GROUP STRUGGLE OR CLASS CONFLICT?
THE APPLICATION OF PLURALIST THEORY AND CLASS THEORY
TO ENGLISH POLITICS.

A thesis submitted by
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ABSTRACT

The growth of single-issue politics, and of the articulation and resolution of political demands through pressure group structures is linked, by group theorists, to the development of the corporate economic State. In an increasingly complex political order, it is argued, the individual must orient herself to political structures through multiple group memberships which cut across traditional socio-economic categories, and which reduce the impact of class identification and political behaviour. Thus the pluralists suggest that group membership is replacing class location as a focus for political identity and a motor of political behaviour.

This argument is investigated with reference to the socio-political attitudes and behaviours of electors drawn from three English Parliamentary constituencies. The constituencies - Guildford, Richmond & Barnes and Sheffield Attercliffe - exhibit distinctive socio-economic characteristics and electoral trends. The constituency sample units are stratified by group, and electors are drawn from those groups typically organised within the community. Participants are examined by survey questionnaire. In examining the class and group bases of British politics, considerable attention is paid to concept-formulation. 'The group' is operationalised according to dimensions of interest and power, and the nature and role of interest group activity within the three constituencies are investigated. The concept of class is operationalised according to Marxian theory, and is critically examined with reference to stratification theory.

Indicators of socio-economic and political variables are investigated during data analysis, and class and group-structured political identifications and behaviours are examined. Although participation in both group and class structures is found to be politically significant among survey-respondents, group-structured political behaviour is found to be strongly related to class location. It is therefore argued that the concept of class possesses explanatory value in political analysis. A class theory of group politics is thus proposed.
Acknowledgements

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E.J.B.
"The value of a thing sometimes lies not in what one attains with it, but in what one pays for it - what it costs us."

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INTRODUCTION

Group Theory forms part of a tradition of pluralist thought which stresses the concept of group competition for the achievement of political goals. This theory, which has represented one of the most substantial challenges to the Marxian paradigm of political society, can be traced back to the publication of A.F. Bentley's *The Process of Government* in 1908.\(^1\)

Bentley rejected the Marxian concept of classes and suggested, instead, that political behaviour may be understood as a process of group struggles. The political identifications and orientations of men are formed, he wrote, by their slipping in and out of specific groups which cross-cut class lines, and which may coalesce around such factors as residence, religion or nationality, or around particular issues.\(^2\) Thus the interaction and conflict between these groupings is perceived to activate the process of government, and to provide the paradigm of political life.

It is the sense in which group behaviour is perceived as a motor of political activity which represents Bentley's greatest impact upon twentieth century political science. Thus the development of the behavioural approach in the 1950's, and particularly the attempt to construct a 'systems analysis' of the political process, stressed the integral role played by the 'group'.\(^3\) Although a systematic approach to the governmental process emphasised the critical importance of theories of power - and interest in the group to some extent gave way to this - the anatomy of power was described with reference to the group, and particularly through the institutional and organisational structures which had accompanied the growth of the corporate economy.

The charm of pluralism, and of a systems analysis of political life, has lain in the attempt it represents to bring empirical and scientific analyses to the study of social order. Such a contribution was welcomed, partly because of the reaction against constitutional and philosophical approaches to political studies, and partly because of academic pressures for an empirical quantification of social studies. The enthusiastic adoption of American group theories of political behaviour by British political scientists may, to some extent, be understood as a product of such considerations.
There have, however, been few applications of group theory to British political behaviour, and little evidence has been assembled concerning the impact of group structures upon political behaviours: investigations into the group base of politics have led, for the most part, to descriptive contributions on the classification and operation of group structures rather than to explanatory material. It may therefore be argued that, as yet, there is little scientific evidence that the group approach to politics is as relevant in Britain as it purports to be in the United States.

In investigating the group theory of politics in Britain, this research project examines both the theoretical construction of group theory and its application in research. The adequacy with which a concept of 'the group' may be theorised and applied to political behaviour is compared with an application of class concepts of politics during survey research. This comparative approach to the theoretical and practical limitations of class and of group theory enables the development of a model through which the relationship between group and class may be understood. Thus the research addresses the issue of whether the group theory of politics may be appropriately applied to England and, if so, whether this model of political behaviour presupposes, or heralds, a decline in class politics.

In investigating these questions, critical attention is paid to the operationalisation of concepts. Part One of the thesis assesses developments in the fields of group and of class theory, and particularly the roles played by theories of power and of interest. Based upon this investigation of theory, a new theory of groups, and a Marxian definition of class, are defined for use in empirical work. The final chapter of Part One examines the ways in which group and class theory may orient a political actor to the politico-cultural environment of Britain: the role of major political institutions (e.g. political parties, bureaucracy and trades unions) in this process are examined in some detail.

The objectives and design of the empirical research are discussed in Part Two. Chapter Four translates the theoretical construction of class and group proposed in Part One to working research variables. The rest of Part Two discusses the method with which these variables are investigated, and the parameters of the fieldwork. Thus selection of the Parliamentary constituencies
of Guildford, Richmond & Barnes and Sheffield Attercliffe as sampling units is explained in Chapter Five, with reference to the suitability of such a research design, and particularly to the socio-economic and political characteristics of the constituencies. A critique of the survey questionnaire used during data collection, and of its administration, is presented in Chapter Six.

Part Three examines, qualitatively and quantitatively, the political orientations and behaviours of members and non-members of organised groups, and assesses the meaning and role of group membership, and its impact upon political behaviour. The class identifications and behaviours of the survey sample are also investigated. Both the empirical examination of indicators of group and class politics and the investigation of theoretical constructs suggest that, not only is group politics not adequately theorised, Marxian class theory presents a more appropriate model of political behaviour. It is thus suggested that group theory be subsumed under a class theory of politics, and a class interpretation of the 'group' is proposed.

The survey research was conducted between July 1985 and July 1986, and the final chapters of the thesis were completed in June 1987, coinciding with the 1987 General Election campaign. A Postscript discussing the Election, and details of further survey research conducted during the 1987 campaign, are presented in the Conclusion and in Appendix E. The author would here point out that, at the time of writing the thesis, and the commentary on the 1987 Election results, the tumultuous events which have since beset the Liberal/SDP Alliance were not in evidence. As we all know: 'A week is a long time in politics.'
INTRODUCTION

The search for theoretical models which may be empirically tested and validated is one which has occupied political scientists since the inception of the modern political State. In 1945 K. Marx wrote that his method "starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment... its premises are not in any fantastic system and rigidity, but in the actual, empirically perceptible process of development under derived conditions." (1)

This, Marx suggested encouraged "...and real knowledge..."

In the twentieth century, however, empirical studies of the political State increasingly approach observation more than a 'closed theory' of British society is merely a mere model of political behavior. A class model of politics, as was earlier, is inappropriate in a complex and multi-ethnic political society, where one no longer responds to the force of political identity (e.g. economic class) but de-fragmented into various 'interests', represented by group memberships.

Although economic political forces are important, they are not always the most important. "The political phenomena which have analysis is not to reduce the importance of economic causality, but to show the complexity of the social world which such forces must be understood within." (2) Hence, understanding and analyzing political behavior requires an accommodation of both functional and the role-playing elements in the social world.

The search for appropriate theoretical models is a never-ending process and the development of such models is not always a straightforward task. It requires a combination of conceptual clarity and empirical evidence. It also demands a critical evaluation of existing theories and a willingness to challenge assumptions.

PART ONE

THEORY

"Theory is the net which we throw out in order to catch the world...to rationalise, explain and dominate it."

K. Popper, Logik Der Forschung, 1935
INTRODUCTION

The search for theoretical models which may be empirically tested and validated is one which has occupied political scientists since the inception of the modern political State. In 1845 K. Marx wrote that his method:

starts out from the real premises and does not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. (1)

This, Marx suggested, is 'real, positive science...and real knowledge'.

In the twentieth century, however, empirical models of the political State increasingly turned attention away from a 'class theory' of British society, and towards a group model of political behaviour. A class model of politics, it was argued, is inappropriate in a complex and multi-issue political society, where man no longer responds to one focus of political identity (socio-economic class) but is fragmented into various 'interests' represented by group memberships.

Although the group theorists claimed to have isolated and measured political activity, and to have developed a theory of political behaviour based upon empirical observation, there is some concern that the group model of politics fails to provide an adequate research tool, and that little explanatory data has been generated by its application to British politics. S. Rothman speculates that:

Perhaps the gap between research and theory stems less from a lack of data than from some limitations inherent in the group approach itself...The failure of group theory to serve as an adequate guide to research is the result both of the logical inconsistencies of its propositions and of its inability to explain what it purports to explain. (3)

It is proposed, in examining the evidence for group and for class based political behaviour in Britain, to investigate the explanatory as well as the descriptive powers of the theoretical models through a critical survey of the premises upon which each rests. The operationalisation as well as the conceptualisation of theoretical variables and indicators is then reviewed.
CHAPTER ONE: GROUP THEORY

"All phenomena of government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming one another, and pushing out new groups and group representatives to mediate the adjustments."

A.F. Bentley, The Process of Government, 1908

1.1. THE GROUP: AN HEURISTIC OR DESCRIPTIVE TOOL?

The unique claim of the group theorists was that they had isolated a phenomenon (the group) through which it was possible to analyse the total and complete process of government. In his monumental study The Process of Government, published in 1908, A.F. Bentley claimed to have located and explained political pressure and activity with reference to the group, and thus to have banished 'the ghosts of utopian theory from his empirical effort'. "Society", Bentley declared, 'is nothing other than the complex of groups that compose it...there are no political phenomena except group phenomena.'

This perception of governmental activity as a product of the conflict between groups established the group as an heuristic device, but some critics have argued that group theory contributes little to our understanding of the dynamics of political society. Bentley's 'conceptualisation of politics as the clash of group interests', notes M. Ryan, 'rested on an unstated assumption, namely the existence of an ideological consensus', which failed to recognise the existence of political pressures which fall outside the 'Bentleyan habit background' and which are not manifest parts of the governmental process. To ignore those pressures which operate outside the socio-economic and political framework is, suggests Ryan, 'to conduct the study of pressure groups as if all groups, in fact, accept the ideological rules of the game'. This, he argues, sustains the bias of pluralism and 'turns theory into myth'. Similarly, I.D. Balbus argues that:

if interests are manifested solely through overt group activity, it is logically impossible to say that certain interests are being ignored, distorted or discriminated against in the policy-making process. (5)
The observation of group struggles within society thus becomes a merely descriptive exercise, useful in understanding the mechanics of government, but contributing little to an understanding of the science of politics. A. Barbrook comments:

It is a peripheral pattern of analysis, useful in its identification of the protagonists and important in extending the range of actors involved away from the purely governmental ones to the many 'private' organisations which have political influence [yet] it fails to identify the internal dynamics of the system. (6)

Thus S. Rothman urges that group theorists 'must give up their claim to have developed a complete system and limit their scope to a more narrow, though still important, range of phenomena' if their work is to prove useful.7

Bentley's celebrated suggestion that 'when the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated' may be applied to an anatomy of political pressure and activity conducted and held within a political system, but would thus appear unable to explain the sum of political pressure in society.8 As Balbus competently speculates:

if the interest is the activity, then the interest cannot possibly help explain the activity. If 'groups are everything' that the political scientist need study, and groups are defined as activity, then all the political scientist need do - indeed all he can do - is observe the process of group activity. (9)

The logical flaw in group theory, suggests Balbus, is the failure of 'the group' to act as an heuristic device through an inadequate conceptualisation and definition of 'interest'.10 A.F. Bentley, in declaring that 'there is no group without its interest', equated 'interest' with 'group', but - suggests Balbus - failed to understand the objective as well as subjective dimensions of interest.11

Interest, explains Balbus, is both a psychological (subjective) state of mind, and a state of mind not contingent upon an awareness of interests: an objective interest thus 'refers to an effect by something on the individual which can be observed and measured by standards external to the individual's consciousness'.12 It is the presence of our 'objective' interests, our life-chances
structured by the prevailing social organisation and our place within it, which prompts the emergence of our 'subjective awareness' - an awareness which is not randomly given, but 'systematically determined by the way in which life-chances are objectively affected by objective conditions'. Thus the theoretical problem is to understand the interaction between objective social facts and the perception of those by individuals in the form of subjective consciousness. It is this relationship, however intangible, that causes, and will thus explain, individual behaviour patterns.

Bentley's definition of interest is unsatisfactory because, in avoiding the objective concept of interest, he equates interest with activity. An exclusive concentration on subjective interests in political analysis can deny the possibility that an individual may be unaware of, or mistaken about, his interests. Marcuse writes:

although the vast majority of the population accepts, and is made to accept, this society [it] does not render it less irrational and reprehensible. The distinction between true and false consciousness, real and immediate interests, still is meaningful. (15)

An analysis of political society through its group activity may therefore err in measuring some interests 'falsely' and in failing to measure those interests which are not 'active'. Thus if one's objective economic circumstances prevent the participation and articulation of an interest through political machineries, a subjective concept of interest will fail to identify that interest. This would suggest that, as the politics of organisation exclude as well as include, the sum of political society's interests, or pressure, can never be gauged through an analysis of group activity alone.

D.B. Truman's attempt to overcome such limitations in group theory focussed upon the concepts of 'overlapping membership' and of 'potential groups'. Truman, assuming attitudes, instead of activity, to be the starting point of his analysis of groups and political behaviour, defined an interest group as:

a shared-attitude group that makes certain claims upon groups in society. If and when it makes its claims through or upon any of the institutions of government, it becomes a political interest group. (18)
Such a definition, in its attempt to locate all realities, behaviours and activities in the framework of attitudes, and in its claim that all individual attitudes will be understood once group affiliations and orientations are known, is clearly grounded in the subjective tradition of interest, and ignores any possible determinants of attitudes or linkages between objective and subjective interests.

Truman based his theory of overlapping membership on the observation that:

a characteristic of group life that is particularly noticeable in complex modern society [is] that no individual is wholly absorbed in any group to which he belongs. (19)

Cross-pressures on individuals, suggests Truman, reduces the cohesion of groups, limits their powers, and thus poses no serious threat to the 'habit background'. Because it is based upon the fragmentation of the individual into various spheres of subjective interest, the theory of multiple group membership challenges assumptions about primary, objective interests, such as socio-economic circumstance. It is thus vital, in assessing group theory, to examine the extent to which overlapping memberships provide a comprehensive picture of the 'interests' held within a political society, and the extent to which they may explain political behaviour and orientation.

It is also necessary to locate the dynamics of group membership with reference to the theory of multiple group membership.

An investigation of Truman's theory of 'potential' groups is less easy, suggests S. Rothman, because such groupings are harder to identify, and have a 'deus ex machina' quality. 20 'Truman's actual starting point', writes Balbus:

is in fact organised groups, and potential groups are relegated to the status of a residual category which is invoked for the purpose of bolstering up his explanation when it becomes clear that political behaviour cannot be fully explained in terms of the interaction of organised groups. (21)

R. Dahl attempted to explain latent group activity by focussing upon issues instead of upon attitude-formation, but failed to understand the role of 'power' in issue-resolution. 22 In seeking to calculate the sum of 'interests' within society through an
examination of interests - and of non-decision making and non-participation - Dahl failed to account for the fact that many interests are excluded from the process and remain unarticulated.

Clearly non-participation, non-organisation and 'potential' groupings pose theoretical and practical problems for the group theorists and for a group analysis of political society. Balbus suggests that non-participation came to be interpreted and rationalised by the pluralists, not in terms of the distribution of power, for this possibility was not acknowledged, but in terms of the theory of democracy. The discovery of non-participation in issue-resolution led, it is argued, to an abandonment of those theories of democracy which had emphasized the critical importance of citizen participation. 'Thus do the pluralists', concludes Balbus, 'with the aid of the purely subjective concept of interest transform the 'is' into the 'ought'; thus do social scientists become the apologists for the established political order'.

The tendency to define 'interest' in purely subjective terms, suggests Balbus, is part of the tradition of Classical Liberalism, with its underlying belief that the best polity is one in which individuals are free to pursue their own interest. This, he argues, is 'at the root' of contemporary pluralism, and reflects a:

- failure to distinguish between objective and subjective interests and to theorise about their relationship [which] necessarily leads to a static political analysis. (26)

Similarly, P.H. Odegard enquires what 'the group theory of politics adds to the general body of familiar - even Classical - political theory', if the 'habit background' amounts to a mere reassertion, in new terminology, of the supremacy of existing (ruling) interests and ideas. (27)

An appraisal of group theory demands that 'the group' be defined in such a way that the operationalisation of group theory is an explanatory, and not merely a descriptive, exercise, and that particular attention is paid to the objective as well as subjective dimensions of interest. These issues are considered in section 1.4., below, and in Chapter Five.
1.2. THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN GROUP THEORY

'Power' is not a static category, but expresses a dynamic and changing relationship; it refers to the arrangement of strengths between people or objects, and the likelihood or not that one may influence the orientations of another. The arrangement of economic power within a society is important, not only in understanding the character and growth of political society, but in considering the mechanics of political society, for economic power determines not only the shape of political institutions, but their operation. The power distribution within a society determines group activity, for groups must form relationships with the prevailing structures of society if they are to achieve success.

M. Weber notes, for example, that a monocratic government (eg. a theocracy) will provide an easily-locatable centre of power for interest articulation, but will pose problems of limited access (ie. one channel only), while a collegiate State provides multiple channels of access with the disadvantage of diluted power centres. An anatomy of power within a political State is thus an integral part of an analysis of the nature and role of group activity. Since the 1960's, the Behavioural approach has come under attack from 'new group theorists' who emphasize the importance of constructing models of interest group intermediation based on theories of power: a plethora of labels have subsequently been used to describe power relationships within the State (Corporatist; estatist; elitist; pluralist). Although these models of power have contributed to group literature, it may be argued that such an approach to group activity performs a descriptive, not analytic, function.

F. Neumann has written that: 'Pluralism conceives of the State not as a sovereign unit set apart and above society, but as one social agency among many, with no more authority than the churches, and political parties, or occupational and economic groups'. Pluralism, according to F.G. Castles, is: 'a series of mediating groups between State and citizen, a balance of forces which produce, in their conflict, social consensus and social policy'. Both definitions rest on the assumption that the distribution of power among groups and interests in society is morally
preferable for individuals, as the State becomes a co-ordinator and arbiter with only modified power; indeed, the combined group interests become the power, and the State. The individual, therefore, has two basic relationships: to his group and to the State. The value of pluralism is thus perceived to lie in its provision of 'a conceptual scheme of politics which fills the gap between the individual citizen and the organised State'.

Pluralism, M. Olson suggests:

- tends to create a mood favourable to pressure groups (even though that is not its principal purpose) primarily because it emphasizes the spontaneity, the liberty, and the voluntary quality of the private association in contrast with the compulsory, coercive character of the State. (32)

E. Fort, however, argues that the pluralists misunderstand the actual nature of power. The concept of 'pluralism', he suggests, is a utopian one which is continually challenged by segregation and stratification. Fort describes pluralism as a system where peripheral powers are assimilated rather than amalgamated into existing power-groups and structures: pluralism is thus, in practice, the continuing dominance of one set of interests and institutions, with increased opportunities for other groups to identify themselves with that dominant interest. Pluralism, therefore, is described by Fort as an arrangement of political power which, although diffuse and located in various centres, is based upon established interests, and presumes consensus upon those interests.

This may be equally applied to corporatist arrangements of economic power and theories of the State: 'Corporatism', Claus Offe writes, 'in order to be stable, must not only continually generate consensus, it must first of all presume consensus.' Offe describes Corporatism as an 'axis of development' characterised by an environment where many interest groups enjoy publicly attributed or institutionalised status. While such status may increase the power of corporate groups, however, group autonomy is at the same time reduced: some may be institutionalised so as to restrain certain activities (eg. trades unions) while others are granted such status for delegatory purposes (eg. the British Medical Association as a source of expertise). Corporatism thus
carries differing terms of trade for certain groups, and potential conflict can be depoliticised through the corporatisation of interests. 36

The suggestion that it is the State which fashions the 'opportunity structure' for group organisation and, ultimately, confers or denies institutional status on organised groups, is supported by evidence that corporate groups emerge as State powers are extended. M.J. Brenner argues that, since 1945, an increasingly specialised Britain has demanded functional representation, as 'society tends towards a pluralism of groups whereby national interest, productional, functional, and communal identities all coincide'. 37 Similarly, D. Bell argues that, since the New Deal revolution, United States legislation must be viewed in terms of functional, social and regional interest blocs. 'American history', he asserts:

   carries meaning largely through the prism of group struggles. This prism separates out its distinctive quality more sharply than the cruder Marxist lens of the class struggle. (38)

The importance of C. Offe's 'corporatist' view of power and of groups lies in its consideration of ideological, economic and political parameters in discerning the shape and content of interest organisation. 39 The explanation of political and social institutions through an anatomy of economic power enables Offe to suggest why groups organise as they do, how they are likely to organise in the future, and at what points of the system group organisation is precluded.

Corporatist and pluralist theories of society cannot, however, explain group inactivity, an area which is essential to an understanding of political society. Ryan comments:

   if the idea of politics as the play-off between opposing pressure groups had to cope with the fact that some groups are more powerful than others and that some were undemocratic, there was also the problem of the unorganised. Who was to look after their interests? (40)

Similarly, S. Lukes criticises the pluralists for their study of actual behaviour as a measure of political activity, commenting:
[they] assume that interests are to be understood as policy preferences so that a conflict of interests is equivalent to a conflict of preferences. They are opposed to any suggestion that interests might be unarticulated or unobservable, and above all to the idea that people might actually be mistaken about or unaware of their own interests. (41)

Lukes notes the invalidity of a claim, based on the observation of incidences of successful penetration, that a system can be penetrated by a dissatisfied group. While acknowledging that an investigation of 'non-decisions' broadens the boundaries of 'political activity', Lukes suggests that the salience of the mobilisation of bias (it is exercised rather than consciously used) prevents the measurement of non-participation and does not aid the identification of unrealised interests and challenges. He therefore suggests a third dimension of power which perceives man's wants as a product of the system which works against their interests, with the mobilisation of bias sustained by the social structure, culture and institutions of a polity. The value of Lukes' approach is that it attempts to identify the 'most effective and insidious use of power...to prevent conflict from arising'. In examining the access and power achieved by groups, therefore, it is necessary to consider those issues and groups which are mobilised off the agenda, and to appreciate that those enjoying close relationships with government are unlikely to be articulating radical interests, much less conflict.

These unorganised and unarticulated interests are crucial to the theory of interests and behaviour within political society. Pluralist and corporatist theories of interest, in their concentration on actual activity, may thus be considered to lack the critical analytic power to explain political pressure and the dynamics of political behaviour. The group theory of politics may therefore be found to be unsatisfactory in its conceptualisation of the relationship between economic power and political organisation, and may fail to identify all aspects of interest politics through 'the group'. It is essential that an operationalisation of group theory takes account, not only of the various interests which may be represented in political society - objective and subjective - but of the differential powers that groups possess, and of the varying opportunities available to groups for successful articulation and resolution of their interest.
1.3. THE CONCEPT OF CULTURE IN GROUP THEORY

A valuable political theory is one which can be applied to - or adapted for - cross-cultural research, and which yields explanatory analysis in comparative study. It will be shown that group theory, because of its inadequate treatment of the concepts of interest and power, fails to record a substantial body of (unorganised) pressure and to identify the dynamics behind political orientation and behaviour when used in comparative analysis.

This reproduction of bias (in favour of organised, articulated interests) is a consequence of the environment out of which group theory grew, and of the subjective interest involved in the operationalisation of the 'group' as a tool for political analysis. Because group theory was first applied to the American political system, and was adopted by European political scientists for systems analysis, the concept of group activity is intimately linked with the political structures - institutions, ideas and cultures - prevailing in those States. Interest group activity may therefore be regarded as an institution of democracy, providing additional mechanisms for the channelling of political demands to centres of governmental power: executive, judicial and legislative. Political scientists, taking the 'group' as their political starting point thus also begin with an assumption of 'democracy' (as observed in Western Europe and North America) as the modus operandi into which all political activity must fit.

There has been some attempt, however, within the body of group literature, to operationalise group theory cross-culturally. D. Easton, following a behaviourist tradition, was the first to attempt a systems analysis based on the structure and functions of political institutions. He identified demands made upon a political system (inputs), and the responses of the political system (outputs) as a dynamic process necessary to a polity's effective functioning. Parties and interest groups were perceived as 'gatekeepers' for the channelling of inputs (made by the citizens or 'political actors') and outputs contained within a system, and served also to support, legitimate and effect reforms, or responses, to 'stress'.
Although a valuable development of group theory, Easton's approach is limited by its failure to locate those interests not allowed to proceed by the 'gatekeepers'. Again, therefore, the criticism may be made that those pressures which need to be identified for a total understanding of political society are not located. Similar criticisms can be lodged against T. Parson's functional approach, which used the concept of culture to emphasize the orientation of actors to a social system, but identified only harmonious relationships and successful orientation, thus failing to record a substantial body of interests within society.48

G. Almond and S. Verba developed Parsons' functional theory through their influential work *The Civic Culture*.49 They utilised political culture, i.e. the particular patterns of orientation to political action, in order to differentiate between political systems. Their typology of culture stressed differences in political organisation, and identified: orientation to outputs; orientation to inputs and outputs; and orientation to regional factors rather than to an overall system. Almond and Verba thus illustrated that similar functional activities (e.g. interest groups) could be located in varying structural apparatuses. The functional categories located by Almond and Verba, however, identify only the harmonious functionings of political structures and the successful articulation of interest and, as W.J.M. MacKenzie points out, their functional categories do not add together to give the total activity within a political system.50

A useful adaptation to Almond's structural-functional approach to political systems was made by F.G. Castles who suggested that group typologies are weakened by being tied too strongly to a particular set of cultural conditions.51 Castles locates four components of social systems applicable to developed, underdeveloped and totalitarian polities. These comprise: values (e.g. democracy, Theocracy); Norms (institutions - electoral system, representative chambers etc.); mobilisation (character of organisation - voluntary, unionised etc.); and situational (character of resources) factors. Castles then applied these criteria to various polities in order to more accurately locate and define the nature of group activity and participation (i.e. to which component group activity is oriented) in different cultures. A central feature of this design is the
belief that increased interest group activity arises from increased economic differentiation. 'Modernisation', Castles writes, 'creates a series of differentiated role structures, and so the potential for differentiated group activity'. All highly industrialised and functionally complex nations therefore require interest group mechanisms, even where 'democratic' values or Western 'norms' are not in evidence.

Castles' approach to interest group activity allows us to describe traditional elites in the underdeveloped and developing world (e.g. church, bureaucracy, military) as assuming the status of interest groups in their competition for power. As the 'situational' component of a developing nation changes (for example through trade by multinational corporations) the traditional elites are faced with the task of altering, or creating, that society's 'norms' in order to avoid social cleavage and preserve their own dominant position. They thus become interest groups supporting, and deriving powers from, an economic system. The value of Castles' approach to an analysis of group politics is therefore the recognition that interest group structures may vary between nations, but are always related to the economic relations within society. A fragmented world culture is therefore penetrated by an international economic system which produces interest group structures to support its operation, to greater or lesser degrees depending upon the level of economic differentiation, and in varying forms dependent upon values, norms and situational factors. Castles regards this system as dysfunctional in that it leads to violence, prevents aggregation of actual interests, and divides groups with similar demands into different ideologies and allegiances.

Although it may appear that Castles' model of group power allows group theory to be successfully adapted for comparative political study, the actual task performed by Castles' analysis is the identification of economic relations and structures within society. From this, it is true, we can construct a picture of interest group activity, but the 'heuristic device' is not the group per se, but economic power. It is thus Castles' anatomy of the power distribution that enables him to suggest that interest
group structures may be found in other structures (eg. the military, the church) than in the industrialised world, and thus it is his economic theory which contributes to the theory of interest.

Other commentators, without explicitly challenging group theory, have observed the link between economic structures and political interest groupings. G. Wootton, for example, notes that the technological revolution appears to demand the organisation of pressure group through hierarchy to the point of oligarchy, and is concerned that such developments have bred inegalitarian and undemocratic forces, excluding many interests from the group struggle. Groups have also been attacked as undemocratic by virtue of their varying resources, or their lack of accountability to membership, or their unequal access to the centres of decision-making power. Thus M. Weber, referring to the relationship between economic power and political structures, observed that: 'The relations of the different forms of representation to the economic order are highly complex.'

We may suggest from the foregoing that group organisation and pressure politics are derived from and directed at an economic system, that they mirror the economic organisational structures, and that both 'democracy' and group activity are reflections of, and responses to, developments in the economic system, which provides the actual ideological framework within which both democracy and interest groups operate. 'Liberal-Democracy' may thus be viewed, not as an ideology, but as a means of administering and organising an economic system, ie. of distributing power and resources within society, and of granting freedom and rights to the politics of organisation. J. Dickinson writes:

The task of Government, and hence of democracy as a form of government, is not to express an imaginary popular will, but to effect adjustments among the various special wills and purposes which at any given time are pressing for realisation...Government is primarily an arbitrator, and...every governmental act can be viewed as favouring in some degree some particular and partial 'will', or special interest. (58)

Because the politics of organisation, being based on the power distribution within society, exclude as well as include, liberal-democracy thus becomes a system which guarantees the
freedom and rights of citizens according to economic resources. By re-defining democracy as a political system whereby economic resources are allocated, rather than as a system of ideas or political principles, it becomes only structurally different from other political systems, eg. totalitarianism: the functions and interests of a modern State within the international economic system are likely to be parallel, and the functions carried out by interest groups in the USA, Britain, South Africa and the USSR are similar, although they may be performed through different political structures. Freeing group analysis from its politico-cultural environment thus enables a more comprehensive and valuable analysis of both comparative interest group structures and international interest groupings.

H. Marcuse, in the Marxian tradition, suggests that it is through the mode of production that the economic system generates political structures. 'Ideology', Marcuse notes, 'is in the process of production itself', and it is this 'machine process' which organises the whole of society. The mechanisation of society, and the relations of production and political organisation this generates, can be understood to produce international economic interests which cross national boundaries and threaten the sovereignty of the national State as a self-contained decisional unit.

Such a consolidation of economic power between national economic elites, notes A. Pizzorno, helps to explain the surge of pressure group activity as a form of interest identification: the internationalisation of socio-economic demands undermines the effectiveness of national decision-making centres (eg. political parties) and demands new modes of functional representation, and changing configurations of loyalty and interest identification. The suggestion that political group interests arise from the extension and concentration of economic groupings across the globe carries important implications, for the economic interests that do not find representation nationally are more excluded by an international system. Cleavages between the politically organised, dominant economic interest, and the unorganised, unarticulated economic interest are, speculates G.L. Goodwin, a very real possibility in such a fragmented international society.
It is clear, from the analysis of interest politics in the international arena, that the 'group', as defined by Western political scientists, fails to perform an explanatory function and that - as a theory of political behaviour - the 'group' may be successfully applied to the Anglo-American democracies, but requires substantial adaptation for use elsewhere. It was suggested that group theory is a product of Western culture in so far as it explains political activity within States exhibiting particular forms of economic organisation and differentiation, and that it was thus a theory of political interest in Western capitalist nations. Such a link between economic organisation and political activity was demonstrated by F.G. Castles in his attempt to use group theory for comparative analysis.

The need to perceive interest group structures as a product of their economic and cultural environments may be applied with equal force to an investigation of group activity within a national framework. The application of group theory to an examination of political activity in Britain will therefore take account of the varying socio-economic environments under study, and of the functional role and economic powers of organised groups in those areas. In such a way it is hoped to understand the dynamics of group activity, and of interest politics, as well as their organisation.

1.4. THE GROUP: DEFINITIONS AND TYPOLOGIES

Group theory, it has been argued, fails to give sufficient regard to the economic organisation and relations of society through a purely subjective definition of interest and a failure to link the distribution of power within society to an anatomy of interest groups. Group theory thus fails to explain the dynamics of organisation and non-organisation, and is not easily applied in comparative analysis. In order to test the adequacy of group theory as a research tool in an investigation of political behaviour, it is necessary to operationalise the 'group' in such a way as to overcome these weaknesses. Such an operationalisation is dependent upon the accurate conceptualisation and classification of 'the group'.

Previous attempts to classify groups have been based upon
particular aspects of group politics and have been largely descriptive exercises. The classification of groups by criteria for membership, for example, defines groups according to their sectional nature, and distinguishes between groups whose membership is 'open' to a certain physical group of the population (e.g. the British Limbless Ex-Serviceman's Association) from groups whose membership is determined by criteria such as income and occupation. A further classification is used for groups whose membership is open to those sharing a particular set of attitudes, or beliefs.

Clearly, a typology based upon membership possesses limited explanatory power, and a more popular classification of groups has been that based upon a definition of interest. The definition of interest has, in most surveys, been based upon a distinction between 'ideological' (also termed cause; attitude; ideas; consumer; non-professional) and 'economic' (also termed producer; professional) interest. F. Stacey's group typology, for example, identified producer; consumer; ideas and ad hoc groups. S.E. Finer's definition of interest informed a more descriptive typology, containing eight categories of 'group': business; labour; co-operative; professions; civic; special social categories; religious; and educational and cultural.

The division of interest into 'ideological' and 'economic' spheres does not successfully define group activity or typologise group politics. The classifications used by Finer and by Stacey include a substantial amount of overlap between the interests identified, in terms both of their functional role and of the orientation of members. These typologies do not express the fluidity of a group's interests and activities, and produce rather static and unwieldy categories. This, it will be argued, is due to an inadequate conceptualisation of interest, and a failure to relate a group's interest to its power, and thus to its organisation.

Group politics, it has been argued, is a facet of economic life in so far as political organisation is based upon and reflects economic organisation and resources. V.O. Key, however, argues that: 'to equate a group theory with a theory of economic interest is to ignore the many groups whose endeavours have only the most tenuous economic basis'. It may, however, be suggested that
an economic theory of interest is an appropriate lens through which to classify group politics, as economic resources will determine the 'success' with which all groups articulate their aims, ie. their ability to organise, and to achieve access to government. Thus the Child Poverty Action Group, which is generally perceived as an 'ideological' group, is able to enjoy substantial governmental access through its command of economic resources, and may be considered an 'economic' group in so far as it demands governmental action on economic policies.65

The organisation, resources, tactics and access to government and status of a group are all inter-dependent factors and are ultimately based upon the degree of economic power a group has access to: it is through an analysis of this power that one can identify the characteristics of a group's functioning, and thus its degree of success. The error committed by previous typologies was to isolate either the organisation, tactics or membership of a group, and to use that factor as a basis for classification, believing it to illuminate the type of interest a group pursued.66 A group's interest will not, in fact, be the sole determinant of its organisation and resources, for some cause groups (eg. the National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children) possess more resources, and more access to decision-making centres than certain producer groups (eg. small labour unions).

Thus what is more useful is an attempt to understand a group's resources, tactics and organisation as factors which determine, and are determined by, its access to government and status, and that these facets of activity, when compounded, are inherently linked with its access and power. For example, those groups which, in their competition for access, are able to develop networks and cogs (eg. clubs and associations) paralleling those found in governmental institutions can 'match' governmental resources with their own, and are thus afforded privileged status. The most authoritative, efficient and powerful pressure, however, is usually that exerted directly on governmental organs.

M. Duverger has categorised available pressure strategies as open (via the legislature); concealed (via the executive); propagandal (on public opinion) and violent (direct action).67
Propagandal pressure is used by almost all groups as a support to other pressures, but is most developed by groups excluded from the formal policy community, and least employed by those groups with access to the executive. The media is the most usual channel for propagandal messages but, because it has its own interests to protect (i.e. the city and the business community) its subjective position will be brought to its reporting of group activities. Other institutions, such as the educational system, may be used to promote selected interests. As Truman notes, 'in addition to being interest groups themselves', churches may 'be of great value as channels of propaganda'.

The economic resources and power held by a group are essential to an explanation of why some group achieve access and power more easily than others. S.H. Beer's distinction between types of interest (i.e. producer and consumer) relied on the equation of producer groups with contacts through the executive and consumer groups as operating through the legislature. By defining interest in terms of the tactics and organisation of groups, Beer does not aid our understanding of why and how this process arose. His observations that an increasingly corporate economy has bestowed great power on functional groups and institutionalised their contact with government is true, but Beer too rigidly believes that 'producer interest equals executive contact equals access' and thus cannot explain how a consumer group can be an important part of the governmental decision-making process, and be regularly consulted. An economic theory of interest is able to explain the access to government of groups such as CPAG, which have in the past been labelled 'ideological', and which Beer would term 'consumer'. The CPAG, because it is an economic as well as an ideological group, exhibits characteristics compatible with the economic and political machinery (i.e. its orientations to government are direct and its organisation is sophisticated and authoritative) and is granted access to governmental power centres.

Indeed, as government becomes increasingly complex, gaps continually emerge in governmental resources and abilities, and 'ideological' groups are as likely to be summoned to the policy community as are 'economic' groups. Groups championing a reform
of economic powers are, in fact, more likely to emerge, as political institutions are increasingly challenged and strained by social 'problems' arising from the economic system (e.g. poverty, unemployment). In order to maintain harmony in the social fabric, therefore, government will welcome groups seeking a redistribution of economic powers (i.e. 'cause' groups) into the policy community. By defining interest in terms of a group's tactics, therefore, Beer fails to explain the actual orientations and dynamics of group behaviour.

The degree of access a pressure group achieves will therefore be dependent upon its strategic position within society, its internal characteristics, and the peculiar characteristics of the governmental institutions at which it directs its activity. Because 'access' involves a fluid set of relationships, the distinction between 'insider' and 'outsider' interests defined by E. Schattsneider is particularly useful for typological purposes; while some interests are kept informed by governmental institutions through consultation, other groups are forced to adopt public campaigns for articulation of their grievance. Truman observed that:

> The development and improvement of access is a common denomination of the tactics of all of them, frequently leading to efforts to exclude competing groups from equivalent access or to set up new decision points, access to which can be monopolised by a political group. (72)

Because groups operate in limited frameworks, competing for limited resources, their demands are limited by those of other groups. As J.D. Stewart writes: 'the most powerful argument for or against a group is the attitude of another group'.

This clearly illustrates the importance of the distribution of power in the group environment, in so far as the victors in the competition for access are those groups which are able to organise and orient themselves authoritatively and efficiently. Some groups possess such a privileged status by virtue of their role in society (e.g. the church or judiciary), while other groups seek to gain such access through the provision of expertise or knowledge (e.g. BMA) or through a special relationship with certain resources or interests (e.g. the Trades Union Congress as the mediator between government and unions). Such interests are then usually
institutionalised and drawn into the formal policy community.

Access, organisation, resources and tactics are all elements of power which will, therefore, determine a group's status and success. The effectiveness with which groups have achieved status, suggests V.O. Key, has led pressure groups to: 'exercise forms of private authority which differ little from governmental authority'. Because government is no longer carried out within the traditional spheres of Parliamentary administration pressure groups can, in a very real sense, be said to 'govern'. G. Wootton suggests that groups have been forced to become 'de facto administrative extensions of government' as economic differentiation and multi-functionality have increased governmental workload. Such a view suggests that groups enable government to govern and, suggests Truman, 'group access becomes complete in this situation... established administrative relationships are highly inflexible'.

The fact that pressure groups participate so directly in government challenges the usefulness of S. Finer's definition of pressure groups as bodies which seek to influence government but not to govern. M. Duverger writes:

The State - and in a more general way organised power in any society - is always and at all times...the instrument by which certain groups dominate others. (78)

Political influence and pressure is a corollary of the distribution of economic power within society, and what constitutes a pressure or interest group can be derived from economic power as a measure of influence, whether or not the interest is specifically organised to wield political pressure.

Thus interest groups may be recognised in spheres of economic life where there is no apparent organisation or intent to govern (eg. commercial advertising, the City). Similarly, institutions such as the judiciary and military possess economic power and help maintain a political system which it is in their own interests to uphold. Such pressure is usually maintained by fully industrialised political systems, but in developing countries (eg. Tropical Africa) the military, especially, has found its interest in conflict with other institutions and has transformed its role as pressure group to one of government.
A recognition of the fluidity of political relationships thus challenges Finer’s definition of interest groups. The boundaries of pressure groups can be shown to be highly unstable even in Britain: a case in point is the development of the Labour Party from an umbrella group for various interests into an established political party, subject to multiple pressures and seeking to accommodate as many interests as possible in order to win votes and governmental power. Bealey and Pelling observed that the Labour Representation Committee of 1900-1906 was ‘primarily a body representing the interests of organised labour - a pressure group on the floor of the House of Commons rather than a national political party with aspirations of governing the country’.

An attempt to relate group activity to concepts of interest and power, and to understand economic power and political pressure as related, thus broadens the parameters of interest group definitions, affording a more precise typologisation of organised groups. M. Duverger, in combining facets of interest group activity during the construction of his typology, is able to produce such a matrix of political pressure. Duverger identifies groups as exclusive/partial (whether oriented partially or solely to political institutions); private/public (whether institutionalised); mass/elite (ie. membership) and professional/non-professional (ie. economic or ideological).

In a similar fashion, interest groups will here be classified according to their economic power, as demonstrated through their access to resources; their organisation (tactics) and orientation (to local, national or international decision-making powers), and the ultimate access and status (ie. success) they achieve. They will be defined as interests whose economic power enables pressure to be brought on political institutions directly (organised activity through political structures, or the seizure of power) or indirectly (without organisation or through extra-Parliamentary channels) with the intent of maintaining and extending their own economic powers/interest, or of effecting a redistribution/reform of the economic powers held within the system.
1.5. CONCLUSION

Economic developments, and particularly the rise of the corporate economy, have transformed political institutions, facilitating the growth of organised interests and drawing them into the policy community via the legislature or, increasingly, the executive. As feudal, manufacturing and industrial stages of capitalism determined political structures, so the corporatist technological age places its own demands on the political system.

The interest to the political scientist is the efficiency with which the political structures generated by the socio-economic fabric serve as transmission belts to policy-making centres, and provide institutions with which the electorate identifies, and which orient the political behaviour of the British public. The impact of organised group activity on voting activity and upon political consciousness is thus a vital part of an enquiry into the adequacy of group theory as an explanation for contemporary political society. These issues, and the relative claims of group theory and class theory to explain political society, will be examined during research.
CHAPTER TWO: CLASS THEORY

"The history of all hitherto existing societies is the history of class struggle".
K. Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, 1848

2.1. MARXIAN THEORY AND THE DIALECTIC

The Marxian theory of class conflict is derived from a dialectical understanding of relationships between phenomena, and the processes of their interaction and development. For Marx, the dialectical method was the means by which epistemological and theoretical frameworks of Classical Liberalism could be transcended. It represented a decisive break with the static method of pure, or formal, logic which conceived of everything in fixed and unchangeable terms: the dialectic represented everything in a state of flux. 'In dialectics', wrote G. Lukacs, 'the definite contours of concepts (and the objects they represent) are dissolved. Dialectics is a continuous process of transition from one definition into the other'. The difference between this method and Classical Liberalism was, explained Lukacs, that:

Every pure logic is Platonic: it is thought released from existence and hence ossified. Only by conceiving of thought as a form of reality, as a factor in the total process, can philosophy overcome its own rigidity dialectically and take on the quality of becoming. (2)

Hegel first suggested that ideas are not fixed, but in a continual state of change. The system of dynamic concepts, or categories, developed by Hegel was conceived as representing all thought and experience which would lead - through dialectical interconnections between the categories - to the 'Absolute' or 'idea'. Hegel proposed that the dialectic between man's labour and the natural world it transforms produces man as a self-creating being. He writes:

One maintains one's position through the process of mediating oneself with the universal, and thus gain recognition in one's own eyes and in the eyes of others...the Universal can only reach the actual through determining the concept and the particularity. (4)
Marxian dialectics: 'comprehends things and their representations, ideas, in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin and ending'. My own dialectical method, wrote Marx:

is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. For Hegel...the thinking process is the demiurge of the real world, and the real world is only the outward manifestation of 'the Idea'. With me, on the other hand, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind and translated into terms of thought. (6)

The dialectical method used by Marx embodies four principles: that phenomena do not exist in isolation, but are dependent upon other phenomena; that phenomena must be studied in their movement and development; that contradiction must thus be sought in the processes of nature and society; and the principle of the union of opposites. The principle of the union of opposites expresses what Hegel termed 'the negation of the negation' and what Marx refers to as thesis, antithesis and synthesis. 'What constitutes dialectical movement', wrote Marx, 'is the co-existence of two contradictory sides, their conflict, and their fusion in a new category'.

The importance of the dialectical method to Marx was that:

From this point of view the history of mankind no longer appeared as a wild whirl of senseless deeds of violence, all equally condemnable at the judgement-seat of mature philosophic reason, and which are best forgotten as quickly as possible, but as the process of the evolution of man himself. It was now the task of the intellect to follow the gradual march of this process through all its devious ways, and to trace out the inner law running through all its apparently accidental phenomena. (9)

The 'inner law' of history derived from the dialectical method was the structure of commodity relations. The methodological point of departure in the Marxian theory of class conflict is therefore that 'the relations of production of every society form a whole'.

'The result we arrive at', explains Marx:

is not that production, distribution, exchange and consumption are identical, but that they are all members of one totality, different aspects of a unit... Thus a definite form of production determines
definite forms of consumption, distribution and exchange as well as definite relations between these different elements. A mutual interaction takes place between these various elements. This is the case with every organic body. (11)

Specialisation, through the division of labour, and the growth of private property, therefore mediate the relationship of the individual to its material environment. The historical process is thus viewed as a series of stages through which the economic structure of society (the Unterbau) passes as it responds to new developments (in knowledge, for example) and to new demands (in the organisation of civil society). Marx, in tracing the progressive differentiation of the mode and relations of production, identified five economic forms: Primitive, communal, feudal, capitalist and socialist. (12)

In defining these economic stages, Marx stressed the parallel and interlocking development of social, political and human relations which, because derived from the substructure of economics, formed a societal superstructure (the Oberbau) which both upheld, and was sustained by, the mode and relations of production. 'Social relations', he explained:

are intimately bound up with productive forces. In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production, and in changing their mode of production, their manner of making a living, they change all their social relations. The windmill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam mill, society with the industrial capitalist. The same men who establish social relations in conformity with their material productivity also produce principles, ideas and categories conforming to their social relations. (13)

Marx's philosophy thus dissolved the rigidity of social institutions with its claim that their origins, because historical and related to the economic structure of society, are subject to history in every respect, including historical decline. G. Lukacs writes: 'The knowledge that social facts are not objects but relations between men is intensified to the point where facts are wholly dissolved into processes'. (14) Thus:

A negro is a negro. He only becomes a slave in certain circumstances. A cotton-spinning Jenny is a machine for spinning cotton. Only in certain circumstances does it become capital. Torn from
these circumstances it is no more capital than gold is money or sugar the price of sugar. (15)

The importance of changes in the relations of production is thus the effect such changes have upon the organisation of society. Marx perceived capitalism as rooted in a definite form of society, the main structural characteristic of which is a dichotomous relationship between capital and wage labour. Because the existence of classes is bound up with historic phases in the history of production, it is from this dichotomous economic relationship that class consciousness and class struggle emerge.

Thus the 'dictatorship of the proletariat', and an ultimately classless society, were postulated by Marx to be an inevitable outcome of capitalist economic development, characterised by a 'splitting up' of the world into: 'two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other: Bourgeoisie and Proletariat'.

2.2. THE CONCEPT OF INTEREST IN MARXIAN THEORY

Marx's concept of class and class consciousness is inseparably linked to the dialectical model of society and his theory of conflict and change. As Balbus notes, 'class' for Marx is an analytic or heuristic concept, not a descriptive category, and proceeds from an assumption of antagonistic and contradictory interests which define society in dichotomous terms.

Through his analytic construct of class, Marx explains the structural base of conflict and change in society from a theoretical starting point of objective interest. Marx believed that, because the economic and social organisation of society determine the life-chances of the individual, those individuals similarly affected by objective social conditions possess a common interest, whether or not they are aware of this. 'Classes in the first instance', writes Balbus, 'are thus objective in that their reality is external to the consciousness of the individuals who compose them'.

Marx discusses the birth of objective classes and the conditions for the emergence of objective consciousness in The German Ideology.
Man's consciousness of the necessity of association is perceived as a separation from the animals which allows for the development of individual consciousness. With this, according to Marx, there developed a division of labour which 'only becomes truly such from the moment when a division of material and mental labour appears'. Thus he asserts that 'the shared interest of a class exists not only in the imagination, as a generality, but above all in the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom labour is divided'.

'Class', in this objectively defined 'common situation', is the necessary condition for the emergence of conflict and change in Marx's scheme, but it is not, Marx recognises, a sufficient condition. For conflict between the two classes to emerge, individuals must become conscious of their objective class interest: Marx thus distinguishes between a class 'an sich' (a set of individuals similarly situated in the division of labour and with common objective interests) and a class 'für sich' (a class for itself, aware of its common interests and in opposition to another class). 'Individuals form a class [in the full sense]', Marx notes, 'only insofar as they are engaged in a common struggle with another class'.

The proletariat is therefore opposed to the bourgeoisie before it has recognised its interests and organised itself politically as a class. 'A class discharging a definite function in the process of production may already exist as an aggregate of persons before it exists as a self-conscious class', writes N. Bukharin. The transformation of objective interests to subjective interests is thus the necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of class conflict.

Lukacs defines objective reality as the 'thing in itself'; a reality which is objectively 'the same' for both classes. This objective reality must, urges Lukacs, be mediated by class interests instead of serving immediate individual interests, in order that the proletariat understand society as a whole. 'The intelligibility of objects', he asserts, 'develops in proportion as we grasp their function in the totality to which they belong'. When the proletariat has reached the stage in its consciousness where man is perceived...
as a social, economic and political (species) being in the socio-
historical process, he becomes - explains Lukacs - 'both the subject
and the object of knowledge'. The self-understanding of the
proletariat is, therefore', he notes:

simultaneously the objective understanding of the
nature of society. When the proletariat furthers
its own class-aims it simultaneously achieves the
conscious realisation of the - objective - aims of
society, aims which would inevitably remain abstract
possibilities and objective frontiers but for this
conscious intervention. (26)

The following stages in Marx's theory of class consciousness
can therefore be traced. Firstly, the existence of a dichotomous
class system based upon the mode of production. This arrangement
of economic power (those who own and control the production process,
and those who are owned/controlled by it) serves the objective
and subjective interests of the ruling class: the objective interest
of the proletariat is to change this system. Secondly, a growing
awareness among the proletariat that this dichotomous system exists,
and is an objective reality (class an sich). Thirdly, an increasing
consciousness of the proletariat that this objective reality is
not in their interest: the recognition of a common objective
and subjective interest among the proletarian class (class fur
sich). Fourthly, a growing conflict between the two classes who
seek to fulfil their objective and subjective interests; and lastly,
the emergence of a Revolutionary Class Consciousness among the
proletariat who seek to overthrow the dichotomous class system.

M. Mann has defined the growth of class consciousness in
similar stages, through class identification (of oneself with
the proletariat); class opposition (recognition of capitalism
as the opposition force); class totality (acceptance of class
identification and opposition as defining one's social situation
and the whole society in which one lives); and the concept of
an alternative society (a goal towards which one can move). Mann
suggests that 'revolutionary class consciousness' is a combination
of all four stages, consciousness 'exploding' as the worker moves
from class identification (through experience) to the final stage
(the linking of experience with wider structures). 27

A central problem in the theory of the development of class
consciousness is proletarian identification with the capitalist system. Such 'false consciousness', suggested Marx, is objective consciousness that has failed subjectively to reach its self-appointed goals, while furthering and realising the objective aims of society of which it is ignorant and which it did not choose. Lukacs explains:

As the proletariat has been entrusted by history with the task of transforming society consciously, its class consciousness must develop a dialectical contradiction between its immediate interests and its long-term objectives, and between the discrete factors and the whole. (28)

Abstractly, therefore, class consciousness implies an unconsciousness of one's own socio-historical and economic condition. The difficulty in overcoming false consciousness is, claims Marx, the tenacity with which capitalism defends itself, through its judicial, religious and educational institutions (the Uberbau, or 'superstructure', of society). The hegemony of the bourgeoisie embraces the whole of society, for the ruling interest developed a coherent theory of economics, politics and society in order to defend its position. Marx explained:

The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of intellectual (geistig) production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of intellectual production are subject to it. (29)

A. Giddens writes:

There is not a unilateral relationship between value and power: the dominant class is able to disseminate ideas which are the legitimations of its position of dominance...The import of this is that ideology must be studied in relation to the social relationships in which it is embedded: we must study both the concrete processes which give rise to various types of ideas, together with the factors which determine which ideas come into prominence within a given society. (30)

Giddens thus points out that ideas at variance with the prevalent views of an age will not come into prominence unless articulated with interests held by the dominant class. Such a situation leads, Lukacs comments, to a position where:
As the bourgeoisie has the intellectual, organisation­al and every other advantage, the superiority of the proletariat must lie exclusively in its ability to see society from the centre, as a coherent whole. (31)

The unique function of the class consciousness of the proletariat is thus that it cannot liberate itself as a class without simultaneously abolishing class society as such. it is, Marx argues, through 'Praxis' - the unity of proletarian thought and action - that class consciousness and action will emerge from the masses, and the conflict of classes lead to a re-structuring of society.

'Men, developing their material production and their material intercourse', he wrote, 'alter along with this their real existence, their thinking and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by life'.

While stressing the importance of objective interest in the development of class consciousness, F. Engels acknowledged the need for the development of the subjective dimension of interest:

According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted...The economic situation is the basis, but the various elements of the superstructure...also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggle, and in many cases preponderate in determining their form. (33)

Thus 'if subjective consciousness is lacking', writes M. Mann, 'so too are the objective conditions, for the two cannot exist separately.34

Balbus suggests that 'the central problems of Marxian class analysis concern the development and organisation of consciousness.' If this problem is seen in terms of the formation of interest, he notes, then it may be equated with the pluralists attempt to distinguish between 'potential' interest groups and organised interest groups.

R. Dahrendorf, for example, tries to define Marx's classes an sich and fur sich by distinguishing between latent and manifest interests and between quasi-groups and interest groups.36 Dahrendorf equates latent interests with a class an sich (objective interest), and manifest interests with a class fur sich (subjective
interest), and suggests it is interest groups which emerge from the uniting of individuals around a common manifest interest.37 'Class theory', asserts Dahrendorf:

is concerned with the systematic explanation of that particular form of structure-changing conflict which is carried on by aggregation of groups growing out of the authority structure of social organisations. (38)

In defining class in relation to the exercise of authority, Dahrendorf assumes Weber's definition of authority as 'legitimate power'. As the proletariat class does not possess economic power or authority, Dahrendorf's location of quasi-groups and interest groups in the authority structure of associations and in relation to legitimacy cannot adequately locate or explain proletarian interests. Dahrendorf's use of latent and manifest interests to explain a class an sich and fur sich is inappropriate because of the failure to identify an objective concept of interest. 'Interests', writes Dahrendorf:

Would seem to be psychological in the strictest sense...the proposition of certain antagonistic interests conditioned by, even inherent in, social positions contains precisely this apparent meaningless assertion that there can be interests which are, so to say, impressed on the individual from outside without his perception. (40)

Thus Balbus argues that:

They [the pluralists] typically fail to investigate empirically the link between manifest interests and their organisation...More importantly, given their purely subjective definition of interest in the first place, pluralists necessarily treat what Marx called a class fur sich...as the starting point of analysis. The crucial question for class conflict analysis - the question of the determinants of consciousness and the role of consciousness in the development of conflict and change, or the conversion of interests defined objectively to interests perceived subjectively - is entirely beyond the scope of pluralist analysis. (41)

The implications of the differing approaches to the concept of interest taken by class and by group theory are described by R.C. Macridis:
Marx, with his class theory and its deterministic underpinnings provided a broad theory of history and development through which man would ultimately be able to shed interest in order to attain freedom - that is, in Marxism, determinism led progressively to higher stages of consciousness and perception of the environment. In contrast, group theorists anchor man's life into the perennial group conflict which, by their very nature, groups can never transcend. Not only our lives remain intolerably and unredeemably 'nasty and brutish', but our theoretical universe in terms of which we can explain behaviour becomes unduly restricted. Interest is the propelling force and man is forever destined to live in an environment that mirrors interest. (42)

In assuming an objective as well as subjective concept of interest in the definition of class and of the development of class consciousness, Marxian theory necessarily adopts a different analytical approach to the concept of power, and to the relationship between interest and power, than that taken by group theorists.

2.3. THE CONCEPT OF POWER IN MARXIAN THEORY

Pluralists, note Balbus, treat 'power' as a descriptive category: they ask who has power, and attempt empirically to determine power distribution within political systems. Marxian class analysis seeks instead to define power and is concerned with the role of power relations in political change. Because Marxian class theory is a conflict model, defined in terms of two classes in a relationship of dependence, 'power' is necessarily perceived as a zero-sum concept and, for heuristic purposes, is approached in dichotomous terms.43

An analysis of power, and of the class relations to which it gives rise, rests upon the mode of production of economic goods and commodities. The class relations produced by the economic system are integral to the arrangements of economic, social and political power within a polity. They are, writes Giddens:

the main axis around which political power is distributed, and upon which political organisation depends. For Marx, economic and political power are clearly, though not inseparably, linked. (44)
Thus possession of property (ie. capital, or the mode of production) determines the relations of power and the development of classes within a society. The ruling class (bourgeoisie), and its social and political interests, are formed from such property-ownership and, set in opposition to this class, is the proletariat, whose relationship to the means of production is as workers, and who are propertyless.

The importance of such an anatomy of power to Marxian theory lies in the role economic relations play in the formation of objective and subjective interests, and the development of class consciousness. Marx explains changes in political society through changes in the mode of production and in the economic organisation of societies. Although represented as political struggles, argues Marx, the abolitions of feudalism, of slavery and of caste-systems - and the alteration in franchise arrangements and social and economic legislation - infact reflect the emancipation of an economic interest.

Thus the increasing specialisation and division of labour demanded by industrialisation altered the political and social organisation of societies and polarised the property-owning and propertyless classes. Engels explained:

In the struggle between landed property and bourgeoisie, no less than in the struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, it was a question, first and foremost, of economic interests, to the furtherance of which political power was intended to serve merely as a means. Bourgeoisie and proletariat both arose in consequence of a transformation of the economic condition, more precisely, of the mode of production. (45)

The industrial order, write R. Bendix and S. Lipset:

Imposed on each the burden of his freedom...The relations between master and servant had become a contractual arrangement. Each was bound to the other by a cash-nexus...Hence the classes of industrial society were simply aggregates of men similarly situated in the society. They were held together only by their economic interests. (46)

The economic interest, and the only economic power owned by the propertyless class, the proletariat, is its labour, and this it must offer for sale to those who control the mode of
production. The proletariat is obliged to convert its commodity (labour) into exchange in order to satisfy basic human wants: thus Marx refers to this class as 'wage labourers'. For the proletariat, writes G.A. Briefs:

the unrestricted and exclusive control of person and property which distinguishes the economy of capitalism is narrowed down to an unrestricted control of what they earn by the sale of their labour power. (47)

At the heart of Marx's theory of economic power are the labour theories of value and surplus value, which are instrumental in explaining the dichotomisation of society and the development of capitalism and class conflict. Marx's labour theory of value demonstrates two principles: firstly, that the labourer works under the control of a capitalist, to whom his labour belongs; and secondly that the product of the labour is the property of the capitalist and not that of the labourer, its immediate producer. The labour process is thus: 'a process between things that the capitalist has purchased, things that have become his property. The product of this process belongs, therefore, to him'.

The commodity of wage labourers (variable capital) is required by capitalists in order that value can be produced from constant capital (land, machinery). 'In so far', wrote Marx:

as its instruments and subjects are themselves products, labour consumes products in order to create products, or in other words, consumes one set of products by turning them into means of production for another set. (49)

Thus he asks, in Wage Labour and Capital, 'Does a worker in a cotton factory produce merely cotton textiles? No, he produces capital. He produces values which serve afresh to command his labour and by means of it to create new values'.

The appropriation, by the capitalist, of the labour power he buys from the wage-labourer, leads Marx to his theory of surplus value. The capitalist, according to Marx, has two objects in view: to produce a use-value that has a value in exchange - an article that can be sold as a commodity - and to produce a commodity with a greater value than the sum of values used in its production. 'His aim', writes Marx, 'is to produce not only a use-value, but
a commodity also: not only use-value, but value; not only value, but at the same time surplus value'. The capitalist thus expropriates labour, demanding that the wage-labourer work for a certain time gratis. 'The appropriation of unpaid labour is the basis of the capitalist mode of production and of the exploitation of the worker', wrote Engels, and:

even if the capitalist buys the labour power of his labourer at its full value as a commodity on the market, he yet extracts more value from it than he paid for; and in the ultimate analysis this surplus value forms those sums of value from which are heaped up the constantly increasing masses of capital in the hands of the possessing classes. (52)

From the theory of surplus value Marx deduced three economic laws which, he argued, made the destruction of capitalism and the development of class consciousness inevitable. The first - the law of capitalist accumulation - is based on the tendency of competition to enforce the capitalist to accumulate labour-saving machinery and so to produce more goods. The second law is that of the concentration of capital, based upon the contraction of the number of capitalists with the expansion of competition, and thus the increase in the ranks of wage-labourers, swelled by those capitalists defeated by monopolisation. Thirdly, Marx suggested, the constant expropriation by capitalists of surplus value, with the accompanying concentration of capital, leads to increasing misery and degradation among the propertyless.

'It is capitalist accumulation', wrote Marx:

that constantly produces...a relatively redundant population of labourers...The labouring population therefore produces, along with the accumulation of capital produced by it, the means by which itself is made relatively superfluous, is turned into a relative surplus population: and it does this to an always increasing extent. (54)

The ranks of the superfluous wage-labourers, or 'industrial reserve army' are swollen by the overwork of the employed part of the working class, while the expansion and contraction of the reserve also regulates the general movements of wages (a large industrial reserve army weakens the wage-labourers' bargaining power with the capitalists, who can now draw readily on idle and superfluous labour power).
It is the difficulties faced in commanding an acceptable price for labour, and the misery of the wage-labourer under these conditions, which affects the development of class consciousness among the proletariat. 'As the bourgeoisie develops', Marx suggested:

there develops in its bosom a new proletariat, a modern proletariat...from day to day it becomes clearer that the relationships of production in which the bourgeoisie moves do not have a single, simple character but a double character; that in the same relationships in which wealth is produced, poverty is also produced...that these relationships produce bourgeois wealth, that is, the wealth of the bourgeois class, only by continuously destroying the wealth of individual members of this class and by producing an ever-growing proletariat. (55)

The miserable condition of the proletariat thus inspires an awareness of the growing contradictions and injustices of society and, ultimately, the consciousness that the genesis of such conditions is the existence of private property. 'The proletariat', wrote Marx, 'carries out the sentence which private property passes upon itself by its creation of a proletariat'. Thus the increasing polarisation of society into property-owning and propertyless classes is the inevitable outcome of the increasing accumulation and concentration of capital.

The tendencies of capitalist production to accumulation and concentration express a 'growing incompatibility between the productive development of society and its hitherto existing relations of production', such that 'bitter contradictions, crises and spasms' emerge from the very fabric of society. Hence, 'the highest development of productive power together with the greatest expansion of existing wealth will coincide with depreciation of capital, degradation of the labourer, and a most straitened exhaustion of his vital powers'. The contradictions of growing wealth and growing poverty; of over-production and deprivation; of a growing scientific power (fixed capital) and the growing superfluity of labour power, stem from the relationships of exploitation inherent in capitalism, by which the propertied class live on the labour of the non-propertied.

Critics of the Marxian theory of the decomposition of capitalism dispute the economic grounds on which conflict theory is based.
While sharing Marx's belief that capitalism will break down and be replaced by socialism, J.A. Schumpeter argued that this would result from the strain which capitalism puts upon its own institutional framework - property - and not primarily through unemployment and 'immiseration'. M. Weber, suggesting that capitalism will develop into bureaucracy, also denied the importance of the role of class conflict. While bureaucratisation was, for Weber, an integral part of the hierarchical division of labour, Marx perceived bureaucratic centralisation as: 'one particular manifestation of the bourgeois State, and consequently as transitory a social form as is capitalism itself'.

The possession of economic power, Marx argued, is formalised through a State mechanism which reinforces the dominant economic interest against the propertyless and powerless. The State is thus part of the superstructure, created by and reflecting the relations of production in society and therefore the class struggle. It is, wrote Engels, 'the admission that this society has become entangled in an insoluble contradiction with itself, that it is cleft into irreconcilable antagonisms which it is powerless to dispel'. The State therefore protects the economic order with legal, judicial, military and religious institutions: 'The cohesive forces of civilised society is the State, which in all typical periods is exclusively the State of the ruling class, and in all cases remains essentially a machine for keeping down the oppressed, exploited class'.

'In order that these antagonisms, classes with conflicting economic interests, might not consume themselves and society in a sterile struggle', wrote Engels:

> a power seemingly standing above society becomes necessary for the purpose of moderating the conflict, of keeping it within the bounds of order; and this power, arisen out of society, but placing itself above it, and increasingly alienated from it, is the State. (63)

Thus, in Marxian analysis, bureaucracy is a means of administering capitalism: it is an arrangement of State institutions characterised by functional representation and centralised power centres. Such State apparatus is perceived as a product of the class struggle:
"At a certain stage of economic development", explained Engels, "which was necessarily bound up with the cleavage of society into classes, the State became a necessity". The failure of State and society to contain the contradiction inherent in capitalism thus anticipates the demise both of capitalist economics and of its corresponding social forms.

Pluralist critics have followed the Weberian tradition in suggesting that the State will develop stronger and more diverse mechanisms for the containment of conflict. D. Bell, for example, has suggested that, as conflict becomes increasingly functional and institutionalised, class conflict is fragmented into several and various group struggles. Similarly, R. Dahrendorf argues that the decomposition of labour and growth of the 'new middle class' have drastically altered the nature of conflict, resulting in the institutionalisation of dichotomous class conflict and the creation of group struggles. 'The homogenous capitalist class predicted by Marx', Dahrendorf comments, 'has in fact not developed. Capital - and therefore capitalism - has in fact dissolved and given way, in the economic sphere, to a plurality of partly agreed, partly competing, and partly simply different groups'. Thus, writes Dahrendorf, 'the very appearance of interest groups, and the concrete changes which they have helped to bring into being, have undermined the possibility of the revolutionary upheaval foreseen by Marx'.

Thus in examining the evidence for a class theory of society, it is important that the Marxian theory of economic power and capitalist economics be operationalised. As P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz note, an empirical approach to power cannot establish the distribution of power in society from an apparent consensus or absence of conflict, since 'there is no way to determine empirically whether community adherence to a belief is the product of elite manipulation...or genuine consensus'.

Bachrach and Baratz suggest, instead, that an investigation of power must seek an explanation of changes in resource allocation within societies, an approach which assumes a dichotomous conflict between contradictory interests. They also urge study of the conversion of objective to subjective interests, and thus an
investigation of the factors of power and powerlessness which underly the dynamics of change in political society. These issues will be addressed during the operationalisation of class.

2.4. THE CONCEPT AND DEFINITION OF CLASS

Although Marx failed to provide a precise definition of class, his conceptualisation of class is made clear throughout his writings. Balbus stresses that:

"It is of fundamental importance to realise that Marx's concept of 'class' can only be understood in so far as it is understood as inseparably linked to the dialectical model of society, i.e. as an integral part of Marx's theory of conflict and change. (71)"

Class, according to Marx, is in the first instance objective, and external to the consciousness of the individuals which compose them. Marx explained:

"Insofar as millions of families live under economic conditions which separate their way of life, their interests and their education from those of other classes of people and oppose them to these, they constitute a class. (72)"

Thus class is defined in terms of the relationship of groupings of individuals to the means of production and, because a relatively developed division of labour is necessary for the creation of the surplus product without which classes cannot exist, is integrally linked to the division of labour.

"The shared interest of a class exists not only in the imagination as a generality', wrote Marx, 'but above all in the mutual interdependence of the individuals among whom labour is divided'. (73)"

In the dichotomous system, classes are not 'dependent' upon each other in the sense of collaborating groups, but they cannot exist without each other. Their reciprocity is an asymmetrical one. While each class 'needs' the other, their interests are at the same time mutually exclusive, and form the basis for the potential outbreak of open struggles.

Although the theory of class conflict was based upon a concept of mutually exclusive and dichotomous classes, Marx did recognise
differentiation within classes. Indeed, he concedes that simple class relations are complicated by the existence of the 'middle classes'. These elements are regarded not as a separate class or group, however, but as either a transitional or segmental phenomenon of a fundamentally two-class society. Such groups are perceived as having been forced to the margins of society (where they were re-defined as a separate class) during the development of capitalism.

The proletariat and bourgeoisie, explains Lukacs, are the 'pure' classes, while the other classes aim only to weaken the antagonisms between the interests of capital and labour. In this process, the objectives of the transitional class become weakened as it sides first with one class and then with another. The continuing development of the capitalist mode of production will ultimately confirm the interest of these transitional classes to lie with either capital or labour.

Thus, in the abstract model of capitalism, the development of the revolutionary potential of the working class is linked to three aspects of the polarisation of the classes: Firstly, the demise of the classes and the segments of classes which complicate the main dichotomous system of capital and wage labour; secondly, the demise of diversified sectors within the working class itself; and finally an increase in the disparity between the material wealth of capital and of wage labour (ie. the 'immiseration' theory).

Some attempts have been made to identify and quantify the strata of society which Marx explained in terms of 'transitional' or 'segmental' classes. F. Bechhoffer et. al., in a study of small shopkeepers, suggested that their sample lay outside the British class structure, detached from both the working class and the middle class. The small shopkeeper is described as:

powerless, isolated and alienated, struggling against hostile economic forces, enduring the psychological pressures of 'status incongruency', and caught between the battalions of big business and organised labour. (76)

Such a strata of society acts, Bechhoffer suggests, as a repository for many of the traditional values upon which a capitalist social order was built - upon individualism, the work ethic and a laissez-
faire economy. 'In our view', Bechhoffer et. al. surmise:

they are properly to be seen as petit-bourgeoisie -
as belonging to neither of the major classes in
our current system of stratification. (77)

L. Corey, however, in his study of the British middle classes,
comments that:

Nothing is gained, and much is lost, by juggling
with distortions of the concept of class, or by
stretching the meaning of working class and prol-
etariat until they become all inclusive, meaningless
concepts. That does not conjure away the numbers or
strength of the middle class; nor the important
problems of differences in functional occupation and
interests, the differences in historical background
and psychology. (78)

Similarly, D. Robertson believes a dichotomous definition of class
with references to the division of labour to be inadequate. 'In
an electoral democracy the ruling class is trivially small', he
argues, 'and unless one restricted the working class by some further
criterion, it would become co-extensive with 95% of the electorate,
and would therefore not be capable of any explanatory role vis-
a-vis the party division of the vote'.

While Marx conceived of 'class' as a historical category,
however, and perceived the middle classes to be fulfilling an
historic role by moving towards the capitalist or proletarian
classes, the term 'middle class' is today used by many critics
as a descriptive category. G.D.H. Cole urges the need to consider
class, not as a descriptive term, but as an historical force,
and suggests that the term 'middle class' today is conceptually
and fundamentally different to the more traditional term 'bourgeoisie'.
(81) Thus he comments that:

What those who deny the existence of classes in such
a society as the US are really denying is not class
but class antagonism as a pervasive phenomenon of
American society. (82)

And in a study of the class structure in the United States, K. Mayer
surmises that "the image of America as a society where 'everybody
is middle class' has persisted long after it ceased to be in accord-
ance with economic and social reality."
Such an approach to the conception of class is labelled 'dichotomic' by S. Ossowski in his examination of social strata in the social consciousness. A dichotomic concept organises a polar division of society around power or authority (rulers and ruled), economic differentiation based upon property (rich and poor) and control of labour (exploiter and exploited). This class imagery, as we have seen, defines each class in terms of its dependence upon the other and perceives middle class strata only as secondary groupings, or appendages, of one or other of the two major class groupings.

Ossowski identifies two further conceptions of social structure: in the 'gradational' scheme, the middle class is often regarded as the most basic class, with other classes determined in relation to it, and the relationship between classes one of ordering rather than of dependence. The 'functional' conception of the social structure divides society into a number of classes differing in accordance with the functions which they fulfil in social life and based upon the relations of mutual interdependence.

The gradational approach to social structure is well represented by the Weberian tradition of sociology. 'Class', in Weber's terminology, always refers to market interests existing independently of whether men are aware of them: an objective characteristic influencing the life-chances of man. 'Status groups', on the other hand, are constructed upon criteria of grouping other than those stemming from market situations, and are subjectively-aware communities. While Weber accepted the predominancy of economic class, he did not perceive this to be the sole determining factor in social structure. Marx, he suggested, failed to recognise the part played in history by status affiliations created as bases of group formation, through processes not directly contingent upon class relationships.

Thus while Marx treated 'economic power' as directly contingent upon class interests, M. Weber understood power to play an independent role in social stratification. Weber believed that Marx failed to realise that the divisions of economic interest which create classes do not necessarily correspond to sentiments of communal identity, which constitute differential 'status'. 'Status', Weber suggested, represents a separate, subjective dimension of stratification.
Aspects of Weberian theory have been widely used to modify Marxian class theory. F. Parkin, for example, suggests that the conceptualisation of class in dual, logically exhaustive categories raises difficulties in the analysis of intra-class relations and social stratification. Anomalies necessarily arise', writes Parkin:

from the use of a definitional framework in which the complexities of class are squeezed into a simple zero-sum model on the grounds that only this type of scheme is capable of capturing the conflictual essence of class. (91)

Parkin suggests that Weber's social closure theory - which focusses upon class as a process - allows a more fluid definition of class. Thus although, like Weber, Parkin believes that the occupational order forms the backbone of the class-structure, he uses a multi-dimensional approach in identifying both class and status inequality as two separate and distinct dimensions of social stratification. By taking account of subjective factors', Parkin suggests, 'the cleavages generated by the economic order could be shown to have less significance than Marx invested them with'. Status, or privilege, consciousness is thus assumed to fulfil a vital role in the formation of social strata or 'classes': this perception of class as a gradational, multifactored phenomenon has been labelled a 'subjective approach'.

The functional approach to class structure also lends considerable attention and importance to the middle classes: the expansion of the service and administrative sectors of the modern economy, in particular, has led to a re-definition of traditional dichotomous class theory. Thus A. Giddens, while recognising that the class system constitutes the fundamental axis of the social structure and the 'main channel of relationships of exploitative domination', suggests that 'the division of labour...may be a basis of the fragmentation as well as the consolidation of class relationships'. Thus Giddens distinguishes, within the 'service class', two aspects of the division of labour, or a 'differentiation of occupations in respect of divergences in market capacity on the one hand, and in respect of divergences in paratechnical relations on the other'. Such a fragmentation within the division of labour
allows Giddens to move away from the fundamental concept of exploitation—the production of surplus value—on which Marx's dichotomic class model was based.

T.H. Marshall suggests that:

if the clear-cut lines of stratification are fading, this may be due, not merely to the growth of more dimensions of stratification, but also to the emergence of more dimensions of social groupings of all kinds. (97)

Marshall indicates a 'gradual replacement of a simple, clear and institutionalised structure by a complex, nebulous and largely informal one', resulting from the convergence of several dimensions of stratification. Although classes may not have decayed altogether, he suggests, they have been transformed from homogenous interest groups where unity was based on a common position in production, to associations formed temporarily in the occupational sphere for the pursuit of common interests. This might be described, speculates Marshall:

as a weakening of class in the Marxian sense, on the grounds that the operative interest groups are no longer determined by the social relationships within the system of production, that is, primarily by property. (99)

R. Dahrendorf also challenges the traditional definition of class according to property relations. Dahrendorf argues that a theory of class based on the division of labour loses its analytical value if legal ownership and factual control are separated: Marx's concept of private property is, he suggests, a specific instance of the authoritative rights of control. Dahrendorf thus replaces 'the possession, or non-possession of effective private property' by the 'exercise, or exclusion from, authority' as the criterion of class formation.

Dahrendorf's definition of class, like that of Marx, assumes conflict between classes, but Dahrendorf's conflict groups are 'only a small segment of the wide field which can be described by the vague concept of structure change'. Any given conflict is explained in terms of the association in which it arose, and is analysed in terms of the conflicts to which it gives rise. Thus property, economic status and social status are not determinants
of class, but 'factors influencing the empirical course of clashes of interest between conflict groups'. Thus:

however one may choose to define classes, they must always be regarded as groupings related to each other in such a way that their interplay is determined by a structurally conditioned conflict of interests. (104)

The ways in which class is conceptualised is thus dependent upon an analysis of the objective and subjective interest, of property relations and the definition of economic power, and of the role of status groupings within society. In defining class in the Marxian tradition, it is important that these issues be addressed.

2.5. CONCLUSION

Having considered the way in which Marx conceptualised class (and particularly his methodology, and the relationship between interest, power and a class theory of society) and having suggested ways in which this differs from stratification theory, it is possible to offer a Marxian definition of class.

G.A. Briefs defines the proletariat as propertyless and with no reserve supply of consumption (savings). A member of the proletariat is, writes Briefs:

a propertyless wage earner (representative of the great mass of such created by the capitalist State) who regards himself and his kind as constituting a distinct social class, who lives and forms his ideas in the light of his class consciousness, according to his class ideals, and who on the basis of this class consciousness rejects the prevailing social and economic order. (105)

Such a definition, in combining the major elements of Marxian theory, is found by the present author to be a satisfactory definition. Objective class is thus defined in terms of the relationship of an individual to the mode of production. Subjective class will be operationalised according to the various stages of class awareness, identity and consciousness. The operationalisation of the concept and definition of class is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four, below.
CHAPTER THREE: BRITISH POLITICAL CULTURE
THE CLASS AND GROUP ENVIROMENTS

"A political culture is the set of orientations concerning the political process (e.g. ideologies, attitudes, beliefs), and their expression, as they are related to members of a political system and set in the context of the norms of that system. Its particular form in any society is a product of the historical experiences that have affected the political system, and the results of the political socialisation processes experienced by members of the political system."


3.1. INTRODUCTION

The application of class and group theory to political society requires an examination of the structures and institutions which comprise the political culture of Britain, and through which class and group identifications and behaviours may be articulated. In acknowledging the role of political culture in attitude and behaviour formation, account must be taken, not only of the network of political institutions, but of the meanings they possess for the political actor.

Voting choice is most often used as the base for empirical research because it simplifies a political actor's response to political society. The ways in which the electoral system may act as a lens through which to view class and group conflict are considered with reference to the class and group bases of the British party system, and the meaning of party choice. Class and group models of voting behaviour are critically examined through an investigation of the corellates of partisanship, and the class and group interests and appeal of the major political parties are investigated.

The starting point of political analysis, for class and group theorists is, however, external to the electoral system. Group theory emphasises the role of associational activity - which may be conducted through political parties, or be directed at political parties, but which is engaged in continuously rather than ritually, and does not canvas votes or represent itself as part of the electoral system. Thus it is suggested that:
elections have very little direct influence on the policy and decision-making of Government. Probably of more importance are such things as the pressures which the parties and the groups are likely to exert continuously, the Politician's own preferences, external factors such as the state of the economy and foreign relations, prudential considerations, and so on. Perhaps it is the case that elections do have a central place in the democratic credo, but it is not easy to justify this central place empirically. (2)

Class theorists, on the other hand, suggest that political institutions - such as parties and pressure groups - do not possess political influence in their own right because they simply transmit the influence of the economic substructure of society. Thus:

while there may be a variety of superstructures for one type of base...there is always a link between the sort of superstructure which does, in fact, grow up and the nature of the base. (3)

Thus political parties are, according to class theory, bourgeois groupings which uphold a political and economic system, and which differ only in their policy towards the administration of capitalism. Marxists thus deny strictly cultural factors in political phenomena. 4

In examining the class and group environments of British politics, the institutions and structures of political society are analysed according to the cultural interpretations assigned by pluralist and by Marxian theorists. Thus, in addition to an examination of electoral politics, the nature and role of associational activity, and of structures traditionally linked with concepts of class (eg. trade unions) are examined. The class and group variables identified in the survey of British political culture are investigated during empirical research.

3.2. GROUP STRUCTURES: ASSOCIATIONAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN

An understanding of the role of interest politics requires an investigation of the relationship between pressure groups and the political parties, and between pressure groups and the executive branches of government. The nature of associational politics will be examined with reference to the class base of group activism.
Political parties, wrote D.B. Truman, are essentially devices for election purposes and not instruments for operating the government. Thus, in their concern to represent multiple interests and conquer the marginal voter, he suggested, they tend to lose their programmatic identity and become receptive to group pressures. Group theorists, therefore, view the political party as a coalition of groups, with party leaders functioning as brokers between competing groups within the party: any action by a political party, suggests S.H. Beer, can be understood by analysing it with reference to its component groups.

Both parties and pressure groups are perceived as integral to the governing process and the division of labour prevailing between these institutions is considered a stable one, and one which is stabilising for the political system. The maintenance of effective relationships within the pressure group: government nexus, argue J.D. Olsen and A. Strauss, avoids conflict and results in 'negotiated order and negotiated environment'. This participation of interest groups in the legislative process ('concertation') is, it is suggested, a structural political response to the social tensions produced by a corporate economy.

'Concertations' may take place between an interest group and a political party (eg. between the Trades Union Congress and the Labour party) or an interest group and a member of Parliament (in the case of smaller interest groupings). Some relationships are formalised through sponsorship of an M.P., but more often an M.P. does not give exclusive loyalty to a group, and is thus subject to multiple pressures. As the relationship between an interest group and an M.P. is mutually supportive - and financial and other rewards may be involved - there is some concern about the presence of interest groups in the House of Commons.

J.D. Stewart suggests that increased Executive activity has provided new points of access for the more successful interest groups. The permanency of relationships between civil servants and pressure group leaders challenges traditional electoral 'choice', suggest A.G. Jordan and J.J. Richardson, and prevents the electorate from influencing major policy decisions. 'It is all too easy', concedes D.B. Truman, 'in examining the kinds of relationships between groups and administrators' to conclude that:
the difficulty encountered by the latter in arriving at stable patterns of interaction makes them pawns of the dominant organised groups. (13)

Government may thus be viewed as: 'a protean complex of criss-crossing relationships that change in strength and direction with alterations in the power and standing of interests, organised and unorganised'.

Interest groups may thus be ranged along an 'insider-outsider' axis according to their access to decision-making powers, with those in contact with the executive more powerful than those which articulate their interest through the legislature. Interest negotiation may be understood to award equal power to the parties involved theoretically, but in practice to favour the dominant economic power. Concertation, D. Coombes concedes, tends to force government into the role of referee and excludes Parliament which, when resources are limited and all interest groups condemned to 'lose', may create tensions. The outcome of concertation would therefore seem to be blockage in decision-making, and power-disputes between groups.

In considering the nature and role of associational politics in Britain, therefore, it is important that the resources, power and organisation of a group be considered, in order that its access to decision-making centres may be understood. Such an analysis suggests that the success of an interest is dependent upon its socio-economic, or class, location and that pressure politics may be analysed with reference to class theory. The class base of group politics may be further examined through the study of a group's membership.

Various studies have indicated that pressure group membership is largely drawn from the 'middle classes'. Participation levels in community and associational life, suggests D. Lockwood, continue to be lower among the working class than among the middle class. 'The closure of voluntary associations along class lines', he writes, "where it is not financial is achieved informally by subtle social barriers erected on the basis of shared attitudes and forms of behaviour which are much less easily acquired than material 'status' symbols." R.E. Dowse and J.A. Hughes also comment upon:
a positive relationship between higher education, sense of political competence and membership of a voluntary organisation, with the association highest for membership of a political organisation. (20)

The relationship between political efficacy and membership of an organisation has also been linked to socio-economic factors by G. Almond and S. Verba, who suggest that associational activity supplements, rather than replaces, other forms of political activity, eg, voting.21

In considering the extent to which membership within group structures orients political behaviour and creates a focus of identity, variables for political participation and efficacy (electoral and non-electoral) will be examined. The class nature of group memberships will be investigated with reference to socio-economic variables, and the role of individual groups in the political process will be considered through an examination of their resources, organisation and tactics. Such an analysis of the role and nature of associational politics will indicate the extent to which 'the group' may be considered as an heuristic device which provides an explanatory theory of political behaviour in Britain.

3.3. CLASS STRUCTURES: THE TRADES UNIONS

Trade unionism is not only an institution through which 'class' interests have traditionally been identified but, because of its historical relationship with the Labour party, is also a movement through which the nature of British socialism may, in part, be understood. An investigation of the role of trades unions in British society is thus integral to an analysis of the class nature of political culture.

Although there is a differentiation of industrial and political roles between the unions and the Labour party, there is a significant overlap of function, and an increasing tendency for the trades union movement to play a dominant role in Labour party policy. The relationship between the Labour party and the trades unions is, however, an unstable one, and there have been indications that the union:party nexus is weakening.22 B. Pimlott and
C. Cook suggest that the Labour vote among trade unionists is in decline while the unionised Conservative vote is rising: there is, furthermore, a decline in the approval among Labour voters of the party's links with the unions. A decline is also noted in union memberships affiliated to the Labour party as a proportion of total union memberships.

This weakening of the links between unions and Labour party may be explained with reference to the changing class base of the unions and of the Labour party. B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe note, of the 1983 General Election, that: 'the extent to which trade unions, as a political issue, had become separated from conceptions of class interests, is indeed remarkable'. R. McKenzie and A. Silver also suggest that:

neither the unions nor the Labour party are seen, except by a very few, as instruments for radically transforming the social system or the class structure, both of which seem to be accepted by most of the working class as essentially immutable.

Trade unionism, argues G.A. Briefs, is an organisational structure which performs economic functions in the regulation of capitalism. The unions are a part of the workers movement, he suggests, which are not part of the class struggle, but which 'have taken root in the soil of the prevailing socio-economic order'. Briefs writes:

the fights staged by trades unions over the question of wages and working conditions of one kind or another do not constitute class struggle; they are part of the normal order of things in an economic system based on market competition.

It is the functional nature of trade unionism which narrows the workers' experience of class conflict to the industrial arena, suggests M. Mann, and thus restricts consciousness-raising to the work place. Industrial action in Britain, he writes, has only instrumental, tactical aims, and is not motivated by visions of an alternative, socialist society: the 'economistic activities' of trades unions thus 'reduce the class nature of the conflict'.

The trades union movement's interests may be identified as industrial (eg. wages); political (those spheres not strictly
industrial but related to the workplace, eg. pensions) and ideological (eg. nationalisation). Concentration on industrial struggles and economistic demands, for example pay awards, may be understood to arise from conditions of unemployment which divert attention from the more ideological commitments of the 1950's and 1960's. Any vision of an alternative socialist ideal is thus obscured by the commitment to fighting for improved job conditions and maximisation of membership benefits. Industrial conflict, suggests S.H. Beer, may be more accurately understood as struggle within the working class than struggle between classes: it is, he writes, 'the desperate Hobbesian struggle of union against union'. Similarly, R. Taylor suggests that the industrial conflict of 1979 was: 'no heroic struggle of labour against capitalism, but a harsh and internecine conflict within the working class itself'.

This intra-class struggle leads, it has been suggested, to a 'pragmatic' approach to labourism, and to the adoption of single-issue tactics similar to those used by pressure groups. This strategy is considered by some to reflect the changing membership of the trade unions, and the emphasis upon individualistic instead of solidaristic demands. The substantial increase in white-collar unionisation (rising from 1,335,000 in 1948 to 3 million in 1971) is thus felt to be an indication of the decline in the class and party base of the union movement.

Such developments in the membership, organisation and aims of the unions may be understood to reflect the way in which the union movement has become institutionalised. This process is one characterised by political stability and economic expansion, and by the unification of unions with a reformist and centralised outlook. C. Crouch suggests that institutionalisation of the unions began after World War II, when the industrial relations system:

- seemed to have settled into a pattern of heavily institutionalised relations between employers and unions, with the State playing a role largely restricted to conciliation and peace-making rather than detailed intervention. (40)

By the 1960's, the trades union movement was in a powerful position, and Trades Union Congress membership, as a proportion of total
H. Wilson, speaking in that year at the TUC centenary celebrations declared that:

the TUC has arrived. It is an estate of the realm, as real, as potent, as essentially part of the fabric of our national culture as any of the historic Estates. (42)

Once invited into the policy-making community, however, notes M. Barratt-Brown, the unions are prevented from pursuing real social change. He explains:

Each and every act that trade unions take, or other organisations take, inside any particular social formation, remains inside than formation, or can be incorporated into that formation as a reform, however much it starts off as a radical criticism. (43)

British trade unionism, according to D. Anderson, 'could not avoid stifling British socialism within one unified body, given the immense strength of the former and incoherence of the latter'. Furthermore, as Crouch argues, the institutionalisation of the unions does not isolate them from economic challenges and, on the contrary, is likely to encourage marginalisation of their interests during periods of high unemployment. This formalised relationship between the trades union movement and government structures has thus become mutually supporting, and has caused the TUC to assume the role of an 'insider' pressure group, affording the Government access to a strategically important group of workers. Although the trades union movement, as a pressure group, has a substantial membership, various studies have indicated a feeling of distrust of union power among the electorate. Sarlvik and Crewe, discussing the public image of trades unions, write:

the data suggest that [it] depends on whether one is thinking of the trades unions as organisations representing the interests of their membership or, alternatively, as a national economic and political pressure group. The one view is favourable and sympathetic. The other is critical, not to say hostile. (47)

In considering the impact of unionisation on political behaviour and voting choice, it is thus necessary to examine the role which unions perform in the British political system, and the class
group orientations of electors to union structures. Such an examination is essential if unionisation is to be usefully operationalised for purposes of political enquiry. If unionisation is found not to be a satisfactory class variable, alternative measures of class-structured political behaviours must be identified and operationalised.

3.4. THE CLASS AND GROUP BASES OF THE BRITISH PARTY SYSTEM

Party, it may be argued, more than any other aspect of British political culture, is responsible for structuring political attitudes and behaviour. Partisan self-image, suggest Butler and Stokes, is possessed by a large majority of British electors and is the most enduring feature of a voter's political inclinations.\footnote{48} The dynamics which underly party preference are therefore crucial to an examination of political identification and orientation, and the correlates of partisanship must form a central part of an analysis of class and group politics.

Partisanship has been defined as a negative relationship, in which the perceived political distance between an elector's own party and the opposition party determines the strength of partisan self-image.\footnote{49} Butler and Stokes' model of partisanship, based upon the direction and strength of partisan self-image, suggests that it is the party which shapes and directs voting behaviour.\footnote{50} This relationship is also described by G. Wallas, who explained that the electorate requires:

> something simpler and more permanent, something that can be loved and trusted, and which can be recognised at successive elections as being the same thing that was loved and trusted before; and party is such a thing. (51)

The crucial aspect of partisanship is thus the determinant of partisan direction, for which theories of political socialisation are most commonly used. While class theorists argue that partisanship is formed by primary agents of socialisation (family, educational institutions and occupational structures) however, group theorists believe that partisan self-image is increasingly determined by secondary agents of socialisation (eg. reference
groups, voluntary associations and 'consumption' factors).

THE GROUP THEORY OF VOTING: CONSUMPTION CLEAVAGES

In 1979 a survey conducted by D. Robertson - using the occupational gradings employed by Butler and Stokes in 1963 - revealed a decline in the link between class and voting choice. Robertson found that, of those expressing a preference for the Conservative party, 55% were non-manual labourers and 29% were manual labourers. Of those respondents selecting the Labour party, however, only 41% were manual workers and only 17% non-manual workers. The Labour party was perceived as unable to increase or hold steady its non-manual vote, and thus to be dependent upon a working class who were no longer committed to them. Sarlvik and Crewe wrote:

By 1979 Labour could no longer be described as the party of the working class, but manual workers clearly remained the class of the Labour party. (53)

In examining the decline of the class vote, Sarlvik and Crewe refer to class as a 'Lockgate' on the vote and ask if other factors - previously considered 'embellishments' of British politics - have become more important.

Sarlvik and Crewe suggest that structural economic changes have altered the class composition of society and rendered the class vote obsolete. The traditional working class, it is argued, has given way to a 'new working class' which 'finds itself on the move, moving towards new middle class values and middle class existence.' The increased number of working class electors who cross the threshold of the middle class are perceived to have achieved class mobility through their acquisition of material possessions and middle class norms and values.

H. Himmelweit, for example, argues that:

the link between class and vote is through attitude and beliefs and varies with the economic and political climate of the day and with the parties' stance. (56)

Such an approach allows for adult attitude and behaviour to be non-congruent with childhood socialisation. This applies specifically to a situation where social mobility creates conflicting pressures which, it is suggested, are resolved by adopting the attitudes and behaviour of the 'group of arrival'. The working class is thus perceived as seeking to adopt and imitate, rather
than to oppose, middle class attitudes and behaviour. This process has been facilitated (suggests D. Lockwood) by changes in the occupational, familial and communitarian structures of the working class. These structures, he argues, were the primary forces in the shaping of class or status-consciousness, and the shift from a work-centred, production-oriented environment to a home-centred and consumption-oriented existence is one which 'privatises' the workers, and alters their class cognitions. Lockwood explains:

when not at work, the individual may retreat into his family, and it is likely that, with the progressive breakdown of tightly-knit, traditional working class areas and the re-housing of their population, this is an increasingly common phenomenon. (59)

The changing residential pattern of the working class, it is argued, has increased exposure to middle class values, and home ownership in particular has been linked to the adoption of middle class identification and a Conservative vote. Robertson, for example, found that 47% of owner-occupiers but only 22% of council house tenants were Conservative partisans. 'The residence of an elector', write Butler and Stokes:

must be regarded as a background factor of great political significance. Electoral change is partly explained by a model that is... 'housing-driven', and which implies that changes in the 'exogenous' housing variable have direct and indirect effects on the strength of parties. (61)

The growth of the 'new working class' has been linked to an enlarged 'secular' vote, and an apparent decline in the class vote. R. McKenzie and A. Silver describe the secular working class voters as:

Those who base their support for the Conservative party not upon a priori assumption about their innate superiority but upon a pragmatic assessment of their policies and performance in office. (62)

The secular voter, it is suggested, distributes his vote among the major parties, not on the basis of traditional loyalties or ideological grounds, but as a considered and pragmatic response to governmental outputs. This 'instrumental' approach to voting choice, it is argued, erodes the two-party class system. (63)
The willingness, on behalf of the elector, to see party choice in such terms reflects, according to group theorists, the changing subjective class identifications held by strategic groups of voters. McKenzie and Silver suggest that: 'the ideological basis of working class Conservative voting is moving away from deference towards secularism', and that working class Conservatives increasingly identify themselves as middle class. M. Abrams also identifies two types of working class Conservativism - deferential and pragmatic - and suggests that manual workers who describe themselves as middle class and support the Conservative party be understood as secular voters. These secular voters, Abrams calculated, constitute over one fifth of all manual workers and provide the Conservative party with nearly one third of all their electoral support. Such cross-class voting among the working class electorate leads group theorists to reject the class theory of political behaviour. The pluralist theory of voting choice therefore stresses the impact of consumption sectors (income, housing, reference groups) upon an elector's class identification, eroding traditional class-based partisan loyalties, and encouraging an instrumental, non-class-based approach to voting choice.

THE CLASS THEORY OF VOTING: PRODUCTION CLEAVAGES

The class theory of voting emphasises the influence of childhood socialisation and of an elector's structural location within the economic system upon electoral behaviour. T. Forester argues that class and class background are important determinants of voting behaviour because they act as a primary social cleavage, determining the position of such variables as housing, education and income. Voting, he writes, 'is pre-eminently related to class, and without the class dimension it is impossible to understand or explain the workings of the party political system.' Similarly, Dowse and Hughes point out that class influences are reinforced by the links between parents' social class, schooling and future opportunity structures. The school, they explain: 'tends to function as a type of anticipatory socialising and stratifying agent. The school helps to create and fix in the children ideas of what is possible and appropriate for them'.

Although cross-pressures may reduce parental influence, the family has been established as a crucial socialising agent. That
most people, write Butler and Stokes:

adhere to the party of their parents attests to the fact that most voters are exposed to influences later in life that are generally consistent with the party into which they were born. In recent decades the most important of these have been the life experiences associated with class. (72)

Even where an elector has not experienced a clear partisan influence as a child, Butler and Stokes suggest that the class milieu will nonetheless play an important role in establishing partisan allegiance.73

The view of class theorists is that the primary agents of socialisation (which determine political attitudes and behaviour) may be broadly defined as 'production cleavages' - that is, as expressing an elector's position in the economic system. Sarlvik and Crewe investigated the effect of production cleavages upon the vote in order to measure the effect of class location upon political behaviour. Using a distinction between employer and employee status (based upon an orthodox definition of class according to an elector's relationship to the means of production), Sarlvik and Crewe found the self-employed to be overwhelmingly Conservative, even when involved in manual labour.74 Employer status, suggested Sarlvik and Crewe, is a useful indication of voting behaviour in so far as it expresses socio-economic class position. Similarly, trades union membership was found to be a useful predictor of partisanship because of the relationship between class and unionisation.75

This analysis led Sarlvik and Crewe to suggest that certain variables which appear to be related to partisanship (eg. region) do not by themselves affect voting choice, but rather exhibit clusterings of characteristics which do (eg. education, housing). Thus partisanship was shown to be related to class rather than to region, with regional differentials in party support produced by the class composition of the north and south east of England and not by differentials in the class vote.

Data presented by Butler and Stokes in 1970 suggested that partisan self-image in the north and south east of England was congruent with class self-image: 72% of electors identifying themselves as middle class voted Conservative in the north of England, and 71% in the south of England, while 71% of electors
identifying themselves as working class voted for the Labour party in the north, and 60% in the south east of England. In 1962, R. Alford calculated an index of class voting from the data for partisanship by region and by occupation. This suggested that class, rather than region, was the more powerful indicator of electoral choice.

Alford also investigated the relationship between religion and voting behaviour and religion and class, and found that religious identity plays an important role in partisan self-image. A Butler and Stokes survey, however, suggested that class is strongly related to partisanship within all church groupings, and that class is more important than religious attendance in determining voting behaviour. A survey by S.M. Lipset reports similar findings. Class position, note Butler and Stokes, is the primary cleavage around which voting behaviour in Britain coalesces, although religious or regional identities may supersede class as a base for partisanship elsewhere.

Alford's compilation of survey-data for the years 1943-1962 illustrates the strong link between partisanship and class. Although expressed preference for both major parties declined in these years, the class support for the Conservative and Labour parties remained constant: Labour partisans were composed of 57% manual workers and 22% non-manual workers, while Conservative partisans comprised 24% manual and 49% non-manual workers. 'If a blurring of social class lines has taken place in Britain', Alford wrote in 1968, 'it has not yet reduced class voting'. M. Abrams drew similar conclusions from his survey of the period 1945-1959, suggesting that: 'There was a high degree of stability in class voting' at these elections.

This relationship between class and vote has appeared to decline, and it is argued that this decline has occurred through two structural weaknesses in the construction of the class vote index, which have led psephologists to look towards other factors, (eg consumption sectors) for explanatory theories of voting behaviour. The first weakness is the conceptualisation of class according to a manual/non-manual divide. This definition of class fails to identify the structure of classes, which is determined by the relations of production, and instead records change in the shape
of classes, ie. the type of labour which characterises class groupings. Alford writes:

social classes in the sense of great diffuse blocs of people in generalised conflict may no longer exist...but social class in the sense of groups in similar objective situations organising to pursue collective interests remain powerful political forces. (87)

The other error which psephologists make in postulating a decline in class voting and a movement away from production cleavages is the assumption that political parties may be equated with class interests, and that a declining Labour vote is representative of a reduction in class-structured politics. Instrumental cross-class voting has therefore been interpreted by class theorists with reference to the class base of the party system, and according to the class interest and appeal of the major parties.

The structural roots of cross-class voting among the working class, argues B. Jessop, are located in social and economic pressures which inhibit the emergence of a revolutionary class consciousness and encourage the acceptance of dominant values. Conservative voting arises, it is argued, either from deference to a social order, or from the development of a subjective class identity which is incompatible with an elector's objective class location through the adoption of salient and dominant belief systems. Thus an elector who has only his assimilation of 'dominant beliefs' to guide his voting behaviour may behave in a manner incongruent with his structural position. 'Deferece', write McKenzie and Silver, 'in itself is not a single, simple and sovereign explanation of working class Conservatism', for deferential social and political opinions may be observed among Labour party voters as well as among working class Conservatives. It is thus argued that, given a Conservative culture and a consensus represented by the Conservative party and other institutions of British society, working class Conservatives are reacting appropriately to political culture, and it is Labour voters who are deviants.

Cross-class voting is therefore understood as a consequence of variations in belief systems arising from an individual's structural location: this phenomenon, argues Jessop, is not incompatible with class interpretations of politics, and should be subsumed
under class theory. In considering the relationship between class and voting behaviour, therefore, class theorists emphasise the cultural context and meaning of electoral behaviour, of Parliamentary democracy, and of the class nature of the political parties, as well as giving primary importance to the concept-ualisation of 'class'.

A CLASS THEORY OF POLITICAL PARTIES: THE DOMINANT SOCIO-ECONOMIC ORDER AND 'POLICY CONVERGENCE'

The Parliamentary political parties are, class theorists would argue, bourgeois political groupings which are directly related to the economic substructure of society, and which maintain the capitalist system. The class interests of both the Labour and Conservative parties are therefore perceived as capitalist interests, and any difference between the parties is explained in terms of class appeal, or the politics of support. Thus while the Conservative party represents a particular class interest, its appeal is across social classes, to the nation, while the Labour party, which is also understood to represent ruling interests, has traditionally concentrated its appeal upon the working class electorate.

The actual interest upon which the Conservative party is built, and which it sustains, is private property. The Conservative party, writes A. Gamble:

has always been the party of property - led by men of property, financed by property, responsive to the changing interests of property. It has protected privilege, justified inequality and defended the established order of society. (94)

Although the meaning of property may have changed over the years, the concept of property-ownership - which is bound up with ideas of freedom and the protection of the individual against the State power - remains an integral part of the Tory tradition. Gamble comments:

the term ruling class refers not to the elites that man the government and other institutions of the State, but to the class that wields economic power through the concentration of wealth and ownership of property in its hands. The essence of property is not merely legal ownership but the control of economic power. (95)
What is remarkable is that, while representing class interests of economic elites, the Conservative party has maintained itself as a governing body, and drawn support from the working class. The extension of franchise - which was feared by Lord Derby to be a 'Leap in the dark' which would 'give the working class a majority of nearly 2:1' and result in the 'rule of mere numbers' - has not threatened the hegemony of the Conservative party because of the predominantly Conservative culture, or 'dominant socio-economic order'.

Thus although Marx believed that:

Universal suffrage is the equivalent of political power for the working classes of England, where the proletariat forms the large majority of the population, where in a long, though underground, civil war, it has gained a clear consciousness of its position as a class...The carrying of universal suffrage in England would, therefore, be a far more socialistic measure than anything which has been honoured with that name on the continent. Its inevitable result, here, is the political supremacy of the working class. (97)

After the introduction of household suffrage, F. Engels was to lament:

What do you say to the elections in the factory districts? Once again the proletariat has discredited itself terribly...It has brought the Tories more than their simple percentage increase; it has improved their relative position. (98)

The association of the 'Tory tradition' with the natural order, and with a particular form of governmental practice, has caused the Conservative party to be regarded, not merely as a governing body, but as a nation. The Conservative party, comments Gamble:

interpreted the politics of power in class terms. But they always sought to project a national image of their politicians and their leadership to the electorate and to their own party, in order to prevent class becoming the basis for competition between parties in the political market. (99)

Thus the Conservative party draws upon a social class identity for electoral support because of the dominant culture which sustains them (not least through working class deference to their 'natural right' to govern).
This appeal to the nation and to patriotism has proved remarkable, under the strains of franchise reform, in producing a working class vote of sufficient power to maintain the Conservatives as a governing body in the twentieth century. The introduction by the Conservatives of a progressive social legislation is thus perceived as a reconciliation of the politics of support and the politics of power. The Conservative party, write McKenzie and Silver, is:

the most astute ruling class the world has known. [It] preserves as much as possible of its power by accommodating itself...to the social and economic changes...In their social policies they have merely come to terms with the inevitable. (100)

The Conservative appeal to the nation, rather than to class, is repeatedly stressed in party literature. In 1952 the Conservatives declared:

It is fortunately true that large masses of the British people are not animated by class hatred or selfish personal greed, but are inspired by a sense of patriotism, duty and service, and love of country, its traditions and greatness, and a belief that justice and fair play are not the children of envy and malice. (101)

The Conservative nation, writes Gamble:

even in the days of Tory democracy, has rarely been conceived by Conservatives as a coalition of interests, still less of classes. Far more often it has been viewed as a united body of patriotic opinions and sentiment in the nation. (102)

While the Conservative party has maintained its governmental position by an appeal to national, rather than to class, interest, the Labour party has concentrated its electoral appeal upon the working class. Class theorists, however, cast doubt upon the thesis that the British Labour party is a radical, socialist party, and suggest that the real interests of the working class are not represented by the Parliamentary Labour party. The Labour party, it is argued, cannot reform capitalism because of the nature of power and the State in capitalist society, and because of the lack of political will on the part of social democratic leaders. The Labour party, class theorists argue, has therefore been 'incorporated' into the dominant socio-economic order, and represents and upholds the interests of the ruling economic and political elite.
Certainly the Labour party has failed to change the reward structure of modern capitalism and, inspite of the principle enshrined in Clause IV of the party constitution, expresses little in common with orthodox socialist principle. This type of labourism results, notes T. Forester, in a meritocratic rather than egalitarian vision of socialism, with increasing opportunity structures not necessarily accompanied by wealth equalisation. There is thus a sense in which the Labour party is irrelevant to the total process of social change: it is viewed as a product of capitalism, constrained by the demands of capitalist democracy.

A class view of the party system would therefore suggest that the Labour party is not a socialist organisation, engaged in class conflict and desiring political change, but rather an 'umbrella' for a variety of interests wanting social reform within the existing political framework. C.R. Attlee wrote, in 1937, that: 'British socialists have always recognised the conflict between classes but have not generally adopted the class war as a theory of society'. Labour socialism is thus regarded as having absorbed the primary working class pressure on the political system by appealing primarily to the working class, but as having assumed an institutional role within British political culture.

The Labour party, it is suggested, as a result of its 'incorporation' into the political culture, increasingly draws support from the whole of society. The change in the class appeal of the Labour party - through an alteration in the tactics and organisation of the party - in order that it may compete at the margins of its electoral support, is a process which excludes working class interests, indeed class politics, more overtly than ever before. B. Hindess writes:

The close association between party and social class has declined and with the progressive disappearance of the class polarisation of formal politics, there has been a decline in political activity resulting from identification with, and commitment to, the interests of the working class as such. (106)

Hindess has documented the changes in the organisation of the Labour party in detail, and has particularly stressed the domination of the Labour party, at a local level, by middle class
'activists'.107 This is largely a result of housing policies and urban developments, suggests Hindess, which have altered the pattern of working class housing, leaving the middle class better placed for key leadership positions within local party structures.108 Similarly, T. Forester notes that:

The social skills and advantages conferred upon middle and upper class people (through education, social contacts etc.) have enabled them to play a disproportionately active part in party political activity, and they have traditionally occupied most of the key positions in the political parties and in government. Attempts to involve more working class people in the political system as a whole have always run up against powerful pressures arising out of the inequalities of opportunity built into the social structure. (109)

The recruitment of Labour party personnel and electors from the 'middle strata' of society is described as creating structural pressures and cleavages upon party organisation, and directing policy initiatives away from domestic and local concerns towards foreign policy and environmental issues.

These changes in the organisation of the Labour party, argues Forester, arise from its incorporation into the Parliamentary system, and reflect the changes in its political role and class appeal. Thus while there has been no obvious breakdown in Labour's 'electoral social control', he writes, there may well have been a significant change in the meaning of voting Labour.110 A falling Labour vote among the working class may not necessarily mean that electors do not see themselves as working class; it may be the case that they see no good reason for voting for the Labour party to represent their class interest (or indeed for voting at all). Similarly, a rising Labour vote among the middle class electorate may indicate changes in the class appeal of the Labour party, rather than an altered class identification among the middle class electorate.

Thus the Labour party is perceived, by class theorists, to have been 'incorporated' into a dominant socio-economic order, and so to have broadened its class appeal in order to win elections and governmental power.111 Thus the Socialist Register, in 1967, observed:
How it comes about that those who win elections with socialist phrases on their lips - and most are not conscious hypocrites - and then proceed to administer capitalist society, which they have previously denounced in an as effective way as possible, is one of the central ironies of modern British politics. (112)

The Labour party, argue Butler and Stokes, was 'drawn away, by the tenure of power, from a primary identification with class goals, to make the difference between the parties in these terms seem less sharp.'

The commitment of the Labour and Conservative parties to the dominant order, writes Hindess, means that any rhetorical and symbolic differences between the parties are overridden by their actual behaviour in office. B. Jessop explains:

Labour politicians and trade unionists legitimated the aristocracy and monarchy through their acceptance of peerages. They support the established church and religion in general...[Labour] is a Parliamentarist party par excellence with a firm commitment to the liberal bourgeois institutions of our political system. Above all, it is committed to a strengthening of the capitalist order rather than to its abolition. (114)

Thus, explains Gamble:

Both parties had become convinced by the late 1960's that drastic action against the working class was necessary in order to protect the State and maintain the viability of the prevailing politics of power. (115)

The commitment to the economic order, and the consequent decreasing distinctiveness of the major parties, is perceived by class theorists to lead to the fighting of economic battles rather than ideological struggle. When the struggle over the distribution of national sovereignty is settled, politics becomes a struggle over the distribution of the national product. As economic well-being is the most important governmental output, suggest Butler and Stokes, the major political issues are valence (competency) issues rather than position (ideological) issues.

Butler and Stokes explain:

Since the goals of economic policy are so largely agreed upon between the parties and enjoy overwhelming approval in the electorate, the economy is a valence issue in which everything is likely to depend on the way the electorate holds the
parties responsible for failure or success in reaching their goals. (118)

Thus the distribution of party choice does not conform to the pattern of class struggle. J. Bonham writes: 'The party contest reflects to a high degree what the British...like to regard as a cleavage of social class, but what is in reality a conflict of economic interest'. Thus although the British party system has been generally viewed as 'the democratic translation of the class-struggle', class theorists argue that political parties cannot be ranged along a class dimension of interest and, although class differences may persist, they cannot be expressed through the party system. B. Hindess writes:

What has changed is the nature of the party political game. Elements of a class polarisation of politics can still be seen at the level of electoral support and, to a far lesser extent, at the level of actual membership. But, he suggests, these remain only as 'touches of rhetoric'.

In examining the class bases of British politics, therefore, and in analysing the representation and articulation of class interests through the electoral system, it is important to investigate the electorate's perception of the class nature and role of political parties, and the meaning which is attached to voting activity.


Group theorists suggest that a declining Labour vote among the working class electorate is symptomatic of a dissatisfaction with class-based politics and that alternative political groupings, based upon consumption cleavages and issue-politics, are replacing class as a focus for political allegiance. S.H. Beer suggests that:

The collectivist polity has divested energies from class conflict not only by improving the chances for industrial self-advancement, but also and especially by strengthening the power of groups. The decomposition of classes, therefore, has led not to old-fashioned atomistic competition, but to the pluralistic competition of the new group politics. (122)
Modernisation, suggests R. Alford, encourages increased concentration on economic issues, party convergence and a secular parochial culture. In this environment, the single-issue approach to political activity, articulated through pressure group structures, acquires a higher profile than traditional class-based partisanship. 'Group memberships and social ties', write Sarlvik and Crewe, 'in middle class and working class alike - help to hold together electoral bases that span broad ranges of political opinion.'

The growth of issue politics, and particularly of issues which transcend traditional class boundaries (eg. consumer issues, environment and defence), mobilises support from the strategically important 'floating voters' who occupy the middle section of political opinion, and lack class partisanship. These electors, it is suggested, are often well organised in pressure group structures which serve to give guidance to a floating voter. Although previously felt to lie outside the environment of party politics, it is suggested that the non class-based, issue-oriented appeal of the Social Democratic Party has drawn these voters into the partisan environment. Thus P. Zentner, in his study of social democratic politics in Britain, suggests that the movement towards social democracy was paralleled by a repudiation of class-based politics and a growth in single-issue politics and pressure group campaigns.

A survey conducted by R.M. Mackenzie in 1968 had drawn attention to the pressures for a new alignment of voters based upon a group of young, affluent and ambitious 'secular voters' whose electoral volatility indicated a dissatisfaction with the two-party system. Over a decade later, Sarlvik and Crewe suggested that this 'middle ground':

falls outside the more reliable sources of support for both the Conservative and Labour parties...the two major parties (partly because of the electoral system) both draw a significant part of their voting support from here...this is where electoral battles are won or lost. (129)

A broad definition of 'middle ground' would, they suggested, embrace 40% of the electorate. 'The middle ground', wrote Sarlvik and Crewe, 'cuts across the divide between middle class and working class': it was thus conceived of as a potentially mass, non class-
based source of electoral support. This potential challenge had appeared to offer its first attack in the February 1974 General Election. The scale of the country's repudiation of the two major parties was felt to be 'considerable': the Conservative share of the vote fell from 46.4% in 1970 to 38.2%, while the Labour party's share fell from 43% in 1970 to 37.2%. This represented a fall in the two-party share of the vote from 90% in 1970 to 74.9% in 1974. The Liberals, meanwhile, not only doubled their vote between 1970 and 1974, but polled more votes than they had since 1929. The combined minor parties held 37 seats after the 1974 election, 24 more than in the 1970 Parliament. P. Zentner writes: 'The 1974 elections were a vote of No Confidence in the major parties and in the system'.

Sarlvik and Crewe reflected that:

From 1945-1970 the two major parties won, on average, all but 8% of the vote and all but 2% of the seats. For a quarter century a stable two-party system was securely rooted in the electorate. Although they suggested that there were some 'still powerful stabilisers of support for the two major parties' built into the electorate, Sarlvik and Crewe believed that:

The erosion of regular Conservative and Labour voting constitutes clear although undramatic evidence of a declining public commitment to the two governing parties.

P. Zentner thus suggests that it was not opportunism which brought the SDP into existence, but rather an electorate's demands. Zentner argues that the polarisation of British politics forced the emergence of a third party, a process symptomatic of the decline of the two major parties and of the Labour party in particular. 'As the Labour left grew stronger throughout the 70's', writes Zentner, 'it did so at its peril, for it created pressure on the right to leave the party altogether'. Internal disunity within the Labour party had been concerned with the theory and practice of socialism, and had revolved around the meaning and application of the principle embodied in Clause IV of the constitution. Thus the Labour party's loss of support is described by Zentner as:
a frustrating experience for both right and left... Both tried to rationalise why Labour was losing support... Both were convinced that the problem lay with the other wing of the party and its influence on the movement, a theme which was to recur. (138)

Working class embourgeoisement, argues Zentner, is the major obstacle confronting the Labour party. He suggests that, had Labour accepted Gaitskell's plans to 'modernise' the party by peripheralising Clause IV, and had they dropped their class appeal, the party would have survived the phenomenon of social democracy. In not so doing, he argues, a divided and divisive Labour party exacerbated class differences and forced the revisionists from the party.

The emergence of the SDP is therefore linked to changes in the class structure of British society, and the formation of alternative, non-class based allegiances and identifications within the electorate. Group theorists thus perceive the major parties to represent and appeal to class interests, and to be in decline because of the reduced salience of 'class' to the electorate. The SDP, it is suggested, has responded to the alternative groupings and interests of British political society and, as a mass, non-class based party, draws support from all sectors of the modern electorate. In examining the group bases of the electoral system, therefore, considerable attention will be paid to the nature of SDP support, and to the strength of foci of allegiance other than 'class'.

3.5. CONCLUSION

As well as examining British political culture through the party system, the network of associational activity and the trade unions, other modes of participation - and indeed non-participation - must be considered during the application of a political theory. Class and group models of political behaviour are therefore applied to those interests which lie outside political institutions, and particularly to activities which are external to the electoral system.

Dowse and Hughes argue that the exclusion of working class interests from the electoral system, because of the bourgeois nature
of the political parties, illustrates the fact that political participation has a social, psychological and economic component. The unequal distribution of resources and opportunities for participation, they write, leads to politicisation external to existing structures. Dissatisfaction and alienation from the electoral system therefore results from the fact that political parties are all representative of the dominant class interest and offer nothing in the real interests of the worker.

Electoral passivity, class theorists propose, is an outer coating for rational abstention, and an underlying disaffection from the political system. Dowse and Hughes write:

Political values, especially the turmoil type, may be interpreted as an early warning to the authorities that at least a segment of the society feels a sense of exclusion and is nursing grievances that have escaped the attention of the other 'normal' political processes...This aspect may be especially significant for discovering the grievances of groups who lack the skill, the opportunities, the legal right to participate, or the possibility of winning an election. (142)

The pluralists, however, interpret electoral passivity as a sign of satisfaction with the political system, indicating acquiescence and acceptance of a particular political model, rather than dissatisfaction. This view of the political process is challenged by class theorists, who argue that the equation of low levels of voting activity with political satisfaction: 'ignores a whole range of other activities such as strikes and mob violence which may show intense dissatisfaction'. The masses, write Dowse and Hughes, 'are not kept out of the political arena by their satisfaction with its products, but rather because they are socialised into acceptance of the existing order'.

An examination of non-participation in the electoral system, and of extra-Parliamentary participation, will therefore form an important part of an investigation of class and of group theory, and these concepts will be operationalised during survey-research.
PART TWO

RESEARCH DESIGN

"Thou shalt not sit with statisticians nor commit a social science."

W.H. Auden
The theoretical positions discussed in Part One must be translated into mathematical models in order that data may be tested against them. The first stage in this process is that of concept-formulation.

Concepts in themselves are not theories, but rather categories for the organisation of ideas and observations. In order to perform an explanatory function, concepts must be constructed as a result of the interaction between observation and category, and not in isolation. Concepts thus mediate between theory and data.

R.G. Burgess urges that this 'dialectic' between attempts to measure concepts and attempts to clarify the meaning of concepts be applied to all social science data measurement. 1 'Analysis of the role of concepts in empirical social research', complains Burgess, 'has been to a very considerable extent neglected, both a symptom and a cause of the gulf which continues to separate sociological theory from sociological research.' 2 Such problems have been particularly apparent to those working in the fields of social stratification and social class. F. Parkin writes:

One of the difficulties encountered by the Marxist theory of class is that of translating the conceptual abstractions of capital and labour into the concrete social categories of bourgeoisie and proletariat. (3)

It would appear that independent survey variables, and particularly class and group variables, are much in need of improvement, and that careful attention to theory is necessary. The primary importance of theory should be acknowledged, for a variable must be adequately theorised if it is to possess explanatory power. Thus one may be forced to ask, for example, whether the Registrar-General's categories of social class are really appropriate to an examination of orthodox class theory.

Concepts should be investigated with indicators, which may be inductively or deductively developed. Indicators measure the variable which is devised to test the concept: the possible ways of measuring the variable of class, for example, range from single indicators to indices of socio-economic status. It is essential
that comparability between concept, variables and indicators is achieved if the selected indicators are to allow effective investigation of a theoretical model. (4)
"I emphasize that [class] is an historical phenomenon. I do not see class as a 'structure' nor even as a 'category', but as something which in fact happens...in human relationships. The finest meshed sociological net cannot give us a pure specimen of class, any more than it can give us one of deference or of love."


"When the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated. When I say everything I mean everything. The completed description will mean the complete science, in the study of social phenomena, as in any other field. There will be no more room for animistic 'causes' here than there."


4.1. OPERATIONALISING GROUP THEORY

The expression of theory in the form of a conceptual model is particularly pertinent to attempts to operationalise the 'group'. In discussing the collection of data on voluntary associations, C.G. Pickvance notes that such data has no significance in itself, and that 'according to the theoretical perspective adopted different types of data about voluntary associations and the nature of participation need to be collected.'¹ Indeed, the fundamental problem with much research on interest groups has been the failure to conceptualise, and thus to effectively operationalise, the 'group' and 'group membership'.² The theoretical contribution of such work has thus been limited, and research has added more to group literature than to our understanding of the dynamics of group participation and politics.

Much pressure group literature has been concerned with producing group typologies. Pickvance notes that the relationship between group typologies and conceptualisation is complex and interdependent. Theoretical perspectives, he writes, "not only guide the collection of data about voluntary associations, but are also the basis on which associations are grouped into 'types'."³ Typological construction cannot be regarded a substitute for adequate conceptualisation of a theory, or vice-versa. Thus Pickvance warns that:
Many analyses make no use of typologies and simply re-use the categories used to gather the data, e.g. political, recreational, social and welfare, as though these were of self-evident theoretical significance. (4)

The avoidance of such pitfalls can be ensured at the first stage of operationalising a theory through a rigorous definition of terms. The definition of 'interest group' must be constructed in conjunction with the theoretical perspective to be tested, but it is only after a working definition of interest group has been adopted that one's conceptual approach to group can be developed for empirical purposes.

The definition of interest groups by the present author, for example, is comprehensive, and derived from economic power: 'Groups' are conceptualised as 'interests seeking to increase their own economic power or to reform the balance of economic powers held within society'. Such a perspective emphasises the economic resources of interest groups, their orientation and access to power centres and their status vis-a-vis governments. Such criteria are judged important in both the evaluation of a group's economic power, and in an understanding of its behaviour.

The 'group' is thus perceived as an association which reflects the economic organisation of society and whose activities are dictated by those economic circumstances, rather than an association which has independent, motive powers. This theoretical perspective can be termed one of social stratification in which interests are examined in relation to economic factors, such as the occupational structure.

Pickvance suggests four possible theoretical perspectives on associational activity: social stratification and community power; pluralism; community structure and work-leisure. He notes that the least-employed of these models, work-leisure, shares with the stratification model the view that occupation is the primary determinant of group participation. The work-leisure approach, however, focuses upon the subjective experiences of work, rather than on the economic rewards of occupation.

This perspective is a relatively recent one. Traditional, or orthodox, group theory fits most readily into a pluralist
conceptual approach. Pickvance identifies the pluralist perspective as one which views interest groups as either 'mediating' between the individual and political system (by bringing individuals together to participate in the political system and hence promoting a plural distribution of power) or as politically mobilising people through increased group contact and involvement. As B.R. Berelson observes, organisational membership 'brings out latent political pre-dispositions and encourages participation in party politics'.

In operationalising both the social stratification and pluralist conceptual models of group theory, the crucial variable is that of effective group membership, i.e. group participation. Associational membership is often merely aggregated in assessing politically significant participation. Burgess notes that this ignores the differential political significance possessed by organisations. Furthermore, the political impact of organisations, especially at the local level, varies.

Membership of a politically under-resourced and inarticulate group would affect the evaluation of group participation differently if observed from stratification or pluralist perspectives. A person in 15 impotent and a-political groups may be viewed, from the stratification perspective, as impotent and unpolitical. From the pluralist model, however, that person may be considered well-oriented and, by necessity, concerned, committed and involved in the politics of 15 organisations.

In drawing distinctions between theoretical models, therefore, and in operationalising group theory from one perspective rather than another, the variable of 'effective group participation' must be broken down into indicators of group membership. Such indicators would investigate the character of participation and thus enable an exploration of the theoretical position to be tested.

Suitable indicators of group participation would include:
The number of groups a respondent claims membership of; the type of groups the respondent claims membership of; the status of the respondent within the group and the amount of time given, by the respondent, to a group. These will be used in operationalising the concept 'group' for empirical research.
4.2. OPERATIONALISING SOCIAL STRATIFICATION: THE WEBERIAN PERSPECTIVE

An abundance of literatures on social stratification have attempted to define and code the concept 'social class' for research purposes. It will be shown that these attempts are, for the most part, based upon Weberian sociological thought. Such an operationalising of class is considered unsatisfactory for research which addresses the issue of Marxian class politics in Britain.

Academic Research and Class

Sociological concepts of class stress the importance of different dimensions of social stratification. 'Class' tends to be reduced to one factor among others in a multi-dimensional view of social stratification which is largely concerned with status. 'Status' itself is considered both in subjective terms (esteem) and in attempts to categorise 'status groups' by actual style of life. Thus a neo-Weberian multidimensional approach would draw analytical distinctions between market, work and status situations, with consumption 'sectors' cross-cutting occupational class.

In defining class positions using status criteria, occupational scales have been used which separate and measure different occupational elements. These include the social relationships and skills involved in the occupation; the industrial sector in which the work is performed; the function the work performs, and the income derived from the occupation. In grouping occupations, the separate identification of industry, economic activity status and skill has been crucial in data collection.

The Hall-Jones occupational scale, for example, constructed in 1950, distinguished between unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled work. Persons occupying a controlling position in business or industry were also graded according to the size of firm. In constructing their index, Hall-Jones sought the opinions of a sample of people on class rankings, and claimed a large consensus of opinion about the grading of occupations and social class. There is thus a large element of subjectivity about the index.

In 1974, Hope and Goldthorpe attempted to refine the Hall-Jones index, arguing that it is better to ask people to rank rather than rate a set of occupations. They asked respondents to place
20 common occupational titles in rank of 'social standing' and to add in 20 occupational titles unique to the respondent: these were interpolated with the 20 standard occupational titles. This scale does not tap prestige, because it does not show how or why people confer status upon others and themselves, but it does measure 'social status' and is a reliable occupational scale.

R. Bland suggests that the Hope-Goldthorpe scale, with its control for the size of occupational establishments and its scale ranking, may be good at producing homogenous classes. Occupational class scales such as Hall-Jones and Hope-Goldthorpe have, however, had the disadvantage of failing to separate manual from non-manual workers. The manual/non-manual divide is seen by many commentators to be an essential element in class consciousness and, more particularly, in party identification. It is, in fact, the most used conceptualisation of class and class deviant political orientations, and often a first approach to political variables.

Butler and Stokes, for example, in the construction of their class gradings in 1964 and 1970, used census occupational categories, modified to divide the market research 'C1' group into 'supervisory' and 'lower non-manual' groupings. This produced a designation I-VII. Butler and Stokes accept a conventional class dichotomy between middle class and working class, and view occupational status in terms of the manual/non-manual divide to be an important measure of class location. In the first edition of Political Change in Britain, Butler and Stokes divided the middle and working classes between grades III and IV, but between IV and V in the second edition.

Butler and Stokes write:

The close alignment of occupational level and class self-image accords well with our evidence that occupation is the most important of the elements that characterise the classes in the public mind. While lending occupational status a pre-eminent position, they draw upon supplementary 'influences' such as education, income and self-image. Ultimately, however, they find 'overwhelming evidence' that occupational status (manual/non-manual) is the 'best guide to whether individuals place themselves in the middle or working class'.

F. Parkin, however, dismisses the significance of the manual/non-manual divide to Marxian class theory. 'Its validity...as a representation of class conflict', he writes:

relied more heavily upon a view of the commercial employee as the prototypical case of the white-collar worker than really is justified, given the enormous growth of public sector employment. What this suggests is that manual and non-manual groups can usefully be thought of as entities socially differentiated from each other in terms of life choices and opportunities, but not as groups standing in a relationship of exploiter and exploited, of dominance and subordination, in the manner presumably required of a genuine conflict model. (19)

Certainly the growth of a service economy has rendered the manual/non-manual distinction between labour less useful to a categorisation of occupation, and thus to a definition of class based on occupational grading. This may not, however, represent the main reason for rejecting the Hall-Jones and Hope-Goldthorpe scales, for a more important flaw, it would seem, is that most of the correlation achieved comes from ranking manual jobs below non-manual, and not from agreement about how jobs should be ranked within each sector. R. Burgess notes that there is also evidence that ranking depends upon the class of the rankers, which must be controlled. Furthermore, one would expect the prestige hierarchy to change with the fundamental shifts occurring in the occupational structure and in the educational requirements and rewards for particular jobs.

A. Stewart, K. Prandy & R.M. Blackburn have suggested that studying the patterns of association between people may be an alternative, or more accurate, measure of status than prestige scaling. They developed a scale of occupational patternings based on official occupational groups, but a scale which is not so much a measure of social status, as a scale of association. Stewart et al. argue that occupations are held by individuals in a diversity of circumstances when account is taken of their careers, and that individuals move between types and levels of occupations as their careers develop. The associational scale correlates well with occupational scales such as Hope-Goldthorpe, and with other prestige scales. Critics, however, argue that this apparent agreement is an artefact of the data collection procedure,
and that association and social status may well be conceptually distinct, if empirically close. ²²

Other recent work includes Goldthorpe's revised class schema, which is based upon an Office of Population Censuses and Surveys classification of occupations, but which makes more use of employment status. ²³ His schema makes a valid contribution to empirical research in two senses: firstly, it groups classes into overlapping sectors of service class; white-collar; non-manual; petit-bourgeoisie; working class; manual and farm workers. ²⁴ Secondly, it enables a comparison to be made with 1981 census data. Although Goldthorpe's 1983 schema cannot operationalise a two-class conceptual model, it does represent an advance over other stratification models in its concentration on the form of the labour contract in constructing occupational groupings.

An important contribution to the academic literature has been a recent tendency to abandon the traditional use of occupational scales in the gradings of class. ²⁵ I. Crewe, for example, believes that housing is a more useful indicator of a person's class than occupation because it is 'universal' (everybody lives in some form of accommodation, while not everyone is in paid employment) and the data is 'hard' (ie. more reliable and valid because more objective than occupational classifications). ²⁶ Crewe stresses that housing is also a strong, if not stronger, predictor of party choice than occupational status and, as most empirical enquiries into class position are concerned, ultimately, with party choice, an optimal indicator.

In this analysis of the ways in which the concept of social stratification has been operationalised, the view has been that multidimensional, or status, analysis has been almost universally adopted by academic research. Such a neo-Weberian approach is built upon the notion that, as F. Parkin writes, Marxist concepts of class are inappropriate to an understanding of structured conflicts that may arise over other inequalities, for example racial, religious, ethnic or sexual. ²⁷

Although occupational scaling continues to be generally used as the basis for class schemas, these are mostly concerned with status and with subjective rankings of occupation, and fail to explain the generation of class inequalities - they are concerned
with effects rather than with causes. The adoption of class indicators other than occupation, as noted above, would appear to represent the triumph of the Weberian status perspective over the orthodox Marxian position.

Private Organisations: Market Research and Class

The prestige scaling used in the United States is based on the occupational ranking scale devised by North and Hatt in 1947. This scale has been successfully used in non-industrialised countries, leading to the hypothesis that the similarity of ordering stems from the logic of any social organisation which involves the division of labour.

Prestige scaling is also the basis of the Market Research scheme used in the United Kingdom. This comprises a scale of six ordered classes: A, B, C1, C2, D and E. Although it claims to be based solely on occupation, in practice the cues are housing and income information.

The Government: Officialdom and Class

In discussing Government definitions of social class, T. Nichols urges that official statistics be seen, not only as a social product, but as a product of a particular political State. The Registrar-General's social class codes are, he writes, essentially descriptive categories relating to status. To investigate the originating principle of the Registrar-General's ranking of occupations, notes Nichols, one must go back to a paper given to the Royal Statistical Society in 1928 by Stevenson, the Statistical Officer at the General Register offices. Stevenson argued against classification by income and asserted that a scheme of social classification should take account of culture. Thus the ranking later produced is, writes Nichols, a ranking of status categories, the basic criterion of which is the general standing within the community of the occupations concerned. R. Burgess also notes that the Registrar-General's categories are groupings of occupations formed by a priori judgements. Lifestyle pattern, Burgess writes, is a common criterion for grouping, with the assignation of a person to a Registrar-General class being based upon occupation as it reflects cultural and educational factors.

There are seven ranked Registrar-General social classes: I, II, IIIN, IIIM, IV, V and VI. There are also 17 socioeconomic groups,
which are not ranked one to another in terms of social standing. These groups distinguish manual and non-manual occupations and separate H.M. Forces and the agricultural sector. Employment status is also a differentiating factor. Social classes are not composed of aggregations of Socioeconomic Groupings, although a collapsed version of SEG's used by the General Household Survey are sometimes referred to as social classes. 32

The reliability of the Registrar-General's social classification when applied to survey data has been estimated at 87% agreement among coders. 33 Different validity claims have, however, been made for the Registrar-General's measure of culture, and its measure of social standing in the community has been widely questioned. It is also felt to be an insufficiently fine classification for demographic research. The finer subdivisions of the Socioeconomic groupings have made their use popular, although their distinction between occupation and employment status is less clear than the Registrar-General's classification. The 17 SEG's can be cross-classified with the seven Registrar-General social classes to produce 37 socio-economic classes, though in practise this fine subdivision is rarely used.

The Classification of Occupations 1970 shows the 223 Occupational Unit Groups (OUGs) cross-classified by the seven employment statuses, and in order to assign an occupation to a social class we need to work out which of the OUGs the job belongs to, and the employment status of the worker. 34 There will always be a 'mis-classification' rate, even with the most detailed groupings, particularly where job titles rather than job descriptions are used.

The 1981 census occupational classification is based upon the Department of Employment's CODOT scheme. 35 547 groupings were aggregated from CODOT, and OUGs were re-defined and greatly expanded in number. R. Burgess feels that 'it is doubtful whether this represents any major breakthrough' and notes that what it does mean is that a major discontinuity in census data has been introduced. 36 R.I. Brewer, however, feels that the Registrar-General's measure of social class is no longer a relational, ranked notion, but rather one equated purely with occupational skill, and an indicator of socio-economic status, not life-chances. 37
In practice it would seem that the changes made to the OPCS classification in 1980 were cosmetic, and that the underlying ethic of the Registrar-General's classification - that it should be based upon occupational status reflecting cultural factors - survives. R. Bland suggests that, although the Registrar-General's classification is easy to use, the classes are not homogenous and contain many anomalies. Thus, he argues, the Registrar-General's index should never be used alone in coding new data, and can only be used with justification for comparative purposes. It would seem that its value in even this respect has now been lost.

Perhaps of more value to an empirical enquiry of class theory is the coding scheme developed by the Population Investigation Committee. Although still concentrating on the manual/non-manual divide, the PIC code does introduce the useful distinction between modes of payment.

The categories produced are: non-manual paid weekly; skilled manual, semi-skilled manual and unskilled manual paid weekly; farmers; agricultural workers; workers paid monthly; employers with more than 10 employees; employers with less than 10 employees and professional class. If one accepts that the terms of the labour contract are a focal point of Marxian class theory, then the distinction between weekly and monthly pay, and employer/employee status, is clearly an important one. This distinction, and other possible indicators of Marxian class theory, will be examined below.

4.3. OPERATIONALISING SOCIO-ECONOMIC CLASS: THE MARXIAN PERSPECTIVE

H. Frankel, in examining the further breakdown of social classes into socio-economic groups, concludes that such a division of the population had enabled revisionists to dispute the relevance of Marx's two-class society, and turn to Weber. Reviewing studies undertaken by L. Warner and R. Centers, Frankel notes the difficulties involved in cross-national comparisons, and suggests that the assignment of social class position in Western
society - by status and other social distinctions - has no meaning or use. This, writes Frankel, is because the distinctions are secondary and more temporary than Marxian class positions: such social distinctions, he contends, arise from class position. They thus serve only to confuse the basic divisions of capitalist society. Frankel thus draws attention to the value of Marxian class concepts as explanatory tools. They must also be viewed, however, as drawing upon descriptive material, and it is largely this we must rely upon in attempting a working definition of class.

The essence of Marxian class theory is the Labour Theory of Value, and in order to analyse class relations - and thus the nature of classes - it is necessary to understand the process of capital accumulation. Because class analysis is grounded on the Labour Theory of Value, the working class is defined by 'productive labour' (that labour which produces surplus value and perpetuates exploitative relationships) and by its 'place' in the social division of labour. Class is thus structured by the division of labour, and it is this which will be central to a definition of class.

The division of labour produced by a particular mode of production determines class relations, and thus endows social groupings with solidary 'class' feelings. Classes can therefore be expressed as collectivities standing in common relation to the means of production. The fundamental division separating these two groupings or 'collectivities' produced by the mode of production is property ownership. 'Property ownership' is used here, not in the sense of owning such private property as a house, but property ownership in terms of personal capital which can be used to expropriate labour - and thus surplus value - from another.

The basic division is thus between capital and labour. A man who is forced to contract his labour power, and has only his labour power to offer, is classed as a worker, or proletarian. A man who possesses the capital which allows him not to contract his own labour, and who, on the strength of his property, can expropriate labour and accumulate further capital, is classed as a capitalist, or member of the bourgeoisie.

Other definitions of class have focussed upon the issue of
property ownership in the sense of control over the physical means of production, or control over the labour power of others. Indeed sociology has become, in many ways, an examination of how to refute Marx and find the source of political power in something other than the ownership of capital.

It has been recently argued that, because Marx's class definition is based on the ownership or non-ownership of capital, rather than upon the differentiation of occupations, the usefulness of Marxist class categories is small. Sociologists have thus tended to move away from divisions in the technical division of labour towards the division of power, authority and control at the workplace. R.V. Robinson & J. Kelley, attempting to operationalise class in this way, have claimed two different dimensions of class - control and authority. 'Control' is operationalised as whether or not one has a supervisor, while the authority dimension is measured by the existence and number of levels of subordinates.

These dimensions can be understood as locating individuals in a hierarchy of supervision at work. Although such a 'hierarchy of supervision' may well be an important determinant of the income and subjective class position of respondents, and may contribute usefully to Dahrendorf's critique of class theory, it is not an accurate way of operationalising Marxian class theory.

It is important, when considering Marx's reference to the 'ownership and control' of capital to interpret this as effective control, i.e. to consider the degree of power consonant with the task of control. A Shop Steward or Factory Supervisor may possess additional powers to a machine operator, and may possess different attitudes and acquire a superior income as a consequence, but if he still has to sell his labour, and is dependent upon his weekly, or monthly, remuneration, then he is, without doubt, what Marx would have termed a member of the working class. This must be applied to all supervisory roles, in all sectors of employment.

There are instances, however, where the 'control' of capital is such as to warrant inclusion of the 'controller' in the capitalist class. As Frankel points out, 'power' may now be seen to reside in organisations such as multinational corporations or bureaucracies, as much as in 'traditional' enclaves of wealth such as the landed aristocracy. Although Marx may not have precisely envisaged
the capitalist institutions such as we now enjoy, he did anticipate the accumulation and concentration of capital - a period he referred to as monopoly capitalism, and which we know, today, as the modern corporatist State. Those in controlling positions within the corporate economy, in such bodies as multinational companies, may fairly be classified as capitalists, in so far as they exercise a powerful control of capital, and reap the attendant rewards.

The question of precisely who should be classed as a member of the working class and who should join the ranks of the bourgeoisie is an issue to which considerable attention has been paid. The debate, as it focuses upon the Marxian concept of class, concerns the respective merits of a 'minimal' definition of the proletariat (including producers of surplus value, less managers and sharers in capital) and a 'maximal' definition (including the 'new working class' and the proletarianised). This is what N. Poulantzas refers to as the 'boundary problem' - the location of the politically relevant line of cleavage under conditions of monopoly capitalism.

The maximal definition of class, writes Parkin, is one in which the significant boundary is drawn at a point towards the top of the stratification system, so that the problem becomes that of deciding which residual groups fail to qualify for inclusion in a proletariat construed as the 'universal class'. Minimalist theory concentrates its efforts on the identification of the boundary between proletariat and new petit-bourgeoisie. It is this group, the 'new petit-bourgeoisie', or 'new middle class', which is regarded as crucial in the changing pattern of social stratification. Geometrically, this is often explained as a shift from a pyramid (with a working class base) to a diamond (a prominent middle mass, with a shrinking working and upper class).

Assuming, first, a minimalist definition of the proletariat, we may examine theses of a 'new working class' expanding the ranks of the middle stratas, as has been suggested by S. Mallet and by J. Goldthorpe. Both Mallet and Goldthorpe stress the rise of a class of technicians, or 'new salariat', characterised by white-collar trades unions. Frankel suggests that there is, in fact, little homogeneity about this 'new middle class', and that there is confusion amongst the new 'white-collar unionists' about whether to attempt to advance themselves through capitalism, or to fight
This group of individuals, which would include sales and service employees and small manufacturers and traders are, suggests Frankel, both capitalists and workers. In many respects, mostly in their non-manual status and their income, they are members of the bourgeoisie, but they are partly paid as labourers, which alienates them from both capitalists and workers. They believe they are independent, but fear business, the State and socialism. The political vacillation of the petit-bourgeoisie has, above all, created a 'floating vote', believes Frankel.

The middle strata is thus based on occupation, income and way of life, but:

The middle class is not a class, because it is not a homogenous body with common interests distinct from other classes, and in fact there is no visible trend in this direction; rather the other way, towards growing identification in certain respects with manual workers. (47)

The bulk of the middle strata are, Frankel concludes, 'nearer the working class on the more objective criteria, nearer the ruling class in subjective behaviour'.

How important is 'subjective behaviour' and a class consciousness to the structuring of classes? Marx argued that 'life determines consciousness, not consciousness life', and in this respect one would expect the objective criteria of the petit-bourgeoisie or 'new middle class' to be paramount. However, Marx also suggested that although they may be won to the working class because their condition is parallel, they are more likely to be lost.

Certainly Marx did not deny that divisions occur within the working class. In Capital he writes:

In addition to the two main classes there is a staff of persons, few in number, whose business it is to look after the machinery as a whole, and to keep it in good repair: engineers, mechanics of various kinds, joiners etc. These comprise a superior class of workmen, some of them scientifically trained, and some of them skilled craftsmen: they are distinct from the class of factory operatives, and are merely aggregated with these. This division of labour is purely technical. (50)

Marx's insistence on objective interests, and upon objective economic circumstance, would lead him to posit what has become
known as the 'maximilist' definition of the proletariat. Champions of the maximilist approach to stratification include Braverman, who believed de-skilling would encourage proletarianisation.\(^{51}\) Into this broad definition of the working class, embracing three quarters to four fifths of the population, would fall managerial staff, shop assistants, clerks and the self employed.

G.A. Briefs defined the proletariat as propertyless, with no reserve supply of consumption, and obliged to sell its labour power which, once contracted, would come under the alien control of the buyer.\(^{52}\) Frankel notes that we have not seen the end of this 'wage slave', particularly under current conditions of employment when unions are weak, security is low and alienation is high. Rising productivity and profits are offset by reduced wages and, in such conditions, proletarianisation is an ever-present threat.

Thus dichotomic conceptions of class society are held to be still relevant, if the class boundaries are, in some instances, more hazy. In conclusion, Frankel suggests that the proletariat is proportionally about the same as in Marx's time, though numerically much larger.\(^{53}\)

4.4. CONCLUSION

In operationalising class theory for research purposes, we must consider the Marxian class concept to be that of collectivities standing in common relation to the means of production. The variable for socio-economic class must therefore be linked to the productive process and will, in most circumstances, be occupation.

Categories such as the unemployed, women, students and members of the forces have generally been separately or inadequately coded in occupational class schemas. Burgess, discussing the problems of occupation as a class variable, argued that the majority of people at one point in time have no job, and asked to whose occupational group they should be assigned.\(^{54}\)

Considering the class position of women in the light of this statement, it is true that the OUGs and SEGs are most unsatisfactory for female employment. There has been recent evidence, for example, of an expansion in the Registrar-General's class IIIN as
a result of increasing numbers of women entering the technological labour market as, for example, computer operatives. Some of these women will be labouring as the primary, or sole, 'breadwinner' in a family unit (eg. as single parents), and some will be labouring as a joint 'breadwinner' in a family unit. 

Female labour is an integral part of the productive process, and its supplies to the labour market are essential for the functioning of the economy. Such labour is, however, marginalised, and women do not, in the majority of cases, compete with men in the labour market. As long as the tension between reproductive (child-bearing) and productive labour exists, this is likely to be the case. This has major implications for the adequacies of an occupational class code. Such a code, while it may be suitable for classifying male employment, is a very weak tool for the coding of female employment.

A greater problem, however, is probably the one to which Burgess refers - that of women not being in paid employment. This dilemma was, in the past, resolved by coding women according to the 'Head of Household' s occupation and income. This has recently become unfashionable, but no suitable alternative solution to class-coding women has been developed. The present author would suggest that there are two possible approaches. The first is to argue that all women who are not in paid employment in the labour market be classified according to the work they do in the home. This could, reasonably, be classified as either 'skilled manual labour' or 'routine service labour'. The second approach is to argue that women who are not participating in the formal labour market are literally not, or un, employed by that labour market, and to code them with the unemployed. Indeed, some house-workers are themselves adopting this classification by claiming unemployment benefit - although they may not, in fact, be actively seeking work, it is to their advantage to claim that they are. Nobody can be sure of what proportion of the unemployed are, in fact, of these circumstances.

Another problem with an occupational class schema is, suggests Burgess, the fact that any given individual tends to have many jobs over a lifetime. Which job, asks Burgess, should be selected? Burgess raises the question of the different meanings a particular job, for example clerical work, may have to a young man (as a
'springboard' job) and to an elderly woman (as a 'dead end' job). This is an issue which has particularly interested market researchers. Research Service Limited, for example, have explicitly incorporated an individual's place in the lifecycle with social class and income.\textsuperscript{57} Certainly such information is useful when considering occupational mobility, but this, in turn, is only relevant if one assumes that occupational mobility produces class mobility. This will not be part of a Marxian analysis of objective class position, though a consideration of lifecycle and social class is clearly an integral part of the analysis of subjective class position. Objective class position will, therefore, be calculated according to a respondents' current economic and occupational position.

This criteria will also be universally applied to the unemployed. Skilled workers who have been made 'redundant' or retired early will be categorised, not by their previous employment, but as 'unemployed'. It will here be argued that, according to Marxian analysis, one could suggest that these people have truly been made redundant by a capitalist system which no longer requires them. Thus a petit-bourgeois shopkeeper may lose everything and join the ranks of the unemployed. This process would be understood as the polarisation of classes, and proletarianisation of the bourgeoisie.

Burgess suggested that in the case of those who are not employed on the labour market, such as students, it may be useful to classify them on variables other than occupation, such as education and housing. Class coding students according to such variables would appear unsatisfactory, however, for data on student housing and education is largely descriptive and overwhelmingly comparable. Classification according to parental occupation of a student may produce a finer and more accurate picture of the socio-economic backgrounds of students, although such an approach may also be criticised. To maintain the approach of class coding according to actual occupational activity and a respondents' position in the division of labour, therefore, it is proposed that students be coded with 'educationalists', as white-collar workers. Similarly, members of the Forces will not be coded in a separate category or by alternative class variables, but will be classified according
to their actual occupation within the forces, and coded with the equivalent civilian employment categories.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>class code</th>
<th>Description of class category</th>
<th>Occupational examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Owners of capital</td>
<td>Landowners, Industrialists, large proprietors, etc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Service sector</td>
<td>Professional and administrative; managers and higher supervisors. Eg. Chairpersons of public and private companies, higher bureaucrats.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>White-collar</td>
<td>Service workers and salariat. Eg. educationalists (inc. students); lawyers; doctors; publishers; industrial scientists and higher technical staff.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>Non-manual</td>
<td>Routine non-manual workers, eg. sales staff; secretarial.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>Small proprietors</td>
<td>With or without employees. Eg. small shopkeepers; farmers and smallholders.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>Skilled manual workers</td>
<td>Craftsmen, supervisors and lower technicians. Eg. electricians; mechanics; hairdressers; nursing staff; computer operatives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>Semi- and unskilled manual workers</td>
<td>Machine operatives; coalminers; agricultural workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>Including retired and redundant workers.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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Fig. 4.1. Occupational Class Schema

In constructing a coding system through which to identify a person's class location, an illustrative rather than exhaustive class code has been devised (Fig. 4.1., above). The coding scheme for class is influenced by Goldthorpe's revised class schema, but has fewer divisions and is differently interpreted. The categories are not classes, and are not ranked or rated. The basic pyramidal division between capitalist and proletariat class comes between codes 20 and 30. Those coded 10 and 20 include the traditional capitalist class (code 10) and the modern 'upper middle strata' who have assumed leading positions in a corporatist...
economy (code 20). Those falling into this category would include leading bureaucrats and managers of large public and private corporations. Those coded 30 - 80 are members of what Marx would term the proletariat. There is a technical division between codes 50 and 60: those between 30 and 50 are regarded as members of the petit-bourgeoisie, caught between capitalists and labourers, and possibly possessing a subjective identification with the bourgeoisie.

Examples of occupations falling into the petit-bourgeois class category would include white-collar, non-manual and self-employed status occupations. In code 30, for example, we would locate teachers and workers in advertising and publishing. Into code 40 would fall the more routine non-manual workers, particularly those in the new 'high-tech' industries, such as computer technology. The category coded 50 would embrace the self-employed, with or without employees, and refers to such as shopkeepers. Farmers would also be grouped here.

Codes 60-80, the working classes, include skilled and unskilled workers and the unemployed. In code 60 are located craftsmen and lower supervisory workers (eg. foremen). Women working within the home would also be included in this category. Into category 70 would fall the industrial and agricultural labourers: factory operatives, builders, etc. The unemployed and retired are separately coded as group 80.

In conceptualising class according to the division of labour, and thus using occupational categories as the variable with which to examine class location, indicators such as employment status, sex and source of income are developed. These are applied during survey research and tested against alternative indices (eg. housing and income) which reflect a Weberian status approach to socio-economic classification (see Chapter 8, below). The operationalisation of the 'group' (discussed in section 4.1., above) is applied to survey data on group politics and discussed in Chapter 7.
CHAPTER FIVE: THE CONSTITUENCIES

"Pray what is the country?" inquired Mr. Rigby. "The country is nothing; it is the constituency you have to deal with."

B. Disraeli, Coningsby, 1844

5.1. THE SAMPLE UNIT

Having established and operationalised theoretical perspectives, a vital part of the research design is that of research context. The most-used research contexts are nationwide electoral surveys, constituency studies, cross-national studies and focussed studies.\(^1\)

A national sampling design possesses the obvious advantage of generating detailed regional data and the British Election Studies provide a good example of the development of such survey research.\(^2\) The panel study conducted by Butler and Stokes between 1963 and 1970 represents a further example of the development of national social survey research.\(^3\) The financial and administrative restraints upon the proposed investigation of class and group politics rendered a national sampling design impractical. It was felt important, however, that a strong element of regional comparison be built into the design.

Because the growth of group networks has been linked to economic change and development, and because this has occurred unevenly over the country, any study of the dynamics of group politics, and of the relationship between the decline in class politics and growth in group politics, must take place in a national context. It is evident that economic change such as the replacement of traditional class structures and institutions (heavy and labour-intensive industry and blue-collar trades unions) by new economic and social structures (computer technology, media and leisure-based industries) has affected the regions of England quite differently. The pains of change have been felt mostly in the north of England where primary industries were concentrated, and where the decline of these industries has been accompanied by severe local crises: investments in the new economic order have been directed, on the whole, towards the south of England.
These regional economies are reflected in official statistics. In 1984, personal disposable income in the south east was 114% above the national average, with households spending proportionately more on housing than on food. The south east also enjoys the lowest regional unemployment rate and the best rate of post-16 schooling in England and Wales. By contrast, the northern region of Yorkshire and Humberside suffers general economic decline, with low levels of investment in the manufacturing sector: the subsequent social disbenefits include low car ownership and a low rate of post-16 schooling (41% of workers have no educational qualification). The extent to which these regional economies may produce significant regional political identifications will form an important part of an investigation into the dynamics of group and class allegiance. Such regional comparisons will also measure the extent to which the group theory of politics may be applied to England.

M.A. Busteed stresses the need to show election results in relation to the socio-economic and demographic features of the communities in which they occur. Electoral geographers, using statistical techniques to examine the relationships between voting patterns and socio-economic factors, test causal hypotheses through a comparison of maps of electoral returns and of socio-economic data. Within this tradition, B. Hindess asks whether a Labour vote in Hampstead is not different to a Labour vote in Ebbw Vale, and thus that national psephology, while it may be useful in the short-term, offers little to long-term analysis.

The relationship between politics and geography is, argues M.A. Busteed, a delicate one. The British Government profoundly influences human geography, writes Busteed, through such projects as industrial policy in the nationalised industries, regional policies and infrastructural policies. These factors, suggests Busteed, transform 'space relationships', enhancing some locations and devaluing others, and thus impacting upon an individual's political behaviour and voting preferences. 'It was not until the middle and late 1960's that an appreciation of the spatial dimensions of British political affairs developed', writes Busteed: this may have been due to a realisation that recent
economic change had affected different regions of the country in different ways or it may have been a reaction against what some regarded as the steadily increasing centralisation of political and economic decision-making. (9)

L.J. Sharpe argues that it is only by 'building-up a picture from below' that we really understand the electoral geography of the country. We may have some idea that social class is the most important characteristic determining political allegiance in Britain, notes Sharpe, but we need to understand its variation of dominance in different parts of the country. The growth of provincial culture, with local variations affecting political identifications and voting behaviour, has thus turned attention away from institutions and national behaviour patterns. 'The constituency' has become a valuable and valid unit of study for sociological and political survey research, and it is within this tradition that the proposed research is designed.

It was decided to sample those constituencies which were deemed representative of the major regional characteristics of England. The criteria used in this selection are discussed in section 5.2. below. Although the constituency is an administrative concept and may not be homogenous, party political organisation is based on the constituency and, for purposes of electoral choice, it is a natural and appropriate unit of study.

R. Burgess writes that, compared with nationwide surveys, constituency studies have the advantage that they can employ a range of research methods in addition to the sample survey, and enable a more detailed exploration of group memberships, social networks and individual politics. Much pioneering work and useful data has been generated by this type of study, which dates from the survey of the 1940 United States Presidential election, conducted by Lazarsfeld and Berelson. The first micro-survey in the British field of political science was carried out by R.S. Milne and H.C. MacKenzie at the 1951 General Election, a study of the individual which was designed to supplement the Nuffield surveys dealing with the national party system. A number of studies have subsequently attempted to present electoral behaviours as part of a socio-economic community.
In using the constituency as a sampling unit for our research design, however, the focal point of interest is not the socio-economic community, but rather the class and group identifications of electors within a particular socio-economic community. Thus we are not inherently interested in the nature of the constituency, but in the political allegiances of electors within that unit. Thus the study is a focussed as well as a constituency study, in so far as certain types of electors are identified for inclusion in the survey and drawn from the initial constituency sampling base. A 'focussed' study is used to investigate a particular type of voter, and to obtain greater specification about such variables as class location. Here it will be used to investigate group and class identification.

The monumental surveys by R. MacKenzie & A. Silver, and by E. Nordlinger, which focussed upon working class Conservative voters, are good examples of the collection of specific social science data. Other important focussed studies include J. Goldthorpe & D. Lockwood's investigation of the 'affluent working class' and H. Himmelweit's panel study of a cross-section of adolescent youths in Greater London. Other useful studies include those focussed upon organisations and institutions. In focussing the study upon a particular elector, a wealth of individual data concerning a particular phenomenon (group and class identifications, for example) is gathered, without sacrificing the demands of broader communal and regional contexts. In order to assess the representativeness of these samples, national census data is merged with the survey data set.

5.2. THE SAMPLE UNITS: A SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROFILE

In selecting Parliamentary constituencies within which to focus the study of class and group consciousness, various political and socio-economic criteria were applied. The political considerations are dealt with below in section 5.3.

The socio-economic characteristics (or 'political geography') of particular interest were: 1) an area situated close to, and
traditionally dependent upon, one or two 'heavy industries', and currently experiencing economic decline. ii) an area situated close to, and supplying labour to, the belt of new chemical- and computer-based industries in the south east. It was felt important to include, in addition, an area exhibiting neither of these specific demographic characteristics. In order that these areas be legitimately grouped, and that certain comparisons be valid, it was important that none exhibited 'rogue' characteristics or was particularly unbalanced in respect of such factors as ethnic population. It was also important that none was located near any politically sensitive structure, eg. military base, which may skew a sample's attitudes. It was also important that the selected constituencies were within urban areas. This was in order that the sample points be comparable but, more importantly, because a fundamental requirement of Marxian class politics is that of urbanisation.

Of the constituencies which satisfied these requirements, and fulfilled the political considerations detailed below, Sheffield Attercliffe, Guildford and Richmond & Barnes were chosen. These constituencies represent, respectively, a northern industrial city; a cathedral town in the Home Counties, situated near growth industries; and a constituency lying within the Greater London boundaries. Each of these constituencies has links with Universities, and has a 'commuter' population.

SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE

W. Hampton, in his study of Sheffield politics, refers to the city as a 'proletarian city'. Certainly it embodies many of the characteristics which are associated with class politics, and with the pressure for change which accompanies deprivation. I. Crewe classifies Sheffield Attercliffe as 'conurbation local authority housing' in his statistical guide to Parliamentary Constituencies, typifying the 'large council estates' as those found on 'the periphery of the largest industrial connurbations'. 43.4% of households in the constituency are owner-occupied; 50.4% are council-owned: Sheffield Attercliffe thus ranks 497th in the constituency league table of owner-occupation. 'The balance of the population', writes Crewe:
typically occupies inter-war semi-detached private housing. Other characteristics include a generally ageing population and a heavy dependence on public transport for travel to work. Employment is essentially blue collar, with above average numbers out of work. (24)

Crewe describes Sheffield Attercliffe as an industrial constituency to the south east of Sheffield, largely dependent upon steel. It is the heavy concentration on steel and coal which has caused Sheffield Attercliffe to be economically vulnerable, and explains much of the unemployment rate. Collieries such as Orgreave, which were prominent during the 1984-85 coal strike, and have suffered at the hands of the Government's industrial policy, lie within the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe. The proportion of skilled and semi-skilled manual workers in the constituency is above the national average because of this demand for labour: Crewe ranks the constituency 11th on the proportion of skilled labour (42.7%); 19th on its manual labour (64.3%) and 538th on professional and managerial labour (11.1%).

People of NCWP origin are usually concentrated in a few constituencies where proportions can be relatively high; these areas are usually settled because of their occupational structure. Because NCWP immigrants have not traditionally entered the coal or steel industries, Sheffield Attercliffe has a relatively small ethnic community. The 1981 census shows that the constituency has below the national average of immigrant Heads of Household.

At the time of the 1981 census, unemployment in Sheffield Attercliffe was recorded at 12.7% which ranks 236th among English constituencies. In a report on the 1981 census compiled by Sheffield City Council Central Policy Unit, a considerable increase in male unemployment since the census is noted. The constituencies with higher unemployment rates than the Sheffield constituencies at the 1981 census are mostly at the centre of the large conurbations outside London, particularly Birmingham, Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool. In most of these cities, the increase in unemployment since 1981 has been of the order of 20-30%. However, the report notes, the increase in male unemployment in Sheffield has been approximately 44%. The report therefore suggested that male unemployment in Sheffield Attercliffe would approach 20% in 1986.
For an important indicator such as the unemployment rate, there is very considerable variation within Sheffield. The constituency of Sheffield Central, for example, ranks 24th nationally, while the Sheffield Hallam constituency ranks 447. A city-wide picture of unemployment suggests that Sheffield is not a deal above the national average, but the Brightside and Central constituencies are the worst affected by unemployment in Yorkshire and Humberside, and are among the worst areas of the country.

In sampling within a constituency like Sheffield Attercliffe, it is important to be aware of the variation across the city within which it falls, and thus to take account both of the autonomous nature of the constituency, and of the constituency as part of a city. The population of Sheffield was approximately 536770 in 1981: four times larger than a typical English district in population terms, with only Birmingham, Glasgow and Leeds larger. Within this large population, however, there is considerable diversity.

The report on the 1981 census notes:

It is possible for the Inner area of Sheffield (population around 270,000) to be of equal size to a large district, such as Leicester, with problems which may be broadly comparable, and yet for these problems to be considerably 'hidden' if the basis of comparison is the whole of Sheffield. (30)

Comparisons of local authorities and cities of such widely disparate size can give a very misleading impression, the report concludes. The variations within the Sheffield district can be almost as great as the variations that exist within the whole of Britain. The six Sheffield constituencies present very marked variations between these, but give the impression that Sheffield is close to the national average when put together to represent Sheffield city. (31)

For this reason, the constituency must be regarded as the appropriate geographical base upon which to make national comparisons, because of the broad similarity in terms of population size, and in order that a sample be homogenous and not 'skewed' by city-wide or regional variation. It is important, for example, that the statistics for Sheffield Attercliffe are not skewed by the
inclusion of those for Sheffield Central which, being at the centre of the conurbation, has a greater degree of deprivation. Thus reasonably valid and meaningful comparisons can be drawn between Parliamentary constituencies which, with deliberately equalised electorates, afford statistically comparable populations. It is for this reason that the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe will be the primary unit of comparison with the other chosen constituencies, Guildford and Richmond & Barnes. Reference will, however, be made to statistics for the whole of Sheffield where appropriate. Similarly, statistics for the constituency of Richmond & Barnes will occasionally be placed in the context of the metropolitan district.

Because the constituencies of Sheffield Attercliffe and Richmond & Barnes are constituencies within cities, in contrast to the constituency of Guildford which encompasses a whole town, the environmental structures of the three areas differ somewhat. While most of the public amenities lie within the constituency so far as Guildford is concerned, and to a large extent in the case of Richmond & Barnes, the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe covers a residential and industrial area only: public services and environmental structures are mostly situated within the centre of the city of Sheffield. It is thus with regard to environmental factors that the Sheffield Attercliffe sample may be related to the context of the city of Sheffield. This will be most appropriate when examining social structures (eg. group memberships).

In many respects Attercliffe is more representative of the country as a whole than the other constituencies in Sheffield; it may be less representative of a northern industrial city than it is of a national average. There are, however, some indications of local economic deprivation. The constituency's close associations with the industry of the Lower Don valley have been weakened by economic decline, and large areas of land in this area have been given over to slum clearance as the constituency's population has shifted southwards. There has been no re-introduction of housing in this area.

Sheffield Attercliffe is also unrepresentative of national averages in respect of its population's educational qualifications: the very low proportion of employed persons with degrees or
professional qualifications reflects both the occupational structure of the constituency and the lack of resources available for the education sector.

**GUIDFORD**

Crewe and Fox classify the constituency of Guildford in category 30 - a 'prosperous' town with little industry - along with 18 other constituencies. These constituencies are described as comprising:

- small-medium sized towns of some affluence, together with a significant surrounding area of an essentially rural and agricultural character. Owner occupation is high, with many professional and managerial workers and only limited manufacturing industry. (33)

Guildford ranks 255 out of 633 in the league table of owner-occupation, 61.7% of its households falling into this category, while 25.5% are council-owned. Its proportion of professional and managerial residents is the 36th highest in Britain: 19.7% of Guildford's population hold a degree or professional qualification (a constituency ranking of 58). There are only 23.1% of residents whose Head of Household is a manual labourer (rank 579).

These figures reflect the occupational structure of the constituency. While the manufacturing sector is small (ranking 503 in Britain), 69.5% of residents are employed in the service sector of the economy. Crewe describes the constituency of Guildford as:

- Based on the mid-Surrey town and a more rural area to its south west. The county town, with a cathedral and a University, Guildford exists as a commercial and administrative centre in its own right, but the area also provides a dormitory for London commuters. (37)

This illustrates the dependence of Guildford upon the new computer-based industries which have emerged across the south west belt of England in the M4 corridor, and for which Guildford is ideally situated, and the extent to which Guildford serves other industrial centres.

Two census indicators on which Guildford measures unusually high scores are those employed in routine non-manual (office) work and those registered as 16-plus students in full-time education.
The unemployment level in the constituency of Guildford is considerably below the national average, which at the time of the 1981 census was 11.5%. In October 1979 there were 2640 (2.2%) out of work in Guildford, a figure which had risen to 6129 (5.7%) by October 1982. This increase is small relative to that experienced by most areas of Britain since 1979.

The area covered by the constituency of Guildford is, generally, experiencing economic growth. Its small reliance on industry and manufacturing has allowed Guildford to avoid the worst of the economic depression, and to enjoy the boom in new industries and the service sector. Unemployment and socio-economic deprivation is minimal, and the population has continued to grow, rising from 93031 in 1951 to 120072 in 1981.

RICHMOND AND BARNES

Richmond and Barnes is a white-collar inner-London suburb in south west London: the constituency is the only London seat to cross the Thames, having territory on both banks of the river. Crewe describes Richmond and Barnes as 'affluent and middle class with one of the lowest proportions of manual workers in the country': it ranks 627 out of 631 on this indicator, only 25.4% of its householders being employed as manual workers. The professional and managerial sector is large in Richmond and Barnes: 34.1% of households are headed by someone in this category. This reflects the dominance of non-manual and service employment and the rather low profile of manufacturing work.

Richmond and Barnes is populated by the 'young upwardly mobile professionals' of the 1980's, many of whom are employed in the communication sector (media, advertising, public relations). Characteristically, its residents are young, single and educated: the constituency ranks 5th in respect of its 'professionally qualified' population and has a high student population (7.2%).

This population composition is clearly reflected in the character of housing within Richmond and Barnes. Crewe writes that:

rented accommodation is important, but average levels of owner occupation distinguish these suburban areas [ie. 'conurbation white-collar area' - classification 19] from solidly inner-city seats. (46)
The high proportions of students and of 'single non-pensioners' provides this demand for private rented accommodation. The above average amount of households in Richmond lacking or sharing the use of a bath is perhaps an indication of this demand.47

The above average amount of owner-occupation (55.2% of households) indicates the suburban nature of Richmond. The constituency of Richmond and Barnes differs from that of Guildford in the lower percentage of private housing; this reflects Richmond's more youthful and mobile population. We may also note the differences in the occupational structures of the two constituencies: although both are overwhelmingly non-manual, Guildford has more dependence upon industry-related office work, while Richmond supplies labour to the service sector.

The constituency of Richmond and Barnes has an unemployment rate which is below the national average at 6.9%. Its population change is negative, having declined from 188100 in 1951 to 157867 in 1981.48 This is largely due to the crowding out of the residential sector by the service industries.

5.3. THE SAMPLE UNITS: A POLITICAL PROFILE

The political considerations which were applied in the selection of constituencies were mostly concerned with party choice. In order to investigate the association of political party with class, and the traditional support for the Labour and Conservative parties, it was necessary to select constituencies which were safe Labour and Conservative seats. Thus class and group orientations could be measured within a traditionally Labour and a traditionally Conservative area.

The growth in group politics has been linked to the formation of the British Social Democratic Party: the SDP, which has appealed across traditional class identities, has enjoyed considerable support from group activists and those anxious to 'debunk the class myth'. The research proposed a test for the relationship between group activism and support for the SDP, and for the relationship of both of these to class concepts of British politics.
It was thus necessary to select a constituency either held by the Liberal/SDP Alliance or well contested by the Alliance. The electoral trend of constituencies reflects a choice between national party programmes, and although this was the first political consideration in selecting the constituencies, local political factors were also important. It was important, for example, that there was no 'local effect', either via a particular candidate or issue, which may have impinged upon the political contest, and thus reduce the viability of comparison. It was also important that the chosen constituencies be administratively stable, and that boundary changes had not affected an electorate's identification with its constituency. Other local political considerations included the extent and nature of organisational politics, and the salience of issue politics to the electorate. It was felt useful, for example, to include an area with substantial group networks in order to examine the dynamics of group politics.

The main political consideration in selecting constituencies for investigation was therefore national party political choice, linked to local political structures and geography. This produced a 'traditional' and safe Labour seat in the north of England, Sheffield Attercliffe; a safe Conservative seat in the south east of England, Guildford; and a Conservative marginal seat within the Greater London boundaries, in which the Liberal/SDP Alliance command considerable support, Richmond and Barnes.

SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE

The Labour party won 209 seats at the 1983 General Election, 143 of which were in England, and it was from these that the first constituency for investigation was chosen.

The Labour setback at the 1983 Election had been considerable; the party received 27.6% of the poll, the lowest share of votes ever won by the principal opposition party. It was to this performance that the outcome of the election was generally attributed; the result was not a Conservative victory, but rather a failure of the opposition.

The Labour vote was mostly distributed in the north of England and in the London constituencies, and was particularly strong
in industrial centres, for example in the cities of Birmingham, Liverpool, Bradford and Sheffield. Of these Labour strongholds, the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe offered socio-economic conditions appropriate to the requirement that an area be included which exhibits economic decline due to over-reliance on a traditional industry. The Labour majority in Sheffield Attercliffe was 25.9% at the 1983 General Election: although this is not the largest majority commanded by the Labour party in the city of Sheffield, it is a substantial majority, and one which is most representative of the Labour Party's performance in the north of England, and in this type of seat.

The constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe is located to the south east of Sheffield and has four electoral wards: Birley, Darnall, Handsworth and Mosborough. The other Sheffield constituencies have five wards, but Mosborough has grown rapidly and is now the largest ward within the city. In 1955 a major boundary alteration made the city an English borough, and boundary changes have removed inner-city areas in the north of the seat. These have had little impact on its political character, however, and although the index of this change is 7.7%, there is 100% relation of the new to the old constituency. The electorate numbers 64203.

Sheffield Attercliffe has an unbroken tradition of returning a Labour M.P., a pattern which is common to most of the South Yorkshire constituencies. In 1983, 14 of the 15 seats in the metropolitan county were won by the Labour party. There was, however, in these 15 constituencies, a 2.4% swing to the Conservative party, a trend to which Sheffield Attercliffe can be seen to contribute.

Table 1 illustrates the decline in the Labour vote in the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe since February 1974. F.W.S. Craig calculates the two party swing in Sheffield Attercliffe to be 2.9% to the Labour party in October 1974, but 5.3% to the Conservative party by 1979. This trend was reflected across the country following the 'Winter of discontent' and may not be indicative of long term trends. More reliable are figures which reflect the Conservative and Labour party percentage change between 1979 and 1983 in Sheffield Attercliffe: although the Conservative
FIGURE 5.1. Constituency Boundary: Sheffield Attercliffe
source: Crewe and Fox.
FIGURE 5.2. Electoral Ward Boundaries: Sheffield Constituencies, including Sheffield Attercliffe.

party records an outflow of support (-0.5%), the Labour party change is considerably worse at -12.6%. This lost two-party support has been completely absorbed by the Liberal/SDP Alliance who gained +14.1% points by winning 22.9% of the poll. The two-party race in Sheffield Attercliffe accounts for 77.1% of the vote, however.

<table>
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<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>VOTES</th>
<th>% OF POLL</th>
<th>MAJORITY (%)</th>
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<td>44.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1974(O)</td>
<td>29601</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>50.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>29702</td>
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<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>23067</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Table 1. The Labour vote in Sheffield Attercliffe, 1974(F) - 1983

The 1983 General Election results are shown in Table 2. Other parties have not made great inroads into the constituency vote. In 1979 the National Front contested the seat and polled 457, or 1%, of the vote, and in February 1974 the International Marxist Group polled 424, or 0.9%, of the vote. These groups drew the majority of their support from the heavily industrialised areas which are now derelict, and whose residents have been absorbed into other electoral wards.

A striking feature of the electoral statistics for Sheffield Attercliffe is the low turnout of 69.7%. This is comparable to the figure for the combined Sheffield constituencies which, at 66.9%, is lower than average for a large city. W. Hampton, in his study of Sheffield politics, explains the relatively low turnout as a consequence of the homogeneity of the wards and the working class electorate. Because the elections are certain to produce Labour victories within the city, Hampton writes, many voters do not bother to turn out. The belief that election
results could not be influenced by individual voters was recorded in a survey conducted by Hampton. The survey also revealed that a number of non-voters felt it immaterial which party was elected. Hampton also notes that working class Conservatives have a higher propensity to vote than working class supporters of the Labour party and that Sheffield's electorate is overwhelmingly working class, and largely because of the city's industrial composition, has only a small proportion of working class Conservatives.

Many of these comments, which relate to the city of Sheffield, may be applied to the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe in order to explain low turnout. As housing and industrial policies create pressure on the communities, however, and as the workplace is moved further away from the home, cross-pressures on the electorate will reduce the homogeneity of the constituency. This may produce new patterns of electoral behaviour, in terms both of turnout and of party choice.

<table>
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<th>VOTES</th>
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<th>% OF ELECTORATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>11455</td>
<td>25.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL/SDP</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAJORITY</td>
<td>11612</td>
<td>25.9</td>
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</table>

Table 2. 1983 General Election Results: Sheffield Attercliffe

L.J. Sharpe notes the importance of candidature at local elections, but also stresses that local candidates of all parties are drawn from the Registrar-General's social class categories II and III, and do not appear to reflect a class base at local level. This would certainly seem to be true of Patrick Duffy, the M.P. for Sheffield Attercliffe who, nonetheless, has built up a considerable personal vote in the constituency, due mainly to his length of service. A.E.P. Duffy was elected M.P.
for Sheffield Attercliffe in 1970, and represents one of the safest Labour seats in the country. The Labour party took control of Sheffield City Council in 1926 and there is a long history of one-party rule: this, and Duffy's sponsorship by the General and Municipal Workers Union, suggests that his position is solid and secure. There would also appear to be a strong connection between M.P. and constituents: W. Hampton estimated that 6% of the electorate had contacted Duffy on at least one occasion, the highest contact rate of any of the Sheffield constituencies.

There is a low level of group membership in Sheffield, and particularly of organised political groups. This may be largely due to the importance of trades union membership in Sheffield, and to the tradition of trades union militancy. W. Hampton suggests that local councillors often contain the group pressures generated in the city: their attitude to voluntary organisations is generally favourable, he writes, though groups are frequently accepted only as 'an expedient forced upon them by economic stringency'.

The most important issues in Sheffield politics are education and housing, and the most influential groups are tenants and residents associations. Hampton writes that these are essentially defensive groups and do not survive long, though while existent they attract a considerable membership. They cannot, however, penetrate decision-making centres as can industrial and commercial groups.

Tenants groups can achieve some success, suggests Hampton, because they confine themselves to a small and identifiable neighbourhood. They are, he writes:

essentially parochial organisations: they are based on one estate, and send delegates to form federations with similar groups in other parts of the city. A tenants association is the local community acting in defence of their homes, and community feeling...is restricted to one's immediate environment. This is why attempts by local political activists to 'widen the struggle' into an attack on their political enemies, or the 'capitalist system' in general, usually result in failure and disagreement within the tenants movement. (66)
The Labour party losses were absorbed by the gains of both the Conservative party and the Liberal/SDP Alliance at the 1983 General Election. The Conservative party increased its number of seats by 41, and its margin in votes and in seats was the largest won by any party since 1935. As a proportion of the national vote, however, this represents only 42.4% less than the 43.9% achieved in 1979. The majority of this support is distributed in the south, and does not penetrate industrialised or large urbanised centres. Support for the Conservative party is typically located in rural areas and southern towns. The constituency of Guildford was selected as representative of a Conservative stronghold, with the incumbent M.P. commanding a 21.7% majority over the second-placed Alliance candidate.

A consequence of the inroads made into British politics by the Liberal/SDP Alliance is the decline in the two-party share of the vote which, at 70%, was the lowest since 1923. The election result at Guildford, with the Alliance in second place from the Conservatives, is thus a more typical result than a triumph of the Conservative party over the Labour party. While the Conservatives were followed by the Alliance in 248 English constituencies, the Labour party were in second place to the Conservatives in only 149 seats.

The post-war experience of British politics has been dominated by two-party electoral contests, but at the 1983 General Election a two-party race between the Labour and Conservative parties occurred in only 47% of the English constituencies. If the Labour and Conservative parties are considered 'class' parties, this may represent a decline in dichotomous class politics. It may, however, be token of dissatisfaction with the traditional party choices, without necessarily reflecting the electorate's class perceptions. This question will be addressed during the research, for this type of change is indicative of the political fluidity of Britain, and of the conditions which have been related to both the decline of class identifications and the growth of group politics.

The constituency of Guildford lies within Surrey County, which was formed in 1974 and is divided into 11 uneven districts.
Figure 5.3. Constituency Boundary: Guildford
source: Crewe and Fox
Figure 5.4. Electoral Ward Boundaries: Guildford
source: Surrey County Council Planning Department
There have been no major boundary alterations and the index of change of the constituency is 6.7%; there is a 97.6% relation of the new constituency to the old.\textsuperscript{69} The constituency of Guildford has returned a Conservative M.P. every year since 1918, and in this it is typical of the English county in which it is situated. All of the 11 seats which comprise the county of Surrey are held by the Conservative party, which has strengthened its grip on the region since 1979.\textsuperscript{70}

In Guildford, support for the Conservative party reached a peak in 1979, and has since ebbed to a level more typical of its previous electoral contests.\textsuperscript{71} David Howell, the M.P. for Guildford, has held the seat since 1966.\textsuperscript{72} The 1979 election was untypical in that the Labour party finished in second place in Guildford: the Liberal party had previously held second place and, at the 1983 Election, regained and improved upon this position.

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>1974 (F)</th>
<th>1974 (O)</th>
<th>1979</th>
<th>1983</th>
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</thead>
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<td>22.6%</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
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<td>INDEPENDENT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0.4%</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>P.A.L.*</td>
<td></td>
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<td>0.8%</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE MAJ.</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3. GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 1974(F) - 1983 (%): GUILDFORD
* Party of Associates with Licensees

From Table 3 we can see that the Alliance's share of the vote in Guildford in 1983 was more than any won by the Liberal party since 1974. Using the Liberal share of the vote in 1979 as base point, the Liberal/SDP Alliance change in the vote at the
1983 Election was +11.9%. The Liberal/SDP Alliance has clearly won substantial support within Guildford and must be considered the major opposition to the Conservative party. Thus although traditional Conservative support is a striking feature of the political history of Guildford, the remarkable success of the Alliance at the last General Election may be an important indication of the shifting contours of British politics.

Most of the electoral inroads made by the Alliance were travelled at the expense of the Labour party whose percentage change in the vote between 1979 and 1983 was -10.5. The Labour party candidate failed to obtain one eighth of the total number of valid votes cast in 1983 and forfeited his deposit. The constituency of Guildford therefore provides a particularly extreme example of the declining fortunes of the Labour party: the research will investigate this trend and relate it to electors' perceptions of the class nature of political parties, and of class politics more generally.

The majority of organised groups in Guildford are sports, youth and church groups, but there are also a number of local voluntary groups, amenity groups and community groups. Many of the organisations reflect Guildford's older population and include various women's groups and senior citizen groups. There are a variety of cause groups (the major issue in Guildford is airport noise) and a number of educational groups. It has been estimated that there are 2.63 environmental groups per 10,000 population in Guildford.

Marginal seats are generally assumed to be good indicators of the direction of British political opinion, and in times of political fluidity these may be a useful guide to general trends. For this reason it was felt useful to conduct the research in a constituency where the lead of or over the Liberal/SDP Alliance was a marginal one. Thus it was hoped to relate the character of Alliance support to group and class theories of political behaviour.

Marginal seats can be defined variously. The Times Guide To The House Of Commons defines marginal seats as those where
the incumbent party commands a majority of less than 10%. This definition produces 155 marginal seats at the 1983 General Election, comprised of 77 Conservative seats, 62 Labour seats, 12 Alliance seats and 4 in Northern Ireland. J. Curtice and M. Steed, meanwhile, define marginal seats as seats where, at a 50:50 division of the two-party vote, the Conservative share of the vote would lie in the 45-55% range. On this definition they calculate the number of marginal seats at the 1983 election to be 80, that is 13.2%.

The definition of marginal seats used here is that of a 5% majority held by the incumbent at the 1983 General Election. 59 English constituencies would be classed as marginal seats according to this definition. The marginal seats held by the Liberal/SDP Alliance are mostly in the northern industrial towns (eg. Stockton South; Leeds West): it was felt that these are more representative of a dissatisfied Labour party vote than of a new direction in British politics, and that these constituencies do not typify those areas where group networks may replace class politics.

Of the constituencies where the Liberal/SDP Alliance were narrowly defeated, Richmond & Barnes offered the most appropriate research laboratory. The Liberals had run second to the Conservatives in Richmond since February 1974, and the 1983 election gave the Conservatives their closest marginal, with only a 74 (0.2%) vote lead. This also qualified as the seat where the Alliance achieved its 'nearest miss'. The constituency of Richmond & Barnes was felt an appropriate example of an area where the third political party had captured considerable positive support, and where there was considerable evidence for 'alternative' political structures, such as group networks.

On 25 November 1970, the boundary commissioners created 5 new constituencies, increasing the total to 635. As part of these changes, Richmond-Upon-Thames became a Greater London Borough instead of an English Borough. There were, however, no major alterations in the political character of the constituency, which has an 87.8% relation of the new constituency to the old: this is an index of change of 13.9%. The constituency has an electorate of 55844 and is divided into 19 wards.
Figure 5.5 Constituency Boundary: Richmond & Barnes
source: Crewe and Fox
Figure 5.6. Electoral Ward Boundaries: Richmond & Barnes
Richmond & Barnes lies within the metropolitan region of Outer London. In 1983 this region comprised 55 seats, many of which, like Richmond & Barnes, lie in the Home Counties and are relatively affluent. Other examples of such constituencies include Sutton & Cheam and Kingston-Upon-Thames. Other Outer London constituencies, however, lie on the outskirts of the city of London and suffer considerable deprivation, for example Newham North East, Ealing Southall and Brent South. Because of this diversity a regional analysis of election results may not be as valuable as for Sheffield Attercliffe or Guildford, and may contribute little to developing a contextual approach to the constituency. Indeed, the electoral statistics tend to reflect the polarity of the Outer London area: in 1983, it returned 11 Labour party and 44 Conservative party members to Parliament.

Within this region, there was an overall swing to the Conservative party of 4.6% between 1979 and 1983, a trend not reflected in the constituency of Richmond & Barnes where there was a 0.2% reduction in the Conservative party's 1979 majority.\textsuperscript{82} Except for the return of an Independent Conservative member in 1922, the constituency of Richmond & Barnes has been won by the Conservative party at every election since 1918.\textsuperscript{83} What is more striking than the small drop in the Conservative poll at the 1983 election is the considerable advance made by the Liberals.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{lcccc}
\hline
PARTY & 1974 (F) & 1974 (O) & 1979 & 1983 \\
\hline
CONSERVATIVE & 44.3\% & 43.2\% & 46.7\% & 46.5\% \\
LIBERAL/SDP & 35.6\% & 32.7\% & 40.5\% & 46.4\% \\
LABOUR & 18.8\% & 21.6\% & 11.3\% & 7.1\% \\
INDEPENDENT * & & & 0.1\% & \\
NATIONAL FRONT & 1.3\% & 2.5\% & 0.6\% & \\
CONSERVATIVE MAJ. & 8.7\% & 10.5\% & 6.2\% & 0.2\% \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\caption{GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 1974 (F) - 1983 (%): RICHMOND & BARNES}
\end{table}

* A second Independent candidate at the 1979 Election polled 0.8%
Table 4 shows the election results in Richmond for February 1974 to 1983. Although the constituency has always been a marginal seat by a 10% definition, the Conservative majority at the last election was reduced to 0.2%. This was largely due to the advance of the Liberal Alliance, whose change in the vote since 1979 was 5.3%. Their extra support was won from both the Labour party, whose change since 1979 was 4.1%, and the Conservative party. The Labour party performed badly in Richmond & Barnes, losing their deposit and polling only 3156 from a total vote of 44472. The National Front has regularly contested the constituency, and in 1979 two independents stood as candidates. Support has characteristically gone to the main parties, however, and has increasingly been divided between Conservative and Liberal parties.

The slender majority held by the Conservative party is particularly vulnerable to attack at Richmond because the local Council is (narrowly) in the control of the Liberal party. A sensitive local political climate such as this demands a careful and political choice of Parliamentary candidate: this is true of any marginal seat, but especially of a constituency whose local and national politics produce different party choices. Jeremy Hanley, the M.P. for Richmond & Barnes, was elected in 1983, narrowly defeating the Liberal candidate who had contested the seat in February 1974 and in 1979. The seat was previously held, from 1959 to 1983, by Sir Anthony Royle.

There are many organised groups in Richmond. These include amenity groups, community and care groups, sports, conservation and environmental groups. There is a particular proliferation of philanthropic, cause and sectional groups, and of single-issue political groups.
CHAPITRE SIX: THE SURVEY

"Men are the best judges of the consequences of their own opinions, and how far they are likely to influence their actions; and it is most unnatural and tyrannical to say, 'As you think, so must you act. I will collect the evidence of your future conduct from what I know to be your opinions'."

Charles James Fox, Speech in the House of Commons, 1789

6.1. INTRODUCTION

Many existing data sets and published researches are oriented towards voting behaviour. Butler and Stokes's model of British electoral behaviour formed the basis for much of this survey work and is today considered a milestone in survey research. Butler and Stokes focussed primarily on party choice and electoral behaviour, and although these are undoubtedly important aspects of political orientation which have their place in any political survey work, the electoral choice survey model is increasingly criticised as too restrictive.

The political scientist, it is felt, must study the electorate as well as elections. As R. Rose writes:

The ballot is the ultimate arbiter of democratic politics, but it is a blunt instrument. It offers a simple choice between a few partisan alternatives one day in 4 or 5 years. A voter can only put a single X upon it. (2)

What is needed, it is argued, is a survey which considers the processes which lie behind an elector's decision-making, and not solely the elector's decision as to whether or not to vote, and for whom. Although Butler and Stokes considered generational patterns of party identification through occupational class and parental partisanship, their main concern was with electoral choice. Dowse and Hughes argue that this form of research is limiting in that:

the individual is torn out of his social context and the processual, immediate character of much of his social life is lost...What is missing is information on the processes such as the development of group consensus which help translate attitude into action. (3)
This process-oriented approach to survey research is the tool of the behaviouralists, and of the group theorists, who believe that only through studying local milieu and 'reference groups' can one understand the nature of political choice and activity. M.A. Busteed explains that the individual elector is conceptualised, in behaviouralist terms, as the node, or point, in an information flow network. This node is directed by various information flows, such as local milieu, and may be cross-pressured by them, during decision-making. The main interest of the behaviouralist is not the ultimate electoral choice, however, but the various stages of information transmission, reception, processing and decision-making. The important factor not enumerated in census reports, Busteed argues, is political history and tradition, and to exclude this influence upon voting behaviour is to do considerable violence to the decision-making process.

Although an electoral approach to survey research was considered inappropriate to an investigation of class and group politics, the behavioural approach was not felt wholly appropriate either. Most studies of group activity have used behaviouralist survey techniques, but much of this work has been descriptive and has contributed little to our understanding of the relationship between class and group politics. As a main concept of the research is to relate the growth in group politics to economic explanations of political change (like Marxian class theory) it is important that group activity be viewed within an 'economic' as well as a behaviouralist context.

Neo-Marxians challenge the central perspectives of behaviourism, and attempt to replace the subjective orientations (eg. reference groups) with objective and real interests (eg. socio-economic position). It is also increasingly recognised, however, that while class interests may be primary and economic position dominant, interests are also mediated by power and authority relations, and by individual and group consciousness. Thus the new willingness to provide survey evidence for neo-Marxian claims is characterised by a survey design which supplements objective biographical detail with subjective, 'behavioural' information.

The investigation of class and group consciousness thus proposes a survey design which combines elements of the electoral, behavioural and neo-Marxian approach. In respect of format the survey is similar
to the model used by the British Election Studies, and includes sections on electoral behaviour; political perceptions and identifications; social and political attitudes; subjective social class; and political antecedents and objective biographical data. This variety of subject matter is important in a survey which aims to be both descriptive and explanatory. The purpose of the survey was not to start with a hypothesis, but to collect data on and around the subject in order to bring the issue into focus and select the important variables.

H.L. Zetterberg identifies the major survey variables as past contextual variables (eg. place of birth); present contextual variables (eg. place of residence); contemporary statuses: Ascribed (eg. age, gender); contemporary statuses: Achieved (eg. occupation, group memberships); past statuses (eg. education) and stratification variables (eg. income, property). Most of these variables are concerned with subjective interests and Weberian concepts of status, and not all will be appropriate to a study of class consciousness. All these variables, however, form part of the process of data-collection, if not of the data analysis.

6.2. THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The method of data collection is an important consideration when designing the survey model. The unique nature of the investigation required a first hand empirical study, and the need to combine behavioural information with voting and objective data indicated that a survey questionnaire be used. The variety of data required gave the questionnaire considerable length and made it unsuitable for immediate administration. As considered responses were desired, and as particular electors were to be located for inclusion in the survey, it was felt most appropriate to use a mail questionnaire. The mail questionnaire also has the advantage of being relatively cheap and efficient, both influential factors in the design of a survey to be conducted on a low budget in three regions of England.

Although the mail questionnaire may elicit more response than a questionnaire administered personally because of the anonymity
involved, it is more often criticised for failing to secure adequate response rates. It also has a tendency to produce an unrepresentative sample, skewed towards the educated professional class, because of their above average response to mail questionnaires. Because respondents can see all the survey questions before completing the questionnaire, this method also produces answers which are not treated independently, and there is no opportunity to supplement a respondents' answers with observational data. These problems may be overcome, or limited, by combining the administration of a mail questionnaire with random interviewing of the sample.

The mail questionnaire was chosen as the most appropriate method for an investigation of class and group politics in contemporary England. The design of the questionnaire was finalised after a pilot survey was conducted in the constituency of Feltham & Heston. The details of this pilot survey can be found in Appendix B, and the questionnaire is presented as Appendix A. The use of the mail technique in survey administration affects the construction of the questionnaire in various ways. The size, layout, content and complexity of the questionnaire are governed by the choice of a postal survey and by financial considerations.

The length of the questionnaire was such that a mail survey had been chosen in preference to a personal interview, but it was important that the length and structure of the individual questions did not deter. Thus an attempt was made to generate interest in the survey inspite of its length, with questions which were relatively easily and speedily completed. It was also hoped to capture an interested public through the administration methods. In terms of questionnaire layout, the important considerations were a high standard of presentation of the form, and simple and straightforward questions with clear procedural instructions. The questions comprised five sections with dealt with the work environment; political environment; social and economic environment; racial environment and class environment. These categories reflected the main aim of the survey which was to collect as much information as possible on a respondent's class and group behaviours and perceptions, as well as standard social science data. The section boundaries were not rigid, however, and there was a considerable randomising of question order.
The wording and content of questions is as important as their order, length and structure, and the use of difficult, vague, ambiguous and unspecific language was avoided. This was necessary in order that leading or presuming questions were not asked. The need for clarity may sacrifice detail in the quest for simplicity, and although the use of a 'closed' question format yields simple and final answers (particularly useful when the object of the survey is to 'classify' the respondent), these are often inflexible and - the respondent may feel - not fully accurate. Because closed, pre-coded questions may force an inaccurate choice or encourage people to take a median position inappropriately, and because they encourage 'stereotyped' analyses, 'Don't Know' or 'Other' responses have been accommodated where appropriate. The questionnaire was also constructed so as to combine open as well as pre-coded questions. The survey questions, and in some cases question wordings, were influenced by previous surveys of class politics. Of these, the most useful were E. Nordlinger's study of working class Conservatives and McKenzie and Silver's study Angels in Marble.\textsuperscript{12}

The questions in Section A of the questionnaire were designed to measure trades union membership and activism among the economically active population (the attitude and orientation of all respondents towards trades unionism was measured separately in Section B). Thus a respondent may be a union activist without perceiving trades unions as class-based organisations, or as instruments of the Labour party: the trades unions are considered as structures rather than ideological groupings. Question 5 concerns trades union membership, questions 6 to 8 measure trades union activism, and question 9 relates trades union membership to support for the Labour party. Because Section A deals with the work environment, those not completing the section were automatically coded as either 80 (unemployed/retired); 60 (homeworker) or as missing. Some respondents not completing the section were students and were coded 30. Of those economically active and completing this section, most gave sufficient information in question 1 with which to code them according to the occupational schema described in Chapter 4, above. More specific information about the nature of work may have aided this classification, however.

Questions 1 and 2 refer to the job held and thus relate an individual's economic class position only to current labour. Because
this expresses job insecurity, it is judged to be important in an application of Marxian class theory. Question 2 was designed to measure the strength of the work environment reference group as well as occupational stability. Questions 3 and 4 are designed to supplement the question on income in Section C. Question 3 aids in the distinction of a 'salarial' - for comparison with more traditional survey data - and question 4 describes the extent to which weekly income is composed of overtime earnings. The latter is important in that it may identify those respondents whose amount of income and source of income are not naturally aligned: increased earnings, according to the embourgeoisement thesis, erode the class consciousness of the working class. Thus it may be the case that a respondent falls into a high income bracket in Section C because of overtime earnings: in this instance, an investigation of the respondent's class identifications would be relevant to the debated issue of whether source or amount of income determines class perceptions.

Section B of the questionnaire deals with the respondent's political environment, and addressed psephological as well as more general political behaviours. The section was generally well-completed, although the fact that some of the questions were not applicable to all respondents caused some confusion. Increasingly there has been a recognition that surveys, whatever their limitation, provide the surest way of getting at the overall parameters of political opinion and behaviour. Burgess identifies several key political variables, both within and alternative to the electoral system. Party affiliation, he suggests, is a reliable dependent variable of wide relevance in political research, acting as an indicator of wider attitudes and behaviour as well as electoral choice. The questions on party allegiance could have been asked more directly on the survey questionnaire. Question 13, which asked if the respondent was a member of a political party, was designed to measure the extent to which an elector was oriented to the political system, and did not ask which party, if any, a respondent belonged to. Questions 23 and 25 were designed to elicit the party affiliation of floating or 'secular' voters but, in practice, a number of respondents answered 'Yes' or 'No' to question 23, and party choice had to be deduced from later answers: in this instance a direct question
may have been better. In combination with question 25, however, the party choice of this group of voters was well recorded. As many respondents in this group had voted for the Liberal/SDP Alliance at the 1983 General Election, question 28 provided a useful check on the party allegiance of secular voters, although the main intent of this question was to define recruitment to the Liberal/SDP Alliance, and the nature of 'secular drift'.

Questions 26 and 27 were designed to measure the balance of the sample's electoral choice at the 1983 Election. At the same time these questions allowed the measurement of party identification. Burgess notes that party identification is influenced by current party preference and can be used to measure the strength of negative and positive partisanship. Party identification also acts as a filter on an individual's monitoring of the socio-political environment. An attempt was made, in questions 26 and 27, not to present the Labour and Conservative parties on a left-right continuum, but, in seeking to present general statements about the two parties, this was to some extent unavoidable. The aim was to present class and non-class views of the parties, in order to analyse the nature of identification with the two major parties, and the extent to which they may be considered 'class' parties. Of the questions that were asked, question 26E can be singled out for particular criticism, as the view was often expressed that concern for internal disunity would not precipitate support for a party other than Labour. The weakness in this question is a matter of structure: many of the items in the questionnaire were composed of two separate but linked clauses. This was an attempt to present as much material as possible within the questionnaire, but was ill-advised and produced unspecificity and inaccuracy. Question 27D was criticised by those who believed that there had not been any cuts in education or welfare.

Questions 21 and 22 were also designed to measure party identification and the strength of partisanship. Voting intention (question 22) is a general indicator of party identification as well as having more obvious predictive qualities. It is easily collected data, and is comparable with other data sets, like opinion poll ratings. While voting intention is a good variable with a high level of
validity, it has an hypothetical character outside elections and must be treated warily. Recalled vote must also be approached with caution. Although it refers to actual behaviour and is not hypothetical in context, it is only broadly valid and reliable when used with reference to the immediately previous General Election. Care must be taken not to disguise the level of non-voting through question wording, as there is a slight tendency to over-represent voting, and especially voting for the winning side. Minor parties are also discriminated against in vote recall questions. The level of false reporting is estimated to run at 3%.

Question 18 was designed to measure electoral participation in the 1983 Election: although it does accommodate non-voters, there is a tendency to lead respondents to a positive response. Other questions on electoral behaviour were designed, not to garner psephological facts on the 1983 General Election, but rather to measure support for 'democracy' and an individual's feelings of, for example, 'political efficacy'. Questions 19, 20 and 24 address the issue of non-voting, and the extent to which non-participation may be due to rational abstention. Questions 12, 13 and 15 concern the extent to which an individual feels oriented to political structures and exhibits political efficacy. Question 16, which was used by E. Nordlinger in his survey, is a measure of political satisfaction. Question 17 asked respondents to describe the British political system: this was also a measure of general political orientation, and was characterised by patterns of multiple response.

Section B opened with two attitudinal questions on trades unions. Question 10 was a very poor question, largely because of the construction of statements which included two clauses: these statements (A, B and G) were found difficult to complete for this reason. Statement A was intended to measure the agreement/disagreement with strike action as industrial policy; statement B was intended to measure the equation of trades unions with working class interests; and statement G was designed to judge the personal effect of Arthur Scargill upon the miners' strike. Statement G was omitted from the analysis of this question after critical attention.

As striking is primarily a tactic, the use of 'justified' in statement C must be criticised. The aim of this statement was to measure the degree to which solidarity was felt with the strike
action taken. Statement D also contains subjective language: the strike may not necessarily be judged to have 'failed'. Again the intent was to measure solidarity with strike action. Statement E was not used in data analysis because the reference to 'individuals' was too vague. Statement F was designed to measure support for consensus rather than confrontation, and statement H was a further check on the extent to which trades unions are considered to represent working class interests. Because of the weaknesses in question 10, this was approached with great scepticism during questionnaire coding and analysis.

Question 11 was a somewhat better guide to respondents' attitudes to the role and nature of trades union organisation. It concerns trades union organisational rights and the issue of compensation for the loss of those rights at Cheltenham Government Communication Headquarters. Although this particular issue is complicated by patriotism, and concerns a white-collar trade union, it nevertheless may serve as an indication of respondents' orientation to trades union structures. It was also designed, in its question on compensation, to measure individualistic and collectivist attitudes.

The concluding questions in section B concern more general attitudes and orientations to the political system, and more specifically, the party system. Question 29 was completed by all respondents and concerned the political impact of the Liberal/SDP Alliance. It included an open-ended question which produced responses falling, broadly, into 8 categories. Question 30 is modelled on a question asked by E. Nordlinger and addresses the issue of the distinctiveness of political parties, while question 31 requests an open-ended response to the claim that Britain is a two-party system. The last question in the section on the political environment overtly links the issues of class and party, asking respondents to associate the major parties with class interests.

Section C was concerned with the respondent's socio-economic (demographic) and 'group' environment. The high completion rates for this section suggest that the items describing objective biographical data were appropriately placed. In the attempt to collect a broad pool of social survey data, this section contained many items which were later judged superfluous. Because the questionnaire had attempted to cover a large number of issues, some of the items lacked sufficient specificity or depth to be useful research indicators.
Questions were more often abandoned during analysis, however, as a natural consequence of the narrowing of research focus. Those items which were not used in the final data analysis nevertheless played an important role as data checks, and form a considerable social science data bank.

Several questions concern basic factual information. Most of these are of limited value to the investigation of class and group identifications, but are invaluable as guides to the representativeness of the sample when merged with census data.23 Questions 33 to 36 include questions on gender, age, income and economic status. Age and income data were collected as groupings and not absolute values in order to minimise non-response.24 Question 36 served as a check on occupational class coding, particularly for those respondents engaged in unpaid domestic labour. Some of these described themselves as unemployed and were coded 80; those describing themselves as houseworkers were coded 60.25 The 'pensioner' category may have been better described as 'Retired/Pensioner' in the current climate of early retirement. Question 37, on personal status, was not used in data analysis. Factual information included the important variable of property ownership. Questions 40 and 41 concern housing, and question 44 car-ownership. Had questions 40 and 41 been merged, substantial benefit would have accrued during coding, and the simplification may have aided questionnaire completion. Objective data was also collected on educational and vocational experience: questions 49 to 52 concern type of schooling and qualifications achieved. Vocational and academic training were judged of equal importance, but were kept separate to aid comparison with census data.

Section C also contained a number of questions on issues of socialisation: this was felt to be important in estimating the likely exposure to class and group societies and norms. Questions 38 and 39 were designed to measure a respondent's geographical mobility. Urban residence is a prerequisite of the Marxian theory of class, and thus urbanisation is judged the most significant residential criterion. A respondent is looked at initially in terms of the urban/rural divide. All respondents were resident in urbanised constituencies, but their birthplace, and parents' birthplace, were classed in rural/urban terms and coded appropriately.
The north/south divide was also applied to items 38 and 39, although the rural/urban divide was judged more important. Those respondents originating from outside Britain were coded separately, although these questions were not designed as a measure for 'non-white' participants. Those originating from parts of Britain other than England were also coded separately. The intention was to distinguish between those whose socialisation, and thus class cognitions, was internal or external to English society.

Question 43 concerned the type of accommodation the respondent grew up in as a child, and this was designed to measure property mobility, and build a general picture of the respondent's childhood socialisation. In practice, this type of detail was impractical and the item was discarded. Similarly, questions 45 and 46—concerning the family size of the respondent's childhood and adult families—were deleted during data analysis. Questions 47 and 48 concerned parental occupation: these were coded according to the respondent's class schema used, and contrasted with the respondent's class coding as a measure of class mobility.

Section C included three questions which addressed the issue of economic satisfaction. One was a factual question concerning the incidence of leisure expressed in terms of vacations. The other two—questions 53 and 61—asked a direct question about job and general economic satisfaction. Both these questions were poorly answered, for different reasons. Question 53 caused great confusion among houseworkers and the retired: whereas the unemployed were disposed to answer 'No', houseworkers tended to omit the question. It would have been useful to ask all respondents to answer this, and to regard 'job' in its broadest sense to include child-rearing and domestic work. Question 61 was often unanswered because of a desire to respond 'Yes and No', or because of a feeling among respondents that income and opportunities are not related.

A large part of Section C was devoted to questions on the social and group environment. Question 42 was designed to test the strength of the neighbourhood reference group, for example, while questions 55 to 57 concerned the respondent's religious reference group. It was felt important to separate the membership of religious groups from group membership generally, as there is evidence that the former is more widespread and of a different nature to the latter.
Membership of a religious group was measured in terms of activism in the religious environment (question 57) and evidence for religious identification (question 55). Questions 58 to 60 form the basis of the information collected on group organisation and politics. It may have been better to list a variety of groups for question 59, and ask respondents to check those to which they belonged, but such prompting may have failed to elicit consciousness of group membership. The structure of question 59 probably caused respondents to underestimate their group memberships: many mentioned only those given as prompts, for example. However, the questions on group memberships were generally completed thoroughly.

Section D of the questionnaire concerned the 'racial' environment. A major concern of class politics is the need to establish class solidarity across racial, religious, sexual and national boundaries. The pattern of settlement in modern Britain is such that non-white minorities have been scapegoats for economic problems such as unemployment and much racial unrest has occurred within the British working class. The aim of Section D was to identify whether respondents viewed social problems as a consequence of economic policies, or in racial terms. Four questions were asked which attempted to measure 'racism'.

After administration of the questionnaire it was acknowledged that, sociologically, Section D is very weak. There was an inadequate understanding of both concepts and practical terminology, and the use of the expression 'foreign immigrants' must particularly be criticised. The racial hostility in Britain tends to be directed against non-whites, and it is chiefly non-whites with whom political parties such as the National Front are concerned. Questions 63 to 65 would therefore have been improved by using the expression 'non-whites' instead of 'foreign immigrants'. 'Non-whites' would also have been more accurate in that many of the black people living in Britain were born here. For this reason question 64 is largely redundant: in many instances, the country of origin is the country of residence. A question on immigration policy would have been more appropriate in the estimation of this dimension of racism. Question 63 was also badly structured: many respondents felt that economic and social problems were two very separate issues and required separate treatment. Although this complicated the coding
of question 63, the provision of an open-ended qualifier as part of the question allowed for the useful analysis of data.

Section E of the questionnaire was concerned with the class environment, and the main part of the section dealt with the respondent's perception of class and society and, ultimately, the importance of class to voting behaviour and the party system. The opening questions, however, were designed to elicit respondents' views on the distribution of power in society.

Questions 66 and 67 addressed the issue of governmental power, and the ability of party politics to deal with social and economic problems such as unemployment. These were both open-ended items and the questions were intended as prompts rather than direct questions. Question 67 particularly addressed the issue of the distinctiveness of political parties within the governmental system. Question 68 concerned the group powers held within society and asked respondents to name any groups which were felt to be excessively powerful. Finally, question 69 addressed the issue of the individual power a respondent felt s/he possessed to influence the course of government.30

Questions 66 to 69 concern the issue of powerlessness, which is believed to be an important dimension of alienation. M. Seeman identified the main elements of alienation as: an inability to predict events or behaviours (meaninglessness); an inability to influence the course of events of one's own life (powerlessness); a belief in morally undesirable means to achieve ends (normlessness); a feeling of not being part of a social network (isolation) and the undertaking of activities for their extrinsic and not intrinsic meaning (self-estrangement).31 These concepts of alienation can be operationalised by formulating questions based upon their principles and, on the basis of these replies, an index of alienation can be constructed. These questions, in combination with the questions on socio-economic satisfaction asked in Section C, were thus used as an indication of alienation - a concept central to an examination of Marxian theories of class.

Questions 70 to 75 concerned the nature of British class society and the importance of social class (questions 70 and 72); class conflict (question 71) and class mobility (question 75) to an understanding of British politics. Many respondents felt they could not express themselves on these issues within the boxes supplied; others disagreed with the issues and concepts being considered and refused
to answer: the combined effect of this was a higher proportion of missing data in this section than in others.

The questions which caused most concern, however, were those on subjective and relative class consciousness (questions 73 and 74). Most respondents were prepared to assign themselves to one of the classes mentioned, but some would not complete question 74. Question 74 was designed to measure relative subjective class consciousness, which is considered an important dimension in the development of class feeling. The main complaint was that the examples given were 'stereotypes' and that insufficient information was given. This was unavoidable if a question of this nature were to be asked at all in such a questionnaire.

The occupational examples given in question 74 were carefully constructed in order to test whether class rankings were made on the basis of source or amount of income. Some of the examples given in question 74 contained a contradiction between source and amount of income (examples A and F); others were intended to typify a class position (examples B, D and E); example C was included as an example of the new middle class who are employed in the service industries. A fully developed class consciousness in the Marxian sense of the term would distinguish between classes on the basis of the division of labour; a partial class consciousness would recognise class widths but would use several divisions of class (eg. upper middle, upper working class) rather than a dichotomic scheme; and those exhibiting no clear concept of class - or a 'classless', or group, consciousness - would tend to 'level' classes, usually to a median position.

The final items on the questionnaire concern class and politics, and address the issue of a 'class vote' and of 'class' support for political parties.

6.3. THE SAMPLE: I

The purpose of sampling is the estimation and testing of research hypotheses, and it is thus vital that the sampling frame is adequate, complete and accurate. An increase in sample size will increase the precision of the sample results, but will not eliminate any bias in the selection procedure. It is therefore the stage of
sample design that is most crucial to successful survey research.

The most significant design feature of the research into class and group politics is the fact that it is stratified by region. This produced the three parent populations of the constituencies of Sheffield Attercliffe, Guildford and Richmond & Barnes, from which sample electorates had to be drawn. An attempt to locate respondents randomly from electoral rolls proved unsatisfactory during the pilot survey, and alternative methods were sought.

A quota sample, a method which has been widely used within the social sciences, was rejected for various reasons. Quota samples are constructed with reference to the parent population's socio-economic characteristics: they seek to locate a proportion of respondents which reflect the age, gender, class and occupational distribution of the population to be sampled. The first problem with this is that the socio-economic and demographic information from which quotas are drawn, which is usually census material, represent the population as a whole rather than the total electorate, making the quotas from the parent population unreliable. The second problem is a case argued by P. Dunleavy: to construct a sample representative of national characteristics in the Britain of the 1980's is unrealistic and unsound practice in view of clear regional diversities.

As the research into class and group politics was to be carried out among regional parent populations, the problem raised by Dunleavy was not of great concern. What was important, however, was that the research's primary aim was to locate electors according to their group and class identifications, and not with primary reference to their socio-economic criteria. Objective factual information was gathered in order to describe and explain group memberships, not in order to locate them. Thus it was not a research objective to include respondents according to quota requirements. It was, however, important to sample a cross-section of group members and non-members, and a variety of groups and class-based organisations were involved in questionnaire distribution. The design is thus multi-stage stratified: the sample is of people within defined group and class strata which lie within specific regions.

The types of groups contacted in each constituency depended very much on the local group environment, but every effort was made to contact comparable groups in the three areas. Thus a number
of sectional, amenity, community and miscellaneous organisations were contacted in each area, as well as a proportion of political groups and trades unions and organisations. Local school Parent Teacher Associations were also approached and, in Sheffield, two ethnic organisations were selected. In Guildford and in Sheffield Attercliffe, contact was made with organisations for the unemployed. Within this framework, the varied local character of group activity prevailed. In the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe, there was little evidence of group organisation, whereas the constituency of Richmond and Barnes is awash with pressure groups, particularly cause and single-issue groups. In Sheffield Attercliffe, however, there are a plethora of Working Mens Clubs, and these - as the most important socio-economic networks - formed the basis for contacts made with groups in that constituency.

30 groups were approached in Sheffield Attercliffe and Guildford, and 22 in Richmond and Barnes. The groups were contacted with a mailing which included a short cover letter; a specimen questionnaire and a reply slip which asked for brief information about the organisation and possible questionnaire distribution. Stamped Addressed Envelopes were included and, on return of the reply slip, parcels of questionnaires were dispatched to the organisation. Participating groups were asked to distribute the questionnaires with SAE's which were provided in order that respondents did not have to return completed questionnaires through group structures.

The survey questionnaire was administered in three waves between July 1985 and July 1986. This was a period of considerable political quiescence, which was important if long-term attitudes and opinions, unaffected by electoral and media contests, were to be gauged. Local issues which may reasonably be assumed to have affected the political opinions of respondents include the reduction in Sheffield's rate support grant and the abolition of the Greater London Council. The abolition of the GLC aroused much popular feeling and was most keenly felt within the London boundaries: it is likely that residents within the Richmond and Barnes constituency were involved in this issue. 'Rate Capping' in Sheffield, meanwhile, had a particularly dramatic effect upon the city's residents, who were dealt the overnight blow of public fare transport increases of up to 200%.

Nationally, the parties' standing at the polls was characterised by a drop in support for the Conservative party. This was partly
due to the damage done by the Westland affair, and may not have been helped by Britain's part in the United States' bombing of Libya, or by the handling of the dispute at the Wapping print plant. The progress of party support over the months when the survey was administered is recorded in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR &amp; MONTH</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>LIBERAL</th>
<th>SDP</th>
<th>OTHER</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JULY 1985</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPTEMBER 1985</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>11.5</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVEMBER 1985</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>19.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JANUARY 1986</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARCH 1986</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAY 1986</td>
<td>27.5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21.5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JULY 1986</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>17.5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Support for the main political parties during the months of questionnaire distribution (%).

Source: Gallup Polls

The questionnaires were distributed one region at a time for practical reasons, and in order that an attempt could be made to use like organisations in each constituency. The questionnaires were first distributed in Guildford between July and November 1985: because this coincided with a holiday period, extra time was allowed for distribution of the questionnaires by the groups, and for questionnaire completion. The questionnaires were distributed in Sheffield Attercliffe and in Richmond & Barnes within a three month period, in Sheffield Attercliffe between February and April 1986 and between May and July 1986 in Richmond & Barnes.

Statistics concerning the response rates of those groups contacted are presented in Table 2, and Table 3 summarises the way in which questionnaires were distributed in the constituencies by participating groups. Because of the method of administering
the survey, there are two levels at which problems may arise: contact with the group, and contact with the respondent. The two sets of response rates show that, once positive contact with a group had been established, high questionnaire completion rates were not necessarily attained. While non-respondent groups can be explained in terms of refusals, movers, unsuitables and units outside the sample population (e.g. deceased, defunct), non-response within the groups is rather different. It may be partly understood as a consequence of the over-estimation on the part of the distributing group of its interested/accessible membership. The problem of groups taking more questionnaires than they could distribute seems to have been confined to one or two organisations but has, of course, served to lower the overall response rate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WAVE</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CONTACTS</th>
<th>POSITIVE RESPONSE</th>
<th>NEGATIVE RESPONSE</th>
<th>INACCESSIBLE</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE RESPONSE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GU01</td>
<td>JULY - NOV 1985</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA01</td>
<td>FEB - APRIL 1986</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB01</td>
<td>MAY - JULY 1986</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA02</td>
<td>MAY 1986</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Initial Contact With Groups: Description And Response Rates.

A response rate of 30% is considered realistic by many, especially when mail survey techniques are used, but a 60% response rate is a more satisfactory goal. 40 It will be seen from the Tables presented that, while such response rates have been achieved in Richmond & Barnes and in Guildford, attempts to contact sympathetic groups in Sheffield Attercliffe proved almost completely unsuccessful, and that the one organisation which did participate could distribute only 23 questionnaires.

The high non-response rate in Sheffield Attercliffe is one of the most important survey findings because it appears to be related to regional, and not research, factors. Explanation for non-response, it is suggested by C. Moser, devolves upon a questionnaire's sponsorship; its subject matter and its population. 41 As the sponsorship and subject matter of the questionnaire were
fixed throughout the survey, it would appear to be the Sheffield Attercliffe sample which produced low returns. There are several possible reasons for this, all of them related to economic factors. The first concerns the group networks and structures within the Sheffield constituency, which are few, and of a distinctively different character to those in Guildford and in Richmond & Barnes. As noted above, Working Men’s Clubs and social halls, and not memberships of multiple groups, provide the principal organised activity outside the workplace and the home. This is a consequence of the economic structures within the constituency which link the workplace and the community. The wealth of organisational activity in Richmond & Barnes and in Guildford appears to be representative of the consumer and issue-oriented society of the developed south. The resources required for developing associational power and articulating through group structures are clearly not available in Sheffield Attercliffe; thus we must understand the pattern of group structures as illustrative of the differential rate of regional economic development within Britain.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGION</th>
<th>DISTRIBUTED QUESTIONNAIRES</th>
<th>RETURNED QUESTIONNAIRES</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE RESPONSE RATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SA</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GU</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. The Distribution and Completion of the Questionnaires Through Participating Groups.

The lack of group structures within the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe, because related to economic resources, may be considered a form of powerlessness. Grievances fail to be articulated and remain unresolved, creating pressure within the socio-economic and political environments. The organisation which did distribute some questionnaires in Sheffield Attercliffe detected a form of powerlessness and, commenting that it was difficult to encourage participation, suggested that this might be because the unemployed got very tired of filling in forms. Thus we may argue that the low response rate in Sheffield Attercliffe adds support to the
view that group structures are spawned by capitalist developments, and particularly by the growth of a corporate economy. The absence of group networks in Sheffield Attercliffe suggests a lack of economic resources, and a lack of confidence in group structures.

There is also a way in which the low response rate in Sheffield Attercliffe could be related to research tools, and that is in the use of a mail questionnaire. The mail questionnaire tends to over-represent those who are male, middle class, non-manual workers, and thus its use may be seen to discriminate against the Sheffield sample. Although this is a consequence of research method, it is economic in origin (related to occupational class), and must be considered a result of population factors, ie. the Sheffield sample contained more manual working class electors who could not be located with a mail questionnaire.

It would have been unsound practise to apply a different research method to the Sheffield Attercliffe constituency during a comparative survey, and thus a further attempt to contact Sheffield electors was made using the survey questionnaire. The only change was to send a fuller cover letter to prospective groups: this is contained in Appendix C. The second survey wave in Sheffield also failed.

The importance of non-response, and particularly of the figures obtained for Sheffield Attercliffe, is not the loss of cases, but the fact that non-respondents differ importantly from respondents. Thus it is the resultant sampling bias which must be investigated: although this may be large, there are no grounds for rejecting a sample provided that we have confidence in the selection process. The sampling method used in the survey has several built-in biases which are not important because of the nature of the research, which is analytic rather than representative. Thus although the response rate for Sheffield Attercliffe is unacceptably high by social survey standards, this is a consequence of the lack of group conditions which are under investigation - and which prevail, and are located, using the same research tools as in Sheffield, in Richmond & Barnes and in Guildford. This is not to dismiss the lack of data collected in Sheffield, which is indeed a great disappointment, and prevents the large-scale analysis of identifications alternative to group structures, such as class consciousness.

Because the research investigates group membership, and is particularly concerned with the character of group memberships,
it may well be the case that an over-representation of certain socio-political characteristics occurs. For example, if it is the case that group members are overwhelmingly employed in the construction industry, then one would expect to find a high proportion of respondents so employed. Thus it is not intended to detail biases which occur as part of the survey, but rather to investigate those which are a product of sample methods. These will be considered in section 6.4., below.

6.4. THE SAMPLE: II

Stratified sampling designs are sampling plans in which the objective is to obtain specified types of individuals in given proportions without regard to their actual proportion in the total population under study. Thus the sample is 'analytic' rather than representative and is intended to permit statements about the relationship between group membership and various socio-economic and political characteristics. It is not intended to describe the entire electorate of the three constituencies, nor is it representative of them, for it was drawn from the group population only.

While the samples may not be representative of the electorate at large, they should be representative of people organised within group structures. Such a section of society may itself form a 'special group', in that there may be a large proportion of a particular kind of voter or an over-representation of a particular class. In considering these questions, it is useful to look at census data. These are most often used to validate the representativeness of a sample, but can also be an important reference point for evaluating statistics derived from a survey, and especially those relating to sub-groups of the population. Various sub-sets of the population (eg. the unemployed) are detailed in census data, and 7 major variables are considered in detail.

In this section, sample returns and census data for major variables are presented. The census data are usually the Small Area Statistics based on 10% samples drawn from 100% counts: these are reliable at constituency level. Wherever possible, attempts have been made to 'bridge time' by consulting supplementary information that might-update the decennial census. The census material provides
valuable information about the constituencies under consideration while facilitating the identification of particular groupings among the sample, and thus indicating the useful direction of data analysis.

AGE STRUCTURE

The age structure of England and Wales is shown in Table 4. Only the population of voting age is shown. The population of the U.K. is increasing more slowly, mainly because of a falling birth rate, and declining school rolls and an ageing population are the main consequences of this trend. Population change is characterised by a flight from towns, and most conurbations have lost substantial numbers. Of the regions under consideration, Sheffield Attercliffe lies within an area which suffered a 1.4% population decline between 1971 and 1981, while Richmond & Barnes and Guildford experienced a population growth of 0.2% in the same period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>16 - 24</th>
<th>25 - 34</th>
<th>35 - 44</th>
<th>45+</th>
<th>65+</th>
<th>75+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>14.3%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>17.9%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Age Structure: England and Wales.
source: 1981 OPCS Monitor Census Returns
(Percentages do not add up because the population aged 0 - 15 is excluded.)

Table 5 presents figures for the age structure of the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe, and compares these with the city average. The Attercliffe constituency has higher than average proportions of persons aged 30 - 39 and 50 - 59/64. The constituency also has few young children, and the effects of the ageing population are most evident within local education.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>20 - 29</th>
<th>30 - 39</th>
<th>40 - 59/64</th>
<th>60/65 - 74</th>
<th>75+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ATTERCLIFFE</td>
<td>10481</td>
<td>10959</td>
<td>22030</td>
<td>10754</td>
<td>3926</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGE</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
<td>13.5%</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CITY AVERAGE</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Age Structure: Sheffield Attercliffe.
source: Sheffield 1981 Census Reports: Constituency Profile
(Sheffield Central Policy Unit)
The age structure of the Sheffield sample is presented in Table 6. As the sample is so small and proportions are misleading, absolute totals are provided. By way of comparison with census material, percentages for age groups within the electorate have been calculated from Table 5. The categories are not identical and the comparative values are presented only as a guide.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>18 - 25</th>
<th>26 - 40</th>
<th>41 - 65</th>
<th>66 - 75</th>
<th>75+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SAMPLE</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGE</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENSUS %</td>
<td>36.7%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Age Structure: Sheffield Attercliffe Sample.

The age structure of the constituencies of Guildford and Richmond & Barnes are presented in Tables 7 and 8. The age structure in Richmond & Barnes is characteristically 'youthful', while Guildford has a large proportion of residents in the older age groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16 - 29</th>
<th>30 - 44</th>
<th>45 - 64</th>
<th>64+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
<td>1623</td>
<td>1775</td>
<td>1890</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGE</td>
<td>29.2%</td>
<td>31.9%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Age Structure: Guildford

source: 1981 Census 10% Small Area Statistics (Economically Active only)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>16 - 24</th>
<th>25 - 34</th>
<th>35 - 44</th>
<th>45 - 59</th>
<th>60 - 74</th>
<th>75+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</td>
<td>9323</td>
<td>11113</td>
<td>9651</td>
<td>12637</td>
<td>12328</td>
<td>5112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERCENTAGE</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>16.7%</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREATER LONDON %</td>
<td>15.3%</td>
<td>15.6%</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>14.6%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Age Structure: Richmond & Barnes

The age structure of the combined samples are presented in Table 9. The principle observation to be made about the age structure of the samples is the size of the 26 - 40 age group. This is the modal category within the complete sample and within the sample of Sheffield Attercliffe and Richmond & Barnes. This is also the age group to which group activists have been typically assigned by previous surveys. In Guildford, more respondents fall into the 41 - 65 years category, and this may reflect both the general population of the region, and the nature of organised group activity within the constituency. Similarly, the proportion of young people in the Richmond sample (18 - 25 category) is higher than that in Guildford and in Sheffield Attercliffe, which reflects the young, single population within the constituency, and the younger membership of the high proportion of 'cause' groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Sheffield Attercliffe</th>
<th>Guildford</th>
<th>Richmond &amp; Barnes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18 - 25</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26 - 40</td>
<td>60.9%</td>
<td>35.8%</td>
<td>43.7%</td>
<td>42.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41 - 65</td>
<td>26.1%</td>
<td>48.1%</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>37.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66 - 75</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
<td>9.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>75+</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Age Structure of Total Sample: by region

GENDER

The gender composition of the samples is shown in Table 10. The sample taken in Sheffield Attercliffe was overwhelmingly female, unlike those taken in Guildford and Richmond & Barnes which were more evenly balanced between the sexes. It is commonly thought that group populations are predominantly male, for which there is some evidence in the samples taken in Guildford and in Richmond.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Sheffield Attercliffe</th>
<th>Guildford</th>
<th>Richmond &amp; Barnes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Gender Composition of Total Sample: by region
Of the total population of England and Wales, 5% receive less than the supplementary benefit level of income and 9% receive supplementary benefit. A further 14% receive an income of up to 40% higher than this level and may be considered as living on the margins of poverty, the official poverty level being set very low. Thus 28% of the population survive on these very low income levels. Figure 6.1. records 24% of the total constituency sample in receipt of an income of less than £3000 per annum: this is a considerably higher level than that of State benefit, but does give some indication of the incidence of low income levels across the sample population.

The overall sample results for income distribution do, however, disguise regional variation, and in particular the discrepancy between results obtained for the lowest income category in Sheffield Attercliffe and in the other two constituencies (see Figures 6.2. to 6.4.). Of the Sheffield Attercliffe sample, 65% fall into this lowest income category, compared with only 17-18% in Guildford and in Richmond & Barnes. This is partly a consequence of regional variation in employment conditions and income levels, but is largely due to the fact that the Sheffield Attercliffe sample contained a high proportion of females not economically active.

Women are an essential part of the labour force and form more than 40% of all wage and salary earners. Their presence in the labour market is dependent upon the supply of male workers, however, and they have been pushed back into the home as unemployment has risen during the 1980's. There are thus regional differences in job opportunities for women. In many instances the Sheffield Attercliffe respondents were homeworkers who were also registered as unemployed and whose income levels were low. Where women are in employment they usually earn less than men and are concentrated in clerical and domestic sectors of industry. The economically active within the Sheffield sample were mostly in low-paid, part-time jobs: often this was as 'chief bread winner' and not for purposes of supplementing income. Thus although it is important to recognise the degree of bias in the Sheffield sample when considering the lowest income category, it does reflect an important aspect of income distribution in Britain.

The other striking feature of the income distribution across the sample is the high proportion of respondents who fall into
the fourth income category (£15000 - £20000 per annum). This may suggest some relationship to income level.

**KEY**

A = Less than £3 000
B = £3 100 - £6 000
C = £6 100 - £8 500
D = £8 600 - £15 000
E = £15 000 - £20 000
F = More than £20 000

**Gross Income Per Annum (£)**

**Figure 6.1. Income: Total Sample.**

**Figure 6.2. Income: Sheffield Attercliffe**

**Figure 6.3. Income: Guildford**

**Figure 6.4. Income: Richmond & Barnes**
the fourth income category (£8600 - £15000 per annum). This is in fact the modal income category and suggests that group membership may bear some relationship to income level.

**UNEMPLOYMENT**

R. Burgess writes that there is:

> a very real sense in which a society is its division of labour, reproduced daily and inter-generationally in the structures and processes of its economic and social interdependencies. (50)

Employment is important, he notes, because its economic and ideological implications permeate all social experience in contemporary Western societies: participation and productivity in the labour process determine prestige and thus produce psychological impacts.

Most studies have focussed upon this psychological dimension of employment, but here 'unemployment' will be used as an indicator of political attitudes and behaviours. An understanding of the politics and geography of unemployment is crucial to an understanding of the forces for social change within industrial society, and particularly to an understanding of the experience of local communities.

In considering employment patterns in Britain it is important to understand the distribution of the workforce between sexes, and by race, age, region, industry and occupation. The social division of labour is the sharpest division between workers, whether employed or not, as women are both horizontally separate from men (in terms of sectors of the economy in which they are employed) and vertically segregated (in terms of pay differentials). There is also the factor of unpaid female labour in the home - ie. domestic work, reproduction and childcare - to be considered when describing and defining employment patterns.

This unrewarded or unrecognised labour, although not involving contractual exchange, is nonetheless productive activity and must be classed as work. This is part of the informal economy, a sector which Burgess suggests is expanding rapidly in order to supplement the breakdown of the formal labour market. Female labour, casual, irregular and insubstantial employment all form part of this 'informal economy'.

A true measure of employment patterns would account for this informal economic activity, but official employment statistics relate only to work performed within the formal labour market, and must be used with caution. Similarly, unemployment figures
are confined only to those registered as unemployed, and omit many who are without paid employment, particularly women.

It is important to be cautious of the presentation of employment statistics as well as of their measurement. A report produced by Sheffield Central Policy Unit argues that the census gives a 'radically different view of unemployment to the one presented in official Department of Employment figures' because of the use of travel-to-work areas as the basis for statistical and geographical comparison. This results in unemployment figures for large conurbation centres being depressed by the fact that many jobs are available to people over a much wider area: it is assumed that people in the inner parts of the travel-to-work areas may place themselves on the market for these jobs, which may not in fact be the case.

There is thus a strong argument for calculating unemployment rates according to residence-based and not travel-to-work areas. This makes comparison of large cities, small towns, commuter zones and rural areas statistically valid and provides a more accurate and diverse picture of regional unemployment. Census data based on Parliamentary constituencies therefore offer the ideal method of comparing areas which are of roughly equal proportion.

Travel-to-work calculations of the unemployment rate in Sheffield, for example, estimate the figure at 11.3%, but the Sheffield Policy Unit suggest that the inner area of Sheffield - with a population of 250,000 - has an unemployment rate nearer to 19% - 20%. In Sheffield Attercliffe it is estimated that the unemployment rate in 1983 was 15%; both these areas would thus qualify for Assisted Area Status, but fail to do so under travel-to-work definitions of the unemployment rate. Thus bearing in mind the limitations of official statistics we may consider the sample constituencies within a regional and national context.

The employment rate in Sheffield Attercliffe is 44.2% of all persons: this is slightly above the city average of 42.6%. Table 11 presents a further analysis of economic activity. Although the metropolitan district of Sheffield compares favourably with other industrial districts and with Inner London boroughs in terms of unemployment rates, a breakdown of the city average would alter the picture considerably. Thus although Knowsley (22%), Liverpool, Manchester, Birmingham, Newcastle and Bradford (12.4%) all register higher unemployment levels than Sheffield's rate of 11.3%, a constit-
uency analysis of the city records Sheffield Central's unemployment at 18.8%.\textsuperscript{55} This is the highest unemployment rate of any of the 54 constituencies in the region of Yorkshire and Humberside. The unemployment rate in Sheffield, and in the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe, is rising rapidly and is estimated to have increased by 50% between 1981 and 1983. To aid regional comparison within the survey, however, statistics used are from 1981 census data. Table 12 presents the unemployment rates in Sheffield Attercliffe, Guildford and Richmond & Barnes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1971</th>
<th>1981</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>METROPOLITAN DISTRICTS</strong></td>
<td>87.3</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INNER LONDON</strong></td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td>44.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHEFFIELD</strong></td>
<td>88.1</td>
<td>33.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Male and Female Full-Time Employment Rates (%)  
source: Sheffield 1981 Census Report, No. 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UNEMPLOYED</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE UNEMPLOYED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</strong></td>
<td>3904</td>
<td>10.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GUILDFORD</strong></td>
<td>2420</td>
<td>4.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NATIONAL</strong></td>
<td>2.5 million</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Unemployment Rates: Sheffield Attercliffe, Guildford and Richmond & Barnes.  
source: Census of Population County Reports, 1981

The national unemployment rate rose from 1.6% in 1961 to 4.3% in 1981.\textsuperscript{56} Since 1981 unemployment has continued to rise and in 1984 there were some 31 million registered unemployed. In 1979 most of the U.K. had unemployment rates that were less than 7% but recent years have seen the emergence of considerable regional variation. Surrey, the county in which two of the constituencies under consid-
ation are located, enjoys the lowest unemployment rates in the U.K., along with Sussex. The unemployment rate across the county of Surrey was 5.5% in May 1984, a percentage change in employment between 1975 and 1981 of +13.3. The constituency of Guildford has a slightly lower than average regional unemployment rate, while Richmond & Barnes, at 5.5%, is representative of the county. The county of South Yorkshire had 15.8% registered unemployed in May 1984, which represented a -10.5 percentage change in employment between 1975 and 1981. The constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe, with an unemployment rate of 10.1%, is below this regional average.

A common feature of unemployment is that the 18-24 and 55-59 age groups form the highest proportion of the jobless. In April 1984 the latter age group formed 16.7% of the registered unemployed while the 18-24 age group comprised 51.9% of the total figure. This pattern is also typical of the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe where 55% of the registered unemployed are aged between 18 and 24. Another distinguishing feature of national unemployment is the high loss of unskilled and semi-skilled manual jobs (22.4% of jobs lost). The constituencies of Guildford and Richmond & Barnes reflect this tendency with their high proportion of economically active female labour: in Guildford, the percentage change in female labour between 1971 and 1981 was +12.7 compared to -0.3 for male labour. Similarly, in Richmond & Barnes women formed 40.8% of the labour force in 1981 compared with 38.5% in 1971, inspite of unemployment rates rising by 51% in the same period.

The sample results obtained in the constituencies are presented in Tables 13 and 14. The occupational class schema described in Chapter Four classifies unpaid homeworkers in class code 60, unless they describe themselves as unemployed in which case this designation overrides that of homeworker. Retired and redundant workers are also classified as unemployed. The effect of this is to inflate sample figures of the unemployed relative to official unemployment statistics, but it is believed that this is a more accurate picture of employment patterns. These results are presented in Table 13. In this Table, the employed contains homeworkers, and the unemployed contains the retired and redundant.

Table 14 presents sample returns according to traditional definitions of the economically active and unemployed. Homeworkers and the retired are not included. It will be seen from the data
that there is an extremely high proportion of unemployed in the Sheffield Attercliffe and the Richmond & Barnes samples. This would appear to suggest that, rather than not actively seeking representation through group structures, unemployed people have a propensity to join groups. This possibility will be investigated during data analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed, Including Self-Employed and Homeworkers</th>
<th>Unemployed, Including Retired and Students</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Attercliffe</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guildford</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond &amp; Barnes</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Economic Activity: Composition of Total Sample Using New Class Coding Scheme: by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Employed</th>
<th>Unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Attercliffe</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guildford</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond &amp; Barnes</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. Economic Activity: Composition of Total Sample Using Traditional Definitions: by region

OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE AND CLASS

The industrial workforce has been in decline since 1960 and in 1984 there was only one person working in industry for every two in the service sector. The loss of industrial jobs has accelerated since 1980, especially in northern and western regions of England: between 1978 and 1983, 23%-27% of industrial jobs were lost in Yorkshire and Humberside, compared with less than 18% in the south east. While 'traditional' industries such as textiles,
iron and steel, coalmining and shipbuilding have contracted, there has been a considerable growth in the pharmaceutical, computer manufacture and electronics industries.

The constituencies under consideration exhibit the varying effects of this structural change in employment patterns. Sheffield Attercliffe is situated in the coal and steel heartlands of South Yorkshire where over 50% are employed in industry, while the constituencies of Richmond & Barnes and Guildford lie in areas where there are less than 32% of the workforce employed in the industrial sector. Furthermore, the nature of industrial employment in these regions is quite different, with Richmond & Barnes and Guildford being situated close to growth industries. Regional variation is also apparent in the service sector: there are c.22,000 employed in service work in Surrey, compared with 15,000 in South Yorkshire. As industrial requirements have changed, the location of industry has shifted, and this has particularly affected industrial cities. Between 1960 and 1981 manufacturing employment in Sheffield declined by 38%. The greatest decline, however, has been felt within the steel and coal industries.

Table 15. Occupational Structure: by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANUFACTURING</td>
<td>37.2%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>17.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSTRUCTION</td>
<td>6.1%</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISTRIBUTION/CATERING</td>
<td>19.3%</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
<td>65.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSPORT</td>
<td>6.5%</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER SERVICES</td>
<td>25.6%</td>
<td>35.4%</td>
<td>inc. in Dist/Cater</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENERGY/WATER</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>inc. in Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGRICULTURE</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table source: Census 1981 10% Small Area Statistics.

The occupational structure of the three constituencies is shown in Table 15. There is significant employment within the service industries in Richmond & Barnes, and relatively little
employment in manufacturing. In Sheffield Attercliffe, meanwhile, over a third of all categories of employment are within manufacturing. In Guildford there is a very large service sector: in 1981, 34.1% of Guildford's workforce were in office employment.67

The proportion of semi-skilled manual workers in Sheffield Attercliffe is distinctly high at 16.9%, a figure which is above the national average of 14.1%. The proportion of persons in households where the head is or was an unskilled worker, however, is relatively low at 5.1%.68 There were 100 or more manual workers for every 100 white-collar workers in South Yorkshire in 1981. Surrey, by contrast, had the lowest proportion of manual workers in Britain: 39 to every 100 white-collar workers.69 In Richmond & Barnes there were 2.9% unskilled manual workers, 20.1% semi- and skilled workers and 69.9% white-collar workers in 1981.70

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>38.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIII</td>
<td>11.5%</td>
<td>13.2%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IIIIM</td>
<td>45.4%</td>
<td>25.7%</td>
<td>20.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>18.8%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>5.8%</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>1.1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. Registrar-General's Social Classification: by region.

The social class composition of the constituencies according to the Registrar-General's classification is shown in Table 16. Table 17 presents the sample results obtained using the definition of socio-economic class proposed in Chapter Four. The mode value in Table 17 is code 30 which shows the high proportion of white-collar workers within the sample. There are few semi-and unskilled
manual workers (code 70) in the sample, and a relatively high proportion of unemployed.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS CODE</th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND AND BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>26.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>18.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>80</td>
<td>52.2%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>21.1%</td>
<td>24.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17. Socio-Economic Class Composition of The Sample Using New Class Coding Schema: by region.

PROPERTY

The best indicator of property is owner-occupation of housing. The 1981 census estimated 55.7% of accommodation to be owner-occupied and 31.2% to be rented from local authorities. Table 18 presents statistics on housing for the three constituencies. Owner-occupation of housing is slightly above the national average in Guildford, and slightly below in Sheffield Attercliffe. While a high proportion of houses are rented from the local authority in Sheffield, a high proportion in Richmond & Barnes are rented privately. This reflects the young, single population in Richmond. Table 19 presents the figures for owner-occupation obtained by the survey sample. Owner-occupiers are slightly over-represented in the Guildford and Sheffield Attercliffe samples at the expense of council tenants, suggesting a possible relationship between home-ownership and group membership.
Table 18. Housing: by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND AND BARNES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OWNER- OCCUPIED</td>
<td>43.4%</td>
<td>64.6%</td>
<td>55.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNCIL RENT</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
<td>15.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE RENT</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>2.2%</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19. Housing of Total Sample: by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND AND BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OWNER-OCCUPIED</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td>57.7%</td>
<td>72.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNCIL RENT</td>
<td>17.4%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE RENT</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>4.9%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td>13.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

EDUCATION

The national average for employed persons with a degree or professional qualification is 13.1%. Sheffield Attercliffe falls well below this with one of the lowest proportions in the country: 5.6%. The data collected by the survey is presented in Table 20. There was a considerable over-representation of those with educational and professional qualifications in all constituencies. This is probably encouraged by the method of data collection. Table 21 presents information collected by the survey on type of schooling received by the sample. This data was collected to supplement information pertaining to educational profile.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEGREE</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>40.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APPRENTICESHIP/</td>
<td>39.1%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
<td>64.8%</td>
<td>58.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VOCATIONAL TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20. Educational and Professional Qualifications of Total Sample: by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND AND BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>23.9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRAMMAR</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
<td>39.4%</td>
<td>36.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECONDARY MODERN</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>17.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMPREHENSIVE</td>
<td>43.5%</td>
<td>7.4%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
<td>14.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NONE</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>8.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.2%</td>
<td>4.2%</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21. Type of Secondary Schooling of Total Sample: by region

ETHNIC ORIGIN

In 1981, 85% of the black and Asian population under 16 and 18% of the black and Asian population of working age were born in England and Wales. There are no precise statistics on the ethnic background of people in Britain, but approximate measures have been made about patterns of settlement. Between 1% and 1.9% of the population in households with a head born in the New Commonwealth or Pakistan are settled in South Yorkshire, and between 2% and 2.9% in Surrey. As the national average is 4.2%, race cannot be judged a major element in the survey research; the small numbers residing within the constituencies under consideration suggest its impact on political attitudes and behaviour will be small. In Sheffield Attercliffe there are 1.6% of households with a head
born in the New Commonwealth; in Guildford 2.9% and in Richmond & Barnes 3.5%.
PART THREE

ANALYSIS

"The political scientist deceives himself if he thinks he has no values, explicit or implicit, but he is deceiving his readers if he does not attempt to give a true and scientifically accurate account of the variety and proportion of images, values and interests that the public actually exhibit."

Bernard Crick
INTRODUCTION

After data collection the questionnaires were edited and coded. The editing was done case by case in order to construct a complete picture of individual respondents.

There was only a small proportion of missing questionnaire data. Of the completed questionnaires, 92% had less than 5 missing items and 46% of questionnaires had no missing data. Only 4 questionnaires had occupational class data missing. The total sample used during analysis was 175 cases.

The purpose of coding is to classify answers to a question into meaningful categories so as to bring out their essential pattern. Most of the questions were close-ended and had an automatic coding frame of 'Yes' (1), 'No' (2) and 'Don't Know' (Y). The open-ended items were grouped according to the range of responses obtained, without producing so many categories as to be unhelpful. The coding frame for open-ended items was designed after the answers had been so grouped.

In some instances, coding was performed in two stages so that a set of codes were themselves coded. Thus in question C38, for example, a respondent's birthplace was coded 1-8 and then compared with current residential description (i.e. Guildford, Richmond & Barnes or Sheffield Attercliffe) in order to produce a new set of codes which express geographical mobility.

All the variables under consideration were discrete, and the data was coded on a nominal scale of measurement. Once coded, tabulation sheets (subject by variables matrices) were drawn up for each case. This summary of data in tabular form eased the creation of computer data files and the checking of coding errors. Frequency counts of all the coding categories also allowed the salient features of the data to become more apparent and thus indicated the directions of statistical analysis.
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE GROUP ENVIRONMENT

"A person requires as many forms of representation as he has distinct organisable interests or points of view."


The group bases of politics were considered with reference to electoral behaviour and the party system, and to the nature and role of interest groupings within the three constituencies. Indicators of group membership were explored in order to profile group members and to examine the dynamics of group politics and its relationship to other forms of political identification and orientation.

7.1. GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Question C58 of the questionnaire asked respondents whether they were a member of any groups, other than Trades Unions. Trades Unions were excluded as orientation to these was being considered separately, as part of the investigation into the class environment. Membership of organised groups was used in order to measure formal group politics, such as is proposed by group theory.

A.H. Birch, in his study of Glossop, excluded Trades Unions and churches when interviewing his sample about group memberships. Of the sample taken by Birch, 28% of participants belonged to some kind of organisation. Provision had been made in the questionnaire for the separation of religious membership from the secular group memberships of respondents, but it was felt important not to separate them initially so that any socio-religious or politico-religious group memberships were not lost.

The results obtained from the samples in Sheffield Attercliffe, Guildford and Richmond & Barnes are presented in Table 1. The high proportion of respondents claiming membership of a group is a consequence of the sampling design, which was stratified by group, and is not representative of the constituency parent population. The sample average of 80.6% group membership is 50%-60% above the levels of group membership recorded by previous studies.
Table 1. Group Memberships of Total Sample: by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GROUP MEMBERSHIPS</th>
<th>NO GROUP MEMBERSHIPS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>65.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>89.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>81.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the results are not representative of the constituency populations, they do reflect the different sampling bases. Thus the low proportion of respondents in the Sheffield Attercliffe sample with group memberships - relative to the other constituencies - is a consequence of the relatively few groups organised within this constituency, as discussed in Chapter Six. A chi-squared test of statistical significance indicates the association between group membership and constituency: a chi square of 7.47 was calculated when cross-tabulating group membership and sample region, giving a significance statistic of 0.02. The association between group membership and region may suggest that socio-economic variables affect the incidence of group affiliations. The most commonly investigated demographic variable is occupational class, which has been linked to group membership by several studies.

T. Bottomore, investigating voluntary organisation activity within a small town, found that social differentiation within the voluntary organisations produced three basic status groups, with the demarcation line between two of these groups being the manual/non-manual divide. Participation in organisations was found to be clearly correlated with occupational status: individuals in the lowest occupational categories played little part in voluntary organisations other than within churches (female) and trades unions and sports clubs (male). 'Consciously or unconsciously', Bottomore suggests:

some of the organisations discourage or squeeze out individuals with lower occupational status, either by fixing a high sub or by establishing a standard of behaviour which is, or seems to be, unattainable by such individuals. (5)
Of the 125 organisations investigated, Bottomore found that only 70 groups drew members from all three occupational groups, and that occupational status was also crucial in establishing the leadership hierarchy within an organisation.\(^6\)

A national sample taken by Sillitoe in 1969 also produced evidence for a decline in group membership across social classes.\(^7\) Joining societies, it was suggested, is not only a middle class trait, but is a social class difference that is apparent from early age. Results produced by a 1985 study of political participation suggest that it is the professional class who are over-represented within groups, and manual workers, and 'particularly those from households outside the economically active sector' who are under-represented.\(^8\) Skilled workers, however, were found to be active within groups, and it is suggested that this is related to experience obtained through trades union. 'Being part of the participatory elite', Moyser and Parry write:

> corresponds very closely to being from the non-manual, and especially managerial, strata of society. Most members of the middle class are not political activists, but the reverse seems plainly to be the case. (9)

The results obtained by the constituency survey are consistent with the findings related by previous studies of group membership and occupational class. From Figure 7.1, it can be seen that the incidence of group membership is most concentrated within occupational class code 30, ie. among white collar workers, and particularly within the service sector.\(^10\) This occupational grouping is that traditionally referred to as the 'middle class', and this would seem to support the hypothesis that it is the middle class who are 'Joiners'. 93.8% of the Richmond & Barnes sample, and 90% of the Guildford sample, who were class coded 30 claimed membership of at least one organisation. In Sheffield Attercliffe, no respondents were described by class code 30.

A striking feature of the distribution of group membership across occupational classes is that only class codes 40 to 80 are represented within Sheffield Attercliffe, in contrast to the two other regions where all class categories, except 10, are located. The failure to identify group structures within the northern constituency would seem to be linked to the low concentration of non-manual, and especially managerial, workers in the constituency, and thus to confirm the effect of the occupational class indicator upon group politics.
Combining class codes 30, 40 and 50 when calculating group membership can be seen from Table 2 to express a very significant proportion of group activity. From Figure 7.1, it is clear that the balance of group members are located within the category coded as 30.5% of the total sample who claimed affiliation belonged to this category. The large concentration of group members within code 30 is a consequence of grouping the unemployed and 'retired' together. Because the economically retired have constructed a group and reference environment for themselves over a number of years, they enjoy sufficient economic prestige over the unemployed. Group members within codes 40 and 50 are the most likely to be included by group membership. Only 17% of the sample was classified as being within code 60. It was decided to classify these together, as there are the most likely to be included by group membership. It was decided to classify these together, as there are the most likely to be included by group membership.

A = Class Code 20
B = Class Code 30
C = Class Code 40
D = Class Code 50
E = Class Code 60
F = Class Code 70
G = Class Code 80

KEY

Figure 7.1. Group Members By Occupational Class Code: Total Sample (N=137)

Figure 7.1.i.: Guildford (N=68)

Figure 7.1.ii.: Richmond & Barnes (N=54)

Figure 7.1.iii.: Sheffield Attercliffe (N=15)
Combining class codes 30, 40 and 60 when calculating group membership can be seen from Table 2 to express a very significant proportion of group activity. From Figure 7.1, it is clear that the balance of group members are located within the category coded 80 by the occupational schema: 28.5% of the total sample who claimed group affiliation belonged to this category. The large concentration of group members within code 80 is a consequence of grouping the 'unemployed' and 'retired' together. Because the economically retired have constructed a group and reference environment for themselves over a number of years, and may enjoy sufficient economic and prestige power to organise themselves within groups, it is not valid to classify them with the unemployed (who are the most likely to be excluded by group politics) for purposes of group membership aggregation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Class Codes 30, 40 and 60 as Percentage of Total Group Activity</th>
<th>Average Percentage Group Activity Within Class Codes 30, 40 and 60.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheffield Attercliffe</td>
<td>26.6%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guildford</td>
<td>67.6%</td>
<td>87.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Richmond &amp; Barnes</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>77.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>61.4%</td>
<td>77.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Proportion of Group Members Within Class Codes 30, 40 and 60 as Proportion of Total Group Memberships Supplied by Those Class Codes: by region.

In order to separate the economically retired from class code 80, data concerning the labour status of group members was collected. This is presented in Table 3, from which it is shown that 15.6% of the total sample described themselves as retired. A cross-tabulation of group membership with class code was controlled for status in order to separate the retired workers from the unemployed. 24 respondents of the 39 who composed category 80 were economically retired and, of these, 22 (91.7%) claimed group affiliation. These respondents were mostly resident within the constituency of Guildford which, as shown in Table 3, has a high sample of retired workers.
Table 3. Group Members By Labour Status: by region.

Clearly group membership among the retired represents a significant proportion of group activity and is responsible for a considerable amount of group affiliation within category 80. The removal of these retired workers leaves 17 respondents within this group: a figure which is largely composed of organised unemployed workers within the Sheffield Attercliffe sample. Table 3 records a very large difference in the sample of unemployed drawn from each constituency: the 46.7% obtained in Sheffield Attercliffe is above the average employment rates for the constituency, but is more representative of the ward from which the local sample was drawn. What seems to be unrepresentative, however, is the degree to which these respondents are organised.

Infact only 23% of the respondents who were class coded 80, and only 20% of those who belonged to category 70 (semi- and unskilled manual workers) did not claim group membership. Clearly this sample, because of its stratification by group, does not substantiate hypotheses about the exclusion of the traditional working class from group structures. However, the lack of group structures in Sheffield Attercliffe, and the absence of respondents coded 10-30 within this sample, would seem to suggest that economic structures and occupational class are related to the proliferation of group activity. The organisation of respondents within groups 40-80 (the 'proletariat' or the economically under-privileged) is produced by sampling bias in the Sheffield Attercliffe survey, and the inclusion of retired workers within class code 80.
Table 3 indicates that, apart from the employed and retired, houseworkers are well represented within group structures. Those describing themselves as houseworkers were classified as skilled manual workers during coding (60), based upon the actual labour performed. As with retired workers, however, this may not be a satisfactory description of economic status when discussing group membership: more important may be a homeworker's economic status as derived from their social status. As with the economically retired, a houseworker may have access to sufficient economic power and prestige power with which to organise within group structures.

Houseworkers were therefore separated from occupational groupings by controlling for status when cross-tabulating class code with group membership. This reduced the number of group members who were class coded 60 from 22 (16% of the total sample of group members) to 13 (9% of the total sample of group members), suggesting that - although skilled manual workers do hold their own within group structures - their proportion is not as high as those respondents who were described by class codes 20-50 (non-manual workers). Modifying the occupational classes with social status data, therefore, and separating houseworkers and retired workers from occupational codes, a revised picture of group membership and socio-economic grouping is produced (Figure 7.2.).

Figure 7.2. Group Membership by Revised Occupational Class Code and Status Data: Total Sample. (N=104)
Having suggested that occupational grouping, or economic 'status', may be a good indicator of the propensity to join organisations, personal disposable income was investigated as a possible measure of group affiliation. Because this is an absolute measure, it is easier to categorise than labour status and, if an accurate indicator, more reliable. Houseworkers were originally income coded as 'under £3000 per annum' rather than being classified according to a spouse's income. In cases where a houseworker did specify an income other than this, that classification was used. This was done in order to describe independent personal disposable income in a manner satisfactory for analysis with class data, but it was felt that, for purposes of group analysis, this was misleading. As argued above, houseworkers may have access to the group environment by virtue of economic power derived from their social status. Thus houseworkers have been omitted from the results presented in Table 4. The totals in Table 4 have been calculated excluding the Sheffield Attercliffe sample because of the sampling bias towards the organised unemployed in that constituency. Figures pertaining to that sample are, however, presented for comparison.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income Range</th>
<th>Guildford</th>
<th>Richmond &amp; Barnes</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Sheffield Attercliffe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under £3000 per annum</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£3100-£6000 per annum</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£6100-£8500 per annum</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£8600-£15000 per annum</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£15100-£20000 per annum</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over £20000 per annum</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Group Membership by Annual Income Excluding Houseworkers: by region.

The figures in Table 4 show that, of the sample of group members obtained, 33% described themselves as earning between £8600 and £15000 per annum. This grouping is the modal category for the Guildford and Richmond & Barnes samples and may be said to represent the middle strata of society. Without suggesting that class
can be equated with income, which it clearly cannot, it may be suggested that those who are most likely to participate in group politics are likely to command the type of income often associated with the professions, and particularly service and middle management labour.

Because group memberships are formed within the domestic environment as well as the labour environment, group members were profiled by home ownership: this not only provides information about a respondent's neighbourhood community, but supplements the socioeconomic class data collected from the workplace (some commentators, notably I. Crewe, have suggested that housing may, in fact, be the optimum indicator of an elector's structural location). Home ownership is found to be significantly associated with group membership in the sample as a whole, and within Guildford and Richmond & Barnes. The significant Gamma Association results are presented in Table 5: a chi-squared test on the Richmond & Barnes data, and in the sample as a whole, is also statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Of those respondents owning property in the three constituencies, 89.6% are members of groups, whilst non-group members are more likely not to own their own home (55.2% of the total sample are not organised within groups and do not own their own property). This effect is strongest in Richmond & Barnes where 92.7% of home owners are group members and 76.9% of non-home owners are not group members.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HOME OWNERSHIP</td>
<td>73.3%</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>65.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASSOCIATION (GAMMA)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.88</td>
<td>0.72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5. Home Ownership Among Group members: by region, with Association Measure (Gamma).

The relationship between home ownership and group membership can be explained with reference to economic and to social indicators. The data reinforce the thesis that group membership tends to occur within the economically advantaged strata of society (white-collar, middle income, home-owners), and also indicates the importance of social prestige, or the 'neighbourhood reference group'. Thus
it may be true that home owners tend to join groups because they wield sufficient economic power to devote their resources to an organisation, but this may also arise from their role, as home owners, within a local community that may value such activity. Group membership may then be an economic function that is measured and rewarded with social benefits.

A survey conducted in the U.S.A. observed that membership in many associations, and particularly active membership within groups, confers high prestige upon an individual. Similarly, T. Bottomore notes:

In so far as voluntary organisation takes over important functions which the family, or the community as a whole, no longer performs, they become centres of power and prestige and the individual's status in the community then comes to depend in a larger degree upon membership of such organisations. (16)

This raises the possibility that group membership may be more a function of social status, in the Weberian sense, than of economic position, and that an understanding of the dynamics of group membership should focus, not upon economic indicators, but upon dimensions of social prestige.

In order to investigate this thesis, data about a respondent's social reference groups was tested against their group memberships. The strength of the neighbourhood environment was measured by Question C42 which coded respondents according to the length of time they had been resident within their community (Table 6).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>UNDER 1 YEAR</th>
<th>1-3 YEARS</th>
<th>4-10 YEARS</th>
<th>OVER 11 YEARS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>36.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6. Strength (Years) of Community Residence of Group Members: by region

The relationship between group membership and length of residence within the home environment is statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Across all three constituencies, 87.7% of those respondents who had been within a neighbourhood for over 11 years were members of
groups, while only 63% of those who had been resident for less than a year claimed group affiliation. This effect is most pronounced in Richmond & Barnes where 42.1% of respondents who have lived in a community for under a year are not members of groups, while only 9.5% of those who have lived in the same environment for over 11 years are not group members.

Clearly, however, this may be due, not so much to the effects of the neighbourhood reference group upon organisational membership, but to that of age. Controlling the sample for age, and excluding those respondents aged above 65 who are group members and have lived in the same environment for over 11 years, removes 13 respondents from this category. This reduces the proportion of group members who have over 11 years of community residence from 36.2% to 29.6%, which suggests that the statistical significance of the relationship was partly due to the effect of the inclusion of economically retired members. Thus the relationship between group membership and neighbourhood reference group may be an indication that social prestige and status variables influence the joining of groups to a greater extent than does economic power. However, it can be argued that such status variables are a product of the economic environment, and that their incidence is directly related to the socio-economic fabric. Thus an area composed largely of council housing may not generate group structures because of lack of resources, and may not view group membership as a badge of prestige, whereas an estate of private housing may base association and community relations upon formal organisational structures, and personal contacts upon shared group memberships.

To investigate this, the relationship between group membership and strength of neighbourhood environment was controlled for home ownership. This was tested in order to see whether the large amount of group membership located among the residentially stable was related primarily to private housing. This was, indeed, the case, with 40 of the 50 cases which recorded group membership and above 11 years of community residence related to home owners. Although non-property owners who were members of groups were more likely to have lived in the same environment for over four years, the significant relationship between these two variables was more strongly related to property ownership.
The examination of the neighbourhood reference group was concerned with a respondent's consumer environment and the ways in which this may affect group memberships. This, as illustrated above, cannot be divorced from economic structures, and is an expression of a respondent's producer environment, tied most closely to the property choice dictated by occupation and income. A respondent's producer environment was therefore tested with reference to group membership, in order to establish any links between strength of work community and propensity to affiliate to group structures.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDER 1 YEAR</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 - 3 YEARS</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>22.9%</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 - 10 YEARS</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>17.1%</td>
<td>32.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER 11 YEARS</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Strength (Years) of Work Environment of Group Members

Question A2 of the questionnaire collected data about the strength of the occupational environment of the economically active. The results are presented in Table 7. Data on the Sheffield Attercliffe sample has been omitted because of the small number of economically active respondents in that sample. The relationship between strength of work environment and group membership is not statistically significant, although the largest proportion of group members in the sample have worked in the same environment for over 11 years. Because the question on group membership excluded affiliation to trades unions, these results are not skewed by membership of labour associations. As with the analysis of the domestic environment, however, these results were controlled for age. Age did appear to slightly influence the relationship between strength of work environment and group membership: 10 respondents who belonged to this category were aged between 26 and 40, while 18 respondents were aged between 41 and 65. It may be the case, therefore, that age and strength of work environment have a joint and integrated effect upon the propensity to join organisations.
The investigation of the home and work environments, and their relationship to group membership, is based on the theory that social reference groups, particularly those which coalesce around attitudinal positions, inform and reinforce group behaviour. The consumer and producer environments, as the major components of an individual's life, are thus thought to be crucial in their impact upon social status groups and group behaviour. A further method by which an individual's reference group environment can be classified is newspaper readership. This was selected as a variable which is easily measured and classified, and which expresses attitudinal positions which cut across the consumer and producer axes. Group members are profiled by the newspapers they read in Table 8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>QUALITY LIBERAL</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>47.8%</td>
<td>38.6%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUALITY CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25.4%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>5.3%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>7.5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLOID CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIALIST</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOCAL</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.8%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Newspaper Readership Among Group Members: by region

The item on newspaper readership (B14) was asked as an unprompted question. The coding frame was developed after data collection and produced 7 categories. These are 'Quality Conservative' (The Times, Daily Telegraph); 'Tabloid Conservative' (The Sun, The Star, Today); 'Conservative' (The Express, Daily Mail); Labour (Daily Mirror); 'Socialist' (Morning Star); 'Quality Liberal' (The Guardian) and 'Local'.

It can be seen from Table 8 that a very large proportion of the sample of group members - 41% - buy or read The Guardian, while a further 23% of the sample claimed The Times or Daily Telegraph as their regular newspaper. This would appear to indicate some attitudinal or status group identification, and one which is clearly
divorced from the other newspapers represented by the survey. However, the attitudinal positions of these two categories of newspaper are not aligned: in fact they have quite separate socio-political identities. At work here is not a social or attitudinal reference group, but rather a socio-economic variable: education.

Controlling the sample of group members who read The Guardian, The Times or the Daily Telegraph for education shows that 49 of the respondents who are group members and read these papers have a degree: this represents 56% of the sample readership of these papers. 80% of the respondents who hold a degree prefer one of these papers, compared with 50% of those who do not hold a degree. Thus just as the home environment would seem to impact upon group membership only in so far as type of housing influences propensity to organise, so choice of newspaper may be indicative of group membership only in so far as it in turn is determined by socio-economic factors, such as type of education. This argument may be sound, but the survey results do not substantiate the theory that it is the educated who are most likely to organise. On the contrary, more group members do not have a degree than do, although in Richmond & Barnes this is not the case. This probably reflects the type of group contacted by the survey, which included old people's organisations and women's groups, both sections of the population which have been denied access to higher education.

These strata of the population have, in fact, been identified as areas within which there is substantial group organisation. Thus it is suggested that social demographic variables, like age and gender, are important determinants of group membership. Moyser and Parry, for example, refer to a 'rule of the middle-aged' with respect to group organisation. This, they note, is at the expense of the young (under 30) and the old (over 65), who are under-represented. 'The intriguing question', they write, 'is whether we are seeing here life-cycle, generational or other age-associated factors at work.' T. Bottomore has reported similar findings arising from his survey of group organisation: group membership was found to be lowest among the over 65's, low in the 15-24 age group, and highest among the 45-60 age group.

The constituency survey used five age categories: these are presented in Table 9. A more youthful group membership than
that located by other surveys was indicated by the data: the total sample of group members was concentrated mostly in the 26-40 age group, except in Guildford where the modal category was that representing the 'middle years', 41-65. Group membership was also found to be lowest among those aged over 66, rather than in the 18-25 age group. The relationship between age and group membership was not found to be statistically significant, although in Richmond & Barnes a reasonably strong association was indicated by the Cramer's $V$ statistic (0.66). In Richmond & Barnes, non group members are concentrated in the 18-25 age category, whereas the non organised for the whole sample are mostly found in the 26-40 age group. This may suggest that the Richmond & Barnes sample is more typical of the age distribution usually found within a group environment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Sheffield Attercliffe</th>
<th>Guildford</th>
<th>Richmond &amp; Barnes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-25 YRS</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>1.5%</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26-40 YRS</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>38.2%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>44.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41-65 YRS</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>44.1%</td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>38.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>66-75 YRS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
<td>9.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER 75 YRS</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
<td>5.9%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Age of Group Members: by region

It has been suggested that membership of religious groups may distort figures on group membership. Thus, although question 58 on the questionnaire included religious groupings when asking about group affiliation, several other questions acted as a check on this 'religious factor'. Questions 55-57 concerned a respondent's religious practices. If a respondent answered 'Yes' to question 55 ('Do you belong to a religious group or faith?') but responded 'Never' to the question 'How often do you attend your place of worship?' (Question 57), question 55 was recoded 'No': this was in order to measure only religious reference groups that were more than nominal. This coding technique produced a total of 68 respondents who claimed membership of a religious group (40.2% of the complete sample) and 101 respondents who did not (59.8% of the complete sample).
On testing group membership with religious membership, it was found that the majority of group members (81, or 57.8%) were members of a secular group only, and that only 9, or 6.4%, respondents claimed religious affiliation only. These results contrast with those obtained by A.H. Birch who found that 25% of his sample were church members only, but only 18% were members of secular organisations alone. It was also found that a large proportion of the sample (59, or 42%) were members of religious groups and secular groups: these results also differ substantially to the 10% obtained by the Birch sample. It would appear from the results obtained that there is no relationship between membership of a secular and of a religious organisation: the most valid presentation of the results obtained would seem to be that 140 respondents were members of secular groups and that, of these, 59 (42%) claimed religious membership as well. These proportions parallel those found for religious membership within the total sample of group and non-group members. A further check on the secular or religious character of a respondent's memberships was allowed by item 59 of the questionnaire which asked respondents to list the organisations of which they were members. Only 29 religious groups were mentioned, which represents only 6% of the total distribution of memberships. Clearly, we are not seeing the effect of religious membership upon declared group affiliations.

The final variable against which group members were profiled was gender. This has been found to be significantly associated with group membership by several studies: A.H. Birch found 75% of his sample of group members to be male, and Sillitoe recorded 55% of a sample group membership as male. Moyser and Parry, however, suggest that this association is more complex than immediately apparent. Their investigation of participation indicated that men are slightly over-represented and women under-represented among those who may be termed 'complete activists', but that women are more likely to vote, to be party campaign workers and to be active within group structures. Moreover, they note, the over-representation of men and under-representation of women is found not only among 'complete activists' but also, though to a lesser extent, among those who they term 'politically inert'. 'Simple generalisations about gender and participation', they conclude, 'seem misguided.'
From the results obtained by the survey questionnaire it is not possible to point to any clear relationship between gender and group membership. Men composed a larger proportion of the overall sample than did women, but regionally the results are quite diverse (Table 10). Bottomore notes that men are more predominant within social, trade and professional groups, whereas women are more predominant in religious and cultural organisations. Certainly, a significant gender association within type of group would seem a plausible explanation for the apparent relationship between gender and group membership per se. The significant issue, thus, may be the relative strengths or organised groups, rather than any distinctive strengths of male and female participation rates generally. This possibility is investigated in section 7.2., below.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>MEN</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Group Membership by Gender: by region

7.2. GROUP POLITICS

The profiling of group members according to economic and social indicators may go some way towards explaining the type of individual likely to be organised within group structures, but is largely a descriptive exercise and does not add much to our understanding of the dynamics and role of groups in British politics. Thus it may be the case that the over-representation of men within group structures is significant, not for what it may imply about gender and the propensity to organise, but rather for the light it sheds upon the structure and functioning of the group itself.
Having established the characteristic membership of the group, it is important to consider the meaning which is assigned to the group by this membership, in order to evaluate its role in the political arena. It is also necessary to quantify the strength of affiliation and activism among the group membership, and to assess the nature and strength of the group itself. At the heart of evaluations of the nature and strength of organised groups are issues of culture and power. It is important to consider whether functionally similar groups are found in differing cultures - in this instance, regions of England - and thus whether membership of organised groups in one environment can be equated with group membership in another. To do this, one must investigate the nature of group structures, and relate them to their cultural environment. When assessing the strength of organised groups, one considers the distribution of power within and between groups, and the power a group holds in society generally, and particularly within the policy making community.

The importance of considering group membership in relation to the concepts of culture and power was discussed in Chapter One, above. The group typology proposed is here used to operationalise these theoretical positions by: a) surveying the type of group structures found in each region and the roles they perform, and b) using an insider-outsider distinction between organised groups to assess their power base.

An anatomy of a group's power relations is considerably more complex than an evaluation of its cultural context: a locally organised group may be very successful and enjoy considerable access to centres of power, while a national group may enjoy only 'outsider' status vis-a-vis policy making centres, and may have very limited resources. A strict national-local description of groups is therefore moderated by what is known about that group's resources and its relations with the centres of power it seeks to influence, or is conversant with. Attention is also paid to the nature of the group's interests: whether, for example, its aims for the allocation of resources are defensive or promotional. A group is also assessed as to whether it is formally or informally organised.

The importance of a group's formal or informal organisation is noted by Moyser and Parry, who observed that while 38% of their sample perceived formal group action to be political, only 15% understood action undertaken in an informal context to be 'political'
activity. Importantly, group members believed national and international agendas to be more formal than local ones: these were considered more 'political' in that they were concerned with a larger public arena and were frequently more controversial and conflictual. A fuller discussion of the advantages to a group of formal organisation may be found in Chapter One.

Of the organisations mentioned by respondents who claimed to be members of at least one group, 173 were judged to be 'insider' groups, and 300 'outsider' groups. These figures are broken down by region in Table 11. A statistic is also presented for the number of respondents organised within insider groups, and within outsider groups, in each of the constituencies. From Table 11 it can be seen that only 2.8% of the groups judged to have considerable power and access to resources (in terms of organisation - local: national and formal: informal - and type of interest representation) were located in Sheffield Attercliffe. In this constituency, 79% of the organisations mentioned by respondents were 'outsider' groups enjoying little power. These were typically locally-organised social, cultural and leisure groups, particularly those relating to domestic and caring skills (eg. charity organisations, senior citizen and women's groups). Local church groups were also well represented in Sheffield Attercliffe.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>'INSIDER' GROUP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>'OUTSIDER' GROUP</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO. OF RESPONDENTS CLAIMING MEMBERSHIP OF AN INSIDER GROUP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO. OF RESPONDENTS CLAIMING MEMBERSHIP OF AN OUTSIDER GROUP ONLY</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Types of Groups in which Group Members are Organised According to the Insider:Outsider Axis of Power: by region
The types of groups, by interest representation, organised within Sheffield Attercliffe are presented in Table 12. It is clear that group structures within this area are primarily based upon social and leisure, and religious, identifications. Anecdotal evidence supporting this finding was obtained from the organisers of the community centre which distributed survey questionnaires: efforts to organise the unemployed in this area were completely unsuccessful until an angling club for the unemployed was formed. Being based around a traditional sport, this proved popular and formed the base for other group activities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP TYPE</th>
<th>COUNT</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cause Groups</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectional Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, Cultural and Leisure Groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Groups</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer and Consumer Interest Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12. Type of Group Organised in Sheffield Attercliffe

The meaning and functional role of group structures in Sheffield Attercliffe would seem to be based largely upon a-political local community resources which operate in a primarily recreational capacity. Of the cause groups mentioned, all three were local (two of which were environmental), and the sectional groups were women's and senior citizen's clubs. It is possible that some of the women's groups represented a promotional interest, but it is more likely that these were social groupings. The professional and service interest groups, which were the only powerful 'insider' groups, represented consumer interests characterised by 'passive' group membership, eg. Automobile Clubs. Twice as many group members organised in Sheffield Attercliffe were organised only within 'outsider' groups as claimed membership of an 'insider' group.

In the constituency of Guildford the type of group networks are rather different in terms of power and cultural location. 54.9% of the groups classified as 'insider' by the survey were located within Guildford and 59.7% of group members within this constituency claimed membership of one of these 'insider' groups (Table 11). The survey also identified a large number of 'outsider'
groups in Guildford, but as a proportion of the total number of groups this figure, at 64.8%, is comparable to the proportion of outsider groups located in Richmond & Barnes (59.2%). The figure for outsider groups, as a proportion of the total organised activity is, at 79.1%, slightly higher in Sheffield Attercliffe than the other regions, and above the sample average of 63.4%. The fact that the power of groups within the three constituencies differs suggests that group membership may have a significantly different meaning in its varying cultural contexts.

The types of organised groups within Guildford are presented in Table 13. Unlike in Sheffield Attercliffe, a larger number of these groups were nationally or internationally organised (146) than were local bodies (136). Although there is, as in Sheffield Attercliffe, an abundance of recreational groupings and of community structures (eg. amenity groups), these figures are matched by substantial proportions of political and cause groups and, particularly, of professional and consumer interest groups. The sectional groups organised within Guildford are mostly senior citizens and women's groups, but include some other sectional interests, eg. disability groups. Within the category 'cause groups' are many organisations concerned with education (eg. CASE) which reflects the fact that Guildford is a university town. There are also a substantial number of environmental groups. Most striking, however, is the proportion of amenity groups which, perhaps, reflects the residential, suburban character of Guildford.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE GROUPS</th>
<th>44</th>
<th>15.9%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECTIONAL GROUPS</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCIAL, CULTURAL AND LEISURE GROUPS</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS GROUPS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODUCER AND CONSUMER INTEREST GROUPS</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>29.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMENITY GROUPS</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Type of Group Organised within Guildford
In Richmond & Barnes, this sense of community action is not as apparent in the types of groups mentioned by respondents. From Table 14 it will be seen that only 10 amenity groups were mentioned, and that religious and sectional groups, which often reflect groups based upon a community structure (especially where the 'sectional group' category is composed primarily of senior citizens and mothers groups etc.) number only 18. The most striking feature of the groups organised in Richmond & Barnes is the number of producer and consumer interest groups mentioned, which represent 39% of the total sample of groups. These are mostly producer interest groups, often professional associations, connected with the work environment. It would appear that in Richmond & Barnes, unlike Guildford, group members seek to represent their interests as producers through interest structures to a greater extent than they do their community interests. Interest groups are also used for the articulation of political demands and other 'causes': the total number of such groupings is comparable with that in Guildford, although the nature of these demands differs somewhat. In Richmond & Barnes there are more memberships of political groupings such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament than in Guildford, and a considerable representation of 'alternative' political demands (eg. concerning cooperative housing and green politics). Recreational interests are also well represented in Richmond & Barnes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Group</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cause Groups</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>23.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sectional Groups</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social, Cultural and Leisure Groups</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious Groups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Producer and Consumer Interest Groups</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>39.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amenity Groups</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. Types of Group Organised within Richmond & Barnes
Of the groups organised in Richmond, a considerable number were judged to have 'insider' status (40.7%): 42.1% of the insider groups in the total survey sample were located in the constituency of Richmond & Barnes (Table 11). This is a lower proportion than those found in Guildford because of the number of cause and recreational groups in Richmond which expressed alternative and minority interests. As in Guildford, and in contrast to Sheffield Attercliffe, more of the groups were nationally and internationally organised (102) than were local (76). 45 of the group members in the Richmond sample claimed membership of an 'insider' group (67.1%): this figure was boosted by the number of respondents within professional associations.

The types of groups found regionally are presented as total sample percentages in Table 15. These proportions can be compared with other sample results. A.H. Birch's study of Glossop, for example, located memberships distributed among associations in the following proportions: 21% recreational organisations (sports, social and cultural); 1% business and professional groups; 6% political groupings and 10% welfare organisations. The proportion of recreational groups mentioned by respondents in the survey is remarkably similar to that figure obtained by Birch and, if 'welfare organisations' could be equated with 'amenity groups', this may also indicate similarity of findings. The 6% of political groupings identified by Birch may also come close to the propensity of 'cause' groupings concerned with political interests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CAUSE GROUPS</th>
<th>88</th>
<th>18.4%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SECTIONAL GROUPS</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>10.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECREATIONAL GROUPS</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>21.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOUS GROUPS</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRODUCER AND CONSUMER INTEREST GROUPS</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMENITY GROUPS</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Types of Groups Organised Within The Total Sample: Average Percentages
The most striking feature of the sample averages obtained is the number of group memberships within producer and consumer interest organisations ('consumer' here refers to service organisations). This suggests that group structures are frequently developed within the work and consumption environments, and that their functional role is concerned with the protection and advance of these interests. That these are primarily economic interests, concerned with the production and distribution of economic resources, would seem to suggest that group structures are, indeed, closely tied to economic structures. These economic 'producer and consumer' interests are predominant in Richmond & Barnes and in Guildford, but in Sheffield Attercliffe recreational interests account for a larger proportion of group membership (Table 12). This may be related to the differing economic structures within Sheffield Attercliffe, and particularly to higher levels of unemployment and of manual employment, which are less likely to generate interest networks.

An investigation of the type of groups organised in the three constituencies in terms of role within the community and of group resources and strength, would thus seem to suggest that group structures do differ significantly between constituencies, and that certain types of group are more likely to organise successfully, and to be generated by, the distinctive cultural and economic environments. This would seem to suggest that group membership possesses different meanings in varying contexts and that observations about a 'characteristic membership' (section 7.1.) must be qualified by information about the group itself. In order to test this hypothesis, the strength of affiliation and activism among the group membership was considered: this was intended to provide clues about the meaning assigned to a group by its membership, and about the membership's perception of the role of the group in the political arena. One dimension of the strength of group memberships is their quantity, and the extent to which various groups are used to represent and articulate an individual's myriad interests: if the thesis that class identity as a focus for political behaviour is increasingly being replaced by issue politics is sound, then one would expect to find a proliferation of group affiliations among group members.

The sample obtained by A.H. Birch found that the numbers of group memberships, as distinct from members, represented an average membership of 1.33 associations per member. In the constituency survey, a total of 141 group members cited 477 group memberships, giving an average group membership of 3.33 associations each.
The actual number of memberships for each member were grouped according to three categories and are presented in Table 16. Membership of less than 5 groups accounts for 77.3% of the sample group members: this pattern of affiliation is common to all three constituencies, although in Guildford, a slightly larger proportion of respondents belong to more than 5 groups (30%) than in Sheffield Attercliffe and Richmond & Barnes. This would seem to suggest that individuals do not seek representation for their various interests in many groups, but rather work within a limited number of group structures which represent some special interest. Furthermore, the quantity of group memberships may well be subject to over-estimation due to the inclusion of nominal memberships.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Membership Category</th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LESS THAN 5 GROUP MEMBERSHIPS</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-10 GROUP MEMBERSHIPS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER 10 GROUP MEMBERSHIPS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16. Number of Group Affiliations of Group Members: by region

In order to test the validity of quantitative group memberships as a guide to the strength of group politics, a question on the quality of group memberships was asked. This was intended to elicit information about a group members role as participant within group structures, and was asked in two parts: whether a respondent was 'actively participant' in any of the groups cited, and, if so, how much time was devoted to them (question 60). Of the 138 respondents who answered the question, 12 said they gave no time at all to their group memberships. Most respondents, however, gave more than 6 hours a month to group activities. Of the respondents who claimed membership of more than 10 organisations, 75% devoted more than 6 hours a month to group activities, suggesting that these memberships are not, in fact, nominal. As those respondents giving a minimum amount of time to group participation claimed membership of less than 5 groups, it would seem that group activism is dependent upon multiple group membership and that - for most group members - group affiliation entails an active and participatory role.
A.B. Hollingshead, discussing the characteristics of group activists in a U.S. town, observed that the hyperactive members of groups were largely drawn from social class II, while 'class V' persons are isolated from such communal activities.\textsuperscript{32} 'The members of each class', he writes, 'participate in community activities in significantly different ways from the members of other classes.'\textsuperscript{33} In order to test whether there was any evidence for this, those most active in groups in terms of time spent within group structures was tested for class code information.

Respondents who devoted more than 6 hours a month to group activities were overwhelmingly concentrated in class codes 30 (30.7%) and 80 (37.3%). 56% of group members classified 30 gave the maximum number of hours per month to group activities, which - excluding category 80 - represents 48.9% of the hyperactive. Those group members in class 30 also compose 27.3% of those respondents claiming membership in more than 10 groups and 50% of those respondents claiming membership in more than 5 groups. Although a substantial number of respondents in class code 80 (26.6%) claim membership of more than 5 groups, this represents only 21% of the total sample of group members coded 80, who mostly claim membership of less than 5 groups.

Respondents in higher class codes, particularly in code 30, would appear not only to be most likely to be group members, but to be very likely to be organised within a number of groups and to give a considerable amount of time to group participation. This does not, of course, tell us anything about the form of participation undertaken within the group and it would be useful to consider leadership hierarchies and class coding within group structures. One can suggest from the data, however, that although group activism would seem to be related to class coding, it is by no means the preserve of the higher class codes within the group membership. Thus the quantification of group membership would suggest that, even if group members are not organised within a plethora of groups, they are nonetheless reasonably active within their organisations. One might expect to find, from this evidence, that group members feel well-oriented to group structures and to the group environment. In order to evaluate the group membership's response to the role of the group in the political arena, data was collected on a respondent's orientation to interest groups, and to the political system.
Item E68 of the survey questionnaire asked all respondents to name any groups which they believed to be too powerful. This was an open-ended question which produced an overwhelming response: of the 169 responses, 131 cases agreed that there are inordinately powerful groups in society, and almost all of these respondents gave examples of such groups. There was no association between attitude to group powers and group membership: similar proportions of group and non-group members agreed that certain groups enjoyed too much power.

The types of groups that were typically mentioned can be divided into 4 categories: political; professional; social; and class interests. References to class interests were overwhelmingly the most common, totalling 148 citations. These included capitalists, business, commercial and financial interests (67); upper class and 'elite' (16); wealthy, aristocrats and old boy networks (21) and labour interests (22). There were 43 references to political interests (Government and civil service were mentioned 28 times, the military and police 8 times and militants twice) and 9 to social groups: religious (2); men (5) and whites (2). Of the professional interests mentioned, masons were cited 4 times and the medical and legal professions in 6 instances. Group and non-group members alike clearly feel that certain groups in society hold excessive power and these interests are commonly identified as economic 'class' interests. These interests are typically informal, unorganised and characterised by access to wealth: there were no references to formally organised interest or 'pressure' groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AGREE THAT SOME GROUPS ARE TOO POWERFUL</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>88%</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
<td>82.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISAGREE THAT SOME GROUPS ARE TOO POWERFUL</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17. Group Members Agreeing and Disagreeing With The Statement That: 'Certain groups in society have too much power'. By region.
The fact that the environment of group power is similarly perceived by group members and non group members may lead us to ask whether those respondents organised within groups feel more powerful, as individuals, than do the unorganised. Dowse and Hughes, for example, suggest that:

Participation in voluntary organisations discriminates between those who feel they could influence a political decision if they wanted to from those who feel they could not. (34)

A survey conducted in Britain by S. Verba found that, of a sample of 963, only 77 (7.9%) respondents believed that they could remedy a local regulation that they considered unjust. The same study found that 'local competent' (those with high education and political efficacy rates) who would 'enlist the support of an informal group to influence a local regulation they thought was 'unjust' formed only 5.7% of a sample of 727.

A similar item was included on the survey questionnaire in order to test the sense of individual power held by respondents (question E69). Although over 50% of the total sample of group members believed they could do little or nothing about a piece of legislation which they thought unjust, 38% felt they could do a considerable amount or a great deal, and in Richmond & Barnes this figure rises to 49.1%. More telling is the fact that, while 37.9% of group members in the total sample believe they could do quite a lot about legislation they disapproved of, only 7.1% of non group members take this position. The overwhelming proportion of non group members - 92.8% - believe they can do little or nothing against legislative proposals. Again, this effect is most evident in Richmond & Barnes where all the unorganised respondents felt they could 'do nothing' or 'not much' about legislation of which they disapproved.

Item B15 of the questionnaire approached the same issue in a rather broader manner, asking respondents how involved they felt in the governmental process. The data suggest that group members do not feel significantly more involved in the political process than non group members, although group members were more likely to feel they had 'enough' involvement in government, particularly in Guildford and in Richmond & Barnes. In Richmond, 29.8% of group members felt they had 'enough' involvement, compared with only 15.4% of non group members, while in Sheffield Attercliffe, no respondents felt they had sufficient involvement in the political process.
Table 18. 'How much do you think you could do about legislation which you disapproved of?': Response of group members, by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Membership</th>
<th>Sheffield Attercliffe</th>
<th>Guildford</th>
<th>Richmond &amp; Barnes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NOTHING</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
<td>11.8%</td>
<td>12.3%</td>
<td>12.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOT MUCH</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>57.4%</td>
<td>36.8%</td>
<td>49.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSIDERABLE</td>
<td>26.7%</td>
<td>26.5%</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GREAT DEAL</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>7.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19. Satisfaction with Participation in Government: by group membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Satisfaction</th>
<th>Group Members</th>
<th>Non Group Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SATISFIED</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DISSATISFIED</td>
<td>79.1%</td>
<td>93.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Item B16 of the questionnaire asked respondents if they were satisfied with their participation level in government. Although a higher proportion of non group members than group members were dissatisfied with their involvement in government, the data were characterised by a general lack of satisfaction with levels of political participation throughout the sample (Table 19). No Sheffield Attercliffe respondents were satisfied with participation levels.

The items which addressed the issues of group powers, individual powers and governmental powers were intended to measure a respondent's political efficacy. It would appear, from the data, that group members do not feel significantly more efficacious than non group members, and that lack of satisfaction with involvement in the governmental process, and a feeling of powerlessness against political and economic interest groupings, characterise the responses of both the organised and the unorganised. This pattern of response is also typical within the three constituencies.

An examination of the meaning assigned to groups by group members, and of their perceived role in the political arena, would therefore seem to suggest that groups do not significantly help
orient an individual to political structures, nor do they particularly reflect the interests of the politically efficacious. Item B12 of the questionnaire, which asked respondents about their level of interest in politics, did not indicate any significant difference between group members and the unorganised, although the sample registered a concern with politics that is probably higher than average (Table 20).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GROUP MEMBERS</th>
<th>NON GROUP MEMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO INTEREST</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDIVIDUALIST INTEREST</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTERESTED</td>
<td>47.9%</td>
<td>55.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VERY INTERESTED</td>
<td>39.3%</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20. Interest in Politics; by group membership

Having suggested that non group members are not significantly less 'interested in politics', nor less politically efficacious, than group members, those respondents who were alienated from the political environment were isolated from the sample. This was in order to observe the proportions of politically 'alienated' respondents who were organised within group structures. A compound variable was created for political alienation: this included those respondents who had declared: a) no interest, or only a limited 'individualist' interest in politics; b) who felt that they had hardly any or no influence on government and were not satisfied with their participation level and c) who felt that they could do little or nothing about legislation of which they disapproved. 38

20 respondents fulfilled the criteria for this variable, which represents 11.9% of the sample. Of these, 60% were group members. Those respondents who were 'politically alienated' and were not members of groups were located in equal proportions within the three constituencies. The data obtained by the survey suggest that 'political alienation' is not significantly associated with non-organisation and that group membership is not necessarily consistent with high levels of political efficacy or a positive orientation to the political environment.
7.3. THE GROUP VOTE

Having considered how far group members are oriented to the group, and to political society generally, and how their level of political efficacy may differ from that of non group members, the orientation of sample respondents to the electoral system was examined. Of particular interest was the extent to which group activity may be understood to supplement or to replace voting activity, and, if the behaviour is supplementary, whether group members demonstrate any distinctive patterns of party identification and electoral choice.

Data concerning a respondent’s voting activity, electoral choice and partisanship were collected by items 18-27 of the questionnaire. 92% of the total sample claimed to have voted at the 1983 General Election and, of these respondents, 84.6% were group members (Table 21). The proportion of non-voters who are not members of groups is 60%. A statistically significant chi-square statistic of 0.0439 was computed for the relationship between voting at the 1983 election and group membership (total sample). In order to confirm the results obtained for electoral turnout at the 1983 election, a further question asked respondents to describe their usual voting behaviour. 167 respondents claimed that they usually or always vote, while 8 respondents said that they never vote or vote only occasionally. These data suggest that the level of voting activity registered for the 1983 election is close to what the sample regard as their ‘normal’ electoral behaviour.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VOTED IN 1983</th>
<th>DID NOT VOTE IN 1983</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GROUP MEMBERS</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>95.6%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON GROUP MEMBERS</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85.7%</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21. Electoral Turnout at the 1983 General Election, total sample: by Group Membership
(Total vote among sample in 1983=161; 9 cases supplied no information about group membership).

The turnout figure calculated for non group members is closer to actual levels, and to results obtained by other studies, than the 95.6% recorded among group members. In their 1985 study of political participation, Moyser and Parry correlated various dimensions of political activity (eg. voting; group politics; protest)
in order to identify the structure of participation and, although the connection was modest, voting was found to be most strongly connected with group activity. While this may suggest that group activists are very likely to vote in elections, it does not provide a useful guide to the dynamics of political participation because of the weaknesses of the vote as a political indicator. Voting, write Moyser and Parry, is 'more the norm than being a non-voter': it also involves more citizens than any other type of political behaviour and is, they note, the only political activity that is undertaken 'in abundance'. Suggesting that 51% of the population vote, but do nothing else, Moyser and Parry write:

Studying voter turnout is, from the point of view of explaining participation, the least satisfactory way of proceeding. This is, perhaps, ironic given the traditional importance ascribed to voting precisely as a participation indicator. (42)

The weakness of voting as a political indicator lies, fundamentally, with the meaning ascribed to voting. That the overwhelming proportion of the population vote, and that the majority of these only vote, does not necessarily weaken electoral activity as a guide to political participation. What does reduce its significance is the fact that voting is largely ritualistic, and does not seem to act as a gauge for political orientation. As Butler and Stokes write:

Playing the role of voter is unlikely to inspire any deep involvement in political affairs...The behaviour demanded of those who play this role is hardly sufficient to bring politics to the centre of the voter's consciousness. (43)

Although voting, as an absolute measure, may have little value as an indicator for political orientation, a citizen's orientation to voting, and particularly rational abstention, may offer some insight into the form of political participation in Britain. Thus although 92% of the total sample of group and non group members voted at the 1983 election, when asked about their orientation to electoral participation, more non group members described themselves as 'usually' voting than 'always' voting. Group members, by contrast, were most likely to vote at every electoral competition (Table 22). Non group members were also more likely not to vote, or to vote irregularly (10.3%) than group members (3.5%). If we look in more detail at those who do not regularly participate in electoral contests, the most striking finding is that these respondents are
located mostly in the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe (50%). Because of the small size of this section of the electorate, however, few useful observations can be drawn from this.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NEVER VOTE</th>
<th>OCCASIONALLY VOTE</th>
<th>USUALLY VOTE</th>
<th>ALWAYS VOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GROUP MEMBERS</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>11.3%</td>
<td>85.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON GROUP MEMBERS</td>
<td>3.4%</td>
<td>6.9%</td>
<td>51.7%</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22. Voting Behaviour of Total Sample: by group membership.

The sample of irregular voters was questioned about their reasons for non-voting, in order to classify electoral non-participation according to theories of political alienation. The coding frame for item 20 of the questionnaire represented low political efficacy; political deference; political alienation and rational abstention. The 8 respondents who do not vote in elections were spread fairly evenly across the categories, and there was no evidence that the non-organised abstain from voting because of 'political alienation'.

A compound variable designed to measure complete 'electoral alienation' was formed: this expressed the number of respondents who never or only occasionally vote in elections; whose grounds for non-voting are rational abstention or political alienation and who abstained at the 1983 General Election on rational grounds or because of low levels of political efficacy. A very small number of respondents (3) satisfied all of these criteria, and all of these 'electorally alienated' respondents were members of organised groups. There would thus seem to be no evidence for a relationship between group organisation and orientation to the electoral system.

Just as voting would seem to be a poor indicator of political participation, non-voting would seem to contribute little to an understanding of political non-participation. However, because non-voting at the 1983 General Election represented a larger and more useful proportion of the sample than did habitual non-voting, further tests on electoral non-participation were applied (question 24). 28.5% of the sample of non-voters at the 1983 election stated a failure to identify with any of the electoral options as their reason for non-voting, suggesting that non-participation among the sample was characterised by more rational abstention than usual.44
If electoral participation is a weak indicator of political orientation, electoral choice is considered a useful guide to political behaviours in modern democracies. The striking feature of the 1979 and 1983 General Elections in Britain has been the sharpening geographical cleavage in the distribution of support for the main political parties. Sarlvik and Crewe, in response to the 1979 General Election, wrote:

In no other post-war election have so many different local factors acted as a brake or accelerator on national electoral forces. But the overall picture depicted a 'two-nation' election. The Conservative majority was largely built on the relatively prosperous commuting areas, small towns and countryside of the south and midlands; it had little foundation in the old industrial and urban areas of the north and Scotland. The Conservatives advanced most where there was economic expansion and security, least where there was deprivation and decline. (45)

At the 1983 election, this trend was reinforced, with the swing from the Labour party to the Conservative party much lower in urban areas and the north than in rural areas and the south: the national two-party swing to the Conservative party was 6%, but there was no national norm in a nation divided regionally (north-south) and structurally (urban-rural). These divisions were reflected in electoral competitions, where polarisation within constituencies continued, and the number of marginal seats declined from 149 in 1979 to 80.46 The impact of economic structures on the vote was also reflected by the pattern of swing in 1983, note J. Curtice and M. Steed, which closely matched the variation in unemployment levels recorded at the 1981 census.47 The Alliance national share of the vote was more evenly spread, geographically.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13 16.8%</td>
<td>13 20.3%</td>
<td>16.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>14 73.6%</td>
<td>39 50.6%</td>
<td>33 51.5%</td>
<td>53.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>3 26.3%</td>
<td>25 32.4%</td>
<td>18 28.1%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23. Distribution of Party Support at the 1983 Election (Total Sample): by region.
The distribution of party support at the 1983 General Election within the Sheffield Attercliffe, Guildford and Richmond & Barnes sample is presented in Table 23. The group stratified samples drawn from these constituencies are not representative of the constituency or national polls of 1983, and the most striking difference is the larger Labour and smaller Conservative party votes. The Alliance vote, at 30%, is slightly larger than its national share of the vote of 26.4%. The sample vote in the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe reflects the strong tradition of Labour support, and is in fact 22% higher than that recorded in the 1983 election. The Alliance vote is 3% above the 1983 constituency poll, while the 25% achieved by the Conservative party at the 1983 election is not represented at all. The Alliance vote among the Guildford sample, at 32.4%, is very close to the 33.4% poll achieved in that constituency in 1983, but the Conservative party is 38% less, and the Labour vote 40% more, than the constituency poll at the 1983 election. The sample results for Richmond & Barnes deviate most strongly from constituency electoral returns. The intense competition between the Conservative and Liberal/Alliance parties is not reflected by the data, which again records a much higher Labour poll than was achieved in 1983 (7.1%). As in Sheffield Attercliffe and Guildford, the Conservative vote is about 25% below that obtained by the constituency party in 1983.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GROUP MEMBERS</th>
<th>NON GROUP MEMBERS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>92.3%</td>
<td>7.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>83.9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>87.5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24. Distribution of Party Support at the 1983 Election: by group membership

The depressed Conservative vote and large Labour party vote, which are features of each of the regions sampled, may suggest that a Labour party vote is related to propensity to organise in groups. When the distribution of party support among the survey constituencies was controlled for group membership, however, there was no evidence of a larger Conservative vote among the sample of non group members (Table 24). Because of the small size of this sample of electors, however, such a finding is of limited
value, and it appears fair to suggest that the survey (which was overwhelmingly taken among group members) identifies a particularly large Labour party vote among group members.

In order to examine the meaning of this Labour vote, and thus to understand the party preference of group members and their orientation to the party system, theories of electoral choice may be applied to the data. Traditional voting theory explains party choice with reference to class structuration and the social location of electors. Political parties are perceived as programmatic and ideological, playing a central role in the formation of electors' attitudes. Voting behaviour is thus regarded as 'expressive', reflecting an elector's social and economic position. This model of voting choice emphasises socialisation and partisanship, and is well documented by Butler and Stokes.

While some commentators, and notably Dunleavy and Husbands, have argued that class is still crucial to voting behaviour, attempts have recently been made to explain electoral choice with a 'consumption model' of voting behaviour. Basic to the 'consumer model' of voting is the thesis that individuals actively seek the party which is most likely to implement certain policies which fit with their attitudes. The party is thus perceived, not as a representation of class interests, but as a link between attitudes and voting. Himmelweit writes:

What matters is that the act of voting, like the purchase of goods, is seen as simply one instance of decision making, no different in kind from the process whereby other decisions are reached. (50)

The consumer model of voting thus describes instrumental policy choices whereby electors cast their votes in order to maximise their own self interests on several salient issues. Parties thus become competing products, and voters 'consume' their distinctive party policies. The corollary of this is that party identification, while it may have an impact on electoral behaviour, is not an important element of voting choice, and variability of party preference, not consistency, becomes the norm.

Butler and Stokes dispute the validity of issue voting as an explanation for party choice: The electorate, they write:

Having but a weak sense of how a particular policy line will have an influence on anything it values...may form only weak and ephemeral preferences even among the party alternatives it does perceive. (52)
The flow of cause and effect is not from issue to party preference, they suggest, but from party preference to belief on an issue.

I. Crewe, who has contributed substantially to the theory of consumer voting, argues that the expressive theory of voting ignores a persistent decline in the combined major party share of the vote, and an accelerating volatility of support between the two main parties. Butler and Stokes' analysis of British electoral behaviour is confined, Crewe notes, to the changing strength of the British parties, and fails to account for such indications of political change as the steady erosion of commitment to the Labour and Conservative parties.

Issue voting, it is suggested by Crewe, had more influence upon the outcome of the 1983 General Election than party leadership or organisation, and the 1979 and 1983 elections were won by the Conservatives largely on the strength of their policy on major issues such as defence and inflation. Similarly, Himmelweit suggests that issues are increasingly the determinant of electoral choice, and that party identification is no longer the main focus for political behaviour. 'In the future', writes Himmelweit:

The influence of the individuals past habit of voting on his or her subsequent vote will, if anything, decrease further. (55)

'Floating' voting behaviour can, however, be learned, just as partisanship may be habitual, and this weakening of party identification is perceived as a sophisticated approach to electoral choice. Himmelweit writes:

What markedly distinguished the floating from the confirmed voter...was not apathy, as has been suggested, but their weaker identity with, and liking for, their own party and their attitudes towards the other parties. Above all, volatility was related to the closeness of the floating voters attitudinal fit to those of the majority of his preferred party. (56)

The rational and instrumental electoral choices which characterise issue or 'secular' voting have been linked to the growth in issue politics and group organisation. Thus the extent to which the group vote identified by the constituency survey may be understood as a secular vote was investigated with reference to various indicators of voting choice.
57 of the survey respondents did not cast their vote for the same party at each election and may be understood as 'secular' voters, while 114 respondents were classed as having a strong party identification. Sarlvik and Crewe estimated that one third of those entitled to vote at two successive elections are 'changers', and the 33% of 'floaters' identified by the constituency survey is thus a representative proportion. Some of these 'changers' may not, however, be classed as truly 'secular' voters, in that many are likely to be party identifiers who have temporarily departed and will later return 'home'. Sarlvik and Crewe estimate that 86% of respondents eligible to vote in 1979 thought of themselves as party supporters, while a further 6% felt closer to one of the parties: clearly such figures embrace a large proportion of floating voters. The interesting phenomenon in British politics, it has traditionally been noted, is party constancy, not change. Himmelweit, however, argues that it is consistency, and not variability, of party choice which is the exception. There is no evidence, she suggests, that the Liberal party - which has traditionally been linked with electoral switching and abstention - is a 'half-way house' for major party identifiers. Electoral change, notes Himmelweit, is due to a broad segment of voters and not to a few floaters.

The sample of floating voters obtained by the constituency survey is presented according to preferred electoral choice (item 25 of the questionnaire) in Table 25. The large Liberal/Alliance vote among this group of the sample may indicate a relationship between instrumental, 'secular' voting choice and an Alliance party preference. It may also, however, indicate the extent to which the Alliance party is involved in electoral 'switching'. To investigate these possibilities, it is useful to consider the party identifications of the respondents. Table 26 presents the character of voting activity among group and non group members, from which it can be seen that group membership is more often characterised by partisanship than by secular voting. Non group members, meanwhile, are slightly more likely to be 'secular' voters. Of the non group members, 53.5% were classed as secular voters, while only 27.8% of group members had a history of vote changing. This suggests that, far from being consistent with secular voting, group membership may be characterised by partisanship: this relationship is indicated by a significant chi-square statistic of 0.0081.
Table 25. Voting Intention of Seculars: by region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>21.7%</td>
<td>26.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>58.3%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
<td>50.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDECIDED</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WOULDN'T VOTE</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 26. Secular and Partisan Voting: by group membership

Benney et al. suggest that changing voting behaviour is influenced by 'group' pressures, and that while conflicting pressures may encourage electoral switching, congruent and reinforcing pressures may produce electoral constancy. The substantial amount of partisanship identified among group members may suggest that these respondents locate themselves within congruent group environments, and that their voting behaviour - rather than being instrumental and issue-oriented - expresses a consistent, pragmatic position. This evidence would indicate that dimensions of partisanship may be appropriate indicators through which to examine the political behaviour and orientations of group members.

Moyser and Parry, in their study of political participation, note an association between group activity and party campaigning, and a high positive association score between party members and group members. The data collected by the constituency survey also indicate a significant relationship between party membership and group membership (Figure 7.3.).
While 46% of group members were also members of a political party, only 13.8% of non group members claimed party membership. Thus while group members were almost evenly divided between party and non party members, 86.2% of the sample of non group members were not members of a political party. A statistically significant chi-square of 0.0013 was computed for these data across the total sample: the association was strong in the constituencies of Guildford and Richmond & Barnes. Partisanship among the sample of group members would, therefore, appear to be characterised by a substantial amount of active commitment to preferred party.

A feature of partisanship is that it has characteristically been the preserve of the Labour and Conservative parties. The 1979 British Election Study found party identification to be strong among 75% of Labour voters and 68% of Conservative voters, while only 42% of Liberal voters claimed such partisanship. Furthermore, 33% of Liberal voters identified with another party, suggesting a high degree of tactical or instrumental voting. The two-party share of the sample vote taken in the combined constituencies by the survey is, at 70%, somewhat higher than the 60.6% obtained by the Conservative and Labour parties at the 1983 General Election. The proportion of these electors who identified strongly with their preferred parties are presented in Table 27.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROPORTION OF LABOUR VOTERS WITH STRONG PARTY IDENTIFICATION.</th>
<th>PROPORTION OF CONSERVATIVE VOTERS WITH STRONG PARTY IDENTIFICATION.</th>
<th>PROPORTION OF LIB./ALLIANCE VOTERS WITH STRONG PARTY IDENTIFICATION.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>71</td>
<td>82.5%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 27. Party Identification of Labour, Conservative and Alliance Voters: total sample.
The lower level of strong partisanship among Liberal/Alliance voters is a feature of third party support that has been much documented. Himmelweit notes a lack of distinctive attitude profiles or ideologies among Liberal voters, and describes their relationship with the Liberal party as a 'marriage of convenience' rather than a love match. The Liberal voter is, writes Himmelweit, the 'comparative shopper par excellence'. What characterises Liberal party supporters, she writes, is:

A less polarised view of society and its institutions and [a reaction] to individual issues rather than to the political package of which the issues form a part. (67)

Thus support for the Liberal/Alliance has been closely linked to secular voting behaviour by several studies. Curtice and Steed describe the Alliance vote as volatile, lacking any sociological or geographical base, and having only a weak association with ideological position. Party identification among Alliance voters in 1983 was somewhat weaker than that described by the BES survey of 1979: while 25% of respondents reported an Alliance vote, only 19.5% of these claimed a strong Alliance identification. There were, by contrast, 7% more Labour identifiers than Labour voters, and only 3% fewer Conservative identifiers than voters.

The data collected by the constituency survey are consistent with such observations: the majority of secular voters in the sample expressed a preference for the Liberal/Alliance, and the Alliance vote recorded by the sample drew 60% of its support from floating voters. Alliance supporters were also found by the constituency survey to have a much lower rate of partisanship than the two major parties. The link between secular voting and support for the Alliance does not, however, appear to extend to the propensity to organise in groups: the smaller proportion of Alliance voters drawn by the sample of group members suggest that group members do not characteristically exhibit secular or 'issue' voting. Because of the relationship between issue voting and support for the Liberal/Alliance, however, and because it has been hypothesised that a growth in 'group politics' may entail a decline in traditional two-party politics, the orientations of the sample of group members to the Liberal/Alliance were investigated (items 28 and 29 of the questionnaire).
71, or 51%, of group members agreed that the Alliance has changed the nature of the British political system, while 67 (48%) did not believe this to be so. Proportions for the total sample of respondents were comparable, and regional variation occurred only in the Sheffield Attercliffe sample where 71.4% of group members did not agree that the political system had been changed by the emergence of the Alliance. Respondents who did agree gave various examples of how the Alliance may have an impact upon the political system. The most common suggestion was that a rise of moderation and consensus would characterise British politics (24%), while 7% of respondents specifically mentioned coalition government. A total of 35.5% respondents suggested that the major impact of the Alliance was to weaken the vote of the other two parties: 18% referred to a general weakening of the two-party vote, while 9.1% referred specifically to a weakening of the Conservative vote and 8.1% to a weakening of the Labour vote. 10% of the respondents suggested that the growth of the Alliance increased the likelihood of achieving electoral reforms such as Proportional Representation.

Some of these changes were perceived as beneficial and some were felt to be unwelcome. There was, however, a good deal of support for a decline in polarised, two party politics, which is slightly surprising in view of the high rates of two party identification recorded by the survey. This may suggest that support for the Alliance is still in a state of crystallisation, and that continuing recruitment may depend upon an electoral perception of the Alliance which emphasises governing capability, and the viability of an electoral alternative. Indeed, the data collected from item 29 of the questionnaire suggest that the Alliance's lack of governmental experience may be an obstacle to their winning electoral support: 51.5% of the total sample thought this to be the case. Although the Alliance shows no signs of having already shifted the traditional base of British political allegiance within the sample of group members, there are indications that this situation is fluid, and that the perceived impact of the Alliance upon British politics is one that is welcome and, when corroborated with more electoral success and experience, may be supported. Item 31 of the questionnaire asked respondents whether they thought that the British political system could be accurately described as a two-party system. While 72 respondents agreed with this description, 90 respondents said that this was not the case. Group members were less inclined
to consider British politics as a 'two-party system' (43%) than non group members (52%). These data suggest that the Alliance may be breaking the two-party psyche of the British electorate, if not the actual mould.

The success with which the Alliance recruits voters from the two main parties, must, however, depend primarily upon its ability to establish a distinctive political identity. This has involved appeals which deliberately ignore socio-economic class divisions, and which emphasise the divisiveness of adversary politics. The electoral fortunes of the Alliance are thus intimately linked to the electorate's perception of two-party politics.

In considering the electoral distinctiveness of the major political parties, and thus the potential electoral flow between parties, it is important to examine the electorate's party perception. Question 30 of the survey concerned the perceived difference between the Labour, Conservative and Liberal/SDP Alliance parties. Table 28 presents substantial evidence that political parties are generally considered to be distinctive groupings: there is little evidence of a perceived 'merging' of party position.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GREAT DIFFERENCE</th>
<th>112</th>
<th>66.2%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SOME DIFFERENCE</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>30.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO DIFFERENCE</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28. Perceived Difference Between Labour, Conservative and Alliance Parties: total sample.

Butler and Kavanagh suggest that in 1983:

The electorate did perceive a real choice between the Conservative and Labour parties, and the existence of the Alliance provided a home for the large body of voters alienated from the two main parties. (70)

Data collected by the constituency survey suggest that the Alliance drew most of its fresh support (ie. excluding Liberal partisans) overwhelmingly from the Conservative party (Table 29). This feature is also found among the non group members within the sample, and is a pattern repeated across the three different regions.
Table 29. Previous Vote of Secular Alliance Supporters: by region

The survey results would thus seem to suggest that, among the sample of group members, it is the Conservative party vote that is most vulnerable to attack from the third party. This may go some way towards explaining the small Conservative vote recorded among the group members, although it does not throw any light upon the very large level of support for the Labour party. In order to further assess the distinctiveness of the political parties, and thus potential electoral change, the nature of two party identifications were investigated (questions 26 and 27).

Responses to a set of statements about the two major parties were grouped into categories which expressed various ideological positions and from which the character of Labour and Conservative partisanship could be deduced. The six statements about the Labour party represented three differing party positions: Labour as a party of the working class; Labour as a party under threat from radicalism; and Labour as an insufficiently socialist party. The respondents who agreed with statement A were judged to equate the Labour party with socio-economic interests, while those who agreed with statements B and E were described as partisans expressing concern at radicalism within the Labour party, and prepared to vote for the Alliance or Conservative parties in the future (Labour moderates). Partisans who agreed with statements C, D and F - expressing an ideological distance from the SDP/Alliance and a preparedness to vote to the left of the Labour party - were classed as Labour radicals. The responses were not expected to fit exactly into these patterns, which were designed as a guide to ideological perception of party, and not an index. Some respondents checked only one of the statements, while others checked several: these usually fell into one of the combinations described above, but where no coherent pattern emerged, the data was classed as missing. The results are presented in Table 30.
Table 30. Party Perception of Labour Partisans (Group Members): by region

A high number of Labour partisans displayed a perception of party which was classified as 'radical' - the majority of the sample described the Labour party in this way, and suggested that they would not be averse to voting to the left of the British Labour party. The proportion of partisans described by this category in the Sheffield Attercliffe sample is less than in the other constituencies: a larger proportion of partisans in Sheffield Attercliffe perceive the Labour party as a party of the working class.

Across the constituencies, the sample results suggest that the Labour party is generally perceived as a class party, while very few respondents express concern at radicalism within the party. Whether or not this would suggest a 'hankering after socialism' on the part of the Labour electorate is difficult to say: previous studies have denied this, and I. Crewe, particularly, scotches the theory that socialist ideals among the Labour electorate have been thwarted by a moderate party. Crewe notes:

To ascribe this [failure of the Labour party] to a thirsting after true socialism has a certain dialectical charm, but little by way of logic or evidence to commend it. (71)

Certainly the survey results do not suggest that Labour partisanship is indicative of an ideological commitment to socialism. The large proportion of respondents who perceive the Labour party as a moderate party may represent a desire for social and economic policies which, while radical in the climate of current British politics, may in fact resemble social democratic rather than truly socialist principle. What is clear, however, is that these respondents, 44% of the total sample, say that they would not give their vote to the Alliance or Conservative parties, and that only 14.7% of
the entire sample of Labour partisans say they would consider voting to the right of the Labour party. As these are the only effective electoral options, this would suggest that the Labour vote among group members is not a potentially secular one, and that Labour partisanship may well be based upon an ideological construct informed by a socio-economic variable such as class interest. This possibility will be investigated in Chapter Eight, below.

The party perception of Conservative partisans is presented in Table 31. Four statements about the Conservative party were divided into two groups: radical and moderate Conservatism. Statements A and D were designed to express a radical ideological approach to the party, and statements B and C a more moderate position. These groupings proved successful in almost all cases, although some respondents grouped Statements B and D together: this would represent, perhaps, a view of Conservatism as necessary if not desirable.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GUILDFORD</th>
<th>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>RADICAL CONSERVATIVES</td>
<td>4 (40%)</td>
<td>13 (100%)</td>
<td>73.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODERATE CONSERVATIVES</td>
<td>6 (60%)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 31. Party Perception of Conservative Partisans (Group Members): by region.
(No Conservative Partisans in Sheffield Attercliffe).

A slightly larger proportion of Conservative partisans (26%) than Labour partisans (14.7%) suggested that they might not continue to vote for their party, but Conservative partisans in the group sample were mostly committed to their party identification. Conservative partisans were also overwhelmingly described as 'radical', particularly in Richmond & Barnes where all respondents were so described. Such 'radicalism', as measured by the survey questionnaire, may be understood as both ideological (statement A) and practical (statement D). Conservative support among the sample would seem to be characteristically ideological and not potentially secular.

The investigation of partisanship among Conservative and Labour supporters reveals a distinctly polarised and ideological vote. There is no evidence that the voting behaviour of group members is characterised by volatility or by instrumental and pragmatic
electoral choices. The two party share of the vote is large among
group members, partisanship is high, and party identification would
seem to be of an ideological nature. These three indicators suggest
that the electoral behaviour of group members is a non-secular
behaviour, and that group politics is not characterised by a growth
in 'issue voting'.

7.4. CONCLUSION: THE GROUP IN BRITISH POLITICS

Moyser and Parry suggest that political participation clearly
exists outside the electoral arena, and that group activity is
the best measure, or the 'Leit-motif', of political participation
in Britain. The constituency survey found group members to be
efficacious in their orientation to society generally, and to the
electoral system more particularly. The propensity to organise
would not appear to replace electoral participation, but rather
to supplement voting activity, and thus to act as a further dimension
of political participation.

Involvement in group structures is, however, an untypical mode
of behaviour, note Moyser and Parry. 'The bulk of individuals',
they write, 'are relatively inert and are, in effect, counter-balanced
by a small number of relatively very active participants.' The
propensity to organise and participate in the political process
is related to economic factors and, particularly, to social class.
While activists are characteristically middle class, note Moyser
and Parry, the proletariat are 'conspicuously' absent from group
structures: "The 'chorus' of complete activists", they write,
'clearly sings with an upper class accent.'

The profile of the constituency survey sample suggested that
group membership is primarily related to economic resources. Region,
income and property ownership were found to act as particularly
good indicators for group membership. The thesis that group activism
may be related to economic resources and to the class structure
was substantiated by evidence concerning the type of group organised
in the three constituencies and the role performed by these groups
in the communities.

Thus although there is some evidence for a coherent identification
based upon the 'group', and an identification which may inform
political behaviour in important ways, there is no conclusive evidence
that one may understand political behaviour and change through
an analysis of group activity in Britain. Certainly there is no evidence to support the thesis that: 'When the group is stated, everything is stated.'

Having suggested that group struggle cannot be considered a satisfactory lens through which to analyse all political activity, we turn now to the evidence for a prevailing division of society into classes, and of the claim that class consciousness, and class conflict, may represent a more useful theory of British political society.

The class scheme developed for the investigation of class politics in contemporary Britain follows an orthodox Marxist perspective, as proposed in Chapter Four. This involves a concentration on occupational class as the motive force in class stratiﬁcation. Occupational class, which was a popular model of voting choice between 1950 and 1970, has traditionally been perceived as the best summary index of the kind of context in which the actor passes his or her daily life. The power of class categories to perform this function is largely dependent upon the objectivity attained in their construction, and particularly in their freedom from cultural bias. Such weaknesses in ofﬁcial class grading schemes, and in other proposed class schemes, are discussed in Chapter Four.

The occupational class codes of the survey respondents are presented in Figure 8.1. It will be noted that class codes 60 and 80 are larger than one might expect from this sample. This is due to a unique method of operationalising the gender division, and the sample of unemployed persons.

Gender is a division in the process of production which has been particularly inadequately theorised and operationalised in social survey research. P. Duminavy notes that gender positions are “logically and empirically prior to occupational class” because the labour market and social attitudes are structured by gender division. “It is invalid”, Duminavy notes, to assess gender effects on voting within a class scheme where people’s sex has an great in influence on this as their class categorisation and whether the categorisation scheme itself makes reference to gender in the rankings of occupations.
CHAPTER EIGHT: THE CLASS ENVIRONMENT

"Whichever way you turn this curse of class difference confronts you like a wall of stone. Or rather it is not so much like a stone wall as the plate glass pane of an aquarium: it is so easy to pretend that it isn't there, and so impossible to get through it."

George Orwell, 1937.

8.1. THE CLASS DIVISION OF BRITISH SOCIETY

The class schema developed for the investigation of class politics in contemporary Britain follows an orthodox Marxian perspective, as proposed in Chapter Four. This involves a concentration on occupational class as the motive force in class structuration. Occupational class, which was a popular model of voting choice between 1950 and 1970, has traditionally been perceived as 'the best summary index of the kind of contexts in which [the elector] passes his or her daily life.' The power of class categories to perform this function is largely dependent upon the objectivity attained in their construction, and particularly in their freedom from cultural bias. Such weaknesses in official class grading schemes, and in other proposed class schemas, are discussed in Chapter Four.

The occupational class codes of the survey respondents are presented in Figure 8.1. It will be noted that class codes 50 and 80 are larger than one might expect from this sample. This is due to a unique method of operationalising the gender division, and the sample of unemployed persons.

Gender is a division in the process of production which has been particularly inadequately theorised and operationalised in social survey research. P. Dunleavy notes that gender positions are 'logically and empirically prior to occupational class' because the labour market and social attitudes are structured by gender division. 'It is invalid', Dunleavy notes:

to assess gender effects on voting within a class schema where people's sex has as great an influence on this as their class categorisation and where the categorisation scheme itself embodies reference to gender in the rankings of occupations. (3)
The method of assigning class codes to females in the constituency survey attempts to take such problems into consideration (see Chapter 4). By allocating women to a class code according to the nature of the work performed in the home (skilled manual labour), the class schema used to operationalise Marxian class theory takes some account of the gender bias inherent in occupational grading. This does not, of course, overcome the problems involved in coding women who are economically active, and whose occupational grading will reflect gender biases in the labour market. This procedure affects the sizes of class (and particularly of class codes 40 and 60 where economically active and homeworking women are concentrated), but should not alter class differences. The gender division of the class categories produced by the constituency survey are presented in Table 1.
Table 1. Class Code by Gender: total sample

Class code 80 includes those respondents who described themselves as unemployed, redundant or retired. Because of the Marxian premise of proletarianisation of a growing industrial reserve army, and because of theories of economic insecurity and its effect upon class polarisation and, particularly, class consciousness, it was felt important not to code these respondents according to their previous employment. Clearly in some instances it may have been more appropriate to code according to usual or past occupational grading, particularly when dealing with the retired workforce. However, in order to express the number of people who are, literally, unemployed by the economic system, it was felt interesting to group these people together. Some women who are houseworkers but who are claiming unemployment benefit are also included in class code 80. In order to break down this class category for certain analyses (for example, during the analysis of group membership), this grouping may be presented by labour status (Table 2).

It will be seen from Table 2 that class code 80 is almost equally divided between the retired and unemployed workforce. Were the retired respondents to be re-distributed according to their past occupational class, the rather large class code 80 would be reduced to a less 'roguish' level. What is more important, however, is not the size of this category, but its relationship to the other class codings, and the width between class categories.
Table 2. Class Code 80 by Employment Status: total sample

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Labour Status</th>
<th>No. of Respondents</th>
<th>% of Sample</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Houseworker</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed/Redundant</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>37.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>55.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is important, in investigating the relevance of class models of politics in contemporary Britain, not to confuse a changing class base with a contracting class base. Class theory posits a distinction between common collectivities of workers, and not between cosmetic, technical divisions in work practices and the methods of production: it is thus essential that a class schema takes into consideration the enduring divisions in the process of production.

In Chapter 4 it was noted that the operationalisation of class concepts in survey research have tended to follow a Weberian perspective of social stratification, in which 'consumption sectors' are understood to cross-cut occupational class. Challenges to the validity of an occupational class model have focussed primarily upon the weaknesses of the manual/non-manual divide. The growth of the service sector, and of routine non-manual employments, blurred the traditional distinction between 'working class' blue-collar and 'middle class' white-collar workers, while the emergence of a 'new working class salariat', in particular, was felt to render the manual/non-manual categorisation a blunt conceptual instrument. 'Britain has been transformed', write Heath, Jowell and Curtice:

From a blue-collar society into a white-collar one. Whereas in 1964 the working class was nearly three times the size of the salariat, constituting nearly half of the electorate, in 1983 the two classes were of almost the same size. (5)

The growth in non-manual employment, argues D. Robertson, meant that the non-manual class was a large and unhomogeneous grouping, about which few meaningful observations could be made. This dissatisfaction with the manual/non-manual divide led political scientists and socio-
logists to re-define class, not according to characteristics of productive activity, but with reference to 'consumption effects', such as housing, education and access to private transport and health care.

Although income levels per se did not appear to be related to political behaviour, or to have general predictive powers, the distribution of consumption choices, it was suggested, were indicative of social stratification. When linked with explanations of political behaviour and voting choice, these 'consumption choices' were found to encourage the 'consumption' of policy alternatives which would promote these economic interests (housing, education etc.), and thus a rise in issue voting and an erosion of the class base of politics were hypothesised.

An investigation of the impact of these 'consumption effects' on the political behaviour and structural location of electors was found, by Heath, Jowell and Curtice, to be no greater than that of class, however. The importance of housing and class were found to be 'similar in a statistical, but not a political sense': 'Changes in the distribution of housing', they write, 'tell us little that the changes in class structure had not told us already'. P. Dunleavy also found little evidence that housing position influenced political alignments, and suggested that home-ownership is 'a disguised measure of economic status'.

Heath, Jowell and Curtice write:

we do not believe that voting behaviour can usefully be equated with consumer choices...it is the questions over which there are fundamental ideological differences not the consensus ones of economic management, which provide the major basis of political allegiance. What we need is a conception of social class that reveals the social roots of disensus. The social grade conception with its emphasis on life-style obscures them. (10)

The real nature of an elector's interests, they suggest, is not amount of income or even consumer choices, but rather the source of income. Thus a manual labourer is receptive to collectivist ideas because his economic interest lies with collective bargaining rather than individual action, and not because of his pattern of consumption choices. It is this difference in the source of income which must be incorporated within a Marxian class model for (it is hypothesised),
it is this which creates class distinctiveness. The amount of income, and the distribution of consumption choices, may suggest ways in which the shape of classes is changing, but cannot illuminate the structuration of classes. Germane to the operationalisation of class theory is the division of labour, and the relationship of workers to the means of production: this relationship is an enduring feature of the processes of production, and allows the concept of class to be adapted and applied to new methods of production and changing employments of the work force.

Thus the manual/non-manual divide is not an explanatory tool in the mapping of class society, but is rather a category which served to describe the classes ('collectivities standing in common relation to the means of production') that were produced by a particular mode of capitalist production. Hence, while pay differentials may become less clear, and more workers may be employed in non-manual, salaried sectors of the economy, the basic division between those who own/control the means of production and those who sell their labour, will remain.

While one is receiving income in exchange for labour, one may make an array of consumption choices which bestow a certain quality of life, but the actual power one has to make these choices at all are continually constrained by one's ability to contract one's labour for a price. The issue of economic security is thus central to the distribution of consumption choices, which will reflect one's structural economic location (relation to the mode of production) and the security of one's economic interests: access to consumption is class-structured, and not a function of income per se.

The income, housing and education of survey respondents, according to their class codes, are presented in Tables 3 to 6. The inclusion of retired workers in class code 80 has the effect of boosting home ownership, income level and private education among the working class. It is clear, however, that these 'consumption sectors' are aligned with class, and are socio-economic variables which are intimately linked with social class and region. Whether or not these variables have a stronger relationship with the vote than socio-economic class, or indeed any relationship with the vote, will be investigated in section 8.2.
### Table 3. Income of total sample: by class code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME (PER ANNUM)</th>
<th>CAPITALISTS</th>
<th>PETIT-BOURGEOISIE</th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDER 3 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 100 - 6 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 100 - 8 500</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 600 - 15 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 100 - 20 000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER 20 000</td>
<td>2 100%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 4. Housing of total sample: by class code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAPITALISTS (code 20)</th>
<th>PETIT-BOURGEOISIE (codes 30-50)</th>
<th>WORKING CLASS (codes 60-80)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OWN HOME</td>
<td>3 100%</td>
<td>68 81.9%</td>
<td>53 65.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRIVATE RENT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11 13.2%</td>
<td>12 14.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COUNCIL RENT</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 1.2%</td>
<td>11 13.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 3.6%</td>
<td>5 6.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 5. Respondents holding a degree (total sample): by class code

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1 100%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPITALISTS (code 20)</td>
<td>1 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETIT-BOURGEOISIE (codes 30-50)</td>
<td>48 57.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS (codes 60-80)</td>
<td>19 22.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 6. Secondary schooling of total sample: by class code

While not denying that people's consumption locations are influenced by their class position, P. Dunleavy argues that consumption positions are not simply corollaries of class, but that it is the combination of class positions, and other social characteristics, which determine consumption sectors.\(^\text{12}\) People, suggests Dunleavy, are integrated into sectors of private consumption in a cumulative manner, and these 'consumption sectors', which are 'cross-class lines of social cleavage', eventually impact upon political behaviour.\(^\text{13}\) Their effect, however, is not so great as to suggest:

- Either a fundamental revamping of the class system
- or the displacement of class politics by issue-specific, micro-social mobilisations. (14)

Dunleavy proposes a radical approach to the definition of class, based not solely upon occupation, but defining social classes by their location in a system of production, and by the level of power that people can exert over their own work tasks.\(^\text{15}\) This typology is based upon the distinction between ownership of the means of production and wage-labourers; control of another's labour and wage-labourers; and white collar labourers and manual labourers. These differentiations produce the following categories: manual workers; non-manual workers; controllers of labour and the petit-bourgeoisie.\(^\text{16}\)
The schema proposed by Heath, Jowell and Curtice produces 5 similar classes, with a distinction made between those who exercise control over others' labour, and those in non-supervisory/management roles. Employment conditions, argue Heath, Jowell and Curtice, are fundamental determinants of consciousness, and the interests of a wage labourer differ substantially from those of a manager, a supervisor or an owner of capital. The separation of supervisory/non-supervisory workplace roles in the construction of a class schema is based upon the concept of an hierarchy of authority such as that proposed by R. Dahrendorf. This was developed in order to differentiate within the classes produced by traditional class theory, which were felt to be so large and unwieldy as to offer little to sociological analysis. This dissatisfaction with the 'maximalist' definition of class led to a conceptual division, not just of labour, but of power, authority and control within the workplace.

Within this tradition, some observers have retained a 'maximalist', dichotomous approach to the definition of class. A. Giddens, for example, suggests that anyone performing a supervisory role within the workplace is 'implicated in running the capitalist economy', and possesses a set of economic interests which diverge markedly from those held by workers. Usually, however, the use of the supervisory/non-supervisory categories has the effect of producing a middle 'petit-bourgeois' class, suspended between workers who neither own nor control capital or labour, and capitalists who own capital and expropriate the labour of others.

The class schema applied to the constituency survey is supplemented with an attention to the hierarchy of authority at work, which is felt to provide useful descriptive information about a technical division of labour between the working class and the petit-bourgeoisie. This cosmetic/subjective division is likely to fluctuate with the development of new work relations and tasks. The important feature of this technical division of labour is that those located within the petit-bourgeois class may exhibit a conflict between their objective economic class position and interests (working class) and their subjective status interests (they may not identify with the working class). It is thus a crucially located class, because it is from this class that support for class-based politics will be won or lost, and it is here that the effects of polarisation will be felt,
if Marxian theories about the development of the class struggle are assumed. The class identifications of the 'petit-bourgeoisie' will be examined carefully in the consideration of class consciousness in section 8.3. Their voting behaviour will be critically examined with reference to such theory in section 8.2.

8.2. THE CLASS VOTE

The party preferences of survey respondents are presented by class position in table 7. These data suggest a relationship between class position and voting choice. While 71% of working class respondents prefer the Labour party, respondents located within the 'capitalist' class are more likely to vote for the Conservative party. Almost two thirds of the sample of Labour supporters are located within the working class, while 70% of Alliance supporters are described by occupational categories 30-50 (the petit-bourgeoisie). Conservative support is drawn mostly from the middle classes, although one third of its support comes from respondents located within the working classes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPITALIST (code 20)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2 7.6%</td>
<td>1 2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETIT-BOURGEOISIE (codes 30-50)</td>
<td>32 38%</td>
<td>15 57.6%</td>
<td>30 69.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS (codes 60-80)</td>
<td>52 61.9%</td>
<td>9 34.6%</td>
<td>12 27.9%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7. Party Preference of Survey Respondents: by class code.

This relationship between class and party is strongest in the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe where there are no Conservative supporters among the sample, and where no respondents are located in class codes 10 to 30. 76% of the Labour vote in the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe is drawn from working class respondents: two thirds of respondents described by the petit-bourgeois category.
are Labour supporters. The data produced by the Guildford sample are close to overall survey results. The Labour party draws two thirds of its support from working class respondents and one third of its vote from the petit-bourgeoisie, while the Conservative party draws 72% of its support from class codes 30 to 50 and 36% of its support from respondents located within the working class. The Alliance draws the overwhelming proportion of its support among Guildford respondents from the petit-bourgeoisie (83.3%). 47% of Guildford respondents located in class codes 30 to 50 state a preference for the Liberal/SDP Alliance.

In Richmond & Barnes, however, the relationship between class position and voting behaviour is less clear. Support for the Labour party is drawn almost evenly from the petit-bourgeoisie and working class, with only slightly more working class than middle class respondents supporting the Labour party. The situation is reversed for the Alliance, with 42% of its support coming from the working class and 57% from the petit-bourgeois categories. The Conservative party draws two thirds of its support from the capitalist and middle class respondents, and one third of its support from working class respondents.

The constituency survey results indicate a clear connection between support for the Labour party and location within the working class, and between support for the Alliance and location within the middle class. Approximately one third of Conservative support is drawn from the working class, with the remaining two thirds coming from the middle and capitalist classes. There is also a significant amount of support for the Labour party within the middle class, particularly in the constituency of Richmond & Barnes.

The suggestion that socio-economic variables other than class may be superior indicators of voting behaviour was investigated with reference to three variables: home ownership, income and education. Non-private housing was found to be associated with a Labour vote, a correlation which has been noted by various surveys (Table 8). The proportion of non-home owners voting Labour (77%) is comparable to the proportion of the working class that vote Labour (71%).

In order to test the strength of the relationship between non-private housing and class position, a cross-tabulation of class grade and party support were controlled for home ownership (Tables
9 and 10). The proportion of working class electors who do not vote Labour is 28.7%, while the proportion of working class electors who own their own homes and do not vote Labour is 46.8%. Clearly home-ownership is associated with the non-Labour vote among the working class sample, although it is not generally associated with non-Labour voting among the working class electorate (53% of working class Labour voters are home-owners). Housing position may thus aid the explanation of class voting, and particularly cross-class voting, but does not usefully correlate with voting behaviour per se. Although non-private housing is a good indicator of a Labour vote, home-ownership is not as clearly linked to party preference as class position. Housing would thus appear to be primarily an indicator of class position.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HOME OWNER</th>
<th>NON-PRIVATE HOUSING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>64.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
<td>35.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>96.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>81.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8. Party Support: by home ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CAPITALIST</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETIT-BOURGEOISIE</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9. Party Support by Class: home owners
An investigation of the association between income and party preference suggested that income is a poor indicator of voting behaviour. Although respondents earning less than £3 000 per annum were more likely to vote Labour, and respondents earning over £20 000 per annum were more likely to vote for the Alliance or the Conservatives, there was no clear association between income level and voting behaviour. Furthermore, income did not appear to offer any plausible explanation for cross-class voting: working class respondents who did not vote Labour were not located in distinctive income brackets, and did not enjoy higher income levels than working class Labour supporters (Table 12).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME (£ PER ANNUM)</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDER 3 000</td>
<td>70.5%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>26.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 100 - 6 000</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 100 - 8 500</td>
<td>45.8%</td>
<td>20.8%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 600 - 15 000</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 100 - 20 000</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER 20 000</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11. Party Support: by income.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>CAPITALIST</th>
<th>PETIT-BOURGEOISIE</th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 25%</td>
<td>18 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td></td>
<td>3 42.8%</td>
<td>1 100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>6 25%</td>
<td>18 75%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10. Party Support by Class: Non-Private Housing.
The third variable to be tested against party preference was education, which has been linked to voting choice by several studies, and most recently by Heath, Jowell and Curtice. The role of education is believed to be particularly significant in identifying Alliance voters: 'Once education experience has been taken into account', write Curtice and Steed, 'the association between class and Alliance voting largely disappears'.

The results obtained by the constituency survey are presented in Tables 13 and 14. Over 60% of Alliance voters have a degree, which is slightly higher than the proportion located within the sample of Conservative supporters, and twice the number of Labour supporters holding a degree. The class position of the Alliance supporters who hold a degree is presented in Table 14.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME (£ PER ANNUM)</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDER 3 000</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 100 - 6 000</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 100 - 8 500</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 600 - 15 000</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 100 - 20 000</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER 20 000</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEGREE</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO DEGREE</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13. Party Support: by education.
While only of Alliance supporters holding a degree are located within the working class, 43.7% who do not hold a degree are working class respondents. The 5 working class Alliance voters who do hold a degree represent only 26.3% of the total sample of working class electors who hold a degree. The petit-bourgeois Alliance voters who hold a degree, however, represent 44.6% of the total sample of middle class electors who hold a degree. The association of education with an Alliance vote is thus strong among the middle class, but not significant among the working class electors. These results would seem to suggest that education, like housing choice, is a function of socio-economic class, and does not provide explanatory information about voting choice.

Benney, Gray & Pear suggest that, although education is linked to voting choice, it is probably a 'refined socio-economic scale', and that class position is the most obvious of the ways in which voting behaviour can be explained. The results obtained by the constituency survey would seem to support this thesis, for there is no evidence that voting behaviour is structured by variables such as housing, income or education, although these do appear to work with class, in the sense that they are part of class location and provide 'congruent' pressure (and, in some instances, cross-pressure). Proponents of the theory of issue voting suggest that housing and education represent policy sectors and decisions about which an elector can make logical decisions, whereas class position does not provide such a clear and delineated choice. Benney, Gray & Pear, however, suggest that:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Position</th>
<th>Degree</th>
<th>No Degree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capitalist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petit-Bourgeoisie</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>77.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 14. Class Position and Education of Alliance Voters
It is not a sufficient or an obvious condemnation to say that voting on class lines is not rational. To one who believes that he will benefit if his class does...it is wholly rational to vote on class lines. (26)

The extent to which British elections can be understood as class-structured voting competitions is an issue which has received much critical attention. The emergence of the Liberal/SDP Alliance has been particularly linked with a decline in class voting, and has been explained with reference to the issue, or secular, theory of voting.

Survey evidence for the relationship between class and voting at the last two General Elections is presented in Tables 15 and 16. It will be seen from Table 15 that the association of the Alliance vote with class was less than in the case of the Conservative or Labour parties. While the Labour party drew the largest proportion of its support from the working class, the Alliance drew support, in almost equal proportions, from the salariat, the routine non-manual workers, and from foremen and technicians. If we assume a possible division of Heath, Jowell and Curtice's five classes into three - drawing one distinction between the salariat and routine non-manual class, and one between the petit-bourgeoisie and foremen and technicians - the data would suggest that the Alliance draw support from representatives within all class divisions of British society.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupational Grades</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Liberal</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I - II</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>22.4%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>36.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III - IV</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>125</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>29.9%</td>
<td>33.7%</td>
<td>35.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V - VI</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>47.6%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
<td>27.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15. Occupational Grade By Vote At the 1979 General Election. Source: BES May 1979 Election Survey.
The most striking feature of the data on the 1979 and 1983 elections, however, is the changing character of support for the Labour party. In 1979, writes H. Penniman, a massive haemorrhage of working class voters from the Labour party proved crucial in deciding the outcome of the election. This trend continued in 1983, when more semi- and unskilled workers and trades unionists left the Labour party. Butler and Kavanagh note that in 1979 "little more than half of British voters actually voted for the party of their 'natural' class", and that in 1983 there was a 'spectacular retreat' from Labour among the working class. Even the high level of unemployment, write Butler and Kavanagh:

"...did not produce class polarisation of the electorate. There was a 3% swing to the Conservatives from Labour in the working class...The decline in the link between class and party continued as the Alliance made inroads across the class divide." (29)

This leakage of working class voters from the Labour party, suggest Heath, Jowell and Curtice, represents an increase in cross-class voting which characterises a class dealignment among the electorate. It is this relative class voting, measured by cross-class voting, rather than the absolute measure of class voting, recorded by the proportion of the electorate voting for its 'natural' class party which, Heath, Jowell and Curtice suggest, should be used as the true measure of 'class dealignment'. 'The proportion of
each class that votes for its natural class party', they write:

is a misleading measure of class voting... we run
the risk of confusing a decline in Labour's elect-
oral fortunes with a change in the class base of
voting... we are, therefore, simply redescribing
Labour's misfortunes rather than explaining them
... The measure does not necessarily tell us any-
thing very interesting about the class basis of
politics. (31)

The argument of Heath, Jowell and Curtice that it is cross-
class voting which has increased since the 1970's, and which suggests
class dealignment, presupposes the structuration of classes around
a manual/non-manual divide. Their index of class voting is calc-
ulated as the sum of the manual Labour vote and the non-manual
Conservative vote as a proportion of all votes: this measure of
the class vote is intended to take account of minor party votes
as well as of the Labour-voting middle class and the Conservative
working class, and is also used by Sarlvik and Crewe. This method
of calculating the relationship between class and party preference
suggests a clear decline in the class vote (Table 18).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% OF WORKING CLASS VOTING LABOUR</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% OF MIDDLE CLASS VOTING LABOUR</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALFORD INDEX</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 17. Alford Index for Britain, 1962-1979 (%)
source: D. Robertson, p.26

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLASS VOTE</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 18. The Class Vote: Non-Manual Conservative and Manual Labour Votes
As A Proportion Of All Votes.
source: Heath, Jowell and Curtice, p.30
The Alford index of class voting assumes that it is the gap between the voting patterns of manual and non-manual occupations that is vital for assessing the class vote. The Alford index thus refers to the difference between classes in their vote for the left party, and expresses the difference between Labour's percentage of the middle class vote and Labour's percentage of the working class vote. This also shows a substantial decline in the class vote (Table 17). Applying the indices of class voting recommended by Alford and by Heath, Jowell & Curtice to the party preferences of the constituency survey respondents produces a low index of class voting, consistent with these data:

**ALFORD INDEX:**
- % of working class voting Labour (61.9%) Minus % of middle class voting Labour (38%)
- \[= 23.9\]

**HEATH, JOWELL & CURTICE INDEX:**
- \[= 69\]
- As % of total votes (69/153 x 100)
- \[= 45\]

Although these data may appear to suggest a falling level of class voting, and a low index of class voting among the survey sample of group members, the methods of calculating the class vote used by Alford and by Heath et al. must be treated with some caution. The weaknesses of applying the manual/non-manual divide to the definition of class categories has been discussed in section 8.1, above. The observations made there lead us to suggest that a non-manual Labour vote does not represent a cross-class vote, but is rather indicative of the changing shape of the working class. Because changes in the way the population is divided into classes affects the value of the index of class voting, it is important that the method of stratifying the electorate is one which expresses enduring class divisions which can usefully be applied in the collection of time-series data. A concentration on the manual/non-manual divide fails to take account of the changing nature of the industrial workforce causing the index of class voting to express changes in the shape of the 'class vote', but not of the relationship between class and voting.

A further limitation of the index of class voting is its equation of class with party, and thus its confusion of class and of partisan
dealignment. Because elections are the most visual and identifiable aspect of British political behaviour, psephological analysis has played an important role in explanatory survey research and political parties, which are often viewed as representing class positions, have been used as a guide to the class orientations of electors. The concept of class voting is thus described with reference to electoral behaviour and party preferences.

This isolation of psephological analysis from the context of voting behaviour, argues Dunleavy, has led some survey research to conclusions about the role of class and of party which may be erroneous. Thus the party identification model of voting behaviour used by Butler and Stokes perceives partisan and class dealignment as phenomena which are linked, and are produced by, the same background trends. 'As class has so much been a guide to voting in the past', writes D. Robertson, 'party identification was closely, though by no means perfectly, correlated with class'. This, suggests Robertson:

requires us either to believe that a very large minority of the electorate cannot tell what is in their own interest, or that the interests are extremely complex and subtle and not easily identified, or that we have the identification of social class wrong. (39)

Clearly, if we assume class and party to be linked, and the definition of class to be based upon the manual/non-manual divide, then 'class voting' in Britain has been falling rapidly, and there has been a considerable 'dealignment' of class. In order to test this hypothesis, however, it is important that the relationship between class and party is investigated. It is also essential that the shape and structure of classes be considered for, as Robertson suggests, if we have the definition right, then class is clearly not informing the behaviour of a large proportion of the electorate. The issue, therefore, is whether a non-manual Labour vote represents a vote informed by class position (is class structured by the manual/non-manual divide?) and, if so, whether this may be considered a cross-class vote (is the Labour party a class party representing the 'working class' - defined as the manual class?).

It is thus proposed that in investigating the role of class in structuring the political behaviours and orientations of the
constituency survey electorate, the relationship between class and voting be described, not only in terms of class voting (based upon an elector’s party preference and objective class position) but through such concepts as the political distinctiveness of class, and the class distinctiveness of parties and class solidarity.

It is important, when considering the ways in which class may structure voting choice, to understand the ways in which political parties appeal to class interests, and the extent to which parties are perceived by the electorate to represent class interests. The concept of class voting, and particularly of cross-class voting and class dealignment, is founded upon the premise of the class distinctiveness of parties, and it is thus essential to determine the relationship between class and party in order that partisan dealignment is not confused with class dealignment.

Discussion of a declining class vote has focussed primarily upon an increasing Conservative vote among the working class. Critics who understand this phenomenon as cross-class voting suggest a dealignment of class, while those who stress a 'partisan dealignment' would argue that the working class did not so much vote away from their own class in 1979 and 1983, as feel repelled by the Labour party. If the Labour party alienated voters on grounds of its class appeal, we may of course tread differing routes to the same conclusion - that there is evidence for a declining class base in British politics. If, however, the electorate abandoned the Labour party through dissatisfaction at its representation of class interest, we may suggest that a partisan dealignment is indicative of the continuing relevance of class-structured political orientations.

Sarlvik and Crewe note that the class-party relationship weakened between October 1974 and 1979. This, they speculate, may indicate that the Conservative party appealed to working class voters rather than fighting the election with a 'class appeal' to their home base of middle class supporters (which would have strengthened the class:party relationship) or with a 'cross-class' appeal (which would not have altered the class:party relationship). Sarlvik and Crewe concede, however, that the class basis of the Conservative win was not so clear cut, and that 'the larger swing to the Conservatives amongst manual workers owed more to changes in the Labour than the Conservative vote.' Further evidence that the increased Conservative vote was a product of partisan and not class dealignment is suggested.
by the fact that the swing to the Conservatives in 1979, and 1983, was similar across the range of occupational grades.

Although the swing to the Conservative party does not appear to be related to occupational class, and did not increase the class distinctiveness of the Conservative vote, there is evidence that the movement away from the Labour party bore some relationship to class. Sarlvik and Crewe note that in 1979 the Labour party lost most ground among the working class, and particularly among union-organised manual workers, while its support among the middle class remained stable.

The falling support for the Labour party does seem to be related to the electorate's class location, and it is important to determine whether this loss of working class support is due to a class realignment among working class Labour partisans, or whether it may be attributed to partisan realignment among the working class. Partisan realignment among the working class electorate may occur if working class perception of the Labour party shifts, and particularly if the dynamics of voting choice are altered by such change. Thus, if electoral behaviour is structured by class interests, and political parties perceived as representatives of class interests, a change in the electorate's perceptions of the class-base of political parties will precipitate partisan flight. If, however, electoral behaviour is not class-structured, and political parties appeal to a class base, a decline in class-based politics will be precipitated.

Thus in assessing the ways in which class may structure political behaviour in Britain with reference to electoral choice, it is important that the class perception of party is examined, and applied to the dynamics of voting choice.

Constituency survey respondents were asked whether they believed political parties served the interests of a particular class (question 32). 76% of the total sample agreed that this was so, suggesting that political parties are generally perceived by the British electorate to be class institutions. When asked to indicate which parties, specifically, served class interests, the majority of respondents indicated both the Conservative and Labour parties. A large proportion of respondents suggested that all parties represented class interests. These data clearly reflect a perception of the party system, and particularly the two-party system, as class-based (Figure 8.2.).
Of those respondents who considered the Labour and Conservative parties separately, however, only 7 suggested that the Labour party served class interests, while 33 respondents cited the Conservatives as a class-based party, and a further 5 suggested that the Conservative and Alliance parties were class-based. Combining those respondents who cited the Conservative party with those who cited the Conservative and Alliance parties suggests that 38 respondents exclude the Labour party from an understanding of the party system as class-based. Thus although the evidence suggests that survey respondents consider political parties to be class distinctive, there is some indication that the class interests of the Labour party are not as salient to the electorate.

The respondents who believed that 'all parties' or the 'Conservative and Labour parties' represented class interests were evenly located within the middle and working classes, while 73% of respondents who cited only the Conservative Party as representing class
interests were working class. Those respondents who did not believe political parties represented class interests (42 respondents, or 24% of the total sample) were drawn from each category, but were particularly well-represented in class code 30 (33%). These data suggest that a class perception of the party system is not significantly related to class position, although there is a strong perception among the working class that the Conservative party represents class interests, primarily.

More striking than the relationship between class position and perception of the party system as a class system is the relationship between partisanship and attitude to the relationship between party and class (Table 19). While 91.5% of Labour supporters believe that there is a relationship between class and party, only 34.7% of Conservative supporters suggest that political parties serve class interests. Labour supporters cite 'all parties', the 'two major parties' and the 'Conservative party as representing class interests, while more Conservative supporters believe that only the Labour party serves class interests. 73% of Alliance supporters believe that political parties represent class interests and, of these, 63.3% suggest that the Conservative and Labour parties are class-based.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Class Parties</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>17.6%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>78.2%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Parties</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>70.9%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative and Labour</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative and Alliance</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19. Sample Response To "Which Parties Serve The Interests Of A Particular Class?": by party preference.
Although the survey data indicate that most respondents consider the party system to represent class interests, very few respondents cite the Alliance as a class-based party. This is consistent with the findings of previous surveys and polls. Sarlvik and Crewe concede that, although there are some grounds for locating a public response to a 'cross-class appeal':

Social class...remains the only enduring division in British society of partisan consequence; it still structures voting decisions [and] in these circumstances a rapid and substantial transfer of manual workers' allegiances to the Alliance seems unlikely. (44)

Heath, Jowell and Curtice also note that:

to be viable in the long run, a party needs a definite social base [and] the implication is that the large Alliance vote in 1983 was the product of transient disagreements with Labour and Conservative parties and that many of these voters are likely to revert to their 'natural' parties representing their respective social classes. (45)

The data collected by the constituency survey would seem to suggest that Labour supporters are more likely to perceive the party system as class-based, and to include the Labour party in that description, than supporters of other parties. Although Alliance voters describe the party system as a class system, they exclude the Alliance from such a description, and overwhelmingly embody the class system in the two-party system. Conservative supporters are most likely to deny the relationship between class and party, or to cite only the Labour party as a class party. Perception of the party system as a class system would thus seem to be more strongly associated with partisanship than with class position.

The attitude of partisans to the class position of their preferred party was investigated by the survey questionnaire (questions 26 and 27). 68% of Conservative partisans expressed strong support for radical Conservative policy and a conflictual, adversarial attitude to politics. Labour partisans were divided into three groups: those who believed the Labour party was too radical, those who believed it was too reformist, and those who considered it the representative of working class interests. While only 12% of the sample of Labour voters felt the Labour party to be a radical party, 41% of respondents were located in the category expressing concern
at the moderation of the Labour party. This represents almost as great a proportion as those partisans who believed the Labour party to be a party of the working class (45%).

These data suggest that although the sample perceive the party system, and particularly the Conservative and Labour parties, as class-based, there are some reservations among Labour partisans about the class nature of their party. Labour voters were more inclined to describe the party system, and their own preferred party, as class-based than the rest of the electorate, but when questioned solely about their own party, tended to stress the reformist and consensual nature of the Labour party.

These findings may be contrasted with other surveys of Labour support which suggest that the party is overwhelmingly considered a party of the working class. Sarlvik and Crewe note that:

The Labour party continues to be regarded, by both its supporters and detractors, as above all else the representative of working class interests and the political wing of organised labour. (46)

A survey of the Labour party, conducted by M. Abrams, reached similar conclusions. 'Labour voters', Abrams writes:

See their party essentially as a class party - for the working class, as the party favouring more welfare services, and as the spokesman and protector of the underdog. (47)

This may lead us to suggest that the Labour partisans among the sample exhibit a strong perception of and orientation to class interests, and register substantial dissatisfaction at the representation of that class interest by the Labour party.

Having considered the perception of the relationship between class and party among survey respondents, the ways in which class may inform voting choice, and the relationship of class to party preference, were investigated. Concepts of the class distinctiveness of parties and the political distinctiveness of classes were applied to the survey sample. These were intended to provide information about the recruitment of class support by the parties, and about partisan solidarity among distinctive social classes.

Data produced by Heath, Jowell & Curtice suggest that the class distinctiveness of the Labour party was high among the working class
in 1983. The vote of the Conservative and Alliance parties was found, however, to be drawn almost evenly from across the classes (Table 20). The most striking feature of their data is the remarkable similarity between the class composition of the Conservative and Alliance vote. These data suggest that the Conservative party is the main rival and victim of the Alliance, and that these parties compete within the same areas for support. This 'common ground' has been identified by various surveys and opinion polls:

The Alliance's strongest age group is between 25 and 34, the young marrieds that are always the Conservative's main target. Their strongest social classes are AB and C1, where again they rival the Conservatives. And their strongest region is the south, where their support equalled that of the Tories in May. On the other hand Labour's strongest appeal is always to those areas where the Alliance is weakest, the 19-24 age group, the C2 and DE social classes, the north of England, and Scotland. (49)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Category</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SALARIAT</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROUTINE NON-MANUAL</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETIT-JOURGESIE</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FOREMEN AND TECHNICIANS</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20. Class and Vote in 1983: the class distinctiveness of the parties. Source: Heath, Jowell & Curtice, Table 2.4., p.21.

Index scores for the class distinctiveness of political parties among the constituency survey sample were calculated as follows: Labour 61; Conservative 65 and Alliance 69. These indicated a lower level of class distinctiveness in the Labour party than in the Conservative party, although both scores are comparable. This suggests that the Labour party draws less class-distinctive support among the sample of group members than does the Conservative party. The class distinctiveness of the Alliance was higher than either the Conservative or Labour parties, indicating the recruitment of class-distinctive support. It would thus appear that, although
the Alliance bases its recruitment upon a cross-class appeal, and that this appeal is salient (supporters and non-supporters alike refer to its lack of class interests), it does in fact have a distinctive class base among the sample of group members.

The party support of the classes was investigated using the concept of the political distinctiveness of classes. This refers to the extent to which electors within the same class category behave similarly at elections, and differently from electors within other class categories. Data concerning the political distinctiveness of classes at recent General Elections is presented in Table 21, from which it will be seen that the political distinctiveness of the working class has fallen.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONAL GRADES</th>
<th>I - IV (SALARIAT, ROUTINE NON-MANUAL; PETIT-BOURGEOISIE)</th>
<th>V - VI (FOREMEN AND TECHNICIANS; WORKING CLASS)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>YEAR</td>
<td>19740</td>
<td>1979</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL/ALLIANCE</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21. Political Distinctiveness of the Classes, 19740 - 1983 (%) 

Sarlvik and Crewe note that the middle classes engage in more disciplined class voting than the working class. 'The fact that the middle class is largely Conservative', they write:

does not mean that the Conservative vote is largely middle class, in fact only a small majority of it is. This is because a large slice of a small cake (the Conservative share of the middle class) can be smaller in size to a smaller slice of a larger cake (the Conservative share of the working class). (51)

The class:party relationship is thus imperfect, but more perfect among the middle classes than the working class. Similarly, Heath, Jowell and Curtice note that although the Conservatives are the party of the bourgeoisie, they are not a bourgeois party,
but draw their votes from across the social spectrum. 'While Labour may fairly be described as the party of the working class', they write:

to say that the Conservatives are the party of the middle class is to misunderstand the nature both of Conservatism and of the middle class. (53)

The political distinctiveness of the classes located by the constituency survey were calculated using the measure of political distinctiveness suggested by W. Korpi. The political distinctiveness of the working class is measured by dividing the sum of working class votes by the number of working class votes for the Labour party. The political distinctiveness of the middle/upper class is measured by dividing the sum of the middle class votes by the number of middle class votes for the right party. The results of these calculations are: political distinctiveness of the working class sample 71.2; political distinctiveness of the middle class sample 60.

The political distinctiveness of the working class respondents in the constituency survey is high, and is substantially greater than the political distinctiveness of the middle class respondents. This suggests that working class respondents in the group sample may identify their political interests according to their class position, and thus that class structures voting activity.

Evidence for a relationship between class and party preference among the sample of group members is thus provided by a cross-tabulation of objective class position with party preference; by the calculation of indices of the class distinctiveness of party and political distinctiveness of classes; and by an investigation of the survey sample's perceptions of the class:party system, and of the class base of their own preferred party. Other variables which may have been associated with the vote (eg. housing, income and education) did not prove of significant association.

In order to further examine the relationship between class and voting activity, a subjective test was applied to the survey sample. Respondents were asked if they agreed, disagreed or 'would once have agreed' with the premise that we vote according to our class status (question 77). This question was designed
to measure the extent to which respondents perceive the class/voting relationship to be in flux, for this is an important element in the investigation of the continuing and competing relevances of class and group politics.

An equal number of respondents disagreed as agreed with the statement that we vote according to our class status (49 cases) but the greatest number of respondents felt that although this was once true, it is no longer the case (70 respondents). If we combine those who have never believed that class informs voting choice with those who think that class no longer structures party preference, 70.8% of the total sample of group members do not believe that we vote according to our class status.

No association was found between objective class position and attitudes to class-structured voting choice. 46.9% of the working class and 44.5% of the middle and upper class suggested that class once bore a relationship to voting choice but does no longer. Slightly more middle class respondents (28.2%) than working class respondents (25.9%) believed social class determined voting behaviour, but among both working class and middle class samples the proportions agreeing and disagreeing with the statement were almost equal. A relationship between partisanship and belief about class-structured voting choice was, however, observed. While the majority of Conservative voters (68%) and Alliance supporters (48%) believe that class no longer informs voting choice, the largest proportion of Labour voters (42%) agreed with the statement that we vote according to our class status.

Those respondents agreeing that electors vote according to class status were then given a selection of political parties and asked to indicate from which classes they drew their support (question 78). This was intended to provide more information on the relationship between party and class, and the class distinctiveness of parties. The question was un-prompted and coded after questionnaire completion.

All political parties were awarded a high degree of class distinctiveness by the respondents (Table 22). The Labour party was considered a working class party, although with a good deal of middle class support. The Conservative party appeared less
class distinctive, although most respondents described it as recruiting from the middle and upper classes. Alliance support was judged almost evenly to come from the middle class or from 'all classes'. The Ecology party had a similar recruitment pattern, although it was more often described as 'middle class' than cross-class. The Communist and National Front parties were both overwhelmingly described as working class. These data suggest that class is perceived by the electorate to structure both voting choice and the appeal of political parties. As Butler and Stokes point out, however, the question of the party destination of class support is a different question to the class source of party support, and in order to fully understand the relationship between class and party it is important that the analysis of class and electoral politics is taken further.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Labour</th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Communist</th>
<th>N.P.*</th>
<th>Ecology</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>67.1</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>55.9</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>42.6</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper Class</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class and Middle Class</td>
<td>29.6</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class and Upper Class</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All Classes</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>18.6</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 22. Classes From Which Political Parties Are Believed To Draw Their Votes (%): sample of group members who agreed that class status informs voting choice. *National Front

An association between objective class position and party preference has been observed above, and a strong perception of the party system as a class system has been noted among the sample electorate, and particularly among Labour partisans. Conservative and Alliance supporters, by contrast, are inclined to deny a relationship between class and party, and to disagree that class status informs voting choice.
A stronger association has been observed between partisanship and attitude to the class:party system than between class location and the class:party system, which may lead us to ask whether the electoral system is class-structured only in so far as political parties base their appeal on class interests. P. Dunleavy suggests that a radical approach to an understanding of class dealignment may analyse the role of dominant ideological influences and party competition itself in structuring voters' views. Peoples' votes, Dunleavy writes, are conditioned by ideological messages formulated by institutions of central social significance (eg. the media) and do not necessarily articulate the structural influence of an elector's social location. This model of electoral choice would emphasise party competition as the central dynamic of political behaviour, with voters' preferences shaped by political parties rather than accommodation, by parties, of voters' preferences. Similarly, D. Robertson argues that the apparent 'volatility' of the electorate is a consequence of a 'highly differentiated class-partisan ideology, which has been of increasing importance'.

A further indication that political parties structure class interests is provided by Benney, who notes that people not only believe their chosen party serves their class interests best, but believe 'that one's own party will do the best job for the other class'. This positive-sum model of parties and class interest has also been investigated by W.G. Runciman. This party representation of class, where interests are not necessarily seen as opposed, and where there is no overt hostility between classes/parties, suggests that the representation of class interests within the party system is constrained by the demands of electoral competition, and may not validly be understood as class politics. This hypothesis will be considered below in section 8.3.

8.3. CLASS IDENTIFICATION

D. Robertson notes that class consciousness is an integral part of an orthodox Marxian definition of class because classes only take on a full political role when self-aware and in conflict. Commenting upon the dearth of research which includes class consciousness in the calculation of indices of class, Robertson
argues the need to measure class feeling, class image and particularly class conflict within the electorate, and to judge the effect of these elements of class upon the vote.\textsuperscript{62}

In assessing the relevance of Marxian class theory to contemporary British politics, it is essential that we consider not only the relationship between objective class position and political behaviour (the class 'in itself') but the relationship between subjective class orientation and political behaviour (the class 'for itself'). The survey questionnaire used five dimensions of subjective class consciousness with which to explore the evidence for class-structured political behaviour in Britain: awareness of class (question 70); attitude to class struggle (question 71); identification with class group (question 72); subjective class rating (question 73) and relative subjective class rating (question 74).

114 respondents believed that social class is an important part of British political society and may be considered 'class aware'.\textsuperscript{63} This represents 65.1\% of the total sample, a figure which is considerably less than the 91\% identified by a National Opinion Poll in 1972.\textsuperscript{64} A larger proportion of middle class than working class respondents considered class to be important. This is consistent with data produced by the NOP survey mentioned above, which recorded the lowest level of recognition of social classes among the DE class.\textsuperscript{65} The difference between the attitude of the middle class and the working class to the existence of social classes is, however, twice as great among the constituency survey sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SOCIAL CLASS</th>
<th>SOCIAL CLASS</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IMPORTANT</td>
<td>NOT IMPORTANT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPITALIST</td>
<td>1 33%</td>
<td>2 66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETIT-BOURGEOISIE</td>
<td>62 74.6%</td>
<td>20 24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>48 59.2%</td>
<td>32 39.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 23. Attitude To Socio-Economic Class: by class
The relationship between partisanship and class awareness is presented in Table 24. While Alliance and Conservative supporters have a similar distribution of attitude to social class, Labour supporters are less likely to stress the importance of social class. This is a rather surprising result, as Labour supporters were found to be more likely to view their own party, and the party system, as class-based. It also contrasts with survey evidence which suggests that Liberal supporters are less likely to be class aware.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SOCIAL CLASS IMPORTANT</th>
<th>SOCIAL CLASS NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 24. Attitude To Socio-Economic Class: by party preference.

An integral part of class awareness is the recognition of class boundaries, and the relative ranking of class categories. Butler and Stokes suggested that people differentiate between classes according to such characteristics as occupation, income, attitudes, education and family background. The National Opinion Poll referred to above lists similar bases of social class recognition, including the neighbourhood environment, and aspects of manners and morals. A.H. Birch, in his study of Glossop, found that respondents were willing to attribute party preferences to various types of people (according to age, occupation, religion and unionisation) as well as social class.

A key issue in the design of the question which measured relative subjective class consciousness (question 71) was the distinction between the amount and source of income. Marxian class theory requires the determination of class according to the division of labour, and thus the source, not amount, of income. The examples of 'types' of people given in the survey questionnaire were intended to represent the conflict between source and amount of income, and thus to measure those respondents...
who demonstrated a full class consciousness, in the Marxian sense, and those who did not. Four gradings of relative subjective class consciousness were derived from responses to question 74: those respondents displaying a full dichotomous class conception; those with a partial class conception; those with a classless, or 'group', conception; and those with no clear pattern of class or group consciousness.

A full class consciousness required that the division of labour determined class. Respondents who described all examples except E as working class, and who allocated example E a category above working class, were considered to have a full, dichotomous class consciousness. These respondents did not heed income differentials, but rather based their relative class ratings upon the relation of the worker to the method of production, and used a dichotomous concept of the class structure.

Respondents with a partial class consciousness recognised class widths, but tended to 'raise' class definitions, according to the amount rather than source of income, thus describing the examples as middle class more often than working class (for example in type A). These respondents also tended to use several class divisions (i.e. to use working class, middle class and upper class). A requirement for partial class consciousness was that respondents recognised an adversary to the working class and that example E be given a category of no less than 'upper middle class'. This was intended to separate those with partial class consciousness from those with no clear class concept. These respondents tended to 'level' classes, mostly to the middle class category, and to apply this to, for example, types C, F and E. Those respondents who applied the middle class or 'no class' category to more than four of the examples were judged to have a classless, or 'group', consciousness. Those respondents who included an inaccessible response (Don't Know, or missing data) were described as having no clear class concept.

Most respondents fell naturally into the categories described above. Full 'group' consciousness, or classless consciousness, is less observed than a full dichotomous class consciousness, although neither of these are as prevalent as partial class consciousness, or lack of any clear class consciousness. It
is the size of these latter categories which is crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of class society, for it is within these groups that respondents may be 'on the move' to developing either a full class consciousness, or a consciousness based upon groupings alternative to class. These data suggest that 65% of the total sample define class according to Marxian criteria of the division of labour, producing clearly differentiated class groupings, but we are unable to judge, from this snapshot picture, the extent to which respondents within the two categories may be recruited by non-class conscious groupings.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO. OF RESPONDENTS</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FULL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTIAL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSLESS/GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CLEAR CLASS/GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 25. Consciousness of Class: total sample.

While the incidence of full class consciousness does appear to be related to class location, partial or non-class consciousness is evenly distributed across class categories (Table 26). Full class consciousness is not, however, significantly related to party preference (Table 27). The distribution of class consciousness is remarkably similar for both the Alliance and Labour parties, while Conservative supporters illustrate a lower tendency for full class consciousness or classless consciousness. These data would seem to suggest that class awareness is quite prevalent throughout the sample, and that a class perception and consciousness of society is linked more strongly to a respondent's own class position than to his/her party preference. Class position and party preference only appear to be related to the demonstration of full class consciousness, however, and are not significantly associated with the other forms of consciousness identified.
A premise of Marxian class theory is that classes should not only be aware, but should be in conflict, and understood to be in conflict. It is the process of class struggle, believed Marx, which expresses and is a consequence of a full class consciousness, and which is the motive force for political change. E.A. Nordlinger writes that:

What is curious about the English working class is that the belief in the class conflict's importance is very much in evidence among both Conservative...
and Labour voters. But at the same time these attitudes have not had any debilitating effects upon the political system...beliefs in the class conflict's importance have not influenced the issues separating the parties nor have they resulted in the fracturing of political groupings and the placing of heavy demands on the governmental institutions. (72)

This situation is due, suggests Nordlinger, to the absence of negative partisanship amongst the electorate, and to the fact that class conflict is perceived as significant on a general societal level, and not on a personal level, thus posing no economic threat to workers. Similarly, D. Robertson suggests that although there may be a high degree of class awareness in British political society, there is no evidence for class struggle as, on a personal level, class is not considered a barrier to social intercourse, and class conflict does not inform socio-political behaviour.73

The constituency survey tested these hypotheses by asking respondents whether they felt class conflict in England was important, and by investigating the class-exclusiveness of respondents (the extent to which respondents felt they 'belonged' to the class with which they identified). 43% of respondents felt class conflict to be 'fairly' important and 26.6% of respondents described it as 'very' important. More respondents felt class conflict not to be important (29%) than to be very important. Combining those respondents who described class struggle as 'fairly' and 'very' important suggests, once more, that between 65% and 70% of the sample display class-oriented political behaviour.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Title</th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>FAIRLY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>54.7%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PETIT-BOURGEOISIE</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>45.2%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>52.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAPITALIST</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 28. Attitude To Class Conflict In Britain: by class
While data taken in 1950 suggested that more electors in social class groups C2 and DE than A8 and C1 believed class conflict to be important, a Gallup Poll taken in the mid 1970's revealed that more respondents in social class categories C2 and ABC1 than DE believed a class struggle existed in Britain. The constituency survey data indicates that more working class respondents than middle class respondents feel class conflict to be important. The figures are, however, comparable, and there does not appear to be a clear connection between class location and attitude to class conflict. Attitude to class conflict is, however, quite strongly linked to partisanship. While only 1.5% of Labour supporters felt class struggle not to be important, 61.9% of Conservative supporters felt it was not important. Alliance and Labour supporters were most likely to describe class conflict as 'fairly important'.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>FAIRLY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>37.8%</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>42.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19.5%</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>14.2%</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>23.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 29. Attitude to Class Conflict in Britain: by party preference.

The fact that attitude to conflict is related to party and not to class may be indicative of a confusion of class with party conflict. Because class position, and especially working class location, was found to be associated with the development of a full class consciousness, attitude to class conflict was cross-tabulated with relative subjective class consciousness (Table 30). Most respondents categorised as having a classless consciousness, or to have no clear class concept, felt class conflict to be unimportant, and the majority of respondents with a partial class consciousness described class conflict to be fairly important. Those respondents with a full class consciousness, however, did not demonstrate a clear belief that class conflict was important, and 25% of these respondents felt
it to be unimportant. These results do not demonstrate a relationship between objective class, class consciousness and belief in class conflict, and suggest that although there is evidence that class awareness is prevalent within the sample, class interests are not perceived in conflictual, adversarial terms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>VERY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>FAIRLY IMPORTANT</th>
<th>NOT IMPORTANT</th>
<th>DON'T KNOW</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FULL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTIAL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS/GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSLESS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 30. Attitude to Class Conflict: by class consciousness.

This thesis was tested by measuring the degree to which respondents identified with their own class environment (question 72). 63.4% of the respondents who felt that class was an important part of political society agreed that they felt closer to people within their own class. These respondents were most likely to feel that class conflict was 'fairly important' (46.3%), and more likely than respondents who did not feel closer to people in their own class to believe that class conflict was 'very important' (36.6% of respondents who felt closer to their own class members felt class conflict was very important compared with 26.3% of respondents who did not identify strongly with members of their own class). No relationships were observed between class location or class consciousness and extent of class identification, but a slight link between party preference and class identification was evident. While 67.9% of Labour partisans agreed that they felt closer to people in their own class, only 62.5% of Conservative voters and 57.1% of Alliance supporters—demonstrated a strong class identification.
Once again, we may suggest from these data that class identity is generated by identification with political parties, rather than with class interests, and that the feeling of belonging, and of adversary struggle, has more to do with the party political system than with the identification of, and orientation to, class interests. Here we may appear to come full circle, for if party and class interests are believed to coincide, then an identification with party, and a model of party conflict and party consciousness, may be felt to be the democratic representation of class. However, as was noted in section 8.2., evidence that the party system is considered a class system is weak, and is compounded by survey evidence that respondents do not participate in the party political system with reference to class interests.

It may thus be more accurate to suggest that a considerable degree of class awareness exists within the constituency survey sample, and that between 60% and 70% of respondents not only recognise the importance of social class, but have a developed consciousness of the class structure, and of the conflictual nature of class interests. The sense of membership of a class, and of adversary interests and class struggle is, however, undeveloped among the survey sample, who conceive of interest identification and interest opposition in terms of formal party political contests, rather than class conflict.

To further investigate the perception of class membership within the sample, the subjective class identification of survey respondents was examined. This was intended to measure the congruency of objective and subjective class descriptions (and thus the extent to which we may apply Marxian theories of false consciousness to the survey sample) and to examine the dynamics of subjective class consciousness.

The 1972 NOP survey suggested that 95% of respondents who thought that there were different social classes were willing to identify themselves as belonging to one. All constituency survey respondents were asked to assign themselves to a set of class categories which included an option of 'no class'. Most informants described themselves as working class or middle class, with a substantial amount assigning themselves to the 'no class' category (figure 8.3.). While 35% of the total sample
did not consider class to be an important part of British politics, only 22.8% or respondents did not assign themselves to a class. Respondents used few categories in describing their own class position, which suggests a clear and relatively simply conceived image of class structure. The distinction between those assigning themselves to the middle and working classes is, however, much less than that recorded by previous surveys. R. S case, for example, found 70% of a sample of English workers describing themselves as working class, and 20% using a middle class label.

![Figure 8.3. Subjective Class Rating: total sample.](image)

In order to test whether the levels of middle and working class subjective class identity indicate a convergence of class consciousness, the subjective class ratings were cross-tabulated with objective class position (Table 31). The extent to which the subjective class label relates to the objective classification of respondents is high. Congruent subjective and objective class
ratings within the working and middle class categories are comparable, although petit-bourgeois respondents are more likely to describe themselves as working class, than working class respondents are prone to adopt a middle class label. These findings are consistent with other researches, although the congruence between objective and subjective class is significantly lower than levels recorded by surveys conducted in the 1960's and 1970's.78

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECTIVE CLASS</th>
<th>OBJECTIVE CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>CAPITALIST</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 31. The Relationship Between Subjective and Objective Class: total sample.

The similar proportions of working and middle class subjective class consciousness produced by the survey would seem to be a product of the class composition of the sample rather than an indication of the convergence of class consciousness. D. Robertson suggests that:

It is the prevalence of working class consciousness, both amongst manual workers and the non-manual social strata, that has declined over the years since systematic surveys were started. While middle class consciousness on the whole has kept its (always lower) level. (79)

The high level of identification with the 'no class' category among the working class may well form part of this process of declining working class consciousness.
Subjective assignation to the 'no class' category is also high among middle class respondents. The extent to which lack of subjective class identification may be related to party choice, and the extent to which it may be related to class, was investigated (Tables 31 and 32). 75.9% of respondents who identified themselves as lower/working class were Labour partisans and 44.2% of respondents identifying themselves as upper/middle class were Alliance supporters. Conservative supporters represented 100% of the respondents describing themselves as upper class, 28.8% of those describing themselves as middle class, and 5.5% of those describing themselves as working class.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Conservative</th>
<th>Alliance</th>
<th>Labour</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>9 21.4%</td>
<td>13 19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>1 4.3%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>2 8.6%</td>
<td>10 23.8%</td>
<td>40 58.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>9 39.1%</td>
<td>20 47.6%</td>
<td>13 19.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>6 26%</td>
<td>3 7.1%</td>
<td>1 1.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER CLASS</td>
<td>2 8.6%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 32. Subjective Class Identification: by party preference.

These data suggest that a subjective working class identification is strongly related to Labour partisanship, and is more strongly related to this than to an objective working class location. Conservative partisanship is strongly related to an upper and upper middle class identification, but identification with the middle class is not significantly related to any of the three parties (although most middle class identifiers are Alliance supporters). Alliance supporters do not exhibit a clear class self-image.80

More striking than the relationship between subjective class identification and partisanship, however, is the data for lack of class identification and partisanship. While assignation to the 'no class' category was found to be almost equally divided between working class and petit-bourgeois respondents (Table 31),
52% of those who did not identify with a class label were found to be Labour partisans (Table 32). Only 12% of respondents who did not claim a class identity, by contrast, were Conservative voters, and Alliance voters - who are generally believed to deny class identifications - formed only 36% of the sample.

These data suggest that class consciousness among Labour supporters, in particular, is in decline and that - as Labour voters are more often working class - a fall in working class consciousness is apparent. In order to examine whether working class respondents who lacked a class identification were less likely to vote Labour, a cross-tabulation of subjective class identity and objective class location was controlled for partisanship (Table 33). 76.9% of working class electors who claimed no class identity were found to vote for the Labour party, suggesting that objective class position informs partisanship even when no class identification is claimed. But as working class electors identify with the middle and upper classes, the tendency to vote Labour declines, and allegiance is transferred to the Alliance and Conservative parties.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3 23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>1 50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- 1 50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4 17.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>4 23.5%</td>
<td>4 23.5%</td>
<td>9 52.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>2 100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER CLASS</td>
<td>1 100%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 33. Subjective Class Identity and Party Preference of Working Class Electors.

These data suggest that objective class does structure subjective class consciousness, and that subjective class identification informs voting choice. Although lack of subjective class identity does not appear to negate the influence of objective class location among working class electors, any cross-pressure of subjective
and objective class identification does tend to produce cross-class-party voting. A similar effect is produced among the middle and upper class electorate who display an increased tendency to vote for the Labour party when identifying with the working class, while a lack of class identification does not significantly alter their voting preference (Table 34). These findings are not consistent with I. Crewe's thesis that a reduced willingness among the electorate to give themselves a class label is part of a declining stability of voting behaviour, and of the connection between class and vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11.1%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>17.2%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER CLASS</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 34. Subjective Class Identity and Party Preference of Middle Class and Upper Class Electors.

Clearly the cross-pressures of subjective and objective class are important in the analysis of voting dynamics. E.A. Nordlinger notes that:

manual workers who think of themselves as middle class vote Conservative more frequently than do those workers whose subjective and objective positions coincide. (81)

A sample of working class voters taken by Nordlinger suggested that while only 29% of working class subjectives voted Conservative, 53% of middle class identifiers were Conservative partisans.82 The constituency survey sample produces similar results, with only 16.6% of objectively and subjectively identified working class electors voting for the Alliance or Conservative parties, compared with 52.6% of working class voters who identify with the middle class.
In order to determine in what circumstances cross-pressures may be applied, the objective and subjective class locations of those respondents who were classed as having a partial or full class consciousness were examined (Table 35). A comparison of Table 31 and Table 35 reveals that those working class respondents who were described as having a partial or full class consciousness are less likely than the sample average to adopt a subjective class identification that differs from the objective class location applied in research. While only 53.6% of the sample of objectively working class electors described themselves as lower/working class, 72.6% of those working class electors with a developed class consciousness gave a congruent class description of themselves. This difference is largely due to the dearth of working class electors with a developed class consciousness who described themselves as lacking a class identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CAPITALIST</th>
<th>PETIT-BOURGEOIS</th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOWER WORKING CLASS</td>
<td></td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPPER CLASS</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 35. Subjective Class Identity and Objective Class of Partially and Fully Class Conscious Survey Respondents

The results for the middle class electorate are less clear. 54.8% of the total sample of electors described themselves as upper/middle class, while 52.2% of class conscious middle class electors described themselves in that way. Although there is, as with the sample of working class electors, a decline in the proportion describing themselves as having no class identification, the most substantial difference between the total sample and the sample of class conscious
middle class electors is the fact that the latter group tend to identify with the working class to a larger extent.

Clearly a full or partial class consciousness increases the likelihood that electors will possess a subjective class identity congruent with their objective class categorisation, and that this will in turn affect their voting behaviour. D. Robertson notes that the proportion of the electorate who exhibit such characteristics is very small, and calculates that the Labour-supporting group with a full class consciousness (aware of class constraints and conflicts) amounts to less than 20% of the subjective working class, or less than 15% of the electorate. 83 This data, he suggests, seriously questions the application of any orthodox class model of electoral politics to Britain. The constituency survey produces a similar proportion of fully class conscious Labour voters among the sample of subjectively working class electors. 64 respondents claimed a working class identification and, of these, 14, or 21.8%, were found to be fully class conscious Labour voters. This, however, represents only 8.2% of the total sample.

Nordlinger suggests that in order to systematically analyse the relationship between subjective class and voting behaviour, it is necessary to understand, not only the impact of subjective class upon the vote (which clearly works with objective class in structuring electoral behaviour) but to know what it is about subjective class which affects voting behaviour. Benney suggests that 'subjective class membership [shows] a much stronger relationship with vote than does objective class position' and that subjective class identification is particularly useful when considering the vote of electors whose occupation and income places them on the borderline of a social class. 84 Economic and status variables have thus been applied to an analysis of the components of subjective class identity.

The thesis that the working class elector may conceive of himself as middle class in material terms was examined with reference to the economic variables, income and housing. It was demonstrated, above, that these variables were not significantly related to the vote, and it was suggested that they were elements of socio-economic class, and indicated class-structured, rather than consumption-structured voting behaviour. If housing and income - as variables representative of material prosperity - show a strong association
with class identity then, Goldthorpe and Lockwood note:

there are implied, thus, as well as economic changes, changes in values, attitudes and aspirations, in behaviour patterns, and in the structure of relationships in associational and community life. (85)

Given the effect of subjective class identity upon the vote, the effect on subjective class of these consumption sectors is clearly crucial to an understanding of the dynamics of political choice. If such consumption sectors are demonstrated as having a greater impact upon subjective class identity than does objective class position - defined, in Marxian terms, according to the relations of production - then, clearly, consumption sectors and associated status and reference groups may have a more dominant influence upon political behaviour than class interests.

The subjective class identifications of working class electors who owned their own homes were compared with those in non-private housing (Table 36). While working class electors who do not possess a subjective class identity or who identify with the working class are evenly divided between home owners and non-home owners, 86.3% of working class electors who identify with the middle or upper classes are home owners. There is also evidence that middle class electors who identify with the working class are more likely not to own their own homes. While those electors who lack a class identity or who identify with the middle class are equally distributed among the sample of middle class respondents with non-private housing, those who identify with the working class represent almost half of the total sample.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRIVATE HOUSING</th>
<th>NON-PRIVATE HOUSING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS AND UPPER CLASS</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 36. Subjective Class Identity of Working Class Electors: by housing.
Of those working class electors who identified themselves as working class and who supported the Conservative or Alliance parties, 40% were non-home owners and 60% lived in private housing. Of those working class Conservative/Alliance electors who did not identify with the working class, however, 21% did not own their own homes compared with 78.9% who did (Figure 8.4.). Home ownership would appear, from these data, to be related to the exhibition of a deviant subjective class consciousness, and to impact upon voting behaviour in conjunction with a cross-class identification (though not with a non-class identification).

Although home ownership may aid the development of a cross-class subjective identification, it does not appear, from the survey results, to have a larger effect upon subjective class than objective class position. While 57.6% of middle class electors identify with the middle class, only 51.6% of respondents in private housing have a middle class identity. Non-private housing is, in fact, a better guide to subjective class position than private housing and, among the working class, produces results similar to those suggested by objective class position: 53.6% of working class electors identify with the working class, while 56.8% of respondents in non-private housing claim a working class identity. Thus while 48.3% of respondents in private housing do not have a subjective middle class identity, only 43.1% of respondents in non-private housing do not identify with the working class.

It may be suggested, from these data, that home ownership will not alter the vote of a working class elector who identifies with his/her own class, but that, for those working class electors who exhibit cross-class-party political behaviour, home ownership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Private Housing</th>
<th>Non-Private Housing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Class</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working Class</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle Class and Upper Class</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 37. Subjective Class Identity of Middle Class Electors: by housing.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASS IDENTIFICATION</th>
<th>MIDDLE CLASS</th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDENTIFIES WITH CLASS</td>
<td>DOES NOT IDENTIFY WITH CLASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HOUSING: PRIVATE/NON-PRIVATE</td>
<td>PRIVATE</td>
<td>NON-PRIVATE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>19.4%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>38.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.4. Voting By Objective and Subjective Class: by home-ownership.
is very likely to form a part of their sociological profile (Figure 8.4.). Non-private housing may thus prove a useful guide to working class identification, but private housing is a weak indicator of the dynamics of subjective class identity. The weaknesses located in housing as a guide to the vote may thus be similarly applied to its relationship with class consciousness.

Tables 38 and 39 illustrate the relationship of income and subjective class consciousness. No significant associations are found between income and class identity, among either the working class or middle class electors. Lack of class identity, in particular, would seem not to be related to income level, and there would appear to be a tendency for increased income levels to be linked with an increased level of working class identification, among both working class and middle class electors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME</th>
<th>NO CLASS</th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
<th>MIDDLE CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDER £3 000 p.a.</td>
<td>9 26.4%</td>
<td>18 52.9%</td>
<td>7 20.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£3 100 - 6 000</td>
<td>3 20%</td>
<td>7 46.6%</td>
<td>5 33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£6 100 - 8 500</td>
<td>2 14.2%</td>
<td>8 57.1%</td>
<td>4 28.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£8 600 - 15 000</td>
<td>2 15.3%</td>
<td>9 64.2%</td>
<td>2 14.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£15 100 - 20 000</td>
<td>1 50%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1 50%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 38. Subjective Class Identity of Working Class Electors: by income.

The effect of an increasing income upon working class subjective identification and the working class vote would appear to be negligible. Of the working class electors who vote for the Conservative or Alliance parties and who do not identify with the working class, 78.9% earned less than £8 500 per annum and 21% earned more than this level. Of the working class Conservative and Alliance supporters who do not identify with the working class, 80% earned less than, and 20% more than, £8 500 per annum.

From Figure 8.5. it is clear that Conservative voting does not increase as income increases, and that the lack of a congruent subjective class identification is not significantly related to
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Class Identification</th>
<th>Middle Class</th>
<th>Working Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identifies with Class</td>
<td>Does Not Identify with Class</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income Level: Above/Below £8 500</td>
<td>Below</td>
<td>Above</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>23.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alliance</td>
<td>56.3%</td>
<td>29.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Respondents</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8.5. Voting by Objective and Subjective Class: by income level.
a higher level of income. On the contrary, working class electors with a working class identification and an above average income are more likely to vote for the Labour party than for the Conservatives or Alliance. Thus although subjective class identity impacts upon voting behaviour (working class electors lacking a working class identity are less likely to vote for the Labour party), income does not appear to impact upon subjective class identity, and is certainly not as good an indicator of subjective class consciousness as is objective class position.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INCOME</th>
<th>NO CLASS</th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
<th>MIDDLE CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNDER £3000 p.a.</td>
<td>2 13.3%</td>
<td>2 9.5%</td>
<td>4 8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£3100 - 6000</td>
<td>4 26.6%</td>
<td>1 4.7%</td>
<td>4 8.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£6100 - 8500</td>
<td>2 13.3%</td>
<td>7 33.3%</td>
<td>8 17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£8600 - 15000</td>
<td>3 20%</td>
<td>10 47.6%</td>
<td>19 40.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£15100 - 20000</td>
<td>3 20%</td>
<td>1 4.7%</td>
<td>5 10.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OVER £20000</td>
<td>1 6.6%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>7 14.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 39. Subjective Class Identity of Middle Class Electors: by income.

Similar findings were recorded by Nordlinger, who suggested that it is not so much income which is related to subjective class, as economic satisfaction. Among working class Conservatives, writes Nordlinger:

"economic satisfaction is a more powerful explanatory variable in accounting for middle class identification than is income alone...The weaker correlation between the Tories' income and their class identification then becomes only a limited explanation; for it is the sense of economic well-being rather than income alone which leads the Tories to identify as middle class."

This relationship is thrown into relief, suggests Nordlinger, by the lack of a relationship between economic satisfaction and middle class identification among working class Labour voters.
Table 40. Economic Satisfaction and Voting Behaviour.

Table 40 indicates the relationship between economic satisfaction and Conservative voting behaviour among the survey sample. Conservative voting thus appears to decrease with rising income levels, and to increase with rising economic satisfaction. This data is consistent with those produced by Nordlinger, who comments that:

material prosperity alone does not shape party preferences. It is only after material prosperity is related to personal economic satisfaction or dissatisfaction, that income levels help to pattern voting behaviour. The crucial variable is not income, but the degree to which the workers are satisfied or dissatisfied with their economic situation. (89)

The relationship of economic satisfaction to subjective class and voting behaviour is presented in Table 41. While more working class identifiers are economically dissatisfied (66%) than content, and respondents who do not identify with a class are as likely to be economically dissatisfied as satisfied, middle class identifiers are more than three times as likely to be economically satisfied as to be economically discontent. If, however, we consider the levels of economic satisfaction and class identity according to party preference, there would appear to be no significant difference between the Conservative vote among middle class identifiers who are economically satisfied and dissatisfied.

This raises the issue of whether economic satisfaction leads to an increased Conservative vote and to increased middle class identification, or whether:
economic satisfaction is a condition of Conservative voting in so far as it first results in middle class identification, which then results in Conservative voting independently of the economic variable. (90)

It would appear, from the data in Table 41, that it is the latter relationship which is demonstrated among the survey sample, as no relationship is apparent between economic satisfaction and voting behaviour amongst working class identifiers. Working class electors who have a middle class identity, however, are more likely to be economically satisfied than discontent (Table 42).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>SATISFIED</th>
<th>UNSATISFIED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>51.8%</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>73.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>15.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ECONOMIC SATISFACTION</th>
<th>ECONOMIC DISSATISFACTION</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>11 25%</td>
<td>31 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
<td>11 55%</td>
<td>9 45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS</td>
<td>7 43.7%</td>
<td>9 56.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 42. Subjective Class Identification and Level of Economic Satisfaction of Working Class Electors.

It would thus appear that economic satisfaction, like private housing, may lead to Conservative voting among middle class identifiers, but does not valuably affect voting behaviour in itself. Although there is a relationship between cross-class identification and economic satisfaction, the effect of the level of economic contentment upon the vote is not so great as to suggest that subjective
class consciousness is moulded by economic satisfaction. This variable does, however, demonstrate a stronger relationship with class consciousness than do consumption sectors such as housing and income.

Having suggested that affluence and economic circumstance are not superior guides to subjective class consciousness than objective class position, and that they are not responsible for the development of cross-class identification (though they may well be part of it), it is necessary to investigate other possibilities. Goldthorpe and Lockwood write that:

The simple argument that working class affluence leads to a 'middle class' style of life, and that this in turn leads to a decrease in Labour voting, takes no account of the social structure in which class attitudes are formed and maintained. (91)

The effect of three elements of the social structure upon class identity and voting activity - the work environment, the neighbourhood environment and the family environment - were investigated with the survey questionnaire.

The aspect of the work environment which is held very important in structuring both the vote, and class identification and consciousness is trades union membership. Because of the historic relationship between organised labour and the Labour party, trades unionism may be said to impact upon voting choice, and because of the role of trades unions in the development of the British working class, they are believed to play an important part in the development of class consciousness. Both these propositions must be examined as part of an investigation of class-structured politics in Britain, for it is important to determine to what extent unionism may encourage partisanship and to what extent it is part of class consciousness.

The trade union vote is quite clearly connected with a vote for the Labour party among constituency survey respondents. While only 53.3% of Conservative voters and 75.7% of Alliance supporters are trades union members, 95.4% of Labour voters are trades unionists. Having established a relationship between unionism and the vote, however, it is necessary to examine the ways in which this relationship may cut across class lines, in order to determine the ways in which unionism impacts upon the electorate's class consciousness.
Union membership has been found by most survey research to be important in shaping the vote, not only of manual workers, but of non-manual 'middle class' voters. Benney et al. found that trades unionism affected the vote in so far as members of trades unions within each class, were more likely to vote Labour than non-members and that less than 1 in 5 of working class union members voted Conservative. The relationship between class, union membership and vote among the constituency survey sample is presented in Table 43.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WORKING CLASS ELECTORS</th>
<th>MIDDLE CLASS ELECTORS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TRADES UNION MEMBER</td>
<td>NON-TRADES UNION MEMBER</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>20 45.4%</td>
<td>1 2.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>2 11.7%</td>
<td>1 5.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALLIANCE</td>
<td>2 6%</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 43. Vote of Trades Union and Non-Trades Union Members: by class.

54.5% of unionists among the survey sample vote for the Labour party, support which is drawn almost equally from middle and working classes. Although this reflects the strong relationship between unionism and a Labour party vote, the Alliance vote among middle class trades unionists is in fact the largest union vote of the survey sample. The relationship of unionism and the Labour vote is thus strong among the sample of working class electors, but weaker among middle class trade unionists (where 58.4% of the sample do not vote for the Labour party). The strong relationship between working class trade unionists and the vote is also reflected by the small proportion of electors who vote Tory (1 in 10).

The smaller Labour vote among the middle class trades unionists may be explained with reference both to the Labour party and to the trades union movement. It may suggest that union membership does not play a role in developing a working class consciousness, and thus does not influence class-structured political behaviour, or Labour voting. Alternatively, the weak relationship between
middle class trade unionism and a Labour vote may indicate a decline in the association between the Labour party and organised labour, i.e. an erosion of the class base of the Labour party rather than of the trades unions. In examining these hypotheses, it is not only necessary to examine the relationships between trades unions and class and between trades unions and the party system, but to investigate the meaning of trade union membership to all sections of the electorate.

The relationship between class and union membership has been challenged both by developments in the union movement and by economic change. The growth of the service sector and changing economic practices have caused a growth in white-collar unionism which has boosted the number of middle class trade unionists and affected the character of the trades union movement. Because the sorts of unions that workers join varies across classes, the nature of union membership, and its impact upon political beliefs, is varied, and reduces the solidary nature of the trade union movement. This raises the issue of whether 'membership of a union in itself, regardless of the content of that experience' has an effect upon voting behaviour.  

Certainly the data presented in Table 43 would suggest that, whereas union membership among the working class is strongly related to voting choice, middle class unionists do not exhibit a clear party preference. Furthermore, notes Robertson, the fact that comparable proportions of manual (50%-55%) and non-manual (40%) workers belong to trades unions suggest that 'membership at least is not so much a class-related variable as one might think.  

For many workers, trades union membership does not imply the articulation and representation of workers' class interests, or even support for the Labour party, but is rather 'an inevitable corollary of following a particular occupation'. Similarly, Goldthorpe and Lockwood observed that only a small minority of union members in an industrial sample were motivated through moral conviction, and suggested that:

the orientation of workers towards trade unionism reflects their orientation towards their employment generally; and where the latter is predominantly instrumental, it is not to be expected that unionism, anymore than work itself, will be seen as a way of satisfying other than economic needs. (97)
Clearly trades union membership in itself is a weak indicator for the impact of unionisation upon class-structured political behaviour and upon the vote, and what is needed is a new approach to the operationalisation of unionisation. The constituency survey attempted to overcome these problems by adopting three categories to express union membership: union activist; neutral union participant and negative union participant. These codes were devised from respondents answers to questions A5 to A8 of the survey questionnaire, which concerned union membership, nature of union to which respondent belonged, and degree of activism of the union member. These questions measured trades unionism and the extent of participation in trades unions rather than orientation and attitude to trades unions, which were measured by questions B9 to B11, and which were answered by all respondents, and not just the economically active. Thus a respondent may be classed a union activist according to her responses to questions 5 to 8, but may not necessarily perceive trades unions as class-based organisations, or as instruments of the Labour party. Questions 5 to 8 thus considered unions purely as structures.

Union activists were characteristically trade union members who held a union post and always attended union meetings; neutral union members did not often hold trade union posts, but attended meetings occasionally, while negative unionists were probably not union members, except for where a closed shop operated, and were not participant in trade union activities. Supplementary coding information was gleaned from the attitudinal questions (B10), and was particularly helpful in separating neutral unionists from negative unionists.

48% of the total sample, and 75.8% of the economically active sample, were union members and, of these, 60.6% were members of white-collar unions and 39.3% members of blue-collar unions. Only 43% of the unions paid a levy to the Labour party. These figures suggest the proportion of middle class union members located by the survey sample. The dimensions of membership measured by the survey questionnaire suggested that 40.3% of unionists were 'neutral participants', 38.5% were 'union activists' and 21% were 'negative participants'.
The meaning of the union movement to union members was measured by a series of attitudinal questions (BI0). These questions were also answered by non-union members, in order to judge the effect of union membership on orientation to union structures. The questions were designed to articulate the unions as the representative of the working class (items B and H), the importance of solidarity and strike action (items A, C and D) and the importance of consensus (items F and G). Basing responses on the issues of the Labour party, industrial action and consensus, answers were then merged into three attitudinal positions: the unions as reformist organs (the need for more radical class action); the unions as the industrial arm of the Labour party and the working class; and the unions as radical organs (the need for consensus). Each case was surveyed and allocated to a code depending on the proportion of responses in the cluster of answers.

45.6% of the total sample of respondents felt that labour unions were too radical, and stressed the need for consensus, while 34.6% believed they were too reformist. Only 19.6% suggested that labour unions were the representatives of the working class and of the Labour party. If, however, we consider the attitude of unionists to the union movement, a quite different picture emerges (Table 44). Of those union members who consider the unions to be too reformist, 70.3% are union activists, while only 8.1% are negative participants. Of the unionists who were judged to be negatively oriented to their membership, 83.3% believed that the unions are too radical. Neutral union participants are also inclined to view the unions as 'too radical' (57.8%), while equal proportions of neutral participants and union activists suggest that the unions are representative of working class interests and the Labour party.

These data suggest that substantially different meanings are attached to union structures by its membership, and that only a minority of trade union members related trades unionism to working class interests and to a Labour vote. This is particularly true of those members who are negatively oriented towards their membership, only 4% of whom believe the union movement represents working class interests. Because a connection between working class unionists and a Labour vote was observed (Table 43), attitudinal positions were related to class and to party preference (Table 44).
Although the data suggest a relationship between class position and orientation to trades unions, with working class respondents more likely to perceive unions as reformist institutions, and middle class respondents more inclined to view them as radical institutions, a stronger relationship is observed between attitude to the union movement and party preference. This would suggest that unionism is in some way connected to party choice, even if unions are not generally considered the industrial arm of the Labour party, or of the working class.

As the attitudinal question had been asked of all respondents in the sample, and not just the union members, the same analysis was applied to unionists, according to their degree of participation (Table 46). Clearly, union activism is related to a Labour party vote, and to a working class location, while a neutral or negative orientation to union membership is related to a Conservative vote, and a middle class location. Furthermore, working class electors
who are union activists exhibit a very strong tendency to vote Labour: 88.8% (16) respondents in this category are Labour partisans.

The relationship between union membership and voting behaviour would therefore not appear to be as simple as has been assumed by previous researches. Although union membership is linked to a Labour vote, it is mainly among the working class electorate that this relationship is observed, and unionism among the middle class electorate would appear to be negatively related to support for the Labour party. The decline in the solidarity and collective political behaviour of union members is a significant trend, and one that is almost certainly related to the changing class nature of the union movement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
<th>MIDDLE CLASS</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UNION ACTIVIST</td>
<td>66.6%</td>
<td>31.2%</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEUTRAL PARTICIPANT</td>
<td>18.5%</td>
<td>48.4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>54.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEGATIVE PARTICIPANT</td>
<td>14.8%</td>
<td>20.3%</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
<td>46.6%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 46. Class and Party Preference of Union Members: by union activism.

To investigate this thesis, the objective and subjective class status of unionists were examined (Tables 47 and 48). Union membership is clearly not related to a subjective working class identification, as more respondents identified with the middle or upper classes (41.9%) than with the working class (37.5%). Union activists are, however, most likely to identify with the working class, and neutral or negative participants are most likely to identify with the middle or upper classes. Those respondents who do not identify with a class are not distinctive by their degree of trades union activism. As union activists are divided evenly between the middle and working classes, this suggests that active trades union membership and a positive orientation to the trades union movement are likely to accompany middle class identification with the working class, and may be said to impact upon class consciousness. Certainly lack of a congruent subjective class identification is high among middle class electors who are union activists (13.5%), and middle
class electors who are working class identifiers form 25.5% of the total sample of union activists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO CLASS</th>
<th>UNION ACTIVIST</th>
<th>NEUTRAL PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>NEGATIVE PARTICIPANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>65.1%</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS OR UPPER CLASS</td>
<td>18.6%</td>
<td>53.3%</td>
<td>62.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 47. Subjective Class Identification of Union Members: by activism.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE CLASS</th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
<th>MIDDLE CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SUBJECTIVE CLASS</td>
<td>WORKING CLASS</td>
<td>MIDDLE CLASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTIVIST</td>
<td>17 39.5%</td>
<td>4 9.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEUTRAL PARTICIPANT</td>
<td>4 8.8%</td>
<td>2 4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEGATIVE PARTICIPANT</td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>2 8.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 48. Subjective Class Identification and Objective Class Location of Union Members: by activism.

The level of middle class identification with the working class is, however, at 25.9%, representative of results obtained for the total sample (Table 31), which would suggest that union membership among the survey sample does not impact upon subjective class identity to a significant extent among the middle class. The proportions obtained for middle class identification with the 'no class' category among trades union members (16%) is also similar to that obtained for the total sample (18%). Among the working class electorate, however, trades union membership would appear to re-inforce a working class subjective identification, for the level of cross-class identification (6.4%) is significantly less than that obtained for the total sample (24.2%). Lack of a class identification is, however,
unaffected by trades union membership (25.8% among unionists and 21.9% among the total working class electorate). Thus where only 53.6% of the sample working class electorate identified with the working class, 67.7% of working class unionists express a working class identification.

These data again reflect the diverse nature of unionism and the fact that union membership alone cannot be considered a useful indication of either class position (objective or self-assigned) or the vote. Although among some sections of the electorate, and within some union structures and productive sectors, union membership may be assigned a class and/or party meaning, this is certainly not a general effect of unionisation. As D. Robertson suggests:

while union membership may be a functional substitute for class consciousness, it is not the same, nor does class consciousness seem to follow from membership of a union. (101)

Certainly the data for class consciousness among the sample of union members suggests that unionisation does not lead to a significant development of a class perception of society (Table 49). The level of class consciousness is comparable with the results for the total sample (Table 31) in all categories of activism, except for full class consciousness among those who are negatively oriented to their union membership, which is considerably less than the survey result (20%), at 9.5%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTIAL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
<th>UNION ACTIVIST</th>
<th>NEUTRAL PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>NEGATIVE PARTICIPANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>44.4%</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>51.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>52.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FULL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
<th>UNION ACTIVIST</th>
<th>NEUTRAL PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>NEGATIVE PARTICIPANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO CLEAR CLASS/GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
<th>UNION ACTIVIST</th>
<th>NEUTRAL PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>NEGATIVE PARTICIPANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLASSLESS/GROUP CONSCIOUSNESS</th>
<th>UNION ACTIVIST</th>
<th>NEUTRAL PARTICIPANT</th>
<th>NEGATIVE PARTICIPANT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4.7%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 49. Class Consciousness of Union Members.
Union membership would therefore not appear to have a significant impact upon class consciousness and subjective class identity among the electorate generally, although there is some reinforcing of class identity among working class trades union activists. The political implications of unionisation suggested by the survey data appear to have more to do with partisanship than with class, but the class-vote relationship remains stronger than the union-vote relationship, with non-unionised working class electors more likely to vote Labour than unionised middle class electors. Trades unions would therefore not appear, from the evidence, to be primarily 'class' institutions, nor does membership of a trades union necessarily signify a developed 'consciousness' of class, or a class-oriented approach to political behaviour.

Having failed to detect any significant relationship between economic affluence or occupational structures (trades unions) and subjective class, the impact of neighbourhood and domestic environments upon respondents' class identifications were examined. Socialisation at home and within a regional milieu are believed, by some, to exert the predominant influence upon the development of a class consciousness and, in many cases, to have an enduring effect upon orientation to class, even where later adult experiences (in the work environment, and in economic terms) produce cross-pressures upon class identifications.

The thesis of the embourgeoisement of the working class represents a major challenge to theories of class socialisation, for a number of writers perceive working class affluence as a process which undermines working class identification, and suggests a merging, or convergence, of the working and middle classes. Goldthorpe and Lockwood, however, suggest that:

the problem of the 'worker turning middle class' involves a complex process of social change, rather than some straightforward reaction of the individual to altered economic circumstances. It may well be the case that a certain level of affluence is a prerequisite of working class embourgeoisement, being the essential means of supporting a middle class style of life and participation in middle class society. But it is an error to take up a naive economic determinism ...and to regard working class prosperity as providing in itself a sufficient basis for embourgeoisement. (104)
An investigation of contemporary working class politics, and of class identification among the 'new' affluent working class, suggest Goldthorpe and Lockwood, must address itself to the attitude of the working class to the British class structure, and to the perceived opportunities for working class advancement within the class structure. Such research, it is suggested, must also consider the 'relational' aspect of class, i.e. the extent to which changes in the occupational or work milieu exert an influence upon the structuring of social relationships.

It is, writes Goldthorpe:

In the structure of the workers group attachments and not, as many have suggested, in the extent of his income and possessions that an understanding of contemporary working class politics is to be found.

Goldthorpe and Lockwood express caution with regard to the treatment of the economic aspect of class in the thesis of embourgeoisement, and suggest that the 'relational' aspect of the problem - the integration of the affluent working class into middle class status groupings and communities - be considered. In investigating the extent to which class awareness, identification and behaviour may be changed by economic affluence, they note, it is essential to understand the ways in which the 'new working class' are accepted in status groups from which they had previously been excluded, and participate in recreational activities traditionally the preserve of the middle class.

Membership of groups is frequently considered to be a middle class activity, and survey research has indicated little group organisation among the working class. The analysis of group membership and participation in group structures in Chapter Seven suggested that membership and participation in group structures was related to class and determined by the nature and role of the group in the political environment. Group membership, it was suggested, was not significantly related to the vote, but exhibited strong relationships with economic variables and with socio-economic class. The relationship of group membership to class was further examined by establishing the extent to which group members identified with their objective class category (Table 50). Lack of identity with class was not found to be significantly higher among working class electors who are members of groups, but a higher cross-class ident-
ification was found among middle class electors who are not group members. Group membership among the survey sample would therefore appear to re-inforce class identification among middle class electors, but not to affect identification among the working class (the relationship between class and group is discussed in Chapter Nine).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WORKING CLASS</th>
<th>MIDDLE CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDENTIFIES WITH CLASS</td>
<td>DOES NOT IDENTIFY WITH CLASS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUP MEMBER</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
<td>86.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NON-GROUP MEMBER</td>
<td>16.6%</td>
<td>13.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 50. Subjective Class Consciousness of Group Members: by objective class.

Data on class mobility was collected by the survey questionnaire, and included a direct question as to whether respondents believed it was possible to move between classes (question 76), and information on the occupational classifications of respondents' parents (questions 47 and 48). The geographical mobility of respondents was also measured (question 38).

Because maternal occupational class code was frequently that of houseworker (code 60), paternal class code was used to judge the occupational class movement of survey respondents. 74.3% of survey respondents were class coded differently to their fathers and, of these, 52.7% had moved to a higher grade, and 47.2% to a lower occupational class category. The high proportion moving downwards may be attributed, in part, to the class coding of female respondents according to their domestic labour rather than their spouses' employments.

Belief in the ability to move between classes - in either direction - is not significantly related to occupational mobility among the survey sample. Only 16.2% of electors felt it was not possible to move between classes, and 78.9% of electors who did not exhibit occupational mobility felt it was possible to move. Class consciousness does not appear to be significantly related to social class mobility either, although those respondents who tend not to exhibit a clear concept of class, or who exhibit a
negative class consciousness, are more likely to have experienced downwards occupational mobility (Table 52). These data are rather surprising as it is often assumed that upward mobility produces cross-class and non-class identification.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>POSSIBLE TO MOVE CLASSES</th>
<th>NOT POSSIBLE TO MOVE CLASSES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UPWARD CLASS MOBILITY</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOWNWARD CLASS MOBILITY</td>
<td>37.9%</td>
<td>29.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS MOBILITY</td>
<td>24.1%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO. OF RESPONDENTS</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 51. Occupational Class Mobility and Attitude to Openness of Class Structure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>UPWARDLY MOBILE</th>
<th>DOWNWARDLY MOBILE</th>
<th>NO CLASS MOBILITY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>FULL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>25.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PARTIAL CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>32.7%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>23.2%</td>
<td>38.8%</td>
<td>27.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLASSLESS CONSCIOUSNESS</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 52. Occupational Class Mobility: by class consciousness.

43.3% of electors do not identify with their objective class position and, of the non-identifiers, 86.1% exhibit occupational mobility. This figure is higher than that obtained for occupational mobility among the total sample and suggests that cross- or no-class identifiers have a high degree of occupational mobility. Of those electors who have adopted the class identity of their current class location, 44.6% had experienced upward mobility, and only 20.2% downward mobility. Those respondents who had experienced downward mobility were more likely not to adopt the identity of their new class location (64.8% of the downwardly mobile do
not identify with their objective class, while 60.8% of the upwardly mobile had adopted a congruent class identity).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>IDENTIFIES WITH CLASS</th>
<th>DOES NOT IDENTIFY WITH CLASS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UPWARDLY MOBILE</td>
<td>49.6%</td>
<td>37.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOWNWARDLY MOBILE</td>
<td>20.2%</td>
<td>48.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO CLASS MOBILITY</td>
<td>35.1%</td>
<td>13.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NO. OF RESPONDENTS</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 53. Occupational Mobility by Subjective Class Identity.

These data suggest that occupational class mobility affects the development of subjective class identity, depending on the direction of movement between class categories. Downward occupational mobility would appear to be more frequently associated with a failure to develop an identification with the class to which an elector arrives, but this should not be assumed to indicate a loyalty to parental/socialised class position, for downwardly mobile respondents also exhibit an undeveloped class consciousness. Occupational class mobility has been observed to affect the vote in a similar manner to the ways in which it is observed to affect class identity, with two fifths of the upwardly mobile regularly deserting the Labour party for the Conservatives, while only one fifth of the downwardly mobile desert to the Labour party.\(^{109}\)

Goldthorpe and Lockwood suggest that data on working class affluence and social mobility do not produce any 'firm evidence either that manual workers are consciously aspiring to middle class society, or that this is becoming more open to them' and that 'status goals seem much less in evidence than economic goals', even among the 'new' working class groups to whom the thesis of working class embourgeoisement has been applied.\(^{110}\) The embourgeoisement thesis, they note, assumes that the middle class, towards which the new working class is alleged to be moving, is an unchanging and homogeneous grouping.\(^{111}\) In fact, Goldthorpe and Lockwood argue, economic parity has only been achieved with the lower strata of the middle class and, in any case, incomes and consumption patterns alone do not
afford middle class status, but rather such factors as economic security and prospects for advancement, for which there is as yet little evidence among the working class.\textsuperscript{112}

Certainly there would appear, from the constituency survey, to be little evidence that consumption sectors, such as housing and income, affect the class identification of respondents in any systematic way. Affluence is not understood to provoke embourgeoisement among the working class sample, and the data on social class mobility - which do not indicate any significant relationship between mobility and class identification - are consistent with these findings. Subjective class identity is also found not to be significantly related to environmental and group structures in the home or workplace. Objective class position would appear, therefore, to be the strongest indicator of subjective class identity, evidence which leads us to suggest that class identification is related, first and foremost, to the division of labour, and that consciousness of class is structured and informed by the relationship of collectivities of workers to the productive process.

8.4. CONCLUSION: CLASS POLITICS IN BRITAIN

The survey data indicate that the vote is more strongly related to class than to any other variable, and that consumption sectors, such as housing and income, are not significantly associated with electoral behaviour. It was observed that subjective class identification, as an integral part of orthodox Marxian theory, demands careful attention in the analysis of class-structured politics.

The class identity of the survey electorate was found to be most strongly related to objective class position. There is some evidence that failure to exhibit a class identity congruent with objective class location is related to housing position, but consumption sector variables do not generally provide efficient indicators of subjective class identity. Subjective class identity would appear to be primarily structured by objective class position (the division of labour).

The survey electorate were found to exhibit a relatively high degree of class-structured political behaviour, but there was little evidence that the sample had a developed class consciousness.
There was little recognition of the conflictual nature of classes and, although respondents were willing to identify themselves with a socio-economic class, there was little sense of 'belonging' among the sample. We may suggest, from this, that the electors located by the survey sample are 'class aware', but not truly class conscious, and that they may be described as classes 'in themselves' but not yet 'for themselves'.

H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 1964.

9.1. GROUP IDENTIFICATION AND CLASS CONSCIOUSNESS IN BRITISH POLITICS

In reviewing pluralist theory it was suggested that the concept-ualisation of 'groups' as devices through which political activity can be observed and understood fails to take account of the objective dimension of economic interest. The behavioural approach to political systems, it was argued, is inadequate as a paradigm of political society because it cannot identify or measure those political attitudes and behaviours which fall outside the environment of group activities, and particularly those which lack the economic resources to organise effectively. An operationalisation of the 'group' based upon theories of interest and power, which analyses the strength and role of a group through its economic resources, organisation, tactics and membership was therefore proposed.

The organised groups identified during survey research were classified according to their interest, economic resources and access to power, and thus according to the role assigned them by their membership community. Clear differences were observed in the amount and nature of organised group activities in the three survey constituencies. While in Richmond & Barnes and in Guildford there were a plethora of single-issue, political: cause and sectional groups, the groups in Sheffield Attercliffe tended to be much fewer and to be social or recreational organisations based upon the local producer environment (eg. Working Men's Clubs and Community Associations). These regional differences in group politics are reflected in the survey returns, and particularly by the poor response-rate obtained in the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe. Although
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

CLASS CONFLICT OR THE GROWTH OF SECULAR SOCIETY?

"Underneath the Conservative popular base is the substratum of the outcasts and outsiders, the exploited and persecuted of other races, and other colours, the unemployed and the unemployable. They exist outside the democratic process; their life is the most immediate and the most real need for ending intolerable conditions and institutions. Thus their opposition is revolutionary even if their consciousness is not. Their opposition hits the system from without and is therefore not deflected by the system; it is an elementary force which isolates the rules of the game and, in doing so, reveals it as a rigged game."

H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, 1964.

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The organised groups identified during survey research were classified according to their interest, economic resources and access to power, and thus according to the role assigned them by their membership community. Clear differences were observed in the amount and nature of organised group activities in the three survey constituencies. While in Richmond & Barnes and in Guildford there were a plethora of single-issue, political, cause and sectional groups, the groups in Sheffield Attercliffe tended to be much fewer and to be social or recreational organisations based upon the local producer environment (eg. Working Men's Clubs and Community Associations). These regional differences in group politics are reflected in the survey returns, and particularly by the poor response-rate obtained in the constituency of Sheffield Attercliffe. Although
the small Sheffield sample is unsatisfactory and creates problems during comparative regional and statistical analyses, it is argued that, as a product of the local group environment, its inclusion makes an important contribution to the group analysis of British politics.

The relationship between organised group activity and region is, it is suggested, a product of the differing socio-economic fabrics of the survey constituencies. The varying occupational environments of the three regions produce substantially different class and social structures which are reflected in the data obtained for group activity and membership. Group membership is found to be strongly linked to location in the middle, or petit-bourgeois, class and, although group members may be usefully profiled by consumption sectors such as income, home ownership and education, the production cleavage of occupational class is, it is argued, a more significant indicator of group membership.

The effect of group membership upon political identity and behaviour is investigated with reference to the consumer theory of secular voting and to the rise of issue-politics. Members of groups exhibit high levels of partisan voting, particularly for the Labour party, and a largely non-secular orientation to electoral choice. The party system is perceived by group members as ideologically polarised and distinctive, and the two-party share of the vote is high. Although secular voting is found to be related to support for the Liberal/SDP Alliance, group members do not show an increased propensity towards the Alliance or away from the two-party system. Class images of party choice and class-structured voting behaviour are observed among group members, and it is argued that membership of groups, and consciousness of issues, does not significantly orient electors to the party system or to political activity generally, or serve as a focus for political allegiance.

In investigating whether class theory provides a more accurate model of political behaviour than pluralist theory, an orthodox Marxian concept of class, according to relationship in the division of labour, is applied to the survey data. The definition of class with reference to a manual/non-manual distinction of labour, and the relation of consumption sectors to the structuration of classes, is found to be inappropriate for the operationalisation of Marxian theory.
Objective class location is found to be strongly related to the attitudes and political behaviours of the survey sample, and to be the most efficient indicator of voting choice. Subjective class identity is also linked to voting behaviour, and is itself significantly related to occupational class position. The sample thus indicated a high level of class-structured electoral behaviour, both in terms of economic location and subjective identification with class. Non-class structured, or cross-class, voting behaviour was found to take place among those electors who demonstrated a subjective class identity non-congruent with their objective class location. Among this group of voters, consumption sectors (housing, income and education) appeared to play an important role in the development of subjective class identity, and thus to be linked to cross-class voting choice. These consumption sectors were not generally, however, a better indicator of subjective class identity or of the vote than objective class position.

Both class identity and objective class position are found to be strongly linked to party choice. The political distinctiveness of classes is therefore high, and a strong connection is perceived, by the sample electorate, between class interests and party system. This is particularly true of electors exhibiting high levels of partisanship, and of Labour party supporters. Parties are thus regarded as class institutions, and the electoral system as an adversarial two-party competition between distinctive groupings.

Class position is therefore found to be politically significant in so far as it structures voting choice, but an investigation of other dimensions of class theory suggested that class consciousness among the survey electorate is relatively undeveloped. Although willing to assign a class identity to themselves, and aware of class boundaries, survey-respondents do not exhibit strong feelings of class membership, or perceive class interests in conflictual terms, and little evidence of developed class consciousness was observed. Class identity would therefore seem to relate primarily to the party environment, and the structuration of voting choice.

It is therefore suggested that, although derived from class interests, attachment to party is a stronger and more salient allegiance than attachment to class, and that party membership, party conflict and party consciousness are more meaningful concepts to the electorate than those of class. A notable exception to
this is found among working class electors who exhibit a strong perception of and orientation to class, and who express dissatisfaction at the Labour party's commitment to class interests: these electors are also most likely to demonstrate a developed class consciousness and to attribute importance to class conflict. Generally, however, there is no evidence that political parties are significantly involved in the development of class interests or class consciousness, inspite of their recruitment of largely class distinctive support, and the connection made, by the electorate, between party and class interests. This, it is suggested, is consistent with a Marxian class analysis of the role and nature of political parties.

It is thus suggested that while the sample electorate exhibit a class awareness and behave, politically, in class distinctive cohorts, there is little evidence of class consciousness among the survey-respondents. One may thus argue that the survey sample are a class 'in itself', but not yet a class 'for itself'. While objective class position appears to provide a stronger focus of political identity and behaviour than group membership, it was felt useful to consider the relationship between group and class identification with reference to those respondents who displayed a strong orientation to group and to class. Those respondents who exhibited 'full class consciousness' were therefore selected from the sample and subject to further analysis.

A compound variable was formed from respondents who believed that social class was an important part of British society, who thought class conflict was very or fairly important, who expressed a clear class identity, and who exhibited a dichotomic class conception or partial class consciousness. These electors were re-categorised as 'class conscious', and compared with the sample of group members.

The sample of class conscious respondents totalled 48, or 27.4% of the total sample. These respondents were distributed fairly evenly throughout the constituencies with 21 (29.6%) in Richmond & Barnes, 20 (24.7%) in Guildford and 7 (30.4%) in Sheffield Attercliffe. They were also representative of the distribution of class categories within the three regions: 53.1% of the total sample of fully class conscious electors were drawn from the middle and upper classes, and 46.8% from the working class. The party preferences of class conscious respondents do not form any significant
groupings (Table 1). While the majority of class conscious respondents give their vote to the Labour party (52.6%), they form only 30.3% of total Labour partisans. Liberal/SDP Alliance supporters who are also class conscious, however, form 37.8% of the total Alliance vote.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VOTE</th>
<th>AS % OF TOTAL PARTY VOTE</th>
<th>AS % OF TOTAL CLASS CONSCIOUS VOTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>30.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Party Preference of Class Conscious Respondents: total sample.

141 cases were included in the sample of group members: 58 (81.7%) of these respondents located in Richmond & Barnes, 68 (84%) of Guildford respondents and 15 (65.2%) of Sheffield Attercliffe respondents. The proportion of class conscious respondents in each constituency who were also members of groups was found to be comparable to overall constituency figures for group membership, except for in Sheffield Attercliffe where class conscious respondents were less likely to be group members than were the overall Sheffield sample (57.1%). Those group members exhibiting class consciousness, as a proportion of all group members, is also regionally comparable at 30%.

The group of class conscious respondents and group members were compared on several variables in order to calculate any significant differences in the sample means of the two groups. While there were no significant statistics for economic variables, such as housing, there were significant differences in the results calculated for political variables, and particularly with respect to the party system. Thus an examination of attitudes to the Liberal/SDP Alliance's competency for government and effect upon the political system produced significantly different sample means among group members and class conscious respondents, as did an examination of the class nature of the political parties (Figure 9.1.). These data suggest that the political attitudes of class conscious respondents and group members differ significantly, particularly with
<table>
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<tr>
<th>VARIABLE</th>
<th>SHEFFIELD ATTERCLIFFE</th>
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<th>GUILDFORD</th>
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</thead>
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<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES/ GUILDFORD</td>
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<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES/ GUILDFORD</td>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
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<td>GUILDFORD</td>
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<td>ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION</td>
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<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES/ GUILDFORD</td>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
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<tr>
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<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES/ GUILDFORD</td>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
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<td>GUILDFORD</td>
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<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES/ GUILDFORD</td>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
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<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES/ GUILDFORD</td>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
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<td>ATTITUDE TO COMPENSATION AT GO4</td>
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<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES/ GUILDFORD</td>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
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<td>Guildford/ Richmond &amp; Barnes</td>
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<td>-------------------------------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ability to Move Between Classes</td>
<td>Guildford/ Richmond &amp; Barnes</td>
<td>0.000/ 0.000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 9.1. Variables for which significant differences in the sample means of group members and class conscious respondents were calculated.
regard to the perception of class interests and the party system. Full 'class' and 'group' identities may therefore be understood to structure attitudinal position and electoral orientation.

One may therefore surmise that, while class conscious respondents and group members do not demonstrate distinctive economic profiles (and in particular are not located in congruent class categories), they do exhibit some significant differences in their attitudinal profiles. Because of the observed overlap between class consciousness and group membership, however, it is likely that the relationship between class and group politics is not as distinct as these data may suggest. Clearly, we may be observing the effect upon political attitude of something other than class or group identity, either because of the weakness of the compound variable for class consciousness, or because class or group identity operates via another institution (eg. the party system) rather than directly upon the elector. This argument is consistent with previous observations about the nature of party affiliation, and the perception of class interests through the lens of the party struggle.

Are groups and group identity therefore replacing class consciousness, and can we view group and class theory as two mutually exclusive and competing models of political behaviour? If we can understand all political phenomena through 'the group', what role can we assign to the observed effect of class and class identity upon political behaviour? In investigating the relationship between group and class, it is important to address the issue of whether group phenomena can be better understood through class than through group, or whether group theory might provide a coherent explanation for class struggle and the future of class politics.

9.2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CLASS AND GROUP: A CLASS THEORY OF GROUP POLITICS

Although 'class', and identification with class, are observed to play an important role in British political behaviour, it has been noted that class interests and class conflict are articulated within the boundaries of the party system which, when viewed from an orthodox class position, is found to be an unsatisfactory vessel for the transmission of working class interests. Political institut-
ions, like the Labour party and trades unions, are therefore perceived to absorb working class pressures within the political order, and to sustain the predominance of a ruling interest. The supremacy of the ruling class, it is argued, has enabled it to subvert class organisation to a complex and bureaucratised system of governmental organisation, in which traditional representatives of class interest have become merely platforms for the aggregation and articulation of various group interests. Class demands are thus perceived to be satiable only when formally drawn into the policy community through institutionalisation, and articulated through the new group structures. They are therefore likely to be frustrated by the State bureaucracy which allows group demands to proceed, unless their conflictual nature is reduced, and consensus is stressed.

This growth in State bureaucracy, and in group politics, is explained as a political response to the corporatisation of economic interest. Changes in the world environment, it is argued, and an increasing emphasis on issues, requires new transmission belts and governmental machineries in order that demands be satisfied. The strengthening of State apparatuses through group representation of interest is therefore firmly linked to developments in the economic base of society.

The incorporation and institutionalisation of interests through group structures is, however, dependent upon resources, and within the framework of group politics, it is suggested, an elite of groups emerges which have access to centres of power. These powerful group interests are perceived to exclude those interests which cannot be fashioned so as to be channelled through group structures (eg. interests which lie outside the politico-cultural environment) or which lack economic power. The effect of this, it may be suggested, is that group interests polarise in strength on economic lines, and a re-alignment of class takes place within the group environment. This thesis would suggest that, rather than displacing and eroding class and class consciousness, groups may form part of a cycle of interest representation in which economic organisation dictates the form of political structures.

Thus the new group environment may be understood to weaken the solidarity and mobilisation of class demands through its political institutions, and to foster division within classes by splitting
class interests into multiple issues. This process is particularly observed within trades unions and the Labour party, but is also more generally applicable to the orientation of society to consumer instead of producer issues. This approach to political demands is felt to isolate electors from the influence of the workplace, and of class interests produced by the division of labour. Consciousness of class interests is also felt to be displaced by group interests in so far as the demands of group politics are issue-oriented and have a short-term, realistic focus, while class consciousness has a weaker focus, and labours to a higher, ideological and long-term end.5

While this weakening of class identity in the group environment may be perceived to impede and reduce the mobilisation of classes, it does not necessarily erode the objective reality of class, and if the group environment is subject to polarisation and exclusion of interest, a new alignment of class interest may occur. R. Alford writes:

Whether all group formations, not merely social class, are losing political relevance, and thus leaving no important mediating identifications between voter and nations is another frequently argued question... secularisation and the dwindling of various parochial identifications may actually be leaving social class as the strongest remaining source of political identity. (6)

It is thus to the future of the new class and group politics that we now turn.

9.3. CORPORATISATION OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF CLASS POLITICS

The modern corporate State, with its concentration of economic interest, has developed a powerfully centralised policy-community. H. Spiro suggests that this increasingly tight and complex economic and political interdependence has led some interests to:

Perceive their own situation as peripheral to the interests of the 'rationally' enmeshed others, and/or led these groups to perceive the very complexity of the total nexus as beyond comprehension and therefore also beyond exploitation in their own interests. (7)
Thus the growing efficiency with which some interests are represented and reconciled, is balanced by an increasingly total exclusion of the less powerful economic interests. The result, argues R. Dahl, is that the more disadvantaged groups, unable to adopt the norms of functioning through the existing political mechanisms, remove themselves from the 'normal' processes of government. Their frustration at what they perceive as weaknesses in the governmental process therefore encourages politicisation external to the institutions and symbols of the capitalist system. Thus the apparent powerlessness of the economically disadvantaged - who possess neither security, representation nor contact with formal political interest structures - may emerge as an independent and effective force, mobilised through alternative channels.

Some political sociologists have explained the growth of single-issue direct action groups (eg. Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament), unorganised and spontaneous direct action (eg. in Continental Europe in 1968 and in the urban cities of Britain in 1981 and 1985); and international terrorism in terms of disaffection from and disbelief in existing political institutions. The success of such protest is perceived to be a result of the growing 'indeterminacy and amorphousness in the power situation' and the 'evaporation' of traditional power structures. The modern corporate State, it is suggested, in strengthening the economic and political policy-community, simultaneously develops weak systemic links at which attacks may be directed. Thus corporatism excludes the economically disadvantaged, fuelling alternative political orientation and identification, and providing foci for the release of protest.

G. Ionescu explains such identifiable and disruptive pressure as: 'the direct effect of the growing impact of the industrial-technological revolution on the political structures, as well as on the economies, of the countries in which it has occurred.' He analyses these new centres of power in terms of two conflicting, inversely-related forces: the centrifugal tendencies of society and the centripetal tendencies of politics. Because corporations are agents of decentralisation and 'intrinsically and fundamentally opposed to the centralising agent of society; the State', Ionescu believes that the corporations uphold 'their own limited interest against the more general interest and thus act centrifugally against the purposes of the national interest'. This fundamental opposition
creates, suggests Ionescu, an 'a-potent' society where centrifugal forces demand a new, unifying political structure.\[^{13}\]

Class theory, in positing the breakdown of capitalist power structures and of the social order, emphasises the growing conflict between society and humanity (centrifugal) and State and citizenry (centripetal). Marxian sociology thus assumes a 'coercive', or force, approach to power, whereby the State is viewed as the instrument through which societal coercion is legitimated, positing obedience by fear.\[^{14}\] By contrast, group theorists stress negotiated order via the aggregation and satisfaction of organised interests, ie. a 'value-consensus' theory of power.

Consensus theory advocates negotiated order through the management of political agenda.\[^{15}\] The weaknesses of such an approach has been well noted by C. Offe who suggests that this process has shifted attention away from the adequacy of policy responses to the manageability of political inputs. This 'political rationality', or the desire to satisfy manifest and latent interests, has become a system whereby demands and interests are shaped and channelled by the system to make them satiable, rather than satisfied.\[^{16}\] L. Dion, meanwhile, has observed that the elimination of overload through the creation of new mechanisms may well generate its own weaknesses and contradictions.\[^{17}\] Pressure groups, political parties and the media have, he believes, not succeeded in channelling pressures towards the system, but have provoked social stagnation and direct action.\[^{18}\]

Conflict (or force) theory perceives that those interests which challenge the rules of demand - satisfaction, or are peripheral to the satiation-process, cannot be reconciled through consensual politics. Excluded interests are thus forced to obey the negotiated order, or to attack the fundamental 'habit-background' from which the governmental process springs. Attacks on the habit-background of a society are thus emphasised by conflict theorists as an indication of the actual dissensus, and inevitable failings of, a system which excludes and alienates some interests.

M. Weber has suggested that a 'State' can be said to cease to exist, in any relevant sense, whenever there is 'no longer a probability that certain kinds of meaningfully oriented social action will take place'.\[^{19}\] Increasingly, and inspite of pleas for consensus, there is evidence that in certain regions, and among
certain social and economic groups, 'meaningfully oriented social action' is being displaced by the phenomenon of 'anomic man'.

It has been suggested that the extent of 'anomie' within a society is most appropriately measured through the examination of participation within a polity. Falling levels of electoral participation, it is argued, indicate a withdrawal from, and dissatisfaction with, existing political machineries. The pluralists, however, claim that non-participation suggests, not that the system of representation may be flawed, but that a new working definition of 'democracy' is required. This acquiescence of citizens, argues S.M. Lipset, indicates a decline in conflictual ideology, and particularly in class conflict, and the emergence of a new ideology based on the agreement to disagree, or consensus. I.D. Balbus, however, argues:

instead of treating the datum that most Americans do not express interest in most political issues as a normative problem or defect, pluralists have typically attempted to transform this defect into either a 'natural law' of politics or else a political virtue. Non-participation - ie. the failure of citizens to express preferences with respect to those things which affect their life-chances - doesn't mean there is anything wrong with the political system; it simply means, according to the pluralist line of reasoning, that there has been something wrong with those theories of democracy which have emphasised the critical importance of citizen participation. (23)

An economic, class analysis of anomie emphasises the alienating forces of the division of labour and the economic organisation of society, and observes anomie behaviour both in terms of falling levels of electoral participation and of revolutionary anger directed against the system. S. Berger writes:

Precisely those features of capitalism that stabilise representation - the organisational monopolies, the clearly defined jurisdictions, the exercise of public authority by private groups, the possibilities for organisational control of members, the bureaucratisation of interest groups - all widen the gap and harden the lines that separate the represented from the excluded. (24)

Marxian theorists have stressed the lack of economic resources, and particularly the role of unemployment, in producing alienated and 'anomic' individuals who lack representation within the political system, and whose orientation to political culture is weak. Marx derived the concept of alienated labour from the economic
division of labour; property relations, he suggested, alienate
the labourer from the product of his labour, from the producing
activity itself, and from himself and the human species. This
process of alienation was understood as an essential part of the
development of a revolutionary class consciousness, and of the
conflict between labour and capital, and thus 'immiseration' and
alienation, suggested Marx, would develop most rapidly among the
unemployed, or the 'Industrial Reserve Army'.

Political sociologists have drawn attention to the increasing
levels of unemployment in Britain with reference to Marxian theory,
and have particularly stressed the geographical nature of the polarisation between unemployed and employed. The unemployed, suggests F.F. Ridley, are increasingly alienated by a political system which frustrates their ability to mobilise, partly because of the psychological effects of unemployment and the attitude of the employed, but mostly because of the political structures which prevent the articulation of their interests.

Only by becoming a real pressure group can the unemployed secure their interests, writes Ridley, but, in spite of "Mrs Thatcher's temporary dismantling of the 'corporate State', the cake is sliced to the advantage of powerful interest groups." The lack of a powerful voluntary sector cause group for the unemployed is, he notes, both an indictment of society and an indication of the need for economic resources in order to organise. The effect, he suggests, is that large numbers, and especially those who live in deprived areas, are becoming alienated from the socio-political system.

Ridley asks whether the present system can contain the frustrations of 'those who have no access to the politico-economic system and cannot defend their interests through pressure group channels', and concludes that, although governmental policy has some power, 'the unemployed will still need to get the strength of organisation behind them to compete effectively in the battle of interests.'

The weakness of organisation among the unemployed was observed during the administration of the constituency survey, and prevented the inclusion of a substantial number of economically inactive respondents. Attempts to contact non-organised electors during a pilot survey had proved unsuccessful, and further attempts to locate non-organised unemployed through various class-based associa-
tions and through Job Centres also failed. This proved to be one of the most disappointing aspects of the research project, for it was originally hoped to perform comparative analysis on organised and non-organised electors. Because effective contact with electors necessitated an approach through group structures, however, the sample is overwhelmingly composed of the organised.

Consideration was, however, given to the theory of alienation during data analysis, and substantial attention was paid to the survey levels of political participation. While the organised were found to be slightly better oriented to electoral structures than the non-organised, no significant statistics were computed. The construction of a compound variable for alienation did, however, suggest a significant difference in regional sample means (0.005), indicating a relationship between socio-political alienation and geographical location.

There would, therefore, seem to be various evidences that polarisation in Britain is following geographical lines according to economic resources, and that these divisions are reflected in group organisation and exclusion from interest politics. The possible directions of extra-Parliamentary class politics have been discussed above, and the electoral implications of such developments are considered below, with reference to the 1987 General Election results.

9.4. POSTSCRIPT: THE 1987 GENERAL ELECTION*

The state of the poll at the June 1987 Election proved unremarkably similar to that of 1983, with the Conservatives holding steady a 42.3% share of the vote, a nationwide swing to the Labour party of 2.5% producing a 30.8% share of the vote, and the Alliance slipping three percentage points to 22.6%. Regionally, however, there was a distinct polarisation of party support, with the Conservative vote collapsing in the north, Liverpool, Wales and Scotland, while the Labour party failed to make any significant advances in the south, south-east, London or the Midlands. The geographical 'north-south' division of the vote thus refers, not only to the north of England, but to Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, and represents

* An account of the Election results in the survey constituencies and of the re-contacting of survey-respondents during the 1987 campaign can be found in Appendix E.
a divide between the south of England and the Midlands, and the rest of the United Kingdom.

The regional division of the vote in England reflects the sharpening cleavage between economic deprivation and prosperity. The political polarisation of the electorate describes an economic gulf between industrial and manufacturing centres experiencing high levels of unemployment and urban decline, and centres of economic expansion based upon the service industries and new technologies. The political division of Britain may therefore be understood to express the opposition between capital and labour in Britain, and the conflict between class interests.

The 1987 results, writes I. Crewe, suggest that:

class rather than age or sex remain the primary shaper of the vote, and the stark north-south variation in the swing immediately suggests a sharpening of the class polarisation in the vote. (34)

Crewe, however, argues that the real political division among electors is between the traditional and the new working class, and that class voting at the election did not significantly increase. On the contrary, he writes, the Conservative vote held steady 'because they made further inroads into the working class', while middle class support for the Conservative party fell significantly. The Conservatives, he points out, are the first party of manual workers in the south, among owner-occupiers and non-unionists, while the Labour party draws support from council tenants and the public sector. Thus, Crewe argues, while the Labour party remained largely working class, the working class is no longer largely Labour. Furthermore, he writes, the steady expansion and re-structuring of the new working class means that Labour's traditional class base is dwindling further, and 'demography and time are not on Labour's side.'

Crewe's analysis of the relationship between class and vote is based upon a traditional definition of class according to a manual/non-manual divide, the weaknesses of which have been discussed above. Clearly, however, a Marxian definition of class according to the relations of production would produce similar, and probably larger, proportions of cross-class voting. The division of the vote at the Election may therefore be more accurately understood as one between the severely economically disadvantaged and the
rest of the country. Indeed, this trend was noted by political commentators who, instead of referring to a division between the 'haves and have-nots', spoke of the 'haves, the have-nots and the have-lots'. It would appear that the haves are voting, not with the members of the working class who 'have not', but with the 'have-lots', to whom they aspire.

Such a polarisation is, as Crewe notes, one that splits the working class, but the important point about it is that it is a divide which increases the gulf between the disadvantaged and the rest of society and, according to class theory, is a divide across which the 'haves' may fall (even though they attempt to avoid it in their political identification) because of the insecurity of their economic position. The opening of this gulf is thus an integral part of a class analysis of political behaviour, and to dismiss the implications of the conflict between the interests of each bloc, merely because the polarisation doesn't closely follow defined class lines - and particularly those based upon a manual/non-manual divide - is to ignore the dialectical construction of class boundaries around a primary economic cleavage.

The regional division of England thus follows economic lines and may be indicative of the polarisation of classes, as suggested by class theory. To what extent, however, may the electorate be understood to have perceived such class interests at the 1987 Election, and to have voted according to class identification? Inspite of indications that the party system is less able to represent adversarial class interests due to a distinct convergence of the class appeal of the Labour and Conservative parties, the electorate would appear to continue to filter their class interests through the party system.

The Labour party, for example, won the majority of its support from the economically depressed areas in the north and failed, inspite of an attempt to win the cross-class vote, to make any significant inroads among the affluent working class or the middle classes. The Labour party conducted an election campaign notably lacking in reference to socialist principle, or class interests, and from which traditional class institutions, organisations and representatives (eg. trades unions) were excluded. This attempt to appeal to the whole electorate, rather than to the working class alone, was launched with a professional party machinery and 'Presidential' campaign. Mr Kinnock, wrote The Observer, 'has made it clear
that his aim is to pitch the party's appeal in such a way as to get elected, which has meant moving it back towards the centre.\textsuperscript{38}

This convergence of the class appeal of the major parties suggests that the polarised vote was not produced by any actual class polarisation of the party system, but rather by historical, local and electoral factors which affected the Labour vote. Thus electors in areas of economic decline may well have voted Labour because of its historical associations with public issues, and its traditional connection with the working class interest. This may have worked in combination with 'electoral factors', in so far as there was a lack of any effective electoral alternative to the Labour party.\textsuperscript{39} Finally, local factors may help to explain the large Labour vote in the north, for there are indications that, in inner cities and areas of economic decline, local Labour party organisation and objective is significantly more radical than that of the national party, and a Labour vote may thus carry a significantly different meaning in these areas of the country.\textsuperscript{40} Thus although the Labour party did not overtly recruit a traditional class vote, this was accrued either as part of its heritage, due to local factors, or because the Labour party represented the only electoral option for this section of the electorate.\textsuperscript{41}

The electorate's propensity to perceive the party system as a vehicle for class interests, and particularly to view the Labour party as a party of the working class, is also suggested by the rejection of the Labour party among the affluent working class and in the south of England. The Labour party - which tried to play the Conservative party at their own game and to compete on the same grounds, for the same vote, as the Conservatives - were unable to successfully challenge the Tories because of their inability to mobilise the 'national interest' to their cause. The Conservatives sales-profile of authority, experience and patriotism was one on which they had a monopoly, and the Labour party were successfully portrayed, by the Conservatives, as a sectional class group who would abandon the national interest and cause Britain's 'downfall'. Thus the Conservatives mobilised their traditional appeal - a cross-class appeal to the national interest - and warded off the Labour party's challenge to their traditional right to this interest. Furthermore, the Conservatives succeeded in mobilising the aspirations of the 'haves' to the 'have lots', so dividing the working class
vote further, while the Labour party did not adequately mobilise the fear of economic insecurity or disadvantage.

The party system would therefore appear to represent class interests in so far as the Conservative party directed its appeal at the working class vote and the Labour party was unable - inspite of an attempt to win cross-class support - to move away from its class-base. More importantly, however, party choice is, in the perception of the electorate, a class-based activity.

Further supporting evidence for this may be drawn from the reduction in the Liberal/SDP Alliance vote. The Alliance continued to direct its appeal at floating voters, and abstainers, and stressed, in its manifesto, the need to break with class interests and adversarial politics. The electorate overwhelmingly rejected the Alliance, and the Labour party was able to collect most of the deserting Alliance vote. Far from breaking the two-party, class mould of British politics, the Alliance broke its own back and, although this has been attributed to organisational problems with the dual leadership, it would seem fair to suggest that their failure represents a rejection of policy, as well as of party.

The electorate's rejection of the Alliance may also be interpreted, theoretically, as a failure of secular, issue-politics to organise electors and to provide a focus of political allegiance, even when mobilised within a party structure. Class interests would seem to remain pertinent to electoral choice, and salient to the electorate - even where a reduction in the class appeal and interests of the party are evident. It may therefore be argued that class does perform a major role in the structuring of political attitudes and behaviours, and that there is little evidence that overtly non-class based appeals are embraced by the electorate.

What does appear to be changing, then, is not the class base of political activity, but the identification of class interest, and the shape of classes. The electoral polarisation of Britain in 1987 may represent an increased gulf between interests in conflict, and a new boundary across which class interests will be structured. The identification of (objectively) working class electors with the advantaged rather than disadvantaged does not invalidate such a class analysis, for economic insecurity - and particularly unemployment - ensures that no worker is protected from a fall across this divide, and thus from the development of subjective class consciousness.
The economic divisions in Britain may thus be considered the motor of political division, and of class-structured politics.

Such a scenario may encourage the Labour party to shift back, sharply, to a working class base in order to represent the new, propertyless working class. Thus a polarisation of the electorate may stimulate a polarisation of party. The disadvantaged section of the electorate may, however, finding themselves excluded from the institutions of British political culture, including the party system, develop a revolutionary class consciousness, and thus pursue extra-Parliamentary political identification and behaviours. It is to this situation that Marcuse's bleak vision of the future - quoted at the opening of this chapter - refers.
QUESTIONNAIRE

SECTION A

IF YOU ARE NOT CURRENTLY EMPLOYED PLEASE GO STRAIGHT TO SECTION B.

1. If you are currently earning, what is your occupation?  
(If you have more than one job, please state hours worked in each.)  
A. .................................................................

2. How long have you held your current job?  
A. .................................................................

3. Are you paid weekly or monthly?  
A. .................................................................

4. If you receive a weekly wage, approximately how many hours a week do you work overtime?  
A. .................................................................

5. Are you a member of a Trade Union or Professional Association?  
Yes  
No  
If you answered 'Yes', please give name.  
A. .................................................................

6. Does a closed shop operate?  
Yes  
No  

7. Do you hold any post in your Trade Union or Professional Association?  
Yes  
No
8. Do you attend Union or Association meetings?

   Yes
   No

   If you answered 'Yes', approximately how many times a year do you attend?

   A. .................................................................

9. a) Does your Union or Professional Association pay a political levy to the Labour Party?

   Yes
   No

b) Are you aware that you have the right not to pay the levy?

   Yes
   No

c) Have you exercised your right not to pay the levy?

   Yes
   No
LISTED BELOW ARE VARIOUS STATEMENTS AND VIEWS EXPRESSED ABOUT BRITAIN. COULD YOU SAY WHETHER YOU AGREE OR DISAGREE WITH THEM, GENERALLY.

10. a) The Trades Unions today have too much power and are too ready to strike.
   Agree
   Disagree

b) The Trade Union Movement is not what it once was and no longer represents working people.
   Agree
   Disagree

c) The recent miners' strike was justified.
   Agree
   Disagree

d) The recent miners' strike failed because other workers didn't give them enough support.
   Agree
   Disagree

e) Individuals today have too much power.
   Agree
   Disagree

f) Workers and management should be more ready to discuss problems and negotiate.
   Agree
   Disagree

g) Arthur Scargill was a main cause of the miners' strike and made an early settlement impossible.
   Agree
   Disagree

h) Trades Unions are the only safeguard of working class interests.
   Agree
   Disagree
11. As you may be aware the Government has banned Trade Unions at its Communication Headquarters at Cheltenham. Do you think the Government is right to do this?

Yes

No

Workers at Government Communication Headquarters at Cheltenham have been offered £1,000 to give up this Trade Union membership. Do you think they are right to accept this money?

Yes

No

12. How concerned are you with politics?

Not at all

Only as it affects my immediate interests

Interested in local and national politics

Very interested in politics

13. Do you happen to be a card-carrying member of a political party?

Yes

No

14. If you buy a newspaper, or read one regularly, which is it?

A. ..............................................................

15. How much say do you feel you have in how the country is governed?

A lot

Enough

Hardly any

None

16. Do you think this is the way things ought to be?

Yes

No
17. **How would you describe the British Political system?**

- Capitalist
- Socialist
- Totalitarian
- Liberal-Democracy
- Communist
- Military Regime
- Police State
- Dictatorship
- None of the above (please specify)

18. Did you happen to vote in the last General Election (1983)?

- Yes
- No

19. Do you vote in Elections?

- Never
- Occasionally
- Usually
- Always

20. If you never vote, or vote only occasionally, which of the following do you feel most accurately describes your reasons?

- My vote wouldn't change anything
- I am not well-informed enough to use my vote properly
- I don't care
- I don't support the positions of any of the Parties which stand for election
- Other (please specify)

21. If you usually or always vote, do you always vote for the same party or not?

- Yes
- No
22. If you have always voted for the same party, would you do so tomorrow, if there were a General Election?

Yes

No

23. If you haven't always voted for the same party, do you remember which party you voted for in the last General Election (1983)?

A.

24. If you didn't vote in 1983, was this deliberate? Please give reasons.

A.

25. If you haven't always voted for the same Party, which Party would you vote for if there were a General Election tomorrow?

A.

26. IF YOU ALWAYS VOTE FOR THE LABOUR PARTY, could you please read the following statements and tick the boxes of the opinions you agree with.

a) Labour is the only Party genuinely concerned with the interests of working people.

b) I would feel a lot happier with the Labour Party if the militant groups were expelled.

c) I feel much happier with the Labour Party now its more moderate politicians have left to form the Social Democratic Party.

d) I would never consider voting for the SDP/Liberal Alliance.

e) I am concerned about the internal disunity in the Labour Party and may vote for the Alliance or Conservatives at the next Election because of this.

f) If the Labour Party doesn't pledge support for the Welfare State and the working people at the next Election I shall consider voting to the left of Labour or for an Independent candidate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>a</th>
<th>b</th>
<th>c</th>
<th>d</th>
<th>e</th>
<th>f</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

6.
27. IF YOU ALWAYS VOTE FOR THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, could you please read the following statements and tick the boxes of the opinions you agree with.

a) I fully support the Thatcher administration and believe it has revived the spirit of Conservatism.

b) I find the nature of today's Conservative Party a little off-putting.

c) Unemployment levels in Britain, and the general economic climate, may force me to consider not voting Conservative at the next General Election.

d) The cuts in Education and Welfare are unfortunate but necessary if Britain is to recover her economic position.

28. IF YOU VOTED SDP/LIBERAL ALLIANCE AT THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION, which Party did you previously vote for, usually?

A. ..............................................................................................

29. PLEASE ANSWER THIS QUESTION WHICHEVER PARTY YOU VOTED FOR AT THE LAST GENERAL ELECTION.

a) Do you think that the SDP/Liberal Alliance has enough experience for Government?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

b) Do you think that the Alliance has changed the nature of the British political system?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

If you answered 'Yes', please specify:

A. ..............................................................................................

..............................................................................................

..............................................................................................
30. Considering the Labour, Conservative and SDP/Liberal Alliance, how much difference would you say there is between them? Would you say there was:

- A great deal of difference
- Some difference
- No difference at all

31. It is sometimes said that Britain is a two-party system (Conservatives and Labour). Do you think this is an accurate description of British politics today?

32. Do you think that Political Parties serve the interests of a particular class, primarily?

- Yes
- No

If you answered 'yes', could you indicate which parties:
SECTION C

PLEASE TICK THE APPROPRIATE BOXES IN ANSWER TO THESE GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT YOURSELF.

33. Male [ ] Female [ ]

34. Age Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>18 - 25</th>
<th>26 - 40</th>
<th>41 - 65</th>
<th>66 - 75</th>
<th>Over 75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

35. Annual Income

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual Income Range</th>
<th>18 - 25</th>
<th>26 - 40</th>
<th>41 - 65</th>
<th>66 - 75</th>
<th>Over 75</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under £3,000 per annum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£3,100 - £6,000 per annum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£6,100 - £8,500 per annum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£8,600 - £15,000 per annum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>£15,100 - £20,000 per annum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over £20,100 per annum</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36. What is your current employment status?

- [ ] Employed
- [ ] Housewife
- [ ] Unemployed
- [ ] Student
- [ ] Pensioner
- [ ] Other (Please specify) [ ]

37. Which of the following applies to you?

- [ ] Single
- [ ] Married
- [ ] Divorced/Separated
- [ ] Widowed

38. Where were you born?

A. ..............................................

9.
39. Where were your parents born?
   A. ........................................................................

40. Are you buying your own home?
   Yes
   No

41. If not, which of the following types of accommodation applies to you?
   House, flat or room rented privately
   House or flat rented from your Local Authority
   Hostel, dormitory or other institution
   Living with Parents or relatives

42. How long have you lived there?
   A. ........................................................................

43. In what type of accommodation did/do your parents live?
   A. ........................................................................

44. Do you own a car?
   Yes
   No

45. Do you have any children?
   Yes
   No
   If you answered 'Yes', how many do you have?
   A. ........................................................................

46. How large was the family you grew up in as a child?
   A. ........................................................................
47. What was your father's occupation?
A. .................................................................

48. What was your mother's occupation?
A. .................................................................

49. What type of secondary school did you attend (e.g. Comprehensive, Secondary Modern, Grammar, Public etc.)?
A. .................................................................

50. At what age did you leave school?
A. .................................................................

51. Do you hold a degree from a College or University?
   Yes   No

52. Did you go to College for further training and skills, complete an apprenticeship, or similar?
   Yes   No

53. Do you feel that your present job gives you a fair chance to make use of your abilities?
   Yes   No

54. Do you take holidays away from home?
   Never  Occasionally  Each year  More than once a year

55. Do you belong to a religious group or faith?
   Yes   No
56. If 'Yes', which do you belong to:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Church of England</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Other Protestant (e.g. Baptist, Methodist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islamic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other (please specify)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

57. How often do you attend your place of worship these days?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A few times a year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>About once a month</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More often than once a month</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

58. Are you a member of any groups - religious, social, sports, political or any other type of organised group - besides Trades Unions?

| Yes | No    |

59. If you answered 'Yes', could you list them? (Include local groups, Parent Teacher Associations, Automobile Association, Women's Groups, Church Groups, etc.)

<p>| |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

60. Are you an active participant in any of these groups (e.g. attending meetings) and do you give any of your time voluntarily to these groups?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A.</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
If you answered 'Yes', approximately how many hours a month?
A. ..............................................................

61. Thinking about the economic situation of your family in
general - your income, your opportunities - do you think it
is satisfactory or not?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

SECTION D

62. Do you feel it is right for Parliament to pass laws against
racial discrimination?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

63. Do you feel that the presence in Britain of large numbers
of foreign immigrants has added to the country's economic
and social problems?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If you answered 'Yes', please specify:
A. ..............................................................

64. Do you think it would be right for foreign immigrants to be
forcibly sent back to their countries of origin?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65. Do you think that Political Parties which are hostile to
foreign immigrants in this country, e.g. the National Front,
should be banned?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Yes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

13.
66. How do you feel about the current level of unemployment in Britain? Do you think the Government can do anything about it, or is it just something we have to get used to?

A. .................................................................

.................................................................

.................................................................

67. If a Government could do something about the unemployment level, would it matter which Party was in power?

A. .................................................................

.................................................................

.................................................................

68. It is sometimes said that certain groups in society have too much power and that they use it against the interests of the majority. Do you:

Agree

Disagree

If you agree, what sort of groups have you in mind?

A. .................................................................

69. Suppose some legislation or regulation was being considered either by Parliament or a local body which you disapproved of quite strongly. How much do you think you could do about it?

Nothing

Not much

Quite a lot

A great deal

70. It has been said that social class is an important part of British society. Do you agree?

Yes

No
71. Do you think that class conflict in England is:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Very important</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fairly important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not important</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72. If you agree that class is an important part of British politics, do you feel closer to people in your own class?

A. .......................................................... 

73. Which of the following do you consider yourself?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No class at all</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lower working class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper middle class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Upper class</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

74. Could you put the following types of people into one of the categories listed in question 73, above?

a) A self-employed mini-cab driver whose gross earnings total over £15,000 per annum.
A. .......................................................... 

b) A machine-operator in a steel factory.
A. ..........................................................

c) A person writing slogans for an Advertising Agency, earning about £10,000 per annum.
A. ..........................................................

d) A chauffeur working for a weekly wage of £120.
A. ..........................................................

e) A person who doesn't need to work and lives comfortably on income earned from his/her investments.
A. ..........................................................

f) A small shop-keeper who enjoys a reasonable standard of living but has to work hard.
A. ..........................................................

15.
76. Do you think that it is possible to move from one class to another today?

A. .................................................................

77. It has been said that we vote according to our class status. Do you:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agree</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Think this was once true, but is no longer.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

78. If you agree, could you say which classes the following parties draw their votes from?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conservative</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDP/Liberal Alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communist</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Front</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ecology Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

I would/would not* be prepared to take part in an interview at a later date.

* please delete as applicable

Address (if willing to be interviewed) ........................................

Many thanks for taking the time to complete this Questionnaire. You should now return it to the group through which it was distributed, or mail it to:

Ms E. J. Barrett, History Department, Royal Holloway College, Egham Hill, Egham, Surrey TW20 0EX
APPENDIX B

The Pilot Survey

The survey questionnaire was piloted in the constituency of Feltham & Heston, which is situated at the Western end of Hounslow, within the Greater London boundaries. The two-party share of the vote at the 1983 General Election was 82.8%, the Liberal/SDP Alliance polling only 15.9% of the vote. It is a marginal seat, held by the Conservative party.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTY</th>
<th>VOTES</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONSERVATIVE</td>
<td>23 724</td>
<td>43.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LABOUR</td>
<td>21 576</td>
<td>39.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBERAL/SDP ALLIANCE</td>
<td>8 706</td>
<td>15.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL FRONT</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. 1983 General Election Results: Feltham & Heston.

The percentage change in the vote between 1979 and 1983 was +2 to the Conservative party and +7.4 to the Liberal/SDP Alliance. The Labour party percentage change was -8.9. The constituency is characterised by a high proportion of council housing and is largely working class in composition.

A pilot survey aims to test the representativeness of the sampling design and the effectiveness of the sampling method (for example in terms of response rates). It is also important as a means of assessing the suitability of the data-collection method and the adequacy of the survey questionnaire. Feltham & Heston was selected as an appropriate area in which to pilot the survey because its location and characteristics combined elements of each of those constituencies to be sampled during the main survey.

Because a central concern of the research was to relate the growth of group politics to economic structures, and to investigate whether the economically disadvantaged could be 'organised out' of politics by a tendency not to develop group memberships, it
was felt important to contact a proportion of electors who were not participant within group networks. It was felt that this would be best achieved by direct contact with the electorate. Thus it was decided to administer the questionnaire in a postal survey, contacting electors selected randomly from electoral rolls.

The constituency of Feltham & Heston is composed of 11 wards. The pilot survey was conducted within the Feltham Central ward, which has an electorate of 7512. 100 electors within this ward were drawn randomly from the electoral register, and these were then divided into two groups of 50. The purpose of this was to test two different methods of approaching the electors.

Half of the sample group received a letter which introduced and briefly described the survey and its objectives. Their help was requested in the completion of the survey, which was described to them. A reply slip and S.A.E. were included and the respondents were asked to indicate whether or not they wished to receive a questionnaire. The other half of the sample received a package containing a questionnaire, an S.A.E., and a cover letter. The letter explained to them the purpose and nature of the survey, and asked for their help in completing and returning the form. Confidentiality was stressed in both instances.

The random sample generated 38 female and 62 male electors. An analysis of the names drawn from the rolls suggested that there were approximately 11 electors of non-British origin within this sample. Although random sampling may produce a representative cross-section of the electorate, it suffers from a major weakness, which is its ineffectiveness in producing an acceptable response rate. Because postal surveys suffer from this inadequacy, a response rate as low as 60% is generally judged acceptable.

The pilot survey conducted in Feltham & Heston achieved a very low overall response rate of 26%. Of the two methods of approach employed, that using an initial contact letter without a questionnaire enclosure obtained a slightly better response. It was obvious from this that an alternative sample design and method were required.

It was decided that a semi-captive audience was required in order to overcome some of the problems in encouraging participation, and that a group survey would produce a more acceptable response rate. It was thus decided to request help with distribution from
various groups organised in the chosen constituencies.

A main aim of the postal survey was to contact electors who lacked group memberships, however, and it was thus necessary to use structures and institutions other than formally organised pressure groups and associations. As well as distributing questionnaires through groups, therefore, contact was made with traditionally 'class-based' institutions, such as trades unions and political parties. Local community centres and centres for the unemployed were also involved in questionnaire distribution. Although this meant that everyone taking part in the survey was contacted through an organisation or centre, a considerable degree of difference in organisational activity of the respondents was achieved.

The second important test employed by the pilot survey was upon the survey questionnaire. Several revisions were made as a result of the pilot study in Feltham & Heston: some as a result of comments made by participants, others because of evident confusion during the completion of the form. The most important changes were those made to the order and wording of questions. The questions on objective biographical data had originally been placed first; this was felt to have lowered the response rate and the section was moved into the body of the questionnaire. The section of questions on the political environment, including attitudinal questions, were moved from the back of the questionnaire to become section B, as these questions had been generally well completed.

Several questions were deleted, including political recall questions which were judged unreliable because of their distance (eg. on the 1979 General Election); questions on British citizenship; and several questions on the characteristics of classes which had been poorly answered during the pilot survey. In many cases the wording of questions and procedural instructions were simplified, and the questionnaire was shortened.
APPENDIX C

THE COVER LETTERS

A short cover letter introduced a specimen questionnaire which was sent to a number of groups in each of the three constituencies. This included information about the nature and purpose of the research, and assured participants of the confidentiality of their replies.

The cover letters were personalised according to the region and type of group that was addressed; when contacting groups for the elderly, for example, the importance of including the views of older people in the survey was stressed. The letter in the example given was sent to organised groups in Sheffield Attercliffe. A copy of the cover letter sent to the second wave of Sheffield groups is also presented.

EXAMPLE ONE

Dear

I am writing to ask for your help with a research project which I am conducting as part of my doctoral studies at the University of London.

The research, which is being carried out in Sheffield, and in two other British cities, concerns the social and political attitudes of the membership of organised groups and societies. I am anxious to include as many people as possible in this survey, and I wondered if you could help by distributing survey questionnaires to members of your organisation. I would like to assure you that the questionnaire, which does not take long to complete, is completely confidential.

I have enclosed a reply-form which asks a few questions about the organisation of your group. If you would complete this, and indicate how many questionnaires you could distribute among your membership, I will send these to you. Postage will be paid for their return, and an S.A.E. is enclosed for the return of the reply slip. A specimen questionnaire is also enclosed.

If your require further information about the research project please do not hesitate to contact me. May I thank you in advance for your co-operation.
Dear,

I am writing to ask for your help with a research project which is being carried out at the University of London. The research is being conducted towards the degree of PhD., and is an entirely private study. It has no connection with governmental or commercial surveys.

The research is concerned with the social and political attitudes of the British public, and particularly with the views of certain groups in society. I am especially interested in contacting elderly people, unemployed people and women, and am also wishing to locate people who are members of local groups (community associations, local pressure groups, amenity groups etc.).

I wondered if members of your group would be willing to help in this survey by filling in a questionnaire. The questionnaire is largely concerned with attitudes to British society and politics, and asks questions about the major political parties, voting behaviour, and about 'social class'. There are also questions about issues such as unemployment, and a short section asking for some personal details such as sex and age of the respondents. The form is mostly a matter of ticking boxes and thus is quite easy and quick to complete.

I can assure you that the questionnaire is completely confidential and that under no circumstances will the names of participants be used in the survey-findings.

The research has been successfully conducted in two southern British towns, and I am hoping to receive a large enough response from Sheffield in order to make some regional comparisons. I have enclosed a specimen questionnaire and a reply-slip which asks a few questions about your group, and which I would be grateful if you could return in the enclosed S.A.E. You may indicate on this form how many questionnaires you could distribute - these will be sent to you with reply-paid envelopes.

If you require further information about the research project, please do not hesitate to contact me, but may I thank you in advance for your co-operation.

EXAMPLE TWO
REPLY SLIP

1. What is the name of your organisation?
   A. ......................................................................................................................................................

2. Is it a local group or a local branch of a national association?
   A. ......................................................................................................................................................

3. Is it a registered charity?
   A. ......................................................................................................................................................

4. How many members do you have in Guildford?
   A. ......................................................................................................................................................

5. How long have you been active in Guildford?
   A. ......................................................................................................................................................

6. How often does the group meet?
   A. ......................................................................................................................................................

7. How many questionnaires could you distribute among your membership?
   A. ......................................................................................................................................................

8. Address to which questionnaires should be sent.
   ......................................................................................................................................................
GROUPS PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY

Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (Richmond branch): c. 1000 members.
Richmond and Twickenham Trades Council: 36 delegates, 6 000 Trades unions.
Richmond-Upon-Thames Environmental Trust: 50 members.
Conservative party (Richmond): 4 000 members.
Social Democratic party (Richmond): 80 members.
Business and Professional Women (Richmond branch): 17 members.
Richmond Housing Co-operative: 35 members.
National Association of Local Government Organisations (Richmond): 940 members.
Woodhouse Community Education Centre (Sheffield): 2 500 members.
Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (Guildford): 2 000 members.
Co-operative Women's Guild (Guildford): 20 members.
Campaign for the Advancement of Secondary Education (Guildford): 80 members.
National Council of Women of Great Britain (Guildford): 34 members.
Guildford Unemployed People's Centre: 80 contacts per day.
Socialist Party of Great Britain (Guildford): 18 members.
Guildford Society: 900 members.
George Abbot Parent Teacher Association (Guildford).
Surrey Voluntary Service Council (Guildford): 35 members.
APPENDIX E

THE 1987 GENERAL ELECTION SURVEY

The 1987 poll in the three sample constituencies is presented in Table 1. The swing from the Alliance to Labour in Sheffield Attercliffe is relatively large and sets the constituency firmly in the context of the northern, inner city trend towards Labour. There was a very small swing from Labour to the Liberal/Alliance in Guildford which may represent a tactical attempt to unseat the Conservatives (although this is not a realistic aim). In Richmond & Barnes, the Conservatives consolidated their support and increased their very small majority of 74, in 1983, to 1766. This represents a swing from the Liberals of 1.86%.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Guildford</th>
<th>Richmond and Barnes</th>
<th>Sheffield Attercliffe</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Conservative</strong></td>
<td>32,504 55.4%</td>
<td>21,729 47.7%</td>
<td>11,075 22.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Labour</strong></td>
<td>6,216 10.6%</td>
<td>3,227 7%</td>
<td>28,266 57.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alliance</strong></td>
<td>19,897 33.9%</td>
<td>19,963 43.8%</td>
<td>9,549 19.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Green</strong></td>
<td>- -</td>
<td>610 1.3%</td>
<td>- -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Change</strong></td>
<td>0.35% Labour to SDP Alliance</td>
<td>1.86% Liberal to Conservative</td>
<td>4.81% Alliance to Labour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Majority</strong></td>
<td>12,607 21.5%</td>
<td>1,766 3.8%</td>
<td>17,191 35.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>POLL</strong></td>
<td>75.27%</td>
<td>83.23%</td>
<td>72.91%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. 1987 General Election Results in Guildford, Richmond & Barnes and Sheffield Attercliffe.

Richmond and Barnes is an 'old Liberal' seat where the Alliance has held second place, and where the Labour vote was squeezed in 1983. In this seat, the Alliance could not hope to pick up many more Labour votes and it would seem that, because Labour managed to hold its 1983 vote steady at 7%, the Alliance challenge to the Tories was impeded. Furthermore, Alliance support lagged so far...
behind in the election campaign that it became unlikely that an extra tactical vote from Labour supporters would make an electoral difference.

During the General Election, a sample of survey respondents were re-contacted and asked to indicate their party preference. Forms were mailed to these electors to arrive the day before polling day in order to get as near as possible to actual voting choice. The forms were coded with the respondents regional classification and voting choice in 1983 in order to assess electoral constancy and change, and in order to validate previous survey findings. Of particular interest was the high Labour vote identified during the 1985 survey in these constituencies: it was felt useful to check whether this was a rogue finding with reference to actual electoral behaviour.

44 electors who had participated in the original 1985 survey were re-contacted. Half of these were drawn from the constituency of Guildford and half from Richmond & Barnes: this represents 30% of the total combined sample of these constituencies. Sheffield Attercliffe was excluded because of the inadequacy of the original sample. 16 completed responses (72.7%) were obtained from Richmond & Barnes and 21 responses (95.4%) from Guildford. This overall response rate of 84% is extremely high, especially as the previous survey had been conducted between 12 to 18 months earlier.

The data obtained from this survey are presented in Table 2. It will be noted that the high Labour vote identified among group members is still prominent among the sample at the 1987 Election. In Guildford this high Labour vote is accompanied by a very low Conservative vote, and a larger Alliance vote, where in Richmond & Barnes the data reflect the Conservative victory, but at a lower than actual level, and at some cost to the Alliance. Again, the Labour vote is more pronounced than according to actual constituency returns.

Although the sample of electors who were re-contacted in Guildford and in Richmond & Barnes display slightly different voting patterns than those obtained for the constituency samples in the original survey, the voting choice of the electors was largely congruent with past voting behaviour. In Richmond & Barnes, 75% of electors voted for the same party as they preferred in 1983, and in Guildford there were 80% constants. This reflects the fact
that election campaigns have little effect upon political attitudes, but also is important in so far as it confirms the reliability with which party preferences were coded in the 1985 survey. The large sample of Labour supporters may thus be considered valid in so far as the 1987 Election again produced a high proportion of Labour voters among the sample, and in so far as voting choices were congruent with those expressed on the survey-questionnaire.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>CONSERVATIVE</th>
<th>LABOUR</th>
<th>ALLIANCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GUILDFORD</td>
<td>2 (9.5%)</td>
<td>8 (38%)</td>
<td>11 (52.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RICHMOND &amp; BARNES</td>
<td>6 (37.5%)</td>
<td>5 (31.2%)</td>
<td>5 (31.2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Voting at the 1987 Election: total sample.

Of the sample electors who changed their voting choice from that stated in the original survey questionnaire, 4 were straight-switchers and 4 were tactical voters. Of the changers, two were Alliance voters in 1983 and two were previously Labour voters. The 1983 Labour voters were both located in Richmond & Barnes: one voted Alliance in 1987 and one voted Conservative. In Guildford, Alliance voters in 1983 switched to the Conservatives (one) and to Labour (one). The four tactical voters (two of whom were located in Richmond & Barnes and two in Guildford) stated that their party preference was Labour, but that they were voting tactically for the Alliance, in order to attempt to prevent a Conservative victory. This reflects the local party competition in these constituencies rather than a national trend, and particularly the dynamics of party choice in the constituency of Richmond & Barnes.
Dear voter,

You were kind enough to co-operate in my research project, in 1985/6, into political attitudes in Britain. I am writing to ask for your further help in view of the current General Election and would be grateful if you would complete this form and return it to me using the Stamped Addressed Envelope.

Can I stress once again that all information given to me will be treated in the strictest confidence.

Yours faithfully,

Ms E.J. Barrett.

I WILL/WILL NOT VOTE IN THE GENERAL ELECTION IN JUNE 1987*

MY VOTING CHOICE IN 1987 IS: CONSERVATIVE
LABOUR
SDP/LIBERAL ALLIANCE
OTHER (PLEASE SPECIFY)....

* Delete as appropriate.
NOTES AND REFERENCES

INTRODUCTION
2. See A. Barbrook, Patterns of Political Behaviour (Martin Robertson, 1975) pp. 9-16
3. This school of theorists is best represented by D. Easton. See D. Easton, The Political System (Knopf, New York, 1971).

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
2. Ibid.
   R.C. Macridis has similarly observed that the study of groups is no substitute for theory, and that no theory can evolve from a mere description of groups in terms of membership figures, governmental access etc. See his 'Interest Groups in Comparative Analysis', Journal of Politics, 23 (1961) 25-45, p.26.

CHAPTER ONE
1. A.F. Bentley, op.cit.
2. A.F. Bentley, op. cit., p.222
4. Ibid., p.23
6. A. Barbrook, op. cit., p. 15
7. S. Rothman, loc. cit., p. 15
8. A.F. Bentley, op. cit., p. 208
9. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p. 158

* Place of publication, unless otherwise stated, is London.
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER ONE

10. ibid.
11. A.F. Bentley, op. cit., p. 211
12. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p. 152
13. ibid., p. 153
14. A.F. Bentley, op. cit., p. 213
15. H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (Beacon Press, Boston, 1964) p. xiii
16. Sir Douglas Wass, after many years as Permanent Secretary at The Treasury, delivered the 1983 Reith lectures in which he made trenchant comments on the question of political organisation: 'Political decisions at every level of government are reached with a view, in part at least, to satisfying these pressure groups and interests. Whether they satisfy the requirements and aspirations of the rest of us is a question all too rarely asked. The pressure group, in fact, is often quite unrepresentative of the people as a whole. The costs of deferring to it are rarely evaluated in terms of the impact on the entire community. It is much easier politically for governments to come to terms with some special interest than to oppose it. Those who suffer from the compact are often unorganised, and their protests - if they are ever articulated - go unheard.' Sir D. Wass, Reith Lecture No. 6, 1983
18. ibid., p.37
19. ibid., p.157
21. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.159
23. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.164
24. S.M. Lipset regards low levels of electoral and group participation in the U.S. to be of little concern and suggests that low levels of participation confer more legitimacy than do high rates of participation. Political Man (Heinemann, 1959) p.14
See also F.G. Wilson, 'The Inactive Electorate and the Social Revolution', Southwestern Social Science Quarterly, XVI (1936) 73-84, p.76. Wilson argues that high participation rates would be indicative of increased social tensions.
25. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.165
26. ibid. pp 167-172
H. Marcuse also notes the connection between Classical Liberalism and western pluralism. op. cit., p.50
35. ibid., p.136
36. The trades union movement, a force which began as a representative of working class demands may be perceived, over the years, to have been integrated into existing political structures, and the threat of working class organisation, which could conceivably have threatened the arrangements of the economic system itself, has been contained.
40. M. Ryan, op. cit., p.14
41. S. Lukes, Power: A Radical Review (Macmillan, 1974)
42. 'Mobilisation of Bias' is the "Predominant values, beliefs, rituals and institutional procedures ('rules of the game') that operate systematically and consistently to the benefit of certain persons and groups at the expense of others". S. Lukes, op. cit., p.16
See also P. Bachrach and M. Baratz, 'The Two Faces of Power', American Political Science Review, LVI (1962) 947-952
S. Schnattsneider, The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America (Holt, 1960)
'All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of social conflict and the suppression of others, because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics while others are organised out.' Schattsneider, op. cit., p.71
43. S. Lukes, op. cit., p.21
44. ibid., p.23
45. See, for example, V.O. Key, Politics, Parties and Pressure Groups (Crowell, New York, 1964). Key argues that the nature of politics demands that there be a winner and a loser, and so some groups will have to receive preference while others suffer disadvantage. This, he feels, is an integral part of democratic principle, and thus interest groups embody and encourage democracy.
See also S.M. Lipset, op. cit., p.23. Lipset argues that industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth and education 'enforce democracy' and spawn political institutions, such as pressure groups, to match these increasingly differentiated and complex socio-economic structures.


47. D. Easton (1965), op. cit., p.132. A. Barbrook explains: 'inputs act on the political system so as to create disturbance, the system reacts to stress and, unless the stress is too great, responds by producing outputs to relieve it'. A. Barbrook, op. cit., p.55


50. The functional categories are: rule-making; rule-application; rule-adjudication (outputs) and political communication; aggregation of interests; separate articulation; political socialisation and recruitment (inputs). See W.J.M. Mackenzie, 'Pressure Groups in British Government', British Journal of Sociology, VI (1955) 133-148

51. F.G. Castles, op. cit.

52. ibid., p.30

53. For example the church in Latin America, which was once the dominant political power and the traditional elite, has found its role in Latin American politics reduced to that of interest group, as the nature of economic life has changed (eg. through multinational corporations) and elite-circulation has produced different dominant interests.

54. F.G. Castles, op. cit., p.44

55. G. Wootton, Pressure Groups in Britain 1720-1970 (Allen Lane, 1975)


57. 'If political authority is not only taken into consideration by the groups but shapes their pattern of action and often the nature of their claims, then the political community assumes the character of an independent factor acting upon the interest groups rather than being the 'resultant' of group action and interaction.' R.C. Macridis, loc. cit., p.30

58. J. Dickinson, 'Democratic Realities and Democratic Dogma', American Political Science Review, XXV (1930) 283-309, pp. 291-293

59. H. Marcuse, op. cit., p.11

60. See A. Pizzorno, loc. cit.


63. S.E. Finer, Anonymous Empire (Pal Mall Press, 1966)

64. V.O. Key, op. cit., p.115

65. Reference to an 'economic theory of interest' is not made in the Olsonian sense of economic individualism, which is based upon the belief that individuals will organise in-groups dependent upon selective, non-collective incentives and that - once organised - the interest remains within
the individuals who comprise the group, and does not transfer itself to a 'group psychology'. Olson's theory denies the possibility that some individuals may recognise an 'objective' interest and deny subjective, self-interested activities. Some may choose not to join an organisation lobbying for tax cuts, for example, even though tax cuts may improve their own economic position, because of a belief that social services should be maintained. Olson's theory is based upon individual economic power and interest, and does not consider the distribution of power in society which, it is here argued, determines an individual's ability to organise. See M. Olson, op. cit.

66. Such a criticism can be made of A. Potter's identification of 24 categories of organised interest. A. Potter, Organised Groups In British National Politics (Faber, 1961)


68. D.B. Truman, op. cit., p.244

69. S.H. Beer, Modern British Politics (Faber & Faber, 1965), p.319

70. D.B. Truman, op. cit., p.507

71. E.E. Schattsneider, op. cit.

72. D.B. Truman, op. cit., p.264

73. J.D. Stewart, British Pressure Groups: Their Role In Relation To The House of Commons (Oxford University Press, 1958), p.43

74. V.O. Key, op. cit., p.14

75. G. Wootton, op. cit., p.103

76. D.B. Truman, op. cit., p.450

77. S.E. Finer (1966), op. cit.

M. Duverger (1958) believes: 'Pressure Groups...do not participate directly in the acquisition of power or in its exercise; they act to influence power while remaining apart from it; they exert 'pressure' on it.' op. cit., p.101

W.J.M. Mackenzie defined pressure politics as: 'The field of organised groups possessing both formal structure and real consumer interests, in so far as they influence the decisions of public bodies.' 'Pressure Groups in British Government', British Journal of Sociology, VI (1955) 133-148, p.137

78. M. Duverger, The Idea of Politics (Methuen & Co., 1964)

79. See D.B. Truman, op. cit., p.486


81. M. Duverger (1958), op. cit., p.104-114

82. It has been suggested that pressure groups influence voting behaviour in the belief that influencing the character of an elected government will increase the group's chance of interest-satisfaction. D.B. Truman writes: 'though we cannot know to what extent groups affect voting behaviour, we know that they do.' op. cit., p.314
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER TWO

CHAPTER TWO

2. ibid., p.203
4. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (Translated by T.M. Knox, Oxford University Press, 1952), p.134
5. L. Althusser argues that all links with non-Marxist philosophy, and especially the Hegelian, should be severed in the analysis of Marx's use of the dialectic. It would seem to the present author, however, that the development of Marx's dialectical method is integral to his own reading of Hegel. See L. Althusser, For Marx (Pantheon, New York, 1972)
8. R.N. Carew-Hunt, op. cit., p.50
10. F. Engels, 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific', loc. cit., p.697
12. A. Giddens thus asks whether Marx's 'Historical Materialism' is not simply 'Technological Determinism', based on the expansion of new sets of forces of production within an existing set of relations of production. A. Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies (Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1973)
18. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.168
19. ibid., p.168
21. ibid., p.160
22. ibid., p.179
25. ibid., p.2
26. ibid., p.149
See also W. Landecker, 'Class Crystallisation and Class Consciousness', American Sociological Review, XXVIII (1963), 219-229. Landecker argues that the emergence of consciousness operates on three levels: class status consciousness, class structure consciousness and class interest consciousness.

28. G. Lukacs, op. cit., p.71
29. K. Marx, 'The German Ideology', loc. cit., p.61
30. A. Giddens (1973), op. cit., p.41
31. G. Lukacs, op. cit., p.69
32. K. Marx, 'The German Ideology', loc. cit., p.155
34. M. Mann, op. cit., p.12
35. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.171
37. These interest groups are recruited from larger quasi groups and will organise successfully depending upon their ability to mobilise political conditions, leadership, ideology and the common latent interest.
38. R. Dahrendorf, op. cit., p.152
39. ibid., p.181
40. ibid., p.174
41. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.171
42. R.C. Macridis, loc. cit., p.32
43. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.172
44. A. Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory (Cambridge University Press, 1971), p.39
46. R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, op. cit., p.9
49. ibid., p.349
52. F. Engels, 'Socialism: Utopian and Scientific', loc. cit., p.700
56. K. Marx, Capital Vol. I, loc. cit., p.422
57. K. Marx, 'The Poverty of Philosophy', loc. cit., p.492
61. A. Giddens (1971), op. cit., p.237
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER TWO

62. ibid., p.757
63. ibid., p.752
64. ibid., p.755
See also S.M. Lipset, Political Man, op. cit.
66. R. Dahrendorf (1959), op. cit., p.47
67. ibid., p.58
See also P. Bachrach and M. Baratz, 'The Two Faces of Power', loc. cit.
70. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.174
71. ibid., p.168
73. K. Marx and F. Engels, 'The German Ideology', loc. cit., p.160
74. G. Lukacs, op. cit.
The petit-bourgeoisie, wrote K. Marx, is a 'transitional class in which the interests of the two other classes becomes simultaneously blunted.' It imagines itself 'to be above all class antagonisms.' K. Marx, 'The 18th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', loc. cit., p.133
76. Ibid., p.103
77. ibid., p.105
81. ibid., p.10
82. K. Mayer, 'Recent Changes in the Class Structure of the U.S.', 66-80, in Transactions, op. cit., p.71
85. Ossowski suggests that Marx's unique contribution to the theory of class was that he synthesised all three conceptions of class structures to produce a single coherent theory, embracing dichotomous, gradational and functional concepts
86. D. Roberton, op. cit., p.7.
of class. Hence while in his propagandal writings Marx used dichotomous class imagery, in his more scholarly writings he drew upon gradational and functional class schemas, introducing and describing 'intermediate' classes.


88. See Z. Bauman, 'Officialdom and Class: Bases of Inequality of Socialist Society', 129-148, in F. Parkin (1974), op. cit. Bauman constructed a 'power-structure' model to process situations as raw data, and a stratification model to systematize and catalogue evaluative and selective behaviour patterns. These models can be used to describe and explain both potential (subjective) and actual (objective) interests. See also M. Djilas, The New Class: An Analysis of the Communist System (New York, 1957). Djilas argues that it is not the ownership of the means of production that determines a class, but that this very ownership is only a special case of a more general social force, power.

89. Sorokin defines stratification as 'the differentiation of a given population into hierarchically superposed classes.' R. Centers writes: 'the descriptive ordering of people into higher and lower categories with respect to some objective differential or differentiation, primarily economic or at least quasi-economic in character.' R. Centers, The Psychology of Social Classes: A Study of Class Consciousness (Princeton University Press, 1949), p.14


91. ibid., p.2

92. F. Parkin, Class Inequality and Political Order (Paladin, 1972), p.18

93. ibid., p.29

94. For other subjective definitions of the class structure see W. Lloyd Warner, Social Class in America (Science Research Associates Ltd., Chicago, 1949)

95. A. Giddens (1973), op. cit., p.108 and p.192

96. ibid., p.187


98. ibid., p.4


100. R. Dahrendorf writes: 'Classes are social conflict groups the determinants of which can be found in the participation in or exclusion from the exercise of authority within any imperatively co-ordinated association.' Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, op. cit., p.138

101. Ibid., p.136

102. Ibid., p.129

103. Ibid., p.216

104. Ibid., p.134

105. G.A. Briefs, op. cit., p.50
CHAPTER THREE

1. The relationship between class theory and electoral politics has been discussed by various critics. F. Parkin notes the congruence between the major social values and those of the Conservative party and suggests that, when translated into political activity, the result is a built-in electoral advantage accruing to the Conservative party, a Labour vote representing a deviation from a structural norm.


3. M. Duverger (1964), op. cit., p.70

4. K. Marx argued: 'The advance of capitalist production develops a working class which by education, traditions, habit, looks upon the conditions of that mode of production as self-evident laws of nature.' Capital Vol. I (Foreign Language Publishing House, Moscow, 1954), p.737


See also A.G. Jordan and J.J. Richardson, Governing Under Pressure (Martin Robertson, 1979), p.117

6. S.H. Beer (1965), op. cit., p.106

7. V.O. Key (1964), op. cit., p.130

See also S.H. Beer (1965), op. cit., p.351

8. J.P. Olsen, Organisational Participation in Government (University of Bergen, 1977)

A. Strauss, Negotiation, Values, Contexts, Processes and Social Order (Jossey-Bass, 1978)


See also D. Coombes, 'Concertation' in the Nation-State and in the European Community', 86-99, in G. Ionescu (1980), op. cit.

10. The issue of a pressure group extolling 'improper' pressure upon an M.P. raises such questions as the accountability of an M.P. to her constituents.

11. J.D. Stewart, British Pressure Groups: Their Role in Relation to the House of Commons (Oxford University Press, 1958)

See also D.B. Truman, op. cit., p.117


See also D.B. Truman, op. cit., p.450

13. D.B. Truman, op. cit., p.446

14. ibid., p.508

15. E. Schattsneider, op. cit.

G. Almond anticipated a situation where bureaucracy itself became an 'associational' interest group, aggregating interests while fulfilling its chief role of applying rules. This view of government departments, and of governing bureaucracies in developing nations, is increasingly aired. G. Almond and G.B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Little Brown, Boston, 1966)
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER THREE

16. D. Coombes, loc. cit., p.88
17. The 'Plan for Coal' - a tripartite agreement between the National Coal Board (now British Coal), the National Union of Mineworkers and the Government - was violated by the National Coal Board, with Government support, in 1984. Although the 1974 agreement had been reaffirmed in 1981, an atmosphere of unemployment and weak unions lent inordinate power to the bargaining position of Government and corporation.
18. R. King and N. Mogent, Respectable Rebels: Middle Class Campaigns in Britain in the 1970's (Hodder & Stoughton, 1979)
22. D. Coombes, 'Trades Unions and Political Parties in Britain, France, Italy and West Germany', 486-495, Relations Between Trades Unions and Political Parties: Report on a Conference (Policy Studies Institute, 1978)
See also B. Jessop, Traditionalism, Conservatism and British Political Culture (Allen & Unwin, 1974), p.97
27. G.A. Briefs, op. cit., p.32
28. ibid., p.213
29. M. Mann, op. cit., p.47
30. ibid., pp.22-32
31. B. Pimlott and C. Cook, op. cit.
34. S.H. Beer, Britain Against Itself (Faber & Faber, 1982), p.62
37. The Observer, 28 January, 1979
38. M. Barratt-Brown, op. cit., p.157-168
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER THREE


41. A.H. Halsey, op. cit., p.126


43. M. Barratt-Brown, op. cit., p.229

44. D. Anderson and P.E. Davidson, Ballots and the Democratic Class Struggle (Stanford University Press, California, 1943)

45. R. Taylor, loc. cit., p.191

46. B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe, op. cit., p.144.

See also B. Jessop, op. cit., p.97 and F. Parkin (1974), op. cit., p.117

47. B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe, op. cit., p.141


Butler and Stokes suggest the remoteness of politics; a desire for 'outputs'; a desire for the alteration of governments; an intrinsic value of party; and partisan self-image contribute to the hold of party on popular thinking. R. Alford suggests that class identification with a political party does not result only from the representation of a class interest, but may result from a party's appealing to class interests, or through a party's possession of the historical loyalties of certain classes. R. Alford, op. cit., p.130


51. D. Robertson, Class and the British Electorate (Basil Blackwell, 1984), p.44

52. B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe, op. cit., p.88


54. D. Lockwood, loc. cit., p.248


See also Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p.43

57. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.33

58. D. Lockwood, loc. cit., p.250

59. Ibid., p.257

60. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p.112

61. R. Mackenzie and A. Silver, op. cit., p.164

62. S.H. Beer (1982), op. cit., p.82

63. R. Mackenzie and A. Silver, op. cit., pp.226 and 189


65. Ibid.

66. E. Nordlinger, op. cit.

NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER THREE

70. Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p. 190
71. ibid., p. 192
72. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 65
73. ibid., p. 38
74. B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe, op. cit., p. 93
75. D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 33
76. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 124
77. R. Alford, op. cit., p. 147
78. ibid., p. 137
79. D. Butler and D. Stokes, op. cit., p. 158
Butler and Stokes suggest that 'the emergence of Labour as a strong and explicitly class-based party was both cause and consequence of the decline of the religious alignment.' p. 172
S. M. Lipset suggests that socialist groups and religious radicals compete for the allegiance of the same groups. op. cit. p. 100.
80. S. M. Lipset, op. cit., p. 259
81. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p. 77
The impact of social variables (eg. age and sex) on the vote have been investigated by various surveys and, although some influence is found upon electoral behaviour, the effect is nowhere as large as that of socio-economic class. See D. Robertson, op. cit., p. 33 and A. H. Halsey, op. cit., p. 243
82. R. Alford, op. cit., p. 348
83. ibid., p. 290
84. M. Abrams, loc. cit., p. 342
85. R. Alford, op. cit., p. 337
86. B. Jessop, op. cit., p. 104
90. B. Jessop, op. cit., p. 85
91. McKenzie and Silver, op. cit., pp. 158-164
92. Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p. 188
93. B. Jessop, op. cit., p. 43
95. ibid., p. 207
99. A. Gamble, op. cit., p. 211
100. R. Mackenzie and A. Silver, op. cit., p. 20
102. A. Gamble, op. cit., p. 203
103. See, for example, R. Miliband, Capitalist Democracy in Britain (Oxford University Press, 1982) and M. Mann, op. cit.
104. T. Forester, op. cit., p. 6
107. ibid.
109. T. Forester, op. cit., p. 86
110. ibid., p.94
111. ibid., p.54
113. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p.197
114. B. Jessop, op. cit., p.73
115. A. Gamble, op. cit., p.158
117. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p.335
118. ibid., p.390
119. J. Bonham, The Middle Class Vote (Faber & Faber, 1954), p.71
121. B. Hindess, op. cit., p.10
123. R. Alford, op. cit., p.318
124. B. Sarlvik and I. Crewe, op. cit., p.289
125. J. Bonham, op. cit., p.21
127. P. Zentner, Social Democracy in Britain (John Martin, 1982). Alford wrote in 1963: "where major pressures exist for a new alignment of voters and where the main parties seem incapable of providing representation because of historic ties with 'enemy' groups, a third party may emerge which functions as a transition party, even though the issues and appeals upon which it is based do not explicitly indicate this." R. Alford, op. cit., p.303
128. Mackenzie and Silver, op. cit.
129. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.324
130. ibid., p.326
132. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.31
133. A King, 'The Election that Everyone Lost', loc. cit., p.30
134. P. Zentner, op. cit., p.96
135. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.30
136. ibid., pp63-73
137. P. Zentner, op. cit., p.7
138. ibid., p.36
139. Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p.318
140. ibid., p.314
142. Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p.434
143. S.M. Lipset, op. cit.
144. Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p.314
145. ibid., p.144
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FOUR

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2. ibid., p.246
3. F. Parkin, Marxism and Class Theory: A Bourgeois Critique (Tavistock, 1979), p.1
4. Burgess defines a 'variable' as the representation of a social characteristic or social factor in empirical research. 'Indicators' are a means of representing or measuring sociological concepts using items for which empirical data may be collected. The key issue involves the way in which concepts can be operationalised and the gap bridged between concepts and indicators in order that theory and research can be linked.

CHAPTER FOUR

2. See above, Chapter One, for a discussion of this issue.
3. C.G. Pickvance, loc. cit., p.230
4. ibid.
5. See above, Chapter One, section 1.4.
6. A further criteria is membership.
7. C.G. Pickvance, loc. cit., pp224-229
8. ibid., p.228
9. ibid., p.225
11. R. Burgess, op. cit.
15. See for example R. Mackenzie and A. Silver, op. cit.
17. D. Butler and D. Stokes, op. cit., p.73
18. ibid., p.70
19. F. Parkin (1979), op. cit., p.13
22. C. Marsh, loc. cit., p.132
24. Classes I,II,IIIA,IIIB,IVA,IVB,IVC,V,VI,VIIA,VIIB.
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FOUR


27. F. Parkin (1979), op. cit.

28. This is used at the National Opinion Research Centre.


30. Ibid.

31. R. Burgess, op. cit., p.133


33. R.G. Burgess, op. cit., p.133

34. Classification of Occupations, 1970 (OPCS, 1970). The distinction for management was introduced in 1961, and the number of OUG's was reduced from 500 to 200.


36. R.G. Burgess, op. cit., p.126


38. R. Bland, loc. cit.

39. H. Frankel, Capitalist Society and Modern Sociology (Lawrence & Wishart, 1970)


41. W.L. Warner, Social Class in America (Science Research Associates, Chicago, 1949)

42. R.V. Robinson and J. Kelley, 'Class as conceived by Marx and Dahrendorf: Effects on Income Inequality and Politics in the U.S. and Britain.', American Sociological Review, 44 (1979), 38-58

43. H. Frankel, op. cit. One third of Britain's trade is estimated to move between affiliates of giant corporations.

44. N. Poulanzzas, op. cit.

45. F. Parkin (1979), op. cit.


48. H. Frankel, op. cit.

49. For enquiries into subjective class image and occupation see H.H. Davis, Beyond Class Images (Croom Helm, 1979). Davis identifies craft consciousness, collusive consciousness and proletarian consciousness among fitters, clerics and steelmen respectively. Davis suggests class consciousness is a specific form of social consciousness, and that it is in decline as consequence of a decline in occupational consciousness. Other studies identify a tendency towards
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FOUR

instrumentalism and away from class consciousness, for example J. Goldthorpe et. al., op. cit.

52. G.A. Briefs, op. cit.
53. Barratt-Brown calculates that 90% of the British population are employees. 10% of taxpayers are in receipt of 99% of property income, and therefore 9/10 of the population have no resources but their labour power. Barratt-Brown, op. cit., p.19.

More than 70% of the world’s population owns, it is estimated, less than 20% of the world’s wealth. United Nations Statistics Yearbook and Bulletin of Statistics

54. R. Burgess, op. cit., p.13
56. An exception to this rule would be those women wealthy enough to employ somebody else to perform housework or childcare labour. These would be classified as small proprietors with employees. Women who are wealthy but do not work will be classified as previously stated.

CHAPTER FIVE

1. The cross national study is inappropriate to a study of class and group consciousness in Britain and will not be discussed here. This type of study is best represented by R. Alford’s 1963 study of four Anglo-American democracies, Party and Society (Rand MacNally, 1963)

2. The BES surveys were first conducted in 1963. At the 1983 General Election, the survey (conducted by I. Crewe for the BBC/Gallup) used a data set of 4000.

3. This was based on a sample of 718 private householders in a number of British constituencies. Butler and Stokes, Political Change in Britain, op. cit.

4. Regional Trends, 21, HMSO, 1984
5. Ibid.
7. B. Hindess, op. cit.
8. M.A. Busteed, op. cit., p.2
9. Ibid., p.25

11. The lack of constituency homogenity can, in fact, be overcome by consulting ward-level information. It is the aggregation of constituency data from ward data that often gives the appearance of uniformity in a constituency where there is none, and ward specificity can be invaluable in constructing an accurate profile of political behaviour and socio-economic conditions.
12. R.G. Burgess, op. cit., p.201
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FIVE


16. See below, Chapter Six.


20. Sheffield Attercliffe lies 5 miles from Sheffield city centre where a proportion of the population work; much of Guildford's population are employed either at London airport or along the M4 corridor of new industries; Richmond's workforce serves both inner London and the Home Counties.


24. I. Crewe and A. Fox, op. cit., p.283

25. Ibid.


27. Ibid., p.149

28. Ibid. Sheffield Attercliffe lies somewhere between these two constituencies.

29. D. Rhind, op. cit. This has grown from 474 381 in 1901. In 1961 the population was at its highest at 589 865.


31. Ibid., p.162

32. Crewe and Fox, op. cit. Other such constituencies include Cheltenham and Salisbury.

33. Ibid., p.171

34. Ibid., p.171

35. Ibid., p.171

36. Ibid., p.171

37. Ibid., p.171

38. Guildford enjoys substantial ties with services and industries related to London airport, for example.

39. 20.3% of the workforce are employed in routine non-manual work, and 7.4% of the population are in full-time post-16 education.
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FIVE

40. Crewe and Fox rank Guildford 612th out of 633 on the unemployment indicator.
42. D. Rhind, op. cit. The population increased by 2.4% between 1971 and 1981. Crewe and Fox, op. cit.
43. Crewe and Fox, op. cit., p.270.
44. 76.7% of Richmond and Barnes' Heads of Household are engaged in the service sector, a constituency ranking of 14. Those involved in the manufacturing sector total 22%. ibid.
45. ibid., p.270.
46. ibid., p.270.
47. 6.7% of households fall into this category. Richmond & Barnes ranks 53rd on this, a high position when the affluence of the constituency is taken into consideration.
48. D. Rhind, op. cit. I. Crewe estimates the population change at -12.9%. Crewe and Fox, op. cit.
49. See above, section 5.2.
50. The Labour majority in Sheffield Brightside was 34.5%, and in Sheffield Central 40.8%. All statistics are from Dod's Parliamentary Companion (Hailsham, 1984), pp515-548.
51. Crewe and Fox, op. cit., p.283.
52. F.W.S. Craig, Britain Votes 2 (Parliamentary Research Services, Chichester, 1980).
53. ibid., p.245.
55. I. Crewe and A. Fox, op. cit., p.283.
57. The constituency ranks 508th in Britain. Crewe and Fox, ibid.
58. Butler and Kavanagh, op. cit., p.302. The figure for national turnout in England in 1979 was 75.9%, F.W.S. Craig, op. cit., p.240.
59. W. Hampton, op. cit.
60. ibid., p.69.
61. ibid., p.59.
64. W. Hampton, op. cit., p.85.
65. ibid., p.298.
66. ibid., p.273.
68. Calculations based on statistics from Dod's, op. cit.
69. Crewe and Fox, op. cit., p.171.
70. ibid.
71. Times Guide, op. cit., p.270. There was a 4.7% swing to the Conservative party, throughout the country, at the 1983 General Election. The Conservative change in Guildford between 1979 and 1983 was -1.7%. Crewe and Fox, op. cit., p.171.
72. Howell has held the posts of Secretary of State for Energy and Secretary of State for Transport, but was dropped from the Government after the 1983 General Election.
73. Crewe and Fox, op. cit., p.171.
75. The candidate for the Party of Associates with Licencees also lost his deposit.
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER FIVE


77. Times Guide, op. cit., p.282


79. Curtice and Steed note that this represents a 50% decline since 1955.

80. Crewe and Fox, p.270. A minor boundary alteration was also made in 1964.


82. Times Guide, op. cit., p.262


84. Butler and Kavanagh, op. cit., p.381

85. Statistics from Dod's, op. cit., p.540. Turnout in Richmond & Barnes is the 12th highest of all constituencies at 79.6%.

CHAPTER SIX

1. D. Butler and D. Stokes, Political Change in Britain, op. cit.


3. Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p.300

4. M.A. Busteed, op. cit., p.41


Lazarsfeld and Manzel (1965) claim that there are four types of individual data to be collected: Absolute properties unique to an individual (e.g. income); relational properties (marital status); comparative properties (occupational hierarchy) and contextual properties (neighbourhood). This may also be understood as factual and objective information (demographical and social environment) and subjective information (activities, opinions and attitudes).

7. For details about the sampling and administration of the survey questionnaire see below, section 6.3.

8. The problems of non-response and representativeness of the sample are considered in section 6.5., below.

9. See Appendix A, p.38 and Appendix B, p.355

10. Inspite of this, the length of the form was criticised by some respondents.

11. The survey was entitled simply 'Questionnaire' because of the breadth of its subject matter and in order to avoid 'leading' respondents' attitudes to the project.
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SIX

12. E. Nordlinger, op. cit. and Mackenzie and Silver, op. cit.

14. R. Burgess, op. cit., p.2

15. This question was modelled on that used by Mackenzie and Silver: the language is slightly archaic.

16. Burgess suggests that the extent of left-right conceptualisation of politics is variable between individuals, groups and classes and that such political attitudes cross-cut these orientations.

17. R.G. Burgess, op. cit., p.207

18. The language may again be criticised as archaic (One may not be able to stop oneself voting). This question was modelled on that used by Mackenzie and Silver.

19. One respondents criticised this question for employing 'middle class terminology'.

20. Of course, nothing is 'what it was': this phrase was intended to convey the sense of a movement with changed interests (Statement B).

Statement G was weak because I. MacGregor also had a personal effect, and some respondents felt an early settlement was impossible because of MacGregor, or that an early settlement was impossible, but for completely independent reasons.

21. Trades unions were not, of course, considered the only safeguard of these interests. Many of the statements in this section were modelled on Mackenzie and Silver's questions.

22. The same question is asked, in an inverted fashion, in Section E (the class environment), item 78.

23. See below, section 6.4.

24. 'Gross' should have been specified in question 35.

25. See discussion in Chapter Four, above.

26. It should not have been presumed that parents were dead/retired.

27. Question 54. This was not used in data analysis.

28. The question was based on one originally asked by Nordlinger, op. cit.

29. This is not to deny the existence of anti-semitism, but to draw a distinction between highly visual groups of people, eg. black people, who may easily become scapegoats in times of economic depression, and the Jews who, while they have never been free from the latent threats against them as a people, have been able to integrate more easily, economically.

30. Question 69 was badly structured as it linked local and national power centres. Questions 68 and 69 were influenced by Nordlinger, op. cit.


32. This question was influenced by Mackenzie and Silver.

33. Stratification involves dividing the population into a number of strata and selecting a sample from each.

34. See Appendix B.

35. P. Dunleavy, op. cit.

36. Group activity was identified largely through local directories etc. In Guildford and in Sheffield Attercliffe, local libraries compiled information thesauruses and information sheets which were valuable.

37. See above, p.109.
37. At a later date, a further ten groups were contacted in Sheffield Attercliffe; see below. For a list of participating groups see Appendix D.

38. See Appendix C.

39. Many groups were not meeting over the summer and thus, in practice, most of the Guildford survey was completed during the Autumn months.


41. C.A. Moser, Ibid. To limit non-response, a mail survey also needs to include SAE’s, assurances of confidentiality and anonymity, a good covering letter and a short and simple questionnaire. The research endeavoured to meet these criteria, although the questionnaire was somewhat lengthy and complicated.

42. The organisation provides community services and facilities.


44. Demographic topics: migration, race, education, housing, cars and travel, employment, occupation and industry.


46. There is some variation between electoral wards.

47. Fothergill and Vincent, op. cit., p.16

48. In 1983 the average weekly earnings for women in white-collar employments in the south was £120 compared with £190 for men in the same area. Fothergill and Vincent, op. cit., p.49

49. 28 000 women were registered as unemployed in South Yorkshire in 1984 compared with 7000 women in Surrey: 3% more women in Surrey than in South Yorkshire are in paid employment or seeking work. Ibid., p.46

50. R.G. Burgess, op. cit., p.154

51. 'Economic Activity and Unemployment in the Metropolitan Districts and Inner London'. Sheffield 1981 Census Report Number 2., p.13

52. The DES method of calculating the unemployment rate based on travel-to-work areas is:
unemployed persons/jobs + unemployed = unemployment rate.
The Census method for the metropolitan districts and constituencies is:
unemployed persons/working residents and unemployed = unemployment rate.
The census method increases the unemployment rate by 1% because the former excludes the effect of jobs filled by commuters from outside the travel-to-work area.


54. Sheffield 1981 Census Report, Constituency Profile, Table 16.

55. On this basis, Sheffield Attercliffe's unemployment rate in 1981 was 10.2%

56. A.H. Halsey, op. cit., p.119 and Fothergill and Vincent, op. cit., p.50

57. Fothergill and Vincent, op. cit., p.88. The percentage employment change in Guildford between 1971 and 1981 was +4.8.
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SIX

59. Fothergill and Vincent, op. cit., p.50.
60. OPCS County Monitor: Surrey.
62. Fothergill and Vincent, op. cit., p.32.
63. ibid.
64. ibid., p.33.
65. ibid.
66. 10 000 jobs were lost in Sheffield and Rotherham between 1974 and 1981 at the British Steel Corporation, and there have been c. 48 000 jobs lost in the Yorkshire coalfields between 1965 and 1982. Fothergill and Vincent, op. cit., pp36-38.
69. Fothergill and Vincent, op. cit., p.45.
70. 1981 Key Facts and Figures, Richmond-Upon-Thames, loc. cit.
71. OPCS Census Monitor, 1981, HMSO.
74. ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN

1. A.H. Birch, op. cit.
2. ibid., p.196.
3. Moyser and Parry recorded 11.2% of a sample (N=1570) supporting or working within an organised group and 13.8% of the sample working with other people to raise an issue. Paper given to the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association of the U.K., Nottingham University, 1986, 'Political Participation in Britain: Images, structures and Characteristics.'
5. Ibid., p.368.
6. Ibid., p.359.
8. Moyser and Parry, loc. cit., p.44.
9. Ibid.
10. The class grading system used is that described in Chapter Four. Class code data was based upon information obtained by item A1 of the questionnaire, for economically active respondents, and item C36 for those not in paid employment. Some job description to clarify job title may have aided the coding of occupational data although, because the class schema was not based upon hierarchies within the workplace this was not a serious impediment.
11. This strategy was adopted for conceptual reasons in order that Marxian class theories of economic inactivity could be more satisfactorily operationalised.

12. This data was collected by question C36 of the questionnaire.

13. See Chapter Six for a discussion on this subject.

14. Data supplied by item C35 of the questionnaire.

15. A.B. Hollingshead, 'Selected Characteristics of Classes in a Middle Western Community', 213-224, in R. Bendix and S.M. Lipset, op. cit., p.219

16. T. Bottomore, op. cit., p.352

17. A chi-squared test gave a significance statistic of 0.0242 for the total sample.

18. The Independent was not publishing at the time of the survey.

19. 54.4% of group members in Richmond & Barnes are educated to degree level: in the overall sample, only 44.6% are educated to this level. Data collected by item C51 of the questionnaire.

20. Moyser and Parry, loc. cit., p.43

21. ibid., p.42. Moyser and Parry note that protest rather than group membership, however, is the preserve of the under 30's, and that the elderly have a larger representation in figures concerning voting.

22. T. Bottomore, op. cit., p.359

23. Item C34 of the questionnaire collected data on age groupings.

24. Cramer's $V$ statistic is used for nominal data in tables with larger dimensions than $2 \times 2$. It's perfect measure of association is 1.

25. A.H. Birch, ibid., p.196

26. ibid. Only 20 respondents, or 14.2%, did not claim membership of either religious or secular organisations: Birch located 47% of his sample in this category.


28. 'Complete activists' are those who engage in the following activities: voting, campaigning, group membership, contacting of MP's and civil servants, protesting. Moyser and Parry, loc. cit., p.40

29. Moyser and Parry, loc. cit., p.9 They note the recent growth in informal and 'unconventional' group structures, particularly those that have grown at the grass-roots level and have a populist composition: these, it is suggested, represent a new form of political action that challenges conventional structures and elites. Moyser and Parry, loc. cit., p.23

30. A.H. Birch, op. cit., p.196. The percentages total 38% because this was the number of memberships, as distinct from members, in the sample.

31. A.H. Birch, op. cit., p.196

32. A.B. Hollingshead, loc. cit. Social Class II equates with classes II and IIIN; social class V with classes IV and V.

33. ibid., p.224

34. Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p.306

35. Quoted in R. Alford, Party and Society, op. cit., p.299

36. ibid., p.297
37. In 1963 and 1969, Butler and Stokes conducted a similar investigation of perceptions of popular influence on actions of government. In 1969 they found that 61% of their sample believed the government did not pay much attention to popular opinion, that 19% believed they paid 'some attention', and that 9% felt they paid a 'good deal' of attention. These proportions are very similar to those obtained by the overall sample. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p.29

38. This was those coded 1 or 2 for question B12 + those coded 3 or 4 for question B15 + those coded 2 for question B16 + those coded 1 or 2 for question E69.

39. Butler and Stokes suggested that 77% of the electorate vote in General Elections. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p.21

40. Moyser and Parry, loc. cit., p. 17 & 35.
41. ibid., p.28
42. ibid., p.27 & 34.
43. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p.20
44. There have been few studies of electoral abstention, and much work needs to be done in this area. Some surveys have included data on non-voting which suggest that it is perceived as a valid electoral choice: Himmelweit recorded a 15% abstention rate at the October 1974 General Election and, in a voting profile of a longitudinal sample, suggested that 5 individuals were consistent abstainers and that 13 preferred abstention. Himmelweit, op. cit., pp 236-237.

45. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.7
46. Butler and Kavanagh, op. cit.
47. J. Curtice and M. Steed, loc. cit.
49. P. Dunleavy and C. Husbands, op. cit.
50. H. Himmelweit, op. cit., p.12
51. ibid.
52. Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p.278

54. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.175-176. There is, however, as little consensus on the measurement of issue voting as on the measurement of class voting: far from suggesting that Labour policies on nationalisation and defence jeopardised their electoral chances, Heath, Jowell and Curtice suggest that, had electors voted according to their policy preferences on these two issues, there would have been a Labour landslide in 1983. And if voters had decided between party according to their overall policy preferences, there would have been a tie between the Conservative and Labour parties. Heath, Jowell and Curtice, op. cit., p.94.

55. Himmelweit, op. cit., p.194
56. ibid., p.48
57. There are 4 missing cases of data.
58. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.63
59. ibid., p.293
60. Benney et. al., op. cit.
61. Himmelweit, op. cit.
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER SEVEN

62. Benney et. al., op. cit., p.177. Benney notes that such economic variables as class position do not, by themselves, bear any relationship to vote changing: only when variables are combined may they direct electoral flow. Various studies have been done on the social characteristics of vote changers; see for example Benney et. al., op cit., p.189; McKenzie and Milne, op. cit., p.46 and McKenzie and Silver, op. cit.

63. Moyser and Parry, loc. cit., p.45 & 26. Party membership, however, records a negative association with protesting and voting activity.


65. ibid.
66. Himmelweit, op. cit., p.198
67. ibid., p.168
69. ibid., p.3
70. Butler and Kavanagh, op. cit., p.269
71. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.302
72. Moyser and Parry, loc. cit., p.28
73. ibid., p.30
74. ibid., p.44
75. A.F. Bentley, op. cit.

CHAPTER EIGHT

1. P. Dunleavy, op. cit., p.4. Butler and Stokes represent this tradition well.

2. ibid., p.127
3. ibid.

5. ibid., p.35
6. D. Robertson, op. cit.
7. D. Robertson found that although income levels may impact upon political behaviour at a higher level, 'in working class organisations there does not appear to be any great tendency to vote according to income.' op. cit., p.55

8. Heath, Jowell and Curtice, op. cit., p.45
9. P. Dunleavy, op. cit., p.137. Access to transport was observed to have a similar scale of effects.

11. ibid., p.16
12. P. Dunleavy, op. cit., p. 137
13. ibid., p.142
14. ibid., p.143
15. ibid., p.123
16. ibid., p.124
17. They distinguish between foemen and technicians, routine non-manual workers, the salariat, the petit-bourgeoisie and the working class. Heath, Jowell and Curtice, op. cit., p.17
18. ibid., p.14
20. See Chapter Four for a fuller discussion of these issues.
21. A. Giddens (1973), op. cit. Cited in D. Robertson, op. cit., p.13. This includes anyone whose income and position depends on the State apparatus in certain ways, eg. NHS doctor or academic.

22. P. Dunleavy, op. cit., p.195. Dunleavy found Labour support to be positively correlated with manual occupation, council tenancy and non car ownership, and negatively correlated with rural employment. See also M.C. Roberts and K.W. Rumage, 'The Spatial Variations in Urban left-wing voting in England and Wales in 1951', Annals Association of American Geographers, 55 (1965), 161-178. They suggest the left-wing vote is associated with non-private housing, social classes IV and V, persons who finish formal education at age 15 and the percentage of population working in the area in manufacturing, agriculture and mining.


24. Curtice and Steed, loc. cit., p.5

25. Benney, Gray and Pear, op. cit., p.111

26. ibid., p.6


29. Ibid., p.291

30. Heath, Jowell and Curtice, op. cit., p.31

31. Ibid.

32. ibid., p.30.

33. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.86

34. R. Alford (1963), op. cit.


36. Dunleavy and Husbands, op. cit.

37. Ibid., p.11

38. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.26

39. Ibid., p.14

40. Sarlvik and Crewe describe partisan dealignment as a situation where none of the major occupational groups provides solid and consistent support for one of the two major parties. op. cit., p.332

41. Ibid., p.82

42. Ibid., p.83

43. Ibid., p.332

44. Ibid., p.342

45. Heath, Jowell and Curtice, op. cit., p.7

46. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.342

47. M. Abrams, op. cit., p.14


50. The class distinctiveness of party was calculated using the index suggested by W. Korpi, loc. cit., p.629. Class distinctiveness of left party = working class voting left / working class voting left + middle class voting left.
51. Sarlvik and Crewe, op. cit., p.79
52. Heath, Jowell and Curtice, op. cit., p.20
53. Ibid., p.7
54. W. Korpi, loc. cit., p.629
55. Few respondents believed the Conservative party drew support from the working class.
56. The National Front is, in fact, the most class distinctive party, drawing most of its support from the working class.
57. P. Dunleavy, op. cit., p.18
58. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.223
59. Benney et al., op. cit., p.122
61. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.7
62. Ibid., p.94
63. 1% of the sample did not know whether class was important and 30.9% said it was not important.
65. AB = 93%; C1 = 95%; C2 = 92%; DE = 87%. Ibid.
66. See above, p.230
67. B. Jessop, op. cit., p.98. Conservative = 95%; Labour = 92%; Liberal = 81%.
68. Butler and Stokes, op. cit. Quoted I. Reid, op. cit., p.26
69. I. Reid, op. cit., p.27
70. A.H. Birch, op. cit., p.87
71. The 60% of respondents exhibiting a classless consciousness and located within the working class were found to be assigned to category 80 because they were retired, which reduces the significance of that statistic.
72. E. Nordlinger, op. cit., p.175
73. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.94
76. I. Reid, op. cit., p.24
78. Butler and Stokes (1969), op. cit., Table 4.3. Quoted in I. Reid, op. cit., p.25
79. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.89
80. See also Butler and Stokes, op. cit., p.79
81. E. Nordlinger, op. cit., p.163
82. Ibid.
83. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.94
84. Benney et al., op. cit., p.115
86. See above, p.238
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER EIGHT

87. E. Nordlinger, op. cit., p. 169
88. ibid., p. 172
89. ibid., p.170
90. ibid., p.173
91. Goldthorpe and Lockwood, op. cit., p.112
92. 8 Conservative supporters were trade unionists; 42 Labour voters and 25 Alliance supporters.
93. Benney et. al., op. cit., p.112
94. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.62
95. ibid.
96. Benney et. al., op. cit., p.112
97. Goldthorpe et. al., op. cit., p.114
'Instrumental orientation', suggest Goldthorpe and Lockwood, reflects divisions in status and skill rather than the division of labour, and would appear to be more important in its effects upon industrial attitudes and behaviour than changes in production technologies. p.144
98. These questions applied to the union movement as a whole and not to individual unions.
99. Attitudinal position one: Agreement with statements B,C and D. Disagreement with statements A,F,G and H.
Attitudinal position two: Agreement with statement H. Disagreement with statement B.
Attitudinal position three: Agreement with statements A,B,F and G. Disagreement with statements C and D.
100. Nordlinger notes that 'the conditions of working class life have been so decisively altered as to make the appeal of class solidarity largely irrelevant in the second half of the twentieth century.' op. cit., p.180. Class solidarity, argues Nordlinger, has lost its political, social and economic meaning.
101. Robertson, op. cit., p.64
102. Dunleavy argues that union membership is determined by production sector and by gender and has no overall associations with social class. It is in this context, suggests Dunleavy, that the political implications of unionism may be understood. op. cit., p.131
103. This view is found in official reports, newspaper commentary and a number of academic works.
104. Goldthorpe and Lockwood, 'Affluence and the British Class Structure', loc. cit., p.139
105. ibid., p.148
106. ibid., p.139
107. Goldthorpe, Industrial Attitudes, op. cit., p.82
108. ibid., p.138
109. D. Robertson, op. cit., p.64
110. Goldthorpe and Lockwood, 'Affluence and the British Class Structure', loc. cit., p.155
111. ibid., p.151
112. ibid., p.137
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER NINE

CHAPTER NINE

1. Those respondents who answered 'Yes' to question 70, who felt class conflict is very or fairly important (question 71), who considered themselves to belong to a distinct class (question 73) and who were classed as having a dichotomic or partial class consciousness from their answers to question 74.

2. This was done according to the SPSSX procedure 'T-Test'.

3. The variable constructed for class consciousness may lack accuracy because it is based upon four coded items, one of which (question 74) had, itself, been coded as a compound variable.


5. Kirchlechner, 'New Demands or the demands of new groups?', 161-176, in Crouch and Pizzorno, eds., op. cit.

6. R. Alford, op. cit., p.ix


12. D. Reisman, loc. cit., p.162


14. Dowse and Hughes, op. cit., p.18

15. A.J. Lijphart, 'Majority rule versus democracy in deeply divided societies', loc. cit.


18. ibid., p.35


20. E. Durkheim defines 'anomie' as a situation where individuals have lost their relationship to the norms of society and their sense of responsibility to society. The Division of Labour in Society (Macmillan, 1933). See also A. Barbrook, op. cit., p.92

21. S.M. Lipset, op. cit. G. Wootton suggests that low levels of electoral participation indicate the need for a new occupational system of representation to replace existing geographical forces. G. Wootton, Pressure Groups in Britain, 1720-1970, op. cit.
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO CHAPTER NINE

22. S.M. Lipset, op. cit., p.451
23. I.D. Balbus, loc. cit., p.164
24. S. Berger, ed., op. cit., p.22
25. See for example H. Marcuse, op. cit., p.256
For a useful theoretical and practical discussion of alienation and economism, see M. Mann, op. cit. For Marx's treatment of false consciousness' see 'The German Ideology', loc. cit.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
30. This variable was composed of those who expressed little interest in politics, who felt that they had little influence upon government and were unhappy about this, and who felt they could do little as individuals about policy, plus those who do not always vote in elections (questions 12, 15, 16, 69 and 19).
32. In Liverpool, for example, there was a +9.1% change in the Labour vote, and a -11.8% change in the Conservative vote, while in Glasgow the Conservatives slipped -6.2% points and Labour advanced by +10. The Guardian, June 13, 1987.
33. The cases of Scotland and Wales are slightly different and must be viewed with reference to nationalist politics as well as to economic policies.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. See particularly Chapters Four and Eight.
38. The Observer, editorial, June 14, 1987, p.8
39. Abstention does not appear to have been considered an electoral option in any significant proportions.
40. At the 1987 local elections in Liverpool, for example, Labour re-gained the city council and is reputed to retain a strong militant element. In inner London, Liverpool and in Sheffield, Labour MP's with a more pronounced commitment to socialist principle than the national leadership were returned in the general Election.
41. Although references to class politics were muted during the Labour party campaign, after the election Eric Heffer MP argued the need to return to class politics and to adopt more left-wing policies within the shadow cabinet, in order to win both the white and blue collar votes. E. Heffer, The Guardian, 23 June, 1987
NOTES AND REFERENCES TO APPENDICES

APPENDIX B

1. I. Crewe and A. Fox, op. cit., p. 152
2. 100 electors from 7512 represents 1.3% of the total electorate.
   The random numbers were produced by a computer programme
   for random number generating.
3. The letters used in the pilot survey were of similar format
   to those used in the main survey, as presented in Appendix
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