to speak, flat up against false judgments, and true propositions flat up against true judgments; although there are difficulties on such a view.

The conclusion, in 1904, that some propositions are true and some false just as some roses are red and some white, was bound to be unsatisfactory: and Russell turned in *The Nature of Truth* to a new solution of the problem. Before, however, we try to follow this discussion I want to emphasize several points that arise in the 1904 version. In the first place Russell's whole treatment suffers from a misconception as to the nature of the relation between judgments and the facts that make those judgments correct. This criticism, incidentally, is based on the common sense position, which to my mind Russell should have assumed outright, that it is some relation to a fact that a true judgment correct. The interesting point to notice is that this confusion of Russell's, which leads to such an impossible conclusion, is analogous to that of supposing that there must be round-squares because we can talk about them. So that the solution ought to lie in showing that the reference of a judgment to the fact that makes it true is as indirect as the reference of the symbols that express the proposition Scott is the author of Waverley to particular elements in the facts that make the proposition true. We could avoid "proposition" here by saying: 'the reference is as indirect as that of the sentence to the particular constituents of the facts that make it true'. I would go further and say that the problem of the truth and falsity of propositions should be soluble if we could find out what exactly is the reference of "Scott is the author of Hamlet" not to the particular constituents of the facts which make the sentence true because there are no such facts, nor to the particular constituents of the negative facts which make the
sentence false, because I doubt if there are any, but to the constituents in the universe with which we must be acquainted in order to understand the sentence. That two people can judge the same false sentence to be true will then be no more and no less mysterious than the fact that they can judge the same true sentence to be true. For both we require that there are some entities with which two people can be acquainted and perhaps understand the use of each other's symbols of expression. But to say all this of course is to say practically nothing.

To deal very shortly with On the Nature of Truth - because the bulk of it is a short and much clearer statement of the for and againsts there being objects both to true and false judgments - the main point Russell here makes is that, if two people can make the same false judgment, the object of both true and false judgments is not a single object. In other words he abandons the the position I have criticised him for holding, namely, that the relation of a judgment to its object is like the relation of a presentation to its object. He suggests that in judging a number of objects - perfectly good independent ones - are before the mind, which, so far as I understand the view, supposes a certain relation to hold between them and in a given direction. The judgment is true if in fact there is a corresponding relation holding between the objects of the judgment. On this view it is judgments that are primarily true and false.

In essence, to supply a plurality of objects to judgments is the same kind of solution to what we have suggested is the same kind of problem as showing how we can talk of round squares.
We avoid the contradiction there by granting that the phrase "the round square" in "the round square is blue" does not name any one single entity the round square. We avoid holding there are both true and false propositions (or objects or facts, they are equivalent here) by showing that judging is a relation between a mind and a set of objects one of which is a relation; and judging is not therefore a relation to a single object.

Whether, however, we talk of the truth and falsity of judgments, or of sentences, we have clearly only indicated a possible way of solving the problems when we admit a plurality of objects to false judgments, or suggest that in such a sentence as "Chimeras are intelligent" "Chimeras" is not a name for a single particular object, but the proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted. Certainly it is obvious how important it is to be clear as to the nature of the objects which are 'before the mind' in both cases. This should make abundantly clear how important for Russell is the nature of the objects of acquaintance.
Russell in 1904 had talked of "presentation" when he wanted to speak of a relation of awareness as distinct from judging. He used "acquaintance" once as an alternative word. In 1905 he distinguished fairly carefully between acquaintance and knowledge by description. In March 1911 he deliberately replaced "presentation" by "acquaintance" giving reasons for the change in terminology. These reasons throw some light on the nature of acquaintance, and derivatively on the objects of acquaintance, with which we are mainly concerned.

With regard to acquaintance Russell says:—'I say that I am acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object i.e. when I am directly aware of the object itself. When I speak of a cognitive relation here, I do not mean the sort of relation that constitutes judgment, but the sort which constitutes presentation. In fact I think the relation of subject and object which I call acquaintance is simply the converse of the relation of object and subject which constitutes presentation. But the associations and natural extensions of the word acquaintance are different from those of the word presentation'. Acquaintance, in contrast to presentation, does not imply that if an object once present to mind is no longer so, then we are not acquainted with that object. Presentation in other words suggests a cognitive relation which cannot hold unless the object in question is now presented.

Acquaintance does not have this implication. So far this is clear, what is unclear, though, is whether or no Russell really wanted to use "acquaintance" in such a way that we are acquainted with an object no longer present. From what he actually says at this point it is extraordinarily difficult to decide. On the basis of the use made of acquaintance later, one would suggest that to talk of acquaintance with an object not present to mind, is a contradiction in terms. The fact, however, remains that the term as originally introduced had not this strict significance. This point, to my mind, is by no means merely concerned with the use of words. The notion of acquaintance plays an enormously important part in the development of Russell's position and that the notion of acquaintance itself has gradually changed is not without significance. How important it is to be clear about acquaintance can only be appreciated later. I am not, by the way, suggesting that the notion of acquaintance has so much altered as maintaining that in the course of working out the original position Russell and others have gradually made more and more precise Russell's first conception of acquaintance. Perhaps the essential quality of acquaintance comes out best in the second distinction Russell made between it and presentation: namely, 'the word acquaintance is designed to emphasize, more than the word presentation, the relational character of the fact with which we are concerned.'

'There is a danger' according to Russell 'that in speaking of presentation, we may so emphasize the object as to lose sight

\[\text{Loc. Cit. p. 210}\]
of the subject. The result of this is either to lead to the view that there is no subject, whence we arrive at materialism; or to lead to the view that what is presented is part of the subject, whence we arrive at idealism, and should arrive at solipsism but for the most desperate contortions. Now I wish to preserve the dualism of subject and object in my terminology, because this dualism seems to me a fundamental fact concerning cognition. Hence I prefer the word acquaintance, because it emphasises the need of a subject which is acquainted.

The first point to stress is that it is a relation holding between two numerically distinct terms. Over and above this it is clear that the fundamental notion is that of a relation holding between a subject and an object that has at least been present to mind. Whether by the end of the discussion we are forced into holding that acquaintance is only rightly used for a relation between a subject and an object now present and that the relation between a subject and an object once presented is derivative and thus analysable in terms of the fundamental relation I do not know. I rather think we are: but this is all I mean by saying that the initial notion becomes more precise in the development of the position in which it is so important.

A further consideration suggested by Russell's deliberate change in terminology is the enormous importance, when there is a relation holding between two distinct terms, of avoiding words which can stand for the relation and the object term indiscriminately.

* For discussion of this point see Section 7.
Moore over and over again has emphasized a distinction between cognition and what is cognised, and analogous to this is the distinction between presentation and what is presented, sensation and what is sensed, experience or experiencing and what is experienced. In the case of presentation, sensation, and experience, the terminology can be seriously misleading, owing to the fact that all three words are capable of the double use suggested. The relevance of this to Carnap is obvious.

We now turn to the kind of objects with which, in 1911, Russell claims we have acquaintance. 'The first and most obvious' examples are sense-data. According to Russell 'when I see a colour or hear a noise, I have direct acquaintance with the colour or noise'. The direct sensible object so given is not to be confused with the physical object e.g. the door or window at which we should be commonly said to be looking: this is an elaboration of what Russell actually says but I think there is no doubt it is implied. This direct sensible object, which is distinct from the supposed physical object, is complex, at least more often than not. An example of such a complex would be this before that, or this above that, or the-yellowness-of-this. There is, I think, a definite ambiguity in Russell's use of "sense-datum", as it covers both this and that and the whole complex this before that. He certainly holds that 'this before that' may be directly given and presumably sensibly given, but evidently draws a distinction between such complexes and their terms. This is suggested by the fact that he treats both complexes and their terms as particulars, and then divides them into particulars which are existents, and particulars of
which one or more constituents are existents. He holds that possibly we may be aware of complexes without being aware of their constituents: which (if he means we can be aware of a complex without analysing out its parts and attending to them) is plausible, but, as Russell says, difficult to be at all clear about. What seems still more unclear is what Russell meant by an existent. The antithesis of existents, and complexes with existents as constituents, strongly suggests that an existent is an entity which is sensibly perceptible and in fact unanalysable. In which case an existent, since it is both simple and sensible, seems very similar to one of Hume's 'simple impressions'. I think it is of the utmost importance to recognise that Russell's use of "sense-datum" is ambiguous. As we have already shown he uses it in certain contexts to cover sensibly presented objects that are 'complex' in the sense in which 'this before that' may be said to be complex. On the other hand both in this article and in Le Réalisme Analytique there is evidence for the view that he held we are sensibly aware of entities that are in some sense simple. This evidence in the French article we shall discuss in a moment. On the whole, and in the light Russell made of sense-data, I think we should regard them as undoubtedly genuine constituents of the universe. Therefore if these genuine constituents are simple - as Russell holds - then his early view that sense data are even sometimes complex should be regarded as simply inconsistent with the bulk of what he says. Although we must

* Loc. Cit. p. 215
admit there is this inconsistency, yet it seems to me that the inclusion of sense-data among the simple elements presupposed by the existence of complexes, provides strong evidence for regarding sense-data, in Russell's philosophy, as among the ultimate constituents of the universe. I rather suspect that Russell, at this time, enquired very closely into whether sense-data are simple or complex. Certainly it is extremely difficult to determine what exactly we mean by, either of these adjectives. There is no doubt that, apart from this article in which they were allowed to be complex, sense-data were treated as ultimate constituents of the universe, and therefore if the question had arisen they should have been regarded as simple. The significance of this discussion, and the importance of the question, in relation to the Lowell Lectures is obvious. It was not until some years afterwards that Russell came to hold that simples are known only as the limits of analysis.

Besides acquaintance with particulars - in the sense defined - Russell claimed acquaintance with universals, but very carefully pointed out that we are aware of universals in a slightly different sense of aware from that of particulars. According to Russell 'not only are we aware of particular yellows, but if we have seen a sufficient number of yellows and have sufficient intelligence, we are aware of the universal yellow; this universal is the subject in such judgments as "yellow differs from blue" or "yellow resembles blue less than green does". And the universal yellow is the predicate in such judgments as

* This use of "particular" is clearly unsatisfactory.
"this is yellow", where this is a particular sense-datum. We are also directly aware of universal relations e.g. up, down, before, after resemblance, desire and so on. Russell supports this contention by two rather important considerations. In the first place we can know such propositions as 'a is before b' and 'b is before c' entail 'a is before c'. Here a and b and c are not definite things but just anything, so it would seem we can be acquainted with 'before' at any rate in abstraction from any specific case of one definite thing being before another definite thing. The second point is that the judgment 'this is before that' where this judgment is derived from awareness of an object which, presumably, is temporarily complex, constitutes an analysis. According to Russell 'we should not understand the analysis unless we were acquainted with the meaning of the terms employed. Thus we must suppose that we are acquainted with instances of it'.

In my opinion these two considerations are important partly because they show that Russell, whatever he meant by a universal, thought we could be acquainted with it in abstraction either from what it characterised - if it were a quality - or from terms it related - if it were a relation. Secondly the argument that we cannot understand the analysis of something unless we are acquainted with the meaning of the terms employed, is very closely connected with the principle Russell enunciated a few pages later namely, 'any proposition that we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted'.

To return - Russell therefore has two sorts of objects of which we are aware, namely, particulars and universals. Among
particulars he includes all existents, and all complexes of which one or more constituents are existents, such as this before that, this above that, the yellowness of this. Among universals he includes all objects of which no particular is a constituent. The distinction 'universal particular' includes all objects, and might also be called the disjunction abstract-concrete. It is not parallel with the opposition 'concept percept', since things remembered or imagined belong with particulars, but can hardly be called percepts. At the same time universals with which we are acquainted may be identified with concepts.

I have already said that what Russell means by an existent is to my mind a mystery, whatever he could mean by a universal seems to me an even deeper one. At the same time it is the sort of mystery that is unprofitable to discuss out of relation to all the things Russell at least has said on the topic. Also it is difficult to see how enormously important a clear theory of universals would be until we have some idea of the part played by acquaintance, and the objects of acquaintance, in Russell's development. I am therefore going to assume we have some idea of what he meant by a sense-datum — viz: what we are directly aware of in hearing or smelling or seeing etc.— what he meant by a quality and a relation; and that he held we could be acquainted with qualities and relations in abstraction from the things they qualified or related. This means leaving the detailed discussion of what they were aside, at least for the moment, and concentrating on the function they had to fulfill.

I have referred already to the fact that Russell was concerned to hold that two people can make what would commonly
be said to be the same judgment: further, if it is not already implied, that the object of A's judgment and the object of B's judgment is the same entity in both cases and is a perfectly good public and mental entity. By 'object' of a judgment here I simply mean 'that which is judged' the term or terms at the other end of the relation of judging, 'the accusative of judgment' or the entity answering to equivalent descriptions. Russell held moreover that the entities so judged are in a fundamental sense. The point would perhaps be better put - if A and B both judge x, the constituents of x are.

It followed directly from this position that the round square or the king of France, could not be a constituent of any judgment. Hence such sentences as "the king of France is bald" or "the round-square is unthinkable" must be capable of an analysis which showed that the phrases "the round square" or "the king of France" were not used to name single objects that are. This development came from the position that it was self-contradictory for an entity which is not, to be at the same time a constituent of a judgment. Together with this difficulty arose the problem of accounting for A's and B's ability both to believe a false proposition. Or, as I would prefer to put it, there arose the problem of how A and B could make the same false judgment. The judgments could only be called the same in virtue of reference to an entity or entities which are common to both judgments and between them. Russell's first position was to admit both objective true and objective false propositions. This was obviously unsatisfactory and led him to formulate the
multiple theory of judgment.' The essence of this was to split up the so-called object of judgment into several entities, each of which presumably have being, and a relation. Hence when A judges x to be the case, there is a 'complex' consisting of S related by the relation of judging to a set of elements B, C, etc. and whatever relation R is supposed to hold between B and C etc. The point to get hold of is that the relation of judging holds between A, B, C, and the relation R severally.

Now the principle which is of absolutely fundamental importance is that already quoted viz: 'every proposition which we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted', which Russell calls 'the fundamental epistemological principle in the analysis of propositions containing descriptions'. It is, however, enlightening to quote in this context his re-statement of the same principle a few pages later viz: 'whenever a relation of supposing or judging occurs, the terms to which the supposing or judging mind is related by the relation of supposing or judging must be terms with which the mind in question is acquainted'.

It follows from this that B, C, and R in the complex which constitutes a judgment are all objects with which the mind is acquainted. But the objects of acquaintance are either sense-data or universals; therefore the genuine constituents of all our judgments are either sense-data or universals. This is not

For discussion of the objects of acquaintance see Kneale, The Objects of Acquaintance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 1933-34. This article is interesting but was published after the bulk of this thesis was written.
quite accurate because one constituent of a judgment is a mind and another is the relation of judging; and these are constituents of any judgment. Hence we want to talk as Russell does, of the distinctive constituents of any judgment, and then to say these are either sense-data or universals. The ambiguity that I have pointed out in Russell's use of "sense-datum" in no way affects the view that he did regard sense-data as objects of acquaintance. Partly to avoid prolixity and partly because of a most interesting suggestion that at once follows, we will put back the word "proposition" for the distinctive constituents of any judgment. It then follows that the genuine constituents of propositions are sense-data or universals.

Two important considerations are connected with this. In the first place Russell originally assumed that the constituents of propositions are. There is no doubt that for other reasons also he regarded sense-data and universals as genuine elements in the universe. On the other hand the identification of them provides with the constituents of propositions, I think, further evidence of the important ontological position of sense-data and universal in Russell's philosophy.

The other consideration is important in relation to the epistemological position of sense-data and universals. It will be remembered that Russell, both in Mind 1904 and On the Nature of Truth, stressed the fact that in presentation no error arises. We start making mistakes when we start making judgments about what is directly given. "Acquaintance" has been substituted for "presentation" with the alteration in meaning already mentioned, but there is absolutely no reason to suppose that
Russell withdrew the view that it is impossible to doubt the
deliverance of direct awareness. On the contrary in Mind 1913,
and later, he repeatedly emphasised the indubitability of the
relation of acquaintance. It follows that for Russell the
objects of acquaintance are the basis of knowledge.

Two other articles should now be brought into line with
this discussion, namely: Le Réalisme Analytique and The Basis
of Realism. Both are interesting if only for their close
chronological relation to the Aristotelian article that we have
been mainly considering. The Aristotelian paper was read
March 5th 1911, The Basis of Realism appeared in the Journal of
Philosophy for March 16th 1911, and Le Réalisme Analytique was
read in France on March 23rd of the same year. Both however
bring out important points in Russell's general position.

Perhaps the outstanding point in Le Réalisme Analytique is
that Russell's philosophy is a form of atomism. It is atomic
and it is analytic 'parce qu'elle soutient qu'il faut chercher
les éléments simples dont se composent les complexes, et que
les choses complexes présupposent les choses simples, tandis que
les choses simples ne présupposent pas les choses complexes'.
Or again 'Je dis donc qu'il y a dans l'universe des êtres simples,
ce que ces êtres ont des relations en vertue desquelles ils
composent des êtres complexes..... chaque entité simple est un
atome'.

The distinguishing characteristic of these of these atoms
* Le Réalisme Analytique.p.55 à 56.
is that they are purely logical atoms: 'Il ne faut pas supposer que les atomes doivent persister à travers les temps,, ou qu'ils doivent occuper des points de l'espace: ce sont des atomes purement logiques'.

The next important point to notice is that there are two kinds of constituents into which complexes can be analysed. There are terms and the relations which relate them. Or perhaps there may be a term and a predicate which qualifies it. Propositions may be about relations but on the other hand there are terms which can only appear as logical subjects and never as relations or predicates. These special terms Russell calls particulars while 'les autres termes des complexes, ceux qui peuvent paraître comme relation ou comme prédicat, je les appelle des universels'.

Universals do not have being in quite the same sense as particulars, and it is particulars which exist in the strict sense of the term. I am not sure what Russell means by this but to discuss it would be irrelevant to the main issue. The points he most wants to insist on are that though particulars exist there is no reason to suppose they persist: 'ils peuvent n'exister qu'un instant'. Secondly 'leur existence n'a pas besoin d'être indépendante des autres existences au point de vue causal. (Au point de vue logique, toute existence simple est indépendante de toute autre, et la seule dépendante est du complexe au simple). L'ancienne idée de substance contenait deux éléments...... 1) un élément logique 2) un élément métaphysique, à savoir l' existence permanente et indépendante.
J'accepte le premier élément, mais je n'accepte pas le second.

To my mind this notion of a particular that may be logically independent but not causally so, is important and not easy to understand. Possibly the idea is derived from two views, which I will put forward in a moment, but must wait until we have seen the cognitive relations into which logical atoms may enter.

Some universals are known and some are not. The same is true of particulars. Those universals that are known are called concepts 'Les particuliers qui sont connus s'appellent données des sens (en prenant cette expression dans son interprétation la plus large). Les concepts et les données des sens sont également des objets pour l'esprit: c'est à dire que ce sont des entités auxquelles l'esprit a un rapport cognitif. Ni les uns ni les autres ne sont dans l'esprit - exception faite toute fois, pour le cas des données psychologiques'.

It is clear from this that sense-data and universals are the basic elements of knowledge and are, over and above this, at least some of the simples into which complexes are analysable. That they are some only of the ultimate elements of the universe suggests that we must guard against asserting that they are the basic elements. On the other hand Russell is definitely committed to the view that whatever the unknown universals and particulars are like they are similar to concepts and sense-data in being simple. It would follow that if a physical object were something complicated and capable of analysis it would not be found among the ultimate furniture of the world.

* Loc. Cit. p.56.
We now come to an important point with regard to the nature of sense-data. Russell helds there are no general reasons for rejecting realism in so far as it means that sense-data are identical with physical objects, and continue to be, even in the absence of a subject. There are however 'des raisons de détail - les raisons traditionelles - de croire que les données des sens ne dépendent pas seulement (au point de vue causal) de l'objet, mais aussi de sujet. En d'autres termes, on se trouve forcé de croire que les données des sens sont des entités qui existent seulement quand il y a un certain rapport entre le sujet et l'objet physique - un rapport en partie spatial en partie physiologique. L'objet physique est une "chose en soi" qu'on ne peut connaître directement; son existence même est douteuse, puisqu'elle dépend d'une induction assez précaire.

The point of holding that particulars which though logically independent are not causally so, then becomes clear. Russell, it seems, wanted to hold both that sense-data are perfectly good examples of simples into which complexes may be analysed, and secondly to admit there are reasons for supposing sense-data only exist when there is a certain relation between a subject and a physical object. To my mind he need not have paid any attention to the reasons for supposing sense-data do only exist when there is this relation. To pay attention to the accepted physiological or physical views on the subject is to presuppose a metaphysical view both as to the nature of the physical object and the relation of sense-data to it. I do not want to assert or deny anything about the accompanying physics or physiology. But that as Russell was there using sense-
data - simply for that which e.g. a man sees when he sees a flash of lightning - he had no need to assume anything about the relation of such sense-data to physical objects, if there are any. In which case to hold that sense-data are causally dependent on physical objects in a certain relation to a mind is not necessarily false but simply irrelevant. I may add how irrelevant it is, is suggested by some remarks Russell made later in reply to Professor Dawes Hicks' criticism of the Problems of Philosophy. This article is so important in connexion with the whole of this paper that perhaps some of it is worth quoting at length. I want first to sum up the position so far.

There are at least two cognitive relations one of which is dual (acquaintance) the other multiple (judgment). In the case of acquaintance it is impossible to doubt whether or not there is an object because to ask a question would be non-significant. Hence the objects of acquaintance are the basic elements of knowledge. On the other hand any proposition that we can understand must be composed wholly of constituents with which we are acquainted. But the constituents of propositions, at any rate in the early part of Russell's work, at least are among the ultimate furniture of the world. It follows that there is good reason to suppose Russell regarded the objects of acquaintance both as the basic elements of knowledge and as basic elements of the universe. It is therefore very important to be clear as to the nature of the objects of acquaintance. The Aristotelian Article brings out the point that they are sense-data and universals. The French article brings out the point that Russell's position as a whole is (1) a form of atomism, in
so far as it supposes a logical dependence of complexes upon simple entities; a form of realism in so far as it supposes cognition to be a direct relation between a subject and an object. This object is not an idea, but a genuine bit of the external world, and there is no reason to suppose that this object is in any sense similar in kind to the subject that knows it. The French article brings out further the point that universals and sense-data are both, what we will call for short, ontological and epistemological objects. But though universals and sense-data constitute the elements of knowledge, there may be other elements in the universe as well. On the other hand, in this article, Russell is committed to the view that whatever else there is among the ultimate furniture of the world it must be simple. It would follow that anything capable of analysis is not included. The relevance of this becomes more obvious when we discuss the relation of sense-data to physical objects. It is important to notice that Russell remarked that a physical object is a 'chose en soi' even the existence of which is doubtful.

The Basis of Realism throws light on the position by the emphasis Russell lays on the doctrine of external relations; and the precise interpretation he gives to this doctrine. The doctrine, according to Russell, 'may be expressed by saying that (1) relatedness does not imply any corresponding complexity in the relata; (2) any given entity is a constituent of many different complexes'. I do not propose to elaborate this, except to mention a point of great importance, namely: that Russell so interprets the first clause that, if it were false, 'simple terms could have no relations, and therefore could not enter into
complexes; hence every term would have to be strictly infinitely complex'.

The doctrine of external relations is therefore closely connected with the view that there are simples. Arising out of, and perhaps even more important than this, is the remark Russell makes to the effect that 'The two parts of the doctrine of external relations together constitute the justification of analysis, and the denial of the view that analysis is falsification'. We shall see the significance of this more clearly when discussing the presuppositions of analysis; one of which certainly is that there are simples. It is interesting that Russell himself seems to have recognised this as early as 1911.

Now that we have some indication of the position of sense-data and universals in Russell's philosophy, I think they themselves should be discussed in rather more detail. After that we can return to the relation of sense-data to physical objects.

* Journal of Philosophy. 1911 p.159.*
The objects of acquaintance. II.

In reply to an article of Professor Dawes Hicks' Russell gave an interesting re-statement of the nature of acquaintance and made, I think, his conception of sense-data clearer than before.

Presentation or acquaintance was to be radically distinguished from judgment since acquaintance is a two-term relation of a subject or (better) an act, to a single (simple or complex) object, while judgment is a multiple relation of a subject, or act, to the several objects concerned in the judgment. From the fact that presentation is a two-term relation, the question of truth or error cannot arise with regard to it: in any case of presentation there is a certain relation of an act to an object, and the question whether there is such an object cannot arise. In the case of judgment error can arise; for although the several objects of the judgment cannot be illusory, they may not be related as the judgment believes they are. The difference, in this respect, between judgment and presentation is due to the fact that judgment is a multiple relation, not a two-term relation.

Russell continued to describe sense-data as a class of objects with which we are acquainted. They were differentiated from other objects of acquaintance by the fact that their presentation is sensible. They might be defined as 'presented

* Mind July 1912.
** Mind 1913 p.76.
objects simultaneous with the act of presentation'. As Russell points out, this definition excludes universals, because they are not in time and therefore not simultaneous with anything. Secondly it excludes remembered objects, because these are earlier than the acts which remember them. It is important to remember here that the definition is simply of sense-data, which are a species of objects of acquaintance. Russell is not excluding universals and remembered objects from objects of acquaintance, but only from sense-data. I do not think, either, he is committed to denying that universals may be apprehended through sense, though the kind of acquaintance we have with universals is a little difficult to understand.

Sensations, in contrast to sense-data, Russell here uses for the complex act-acquainted-with-object. The inseparable connexion between sense-data and sensation is, so far, a matter of definition. By this Russell means that in so far as a sensation stands for an act acquainted with an object, there clearly cannot be sensations without objects if there are sensations at all. Conversely, sense-data, by definition, are those objects, if any, which are sensibly presented and are simultaneous with the act of presentation. The point Russell now makes clear is that the sense-data may have other properties in common besides that of contemporaneous acquaintance. Supposing 'As' one all those objects which have the common properties of sense-data with the possible exception of being given in sense, then it is possible to enquire into the nature of the relation of sense-data to the 'As'. It is important not to confuse the question of the relation of the 'As' to sensations,
with that of the relation of sense-data to sensation.

It is clear from this that Russell is right in maintaining that it is impossible to speak of the sense-datum as appearing different from what it is. The object of a presentation is what it is, and there is an end of the matter. He is further concerned to maintain that the sense-datum is certainly something other than the subject, something to which the subject's relation is just as external as to the physical object. Where he parts company with the out and out realist is in holding that for various empirical reasons of detail, it is not certain that the quality which is the sense-datum ever exists at times when it is not a sense-datum.

Russell means by a quality, here, that which we previously symbolised by A. His argument then is that objects given in sense, simultaneous with the act of presentation, are different from the subject and are externally related to the subject. At the same time there are empirical reasons for supposing these objects may not exist when not so presented. The point to notice is the stress he lays on the empirical nature of these reasons. It is not apparently considered a priori impossible for that which is in fact given to exist when not given.

Russell argues from empirical reasons also, that it is not the case that we are acquainted with the physical object. More precisely he rejects Professor Dawes Hicks' suggestion that he regards it as a priori impossible to have acquaintance with physical objects. He decided that it is a question of fact

x Cf. Moore Refutation of Idealism.
and suggests by a rhetorical question that in fact we are not acquainted with physical objects. In discussing this I think we have to move very carefully. Probably it is impossible to absolve Russell from sheer inconsistency. At the same time we want to be clear as to the precise point at which the inconsistency lies. For example it would not follow from the fact, if it were a fact at this time, that Russell conceived the physical object as involving multiplicity, that we could not be acquainted with it. This would not follow because Russell, at this point, was still holding we could be acquainted with complex objects. The inconsistency is the one already pointed out, namely, he should not have held we could be acquainted with complex objects, and at the same time have maintained both that the ultimate furniture of the world is simple and that acquaintance is a relation between a subject and an object which is in a fundamental sense. I am not suggesting that Russell should maintain that directly we are acquainted with an object we know all there is to know about it. On the contrary, he could perfectly well hold that we are acquainted with a specific red sense-datum without being aware of its difference from an equally specific blue one. The point is he should have abandoned one of the following positions, namely: Sense-data are complex: we are acquainted with sense-data: we are acquainted with ultimate constituents of the universe: the ultimate constituents of the universe are simple. In fact, I think, as has already been suggested, Russell never considered, in relation to the other positions he held, the question whether sense-data are complex or not. He required for his epistemology
that we should be acquainted with genuine elements of the universe, and there is no doubt he considered sense-data as answering to this description. We shall see this point even more clearly later. It remains to point out that the theory of the nature of physical objects which Russell came to hold in the Lowell Lectures did entail that we not only are not, but could not be acquainted with physical objects. This is interesting in relation to Professor Dawes Hicks' original criticism.

To return once more to sense-data: Russell regarded them as existing quite as truly as anything. "Indeed I regard their existence as the ultimate certainty on which all knowledge of what exists must be based. But it seems that their nature and their existence are to some extent dependent on the subject. This is not in the sense that they are illusory, or that they are in the mind (whatever that means) but in the sense that there is no good reason to suppose that they exist when they are not sensated, or that a particular sense-datum is ever sensated by more than one subject.

It is worth noting here that if objects of acquaintance were restricted to sense-data, it would follow from the principle of acquaintance that any empirical statement I can understand should be resolved into a set of statements about my own sense-data. It is interesting to compare this with Mr. A. J. Ayer's

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Cf Moore 1909-10. Subject Matter of Psychology. In the case of sense-data 'there is no question whether there are such entities'.

Mind. 1913. p. 79.

For further discussion of this point and that of solipsism see my Aristotelian paper. Cf. Moore Nature and Reality of Objects in Perception, Use of "sense-contents". Russell's in 1913 direct follow-on from Moore 1905-6, and also connexion with Moore Aristotelian 1913-1914.
remark "any expression of which an object other than a fundamental object, is a constituent is translatable into expressions of which it is not a constituent but certain objects belonging to the stage below it are. The fundamental objects are my sense contents. For all propositions that I can understand can be verified by the occurrence of certain sense-contents in a sense field. Therefore they are all of them in principle formulatable as propositions about my sense contents'. In order to draw any interesting conclusions from this comparison we should have to establish that Russell's use of "sense-data" and Mr. Ayer's of "sense contents" are in all relevant respects the same. Of this I am not sure. Hence it is uncertain how far Mr. Ayer's view, and that of the school of thought he represents, is the direct outcome of taking over certain positions of Russell's. At the same time there is no doubt that the relation between the two views is both historically and logically very close. With the question of how far either view entails any form of solipsism, we shall be concerned later.

To return to Russell - in 1913 he was still regarding the physical object (if there were any such and the scientific account of them were roughly true) as related to sense-data by a complicated relation. This relation was compounded of a relation which would commonly be called causal, together with similarity of position in two structures (that of sense-data and that of physical objects) which have certain logical affinities. What Russell meant by structure here is quite mysterious. There is no doubt that he regarded the existence of physical


* See footnote previous page.
objects with profound suspicion.

So much for acquaintance and sense-data. Before we turn to the other objects of acquaintance, universals, it is worth remembering that Russell held it was 'particulars which are instances of the universal and are sense data when that shade of colour is seen' although there is a universal which is a given shade of colour.

It will be remembered that in 1911 Russell argued that we are acquainted not only with instances of universals but with universals. In 1912 he dealt in detail with the question of universals and particulars. In order to appreciate what he was driving at we need to refer back to Moore's Nature of Judgment. In order to see the significance of the problem we should have to be clear as to how far the privateness of sense-data to the percipient and the principle of acquaintance entail, if at all, any form of solipsism. We will try to get clear about Russell's view first.

That philosophers who have seen in the distinction between universals and particulars an irreducible distinction between logical subjects and predicates have also treated predicates - I would add relations - as if they were a special kind of logical subject, seems to me completely correct. Whether or not they were mistaken in this is not so obviously true. If it were a mistake Ramsey seems to have been the first person to have come

Cf. Mind 1913 p.80.

Loc. Cit.


near to avoiding it. But to my mind it is still doubtful if 'that great muddle the theory of universals' has been seen through by Wittgenstein or anybody else, or is likely to be for some time.

It is customary to begin a discussion of universals and particulars by deciding that the question is whether or not there are two irreducibly different kinds of elements in the universe. If one happens to hold an 'atomistic' metaphysic this is equivalent to the question whether or not there are two irreducibly different kinds of atoms. Having formulated the question in this way it is almost impossible to avoid getting tied up in considerations as to whether one kind of atom is reducible (whatever that may mean) to the other kind, or not. The more important point is that possibly the initial formulation of the question is mistaken. We are not asking, or rather we ought not to be asking, whether there are or not two irreducibly different kinds of 'atoms' but whether there are simple elements which are strictly logical subjects, and besides those something so different that possibly we cannot even apply the word 'element' to it without danger of talking nonsense. We talk nonsense, in one of its various forms, so often that perhaps this is not very startling. The point is that once we have called something an element, or given it a name of any sort, it is extremely difficult to avoid substantializing it, and, in this case, regarding it as the 'stuff' of which the universe is made. In consequence we do in fact tend to treat predicates and relations as a

\[\text{Cf. Russell. Le Réalisme Analytique.}\]
special kind of logical subject.

There are signs of the beginning of such a treatment of relations in *The Nature of Judgment*. To treat qualities as logical subjects is as old as Plato. It is worth noting in case such treatment is a mistake, that the whole line of development from Moore has been towards avoiding this tendency although Mr. Ayer is correct in supposing that there is such a tendency.

There is no doubt that in *The Nature of Judgment* Moore laid the foundations of a pluralistic metaphysic, more precisely the logical atomism developed by Russell. Moore’s position can be looked at from two points of view: either as the assertion of a plurality of disconnectable concepts, or as the recognition that there are relational facts. The second way is relevant to the topic of universals and particulars, since to assert that there are relational facts implies not only numerical difference between the terms related, but a difference in kind either between related terms and their mode of combination or between relata and those that relate; and possibly it implies both of these distinctions. I say ‘possibly both’ as it might be the case that the second distinction is definable in terms of the first, though this suggestion is hazardous and I put it forward but tentatively.

I think it would be correct to say that Moore assumed an irreducible distinction between concepts and their mode of combination, and that this distinction under the guise of the difference between the constituents and the form of a fact has run through the whole line of thought developing from Moore.
I do not, at least at the moment, want to question this distinction. But in *The Nature of Judgment* Moore never made quite clear, when he was talking of concepts, whether they should be considered only as the terms of a relational fact, or whether the relating relation was also a concept. Further he never made quite clear whether to say that a different relation held between A and B (not concepts) from that which held between C and D, was simply a way of saying two different concepts were components in the two cases or whether it simply meant that A and B were combined in an irreducibly different way from C and D. Hence it is difficult to make out from *The Nature of Judgment* whether, when Moore talked of two different kinds of concepts, he was talking of (a) two different kinds of terms that can be related, or (b) a distinction between related and, in a sense, almost equally substantial terms— that—relate, or (c) the difference between relata and the way they are combined in a relational fact.

The correctness of these distinctions is irrelevant for the moment, and anyway an exceedingly difficult subject about which to say anything sensible. The main point is that Russell seems to have in fact taken over from Moore, without question, the distinction between the terms and the form of a fact, and to have discussed universals and particulars in terms of the distinction between two kinds of concepts, relations and possible relata. "Concepts", incidentally, is here used as Moore and not as Russell used the term. It is clear from this

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Cf. Section III. D. 4
that at the beginning there was a tendency to regard the distinction of universals and particulars as a distinction between concepts. We shall see in a moment that this is followed up by Russell treating the distinction as one between terms that can only occur as logical subjects and terms that can occur both as logical subjects and as predicates or relations. Since Russell's use of "terms" in this connexion is similar in all relevant respects to Moore's use of "concepts", the trend of thought is obvious.

Although, by the distinction between concepts that exist in time and those that do not, the topic of Universals and Particulars was suggested in *The Nature of Judgment*, it came up more clearly in *Identity*. Here Moore in asking what was meant by saying two things are similar, raised the question of whether the specific quality that characterised 'a' and the specific quality that characterised 'b' was in fact one quality or two qualities as numerically distinct as 'a' and 'b'. His conclusion seemed to be that the qualities were in fact two, but that each had a 'nameless' relation to a universal, and it was in virtue of this that either the two qualities or 'a' and 'b' the objects qualified (which of these is not quite clear) were said to be similar.

What exactly Moore meant by either "particular" or "universal" in *Identity* is extremely difficult to see. As far as I understand him, Moore should hold that the things which are particulars are specific sense qualities, and that particulars are not to be identified with the things characterised by those specific sense qualities. What meaning however to attach to the following
passage is difficult to determine. 'Anything is a particular
which has to some other things, differing from it numerically
only, the peculiar nameless relation above mentioned. Anything
is a universal which has this relation to nothing else at all.
Thus there may be universals having only one particular, or
having no particulars whatsoever: but every particular must
have a universal. The name "universal" must not therefore be
understood to imply particulars, but only to note the fact that
if there be more than two things differing from one another
numerically only, there is one among them having a relation to
all the rest, which none of the rest have to it or to one another.
A class concept, on the other hand, does imply at least one
member, conceptually different from it, and if there are more
it has to all a relation which none of them have to it or to
one another. It is moreover always also a universal, but may
have no particulars. Great care is therefore needed in
distinguishing the different relations it may have to different
things in either character.'

I find it difficult to understand what precisely Moore was
maintaining. Probably the best guess is Findlay's to the effect
that Moore's view resembles Meinong's, and perhaps indirectly
Plato's. Meinong apparently distinguished two senses in which
we may speak of a characteristic: when I utter the word 'green'
I may be referring to a characteristic as such, regardless of its

* To be consistent with every particular having the nameless
relation to only one universal this should clearly read 'thing'
and not 'things.'

occurrence in this or that object, or I may be thinking of it as the attribute of a particular object. 'In the former sense green subsists timelessly like similarity or diversity and is not affected by the coming into being or the passing away of objects that are green; in the latter sense, there as many greens as there are green objects, and each of these 'greens' comes into existence and passes away with the object that possesses it.' 

'Green' in the first sense would, I think, for Moore be a universal in relation to the specific and numerically distinct 'greens' in the second sense. It would be a class-concept in relation to the objects characterised by 'greens' in the second sense. The only flaw in this interpretation is the difficulty of seeing how a universal which has no particulars succeeds in being a class concept, if "particulars" means specific shades. If it means the objects characterised by them then of course we may have classes with no members. Possibly Moore used "particular" in different senses in different places.

There are two main points to notice about Russell's treatment of universals in The Principles of Mathematics. In the first place he splits up terms, which he says are all logical subjects, into things indicated by proper names, and concepts. As we have already pointed out Russell has a double use of terms in this connexion. I think it could be regarded as corresponding to a wide and narrow conception of a logical subject. In the wider sense anything that has 'being' is a term, in the narrower sense terms are the subjects 'about' which propositions

p.44.

Section II.
are. In this case "Socrates is human" has only one term. It is terms in the wider sense that divide into things and concepts. Concepts in turn divide into 'those indicated by adjectives and those indicated by verbs. The former kind will often be called predicates or class concepts; the latter are always, or almost always, relations'. The interesting thing about all this is that Russell attempts to elaborate this distinction in terms of the way in which concepts are used. Concepts in contrast to things can occur both as terms, in the narrow sense, and as predicates and relations; whereas 'things' have not this double use, but can only occur as terms in the narrow sense. A further important and interesting property of concepts is their ability to denote. Propositions in *The Principles of Mathematics* seem to have eked out a miserable career sharing most of the properties which would now be attributed to facts but having, over and above that, constituents that denote. With the substitution later of denoting phrases for denoting concepts, propositions do seem to have become what Findlay, borrowing a useful word, calls Zwischendinge. Incidentally his contention that because propositions are now commonly thought of in this way, therefore Russell's propositions before 1905 and Moore's in *The Nature of Judgment* are to be sharply distinguished from Meinong's objective is quite beside the point. It was due to reflection on the difficulties of regarding propositions as in all respects similar to facts that accounted for the conception of a proposition as something different both from a fact and a sentence. I do not however want to argue that Russell's propositions before 1905 were in all respects similar to Meinong's adjectives
because there seem to have been other differences. All this however is really in parenthesis, the point I do want to make is that if the really startling property of concepts was to denote and shortly afterwards denoting phrases were substituted for denoting concepts there are the germs to be found in The Principles of Mathematics, of a theory which differentiates universals from particulars in terms of different kinds of symbols. This is interesting to compare with Ramsey and Mr. Ayer.

The second main point is that Russell criticised Moore's theory of universals with numerically diverse instances; and argued in favour of the view that if A and B differ, and C and D differ, it is precisely and numerically the same relation of difference that occurs in the two cases.

This same line of thought Russell developed more fully in 1911. There are three possible views between which to decide: either (1) there are no universals, or (2) there are no particulars, or (3) there are both particulars and universals. The initial question that governs the whole discussion is 'whether there is a fundamental division of the objects with which metaphysics is concerned into two classes, universals and particulars, or whether there is any method of overcoming this dualism'.

Russell attributes the first of these alternatives to Berkeley and Hume. It presupposes particulars; and can be dismissed on the ground that, even if qualities are analysable into relations of similarity, we should get into a vicious infinite regress trying to explain this similarity without

* Principles of Mathematics, p. 52.
** Universals and Particulars, p. 1.
admitting a relation which is itself a universal. Hence having got one universal there is no good reason to reject others. This argument, I think, not only presupposes that there are particulars, but also that there is at least one true statement to the effect that this particular resembles that particular. Russell's result is then to show that we cannot give a satisfactory analysis of this without assuming a universal of some sort.

With the rejection of the view that there are no universals, the issue then lies between the view that there are only universals and that which holds there are both universals and particulars. On the first theory the problem is to account for the apparent diversity of similar patches of colour. Incidentally it is enormously difficult to phrase this without begging all the questions at the start. Russell starts from the fact that 'we speak of two white patches, and it is obvious that, in some sense, the patches are two not one. It is this spatial plurality which makes the difficulty of the theory that denies particulars'. Russell has confined his discussion to the consideration of sensible objects in a single sensible space, the gain is obvious.

Taking a 'place' (for reasons which are here irrelevant) to be the space occupied by one undivided object of perception, then the maxim that one thing cannot be in two places at once can be restated to meet the fact that perceived spatial relations though capable of order, have not the neat smooth properties of geometrical relations between points. The maxim becomes 'every spatial relation implies diversity of its terms i.e. that nothing
is to the right of itself, or above itself, and so on'.

Russell’s argument in favour of particulars then consists in pointing out that there are certain perceptible spatial relations such as ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, and these spatial relations have the property of being such that no object can have them to itself. ‘It follows directly from this that the terms of spatial relations cannot be universals or collections of universals, but must be particulars capable of being exactly alike and yet numerically diverse’. It is not quite clear from this whether Russell regards universals as numerically the same in all cases, or whether he regards the conception of numerical difference as inapplicable. I think, if I have not misunderstood Russell, it is likely to be the former, since Moore seems to have been the first person to suggest the inapplicability of numerical sameness or diversity to universals, and that was some years later.

It is pretty clear that if predication is a relation involving a fundamental logical difference between its terms, then predication cannot be an ultimate relation unless there are particulars, in the sense of logical subjects. According to Russell to define particulars as logical subjects or rather as ‘entities that can only be subjects of predicates or terms of relations’ is a better way of defining them than that in terms of space or time. This is because ‘space and time are accidental characteristics of the world with which we happen to be acquainted, and therefore are destitute of the necessary universality belonging to purely logical categories’.

Particulars are therefore to be understood as entities
which 'enter into complexes only as the subjects of predicates or the terms of relations, and if they belong to the world of which we have experience, exist in time and cannot occupy more than one place at one time in the space to which they belong'. Universals, by contrast, 'can occur as predicates or relations in complexes, do not exist in time, and have no relation to one place which they may not simultaneously have to another'. It is very important to remember here just what analysis Russell gives of "existing in one place at one time".

There are several points that want emphasising in this article. In the first place Russell's method is interesting, although he does not make very clear what his procedure is, I think it is correct to say his principal arguments are of the form: certain statements are accepted as significant and true, if this is the case, certain other facts must be the case.

The second point is that there certainly is some confusion between (1) the question whether the distinction between universals and particulars is a distinction between logical subjects and predicates, and (2) whether it is a distinction between logical subjects and universals of which relations would be a species. As Joseph points out, and rightly, the first distinction would be one between two kinds of constituents of the universe, whereas in Principia Mathematica relations had been so far distinguished from terms of relations as to be regarded as components rather than as constituents of the complexes or propositions in which they occur. Joseph draws

the conclusion that Russell holds that it is predicates rather than relations which resist the abolition of the difference between particulars and universals. And he suggests that this is implied by Russell's remark 'a particular is naturally conceived as a this' or something intrinsically analogous to a this; and such an entity seems incapable of being a predicate or a relation. A universal, on this view, will be anything that is a predicate or relation. But if there is no specific relation of predication, so that there is no class of entities which can properly be called predicates, then the above method of distinguishing particulars and universals fails.

Joseph seems to me right in supposing that this passage suggests that Russell was primarily distinguishing logical subjects and predicates. Joseph seems quite precisely wrong in failing to realise that this passage stands out in Russell's article as being flatly inconsistent with the bulk of it. That this article of Russell's is muddled is glaringly obvious. In point of fact he shifts from trying to establish that there is an ultimate relation of predication which implies difference in kind between its terms, to establishing that certain spatial relations imply diversity of their terms. In consequence most of his contentions are in favour of the position that Joseph suggests he might hold, but would in fact reject viz: that relations and terms may be regarded respectively as universals and particulars. It is a pity that Joseph having put his finger on what may well be a profitable distinction confines his discussion to the distinction between subjects and

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* Universals and Particulars. p.6.
predicates. That this is a pity - or rather it seems a pity to me - is because there is undoubtedly in the universe a distinction between objects and the relations in which they stand to each other. This is even more obvious in the case of auditory sensations than visual, though it is the latter that are usually supplied by way of illustration. This distinction may or may not be that at which discussions of universals and particulars are aiming, but it does seem to be one which turns up pretty often. The second point is that this distinction does not seem to be at all like that between subjects and predicates or substances and attributes, which also turns up among discussions of universals and particulars. It is therefore a pity either to mix the two, or, in the absence of a decision as to which is wanted, to discuss one to the exclusion of the other. Thirdly Ramsey, rightly or wrongly, has suggested that the second distinction, namely, that between subjects and predicates, is explicable in terms of a distinction between different kinds of symbols. He may or may nor be right. Even if he is however, granting the distinction of problem drawn he would not have disposed of universals at least in one sense of "universal". Hence one could perfectly well hold that some of the entities that philosophers have called universals are correctly described as a special kind of symbol: and at the same time maintain that the universe includes or is comprised of an endless number of irreducibly different factors. It would be curious if we have been trying to reduce a number of irreducible distinctions to one.

So far there are four points to stress. There seems to be
a distinction between terms and relations though we may be mistaken in making the relations a sub-class of 'terms' in a wider sense. The distinction between subjects and predicates may be a symbolic distinction. If it is then this distinction is almost certainly different from that between terms and relations. If it is not symbolic it still may be a confusion to regard it as the same in kind as that between terms and relations.

In the Monist articles of 1918, and still more in his *Logical Atomism* of 1925, there are suggestions that Russell recognised a close connection between the distinctions commonly discussed under 'Universals and Particulars' and the radical difference between the constituents and the form of a fact. What precise significance we should attach to his remarks about the relative independence and dependence of logical subjects and qualities and relations respectively, is however difficult to determine. I think he confused the difference between subjects and qualities with that between terms and relations, and that this was a mistake has already been suggested.

The *Logical Atomism* articles are very important in relation to analysis, but that is irrelevant for the moment. To return to discussions of universals: there is one point which cannot be over emphasised, namely, the very great importance of distinguishing the question of what we mean by saying of $x$ that it is a universal or a particular, from what entities answer to either description. This becomes increasingly obvious in relation to Professor Stout's discussion *The Nature of Universals* and...
Propositions and the symposium arising out of it. Professor Stout starts from the position that there are various types or forms of unity; of which the unity of a class or kind as including its members is one species. What he means by the term "universal" is either this unity itself, if it is taken as ultimate, or, if it is not taken as ultimate, whatever principle is supposed to account for it. Professor Stout himself holds that the unity of a class or kind is quite ultimate, and that any attempt to analyse it leads to a vicious circle. He proceeds to point out, which I think is clear, that such a view is diametrically opposed to one which treats qualities and relations as such as universals. (That is; a view which calls relations and qualities universals in as much as the same relation may severally and separately relate distinct sets of terms, and the same quality may be common to numerically different things.) Such a view as this, with which Professor Stout disagrees, makes the unity of a class or kind derivative. 'It is constituted by the identity of some character, simple or complex, characterising the things denoted by the general name'.

So far so good. Professor Stout may be wrong, but at least he has the rare and outstanding merit of stating his opponent's views carefully and clearly and criticising them tolerantly.

The next important point Professor Stout attempts to establish is, roughly speaking, that qualities and relations are as numerically different as the objects which they respectively characterise and relate. I have stated this vaguely because Stout seemed himself in that article to overlook the distinction
between this specific shade of red and the referend of "Red" as ordinarily used. Hence he seemed to suppose that "Red" was a name for a specific quality. As we can see this makes his treatment far less clear than it might have been, and leaves way open for some of Moore's ruthless sifting. The pity of this is not that Moore could criticize Professor Stout and rightly, but that most of the discussion, or at any rate a large part of it, is confined to clearing up a point which is not the most interesting part of Professor Stout's article.

Stated (at least as far as I can do it)—omitting parts that seem to be irrelevant—Professor Stout's view on one point certainly is that if there are two billiard balls which we should call exactly similar, the specific shade of colour characterising one is numerically different from the specific shade characterising the other. Here Professor Stout probably quite simply wrong, but he holds the view because he thinks that if the specific shade is a universal, i.e. is the same in both cases you must also hold, either that the 'object' or 'substance' or 'that which is characterised', is something 'apart' from its characteristics, or else that there is not an ultimate plurality of substances. Both of these alternatives are to Stout unsatisfactory. What precisely Professor Stout means by a substance I am not sure, but I do not think it would be relevant to criticize any view he may happen to hold if he would agree that what he wants is to show with Russell the 'common sense belief that there are many separate things'. If this is so,
Stout seems to me to be quite simply right in rejecting both alternatives, but he may be wrong in supposing the 'Moore-Russell' view of universals entails either.

So far then I think the Moore-Russell view that an absolutely specific shade of red may be a universal, in the sense that it characterises, or rather can characterise, more than one object, is probably right. Whether qualities and relations should be classed together in this respect is a point which is different and less certain. The position I want now to suggest is that one might hold a Moore-Russell view about absolutely specific shades, but that Stout may have got hold of something rather important when it comes to dealing with the referend of "Red" as ordinarily used.

Professor Stout's view, put very shortly but I hope not distortedly, is that the term "Red" does not stand for any determinate quality which is possessed by all red things, and not possessed by blue ones. On the contrary it is a name for nothing, but is a thoroughly general term which signifies a variety of different specific shades of colour. The important point in which this theory differs from a Moore-Russell view, or the pure nominalism say of Berkeley (at moments) is that Professor Stout takes the notion of a set or class as ultimate. Resemblances between members a.b.c.d. will be derivative from the fact that a.b.c.d. constitute a peculiar kind of unity. a.b.c.d. do not for Stout constitute a class because they have a certain simple namable quality which belongs to each of them.

There are several enormously important points to make about this. In the first place I am going to assume Stout is
wrong in supposing that the specific shade of one billiard ball is numerically distinct from the specific shade of the second ball which would ordinarily be said to be exactly like the first. Granting this assumption it still does not follow that one should give the same analysis of the referent of "Red". Put more clearly we need not also hold that "Red" in any usage is a name for a single quality shared by all red things and in virtue of which they constitute a class. On the other hand in the absence of a clear conception of the 'peculiar unity' of this class in contrast to that of another class, it is difficult to see how "Red" could be used to stand for any one but not a specified one of a set of objects, unless that set were a set in virtue of there being some property common and peculiar to all members. Moore, in the symposium, argued in favour of the 'universality' of specific shades on the grounds that 'local separation' does not apply to characters in the same sense as it applies to things. He pointed out Stout's mistake in leaving undistinguished specific shades and the referent of "Red", and summed up in favour of the view that "Red" names a generic property shared by red objects viz: the property of having some quality of a certain kind. I think a possible variant on Moore's view would be that "Red" names the generic property of having one or other of a set of specific qualities, the set being constituted by the fact that each member is similar in some degree to a relatively arbitrary standard shade. This however is not the most

x For an interesting discussion of compound and complex properties see Broad's Examination of Mc Taggart's Philosophy. p.107 sq.
important point, nor would it be relevant to talk much about the similarity between Moore’s arguments in favour of the universality of specific shades, and Russell’s description of a universal. At the same time both of these points are too interesting to leave unmentioned.

To come now to what in my opinion is the most interesting part of Professor Stout’s article viz: the connexion, (and by that I mean simply the relevance of one topic to the other) between universals and generality. This question is not so remote from the distinction between what we mean by universals, and what entities answer to our description, as would seem at first sight. If we mean by a universal a quality which can characterise two numerically different objects, then Professor Stout has denied that there are universals. But he has taken enormous trouble to say that he is not denying that there are universals, but that what we mean by a universal is a ‘distributive unity’. The point I want to emphasise is that in fact Professor Stout was trying to give an account of the signification of such words as "every", "some", "any" and "all". In other words he was trying to find a theory of generality. I am not wanting to suggest that Stout started from the view that we use such expressions in sentences and was proceeding to ask what must be the case if such a use is legitimate. That would be to lay at Professor Stout’s door an interest in approaching philosophical problems through language which, as far as I know, would be foreign to him. Perhaps it would be better to describe his aim as the finding of that element of generality in the universe in virtue of which
as a matter of fact we can make general - in a somewhat
different sense of 'general'-statements. The point is difficult
to put without a reference to language; all I can emphasise is
that Stout is more interested in the elements that make
linguistic generality possible, than in the fact that they do
make it possible, or the generality of language itself. With
all these qualifications I think it would be true to say Stout
means by a universal that, in virtue of which, for example,
we can make judgments about a number of objects although we
are neither acquainted, nor could have acquaintance, with each
member of the set in question. As we have seen, qualities will
not answer to this description of a universal because - owing to
his special views about substance - Professor Stout requires them
to be numerically distinguishable entities. But 'there is no
generality in substances which is not entirely derivative. It
is wholly constituted by the generality of the adjectives which
qualify them, and the generality of adjectives does not consist
ultimately in possessing other common adjectives'. Hence we
get the view that "distributive unity" is signified by such
words as "all", "every", "any", "some" and the indefinite article.
The main point is that Professor Stout's conception of
distributive unity is a conception of a type of organisation
in the universe; generality in language, perhaps more clearly
our ability to generalize and express such generalizations,
should for Stout be dependent upon this fact that there is this
organization.

What Professor Stout would have to say, in detail, as to
the relation of the symbols e.g. "all", "every" to the
distributive unity they symbolise I do not know. Nor do I know what conception he would have of a variable. Indeed all I have dared to say of Professor Stout's view may be based on complete misunderstanding. On the other hand though one may reject his conception of specific and "similar" qualities as numerically distinct, his discussion at least had the merit of forcing Moore into suggesting the sheer inapplicability of a certain sense of "local separation" to qualities. Further I think in consciously, or unconsciously, raising the problem of what there must be in the universe if we can generalize, and discussing 'universals' in the light of this, Professor Stout has done something very useful. I would say this, though fully recognising that the criticism brought against Stout's view—viz: that his "distributive unity" does not show how he can refer to every member of a class without first inspecting each member in order to make sure the 'set' constitute a 'distributive unity'—may be sound. Perhaps it is rather a queer position to be disagreeing with almost all a man's main points and yet maintain his work is of value. I can perhaps, only defend it by arguing that Stout asked important questions.

I want now to turn to Ramsey, partly because he has some interesting remarks in relation to Professor Stout's view and partly because of his connexion with Mr. Ayer's. After that we must try and deal with a question left over at the beginning of this discussion viz: the relation of universals to solipsism.

I shall not attempt to state Ramsey's views in detail because I do not understand them well enough. At the same time Cf. G. Dawes Hicks. Aristotelian Soc. Supp. Vol. III. p. 126.
there are several important points that arise. One of the most interesting is that he attacks the view that there are complex universals. This I think is only Moore's theory of generic properties under another name. Ramsey's refutation of it I simply do not understand, I would add that this is not in the least an odd manner of saying he is wrong. On the contrary I find Moore's theory of generic properties a little hard to swallow and would welcome a theory which showed how we can use a variable propositional function without supposing that the variable is a name for a property. I just do not see how 'a has all the properties of b' can be regarded as "the joint assertion of all the propositions of the form $\phi(a)$, where there is no necessity for $\phi$ to be the name of a universal, as it is merely the rest of a proposition in which $a$ occurs".

It is because Ramsey regards a theory of complex universals as untenable that he supposes if there is a distinction anywhere between subject and predicate, it will be in atomic propositions. This entails an examination of the construction of an atomic fact out of its constituents. There are three possible views. Johnson's to the effect that the constituents are connected together by a characterising tie. Secondly there is Russell's that in every atomic fact there must be one constituent which is in its own nature incomplete or connective. This constituent will be a universal and the others particulars. Thirdly there is Wittgenstein's, that there is neither copula nor one specially connected constituent but 'the objects hang one in another like the links of a chain." I am more or less quoting Ramsey's
formulation of the three views, as it is short and clear. To
my mind - though I doubt very seriously if I understand Ramsey -
his attempt to show that "Socrates" and "Wise" differ only in
the ranges of propositions to which each refers, is at least in
part an attempt to show that Russell had no business to regard
the distinction between qualities and logical subjects as closely
related to that between the terms and the form of a fact. Though
I do not think Ramsey saw clearly what he was doing. He does
this by trying to show that qualities do not occur in facts in a
peculiar and "ultimately" different manner from subjects. To
my mind Russell should not have confused the distinction between
terms and the form of a fact and terms and qualities, so that so
far Ramsey is right. I am not sure however whether we can go
on to say that the distinction between qualities and subjects
is a matter of definition, but I do not think the idea is a
priori nonsensical.

Where Ramsey is interesting in relation to Stout is that he
is faced with a similar problem viz: that of accounting for how
we can refer to any one of a set of objects where that set is
not a set in virtue of having a common property. He certainly
wants at one point to get rid of common properties at least in
the generic sense of Moore, also I think this is implied obscure­
ly in any attempt to put the occurrence of a quality and of a
term in a fact on ultimately the same footing. I do not think
a wholesale abolition of common properties - in any sense - is
either desirable, possible or necessary. In fact Ramsey
himself only introduces a similar notion later in the same paper
when he talks of the expression R B as that "which is common to
universal, reprinted in Re Foundations of Mathematics.
a set of propositions". On the other hand once the distinction between terms and the forms of facts is clearly recognised to be different from that between terms and qualities there seems a great temptation to regard the difference between terms and qualities as a relatively superficial distinction. Hence arises the problem of so analysing the expression "common property" as to show 1) how far properties resemble terms in their occurrence in facts 2) what account can be given of reference e.g. to a set of objects with only some of which we are acquainted. This brings us to Mr. A.J. Ayer.

I have little doubt that on his view most of what I have said up till now is sheer nonsense. But the epithet nonsense has been scattered all over most recent discussions like measles ever since Wittgenstein suggested it wasn't rude.

Mr. Ayer's position is marked by the fact that it is sense-contents which are fundamental objects. They are fundamental in the sense that it is their occurrence that constitutes the verification of an understood proposition. Socrates and wise are to be distinguished as particular and universal in so far as the relation between sense-contents which constitute Socrates is different from the relation between sense contents which constitute wise. The debt to Ramsey is, I think, fairly obvious. The sense contents in a visual field are differentiated by means of the spatial relations they have to each other. The same sense-content cannot by definition be the referent of two different sets of spatial relations, inasmuch as its individuality is constituted by its being the referent of one unique set. The sense contents constituting white apparently are not defined
as the terms of unique sets of spatial relations, but by the fact that they resemble each other in being white. If this makes sense at least all sense-contents are numerically distinct entities, so that resembling sense-contents are also terms of unique spatial relations. Hence, sense contents qua contents which resemble each other, this presumably is what "white" does. Or we can refer to sense-contents qua terms of unique sets of spatial relations. Any given sense-content by definition be the term of more than one set of relations in a given field. But a given sense-content can correspond in position in one sense-field to another sense-content in another sense-field. It is possible to see on these lines, how the object, to which belongs a set of sense-contents having to each other this relation of spatial contiguity in successive sense-fields, can in a derivative sense be said to be unable to be in two places at once. It is obvious that to say of the two primary particulars, i.e. sense-contents, that they cannot be in two places at once is as tautological as to say that two secondary particulars cannot be in two places at once. It is equally obvious that "unable to be in two places at once" is not the same when it is applied to sense contents as to things or secondary particulars. I am not sure, but it would seem on Ayer's view that a set of sense-contents constituting a thing are related to each other both by spatial contiguity in successive fields and also similarity. He can quite well hold, as he does, that it simply is an empirical fact that there are things in this sense.

This does not imply or deny that a thing is merely a set of sense contents.
On Mr. Ayer's view then, the distinction between particulars and universals is either a distinction between sense-contents, all of which are primary particulars, and white, or such-like, in the sense explained. Or it is a distinction between such constructs as white and secondary particulars. From the point of view of expression the distinction between primary and secondary particulars is not ultimate, since all statements about secondary particulars are in principle capable of transformation into statements about primary ones. Universals—understood in the sense explained—are essential to expression since we cannot refer to a primary particular except by reference to its relations to others. To put it in Mr. Ayer's way—I cannot mention particulars in my language without saying something about them.

With the interpretation of 'a and b have a common quality' as a and b resemble each other in a certain respect, I do not want particularly to quarrel. I do as a matter of fact think there is a queer sort of difference between a specific colour that we are looking at and that which it is said to characterise. This however may well be a prejudice due to being born and bred within a subject-predicate philosophy. Ayer's so-called reduction of qualities and relations is not a question of grouping qualities and relations together but of differentiating sense-contents on the one hand from 'constructs' of sense contents on the other—that is if he is consistent. The prime difficulty to my mind is to see, even with the most generous allowances for language, how he gets out of defining universals in terms of universals without the help of an
ordinary Moore-Russell universal e.g. resemblance. But I may be wrong. I do not want him to distinguish sense-contents into terms and relations, that would involve us in the regrettable nonsense of treating relations as a special kind of logical subject. But I see no reason why sense-fields should consist solely of sense-contents; and if we are to translate everything Mr. Ayer says about the relations between sense contents into statements in turn about sense-contents we seem to land in an atomism considerably worse than Hume's. One moreover which is unplausible in the face of what sense-fields look like, and which seems to involve us in hosts of unnecessary difficulties. I would agree with Mr. Ayer if he wants to say, among other things, that you cannot understand what is meant by e.g. "before" and "after" unless you have simply felt the difference, so that the use of "before" and "after" in any sentence cannot be understood without reference to experienced relations. In that case the sentence e.g. "This blue patch is beside that" to be understood must be analysable into at least (on Mr. Ayer's and, I think, on Russell's view "wholly") a set of statements about that which I experience.

At this point arises the solipsistic trouble. My experiences are no doubt mine and nobody else's, hence on the face of it it looks as though you could never understand any propositions I make. There are several ways of avoiding this. In the first place we may argue that the objects of my experience may be identical with yours so that a sense-content in my field could be identical with a sense content in yours and we should have established a common point of reference. There seems to be
a logical reason against this as one and the same sense-content cannot by definition be the subject of different spatial relations. If, as on Ayer's view, relations are themselves sense-contents it follows that no object I experience can be experienced by you. Hence if two people do understand each other, it must be in virtue of a relation which holds between an object I experience and one that you experience, though presumably this relation is not itself an object of experience to either of us. This I gather is what Mr. Ayer must mean by saying our world's have similar structure. Obviously nothing can be said by either of us which had this relation as a constituent. Hence either all that I have been saying is meaningless or else it is verifiable in my experience. Hence I am landed in the position of having to verify in my experience the presence of a relation which I cannot experience. At best, as far as I can see, this relation must remain a dubious hypothetical entity - "not at all worthy of a place in scientific philosophy". It seems simpler to suppose that you and I can both be terms in a relation which relation both of us can experience. But this suggests that a relation is something quite different from a sense-content which can only be the subject of a unique set of spatial relations. To my mind the notion of being the term of spatial relations is inapplicable to spatial relations or any other kind of relation. Mr. Ayer in other words tends to treat universals as a special kind of logical subject, only he commits the crime in so virulent a form, as to provide a reductio ad absurdum.

I do not propose to argue that if we admit one experience
'common' relation between two people, or two people's sense-contents (where 'common' simply means that you and I, or a sense content of yours and a sense content of mine may be related), we are therefore, justified in assuming innumerable different 'common' relations. All I have argued is that we cannot give a plausible account of the understanding of language that there is between different people except on the assumption either of a hypothetical similarity of 'structure' which nobody can experience - unless we trail off into mysticism - or on the assumption of at least one experienceable relation which is 'common' in the sense explained to two different terms, and which seems different in kind from the sense contents whose pecularity is in being the terms of unique spatial relations. It is open to Ayg to reply that there are sense-contents which are not terms of spatial relations, but that is on his own showing to make nonsense of the phrase sense-contents, or at least I think it is.

We have now to attempt to sum up this very lengthy discussion. We have seen in the first place the treatment of universals and particulars in the early writings of Moore and Russell. A distinction between the terms and their mode of combination in a fact seems undeniable. Also as long as we do not substantialize relations we can usefully call this distinction that between terms and relations. With regard to properties or qualities: it is possible that we can explain the phrase 'common property' in terms of relations of similarity. This does not dispense with universals. On the other hand qualities e.g. this specific shade of blue-black are totally different
from relations, hence to speak of reducing qualities to relations is misleading at any rate. If "a and b have a common property" is equivalent to "a and b resemble each other" the specific yellow of a and that of b are regarded as logical subjects. Hence there can be no question of reducing qualities to relations though statements about 'common properties' are analysable - on this view - into statements about specific shades and relations of similarity. There is still the question on this view as to whether specific shades can be regarded as logical subjects. Professor Stout and Mr. Ayer both appear to argue in favour of this. Professor Stout provides an alternative theory to Moore and Russell, to account for general reference. It is doubtful if his "distributive unity" fulfills the function as well as Moore-Russell "universals" (at any rate in the sense of relations). Ramsey's attempt seems even less satisfactory. Mr. Ayer while admitting there are common qualities is bound I think, to treat specific shades as logical subjects. It is difficult to see how he can explain relations except with reference to entities irreducibly different from 'sense-contents'. Further he does not succeed any more than Professor Stout or Ramsey in giving a satisfactory account of reference to objects with which we are not acquainted e.g. other people's sense contents. Mr. Ayer admits two people can understand each other's statements so that in any ordinary sense of solipsism his view is not solipsistic. On the other hand without something that can be a common reference for the two individuals (that is without admitting something different from sense contents) his account of communication remains unplausible. Finally it seems a profound
mistake to treat universals as at all like logical subjects.
VII.

Moore and the Nature of Sense-Data.

It may seem odd suddenly to return to Moore at this stage instead of proceeding directly to discuss Russell's conception of the relation of objects of acquaintance to physical objects. It may be that the interaction between the views of Moore and Russell is not so close as to make it impossible to discuss this particular theory of Russell's without reference to Moore. On the other hand much of what Moore was saying in between - for example - Identity and The Status of Sense-Data is interesting in relation to Russell's views at the same period. Further I think it is easier to estimate just what significance should be attached to Russell's theory of physical objects when we have tried to understand the possibilities that Moore suggested, than when we have not. I say it is easier advisedly, this does not alter the fact that it still remains a very difficult thing to do.

It will be remembered that in The Nature of Judgment Moore had described perception as the cognition of an existential proposition, and had argued that therefore it was apparent how perception could furnish a basis for inference. I do not think it is very clear what was meant by this, but judging from the use Moore afterwards made of the notion of perception, I think there is some ground for asserting that from the first he recognised, though obscurely, the important points about it.

* p. 183.
In the first place inferences of any sort depend upon relations which are themselves 'independent' of the mind. The second point is that the terms related must be equally 'objective'. That perception is the basis of inference therefore involves the assumption that it is the cognition of objective terms objectively related. I may well be reading Moore something for which there is no warrant. At the same time I do not think, at least at the moment, that I am wrong in suggesting that Moore held from the first what may be loosely described as a realistic view of perception. The possible refinements of so vague a description we can only learn from two things. In the first place Moore's own extremely subtle development of this position from which he started, that is to say in the progressively more precise statements he makes of the nature of perception. Secondly - again from Moore - in the approximation to the explicit recognition by him in 1925 that his whole procedure is based on the assumption that there are certain common sense propositions that we understand and know to be true, although we do not know their analysis.

In *Experience and Empiricism* the next article of special importance with reference to the theory of knowledge, Moore assumed a distinction which he emphasised, I think, in every succeeding article that was relevant to the topic. Experience, he said, denotes a kind of cognition, and - this is the important point to notice - like both cognition and knowledge it stands for a double fact a) the mental state b) that of which the mental state is cognisant. We shall see in a moment that *The Refutation of Idealism* supplies the next step in this
particular line of development, viz: the attempt to establish the independence of the objects of cognition in addition to the distinctness of the object and the act of cognition.

But Experience and Empiricism is important in other connexions as well. Not one of the least, is that Moore recognised how much of the importance given to experience by philosophers, at that time, was due to Kant. I would add that this is probably still true. In some ways a case could be made out to the effect that Russell and his philosophical descendants are in a very weak position for regarding Kant as a 'mere misfortune', though the nature of the debts of contemporary work either to Kant or Hume would require volumes in themselves. I think it is interesting that Moore points out that Kant's position is based on the acceptance of the truth of experience, and that Kant's object is to establish other propositions on the ground that they are implied in the facts of experience.

According to Moore experience is best described as the cognition of a true existential proposition. Cognition can be of true and of false propositions, and not all true propositions are about existing things. If we have some idea of the nature of an existential proposition, that is as near, at any rate as I can get, to what Moore means by experience. Empirical propositions must truly assert either the existence of one or more of the following entities 1) this here now 2) this now 3) this here 4) this 5) this place now 6) this place 7) this time; or (b) and (c) an empirical proposition must be either a relational or collective proposition in which the terms related or grouped presuppose propositions of class a.
In terms of experience so understood Moore suggests that 'experience is the origin of all our knowledge' may be taken to mean all known truths are of the same kind as the objects of experience. From this principle it would follow that, in a sense, actual experience was the sole test of all our knowledge; since it would be true that we could know nothing but what could be experienced, and that consequently any piece of knowledge might be disproved by a possible observation or experience.

There is a distinction here which is interesting in relation to Wittgenstein, Schlick, Carnap and I believe Waismann. That is to say the distinction between knowledge that in principle could be tested by experience though in fact it is not, and for practical reasons cannot be, and that which is not only unexperienced but unexperiencible in principle. If Schlick and the others are right we could not understand any proposition, if there is such a thing, which is not in principle verifiable in experience. I am not sure how far Moore by his own criterion is an empiricist, nor how far his stress on the importance of analysis is entailed by his empiricism - if he is empirical. Certainly Schlick and the others come very near answering to Moore's description, and the view that a priori propositions are tautological supplies an interesting variant on the method of empiricists of every kind, in dealing with so-called necessary truths.

In the Refutation of Idealism Moore took esse is percipi to be an essential premiss in all arguments in favour of idealism. If therefore he could show there is no reason to suppose esse is

\* Cf. Schlick. College of Specific Publications.

percipi, he would have shown that, at any rate so far, there is no good argument for idealism, though this would leave undecided whether reality is spiritual or not. It is therefore important to ask if esse is percipi. The expression may mean a variety of things, but whatever it may mean it does at least assert that whatever is, is experienced. Granted this then the statement esse is percipi may assert one of three things a) "esse" and "percipi" are synonyms. b) Part of what we mean by saying of a thing that it is real is that it is experienced. But this is only important if it means it is self-contradictory to say of anything real that it is not experienced i.e. there is a necessary connexion between the rest of what 'real' means and 'experienced'. c) Taking x to denote the rest of the properties meant by real and leaving open the question whether 'experienced' is also the meaning of 'real', Moore maintains that the third possible meaning of esse is percipi, is that there is a necessary synthetic proposition to the effect that x is percipi. Of 'esse is percipi', so interpreted, Moore maintains it cannot be refuted: 'but if this sense were clearly apprehended no one, I think, would believe that it was true'. But very shortly, I think his argument is: esse is percipi is either a tautology which it isn't - or it asserts percipi is a necessary part of what is meant by esse. If it is then there must be a necessary synthetic connexion between the rest of esse and percipi: that is if the assertion is of any importance. But if neither of these alternatives is the case, then the only third possibility is that there is a necessary synthetic connexion between percipi and esse, where esse does not include percipi. Hence (alter-
II and III both turn on whether there is a necessary synthetic connexion between percipi and a) the rest of esse or b) esse as not including percipi. But we have only to realise this to see the unplausibility of supposing there is such a connexion.

A common interpretation of esse is percipi is 'the object of experience is inconceivable apart from the subject'. Idealists tend to regard this as an analytic truth, proved by the law of contradiction alone. This is based on identifying, say, yellow with the sensation of yellow. But idealists maintain simultaneously that experience of yellow is different from the experience of green yet both are experience. To regard yellow and the sensation of yellow as distinct but yet as forming an 'organic unity' seems to involve us in a similar contradiction. This is because, if to say x is an 'organic unity' means that whenever you try to assert anything whatever of that which is part of x, what you assert can only be true of x as a whole; then x should be substituted for its part in all propositions. But this is only possible if x is identical with its part: and this contradicts the distinction with which we started. It is clear from this that we must reject either that the experience of yellow and the experience of green are both experience, or we must accept a distinction between yellow and green and with it a distinction between the sensation of yellow, and yellow. Moore tacitly abandons the identification of a sensation with its object. He proceeds to maintain that 'anybody who said that 'esse' and 'percipi' were as distinct as 'green' and 'sweet' would be no more ready to believe that whatever is is also
experienced, than to believe whatever is green is also sweet).

The second part of the *Refutation of Idealism* is almost more difficult to follow than the first. It is concerned principally with an analysis of sensation, designed to show that if any given idealist admits there are objects in the world that persist when he is not experiencing them, e.g. other minds, then there is just as much reason for considering the object of sensation as not inseparable from sensation: since the relation of experiencing is the same in both cases. Further, since it is in the case of sensation that it is most easy to suppose the object inseparable, if in fact in this case it is not inseparable then there is no good reason for supposing anything is inseparable. In other words there is no good reason for supposing that everything is, is mental. The point to notice, of course, is that Moore takes the strongest reason for supposing esse is percipi to be the supposition that the object of a sensation is inseparable from it. Finally if an idealist maintains that the object of sensation is inseparable then, consistently, he should maintain that everything of which he is aware is an inseparable part of his experience. Hence he should hold that though there may be e.g. other people there is no reason to suppose so. The basis of this argument is that the relation of experience to object is in principle the same in all cases i.e. it is always an experience of an object.

It should be clear from this how important it is to maintain the distinction of sensation and object. Personally I think this is a position one simply does or does not hold. The one important argument Moore produces in favour of it is that one
cannot maintain that the experience of blue is different from that of green, both are experience, and also experience and blue are identical. Therefore there is either just blue and no experience, or there is both experience and blue. But there is experience therefore there is also blue. 'Blue' is as much an object and as little a mere content of my experience, when I experience it as the most exalted and independent real thing of which I am ever aware'. This quotation it is true comes from the middle of another argument which I have not attempted to reproduce, but it illustrates better than other short passages the kind of view Moore is maintaining.

* In The Refutation of Idealism there are, then, two main points to notice. In the first place the connexion between holding a certain view of the nature of sensation and accepting or rejecting esse is percipi. Secondly that Moore, having marked the distinction between sensation or experience and its object in Experience and Empiricism, has now tried to establish the independence of the object.

In The Nature and Reality of Objects of Perception we get this last point still more emphasised. Further Moore's approach to the problem marks, I think, a very definite step in the evolution of his method. Very broadly the gist of his article is that we cannot with reason suppose that there are other people and material objects unless we also accept the independence of the objects of perception. But we do think that there are other people etc. is a reasonable supposition, therefore at least we must not deny the independence of the objects of perception. Further the denial that there are material

* cf. Kant's Idealism, p. 140.
objects seems equally to require the independence of objects of perception. The force of all this cannot be seen without more detailed discussion. The point I want to emphasize at the moment is the form of the argument. Further, an important argument developed by means of the example 'Hens lay eggs' indicates that Moore thought, even as early as this, that one could understand some propositions and know them to be true, although one did not know what precise account should be given of what exactly they asserted. That an idealist could not consistently maintain there are other people or rather some independent objects and that 'blue' is not one, had of course been suggested in *The Refutation of Idealism.* But it was a suggestion thrown out and there is, from the point of view of method, the comparison between the importance of this, and the whole form of the argument in the later article.

Stated as shortly as I can Moore's article runs: we do think there are other people and things, hence it is important to ask which among the true propositions which one man believes are such that they would probably not be true, unless some other man existed and had certain particular perceptions. Generally speaking we do regard certain perceptions as supplying reasons for beliefs. But we want to find a true proposition which would not be true unless it is unlikely that I should be having the perceptions I am now having if there were no other people. Further we want to know the nature of a proposition which can be regarded as evidence for some other proposition to the effect that my perceptions are connected with perceptions of other people. Obviously such a proposition must be a generalization.
Therefore we require reasons for a generalization to the effect that a certain kind of perception in one person is always connected with a certain kind of perception in another person. The reason for such a generalization must lie in observation. Hence which among my own observations give me a reason for supposing that some perceptions of mine are generally preceded or accompanied by other people's perceptions. Many philosophers have maintained there is no reason, although they have also held that certain perceptions of mine are in fact connected with other people's perceptions.

We now require to ask first what conditions observation must satisfy in order to provide the necessary minimum of evidence for such a generalization. If the generalization is of the form the existence of B generally follows the existence of A then 1) we must have observed something like B viz: \( \beta \) following something like A viz: \( \alpha \).

2) Both \( \beta + \alpha \) must have been 'real'.

3) A and B must stand in the same relation to each other as \( \alpha + \beta \).

Secondly we want to know what kinds of things we observe. Moore restricts observation or perception to colours, size and shape of colours, spatial relations in three dimensions between patches of colour and movement. I think he meant to include the correlative objects of other senses, though he doesn't make it very clear. Further we observe our own perceptions of these. Hence we come back to the old question in the new form - which of these contents I observe will give me reason to infer a generalization of the form whenever such and such perception
occurs it is connected with another person's perception or feeling.

Now it is clear that the observations of my own feelings and perceptions will not warrant this inference. Since I only perceive my perceptions of movement etc. standing in that relation to each other in virtue of which I call them mine. Hence by condition 3 I am only justified on seeing movements (even if I should naturally call them other people's) in inferring previous perceptions of my own. If however we assume the object of my perception to be 'real' then I observe a relation between a real movement of my body and my own feelings. There is no reason why I should not infer that the real movements of another, stand in the same relations to his feelings as my movements do to mine. In this way it is seen how we require to assume the 'reality' of the objects of perception.

Any view to the effect that 'there are other people' is an hypothesis that works, is either consistent with this or demands the same assumption. In particular 'Beliefs that lead to true predictions are true' though it might be justified by the observation of my perceptions alone, yet, if it is true, it also supplies reasons for the reality of the objects of perception since belief in these is the basis of much true prediction.

If therefore it is reasonable to suppose other minds exist we require at least the assumption that the objects of perception are real. The same arguments apply for the existence of material objects.

Finally is there any reason against supposing the reality of the objects of perception? That nothing exists except when
perceived is no objection. Other objections are based on the assumption that two different kinds of things cannot exist at the same time in the same place. This presupposes the conception of something really existing in a given place in a sense other than being perceived there: since it is admitted that the two objects are perceived in the same place. The defect of this argument if it is designed to show that all perceived objects are unreal is that though, say, A and B cannot be in the same place there is no reason why one of them cannot be in that place. At the same time the only reason for supposing one of them doesn't exist there is that the other does; which involves the assumption of an unobserved independent object. Moore is willing to admit some sensible qualities which we perceive do not exist at the places where they appear to exist, but in the case of microscopic objects there is no reason to suppose that the parts of a given area cannot have one colour while the whole area has another.

To sum up, the view that there are other minds and physical objects, if it is reasonable, requires us to assume the reality of the objects of perception. The chief denial of the independence of these objects is based on the supposition that there are some independent objects which presumably are unobserved. Hence either to assert the existence of other minds and objects, or asserting there are other minds and denying there are objects depends on assuming unobserved entities, the same in kind as those requiring a 'reason' or there are at least grounds against denying the independence of perceptual objects. In so far as we are with reason certain that e.g. Sindbad did not

\* Note Moore's special use of 'reason'.
see a Roc and that you do see this page, then it seems we must admit perceptual objects 'exist' in the simple and obvious sense that we all understand.

Personally I don't think Moore ever finds the true generalization that would not be true if there were no other people. All he succeeds in showing is that such a generalization would not be true unless the objects of perception are 'real! This is good enough for establishing the point he wants.

There is nothing so far as I can see in William James Pragmatism which is particularly relevant to this topic. The only two remarks in Hume's Philosophy that are of importance are, in the first place, that it is 'impossible for anyone to prove, in one strict sense of the term, that he does know external facts. I can only prove that I do, by assuming that in some particular instance I do know one.' Further 'the only proof that we do know external facts lies in the simple fact that we do know them'. Though there are some external facts we know, it is also certain that there are some that we do not.

The interesting question to ask is whether the line between the two falls where Hume says it does. Is it true that the only external facts I know are facts for which I have a basis in my own experience? This question introduces the second point of interest for us in this article viz: that Moore leaves it an open question whether there are propositions asserting

Moore's own example, given to an audience to whom he was speaking, was 'You do hear my voice'. I have substituted a different example in order to retain the force of the argument.

matters of fact (in Hume's sense) which we know neither by direct observation, memory, or the result of previous experience - it would be a rash man who set out to convict Moore of holding a certain set of dogmatic propositions!

The Subject Matter of Psychology, published only a month after the article on Hume, provides a number of interesting points. Moore starts from the position that there are a good many different kinds of things in the universe, and the problem is to decide which are 'mental' in the vague sense that they are the proper subject matter of Psychology. He finds three undoubtedly mental entities and distinguishes four different senses of "mental". To deal with the 'entities' first:— Every act of consciousness is a mental entity and it is mental in the simple sense that it is an act of consciousness. Some acts of consciousness are also mental in the sense that they all belong to one mind. Moore suggests that there might be acts of consciousness that are not mental in this second sense - a suggestion which provoked Professor Dawes-Hicks to refer, with some criticism, to James' 'little feeling of x'. The second and third kinds of mental entities are respectively the differences between such mental acts as willing, believing etc. (which differences are other than distinctions between the objects of these acts) and, thirdly, collections of mental acts that form unities. The four senses of "mental" are: 1) That in which an act of consciousness is mental; 2) That in which an act of consciousness that belongs to a specific mind is mental. Other things besides acts of consciousness could be mental in this sense; 3) That in which qualities as distinct from properties
of mental acts are mental. This applies to the differences between willing and believing etc: 4) That in which a collection of mental acts which form a unity, is mental.

So much for 'mental' and mental entities. The most interesting point of the article is that which deals with doubtful mental entities. Under this heading Moore includes the mind; 'contents' in the sense in which Meinong appears to have used the word viz: internal differences among acts of consciousness, which correspond to differences between their objects; and sense-data. It is very important to be quite clear about what Moore says here, specially with reference to the first and third 'doubtful mental entities'.

With regard to the mind, Moore does not doubt that when people talk of "my mind" they are talking about a genuine entity; what he has doubts about is what sort of an entity it is, here is a nice point of method. In particular, is the mind mental in any of the four senses hitherto distinguished. If Hume's view - that it is a collection of mental acts - were true, and it is plausible, the mind would be mental in sense. (4). Such a view gives a neat interpretation to a mental act is 'in my mind', i.e. it is one of the collection of my mental acts. Yet on the other hand when I say I am seeing this room and saw another yesterday, I seem to be asserting a different relation between me and my seeing than that the latter is one member of the collection constituting me. It is difficult to see, on this view, what relation mental acts have to each other in virtue of which they are mine; moreover we tend to regard them as having a relation to a distinct entity which is me. If there
were such an entity it still might not be mental e.g. it might be my body. Moore therefore points out that a distinct mental entity is only one of a set of possible alternatives.

Contents might exist and would be mental but it is doubtful if there is good reason to suppose they exist, we therefore turn to discuss "sensations!", "sense-presentations" or "sense-data". Moore includes under "sense-data", entities of which we are often directly conscious e.g. colours, sounds, toothaches when they are actually seen, heard or felt respectively. The term also covers images that occur either when we are awake or dreaming. In all cases there is no question whether there are such entities. In discussing whether sense-data of which we are directly conscious are mental or not, Moore emphasises four points. In the first place - that which I have said he has repeatedly marked - we must not confuse sense-data with acts of consciousness of sense-data. Secondly they must not be confused with 'qualities' in the sense in which Moore uses qualities in this article. Thirdly it is extremely doubtful if they have the same relation to my mind as acts of consciousness do. Since by implication they are unlikely to be 'mental' in any of the first three senses and it is obvious, though Moore does not point it out, that they are not 'mental' in the fourth sense, it looks as though sense-data should be regarded as non-mental. There is however a sense of mental which is equivalent to saying entities are mental if they are only so long as someone is conscious of them. All Moore has to say on this point is that if sense-data are only when perceived then they would be mental in this sense: but ordinarily much more than this is
meant when they are said to be in the mind.

With regard to sense-data, if there are such, which are in the unconscious: the first three considerations apply equally to these and to the 'conscious' sense-data. It is obvious with regard to the fourth and the strongest reason for calling sense-data 'mental' in any sense is that they are only when perceived) that the conception of mental in these senses is inapplicable.

I do not think there is much need to emphasize the important points here. The whole line that Moore takes is obvious, directly his views over a number of years are put side by side. I think, however, we must not forget to notice how in the course of discussion the use of 'perception' has become more and more precise. Perhaps this would be better put by saying Moore seems to have come gradually nearer to distinguishing different kinds of awareness, of which the immediate apprehension of a sensible view present to mind is the most direct. There is a passage in The Nature of Objects of Perception, which I have not previously emphasised, where Moore first distinguishes in which I perceive a particular patch of colour from the sense explicitly the sense in which I perceive a book. It is an enormously important passage, as we shall soon see, in relation to the later work. As we shall see when considering The Status of Sense-Data, Moore does seem to have come nearer and nearer to recognising explicitly a direct cognitive relation as of fundamental importance in the theory of knowledge. To my mind all that he has said on the topic of the nature of the objects of 'perception' or 'experience' or 'sensation', could also be regarded as tending towards establishing that there is cognitive
apprehension of 'real' or genuine entities. We must certainly emphasize the 'directness' of the relation which Russell turns up with the label of 'acquaintance', but it is just as important, I think, for the understanding, at any rate of Russell, to see that the objects of acquaintance are genuine entities. However cautious Moore himself may have been in deciding, for example whether the 'real' objects of perception are or are not mental, the mere study of the possibilities he suggests is enough to make very much clearer the theory of knowledge in general and Russell's position in particular. Moreover I do not think we can overestimate the influence of Moore on Russell in this respect, though the point may only become clear later.

In the Status of Sense-Data Moore re-emphasised the distinction between experiences and the entities experienced. Further there is a distinction between speaking of the sort of entities which are the objects of 'sensory experience' (which covers the experiences of images when awake, dream images or sensations, hallucinations and certain classes of illusory experiences, after images or sensations as well as sensations proper) and the entities which are experienced in this kind of experience. In speaking of the sort of entities, we do not necessarily confine ourselves to those which are actually experienced. Moore leaves it an open question whether the two are identical or not. The suggestion however is enough to warrant immediate reference to Russell's unsensed sense-data in the Lowell Lectures.

The first question Moore is here concerned to discuss
is the relation of these 'sensibles' to minds, the second is their relation to physical objects. Moore calls 'direct apprehension' the relation to a sensible when we are actually seeing or hearing it and so on. This relation must be distinguished from that which we have to what we should call the same sensible when we are remembering or thinking of it. This is an important distinction specially if we remember that Russell at first allowed 'acquaintance' to cover both. The second important point is that "direct apprehension" is so used that quite possibly it never holds between me and any sensible. It may be the case that when I say I directly apprehend X then I am asserting both 1) x is being directly apprehended by something 2) this act of direct apprehension has to something else external to it, a quite different relation which makes it an act of mine. We should refer back to The Subject Matter of Psychology to see the force of this remark.

It is important to distinguish direct apprehension from attention. It is possible that we may attend to something without directly apprehending it, it is doubtful if we can apprehend directly without attention. It is also important not to confuse saying of an entity that it is directly apprehended and saying 'a mental act is in my mind'. The relation of an apprehended sensible to whatever apprehends it is quite different from the apprehension of a sensible either to me or to the other apprehensions that are 'mine' - whichever view is true of the nature of the mind. This I think is the same point as he made in The Subject Matter of Psychology. It is confusing to use 'erlebt' sometimes for the one and sometimes for the
other relation. There is no reason to suppose there is any other relation to sensibles besides that of direct apprehension.

The next point to discuss is whether sensibles exist at times when they are not experienced. In the first place it is not self contradictory to suppose there are unexperienced sensibles. Secondly Moore says that he does not see clearly that nothing can have the property of being a sensible without that of being experienced. Further he has a strong propensity to believe that the sensibilities which would be experienced in a sensation proper (if a body with a certain constitution and under the given physical conditions were in a position which it is not) exist unexperienced. The most weighty argument against this view is that there is empirical evidence for the dependence of the existence of sensibles on the condition of the nervous system. This Moore says is based on a confusion between the existence of the sensibles which we experience and the fact that we experience them. There may, though, be other reasons for holding that sensibles of this special kind do not exist unperceived. It is important, however, to realize that to say the sensibles, which would be seen by a colour blind man were he in my position, exist just as much as mine, does not imply they are in the same place as mine. All Moore is contending for is that they exist now.

We now turn to the relation of sensibles to physical objects. All this section is of immense importance, both from the point of view of method and for the actual views expressed.

Moore approaches the question by asking how certain propositions...
admitted to be true and to be about physical objects are to be interpreted, at the same time considering how they are related to certain sensibles. He takes as examples a set of propositions about a florin and a half-crown; an example too carefully described to paraphrase, too long to quote and probably too famous to require it.

There are two important principles which he lays down

(I) The visual sensibile directly apprehended is not identical with the upper side of the coin, since two different people can see — in exactly the same sense of «see» — different sensibilities and the upper part cannot be identical with both. It follows that we must distinguish the sense in which we see a visual sensibile and see a physical object. In a proposition of the form "I see «A»" where "«A»" is a name or description of some physical object, though, if this proposition is to be true, there must be some visual sensibile «B» which I am directly apprehending, yet the proposition "I see «A»" is certainly not always, and probably never, identical in meaning, with the proposition "I directly apprehend «B»". The direct apprehension of «B» is to be distinguished both from perceiving (1) the physical object, e.g. the half-crown, and from perceiving (2) one side of it. (II) Knowledge of the given propositions is based, in the last resort, upon experiences of mine consisting in the direct apprehension of sensibles, and in the perception of relations between

xx Philosophical Studies, p. 186.
xx Loc. Cit. p. 68.
directly apprehended sensibles. 'It is based on these in at least this sense, that I should never have known any of these propositions if I had never directly apprehended any sensibles nor perceived any relations between them'. It is important not to succumb to the temptation of generalizing this but to remember that Moore is talking of a specific although, I think, typical set of true propositions about material objects. We must not jump straight from Moore's view into that of Ayer or Wittgenstein, however obvious is the line of descent.

Granted that these principles are true then in what sense are the given propositions true. Possibly the only true interpretation is a set of if-then propositions about what other sensibles I should apprehend if I made certain movements etc. The advantages of such a view are obvious, the principal being that it shows more clearly than any other in what sense the knowledge of such propositions is 'based' upon direct apprehension of sensibles. The main objection is that if I say 'the coins existed before I saw them' I have to give this a Pickwickian interpretation, since the sense in which I can say this of the coins is utterly different from the sense in which I can say it of sensibles. Moore has a 'strong propensity to believe' that when I know the coins existed before I saw them, I know is that something existed at existed at that time, in the very same sense in which sensibles now exist. Further it may not be a mere prejudice to suppose that in knowing of the present existence of these things I am knowing of the present existence of things other than any sensibles which I or anyone else am directly
apprehending. Therefore alternatives to this view must be considered.

Obviously if $x$, a physical object, exists in the same sense as $y$, a directly apprehended sensibile, $x$ is known only by description as that which has a certain connexion with $y$. Here I think we have to note Moore's debt to Russell rather than the converse. To return to the argument: the difficult question is what is the nature of the connexion. It may be causal, but there are heaps of entities causally connected with $y$ so it must be a special causal relation e.g. that of $x$ being the source of $y$. On the view $x$ exists in an ordinary sense, but we can only say it is circular in a Pickwickean sense; since the statement that it is circular means if I do such and such then I shall experience certain sensibiles. Moore brings the same objection against this as against the first view only with the difference that he emphasises that he wants to maintain $x$ both exists and is circular in an unpickwickean sense. The third alternative is that the 'source' is a huge collection of unsensed sensibiles. Again we can only give a Pickwickean interpretation, though a different one, to the statement that it is circular. All these three suggestions therefore are open to the drawback that they give a peculiar meaning to a true proposition that we understand, whether it be that the half-

The only remaining alternative seems to be a view something like Locke's. That is that the coins exist and are circular in an ordinary sense. They resemble sensibiles, which are in

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*Cf. Kant's Idealism, last May 2nd 1904.*
no sense part of them in respect of their primary qualities; but there is no reason to suppose the coins (or sources) have secondary qualities. It is consistent with this to maintain there are unsensed sensibles so long as we do not claim them to be in the same place as the 'source'. We can also maintain of sensibles that they are not 'in the mind' except in the sense that some are directly apprehended by some minds. All we must maintain is the resemblance of certain sensibles and their sources, or physical objects, in respect of their shape.

There is only one objection to this view but it is the serious one that it is difficult to see how I know there are such sources and what primary qualities they have. It seems in order to answer this I should have to know immediately with regard to some sensible both that it has a source and what shape that is. It may be objected that this is the sort of thing I cannot know immediately. On the other hand, Moore points out, the arguments in favour of a view of type 1) are based on the assumption that there are only certain kinds of facts I can know immediately, hence it is a prejudice to suppose knowledge of facts of another kind. Possibly - and this to my mind is enormously important in relation to Lewis and Wittgenstein - that we can only know immediately facts of a certain kind, is itself a prejudice. The fourth view cannot therefore be regarded as conclusively disproved.

I have perhaps gone somewhat beyond the 'Nature' of sense-data in beginning to discuss their relation to physical objects. On the other hand to have seen at least in some degree what Moore had pointed out as to their 'nature', and to have some
idea of the possible answers to the second question, that he had suggested by 1914, seems to me the best groundwork for a discussion of Russell on the same topic.
The logico-analytic method, and Russell's theory of physical objects.

From what already has been said, there seems good ground for the assertion that for Russell, by the time he came to write the Lowell Lectures, sense-data and universals were to be regarded as genuine constituents of the universe. The most convincing evidence for this statement is to be found in Le Réalisme Analytique. Here Russell described his philosophy as a form of atomism, and included sense-data and universals among the atoms. Similar evidence can be deduced from the fact that sense-data and universals are objects of acquaintance: the objects of acquaintance are constituents of propositions: and the constituents of propositions are. Still more evidence is to be found in the common-sense view that in presentation we are aware of genuine entities.

Not only, however, are sense-data and universals genuine constituents of the universe but also they are basic elements in knowledge. This follows directly from the indubitability of the relation of acquaintance.

Another point brought out clearly in the French article is that Russell regarded the ultimate furniture of the world as simple. His philosophy was analytic "parce qu'elle soutient qu'il faut chercher les éléments simples dont se composent les complexes présupposent les choses simples, tandis que les choses simples ne présupposent pas les choses complexes" (x Le Réalisme Analytique. p. 55.).
Again 'Je dis donc qu'il y a dans l'universe des êtres simples, et que ces êtres ont des relations en vertu desquelles ils composent des êtres complexes....chacune entité simple est un atome'. It would follow from such a view, as has already been pointed out, that any object involving multiplicity, and capable of further analysis, should be excluded from the ultimate furniture of the world.

The theory of Descriptions had shown that any proposition we can understand must be 'about' - (i.e. the facts that would make it true would be facts about) - entities of the same kind as those we have experienced. It had also suggested that the analysis of any sentence in which a variable occurs into a set of sentences in which demonstrative symbols replace the variable, would be a method of discovering the nature of the facts that would make the sentence true.

It is but a short step, from the acceptance of all the above positions, to attempt to analyse accepted empirical propositions, or sentences expressing these, into a set of statements immediately about sensibilia. Further it would be intelligible to regard such a procedure both as a method of discovering the premisses, or hardest data, involved in the body of common knowledge, which constitutes the initial data, and as a way of considering the degree of certainty which should be attached to that body of knowledge.

In my opinion it was the outline of a procedure of this sort that Russell sought to illustrate in the Lowell Lectures.

Further, however unclear is much of what he said, I think it was such a procedure that he meant by the logico-analytic method. Probably his emphasis on the justification of the acceptance of empirical propositions led him to lay too much stress on the importance of reducing empirical propositions to statements immediately about sensibilia, and if possible about the sense-data of one person. The desire to show what must be the case if Physics is verifiable (i.e. both true and can be known to be true) consistently with maintaining that the hardest data are my own sense-data lies at the back of the remark - 'it would give me the greatest satisfaction to.........establish physics on a solipsistic basis; but those, and I fear they are the majority, in whom the human affections are stronger than the desire for logical economy, will no doubt, not share my desire to render solipsism scientifically satisfactory.'

I do not want to suggest that in the Lowell Lectures, or elsewhere, Russell settled down painstakingly to analyse a given empirical sentence into a set of statements about possible objects of acquaintance. I still think that such a procedure answers the description of the logico-analytic method as Russell understood the phrase, though I admit he would, and did, speak of the analysis of the body of common knowledge and not of the sentences expressing it. What Russell in fact did in the Lowell Lectures, was to assume that an accepted body of knowledge should be capable of statement in terms of sense-data. He then took physics and certain common-sense views as accepted bodies of knowledge, and tried to see how far the statement that they are known to be true is legitimate, if the only hard data are one
man's sense-data and the laws of logic. Finding that 'verifica-
tion' on these lines would not be likely to go far, he changed
his method, and outlined the sort of conception one could get
of a physical object assuming the sense-data and the testimony
of other people, together with unsensed sensibilia. In giving
such an outline, the important point was to find a conception
of space which would be consistent with maintaining that sense-
data are genuine elements in the external world. Having done
this, Russell turned back and pointed out that there were no
good reasons against, and practical reasons in favour of,
assuming both the testimony of others with regard to their own
sense-data, and the existence of unsensed sensibilia. The
view that he had suggested about the nature of physical objects
was therefore at least a possible view. Further it would
provide a theory of what must be the case if physics or common-
sense is true, consistently with maintaining they can be known
to be true, and consistently with assuming, besides our own
sense-data, nothing more dubious than other people's sense data
and unsensed ones. Since (as far as I know) Russell nowhere
denies, and he explicitly asserts, that there are the series of
sense-data and sensibilia which we call physical objects, there
is no more reason to suppose he denies there are sticks and
stones and stars than there is to make the same accusation
against Berkeley. Certainly of both it may be said that they
wanted to deny that the table is some queer lump of persistent,
unknowable, metaphysical and monstrous matter. I do not propose
to discuss, at this point, which is the more plausible of the
wildly remote alternatives they suggest as the correct account
of the referend of "the table". On the face of it, Russell's alternative since it accounts for ten men seeing the same sun, is probably the better.

I now want very briefly to outline the theory of physical objects which Russell suggested, though this is not at all easy.

In my opinion the clearest point with which to start this discussion is that which has already been suggested, namely, that for Russell sense-data were genuine constituents of the universe. I do not propose to elaborate this very much, nor is it necessary to discuss how, if at all, Russell could hold both that the ultimate constituents of the universe are simple and that sense-data are ultimate constituents. There are three points to remember about sense-data which come out clearly in Sense Data and Physics. In the first place they are the objects singled out, by attention, from a sense field. Secondly they are part of the physical world; that is, if dependent upon organisms at all, they are dependent on the physical properties of those organisms; the mind adds nothing but mere awareness. Thirdly, though physical, they probably do not persist unchanged after ceasing to be data. A general point of enormous importance to remember about sensibilia (i.e. the kind of objects given in sense) is that there is no a priori reason why a particular which is a sense-datum should not persist after it has ceased to be a datum, nor why other similar particulars should not exist without ever being data. I think there is no doubt from Russell's discussion that, both in this article, and in the Lowell Lectures, he owed an enormous amount to Moore. That is why I discussed Moore's treatment of sense-data (or
sensibiles) in some detail.

Now the difficulty on this view is to provide an intelligible account of how different people can talk about the same table. The 'jaundice' arguments for the view that what I am now looking at cannot be regarded as identical with the table are well known e.g. what is presented is square at one moment and at the next moment I have a rectangular presentation; yet on both occasions I affirm I am looking at the table, and deny both that it is square and rectangular and that it changes its shape from moment to moment. If we accept the testimony of other people we can get a set of arguments to the effect that if the table is identical with that which is presented to different people, then apparently one and the same persistent simple thing has incompatible predicates. Incidentally I do think the unquestioned, and usually unnoticed, presupposition of all these arguments, namely, that there are incompatible predicates, is a point worth noting. I do not propose to call in question such a presupposition, but I do think it ought to be mentioned.

Faced with such difficulties, there are at least two obvious courses to take. One is to retain the simplicity and persistence of the table; but to regard it as an object known, at best, only by description as something standing in some special sort of causal relation to what is directly presented. We are of course still at liberty to regard that which is directly presented as a genuine item in the physical world: even if such objects are private in the sense of being known to nobody else. More often, since the things we are really interested in are common physical objects, pancakes and people and fires,
sense-data degenerate into more subjective phantasms. I do not think Russell ever held such a view as the last, though he certainly held, in *The Problems of Philosophy*, that the table was known by description as something standing in a certain relation to sense-data.

The other alternative is to retain the view that sense-data are genuine physical elements and to reject the conception of the table as a simple and persistent entity. If one wants to avoid assuming 'unknowables', as Russell did, this is the most obvious course to take, and Russell in the Lowell Lectures took it. One important consequence follows; that is, if the ultimate constituents of the universe are simples the table can no longer be included among them. I think that some realization of this point lies at the back of supposing that Russell denied there were tables and stars, not to mention such poor unities as Piccadilly and Roumania. I think such an accusation is based on overlooking the theory of types, and forgetting that most of Russell's arguments for the existence of ultimate simples are based on the fact that there are complexes, and the conception of something complex presupposes that of something simple. It is important to remember the theory of types because that makes it possible for Russell to hold that in one sense of "is" or "are" there is the *Pieta* and there are chairs; though "is" and "are" in this usage are capable of analysis into the sense of "is" and "are" in which there are sense-data. To accept this is in no sense to make Michelangelo's statue, or

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chairs, 'unreal'. Such a mistake is easy if we take 'ultimate' as it is used of sense-data to mean genuinely real as opposed to 'more-real' than sense data. Russell often used language which spurious. Possibly, in his desire to deny there are objects more real than anything else. Where he does this it is simply misleading. His use of the phrases 'logical construction' and 'logical fiction' is unfortunate for the same reason.

The particular form of the jaundice argument that Russell seems to have taken for his starting point was as follows: where you and I talk of the same table (as we occasionally do) then since one thing cannot be in two places at once what you and I mean by "the table" is in the same place. But you and I have different sense-data. These different shapes and different colours cannot co-exist simultaneously in the same place. They cannot, therefore, both be constituents of the physical world. It is obvious how important it was for Russell to supply an account of the table's position in space consistent with the denial of this conclusion. It is here that we come to his theory of perspectives, though, I think, it is clearer to regard this theory as an answer to the question: if one thing is defined in terms of its spatial relations how can the conception of a single thing, the table, be reached from postulating a number of different sense-data that cannot exist in the same place. The answer involves a new analysis of "in the same place" and also the denial that "single" as it applies to the table entails non-multiplicity and incapability of analysis.

The first point Russell makes with reference to "in the same place" is that there are two places of different sorts associated with every sense-data, namely the place at which
it is and the place from which it is. The place at which a sense-datum is, is a place in perspective space in which is located the thing which the sense-datum is an appearance. By saying a sense-datum is an 'appearance' of a thing it is meant that the sense-datum is a member of the class of appearances which together constitute the thing. The place from which the sense-datum is, is the place (in perspective space) of the perspective in which the given sense-datum is located. This is difficult to understand and requires some more detailed treatment. The best place to start the discussion is with the last point; namely, with the location of a sense-datum in a perspective.

In Russell's words: 'The first fact to notice is that, so far as can be discovered, no sensible is ever a datum to two people at once. The things seen by two different people are often closely similar, so similar that the same words can be used to denote them, without which communication with others concerning sensible objects would be impossible. But in spite of this similarity, it would seem that some difference always arises from difference in the point of view. Thus each person, so far as his sense-data are concerned, lives in a private world.' A sense-datum located in such a private world is in a place different from any place in the private space of another percipient. This follows from accepting the relativity of position: such that a place is only definable by the things in or around it. It is clear from this that the same place (in this sense of "the same place") cannot occur in private worlds. Cf. Mysticism and Logic. P. 159.
worlds that have no common particular constituent. If therefore a sense-datum I am looking at is never in the same place as one at which you are looking, then the fact that the two sense-data differ is no argument for their physical 'non reality'.

This argument, so far as it goes, disposes of the difficulties in the way of regarding sense-data as genuine physical objects. At the same time, as it stands, it leaves quite unintelligible the fact that you and I suppose our respective sense-data both to belong to one thing located at one point in one space. We will return to this in a moment: but first the notion of a private space or perspective must be elaborated.

The definition of a perspective Russell admits is difficult. A perspective is certainly not to be identified with any one of the spaces connected with the different senses. Russell assumes that by experience we have learnt to correlate these. Assuming such a correlation the obvious definition of a perspective would be in terms of all the data of a percipient at one time. This Russell rejects because he wishes 'to allow the possibility of perspectives which are not perceived by anyone'. For example I may get one set of sense-data from my corner of a room, while someone else has a slightly different set from a different corner of the same room. Russell wants to leave open the possibility that from the third and fourth corners, in which there is no one present, there are different sets of sensibilia which would be sense-data if there were anyone there to sense them.

The difficulty of defining the perspectives of a given particular in terms of all the particulars which have a simple
(direct) spatial relation to the given particular, is that there is no such direct spatial relation between the sounds, smells, feels, tastes and sights, presented to one person at one time. If we want all such data to belong to the same perspective such a method of definition will not do.

To solve these difficulties Russell calls in the direct time relation of simultaneity or successiveness which is sometimes a datum. He then defines the perspective to which a given particular belongs as "all particulars simultaneous with the given particular" where "simultaneous" is to be understood as a direct simple relation, not the derivative constructed relation of physics'. So much for the location of a given sense-datum in a perspective.

We now have to discuss the correlation of perspectives in a 'perspective' or 'physical' space different from that of the space of a given perspective. According to Russell: By moving and by testimony, we discover that two different perspectives, though they cannot both contain the same "sensibilia", may nevertheless contain very similar ones; and the spatial order of a certain group of sensibilia in a private space of one perspective is found to identical with, or very similar to, the spatial order of the correlated "sensibilia" in the private space of another perspective. In this way one "sensibile" in one perspective is correlated with one "sensibile" in another. Such correlated sensibilia will be called "appearances of one thing".

*Cf. Mysticism and Logic. p. 141
**Cf. Loc. Cit. p. 160
It is plausible to maintain that perspectives may be correlated by similar sense-data. It remains to be seen how they can be ordered in perspective space. This Russell does by means of the order of similar sense-data. For example, we could arrange a set of round appearances, commonly said to be of a penny, in a series of 1 - 10 according to their variation in size. Perspectives would be regarded as 'near' to each other according to the degree of similarity in size and shape holding between the sense-data they contained. The next point is to give some meaning to the phrase "the place (in perspective space) where the thing is". This is done by means of forming another series of perspectives, ordered by a similar method to the first, but containing the appearances of the penny when it is said to be 'seen end-on' and to look 'like a straight line of a certain thickness.' Prolonging these two lines of ordered perspectives until they meet, then, the place of intersection may be defined as 'the place (in perspective space) where the penny is'.

On these lines Russell thinks that sense can be made of the statement 'that perspectives in which a thing looks large are nearer to the thing than those in which it looks small: they are, in fact, nearer to the perspective which is the place where the thing is'. He also attempts to give a statement of the fact that the aspect which a thing presents at a given place is affected by the intervening medium, namely: 'The aspects of a thing in different perspectives are to be conceived as spreading outwards from the place where the thing is, and undergoing various changes as they get further away from this place.'
The laws according to which they change cannot be stated if we only take account of the aspects that are near the thing, but require that we should also take account of the things that are at the places from which these things appear).

On these lines it can be seen how sense data (which would ordinarily be said to be one thing) can be correlated to form a momentary state of that thing, although the sense-data can never occur in two different perspectives.

I do not propose to deal with Russell's attempt to correlate momentary states of a thing into a thing which endures throughout a period of time. In the Lowell Lectures he has very little to say on this point except that it must and can be done in principle. His treatment of the same point, in Sense Data and Physics, is brief and not very easy to follow. It remains to quote Russell's own summary of the association of two places in perspective space with every aspect of a thing viz: 'it will be observed that two places in perspective space are associated with every aspect of a thing: namely, the place where the thing is, and the place which is the perspective of which the aspect in question forms part. Every aspect of a thing is a member of the two different classes of aspects, namely: 1) the various aspects of the thing, of which at most one appears in any given perspective; 2) the perspective of which the given aspect is a member, i.e. that in which the thing has the given aspect. The physicist naturally classifies aspects in the first way, the psychologist in the second. The
two places associated with a single aspect correspond to the two ways of classifying it. We may distinguish the two places as that at which, and that from which, the aspect appears. The "place at which" is the place of the thing to which the aspect belongs; the "place from which" is the place of the perspective to which the aspect belongs?

We have now to emphasize the main points which such a view implies as to the nature of a 'thing'. In the first place, as has already been suggested, a thing is conceived as involving multiplicity. Secondly, since the 'thing' cannot, without indefensible particularity, be identified with any single one of its appearances, and, according to Russell, it is possible that the class of appearances will fulfill the purposes for the sake of which the thing was invented, it is expedient, on Russell's view, to identify the thing with the class of its appearances. The main reason, I think, which drove Russell to this conclusion, was the desire to avoid assuming entities of a nature different in kind from those of which we are sensibly aware. This in turn was due to his emphasis on the indubitability of the relation of acquaintance. But even so the thing is not merely a class of appearances. 'A thing may be defined as a certain series of appearances, connected with each other by continuity and causal laws'.

There are certain difficulties in Russell's account of the nature of a 'thing' which he very briefly considers. His main points in some constitute an elaboration of the suggested definition of a thing. They are to the effect that similarity
and continuity are insufficient principles to warrant the classification of a number of 'helter skelter' sense data as appearances of one thing. 'What is wanted further seems to be something in the nature of fulfilment of causal laws'. When he speaks of 'causal laws' he means 'any laws which connect events at the different times, or even, as a limiting case, events at the same time provided the connexion is not logically demonstrable'. Russell at this point makes use of the empirical success of physics in providing hypotheses that 'are at no point in contradiction with sense data, but, on the contrary, are ideally such as to render all sense-data calculable from a sufficient collection of data all belonging to a given period of time'. If physics has found it possible to collect sense-data into series which obey its laws, and we can also assume that there is only one way of grouping appearances so that the resulting things or series obey the laws of physics, then it is possible, as Russell does, to reach a definition of things as 'those series of aspects which obey the laws of physics'. His added remark: 'That such series exist is an empirical fact, which constitutes the verifiability of physics' is my warrant for saying that Russell did not deny there were common-sense things or physical objects, however misleading are his remarks about 'merely logical constructions' and 'symbolic fictions'.

So much for the conception of a 'thing' which Russell sketched in the Lowell Lectures, Sense Data and Physics and the Ultimate Constituents of Matter. I am aware that in expounding Russell I have omitted all reference to Whitehead and the
method of extensive abstraction. In a detailed exposition of Russell this would be indefensible. I am well aware that the suggestion of describing physical objects as functions of sense data was derived by Russell from the consideration of Whitehead's definition of a point in terms of perceptual entities; or at least Russell derived a great deal from Whitehead's use of extensive abstraction. The reason for omitting to discuss this is that though helpful in some ways, it would also suggest confusions which it is important to avoid in discussing Russell's theory of physical objects. For example it is almost impossible, after reading Russell's chapters on Whitehead, not to regard points as 'put together' out of the materials given in perceptual situations, and by means of logical technique. It may or may not be correct to regard points as 'constructed' in this sense, and not as 'inferred entities'. Even if it is correct, the construction having been effected, that which is constructed is there in as good a sense of "there" as anything is. Now there are two closely connected ways in which such a conception may be misleading if it is applied too freely to physical objects. In the first place, though statements about points, and statements about puppies, may be equally capable of analysis into sets of statements about sense-data, it may yet be the case that points are 'put together' or are 'constructs' in a sense, not difficult to see, in which puppies are certainly not. Secondly it would be easy (although as has already been suggested, mistaken) to regard anything which is a 'construct' as points may be, as 'unreal' or a fiction. It is but a short step from these two confusions to supposing, not only points and
puppies, but the physical world in general, to be as much an unreal 'sorry, antediluvian, makeshift of a building' as Hoti's house. 'Sorry' and a 'makeshift' it may well be, but 'unreal' or a 'building', no. Nevertheless that is the sort of view suggested by reading Russell in the light only of the method of extensive abstraction, and by paying too much heed to the use of the word "fiction". Further the confusions suggested are, I think, made by Russell himself from time to time.

In conclusion there is one important point to make. Russell's theory of perspectives may or may not be a correct account of the nature of a physical object. The outline is difficult to understand and one cannot tell how it would work out in detail. At the same time it is clear that it was suggested only as a possible account of the nature of a physical object, and an account which would square with the following positions held by Russell, namely: the final facts to which reference is made by true empirical propositions are facts about sensibilia (whether they are sensed or not is left open): no two people are ever acquainted with the same sensibilee; and yet they can both talk about the same physical object. The acceptance of these last three positions does I think entail a conception of a physical object as involving multiplicity. The acceptance of the theory of perspectives entails much more. The difference between the two positions illustrates that much or little may be meant by Russell in saying that the table is a 'logical construction'.
The assumptions and significance of the logico-analytic method.

In supposing that a certain kind of procedure is adequate to deal with a certain kind of subject matter, we suppose something about the nature of the subject concerned; namely, that it has those characteristics without which such a treatment would be impossible. In attempting to state the presuppositions of directional analysis in metaphysics, I shall try to state them simply as assumptions without which we could not suppose such a method would work. Such an attempt is quite distinct from asking or answering the question whether those assumptions can be justified.

A general assumption made by an analytic as contrasted with a deductive philosophical method is that it is not the business of a philosopher either to seek or to settle by definition what he means by certain terms e.g. "the universe", "reality", "mental" and "material", in order to deduce what follows from the definitions. No one would deny the value of a great philosophical system such as Spinoza's, although it appears to be derived by the use of such a deductive method. At the same time this method may lead to the omission of important items in what purports to be an account, at least in principle, of 'the nature of reality'. For example, strictly finite entities, and there seem to be such, have no place in such a system as Spinoza's. Such a criticism is no doubt brought 

My use of 'directional analysis' follows Professor Stebbing's Logical Positivism and Analysis.
against Spinoza from outside his system. The point is that the acceptance of the axioms and definitions of a deductive system binds us to the acceptance of the conclusions, providing of course that there is no mistake in the deductions. We may by such a method find ourselves bound to accept conclusions which we believe to be false; there is, therefore, a danger in attempting to decide at the outset what is meant by certain fundamental terms.

It is easy to caricature such a method. Something very like it has been done recently by Aldous Huxley in a different connexion. His remark, though not to be taken too strictly is worth quoting, partly for the emphasis it lays on the mistaken respect for language. He writes: 'A vocabulary is a system of platonic ideas, to which we feel (illogically, no doubt, but strongly) that reality ought to correspond. Thanks to language, all our relations with the outside world are tinged with a certain ethical quality; before even we start our observations, we think we know what it is the duty of reality to be like. For example, it is obviously the duty of all oranges to be orange; and if, in fact, they aren't orange but, like the fruits of Trinidad, bright green, then we shall refuse even to taste these abnormal and immoral caricatures of oranges'.

But the analytic philosopher is not so far from the deductive philosopher as my quotation from Aldous Huxley might suggest. Directional analysis is in fact based on the assumption that there is a degree of correspondence between sentences and the facts to which they refer, sufficient to
warrant us in supposing that the study of the way in which a true sentence refers to facts, will tell us something about the nature of those facts that make it true. We shall return to the dangers of such an assumption later on; when we have discussed in more detail the other assumptions of deductive analysis in general, and what I believe to be a special kind of directional analysis, namely Russell's logico-analytic method.

Professor Stebbing in *The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics* was the first both to indicate that the kind of analysis generally attributed to Moore and Russell depends upon certain presuppositions; and to attempt to state what these presuppositions are. I think the assumptions to which she drew attention are some of the assumptions upon which Russell's Logico-analytic method rests. But I think the method discussed by Professor Stebbing differs from Russell's in that the latter does, whereas the former does not, lay down at the outset a description of the kind of elements that will turn up in the basic facts to which analysis approaches. By this I mean that Russell made the additional assumption that the analysis of an empirical sentence should be into statements which referred immediately to sensibilia, and, if possible, to the actual sense-data of one person. This additional assumption of Russell's, as we shall try to show in a moment, is due to an element in Russell's thought, which makes the aim of analysis, in his hands, something very different from the aim of analysis as it seems to be understood by Professor Stebbing and Professor Moore. First of all, however, we should try to get clear
about the common assumptions of the two kinds of directional
analysis.

The first assumption pointed out by Professor Stebbing is
the logical presupposition that: *if p is to be analysed, then
p must be understood. It follows that there is at least one
expression which unambiguously expresses p', "p" is here taken
to stand for any proposition. In the light of some remarks
made by Professor Stebbing, in a later article, it is probable
that it would be better to speak of the analysis of sentences
rather than of propositions. Hence this first assumption
should be that there are unambiguous statements; where to say
that a statement is unambiguous is to say that what it expresses
is understood. The second presupposition which Professor
Stebbing includes under 'metaphysical presuppositions') but
which I should prefer to call an epistemological assumption, is
"if p is to be analysed, then it is not always the case that p
is known to be false, and it is sometimes the case that p is
known to be true'. It is easy to substitute sentence for
proposition in this statement.

The significance of both of these assumptions becomes very
much clearer in relation to three important positions attributed
by Professor Stebbing to Moore. 'First he holds that "at
different moments in our lives we know a great many different
empirical facts". To say this is equivalent to saying that at

* The Method of Analysis in Metaphysics. p.85.
All subsequent quotations of presuppositions and definitions
are taken from this article ps. 83-5.

** Logical Positivism and Analysis p.31.

x J. Moore. A Defence of Common Sense.
various moments in our lives we are in a position to assert
with regard to a certain proposition that we know this
proposition to be true'. An example would be that I know I am
now writing; for someone reading the paper it could be: I know
that I am now reading. Secondly, Moore holds that with
regard to many such propositions there are expressions in
ordinary usage which unambiguously express these propositions
which we know to be true. A proposition is unambiguously
expressed when what is said is understood*. Professor Stebbing
adds an important footnote: 'an unambiguous expression is not
equivalent to a perfectly clear expression, since we may under^
stand more or less clearly'. Thirdly, Moore holds that to
understand an expression is not equivalent to being able to give
a correct analysis of its meaning'.

I think that this third position is so important that it
should be explicitly included among the presuppositions of
directional analysis. It does not fall neatly under the
heading either of logical, epistemological or metaphysical
assumptions, but that is no great drawback. It seems to me to
part of a wider and fundamental assumption that there are degrees
of understanding. It is important in relation to directional
analysis, because, for one thing, it would be impossible to
analyse a sentence that is not understood, and, for another,
it would be fruitless to attempt to analyse a statement into
another set of statements if we knew from the first exactly
what must be the case if our initial statement is true. It is
because we know more or less what we mean, but are so unclear
that we soon become involved in contradiction, that an attempt
on the part of philosophy, to provide some technique for making clearer that which we already understand in some measure, and believe to be true, should be taken seriously.

Under the heading of metaphysical presuppositions, and following from the assumption that directional analysis is possible, Professor Stebbing includes: 'there is a way of analysing \( p \) such that we can correctly speak of the analysis of \( p \). This assumption is equivalent to the assertion that we must be able to say 'there is one and only one analysis of \( p \), and this is the analysis'. I have no doubt that this is a presupposition of directional analysis, but again I cannot understand why it should be regarded as metaphysical. It seems to me to follow from the assumption, not brought out in this article but stressed in a later one, that there are final facts that make sentences true or false. It seems to me that it would follow from these two assumptions, that there is one and only one set of facts which would be the facts which make it possible for a given sentence to be used to say what is true. It follows from this that there is only one way of analysing the sentence in question. That different sentences could be made true by the same set of final facts would be consistent with this last remark, provided that we remember that analysis takes into consideration the way in which symbols are used.

The consideration of the way in which symbols are used brings us to the presupposition Professor Stebbing denotes by \( 3.2 \) namely: 'if \( \pi_1, \pi_2, \ldots, \pi_n \) is the analysis of \( p \), then \( p \) entails and is entailed by \( \pi_1, \pi_2, \ldots, \pi_n \). It follows that there is no sub-set out of \( \pi_1, \ldots, \pi_n \) which is the analysis of \( p \).
This statement should be compared with Professor Stebbing's later remark. 'the conjunction of the set of absolutely simple sentences, each indicating a basic fact, which constitute the final resultant does not yield a complete analysis of the expression "this is a table", for an analysis must both entail and be entailed by the analysed expression. Accordingly, to complete the analysis we have to consider not only the symbols but also how they are being used in a given case. Thus we require further a theory of generality'. It is clear that if \( \Pi_1 \cdots \Pi_n \) in the first quotation, stand for absolutely simple sentences, then, the second quotation contradicts the first, inasmuch as the set of simple sentences though entailed by the initial one do not entail it. Taking \( s \) for the initial sentence then of course it is true that all the simple sentences entailed by \( s \) must be included in the analysis of \( s \): a sub-set of simple sentences could not in any sense be regarded as the analysis of \( s \). It is important to be clear about this point, otherwise we are in danger of making the mistake over less general sentences that is often made over obviously general ones e.g. "all men are mortal": namely, that of supposing a set of statements "this man is mortal", "that man is mortal"... are jointly equivalent to "all men are mortal", overlooking that we require, in addition, to state that these are all the men there are.

Presuppositions 3.3, 3.31, 3.41, 3.5 and 3.51 are straightforward except that it is important to remember the definitions of Resultant, the resultant, a level, a factor in a Resultant, Logical Positivism and Analysis. p.32.
an element in a resultant, and a Resultant of a higher order.
The presuppositions are 3.3. 'Each Resultant of a higher order contains more configurations elements than the Resultant of the next step!' 3.31 'the lowest level resultant is the resultant of the analysis. 3.4 'every Resultant refers to a set of basic facts'. 3.41 'the resultant indicates a basic fact. 3.5 'each factor in a given level must exclude every other factor in that level'. 3.51 'if on a given Resultant every element in that Resultant has been analysed to the same degree, then no factor in that Resultant is identical with any other factor in any other Resultant which is a level Resultant'. The definitions are as follows 1) "A Resultant" = "a completed step in the analysis other than the final step." 2) "The resultant" = "the final step in the analysis". 3) "A level" = "a resultant in which every factor has been carried to the same degree of analysis". 4) "A factor in a Resultant" = "a configured element in a Resultant, which is contained as a sub-configuration in that Resultant". 5) "An element in a resultant" = "that which is configured in the given resultant but does not itself configure".

The significance of using capitals for resultants other than final resultants is clear. It is also clear what is meant by a Resultant of a higher order, therefore I have not quoted the definition.

When we come to presupposition 3.6. 'A basic fact is an absolutely specific fact' we find the most obviously metaphysical assumption, and perhaps the most important one. In some ways I think it should have been numbered 4 and not included under
the possibility of directional analysis. There seems no good reason for including 3.6 under this heading, and excluding 'if p is to be analysed, then it is not always the case that p is known to be false, and it is sometimes the case that p is known to be true'. I am afraid I do find Professor Stebbing's classification of the presuppositions very puzzling, but this is a small point as long as they are presuppositions of directional analysis.

If we add to this set of assumptions the assumption that a basic fact is an absolutely specific fact about sensibilia, then I think we have at least the most important presuppositions of the logico-analytic method. It remains to discuss the significance of the method, and to point out in this connexion that the fact that Russell made this additional assumption is closely connected with a wide difference in his conception of the significance of the method.

I have already suggested that an attempt to find a precise way of making clear that which we understand up to a point, and believe to be true, is profoundly important. There is no need to emphasise the fact that we almost always think unclearly, and that the fact that we do thus think unclearly is serious. There is no need to emphasise this partly because it is one of the facts to which attention has been called by the stress laid by contemporary philosophers upon the misleadingness of language. The difficulty is not to see the value of a technique which would help us to avoid at least certain kinds of confusions; but to see whether directional analysis can be regarded as such a technique. Perhaps the main among many difficulties in the • In quoting I have once changed R to r where I believe there must be a misprint.
way of accepting this view, lies in the fact that from the point of view we want to assume as little as possible about the basic facts that terminate an analysis. This entails that we require a complete or at least nearly complete mastery of symbolism, including the technique of transforming general sentences into less general sentences using only logical principles as our guide. On these lines I believe the question of the further analysis of most sentences, because most if not all involve descriptive phrases, is bound up with the problem of the nature of a variable. On the other hand, as Professor Moore once pointed out, though he might well be horrified at the use made of the suggestion, we require some extra-logical knowledge to determine in a given case whether a symbol is being used in a certain way or not. For example, we require extra-logical knowledge in order to decide whether "The author of Waverley" in "The author of Waverley is Scott" is an incomplete symbol in the same sense in which it is an incomplete symbol in "The author of Waverley exists". This suggests that we require extra-logical knowledge about the facts to which immediate reference is made by any given sentence before we can analyse that sentence satisfactorily. (I use "immediate reference" in this context in the same sense, as far as possible, as Professor Stebbing when she says 'the immediate reference of there is a table in this room is what you have all understood, namely, that there is a table in this room'.) There is no great difficulty in this, except that we should state clearly what we believe ourselves to know in any given case, before we start analysing a given expression or set of expressions.
The difficulty arises in determining whether or not we must know, before we can analyse, what kind of facts are to be regarded as - in Professor Stebbing's language - 'the terminus ad quem of the analysis.' For Russell this question does not arise; because with the assumption that the ultimate facts are about sensibilia, the question is virtually answered. I do not know whether this assumption of Russell's has any justification. My point is that failing some logical means of determining the direction of an analysis we do need some idea of the kind of 'experienceable' facts that we may expect to turn up as basic facts: otherwise there is nothing which gives us the direction in which to analyse. On the other hand how far it is legitimate, if the method of analysis is an attempt to find out at least what facts must be the case if a given sentence is true, to assume at the start what kind of facts they will be? Within certain limits of course this assumption is entailed by the fact that we understand the sentence we propose to analyse. The understanding of a sentence entails that the facts that would make it true will be facts of the same kind as those we experience. The point is that in order to give a direction to an analysis we may need to assume something more specific than this, about basic facts: and it is difficult to see, if we have to assume this, how the method of analysis avoids becoming a way of inventing plausible hypotheses (in terms of e.g. sensibilia or whatever ultimate elements are assumed) as to what must be the case if certain sentences are true. In point of fact, as I have suggested elsewhere, Russell did seem to drop pure analysis and change his method to the invention of plausible...
hypotheses, something on these lines. It may be that an assumption as to the specific nature of the basic facts does not entail such a change of method, and it may be that, if it does, some other way can be found of giving a direction to analysis. One feels after reading some of Russell's work, and more obviously some of Moore's, that what one understood vaguely before simply is clearer. Russell's analysis of "Scott is the author of Waverley" provides a ready-made example. What we need to find out is what determined the direction of the analysis in given cases where we believe the clarification of a statement to have taken place. These questions may be the wrong ones to ask. On the other hand I cannot help feeling that questions very much like these do need answering if directional analysis is to tackle the enormous task laid out for it.

I said at the beginning of this paper that the additional assumption Russell made as to the nature of basic facts was due to an element in his thought which made the aim of analysis, as he conceived it, different from that of Professor Stebbing and Professor Moore. I think this element was Russell's conviction that the 'hardest' data are facts about objects of acquaintance. Our knowledge that "this is a table" is true, would not only be based upon sense-data in the sense that we should not have known it unless certain sense-data had been presented to us, but it would be based upon our knowledge of such sense-data, in the sense that such knowledge is 'harder' than our initial belief that this is a table. It was because of this that Russell conceived analysis as concerned not only to find out what is undeniably involved in our belief that certain state-
ments are true, but also as concerned to estimate, by reference to hard data, the degree of certainty that should be attached to different statements that we accept. This additional aim is foreign to the writings of Professor Moore and is expressly repudiated by Professor Stebbing. For Russell, of course, the desire to provide a criterion of certainty is an additional reason for assuming what specific kinds of facts will terminate a directional analysis.

There are two main points that remain for discussion. The first has already been touched on in some measure, namely the nature of the basic facts which terminate a directional analysis. As Professor Stebbing has pointed out it is an assumption to suppose that the basic facts are absolutely specific facts, where 'to say that a fact is absolutely specific is to say that its elements are determinate'. One cannot say very much about this assumption except that it is plausible. I think, on the other hand, that although we do believe some of our statements are so radically unclear that they could not be analysed into sets of specific statements. In discovering that such statements are incapable of analysis in this sense that they cannot be translated into sets of statements that indicate specific facts, a philosopher would be doing a great service. It is something to find out where we are completely muddled. But there is a danger in supposing that an account, in terms of specific facts, as to what we might mean, always constitutes an analysis. It may be that a given statement is incapable of precise analysis although we may make it clearer to some degree. It may be possible and it is certainly interesting at the point at which
pure analysis fails, to change one's method and invent hypotheses as to what we may mean if, for example, we are to believe both the initial statement and some other one. Russell, as I have pointed out, did change his method in this way in order to give an account of physical objects that would square with the beliefs that sense-data are part of the physical world; two people can talk of the same table; and also sense-data depend on the physical condition of the person sensing them. The danger lies not in inventing hypotheses but in supposing the results of pure analysis, and should therefore be regarded as entailed by the truth of the initial statement.

The other point is that emphasis should be laid on the fact that when Moore claims to know certain common sense propositions to be true he does not mean that we know what is meant by a material object and that there are material objects. What he means is that we know at particular times particular facts, such as this table, or that a poppy, further involved in this, knowing such facts, is that we understand the sentences expressing them, and these sentences are certainly true. All these points are of fundamental importance. Where I think emphasis is also needed is that it is we, not just Moore, who are supposed to know these particular facts, and to understand the true sentences that refer to them. It is therefore necessary, whether with Professor Moore and Professor Stebbing, we regard the aim of analysis to make clearer our statements by showing what facts must be the case if they are true; or whether with Russell, we aim both at making clearer our statements and at estimating which of them are the most
reliable; to state among our fundamental presuppositions the fact that there is communication. To state this as a presupposition is not of course to imply that it is in any degree doubtful. The inclusion of the fact of communication as a presupposition of directional analysis indicates, as by way of a last point I should like to indicate, how widely remote are any of the aims and all the assumptions of directional analysis - Russell's or others' - both from a wholesale scepticism, and from a position which could be described as solipsistic.
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