COLONIAL GEORGIA IN BRITISH POLICY

1732 - 1765

by

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ABSTRACT

The motives behind the foundation of Georgia illustrate the outlook upon overseas possessions held by the mother-country in the eighteenth century. Its conception was due to the philanthropy of private individuals, but its support by the Government was due to the strategic and commercial benefits that Britain was expected to derive. The strategic benefits were apparent in the conflict with Spain and France. The question of who should control the Georgia area was the cause of Anglo-Spanish diplomatic controversy which was kindled in the conflagration after 1739, and was not insignificant in the French and Indian War after 1755. The fact that Georgia was none too well supported by the British Government in these wars does not detract from the province's importance in those years, and the final outcome was in large measure a justification of the strategic and defensive motives that had lain behind the foundation of the colony.

The corporation of trustees established to manage the affairs of the new colony pursued an individual policy differing in several particulars from the policy normally followed towards the other colonies, but its unsuitability in the circumstances prevailing at the time soon became apparent, gave rise to local discontent and eventually brought about its modification. When Georgia became a royal province its government and difficulties assumed forms similar to those
experienced in the other Crown colonies. Economically, Georgia's development reflected all the commercial theories of the old colonial system and illustrated the mother-country's blind devotion to what was desirable and her consequent neglect of what was practicable or most suitable to the natural capacities of the overseas settlements. The history of colonial Georgia stands as a clear example of the objects, the methods and the failings of the old colonial system of empire.
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PREFACE

This study is an attempt to place colonial Georgia in its proper historical setting and to assess its significance in the development of the first British empire. In order to give the subject this new perspective I have examined the sources and evidence from the vantage point of the mother-country, "the land", as C.M. Andrews has pointed out, "whence the colonists came and of which they were always legally a part." Nevertheless, in shifting the emphasis to policy I have tried to avoid the error of taking too little account of events within the colony itself. Therefore, internal affairs have received the attention required to keep the narrative rightly balanced and proportioned, and, while the original authorities have been used as much as possible throughout, my debt to the work of American scholars on internal history will be apparent from the footnotes.

The year 1765 was not an arbitrary choice as the date to close the story. It seemed essential to keep the subject clear of the embroilments that formed the preliminaries of the American Revolution, which are properly matter for another thesis. Wherever necessary, however, I have not hesitated

to venture beyond 1765, especially in the final chapter, but I have carefully refrained from making any mention of the Revolutionary troubles themselves.

Some explanation is necessary regarding quotations and dates in the text. Except in a few cases where use of the original forms has seemed preferable, quotations from documents have been changed in spelling, punctuation and capitalization so as to conform to modern English usage. As to dates, writers on this period are always faced with the same difficulty. Before 1752 two calendars were in use in England; the Julian or Old Style was the legal calendar and was eleven days behind the Gregorian or New Style which was used in all other European countries except Russia. Moreover, the year in England began on 25 March and not on 1 January as in other countries. In the present text all dates mentioned prior to 1 January 1752 are given in the Old Style, but the year is taken as commencing on 1 January. In the footnotes, however, the actual dating on the document is cited, and will often be found to be in both styles; for example, 14/25 January 1732/3. This no longer applies after 1 January 1752. A Bill for regulating the commencing of the year and for correcting the calendar had passed Parliament in the spring of 1751. The correction of the calendar was made by calling the day after 2 September 1752 the 14th., thus omitting the discrepant eleven days.

Finally, I must acknowledge all those persons who, in one way or another, have assisted me in my work. In particular,
I should like to express my gratitude to Lady Edith Haden-Guest for the loan of the photostat copy of the contemporary map of Georgia in the Library of Congress, and to Professor G.S. Graham of King's College, London, for his persistent criticism and advice.
CHAPTER I

ORIGINS AND FOUNDATION

The colony of Georgia was conceived in philanthropy. Its origins can be traced back to the generosity of Monsieur Abel Tassin d'Allone, King William III's private secretary at the Hague, in supporting Dr. Thomas Bray, an Anglican clergyman who visited Holland in 1697 to seek the King's patronage for schemes to promote Christian knowledge in the colonies. When d'Allone made his will in 1721 he bequeathed to Dr. Bray one tenth of his English estate and the arrears due to him from the Crown as a capital fund to be used towards "erecting a school or schools for the thorough instructing in the Christian religion the young children of negro slaves and such of their parents as shew themselves inclineable and desirous to be so instructed, in some one or other of the English plantations in the West Indies." The bequest, which amounted to £900, was immediately invested in South Sea annuities. Possession of this fund enabled Bray to tackle his schemes more hopefully, but towards the end of 1723 he became so ill

that he invited John Lord Viscount Percival (later the Earl of Egmont), Robert Hales, the Rev. Stephen Hales and William Belitha to join him as trustees for the bequest and to co-operate in his work. These men became the original members of the charitable group known as Dr. Bray's Associates for founding clerical libraries and maintaining schools, the seed whence sprang the project of colonizing Georgia.

Bray's philanthropy did not stop at this but spread into other fields, and by 1727 he had become interested in the appalling conditions then prevalent in English gaols, and he undertook to solicit benefactions for the relief of prisoners in Whitechapel and Borough Compter. It was this work which brought him into contact with James Edward Oglethorpe, who had been so shocked by the death from smallpox of an indebted architect friend in prison that he demanded an investigation into conditions in the gaols, and in February 1729 the House of Commons appointed a committee under his chairmanship for that purpose. As a result of its investigations this committee presented to the Commons


three reports which accused the London gaolers and their subordinates of corruption and oppressive treatment of prisoners, and the House voted unanimously for their prosecution.

The very success of the movement for prison reform, however, created a new problem for the philanthropists. An Act for the relief of insolvent debtors in 1729 liberated large numbers of prisoners who could not find employment and were left to wander, beg and starve in the streets of London. By itself, therefore, the Act was, as Oglethorpe said, an "imperfect charity" because so many derived no other advantage from it "but the privilege of starving at large." It was this problem which turned the attention of the philanthropists towards the possibility of forming these poor people into a new colony in America. There is some doubt as to who first proposed the idea. Thomas Coram attributed it to Dr. Bray, but the historians

2. 2 Geo.II, c.20.
of Georgia have always given the credit to Oglethorpe and, Coram's testimony excepted, the documentary evidence available supports their view. V.W. Crane, it is true, has argued strongly in support of the opinion that the project originated with Bray. That is possible but not proved; what is certain is that the main impetus came from Oglethorpe. In a letter dated 23 December 1730 Lord Percival wrote to Bishop Berkeley that Oglethorpe "gave the first hint" of the colonizing project the previous year, and both Percival's diary and the minutes of the meetings of the trustees for d'Allone's legacy show beyond any reasonable doubt that Oglethorpe was the principal inspiration behind the movement to found a new colony.

There was nothing original in the idea. The use of colonies as a dumping-ground for the surplus or idle population of the mother-country had been suggested as early as Queen Elizabeth's time, and variations on the same theme had been composed throughout the Seventeenth Century. By virtue of two Acts of Parliament several hundred convicts after 1719 had been transported annually to Virginia, where it was hoped they would be able to re-start

2. Berkeley and Percival Correspondence, p.270.
their lives after their misfortunes in England. From the earliest days of the empire there had been this conception of lands abroad as lands of hope for those who had been unfortunate at home. What was new in 1729 was that circumstances began to converge which were to make possible the foundation in America of a settlement for this purpose.

The necessary constituents for a colonization project came together almost providentially at this time. Pioneers were to be found in those thrown on the streets by the Act of 1729, and an organization willing to take the matter in hand was to be found in the Bray Associates. Towards the end of 1729 Dr. Bray knew that he was dying and probably would not outlive the winter. But before he died he wished to see the way prepared for establishing a settlement in America for the relief of English poor and unemployed and of Continental Protestants persecuted for their religion. Though very ill and confined to his room he sent for Oglethorpe, Lord Percival, Stephen Hales, James Vernon and a few others and suggested that to his original designs of establishing parochial libraries in Britain and teaching Christianity to negroes in the plantations should be expressly added the design of founding a colony. He then

had an instrument embodying these designs drawn up in accordance with his wishes and altered his will so that this trust devolved on his Associates. He completed this work just in time, for he was weakening rapidly and a few days later, on 15 February 1730, he died.

While Bray was thus creating the organization, chance was providing the necessary additional capital. A haberdasher named Joseph King had left a legacy of £15,000 in the hands of three trustees. One of these, being King's heir and mindful of the fact that both his partners were over seventy, refused to come to any agreement with the other two over the disposal of the money, apparently hoping to acquire the whole sum for himself on their demise. Age, however, had not crippled his partners' sense of justice and, being determined to get rid of the trust, they sought Oglethorpe's assistance in getting it lodged in the hands of the Master of Chancery until new trustees were appointed to dispose of it. Out of this move arose a lawsuit in which Oglethorpe represented, and won the case for, the two elder partners, who then wanted the money to be annexed to another trust. Oglethorpe suggested the d'Allone legacy and invited Lord Percival, one of its trustees, and several others who had served on the gaols committee, to

accept the new bequest. The trustees of King's legacy would as yet permit only a third of it to be placed under the new management, but Oglethorpe considered this sufficient for what he and the Bray Associates had in mind. Their intention now was to procure territory in America and populate it with English unemployed. It was hoped that such people would be able to cultivate flax and hemp and, in time, so increase as to become a barrier for the defence of Britain's possessions against the French and Indians in those parts. The scheme was approved at a meeting of the Bray Associates on 5 March 1730, and at the end of July they agreed to petition the King for land to the south-west of the Carolinas.

Nearly two years were to elapse before the coveted royal charter was acquired. The British Government did not feel the same urgency in the matter as did Oglethorpe and his colleagues, and the petition had to take its turn with all the other business pressing on Sir Robert Walpole's Ministry. On 17 September 1730 the Privy Council received from the Associates their petition pointing out that London

1. Egmont Diary, I, pp.44-6, 99. The Minutes of the Meetings of the Trustees for Instructing the Negroes in the Christian Religion and Establishing a Charitable Colony for the Better Maintenance of the Poor of this Kingdom, and other good purposes, according to d'Allone's Charity, 21 March 1729 to 3 Dec. 1735 (S.P.G. Archives) pp.1 and 11.
and its neighbourhood teemed with poor people who would willingly seek a livelihood in America if they had the wherewithal to get there; thus the Associates proposed to provide if the King would grant them lands between the Rivers Savannah and Altamaha in South Carolina and a charter of incorporation authorizing them to contract with prospective settlers and to receive contributions towards financing the enterprise. The Privy Council allowed a couple of months to slip by and then, after considering it in committee, referred it on 23 November to the Board of Trade which, ten days later, interviewed some of the petitioners and asked them to write out their proposals in detail for the Board's deliberation.

On 9 December Oglethorpe tendered again a memorial for a charter, but the Lords Commissioners made several stipulations on particular points. The rivers, they said, must be common to all British subjects and not under the exclusive ownership of the petitioners; all laws must be made in the mother-country, receive the King's approval and be always subject to his revision or repeal; military officers must hold their commissions from the Governor of South Carolina; every appointment to civil office must be

endorsed by the Crown; and after a certain period quit-rents must be paid on terms similar to those in South Carolina. Such stipulations obviously demanded serious consideration, and Oglethorpe forbore from making a positive answer until he had consulted his confederates. He laid their reply before the Board the following week. They acquiesced in the Board's proposals on the payment of quit-rents, appointment of civil functionaries and commissioning of military officials. As regards legislation they conceded that laws made by them should be submitted to the King and, if not disapproved by him within so many days, sent over and enforced in the colony until he disallowed them. They agreed also that they should not have proprietary ownership of the rivers, but asked for their tract of land to be bounded by the southernmost branch of the Altamaha and the largest and most navigable branch of the Savannah. The Board discussed the whole matter the next day and ordered the draft of a report on it to be prepared.

This report appeared before the Privy Council in committee on 18 January 1731. It was a favourable one. The Board thought the design commendable and advised that the petitioners should be incorporated as a charitable society and given the lands they asked. The tract should be separated from South Carolina and made into an independent

colony as regards legislation and government, except that command of the militia should remain in the possession of the Governor of South Carolina. For every hundred acres leased by the corporation the King was to exact, after an interval of ten years, a quit-rent of four shillings proclamation money. The powers of the corporation, as set out in the report, were to be large but definite: it should be able to constitute courts of record and other courts to be held in the King's name; to appoint and dismiss, during a period of twenty-one years, all government officials except those concerned with royal revenue; to prepare laws which, if not disallowed by the King within three months of their being laid before him in Council, were to be enforced until he did rescind them; "and the corporation ought also to lay constant accounts of the progress of the colony before one of Your Majesty's principal Secretaries of State and the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, that Your Majesty may be duly informed thereof." Finally, the Board advised that the new colony should be subject to all the current laws and regulations relating to British plantations in America.

Difficulties and complications arose, however, which, together with the customary dilatoriness of Government departments, delayed ratification of the charter in its final

form for nearly eighteen months. Some of the Associates were apprehensive lest, by accepting responsibility for the proposed colony, they would be compelled to relinquish their seats in Parliament. In February 1731 they held an informal meeting at the Bedford Arms Tavern in Covent Garden and, on Oglethorpe's suggestion, resolved to approach Walpole and procure an Act qualifying them to retain their Parliamentary seats, as had been done for M.P.s who became directors of the South Sea Company. When the matter was discussed with Walpole a month later he decried their misgivings as being quite groundless, and at the same time criticized a conspectus of their proposed Bill which they showed him. Nevertheless, he was not unfriendly towards the scheme in general and not personally disposed to hinder the Associates in their quest for a royal charter.

It was their own wrangling over niceties that now impeded progress. They were not satisfied by the draft of a charter as drawn up by the Attorney and Solicitor General. They feared that its provision for a new election of councillors every three years would take power from them and put it in the hands of others who might convert the scheme into "a job". They felt that the Governor of South Carolina, by having control of the militia, would thereby be in a position to incommode the new settlers at will. And lastly, they

observed that some words had been inserted which seemed to give the King a duty on imports and exports which they thought would act as a great discouragement to an infant settlement. Consequently, they suggested some alterations in the draft, emphasizing their desire to be independent of the Governor of South Carolina and their reluctance to agree to a rotation of members on the common council.

The Privy Council committee, who in December considered these suggestions, referred the draft charter back to the Attorney and Solicitor General with their own suggestions for its amendment. They conceded that clauses relating to regular periodical elections to the common council should be omitted or modified, and appointments to it be continued during good behaviour. While the corporation had only its present twenty-one members the common council should consist of no more than fifteen persons, but as soon as the corporation had increased in number the common council ought to be augmented by election to twenty-one. The committee recommended also the insertion of a clause to restrain members of the corporation from having any grants of land made either to themselves or to anyone else in trust for them. Another addition was to the effect that all grants of land made by the corporation were to be void unless registered with the Auditor of Plantations within a limited time. Some other

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points, including the definition of a western boundary and determination of the number of acres to be conferred on each settler, were passed on to the Board of Trade for a report. The Board discussed these points with Oglethorpe and eventually recommended that the western limits of the proposed settlement should form an elongation of the western boundary of South Carolina as defined in its charter, and that all islands within twenty leagues of the eastern shore between the Rivers Savannah and Altamaha should also be included in the grant; as to the amount of land to be allotted each settler, the Board advised a maximum of five hundred acres. Six weeks later the Privy Council committee approved the charter in its altered form, and the Duke of Newcastle, as Secretary of State for the Southern Department, promised the petitioners he would persuade the King to sign a warrant for it.

Further delay was now caused by the capricious behaviour of George II. When Newcastle first took the charter for royal signature at the beginning of February 1732, the King refused to sign, expressing dislike of some of the terms and objecting especially to the nomination of militia officers being vested in the colony's trustees instead of in the Governor of South Carolina. The King's disinclination to

put the royal seal to the charter embarrassed Newcastle
and brought upon him the criticism of the Associates, who
attributed the delay to the machinations of a Ministry
taking its revenge on them for voting in Parliament against
the salt duty. Such criticism was unfair and misplaced.
Walpole was "hearty for the charter" and, when informed by
John Drummond of the petitioners' uneasiness, declared:
"Mr. Drummond, the gentlemen wrong me to believe the charter
sticks with me, and they wrong the duke in thinking it sticks
with him. It is not proper for me to tell you where it
sticks." He told Lord Percival that none of the Ministry
was against it, and that the hindrance was due to the King's
jealousy for his prerogative.

The Associates were irritated by this turn of events and
felt that the King should have voiced his opinions before
permitting the affair to go so far. They were not prepared
to accept the charter on the royal conditions for three main
reasons. Firstly, since during its infancy the colony would
not be able to afford both a military and a civil officer
separately, administration would be complicated if the
individual in whom these functions were united had to serve
two masters at the same time, the trustees in civil affairs
and the Governor of South Carolina in military. Secondly,
they would be unable to defray the large expense involved in
the King granting employments, while they would be much
quicker than the Government in getting commissions out.
Thirdly, they had always been of the opinion that the less their colony depended on the Governor of South Carolina the more likely it was to be successful. The King could not alter the charter himself because it had already passed the Council in his presence, but the Associates knew full well that if he were to refer it back to the Council for reconsideration there would inevitably be more delay and possibly some quibbling too. Newcastle, however, was as persistent as his timidity would allow, continuing to solicit the King's signature and continuing to incur the royal displeasure in doing so, until, at last, on 21 April 1732, the King gave way, much to the relief of the petitioners who promptly went in a body to thank Walpole, not Newcastle, for his assistance. Walpole expressed pleasure at their obtaining what they wanted, and regret at their not receiving it sooner. Their relief and gratitude is understandable; the legislative foundations of Georgia had now been laid, and more practical preparations for the enterprise could be started in earnest.

In sanctioning the project the British Government was not motivated by any such charitable intentions as inspired Oglethorpe and his friends. It would be wrong to attribute

the colonization of Georgia solely to the philanthropy of a few public-spirited individuals. While the Ministry was not much interested in the plight of insolvent and unemployed debtors, it was very concerned about the defence of the empire. The French in New France and Louisiana, the Spaniards in Florida and Cuba, and the Indian nations along the back of the English settlements were a constant source of danger to the security of British territory in America. Of vital importance was the southern frontier, which the Government realized must be defended, for the loss of South Carolina would endanger the fur traffic and growing rice trade and bring the French and Spaniards so close to Virginia as to imperil the tobacco trade. The southern colonies could not afford to ignore the menace of the Spaniards stationed at St. Augustine on the coast of Florida. The boundaries in this region had never been satisfactorily defined and frontier incidents were common. The Governor of St. Augustine welcomed fugitive negro slaves from South Carolina, organizing them into a regiment with their own officers and making no differentiation in their uniform or pay from the Spanish troops. It was natural for the English colonists to be ever fearful of an attack from this quarter; alarms were common, such as that

1. In giving a brief account of British policy on the southern frontier at this period, it is necessary to acknowledge the debt owed to V.W. Crane's work on the subject.

in 1719 of an expedition having set out from Havana designed for the conquest of the Bahamas and the southern colonies, but which was fortuitously dispersed by a storm after an unsuccessful assault on New Providence.

Britain could not be unaware of the dangers to which her colonies were exposed, and by 1721, when the Board of Trade prepared an account of the state of the plantations in America, the need for defensive precautions was recognized. The Lords Commissioners warned the King that South Carolina was open to French, Spanish and Indian incursions, and might be lost if military reinforcements were not sent. Its boundaries should be clearly defined, as at the moment their only definition was the vague one contained in the original charter to the lords proprietors. The Board recommended that forts be built and particular care taken to secure the navigation of all rivers, especially the Altamaha, which entered the sea north of St. Augustine. The urgency of these precautions was emphasized by the fact that the French were experiencing difficulty in navigating the Mississippi and it was possible that, having but recently restored Pensacola to the Spaniards, they would attempt to open another communication from their settlement at Mobile down the Altamaha to the ocean. Such a move would jeopardize British

interests in the whole South Atlantic region and, with the Spaniards in Florida adopting an attitude which, if not certainly hostile, was certainly not friendly, it was essential for adequate precautions to be taken against foreign encroachments. For this purpose, both the northern and southern extremities of the British colonies would have to be fortified, the friendship of the Indian tribes assiduously sought and carefully maintained, and government in the several plantations strengthened and improved. The mother-country was obviously already anxious about the safety of her American empire, and the colonists themselves began to take some precautions. But the most ambitious plans for barrier settlements were those conceived by enterprising individuals and which foreshadowed the ultimate creation of the colony of Georgia.

The most remarkable of these precursory schemes was that of Sir Robert Montgomery, a Nova Scotian baronet, who in 1717 published *A Discourse concerning the Designed Establishment of a New Colony to the South of Carolina in the most delightful country in the universe*. The design, its author proclaimed, was due not to any sudden whim but to "a strong bent of genius" he had inherited from his ancestors. This inborn genius could now display itself because, on 19 June 1717, the lords

proprietors of Carolina had granted him all the land between the Rivers Altamaha and Savannah for the express purpose of erecting "a distinct province" under the name of the Margravate of Azilia. The contract was to be operative only if settlement had commenced within three years, so that Montgomery was obliged to indulge in some fanciful advertising of the prospects in order to attract immediate support. According to him a terrestrial paradise lay in the country south of Carolina:
"Its gentle hills are full of mines, lead, copper, iron and even some of silver; 'tis beautiful with odoriferous plants, green all the year." Its fertile soil would eventually render the mother-country independent of foreign markets in an immense variety of commodities including coffee, tea, figs, raisins, currants, almonds, olives, silk, wine and cochineal, although in the early stages the shareholders were to derive their profits mainly from potash and rice. More significant was the intention to settle the margravate in symmetrical departments, each separately secured against attack, so that the whole would be "one continued fortress". In other words, it would act as a barrier against the French on the Mississippi, the Spaniards in Florida and the Indians of the backwoods, though Montgomery naturally said little about this aspect because he wished to entice investors. The Carolina proprietors recommended the scheme to the Privy Council, 1

which favoured the idea of a barrier province, but investors were not persuaded by Montgomery's facile optimism and by 1720 the design had fizzled out.

Nevertheless, the British Government remained sympathetic to the idea of a barrier province in the south and showed some interest when, in 1721, Jean Pierre Purry, a native of Neufchâtel in Switzerland, asked permission to found a new settlement in Carolina. Purry had already visited Carolina to collect information about the area, and now claimed that by reason of the latitude it could be as productive of the richest plants, fruits and drugs as anywhere on "the terraqueous globe", provided there were no impediments such as rocks, marshes or deserts. Like Montgomery, Purry dilated fondly on the valuable commodities that might be produced, which included wine, oils, cotton, indigo, wax, fruit, coconuts, timber, tar, flax, hemp, rice and wheat, besides silk as good as that of France, Spain or Italy. He offered to convey Protestants from Switzerland to the New World and settle them in a part of the Carolina neighbourhood he proposed to call Georgia, whence their settlement would extend gradually westward until the Mississippi was reached, thereby cutting French communication between Canada and Louisiana. He entered into a contract with the British Government to receive a certain amount of land for every hundred men he transported to America, and in 1732 the outpost
of Purrysburg was established on the Savannah River.

In the meantime, measures were being taken to provide for the defence of the southern colonies. In 1716 the Carolinians erected a fort on the River Savannah to protect their frontier and assist the Charleston traders. In 1720 the Board of Trade discussed the safety of South Carolina with its new governor, Sir Francis Nicholson, and its agents, Colonel John Barnwell and Joseph Boone. The discussion revealed that the French were encroaching on the colony, having recently seized an English settlement, and were being rapidly reinforced with men from France. In order to guard against further encroachments and to preserve the trade with the Indians, it was suggested that forts should be built on the frontiers and the mouth of the Altamaha possessed immediately, as the French were pretending a right to it. The Board endorsed these suggestions a week later and, after approval by the Privy Council, the construction of a fort on the Altamaha was enjoined on Governor Nicholson by the King. This fort, named after King George and built at


the confluence of the Oconee and Ocmulgee Rivers, sixty miles from the margin of English settlement, had a chequered history. Throughout 1725 the Spanish agent in London complained about the fort and was, no doubt, delighted when in January 1726 it was burnt down, possibly with the connivance of its turbulent garrison who were dissatisfied with living conditions and twelve of whom seized the opportunity to desert to the Spaniards at St. Augustine. The Governor of South Carolina had it rebuilt, but in the autumn of 1727 its garrison, a company of invalids, "old, infirm, inactive and morose", and so lazy and mutinous that they could not be prevailed upon to fetch themselves wholesome water, were finally withdrawn. The significance, however, of this and other fortifications was that they were clearly intended to become the nuclei of frontier settlement; Fort King George pointed the way to the ultimate establishment of the barrier colony of Georgia.

In spite of the abandonment of the fort on the Altamaha, Britain had no intention of allowing that river to fall under foreign control. The Board of Trade was again warned by


2. Add. MSS.32752, p.316, Keene to Walpole, 3 Nov. 1727. C.O.5/360 (Colonial Office papers, Public Record Office) fo.22, Nicholson to B.T.

Governor Nicholson in the autumn of 1727 of the need for a permanent fort to prevent the trade and navigation of the river falling into the hands of France or Spain, and in 1728 and 1729 Thomas Lowndes submitted proposals for diverting the Palatine emigrants from Pennsylvania to the large uncultivated tracts in South Carolina. Soon after being appointed royal governor of South Carolina in November 1729, Robert Johnson began to bombard the Board of Trade with proposals for improving the settlement and defence of the province. He suggested the granting of 200,000 acres on the frontier for the erection of ten townships, of which three were to be on the River Savannah, two on the River Santee, and one on each of the Rivers Pon Ron, Wateree, Black, Pedee and Waccamaw. The argument was that if poor people were settled in these townships and encouraged to make small fortifications around them, they would act as a buffer against hostile incursions. On 17 September 1730 the Privy Council approved a draft of instructions for Governor Johnson which had been submitted by the Board of Trade on 10 June. Article 43 of these instructions required the marking out of eleven townships, compared with the ten proposed by Johnson, of which two were to be on the Altamaha, again an innovation on Johnson's plan. Moreover,

1. Ibid., pp. 251, 291. C.0.5/360, ff. 22, 72. C.0.5/361, ff. 68-72.
2. Ibid., ff. 34, 78, 82, 95.
by article 106 the Governor was to repair the fort on the Altamaha immediately and garrison it with a detachment from the Independent Company stationed at Port Royal.

All this indicates that concern for the frontiers in America was not confined to the colonists themselves. Relations with Spain and France were in a parlous state generally, so that the British Government was not indifferent to any hostile moves by either of these two nations, whether in the New World or the Old. Friction with France was being engendered by the continued persecution of the Huguenots and by the disputed ownership of St. Vincent, St. Lucia and Dominica in the West Indies, as well as by the appearance of French forts along the Mississippi River and the Canadian border. Early in 1730 when the House of Commons debated the nation's position at home and abroad, Sir William Wyndham pointed to the danger of French encroachments at the back of the American plantations, doubting whether English acquisitions either there or in Europe were safe. Britain was certainly conscious of the insecurity of her frontiers in America, and when the Government received a petition for lands on which to plant a new colony, the possibility of it functioning as a defensive barrier must have been a strong argument in its favour. It is noticeable that Oglethorpe and his partners

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2. Egmont Diary, I, p. 35
did not omit to emphasize the defensive value of their charitable design, and for a generation after its foundation the strategic importance of Georgia remained a recommendation in the eyes of the Government. The Trustees told Walpole \(^1\) in 1737 that it was "the Key of all North America", and a South Carolina merchant in 1743 described it as "a Gibraltar to this province and North America, however insignificant some people may make it." \(^2\) Another writer in 1744 maintained that "its importance and utility, nay, the absolute necessity of it as a frontier, cannot be denied." \(^3\) Such statements were very exaggerated, if not absurd, but they do, at least, indicate that much value was attached to Georgia as a factor in the defence of the American possessions.

It was not intended to populate the colony solely with poor debtors from the mother-country, for persecuted Protestants from the Continent were welcomed as settlers. There had long been a fear that emigration from England might endanger the domestic economy. It was thought by many people that Britain could not afford to lose workers, and since 1718 the emigration of skilled artisans had been discouraged. \(^4\)

1. C.O. 5/654, fo.109, Trustees to Walpole, 22 June 1737.
3. Ibid., XIII (Sept.1744) p.445.
This point of view was brought out in a Parliamentary debate in May 1732, when several petitions were forwarded complaining of the mischief caused by vagrants and beggars. Oglethorpe and others concerned in the Georgia project had intended at this juncture to present an address asking the King for a grant to transport vagrants under the age of sixteen to South Carolina and there bind them as apprentices. An unexpected opposition arose against the proposal, and the House decided to go into committee on the petitions later and consider how the vagrants could be made useful at home. Captain Vernon and others said labour was urgently required in England, and it would be doing the public a disservice to send vagrants under sixteen to America. Although the House commended the scheme in general and was informed by Walpole that the King had no objection to the motion, it would not agree to it.

Opinion in the House on the subject was still divided when, a year later, the Georgia Trustees petitioned for money. In presenting the petition the Master of the Rolls pointed out that the settlement of persecuted foreign Protestants in Georgia was a worthy and charitable act which would result in the production there of raw materials for Britain's manufactures, augment her trade, increase the number of her subjects and provide employment for her poor. Sir Joseph Jekyll commended

Georgia as strengthening the United Kingdom's power in the West Indies, besides relieving needy people at home and making them useful producers of materials for Britain's manufactures. Bearing in mind the efforts of the Trustees, he argued, "it would be a scandal for us who sit easy at home by our fires not to countenance so great virtue and support so good a design."

Opposition to the motion was voiced by Francis Whitworth, M.P. for Minehead, and Thomas Winnington, M.P. for Droitwich. They did not question the good intentions of the Trustees, but were opposed to sending Englishmen abroad because the country was already short of inhabitants. They recommended, instead, that the Continental Protestants should be settled in England and that the English poor should be found useful employment within their native country. The upshot of this particular debate was that the House went into committee on the matter, and when Colonel Bladen finally made the motion to grant £10,000 nobody spoke against it, but some Members interjected a few noes to prevent it passing without dissent.

This apprehension over the possible effects on the country's population was common in England in the eighteenth century, and often expressed in Parliament. Few economic writers of the period approved of emigration, and it was, in fact, a capital offence to inveigle artificers and mechanics

to leave the Kingdom. Peopling America with foreign Protestants was generally regarded as a much more prudent way of expanding the empire, and in looking abroad for settlers the Georgia philanthropists were keeping in line with the policy of the Government, which had for long preferred the colonies to be used as an asylum for European refugees. When Charles II sent two shiploads of Huguenots to Carolina in 1679 with the idea of introducing the cultivation of grapes, olives, and silkworms there, he was setting on foot a movement which continued down to the time of the Seven Years War. In 1705 John Archdale, one of the proprietors of Carolina, made arrangements for a settlement in the province by what was called the High German Company of Thuringia. Three years later English colonial proprietors disseminated throughout the Rhine Valley pamphlets extolling the life and climate in the New World, and distributed in the Palatinate books and papers urging people to come to England where means would be found to enable them to go to Carolina or another of the colonies. In 1710 the Government defrayed the expenses of transplanting several thousand poverty-stricken refugees from the Palatinate

to New York and North Carolina. This willingness to encourage foreigners to cross the Atlantic as a method of increasing the population and strengthening the defences of the empire remained a feature of British policy until the end of the period. In 1763, for instance, the Board of Trade made a report on the course to be adopted towards the recently-expanded empire. Colonization was to be directed into regions where it would supplement, and not interfere with, the metropolitan economy. A good example of such a region was provided by Georgia, for there subtropical crops could be raised. The manpower for these extended settlements, however, was to be drawn not from Britain but from continental Europe or the other colonies. Clearly, therefore, Oglethorpe and his colleagues were on firm ground when, in their petition, they declared their intention of sending over persecuted Protestants from Europe.

As J.R. McCain has stated in his study of Georgia as a proprietary province, the "various arguments for the founding of the colony form an excellent commentary on the whole policy of England regarding her commercial and industrial relations to her colonies." The Government could not overlook

3. J.R. McCain, Georgia as a Proprietary Province (Boston, 1917) p.21.
all the economic and commercial advantages which writers, ever since Tudor times, had described as likely to accrue to the mother-country from colonial possessions. Would not a new colony help to tip the balance of trade heavily in Britain's favour if such commodities as silk, wine, salt and sub-tropical fruits were produced? The possibility of cultivating olives, grapes and silkworms had been the motive behind sending Huguenots to Carolina in Charles II's time. Silk was always regarded with particular favour, and there was nothing remarkable in the hopes entertained by the founders of Georgia that it would become the staple of their settlement. Earlier attempts to raise it in the southern colonies had had disappointing results, but the idea remained implanted in the minds both of Government ministers and of those interested in colonial development. In November 1731, while the Bray Associates were still trying to obtain the charter, the Board of Trade read a memorial proposing the erection of a silk factory in South Carolina. In emphasizing the possibility of cultivating silk the Associates were again merely applying an old and widely advertised notion to ingratiate their project with the Government.

Other articles which the United Kingdom would very much value from her colonies included lumber and naval stores,

for which she was almost entirely dependent on the countries of the Baltic. Timber, deal boards, spars and iron came from Norway; tallow, iron and potash, hemp for cordage and flax for sail-cloth came from Russia who, realizing England's dependence on her, monopolized the trade and could demand what prices she chose. This state of affairs had long been attracting increased attention from the Board of Trade which, by the second half of the seventeenth century, was tending to interest itself more in the commerce in naval stores and less in the search for precious metals. This tendency was, in truth, not wholly commercial in its inspiration. A secure and regular supply of naval stores was essential in the event of war, and it was this aspect, as much as the commercial one, which must have influenced the English Government. In 1694 the Board of Trade had been ordered to set a time for hearing all proposals for bringing naval stores from the plantations and to encourage all who would undertake it, and during the succeeding ten years several attempts were made to form chartered companies for that purpose. In 1697 it was decided to send a commission to New England in order to investigate the possibility of obtaining supplies from there. Then, at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the whole

problem was suddenly made more urgent by the formation of
the Stockholm Tar Company, which aimed to monopolize the
trade in tar and pitch, and by the outbreak of the War of
the Spanish Succession which made efficient equipping of the
Fleet essential. In October 1703 Queen Anne directed the
Board of Trade to consider the possibility of obtaining
supplies from the American plantations, and the Board
recommended the subsidizing of colonial naval stores and
the removal of the existing duties on importation. By 1705
naval stores had been enumerated by Parliament and premiums
granted on their importation, thus laying the foundations for
a gradual accumulation, during the early part of the eighteenth
century, of an elaborate system of bounties on masts, hemp,
bowsprits and spars, resin, pitch, tar and turpentine.

One of the staunchest advocates of colonial production
of those commodities, especially naval stores, for which Britain
depended on foreign countries was Joshua Gee, who in 1729
first published his treatise on British trade. He pointed
out the disadvantage the Kingdom was under in depending so
heavily on the Baltic countries for naval stores, and how
convenient it would be if they could be produced in America.

1. E.L. Lord, Industrial Experiments in the British Colonies
   of North America (Baltimore, 1898) pp.1-3, 9-14, 17-41, 56.
2. C.O.f/3, no.16, Committee of Trade to Secretary Hedges,
3. 3 and 4 Anne, c.10.
Russian hemp and flax had to come nearly six hundred miles by land and a thousand miles by water before being shipped to England, whereas the colonies, with their many navigable rivers ensuring easy communication to the sea, could supply enough naval stores to meet all the requirements of the mother-country provided they were properly encouraged. Of equal importance, according to Gee, was silk. England was manufacturing about six times as much silk as under James II but still had to import large quantities from Italy, so that the balance of trade with that country had turned against the United Kingdom. From the time a Bourbon ascended the Spanish throne and introduced French stuffs and fashions Britain's favourable trade balance with Spain had diminished noticeably. Furthermore, wine, brandy, linen, fine lace, cambrics and silk manufactures were being smuggled into England from Land's End to the Downs, and this was bound to represent a serious draining away of bullion because the smugglers had to buy with gold and silver.

Those who wished to establish new settlements in America used arguments like these to justify their thesis that colonies might bring inestimable benefits to the mother-country. Gee maintained that it would be almost impossible to find five articles such as hemp, flax, silk, iron and potash, so essential to English manufactures and so easily producible in the plantations. There was no reason why tea, coffee,
coconuts, indigo and cochineal should not be cultivated too. And where were these commodities most likely to succeed? In the south, asserted Gee, and especially in "that noble colony of Carolina, the most improveable, in my apprehension, of any of our colonies", but which, unfortunately, was poorly protected and liable to be overrun by the French, Spaniards and Indians. However, since this region had an excellent climate, a fertile soil and many navigable rivers, large numbers of settlers might be attracted there and so assure the English of the mines in the Appalachian Hills and secure the frontiers against encroachments. If Carolina was given proper encouragement, silk, cochineal, indigo, olive oil, hemp and flax could be raised there in quantities sufficient to satisfy consumption in the mother-country.

Views of this nature were current in England at that time. Englishmen had romantic impressions of all uninhabited territories in America and believed that almost any tropical product could be raised in the wild southern lands beyond the ocean. Valuing colonies as sources of raw materials, Englishmen liked to imagine that Georgia would one day supply the homeland with the luxury goods that at present had to be sought from the warm foreign lands. This conception was based largely on arguments of geographical latitude. Silk,

for instance, could be expected from the southern colonies because their latitude and proximity to the sea were similar to those of the coastal provinces of China, India, Persia, Turkey, Italy, Provence and Languedoc. One writer claimed that it had been proved that no place could grow silk better or easier than the Carolinas, where mulberry trees grew in vast quantities and at a prodigious speed. It is not surprising, therefore, that the founders of Georgia looked forward to their province sending home so many valuable products in abundance. Informed opinion in the country was on their side, and the contribution their enterprise might make towards the realization of the commercial principles of the old colonial system must have been an important recommendation to the Government.

Hence it is clear that Georgia originated not only in philanthropy but also in terms of strategic and economic policy. The Associates looked mainly to its charitable benefits; the Government looked more to its defensive and commercial advantages. All these motives were embodied in the preamble to the charter. This declared that many poor


2. The Importance of the British Plantations in America to this Kingdom (London, 1731) pp.62-3.

and unemployed persons, if given the means, would gladly
go to America and there obtain a living for themselves,
strengthen the colonies and increase the commerce and wealth
of the whole empire. It mentioned the exposed state of
the southern frontier and the great distress brought on the
people of South Carolina by the ravages of the Indians, and
concluded that the best protection would be afforded by the
establishment of a permanent settlement in the southern
territories of the province. That this implied the ravaging
of the new settlement instead of South Carolina and might,
for that reason, deter intending emigrants, was overlooked for
the obvious advantages to be gained by the South Carolinians.

In order to put the plan into effect a corporation was
constituted, the first to be organized in England for the
purpose of colonization since 1629, over a hundred years
before, when a royal charter had been issued to the
corporation known as the Company and Governor of Massachusetts
Bay in New England. The new corporation was constituted
under the name of the Trustees for Establishing the Colony
of Georgia in America, and had authority to receive contributions
and manage the affairs of the new settlement. Since the
whole body of Trustees could not be expected to convene as
often as business would require, a Common Council was
established, to consist at first of fifteen members, with
authority to transact business on behalf of the Corporation
when not in session. The first president of the Corporation was to be Lord Percival and, as had been the case with the Virginia Company in the seventeenth century, there was no limitation on the increase of its membership. No one was to be paid a salary for his services as a member of the Corporation, and every year a statement of all money received and spent on behalf of Georgia was to be laid before the Chancellor or Speaker, the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, the Master of the Rolls, the Chief Justice of Common Pleas and the Chief Baron of the Exchequer. The Trustees were to hold the land "in free and common socage and not in capite", and on every hundred acres they granted out or settled they were to pay the King an annual quit-rent of four shillings, such payment not commencing until ten years after the grant was made. The Corporation was empowered to legislate for the governing of Georgia over a period of twenty-one years, provided the laws were approved by the King and not repugnant to the laws of England. It could convey to Georgia as many foreigners or British subjects as were willing to settle there, while the Common Council had full authority to apply all the money it received. Persons born in the colony were to enjoy the same liberties as if they had been born in Britain, and freedom of religion was extended to all except

Roman Catholics. Members of the Corporation were debarred from possessing lands in Georgia, and no one settler was to receive more than five hundred acres. All grants and improvements of land were to be registered and accounts of them transmitted annually to the Auditor of Plantations and the Surveyor of South Carolina, while accounts of the colony's general progress were to be given periodically to one of the Secretaries of State. The Common Council could appoint the governors, judges, magistrates, ministers, and military as well as civil officers, but every governor had to undertake to observe the Navigation Acts and obey all instructions sent him by the King. Georgia's militia was placed under the command of the Governor and Commander in Chief of South Carolina.

The charter's definition of the extent of the new colony was of international significance. The King granted to the Corporation all those lands, countries and territories situate, lying and being in that part of South Carolina in America which lies from the most northern part of a stream or river there, commonly called the Savannah, all along the sea coast to the southward unto the most southern stream of a certain other great water or river called the Altamaha, and westerly from the heads of the said rivers respectively in direct lines to the South Seas; and all that share, circuit and precinct of land within the said boundaries, with the islands on the sea lying opposite to the eastern coast of the said lands, within twenty leagues of the same, which are not inhabited already or settled by any authority derived from the Crown of Great Britain.
The lavish magnitude of this grant did not appear improper to the British Government, which regarded it merely as a re-granting of part of the territory that had been given to the Carolina proprietors by King Charles II in 1663. According to the English view Carolina stretched down the eastern coastline of America from latitude 29 degrees to latitude 36\(\frac{1}{2}\) degrees, and into the interior without any limit at all. But in 1732 circumstances were such that the actual settling of the Georgia region was certain to cause friction with Spain and France. Ever since the foundation of Carolina, England and Spain had contested the ownership of the land between Charleston and St. Augustine on account of its strategic value, potential wealth and importance in the fur trade with the Indians. Now, in a single paragraph, Britain proclaimed her intention to establish a claim which, commencing on the Atlantic coast, cut across Spanish Florida and French Louisiana and extended westward through the present states of Texas, Arkansas, New Mexico, Arizona and California until it reached the Pacific Ocean. It was impossible for either France or Spain to acquiesce in a British claim to this huge strip of territory. The Spaniards saw in the settlement of Georgia a trespass on their empire in Florida and a formidable obstacle to any move against South Carolina. The French regarded it as part of a larger plan of English imperial expansion, the inauguration of a westward movement round the...
southern verge of the Appalachian Mountains aimed at reaching the Mississippi and severing communications between Louisiana and Canada. Within a few years the boundaries of Georgia were the subject of diplomatic wrangling in the Courts at Madrid and London. For a generation the history of the southern colonies was to be dominated by the hostility between the English and the French and Spaniards.

In view of the antagonism which the settlement of Georgia was bound to arouse, it was essential for it to be protected not only against military assault but also against religious undermining. It was possible that Catholics in Georgia might be induced by the French and Spaniards to foster intrigues and weaken government inside the province, thereby making it an easier prey to attack. Consequently, the charter followed the instructions issued to royal governors in the eighteenth century, and transferred to Georgia the civil disabilities then imposed on Roman Catholics in England, all other denominations being granted free exercise of their religion. Reasons of conscience and security made Papists undesirable immigrants.

Reasons of security demanded, too, that the settlement should be controlled direct from London. It was not, like New England, Maryland and Pennsylvania, the offspring of

religious differences in the mother-country and was not designed to release British subjects from the control of their homeland. The Government was not disposed to permit much independent power to pass into the hands even of the Trustees, and certainly not of the settlers themselves. The charter merely set forth that

for and during the term of twenty-one years, to commence from the date of these our letters patent, the said corporation assembled for that purpose shall and may form and prepare laws, statutes and ordinances fit and necessary for and concerning the government of the said colony, and not repugnant to the laws and statutes of England, and the same shall and may present under their common seal to us, our heirs and successors in our or their Privy Council for our or their approbation or disallowance; and the said laws, statutes and ordinances, being approved of by us, our heirs and successors in our or their Privy Council, shall from thenceforth be in full force and virtue within our said province of Georgia.

All legislative power was vested in the hands of this small group of men in London, and no provision was made for any local self-government within the colony which, like early Virginia and New York, passed through nearly all its period of private ownership without an assembly. The government established for Georgia evokes comparison with that set up by the second and third Virginia charters of 1609 and 1612,


which had entrusted the general management of the Virginia Company to an assembly of shareholders that elected a council in London to carry on its executive functions. But there were important differences. The British Government had learned by the eighteenth century that colonial proprietors and local assemblies tended to acquire excessive powers, and therefore was reluctant to erect private or charter provinces. The danger of these lay in the scope they provided for the construction of independent authorities, and this was contradictory to the whole principle of colonization. "Charters from the King", wrote a pamphleteer in 1774, "are a branch of his prerogative; within the constitution. To raise any superstructure upon them, subversive of legislation, would be attempting to build a house sideways." Of particular interest, as regards Georgia, was the rejection of a petition from the Earl of Doncaster and Dalkeith in 1682 for a proprietary grant south of Carolina. The reason given by the Board of Trade for the rejection was the inadvisability of the King granting away powers that might lessen the dependence of the plantations upon him.

The Georgia charter in 1732 did not involve any deviation from this line of policy. Georgia was not made into a

1. Colonizing, or a plain investigation of that subject (London, 1774) p.9.
2. C.O. 1/49, ff.116, 117, 237. C.O. 324/4, p.84. C.O. 391/4, pp.52, 55-6, 64.
proprietary province; it was made into a trust colony, with the Trustees enjoying only a limited independence. Not only were the laws they drafted subject to approval by the Crown, but accounts of the colony's progress were to be submitted to the Government periodically and details of all receipts and expenditure presented annually. Furthermore, it was laid down that after a term of twenty-one years the grant should revert to the Crown, the only instance of such a limitation in point of time in the history of the old colonial empire. Whereas the chief motive of the members of the Virginia corporation had been personal profit, the Georgia Trustees were debarred from property rights in their enterprise and forbidden to derive any profit whatsoever from the holding of office or appropriation of land in their colony. Georgia was unique in that its founders were motivated solely by genuine philanthropic interests; it was the first colony to be founded primarily for charity.

This was, in truth, the remarkable feature of the enterprise, for philanthropy during the first half of the century was inappreciable compared to the beneficence that blossomed in the second half. In the earlier years there was little attempt to ameliorate the conditions of the poor, and legislation on the subject was scanty. The Georgia
Trustees' project for the settlement of a new colony with poor and unemployed was one of the few exceptions to this. Here was charity in a pure and practical setting: genuine concern for people's condition; diligent attempts to provide relief; no profit whatsoever for the promoters.

The Georgia project was initially well advertised, all classes of the community being invited to subscribe. At a meeting of the Common Council of the Trustees on 3 August 1732 Oglethorpe was directed to advertise the scheme in the newspapers and try to prevent the publication of anything detrimental to it. In the same month the Trustees published the following statement:

There are many poor unfortunate persons in this country, in every country, who would willingly labour for their bread if they could get bread for the labouring for; such persons may now be provided for by being sent to a country where there are vast tracts of fertile land lying uninhabited and uncultivated; they will be taken care of in their passage, they will get land to employ their industry in, and they will be provided with sufficient tools for setting their industry at work, and with a certain support till the fruits of their industry can come in to supply their wants; and all this without subjecting themselves to any master or submitting to any sort of slavery; the fruits of every man's industry are to be his own;


every man who transports himself thither is to enjoy all the liberties and privileges of a freeborn British subject. Who from henceforth dare stay in Britain and complain of want? Whoever he be, his want must proceed either from his laziness or his idleness, and no man that knows him ought to give him relief; the only proper way of assisting any indigent person we know will be to recommend him or them to this society, and put as much money into their hands as may be sufficient for sending over the person or persons we have in mind to relieve to their colony of Georgia. There is hardly any person in good circumstances in England but what knows some industrious persons that are unfortunate and in want: whoever does know any such is in duty bound to recommend them; and every man that can possibly spare it ought to place at least such a sum in the hands of the Trustees as may be sufficient for sending over and settling the persons he so recommends. 1

This emphasis on the benefits which the poor and unemployed were likely to derive was repeated during 1732 and 1733 in all the advertisements and propaganda pamphlets which, being published within a short time of one another, made the English people temporarily Georgia conscious. Englishmen were asked to consider the problem of "the multitude of unfortunate people in the Kingdom of reputable families and of liberal, or at least easy, education: some undone by guardians, some by lawsuits, some by accidents in commerce, some by stocks and bubbles and some by suretyships." Since these persons were obliged to live on others, their exodus would be no loss to

the nation. It was argued that "as every wise government, like the bees, should not suffer any drones in the state", so these unfortunates should be transferred to places where they might be an asset to the commonwealth instead of a burden on the community. The Trustees would not deprive the country of anyone who might be useful at home, but would send over to Georgia only those who were unable to obtain even the most meagre subsistence here. They had decided to publish the names of emigrants at least a fortnight before embarkation so that no debtor would be able to seize the opportunity to leave the country without the consent of his creditors.

The Georgia advocates did not forget to mention that persecuted Protestants of Europe as well as unfortunate debtors of England would benefit. By sending over persecuted German Protestants, Britain would be both performing a religious duty and strengthening her empire with industrious subjects whom otherwise the King of Prussia would engross. In fact, so it was announced, the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel had already resolved to supply the Trustees with enough money to organise the emigration of seven hundred Protestants from


Salzburg, where the Roman Catholic archbishop was pursuing a repressive religious policy. "Subjects thus acquired by the impolitic persecutions, by the superstitious barbarities of the neighbouring princes, are a noble addition to the capital stock of the British Empire". In this way the cause of the true Christian religion would be advanced. The good discipline enforced by the Society would improve the characters of the colonists whose example, in turn, would contribute towards the conversion of the Indians, who were not loath to accept Christianity as long as the settlers treated them in a friendly fashion and did not imitate the cruelties practised by the Spaniards.

The economic benefits which the mother-country would get from her new colony were conventionally stressed. There was very little new in the arguments used. British manufacturers would be employed in supplying the settlers with clothes, tools and other necessaries, while in return Georgia would provide England with silk, wine, oil, dyes, drugs and other commodities which at that time were purchased from foreigners. Silk in particular, it was predicted, would thrive if proper measures were taken to assist and encourage its cultivation. By 1733 the public was being informed that the Trustees had already

sent to Italy for silkworms' eggs and engaged several Piedmontese to go to America and teach silk cultivation. The production of raw silk in Georgia, it was maintained, would give employment to at least twenty thousand colonists for about four months a year, and to another twenty thousand persons in England all the year round in working the raw silk and manufacturing the goods sent in exchange. By encouraging the growth of silk Britain might save over £100,000 a year of what she paid to Piedmont, and perhaps even be enabled to undersell all her European rivals in silk manufactures. The picture was bright, if not florid, and must have created a good impression upon those who took the trouble to read the pamphlets.

A colony on the southern frontier, according to the Trustees, would have strategic and defensive advantages. How foolish it was to neglect settlements abroad at a time when the French were trying to undermine the English in the West Indies, the Portuguese enriching themselves from plantations, and the Spaniards using theirs to compensate their own innate idleness. The establishment of new settlements in South Carolina and the erection of towns along

the Rivers Savannah and Altamaha would be a defensive barrier for all the southern colonies and give them a strategic advantage in the frontier and trading rivalry in that area. The Georgia propagandists listed all these advantages and affirmed their confidence in the success of the venture. For precedents they turned to Virginia and Pennsylvania. Virginia had been colonized in spite of enormous difficulties and at first had depended wholly on England for provisions, yet now it was a mighty province. It was scarcely fifty years since Pennsylvania had been as much a forest as Georgia was now, but under William Penn's wise management its population had grown to ninety thousand. Georgia's prospects were better than those of either Virginia or Pennsylvania had been, for neighbouring South Carolina abounded with provisions, the climate was known, and experienced men were ready to demonstrate how the soil should be cultivated. In the event of an enemy attack Georgia could be relieved from Port Royal or the Bahamas, and assistance on land could be furnished by the South Carolina militia. Here then, in the Trustees' eyes, was a charity worthy of every patriotic Englishman's support; the risks seemed slight, the prospects good, the ultimate possibilities dazzling.

The propagandists ridiculed objections that a new settlement would take away workers needed at home, or that if the colonies continued to grow they would become independent. What grounds were there for such objections? The colonies would not throw off their dependence, said the Georgia enthusiasts, so long as they were governed by "mild and wholesome" English laws and their property guaranteed, and it must be remembered that the majority of colonists invested in British funds or lands and sent their children to the mother-country to be educated. It was very unlikely that they would entertain any thoughts of independence until Englishmen in the homeland were themselves oppressed. And assuredly, applying the argument to the particular case of Georgia, no colony would be more dependent on Britain, both for a market and for its supply of manufactured goods.

With the wonders of Georgia thus listed and adorned for public consumption, it was hoped the request for contributions would have a ready response. The project suffered, however, from the disadvantage as compared with former colonizing schemes, that it was explicitly a charity. The Trustees could offer no hopes of profit to contributors; they had to rely for success "first upon the goodness of providence, next

upon the compassionate disposition of the people of England."

It was soon obvious that providential goodness and public compassion would not of themselves provide adequate funds. The Trustees campaigned energetically in an attempt to stimulate people's generosity, ridding possible apprehension over the disposal of the money and making emotional appeals for support. All money received would be deposited in the Bank of England, each contribution would be registered in a book kept for that purpose by the Trustees, and printed copies of the accounts would be distributed to every considerable subscriber.

With these guarantees went appeals to the patriotism, Christian kindness and pity of every beneficent gentleman:

Let him see those who are now a prey to all the calamities of want, who are starving with hunger and seeing their wives and children in the same distress; expecting likewise every moment to be thrown into a dungeon with the cutting anguish that they leave their families exposed to the utmost necessity and despair: let him, I say, see these living under a sober and orderly government, settled in towns which are rising at distances along navigable rivers: flocks and herds in the neighbouring pastures and, adjoining to them, plantations of regular rows of mulberry trees entwined with vines, the branches of which are loaded with grapes; let him see orchards of oranges, pomegranates and olives; in other places extended fields of corn or flax and hemp. In short, the whole face of the country changed by agriculture, and plenty in every part of it.

Let him see the people all in employment of various kinds, women and children feeding and nursing the silkworms, winding off the silk or gathering the olives; the men ploughing or planting their lands, tending their cattle, or felling the forest which they burn for potashes or square for the builder; let him see these in content and affluence and masters of little possessions which they can leave to their children; and then let him think if they are not happier than those supported by charity and idleness. Let him reflect that the produce of their labour will be so much new wealth for his country; and then let him ask himself whether he would exchange the satisfaction of having contributed to this for all the trifling pleasures the money which he has given would have purchased.

Nevertheless, contributions came in very slowly. There were several notable benefactors, but generally the public response was disappointing. The directors of the Bank of England subscribed £300 after Sir Gilbert Heathcote had recommended the scheme to them. The directors of the East India Company gave £600 and the trustees of the Earl of Thanet's legacies £300, and by October 1732 a total of £2,000 had already been received. The expense of maintaining Dr. Houstoun, the botanist engaged by the Trustees to visit various countries to collect plants and seeds for Georgia, was met by subscription from Sir Hans Sloane, the Duke of Richmond, the Earl of Derby, and the Apothecaries Company. The Earl of Derby, in addition, reprinted and published in his own

1. Ibid., pp.230-1.
2. Political State of Great Britain, XLV (Feb.1733) p.179.
county at his own charge the Trustees’ account of their designs. Nearly all towns of any size had collections in aid of Georgia, and by 1735 Bristol was noted as one of the few places which had not contributed. The clergy of Liverpool recommended the colony in their sermons and went collecting from house to house, while the town corporation promised to give £50 out of its corporate stock, a donation which the Trustees seem to have had some difficulty in ultimately obtaining. In 1737 several ladies at Bath undertook to promote a collection there for the support of missionaries to Georgia, and the Rev. Whitefield promised to preach a special sermon for the purpose. The Earl of Abercorn was particularly generous, and Thomas Penn, the proprietor of Pennsylvania, was quick to offer his assistance. Lord Carteret, who in 1729 had refused to join his seven co-proprietors of Carolina in resigning their rights in the province to the Crown and so still owned a tract of land there, was most helpful, advising the Trustees on how to secure their


5. C.O.5/666, pp.22 and 23, Martyn to Abercorn and Penn, 9 and 24 May 1733.
charter from the King and the best method of starting the colonists.

Gifts of money, books and other articles, many of them anonymous, were always coming in, but they did not come in quickly enough or in sufficient amounts to meet the needs of the Trustees who, by the beginning of 1733, were already hoping for Parliamentary assistance. By April the Trustees had decided to ask the Commons for a financial grant, and to distribute their prospectus on Georgia in both Houses to help create a favourable attitude towards their petition. Georgia was to become unique in colonial history as the only colony to depend almost from its very beginning on the financial support of the home Government.

The auguries for the request of money from Parliament were good. Many of the Trustees were themselves M.P.s, and the book advertising their scheme was circulated in both Houses beforehand. Moreover, the Ministry and general public were partial towards the new settlement, a bias increased by the uncommon amount of vagrancy in London at that time which was weighing heavily on the parishes of the city. Sir Robert

2. C.0.5/666, p.7, Martyn to Oglethorpe, 24 Jan. 1732/3.
Walpole and most of the prominent figures in the Commons seem to have been favourable towards the project, and there was no disposition to oppose a motion for financial assistance. In 1733 the Trustees were voted £10,000 out of a fund arising from the sale of lands in St. Christophers Island that had originally been part of an endowment voted to Bishop Berkeley in 1726 for a college in the Bermudas. Payment to Berkeley had been so delayed that he had wearied of the idea, and now £80,000 of the money was appropriated to the dowry of the Princess Royal on her marriage with the Prince of Orange, and the remainder given the Trustees "to be applied towards defraying the charges of carrying over and settling foreign and other Protestants in the said colony." Government favour went even further, for the money was paid out of the Exchequer without any deductions, the Treasury and Exchequer officers waiving their customary fees and perquisites as it was for a charitable use and the national benefit.

Government departments did what they could to help the emigrants. At Lord Percival's request the Admiralty instructed all warships on the Atlantic and American stations to render assistance and gave Oglethorpe a general requisition on any ships from which he might require aid.

2. 6 Geo.II, c.25, par.7.
wrote to all governors in America asking them to help the new colony, and the Privy Council ordered Governor Johnson of South Carolina to give the emigrants a proper welcome. Johnson did not fail in his duty. He himself subscribed £50 to the Georgia fund, and when the settlers arrived in America he persuaded the South Carolina Assembly to vote them all the assistance the country could afford, including boats, 105 head of cattle, twenty-five hogs and some rice, while twenty rangers were detailed to protect them against attack by Indians. The friendliness of Governor Johnson was an important factor in the early settlement of Georgia.

Thus, Georgia began with expressions of goodwill on both sides of the Atlantic. On 7 July 1732 Lord Percival, as president of the Corporation, took the oath before the Baron of the Exchequer; on the 20th the Trustees held their first regular meeting and ordered a Common Seal to be made.

3. Col.Red.Ga., I, pp.65-6. Political State of Great Britain, XLIV (Aug.1732) pp.149-50. The Seal had two faces; the one was for affixing to grants, orders and certificates, the other for authenticating legislation, deeds and commissions.
The 114 pioneer settlers were carefully selected by the Trustees and placed under the voluntary personal leadership of James Oglethorpe himself. On 17 November these, accompanied by "ten tons of Alderman Parson's best beer", left the English shores in the two hundred ton frigate Anne and sailed for a land of which the most extravagant hopes were entertained.

CHAPTER II

THE POLICY AND PRACTICE OF THE TRUSTEES

Oglethorpe and the emigrants reached America in January 1733. Two children had died on the voyage, but the remainder of the expedition was in good health except for ten who were "down of the bloody flux". Accompanied by Colonel William Bull and a force of rangers from South Carolina, Oglethorpe travelled down the Savannah until a suitable place for a settlement was found. There, on a sandy, pine-crowned bluff fifteen miles down the river, the town of Savannah was built. Four months later Oglethorpe, with the help of a white trader's half-breed wife who could speak both the English and Creek Indian languages, concluded a convention with the neighbouring Indians whereby they surrendered the land between the Rivers Savannah and Altamaha and agreed to have no more communication with the French or Spaniards. And so the administrative centre and principal port of early Georgia was founded.

From this beginning other villages and towns grew up. Mainly through the efforts of Samuel Urlspurger, Bishop of Augsburg, some Protestant exiles from Salzburg led by the Rev. John Martin Bolzius established the town of Ebenezer a little

1. Egmont Diary, I, p. 364

further up the river from Savannah in what is now Effingham County. Important among the early colonists were the tough, hardy Highlanders. Many inhabitants of the Scottish Highlands at this time were in poverty on account of a steep rise in rents and a decline in the price of their stock. This situation was brought to the notice of the Trustees by Daniel McLachlan, a clergyman who had travelled among these people for several years and who offered to take over several hundred of them if the Trustees would contribute towards the cost of transportation. The Trustees were interested in sending over Highlanders but would have nothing to do with McLachlan, who had been in prison for publishing an indecent book which he himself described as merely a "ludicrous piece of humour" but which the Trustees viewed more severely and, being mindful of the morals of the colonists, would not allow him amongst them. Some Scottish families were sent out in 1735, however, under the command of Hugh MacKay, and they established the town of New Inverness, later known as Darien, on the north side of the Altamaha, sixteen miles above St. Simons Island and along the southern border facing the Spaniards. By upbringing and temperament these Highlanders were fitted for the role of frontier guards

2. C.O.5/636, fo.327, McLachlan to Oglethorpe, 9 May 1735. C. 0.5/639, ff. 162 and 198, McLachlan to Trustees, 26 Feb., 1736/7 and 6 April 1737.
3. Egmont Diary, II, p.384
which the site of their settlement would oblige them to play. Of a very different character were some Moravians who went over with the support of their patron and protector, Count Zinzendorf, and not on the charity of the Trustees. A pioneer group under August Gottlieb Spangenberg landed in Georgia in April 1735, to be joined nearly a year later by another group under Bishop David Nitschmann. They were unsuitable for a barrier province like Georgia because they refused on principle to perform any sort of military service. They refused to bear arms, they said, because they were not freeholders and because "it being a thing against our conscience, we cannot, dare not, will not do it." Naturally they incurred the dislike of the other inhabitants and by 1740 the Moravians had all left Georgia for other colonies, especially Pennsylvania.

These early settlements were necessarily small, primitive and precarious. Their position was indeed an unenviable one.

Located in the depths of a primeval forest, the tangled brakes and solemn shadows of which proclaimed loneliness and isolation; the vast Atlantic rolling its waters between it and the mother country; the Carolina settlements at best few in numbers and contending in a stern life-struggle for their own existence; Spaniards in Florida jealous of this disputed domain, and ready at any moment to frustrate by stealthy approaches and with force

of arms all efforts of the English to extend their plantations along the Southern coast; and, above all, Indian tribes in the occupancy of the country attached to their grand old woods and gently flowing streams, watchful of the graves of their ancestors, imposed upon by Spanish lies, disquieted by French emissaries, cheated by Carolina traders, and naturally inclined to resist all encroachments by the whites upon their hunting grounds, it did indeed appear that the preservation and development of this province were well-nigh impossible.

The responsibility for protecting and nurturing the province lay with a group of men living in England and noted mainly for their humanitarian and religious interests. Five of the Trustees named in the charter were Anglican clergymen, while most of the remainder had been on the Parliamentary committee for the investigation of goals. Their meetings were regular but attendance gradually decreased until a form of committee organization transacted most of the business. The charter stipulated that eight members should be a quorum for the executive council but, as attendance fell off, meetings called of the council often found themselves without a quorum and would resolve themselves into a session of the board, which had fixed its own quorum at three members, in order to proceed with the transaction of business. So the Trusteeship became a monopoly of the few who retained interest in the project, and during these early years the most interested was Oglethorpe.

Oglethorpe was thirty-six when he left England for Georgia, and was in the middle of an active, vigorous life. He came

1. C.C. Jones, The History of Georgia (2 v., Boston, 1883) p. 133
2. The best biography of Oglethorpe is that by A.A. Ettinger. Also of value are those by H. Bruce and L.F. Church.
from a family with strong Jacobite sympathies and of high military and Parliamentary traditions. A respectable education at Eton and Oxford had been followed by reputable military service in eastern Europe under Prince Eugene of Savoy. In 1722 he had been elected Tory M.P. for the borough and market town of Haslemere in Surrey, and it was in that capacity that he had acquired his interest in the scheme for the colonization of Georgia. Oglethorpe's influence on the shaping of policy towards the colony was very great, even though he was in America more than in London. His had been the principal inspiration from the start, and the fact that he alone of the Trustees had been to Georgia moved the others to support his opinions. The unwillingness on the part of the majority to oppose Oglethorpe's views was one of the reasons for Thomas Coram's resignation from the Corporation in 1735. But the Trustees would have been foolish not to have put great reliance on Oglethorpe's opinions, for he could speak from actual experience of conditions in the colony. His decision to lead the first emigrants may have been due to his enthusiasm for the scheme, or perhaps to the removal of any domestic encumbrances by the death of his aged mother in June 1732. In any case, the Trustees welcomed

1. Thomas Coram had thought of accompanying the emigrants to Georgia, but was discouraged from doing so by Jonathan Belcher, Governor of Massachusetts and New Hampshire, who told him that the "southermost colonies of North America have been graves to the people of England": The Belcher Papers (Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society Sixth Series, Vols. VI-VII) I, pp. 112, 298.

the decision and gave him liberal powers which he expanded rapidly as soon as he was across the Atlantic and beyond their immediate control. Since there was no governor nominated as such, and since the officials appointed by the Trustees were men who had been paupers and debtors in England, it was natural for the people to look to Oglethorpe, the personal representative of the Trustees, as the supreme authority.

In the main, Oglethorpe's rule was just and sensible and his concern for the public welfare undoubted. His work was commended in both Georgia and England, and there is ample evidence of the respect with which the settlers regarded him. On the other hand, he was, by nature, a man of earnestness and conviction, with a keen sense of personal dignity, and possessed of such confidence in his own judgment that he tended to take his own independent line and to adopt an attitude that was often autocratic. When Samuel Perkins, for instance, an inhabitant of Frederica, found he could not earn a living by tillage alone and decided to try his former trade of coach-making, Oglethorpe rounded on him and forbade him to do so: "By God", he exclaimed, "I will burn the first chaise you make!" While his dictatorial demeanour alienated some people in Georgia, his increasing independence in the management of affairs aroused apprehension among the Trustees in London. They complained that he wrote only occasionally and kept them ignorant of events in the colony. Moreover, his practice of drawing drafts on them indiscriminately and without

1. A Brief Account of the Causes that have retarded the Progress of the Colony of Georgia in America (London, 1743) app. I.
their advice exposed them to the possibility of being cheated by false bills. He left Georgia finally in 1743, and in the September of that year acquired financial security and a home at Cranham Hall in Essex by his marriage to the heiress, Elizabeth Wright. Thereafter his interest in the province seems to have diminished. His attendance at meetings of the Trustees became spasmodic and he attended none after 16 March 1749.

He continued to participate in Parliamentary debates until 1754 but was never again able to hold the attention of the Commons as he had formerly done, in spite of a shrill voice that could be heard in the lobby when he was speaking in the House. Thenceforward and for many years he occupied a prominent position in the social life of the capital, passing his time in the literary circle of Samuel Johnson and James Boswell, of Goldsmith, Burke and Hannah More, until his death at Cranham in 1785. Nevertheless, he was the most important figure in the early history of Georgia, and his was the principal influence in the shaping of policy.

Oglethorpe and the Trustees paid careful attention to the welfare of the settlers, who were sent over as comfortably as possible and well provisioned and accommodated on arrival. Of over fifteen hundred emigrants conveyed to Georgia before

1741 not more than six died on the voyage, a remarkable record in view of conditions at that time. Each colonist going out on the Trustees' charity was guaranteed subsistence for twelve months at least and was fed from a public store. The twelve months period had frequently to be prolonged and some inhabitants came to rely unduly on subsidies, doing little to help themselves and many of them leaving the colony when the store was closed in 1739.

If the Trusteeship was benevolent, it was equally a despotism. Emigrants went out under its care and settled in America under its absolute authority. It was said that there was scarcely any known form of government which could not be found in the British plantations in the eighteenth century, and certainly Georgia added to the variety. No governor was ever appointed by the Trustees. The reason for this has been attributed to the fact that, by a provision in the charter, every governor of Georgia appointed by the Common Council was to be answerable to the Crown, and the Trustees were unwilling to permit their authority to be thus reduced. There is, no doubt, much truth in this assumption,


4. McCain, Georgia as a Proprietary Province, p. 63.
for the Trustees were always jealous of their powers, but it is not the whole explanation. In a letter to Bishop Berkeley in May 1731 Oglethorpe stated that those concerned in the Georgia project "will use their utmost endeavours to prevent luxury and oppression in the officers, and idleness and vice in the people. They intend to send no governor to prevent the pride that name might instil." The validity of this reasoning and the amount of influence it had on the Trustees' policy is open to question, but it is to be remembered that they were men of high ideals and very concerned for the settlers' moral welfare. There is, at least, some justification for doubting whether unwillingness to allow their authority to be reduced in favour of the Crown was the sole reason for their failure to appoint a governor.

On the excuse that the colonists were inexperienced in the art of ruling, powers of local government were with-held and for eighteen years all regulations were made at meetings of the Trustees, or their Common Council, which were held in London. Throughout nearly all its proprietary period Georgia was without its own provincial assembly, as Virginia before 1619 and New York before 1683 had been. There was no representative system and no regular elections for any of

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1. Berkeley and Percival Correspondence, p.277.

2. If Oglethorpe had been appointed governor he would have been obliged to resign both his membership of the Trust and his seat in the House of Commons, the former on account of a provision in the Georgia charter, the latter on account of the Place Bill of William III's reign which had been incorporated in the Act of Settlement.
the local or general administrative offices. The colonists complained little against this, possibly because the need for an assembly was not urgent where there was no taxation and expenses were met by Parliamentary grants. Nevertheless, the deficiencies of the Trusteeship system of government and the advantages of putting it on a better foundation were recognized by contemporaries. Sam Eveleigh, for example, an old merchant of Charleston and a keen observer of Georgia affairs, recommended a constitution on the lines of that attributed to John Locke and put forward by the Carolina proprietors in the previous century. But the Trustees were inflexible, and Georgia's development was a mechanical one imposed from without, differing from the regular and methodical growth of New England which had been more by the free choice of the inhabitants themselves.

Georgia's local administration had been arranged before the colonization began, for in November 1732 the Trustees had resolved that civil government should be by bailiffs, constables and tithing-men. At first everything inevitably centred on Savannah, the site of the original settlement, the largest town and the only port. The Trustees intended to set people in towns, each of one hundred families, and divide the land of every man into three parts, one for a house and a yard in the town, another for a garden nearby, and the third part

1. C.O.5/636, fo. 133, Eveleigh to Martyn, 17 Jan. 1734/5
for a farm a little way outside the town. On 7 July 1733 Oglethorpe named the wards and assigned the lots in Savannah, four wards being marked off and divided into sixteen tithings. The Trustees, having already provided for a town court empowered to try civil and criminal cases, appointed three bailiffs, a recorder, two constables, eight conservators of the peace and two tithing-men. These officials composed the entire local government, and although no explicit instructions were ever sent them, their powers were mainly of a judicial character. They received no financial remuneration for their services until July 1735 when the Common Council voted them small sums.

The partition of Savannah into wards and tithings with officers for each was unprecedented in American history. The system of tithings and tithing-men goes back to the Saxons and the time of King Alfred in England, but it had hitherto been only partly introduced into America. When the province of Maine was granted to Sir Ferdinando Gorges early in the seventeenth century, he drafted a constitution dividing it into counties, hundreds, parishes and tithings under the jurisdiction of a lieutenant, justices, constables and tithing-

1. Martyn, "Reasons for Establishing the Colony of Georgia", Coll.Ga.H.S., I, p.225. There is reason to believe that the town plan of Savannah was suggested by a book called "The Villas of the Ancients Illustrated" (London, 1728) written by Robert Castell, the architect whose death in prison had led to Oglethorpe's investigations: see New England Historical and Genealogical Register, XL (Jan. 1886) p.127


men, but, having thus created more offices than there were persons to fill them, Gorges was prevented from putting his plan into effect by the distractions of the English Civil War \(^1\) and by Maine's summary annexation to Massachusetts. In comparison with this plan, however, the system in Savannah was neither so definite nor so elaborate.

The charter empowered the Corporation to create courts of law in Georgia, and on 2 November 1732 the Trustees "affixed their Seal to a grant erecting a court of judicature for trying causes, as well criminal as civil in the town of Savannah, by the name and style of the town court". \(^2\) It was July 1733, however, before the town court was actually erected in Savannah, and until then Oglethorpe seems to have dispensed his own personal conception of justice. The court was held every six weeks and decided all civil and criminal matters by grand and petty juries as in England. \(^3\) It generally dealt out an equable justice, but, since there were no lawyers in the province, it occasionally had to secure the counsel of a lawyer from Charleston and often even had to take into consideration the advice of the Trustees in London. Such advice was not unwelcome in the colony, most of whose magistrates were untrained and inexperienced and some of whose bailiffs could

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2. Col.Rec.Ga., I, p.83


neither read nor write, but it had the disadvantage of delaying the administration of justice, for communication between England and Georgia was a lengthy process. It would have been impolitic for the officers in Georgia to have acted too independently because the Trustees were always conscious of their judicial rights and watchful of their privileges. When John Vanderplank, the constable at Savannah, feared he might be sued in England for performing his duty of staving casks of rum in Georgia, the Trustees assured him that only they could give directions in the colony and their instructions must be followed.

It is noticeable, too, that during the period of the Trusteeship only two appeals were made from Georgia to the King in Council. The first instance was in March 1737 when the wife of Joseph Watson, an Indian trader, appealed first to the Trustees and then to the King in Council on behalf of her husband who had been imprisoned for inciting the Indians to crime. Thereupon the Trustees hastened to send an order for the unconditional release of the prisoner, almost certainly with the idea of avoiding a controversy with the Privy Council over the question of the jurisdiction in appeals from Georgia.

1. C.O.5/666, p.61, Trustees to Vanderplank, 27 July 1734.
2. J.H. Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the American Plantations (New York, 1950) p.168, and McCain, Georgia as a Proprietary Province, pp.209-11, both declare there was only one appeal during the period but each refers to a different instance.
The second instance was in 1751 when Caleb Davies successfully petitioned the King in Council against the verdict on a charge brought against him by James Powell. There was, in fact, no provision in the Georgia charter concerning appeals to the King in Council, but presumably the same principle was applied as had been enunciated by an Order in Council of 9 March 1698, when the Governor and Company of Connecticut had been informed that it was "the inherent right of His Majesty to receive and determine appeals from all His Majesty's colonies in America". This principle had been further expounded in 1701 by Attorney-General Trevor and Solicitor-General Hawles, who said that, although the Connecticut charter did not mention appeals to the King in Council, the right of such appeals was inherent in the Crown. It would have been in character for the Trustees to have discouraged any appeal removing a matter from their own cognizance. Nothing is more apparent throughout this period than the jealousy of the Trustees for their rights, and their determination to pursue a policy elaborated by themselves and based largely on their own pet theories.

The attitude of the Trustees towards land ownership in Georgia was reasoned and charitable but not conducive to the colony's growth or contentment. Their policy was motivated


primarily by concern for defence and the need to fit each person not only as a settler but also as a soldier. The maximum grant for someone emigrating at the expense of the Corporation was laid down as fifty acres, while a man going out at his own charge with at least four and not more than ten menservants was entitled to five hundred acres. Each servant, on the expiry of his period of indenture, was to be allowed twenty acres. The early grants were all made on condition of payment, after ten years, of an annual quit-rent of ten shillings per hundred acres. Everyone receiving land was expected to clear and cultivate it, enclose it with a six feet fence and plant a thousand mulberry trees to every hundred acres. If these conditions were not fulfilled within ten years the land was to revert to the Corporation. Owners were forbidden to alienate their lands without the Trustees' permission, which was usually given on application. All land was owned in tail-male, so that in the event of there being no male heir it reverted to the Trust and was not inherited by the female issue. The Trustees promised to give special consideration to the claims of daughters of those who had made improvements on the land, and the widows of such persons were entitled to a life interest


in the house and in half of the land's improved areas. These restrictions were not intended to be enforced rigidly and were modified whenever circumstances demanded.

The Trustees had good arguments to support their policy. It did not seem advisable to allow absolute possession of property to persons who had in many cases been sent to Georgia on account of mismanagement of property in England. Moreover, the restriction on the amount of land which any one person could possess was in tune with the ideas of the Government. The Board of Trade, for example, insisted on laws to break up exorbitant land grants in New York and refused consent to laws in other colonies which would encourage large landholding because large individual landholdings hindered rapid growth in population. In its report to the Privy Council in December 1731 the Board had expressed its opinion that the proprietors of the intended new colony should be restrained from granting more than five hundred acres to any one person. The Trustees' decision that fifty acres be the maximum for a person emigrating at their expense was based mainly on military considerations. Since each planter was regarded as a soldier, it was necessary for the number of planters to be maintained at a high level so that the province would have a respectable militia, and fifty acres was judged to be generally adequate.

1. Ibid.
to support one planter and his family.

The other restrictions were all justified by this theme of defence requirements. Female inheritance was forbidden on the grounds that otherwise the strength of each township would be reduced, in as much as an unmarried woman might hold an allotment to the exclusion of a man who would have been a member of the garrison. Other inconveniences were likely to arise. Women were unsuited to duties like watchings and wardings and serving on juries; therefore, as the number of males in a township decreased so would each man's turn for these duties become more frequent and consequently more burdensome. The principal idea behind the Trustees' policy was to maintain a number of men equivalent to the number of allotments for the better defence and improvement of the colony and also, incidentally, for the preservation of a certain degree of social and economic equality among the inhabitants. It followed from this that alienation of land must be prohibited in order to keep the lots entire and undivided and prevent any individual engrossing too much land, which would have meant the diminution of the garrison. As another reason for this last restriction, it was argued that the sale or mortgaging of lands might encourage settlers to run into debt and make them idle. Evidently, moral and economic welfare was also in the minds of the Trustees in framing their initial policy. These restrictions were relaxed whenever particular cases required, and permission to alienate lands was usually given on application. And later, when the province enjoyed a
greater measure of security, the Trustees enlarged the tenure of land to tail-general. This modification did not occur, however, until nearly a decade of the restrictive system had shown up its failings and disadvantages and opposition to it had become vociferous in Georgia.

An important aspect of land policy was the matter of quit-rents. The greater part of colonial land was held by feudal tenure and, except in New England, the payment of quit-rent was the chief bond between lord and tenant. It was to be expected, therefore, that in his charter to Georgia the King should reserve to himself quit-rent on all lands taken up by the Trustees, and the rate was fixed at four shillings proclamation money for every hundred acres, to become payable ten years after the original granting of the land. It had long been customary for the rate in proprietary colonies to be higher than in the royal provinces, and Georgia was no exception. In 1733 the Trustees increased the quit-rent for those who went out at their own expense to twenty shillings per hundred acres, payable in sterling ten years after the date of the grant, and it remained at that figure until the end of the charter period. By this means the Trustees hoped, after paying the Crown its stipulated rate of four shillings, to be left with a surplus for use as a fund to support administration and promote settlement.


2. Col.Rec.Ga., III, p.412
It was a fallacious and impracticable policy, and naturally gave cause for dissatisfaction among the colonists. The Trustees were undoubtedly acting for what they believed was the good of the province, and they could have argued that experience showed that the evil of land speculation was less apparent in those colonies where quit-rents were well established, such as Maryland and Virginia, than in those where they were not so well established. On the other hand, experience showed also that quit-rents were a recurring source of popular discontent, and for the Trustees to fix theirs at an exorbitant amount was asking for trouble. The attempt to impose quit-rents in Massachusetts during James II's reign had been one of the reasons for the revolution there against the government of Edmund Andros. Opposition to quit-rents had played its part in Nathaniel Bacon's rebellion in Virginia, and also in the agrarian riots in East Jersey which, according to the authority on this subject, illustrated "the principle that in face of a persistent and united public opinion legal right must give place to social needs." The payment of quit-rent in America did not mean a release from onerous services, as it did in England, but rather was it an additional burden on people who were trying to build themselves a new life and shake off a background of debt. Furthermore, it is difficult to condone a policy which demanded payment in specie, of which

2. Ibid., pp.62-4
3. Ibid., pp.92-3, 97-8, 108.
there was certain to be a grave shortage in Georgia. The Trustees did sometimes modify their charges in order to foster settlement, as, for example, in a grant of five thousand acres on 26 October 1735 when they reserved a quit-rent of only four shillings per hundred acres. But apart from a few tracts devoted to religious or public services, such remissions were exceptional and nearly all allotments were encumbered with excessive charges. This narrow policy inevitably failed, as it had failed in South Carolina, and its impracticability is demonstrated by the fact that the Trustees were never able to collect any quit-rents in Georgia.

The general policy of the Corporation towards the whole problem of land may have been based on the best of motives, but as far as the colonists themselves were concerned it was quite unrealistic. Within a few years freeholders were intent on letting their houses and lands, expecting the rent to be remitted to them after they themselves had returned to England. Governor Belcher of Massachusetts wrote to Oglethorpe on 25 May 1734 expressing his fear that the restriction of land tenure in Georgia to tail-male would discourage settlement there because land could be held on much better terms elsewhere in America: "I think it must greatly check the growth of that new colony, by the inhabitants strolling to other parts of

1. Ibid., pp. 126-7, 350
2. C.O.5/636, fo.190, Dobree to Trustees, 6 Feb. 1734/5.
America to get lands on the much better terms aforementioned." Thomas Coram soon realized that a wrong beginning to the colony had been made, and at a meeting of the Board of Trustees on 27 March 1734 he declared that under the existing system the inhabitants would desert the province "like leaves from a tree in autumn". Two months later he and Dr. Bundy supported the attitude of forty French Vaudois Protestants, selected for their knowledge of silk and vine culture, who refused to settle in Georgia unless their female relations as well as their sons were permitted to inherit property. Coram and Bundy said it would be stupid to lose an opportunity of sending so many people with experience of silk cultivation for the sake of preserving tenure of lands in tail-male. There was a clear discrepancy of opinion among the Trustees on the matter, but the majority supported the views of Lord Egmont, who had always been against inheritance by a female on the ground that she might marry a man who would neither live on the land nor attend to its cultivation, thus depriving the colony of its small freeholders in whom its strength resided. If an exception was made in the case of the forty Vaudois it would only cause discontent among the other inhabitants who possessed lands in a different tenure, while if fee-simple was extended to the whole province the grants might become "a bubble in Exchange Alley". For these reasons the application

of the Vaudois was rejected.

Hence, the Trustees were loath to relax the restrictions even for the sake of their favourite commodity, silk. But whatever justification there may originally have seemed to be for primogeniture and tail-male, by 1734 it was evidently already apparent to some members of the Corporation that the regulations were impolitic. Apart from New England the experience of other colonies was not encouraging for the strict enforcement of such rules. Besides keeping the province militarily strong the Trustees were, no doubt, aiming at preventing monopolization of land and at developing an economy of small farms. This was bound to be detrimental to a colony in Georgia's situation. Prosperity and progress in America were coming more and more to depend on capitalism, and conditions favoured large enterprise and the concentration of property in a few hands. It followed that Georgia could not prosper as long as the restrictions on landholding remained. They made impossible the establishment of a plantation system, especially after the use of negro slaves was prohibited in 1735. The Trustees were, in effect, cramping the poor, small farmers of Georgia in their competition with rich, large landowners of South Carolina. This was the upshot of a policy coloured too much by moral and military considerations and too little by the economic and human factors.

By March 1734 there were already in Georgia 491 persons

who had been sent on the charity, besides 21 masters with 106 servants who had gone out at their own expense. The servants and labourers who had emigrated at the corporation's charge were employed directly under an overseer of the Trust and their wages fixed by the authorities. They had little scope for private enterprise. Their activities were closely controlled and the overseer was required to keep what was called a "Weekly Book of Labour by Tasked Work." Such close control could presumably have been vindicated by the character of the settlers. The population of early Georgia consisted of Englishmen and Scotsmen who had been unfortunate, unemployed or imprisoned in their native country, and of Europeans who had suffered religious persecution in their homelands. The first embarkation consisted of a selection by the Trustees from families recommended by parochial clergy as being respectable, poor and possessing the moral and physical attributes of good colonists. These were to be conveyed to America gratis, provisioned for three months after arrival, supplied with coats, arms and ammunition, and be granted limited areas of land.

Inevitably, undesirable elements found their way into the colony in spite of the vigilance of the Trustees. The foreign Protestants and Scottish Highlanders were generally industrious and admirable settlers, but there were adventurers,

who went to Georgia in hopes either of making a quick fortune or of evading responsibilities incurred previously elsewhere. The erection of a lighthouse on Tybee Island in the mouth of the River Savannah was retarded by the almost continual drunkenness of the workers there. When alarms of Spanish and Indian activities made necessary the construction of a square redoubt and entrenchment on the island of Skidoway only six men could be coaxed into attempting the work, the other inhabitants refusing to do anything without pay, even though it was for their own protection. Mr. Elisha Dobree seems to have been one of the more hard-working members of the population and certainly took pains to ingratiate himself with the Trustees by keeping them well-informed of his own personal exertions and the colony's general condition, but even so he could not prevent the secret leaking out that he had come to Georgia from South Carolina in order to elude his creditors.

One of the themes of Elisha Dobree's correspondence was the shortage of servants in Georgia. He pointed out that an adequate number of servants "would enable the freeholders to go on briskly in clearing their lands and cultivating the same, for it does not yet appear to me what great

2. C.0.5/636, fo.19, Dalmas to Trustees, 23 Aug. 1734
3. C.0.5/666, p.75, Martyn to Savannah bailiffs, 28 Oct. 1734; p.122, Trustees to Dobree, 29 May 1735.
improvement one man by himself can do in such a forest as this is, and it's out of their power to buy any servants". By the autumn of 1734 servants were in great demand, mainly for cutting timber and clearing land, and in September 1737 the grand jury in Savannah drew up a representation to the Trustees alleging that the lack of servants rendered freeholders incapable of cultivating their lands with proper vigour. The shortage was due partly to the unattractive conditions of service provided by the Trustees. In most of the colonies a servant, on the expiry of his contract, was not sent empty away but was entitled, either by custom or statute, to receive what were known as freedom dues, which usually included suitable clothing, agricultural tools and seeds, sometimes arms and other provisions, and often a grant of fifty acres of land. In contrast, a servant in Georgia could expect no more than a mere twenty acres when he had completed his term of service. Such frugality was bound to deter settlement and encourage transfer to other colonies, and it was not long before servants in Georgia were deserting to South Carolina where a ready welcome always awaited them. Even the German servants, so often described as models of industry and fidelity, were, in some instances, disobedient.

and refractory and clandestinely quitted their masters. Many masters shortened their terms as an inducement to faithful service, but they could not prevent most of the single men from escaping and "skulking about the out-settlements of South Carolina", whence it was almost impossible to retrieve them. Even when some were recovered no reliance could be placed on them, for they would only remain until another opportunity of escape presented itself.

This need for servants was accentuated by the prohibition on negro labour in Georgia. Slavery existed in all the provinces except Georgia by the 1730s, not excluding New England even. Slave status was unknown to English law and there had been no Act of Parliament formally establishing it in any of the American plantations, but its existence was apparently taken for granted under the municipal law of the colonies. In the south especially, in the tobacco plantations of Virginia and Maryland and in the rice-fields of South Carolina, slavery had been proved the most economical and effective form of labour. Hence the Trustees were assuming an independent line when, in 1734, they drew up a law prohibiting the importation and use of black slaves in Georgia. This law enacted that after 24 June 1735 a fine of £50 would be inflicted on anyone importing a negro into Georgia; that any negro found in the province was to be the property of the

Trustees; and that any slave who had deserted from South Carolina and was claimed by his owner should be restored to the owner on payment by him of the expenses incurred.

The Trustees had a wealth of arguments and evidence to support them in this measure. South Carolina was living in constant apprehension over its large negro population, and it was fear of slave rebellion, coupled with the menace of French and Spanish influence among frontier Indian tribes, which in 1740 moved that province to encourage more white immigration. The Georgia law was commended by several Americans who deplored the increase of slavery in the colonies. Colonel William Byrd, a Virginia planter, wrote to Lord Egmont in 1736 wishing that a similar prohibition could be enjoined in his province:

They import so many negroes hither than I fear this colony will some time or other be confirmed by the name of New Guinea. I am sensible of many bad consequences of multiplying these Ethiopians amongst us. They blow up the pride and ruin the industry of our white people who, seeing a rank of poor creatures below them, detest work for fear it should make them look like slaves.

He described the perils of too many blacks and thought Parliament should forbid any more to be brought in.

Similar arguments were used by the Trustees to justify

their action. They too thought a white man owning a black slave would be disinclined to work himself and would spend much of his time ensuring that the negro toiled. They feared, as Byrd did, that the Spaniards in Florida would be continually inciting insurrections among the slaves or enticing them away. The Spanish governor at St. Augustine welcomed fugitive negroes, and if they were permitted in Georgia the desertion to Florida of those in South Carolina would be facilitated. There was always the danger that slaves might become the allies of hostile Indians on the borders. Moreover, their very expense was prohibitive so far as the poor settlers and the Trustees were concerned, it being estimated that the price of one slave was equivalent to the cost of the passage over, equipment and one year's subsistence for a white man. The Trustees believed slave labour would not be required for the products which they intended to be raised in the colony. Did not experience in the other provinces prove that the admission of negroes encouraged the wealthier planters to live elsewhere and leave their estates in the care of overseers? Finally, it had to be remembered that one of the reasons for founding Georgia was to establish a defensive barrier on the exposed southern frontier, and to admit negroes in the population would seriously weaken it in this respect. Then there was the humanitarian

motive, although certainly a subsidiary one. "Slavery", wrote Oglethorpe, "is against the Gospel as well as the fundamental law of England. We refused, as Trustees, to make a law permitting such a horrid crime." Brave words from a man who combined philanthropy in America with the offices in England of director and deputy-governor of the Royal African Company.

The arguments advanced by the Trustees to vindicate the prohibition were well-reasoned, supported to a large degree by the experience of other colonies, and in harmony with Georgia's original raison d'être. But natural progress would unavoidably be slow under a hypothetical policy contrived by a Corporation practically unacquainted with actual conditions prevailing three thousand miles away across the Atlantic. As soon as rice began to be cultivated slave labour became indispensable on account of the nature of the work in the paddy-fields and the malarial atmosphere of the swamp lands. Immediately he heard of the law Sam Eveleigh, perhaps the most discerning of contemporary observers of Georgia, wrote from South Carolina to the Trustees' secretary noting with surprise that the Act had been described in some quarters as necessary and useful:

But do assure you that here, where they ought, at least, to be better acquainted in these affairs than the gentlemen in England, they are of far different sentiments, and they all

unanimously agree (at least such as I have talked with) that without negroes Georgia can never be a colony of any great consequence. But since the Trustees have thought fit to pass such a law I shall say no more, only this one remark. That I observed, whilst at Georgia, great quantities of choice good land for rice, and am positive that that commodity can't (in any great quantities) be produced by white people because the work is too laborious, the heat very intense ....

It is significant that such an opinion was expressed so early in the life of the province. The reasons put forward for the prohibition seemed logical enough on paper, but when considered in the light of actual conditions they fell apart. Here again is seen the serious disadvantage of government benevolent but remote, well-intentioned but based over much on theory. This was the point Sam Eveleigh emphasized when he alleged that, although too many negroes might conceivably be dangerous, a moderate number was essential if Georgia was to prosper:

It can't be supposed that the Trustees know the circumstance of this country as well as those who have lived several years in it, and we are all here generally of opinion that Georgia can never be a place of any great consequence without negroes.²

Several years elapsed before the Trustees had to acknowledge the truth of his words, and during that time their policy was increasingly criticized, not only by malcontents but also by their own officers in the colony.

The Trustees' opposition to negro labour was, in fact, contrary to most contemporary opinion on the subject, both in the colony itself and in Britain. Economic theorists approved

2. C.O.5/636, fo. 133, Eveleigh to Martyn, 17 Jan. 1734/5
of slavery in the plantations because it would help preserve an agricultural economy there. In his tract on the African slave trade in 1745 Malachy Postlethwayt maintained that while the plantations relied on negro labour they would never injure British manufacturers nor become independent of the mother-country. Colonial importation of slaves from Africa, it was argued, should be encouraged as an important contribution to Britain's advantageous trade with that continent. So convinced was the Government of the value of the trade that, by means of the Crown's power of veto and by instructions to governors, slaves were often forced upon the colonies.

Hence, the altitude of the Trustees was an independent one and not in tune with the policy of the Government. The reasons for it were ones primarily of economics and security. The Trustees did not abhor slavery itself, and the Act of 1735 declared that unclaimed negroes found in Georgia were to be "the sole property of, and to belong only to, the said Trustees and their successors, and shall and may be exported, sold and disposed of in such manner" as the Common Council thought most beneficial to the colony. True, aversion to it was growing among some sections of the public. Several prominent figures, including George Fox, Richard Baxter, Aphra Behn, Daniel Defoe

2. Add. MSS. 38387, fo. 1, thoughts on the importance of our colonies in the West Indies (c.1763)
and Adam Smith spoke against it during the eighteenth century, and the Quakers were its persistent opponents. But while mercantile influence predominated in the Government, the slave trade was considered an important element in Britain's commercial system. The best course for the Trustees to have followed would have been to have permitted the importation and use of slave labour under certain quantitative restrictions, instead of attempting to impose a complete prohibition which, for fifteen years, remained a cause of warm debate and bitter complaint.

Simultaneous with the law against negroes was another important measure designed to prevent the use of spirituous liquors in Georgia. After 24 June 1735 "no rum or brandies nor any other kind of spirits or strong waters by whatsoever name they are or may be distinguished" were to be allowed in the province, and anyone who sold them was to be fined £5 for the first offence and £50 for the second. "And the better to prevent profane cursing and swearing, vice and debauchery, too frequently occasioned by tippling houses and disorderly public houses", the sale of any wine, beer, ale or other liquors without a licence from the authorities was forbidden under penalty of £20. Here again the Trustees were acting paternalistically in what they believed was the best interest.

of the colony. As early as August 1733 Oglethorpe wrote to the Common Council about the dangers of unrestricted drinking of rum, holding that several deaths among the settlers could be ascribed to it. It was this information which persuaded the Trustees that the importation of rum should be prohibited. In their opinion all sorts of maladies were attributable to "that pernicious liquor", and they expected the people to abstain from it for their own sakes. The preamble to the Act stated that it had been found by experience that the consumption of rum and brandies in Georgia was the cause of "dangerous maladies and fatal distempers", and should be checked in order to save the colony from ruin.

As applied in practice the law was not so restrictive as it seemed on paper. It did not prohibit all strong drink; beer was freely imported from England, the magistrates in Savannah being empowered to licence private persons to sell it. At the same time, molasses could be imported from the West Indies, and wines from Madeira were provided at reasonable prices. In any event, it was impossible to stop the people obtaining rum illegally, the principal source of supply being South Carolina, whose traders were adept at smuggling it both to the Georgia settlers and to the Indian tribes, producing,

2. C.0.5/666, p.75, Martyn to Savannah bailiffs, 28 Oct.1734.
3. Martyn, An Account showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia..., p.16.
it was alleged, "disease among the former and disorderly conduct on the part of some of the latter." The carpenter in charge of the construction of the Tybee lighthouse complained that his workmen acquired rum so easily and cheaply from South Carolina that they could get drunk for a week on one day's pay, and then they cared neither for him nor anything else. New England was another culprit.

Colonel Byrd warned Lord Egmont that the New Englanders would discover some way of getting round the Act and advised keeping a watchful eye on them: "They have a dexterity at palliating a perjury so well as to leave no taste of it in the mouth, nor can any people like them slip through a penal statute."

He praised the policy of the Trustees and hoped it would be enforceable:

I entirely agree with Your Lordship in the detestation you seem to have for that diabolical liquor rum, which does more mischiefs to people's industry and morals than anything except gin and the Pope. And if it were not a little too poetical, I should fancy as the gods of old were said to quaff nectar, so the devils are fobbed off with rum.... Thrice happy Georgia if it be in the power of any law to keep out so great an enemy to health, industry and virtue! The new settlers there had much better plant vineyards like Noah and get drunk with their own wine...

The settlers of Georgia thought differently. There was never any possibility of the law being enforced effectively, and the

1. C.0.5/636, fo.25, Jenys to Trustees, 6 Sept.1734; fo.72, Mackay to Trustees, 20 Nov.1734; fo.302, Christie to Trustees, 28 May 1735. C.0.5/639, fo.14, Oglethorpe to Trustees. Jones, History of Georgia, I, p.189.


private sale of rum increased rapidly until most people in Savannah were drinking it in defiance of the regulations, very often to excess.

In spite of the impassioned complaints from the settlers, the restriction on importation and use of rum, brandies, spirits and strong waters was genuinely intended to benefit the inhabitants, prevent ill-health and laziness and improve material conditions. The policy was quite in keeping with English thought in the eighteenth century, for addiction to liquor was not characteristic of colonials alone. Drunkenness had long been common in England among both upper and lower classes of society, at each of the universities, in country as well as town. Porter, salep and brandy intoxicated the upper classes, while Dorset beer and Oxford ale fuddled the common man. The early Hanoverian period witnessed, too, the spread of the habit of gin-drinking, an unmistakable cause of much misery and crime. Intemperance was not a monopoly of the Georgia settlers, nor were the Trustees being narrow or pedantic or exceptional in attempting to suppress it. Businessmen in England deplored the habit because it produced indolence among the workpeople and wasted labour and time. The growth of the evil brought about the Act of 1736 restricting the sale and distribution of gin, a measure which, though ineffectual, yet shows the tone of public thinking. And so, when the Trustees sought to

prevent the evils of insobriety in Georgia they were not making a new departure; rather were they applying principles acquired from knowledge of excesses in England as well as in America. In this, however, as in other matters, pressure of circumstances ultimately constrained the Trustees to relent.

One reason for restricting the importation of rum and spirits into Georgia was the pernicious effect they were likely to have on relations with the Indians. Rum had become an important article of trade into the interior, but the tendency of the Indians to drink to stupefaction often led to trouble with the English traders. Thus, an indiscriminate traffic in rum would have been a menace to the establishment of the good relations with the Indians so essential to an inchoate colony like Georgia, which could obviously not sustain a war with them on its frontiers. The dictates of sound policy required that the Redskins should be reconciled to English intrusion on their lands, their co-operation gained in commerce and their alliance won against the French and Spaniards.

The Trustees always recognized the Indians as the original owners of the land and made no settlement without their consent. Even before the beginnings of settlement, those concerned in the Georgia project had resolved that the Indians should "upon all occasions be treated with the strictest justice and utmost humanity". This policy brought immediate and lasting

1. Berkeley and Percival Correspondence, p.278, Oglethorpe to Berkeley, May 1731.
success. Soon after the landing of the first settlers in Georgia Oglethorpe negotiated with representatives of the neighbouring tribes of the Creek nation, and on 21 May 1733 a treaty was made. In return for a guarantee that compensation would always be paid for injuries done to them by merchants, the Creeks agreed to allow the inhabitants of Georgia to trade in their towns, goods being sold at rates fixed by mutual consent. In addition they ceded to the English all lands in the tidewater region which they themselves did not require, retaining only the islands of Ossabaw, Sapelo and St. Catherines for bathing, hunting and fishing, and a small tract lying above Yamacraw Bluff on the south bank of the river which was reserved as a place of encampment for whenever they wished to visit Savannah. They also agreed to have no more communication with the French or Spaniards and promised to not molest the settlers and to observe the treaty "as long as the sun shall shine or the waters run into the rivers." This resulted in the pacification of all the tribes comprising the Lower Creek nation and enabled the new colony to extend itself up the River Savannah and along the coast without hindrance from the natives. Georgia was fortunate in experiencing negligible opposition from the Indians in the early years of its history.

1. G. White, Historical Collections of Georgia (New York, 1855) p.121. It was customary for Indians to surrender their land easily at this time, for they attached much less importance to it than did the whites - see S.G. Drake, "Early History of Georgia, and Sir Alexander Cuming's embassy to the Cherokees", New England Historical and Genealogical Register, XXVI (July, 1872), p.260.
Philip Thicknesse, one of the first settlers, relates that, whenever he went into the woods, he was always more fearful of rattlesnakes than of Indians.

This good beginning was reinforced by the wise policy of the Trustees in devoting a considerable part of their revenue to the purchase of presents for the Indians, though much of this expenditure was reimbursed by the Government. The treaty with the Creeks was stabilized in 1734 by the visit to England of the aged Tomochichi and some other chieftains of a small group of that nation living at Yamacraw on the south bank of the River Savannah. The president of the Common Council concurred in the elderly mico's hope that the two peoples would always live peacefully together in Georgia:

The Trustees will endeavour to cement a strict alliance and friendship with you, your children shall be ours and ours shall be yours, and we are all under one God, Who will punish any who are guilty of breach of faith.

Tomochichi's friendship for the English was deepened by the treatment he and his companions were accorded throughout their visit. The King received them at Kensington and the Archbishop of Canterbury spoke with them at Lambeth Palace. They were taken to Eton, Windsor, Greenwich and Hampton Court, lavished with gifts and mementos, and Tomochichi's portrait was painted and hung in the Trustees' office in London.  

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both guests and hosts, the visit cemented a friendship of vital importance to Georgia.

The climax of Anglo-Indian friendship in Georgia during Oglethorpe's residence there was the ten-day conference held in August 1739 at Coweta, the principal town of the Lower Creeks, situated on the Chattahoochee. Accompanied by a few soldiers and servants Oglethorpe journeyed nearly three hundred miles through a trackless wilderness of morasses, thickets and forests of pine to attend a great council of the tribes. There he feasted on fowl, beef, pork, venison and many kinds of fruit, smoked with them their calumet of peace and drank the sacred black medicine reserved for important people and special occasions. Amid splendour and luxury Oglethorpe negotiated with sachems of the Creek, Cherokee and Chickasaw nations, and on 21 August agreement was reached on the regulation of trade, preservation of peace and confirmation of the ownership by the Trustees of the lands between the Rivers Savannah, Ogeechee and St. John. The Creeks continued to reserve to themselves the sea islands of Ossabaw, Sapelo and St. Catherine's, and the small strip of territory from Pipemakers Bluff to Savannah, while Oglethorpe promised that the English would neither appropriate any lands other than those ceded to the Trustees nor encroach on those reserved to the Indians.

outcome of the conference was a triumph for Oglethorpe, a sick man at the time; he succeeded in establishing a friendly understanding with the Indians at a critical juncture, for England and Spain were on the verge of war, and France, as always, was watching for an opportunity to embarrass her rivals in the New World.

An important element in the Trustees’ policy was the missionary motive. All members of the Georgia Corporation were noted for their humanitarian or religious interests; five were Anglican clergymen, ten had served on the committee on gaols, Adam Anderson was a member of the Society in Scotland for Propagating Christianity, and James Vernon was a member of both the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel and the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. All were Associates of the late Dr. Bray, though many may have been so merely because of their interest in the Georgia project. Contributors to the enterprise included the Archbishop of Canterbury and several bishops, archdeacons, deans and parochial clergy; the first shipload of emigrants was accompanied by 115 Bibles, 116 Books of Common Prayer, 72 psalters, 312 catechisms and 493 other holy works.

One of the first acts of the Trustees was to fix a site for a church in the colony and reserve an adequate glebe for a minister. They were anxious to provide proper religious

guidance in Georgia and were immensely pleased when Dr. Henry Herbert, son of Lord Herbert of Cherbury, volunteered to accompany the first settlers and minister to them without charge, but unfortunately he had only a few months to live. In January 1733 the Trustees memorialized the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel to pay a salary to a minister in Georgia as it did to ministers in other colonies, since it would be some years before the three hundred acres allotted by the Trustees for a glebe would produce sufficient to maintain one. The request was granted, and the Rev. Samuel Quincy having offered his services, he was appointed missionary to Georgia with an annual salary of £50. He was a good-natured, friendly man and popular with the inhabitants, but he annoyed the Trustees by taking a six months vacation in New England, leaving a wheelwright to perform his duties in Georgia. He had obtained Oglethorpe's consent to make the voyage for the benefit of his health, but had omitted to seek the permission either of the Trustees or of the S.P.G., and such disregard of authority could not be tolerated. Hampered by ill-health and the insolence of Thomas Causton, the magistrate, Quincy saved the Trustees from having to dismiss him from his post by himself applying to return to England, and in October 1735 John Wesley was appointed in his

place and at the same salary.

The founder of Methodism had an unfortunate time in America. He went to Georgia primarily with the idea of becoming a missionary among the heathen Indians, and regarded his duties among the English colonists as of secondary importance. His enthusiasm seems to have blinded him to the difficulties involved, such as his ignorance of the Indian languages and the fact that the Indians had already encountered specimens of Christianity in the persons of vicious traders from South Carolina, acquaintance with whom was not likely to make them easily receptive of any Christian teaching. Even the amiable Tomochichi resisted conversion, scornfully rejecting Wesley’s overtures by pointing to the example of the Christians at Savannah and Frederica: "Christians drunk! Christians beat men! Christians tell lies! Me no Christian!"


But Wesley had decided his vocation lay among the heathen, and so he and his brother Charles, leaving behind their widowed mother "without a penny in the world and with the creditors already distraining on her poor hens and chickens", departed on their missionary venture zealous, ignorant and optimistic.

It had been agreed between Wesley and the Trustees that he should, at first, act as minister to the church in Savannah. But Georgia the colony and Wesley the minister were soon found to be incompatible. The inhabitants suspected he had been sent by the Trustees for a clandestine purpose, and they were quickly vexed at his autocratic demeanour and the establishment of what they regarded as a High Church service in Savannah. He then completely undermined his position by falling in love with the storekeeper's niece, "a very pretty young lady" according to Philip Thicknesse, and by being vindictive when she preferred someone else. After disosing his remorse to the girl's uncle and receiving no sympathy from that quarter, Wesley gave vent to his injured feelings by refusing her the sacrament at communion on the technical grounds that she had committed some minor offence and failed to comply with the rubric requiring notice of intention to communicate. This imprudence resulted in the husband of the offended lady bringing a suit against him for £1,000 damages, and Wesley

came before the colony's grand jury. On 2 December 1737 the magistrates issued an order forbidding him to leave the province, but notwithstanding all the precautions taken he departed for South Carolina the same evening in the company of a constable, a tithingman and a barber, reputed to be three of the most objectionable persons in Savannah. He seems to have been treated with less than justice in Georgia for, as Alexander Garden, Commissary of the Carolinas, wrote in a letter to the Bishop of London in September 1737, Wesley may have been somewhat indiscreet but he was certainly innocent of anything criminal. Nevertheless, the episode ended Wesley's early hopes and expectations and the Trustees were again disappointed.

After the troubles with Wesley the Trustees decided that Georgia should be blessed with two ministers, one at Savannah and another at Frederica. In June 1738 the S.P.G. proffered the services of the Rev. William Norris, whose application for missionary work was backed by the recommendation of the Primate of Ireland. Norris seemed an ideal person for the job, and the Trustees confidently asked the Bishop of London to ordain him deacon and priest immediately in order that he

could embark on the very next ship for Georgia. Once installed in Savannah, however, Norris became a source of disquiet to the Trustees. He was soon complaining against Oglethorpe who, he said, had several times seized and threatened to destroy him, against James Habersham the schoolmaster, Thomas Jones the magistrate and George Whitefield the other minister in Georgia, who criticized his way of life and accused him of playing cards with ladies when he ought to have been saving souls. While esteemed by the majority of the populace, his bad relations with other officials, coupled with rumours of familiarity with the maidservant who cleaned his house, jeopardized his authority. Although the Trustees were at first satisfied of his moral integrity and pleased at the conduct of his duties, they eventually learned that he was leading an idle life and neglecting his duties. Finally, in 1740, he returned to England, still full of complaints, including one against the Trustees for not having paid him his salary. The S.P.G. remained unconvinced

1. G.0.5/667, p.144, Martyn to Bishop of London, 28 June 1738; G.0.5/640, fo.132, Egmont to Bishop of London, 1 July 1738; fo.134, Bishop of London to Egmont, 3 July 1738.


4. Ibid., pp.144, 420, 514, 572-3, 618.
of Norris's culpability, considering him to have been ill-treated in Georgia, and resolved to employ him again as a missionary in the first suitably vacancy that arose.

The ill-luck of the Trustees in their choice of ministers was interrupted by the appointment to Frederica of George Whitefield in December 1737. He rapidly became popular and his mission as much of a success as Wesley's had been a failure. He was interested in education and was instrumental in opening one school at Savannah for girls and another at the village of Highgate for teaching English to the French children so that they could attend Anglican services. A high mortality rate made the care of orphans a problem in Georgia, and after the Trustees had granted him a tract of five hundred acres and given him permission to collect money, Whitefield planned the construction of an orphanage which he called Bethesda, the maintenance of which was always dear to his heart and an inspiration to him in his work. So far as religion was concerned Whitefield served Georgia well, his zeal carrying him beyond his nominal office as Anglican incumbent in Frederica, and later in Savannah, so that he became more of a minister at large. He was generally liked by the inhabitants

but shocked some of the more conservative members of the Established Church by indications of unorthodoxy, such as pleading for justification by faith alone and inveighing against the modern clergy "as slothful shepherds, dumb dogs, etc., who led their people dreaming on in a carnal security to destruction." It was when he meddled in the settlement's economic life, however, that he clashed with the Trustees. In June 1740 he was reprimanded by the Trustees for proposing to erect looms and teach the orphans to weave cotton. In Britain it was widely held that the function of colonies was to supply raw material for the manufactures of the mother-country and not to compete with her by manufacturing for themselves. Consequently it was absolutely forbidden to set up looms in any part of Georgia; if the children had to be found something useful to do then they should be taught the winding of silk. Within a month of this reprimand Whitefield was dismissed from his office of minister in Savannah. Evidently the Trustees' concern for the colony's spiritual welfare was not as strong as their determination to make its economic progress conform to the pattern they themselves had in mind.

The Trustees seem to have been blighted in their choice of ministers; none could satisfy them well or long enough.

2. C.0.5/670, p.443, Instructions to bailiffs, 6 June 1740, C.0.5/667, pp.341-4, Trustees to Whitefield, 11 June 1740. Church, Oglethorpe, pp.224-7.
The selection of Thomas Bosomworth on 4 July 1743 was ill-starred. The S.P.G. promised to pay him an annual salary of £50 for three years and the Trustees undertook to provide him with three hundred acres of land and two servants to till it. Bosomworth had the advantage of having lived in Georgia before taking holy orders in Britain, but the disadvantage, from the Trustees' point of view, of an independent frame of mind. Although instructed to reside in Savannah, he preferred Frederica and betook himself thither, where, he said, "the people had been too long as sheep without a shepherd, and driven to and fro with every wind of doctrine." In the summer of 1744 he contracted a fever which made him so ill that "he was scarce able to put pen to paper to draw for his salary", and in 1745 he returned to Savannah but soon moved on into South Carolina and later in the year appeared in England. Here he decided to join the campaign against the Young Pretender in the North of England, a decision which the Trustees regarded as tantamount to his resignation and they recommended the S.P.G. to appoint Bartholomew Zouberbuhler, a Swiss, as his successor with the usual salary. At last the

Trustees were rewarded with an active and conscientious minister who performed valuable service for the Church in Georgia until his death there in 1766.

The Trustees gave much attention to the needs of the Church in Georgia, but misfortune dogged them all the way. Payment of quit-rent was often not exacted on land intended for religious use, such as the three hundred acres granted to Causton, Parker, Christie and West in March 1736 for building a church. Indentured servants were supplied to cultivate the lands held by the Anglican Church in Savannah, Frederica and Augusta. Zouerbuhler's clerical clothing, cost of bedding and passage over were all paid for by the Trustees. Even more was done for Whitefield who made an inventory of his requisites which included six shirts, four pairs of stockings, six pairs of socks, four pairs of shoes, two pairs of breeches, a waistcoat, a greatcoat, a nightgown, handkerchiefs, a hat, a wig and a watch. When the Trustees had equipped him to his satisfaction, he came upon them again for "a gun, a sea-chest and some other trifling particulars" before he embarked. A catechist to instruct the children

in Savannah was maintained by an anonymous benefactor from 1734 onwards. Money for building and furnishing churches and parsonages was provided liberally by the Trustees. It has been estimated that at least £7,000 was spent for religious purposes in Georgia during the Trusteeship period. This money was spent on the encouragement in the colony of the Church of England, but other Protestant denominations were not persecuted in any way. The Salzburgers at Ebenezer, for instance, had their own minister. When definite regulations on marriage were belatedly sent out in 1741 it was laid down that marriage ceremonies were to be performed in accordance with the laws of the Church of England, but the Salzburgers were to be permitted to obtain licences from the magistrates. In August 1735, on the recommendation of the Society in Scotland for Promoting Christian Knowledge, the Trustees approved the nomination of a Presbyterian missionary to work among the Scots at Darien.

3. McCain, Georgia as a Proprietary Province, pp.337-8. The estimate is derived from Col.Rec.Ga., III, passim. The money came from public contributions and from the funds of the Trustees, but the salaries of the ministers were normally met by the S.P.C.: see Strickland, Religion and the State in Georgia ..., pp.28, 45, 51, 111.
5. McCain, Georgia as a Proprietary Province, p.328.
Religion and education were complementary in early Georgia. This is not surprising when it is remembered that education in England had been generally within the province of the Church since medieval times. In America the relationship was more variable but the same connection had always been there. New England had an exceptionally good record in educational facilities, but it is noticeable that elsewhere the majority of colleges were virtually training establishments for clergy, and there was a strong tendency for wealthy planters to send their sons to school and university in the mother-country. The Trustees, in a short period in a new settlement, could not hope to create an educational system of the standard of the other colonies. One obstacle was the diversity of languages, and in October 1733 the Trustees felt obliged to engage a German, Christopher Ortman, to teach English to the children of the Salzburgers. Progress was impeded also by the great distances between plantations, the poor state of such roads as there were, the widespread illiteracy among the early setters, and by the need for the children to help in the fields.

Nevertheless, much was done to encourage learning. Books, mainly of a religious character, figured large on the lists of exports from England to Georgia, friends of Stephen

1. Egmont Diary, I, p.405.
Hales, especially, contributing very generously. The first regular school was established in Savannah in 1736 by Charles Delamotte, the Methodist son of a sugar-baker, who went to Georgia at his own expense and taught the children reading, writing and the principles of Christianity without remuneration. In 1742 a free school was begun in the town under a former assistant of Delamotte named John Dobell, the cost being met by those parents who preferred to pay for the education of their children and by the Trustees who paid for the remainder. In spite of misgivings among many parents over free education for their children, the tendency being to regard it as somehow humiliating, most of the school's membership was on the bounty of the Trustees, and in April 1743 the Common Council resolved that the education at the school should be free to all irrespective of parents' willingness or ability to pay. Bethesda became another centre of education for children from Savannah, instruction there naturally having a decided religious bent. At the beginning of 1744 the Rev. Thomas Bosomworth remarked in a letter to the S.P.G. on the great need of a schoolmaster in Frederica, but one was not provided until May 1745, when the Trustees appointed John Driezler at a salary of £10 a year, and he taught in both

English and German, the books being supplied by the S.P.G.\textsuperscript{1}

Instruction, however, was unsystematic and inconsistent. A person who lived in Savannah, for example, naturally had more opportunity for schooling than someone who lived along the exposed southern or western frontier. There is no record of any educational facilities during the Trusteeship period at either of the important frontier posts of Augusta and Darien. Moreover, the schoolmasters in Savannah were not always of exemplary character. Peter Joubert, for instance, was discharged in December 1749 because the inhabitants complained that he "had for some time past neglected to give proper attendance to his scholars, and likewise that he has been of late so much addicted to drinking that he gives great offence to the inhabitants, and what is more pernicious sets a bad example to their children." Edward Holt was another who earned the disapproval of the people of Savannah for his conduct towards many of the children. Both Holt and his wife, according to the Rev. Zouberbuhler, delighted in "idle tattle and speaking things which they ought not", and in October 1750 Holt was suspended from acting as a schoolmaster under the Trustees but was allowed to maintain a private school for the children of such parents as were prepared to entrust their offspring to him. In the following

month he repented of his conduct and was restored to his
former position on promising to give no offence in the future,
but he soon became fractious again and in 1752 returned to
England.

These instances do not necessarily mean that teaching was
generally of so very low a standard in Georgia, but such good
education as there was seems to have been provided mainly
through the medium of religion. Teaching and preaching were
interchangeable occupations, and persons appointed as catechists
or schoolmasters were indistinguishable by the duties they
performed because each did the work of both. John Dobell,
the schoolmaster, read prayers in the villages of Highgate and
Hampstead, though not in a very satisfactory manner. During
Whitefield's absence James Habersham, a schoolteacher, observed
the hours of prayer and read the services in Savannah. When
Christopher Orton was minister in Savannah the Trustees
approved his taking over management of the school in the
absence of a qualified person. Education was clearly of a
spasmodic sort, its extent limited and its standard not high.
But considering the means at the disposal of the Trustees

and the character and situation of the province, it cannot be said that Georgia compared so very unfavourably in education with some of the other colonies which had a longer history and whose frontiers were more secure.

One other aspect of the Trustees' religious policy remains to be mentioned. Among those commissioned to collect subscriptions for the Georgia enterprise when contributions were first invited were Messrs. Alvaro Lopez Suasso, Francis Salvador jnr., and Anthony Da Costa, three wealthy officers of the influential Sephardic congregation in London, which had appointed a committee to apply for grants of land in Georgia as a means of relieving the strain of pauperism imposed by the influx at that period of poor Jews from the Continent, who were a drain on the charity funds of the Sephardic community. These three Jewish officers did not transmit the money to the Trustees, as instructed, but used it independently to send settlers of their own race to the colony. The arrival in Savannah of a shipload of forty-three Jews came as a profound shock to the Trustees who at once ordered the three culprits to surrender their commissions, which tardily and reluctantly they did. The attitude of the Trustees is explained partly by the common suspicion that Jews prejudice a country's trade and welfare, and partly by fear that subscribers would

withdraw support if they thought they were helping to finance a Hebrew settlement. Oglethorpe was directed to discourage Jews who tried to settle in the province, but he did not comply, the other settlers apparently harboured no ill-will towards them, and several Jews were mentioned as grantees in the general conveyance of town lots, gardens and farms on 21 December 1733.

Official consent was never given to the presence of Jews in Georgia, but they were allowed to remain undisturbed and played a busy role in its early growth. Dr. Samuel Nunez Ribiero, a Portuguese Jew, was the only physician in the province during the early years and rendered valuable service in that capacity. Messrs. Minis and Solomons were among the first to establish a mercantile firm in Savannah. Abraham de Lyon, an experienced vigneron from Portugal, with financial assistance from the Trustees experimented not

1. C.0.5/666, pp.10 and 40, Martyn to Oglethorpe, 21 Feb. and 18 Oct. 1733.


4. The Trustees were £215 in debt to this firm in Jan.1736: Col.Rec.Ga.,II, pp.195, 219.
unsuccessfully with the cultivation of grapes. That no action was taken against the Jews was due probably as much to the example of other colonies as to the wisdom of the Trustees. There could have been no more than a thousand Jews in all the Thirteen Colonies together, and the little band in Georgia was hardly worth making trouble about. Neighbouring South Carolina had always treated Jews tolerantly and was, indeed, the first community in the world to grant them the right to vote and the first government where a Jew was elected to office by his Christian neighbours. In New England they were not regarded with so much disfavour as were Catholics or Quakers; in New York they could become naturalized citizens; in Pennsylvania their social disabilities were few; and throughout this period in America social and legal restrictions on Jews were being gradually whittled down. Furthermore, the Sephardic Jews of this period excelled in the production of silk and wine, a fact that may have influenced the Trustees to adopt a forbearing attitude towards the generally young, able-bodied and hard-working members of the race who found their way to Georgia. Viewed in this light, the original reluctance of the Trustees to permit the settlement

3. Ibid., p.154.
of Jews in Georgia may appear somewhat difficult to understand. The explanation probably lies in the fact that the Trustees were Englishmen and imbibed the opinions and prejudices of their countrymen. In eighteenth century Britain the common impression of the Jews was as a race of usurers and brokers, and hatred of them was intense. It was the period when an Act to enable Jews to apply for naturalization aroused so formidable an opposition amongst the public that it was repealed in the same year; it was the period when "No Jews! No Jews! No wooden shoes!" became a popular cry; the period when Jews were excluded from public office and debarred from landed estates except by special Acts. But in whatever light the Trustees regarded the emigration of Jews to Georgia, they would have been foolish indeed to have pursued a rigorously antagonistic policy towards them, for such a policy would have been quite incapable of enforcement and could have produced nothing but harm to the colony. As it was, although the Trustees were apprehensive over the effect Jewish settlers might have both on colonists in Georgia and on subscribers in Britain, they did not attempt a persecuting or restrictive policy towards them, and permitted them to remain in the colony in the shade of official, but inactive, disapproval.
The lot of all settlers in Georgia was depreciated considerably by financial difficulties. There is no means of ascertaining whether the settlers brought money with them, but if they did the amounts would have been very small indeed. During the first few months of the colony, when there was no external commerce and trade with the Indians was by barter, the weekly issue of provisions from the public store made possession of money unnecessary. But as population increased some sort of currency became essential and was provided in the form of sola bills. These were promises of payment by the Trustees, distributed by them to their agents in Georgia, and redeemable on presentation at their office in Westminster. The bills were issued for amounts of £1, £2, £5, £10 and £20, and could be passed on from hand to hand and so function as a normal currency. Distribution was carefully regulated, and the Trustees demanded an account of the purpose for which each bill was required and kept a record of all that were issued and redeemed.

This system could not entirely answer the needs of the colony, especially as external commerce expanded, and a demand for hard money soon arose. The problem was accentuated by merchants from South Carolina selling their pork, fowls and other provisions for such ready money as there was in Georgia, thus draining it away from the province. The Trustees were aware of the problem and occasionally sent over English coin, which was paid to the officials and through them put into circulation. Thirty hundredweight of copper halfpence, worth £322, was sent out in 1734, and in July 1735 the Trustees decided to ship £1,000 in silver coin to the colony. In June 1739 the Common Council arranged for two tons of halfpence, worth £522, to be bought and sent to Georgia.

Coinage never remained in the colony long, however. It would accumulate in Savannah, the commercial centre, whence it was soon remitted either to the mother-country or to the other colonies in exchange for essential goods. Sola bills, therefore, were the principal circulating medium under Trusteeship, although the currency of South Carolina also circulated in Georgia, passing at the rate of £6.40 to £1.00 sterling. Unfortunately, the bills did not circulate well.

in other colonies, nor were there always sufficient to answer requirements within Georgia itself. In February 1749 the merchants Harris and Habersham wrote to the Trustees' secretary in England that for five years the President and Assistants in Savannah had lacked sufficient sola bills to discharge the regular expenses, such as salaries of officials, bounties and small weekly allowances to the poor and infirm. The shortage remained until the surrender of the Trustees' charter in 1752, when only £1,149 sterling issued as sola bills in Georgia had not been returned to England for payment. This sum was paid into the hands of Samuel Lloyd for payment of the bills, and advertisements were sent to South Carolina coffee houses and other places and inserted in colonial gazettes informing holders of the bills that they were to secure their payment from Samuel Lloyd before 31 December 1755.

The financial policy of the Trustees has to be considered in the light of their own difficulties. They were never rich enough to be extravagant. Money came in in small quantities and went out in large and increasing expenses.

3. There is a good article on "Financing the Colonizing of Georgia" by H.B. Fant in the Ga.H.Q., XX (March, 1936) pp. 1-29.
There was the cost of subsidizing the transportation and settlement of emigrants, of public works like the construction of a lighthouse on Tybee Island and, not least, of fortifying the frontier. By 1736, indeed, the Trustees were so short of cash they informed the Secretary of State that they were unable to spend any more on conveying emigrants to Georgia. Their need of money became more and more urgent and they were obliged to grasp at any possible source of income. In 1738, for example, on the decease of the Master of the Rolls, they entertained hopes that he had remembered Georgia in his will. Another instance occurred in the curious case of Henry Walker, a Staffordshire gentleman, who in Queen Anne's reign had undertaken collections for a charity to settle Palatine refugees in America. In February 1734 some of his contributors petitioned Parliament complaining that their subscriptions, amounting, it was said, to about £20,000, had not been put to the use intended and asking that an inquiry should be made and the money, if it could be found, put to some other good purpose. This seemed to present a golden opportunity to the Trustees, for what purpose could be better than the support of their project? Consequently, Georgia was mentioned in the petition and the Trustees awaited the outcome expectantly.

1. C.0.5/666, p.223, Martyn to Harrington, 19 May 1736.
It is a crude commentary on their penury, this anticipation of financial benefit from an inquiry into the activities of an aged, bedridden gentleman, his reason impaired by attacks of palsy. They were to be disappointed, however, for the sum remaining was found to total no more than £12 14s. 5½d.

Constant need of money made the Trustees dependent on Parliament, without whose support the colony could not have been maintained. Georgia was voted £10,000 in 1733, £26,000 in 1735, £10,000 in 1736, £20,000 in 1737, £8,000 in 1738, £20,000 in 1739, and varying annual sums so on until the end of the charter period, by which time a total of £136,000 had been granted. In the same period less than £16,000 was collected by the Trustees from other sources. Such Governmental benevolence towards a colony had no precedent in British imperial history. One of the fundamental tenets of imperial thinking at this period was that, except perhaps for naval and military protection, each colony should maintain itself. But Georgia was regarded as a special case by virtue of its immaturity and situation as a barrier province. Nevertheless, the Trustees were obliged to petition the House of Commons.

nearly every year for their grant, and this tiresome process tended to demoralize them, especially as opposition increased and criticism became more pungent. The necessity of living from one Parliamentary grant to the next had a staccato effect on the policy of the Trustees, for a fluctuating annual income meant that no long-term decisions could be made with assurance.

The disadvantage of this yearly recourse to Parliament gave rise to a movement among the Trustees to get their financial requirements in the general estimate laid before Parliament by the Crown. In April and June 1737 they begged Walpole for an annual sum of £7,000 supplied by way of estimate, as was done for the other colonies. They said it was impossible for them to petition Parliament every year and reminded him of their constant expenditure on civil government, maintaining new arrivals, keeping Indian friendship and improving cultivation. Oglethorpe, who had temporarily returned to England, presented the letter himself to the minister, who received it amiably and, a week later, promised that Georgia should receive £7,000 a year in the estimate. After thinking it over for another week, however, Walpole began to harbour doubts and asked Oglethorpe the reason for the application. Oglethorpe's argument that it was essential to have a fixed revenue apparently satisfied the minister, for by September he was assuring Oglethorpe of £8,000 a year.

for Georgia by way of the estimate. Unfortunately, the wind did not blow favourably for long, and by the following February Walpole had changed his mind and withdrew the promise. And so, in 1738, after Walpole had led them round in a circle, the Trustees had to repeat the hazardous procedure of petitioning the Commons for financial assistance. They continued to ask for their grant to be included in the estimate, but without success, and were obliged to petition Parliament annually until the expiration of their charter rule. Much of the instability in early Georgia's administration can be attributed to the fact that voluntary subscriptions were never sufficient to meet the needs of the Trustees, who from the very beginning had to rely on uncertain and variable grants from a frequently critical Parliament.

Nevertheless, by 1737, the Trustees could look with some sense of achievement, if not with their former unbounded enthusiasm, on the settlement they had established across the Atlantic. Five towns and several villages had been erected. Savannah consisted of about 140 houses and was increasing. Augusta, 125 miles upstream from Savannah, was prospering on the Indian trade; Frederica, on St. Simons Island, and Darien, on the Altamaha River, had just been founded; Ebenezer was

being built by the Salzburgers, and forts had been erected to protect the southern frontier. Several ships had been loaded in Georgia during 1736 and there were prospects of a flourishing commerce. Peaceful relations had been established with most of the neighbouring Indians and trade with them was expanding. South Carolina was benefiting from its improved security, and land on its southern border which had previously lain waste and desolate was now cultivated and the price of it multiplied fourfold. If the initial achievements were not as great as had been hoped (they would, indeed, have been remarkable if they had) they were certainly not to be despised, and now that the foundations had been laid might not the future hold some promise? Unfortunately, the Georgians were not allowed to devote themselves wholeheartedly to the improvement of their little settlements. The Spaniards in Florida were turning their eyes towards the newcomers on their northern border, and what they saw they did not like.

Disagreement over the boundaries of Florida and Georgia was one of the causes of the Anglo-Spanish war which opened in 1739. Throughout the preceding three years there was controversy over this subject between the two nations, each adapting former treaties and accounts of discovery to suit their respective cases. It would be wrong, however, to imply that this question was a prime reason for Britain and Spain going to war in 1739. It was a subsidiary issue in the general pattern of international relations at that time and never figured large in the argument between the Courts of Madrid and St. James. Much more important was Spanish vexation at the British privilege of supplying slaves to the Spanish colonies, the asiento de negros exacted at the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Another grievance was the South Sea Company's practice of fraudulently overloading the one ship it was permitted to send every year to trade at Cartagena and Vera Cruz. Spain complained also of English contraband in the West Indies, of illegal logwood-cutting on the Honduras coast, and of the claim to collect salt in the Tortugas. For her part, Britain resented the measures taken by Spanish guarda-costas to prevent smuggling, particularly their harsh exercise of the right of search. As stories of losses and atrocities at sea multiplied, the advocates of war found a sympathetic audience.
Walpole, however, favoured a settlement of differences by negotiation, and so the years before 1739 were full of claims and refutations, notes and memorials between ambassadors and ministers. Although the Governments were concerned with the boundary of Georgia less than with the other causes of dispute, it did have a part in the discussion and influence the policy of each side. It was, furthermore, obviously a matter of vital significance to the Trustees and the pioneers in the little colony. The dispute has been described in detail by J. T. Lanning in a somewhat confusing and repetitive book, based on Spanish as well as English sources. The purpose of this present chapter is to elucidate, by a chronological survey, the basic principles upon which the diplomatic controversy was conducted and its main features in so far as they concerned the Government of the United Kingdom.

Spain rested her case on prior discovery and settlement. In 1512 a royal patent had been granted Juan Ponce de Leon to discover and occupy the coasts of the Florida region, mentioned in the patent as "the Islands of Beniny", where, according to Indian legend, was to be found a rejuvenating spring of running water. Exploration was to be made within three years and, if successful, the discoverer was to be appointed life governor of the newly-found territory with the title of adelantado. The

1. J. T. Lanning, The Diplomatic History of Georgia. A study of the epoch of Jenkins Ear (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1936)
following year he explored both the east and west shores, landed near the mouth of the River St. John, and commemorated with the name of Florida the woodland beauty of the countryside and its discovery during the Season of Flowers, but he established no settlement there.\(^1\) Spanish Jesuits and Franciscans began missionary activity in the Georgia country a century and a half before the arrival of the English, and their influence extended up the coastline as far as Santa Elena (Port Royal, S.C.).\(^2\) But Spain valued the South Atlantic littoral principally for its strategic importance and never seriously intended to make it commercially productive. Florida protrudes southwards from the continent, dividing the Gulf of Mexico from the Atlantic Ocean; the lower part of the coastline is close to the Antilles, and the eastern shore runs nearly parallel to the Bahama Channel which was the natural route to Spanish ports in the Caribbean. Consequently, if a rival Power controlled Florida the sea lanes along which the Spaniards sent home their treasure ships would be unsafe. As a protective step an outpost was established at St. Augustine in 1565, and this, together with the military and naval forces stationed at


Havana, should have ensured Spanish command of the vital Bahama Channel.

There is not much evidence to support the English contention that John Cabot was the first European to sail along the coast of the Florida peninsula when he made a voyage in 1497 from Cape Breton to the latitude of Cuba. The solid foundation for this contention was a passage from the sixth chapter of the third decade of Peter Martyr's *De Orbe Novo Decades*, but there is reason to doubt whether Cabot did, in fact, travel further south than Cape Hatteras in latitude 36 degrees. Of much greater weight than this hypothesis was the actual settlement of Carolina by the English and the extensive contacts of their traders with the Indians. Whereas England had colonies agriculturally productive and trafficking with the Indians, Spain had little to show in comparison except a garrison ensconced behind the walls of St. Augustine. Nevertheless,


"Thus seeing such heapes of yce before him, hee was enforced to turne his sailes and follow the West, so coasting still by the shore, that he was thereby brought so farre into the South, by reason of the land bending so much Southwards, that it was there almost equall in latitude with the sea Fretum Herculeum, having the Northpole elevate in maner in the same degree. He sailed likewise in this tract so farre towards the West, that hee had the island of Cuba on his left hand, in maner in the same degree of longitude."
each side wanted control of the country south of the River Savannah, the English mainly for commercial, the Spaniards mainly for strategic reasons, and it was inevitable that clashes should occur. As early as 1726 merchants petitioned Parliament against the severity of Spanish guarda-costas and their failure to discriminate between smugglers and legal traders in the West Indies.¹ Negotiations brought about the Treaty of Seville in November 1729 which promised restoration of Anglo-Spanish trade to the position of 1725, full restitution for seizures, and the detailing of other matters to the adjudication of commissaries at Madrid.² In April 1730 John Goddard, Benjamin Keene and Arthur Stert were appointed as the British commissaries, and although their chief task was to settle particulars of the South Sea Company's claims they were also instructed to maintain Britain's rights on the South Carolina border.³ No satisfactory solution of the territorial question came from these discussions, and within a few years Spain's ambassador in London was complaining of incursions into Guale, the region which the English had unlawfully appropriated under the title of Georgia.

¹ J. T. Lanning, Diplomatic History of Georgia, p.131.
³ Add. MSS. 33006, ff.298-303, H.M. instructions to Keene, Stert and Goddard, 19 August 1730. J. T. Lanning, Diplomatic History of Georgia, p.132.
By 1736, indeed, Oglethorpe's movements had aroused profound suspicion among his Spanish neighbours, and the Duke of Newcastle despatched his own representative, Charles Dempsey, to investigate the situation on the spot. The Governor of St. Augustine, Don Francisco del Moral Sanchez, received Dempsey civilly but expressed concern over the settlement of Englishmen on Spanish territory and complained that three hundred of them accompanied by some Indians, had moved into the province of the Uchees with the intention of building a fort there. In April Oglethorpe wrote personally to Sanchez proclaiming his desire for peace and informing him that he had issued orders for Spanish subjects not to be molested and had posted a boat and guards to prevent anyone crossing the river without permission. At the same time he wrote to Dempsey in a similar conciliatory tone, telling him it was better for Britain that Spain and not another Power should possess Florida:

The Spanish and the English interests are naturally the same. We furnish them with provisions, they us with silver. They have more lands in America than they can use, the King of Great Britain also has more lands than sufficient, therefore he is not desirous of increasing by injustice his dominions, but of cultivating and peopling with regular towns and establishing good laws in those which he already possesses.


2. Egmont Diary, II, p.282. The Uchees were a small band of Indians inhabiting the country on both sides of the River Savannah above and below Augusta and as far down as the River Ogeechee.

3. C.O.5/654, fo. 45, Oglethorpe to Governor of Augustine, 10 April 1736.
He had no knowledge of any of his men settling among the Uchees, but in any case, he wrote, that country belonged to Britain.\(^1\)

Having thus struck a propitiatory note in America, Oglethorpe then wrote home to the Secretary of State emphasizing the importance of retaining Georgia, a valuable province in his view, "the land capable of the richest production, the sea full of good ports near which all the large homeward bound ships from the Spanish America must pass." With the continued assistance of Parliament and the support of neighbouring Indians he would, he said, more than be able to hold his own against an enemy attack and even perhaps to conquer Florida, Cuba and Mexico.\(^2\)

Oglethorpe's desire for peace was obviously not deep. He seems, indeed, to have regarded the colony of Florida with much the same mixture of hatred, distrust and self-confidence as Hannibal had regarded the republic of Rome, and there was some justification for Spanish mistrust of his motives. The British Government, too, had its doubts about him, and in July instructed him to act cautiously and give no cause for any complaint from the Spaniards.\(^3\)

These orders arrived too late, however. Clashes had already occurred in Georgia, and in September 1736 Spain's ambassador in London, Don Tomas Geraldino, presented the

1. C.O.5/654, ff. 50-1, Oglethorpe to Dempsey, 10 April 1736.
2. Ibid., ff. 60-1, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, 17 April 1736.
3. Ibid., fo. 64, Newcastle to Oglethorpe, 2 July 1736. Egmont Diary, II, p.289.
Duke of Newcastle with a memorial against English activities. It consisted of five postulates. First, that in the previous March some Indians in alliance with the English had attacked a Spanish fort near St. Augustine and decapitated one of its garrison. Second, that settlers from Georgia had constructed and garrisoned a fort at the mouth of the River St. Simon, twenty-five leagues north of St. Augustine and inside the boundaries of Florida. Third, that proof of Spain's title to the land on which the fort was built lay in the fact that a previous English outpost there had been demolished at Spain's request in 1724. Fourth, that a fort was being erected among the Uchees and the Indians incited to war against the Spaniards. And lastly, that all Georgia and part of South Carolina was Spanish property by virtue of article 7 of a treaty of 1670 and article 8 of the Treaty of Utrecht.  

The Trustees discussed the memorial with the Board of Trade and an answer to it was prepared. This asserted that the alleged attack in the previous March had been made not by Indians in alliance with the English but by neighbouring tribes.

1. S.P. 100/58 (State Papers, Public Record Office), Geraldino to Newcastle, 21 September/2 October 1736. Col. Rec. Ga., I, p. 260. Egmont Diary, II, pp. 300-1. Article 7 of the 1670 treaty provided for the recognition of the status quo of the dominions of both England and Spain, as determined by possession at that time.

in revenge for "a most unheard of and outrageous injury acted by some Spaniards or Spanish Indians, who had killed some Indian women and children and two men, and, after most wickedly abusing another Indian woman, had burnt her alive." Geraldino, declared the Trustees, was misinformed about the rebuilding of a fort formerly demolished: "For that the said fort, having been left by the Independent Company without the consent or knowledge of His Majesty, was ordered to be rebuilt by an instruction from His Majesty to the late Governor Johnson."

All forts were being built within British territory and at the desire of the Indians, and were required for the peace and defence of the country; no directions had ever been given for establishing settlements or fortresses beyond the charter limits of Georgia, and if the Uchees lived within the same then they were British, and not Spanish subjects. Finally, reports of colonists from Georgia inciting Indians to attack the Spaniards were almost certainly unfounded; the Trustees "have always had it at heart in the making of their several settlements to avoid all occasions of contest with the neighbouring nations in alliance with the Crown of Great Britain, and do not believe that any of their people can have acted so contrary to the design and intention of the Trustees." The apprehensions of the Governor of St. Augustine were more probably caused by the activities of certain traders from Charleston who had gone up among the Indians without the knowledge, and contrary to the orders, of the Trustees, and for whose conduct they who sent them
were alone answerable. 1 Newcastle communicated this answer to the Spanish ambassador in November, 2 but by then the issue had been complicated by recent events in America.

The British Government had commissioned Charles Dempsey to go to St. Augustine and arrange an agreement between Oglethorpe and the Governor of Florida on the boundary dispute. Oglethorpe insisted that the frontier lay along the River St. John, and tried to convince the Government in London of this by sending home a map showing a southern mouth of the Altamaha debouching near the River St. Mary. 3 As a counterblast the Governor of Havana, Guemes y Horcasitas, sent to Frederica a diplomat and engineer named Antonia de Arredondo with a demand for the English to withdraw beyond Fort Royal. War seemed likely, but frequent talks eventually brought agreement, and on 11 October 1736 Oglethorpe made a treaty with Governor Sanchez. Each was to restrain his Indian allies and leave the fixing of boundaries to the home Governments; Oglethorpe promised to evacuate in the meanwhile Fort St. George, which blocked the entrance to the River St. John, provided no

2. S.P.100/58, Newcastle to Geraldino, 25 November 1736.  
Spaniards moved in and the British title to it remained. This put the dispute on a different footing, for it not only placed the onus of defining the frontier entirely on the shoulders of the ministers and diplomats in Europe but also helped to stiffen the attitude of each side. Oglethorpe thought he had struck a good bargain for England in making the treaty. Spain thought so too, and the unfortunate Sanchez, who had consented to it, was recalled and prosecuted, while Dempsey's brother, who was an officer in the Spanish service, was cashiered on account of his brother's part in concluding the treaty.

From this time forward Georgia began to assume more prominence in the wrangling that was going on with Britain. Responsibility for all British interests in Spain rested on Benjamin Keene, a man of considerable parts and agreeable temper, who combined the posts of English ambassador and South Sea Company agent, a double role which caused some anomalies in

J. Harris, Navigantium atque Itinerantium Bibliotheca, or a complete collection of voyages and travels (2v., London, 1744-8) II, pp.331-2.

in that he had often to present grievances against Spain on behalf of the Company before being ordered to do so by the Government.\(^1\) Throughout the negotiations from 1736 to 1739, which revolved mainly around commercial questions and depredations, Keene was watchful for signs of a Spanish attempt on the English colonies in America, and tried to keep himself so informed as to be able to anticipate any orders for an attack on Georgia.\(^2\) He had some wily individuals to deal with in Madrid. In the spring of 1737 he broached the subject of Oglethorpe’s treaty before the two principal Spanish ministers, Torrenueva and La Quadra. The latter, whom Keene found "a little pettish upon this subject", said he had not examined it but had heard it was prejudicial to Spain’s interests, and inferred that the King, Philip V, disapproved of it. He tried to pass off the colony of Georgia as merely "a private grant to some particulars to form a sort of company of adventurers, and consequently not a thing that could immediately interest the two Courts." This attitude drew a sharp statement to the contrary from Keene, who declared "that it was a public and national concern, encouraged and protected by the whole legislature." Torrenueva took a similar line to Quadra and,


"in a blundering way", denied all knowledge of the treaty. ¹

The Spanish ministers thought they were in a good position. Oglethorpe's activities were causing the British Government some anxiety, and the Spaniards believed the Walpole Ministry disliked the Georgia colony and would disavow it were it not that the support of the Trustees was needed in Parliament for other matters. If the garrison at St. Augustine was strengthened, Geraldino reported, it might be possible to cause a breach between the Trustees and the Government which would lead to the abandonment of Georgia. ² There may have been some justification for this belief, but it failed to take into account the increasing resentment in England against everything Spanish, and the presence in the Ministry of a group, including the Duke of Newcastle, which, while desiring peace, was not afraid of risking war. On receiving intelligence from Lieutenant-Governor Broughton of South Carolina concerning Spanish designs against Georgia, Newcastle instructed Keene to discover if such an attack was being contemplated. He was to make strong representations to Quadra that Oglethorpe's agreement with Sanchez had removed all grievances, and that if Spain began hostilities in those parts then Britain would not

1. Add. MSS. 32794, ff. 337-40, Keene to Newcastle, 22 April 1737.

fail to defend her subjects there. Six weeks later Newcastle reaffirmed the Government's determination; Keene was to ensure that any intended attack on Georgia was cancelled forthwith, and, in talking with the Spanish minister, was "not only (to) use the strongest expostulations upon this subject, but make him see the ill consequences that must certainly follow the making any such attempt." Furthermore:

although that country is by His Majesty's grant become the property of some of the King's subjects, it is nevertheless under His Majesty's sovereignty and protection; and you will give them to understand that His Majesty will always consider it in that light.  

The Ministry had now discarded its former complaisance and, under Newcastle's guidance, was adopting a more resolute policy. Spain cannot have been unaware of the change, and her apprehension was increased by the appointment in June of Oglethorpe as commander-in-chief in Georgia and South Carolina. An assurance that he would be under the King's commission and not, as previously, under the Trustees, did not placate the Court of Madrid. The inevitable memorial from the Spanish ambassador was duly presented at the end of July. He protested that the settlement of Georgia was continuing apace in spite of the fact that all territory as far north as latitude 30 degrees 50 (which included Georgia) was part of Florida. He asserted

2. S.P. 94/129, Newcastle to Keene, 5 May 1737. Add. MSS. 32795, ff. 22-4.
that Britain had been encroaching on Spain's dominions ever since the 1688 Revolution, and demanded the cessation of colonizing in Georgia and the demolition of new forts there. The King of Spain, he said, was resolved to re-annex all that had once belonged to him, and unless the English removed themselves peacefully Spanish troops would eject them by force. Finally, he required the cancellation of Oglethorpe's new appointment and threatened war if troops were sent to America and placed under his command.¹

If this was meant to intimidate it did not succeed. A correspondent in the Daily Post regarded the demand for Oglethorpe's dismissal as proof of Spain's dread of his abilities, and decried Spanish hopes of "a James the First upon the throne of Great Britain or a Gondomar now at our Court." Whatever right to Georgia the Spaniards may have had by virtue of an article in the treaty of 1670, he maintained, they had forfeited by their spoliation of English shipping and infringement of every other article in the treaty. "A very merry way of proceeding indeed¹ to claim the benefit of one single article of a treaty, and with the utmost insolence and barbarity to break all the rest. This is Spanish logic with a witness." But whatever the attitude of Spain, it may be assumed that "our ministers will as soon consent to part with their eyes as to

part with Georgia." The hostility of Geraldino's second memorial, indeed, brought about an effect contrary to that intended; instead of cowing Britain it made her more concerned for Georgia. Everybody resented it and only Walpole was afraid to make it a casus belli. He felt that the nation was in no position to wage a successful war, and in a heated argument with Oglethorpe suggested the general should accept command of a regiment in England instead of in America. Oglethorpe lost his temper at this, "and asked him what man he took him to be, and whether he thought he had no conscience, to be the instrument of carrying over 3,000 souls to Georgia and then abandoning them to be destroyed by the Spaniards for the consideration of a regiment." If the intention was to surrender Georgia, he said, then it ought to be admitted at once so that the inhabitants could be given time to withdraw safely. All the Trustees, commented Lord Egmont, "think it a melancholy thing to find the low credit the nation is in with foreign princes on account of our facility in bearing insults, which proceeds from Sir Robert Walpole's natural timidity, and his apprehension of not sitting so firmly in the seat of Chief Minister in case of a war, which he colours with the inability the nation is in to enter into one." Walpole's attitude, however, was not shared by the rest of the Government, and when the memorial was considered in August by the King in Council

1. The Daily Post, no. 5600 (23 August 1737).
there was frank indignation at it, especially by Sir Joseph Jekyll and Lords Wilmington and Islay. Its first reading was followed by a long pause until the Duke of Argyll declared: "The memorial should be answered, but not in the usual way - the reply should be a fleet of line-of-battle ships upon the coast of Spain." This remark broke the silence of the King, who cried out: "Well done, Your Grace - your advice is agreeable to mine." Georgia, it was decided, must be protected, and a battalion of troops was transferred from Gibraltar to America and ships sent to guard against attack by sea.

Early in September Geraldino received his reply from the Duke of Newcastle. The Government, he was told, was surprised at the contents of the memorial, denied the accusation of trespassing in Florida, and repudiated the territorial allegations. Oglethorpe had given no occasion for complaint from the Spaniards and the King reserved the right to employ whomsoever he wished in his service. Britain had no desire to cause a dispute but was determined to defend her rights and protect her subjects in America, remaining none the less willing to refer the frontier question to adjudication by commissaries.

The Spanish ministers in Madrid were informed of the measures Britain had taken to defend her dominions, measures at which, they were told, they ought not to be surprised in view of the tone of their recent memorial.¹

At this the Spaniards became temporarily more cautious and conciliatory. Geraldino tried to palliate the truculence of his original assertions, though he retained hopes of Oglethorpe being prevented from returning to America,² while in Madrid prevailed a desire for settlement of differences by negotiation.³ But news of the departure for America of Oglethorpe and his regiment stirred up Spanish apprehension again. Geraldino tried to obtain definite assurances from both Walpole and Newcastle but neither of them would oblige, denying him any satisfactory answer by each referring him to the other.⁴ In fact, the Government's policy was now being more and more decided for it by the political situation in the country and by events generally. The guarda-costas had of late been as ruthless and efficient as ever and stories about depredations

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1. S.P. 94/129, Newcastle to Keene, 12 September 1737. Add. MSS. 32795, ff. 305-7. Add. MSS. 32796, fo. 11, Keene to Newcastle, 14 October 1737.
3. S.P. 94/128, Keene to Newcastle, 14 October 1737. Add. MSS. 32796, fo. 12; fo. 26, Keene to Newcastle, 21 October 1737.
were growing daily. The Parliamentary Opposition seized on popular indignation at the treatment of British shipping and used it as a stick to beat an Administration that was visibly weakening. Walpole's pacifism was isolating him from both Parliament and the people, and it was Newcastle who reflected public opinion. The West Indies merchants complained to the King about Spanish depredations, and in November Newcastle sent Quadra a long memorandum on the outrages. At the same time Keene was instructed to demand restitution on the basis of existing Anglo-Spanish treaties, and also to point out that the recent answer to Geraldino's memorial contained demonstrative proof of Britain's title to Georgia and that any talk by Spain of settling the issue by negotiation was meaningless, "since the stating the fact is sufficient to show His Majesty's right to that colony." 

This was palpably untrue, of course, and merely stating the fact was no argument whatever. Indeed, all the evidence, theoretical and historical, supported Spain's title to the Georgia country, and although there are some subtle and painstaking memorials preserved in the Public Record Office which, relying chiefly on the evidence of charter grants, attempt to build up a British case, no convincing answer was ever made to the Spanish argument. England's difficulty is

2. Add. MSS. 32786, ff. 119-20, Newcastle to Keene, 4 November 1737.
best illustrated by consideration of Spain's case as put forward by Antonio de Arredondo, a Spanish officer and engineer from the garrison at St. Augustine, who had made numerous journeys along the South Atlantic coastline and into the interior. In presenting his proof of Spain's title to Georgia, Arredondo combined unrivalled personal knowledge of the whole borderland country with information gleaned from the archives of St. Augustine and from Andrés de Barcia's *Ensayo Chronologico para la Historia General de la Florida* (Madrid, 1723).

Arredondo claimed that Spain was entitled to the coastline as far north as Port Royal in latitude 32 degrees 30'. The treaty of 1670 had stipulated that England should retain such lands as she then actually possessed, the southernmost limit of which at that time was Charleston. All territory to the south was understood to belong to Spain, and therefore England's settlements there were a violation of her treaty obligations.

He pointed out the inconsistency of the Duke of Newcastle's allegation that, on the one hand, neither the treaty of 1670 nor that of 1713 had defined the limits of Carolina, and, on the other hand, that the limits of Georgia and South Carolina

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1. An English translation of this work was published by the University of Florida Press in 1951. The edition was limited to 999 copies.

2. Arredondo's *Historical Proof of Spain's Title to Georgia*, ed. H. E. Bolton (Berkeley, Cal., 1925) p.113.
had been publicly recognized and always agreed to.

Therefore it is easy to see that the Court of London, being obfuscated and not knowing how to combine at once a negative and an affirmative into one proposition, asserts in its own favour the very thing it denies, and inadvertently denies, on the other hand, the very thing it admits, without seeing that its self-contradiction convicts it of its own lack of logic. 1

Arredondo's arguments were irrefutable and as long as the controversy remained on theoretical grounds Britain had no case. But in international affairs de facto is always more important than de jure. Britain had one argument which far outweighed the historical and ethical evidence Spain could muster - she was in actual possession of the debated land. She held all the territory north of the Altamaha and threatened the Florida settlements. Spain could do little about it except fight, and that would be jeopardizing her possession even of Florida for the sake of a possible, and certainly only temporary, conquest of the English southern colonies. Neither Government really wanted war yet neither could afford to relinquish its claims. Thus, for another year and a half the diplomatic prevarication went on to the accompaniment of illegal trading in the Indies, severe and increasing depredations, bickering over the right to cut logwood in Campeachy Bay and, of course, rivalry on the frontier of Georgia.

1. Ibid., pp. 213-4.
By the beginning of 1738 the idea of the boundary issue being settled by commissaries appointed for that purpose by the two Courts was acceptable to each side. An obstacle, however, lay in the Spanish demand that the forts recently built by Oglethorpe in Georgia should be evacuated and demolished before the proposed commission opened. Keene, on behalf of the British Government, objected to this condition and asked the reason for it, telling Torrenueva that so far from it being a preliminary it was the most Spain could expect after the conclusion of the commission if she had proved her allegations incontestably. Quadra, too, insisted on the forts being evacuated prior to the opening of any conferences, and said Oglethorpe's recent activities could be construed only as a contravention of treaty stipulations. Keene replied that if Britain chose to erect forts on her own territory that was her business and not Spain's, and the assertion that they constituted new encroachments was one that could not be proved until there was "a candid and impartial examination of facts by commissaries named on both sides." At the same time Geraldino in London reiterated that Spain would agree to such a conference provided it lasted no longer than six months, that neither side occupied the disputed territory during that time and,

particularly, that the forts erected by Oglethorpe were demolished beforehand.

A few months earlier the British Government might conceivably have compromised on this matter. When the Spanish ambassador presented his conditions in March 1738 any conciliatory gesture was impossible. On the 17th of that month Parliament had met in an angry mood, and Captain Jenkins recited his wrongs and displayed his notorious ear at the bar of the Commons. Pulteney and Pitt voiced the indignation of the House, watched from the gallery by a sympathetic Prince of Wales. Incensed at Spanish depredations and the patrolling of the seas by guarda-costas, Parliament was not disposed to yield to Spain on any point, not excluding that of the colonial frontier. Walpole remained anxious for peace at almost any price, but Newcastle, more susceptible to popular clamour, realized the Government could not surrender Georgia. A resolution was passed by the Commons that measures should be taken to enforce the right of British ships to sail in all the seas around America, and at the end of March the English naval commander in the Mediterranean, Captain Clinton, was ordered to station his squadron at Minorca.

And so, when Newcastle answered the Spanish note in April he had no alternative to affirming his original standpoint. England had no objection to the suggested time limit of six months but would not comply with a prerequisite to evacuate territories and demolish forts. She would consent to refer the boundary question to commissaries only so long as everything in the disputed area remained on its present footing. This show of determination had some effect, for at the end of May the Spanish ambassador, while still declaring that the forts ought to be destroyed, laid more stress on his sovereign's desire for an amicable settlement and willingness for England to send two delegates to Madrid to discuss Georgia's boundary with two appointed by himself. The British Government responded to Spain's overtures and made arrangements accordingly; but it was also resolved to negotiate from strength, and in June a reinforcement was sent under Admiral Haddock to cruise in the Mediterranean, while Keene was directed to warn British merchants in Spain to withdraw their property from the country at once.


3. S.P.94/132, Newcastle to Keene, 1 June 1738. Add.MSS.32798, fo.119; fo.151, Keene to British consuls, 28 June 1738. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, p.49.
Meantime in London the Council met to consider Geraldino's recent statement and decided that preparations for the Madrid conference should go ahead immediately. Geraldino was then informed, first by Walpole and then by Newcastle, that the King would nominate his commissaries without delay. In acquiescing in these arrangements Spain mitigated her original terms as gracefully as possible. She accepted the principle laid down by Newcastle the previous April, namely, that circumstances in the debatable lands should remain in their existing state and neither side increase its fortifications or occupy new positions there.

Prospects now seemed good for a peaceful solution. Although the public was suspicious of this sudden friendliness between the Courts, the British Government undoubtedly hoped the way was open for a permanent settlement of all differences and perhaps even for an Anglo-Spanish alliance. When, in August, Keene was advised to familiarize himself with the points at issue in preparation for the proposed commission, he was also told:


It is the King's view and desire to live upon a foot of the utmost friendship with Their Catholic Majesties; and therefore His Majesty wishes to remove all future causes of complaint or dispute. Such an alliance would not only be for the mutual advantage of both Kingdoms but might also greatly tend to the security of the balance of power in Europe. 1

The advice to acquaint himself thoroughly with the matters likely to be raised was indeed urgent, for Keene confessed he had only a hazy notion of what the dispute in Florida was about and begged for clear instructions. He and Abraham Castres, the other British delegate, wrote to Newcastle that the two chief questions to be resolved by the negotiations would be the limits of Georgia and freedom of navigation in America, but that on the former they had nothing to offer, "having had little or no information hitherto of the real state of our dispute with this Court upon this important subject." 2 The need for precise knowledge on this matter was demonstrated by the objection of the Spanish Court raised in October against the first draft of a convention. Exception was taken to an expression in the second article, to wit: "Les frontières de la Caroline meridionale, dans laquelle on entend être comprise la colonie de la Georgie." Spain held, with some justice, that her ambassador in London

1. Chatham Papers, XCII, Newcastle to Keene, 21 Aug. 1738.
had been outwitted, for this parenthesis incorporating Georgia in
South Carolina would support the British title to all that
region, and although Spain might have no claim to South
Carolina she had a good one to all, or at least the greater
1
part, of Georgia.

Such equivocation was typical of the proceedings which
delayed the signing of a convention until the beginning of
1739. Discussions continued throughout the autumn of 1738 and
obstacles were gradually overcome or removed. The principal
impediment was haggling over the discharge of debts between
the two nations. Britain owed Spain £180,000 but claimed
that Spain owed her £343,277 for damages to her shipping.
A bargain was eventually struck whereby Spain was to pay
£95,000, representing the balance of her depredations over
those committed by England. All outstanding obstructions
were seemingly overcome by Christmas, and in January 1739 the
convention was signed at the palace of El Pardo.

Article 1 of the Convention of Pardo stipulated that
each country should send plenipotentiaries to Madrid to
arrange a settlement of commercial differences and of the
Florida and Carolina boundaries.

   Add.MSS.32799, ff.144-8.
2. The text of the Convention of Pardo, 14 Jan. 1739 (N.S.)
   is in S.P.94/132; Add.MSS.35406, ff.80-103; and
Article 2 stated:

The regulation of the limits of Florida and Carolina, which according to what has been lately agreed was to be decided by commissaries on each side, shall likewise be committed to the said plenipotentiaries to procure a more solid and effectual agreement; and during the time that the discussion of that affair shall last, things shall remain in the aforesaid territories of Florida and Carolina in the situation they are in at present, without increasing the fortifications there or taking any new posts; and for this purpose His Britannic Majesty and His Catholic Majesty shall cause the necessary orders to be despatched immediately after the signing of this convention.

By a separate article Benjamin Keene and Abraham Castres were named as the British plenipotentiaries, and Don Joseph de la Quintana and Don Stephen Joseph de Abardia as the Spanish.

That this represented a genuine desire of both Governments to eliminate differences is attested by Spain beginning to disarm her fleet and by Newcastle's hankering after an alliance. But there were some serious weaknesses in the convention. In the first place, the right of search was not abandoned. Secondly, the claims of the South Sea Company had been left for separate arrangement, and the Company's determination to drive a hard bargain angered the Spaniards and marred the negotiations. And thirdly, the question of colonial boundaries was not settled but only referred to the further consideration of the commissaries,

and the history of the previous three years indicated that agreement on this head would not be easy. Spain wanted the frontier problem to be decided first whereas Britain was more interested in depredations.

Whatever hopes of peace the Government may have harboured were rudely shaken by the reception of the convention in England. The Georgia Trustees were very suspicious of Walpole's intentions, fearing he was not averse to relinquishing the colony in order to pacify Spain. There were even some among the Trustees themselves, notably George Heathcote, John White, Robert Moore and Robert Hucks, who believed the abandonment of Georgia would be a small price to pay for peace. The majority, however, wished to keep Georgia at all costs and thought the convention made its retention problematical. There was rumour of a secret article instructing the British commissaries to surrender the colony, and the Trustees so distrusted Walpole they were half inclined to believe it. When he asked them to make out Britain's title to Georgia they would go no further than to declare that they had never doubted its validity because it had been granted by the King and confirmed by Parliament. They considered such a task belonged more properly to the Board of Trade, Attorney-General or even the Privy Council, and

1. Emont Diary, III, p.36.
were afraid that if they attempted it and the province was then given up in the negotiations the Ministry would be able to lay the blame on the Trustees for having undertaken to defend Britain's title and failed to present a sufficiently convincing case. Walpole himself tried to allay the Trustees' uneasiness, saying there had never been any idea of abandoning Georgia, though he admitted he saw no reason why a small part could not be handed over.

It was natural for the Trustees to distrust the minister, for his peaceableness was well known, but there is nothing to indicate the surrender of Georgia was ever seriously considered by the Government. Walpole's desire to pacify Spain was a reasoned outcome of his recognition of the value of maintaining the lucrative West Indies trade, which was bound to be precarious without Spanish goodwill. He recognized the fact that the Spaniards were justified in searching ships and attempting to prevent illicit traffic, and wanted little beyond an arrangement checking excesses in the exercise of this right. He undoubtedly desired peace and might privately have contemplated using Georgia as a bargaining counter in the negotiations, but he must have realized the strength of public feeling rendered such a manoeuvre impracticable if his

1. Ibid., pp. 6-22, passim.
waning authority was not to disappear altogether. It was popular clamour which provoked him to announce emphatically at the beginning of February 1739 that English ships ought not to be searched at sea by Spaniards, and that the colony of Georgia would not be relinquished. When, on 16 February, Henry Archer, who was sitting by him in the House of Commons, warned him that unless the Trustees were convinced Georgia was to be retained they would vote against the convention, Walpole immediately asked Colonel Bladen if he would undertake to demonstrate Britain's title to the province. Bladen said he would. "Then by G-," said Walpole, "the Spaniards shall not have it." Criticized by the Opposition, reproached by the public and caricatured in the press, the minister was compelled to hearken to the national demand for Britain to stand firm by her alleged rights and not yield in any way.

Nevertheless, Walpole's declaration did not satisfy the Trustees. They had never trusted him over Georgia and they could not trust him now. As the time approached for the convention to be debated in Parliament so they became more nervous. At a meeting on 21 February Lord Egmont warned his colleagues of the need to substantiate their case before the debate opened, for the Ministry was withholding several essential points relating to the British title to the colony. People were wondering if anything was being done in the matter:

"What are the Trustees doing?" they asked. "Are you careless what becomes of the province? Are you asleep? The City, the merchants, the trading towns are petitioning against this convention, and will you do nothing? Can you expect anyone will support you if you will not support yourselves?" After some discussion the Trustees decided to present a petition to Parliament asking that the definition of the Georgia frontiers should not be referred to the judgment of a commission as laid down in the second article of the convention.

The Ministry was to receive some rough treatment in Parliament and must have known it. Public feeling had been inflamed by a factious Opposition whose aim seems to have been to make a settlement impossible and a war inevitable, and by this means to procure Walpole's eviction from power. However desirous he may have been to let sleeping dogs lie the Opposition was determined they should have no rest, although in questioning the motives of the Government it was barking up the wrong tree. On 26 February the Trustees' petition was presented and Alderman Perry enunciated its basic argument, namely, that the convention implied that Britain acknowledged the frontiers of Georgia to be disputable.

Sir William Wyndham, leader of the Opposition, denounced the convention as the most dishonourable treaty ever made by his country, contending that both Georgia and South Carolina were endangered by it and some, if not all, of the inhabitants faced with the prospect of losing their possessions: "for if we happen to be infected with the same complaisant humour when we conclude the definitive treaty, with which we seem to have been infected when we concluded the preliminary articles, I do not know but the whole, or a great part of South Carolina may be made a present for keeping the Spaniards in good humour. At least, some of the southern parts of Georgia must be given up; for it would have been ridiculous in us to refer the limits between the Spaniards and us in Florida to be settled by plenipotentiaries if at the same time we had been resolved not to part with an inch of what we then pretended to." This was the standpoint adopted by the Opposition throughout the debates in February and March. The convention, so the argument ran, was ignominious because it failed to prohibit the right of search and included an article casting doubt on Britain's right to Georgia.

Many celebrated figures joined in the attack on the Government - Carteret, Chesterfield, Argyll and Bathurst in the Lords; Wyndham, Lord Gage and the thirty-one years old William Pitt in the Commons. To Carteret national honour was involved in the preservation of Georgia, for the

1. Ibid., cols.1068-77.
title to it was manifest and it would be unjust to forsake those people who had emigrated thither trusting in the protection of the United Kingdom. "The nation", he said, "has been at immense charges in settling and supporting that colony; and should we now give it up, or even suffer our possession of it to be called in question, all Europe must look upon us either as the most unjust or most weak people under the sun". Although not definitely inferring that it was the Government's fixed intention to surrender the colony, he went on, "it is ignominious to this nation to suffer so much as her right of possession to be questioned. It is a prostitution of the public faith." The Earl of Chesterfield harped on the ingloriousness of the convention, while Bathurst likened it to a carte blanche offered to Quadra to write down whatever he pleased. The second article, said Bathurst, "was the same as if we had sat down to hazard, and had staked North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia against the insignificant Spanish fort called Fort Augustine; for that is the only fort or settlement the Spaniards have in Florida." All the critics dwelt on the clause suspending defensive precautions in the disputed area, arguing that it benefited the Spaniards more than the English and left Georgia defenceless against attack from Havana or St. Augustine.

1. Ibid., cols.1113-4.
2. Ibid., cols.1171-84, 1211-23.
3. Ibid., cols.1114, 1223, 1283, 1304.
The only reason Lord Gage could see for this clause was that the Government, finding Spain disliked Georgia and not daring to give it her by treaty, expected to be able to whisper to the Spanish ministers: "we are sorry we don't dare give it you up, but we will agree it shall be left defenceless and then you may easily take it and we not called to account for it." This, he said, was not at all improbable considering the industry with which the Government had sought to retain Spanish goodwill. Pitt described the convention as odious and fallacious: "nothing but a stipulation for national ignominy; an illusory expedient to baffle the resentment of the nation; a truce without a suspension of hostilities on the part of Spain; on the part of England a suspension as to Georgia of the first law of nature, self-preservation and self-defence." Much of the Opposition's argument was sophistic and not convincing, but the vehemence of its delivery and the clamour in the country helped to make it effective.

The Government took a more responsible view of the situation, seeing the disputes about Georgia and the right of search in their wider contexts. The Family Compact of 1733 meant that a war with Spain might entail war also with France, who then appeared to be the most formidable Power in

1. Ibid., col.1272.
2. Ibid., cols.1280-3.
Europe. Could Britain afford to risk such a contest when she could not depend on assistance from either Germany, Holland or Sweden? However unwarranted this fear may have been in the light of later events, it must be remembered that French military support of Spain seemed very possible to English statesmen in 1739, and that it was ultimately this alliance which humiliated Britain in 1782. In the Government's opinion the great virtue of the convention was that it held the door open for a peaceful settlement at a time when war might have brought disaster. This was the point made by Henry Peham in the February debate on the Trustees' petition, when he rejected the charge that Spain's title to Georgia had been admitted:

We have agreed to hear what they have to say for no other end but to convince them that there is not the least foundation for the claims they have lately set up; and this we have done out of charity to them, as well as out of regard to our own interest, in order to prevent an open rupture between two nations whose mutual interest is to live in mutual friendship.  

This point was amplified by Lord Hervey in the House of Lords at the beginning of March. He thought Britain had done well out of the convention. There was no question, he said, of discussing our right to Georgia; the dispute was only about its boundaries. The Spaniards, he admitted, "may perhaps

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pretend that we have extended our settlements in Georgia too much towards the southward, and, by that means, have encroached upon their territories in Florida; and if they should, our plenipotentiaries may refuse to treat with them upon such terms; for by this article they are laid under no obligation to do so." Taking the debates as a whole, there would appear to have been less passion and more reason in the Ministerial than in the Opposition's cause, and in favouring at least an attempt at settlement by negotiation on the basis of the convention the Government was undoubtedly right and the Opposition as certainly wrong.

The decisive debate took place in the Commons on Thursday, 8 March. The importance attached to the subject is shown by the unusually large attendance, 497 Members being present out of a total of 558. Horace Walpole commenced on behalf of the Government at 11.30 a.m. and spoke for two and a quarter hours, giving a full explanation of the convention. The debate ended half an hour after midnight with a Government majority of twenty-eight. The following day brought more inflammatory speeches from members of the Opposition, some of whom, led by Pulteney and Wyndham, seceded from the House to mark their disapproval of Ministerial policy. The division again gave the Ministry a majority,

1. Ibid., cols.1204-5.
2. Egmont Diary, III, pp.31-2.
244 votes being cast in favour of the convention and 214 against, including that of old William Sloper who, having fallen asleep, was counted with the minority.

A favourable Parliamentary vote, however, was not sufficient to allow the Ministry to follow its own line. The nation was exasperated with Spain, especially over the right of search. It was impossible for Walpole and Newcastle to disregard the unmistakeable feeling of the country. Ministers were caricatured, Parliament was inundated with petitions against the terms of the convention, and the Prince of Wales led the shouting in the streets for revenge. Pamphleteers fulminated against the Government's failure to challenge the right of search, to exact redress for the severance of Captain Jenkins' ear, or to obtain Spain's disavowal of her claim to Georgia. The agreement to refer these matters to plenipotentiaries was described as indefensible. Our title to Georgia, it was said, was based "in near an hundred years uninterrupted possession" and was better than any right founded on a thousand treaties. The stipulation for neither side to increase its fortifications was criticized on the score that it benefited the Spaniards who were planning to attack Georgia, whereas the English gained nothing because there was no intention of invading


Florida.

Although the Ministry had gradually to bow before this storm, it tried hard nevertheless to reach a settlement in the negotiations. Oglethorpe was instructed to observe the conditions laid down in the convention and not give Spain any reason for accusing Britain of bad faith. At the same time extensive research was begun in order to compile a substantial rebuttal of Spanish claims. The most thorough was that conducted by Harman Verelst, treasurer to the Trustees, who presented the result of his investigations to Newcastle in April. He argued that there were four ways by which a title to territory in America could be acquired. One was by first discovery; another was by the occupation of lands deserted by their original discoverers; a third way was by conquest; and, lastly, territory might be acquired by treaty. Verelst's thesis was that Britain was entitled to all the American continent from Newfoundland to the Cape of Florida by virtue of Cabot's voyage in 1496 which, by clever manipulation of historical evidence, he demonstrated to be the first to discover that part of the world. He proposed that the frontiers of Georgia and Florida should lie along the northern and southern banks respectively of


2. C.0.5/654, fo.203, Newcastle to Oglethorpe, 18 March 1738/9.
the River St. John.

Newcastle turned next to Colonel Martin Bladen, who, having been a leading member of the Board of Trade since 1717, was more likely to give reasonable advice. Bladen had read Verelst's observations and proposals but thought them too specific and detailed and was afraid that they might, as a result, cause much controversy and hinder the negotiations. Bladen's proposal was more moderate, and based largely on the first charter granted the Carolina proprietors in 1665. This would bring the Georgia boundary back to the River St. Matthias:

Here therefore I would stop, for how desirous soever Your Grace, or I, may be to extend the British dominions in America, yet I apprehend the best way of asserting our right is to carry it no farther than our vouchers will support us. 2

All the information collected in this way was not intended for use until absolutely necessary, as Britain was in actual possession of the disputed territory and the onus of establishing a title to it lay first on Spain:

for not only by the laws of England but by the general law of nations, it is incumbent upon him who is desirous to recover to show an undeniable right against all the world before the party in possession is obliged to produce his; for which reason, the calling for any papers in either House of Parliament relative to the title of Great Britain to the lands in question would be giving the adversary an advantage to which he is not entitled by any law, and which we ought carefully to avoid. 3

3. Add. MSS.35893, fo.71, Some observations relative to the boundaries of Florida and Georgia.
Consequently, Britain entered the negotiations on the defensive as regards the question of the boundaries and ownership of Georgia.

The prospects for a settlement by negotiation were not auspicious. The Spanish Government vacillated so much in its attitude towards Georgia that its unfortunate ambassador exasperated everyone in London, having to "talk backward and forward" as the tone of his instructions changed. In Madrid the plenipotentiaries became more and more estranged. The South Sea Company would not yield to Spain and refused to pay the £68,000 it owed her. Quadra, in May, demanded the withdrawal of Haddock's squadron, which had recently received orders to remain at Gibraltar and not return to England as previously instructed. Walpole explained this to Geraldino as an essential precaution in face of the public hostility towards the Ministry stirred up by the Opposition. In addition, the Spanish minister reasserted the right of search, revoked the asiento, and announced the intention to confiscate the South Sea Company's effects as indemnification for the £68,000 it owed. War was now inevitable, but attempts at negotiating continued. Differences arose over the agenda. The English wanted to discuss navigation first,

2. Egmont Diary, III, pp. 35, 44-5.
3. J. O. McLachlan, Trade and Peace with Old Spain, 1667-1750 (Cambridge, 1940) p. 120.
whereas the Spaniards said it would be impossible to reach any arrangement on that until "their favourite point" of Georgia's frontier had been decided. Keene and Castres were resolved not to give way, saying they would prefer to suspend the conferences "than to incur the reproach of having made our appearance there for no other purpose than to give the Spaniards an opportunity of trying whether Georgia is to be theirs or ours." By the end of June the Spanish plenipotentiaries had become more audacious and were laying claim even to Providence and all the Bahamas, thus transgressing the articles of the convention.

Spain's refusal to pay the £95,000 stipulated in the convention provided a technical *casus belli*, if one had been needed. The reasons alleged for this non-compliance were the continuance of Haddock's squadron in the Mediterranean and the tardiness of the British Government in sending orders to Georgia to stop extending fortifications. The Spaniards complained, too, that "three men-of-war were sent upon frivolous pretexts to reinforce the squadron at Jamaica, and troops and ammunition were put on board several ships."

It was clear that Spain had no intention of paying, and not surprisingly, for she was short of money and war seemed

2. S.P.94/133, Keene to Newcastle, 29 June 1739. Add.MSS. 32801, fo.90.
imminent anyway. The deadlock was complete. Newcastle believed Spain had made an alliance with France, and so he could not afford to leave Gibraltar and Minorca defenceless by recalling Haddock's squadron. On the other hand, the Spaniards declared they could not guarantee peace so long as it remained off their coast.

The last chance of appeasement had now disappeared. In June Newcastle ordered the British commissaries in Madrid to cease negotiating and authorized colonial governors to grant letters of marque and reprisal to qualified applicants. Events in the New World were moving as fast as in the Old. There was reason to believe that the Spaniards were seeking to incite the Indians in Georgia against the English. Then, in September, the South Carolinians were provoked by Spanish policy. The Governor of St. Augustine had published a proclamation that all negro slaves who escaped to him from the British plantations would be granted their freedom and given his protection. Several slaves from South Carolina had already availed themselves of this offer and the planters were beginning to fear they might lose most of their labour.

1. S.P.94/133, Keene to Newcastle 24 April and 18 May 1739.
2. Lanning, Diplomatic History of Georgia, p.188.
4. Spain had originally encouraged runaway negroes to go to St. Augustine by a royal decree of October 1699 promising them protection. This had been repeated periodically from that time forward,
Their resentment at Spanish policy flared up when, on 9 September 1739, some negroes at Stono, less than twenty miles from Charleston, started a revolt that cost the lives of twenty-one white men and forty-four black. The South Carolinians attributed the insurrection to Spanish intrigues and were determined it should not go unavenged:

With indignation we looked at St. Augustine like another Sallee, that den of thieves and ruffians, receptacle of debtors, servants and slaves; bane of industry and society, and resolved in our minds all the injuries this province had received from thence ever since the first settlement.

With elements both in the colonies and the mother-country agitating for war and with diplomatic negotiations broken off, formal declaration of hostilities was merely a matter of timing. Already, in July, Vice-Admiral Vernon had been despatched to attack Spanish settlements in the West Indies, and Keene was recalled from Madrid in August. Oglethorpe was ordered "to annoy" the Spaniards in Florida and put Georgia in a state of defence. Finally, on 19 October, the King's heralds at Temple Bar proclaimed that war had been declared. Three years of negotiation had failed to solve

the differences between the two nations; the problems, not only of the Georgia boundaries but also of the *asiento*, right of search and logwood-cutting, were to be settled by force.
CHAPTER IV

THE WAR WITH SPAIN, 1739-48

At noon on Wednesday, 3 October, 1739, the magistrates and militia assembled at the court-house in Savannah to hear General Oglethorpe announce that war had been declared. He assured them that effective measures had been taken to defend the western and southern margins of the colony, and that the Government had promised to reinforce the frigates which were already cruising along the sea coast. Having arranged for his proclamation to be published, the general returned to his lodging, whereupon "five cannon were fired and the militia gave three handsome vollies with their small-arms, as it were in defiance, without the appearance of any dread of the Spaniards".

It was, perhaps, inevitable that the British Government should regard hostilities in Georgia as no more than a sideshow, of secondary importance to operations in Europe and especially to the prospects of plunder in the Caribbean, where the guarda-costas had committed their offences and where Englishmen, on the principle of making the punishment fit the crime, wished the war to be fought and won.

Georgia was a new colony, little understood and remote from the real centres of conflict. The southern frontier, it is true, had received a fair proportion of the military expenditure wrung from a grudging Ministry during the recent years, mainly because of persistent appeals from South Carolina, Oglethorpe and the Georgia Trustees, backed by frequent alarms of impending attack. In 1734 the annual cost of His Majesty's military establishment in South Carolina was £3,071 for one company of 115 men, out of a total expenditure of £38,837 on the American plantations as a whole. The foundation of Georgia drew more attention to defence requirements in its vicinity, especially as Spain's known antagonism towards Englishmen settling near Florida gave rise to easily-credited rumours and reports of imminent retaliation. Before the end of 1733 intelligence was already received of a Spanish plan to descend from Havana onto the ill-protected Georgia and Port Royal. Bands of Spaniards and Indians were often reported seen on the frontiers and in the woods after 1733, and the need for fortification became manifest. In July 1735 the Trustees drew up a petition to the Crown for a quick delivery of ordnance stores in order that a new settlement they were about to make should

1. Rockingham Papers (Wentworth Woodhouse Muniments in the Sheffield City Library) M.25, pp.81-93. These documents are cited by courtesy of Earl Fitzwilliam and his trustees of the Wentworth-Woodhouse Estates Co.

be well fortified. This was referred by the Privy Council to the Board of Trade in August. The Lords Commissioners read it a week later, but were disinclined to act and allowed it to languish for over twelve months, in spite of appeals from the Trustees. Eventually, in December 1736, the Trustees were told that the long delay in answering the petition was due to the fact that they "had gone by bow and not by string" in applying direct to the King and not first to the Board. In any case, it was the Board's opinion that ordnance should not be a separate charge but should be defrayed out of the money granted by Parliament for the support of Georgia.

The Government's neglect of the colony's defence in these years upset the Trustees, and they attributed it to the general assurance of peace then prevalent in Europe, which seemed to render any immediate attack on the southern provinces by French or Spaniards a very remote possibility. The Trustees themselves, nevertheless, pressed ahead with security measures as best they could. In November 1735

4. C.O.5/666, p.206, Martyn to Oglethorpe, 1 April 1736.
they asked the Duke of Newcastle to recommend, "in the strongest terms", the Governor and Council of South Carolina to supply a number of negroes for the construction of a fort on St. Simons Island in the mouth of the Altamaha. Oglethorpe was sedulously preparing defences as efficiently as his means would permit, but direct Government assistance was patently necessary if the inhabitants were to feel safe. The year 1737 witnessed the real beginning of this assistance.

In February 1737 Lieutenant-Governor Broughton of South Carolina reported that the Spaniards at Havana and St. Augustine were making preparations to destroy Georgia. He communicated the full particulars of the information he had received to the Duke of Newcastle, and at the same time assured the Trustees that South Carolina would contribute towards the defence of Georgia, "and for that purpose all the necessary dispositions have been made which the shortness of the time since we have received the advice would permit, and you may depend that nothing in my power shall be wanting to promote the present service. I have already given orders to raise forces upon pay to reinforce our settlements which lie nearest to Georgia and Florida to watch the motions of the Spaniards"

1. C.O.5/654, fo. 28, James Vernon to Stone, 16 Nov. 1735.
and to gain and give intelligence". The Trustees were sceptical but sought assurance from Newcastle that the 1 colony would be protected. There was, in fact, substance in the report. According to an American authority on this subject, archives in Spain contain manuscripts of plans to attack and expel the English from Georgia, a design frustrated for nearly two years between 1736 and 1738 by the instability of the English guide, a certain John Savy who had treacherously gone to Cuba to sell his knowledge, and the inability of the viceroy of New Spain to furnish sufficient troops and money.

The British Government was by this time beginning to show more interest in Georgian security, for Walpole had already, early in February 1737, broached the subject

1. C.O.5/639, fo.159, Broughton to Trustees, 7 Feb. 1736/7 B.T. Journal, 30 March 1737. Col.Rec.Ga., I, p.280 Egmont Diary, II, p.379. For South Carolina's aid to Georgia at this time see the Journal of the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly, 1736-9 (S.C. Historical Commission, 1951) pp.208-9, 215-6, 222, 225-6, 249, 367-8. Commodore Dent, from whom the intelligence had been received, was returned "the public thanks of the General Assembly for the seasonable advice he has given". ibid., p.275.

2. J.T.Lanning, "A Descriptive Catalogue of some Legajos on Georgia in the Spanish Archives", Ga.H.Q., XIII (Dec.1929) p.417. In a chapter of his Diplomatic History reproduced in the North Carolina Historical Review, X (July, 1933) pp.186-213, Lanning stresses the importance of Savy. His activities were admittedly closely followed in these years, but so far as the British Government was concerned they seem to have been more a matter of interest than of anxiety. Walpole, Newcastle and the Trustees were kept informed, but there is no evidence that the matter was ever notified to the Secretary at War, Admiralty, Privy Council or Board of Trade. The most relevant documents are C.O.5/654, ff.118 and 123-4. Add MSS. 327 96, ff.46-8 and 52. See also Egmont Diary, II, pp. 446,457. Col.Rec.Ga., XXI, pp.374,382.
with Oglethorpe, who said he believed it would be difficult to form a regular militia in America:

That he could form about 300 men capable of bearing arms in Georgia, that South Carolina had money but no men, that North Carolina had men but no money; that Pennsylvania had both, and Virginia only money. That New England had men but no money, and New York had money and few men.

In view of this he maintained that it would be cheaper and safer to establish a battalion of five hundred regulars in each province, to be paid for by the colonies themselves. It was at this meeting that the proposal was made for Oglethorpe to take a military command in America, and in the June following he was formally commissioned General and Commander in Chief of all His Majesty's forces in South Carolina and Georgia.

Soon afterwards a regiment of six hundred men was ordered for the defence of Georgia, and was created by consigning to Oglethorpe all the effective privates of the Twenty-Fifth Foot. The first detachment sailed in January 1738 in three transports conveyed by the Phoenix under Captain Fanshawe. Another detachment embarked at Portsmouth in the June in five transports conveyed by the Hector.

Captain Sir Yelverton Peyton, and the Blandford, and landed at the southern end of St. Simons Island on 19 September, the Hector having parted company on approaching the Georgia coast and sailed for Virginia. These ships were under orders to remain and reinforce the squadron on the colonial coasts, the Hector at Virginia, the Phoenix at South Carolina and the Blandford at Georgia.

At the beginning of 1738 the intended Spanish expedition against Georgia was suspended during the negotiations in Madrid by order of the King of Spain. But the danger remained, and in May Oglethorpe was directed to discover what military preparations were being made at Havana and St. Augustine, to investigate enemy movements on the frontier, and to position his forces to give security to the settlers without giving umbrage to the Spaniards. He was also given some latitude for personal initiative in that if the Spaniards commenced hostilities he was to defend Georgia as effectually as possible and act in whatever manner he thought would best serve Britain's interests. His situation was not a comfortable one in 1738.

There was a strong suspicion that Spain had made an alliance

with France for a joint invasion of the colonies in the event of a rupture with Britain. If this were to happen South Carolina and Georgia could have offered little resistance and, in the opinion of the president of the South Carolina Council, would probably "be lost to the Crown of Great Britain unless such an aid is afforded them as may at least make them equal in strength and power with the French and Spaniards". They would have found difficulty in raising more than four thousand fighting men between them, and these would have had to have been mustered from a country both extensive in area and sparse in population. The defences of Georgia were in a very poor condition, a circumstance which, in November, Oglethorpe bemoaned in a letter to Alderman Heathcote:

I am here in one of the most delightful situations as any man could wish to be. A great number of debts, empty magazines, no money to supply them, numbers of people to be fed, mutinous soldiers to command, a Spanish claim and a large body of their troops not far from us.  

This weakness of Georgia's defences was also brought home to the Trustees by young Philip Thicknesse, the first emigrant to return from the colony, when, according to his own testimony, he attended them at their office in Old Palace Yard and scoffed at a paper they possessed.

2. C.O.5/640, fo.225, Oglethorpe to Heathcote, 20 Nov. 1738
showing "forts raised where no ground had been broken, and flags flying where no staffs had been erected."

The position at sea was rather better. Ships on the American station were allocated to protect a particular locality, but in the event of any one colony being threatened they were to act together for its defence, a necessary principle of policy because to leave one or two ships scattered along the coast would be inviting their destruction at the hands of a superior enemy. Thus, on 9 May 1738, Captain Peyton of the Hector was instructed that, if he should learn of any design by the Spaniards to attack Georgia, the Bahamas "or any other of His Majesty's colonies thereabouts, you are to do your utmost to defend and protect the same, and to call to your assistance the Sea Hope from Virginia or any other of His Majesty's ships stationed in those parts, who are to act in conjunction with you for the preservation and security of the said places". All the other captains on the coast had similar instructions. In January 1738 a force of five ships under Commodore Charles Brown had been ordered for service on the Jamaica station with instructions not only to protect the trade in that area and observe French and Spanish movements but also to assist the other ships stationed on the American coast in defence of Georgia if that colony should be in

1. Thicknesses Memoirs, I, pp. 56-7. It must be noted that there is no mention of the meeting in the official records or in Egmont's diary.

danger of attack. Soon after his arrival in the West Indies, Brown detached the Torrington, Captain Knight, to Havana in order to obtain intelligence of the suspended Spanish expedition against Georgia and of the condition and strength of the Spanish squadron. Knight learnt that, although the expedition had been countermanded by an order from Madrid, three thousand men had been prepared for it and were to have been carried in flat-bottomed boats, "ridiculous things which could all be destroyed at sea by one ship of 40 guns and one of 20", and which were now being kept ready for another occasion.

Oglethorpe himself deplored having to rely largely on ships stationed at Charleston, which lay at a considerably greater distance from the Florida-Georgia boundary than did St. Augustine. For this reason he made a request in September for the man-o'-war which had conveyed him over from England to be kept at Georgia. Captain Burrish, its commander, had already proved his worth "by standing directly to the southward up to the very noses of the Spaniards, whilst all the others went into Charleston, where they generally stay". Oglethorpe reckoned that, in

1. Adm. 2/55, p.186
2. Richmond, op.cit., I, pp.5-6, 10.
conjunction with Captain Gascoigne's ship already in the
region, Burrish would be able to guard the province by
sea and keep communications open. Nearly a year later
the strength of Georgia's sea defences was given a fillip
when, on 11 June 1739, the Admiralty issued orders to the
commanders of the Phoenix (S.C.), the Hector (Va.), the
Flamborough (N.Y.), the Squirrel (New England), the Tartar
and the Spence sloop (Bahamas) that, in the event of an
attack on Georgia, they were to endeavour "to protect the
said settlements from any attempts that may be made on them,
either by taking, sinking, burning or otherwise destroying
the ships, vessels or boats which the Spaniards may employ
thereon." These orders were confirmed and emphasized in
July, when the commanders of British ships stationed in
American waters were directed to go to the assistance of
South Carolina and Georgia "upon the least suspicion" of
a Spanish attack. When Vice-Admiral Vernon was despatched
to the West Indies to destroy enemy settlements and distress
their shipping, his instructions included the shielding of
the southern provinces should an attack be expected and the
sending of "such ships as you shall think proper for the de­
fence of those our possessions, and for taking and intercept­
ing the Spanish ships, sloops or boats that may be sent

1. C.O.5/640, fo.184, Oglethorpe to Thomas Archer, 19 Sept.
1738.
These measures taken by the mother-country did not allay fears in Georgia, where the inhabitants were deeply conscious of its exposed position on the periphery of the American plantations. While the news of the recent naval orders, for instance, was welcomed, it was observed in the September that in contrast to the northern provinces, each of which had several ships stationed always ready to protect them, "poor Georgia had never any but the Hawk sloop yet". For more than two years the Spanish menace had caused apprehension in the colony, and there were a few who would have liked to have withdrawn beyond the reach of invasion. In Savannah a brave humourist set up an insurance office at which persons fearful for their safety could take out policies at five to fifteen per cent, provided they did not put too great a value on themselves. The majority, however, were not afraid, and business was continued as normally as possible. When Oglethorpe, soon after his return to America in 1738, warned the people of Frederica of their danger and gave leave for any who were afraid of the Spaniards to depart, they all decided to remain.

1. Add. MSS. 32692, ff.128-32, Instructions to Vernon, 16 July 1739.
2. Col.Rec.Ga., IV, pp.415-6
3. Ibid., p.130.
This, then, was the scene when, in October 1739, the Government instructed Oglethorpe to attack St. Augustine if he thought it practicable. Additional ordnance stores had been ordered to be sent him, and naval commanders on the American station were directed to assist him in the enterprise and prevent supplies reaching St. Augustine from Havana. The conquest of this outpost seemed to be essential for the security of the southern colonies. In the opinion of the Governor of Massachusetts, South Carolina and Georgia would never be safe while they had "such a nest of vermin as Augustine so night them". Sir Charles Wager, First Lord of the Admiralty, told Vice-Admiral Vernon that "if St. Augustine could be taken, it would be very great service to that part of our continent of America". Oglethorpe himself was keen and confident, and would have been more so had he known the relative weakness of the enemy defences. A wave of consternation swept through the Spaniards in America, who blenched at the thought of a repetition of the exploits of Drake or Morgan in the Caribbean, or a campaign against St. Augustine by the forces in Georgia. The Spaniards had

concentrated their strength at Havana and in the Caribbean but had neglected to maintain good fortifications on the mainland. In a letter of January 1737 Arredondo, the engineer, stated that the mouth of the River St. John was protected only by a tiny palmetto hut, so dilapidated that he found it painful to look at. Some distance inland and on either side of the river were the wooden forts of Picolata and St. Francis de Pupa, both of which were small, light, rotten and ready to crumble. Even so, Fort St. Francis, in an important strategic situation on the north side of the river, was to worry Oglethorpe, who regarded it as "an absolute infraction of the treaties" and an example of the Spanish preference for "what was useful to what was just".

Towards the end of 1737 the commander at St. Augustine asked the Governor-General of Cuba for assistance as he lacked the means to resist even a moderate force, while the castle, which was the only real defence in the town, possessed no guns that would fire longer than twenty-four hours, and even if it had there were no artillerymen to manage them. The Spaniards, for all that, made the first move. On 13 November they killed two of the Highlanders stationed on Amelia Island, scalping the one and decapitating the other. This was the

first of several attempts on the island. It emphasized
the need for some scout-boats, and Oglethorpe wrote to the
Trustees Urging them to ask Parliament for at least five,
as well as for a troop of rangers. The regiment, he said,
could defend the area it was actually in, but could not
"march on foot over the waters without boats"

In seeking further aid from the mother-country Ogle­
thorpe was being optimistic. The Government could not
regard the capture of St. Augustine as anything more than
a minor affair compared to the promise of plunder in the
West Indies. To create an effective force Oglethorpe
would be obliged to rely mainly on the resources available
in Georgia and South Carolina themselves. So it was that
he wrote to Lieutenant-Governor Bull for support from South
Carolina, and in March 1740 paid a fortnight's visit to
Charleston to plead his case in person. South Carolina was
a little dubious about the project, having already experienced
the hazards of marching against St. Augustine, and was itself
at that time in a disturbed condition from the rebelliousness
of its negroes and the reduction of the population by an

1. Cholmondeley MSS., letter 2927, Oglethorpe to Walpole,
20 Oct. and 16 Nov. 1739. C.O.5/654, ff.249 and 251-4,

epidemic of smallpox and yellow fever. But in April the legislature passed an Act voting Oglethorpe £120,000 in its own currency (£15,000 sterling), a regiment of Foot, a troop of Horse and some men-o'-war. The legislature was unable to raise the money at once, however, and Oglethorpe was obliged to advance it £4,000 sterling for which he drew on Harman Verelst, the Trustees' treasurer. Oglethorpe sent Verelst a power of attorney authorizing him to raise money on all his real and personal estate without limitation and to employ all his Governmental salary for answering any bills he might draw on him for the public service. "A real instance of zeal for his country!" was Lord Egmont's comment.

In England, meanwhile, Oglethorpe's requirements were being kept before the Government's notice by William Horton, one of his lieutenants from Georgia. Any additional naval protection for the colony was out of the question at this time, requests from Barbados, the Leeward Islands and other parts having to be rejected by the Admiralty on account of the great need for small ships in home waters. The position was somewhat different as regards land forces, however,
and in May the matter was mentioned to Walpole, who referred it to the Secretary at War. He, in turn, brought it to the attention of Lord Cathcart, commander of the intended expedition against Havana, and on 19 June it was decided to supplement Oglethorpe's regiment with a company of grenadiers and to double the number of its subalterns.

These substantial reinforcements were promised too late, however, to be of assistance in the attack on St. Augustine, for Oglethorpe had already begun to move forward into Florida. Many of Georgia's young inhabitants were enlisting in his army, and a group of Chickasaw and Uchee Indians, thirsting for Spanish blood, had taken up the hatchet and joined him. At the beginning of December 1739 a preliminary incursion was made to within a few miles of St. Augustine, primarily to test enemy strength and learn something about his preparations. But the Spaniards would not risk an encounter, and Oglethorpe withdrew after inflicting a few casualties and destroying some horses and cattle. He lacked, as yet, either the resources or the manpower to strike direct at St. Augustine, and was merely playing for time. "I am going to make another inroad", he told the Trustees, "and trust in God

2. Col.Rec.Ga., IV, pp.458, 556-7
it will daunt them so that we shall have full time to fortify!"  

This second incursion took place in January 1740, and at daybreak on the 7th his Indian allies burnt the little wooden fort of Picolata which the Spaniards had abandoned. Before sunset on the same day he reduced Fort St. Francis de Pupa, on the opposite bank of the St. Johns River to Picolata, and took prisoner its tiny garrison, a sergeant, a corporal, nine privates and one Indian. On 10 May Fort Diego, on the plains about half-way between St. Augustine and the River St. John, was surrounded and surrendered almost immediately. Oglethorpe placed a garrison in it under Captain Dunbar in order to safeguard his retreat in the event of mishap and to preserve a communication with Georgia via the navigable waters of Poplar Creek and the River St. John. He then returned to the mouth of the river where he was joined by the South Carolinian regiment under Colonel Vanderdussen and by a company of Highlanders under Captain McIntosh.

Meanwhile, the naval squadron at South Carolina was preparing to support the land forces. The Squirrel, Captain Peter Warren, was sent to St. Augustine in April

pending the arrival of the rest of the squadron, and on the 28th. captured a Spanish sloop. The *Squirrel* was joined by the *Wolf*, Commander William Dandridge, at the end of the month, and in May by the *Hector*, Captain Sir Velverton Peyton, and the *Spence*, Captain William Laws, and on 1 June the *Flamborough*, Captain Vincent Pearce, which had been lying in the St. Johns River co-operating with the advancing troops, joined the remainder of the squadron off the bar at St. Augustine.

On the mainland Oglethorpe, with an army now of about nine hundred soldiers and eleven hundred Indians began the march into Florida in earnest. Fort Moosa, which lay less than three miles from St. Augustine and had a communication with the castle by a tide creek through the marshes, was captured and destroyed, and on the night of 4 June the British force arrived before the Spanish principal entrenchments on the western side of the town.

The ensuing demonstration against St. Augustine has often been recounted by historians, always using the same sources. There is, unfortunately, very little documentary material on the subject among the official records, and the


almost complete absence of detailed reports from the War Office, Colonial Office and Admiralty papers may be taken as an indication of the uninterest and unconcern in that field of operations then evinced by the home authorities. Such documentary material as there is, however, does not controvert the existing narratives or the other original sources. It would be idle here, therefore, to relate the action at any length, but it is necessary, nevertheless, to summarize the campaign first before going onto make any criticism of its management or assessment of its significance.

A plan to capture the city by storm, involving a combined operation by land and naval forces, was thwarted by the presence in the channel between Anastasia Island and the castle of six Spanish half-galleys moored abreast, which prevented the ascent of barges intended for the attack and precluded a landing of troops on the island. The water being too shallow to permit the English men-o'-war near enough to dislodge them, there was no alternative but to

change the plan of campaign and resort to a regular siege, hoping thereby to starve out the garrison. For this purpose a party of 140 men under Colonel Palmer was left in Fort Moosa with orders to intercept all supplies coming to St. Augustine from the interior, to make frequent appearances within sight of the town, and generally to harrass the Spaniards on that side without risking a proper engagement with them. If attacked by a superior force the party was to withdraw to Fort Diego. Colonel Palmer considered the force allotted him for this task to be too small in view of the fact that it would be separated from the rest of the army and within reach of the enemy in the castle, but reluctantly consented to accept the command upon Oglethorpe promising him reinforcements as soon as Anastasia Island had been taken. The South Carolina regiment was sent along the sea-beach to take possession of a neck of land called Point Quartell between the north and south channels of the River St. Mark, about a mile from the castle, and to erect a battery there commanding the strait forming the northern entrance to the harbour.

On 10 June Oglethorpe, with his regiment and most of the Indians, landed on the east bank of Anastasia Island and took possession of the waterside sand-hills, the enemy retreating back to the town. Captain Vincent Pearce, commander of the naval squadron, stationed one of his ships to guard the passage by way of the River Matanza and employed the remainder in blockading the mouth of the harbour.
so that the Spaniards were cut off from all supplies by sea. On Anastasia Island, meanwhile, the army, assisted by two hundred sailors from the fleet, mounted several cannon with which to bombard the town and castle. Oglethorpe's summons upon the Spanish governor to surrender was requited with mocking scorn, and thereupon the English batteries were directed to open up against the town. This was answered by an equally spirited fire from both the fort and the half-galleys in the harbour, and some warm fighting took place between the Spanish flotilla and the blockading British naval squadron. The cannonade was maintained briskly by both sides for nearly three weeks, but with little effect; the infrangible walls of the castle were merely indented, never pierced, and "tho' the bombs fell either into the town or castle, yet there was so much room within the town that the inhabitants retired to places out of the reach of them".

In the meantime, observing the besiegers to be uncertain and their vigilance relaxing, a detachment of three hundred Spaniards made a sortie on the night of 14 June, and at sunrise the next morning, after a desperate hand-to-hand combat, captured Fort Moosa, which had not been sent the reinforcements Oglethorpe had promised, taking thirty-four prisoners and killing sixty-eight of the garrison, including Colonel Palmer. This victory of the Spaniards opened communication between St. Augustine and the interior and so enabled their garrison to obtain much-needed cattle and
supplies. Shortly afterwards the ship guarding the Matanza River was withdrawn from its station, and in the interval before its relief took over some small vessels from Havana carrying provisions and reinforcements managed to reach St. Augustine by way of that narrow channel. All hope of forcing the town to surrender now disappeared, and the besieging forces became disheartened. The heat of the summer sun was intense, the regiment was sick and weary, and the South Carolinians decamped in large numbers. With supplies short and the usual season of hurricanes approaching, Commodore Peyton would not risk his fleet remaining on that coast any longer. By 5 July the siege had been abandoned.

Its failure may be attributed to insufficient support from the mother-country and the other colonies. This must, however, be qualified by surveying the campaign in its world setting. To Oglethorpe and the Georgians it necessarily seemed of vital importance, meriting the close attention of patriotic Englishmen. But how different it must have appeared to the British Government in the summer of 1740! Admiral Vernon had to be supported, and the despatch of an auxiliary fleet under Rear-Admiral Sir Chaloner Ogle to join him in Jamaica sapped national resources considerably. Spain's empire in the Caribbean was an easy, glitteringly attractive prey, but it was essential to be selective and St. Augustine did not appear high on the list. A more lucrative prize was Cuba, the Pearl of the Antilles, or the
port of Cartagena, the strongest place in Spanish America and the destruction of which would deal a crippling blow to the enemy's whole position in the New World. Moreover, expenses were heavy, and it was only with difficulty that Anson's small squadron was fitted out in September 1740 for its expedition to the Pacific. Little wonder, then, that the siege of a lonely Spanish outpost on the distant South Atlantic littoral should receive scant attention in London, especially when its garrison had been described, by the English local commander, as weak, its inhabitants as mutinous, and its capture as a task of probably facility.

Nor could the other colonies be expected to exhibit much interest in what was, even to them, a comparatively remote territory. There was little incentive for them to waste their resources among the thickets and everglades of central Florida. The capture of St. Augustine would be of benefit to all, but what were the chances of success? It was situated in good defending country and begirt with an almost impenetrable morass. The hot season was commencing, insects, sand-flies and mosquitoes were prevalent, and inland there would be danger of fever. The South Carolinians were already acquainted with the aloof, stone square castle of San Marcos at the northern end of the town, and realized the difficulties involved in attempting to reduce it.

The American colonies did not have a good record of mutual military assistance, and, except for South Carolina, the little war on Georgia's borders was not such as to stimulate particular concern. A moral from the colonies' disregard of Oglethorpe's campaign was drawn nearly twenty years later by an anonymous English writer:

> And the dilatory proceedings of the Assembly of South Carolina upon this occasion, as well as the neglect of all our other colonies, to contribute the least mite towards the expedition, ought to have shown us that it was absolutely necessary to put all our colonies and plantations in America under some new regulation by an Act of the British legislature; ... none of our little distant colonies will ever consider the general safety if their own particular safety be not in immediate danger.1

This was too severe a view to take of the matter. It was impossible for the other provinces to feel the same urgency about the campaign as the Georgians felt, and they could hardly be expected to do more than cast an approving, well-wishing eye on the expedition. And South Carolina did give substantial assistance, including a regiment which unfortunately failed to co-operate well with the rest of the force and many of whose company of volunteers "made more haste to return home than was for their credit". The commander of the regiment, Colonel Vanderdussen, condemned "the dastardly behaviour" of the volunteers and acknowledged that some of his own officers had not conducted themselves as they should.2

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But it is a harsh judgment that attributes the English failure at St. Augustine to the apathy of South Carolina. The desertions were chiefly by its volunteers, who had anticipated a prompt, glorious attack rather than a lengthy, laborious siege, and were not by personnel of the province's regular regiment. There were, in fact, only two desertions from the regular regiment, one by a New Engander who effected his escape and the other by an Irishman who was retaken and shot. Indeed, the South Carolina Assembly, as was, perhaps, only natural and to be expected, emphatically rejected the charge that it was "in the least degree the cause of the ill-success of the expedition", and exonerated the troops who had served in its pay.

And even if there had been prompt support from the mother-country and the other colonies, would the result have been different and would it have been worth the cost? It is true that the Spaniards in St. Augustine had to suffer severe privation. Throughout the preceding months the commander, Don Manuel de Montiano, had been beseeching the Governor-General at Cuba for provisions. The town's population exceeded 2,400, and the lack of food and pay was causing many to clamour for permission to leave for Havana. Montiano predicted that unless succour arrived by the middle of June the garrison was certain to perish. But the Span-


iards did not perish. The outcome of the siege illustrated the strength of the Spanish position and the relatively heavy price the English would have been obliged to pay in order to capture it. The Spaniards were hard-pressed for a time, but were very little weakened by the encounter. The regular troops, the militia, the convicts and free negroes, all conducted themselves with courage and steadiness throughout the siege, and not one deserted. In the castle itself their only casualties were two killed and a negro and a soldier wounded, of whom the negro was soon perfectly well and the soldier had a good chance of surviving, "though with one leg fewer".

On the other hand, Oglethorpe's army had had to march through tough country and endure "hardships equal to those that the soldiers of Cato endured amongst the parched sands of Libya." Although the Spanish commander was prevented from making an immediate counter-attack because of the weakness of his forces, he admitted they were but little weaker than those commanded by Oglethorpe. No blame should be attached to Oglethorpe himself for the expedition's failure to achieve its declared purpose. Both the naval historian

1. Ibid., pp.60-1
2. Kimber, A Relation or Journal of a Late Expedition to the Gates of St. Augustine, p.4.
of the war and Oglethorpe's most recent biographer ascribe the failure of the expedition solely to want of energy and initiative on the parts of the general and the commander of the naval squadron, Captin Vincent Pearce. The historian of colonial South Carolina charges Oglethorpe with an indecision and inconstancy of purpose during the campaign, illustrated by his rushing pointlessly back and forth between St. Augustine and the River St. John, tiring both himself and his men, that "show him to have been lacking in all the qualities necessary for an independent commander." This seems too harsh a view to take of the general's conduct. The difficulties with which he had to contend were great and the means at his disposal small. It is not always pointless to rush back to base to ensure that essential supplies have arrived. Success was dependent upon dispatch. The inability of the South Carolina troops to join him earlier in the expedition meant campaigning in the hot season, and this, with the duration of naval support restricted by the need for the squadron to find harbour before the storms commenced, rendered protracted operations impossible. Moreover, it is difficult, as one of Oglethorpe's biographers has pointed out, "to

batter down the walls of a fortress without artillery, and it is equally difficult to blockade a harbour when your naval forces either cannot or will not seal it". The commander of the South Carolina regiment, when speaking of Oglethorpe later to William Stephens in Savannah, did so "with all due honour and deference" and apparently had no criticism of his actions to vent. He had done his best with the means at his disposal, and if he had failed to take St. Augustine he had at least succeeded in delaying Spanish preparations to attack Georgia. But it was a tired, disappointed man, sick with fever, who departed from before the walls of St. Augustine "with drums beating and colours flying" and brought his army back in good order to Frederica. His policy now was obviously to strengthen Georgia's defences against a Spanish counter-attack, and for assistance in this he turned again to the mother-country.

On 7 October 1740, soon after the news of Oglethorpe's retreat reached London, the Admiralty ordered the officers in the American service "to be particularly attentive to the security of the province of South Carolina and the colony of Georgia, and at all times to give all the assistance in your power to the people of that province and

1. Church, Oglethorpe, p.190.
colony against their enemies, and particularly against the Spaniards at St. Augustine. In April 1741 the Secretary at War agreed to the augmentation of Oglethorpe's regiment with a company of grenadiers. This was encouraging, but something more definite was required if Georgia was to feel safe. Oglethorpe told Walpole that the security of all the southern colonies depended on the preservation of Georgia, for its loss would probably lead to a general revolt of the negroes, who greatly outnumbered the whites in Virginia, Maryland and South Carolina, where "the Spaniards have for several years carried on an interest amongst the slaves, chiefly by Irish priests who pass for physicians, dancing masters, clock-makers, and other such kinds of rambling professions which gives them access into the planters' houses". On 12 May 1741 Oglethorpe wrote to the Duke of Newcastle warning him that the Spaniards intended to invade Georgia as soon as the result of Vernon's expedition in the West Indies was known, and asking him for military supplies and some men-o'-war to guard the river and sea approaches. A few weeks later he informed the Trustees of attempts by Spanish emissaries to stir up discontent

3. Cholmondeley MSS., letters 3093 and 3095, Oglethorpe to Walpole, 28 April and 12 May 1741.
among the people, their main theme being that of the colony's need for negroes, "since as many slaves as there are, so many enemies to the government and consequently friends to the Spaniards." Another of their objectives was to discourage the planters, and by thus impeding the progress of the province make Britain tired of supporting it. "The way to overcome all this", in Oglethorpe's opinion, was "to persist in allowing no slaves, encourage the importation of Germans and married recruits, and prevail with the Government to answer those necessary expenses of rangers, sloops, boats and fortifications". The colony did not possess the resources to ensure its own protection, nor could it depend on its neighbours; it had to seek its support from the mother-country.

On 5 October 1741 a detailed paper containing proposals by Oglethorpe on the war in Florida and Georgia was presented to the Board of Trade by Harman Verelst, the Trustees' treasurer. In order to wage an offensive and defensive campaign against the Spaniards, Oglethorpe demanded a battalion of land forces and a small train of artillery manned by engineers and gunners from Europe; he wanted money for winning alliances with the Indians, employing a hundred boatmen and for raising in America two troops of rangers and a Highland company; he asked

1. C.O.5/641, fo.26, Oglethorpe to Trustees, 29 June 1741
for some artillery to defend Frederica and improve the
defensive works of Forts William and St. Andrew on
Cumberland Island, and for ships to oppose the Spanish
half-galleys and block the sea-entrances to St. Augustine.
Lastly, in the event of war with France he wanted authority
to rouse the Creek, Chickasaw and Cherokee Indians, enlist
more rangers, augment the numbers in each troop, and to
fortify Mount Venture and Fort Augusta. These proposals
were referred for consideration to a committee made up of
the Duke of Montagu, Sir Charles Wager, General George Wade
and Martin Bladen. In the meantime, British ships stationed
at South Carolina were to be ordered to cruise along the
coast and prevent provisions reaching St. Augustine by sea.

When the proposals were considered at the beginning of
November they were found to be "couchèd in such general and
uncertain terms as required much explanation," and although
Verelst was called upon to amplify them he was unable to
add much in the way of precise detail. William Horton,
an officer from Oglethorpe's regiment, and Captain Thomson,

1. C.O.5/654, fo.363, Oglethorpe's proposals on war in
    Georgia, 5 Oct. 1741 (The handwriting is that of Verelst)
    See also Cholmondeley MSS., letter 3095 (enclosure),
    Proposals relating to the war in Georgia and Florida by
    Oglethorpe, dated 28 April 1741. C.O.5/5, fo.170,
    Bladen to Newcastle, 19 Nov. 1741.

2. List of the Vernon-Wager MSS in the Library of Congress,

3. C.O.5/654, fo.365, Courand to Oglethorpe, 19 Oct. 1741

4. Ibid., ff. 369 and 380, Admiralty, 4 and 14 Nov. 1741
master of a ship recently arrived from Georgia, were invited into the discussion, and they expressed the belief that if the sea entrances to St. Augustine were blockaded the town might even yet be reduced by a moderate force. Governor Glen of South Carolina also submitted two memorials on the same subject, saying that if another attempt was made on St. Augustine his province would supply two battalions from its militia, provided the King paid for them. The final report on these propositions stated that the lack of full and precise information made it difficult to recommend large reinforcements for Oglethorpe. The reduction of St. Augustine, nevertheless, would certainly benefit Britain's interests, and Governor Glen's offer ought to be accepted and some ordnance stores sent, but in view of the expensiveness of the war in Georgia a storekeeper ought to accompany the ordnance in order to make regular accounts.

The committee's recommendations, meagre as they were, were not followed. The Government had more important things to think about, and the Duke of Montagu admitted that to press the matter further would be of no more use than "speaking to the wind". Oglethorpe was left in uncertainty, even having to write to Walpole personally.

1. C.O.5/5, ff.172-4, Bladen to Newcastle, 19 Nov. 1741
for definite instructions on whether to maintain or reduce his forces:

For till I receive such orders I am in the greatest uncertainty, not daring to reduce them without orders since I know the consequence may be fatal to this part of His Majesty's dominions, and in continuing them being apprehensive that you would think the expense great and that there might be some misunderstanding which may be of very ill consequence to my own affairs.

By June 1742 the Spanish attack on Georgia was imminent and still Oglethorpe was being left to his own initiative. The defences were unsound, he lamented, "being very weak in cannon and shot, never having had any from England, nor indeed anything else since my last arrival in this country, but one store ship with powder and small-arms from His Grace the Duke of Argyll just before he was out of the Ordnance. From the time he quitted the service till now I have been left to shift for myself." It was now too late, he told the Duke of Newcastle, to ask again for reinforcements; before they arrived the issue would be decided: "I hope I shall behave as well as one with so few men and so little artillery can" Some English merchants did, in fact, send some military stores and provisions, but in July 1742 these were either seized and burnt by the Spaniards or else scuttled to prevent them falling into their hands.

It was natural for Oglethorpe and the inhabitants of Georgia to feel they were being cursorily treated by the

1. C.O.5/655, no.10, Oglethorpe to Walpole, 7 Dec. 1741.
2. Ibid., no.19, Oglethorpe to Earl of Wilmington, 7 June 1742
3. Ibid., no. 15, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, 7 June 1742
home Government. The Spanish menace was very real to them. On the other hand, the campaign in the southern provinces was only one small part of the wider conflict which the Ministry had to consider. Maria Theresa was calling for British troops to protect the Austrian Netherlands against France. It was becoming obvious that the war could not be confined indefinitely to Spain and England but must eventually include the other European Powers. Vernon's expeditions against Cartagena, Santiago de Cuba and Panama had all failed or been abandoned, and the Government's interest in the American theatre of operations waned as the conflict with Spain merged into the War of the Austrian Succession.

The southern colonies were fortunate in having a man of Oglethorpe's calibre to protect them. Brave, determined and a popular commander, he viewed the approaching invasion with a bland serenity recalling that with which the great Marlborough had been wont to conduct his affairs. Throughout the June of 1742 he took such precautions as he could, and when the Spanish ships were first sighted on the 22nd preparations for their reception were well advanced. On 5 July a strong east wind and a favourable flood tide brought into Jekyll Sound the Spanish fleet of over thirty sail, which, having weathered the fire from the English guns at Fort St. Simon, proceeded up the Altamaha and between sunset and sunrise the following day disembarked some three thousand men on a dry marsh near the village of St. Simon, at the same time hoisting a red flag to the
mizen topmast-head of one of the largest ships. Oglethorpe spiked most of his guns, not very efficiently according to the Spanish account, withdrew his forces to Frederica, seven miles up the river, and at once gave orders for defence and sent out scouts.

On the morning of 7 July a force of nearly two hundred Spaniards and Indians marched up the road to within a mile and a half of Frederica. On learning of this Oglethorpe leapt upon the first horse he could find and led a party of Indians, rangers and Highlanders to attack the enemy in the defiles of the woods before they could deploy in the open ground. A charge was made immediately and the Spanish force was routed, Oglethorpe himself taking two prisoners. He pursued the remnant as far as an open meadow, on the edge of which he posted his troops in the concealment of the woods, and then returned to Frederica to prepare the rangers and the marine company for instant action. Scarce ly had Oglethorpe got the rangers into marching order when he learnt that the force he had left to ambush the enemy had itself been routed by another Spanish detachment which had chanced to discover it. Fortunately, a group of Highlanders under Lieutenants Sutherland and McKay, instead of retreating with their comrades, skilfully executed a flanking movement, gained the rear of the pursuing enemy and hid themselves in ambush in the thick palmettoes which surrounded another open glade about two miles from Fort St. Simon. The Spaniards, on their return, marched out of the wood into this glade and, assuming the contest to be over
for the day, obligingly stacked their arms and sat
down to kindle fires and take refreshment. Thereupon,
from out of the surrounding brushwood rose a Scotch cap on
a stick, the prearranged signal for the Highlanders to
pour volley after volley into the recumbent enemy until
the ground was strewn with dead and dying bodies. When
the ambushers rushed out with bayonets levelled and
claymores flashing, the remaining Spaniards fled in all
directions, some into the impassable marshes, some into
the impenetrable thickets, some through the defile into
the tomahawks of approaching Indians, and only a few to
the safety afforded by the guns of their battery and ships.

After this victory, the Battle of Bloody Marsh as it
came to be called, the main attention was concentrated on
strengthening the defences of Frederica, but on learning
from an English prisoner escaped from the Spaniards that
there was dissension among the invaders and that, in con­
sequence, they had encamped in separate places, Oglethorpe
decided to make a surprise attack in the night. He left
Frederica on the afternoon of 12 July and with a force of
five hundred men marched to within two miles of the enemy
camp, halting there in order that he might reconnoitre
the ground. The attempt to surprise the invaders, however
was frustrated by the desertion of a Frenchman who had
joined the English as a volunteer. Oglethorpe realized that
now that his intentions were known to the enemy an attack
would be futile, and he decided to return to Frederica.
Undeterred by this misfortune, Oglethorpe astutely used the deserter as a channel to convey to the Spanish commander the impression that the English were much stronger than had hitherto been supposed and that large reinforcements were on their way from South Carolina. The Spanish were not easily deceived and were inclined to regard the arrival of the Frenchman as an artifice, but Oglethorpe's stratagem was providentially assisted on 13 July by the appearance out at sea of five English vessels, part of a small force sent by the Governor of South Carolina to watch the movements of the enemy. This seemed to authenticate the information secured through the deserter, and the Spaniards, according to the journal kept on the expedition by the Marquis of Casinas, fearing "not so much what was involved, nor the vessels in sight, as the vessels which might follow in greater force", resolved to abandon the invasion and reembark their troops forthwith. This they did, after burning the barracks and officers' houses at St. Simons, but with such precipitation that they left behind them guns, ammunition, provisions and unburied bodies. By 21 July they were all reported gone.

The campaign was heralded in America as an important victory of English over Spanish arms. It was realized that had the enemy been successful in his demonstration against Frederica he would almost certainly have moved against the more northerly strongholds, for in 1742 Oglethorpe's regiment was the only regiment of British troops on the Atlantic seaboard south of Nova Scotia. The action was, indeed, a triumph for Oglethorpe. It might have been a greater triumph if the ships at Charleston had acted with promptness, for Oglethorpe hoped that their arrival would pen the Spanish vessels in Jekyll Sound and ultimately deliver them into his hands. But the South Carolinians were confident that the Spaniards would have difficulty in making headway on St. Simons Island and consequently did not hurry to dispatch their fleet. As Oglethorpe so bitterly expressed it in a letter to the Duke of Montagu: "The men-o'-war acted by precedent of former times, and consequently did not come till all was over, and the Spaniards had full time to go off by sea." Even so, the victory was a substantial one. Several provinces sent Oglethorpe special letters of gratitude, and on 13 February 1743 the King, of his own accord, promoted him

1. Cate, op.cit., p.170
3. Townshend MSS., pp.270-1, enclosure from the S.C. Gazette of 26 July 1742.
4. MSS. of the Duke of Buccleuch and Queensbury (H.M.C. Reports) I, p.408.
brigadier-general for his good service in repulsing the Spaniards. And yet, as Sam Ogle pointed out to Newcastle a few months later, the English colonies remained palpably weak against attack:

This truth will manifestly appear by the late attempt of the Spaniards upon Georgia, where, notwithstanding General Oglethorpe's good conduct and personal bravery the preservation of that province was rather owing to the ill-management and disagreement of the Spanish commander than to any human means employed on our part for our own defence. And if the Spaniards had, instead of attacking Georgia, gone directly to Fort Royal or Charleston in South Carolina, as was proposed by one of their commanders, that province must certainly have fallen into their hands.  

The Battle of Bloody Marsh saved the southern colonies from what might later have become a serious menace.

Nevertheless, to the settlers in Georgia the dangers remained as real as ever. Early in 1743 many of them believed that the Spaniards, with the secret support of the French, were planning a strong push against the English in North America, and in February Oglethorpe sent Captain Dunbar to London in order to obtain assistance, "which if we have not, we must certainly perish". "In the present situation I am in", he wrote, "I shall do the best I can, but have reason to apprehend the worst of consequences"

2. C.O.5/655, no.113, Ogle to Newcastle, 17 May 1743.
3. Ibid., no. 94, Oglethorpe to Stone, 16 Feb. 1743.
from the great numbers of the enemy if I have not timely
support." The Government, however, was not convinced
and would not accede to Oglethorpe's requests. The Privy
Council, indeed, observed that large sums of money had
already been issued to answer bills drawn by him, and that
the expenses were "constantly going on, and justified by
nothing but the evident danger of the colony". Oglethorpe
was ordered, therefore to reduce expenditure as much as
possible as soon as that danger had been lessened or re-
moved. He continued to apply for supplies and reinforce­
ments none the less, but without effect, until, his patiense
exhausted, he disclaimed any responsibility for what might
happen as a result of the Ministry's attitude.

But the Government was fully justified in its policy.
It could not afford to waste money or troops on what was
undeniably a minor aspect of the war. Oglethorpe said
there was danger not only from the Spaniards in Florida
but also from the French moving in from the Mississippi.
This may have been true; but it was true also (and Ogle­
 thorpe would not know this) that the danger in Europe was
now from France no less than Spain. In October 1743 the

1. C.O.5/655, nos. 65 and 93, Oglethorpe to Newcastle,
22 Jan. and 14 Feb. 1743; no. 123, Dunbar to Newcastle
13 June 1743.
2. Ibid., no. 122, Stone to Oglethorpe, 9 June, 1743.
3. Add MSS 32702, fo.347, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, 15 April
1744. C.O.5/655, no.149, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, 24
Aug.1744. It is interesting to note that in the autumn
of 1744, when Oglethorpe was losing his patience, the
coasts of South Carolina were being insulted by Spanish
vessels and several English trading vessels had been
seized: Adm.1/3817, Glen to Admiralty, 22 Sept. 1744.
Franco-Spanish alliance was tightened by the professedly imperishable Family Compact of Fontainebleau, whereby France was pledged to assist in the recovery of Minorca and Gibraltar and Spain not to renew the asiento in favour of England. Article 10 dealt with the territories in America:

And since the security of Florida cannot be assured so long as the new colony of Georgia is allowed to exist, where hitherto the English have been unable to justify their settlement by any title, their said Majesties shall also take action in concert to compel the English to destroy the new colony aforesaid as well as any other fortified place which they have constructed in the territory of His Catholic Majesty in America, and to restore the country or places belonging to Spain which they have occupied or which they may occupy during the war.

The war now took on a new complexion. Georgia was clearly of some significance because it was mentioned in the Franco-Spanish treaty. But the tremendous range over which hostilities were now to be conducted, and the important commitments Britain had all over the globe, made it inevitable that the plight of Georgia and South Carolina should have scant attention paid to it. The Government had to dispose its forces with some care. It had obligations in Hanover; it was bound to give support to Austria and Savoy; it had to provide for a struggle with France that would stretch from the sunny waters of the Indian Ocean to the rugged backwoods of North America; and it had to beware lest Gibraltar, Minorca and the Mediterranean-

ean fell under Bourbon domination. It is not surprising, then, that Georgia received niggardly treatment by the mother-country during the remainder of the conflict.¹

Even so, in America, meanwhile, Oglethorpe had not been content with merely repulsing the Spaniards. Firmly believing they were resolved to return to the attack, he decided to draw them into battle before they were reinforced from Havana. Accompanied by a considerable body of Creek Indians, a detachment from the Highland company and a part of his regiment, Oglethorpe landed in Florida on the night of 9 March 1743 and drove the enemy within the lines of St. Augustine. Convinced that the town was too strong to take by storm, Oglethorpe endeavoured to lure the Spaniards into ambush by hiding most of his army from sight and parading a very small force outside the lines. The ruse was unsuccessful, the enemy declining to leave their fortifications, and the English were obliged to return to Frederica, having marched ninety-six miles in four days. Thus ended the general's last expedition against the Spaniards, and a few months later he sailed finally to England.

By the autumn of 1743 war with France was expected and plans had to be modified accordingly. The security of

¹ This neglect of the Georgia frontier question after 1743 was reciprocated on the part of Spain: see Lanning, "A Descriptive Catalogue of some Legajos on Georgia in the Spanish Archives", Ga.H.Q., XIII, p.418.
commerce and settlements in America was considered, and the Privy Council recommended the reinforcement of Georgia and the Carolinas with three independent companies and six galleys. "But to command the Gulf of Florida, which has always been thought a matter of the highest consequence, both to annoy our enemies and to secure our own navigation, a little more care should be taken of the Bahama Islands." This was sound enough, but the question of expense limited whatever good intentions the Government had for American defence. Notwithstanding King George's personal example at Dettingen the previous June, behind the popular excitement was a growing sense, shared by some members of the Cabinet, that England was spending a disproportionate amount of men and money.

So that it was a critical Government that contemplated the cost of protecting Georgia. Between 1738 and 1743 a total of £91,705 13s 5d had been spent on the colony, and since regular and exact returns of the men and supplies in the province could not be ascertained, the Government was sensibly reluctant to continue expenditure there. In 1747 Henry Fox, the Secretary at War, wrote firmly to Newcastle, the Secretary of State:

1. C.0.5/43, ff.17-23, Considerations on the security of British commerce and colonies in America, 24 Sept. 1743.
2. Add MSS, 35893, fo.90, Account of the extra services in Georgia. Commons Journals, XXIV, p.615.
I am not, nor cannot be, answerable for the safety of Georgia, but I must beg leave still to be firmly of opinion that it would be extremely wrong to continue so great an expense for troops, boats, etc., on account of their supposed utility, without knowing whether or no there are such troops, boats, etc., employed.

Fox was quite right, of course. Britain could not afford to waste money on defences of questionable utility. The country had experienced the Jacobite Rebellion and the disasters of 1745, a year of gloom relieved only by the capture of Louisbourg, the capital and port of Cape Breton. At that time it had seemed to the Earl of Chesterfield, Secretary of State and an advocate of peace, that "to carry on the war another year is evidently impossible, from our exhausted condition as to finances, from the universal disposition of the whole nation, and from the dangers to which we are exposed".

By 1745 movements for peace were beginning. The Dutch were anxious for a cessation of hostilities, and the Pensionary and the English ambassador at the Hague, Robert Trevor, exchanged ideas on the subject. The English ambassador set down on paper the articles which, he suggested to Henry Pelham, who then headed the British Government, might provide a treaty prelusive to a general accommodation. Among these was a proposal for an Anglo-Spanish peace based on the Treaty

of Utrecht and the Convention of Pardo: "The frontier between the Carolinas and Florida to be marked by commission-ers". This article would have meant restoring the Georgia boundary problem to the position of 1739, when deadlock had been the result and would assuredly have been so again. Be that as it may, no attempt was made to promote negotiations on these lines. One of Trevor's proposals was that if the Grand Duke, husband of Empress Maria Theresa, should be elected Emperor, he was to cede Tuscany to the Spanish Infant, Don Philip. But the Earl of Harrington, Secretary of State, had recently accompanied King George to Hanover and concluded there a convention with Prussia by which Britain undertook to extort from Austria a renewal of the Breslau settlement of 1742, and until it was seen what effect this had in Vienna it seemed inadvisable to suggest to the Empress that her husband should hand over his grand-duchy at the same time as she herself was called upon to surrender all hope of retaining Silesia. Peace did not come in 1745, nor did it come for over two years more, but preparation and talk of it were afoot. The death of Philip V in 1746 shattered the ambitious power of Elizabeth Farnese in Spain, and his son and successor, Ferdinand VI, began almost at once to seek negotiation with

1. Ibid., pp.122-5, Trevor to Pelham, 30 July and 3 Aug. 1745
Britain by way of Lisbon. In August 1746 Benjamin Keene was given full power to cross over from Portugal into Spain as soon as possible in order to negotiate on all matters that might conduce to restoring peace and renewing Anglo-Spanish friendship. In the diplomatic exchanges of the ensuing eighteen months the problem of the Georgia-Florida frontier was practically ignored by the statesmen, for there is only very occasional mention of it in the correspondence of the period. Consequently, there was no sign whatever of a proper solution to the problem when, in March 1748, a congress of the Powers was opened at Aix-la-Chapelle to arrange a peace settlement.

Nevertheless, the fact remained that the boundary of Georgia might be discussed at the congress, and apprehensive of this the Georgia Trustees were careful to bring the details of the situation before the Duke of Bedford, one of the Secretaries of State. They employed the agreements made with the Governor of St. Augustine before the war to prove Britain's title to the River Altamaha and her sovereignty over the Creek, Chickasaw, Cherokee and some Choctaw Indians who had been allies of the English against the Spaniards.

1. Add MSS. 36120, fo.211, Newcastle to Hardwicke, 11 Aug. 1746. Add MSS. 33009, fo.49.

2. This is most obvious in S.P.100/9 and 100/59, and in the correspondence between Keene and Newcastle in Add. MSS. 32807. According to J.T. Lanning in the Ga.H.Q., XIII, p.412, there is the same paucity of materials in Spanish archives.
They also submitted the old thesis of Britain's right to North America based on the discoveries of Sebastian Cabot. The Trustees need have had no fear. After several months of negotiation a treaty was signed in October which did little more than leave the real causes of dispute as they had been before the war. Nothing was said about the boundaries of Georgia and Florida, and nothing about guardacostas searching English ships suspected of smuggling. The asiento was renewed for four years in favour of British subjects, but in 1750 was finally abandoned for a money indemnity. The principle of reciprocal restoration of all conquests meant that Louisbourg was handed back to the French, and New England rendered insecure again. Indeed, so far as North America was concerned, the war had decided nothing. But it had revealed one very important fact; that, so far as Georgia was concerned, France was now the greater enemy. The main danger henceforward lay not from the Spaniards in Florida but from the Frenchmen and their Indian allies moving in from the region of the Mississippi.

1. C.O.5/656, ff.60-106, Martyn to Chetwynd, with enclosure 7 April 1748.

2. The text of the treaty is in London Magazine, XVII (Nov. 1748) pp.503-12, and in European Treaties bearing on the History of the United States, IV, pp.73-5 (in French)
Oglethorpe had to contend with social and political difficulties as well as with the Spanish enemy. The Trustees, while recognizing his value as a military commander, were wary of allowing him too much authority in the civil field because he tended to put his own construction on their orders and enforce them at his own discretion. In August 1737 they appointed William Stephens as their secretary in the province, and his job was to keep them more circumstantially and regularly informed of affairs there. In April 1741, when Georgia was divided into two counties, Savannah in the north and Frederica in the south, each under the jurisdiction of a president and four assistants, Stephens became president of the northern county, while the other was left vacant until the wishes of Oglethorpe were known. Then, in June 1743, when he was over seventy, infirm and encumbered with domestic bereavements, Stephens was made president of the whole colony. Thus Oglethorpe's authority during the war with Spain was not so comprehensive as he himself, no

2. C.O.5/668, pp.10-1, Martyn to Stephens, 24 April 1741. Col.Rec.Ga., II, pp.367-8. See also Egmont Diary, III, pp.171-2. The intention was that Oglethorpe should become president of the southern county, but no appointment was ever made.
doubt, would have wished. The Trustees distrusted his independence; some colonists disliked his autocratic temperament; the Walpole Ministry disapproved of his truculent attitude towards the Spaniards; and there was even a rumour in England that his allegiance was suspect, for he had one sister a maid of honour to the Queen of Spain, another in France and one in Savoy. These factors have to be borne in mind when assessing Oglethorpe's military achievements in America.

Another important consideration was the fact that the dangers to Georgia were not only from enemies outside its borders but also from unruly elements within. From an early date there had been those in South Carolina who decried Georgia and encouraged its inhabitants to leave and try their luck in its northern neighbour. Merchants in Charleston, fearing competition in their trade, disseminated grotesque descriptions of the infant settlement in 1734: "There could be no description of any place, without the malice of hell itself, be made so dismal as the people of that town endeavour to make of Georgia." There was certainly no lack of material for painting a melancholy picture. By 1734 the province's deficiencies in many of the ingredients of civilized society were beginning to attract the notice of some

1. Add MSS 32992, fo.114, A.B. to Newcastle.
3. C.O.5/636, fo.21, William Bateman to Trustees, 3 Sept. 1734
inhabitants. Money was scarce, and a person could not spend even five shillings without a warrant: "we may almost say that all payments are stopped from one freeholder to another". There was much distress and real need. Some people were obliged to sell their household goods in order to buy bread, and others, at one time, were reduced to feeding on alligators. As one inhabitant observed: "Georgia, which was seemingly intended to be the asylum of the distressed, unless things are greatly altered, is likely to be itself a mere scene of distress".

By the spring of 1735 dissatisfaction was spread wide among the population, and there was common talk of returning to the mother-country.

The main grievances related to negroes, rum, land and the public store. Many inhabitants deemed slave labour essential if the province was to compete at all with South Carolina. In the words of one eighteenth century writer, probably Edmund Burke: "it is the nature of man not to submit to extraordinary hardships in one spot, when they see their neighbours on another, without any difference in the circumstances of things, in a much more easy condition".

3. C.O.5/636, fo.190, Dobree to Trustees, 6 Feb. 1734/5. C.O. 5/637, fo.9, Peter Gordon to Trustees, 7 May 1735.
Carolina possessed slaves, Georgia did not. The demand in Georgia emanated principally from settlers holding sufficient land to make negro labour really useful, or from those possessing sufficient capital to make a slave trade profitable. Economic conditions and the proximity of South Carolina made their arguments strong. One critic, writing in 1743, observed "In spite of all endeavours to disguise this point, it is as clear as light itself that negroes are as essentially necessary to the cultivation of Georgia as axes, hoes or any other utensil of agriculture". The demand for a restricted admission of negroes arose early in the history of Georgia and grew steadily in volume, and the refusal to permit it remained for many years a prominent cause of discontent.

Another grievance was the prohibition on rum, a measure which the Trustees were convinced was in the interests of the settlers themselves. It was impossible to enforce this law, and by 1738 "private rum shops were become as common among the people, in proportion, as gin-shops formerly at London". Whatever may have been the febrifugal advantages of rum, the Trustees considered only its pernicious effects. As late as December 1741 they asked Oglethorpe to restrain

1. A Brief Account of the Causes that have retarded the Progress of the Colony of Georgia, p.8.
2. Col.Rec.Ga., IV, p.122
Jacob Matthews, whose practice it was to intoxicate Indians in Savannah so that they "used to roar and yell about the streets, as well at nights as days, to the terror, disturbance and annoyance of the inhabitants" \(^1\) The land restrictions, too, were a source of unrest, and by 1738 several persons had declared their intention to leave Georgia unless alteration was soon made to the existing system of land tenure, and William Stephens did not doubt that many others were "caught with such opinions" \(^2\)

In whichever direction the colonists turned there were restrictions, benevolently imposed by the Trustees but so aggravating to the people who had to suffer them. The effect was to discourage even the more conscientious of the population. The spring of 1737 seems to have been a particularly unfortunate period. There were no provisions in the public store at Savannah, purchasing power was practically nil, it being reckoned that if a boat were to come with supplies "the whole town could not purchase it", and some men were obliged to find employment in South Carolina to prevent their families starving. "In our present circumstances", wrote Elisha Dobree, "there seems to be a dark cloud over us, and most of our people are cast down at the thoughts of what they

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1. C.O.5/668, p.67, Verelst to Oglethorpe, 14 Dec. 1741
3. C.O.5/639, ff.271-2, Brownfield to Trustees, 2 May 1737
expect to be". By 1739 the province was in such a poor condition that it became quite fashionable to ridicule it. "It was a melancholy thing", wrote George Whitefield on his second voyage there, "to see the colony of Georgia reduced even to a much lower state than when I left it, and almost deserted by all except those who could not well go away."

Discontent was organized and fostered by a group of disgruntled persons, mainly Scotsmen, in Savannah. The leader was Patrick Tailfer, a doctor from Edinburgh, who formed his followers into a club which met regularly at Mr. Jenkins's tavern, where, no doubt, indignation could be raised to fever heat under the stimulus of a tot of unlicensed rum. It was by visiting the tavern occasionally that William Stephens was able to keep himself well-informed of their activities. Their most virulent exclamations were about land tenure, which they termed "a slavery under the Trustees", and the prohibition on negroes, and by various means they sought to persuade the other inhabitants into thinking with them. They would meet in parties "and cabal how to retify and reform matters according to their several caprices."

1. Ibid., fo. 178, Dobree to Trustees.
They would spread alarming rumours, "bugbear tales" Stephens called them, about the Trustees' intentions or of imminent Indian attacks, "sticking at nothing they thought would make the place odious to the inhabitants". They maintained an advertising campaign to attract adherents, making "a tinsel appearance" in the evenings at the very time when preparations were afoot for the attack on St. Augustine. In June 1740 the club promoted horse-racing with the idea of inducing the onlookers to adjourn after the race to the tavern, where Dr. Tailfer and his accomplices could rant about the grievances the colony was alleged to labour under to an audience naturally disposed to be receptive so long as their tankards were full. This, however, had little effect on the more responsible sections of the populace, and won the club the support only of a few idle persons "who had more regard for their share of drink in the wagers lost than to the doctor's eloquence."

In December 1738 the club drew up a representation to the Trustees, setting forth the impossibility of the province continuing with its present land system, lack of slave labour, and its commercial disadvantages in comparison with other British colonies. This quickly became the talk of the town and received 121 signatures and the support of nearly everyone.

2. Martyn, An Account showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia, pp.51-4.
which, as Stephens admitted, "shewed plainly the contents of it were what they had at heart, though they had hitherto refrained from making such open complaint". The malcontents proposed to publish the representation in other parts of America and in England, and were encouraged by the news of similar disaffection among the inhabitants of Darien, who had sent a deputation to Oglethorpe to lay their grievances before him. The industrious Highlanders of Darien, however, were not so discontented or refractory as Dr. Tailfer's supporters in Savannah, and the representation had a cool reception there. The Highlanders were certainly uneasy, but the majority were characteristically cautious, "thinking it the wisest way not to quarrel with the bread and butter they got, though perhaps not spread to their liking". Finding that their complaints made little impression on the Trustees either, some of the malcontents by the close of 1739 were preparing to cross over to the opposite banks of the Savannah into South Carolina, where they would be entitled to employ negroes. Differences arose among them, Tailfer's authority was questioned by some, and he himself threatened to move to one of the West Indian islands. In July 1740 a few left for New York,

2. Ibid., pp.264-5.
among them the notorious Mrs. Townshend, who had execrated the Trustees and been a nuisance in the town for several years. Finally, in September, the leaders carried out their long-proclaimed intent to leave the province. "Thus", rejoiced Secretary Stephens, "we at last see an end of that cursed club which has so long been the very bane of this place".

Georgia had seen, but not heard, the last of the malcontents. Tailfer and his colleagues had no intention of allowing their grievances to be overlooked, and in 1741 they published in Charleston what they called A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia in America. This set out in detail all the encumbrances under which the province was labouring. The reasons for Georgia's slow and disappointing progress were listed as the sanguine and misleading description of its soil and climate by the Trustees; limitation of land tenure to tail-male; restrictions on a proprietor selling or leasing property; the impossibility of supporting a family on the permitted maximum of fifty acres; the high rate of quit-rents; the prohibition on negro labour; anomalies in the legal system, especially Oglethorpe's assumption of the power to nominate magistrates; ill-judged methods of encouraging the production of silk and wine; and the assigning of definitive tracts of land without regard to its quality or to the

1. Ibid., pp.465, 624, 630-1, 655.
settlements' capabilities:

By these and many other such hardships, the poor inhabitants of Georgia are scattered over the face of the earth; her plantations a wild; her towns a desert; her villages in rubbish; her improvements a byword and her liberties a jest: an object of pity to friends, and of insult, contempt and ridicule to enemies.

Although the pamphlet was abusive, especially against Oglethorpe, much of its criticism was well-founded. The early propaganda put out by the Trustees had, in truth, been sanguine, and Philip Thicknesse, who described himself as one of "the foolish Georgia emigrants", asserted that he had only gone to the new colony because he "had been so poisoned by the glaring colours in which Oglethorpe had in his printed books displayed the prospects". The criticisms about land and property regulations were demonstrably valid. The labour problem was real, although the need for slaves could be questioned. It has already been noticed how Oglethorpe's extending authority had become a source of uneasiness even among the Trustees. The injustice involved in the assignment of land regardless of its qualities or the capabilities of the tenant was to recur as a cause of complaint under the royal government after 1754. The criticism of the high

1. P. Tailfer (et al.), A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia in America (Charleston, 1741) pp.79-80.

2. Thicknesse Memoirs, I, pp.21-3. On the other hand, Thicknesse, in Nov. 1736 when he was still only sixteen, had written home to his mother saying that he liked Georgia, that he would sooner live there than anywhere in England, and advising his brother Sam to come out and join him, for they would be able to live as happy as the day is long: Col.Rec.Ga., XXI, pp.256-7.
rate of quit-rents, however, does not ring true nor bear examination, for payment did not commence until ten years after the grant and none of the settlers in Georgia had yet paid one penny in quit-rent. But the persistence of the malcontents was bound to attract the attention to the colony which they desired. Through friends in Savannah they were spreading reports of inevitable ruin, and "tickling each other at the hellish imagination of." Their influence became still more dangerous when they managed to acquire supporters in the mother-country.

On the whole, the majority of those people in Britain who had heard of Georgia viewed it benignly but with little particular interest. Colonial affairs were subsidiary issues in the English political life of that period, and there was no reason why Georgia should receive special attention, except at the annual voting of its grant in Parliament. As a province that did not depopulate the mother-country, nor compete with her manufactures, and which bade fair to become a valuable source of raw materials, Georgia was naturally popular in its early years. "It is generally believed," wrote Pegasus in the Grub-Street Journal, "that this matter will, in a few years, considerably lessen the poor tax, by relieving great numbers of unfortunate people, and by giving employment to the manufacturers in England for

furnishing them with all kinds of necessaries". There were always some opponents, of course, and there were bodies in the country which, holding advanced ideas of the public good, expressed anti-imperialist sentiment and the fear that the expansion of the colonies would culminate in their escape from the mother-country's control. But the critics were a small minority. When people thought about the colonies, which was not often, they generally regarded them with mild approval, and certainly they had no strong reason to disparage Georgia. Most people believed in the advantages of empire and held the views which John Bennet maintained so forcibly in his discourses published in 1736. He argued that all England's needs could be fully met by the wise regulation and improvement of the American colonies. In England were large numbers of idle, miserable and debauched persons who were a burden on the community, while in America was land enough to provide a subsistence for them all and where they would be of some use to this country. Colonies do not depopulate or drain the mother-country, but strengthen her, their advantages, continued Bennet, being well defined in the reasons which had been advanced for the foundation of Georgia. "And the great encouragement His Majesty has already given to Georgia, etc., should make us rest confident

1. Grub-Street Journal, no.133 (20 July 1732)
that he has nothing more at heart than the improvement of
the British empire in America, and the happiness of his
faithful people! 1

In the troublesome years after 1739, however, it is
noticeable that criticism of the province was increasing,
especially in Parliament. Malicious rumours were diffused;
Georgia was described as a chimera and the Trustees were
accused of sharing out the Parliamentary grants among them­
selves. The critics began to find their ammunition in
the allegations sedulously publicized by the malcontents
of the colony itself, and though much of it misfired, suffici­
ent hit the target to cause damage. After Parliament's
voting of the grant in February 1740, Lord Egmont "came
away with a heavy heart to see so great an affair as the
settlement of our colony treated so ludicrously, and so
little regarded by the majority and the minority." 2

Most prominent of the Members of Parliament taking up
the disaffected cause was Lord Gage, an inveterate opponent
of the whole Georgia project. When the annual financial
grant was debated in the Commons in January 1740, Gage said
he wanted to know what Georgia really was before he would
vote money towards it. Later, he accused the Trustees
of pursuing a policy that would bring ruin on the whole

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1. The National Merchant, or discourses on commerce and
province, and cited the malcontents' representation of 1738 to prove it. "I have my pocket full of papers", he said, "that show it cannot subsist in the manner it is, and that the people have almost deserted it". The settlement was obviously not worth public assistance, and he deprecated the way Parliament was prone to "give away the nation's money blindfold". He even made a motion that all correspondence between the colony and the Trustees over the last two years should be laid before the House, but withdrew it when Lord Baltimore blandly remarked that "there might be some ladies in Georgia who had a correspondence with the Trustees". Horace Walpole sardonically observed that the only way to reconcile Lord Gage was to make him a Georgia Trustee and then all would be well.

Another critic was Sir John Bernard, M.P. for the City of London and an authority on financial and commercial matters, who argued that the prohibition on negroes prevented Georgians from competing on equal terms with South Carolinians, who would always be able to undersell them. John Mordaunt, M.P. for Whitchurch and a constant enemy of Georgia, pointed out that seven years had gone by without the inhabitants producing any silk or wine:

1. Ibid., pp.103, 107-8, 112.
he therefore believed they would not have silk enough to clothe themselves, and as to wine, he believed it would be well to give it to the inhabitants for their own drinking, and wished them good luck with it, for it would be all would ever be seen of their wine, and if the people of the place drank no other they would be the soberest subjects in the world. That the colony had cost the nation a vast sum and it was time to put an end to it, and this sum would probably be the last granted, for he could venture to foretell that if the Trustees came next year for more there would not be a man for giving a farthing.  

Nevertheless, the Trustees did come for more the next year, and a majority of 115 against 75 were for giving £10,000. At the same time they came in for more censure, not only from the inevitable Lord Gage but, also from the ill-natured Sir John Hind Cotton, who opposed granting any more to Georgia because it was of no benefit to Britain, nor likely to be, and he was for transferring its inhabitants to South Carolina. Samuel Sandys, known as "the motion maker" by his persistent attacks on the Walpole Ministry and who was soon to be Chancellor of the Exchequer, said he did not know what to think of Georgia, but thought there should be an inquiry into the propriety of supporting or not supporting the colony, and criticized the Trustees for sending there so many idle people who would not labour here and assuredly would not labour anywhere.

The main source of information for the Parliamentary

1. Ibid., pp.108-9, 113.

critics was Thomas Stephens, the wayward son of William Stephens. In October 1739 he arrived in England determined to bring the state of Georgia to public notice, and, except for a few months at the end of 1741 when he revisited the province, disseminated for three years accounts of deplorable conditions prevailing in the colony as a result of its government and laws. On 1 April 1742 a petition from him to this effect came before the Privy Council, and at the end of the month it was debated in the House of Commons. The petition alleged that the failure and impracticability of their schemes in Georgia had been "properly represented from time to time to the Trustees" and the necessary alterations recommended and requested of them for nearly seven years:

and through a refusal of these alterations, and misapplication of the public money, great delay in discharging the debts due from the Trustees to the people, and many abuses in the civil power, the colony is so greatly reduced, both in the number and condition of its inhabitants, as to be incapable of fulfilling His Majesty's most gracious designs in establishing it, unless such present redress be found for the injured people, and such means procured for their encouragement as may concur with the natural fertility of the soil, the commodious situation of the province, and its excellent harbours for trade, to answer the generous purposes of an effectual establishment.3

In June a committee of the House resolved that Stephens's

1. Ibid., pp.82, 84, 105, 118, 139, 176, 200, 205, 264.
petition contained "false, scandalous and malicious charges tending to asperse the characters of the Trustees", and that the preservation and support of Georgia was necessary and advantageous to Great Britain. Accordingly, the culprit was brought to the bar of the House, where, on his knees, he was severely reprimanded by the Speaker before being discharged upon payment of his fees.

These resolutions were, no doubt, gratifying to the Trustees, but the fact could no longer be disguised that the Georgia project was falling into disrepute. Neither the Ministry nor the Opposition was much concerned for the colony as such, and the Trustees were regarded with disfavour by both sides. Walpole himself was never particularly zealous for the enterprise, and his wife was known to be an opponent of it. He distrusted the power acquired by the Trustees under their charter, believing it gave them too much independence of the Crown, and he disliked them personally because they sometimes voted against him in Parliament. The whole Court party, indeed, resented the tendency of some of them to vote together against Ministerial measures, and several of the party held the Board of Trustees in great distaste: "They had rather see

the Board dissolved", wrote Lord Egmont, "and the colony in the sea than that an election should be lost by our means". Hucks, White and Heathcote, in speaking and voting against the motion in February 1736 for a Parliamentary grant to continue repairs to Henry VII’s Chapel, aroused considerable Ministerial antagonism which bade fair to negative the Trustees’ petition for money, Walpole observing "that it was indiscreet in gentlemen who were themselves to apply for money to refuse it to others". It was the Ministry’s coolness towards Georgia that helped to induce Moore, White and Lord Egmont to eventually resign their membership of the Common Council.

But it is difficult to believe that the Ministry was ever seriously concerned with the Parliamentary influence of the Georgia Trustees. A recent scholarly examination of the relationship between the Trustees and the House of Commons shows that they were never an effective group in Parliamentary affairs because their interest in Georgia was seldom so keen as to affect their political loyalties, and their prestige was due more to the early popularity of

1. Egmont Diary, II, pp.155-6, 239, 286; III, p.113.
2. Ibid., II, pp.236, 269; III, p.265.
Georgia itself than to any united action on their own part. It is true that of the twenty-one Trustees mentioned in the charter eleven sat in the House of Commons, and that of the seventy elected to the Board between 1732 and 1752 forty-four sat in the Commons and five in the Lords. On the other hand, there were never more than twenty-five of them in the Commons at any one time, and none could accurately be described as a prominent member of the House.  

Again, although it was at first in Walpole's interest to patronize the Trustees in order to avoid alienating his supporters among them and, perhaps, to incidentally win some Opposition votes, it gradually became apparent that the Trustees were more dependent upon him than he was upon them. Most of them were "Walpole men" in any event, and by 1739, when criticism of Georgia was increasing in Parliament, some were clearly more interested in supporting the Ministry than in helping Georgia, and after 1740 few of the Trustees in Parliament were prepared to speak out boldly on behalf of the colony or to risk offending Walpole by asking for funds.

The Government's apparent indifference to Georgia affairs was not due solely to personal or political considerations. Whatever Walpole may have said in private

1. Ibid., pp. 552-4
2. Ibid., pp. 560-1. Egmont Diary, III, pp. 9-17, 25-8, 32-3.
conversation, and whatever some of his colleagues may have thought of the Trustees, the fact remains that Parliament continued to make grants for the support of the province. The animadversions from Gage and others represented a small minority, and the emotion aroused was generally out of all proportion to the numbers involved. It was natural, none the less, for the Trustees to feel themselves unjustly treated when the Ministry belittled their project and condemned their Parliamentary activities, but in doing so they were making the worst of a reasonably good job. Indeed, the Government's attitude to Georgia, when seen in its proper perspective, appears in a relatively favourable light.

By 1740 Georgia was a disappointment to many people, and its record provided no valid reason why its existence should be maintained, except in the capacity of a buffer between Florida and South Carolina. None of the original expectations had materialized and there was little indication that it would ever contribute much of value to the imperial system. Many of the grievances aired by Dr. Tailfer and his associates were not hypothetical; they definitely existed. The complaints regarding negroes, land tenure and rum did not come only from the malcontents; responsible and industrious inhabitants voiced the same objections. Much of the disaffection was founded on
genuine misery, discomfort and want. The economic policy of the Trustees was patently wrong in practice, however proper it may have seemed in theory. Although the malcontents did not secure a great number of active supporters, many sympathized with their views, and it cannot be said they were altogether unsuccessful. Their constant pressure, reinforced by arguments from more responsible quarters, gradually proved to the Trustees that a wrong beginning had been made to the province and that some modification of policy was essential.

It is always difficult for authority, however, to admit error, and all too often an attitude or policy is prolonged because of reluctance to surrender cherished principles. This was the case with the Georgia Trustees. In founding their colony they had built up a system of rules they judged most fit and necessary for its welfare. They had elaborated and advertised to the public the reasons for these regulations and given their administration an aura of righteousness. Yet, within a decade of the experiment's inauguration, censure of their policy was coming from all quarters. A policy intended for the common weal was the cause of common woe; what was to have been the ideal had proved to be far from that. Evidence that they were travelling the wrong road accumulated with the years, but they were loath to change direction. Were they, altruistic and intelligent
men, to renounce the principles upon which they had 
found the colony for the sake of appeasing a gang of 
turbulent malcontents? Why should they? The reasons 
for their policy had been lucidly and logically put on 
record, and the evidence they received was conflicting. 
William Stephens, the Trustees' secretary in Georgia, 
was inclined to justify their policy rather than criticize 
it, and although his views were not always so in harmony 
with those of the Trustees as one authority has inferred, 
it is true that the information he provided the Trustees 
was generally of such a character as to invite the con­ 
tinuance of existing policy. But disaffection mounted, 
and by 1739 it had become obvious that some alteration of 
the regulations was essential if settlers were to be kept 
in the province.

Foremost among the grievances was that over tenure 
of land. In March 1738 some members of the Common Council 
of the Trustees met by private agreement and decided on 
a compromise by which lands might descend to female heirs 
on condition that they married a man who would reside in 
the colony and who, at the time of marriage, possessed no 
land of his own. By this means the main purpose behind 
the regulations, namely the retention of inhabitants capable 
of bearing arms, would still be answered. By March 1739

1. McCain, Georgia as a Proprietary Province, pp.169,171-2. 
the Trustees realized they would have to allow unqualified female succession, and in the September a resolution embodying the change was ordered to be printed in the newspapers. Other resolutions were passed to the effect that in the event of there being no issue, male or female, an estate need not revert to the Trustees but could devolve on a person appointed by the landholder, provided the successor named was not a Roman Catholic. On 6 June 1740 it was agreed that freeholders should be allowed to lease land for rent to tenants for a period of up to seven years, on condition that the tenant resided on the land and improved it. In the following month the maximum amount of land any one person could accumulate by inheritance was raised from five hundred to two thousand acres, and the stipulations as to cultivation and the planting of mulberry trees were considerably reduced.

1. Col. Rec. Ga., I, pp. 345-6. Egmont Diary, III, pp. 31, 34, 78-9, 81. The change was made on the authority of the Trustees as set forth in the charter, and not embodied in a formal law because that would have involved securing royal approval and removed the power of revoking or altering it out of the Trustees' hands.


3. Ibid., p. 336.

4. Ibid., pp. 338, 340. Egmont Diary, III, p. 157. On a 500 acre grant only 60 instead of 200 acres need be cultivated in the first ten years, and only 1,000 instead of 2,000 mulberry trees be planted in the same period.
These changes were not sufficient to completely satisfy
the colonists. The liability to forfeit lands remained
if the stipulated improvements were not made inside the
specified period, and with the exigencies of war pressing
hard the opportunity to make such improvements was unavoid­
ably curtailed. Moreover, the malcontents in Savannah had
been doing their utmost to persuade the people that the
amendments were trifling and that land in Georgia was still
held on "the basest tenure in Christendom". In March 1741
the Trustees reduced again landholders' obligations as to
cultivation, and consented to a hundred German Protestants,
who had petitioned to be sent to Georgia, receiving lands
in tail-male and for an annual quit-rent of only four shill­
ings per hundred acres. Twelve months later it was
resolved that on the death of a tenant his wife should have
the house, together with the outbuildings, gardens and
appurtenances belonging to it, and the land be divided be­
tween her and the eldest son; if there was no son then
that half of the property could be devised by will or in­
erited by the eldest daughter. In July and August 1742

2. On a 500 acre grant only 50 instead of 60 acres need
be cultivated in the first ten years, and correspondingly
less on grants of smaller acreage.
the Board of Trustees recommended to the Common Council that in future a person who took servants to Georgia and settled there at his own expense should be granted land in fee-simple instead of tail-male, but should be forbidden to alienate any of his property until after a period of ten years, by which time he must have cultivated at least an eighth of it. At the same time, in order to prevent inconveniences that might arise by monopolization, accumulation of realty was restricted to two thousand acres, although a person becoming entitled by inheritance to more than that was to be allowed to sell the excess. Finally, in March 1750, the tenure of all lands was enlarged to absolute inheritance. Thus the colonists at last obtained what they had sought for so long. The way was opened for the creation of larger land-holdings and for the gradual development of a landed aristocracy.

Together with the mitigation of conditions of land tenure went a reduction of charges upon it, a measure necessary to stimulate economic development. A beginning was made in December 1741 when the Trustees prepared a petition to the King for the cancellation of quit-rents

on pine-barren lands. Since nothing came of this, they
drew up another petition in July 1742 setting forth that
further encouragements were needed in order to effectually
settle Georgia, and that of particular advantage would
be the release to the Trustees of the quit-rents due the
Crown so that they could grant land on cheaper terms and
apply any residue for the benefit of the colony. This
petition came before the Privy Council at the end of the
month and was referred to the Board of Trade in August.
The Lords Commissioners considered it in October and re­
commended a reduction of quit-rents by the King from four
shillings to two shillings per hundred acres as a means
of promoting settlement in Georgia. In pursuance of
this recommendation the Trustees drew up an Act which
provided for the reduction of quit-rents to two shillings
per hundred acres, payable after ten years, and for the
remission of all arrears that may have become due on former
grants. The Act seems to have had an unfortunate career,
being bandied about by the Privy Council and the Board of
Trade until 1745, and there is no evidence of it ever being

1. Col.Rec.Ga., I, p.390. Pine-barren was land where pines
were prevalent. It was usually high land and the soil
dry and sandy.

2. Ibid., p.400.


nal, 6, 20, 28 and 29 Oct. 1742.

put into force.

There was, in fact, no prospect whatever of quit-rents being actually collected, and it is impossible to accept J. R. McCain's statement to the contrary. "Conditions", according to him, "greatly improved during the last two or three years of proprietary control; and it is quite probable that if the Trustees had remained in power a few years longer that the quit-rents would have been regularly and successfully collected". If conditions were improving during the later years of charter rule, the authority of the Trustees certainly was not, and it is difficult to conceive of them ever having the power to enforce the regulations. It has also to be borne in mind that conditions improved much more rapidly after the inception of royal government in 1752, and yet it still proved impossible to collect the quit-rents even then. It is obvious, therefore, that the collection of quit-rents in Georgia was an impracticable proposition throughout the Trusteeship period of rule.

By 1742 the Trustees were aware, too, that their Act prohibiting importation of rum into Georgia was ineffective, except in causing discontent. In January an instruction was sent to William Stephens to "wink at the importation of


2. McCain, Georgia as a Proprietary Province, p.256.
rum and discourage seizures thereof", and in July the seal of the Corporation was affixed to two Acts, one for amending the existing law and the other for regulating the sale of rum and "suppressing the odious and loathsome sin of drunkenness". The amending Act permitted the importation of rum after 29 September 1742 from any of the other British colonies in exchange for lumber or other goods of Georgia. To prevent frauds or abuses the Common Council reserved the power to regulate the purchase and sale of the rum imported. Repeal of the prohibition was prompted by the resolution of a committee of the Commons that it would be "an advantage to the colony of Georgia to permit the importation of rum into the said colony from any of the other British colonies", and by the opinion expressed in debate in the House that a moderate quantity of rum mixed with water was a necessary tonic for the settlers and that its importation from other colonies would promote the export of lumber.

The Acts were transmitted to the Privy Council in January 1743, and referred from there to the Board of Trade.

2. Col.Rec.Ga., I, pp.54-6, 398-400.
The Board dallied with them for three years. It had no objection to the general tenor of the Acts but took exception to some particular points. First, to the confinement of importation to the method of barter only. Second, to the fine of ten pounds on offenders against the licensing law, which was excessive in that there might be "insuperable difficulties in procuring security in so great a value in so poor a country". And third, objection was made to the clause reserving to the Trustees the power to make rules from time to time for the buying and selling of rum. The Trustees stood firm, however, and refused to admit any alterations in the laws they had drafted. Consequently, the Acts were never officially approved, and theoretically the original prohibition imposed in 1735 remained in force. But in any case, by this time rum was being sold widely in the colony as if there were not, nor ever had been, special regulations attached to it. The liquor law had always been an anomaly, incapable of enforcement, and the perversities of the Trustees and the Board of Trade could make no appreciable difference to the situation.

The problem of labour in Georgia always weighed heavily on the minds of the Trustees. The presence in the colony

1. B.T. Journal, 6, 20, 28 and 29 Aug. 1742; 4 March 1743; 19 April 1744.
of a group of malcontents helped to perpetuate resentment among the settlers at conditions of work. Drunkenness, laziness, and the time spent on defence precautions against invasion, all tended to delay improvements and limit production. Nevertheless, the Trustees were confident the province would succeed, although they felt there was "a world of idle folks there." The attitude of many settlers towards employment was, indeed, a source of much indignation among the Trustees, who, being men of high principles, were inclined to regard reluctance to work as a breach of contract and punishable as such. The outstanding example of this occurred in 1746 when several carpenters in Savannah refused to work unless they were guaranteed a minimum income. The Trustees considered this action illegal, and ordered the relevant Act of Parliament to be sent over and its terms enforced. This step was singular inasmuch as strikes or concerted action by workers in colonial America were seldom squarely faced by the authorities. This, in fact, was the only instance of masters or journeymen, other than those in the licensed trades, being firmly handled when they tried to combine.

Conditions of service for servants in Georgia were

1. Egmont Diary, III, p.59
3. Morris, Government and Labor in Early America, p.205
gradually made more generous. On 10 August 1737 the Common Council resolved that all servants of good record who served out their time before Christmas of that year should be granted fifty acres of land together with a cow and a sow. In March 1741 it was ordered that all servants in the colony who completed their period of service and produced certificates of good behaviour from their masters should receive, in addition to a year's maintenance and tools, fifty acres of good land instead of the twenty to which they were at present entitled. Then, in March 1743, the Trustees decided that all servants were to receive an allowance for twelve months following the expiration of their contract. Each man was to have eightpence a day and each woman sixpence, each man also receiving a cow, a calf and a sow and the usual working tools. This extended to all servants with a minimum indenture of four years a privilege which those indented to the Trustees had enjoyed since 1741.

Undoubtedly the most pressing labour problem, however, was the persistent demand for negro slaves. Georgia's richest soil was suited to rice cultivation, but little could be done in this direction without the use of slave labour. The inhabitants were not slow to evade the prohi-

bition, one method being to hire negroes from South Carolina whose owners would re-claim their property whenever an attempt was made to enforce the regulations. The inevitability of slaves being ultimately admitted must have become obvious to the Trustees by the 1740s when they were subjected to increasing pressure on the issue. The Rev. John Martin Bolzius, the Salzburgers' minister at Ebenezer, while opposing the introduction of slavery into Georgia confessed that his opinion was a minority one. In 1740 James Vernon, a member of the Common Council of the Trustees, urged the admission of free negroes, arguing that the Act of 1735 excluded only those employed as slaves. In 1742 Martin Bladen and Horace Walpole were both in favour of slave labour in Georgia, though Bladen changed his mind the following year. In June 1742 a committee of the House of Commons announced its opinion that the employment of negroes, "under proper regulations and restrictions", would be beneficial to Georgia. George Whitefield ardently advocated the use of slave labour in Georgia. He told the Trustees that the inefficient cultivation of his land was due to the obligation to employ white labour, and he would deem himself highly

favoured if he was allowed to purchase a good number of negroes and bring them up in the Christian tradition.

But it was difficult to move the Trustees on this subject. In July 1742 they relaxed sufficiently to instruct William Stephens to inquire into the advisability and method of admitting negroes into the province, and appointed five members of their Common Council as a committee to consider the matter. No progress was made by this because the Trustees were not slow to agree with Stephens's opinion that it would be unwise to admit blacks while Spain remained in control of St. Augustine and there was a possibility of their being incited to rebel. By the summer of 1746 the Trustees were still adamant, and expressed surprise at the continued expectancy in the colony that the prohibition would be removed; once the settlers had slaves, it was argued, "they would soon become such themselves by being debtors to the negro merchants."

As over the question of rum, so over that of slaves, effective control of the situation was slipping from the Trustees' hands. At the end of 1746 they learned that the Rev. Thomas Bosomworth had sent to South Carolina for six

2. Col.Rec.Ga., I, pp.400-1
3. 0.0.5/668, p.124, Martyn to Stephens, 10 May 1743.
4. Ibid., p.225, Martyn to Stephens, 18 July 1746
negroes to be employed on his plantation, and a sharp letter was dispatched to the President and Assistants deplo­ring their failure to take any step to punish and prevent such violation of the law, having "contented themselves with seeing and complaining of it!" By the beginning of 1748 settlers even in the south were in possession of slaves, and Alexander Heron, commander of the garrison at Frederica, not only owned several but declared he would protect and uphold any others that were introduced into the province. The Trustees' reaction to this was to meet in the vestry of St. Margaret's Church and prepare an instruction to the President and Assistants expressing their surprise that blacks should still be present in the province in contraven­tion of the law, and repeating their resolve never to permit the introduction of negroes because of its dangers to a frontier settlement's security:

And as the people who continue to clamour for negroes declare that the colony can never succeed without the use of them, it is evident they don't intend by their own industry to contribute to its success and must therefore rather hinder than promote it; the Trustees therefore require it may be signified to all the in­habitants of the colony that if any of them persist in declaring they cannot succeed without negroes, it would be of service to the colony as well as themselves for them to retire into any other province, where they will be freely allowed the use of negroes.

Nothing could be more unequivocal than that, and yet just over twelve months later the Trustees changed their minds.

In May 1749 they considered a letter dated 8 May 1748 from the President and Assistants of Savannah which described the impossibility of effectively preventing slaves being brought into Georgia and which stated that any further attempts to enforce the prohibition would depopulate the province. With control of the situation now unmistakably removed from their hands, the Trustees had no alternative to acknowledging the fact of the matter, and they decided to petition the Crown for the repeal of the Act. Even so, the repeal was not to be absolute because it was "the general desire of the nation to have the raising of silk carried to the greatest length and perfection possible in Georgia, as being what is most wanted in England, and does not interfere with the products of other colonies". The Trustees, therefore, wished to ensure that silk culture would benefit from, and not be prejudiced by, the admission of negroes.

Accordingly, the Trustees' repeal Act of 8 August 1750 contained provisions intended to safeguard the interests of the colony against the dangers intrinsic in permitting negro labour. Every planter was required to have at least one

1. Ibid., pp.530-2.
2. C.O.5/668, pp.328 and 334, Martyn to Stephens, 19 May and 7 July 1749.
female slave with every four males he owned, and she was
to be taught the art of winding and reeling silk from cocoons.
In addition, each planter was to plant five hundred mulberry
trees on every five hundred acres of land he possessed and
give them adequate protective fencing against cattle. Among
the restrictive safeguards in the Act was one requiring that
there should be one white manservant capable of bearing arms
for every four negroes employed on a plantation. A planter
chastising his slave to the point of endangering life or
limb was to be fined, and in the event of his murdering one
he was to be tried according to the laws of England. An
office was created for the registration of all negroes im­
ported, and provision made for ships carrying black slaves
to be inspected by health officers before landing their
cargoes. Intermarriage between black and white was for­
bidden. Duties were imposed on the importation of negroes,
the revenue from which was to be used towards supporting
the Church, civil government and public works in the colony.
Henceforward, with the restriction on it removed, Georgia's
negro population rapidly increased. During 1752 over one
thousand were brought into the province. The chief supplier

ary Province, pp.186-7, states incorrectly that there is
no evidence that the Act was ever considered by either the
Privy Council or Board of Trade. In fact, the Act was re­
ferred by the Privy Council on 15 Nov. 1750 to the Board
of Trade, which recommended the royal approval in Aug. 1751:
P.C.2/102, p.90. B.T. Journal, 20 Nov. 1750; 5 March 1750
/1; 18June, 18 July and 2 Aug. 1751.
was probably South Carolina, as negroes had been obtained illegally from there throughout the prohibition period, but shipments from the West Indies became considerable after 1755.

Thus, at the last, the Trustees had to bend before the pressure of the settlers. Their reluctance to yield was owing to a genuine fear that slave labour would be detrimental to the true interests of Georgia, and that the security of the province would be weakened. There was substance in this view. It is a debatable point whether Georgia would have been so well able to withstand the menaces of the Florida Spaniards if it had contained a large negro population. Experience in South Carolina proved that the dangers were very real. It is possible, too, that the pioneer settler would have been much less inclined to work himself had he been able to find someone to do it for him cheaply. In his travels in America in 1759 and 1760 the Rev. Andrew Burnaby reckoned that the people in the southern colonies were being made indolent by the use of slave labour:

I myself have been a spectator, and it is not an uncommon sight, of a man in the vigour of life, lying upon a couch, and a female slave standing over him, wafting off the flies, and fanning him, while he took his repose.2

It is impossible, however, to escape the conclusion that,

1. Tables in Documents Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America, IV, pp.612-7, The total number imported by ship into Savannah 1755-65 was 639.

2. A. Burnaby, Travels through the Middle Settlements in North America (London, 1775) p.90.
once the colony had been properly settled, the admission of negroes was essential to its progress and prosperity. Rice and cotton cultivation demanded them, and it was on those products that future development depended. Moreover, while the restrictions on the importation of negroes and rum were retained, the colony was deprived of its principal vent for lumber, the West Indies. And, it must be remembered it was no policy of the British Government to restrict importation of slaves when Georgia came under royal control, for, as W. E. H. Lecky has written, during the first half of the eighteenth century the slave trade "occupied the very foremost place in English commerce". Economic factors, then, made the eventual introduction of slaves inevitable, but it may well be that it was to Georgia's benefit that they were not permitted until the province had been given time to establish itself.

The great irony of the repeal Act of 1750 was that, in spite of the care taken in it to protect and encourage silk cultivation, one of its immediate effects was the decline of the silk industry, for as soon as slaves were admitted the inhabitants began to turn their attention to the cultivation of rice. It is almost pathetic to watch the

Trustees still adopting measures for encouragement of silk after seventeen years of little or no success. The emphasis on silk was even brought into the resolution of March 1750 that an annual meeting of representatives in Georgia was now essential in order to keep the Trustees acquainted with the true state of all parts of the colony. The Assembly was to meet in Savannah for no longer than one month every year, "at the most leisure time", and debate and propose to the Trustees what it considered would benefit the province as a whole. It had no legislative power, that remaining with the corporation as set forth in the charter. The Assembly was to be composed of four deputies from Savannah, two each from Augusta, Ebenezer and every other town or village with over thirty families, and one deputy from each town or village with ten families. No suffrage qualifications were laid down, but the qualifications for membership of the Assembly were the most absurd in all America. A man could not be elected unless he had one hundred mulberry trees planted and fenced on every fifty acres of land he owned, and after 24 June 1753 he would be obliged also to conform strictly to the limitation on the number of negroes in proportion to his white servants, have at least one female

in his family instructed in the art of reeling silk, and produce fifteen pounds of silk a year on every fifty acres of land he owned.

This is certainly the outstanding example of the Trustees' determination to make silk the staple of Georgia. The silk mania, however, must not blind us to the important fact that in 1750 Georgia was at last graced with its own Assembly. Admittedly its powers were restricted, but the seed of local self-government had been sown none the less, and the settlers were now enabled to give public expression to their grievances and wishes instead of having to cabal or make disjointed complaints. J. R. McCain has made this comment on the Trustees' policy:

If they had taken the inhabitants of Georgia into their confidence at the beginning, and if they had established then an assembly like that of 1750, it is probable that the colonists might have aided in the solution of their own problems; but the Trustees waited until it was too late to be of service to them to establish the colonial assembly.

But this, surely, is an over-simplification of the issue. It is agreeable to imagine local democracy functioning in an infant settlement, but it is difficult to believe it would have done so successfully in early Georgia. The population was small, the settlements scattered; the people diverse in temperament, nationality and background; many were uneducated, some irresponsible, and few could have possessed any

real sense of public obligation. An Assembly might well have been successfully established earlier than it was, when a community spirit had grown, but for one to have been established "at the beginning" would have been to invite its breakdown, and so, perhaps, to have ultimately retarded the development of local self-government and responsibility.

By 1751 Georgia had travelled the first part of the road towards becoming an integral section of the American colonial scene. The journey had not been as easy or successful as many had anticipated, but some distance had been covered along a difficult route. The direction had not been exactly that designed by the Trustees, and many of their cherished schemes had been left by the wayside. Regulations on land, labour and liquor had had to be modified under pressure from the settlers. The romantic pictures of abundant wine and milk had been proved illusory, and the great economic benefits Georgia was supposed to bring the mother-country were still awaited in 1751 after eighteen years of experiment and struggle. The narrow policy of the Trustees, well-intentioned it is true, had helped to impede that development of the colony most befitting its natural resources. Had they, instead of persistently encouraging inappropriate articles, permitted the settlers to exploit the natural proclivities of the soil, then rice, cotton and tobacco would have been cultivated, and the restrictions on land-holding and negro labour would, perforce,
have been relaxed much sooner than they were. This, in turn, would have abated the discontent among the inhabitants and perhaps led to a more rapid increase in population. But the Trustees directed the government of Georgia from London, and it was impossible for them to fully appreciate actual conditions in the little settlements three thousand miles away across the Atlantic. They had always to act in the light of the situation as it appeared to them by hearsay and report. And they could never be sure they were not being misled. Their desire and need for precise information persisted from the time they reprimanded Oglethorpe for not writing until the time they established a representative assembly.

But these shortcomings must not be allowed to detract over much from the achievement of the Trustees. When all is said, they had succeeded in founding a barrier province which improved Britain's position in her rivalry with France and Spain in America. Moreover, they had done this for genuinely charitable reasons and without financial reward to themselves. The inception of the project and the government of the colony was not the full-time occupation of any of the Trustees. It was, one might say, a leisure interest from which they gained nothing for themselves, and which they pursued solely because they believed that in doing so they were serving their God, their country and their fellow-men.
CHAPTER VI

THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR

The map of North America in 1754 showed a long but narrow fringe of English colonies hugging the Atlantic coast from the Penobscot to the Altamaha. Westward English settlement died away as it reached the wooded ridges of the Appalachian Mountains, but further on the Frenchman was establishing himself in Canada, in Louisiana and up the Mississippi to the Illinois country, threatening to control the vast hinterland strip between Montreal in the north and New Orleans in the south. No recognized boundary existed between the French and English settlements, neither Power having ever defined its territorial claims. The charters of the English colonies, including that of Georgia, stated or inferred that their westward limit was the Pacific Ocean. On the other hand, France regarded as hers all the interior between the Appalachians and the Cordilleras, except the parts already occupied by Spain.

As each nation expanded its area of occupation clashes inevitably occurred. As early as 1720 the danger of French possession of the Mississippi region had been broached by colonists, and Georgia and South Carolina were particularly concerned about the growth of Louisiana, the Trustees warning
the Government of the danger in 1742. In 1734 Sam Eveleigh wrote from Charleston:

I beg leave to give my opinion that His Majesty's settlements on this continent, particularly this province and the province of Georgia, ought at this time to be encouraged, because I am informed that the French increase very fast at New Orleans and are extending their limits by building forts; so that His Majesty's British empire in America is more than one half surrounded by the French from the mouth of the River Mississippi to the mouth of that of St. Lawrence: Nay! further, from Mobile to Cape Breton.

In the same year the South Carolina Assembly addressed a memorial to the King alluding to the increase of French strength and traffic at New Orleans, and their erection of forts up both sides of the Mississippi, some less than three hundred miles from the English settlements. Frenchmen from Canada were coming "daily down in shoals to settle all along that river", and were reported to have five hundred men employed as "wood-rangers" to prevent neighbouring Indians disturbing their settlements. They had, moreover, won the alliance of several of the Indian nations in that region, including the warlike Choctaws, and were trying to alienate others against Britain. The British Government was certainly apprehensive about French activities along the Mississippi at this time and was not unwilling to countenance the strengthening of defences in the southern colonies.

4. Egmont Diary, II, p.159.
This apprehension was mutual. The foundation of Georgia appeared to France as the beginning of a westward English thrust in the south which might reach as far as the Mississippi and cut communication between Canada and Louisiana. From the French point of view there was the added consideration that the English population on the continent was at least fifteen times that of their own, a million and a quarter massed along the coastline against only eighty thousand scattered over the vast stretch of territory from Canada to Louisiana.

The French had remained neutral during the early years of the Anglo-Spanish war after 1739, but when Britain and France became openly involved on opposite sides in the dynastic struggle in Europe, the conflict had inevitably spread to the colonies. The main scene of Franco-British hostilities in America had been in the north, and the most signal event the fall of Louisbourg. Otherwise, apart from spasmodic raids and counter-raids with the help of Indians, the war in America had been of little interest and of no lasting influence. Louisiana and Georgia were concerned hardly at all in the conflict, although Oglethorpe in London urged the Government to augment the forces in the southern colonies and assist allied Indians to attack the French on the Mississippi.  

The Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle which formally ended the war in 1748 was generally regarded as no more than a truce. France

1. Add.MSS.32702, fo.347, Oglethorpe to Newcastle, 15 April 1744.
delayed her evacuation from the West Indies and kept control of St. Lucia, Dominica, Tobago and St. Vincent in violation of an agreement made shortly after the treaty. The Nova Scotian boundary remained in dispute, no definitive limits were drawn for the south-west, and France continued to erect a series of forts connecting Louisiana with Canada, a point brought again to the Trustees' notice in 1752 by Edmund Gray, acting as Georgia's agent. "The French measures on the Mississippi, St. Lawrence and the Lakes", he feared, would "open them a communication along the back of the British colonies through the continent from the Gulf of Mexico to that of St. Lawrence." The main danger from this development was, in Gray's view, more real in the south than in the north, where Nova Scotia formed a barrier, for the south was weaker and more exposed and France, "a sagacious and vigilant enemy", had long aimed at wresting Georgia from the hands both of the English and the Spaniards. Britain and France remained as enemies in North America, and during the seven years after the peace of 1748 prepared for the renewal of the struggle.

Important during these years was the Spanish question. After 1748 the Duke of Newcastle had two main objectives.

One was to re-create the old anti-Bourbon coalition, and the other was to detach Spain and her satellite states of Naples and Parma from the Family Compact with France. And so Sir Benjamin Keene returned to Madrid with instructions to detach Spain from her "blind dependence" on France and unite her more closely to Britain and her allies. Ferdinand VI and his Queen favoured peaceful relations with both the rival Powers, and were supported in this attitude by their Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Don Joseph Carvajal, who, though well disposed towards England, had no intention of falling out with France. But the other Spanish minister with whom Keene had to deal, the Marquis of Ensenada, whose departmental responsibilities included the Indies, was friendly towards France and worked for a renewal of the Family Compact. Ensenada had the advantage that the old Anglo-Spanish differences remained unreconciled and constantly interrupted negotiations. Newcastle wrote that the cause of all Britain's difficulties was her claim to cut logwood and build huts on the Mosquito Shore; "and on that pretence the Spaniards take all our ships and will continue to do so.".

1. Add.MSS.32815, fo.289, Newcastle to Keene, 8 Dec.1748.
3. Add.MSS.32839, fo.24, Newcastle to Keene, 26 July/6 Aug. 1752.
Spain resented also the British retention of Gibraltar and Minorca and the presence of English settlers in Georgia. These differences were the same as those which had caused the war of 1739, and Keene deplored the success of Pulteney's opposition in that year to the policy of coming to terms with Spain, and complained that "all these little squibs were lighted up at his bonfire." The continuance of the disputes made an Anglo-Spanish alliance unlikely, but there was every reason to prevent a revival of the Family Compact, especially as regards any future conflict in America, for the combination of the forces in Florida and Louisiana would constitute a serious threat to the security of Georgia and South Carolina.

On the whole the diplomatic competition in Madrid developed favourably for Britain. In 1750 the Treaty of Aquisgran was signed whereby Britain renounced the remaining period of the asiento but was confirmed in the commercial rights obtained in former treaties. The treaty was ordered by the Secretary of State to be made known to the inhabitants of Georgia in order that they might reap the benefits of it "and avoid giving the least ground for such complaint as may in any wise interrupt the good harmony so happily re-established between the two Crowns." This was important.

1. Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, ed.R.Lodge (Cambridge, 1933) p.319; Keene to Castres, 11 Aug.1752.
because if hostilities on the Florida-Georgia boundary should break out again, the French would be given an added incentive to move in from the Mississippi and persuade the Indians to help them attack the southern colonies. Such an eventuality would obviously change the balance of power in the south to the advantage of France.

Fortunately for Britain the situation on the southern frontier remained quiet. Rumours of impending Spanish attack continued to arise in Georgia, especially in 1754 when it was reported that considerable reinforcements of men from Cuba had arrived in St. Augustine. Although the President and Assistants in Georgia hoped the report was unfounded, "as it would be contrary to the good understanding at present subsisting between Their Britannic and Catholic Majesties", they thought it necessary, none the less, to order a scout-boat to cruise along the coast near St. Augustine to procure intelligence, but no definite information was acquired. Such occurrences did little, however, to disturb the comparative peace of the southern frontier. In Europe, likewise, the improved relations with Spain were maintained. French influence at Madrid declined, and in 1753 the Court of Versailles decided to send the Duke of Duras as ambassador to try and restore it.

For the next three years (according to Sir Richard Lodge) there was a stoutly contested duel between Duras and Keene. The stake at issue was a big one, nothing less than the future fate of North America and the balance of power in Europe. The boundary disputes in America, which had evaded settlement at Aix-la-Chapelle, threatened in these years to bring about open war between France and England. If Duras should succeed in renewing something like a Family Compact, France would certainly refuse to give way in America, and with the addition of the Spanish fleet might hope to be more than a match for Great Britain, weakened as the latter was by the increasing alienation of Austria and the ill-concealed irritation of the Dutch Republic. If, on the other hand, Keene should prevail, France, without any assurance of Spanish support, would be far less assertive in America, or, in case of war, England could face France with some confidence in a war that would probably be mainly fought at sea.

Duras tried to persuade Carvajal to make an alliance between their two countries, but he received only vague promises of Spanish assistance should France ever be in very great difficulties. When Carvajal died in 1754 it seemed as though Duras and Ensenada must succeed, but Keene's hand was strengthened again by the appointment as Carvajal's successor of the Anglophile Richard Wall, an Irishman who had recently been Spain's ambassador in London, and before the end of 1755 both Ensenada and Duras had left the Court of Madrid.

Moreover, the Spaniards in the New World had been instructed

1. Introduction to the Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, p.xix.
2. Pares, War and Trade in the West Indies, p.556.

Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, pp.ix-xxi.
to abandon their preparations for attacking foreign settlements because it was believed that the dispute with Britain would be amicably settled. Georgia could now regard Florida with less misgiving and feel more secure on the southern borderlands.

Nevertheless, the danger of French and Indian attack remained, for by 1755 hostilities between France and Britain had broken out in North America. In the summer of 1753 the French had erected two forts to the south of Lake Erie and threatened to occupy the valley of the Ohio. Having failed to expel them by a show of force, the Governor of Virginia built Fort Necessity at a place called Great Meadows on the western slopes of the Appalachians. On 3 July 1754 an enemy force, in retaliation for a previous skirmish, attacked and captured the fort. This stirred the British Government to stronger action. It was appreciated that some provision must be made for the recovery and retention of territory in North America "which the French have (most unjustly and contrary to solemn treaties subsisting between the two Crowns of Great Britain and France) invaded, and possessed themselves of, and raised fortifications upon." At a meeting of the Cabinet Council on 26 June 1754 "Their Lordships were humbly of the opinion that the most effectual measures should be

1. Chatham Papers, XCII, Wall to Keene, 15 Sept.1754.
2. Add. MSS.33029, fo.144, Sketch for the operations in N. America, 16 Nov.1754.
forthwith taken for the defence of the said frontiers, and for obliging the French to retire from thence." It was resolved as a first principle, wrote Newcastle, "that the colonies must not be abandoned, that our rights and possessions in North America must be maintained, and the French obliged to desist from their hostile attempts to dispossess us."

Accordingly, in the summer of 1755 an expedition under General Braddock set out against Fort Duquesne, the principal new French encroachment on the Ohio, only to meet defeat in a ravine eight miles from the objective.

These early exchanges between the French and English in America did not affect Georgia, and the colony was virtually omitted from consideration during the initial formation of plans by the British Government. Georgia's immediate concern was chiefly with the Indians, whose attitude was always an important factor in Anglo-French rivalry in the south. For the sake of clarity and convenience it is proposed here to treat the Indian aspect of the conflict separately and as a whole before going on to describe in subsequent sections the condition of defences in Georgia, the province's role in relations with Spain during the war, its significance in the planning of the military campaigns and, finally, how it was affected by the peace negotiations.

1. Ibid., ff.124-5.
2. Add. MSS.32735, ff.597-8, Newcastle to Horatio Walpole, 29 June 1754.
At the middle of the eighteenth century there were about twelve thousand male Indians in and around the southern colonies. Of these about 2,500 were Cherokees, living among the mountains and valleys of what is now Tennessee and northern Alabama, who came into close contact with Georgia and South Carolina and were largely under British influence. Westward of them and nearer the Mississippi roamed the Chicksaws, who had been allies of the English since before the foundation of Louisiana. South of the Chickasaws were the Choctaws, a powerful tribe with some five thousand warriors and who, before 1756, were amenable to French influence. East of the Chickasaws and Choctaws was the Creek confederacy of many diverse tribes, whose territory stretched from the River Alabama on the west to the Ogeechee on the east and included the valleys of the Chattahoochee and the Flint and most of the Florida peninsula. The Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws and Cherokees, the descendants of whom now live in Oklahoma, were the principal nations to which attention had to be paid in the south. The Catawbas, settled on the river of that name between the Carolinas in what is now York County, had only about three hundred fighting men but were valuable to the English in protecting South Carolina and the southern frontier against French and Indian invasion. Finally, there were the wandering Shawnees, strategically situated at the headwaters of the River Coosa between the Cherokees and the Upper Creeks, and who were to
prove of some embarrassment to the English in the war with France.

The French could not hope to launch a successful overland attack on the English colonies without the support of a large Indian force. The result was bitter competition between the two European nations, not only for Indian friendship but also for Indian trade. The Appalachian range was not an insurmountable barrier to the English colonists, and in the eighteenth century settlers and traders from Pennsylvania, Virginia and the Carolinas were beginning to venture through the passes of the mountains, beyond which the way was clear to the Ohio, and this movement intensified the Anglo-French struggle for control of the south-west trade.

Both sides sought to obtain the alliance of the Indians by lavishing presents on them. From 1732 to 1738 the British Government had spent between £1,000 and £8,000 annually on the southern Indians, and in 1748 decided to send £3,000 worth of presents to Georgia and South Carolina. At the suggestion of the Trustees these were to be purchased in England where they would be cheaper and of a more dependable quality. The first presents on this order were sent out in 1749 and divided equally between Georgia and South Carolina. Another


batch of presents was sent over in 1750, but from then until 1754 no money for this purpose was forthcoming from the Government. There is no obvious explanation of this. It may have been that the southern frontier seemed less important to the mother-country at a time when European diplomacy was in a flux, or perhaps it was because the south tended to get overlooked during a period when French and English commissioners in Paris were wrangling over the boundaries of Nova Scotia. It is possible that the interruption was due to the fact that, with the termination of the Trustees' charter, it was deemed unwise to spend money on presents while the condition and future of Georgia were in some doubt. Whatever the real reason may have been, it was decided to recommence the practice when the first royal governor took office in 1754, and money for presents was voted in both the succeeding years.

By 1755 the Government recognized the necessity of maintaining an alliance with the Indians in view of the critical nature of Anglo-French relations by that time.

1. C.O.5/644, A.24, Martyn to B.T., 3 June 1754.

The Governor of Georgia, John Reynolds, was told that the "preserving the friendship and alliance of the Indians ought at all times, but more especially at this conjuncture, to be a principal object of our attention." It is clear that the mother-country was fearful not only for her colonies skirting the waterway of the St. Lawrence and the valley of the Ohio, but also for those which might become the target of a thrust from along the lower Mississippi. Such an inroad by the French was possible only if they could obtain a large Indian following, and it was this fact which made the distribution of presents to the Indians on the Georgia and South Carolina borders so essential as war became more likely.

All the way down the back of the English colonies the French were strengthening their position; skirmishes were frequent and the rivalry for Indian trade and friendship intensified. As early as 1738 the French had been aiming to destroy those tribes along the borders of South Carolina who were friendly towards the English, and several attacks were made on the Chickasaws. By 1740 the French were reported to be giving the Creeks and Chickasaws large presents of food, clothing, guns and ammunition in an attempt to detach them


from English influence. Some form of concerted action by the colonies was required if French tampering with the frontier Indians was to be stopped, and Oglethorpe and Lieutenant-Governor Clarke of New York made a proposal in 1741 to unite all of them in the British interest as a means of defeating French designs and preventing further encroachments, but nothing came of it.

By 1754 the French were carrying on a war of extermination against the Chickasaws at the back of Georgia and South Carolina, and trying to win over the Upper Creeks with presents.

Several sachems of the Upper Creeks were prevailed upon to go to Mobile where attempts were made to persuade them to put themselves under French protection against alleged English designs to steal their lands and make them slaves. For some years the S.P.G. missionary at Augusta had been very concerned over the "unspeakable troubles" which the inhabitants were having with the neighbouring Indians, "merciless savages" he called them, who, acting with French connivance, were wont to threaten, scalp or enslave persons in the English out-settlements.

2. C.O. 5/655, no.21, Martyn to Stone, 26 July 1742. Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed.E.B. O'Callaghan (15 v., Albany, 1853-87) VI, p.211, Oglethorpe to Clarke, 12 July 1741.
On 27 June 1754 Charles Pinckney, agent for South Carolina, appeared before the Board of Trade with a petition setting forth that "the dangers to Carolina and Georgia from the present army of French regulars and Indians at the backs of Virginia, and those which it is said are to join them from the Mississippi and the French settlements of Louisiana are very great, should they, as in all probability they will, when they have beat the English from their forts and settlements on the Ohio, march southerly into the Cherokee countries and make themselves masters there." The need to pay the most careful attention to Indian affairs had now become manifest. In pointing out this obvious fact in 1757, the economist Malachy Postlethwayt did not confine his argument to the northern colonies, but maintained that Georgia might prove to be important in securing the alliance of the Indian nations to the west of it. The due support of the colony, he wrote, was a matter "of no less public attention than that of Nova Scotia, New York and Albany" if the friendship of the Indians, especially the Creeks, was to be retained.

The British Government did recognize the need to keep the Indians pacified and prevent the French acquiring too powerful an influence over them, although its supply of Indian presents


was not always as regular or generous as the governors demanded. The most important step, however, towards putting Indian affairs on a better and firmer footing was taken in 1756 when the Government appointed two agents to superintend political relations with the Indians, Sir William Johnson for the northern and Edmund Atkin for the southern colonies. Both were paid out of the royal treasury and were expected to deal with all matters pertaining to the preservation of peaceful relations, such as cession of lands, trade disputes, inter-racial crimes and the arrangement of congresses. This step was of special value to the southern colonies because throughout the struggle with France in the years after 1755 their main danger came from Indians in alliance with the French rather than from the French themselves. Indeed, Georgia's first major encounter in the French and Indian War was with the Upper Creeks, who resented the presence of English squatters on the River Ogeechee, but although blood was shed, friendly relations were soon re-established.

When Henry Ellis took over the governorship of Georgia towards the end of 1756 the relationship with the southern Indians was good, although they were apt to commit

little disorders "such as killing of cattle and frightening the inhabitants". His only fear was that no presents would arrive from England, for gangs of Indians visited him every week expecting them. "We treat them in the best way we are able", he wrote, "furnishing them with provisions, some promises, a few presents and a great many fair words." Fortunately a large supply of presents arrived in May 1757 which enabled the Governor to negotiate extensively with the Creeks. At a conference with some members of the nation on 18 May 1757 he sought to win their friendship by expatiating on the cruelties of the French, who "were creeping upon them like old age, which they could not see". The English bought the lands they wanted off the Indians and honestly paid for them, whereas the French aimed to acquire territory by barbarously murdering the native inhabitants. English presents, he said, were much better than those of the French which, "like the rum the Indians drink, however sweet now would make them terribly sick in the end." When Englishmen talked "their tongue and heart were fast together", whereas "when the French hold out one hand to them in token of friendship, could they look into the other they would see a knife ready to cut their throats." The Governor concluded by offering a reward of eight pounds of leather for every French scalp brought in, and sixteen pounds of leather for every prisoner, prisoners being much preferred.

1. C.0.5/646, C.3, Ellis to B.T., 5 May 1757.
2. C.0.5/694, Fo.102.
Ellis' tactics were greeted with success when he invited delegations from both the Upper and Lower Creeks to meet him in Savannah.¹ For a week the delegations were treated to military parades and salutes, bountifully feasted and supplied with presents before assembling in the Council Chamber to conduct business. There, on 3 November 1757, they signed a treaty renewing their alliance with England, but no attempt was made to induce them to take the offensive against the French, as this would have given umbrage to a strong party within the nation which was amenable to French influence. However, it was agreed that all existing grievances should be "forgiven and forgot as thoroughly as if they had never happened", and misdemeanours committed by individuals of either race should not, in future, be considered as acts of the whole nation to which they belonged, but all disputes were to be adjusted amicably at meetings called for that purpose. At the wish of the Indians themselves, the islands of Ossabaw, Sapelo and St. Catherines and the Indian reserve near Savannah were delivered "in trust to His Honour the present Governor" as the representative of the King of England. Finally, both sides agreed that "the friends of the one shall be eternally considered as the friends of the other, and the enemies of either as the enemies of both: and that the present treaty of peace and alliance shall remain firm and inviolable as long as the sun shall shine and the rivers run into

¹ C.O.5/696, fo.20.
In October 1758 Edmund Atkin, the superintendent for the southern Indians, began a trip into the Creek country. His objective was to reach a formal understanding with the Choctaws inhabiting the neighbourhood of Mobile and New Orleans, whose friendship the English acquired by supplying their wants better than the French. Soon after arriving in the town of Cussita, Atkin was visited by messengers from the Choctaws and informed of the desire of their nation to be in friendship with the English and to be supplied with British goods like other Indian nations. Atkin demanded that deputies should be sent from those towns desirous of entering into a treaty, and on 18 July 1759, at the Upper Creek town of Wauleyhatchee, in the presence of many Creeks, Chickasaws and British traders, a treaty was signed whereby the Choctaws, in return for trade, agreed to make peace with the Chickasaws and commence hostilities against the French.

Atkin, however, had no success with the Creeks. It is true that during his journey through the Creek towns he managed to conciliate many of the more hostile leaders and remove some of their fears by declaring, in public squares and private

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2. Ibid., II, pp.268-70, Atkin to Pitt, 27 March 1760. Alden, John Stuart, pp.97-8, incorrectly gives the date of the treaty as 10 July.
conferences alike, that the English wanted only to rectify differences and remain at peace with the Indians, and had no intention of acquiring land or building forts in Indian country. But this was superficial. Indeed, he eventually aroused against himself an antagonism, carefully fostered by French intrigue, that jeopardized the good work Ellis had been putting in with the Creeks. While addressing a meeting of their headmen in Tuckabatchie Square, Atkin had several strokes made at him by a tribesman with a hatchet. He survived the assault, which he nervously passed off as the act of a madman, but it was clear that he was disliked by some, at least, of the Creek nation. Moreover, he had aroused the enmity of several of the colonists, especially the traders, who had, he complained, "by propagating calumny and falsehoods, hatchetted my reputation in my absence worse than the savage did my body." He observed that he had been hazarding his life daily in His Majesty’s service, and bore in his body the honourable marks of his zeal, but had been obliged to do so with the full backing of only Governor Lyttelton of South Carolina. Whether the suspicion of him was justified, or not, Atkin had patently become more of a liability than an asset to the security of the southern colonies, and in 1760 Ellis told the Board of Trade that the superintendent was unfit for office.

1. Pitt Correspondence, II, pp.270-2, Atkin to Pitt, 27 March 1760.

2. Alden, John Stuart, pp.98-100. Atkin was not in fact succeeded until 1762 when John Stuart took up the appointment.
The outbreak of war between the English and the Cherokees in 1760 made Creek friendship vital to the safety of the southern provinces. If the Creeks and Cherokees allied, Georgia would be in very real danger of destruction, and Atkin and Ellis endeavoured to play off one tribe against the other. Incentives were offered the Creeks to attack the Cherokees, Ellis promising them that for every enemy scalp they would receive "a trading gun, three pound of powder, six pound of shot, a blanket, a flap, a pair of Indian boots and a cag containing four gallons of trading rum." Such inducements would be expensive, and the Governor advised the Board of Trade that further supplies of presents were essential if the goodwill of the Indians was to be preserved. Ellis found it difficult to embroil the main body of the Creeks in a war with the Cherokees, for French and Cherokee influence among them was strong. Nevertheless, while continuing negotiation in public, Ellis attempted privately to employ straggling parties of Creeks, which visited him occasionally, as a means "to embroil their nation insensibly and as it were against its inclination", and he managed to prevail upon several gangs to go scalping. Although relations with the Creeks remained precarious, the majority maintained a policy of

3. Pitt Correspondence, II, p.277, Ellis to Pitt, 16 April 1760.
neutrality and the danger gradually passed.

The most serious menace came from the Cherokees, who had always been amicable towards the English and in 1757 volunteered to protect the frontier south of the Potomac. During the early years of the Franco-British war they remained friendly, although the French successes of 1755 and 1756 shook their confidence in the English and the conduct of the rival Virginia and South Carolina traders annoyed them. The danger of their allying with the French was recognized in the colonies, and in 1757 Governor Hardy of New York expressed his fear to Pitt that the French might inveigle the Cherokees into taking up the hatchet against the English, a contingency fraught with peril for the southern provinces. This eventuality could be forestalled, in Hardy's opinion, by sending cruisers from the Jamaica squadron to blockade New Orleans and the mouth of the Mississippi, and so intercept French presents intended for the Indians. It was not until the beginning of 1760, however, that the Cherokees began hostilities against the English. Even then the outbreak was

1. For English relations with the Creeks in Georgia between 1757 and 1762 see W.O.34/34, ff.189-92, 216, 219-25, 251. Also R.L. Meriwether, Expansion of South Carolina, 1729-65 (Kingsport, 1940) pp.221-5.

2. The Cherokees sent parties of warriors to assist the English expedition under Forbes against Fort Duquesne.

3. Alden, John Stuart, p.50.

due in some degree to the indiscretions of Governor Lyttelton of South Carolina, and diplomatic encouragement by the English might have induced some of the Cherokee towns to fight on their side, for the nation was at first far from united against them.

The initial attacks were against South Carolina, but the danger to Georgia was obvious, especially as the company at Fort Augusta had been recalled by Lyttelton the previous autumn. Ellis knew Georgia could not resist a total Cherokee assault, for his militia would have been outnumbered two to one. Nevertheless, it was possible to so manipulate the resources available as to render any onslaught hazardous and give the inhabitants a chance of saving themselves and their property. This was what Ellis proceeded to do. An officer and twenty men were sent to take possession of the important Fort Augusta, which had been left defenceless by the withdrawal of its garrison to Fort Moore in South Carolina. The Assembly empowered him to erect in the most exposed areas log forts where people could shelter in emergencies. Subsistence was provided for


two hundred of the militia whom the Governor intended to draft and keep on constant duty until assistance arrived. The rangers, which had recently been augmented, were brought further back so that enemy braves could not easily approach without being discovered; the friendship of the Creeks and Chickasaws was procured; and finally assistance was sought both from Amherst, commanding the British forces in Canada, and from the Board of Trade.

South Carolina had already asked Amherst to send at least fifteen hundred regulars to the south, and Ellis supported the request. In April twelve hundred troops under Colonel Montgomery were dispatched by Amherst with orders to strike a swift blow at the Cherokees and return quickly to the north. After ravaging the villages of the beautiful valley of the Keowee, consuming their magazines of corn and slaying over sixty of the Cherokee population, some of them being burnt in their houses while their kinsfolk gazed at the flames from the tops of the adjacent hills, Montgomery re-embarked with his battalion of Highlanders for Halifax, leaving behind four companies of regulars to protect the frontiers and South Carolina in greater consternation and

the conflict more inflamed. Georgia, however, remained quiet. Its most critical time was in the May, when the French and Cherokees instigated the murder of several English traders in some Upper Creek towns. The news of the attack led to the abandonment of the frontier, except for a few stockades at Augusta inhabited by merchants, but Ellis succeeded in lessening tension and regaining the goodwill of the majority of the Creeks by the adoption of a pacific attitude and offers of presents.

Thus Georgia was comparatively little scathed by the Indian troubles of 1759 and 1760. This was due mainly to Ellis's realistic appraisal and sensible handling of the whole situation. Throughout his term of office he surveyed the problem of the Indians with an eye as clear as that of a missel thrush, playing on their emotions, appreciating their sentiments. His success owed nothing to the Government in the mother-country. Except for Montgomery's expedition against the Cherokees, the home Government contributed but little towards improving Georgia's security, either against the French or against the Indians, during the perilous years after 1755. The credit for the remarkably felicitous

2. C.0.5/649, E.3, Ellis to B.T., 17 June 1760.
management of Indian affairs in Georgia was owing not so much to the Government's irregular supply of presents, but rather to the diplomatic ingenuity of Governor Ellis.

The story of the French and Indian War in North America revolves primarily around the operations in Canada and the West Indies. The southern colonies were not prominent and have been generally omitted almost entirely from the standard accounts, for there were no large or arresting engagements in the south between the French and English. None the less the danger was always there, together with the perilous possibility of Spain renewing the Family Compact and combining with the French to invade the southern provinces from Florida and the Mississippi.

Being the southernmost of the English continental colonies, Georgia was bound to feel exposed and very susceptible to attack. While admitting that Georgia had not produced benefits commensurate with the expense of its establishment, a writer in the Gentleman's Magazine in 1756 declared that the colony was still "thought of some consequence to the British interest, not so much for the value of what it may produce, as because it may serve as a southern frontier against any enterprise that may be formed by the French or Spaniards, if they should fortify themselves in Louisiana, as it is apparently their interest to do." Malachy Postlethwayt, a

contemporary writer on economic affairs, attached great importance to Georgia as a barrier province and criticized the Government for not assisting it more:

When I have considered the colony of Georgia not only in the light of an important commercial one, but as a barrier against both France and Spain in this part of America, where our interests are so essentially concerned, I have frequently lamented that it has not been more zealously supported by Parliament. For what has been done, has been only by piecemeal and with great lukewarmness... Before I leave this point, it will not be improper to observe, at this time of day, that as the colony of Georgia may and ought to be rendered a powerful barrier against both the French and Spaniards in Florida; does it not become the wisdom of the nation to support the settlement on this side no less than Nova Scotia and New York on the other? Is it not an indignation to the nation that it has been so meanly upheld and supported?

This criticism, sound in principle, was too simple to be purely true, for large expenditure on colonial defence could not easily be incorporated into British policy at that time. But support from the mother-country was patently necessary if Georgia was to be adequately prepared against hostile incursions, whether from Frenchmen, Spaniards or Indians.

From the beginning of the war until the end a stream of jeremiads concerning its defencelessness flowed from the Governors of Georgia. In 1755 Governor John Reynolds toured the southernmost areas and found Frederica, for long regarded

as the main safeguard against Spanish invasion, with its twenty cannon spoilt by neglect and the town "in ruins, the fortifications entirely decayed and the houses falling down." Other guns originally mounted on the fort had been transferred to Savannah on the withdrawal of Oglethorpe's regiment and were now lying in the sand there. Not that the British Government had overlooked Georgia since the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle. As early as the spring of 1748 the Secretary at War had asked the Trustees how much money would be required for the defence of the southern frontier, advising them at the same time "to establish it on such a foot as may make a small sum effectual, for I think verily a large one cannot be afforded." With the cessation of hostilities in 1748 the Government naturally wished to curtail expenses, and at the end of the year Oglethorpe's commission was cancelled and his regiment of Foot disbanded. Three of the regiment's seven companies, however, were retained and stationed in South Carolina. And as proof of the continued determination to protect Georgia, a detachment of about fifty men was posted at Frederica, another of fourteen men in Jekyll Island, and the Governor of South Carolina was ordered to station a detachment

2. C.O.5/642, fo.163, H. Fox to Trustees, 1 April 1748.
3. W.0.4/45, pp.262 and 347, Fox to Oglethorpe, 24 Nov. and 27 Dec. 1748.
of twenty-one men from Port Royal at Fort Augusta in order
1 to guard the passage into Georgia down the River Savannah.
Furthermore, those members of the disbanded companies who
were willing to stay in the colony were offered five pounds
to do so and allowed to keep their arms in case they were
needed. These troops were to be provisioned from the
province wherein they were stationed, and a request by the
Trustees for Parliament to vote the supplies was refused.

More than this the Government would not do while there
was nominal peace. In 1753 it refused a request for a
company of rangers to patrol the frontier on the grounds that
as the colony's population was increasing, the Indians quiet,
and some detachments from the Independent Companies were already
sprinkled over the area, there was no justification for added
expenditure. By the autumn of 1754, however, the home
Government was taking a little more interest in colonial
defence generally, and in a letter dated 26 October Sir Thomas
Robinson, Secretary of State, acquainted Governor Reynolds that
His Majesty had ordered two regiments of Foot to be sent to
Virginia and another two to be raised in the colonies themselves
for their own defence, the cost of which was to be defrayed by
the inhabitants. In reply the Georgia legislature maintained

1. C.O.5/668, p.305, Martyn to President and Assistants, 2 Jan.
1748/9.
2. W.O.4/45, p.360, Fox to Pitt, 29 Dec.1748; p.405, Fox to
Heron, 13 Jan.1748/9.
4. C.O.5/672, pp.41-6, B.T.to President & Assistants, 12 July/
that if their abilities had been equal to their inclination they would not have been found wanting on this occasion, but, they said,

our present circumstances are unhappily such that we can contribute little or nothing either as to men or money, on the contrary, we should be ourselves in a most deplorable situation if this colony should be attacked by French or Indian enemies, unless His Majesty would be graciously pleased to afford us some troops for our relief and support.

This argument was followed up by Reynolds at the close of the year when he asked the Board of Trade for a company of 150 regulars, since in its present state the province was practically defence-less against neighbouring Indians, whom the French were inciting to attack it. No answer was given until the following August, when Reynolds was told that the Crown could offer nothing on a general representation of the colony's vulnerability, but required precise details of what was necessary and the cost of every item.

By this time Georgia's General Assembly had begun to make some provision for defence. In January 1755 it enacted that all males between the ages of sixteen and sixty who had been in the colony three months were to be enlisted and regiments formed in every district. They could be mustered at any time, but not more than six times a year, and no one was obliged to

go more than twelve miles from his home at ordinary musters.
Only the various officers of government need not perform
military duty, and even these exemptions ceased in times of
emergency, except for members of the Council and Assembly.
All masters were to see that their male indentured servants were
armed and present at all musters. Provision was made for
concentrating the entire manhood of the province on occasions
of general danger, and the manner of giving the alarm,
organizing patrols, impressing provisions and temporarily
enlisting slaves were all specified. The Act was to be in
force for three years. This made for improved security,
but was considered as no more than an essential minimum, and
did not mean that Georgia was prepared to do more than it need
towards colonial defence. It could, in truth, have given
very little and in fact gave nothing. When, for example, the
King asked for a contribution of men from the province in 1755
to help augment the regiments in North America to one thousand
men each, the Governor and Council decided that none could be
spared.

This was true. None could be spared, and in adopting
this attitude Georgia was not being exceptional or selfish.
Neither Pennsylvania nor any of the southern colonies gave
much support to Braddock's forces. South Carolina and Georgia

1. C.0.5/682, ff.2-16.
2. C.0.5/693, fo.139.
were militarily weak as it was. Georgia's so-called forts or defensive works were of an order that would have moved a Vauban of two generations before to laughter. South Carolina had an ever-present potential internal enemy in its large slave population, and both provinces had their own dangers to face from hostile Indians and the Spaniards in Florida. There was no lack of good intention on the part of the Georgians. In November 1756, for example, the Upper House of the legislature gave sympathetic consideration to a letter from Henry Fox requesting assistance from the Earl of Loudoun, commander of the British forces in North America, and said it would "cheerfully concur in any measures that may conduce to effect the services recommended as far as the circumstances of this province can possibly admit." The Lower House, however, had a clearer idea of what the circumstances of the province would admit in this respect, and assured the Governor that the inhabitants were "utterly incapable" of raising any fund for military uses, but "to testify their zeal for His Majesty's service they will, in case any of the King's forces come into this province, use their utmost endeavours to supply them with forage and provisions according to the extent of their abilities. In other words, they would only contribute towards defence if the benefits of their contribution fell more or less directly on Georgia. In 1757 Governor Ellis informed Pitt that the

inhabitants could do no more than they had already done. They had laid a tax of three shillings per head on their negrees and two shillings on every hundred acres they possessed, and resolved to construct five log forts at Savannah, Augusta, Darien, Ogeechee and Midway. They were all poor, and Ellis reckoned there were "not ten men in the province that are worth £500 each." Their inability to contribute anything to the common cause was evidenced by the fact that the expenses of civil government had always to be defrayed by the mother-country.

And to the common cause Georgia did not contribute. The colony was quite incapable of responding to Pitt's requests, and had it not been for the presence of detachments from the South Carolinian Independent Companies in the forts among the Indians at the back of the province, Georgia's defence would have been negligible, for no reliance could be placed on the local militia. In detailing to the Board of Trade the strength of the military in the province in December 1760 Governor James Wright estimated that only a quarter of them could be depended upon in a crisis, for the others "would run away into the next province out of danger". In 1755 some inhabitants were not above sabotaging their own security by throwing the guns off the bluff in front of Savannah into the river.

1. *Pitt Correspondence*, I, p.90, Ellis to Pitt, 1 Aug. 1757.
3. C.O.5/693, fo.117.
But the constant theme of Georgia's relationship with the British Government throughout the war was the colony's defencelessness. Both Reynolds and Ellis warned the Government in 1756 of the deplorable condition of the fortifications. The only troops in Georgia were detachments of the Independent Company from South Carolina; stores and equipment were short, there was no artillery fit for service, the forts along the frontier were either dismantled or in ruins and the only one remaining was at Augusta, and even that was so rotten that a great part of it was "proped up to prevent its falling". The eight small guns within the feeble embrasures of the fort were honeycombed with rust and mounted on carriages that were decayed. In the ruins of Frederica twenty old cannon lay dismounted and without ammunition. There were nearly six hundred miles of frontier to be defended by a tiny, scattered population of whom only about 750 were capable of bearing arms, and these were enrolled in eight badly-equipped and inefficiently-trained companies of militia. In October 1756 Ellis discussed the matter with the Board of Trade, and asked for a ship of war to protect the Georgia coast and for five hundred stands of arms with a proportionate quantity of powder and ball to be sent out immediately. An order to this effect was made

1. For examples see W.O.34/34, ff.172-215, 238-48, 256.
the following month, together with one for sending to Georgia small-arms and ammunition worth £1,277. 3s.7d., which the Governor was to ensure were kept in good order, preserved in a special storehouse so that none would be embezzled, delivered to the inhabitants when needed, and returned to the storehouse again immediately afterwards. This was a sign that the Government did not regard Georgia's defence as unimportant, at the beginning of the war at least, although the warship requested was never sent and the arms sent out were not so valuable as they might have been, for they were heavy, clumsy and difficult to handle, and Ellis reckoned the danger would have to be very great before the people would use them.

The people, indeed, were far from satisfied with the colony's condition. Something for defence was being done but it was not very much. In Georgia itself an Act was passed in December 1756 requiring the master of every vessel that entered any creek or harbour in the colony to deliver "four ounces of good and clean serviceable gunpowder", which it was hoped would help to maintain a public store of gunpowder always in readiness. This, no doubt, was useful and necessary, but it served also to show how superficial and flimsy the defences were. A committee of the Commons House of Assembly investigated the situation and in February 1757 reported that, apart

2. C.0.5/646, C.4, Ellis to B.T., 25 May 1757.
from a small battery recently erected at Savannah, there were but few guns mounted in the province. Fortifications were in ruins, and even the wooden fort at Augusta was by now so wretched that "upon public occasions they are obliged to take the guns out of it to fire them, lest the shock should bring down the whole fort." On 19 July 1757 an Act was passed providing for the appointment of commissioners empowered to construct log forts in the districts of Savannah, Augusta, Ebenezer, Ogeechee, Midway and Darien. Furthermore, since the safety of Savannah "next to the Divine protection chiefly depends on the care and vigilance of the inhabitants thereof", another enactment required all the male population between the ages of sixteen and sixty to undertake watch duty in the town. In the same month the General Assembly expressed to the Governor its alarm at the colony's predicament,

without any forts that are not utterly in ruins, or artillery but what are in a manner unfit for service. Without magazines or funds to erect them, without any troops stationed here save twenty odd fangers (raised in the hurry of an alarm) yet unestablished, unpaid and undisciplined, without any vessel of war for the protection of our coast; with but few inhabitants, and those poor and widely dispersed over the province; open on the one side to every incursion of Indians, and on the other exposed to every possible insult from the most inconsiderable of the enemy's vessels.

1. Col.Rec.Ga.,XIII, p.149. This corroborates what Reynolds had told the Board of Trade a year before.
3. C.0.5/646, C.9, Address of Assembly to Ellis, 28 July 1757.
This alarm was accentuated by the appearance off the coast of French privateers, for there was nothing to prevent the enemy landing and plundering the plantations along the rivers. Royal cruisers operating from Charleston had instructions to protect the coasts of Georgia, but they did so only spasmodically and very inefficiently, and French privateers from the mouth of the Mississippi sailed along the coasts with impunity and captured nearly every vessel they met. Two such privateers were able to cruise along the Georgia coast for ten weeks unmolested, notwithstanding the presence at Charleston throughout that time of three of the King's ships: "a strange circumstance", remarked Ellis bitterly. Indeed, he felt constrained to fit out a ship himself in the summer of 1758 which, manned by a crew of ninety and mounting a battery of fourteen carriage and an equal number of swivel guns, was placed under the command of experienced officers and kept cruising along the coast for six weeks. The general concern at the exposed situation of the coastal settlements was stated in an address in June 1757 from the Commons House of Assembly to the Governor, asking him to station "alarm-men or look-outs" on the sea coast, the expenses of which the House would defray as soon as possible.

1. Pitt Correspondence, I, p.90, Ellis to Pitt, 1 Aug. 1757. C.O.57673, pp.180-1, B.T. to Admiralty, 22 Nov. 1758.
2. C.O.5/646, C.45, Ellis to B.T., 20 July 1758.
What justification was there for this feeling, a natural one, that the colony was being left open to attack from the sea? Certainly the occasional patrol of cruisers from South Carolina could not hope to prevent or discourage enemy raids or piracy, but to have tried to do so would have required a degree of naval protection that was quite impossible to provide. To any charge of negligence the Admiralty could reasonably have repeated the answer it made to its critics in the previous war with Spain—it was impossible to keep squadrons everywhere. The tendency of the English Government in the eighteenth century was to devote more naval strength to the West Indies, where it was well situated both for raiding and convoying. It is true that Georgia might well have been better secured by detaching one, or perhaps two, men-o'-war to protect its coast, but it is difficult to admit that such a step would have been justified by the degree of protection thus given. The squadron at Jamaica gave both Georgia and South Carolina more valuable assistance than this by cruising between Jamaica and Cuba and in the channel between the west end of Cuba and Cape Catoche, thus blockading the French at the mouth of the Mississippi and, by preventing the arrival there of troopships and storeships, mitigating to some extent the danger of French and Indian attack on the southern colonies. The menace from the sea was no doubt very real to the inhabitants of Georgia, but it was not so dangerous as they believed and was, in any case, one of the
inconveniences a border province has to accept in time of war.

Since naval protection was neglected it was more essential than ever to have adequate land forces to assure the inhabitants their safety was being attended to. Rangers were the most suitable, for in the event of Indian disturbances they were able to shoot on horseback and ride at full speed in pursuit through the woods. Governor Reynolds had begun to raise some rangers in December 1756, when forty men had been levied and officers for three troops commissioned. These were maintained for a time by means of negotiable certificates which acquired credit from the notion that the Crown would redeem them. In 1757 the Earl of Loudoun, then commanding the British forces in Canada, gave Ellis a credit for £850 drawn on the deputy-paymaster at New York in order to maintain the rangers until further orders. This credit was spent before the end of the year but Ellis had received no new orders. Throughout 1758 the rangers subsisted on the private credit of the Governor, who naturally grew annoyed at what he could only interpret as indifference towards Georgia by both the commander-in-chief and the British Government. He wrote several times during 1758 to General Abercrumby, who succeeded Loudoun as commander-in-chief, but received no answer.

1. For an account of naval strategy in the war see Pares, *War and Trade in the West Indies*, chapter 7.

2. C.0.5/646, C.31, Ellis to B.T., 1 January 1758.

3. Pitt Correspondence, I, p.376, Ellis to Pitt, 31 October 1758.
By May he had been obliged to disband half the rangers, and he warned the Board of Trade that unless assistance was received soon he would have to disband the rest.¹

This apparent neglect by the mother-country tended to bring the provincial government into contempt, and Ellis complained of having "to wink at many enormities" and being reduced to various shifts and expedients. "This sort of management may do for a season", he wrote, "but mankind are too penetrating to be long imposed upon even by the most refined policy."² Eventually the matter was brought to the notice of Pitt, who, in March 1759, instructed Amherst, then commanding the British troops in Canada, to make arrangements for the establishment of the Georgia rangers on a proper footing if he thought they were "materially conducive" to the colony's security.³ Amherst thought they were, and at long last, in June 1759, Ellis was empowered to maintain his rangers and draw on the deputy-paymaster for their pay.⁴ The Government's reluctance to give prompt attention to the case was inevitable under the circumstances. The principal fields of conflict were elsewhere and the situation in the south seemed quiet enough. In fact it is evidence of the Government's

¹ C.O.5/657, fo.180, Ellis to B.T., 20 May 1758.
² Ibid., fo.199, Ellis to B.T., 25 October, 1758.
³ C.O.5/673, pp.220-1, B.T. to Pitt, 8 February 1759.
⁴ W.O.34/34, fo.244, C. in C. to Ellis, 1 June 1759.
broad conception of the conflict that Georgia's needs were attended to as much as they were. Even during the glittering years of 1758 and 1759 money was spared for preserving some measure of security to the comparatively remote and tranquil little settlement in the far south.

By 1760 the result of the war in North America was already virtually decided, but the outbreak of hostilities with the Cherokees at the back of South Carolina made Georgia anxious again about its defences. As early as the October of 1759 the Governor had taken precautions against the Cherokee danger, withdrawing some of the troops from Frederica to Savannah in order to release the rangers then in Savannah for duty among the exposed settlements at Augusta. The rangers at Fort Barrington on the Altamaha were ordered to entrench themselves, and arms and ammunition were issued to the various militia officers in the province for the use of the inhabitants if the occasion required. In the following February, after the General Assembly had provided money for the maintenance over a limited period of a number of men drafted for duty from the militia, a plan of general defence was resolved upon. This assigned for duty eighty-five men from the Augusta regiment of militia, twenty-five of whom were to work with the rangers, a similar number to remain for service in Augusta, and thirty to move to Halifax for patrolling between the Rivers Savannah and Ogeechee. The intermediate settlements were protected by sixty men from the
southern regiment scouting in a line between Forts Argyll and Barrington. Twenty men from the Savannah regiment were to scout across the neck of land between the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers, and a general muster of the regiment was to be held as soon as possible for drafting a third of its numbers to hold themselves in readiness for any emergency. All those drafted were entitled to sixpence a day subsistence money for each day of actual service. Reliable negroes, too, were required to perform military service, provided their number did not exceed that of the militia then on duty.¹

Then, in April 1760, the Assembly passed two Acts for strengthening the defences of the province. The first provided for the renovation of existing forts and the erection of a new one around the magazine and blockhouses in Savannah. The second provided for the raising by a general tax spread over five years of £1,100 sterling to be granted the Crown in order to put Savannah and the out-forts in its parishes in a better state of defence.² In the July William de Brahm was ordered to draw up plans for the erection of a small battery mounting six guns on Cockspur Island in the River Savannah for the protection of the harbour and town.³ But these measures were not sufficient of themselves to assure the inhabitants they

2. C.0.5/682, ff.265-8, 275-7.
were safe in Georgia, and many families began to move into other provinces, especially when some of the Creek Indians proved unreliable allies and joined the French and Cherokees in attacking the English. It was in these circumstances that Ellis wrote to the Board of Trade in the summer and autumn of 1760 expressing surprise at the southern colonies being allowed to continue exposed for so long and all his remonstrances having so little effect. For three years he had acted on his own initiative and been rewarded with some success in ensuring the protection of the colony and sustaining the goodwill of the Creeks:

but now people start as from a dream, finding themselves encompassed with, and threatened by, such formidable tribes of merciless barbarians, whose friendship appears so little to be depended upon. And their apprehensions naturally increase when they observe their government unable, either from its own resources or the assistance afforded it by the mother-country, effectually to protect them.1

Ellis was not exaggerating the position in 1760. Up to that year the campaign in Canada had occupied the principal attention, and it was inevitable that the British Government should not consider Georgia in such urgent necessity as the governors made out. But in 1760 the picture was changing. The issue in Canada was practically settled, whereas in the south, with the Cherokees on the warpath, the colonies were more directly menaced than at any time during the war. It was natural, then, for Governor Wright to reiterate his predecessor's

1. C.O.5/648, nos. 36 and 40, Ellis to B.T., 17 June and 20 October, 1760.
entreaties for more military backing from the mother-country. At the end of 1760 there were three regiments of militia totalling 895 men in the province, besides a company of fifty men from South Carolina stationed on St. Simons Island and two troops of rangers each of seventy men and five officers. The company on St. Simons Island, however, was under the command of the Governor of South Carolina, an arrangement of which Wright complained to the Board of Trade, urging that these troops should be under his direction. The Governor's early reports of Georgia's weakness and his request for swivel guns and a proper quantity of shot received a peremptory reply from the Board of Trade at the beginning of 1761. The Board admitted that the defence of the province seemed inadequate but could not agree that the case of Georgia was comparable to that of Nova Scotia as a frontier province exposed to hostile attack, because, so far as military affairs were concerned, Georgia was part of South Carolina, which shared with it the same natural situation, the same dangers and the same interests. Hence the troops in South Carolina were for the defence of both provinces, which in all such matters had to be considered together, "and the wants and defects of the one balanced by the strength and opulence of the other". This did not deter Wright from asking again for military supplies later in the year, nor the Lower

2. C.O.5/674, pp.13-6, B.T. to Wright, 27 February 1761.
House of Assembly from resolving to apply to the British Government for £10,000, that being the estimated amount of expenses incurred by Georgia for its own defence during the war.¹ But it is obvious that by this time the Government was not inclined to bother itself with what appeared to be trivialities when the result of the conflict in North America had already been decided and when negotiations for peace were on foot in Europe. There was nothing ungracious about the Government's attitude, for Georgia simply did not seem important after 1760, and to have supported the southern colonies militarily would have been fighting the war at one remove, so far as the Government was concerned.

The British Government was concerned less with how the southern colonies parried the Indians or strengthened their defences than in how they got along with the Spaniards. By 1755, it is true, the danger from the Spaniards in Florida had declined, and for several years their posts at St. Augustine, Picolata, Pensacola and St. Mark had been intermittently besieged by the Seminole Indians, a branch of the Creeks, who were pressing forward into Florida and driving the Spaniards to the water's edge. But the importance of the Spanish alliance remained prominent in the minds of the French and English, not only during the truce years after 1748 but also throughout the

war period. In 1755 the French ambassador in Madrid, Duras, tried to obtain Spanish aid in the impending struggle, but at that time the Court was much influenced by Wall, who was closely bound to the policy of friendship with England. On 6 August King Ferdinand acquainted Duras of his regret at the rupture between Britain and France and his opinion that intervention by Spain would be a nuisance rather than a help. The King's fear of arousing the antagonism of other nations and his desire to give his ruined people a period for recuperation obliged him to eschew war and follow peace.\(^1\) The efforts of Wall and the King to keep their country out of the conflagration were supported by their representative in London, the Comte d'Abreu, and by Sir Benjamin Keene in Madrid, and for seven years Spain refused to be drawn into a war from which she was unlikely to derive much real benefit. Throughout this period it was the aim of French policy to procure Spain's intervention, and the aim of British to keep her neutral. Pitt dreaded a union of the French and Spanish Crowns and spared no diplomatic exertion to conciliate the Court of Madrid.

This principle of policy explains the Government's attitude towards the settlement south of the Altamaha of a group of colonists from Georgia; as an act of trespass it might alienate Spain and was therefore undesirable. By the Spring of 1755 these settlers, "a lawless crew" under a bogus

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Quaker from Virginia named Edmund Gray, were passing over to the south side of the river daily, and by 1757 Gray and a man named Alexander were conducting a considerable trade with the Creeks. After threats had failed to move them, the Governor of St. Augustine invited Gray and Alexander to establish an Indian trading-house on the north side of the River St. John, where they would be under Spanish protection and liberally supplied with the necessary goods. Gray mentioned this proposition to Ellis, who dissuaded him from accepting. Ellis thought the Spaniards would try and make Gray turn traitor, and feared that acceptance of the proposition would be construed as a tacit recognition of their right to the lands, besides giving them a good opportunity to weaken English influence with the Indians. In order to prevent this, Ellis promised to establish Gray opposite Fort William on the River St. Mary and granted him a licence to trade with the Indians.

The Board of Trade rebuked Ellis for his action, arguing that Spain might regard it as an open avowal of Britain's right to the lands in that area, and so cause a territorial dispute which should be most carefully avoided at this time. Pitt, in his anxiety to conciliate Spain,

1. C.O.5/644, A.64, Reynolds to B.T., 7 April 1755.
was concerned at the awkward possibilities inherent in the situation. In March 1758 he asked the Board of Trade for recommendations on how best to prevent any dangerous consequences, and two months later the Board proposed that the settlers should be immediately ordered to move and the Governors of Georgia and South Carolina enjoined not to allow any other settlements without permission. Instructions to this effect were dispatched in June, and in the November Ellis consulted his Council on the matter. Governor Lyttelton of South Carolina had made a suggestion for putting the instructions into execution, but the Georgia Council thought his method "would carry with it too much parade", which the Governor of St. Augustine might interpret either as an admission by the English that the lands were his property or as a surrender on their part to the representation he had made on the subject. It was decided that a more prudent procedure would be to notify the settlers of His Majesty's pleasure "in a less public manner" and to provide them with other lands on Cumberland Island or elsewhere in compensation. At the beginning of 1759 Ellis and Lyttelton agreed to send commissioners from each of their provinces to break up the settlement, Major Henry Hyrne coming from South Carolina and James Edward Powell being commissioned in Georgia at a salary of a guinea a day to defray his expenses.

After some trouble and delay the majority of the settlers quitted the area, but some obstinately remained, forming an asylum for fugitives from justice.

This episode may be regarded as Georgia's most significant contribution to Anglo-Spanish diplomacy during the Seven Years War. For a short while it worried the ministers in London lest it lead to a rupture with Spain. Unfortunately, just as the dangers of the episode were receding in 1759 there began events in Europe which led to the very result the Government had feared might arise from Edmund Gray's trespasses. For some time the foreign policy of Spain had been directed in a sense favourable to Britain by the minister Wall, who enjoyed the absolute confidence of his master, the feeble Ferdinand VI. But the King died on 10 August 1759 and was succeeded under the title of Charles III by his half-brother the Bourbon ruler of Naples, who disliked Britain and tended to support French interests. The English Ministry, while treating Spain with more favour than it did other neutrals, was unable, or reluctant, to control the privateers which molested Spanish territorial waters, with the result that Wall's regard for Britain diminished and the French position at Madrid began to improve. Although not prepared for an alliance with France

1. C.O.5/657, fo.189, Ellis to B.T., 28 Jan.1759. Pitt Correspondence, II, pp. 38-9, Ellis to Pitt, 12 Feb. 1759. Col.Rec.Ga., VII, pp. 844-5, 875-6. Hamer, op.cit., gives the impression that the settlement broke up quickly and completely, but this does not tally with information that reached Governor Wright who, as late as October 1761 was seeking advice on whether to use force to remove the settlers: Col.Rec.Ga., VIII, p. 585.
at once, by 1761 relations with Britain had so deteriorated that on 15 August the third Family Compact with France was signed. In October Britain asked Spain to explain the compact, and, the answer being unsatisfactory, declared war on her in January 1762. Spain's entry into the war made Georgia the most exposed part of the English mainland colonies, for Spanish raiders now joined the French who for long had been sailing into the mouth of the Altamaha and raiding the coastline. It was fortunate for the province that the main issue in America had already been decided and that the conflict was drawing to a close, as otherwise it would have suffered considerable damage.

When the declaration of war on Spain was proclaimed in Georgia it was accompanied by an order for preventing any trade with the new enemy. This was an extension of the similar orders of 1756 which had sought to debar the exportation from the colonies of provisions that might come into French hands and perhaps cause a scarcity among the English themselves and hamper operations. Nevertheless, the French did procure provisions from the English colonies. An Act passed in Georgia


in July 1757 for preventing the enemy being supplied from the province admitted that cattle and provisions were being daily conveyed overland through Georgia for the use of the French. It was impossible to check colonial trade with the foreign sugar islands, and it continued throughout the war, if not directly, then indirectly through a neutral port in the West Indies. An illegal trade was carried on with the enemy in Florida and Louisiana, principally by Rhode Island but also by South Carolina. By this means the French were enabled to keep their promises of presents to the Indians and encourage the Cherokees against the English. But Georgia was not an important culprit in this respect, and it is, perhaps, significant that Amherst's circular letter to colonial governors in 1752 on the need to stop supplying the enemy with provisions was not addressed to either Nova Scotia or Georgia.

The concern of Georgia with the conflict with France has been shown so far to have consisted largely in the pacification of the Indians, the maintenance of good relations with Spain, and in the gradual, if inadequate establishment of its own defensive system. Its true importance, however, can only be brought out in its proper perspective by a brief chronological


review of the campaign in North America showing in what respects Georgia fitted into the general management of the war there.

The Earl of Loudoun arrived in America in July 1756 to take command of an army that Pitt had described as a "scroll of paper". He sent the Fourty-Fourth Regiment under Webb to strengthen Fort Oswego, but before Webb reached it the fort was captured in August by the French under the vigilant Marquis of Montcalm. This threw the British temporarily on the defensive, and an attack by the French and Indians on the back of the more southerly colonies was expected. Such a diversion had been anticipated as early as the autumn of 1755 but had not then been deemed a real danger, for,

with the Independent Companies and part of the two regiments left there, together with the provincial forces of those parts, and the assistance of our most southern Indians (who have hitherto been, in general, steady) it is to be presumed that any attempts, the French may make that way will be of little consequence, considering also the difficulties they will meet in coming up the Mississippi River.

The danger can hardly have been much greater twelve months later, but Loudoun, nevertheless, instructed the Governor of Georgia to put his frontiers in a good state of defence, as he himself


could do no more with the troops at his command than resist attack. The possible ill-consequences of the loss of Oswego meant, too, that the commander-in-chief was obliged "in the strongest manner" to request manpower from Georgia as well as the other colonies. Since no assistance could be expected from Loudoun, the Governor posted the troops at his disposal as best he could, and detachments were ordered to scout on the line south from Ebenezer through the old fort of Argyll, where the main body of the rangers was stationed, to the Altamaha. This was as much as could then be done, but it is doubtful whether it would have been adequate if the anticipated attack had occurred. Loudoun was, in fact, near the truth in predicting such an attack, for the Governor of Louisiana, Louis Billonart de Kerlérac, strove throughout the early years of the conflict to organize an onslaught on Georgia and South Carolina by southern Indians, the Chickasaws excepted, in order not only to inflict damage on those provinces but also to relieve the pressure on the French in Canada. Fortunately for the English, however, the many difficulties involved, not least being the French Government's desire to economise in Louisiana, prevented it happening in this early critical period of the war.

The loss of Oswego had been a severe, discrediting blow to the British Government. In June the garrison troops at Port Mahon in Minorca had been withdrawn, and Newcastle was resolved that it should be regained by operations in America, a principle of policy evidently not peculiar to Pitt alone. Moreover, attention was not focused solely on Canada and the northern colonies at this time, for among the Duke of Newcastle's papers is a plan for the protection of Georgia and the Carolinas and for the conquest of Louisiana. This points out that the French must be aware of the weakness of Georgia and South Carolina, and it may be assumed that the recent reinforcements sent to Louisiana presage an attack the next winter. "Therefore no time ought to be lost to secure our provinces against such a formidable force, destined for their destruction." Georgia has a very tiny fighting force and its small population is widely distributed: "So that this province may be overrun with as much ease by the force Louisiana can spare, as a troop might pass over Hounslow Heath at present." The protection of the southern colonies will cost nearly as much as would an invasion of Louisiana by the English, and so it would be good policy to attack now and make its conquest "morally certain" this winter. The number of men required would not be large, and the militia and Indians of South Carolina and Georgia

could be supplemented with men from North Carolina, Virginia and Maryland.

It was a commendable scheme, and in many ways a realistic one. But it was not a practicable one in 1756, while 1757 was another year of gloom for Britain. Loudoun was obliged to abandon his contemplated attack on Louisbourg; in August Fort William Henry, on the southern shore of Lake George and covering the New York frontier, was seized by Montcalm; and disastrous tidings from other parts of the globe added to Britain's despair. So far as Georgia was concerned the situation remained comparatively quiet, but the French were active, the disposition of the Indians was uncertain, and the colony felt weak and exposed.

Extensive commitments notwithstanding, some precautions against a French inroad from the direction of the Mississippi were recognized as essential. In February 1757 Loudoun was ordered to send a battalion of regulars to Virginia at once for the defence of the southern colonies. At the end of March a Highland battalion of Foot (about a thousand strong) under Lieutenant-Colonel Archibald Montgomery was ordered to be embarked at Cork for Charleston, where it was to act under Loudoun's orders and co-operate with Governor Lyttelton of

1. Add.MSS.33029, ff.257-70.
2. Pitt Correspondence, I, p.68, Ellis to Pitt, 25 May 1757.
3. Ibid., p.6, Pitt to governors of southern provinces, 4 Feb. 1757.
South Carolina for colonial defence. At a meeting in Philadelphia begun on 15 March and continued by several adjournments to the 24th, Loudoun and the Governors of North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania agreed that there ought to be two thousand men for the defence of South Carolina and Georgia in the event of aggression by the French or Indians, and of this number five hundred should be regulars and the remainder be provided by South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia and Pennsylvania. These troops were to be placed under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Bouquet and transported as soon as possible at the expense of their respective provinces to Charleston in South Carolina, where the cost of their provisions would be met by the Crown. In June, however, Loudoun complained to Pitt of the southern colonies not raising the number of men they had promised, as a result of which Georgia remained weak and unable to resist attack. Bouquet had been ordered to give Georgia as much support as possible, but he was stationed too far away to do anything material. The danger of sudden attack on Georgia was such that, in July, the Governor obtained the Council's approval to the distribution of some arms and ammunition to various officers of militia in the country. Loudoun was aware of the colony's importance

inasmuch as "its being in the enemy's hands would have very bad effect on the neighbouring provinces", and so ordered the Governor an advance of money to maintain the rangers there. This was justified, he wrote, because it seemed to him that Georgia was in danger of being captured by the French, and "it would be much less expense to the Government to support it than to retake it when lost". Later a company of Virginians was detached to Savannah, but was withdrawn again before the end of the year. On the 9th and 10th of December Bouquet wrote to Ellis from Charleston that he did not deem it advisable to send any troops to Georgia in place of the recently recalled Virginian company unless the province could supply the necessary bedding and utensils for them. The Governor and Council were unanimously of the opinion that "the other exigencies of the province" prevented it shouldering such an additional expense, and therefore it would have to do without the troops which had been requested.

By 1758, indeed, the danger to Georgia seemed to have receded, and the initiative was passing to the English. Pitt's plan of campaign in America involved a comprehensive assault on the entire French position between Quebec and New Orleans, and was to follow three main directions. First,

1. Pitt Correspondence, I, p.74, Loudoun to Pitt, 17 June 1757. W.O.34/34, ff.239-40, Loudoun to Ellis, 19 June 1757.
an attempt was to be made to recover the valley of the Ohio and sever French communications by reducing Fort Duquesne. Second, an expedition was to attack Canada from the south and penetrate as far as possible towards Montreal and Quebec. Third, a fleet was to co-operate with a land force in a renewal of the attack on Louisbourg. This last was most important. If Louisbourg was captured early enough in the year an immediate attack was to be made on Quebec by way of the St. Lawrence; but if the season was well advanced then attention was to be turned "upon the forts and places lying on the River Mobile as well as those on the Mississippi." And in any case, Brigadier-General John Forbes was to repair to one of the southern provinces in order to concert "any such offensive operations as may be judged by him most expedient for annoying the enemy, and most efficacious towards removing and repelling the dangers that threaten the frontiers of any of the southern colonies on the continent of America." Preparations for a campaign in the south were begun. In January Pitt gave instructions for General Amherst and Admiral Boscawen to be supplied with relevant information about the southern coasts of America, the forts on the Mobile and Mississippi, and the practicability of an attempt being made on them later in the year by troops sent from Halifax by sea. Experienced pilots and shipmasters who possessed knowledge of the navigation of the Mobile and Mississippi were to be sent to Admiral Boscawen.

to be employed as he thought proper to direct. But it was Pitt's policy to concentrate on one objective at a time, and the first preoccupation of 1758 was the campaign in Canada.

The paramount question was not whether Louisbourg would fall (that was not doubted by either side) but whether it would fall in time for the British to move against Quebec. When the fortress capitulated on 26 July, Amherst and General Wolfe thought there was still time to strike at Quebec, but Boscauwen hesitated, and the matter was decided for them by the arrival of the news of Montcalm's murderous repulse of Abercromby at Ticonderoga and the death of Lord Howe. The situation was not materially altered either by the seizure of Fort Frontenac in August by a supplementary force under Colonel Bradstreet, which cut off Canada from the French south-west, or by the enemy's abandonment of Fort Duquesne in November before the advance of Forbes's expedition, which ended the menace in western Pennsylvania. Amherst and Wolfe realized that the scheme to move on Quebec was now impracticable, for it was necessary to send six battalions to join Abercromby as he retreated through the woods. This, with the dispatch of three battalions to the St. Lawrence and two to the Bay of Fundy, they regarded as a better plan than the idea of attacking French settlements along the Mobile and Mississippi. Consequently, no

1. Pitt Correspondence, I, pp.120-1, Pitt to Lyttelton, 27 Jan.1758.
operations could be undertaken that year against the enemy at the back of the southern colonies.

The beginning of 1759 held out little hope that Georgia would be relieved of the French and Indian danger. In an attempt to deflect Britain's attention from North America the French made ostentatious preparations for invading England and reversing the whole situation at one blow. Pitt, however, remained undaunted by this attempt at a diversion and heeded it no more than to strengthen naval defence a little. He refused to be diverted from the conquest of colonial possessions, and the orders for reinforcing the army in Canada were not altered. His schemes for North America struck a new note. Hitherto the idea of a general onslaught, and conquest of, the whole French empire in America had not been considered practical policy by English statesmen. Their central motive had not extended beyond the establishment of British domination there. Henceforward the conquest of all French possessions in Canada, Louisiana and the West Indies became part of Pitt's determined policy. The importance of destroying French encroachments in the south and counteracting their influence with the Indians was recognized, and in February Pitt ordered Amherst to consult


with Admiral Saunders about an enterprise against the French on the Mobile and Mississippi towards the end of the year.\footnote{Pitt Correspondence, II, p.37, Pitt to Amherst, 10 Feb. 1759.}

Prospects for success were good, for the French position was very weak in 1759. But Montcalm did not neglect the offensive element necessary in a good defence, and he recommended raids on the coasts of the southern colonies as a means of relieving pressure in Canada. The French Government approved of this but could not agree to it because of lack of money; nevertheless, a foothold was to be kept in Canada even if it meant concentrating the forces there into the narrowest limits.\footnote{Waddington, La Guerre de Sept Ans, III, pp.252-8.} Thus it is clear that if the French commanders had had their way Georgia might have suffered some damaging attacks during 1759, but the French Government quashed the idea and resolved on the pertinacious maintenance of the defence of Canada. Nevertheless, the Governor of Georgia managed to persuade his commander-in-chief that the colony's security required more troops, and in October he was empowered to augment his forces.\footnote{W.O.34/34, fo.246, C.in C. to Ellis, 25 Oct. 1759.} As it happened, they were not required. Quebec, Ticonderoga, Fort Niagara and Guadeloupe all fell to the British, and the French hold on Canada was nearly extinguished.
Notwithstanding these overwhelming victories, preparations for the campaign of 1760 were pressed energetically forward by Pitt. The conquest of Canada would be "little more than a military promenade", but the conquest of Louisiana might be a necessary supplement to it. The possibilities were explored by Governor Ellis in a letter to Pitt in April 1760. He suggested an expedition against the enemy fort at Mobile which, if captured, would lead inevitably to the fall of other forts held by the French and their influence among the Indians at the back of Georgia would be destroyed.

It may be objected (wrote Ellis) that such a conquest amongst the Spanish settlements would give umbrage to Spain, which might happen, yet I am persuaded it would be our interest to make it, even were we to yield it to the Spaniards afterwards - who are less dangerous and in every view more eligible neighbours than the French.

This opinion was supported by Governor Arthur Dobbs of North Carolina when he heard of the French having incited the Cherokees to attack Georgia and South Carolina. This, he told Pitt, was proof of the necessity to drive the French out of Louisiana:

and in case the Spaniards should take umbrage at our increase of power in their neighbourhood; and it may be prudent at present not to have any brangles with them, would it not be better to have that settlement entirely vacated by both, or even

2. Pitt Correspondence, II, pp.277-9, Ellis to Pitt, 16 April 1760.
given up to the Spaniards, than allow it to remain in the hands of the French. 

Although the war in Canada was won before the end of 1760 there was a body of opinion in England, too, which believed that neither Virginia, the Carolinas nor Georgia would be safe while the French remained along the Mississippi.

Pitt was not unmindful of the importance of the situation in the south, and in October 1760 he instructed Amherst to acquire information about French strength in Louisiana, expressing the hope that some forces might be spared for use there. But unless something drastic happened it was unlikely that much would be done in that direction. It must be remembered that a principle of British policy at this time was to avoid any move that might antagonise Spain, and since an attack on Louisiana would bring the English near to the Gulf of Mexico, an eventuality to which the Spanish Government was emphatically opposed, it is very probable that the idea was never pressed with urgency. There was, moreover, animosity in the Cabinet between Pitt and Newcastle and his friends, the latter being fearful and jealous of their irascible colleague. Newcastle was also experiencing difficulties with the national finances, and it was doubtful

whether the Cabinet would consent to spend money on an unexciting and seemingly unessential campaign in the sunset regions of Georgia and the Carolinas. And so, in spite of the war with the Cherokees, Georgia had largely to provide for its own defence, stationing its tiny force in the most important posts and arming the inhabitants of exposed settlements.

But the danger to Georgia lay with the Indians only; the French menace was negligible by 1760. France was in a deplorable condition internally, her treasury bankrupt, her navy destroyed, and she was quite unable to reinforce Louisiana. Hence, when Governor Wright's entreaties for assistance were rejected in 1761 and 1762 the British Government was taking a realistic, if not encouraging, line. It was true that the French at Forts Alabama and Mobile were believed to be attempting to provoke the Redskins against the English in Georgia, but was that sufficiently injurious to warrant extra expense by a country that had already spent enormous sums on a war that was now entering its concluding phase? In 1762 the Government did intend the army that captured Havana to move on and attack New Orleans, but the idea faded out. After Amherst's triumph at Montreal in September 1760 the conflict behind the southern colonies tended to diminish.

2. Alden, John Stuart, p.66n.
in significance. The Government was watching affairs in Europe, negotiations for peace were opened, and, most important of all, divisions within the Ministry widened in 1760 and 1761. Prosecution of the war slackened as Pitt's influence waned, and in October 1761 he resigned. George III had come to the throne twelve months before, the Earl of Bute became the principal minister, and all promise of Georgia and the southern colonies being relieved of the French menace disappeared.

The arrangement of a peace had been broached as early as 1759. In that year Choiseul, the chief minister of Louis XV, induced Spain to mediate between France and Britain, and soon after the fall of Quebec the Spanish ambassador in London raised the subject to Pitt, but the English minister insisted on Prussian participation in any negotiations, and by May 1760 the attempt at a bipartite settlement had failed. The peace party in the Cabinet, however, was growing stronger, and by 1761 included not only Newcastle but also Bedford, Hardwicke and the military and naval advisers. Speculation by English statesmen at this time on possible peace terms approached the North American question under three main headings; Canada, Louisiana and the Newfoundland fishery. Louisiana, it was

noted, had received less attention than Canada, "but ought nevertheless to be insisted on to make a part of the British dominions together with all the rivers that the French possessed or occupied in the Gulf of Mexico." And one of the reasons why the French should be dispossessed of Louisiana was that it enabled them to encroach on Georgia and South Carolina and to keep the Indians bordering those colonies in continual war with the inhabitants.

This was one of the principles of policy taken into the discussions which began when both countries exchanged pleni­potentiaries in the summer of 1761, Hans Stanley going to Paris and Monsieur Bussy coming to London. The French met the English views in many particulars, but they resolutely insisted on the retention of Cape Breton and a share in the Newfoundland fisheries, and drew an arbitrary line round Canada and the English colonies which was to serve as the basis of the limits of Louisiana. This delineation of

1. Add. MSS.33030, fo.1, Speculations on peace terms between Britain and France in America, 13 April 1761. Add.MSS. 35913, fo.73, Notes on British and French possessions in America with a view to the terms of peace, 19 April 1761.

2. Chatham Papers, LXXXV, Notte de M.Bussy, 18 Aug.1761: "Pour fixer les limites de la Louisiane du côté des colonies Anglaises et du Canada, on tirera une ligne qui s'étendra depuis Rio Perdido entre la Baye de la Mobile et celle de Pensacola, en passant par le Fort Toulouse chez des Alimabous, et qui se prolongeant par la pointe Occidentale du Lac Erie, enfermera la rivière des Miamis, et par l'extremité Orientale du Lac Huron, ira aboutir à la hauteur des terres du côté de la Baye d'Hudson vers le Lac des Abitibis, d'où la ligne sera continuée de l'Est à l'Ouest jusques et compris le Lac Supérieur."
Louisiana was rejected by the British Government, which asserted that it would never admit the boundaries of Louisiana to extend to the confines of Virginia or of the other British possessions in the Ohio region. The French Government, however, reaffirmed its fishing rights and demanded that the Indian tribes in the hinterland between Canada and Louisiana should be formed into a neutral barrier between the two nations.

The negotiations continued in this vein during the winter of 1761-2. So far as Georgia was concerned the principal matter was that relating to Louisiana. The removal of the French from their threatening position along the Mississippi had been in the minds of the Georgia government throughout the war years, and since the scheme of a military expedition to eject them had never materialized it was natural to hope that the objective would be achieved in the peace settlement. The British Government was clearly determined that the French menace should be dispelled from the south by negotiation as it had been dispelled from Canada by conquest. But in 1762 another factor arose to complicate the issue. Spain was France's partner and was bound to take notice of territorial re-adjustments in an area where she had

1. Ibid., Paper of points to be delivered by Stanley to Choiseul, 25 July 1761. Add.MSS.35421, ff.18,34,82, Papers on Anglo-French negotiations.

2. Chatham Papers, LXXXV, French reply to Britain sent by Choiseul to Stanley, 5 Aug. 1761.
important interests, especially in the Gulf of Mexico. The Florida region, too, was still of strategic significance, and in 1762 came into the peace discussions.

In May 1762 Choiseul offered to surrender the territory east of the Mississippi but insisted on the retention of Martinique and St. Lucia, pointing out that, in making the Mississippi the boundary between the two nations' possessions Britain not only gained a large territorial acquisition but Louisiana and Florida were placed in absolute dependence on the English colonies. The obstacle in the way of an agreement on these lines was the attitude of Spain. Choiseul's offer would isolate Florida and give Britain a foothold on the Gulf of Mexico, and this the Spanish Government would not concede. Indeed, it even countered by reviving its ancient claims both to Louisiana and to Georgia, and, fearful for the safety of Florida, suggested the erection of a neutral Indian zone in the country between South Carolina and the Gulf. This was the situation when the British commissioner, the Duke of Bedford, arrived in Paris in September to participate in the discussion.


Bedford had been instructed by the Government to take particular care over the definition of the Mississippi boundary. When Bedford submitted proposals for the line of demarcation between the British colonies and Louisiana the Spanish negotiator protested that his country had a title to Louisiana, but that his Government was prepared to relinquish its claims to Georgia and accept a fair adjustment of the Florida frontier. The complexion of the whole affair was changed, however, by the fall of the Spanish stronghold of Havana, the news of which reached England at the end of September. The victory "turned the heads of the wisest men," and it was generally affirmed in England that "this rich acquisition" must not be ceded without adequate material compensation. "The nation in general," it was said, "will expect something very advantageous in the future treaty with Spain, in exchange for such a conquest; and it is well, if the old cry of Take and Hold is not revived on the occasion."

1. Ibid., pp.165-6, 168.
2. For the importance of Havana see the Annual Register, V, (1762) p.36, and Kate Hotblack, "The Peace of Paris, 1763", Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Third Series, II (1908) pp.245-8. Cuba commanded the Gulf of Mexico, and Havana, which had long been considered the symbol of Spanish sovereignty in the west, commanded the Florida channel through which had to pass the Spanish treasure ships bound for Europe from Central and South America.
Consequently, Britain stiffened her terms and stipulated that the price of the restoration of Cuba to Spain was the cession of Porto Rico or Florida. Cuba was naturally more precious to Spain than was Florida, but she was reluctant to cede either. To relieve her ally France offered Britain the land to the west as well as to the east of the Mississippi if Spain was permitted to retain her possessions. Britain, preferring Florida, rejected the offer. In thus standing firm for Florida the British Government was acting in the best interests of Georgia, for with the acquisition of the territory east of the Mississippi the French menace would be virtually destroyed in any case, and the dispossession of the Spaniards in Florida would remove whatever potential threat remained to Georgia's southern frontier.

The outcome proved more beneficial to Georgia than could have been anticipated. Neither France nor Spain regarded Louisiana as of any particular advantage, and when Britain refused it France handed it over to Spain with an alacrity matching the chagrin of the recipient, to whom its only value was that it would enable her to maintain a closer watch on English approaches to her treasure colonies. On 3 November, the same day as the preliminaries of peace were
signed at Fontainbleau, the French King ceded to Spain that part of Louisiana west of the new British boundary. Spain accepted because she considered the loss of Florida less harmful than the English acquiring the whole of Louisiana, which would enable them to smuggle into Mexico. This private transaction was not mentioned in the final treaty of peace signed on the evening of 10 February 1763.

Georgia had never been prominent in the minds of the negotiators, but by virtue of the diplomatic exchanges over Louisiana, Florida and the Mississippi the colony indirectly obtained substantial benefits in the definitive peace. By article 7 the limits of French possessions in North America were "fixed irrevocably by a line drawn along the middle of the River Mississippi from its source to the River Iberville, and from thence by a line drawn along the middle of this river and the Lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain to the sea." France ceded Canada, Nova Scotia, Cape Breton and all Louisiana east of the Mississippi except the island on which New Orleans was situated. By article 20 Spain ceded to Britain "Florida, with Fort St. Augustine and the Bay of Pensacola, as well as all that Spain possesses on the continent of North America to the east, or to the south-east, of the

River Mississippi. Hence Georgia was no longer the barrier colony it had been ever since its foundation, for the Spanish potential danger in the south and the French menace in the west had been removed.

Nevertheless, the treaty had a mixed reception in England. Many thought Britain had not taken sufficient advantage of her victories; Pitt said France had been treated too leniently and British interests sacrificed. Florida was considered a poor exchange for the important conquest of Havana, Alderman Beckford comparing it to Bagshot Heath for barrenness; the Earl of Egremont, Secretary of State, recognized "the manifest inferiority" of both Florida and Porto Rico to Havana. But some concessions had to be made if a peace was to be attained and the English ministers were more interested in other matters relating to Spain, such as renewal of commercial treaties and the maintenance of the right to cut logwood in the Gulf of Mexico. Furthermore, the acquisition of Florida was commended by some because it might produce silk and because it removed the Spanish threat to Georgia. In Georgia itself the people were relieved not only because the threat from the south had been dislodged but also because the menace in the west had been considerably

2. Bedford Correspondence, III, p.139, Egremont to Bedford, 26 Oct. 1762.
lessened by the substitution of Spanish for French control. James Habersham in Savannah wrote:

The cession of New Orleans and the lands west of the River Mississippi to Spain yields us great satisfaction, as we the hopeful indeed pretty well assured the Spaniards will prove more advantageous and less turbulent neighbours, than we should have found the French to be.

All the colonies benefited from the Peace, from the recession of the Spanish rival, the fall of French power in America, and from the resulting diminution of the Indian peril, and Georgia, as an exposed, immature and weak frontier province benefited exceedingly. There was, henceforward, no foreign impediment to its development and expansion.

As an appendage to the international settlement must be mentioned the treaty signed with the southern Indians later in the same year. It was on a plan of action originally proposed by Henry Ellis in March 1763 that Lord Egremont, then Secretary of State in England for the Southern Department, ordered John Stuart, who had recently assumed the office of superintendent of the southern Indians, and the Governors of Georgia, Virginia and the Carolinas to meet representatives of the most important southern tribes and remove their grievances. For this purpose a congress was convened at Augusta on 5 November 1763 with chiefs from the Catawbas, Cherokees, Creeks, Chickasaws and Choctaws, a total of about

seven hundred persons attending. Progress was rapid, and on 10 November a treaty was signed. A complaint by the Creeks that settlers from Georgia encroached on their lands was resolved by a substantial cession, made by them in order to "prevent any mistakes, doubts or disputes for the future, and in consideration of the great marks of clemency and friendship extended to us the said Creek Indians". By article 4 of the treaty the headmen of both the Upper and Lower Creek nations and towns agreed that the boundary of Georgia should be a line extending up the Savannah to Little River, across to the headwaters of Briar Creek, down that branch for a few miles, then south-westerly to the main stream of the Ogeechee, down the Ogeechee to a point near the mouth of Buckhead Creek, south to a point on the Altamaha near the mouth of Penholoway Creek, "and from thence to the southward as far as Georgia extends or may be extended."

Provision was also made for the continuance of "a perfect and perpetual peace and sincere friendship" between the English and the Indians. With the treaty signed and ratified, the guns of Fort Augusta were discharged to mark the end of the congress. During the ensuing years this agreement was supplemented by treaties with the several tribes.

The treaty made at Augusta in 1763 was of great benefit to the future development and prosperity of Georgia. The

accession of territory to the colony embodied in the treaty encouraged immigration of new settlers, who could now come with confidence of there being ample tracts of land which they might easily acquire. The Indians, too, left Augusta apparently satisfied, and there was hope on both sides that friendly relations would henceforward be maintained.

We seem (wrote James Habersham) to be in no more apprehension of danger from the savages than you are in London. They are very sensible of the advantages we possess over them by the settlement of the two Florida colonies, and behave very civil, and I now begin to think the time is come when we shall no more be harassed and alarmed by them.

Unfortunately, however, individuals from both races continued to flout the law, to occasion disputes and cause disturbances, and in consequence Georgia continued to be discomposed by the problem of relations between whiteman and redman.

Georgia, then, gained considerably from the peace treaties of 1763. In a sense the province gained more than its part in the war would seem to justify. It had never been prominent, but had not been altogether unimportant. In the early years of the conflict, especially, the need to protect the colony had not escaped the notice of the mother-country or the other provinces, and during the principal campaigns in Canada and elsewhere some provision was made

1. Habersham Letters, p.27.
for the security of the south. From almost the beginning of the war schemes had been entertained of relieving the colony at its back by attacking the enemy in Louisiana. Pitt seems to have kept the idea in mind and broached the subject every year. Georgia had some weight in the policy of conciliating Spain, particularly when Gray and his gang crossed to the other side of the Altamaha. The French appreciated the advantage to be gained from inciting the Indians to make diversionary raids in the back-settlements, and on one or two occasions bodies of English troops were detached from the northern stations to defend Georgia. If it cannot be said to have ever occupied a prominent place in the counsels of the Government it was not ignored, and by Pitt, in fact, appears to have received considerable attention. Therefore it is difficult to understand why Georgia and the southern colonies as a whole have been so perfunctorily treated in accounts of the conflict. Georgia was the southern outpost of the English colonies in America throughout the Seven Years War as it had been throughout the War of Jenkins'Ear. As such it was an important colony strategically, a fact frequently recognized by Pitt, the military commanders and the colonial governors. The ever-expected attack did not materialize, but the menace was always present.

1. E.G., Waddington, La Guerre de Sept Ans, in five volumes totalling 2,867 pages mentions Georgia only once (I, p. 245) and that only in a list of what individual colonies could contribute towards the campaign of 1757. Corbett, England in the Seven Years War, in two volumes totalling 883 pages does not mention Georgia at all. In Gipson, British Empire before the American Revolution, volumes VI-VIII, the colony receives just over 4 pages of the 1200 or so devoted to the war period.
Georgia came through the tribulations of the French and Indian War as a royal province, with an administration similar in form to that functioning in most of the other colonies. Its special system of government established by, and associated with, the Trustees had been ended upon the surrender of their charter in 1752. The transition, however, was neither sudden nor immediate; difficulties had to be overcome, and the departments of Government were not inclined to hurry. Not until 1754 was a royal system of government erected in Georgia, but the process of transition had begun as early as 13 May 1751, when the Privy Council received a memorial from the Trustees regarding the termination of their period of government. It adumbrated what the Trustees had achieved in the past and what they recommended for the future. With the assistance of Parliamentary grants totalling £130,000 large numbers of British and foreign Protestants had been sent over and settled in Georgia, courts of judicature had been established, forts and other public works constructed, and a civil government maintained. Georgia was now an expanding province with over 1,700 whitemen and about 400 negroes. The Trustees referred also to the fact

1. C.0.5/656, ff.150-2, Trustees' memorial to H.M. Add. MSS. 33028, ff.72-5 P.C.2/102, p.233.
that although by charter their term of government would expire on 9 June 1753, the right of leasing land in Georgia was vested in them for ever. As this might occasion some difficulties, they were willing to surrender the trusteeship in its entirety provided the Government consented to certain conditions which the Trustees thought necessary for the security and welfare of the settlers. These conditions were that Georgia's independence of South Carolina should be acknowledged explicitly; the inhabitants be confirmed in their titles and possessions; that quit-rents then due should be entirely remitted and in future be reduced from four to two shillings per hundred acres, as in the other provinces; and that Benjamin Martyn should be continued as the colony's secretary in England. The Trustees, however, were in no position to dictate terms, and when a committee of them attended a meeting of the Privy Council on 19 December they were obliged to resign the trusteeship absolutely, without any conditions or limitations. On 28 May 1752 a draft of a deed of the surrender was approved by the Council and passed under the Great Seal of Britain to signify the King's acceptance. Georgia had become a royal province.

1. C.O.5/656, fo.154

2. P.C.2/102, p.411. C.O.5/669, p.113, Martyn to the President in Savannah, 23 Jan. 1751/2. In a postscript Martyn noted with satisfaction that the new administration would be appointed by the Board of Trade, whose president, the Earl of Halifax was conscious of Georgia's importance.

The first problem was to keep civil government operating in the colony during the transference from Trusteeship to royal control. Edmund Gray, selected by the Georgia Assembly to be its agent, and Benjamin Martyn, the secretary, warned the Board of Trade that the lack of an established government was discouraging industry in the province and deterring people from settling there. The death of the bailiff of Savannah town-court, for example, had arrested the administration of justice because there was, at present, no method of filling the vacancy. Another complication was the conferring of lands by the President and Assistants, for their power to do this was only derivative from the authority of the Trusteeship, and so lapsed with that authority. Therefore, all grants made by them since the surrender of the charter could be construed as void. Problems of this nature, arising from the uncertainty of land tenure and the suspension of the judicature, would remain until a civil government was properly established, and would, during the interval, produce discontent among the inhabitants and discouragement among intending immigrants, who would either not settle in any of the colonies at all or be diverted to one in which they would not be so useful as they would in "the unsettled, improving, important and barrier" province of Georgia. Consequently the

Privy Council issued a proclamation directing that all persons who held offices in Georgia under the Trustees were to continue the performance of their duties until the King's pleasure was known. Twelve months later the President and Assistants in Savannah were notified by the Board of Trade that, since no effective grants of land could now be made except by the authority of the Crown, the grants then being made in the province would be allotments only, to serve as a basis for future grants when a governor was appointed. In this way the initial anomalies were temporarily resolved. It now remained to put the government of Georgia on a permanent footing.

In April 1753 the Board of Trade was ordered to prepare a plan for establishing a civil government in Georgia. The plan was forwarded in June to the Committee of the Privy Council, which approved it in March 1754. It recommended a constitution similar to those obtaining in the other colonies more immediately subject to the authority of the Crown. A governor should be appointed by commission under the Great Seal with power to call an assembly, pass laws, erect courts of judicature, grant

2. Ibid., pp.41-3, B.T. to President and Assistants, 12 July 1753
lands and discharge all other functions necessary for the proper administration of the colony. The King should nominate a council consisting of twelve persons and possessing the same powers and privileges as other colonial councils. The governor was to be the vice-admiral and, in association with other officers, constitute an admiralty court for the regulation of matters subject to admiralty jurisdiction. Other appointments were to include customs officers for collecting duties and regulating other matters subject to the Treasury and Customs Commissioners; a register and receiver of quit-rents; a surveyor of lands; an attorney-general to assist the governor and council on legal issues; a provost-marshal to perform the duties of a sheriff; and a secretary to register deeds, keep public records and act as clerk of the council. On 6 August 1754 the various offices were filled in accordance with this plan, and John Reynolds became the first Governor of Georgia.

The Governors of colonial Georgia were men of character and resolution. The most troublesome was the first, John Reynolds, who took up the post with the experience of several years in the Navy to his credit. What was not to his credit was the persistence with which he sought increases in his salary, £600 a year paid by the Crown, and begged the Earl of Hardwicke,

the Lord Chancellor, for recommendation to any other governorship that fell vacant, as he found that of Georgia not sufficiently profitable. He soon antagonized both the Council and Assembly in the province by his arbitrary conduct towards them and neglect of their advice. He was accused of interfering in the administration of justice, dealing high-handedly with the Assembly, dishonesty in the distribution of presents for the Indians, and of having assigned many public duties to William Little, a former surgeon in the Navy, whom he had brought over with him in the capacity of private secretary and who samefully abused his position. This led to his recall in August 1756 to answer for his behaviour. After "a tedious passage" the hapless Governor had the misfortune to be captured by a French privateer and stripped of his papers, but he eventually reached England in the autumn of 1757. It is, perhaps, significant that the charges against Reynolds were regarded in a serious light by the Government, and that he was punished in spite of his close friendship with Hardwicke.

Conflict between colonial governors and assemblies was not unusual at this time; what was remarkable in this instance was the fact that the Board of Trade upheld the cause of the colonists.


against their governor, for it was the Board's normal policy to
defend the governors against the assemblies, even though it often
did so irresolutely and without effect. The British Government,
however, was evidently not so blind as to not see the patent
unconstitutional conduct of Reynolds, and did not hesitate to
replace him. Upon Reynolds's recall, Henry Ellis was made Lieu-
tenant-Governor of Georgia and promoted to Governor in May 1758.
Unlike his predecessor, Ellis dealt tactfully with the Council
and Assembly, and their relationship with him was harmonious
throughout his residence in the province. He was a good choice
for Governor, but unfortunately ill-health overtook him. In
1758 he was obliged to repair to the northern colonies for con­
valescence, and in 1760 he returned to England permanently,
James Wright being appointed in his stead. Wright was a native
of South Carolina and had served that colony as its agent in
England. He proved to be a man of ability and fortitude, and
it was upon him that the onus fell of defending the royal auth­
ority during the years of revolution.

Coincident with the appointment of John Reynolds as the
first Governor a draft of his instructions had been prepared.

1V of The Colonial Period of American History, 4v., New
2. C.0.5/645, B.23, H.Fox to B.T., 3 Aug. 1756. C.0.5/646, C.39
Gazette, no. 9789 (6-9 May 1758)
3. C.0.5/647, D.13 and D.4, King in Council, 4 Dec. 1758 and
This contained all the general articles usually given to governors in the colonies, with the addition of such particular points as befitted Georgia individually. In accordance with these instructions a judiciary was organized in December 1754, when Reynolds issued letters patent under the Great Seal of Georgia constituting a court of record under the name of the General Court, to be held before two or more judges appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of his Council. It was to sit in Savannah every three months and have jurisdiction over all actions, real, personal and mixed, exceeding the value of forty shillings, except where the title to a freehold was in question, and over all criminal matters, with the same power and authority in Georgia as those exercised by the Courts of King's Bench, Common Pleas and Exchequer in England. In November 1755 letters patent were issued for erecting a Court of Session of Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery, to be held twice a year, where, in order to prevent long imprisonments, all criminals committed after the sitting of the General Court were to be tried by two members of the Council or judges of the General Court commissioned by the Governor for that purpose. A Court of Chancery heard and determined all matters of equity and sat after each General Court if required, the Governor presiding.

The bulk of litigation, however, was carried on in the Courts of Conscience which, by an Act of Assembly in April 1760, were designed to avoid the heavy expense incurred in the ordinary method of suing for and recovering small debts in the General Court. Every settlement had its own justices of the peace commissioned by the Governor to determine in these courts all actions of debt and damage, except those concerning titles to land, in which the amount involved did not exceed £8 sterling.

During the Trusteeship period there had been no admiralty court in Georgia, but in January 1755 one was established consisting of four members, the Governor granting commissions to a judge, an advocate-general, a marshal and a register of the court. This tried breaches of the Acts of Trade, had jurisdiction over cases concerning salvages, mariners' wages, piracy, enemy ships taken as prizes, and over other maritime affairs, and "proceeded according to the course of the civil law and the established method of determination used in Great Britain and other maritime nations".

As in the other colonies the Governor in Georgia had, from his commission, the authority to pardon all criminal offenders excepting those convicted of treason or wilful murder, when he could only reprieve until the King's pleasure was known. He

could also remit fines and forfeitures imposed in the provincial courts excepting those above the sum of £10, when he could only suspend payment and refer the question of remission to the royal authority. This prerogative of mercy was exercised without the advice of the Council, so that the Governor was the sole local agent with the power to check the execution of justice. The Governor had the authority also to grant commissions to judges, justices of the peace and all other officers necessary for the administration of justice, such commissions to be granted "during pleasure only". This qualification represented a new departure in Government policy, for hitherto colonial governors had been forbidden to express any limitation of time in the commissions they granted. The officers appointed included an attorney-general, whose duties were to advise the Governor and Council on legal matters and act as prosecutor for the colony. There was a provost-marshal for the whole province, corresponding to the sheriff in England, who was responsible for summoning juries, serving writs, the custody of prisoners and for issuing summonses for elections to the Assembly. In practice, he resided in Great Britain and rented out the office to a deputy called "the acting provost-marshal" who was empowered by law to appoint deputies in the various parishes and districts to hold the

elections for him. Owing to the ignorance and partiality exhibited by the judges, Henry Ellis requested a chief justice to be sent from the mother-country, and on 27 November 1758 the King signed a warrant appointing William Grover. The Chief Justice was a barrister at law and received a salary of £500, raised by an annual grant from Parliament. The most eminent holder of the office, Anthony Stokes, who arrived in Georgia in 1769, asserted that "the salary and established fees enabled him to appear in the character of a gentleman, and to give due attention to his office without prosecuting any other profession for a maintenance".

It was obvious that the mother-country would have to continue financing Georgia, and the Governor's salary was necessarily paid by the Crown. But expenses were large, and the Governor was instructed to recommend the Assembly to pass a law for the costs of government to be defrayed by the inhabitants themselves as soon as their circumstances permitted. Such a law was to provide for the salaries of the Governor, judges, justices and other officials, for the erection and repair of fortifications.


3. Stokes, op.cit., pp.132-3, 264-8. The assistant judges appointed by the Governor received no salary or fees.
for presents to the Indians, and for other public works.  

The British Government naturally looked forward to Georgia paying its own way. The support of administration in the colony was a considerable burden on the Treasury. The cost from June 1754 to June 1755, for example, was £2,957 10s., only a small part of which remained for spending on public works after the salaries of officials and the bounties on silk cocoons had been paid. 

By the beginning of 1756 lack of money was hampering much important work in Savannah, particularly the building of a gaol, repairing the light-house, court-house and church, and clearing the river of old wrecks and trees that were obstructing navigation. Indeed, the likelihood of the inhabitants ever being able to support themselves tended to recede rather than improve, for expenses increased steadily. Georgia's civil establishment cost Britain £3,557 10s. in the year 1757-8, and by 1759-60 the amount had risen to £4,057 10s. There was some advantage to the mother-country in this arrangement. With the Crown bearing the charges of government in Georgia neither the Governor nor officials were at the mercy of the Assembly, as

2. Add. MSS. 33029, fo.122. The salaries of the Governor and civil officers came to £1,020; the bounties on silk to £1,000.
3. C.O.5/645, B.10, Reynolds to B.T., 5 Jan., 1756
was the case in other colonies where salaries were paid by the
assemblies. In this way Georgia, like Nova Scotia, was on a
somewhat different footing to the other provinces, being more
directly responsible to, and dependent upon, the home Government.
In the case of Georgia, however, there is no evidence to support
the theory that the arrangement was the result of deliberate,
conscious policy on the part of the Board of Trade.

This dependence of Georgia on the continual assistance of
the United Kingdom was some justification for regarding it more
as the property of Britain than as an individual entity within
itself. There was never any idea of the colony being other
than subordinate and contributory to the welfare of its mother-
country. The Trustees had declared at the end of their charter
rule that they had "applied their principal attention to make
the province of Georgia subservient to the interest and trade of
Great Britain." Under the royal government the Board of Trade,
through its inability to place the Governor and other officers at
the mercy of the Assembly for their salaries and through its

1. Georgia and Nova Scotia were similar also in that members
of the Upper House of Assembly were appointed by the Crown,
laws were submitted to the home Government for approval be-
fore being put into force, and both depended on Britain for
financial help. See W.B. Kerr, "The Merchants of Nova Scotia
and the American Revolution", Canadian Historical Review,
XIII (March, 1932) p.23.

2. This theory is inferred by Dickerson, American Colonial
Government, pp.194-5.

consequent obligation to keep the administration of the province strictly responsible to the home Government, was, perforce, conforming to the imperial theories of the time.

The Governor's instructions were precise on the composition of the legislature. As soon as possible the colony was to be partitioned into counties, each of which would then send two representatives to an Assembly possessing legislative powers and privileges similar to those in the other colonies. It elected its own Speaker, but the Governor could negative its Acts, his veto being subject to review by the home Government; it chose its own doorkeeper and messengers, but the Governor appointed the clerks and could adjourn, prorogue and dissolve it at pleasure, except that from Saturday to Monday it might adjourn itself. Membership qualifications debarred Catholics and anyone not owning a freehold estate of at least five hundred acres. Unlike those of most of the other colonies, members of the Assembly in Georgia received no salary for their services. Its membership was never large, varying between fourteen and twenty-five, and the number required for a quorum also varied upwards from a minimum of eight members and the Speaker. Writs of election to the Assembly were issued by order of the Governor in Council and were returnable within forty days. Suffrage franchise was

1. They were unpaid also in South Carolina and Barbados.
limited to freeholders who were not Catholic and who possessed fifty acres of land. If this was not democracy as the term is understood today, it was, nevertheless, in full accord with liberal opinion on both sides of the Atlantic in the Eighteenth Century. As the authority on royal government in America has pointed out:

The principle of universal manhood suffrage seemed as undesirable to the great majority of colonial politicians as it did to the authorities in Great Britain. Nearly everyone agreed that the right to vote or sit in the assembly ought to be limited to freeholders—those who had a tangible stake in the community. It was therefore in keeping with the tenets of the time for a government of property-holders to be established in Georgia.

The first General Assembly met conformably with these instructions on 7 January 1755. Complaints from it against the system so established were soon crossing the Atlantic. In a remonstrance dated 21 February 1755 the House of Representatives objected to the qualifications for electors and elected as laid down in the Governor's instructions. The requirement for representatives to have five hundred acres excluded residents in towns, many of whom possessed buildings worth more than the


2. Labaree, Royal Government in America, p.188.

specified land qualification. Similarly, freeholders of town lots were disqualified from voting, although their one or two acres might exceed in value the fifty acres which enabled others to vote. Therefore the General Assembly asked to be allowed to settle the qualifications by laws more conducive to Georgia's interest and welfare. The Board of Trade's answer was to reaffirm the Crown's authority in the matter and to condemn the regulation of electoral qualifications by provincial laws as a violation of the royal prerogative. Nevertheless, there was no reason why the Governor should not assent to Bills passed in Georgia propounding electoral qualifications provided they were not put into force without the King's approval.

Another objection to the system of government was that the power of the Governor and Council to settle the fees of public officers without the concurrence of the Assembly might operate to the detriment of the inhabitants, whose representatives were unable to procure them any redress if they should complain on this head. It was suggested, therefore, that these fees should be fixed by the General Assembly, as was customary in other colonies. This received an answer in the same vein as the previous objection: all Bills passed by the Council and Assembly

2. C.O.5/672, pp.369-72, B.T. to P.C. Committee, 12 Nov. 1755.
3. Ibid., p.360, B.T. representation to P.C., 6 Aug. 1755.
for the purpose suggested would have to be sent to the King for his approval or else a suspensory clause inserted until the royal pleasure was known. The home Government clearly had no intention of permitting too much power to pass to the provincial legislature.

The Council in Georgia was designed to perform legislative functions similar to those of the House of Lords in England, that is, to serve as the Upper House of Assembly, to temper the actions of the Lower House and to act as the court of appeals. Its members were appointed under royal commissions, selection being made by the Board of Trade and approved by the King, with the Governor having the right to make recommendations. Thus the Council was neither an hereditary, nor an elective, nor a representative body, but it was not necessarily out of sympathy with the populace as a consequence, for its members were colonials and were directly affected by the measures of provincial government. In 1754 the Council had ten members, but by 1758 it had increased to twelve and remained at that figure until the end of the colonial period. When membership fell below seven the Governor could appoint new members up to that number to serve until the Crown made the necessary appointments. Three members made a quorum; although by his instructions the Governor was discouraged from acting with less than five except in emergencies. Councillors were appointed during good behaviour and could be suspended by the Governor if there was just cause. They were expected to advise the Governor and
furnish him with the benefit of their intimate knowledge of conditions in the colony.

This intended partnership between Governor and Council was soon broken. Governor Reynolds quickly earned the hostility of all the Councillors by his impatience with their rights and privileges. The royal instructions emphasized the Governor's power to suspend Councillors, and Reynolds was not loathe to exercise it against any he personally disliked. Clement Martin was suspended because he was turbulent, overbearing and impudent, and disparaged the Governor's authority at every opportunity. Reynolds objected to other Councillors on similar personal grounds, and of the few to whom he took no exception, one, the inoffensive Patrick Graham, "a raw Scotshman who seldom troubled his head with government affairs, but practised physic and minded his little plantation", died soon after the Governor's arrival in Georgia. The remainder Reynolds regarded as in one way or another objectionable. James Habersham "wrote a poor hand and had a worse head for a secretary", and was a source of trouble to the Governor. Francis Harris was criticized as "a person of mean parts and low cunning", who, in association with Habersham, had achieved a considerable position in Georgia "by fingerling the public money". Reynolds omitted to consult the


2. C.0.5/645, B.3, Reynolds to B.T., 22 Sept. 1755.

3. Add.MSS.35909,fo.298, Reynolds to Hardwicke, 28 July, 1758.
Council on important administrative matters, he did not seek its advice on the distribution of presents intended for the Indians, he gave it no reasons for his suspension of Clement Martin, and he concealed from it that section of the royal instructions by which he was obliged to seek its opinion and obtain its consent to his actions. From this time forward until the Revolution the Council became more provincial in outlook and interest and its connection with the Governor, and through him with the Crown, gradually loosened. It began to identify itself more with measures advocated by the Commons House of Assembly, so that the original plan of the British Government regarding its function in administration ultimately came to naught.

All Acts passed in Georgia had to be approved by the King before they could become law. Private Bills and Bills affecting revenue or the trade of Great Britain were required to include a "suspending clause" postponing their operation until the royal consent had been secured. This suspensory clause in colonial legislation made the King, in effect, a direct participant in the actual legislative process instead of a mere external reviewing authority with an executive prerogative. The royal power

2. See Labaree, Royal Government in America, pp.224-5.
to disallow an Act was absolute and need not be exercised immediately or, indeed, within any time limit, so that laws made in the colony might be disallowed several years after they had been passed by the colonial legislature. Furthermore, in disallowing an Act no discrimination was made between the clauses that were objectionable and those that were not; the whole Act would come under the disapproval, thus requiring the re-enactment of those clauses against which nothing was held. The list of enactments disallowed by the Crown is a formidable one. In 1759, for instance, six Acts which had been passed in Georgia between 1755 and 1757 were repealed on the advice of the Board of Trade. Such wholesale cancellation of measures was not due purely to the wish to emphasize royal authority and provincial dependence upon Great Britain. There was often good reason for allogating colonial legislation, especially laws that were partisan, technically poor or detrimental to the interests of the empire in general. The Act passed/Georgia in 1757 for better settling the province declared that all persons who, during the ensuing three years, immigrated from one of the other colonies were to be protected for seven years from arrest and action for debts contracted by them before their settlement in Georgia, except for debts owed in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Georgia and part of South Carolina. This was rejected for the

1. Flippin, op.cit., p.280
very good reason that it established an asylum for debtors against their lawful creditors, and as such was manifestly both unjust and prejudicial to the other colonies.

The most significant disallowance of a statute occurred in 1761. By one of the articles of his instructions the Governor was to erect courts of justice and judicature within the colony, taking care that powers vested in them were no greater than those of English courts and the procedure as near as possible to that followed in England. Once established the courts should occupy a position independent of the Assembly, a principle upheld by the British Government in July 1761 when it repealed an Act passed in Georgia in November 1759 for confirming the inhabitants in the titles to their lands and tenements. The Act was disallowed for two main reasons. First, because it had been passed without a clause suspending its execution until the King's pleasure was known; and second, because

the determining upon a question of this nature by a partial Act of Legislature without any hearing of parties or any of those regulations and exceptions which justice and policy has prescribed in all general laws for quieting possessions, is arbitrary, irregular and unjust, and subversive of those established principles of the constitution by which disputes and questions in all matters of private property and private claims are referred to the decision of the courts of law.¹

This censure of legislative interference in matters not properly


2. Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors, I, p. 298

cognizable by an Assembly was in line with the policy pursued by England since the end of the Seventeenth Century. The status of colonial judiciaries was regarded in the light of English constitutional notions, so that statutes which implied the assumption of appellate jurisdiction by the assemblies were disallowed by the Crown. The repeal of Georgia's Act of 1759 was an outstanding example of Britain's policy to prevent interference by colonial assemblies with the courts of justice.

The question of title to property, of which Georgia's Act of 1759 had treated, was one that caused a lot of trouble. In 1754 the Governor had been instructed to confirm the grants of land made by the Trustees and the allotments made by the President and Assistants on terms similar to those already prevailing, except that in future at least one twentieth of the land must be cleared and cultivated every year and the quit-rent would be reduced to two shillings per hundred acres. At the same time, provision was made to prevent persons accumulating more land than they could properly cultivate. Anomalies and misunderstandings soon arose, and in January 1755 the Council and Assembly prepared a remonstrance to His Majesty asking for alterations in the Governor's instruc-


tions relating to the terms and conditions of land grants. Article 67 of the instructions directed that unless an owner of land cleared and cultivated a twentieth of it every year the grant was void. Nobody would accept land on these conditions because normally at least half the grant was pine-barren and unfit for cultivation, which meant the grantee would almost certainly forfeit his property before long. "These terms and conditions, therefore", Reynolds pointed out, "very much alarm the inhabitants, for they say it will at least retard the settlement of the colony for some time, notwithstanding the hopes they have of the terms being altered". Another problem was that since the end of the Trusteeship period the restriction against an individual holding more than five hundred acres had been evaded by making allotments of large quantities of land to one person in the names of his children, relations, absentees or to fictitious names, and in this way much of the best land had been disposed of.

But it was against the obligation to clear and cultivate five out of every hundred acres each year that the Georgia legislature complained. Its remonstrance was considered by the Board of Trade in May 1755, and it was decided that Reynolds

3. Ibid., A.60, Reynolds to B.T., 28 Feb. 1755.
must have misconstrued the intention of his instructions, which was that the requirements about cultivation should extend only to grants made in the future and not to lands already assigned. Nevertheless, the Board prepared new land regulations for Georgia taken largely from an Act passed in Virginia in 1713 under which the settlement and cultivation of that colony had been greatly extended. The new regulations distinguished between good and bad land and varied the obligations attached to grants accordingly, besides making the terms generally easier and more practicable. It was a fair treatment of a difficult problem.

On the recommendation of the Trustees when they surrendered their charter, the Crown remitted all arrears of quit-rent due it at that time and reduced the charge in future from four to two shillings per hundred acres, to become payable two years after the date of the grant. In February 1757 Sir Patrick Houstoun was sworn in at the Council Chamber in Savannah as register and receiver of quit-rents in Georgia. Unfortunately, quit-rents had never hitherto been collected in Georgia, so there was no machinery ready and operating for the Government to use. The impossibility of obtaining


the quit-rents under the existing system made some new provision for their collection essential, and in February 1760 the Upper House of Assembly recommended a Bill for that purpose. The Commons House did not pass it until two years had elapsed, and then only in an amended form. Thereafter the Act was bandied about in England, criticized by the Treasury and never confirmed. Since no other Act for that purpose was passed, the collection of quit-rents in Georgia was never successfully attempted.

one of the obstacles in the way of collecting quit-rents was the extreme shortage of money in the province. An unfavourable balance of trade drained all the colonies of metallic currency and forced them to resort to the device of paper money. In 1756 the Board of Trade relaxed its principles to the extent of sending over part of the annual Parliamentary grant in copper coin and milled dollars, but this was not sufficient to ease the situation permanently, and the scarcity of bullion made a paper currency imperative. Neither public nor private business could be carried on without it, for there was no commerce that brought specie into Georgia, and even if there had been it would not have

2. Bond, Quit-Rent System in the American Colonies, pp.350-3.
stayed there long, because of the adverse balance of trade. The mother-country could not welcome the issue of paper currency in the colonies on account of its likely inconvenience to international trade. There was, however, no effective means of preventing it. By the time the Board of Trade had decided to disallow an Act creating paper money, the bills would already be in the possession of third parties and disallowance would be inexpedient, inopportune and ineffectual. As far back as 1690 the Massachusetts legislature had issued promissory notes as a medium of exchange in anticipation of tax collections, and by 1755 bills of credit had been issued by New York, New Jersey, the whole of New England, the Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Maryland and Virginia.

In February 1755 the Georgia General Assembly passed an Act for circulating £7,000 in paper money to remedy the serious inconveniences to the inhabitants of their lack of gold and silver and inability to raise the money to pay any tax that might be levied. The bills were declared a legal tender in liquidation of all debts and dues, and provision was made for securing their effectual payment by the parties to whom they were issued. The Act was not to be enforced until the King's pleasure was known, but while it was being shelved in England.

1. C.0.5/646, C.63, Ellis to B.T., 24 April 1759
by the doubts of the Board of Trade, not only were some of
the bills issued in Georgia but another Act was passed in 1757
for emitting £638. 7s. 14d. in paper bills to discharge the
public debt. The British Government regarded these measures
as contrary not only to the Parliamentary resolution of April
1740 that bills of credit issued in the colonies were illegal
by virtue of an Act of Queen Anne's reign and that governors
should veto all colonial Acts authorizing the emission of paper
currency unless they contained a suspensory clause, but contrary
also to the Act of 1751 forbidding the issue of paper money in
the four New England governments except for certain specified
objects. The measures in Georgia, therefore, were a violation
of the constitution, and as such the Government would not approve
them. Of particular significance was the manner in which the
bills had been issued in spite of the suspensory clause for
awaiting the royal pleasure. The suspensory clause had never
been very effective in colonial legislation, and Massachusetts
and Pennsylvania especially were consistent offenders, but in

1. B.T. Journal, 8 Oct. 1756; 21 March 1758
   XVI, pp.224, 229.
3. C.O.5/673, pp.4-37, B.T. to Ellis, 21 April 1758. The Act of
   Queen Anne's reign was 6 Anne, c.57. The Parliamentary reso-
   lution of 1740 is to be found in the Commons Journals, XXIII,
   pp.527-8. The Act of 1751 (not 1750 as the Board of Trade
   says in its letter to Ellis) was 24 Geo. II, c.53.
   the King in Council (New York, 1915) pp.214-5.
the case of Georgia its non-observance may be taken as an indication of the urgency of the currency problem and of the unwillingness to allow the situation to deteriorate while the Government vacillated in London.

Notwithstanding the attitude of the home Government, an Act was passed at the beginning of 1759 to print £799. 8s. lid. in bills of credit in order to defray the expenses of various public works in the province and to make good a deficiency in the last public tax; it being argued that to raise all this money by a public tax would at that time be an insupportable burden on the inhabitants. This was followed by the important Act of May 1760 for issuing and applying £7,410 in paper money, which was confirmed by the Privy Council in July 1761. "Upon the whole", opined the Board of Trade, "although we are sensible of the mischiefs which may arise in Your Majesty's plantations by the increase of paper currencies, and are therefore desirous of checking and discouraging the growth of them in general," in this particular instance it would seem to be so much for the benefit of Georgia that the Act might safely be allowed. Thus the Government ultimately acknowledged the inevitable and countenanced the issuing of a paper currency. But it did so very

reluctantly. It had disallowed all the Acts passed for the same purpose between 1755 and 1759, and the discouragement of measures of this nature in America remained a principle in the mother-country's policy. Only three years after confirming Georgia's Act of 1760 the issue of legal tender paper money in the colonies was forbidden by Parliament.

By his instructions the Governor was to ensure the supremacy of the Church of England in Georgia and, as Ordinary of the province, was empowered to collate to benefices and grant marriage licences. The jurisdiction of the Bishop of London was recognized, and his permission was necessary before a teacher could establish a school in the colony. Dissenters bore some disabilities, but only a small part of their taxes was used to support the Established Church.

The establishment of the Church of England was not designed to interfere with other religious faiths, for to do so would have provoked resistance from the Lutherans and Presbyterians, the Congregationalists and Methodists, the Baptists and Jews, who together formed a considerable portion of the population. An example of the tolerance with which Dissenters were generally treated under the royal government occurred in June 1755 when the

1. 4 Geo. III, c.34.
Governor and Council acceded to a petition from forty-three Presbyterians for land in Savannah on which to build a church, though no immediate steps were taken for its erection. The Government in London, on the other hand, was not always so lenient in its outlook. An Act was passed in Georgia in 1756 for the alleviation of Dissenters who would not take the oath in its existing form. This was abrogated in 1759 by the British Government on the grounds that the degree of indulgence it provided was not in conformity with the Act of Toleration in England whereby Dissenters were not exempt from taking oaths on the Holy Evangelists.

On 15 March 1758 the Governor assented to an Act for establishing Anglican worship and dividing the province into eight parishes for the purposes of election and regulation, similar to the system prevailing in most of the other colonies. The churches in the parishes were organized on the English model, with church-wardens and vestrymen having the power in their respective parishes to assess rates for church repairs, relief of the poor and for other parochial services. The system thus established seems to have worked satisfactorily, although an Act passed on 4 March 1762 making attendance at divine worship com-

2. Ibid., XVI, pp. 96, 108, 111.
pulsory suggests that there was some laxity in observance of
the sabbath. No "worldly labour" was permitted on a Sunday,
and the church-wardens and constables of each parish patrolled
the streets during church services to ensure that the regulations
were kept. Nevertheless, religious issues never became import­
ant or controversial in royal Georgia, where the Anglican Church
was supported by the Government but Dissenters were little dis­
turbed or restricted.

A fresh series of problems for the British Government arose
after the end of the French and Indian War in 1763. The Treaty
of Paris in that year advanced the western boundaries of the
English continental colonies to the Mississippi, while the Span­
ish cession of Florida removed the menace to Georgia's southern
frontier. The first need was to define the new acquisitions and
their contiguous provinces and to direct them along a path con­
forming to Britain's imperial interests. This subject had been
raised before the signing of the treaty, and in the spring and
summer of 1763 it received detailed consideration. At this time
the mother-country preferred the southern colonies to the northern.
The produce of the southern colonies, it was said, "being what
nature affords not to Britain, but yet what luxury renders indis-

1. Ibid., pp. 508-15.
pensable to Europe, our rivals, in the purchase thereof, pay us for our virtue, while we administer to their weakness and increase their wants". They supplied Britain's manufacturers with valuable raw materials, and were, therefore, her "riches and glory". Britain's policy, it was held, should be to check population in the northern provinces because they were tending to become rivals rather than auxiliaries to Britain's seafaring interests, whereas population in the south should be encouraged because there the planters would never compete with the mother-country. "To encourage population in the southern colonies, then, is directly promoting the interest of this island". Further settlements, however, should be confined to the sea coasts and the banks of navigable rivers, so that the trade between them and the mother-country could be maintained at the minimum of expense.

The line of settlement in all the colonies was deemed to have already extended far enough westwards, and the Board of Trade was urged to colonize the southern frontier rather than allow settlers in the heart of the continent, where, "from the great difficulty of procuring European commodities, they would be compelled to commence manufactures to the infinite prejudice of Britain". It

2. Add.MSS.38335, ff.73-4, Some thoughts on the settlement and government of our colonies in North America, 10 March 1763.
was felt that Georgia was too small to support a proper
government and should be extended south to the River St. Mary,
from the head of which a line running west to the River St.
Mark would form the boundary with Florida. The country be­
tween the St. Mark and the Mississippi would then form the
province of Louisiana.

In June 1763 the Board of Trade recommended the division
of the ceded territory in the south into two provinces, East
and West Florida, and the annexation to Georgia of the un­
occupied tract lying between the River St. Mary and Altamaha;
"by this means the principal obstacles which have hitherto
impeded the progress of that advantageous and well-regulated
colony will be removed, and its settlement extended to the
great benefit and advantage of the mother-country".

Such a delineation of Georgia's southern frontier had
long been required. As early as 1755 Governor Reynolds had
pointed out the anomalous character of its definition as ex­
pressed in his commission; "for nobody in this country knows
where the head of the Altamaha River lies, and they are all
as ignorant of what may be called the most southern stream of

1. "Hints relative to the division and government of the con­
quered and newly acquired countries in America", Mississippi
Mss.38335, ff.3-4, Hints respecting our acquisitions in Amer­
ica, 2 Feb. 1763. The remarkably close affinity of these
two documents suggests that they were either written by the
same hand or at least originated in the same head, possibly
that of Henry Ellis.

2. Digest of the Laws of the State of Georgia, app.xiii, B.T.
report to H.M., 8 June 1763.
it, since the other branches of it do not bear its name".  
This was given attention by the Board of Trade but, according to the Board, there were "very cogent reasons why nothing should be done upon it at present", a reply dictated, no doubt, by the need not to antagonize Spain. There were, nevertheless, several settlements beyond the Altamaha; a fort was garrisoned on the farthest point of Cumberland Island, some sixty miles south of the river; and by 1759 the River St. John had come to be regarded as the frontier. When James Wright became governor he wished to extend the colony southwards in order to encourage an increase in population, but again, as in 1755, the Board of Trade was of the opinion that there were "very cogent reasons" for not proceeding with the idea at that time.

Then in 1763 the question acquired a new significance. The Governor of South Carolina, Thomas Boone, resolved to make grants of the land south of the Altamaha and thus extend his jurisdiction over the territory bordering Florida. The Governor of Georgia protested to Boone and complained to the Board of Trade that the action had "struck a general damp and  

dispirited the whole province" and would be Georgia's "death wound or destruction". And so, when the Board recommended in June that Georgia should include the territory between the Altamaha and St. Mary Rivers, it was settling at one and the same time both the southern extremity of the colony and also the dispute over Thomas Boone's granting of land there. The recommendation was embodied in the royal proclamation of 7 October 1763, and in a new commission to Governor Wright on 20 January 1764 Georgia's southern boundary was fixed along parallel 31 degrees to the River Chattahoochee and eastward from that river to meet a line drawn from the St. Mary, while its western limits were extended to the Mississippi. In this way Georgia was enlarged to include most of what later became the states of Alabama and Mississippi. Finally, on 25 March 1765, the Georgia General Assembly passed an Act compelling those persons holding grants south of the Altamaha from the Governor of South Carolina to either surrender their lands or settle and cultivate them by bringing in black or white labour in the ratio of one person for every fifty acres. Provision was also made for properly surveying and marking


out the several tracts of land and for recording, registering and docketing them in the appropriate offices. Thus was the problem of Georgia's southern frontier solved.

Georgia now no longer stretched across the whole width of the continent to the Pacific Ocean, as it had previously done in theory. Even so, there remained the vast area of land beyond the southern rim of the Appalachians which had yet to be occupied and settled. This western territory, lying along the backs of the colonies in 1763 was a massive lonely forest, interspersed only with rocks or prairies, waters or an occasional log fort. Extensive claims to this wilderness were held not only by Georgia but also by Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia and the Carolinas. In Britain opinion was divided on the question of what to do with the region beyond the mountains. Those who advocated colonies as sources of supply argued that westward movement should be discouraged because it limited the Indian hunting-grounds and would be detrimental to the fur trade, which was practised widely in Georgia and South Carolina. Conversely, there were people who thought it should be encouraged because expanding colonies meant expanding markets for British goods. In America itself the owners of large areas of land east of the mountains naturally opposed a movement which would bring down the value of their investments. Their attitude was reinforced by the

1. The offices of the surveyor-general, the register and the auditor: Col.Rec.Ga., XVIII, pp.627-36.
policy of the British Government, which regarded exploitation of the west by dependencies as contrary to imperial interests, and in 1761 colonial governors had been instructed to forbid all purchases of land beyond the Appalachians.

Any attempt to deal with the problem of the trans-Appalachian country necessarily had to consider the rights of the Indians there, and it was in order that the Indians should not be molested that in the proclamation of 1763 the British Government forbade colonial governors to grant any lands beyond the heads or sources of the rivers flowing into the Atlantic Ocean. Another clause reserved under the sovereignty of the Crown for the use of the Indians all the territory not included within the limits of the newly-erected governments. By this means it was hoped that, with the Appalachians as an eastern boundary, the Mississippi as a western, Florida as a southern and the Hudson Bay Company's territory as a northern, the rectangular area between them would form an Indian reserve. Thus Georgia was restrained by the home Government from spreading freely westward and from giving itself scope for a rapid increase in population. It was no part of Britain's policy to permit colonial expansion into the interior, and in protecting Indian rights the Government was promoting British interests. Compared to the other colonies, however, Georgia was


immature, and the restriction, if it had been capable of rigid enforcement, would probably not have had so deleterious an effect on development as in the other provinces.

There was one form of intrusion upon Indian lands which none of the colonial governments could countenance, and that was by squatters. These not only caused trouble with the Indians; they paid little or no rent and their indiscriminate settlement led to confusion of land titles. There had been practically no trouble with squatters in Georgia during the Trusteeship, but the problem became acute after the end of the war with France, for "people of loose disorderly lives" were entering the province, taking up Crown land without authority, building huts and planting crops on it, then selling it to other settlers while they moved further west to repeat the operation. In February 1764 an Act was passed in the colony to prevent such trespassings on Crown lands; the squatters were to be warned to vacate their plots within three months, and if they refused their cabins and fences were to be destroyed. This was a judicious measure, designed to prevent disturbances and confusion at a time when the province was beginning to reap the advantages of royal government.

Georgia undoubtedly benefited by the transference of control from the Trustees to the Crown. In the words of Chief Justice

Georgia continued under the King's Government to be one of the most free and happy countries in the world — justice was regularly and impartially administered — oppression was unknown — the taxes levied on the subject were trifling — and every man that had industry became opulent.¹

Before 1752 the colony had lacked the strong direction that a royal governor and a legislative assembly were able to give it. The Trustees had been wary of allowing the settlers to acquire much power over their own affairs, and as a result the province grew but slowly towards parity with the other colonies. Under the Crown, Georgia gained from a more stable administration which entrusted more influence to the inhabitants. The change of control, moreover, suited the British Government. Throughout the Eighteenth Century it was a principle of British policy to make the colonies more dependent on the Crown, and especially to convert private or chartered governments into royal provinces. It is noticeable that in Georgia's charter of 1732 provision had been made for the settlement to pass under royal control after a specified period. Whereas in 1696 there has been only three royal provinces on the American continent, by 1760 there were seven, and one of these was Georgia. Still admittedly small in population, still comparatively poor in resources, and still largely dependent on assistance from the mother-country, Georgia, none the less, was growing rapidly into a partner not unworthy to accompany the elder colonies on the road to independence.

Any attempt to describe the development of trade in colonial Georgia is hampered not only by the scantiness of reliable statistics but also by variations in those that are available. These were not always computed on a uniform pattern, and comparisons are rendered difficult by figures being given sometimes in pounds, sometimes in barrels, hogsheads or in other measures. An additional source of confusion is that the various statistics do not always cover identical twelve-monthly periods; some run from 31 December to 31 December, others from 5 January to 5 January, and again others from October to October. Nor in the case of Georgia can it be certain that all the province's exports would appear in the list of port clearances, for a considerable part of its produce was exported through South Carolina and would consequently appear in Charleston's clearance figures. In 1766 Governor Wright expressed to the Board of Trade his concern at the use of Charleston as the port for so many of Georgia's shipments. Some rice and indigo, for example, had to be sent in small craft by way of Charleston because of the lack of vessels in Georgia to
convey it to the mother-country. The practice followed in this chapter is to employ, wherever possible, estimates compiled from official sources or by semi-official investigations or by persons in a position to be well acquainted with the true conditions, and to avoid statistics quoted by pamphleteers which must in many instances have been little more than conjecture and probably garbled to comport with the bias of the authors. This lack of uniformity in the compilation of figures, however, need not be a serious disadvantage, for, by a careful selection of averages and comparisons, the trend and scale of Georgia's commercial development can be adequately educed. Therefore, although the statistics quoted throughout this chapter are not put forward as necessarily exact, the general impression which they convey can be assumed to be an authentic one.

The main influence on Britain's commercial policy in the eighteenth century was the concept of a self-sufficing empire, whereby the colonies produced raw materials for the use of the mother-country and consumed her manufactures in exchange. The idea that the plantations should become sources of raw material for Britain's manufacturers arose from the desire to escape dependence on foreign countries,

1. Kings MSS.205, fo.309, Wright's answers to queries by the Lords of Trade, 29 Nov.1766.
and the true function of the colonies was regarded as the production of commodities that would remove the need to buy in foreign markets. If Georgia could produce the commodities then being imported from southern Europe and the Orient its foundation would be amply justified. Another aspect of the empire which interested English merchants and was increasingly emphasized was its value as a market for their manufactures. It is very noticeable how rapidly Britain's exports to the continental colonies, including Georgia, multiplied during the period. Exports in 1746-7 were valued at only £783,092, but by 1761-2 they had risen to a total of £1,726,518, and in 1769 were estimated at £3,370,900 sterling.

Georgia and the southern colonies fitted neatly into this conception of empire. They had an economy in sharp contrast to that of their northern neighbours; they produced such valuable staples as tobacco, naval stores, rice, indigo and cotton; and, having no local industries, they were obliged to obtain nearly all their manufactured goods from Britain. There was little to induce the inhabitants to engage in manufacturing on a large scale when wealth could be more conveniently acquired by agriculture supported by Parliamentary bounties. In 1766, for instance, Georgia was reported as possessing no manufactures of its own, but was supplied with

everything "from and through Great Britain. Some few of the poorer and more industrious people make a trifling quantity of coarse homespun cloth for their own families, and knit a few cotton and yarn stockings for their own use", but there was nothing that might compete with the mother-country. Consequently Georgia, Virginia, Maryland and the Carolinas were rated in Great Britain more highly than the New England provinces, and it was to these southern colonies that it behoved the mother-country to direct her encouragement, "for by encouraging them she in fact encourages herself."

The chief method of encouragement was a system of bounties paid for colonial exports not only by the Government but also, after 1754, by the Society for the Encouragement of Arts and Commerce. At divers times bounties were placed on the production of flax, hemp, silk, fish, pitch, tar, potash, timber, yards, masts, wine, tobacco, indigo, cochineal and turpentine. These were supplemented by bounties imposed by the colonies themselves, Delaware excepted. In this way it was hoped both to free the United Kingdom from dependence on foreign countries and also to keep the energies of the settlers absorbed in producing raw materials and diverted from manufacturing. In order to monopolize the raw materials

thus produced the Government enumerated them so that they could be trans-shipped to England only and not sent directly elsewhere. This policy, initiated by the Navigation Act of 1660, was extended to a long list of colonial goods by several enactments during the subsequent hundred years.

Colonial trade, then, was principally with Britain, and the balance was permanently in her favour. Although this adverse balance belonged primarily to the northern provinces, Georgia's imports before 1773 exceeded its exports, according to Lord Sheffield, to the amount of £123,034 9s. 7d. The north, however, had a substantial local coastwise traffic, whereas there was comparatively little inter-sectional commerce in the south, whose intercourse was predominantly with Britain. True, Georgia was at first supplied with provisions from New England, New York and Pennsylvania, but even in 1765-6 its imports from the northern colonies were only about one eleventh of its total, and its exports thither only about one seventeenth of the total. This trade was a mixed benefit as far as Georgia was concerned because, in exchange for the rum, flour, biscuits and other provisions which they sent to Georgia, the northern colonies tended to take such bullion as the province possessed rather than its produce. Nevertheless, Georgia's trade was carried on

1. J.B. Holroyd (Lord Sheffield) Observations on the Commerce of the American States (London, 1784) pp. 246-7;
2. A Description of Georgia, by a gentleman who has resided there upwards of seven years and was one of the first settlers (London, 1741) p. 4.
chiefly with Great Britain and the West Indies, about three-quarters of it with Britain, where nearly two-thirds of its purchases and over five-sixths of its sales were made. This traffic centred on the port of Savannah, which became in Georgia what Baltimore was in Maryland, Norfolk in Virginia and Charleston in South Carolina. The number of ships entering and leaving the port increased rapidly towards the end of the colonial period, especially after 1759 when the construction of the first wharf there afforded extra facilities. Previously the method of unloading had been the cumbersome one by which the vessels approached the bank as near as the depth of the river would allow and then the small articles were thrown ashore and the heavier cargo landed by means of small boats. In 1760 forty-six ships, forty-one of them from British ports, with a total tonnage of 1,662, entered Savannah, and thirty-seven ships, thirty-four of them bound for British ports, with a total tonnage of 1,457, departed therefrom. This was the smallest trade of any of the colonies, New Jersey,

1. Add.MSS.15484, fo.39. D.Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, Manufactures, Fisheries and Navigation (4 v., London, 1805) III, p.453. Values of Georgia's imports from Oct.1765 to Oct.1766 were £124,062 from Britain, Africa and the West Indies, and £12,017 from the northern colonies. Its exports were £79,728 to Europe and the West Indies, and £5,074 to the northern colonies. See also Kings MSS.205, fo.309.

Nova Scotia and Connecticut being the only others whose tonnage of traffic did not reach five figures. But Georgia's was a rapidly expanding commerce. In 1766 the inhabitants themselves owned three ships, five snows and brigs, and six schooners and sloops, and by 1772 they owned, according to Governor Wright, either wholly or in part, five ships, one snow, seven brigs, thirteen schooners and sloops and ten coasting vessels, with a total tonnage of 1,999. Seventeen hundred sailors were employed and 161 vessels entered Savannah. At the beginning of that year James Habersham, the merchant, wrote from Savannah: "We have now near 40 square-rigged vessels before the town, and this province is making a rapid progress in her commerce, wealth and population." And three weeks later he wrote again: "Our harbour has made a very considerable figure in shipping for about 6 weeks past, and it has really surprised me to see so many of them so readily despatched, and more are daily arriving."

In that same year, 1772, when Savannah was the scene of so much commercial activity, fifty-six vessels entered the new port of Sunbury, which had been settled on the Midway River in 1758 and declared a port of entry by the Governor

1. Add.MSS.38335, ff.209-12, Account of number of ships entering and leaving British colonies in America.


in 1761. It commanded the rice crop from the adjacent swamp region and the indigo planted on the island just below it. In addition, cattle, lumber, shingles, staves and other articles from the interior were brought to Sunbury for sale and shipment. Its principal intercourse was with the West Indies and the northern colonies, vessels from England usually discharging their cargoes at Savannah.

The advantages to be derived by Georgia from the growth of shipping facilities at Savannah and Sunbury were unmistakable. Improved commercial intercourse would enable exports to be handled in such quantities and with such efficiency as to give an incentive to increased agricultural production. The heavy charges imposed by the necessity of having to ship hides and furs to Charleston would be avoided if they could be cleared direct from Savannah. Thirdly, the growth of good seaports would provide another source of revenue for the province, and Savannah might even attract some trade from the contiguous areas of South Carolina. But these benefits lay more in the future, and in the colonial period the trade of Georgia remained small in relation to that of the other colonies, though it was considerable for a province that had been established only a generation.

1. There is an account of Sunbury in Jones, Dead Towns of Georgia, pp.141-223.
A factor to be borne in mind when considering the commercial activity of colonial Georgia is the sparseness of population. It is impossible to quote exact figures, but as a generalization it can be stated that the total population of the American colonies in 1760 was just over one and a half million, of whom fewer than ten thousand lived in Georgia. Even this tiny number in Georgia was a heterogeneous collection of nationalities, races and classes. About three thousand six hundred were negroes, a ratio of black to white inhabitants which conformed closely to that in Maryland and compared favourably with those in Virginia and South Carolina. According to the Rev. Zouberbuhler, of the four thousand people living in Savannah in 1763 eighteen hundred were negroes. The white inhabitants lacked homogeneity both in nationality and background. In 1741 just over half the population was of British extraction, the remainder being foreign Protestants from the Continent. Scotland and Germany, not England, were the main sources of immigrants, and in the period between 1741 and 1754 only one quarter of the land granted was held by men with English names.

4. Botsford, English Society in the Eighteenth Century as influenced from oversea, p. 140.
Many of the first English settlers were, as the Rev. James Macsparran discovered, "the sweepings of the streets of London and other populous places", but they were, none the less, those selected as the most suitable out of all the poor and unemployed who applied, and were not all necessarily debtors as the Trustees had originally intended.

Until the termination of the Trusteeship the population of Georgia remained small and dispersed, and Savannah did not acquire the preponderance one would have expected. In 1749 the Rev. Zouberbuhler estimated that Georgia contained three thousand inhabitants, only about eight hundred of whom resided in Savannah, and even by 1754 Savannah was reckoned to have no more than nine hundred, of whom some four hundred were negroes. The legal admission of slaves and alterations in the constitution, government and land-tenure, however, helped to increase population more rapidly after 1753. When the Trustees surrendered their charter in 1752 there were only three thousand white inhabitants in the province, compared with 25,000 in South Carolina and a total of 1,062,000 in all the colonies combined, but by 1766 there were ten thousand whites and 7,800 negroes in Georgia. These figures almost

1. America Dissected, being a full and true account of all the American colonies in sundry letters from a clergyman there (Dublin, 1753) p.8.

2. Saye, New Viewpoints in Georgia History, p.31. Not more than a dozen imprisoned debtors were actually sent to Georgia.

doubled in the next ten years, and by 1790 the total population was 82,548. But this rapid increase took place mainly after 1765; before then Georgia's population was very small indeed. Bearing in mind both this and the difficulties which the province laboured under for so long, the picture of its commerce in the colonial period appears in a more favourable light.

The trade of colonial Georgia has been hitherto misprized, and unjustifiably so. Usually it is passed off either as of no consequence or as a mere adjunct to that of South Carolina. It has never been treated as important in its own right but has been submerged under the general title of the southern or staple colonies, and sometimes, it would seem, not even included in that description. Such treatment conveys a misleading impression of Georgia's significance in the old imperial system. It is true that during the Trusteeship the province was more of a liability than an asset to the empire, at least so far as industry and commerce were concerned, but by the time of the Revolution the colony was expanding its trade and becoming of considerable value both as a market and as a producer of much-wanted commodities.

The underlying theme or moral of Georgia's economic development in the colonial period is the inability of governmental policy to direct its course. The influence of the Trustees and the Ministry in London was not powerful enough to override the proclivities of the soil or the inclinations of the settlers. Georgia provides an excellent example for the thesis that colonial economic pursuits were determined not by English law or policy but rather by the natural resources of the land, the needs of the colonists themselves and by the general condition of world trade. As C.P. Nettels has pointed out:

When the origins of enterprise in America are considered, it appears that every important industry got its start by reason of the natural resources of an area, by virtue of the demand for a product, or because of such factors of trade as transportation or location. 1

The truth of this statement can be clearly seen in the development of colonial Georgia's production and trade. Very little was produced in the early days. Georgia sent to England only samples or curiosities such as parcels of sea rod, snake root, sassafras, China root, shumach, contrayerva and fins, together with occasional cases of timber, potash, deerskins and silk. 2 Thirty years later the list of products had been extended and consolidated. As population


increased and land was cleared Georgia could not fail to produce in abundance. With a mild sub-tropical climate, a notable variety of soils and drained by large navigable rivers, it was good agricultural country, and the mountain valleys abounded in productive land. In the tidewater region along the coast and among the marshes higher up the rivers it was possible to grow excellent rice. Cotton could be raised on the island-studded coast and on the sandy soils inland, and turpentine, rosin and lumber could be obtained from the yellow pine of the forests. The sea winds encouraged many kinds of fruit, and Indian corn would ripen quickly in the hot summer nights. By 1766 Georgia was producing rice, indigo, silk, pitch, tar, turpentine, corn, peas and potatoes, and obtaining lumber and skins from the Indians.

Georgia's foreign trade may be assumed to have really begun with the establishment in 1744 of the commercial house of Harris and Habersham. James Habersham was a Yorkshireman by birth and had turned his attention to commerce under the direction of his uncle, a prominent merchant in London. He went to Georgia in 1738 on the same ship that took his friend George Whitefield, with whom he co-operated in the erection of the Bethesda orphanage. In 1744 he resigned his connection with the orphanage to form a partnership with Francis Harris.

which quickly became known under the name of "H. and H.". At first its trade was mostly with the northern colonies, with Boston, Philadelphia and New York, but in 1747 it opened a mercantile correspondence in London and the West Indies and began a system of direct importation.

It would be wrong, however, to ascribe the foundations of Georgia's commercial life entirely to Harris and Habersham, for there had been some mercantile activity in the 1730s, and from the very first trade had been an essential item in the development of the province as planned by the Trustees. Their idea was that the new settlement should fit snugly into the imperial system, exporting raw materials to the mother-country and importing manufactures in exchange. Thus when, in 1737, a silk and cotton dyer wrote from Rotterdam for permission to go over and practise his craft in the colony, he was rejected on the grounds that manufacturing there would be detrimental to British interests:

That what we (the Trustees) mean to do is to produce the material for the service of England, which is encouragement enough for our own people, but if we did anything more we should raise a great clamour in England against us.

The Trustees would not approve any manufactures that might interfere with those of the United Kingdom, and put their

2. Egmont Diary, II, p.405.
faith in the cultivation of the soil, even to the extent of deterring attempts to discover gold or silver mines, in the belief that "the greatest riches of Georgia will arise from the industry of its inhabitants in cultivating the surface of the earth rather than searching into the bowels of it." Georgia's economy was intended to be founded on the intensive farming of tropical and semi-tropical crops, so that competition with the staples of the other southern colonies would be avoided and British manufactures not threatened. For this reason the Trustees looked mainly to such crops as indigo, cochineal, and especially silk and wine:

Several other things might be produced, and perhaps more immediately profitable to the planters; but it is apprehended that it is not any business of this colony, nor any benefit to the trade of England, to interfere with what other English plantations have produced, such as rice.

Georgia was to develop in accordance with preconceived notions, on a pattern designed by well-meaning gentlemen in London.

To assist the propagation of desirable crops ten acres at the eastern extremity of Savannah were laid out by Oglethorpe's order in the spring of 1733 as a nursery or public garden for the cultivation of mulberry trees, fruit

1. C.O.5/666, p.112, Martyn to Eveleigh, 1 May 1735.
2. *A State of the Province of Georgia attested upon oath in the court of Savannah, 10 Nov.1740* (London, 1742) p.11.
trees, vines, olives, vegetables and other plants which were then to be distributed to the settlers for cultivation in their private orchards and gardens. The Apothecaries Garden at Chelsea contributed to this, the first economic garden in the world, and seeds and plants suitable for cultivation were collected by William Houstoun of St. Andrews University, the first person whom the Trustees employed for pay. His itinerary was intended to include Madeira, the Spanish settlements at Cartagena, Porto Bello, Campeachy and, if possible, Panama, and his list of desirable seeds and plants included vines, cinnamon, ipecacuanha, jalap, contrayerva, sarsaparilla, cinchona, balsams and logwood, elemi, cochineal and particularly "the white mulberry tree which is most proper for the nourishment of silkworms." This emphasis on silk is the most significant feature of the Trustees' economic policy. It represented, in effect, the long-cherished desire of Englishmen to free themselves from dependence on foreign markets for a commodity becoming more important in their standard of living; it was the continuation of an established policy. In 1609 James I had ordered the Virginia Company to grow mulberry trees, and had even tried to begin silk culture in England. In 1668 Charles II had received a small sample

1. The economic garden on the island of St. Vincent was not established until thirty years later: see R. Wright, The Story of Gardening (New York, 1934) p.335.

of silk raised in America, and it had been aided from time to time in Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Jersey and South Carolina, as well as in Virginia, where may still be seen some of the mulberry trees planted in Yorktown and Williamsburg. Although these previous attempts had disappointed, expectations of Georgia were high.

The Trustees were determined silk should thrive, and silkworms formed part of the representation on one side of Georgia Great Seal which they adopted in July 1732. They sought the advice of the leading authority on the subject, Sir Thomas Lombe, who thought it very likely to succeed in Georgia and would be of inestimable benefit to Britain. Fortified by this expert advice the Trustees felt justified in pressing forward with their schemes, and by the end of 1732 they were granting lands to persons prepared to go to Georgia at their own expense in order to make silk yarn. It was agreed to send over seeds and trees, especially the Italian white mulberry, and high hopes were placed in some Piedmontese silk experts, led by Nicholas Amatis, who had been engaged to go over and teach the trade to the people. Grants of land were made on condition that mulberry trees were planted, and even when the Trustees ultimately allowed negro

labour and a provincial assembly they did so with careful provision for the encouragement of the silk industry.

If its production had required nothing more than generous encouragement from the Trustees then silk would have been an unqualified success. Naturally it needed more than that. News from the experimental garden in Savannah was awaited eagerly, but the soil there was quite unsuitable, being poor and sandy and, it was said, at the height of summer would have roasted an egg. Hopes were raised in 1735 by the arrival in England of a trunk of raw silk which was sent to Sir Thomas Lombe to be organized in his mills at Derby and then woven into a robe in time for the Queen to wear on the King's birthday. But economic conditions and the attitude of the inhabitants were against it, and the early optimism gradually sank. The Italians at first fed the worms and wound some silk to perfection, but they were refractory, disagreed among themselves, and "one of them stole away the machines for winding, broke the coppers and spoiled all the eggs which he could not steal, and fled to South Carolina."

The Trustees, however, were loath to be deflected from their original course. Silk was intended to be one of

Georgia's staples, and after ten years of uninspiring returns they were still persevering in its encouragement, partly because success would endear the province to Parliament and the British public:

The Trustees hope that no opportunities are omitted of inciting the people to be industrious in propagating the mulberry trees and in raising of silk, because their progress in this... will be the surest means of reconciling the colony to the affection of the public and procuring future aid from Parliament.

Their determination was well-meaning, but in promoting silk production in Georgia the Trustees were pursuing a phantom. During their twenty years of rule they spent nearly £1,500 on it, including the costs of servants' passages, provisions from the public store, bounty on cocoons, salaries, machines, basins and filatures, yet the total output of raw silk was almost certainly less than half a ton.

The hopes of the Trustees were shared by the Government, and although results were so disappointing encouragement of silk was maintained throughout the colonial period. In February 1750 several samples of Georgia silk were laid before a committee of the House of Commons in order to testify to its excellent quality. The Trustees requested that the encouragement they had given to silk culture should be continued, and the

2. This is the estimate of Stevens, History of Georgia, I, p.275. It is impossible to work out a precise figure, but the records provide no reason to suppose that silk output could have been more than this.
Board of Trade was well disposed to do so. It investigated what the Trustees had done, and recommended the appointment of a person with authority to draw bills on the Treasury to receive and pay for cocoons until a regular plan of silk encouragement was decided upon. In February 1753 the Government resolved to appoint an agent for Georgia, as recommended, with power to buy the cocoons of raw silk from the growers as an encouragement to them. £1,000 was estimated as sufficient to cover this expense. In 1755 a parcel of Georgia silk was described by English manufacturers as excellent in every respect, and the Board of Trade expressed the wish that it should be vigorously cultivated because it was essential to Britain's manufactures.

Encouragement of colonial silk culture was not limited to Georgia. In 1750 the Government freed from duty raw silk imported from the American plantations, and in 1752, with the surrender of the Trustees' charter, the Board of Trade


4. 23 Geo.II, c.20.
began to pay considerable attention to its production in Georgia, especially as the price of it had risen thirty per cent during the preceding three years. In 1755 the Society for the Encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce offered premiums on the propagation of white mulberry trees in Georgia, and by 1761 the Government was spending £1,000 annually on the purchase of the cocoons from the cultivators.

In 1764 George Grenville added raw silk to the list of enumerated articles that could be exported to England only, and after 1 January 1770 persons importing, or causing to be imported, colonial raw silk into the port of London were paid a premium of twenty-five per cent ad valorem out of the customs by the receiver-general.

The returns on this investment were disappointing, although the quality of the small amount of silk produced was said to be good. Nevertheless, until the end of the colonial period the expectation remained that Georgia would raise silk of good quality in large quantities. As late as 1771 it was believed that silk might yet become an important commodity at Ebenezer, and it was thought fit to mention the fact to Lord Hillsborough.

But Ebenezer was the only place where it had not been, or was

1. C.0.5/657, fo.106, E.T. report on Trustees' encouragement of silk, 9 July 1752.
being abandoned. People could not be expected to engage in silk cultivation when more money could be earned at other labour, and it was clearly impossible to make the industry a commercial competitor to that of Italy, of France or the East, where labour was cheaper. Only 268 lbs. of raw silk were exported in 1756, and the zenith of silk production in Georgia was reached in 1766 when, owing to unusually favourable conditions, 20,350 lbs. of cocoons were raised from which 1,084 lbs. of raw silk were made and exported. In that year, however, the Government reduced by one half its bounty of three shillings per pound on cocoons, and thereafter production declined, and by 1770 output was down to 290 lbs. The withdrawal of Parliament's annual appropriation in 1771, which by then had been reduced to £100, led to the virtual abandonment of silk culture. The Salzburgers continued to produce variable amounts during the early 1770s, but in Savannah the filature discontinued operations in 1771 and the building was thenceforward used for balls, church services and public meetings.

1. An aggregate and valuation of exports of produce from the province of Georgia, 1754-73, compiled by William Brown, Comptroller and Searcher of H.M.'s customs in the port of Savannah, reprinted in B.Romans, A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida (New York, 1775) p.104. See also Kings MSS.210, fo.44. Ibid., 213, p.45. An Historical Account of the Rise and Progress of the Colonies of South Carolina and Georgia, II, p.209.

The failure of silk culture in Georgia can be attributed to several causes. Firstly, the climate was unsuitable. As James Habersham pointed out in 1772, silk culture on any substantial scale was feasible only in the back-country where the fertile lands could be safely tilled by white labour without negro help, for on the coast as many as two-thirds of the silkworms would be killed by disease. Other reasons for the silk failure were the high price of skilled labour, the reduction of the bounty by the Government, and, especially after the admission of negroes, the larger profits to be derived from rice, cotton and indigo. It was possible, as the Rev. Macsparrren perceived, to make mulberry trees grow in North America, but

as gathering the leaves, feeding and attending the worms while spinning their balls, and winding them off when spun will not equal the incomes of other labour, 'tis not to be hoped that a manufacture of this kind can turn to account in any of the English settlements, where the necessaries of life are dear, and so great a paucity of people to clear and till the ground.

By the close of the War of Independence the cultivation of silk had been practically abandoned in Georgia.


2. America Dissected, p.8. Negro slaves could not be successfully employed in the silk industry because they lacked the requisite skill and application.
Second only to silk in the minds of the Trustees had been the growing of vines, for what could be sweeter than wine? They fancied that vines grew wild and abundantly in the colony and anticipated that viticulture would become an important part of its economy. How exciting it was to imagine Georgia's sunny hills displaying purple clusters of vines,

Whence the glad vintage to the vale may flow,
Refreshing labour and dispelling woe.¹

English men expected this glad vintage to flow across the broad Atlantic to the mother-country and remove a Continental adverse weight from her balance of trade:

Now bid thy merchants bring their wines no more,
Or from th'Iberian, or the Tuscan shore;
No more they need th'Hungarian vineyards drain,
And France herself may drink her best Champagne.

Dr. Houstown, the botanist, sent two tubs of vine-cuttings from Madeira to Georgia, more came in a gift from France, and the settlers themselves were optimistic about it. In 1736, at the request of the Trustees, a Jew named Abraham de Lyon planted vines which the following year were reported to have borne a large crop of beautiful, almost transparent grapes, each as big as a man's thumb. The advantages of making wine in the colony must be obvious to everyone, thought the Trustees

2. Georgia: a poem (London, 1736)
This will not interfere with the products of our other plantations. Though therefore no more could be raised than to supply these, it would be a vast profit to Georgia as well as them. They might purchase it at a cheaper rate than they do from Spain and the Canaries. They would not be liable to be interrupted in the purchase of it in a time of war between us and the nations which now supply them; and the money, which they are to pay for it, will still remain among the subjects of Great Britain. But this product must be a work of time, and must depend upon an increase of the people.\(^1\)

Early reports of some successes sustained the hopes of the Trustees and kept them wedded to their policy. Unfortunately these accounts related only to isolated and occasional instances and did not represent a faithful picture of the general scene. Viticulture would no more succeed in Georgia than would silk, and it resulted in the production of only a few gallons before being abandoned. The hopes of the Trustees were disappointed, and the healths of loyal Englishmen never went round in Georgian wine.

Perhaps the disappointing results of their early policy account for the gradual decline of interest among the Trustees in the whole Georgia project. Attendance at meetings fell off as the years passed and no conspicuous success was achieved. Drugs, exotics, madder root, olive trees and the Egyptian kali were nearly all destroyed by frost and snow soon after planting. Other roots and herbs sent out did not come up to expectations, and the people made things worse by occupying themselves more in building houses than in clearing and sowing the soil. The

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2. Egmont Diary, II, p.36
settlers, when confronted with the grim realities of founding a colony, were not inclined to obey the rules of a policy based on hearsay and formulated in London. The exigencies of setting up a home and defending it precluded their paying due attention to the fanciful designs of the Trustees. They had, also, to withstand the rigours of transference to a strange country and new climate, and their early slackness in planting may have sprung in some measure from the attendant ill-health, as in the autumn of 1734 when most of the inhabitants of Savannah were "sadly afflicted with a sort of an itch and boils." The Trustees erred in keeping to a development policy which was soon proved impracticable. The flaw in the policy was that the natural resources of the colony were not necessarily suitable for producing the commodities which the mother-country prescribed. What was deemed desirable was not always feasible, and the result was disappointment. If less attention had been paid to the preconception of what should be produced, and more to raising the rice and cotton which had soon been recognized by many inhabitants as the province's most suitable and profitable crops, then Georgia might have been the peer of South Carolina by 1765 instead of very much its junior. The progress of early Georgia was impeded primarily by the Trustees' inflexible preference for certain transplanted articles and their refusal to pay attention to the natural products of the soil.

More suited to Georgia's natural capacities was the production of naval stores, for which the mother-country was in constant need and to which she was prepared to offer substantial assistance. It was Britain's policy to seek these stores in America in order to mitigate her dangerous dependence on Russia and the Scandinavian countries, with whom the balance of trade was always unfavourable. New England and North Carolina were the principal sources among the colonies, but it was hoped and expected that Georgia would become another. Almost as soon as the settlement had begun, inquiries were made as to the best methods of inducing the inhabitants "to apply their industry to the cultivation of naval stores of all kinds"

The Government had enumerated pitch, tar, turpentine, rosin and hemp in 1705, and successive Acts of Parliament granted bounties on their production, until eventually they were being exported in rapidly increasing quantities from all the colonies, Georgia included, and throughout the minutes of the Governor and Council after 1755 are scattered applications for wharf lots at either Savannah or Sunbury for storing pitch, tar and turpentine as well as lumber.


Hemp and flax were given bounties and freed from duty by the Government, but before 1750 there was little progress in the plantations towards making them commercial crops, and in 1740 the bounty on hemp, "not having in the course of many years experiment produced any effect, it was, either from want of attention or from despair of its success, suffered to expire. In 1763, however, some London merchants petitioned for revival of the bounties, and in 1764 the Board of Trade repeated its belief that, as to colonial hemp, it would be in Britain's interest

in every light, both political and commercial, to secure a supply of so important an article, which is not only a very valuable material of manufacture but is also essential to the commerce, the strength and security of this Kingdom, and for which we have hitherto remained in a dangerous state of dependence upon foreign nations.  

The Georgia Assembly encouraged both hemp and flax, mainly with the idea of stimulating settlement in the back-country. In 1767 provision was made for free distribution of seed to farmers and for publication of directions on cultivation, and the following year bounties were imposed. But neither hemp nor flax became important exports of any of the colonies which, in competing with the Baltic lands, had the disadvantage of higher costs of labour and of transport to Britain. Up to 1756, for example, the average price of Russian hemp was a little more than £21 a ton, including a freight charge of

about £2, whereas American hemp cost as much as £29 a ton, including a freight charge of at least £4. The differences in freight charges arose in some degree from the fact that the ships used in the Baltic trade were more capacious, less expensive, and the method of packaging more economical. The Board of Trade hoped that the circumstances operating in favour of Russian, as against American hemp, would, "under proper encouragement, work out their own cure", while the difference in the prime cost of the material arising from the discrepancy in the prices of labour would be remedied by the application of the bounties. Nevertheless, although Governor Wright said in 1772 that hemp would grow well in Georgia, little was planted there. The largest amount of hemp Georgia exported in any one year was in 1771 when 5,470 lbs. were shipped.

Britain was obliged to import naval timber in the eighteenth century because of depletion in her own oak forests. She produced no trees suitable for masting, and the forests of western Europe provided only poor quality masts. She always regarded plantation lumber, however, as inferior in quality to that of her own or of the Baltic, especially as it was often insufficiently seasoned and liable to warp. But it seemed

1. P.C.2/110, pp.290-1
essential to attenuate the dangerous dependence on foreigners for naval stores, and in 1721 colonial lumber was admitted into England free of duty. This statute was continued by others, but the quantity of lumber sent to the mother-country was never large until bounties on imported lumber of all kinds were granted in 1765, after which colonial exports expanded, although Georgia's increase did not become noticeable until 1771 and 1772.

A sample of Georgia timber in 1735 was judged by the experts in the King's yards in London to be excellent of its kind "but bad, very badly converted", and consequently of little use. But the fact remained that if good quality lumber could be produced plentifully in the province it offered the prospect of a substantial and profitable trade, not only with the mother-country but also, after the removal of the prohibition on rum, with the West Indies, which had to import lumber and shingles for their dwellings, and staves, hoops and other materials for their puncheons, hogsheads and casks. As early as 1739 Robert Williams was often freighting vessels at Savannah with lumber for the West Indies. The Trustees had a sawmill erected in Savannah which in 1738 was sawing seven hundred feet of timber a day. Sawing timber was one of the principal means of livelihood for the inhabitants of Darien, and another mill was erected at Ebenezer but had the misfortune to be wrecked by floods and its scantling and boards

1. 8 Geo. I, c.12.
2. C.O.5/638, fo.26, Edward Jasper to Oglethorpe, II Sept. 1735
were ultimately granted by the Trustees towards building a new orphan-house. 1 By the end of 1741 Georgia was exporting some timber and boards made from its yellow pines, staves from the red and white oak, hoops from the hickory and shingles from the cypress.

Georgia's exports of lumber, however, were inappreciable until the close of the war with France, and then a remarkable increase began. In 1762 Georgia exported 417,449 feet of timber, 325,477 staves and 685,265 shingles. The following year the figures for timber and shingles more than doubled, while those for staves increased by over two-thirds. By 1766 timber exports had doubled again, while shingles had increased by almost half and staves by almost a quarter. In 1772 Georgia exported 2,163,582 feet of timber, 988,791 staves and 3,525,930 shingles, representing an average increase of nearly five hundred per cent in ten years. Lumber was found to be more profitable than pitch, tar and turpentine, which suffered in consequence, exports of them never reaching substantial amounts. After 1760 the exports of pitch, tar and turpentine rose uncertainly to a peak figure of 1,311 barrels in 1766 and then receded to their former level by 1772, when the amount was only 702 barrels. 2

2. Col.Rec.Ga., XXIII, p. 151
With abundant timber of its own, it was, perhaps, to be expected that Georgia should start to build ships for itself. The yellow pine, with its close fine grain, was the most durable of all the resinous woods for the purposes of ship structure and well-suited for lower-masts, top-masts, bowsprits, keels, and for the interior work of the lower holds.

The Navigation Acts admitted colonial vessels to the same privileges as English and this had for long encouraged the shipbuilding industry in America, especially in New England. In the north there were dockyards in all the towns along the coast and in many riverside villages inland, while further south Pennsylvania had developed a shipbuilding industry, ships were made along the Chesapeake, and Virginia built for river and bay traffic. Plantation-built vessels were used mainly in the fishery and the coastal trade, but did carry also to the West Indies, England, Spain and Portugal. The first sloop to be built on the River Savannah was launched in 1739 at Robert Williams's plantation, but little was done in this direction in Georgia until after 1751, when a yard was erected for naval construction, the province's cedar wood having been found suitable for ships. During the first six years of Governor

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Wright's tenure of office one ship, a snow, a brigantine, five or six schooners and a number of coasting vessels were constructed there.

The natural commerce for the American settlements, however, was not across the seas but into the interior. Goods brought from Europe were received at Charleston and Savannah by merchants who sold them to storekeepers in the interior towns, where they were bought again by traders and conveyed on pack-horses into Indian country and there exchanged for skins and furs. In this way new territory was explored, for the traders had to journey many miles in advance of the regular settlements, and the profits obtained provided capital for agricultural expansion. On all the frontiers southward from Pennsylvania the Indian trade became important, and differences over it arose between Virginia and South Carolina, and, later, between South Carolina and Georgia.

The origins of the differences between South Carolina and Georgia may be traced to the visit to England of Tomochichi and the Indians of Yamacraw in 1734. Before returning to America, Tomochichi had asked for the Indian trade to be properly regulated because traders had demanded exorbitant prices for their goods and defrauded the Indians over weights and measures, thereby causing animosities and quarrels which

1. Kings MSS. 206, p.8, Wright to B.T., 18 Nov. 1766.
frequently ended in bloodshed. The Trustees complied by preparing an Act expressly designed to maintain peace with the Indians. This was similar in form and content to that passed in South Carolina in 1731 which would, in fact, have been in force in the Georgia territory had it not been erected into a separate province, and differed only in that the Trustees excluded all traders not licensed by their authority from operating in the province. After 24 June 1735 any person without a license trading with the Indians in Georgia was to be fined £100 sterling for each offence, and those merchants who did take out licences were to renew them annually at Savannah between March and June. All persons receiving a licence had to enter into a bond with the Trustees to the sum of £100 sterling as a guarantee of good behaviour, and commissioners were appointed to supervise their conduct. The commissioners were authorized to bear complaints from the Indians and arrange compensation for any injuries done to them. This was a sensible precaution because the Indians always demanded atonement or retribution for wrongs committed against them by whitemen and were not particular about the identity of their victims if the true culprits could not be found. This law was in no way remarkable, and its enactment was in line with the policies of the other colonies which had long ago recognized the need to regulate trade with the Indians.

On 7 October 1735 the Trustees wrote to the Duke of Newcastle asking him to inform the Lieutenant-Governor of South Carolina that the Act was ratified. The request was a formal one and may have been due simply to the Trustees' sense of propriety, but it is likely too that they were already apprehensive of growing opposition from South Carolina and wanted the authority of the Secretary of State behind them. Of the hostility of the South Carolina traders there could be no doubt, especially against Patrick Mackay, who had been entrusted with the task of enforcing the Act and who began a drastic reorganization of the whole of the Carolina trade in the Creek, Chickasaw and Cherokee towns. By the summer of 1735 the Indian trade was the main topic of conversation in Charleston, where it was rumoured that Oglethorpe was scheming to give Georgia a monopoly of it. Feeling became so bad that some of the Carolina traders, notably Daniel Green, tried to incense the Indians not only against the Spaniards but also against the Georgians.

It was an ironical situation, for Georgia was merely imitating the policy of the South Carolinians who had previously

3. C.O. 5/637, fo.168, Eveleigh to Oglethorpe, 7 July 1735. This is confirmed by a letter from South Carolina dated 30 June 1736 in the Jeffries MSS. (Reference Library, Bristol) XIII, fo.148.
sought to prevent Virginian participation in the trade with the Cherchees by requiring all licences to be issued in Charleston. But when a similar measure was directed against themselves the Carolina traders liked it not at all and they protested vigorously. Their protest was embodied in a petition from their Council and Assembly to the Government in London complaining of the obstruction of their Indian trade by commissioners employed by the Trustees. The petition was referred by the Privy Council to the Board of Trade on 8 December 1736, and the first formal hearings on the dispute began before the Board on 19 May 1737. Having listened to the arguments of both sides the Board sought the opinions on the point of law of the attorney and solicitor-general, who asserted that the Trustees had no right to establish a monopoly over traffic with the Indians in Georgia, but that the requirement for merchants to take out a licence in the colony was a justifiable regulation of trade. A decision was not reached until 1738 when the Government recommended each province to prepare Acts for settling the issue to their mutual benefit and satisfaction, for the continuance of the dispute, it was said, may occasion the loss of those advantages which would otherwise arise by the said trade to the mutual benefit of both the said provinces - And may likewise be a means of interrupting and destroying that amity and good correspondence which ought to be maintained and cultivated with the said Indians.

In the meantime the Trustees were to order their commissioners

to grant licences without charge to all applicants from South Carolina who brought proper certificates from the Governor and Council, and who gave reasonable security for their good behaviour.

This did not satisfactorily settle the dispute, however, and there continued to be trouble between the traders of the two provinces. The Trustees were unhappy about the Government's decision, fearing that the obligation to license all merchants who came with the recommendation of the Governor of South Carolina would lead to so many entering Georgia "as may entirely ruin the trade both of Georgia and Carolina too, and absolutely disgust the Indians". "This", wrote Lord Egmont, "is a very serious affair, and the very being of the Indian trade with respect to Carolina as well as Georgia depends on a proper adjustment of the differences between the two provinces."

Not until December 1741, when Governor Glen of South Carolina dined with the Trustees in London, was an agreement reached that brought the controversy to an end. They decided that, since the heads of the Rivers Savannah and Altamaha were not


2. Egmont Diary, II, pp.494, 498, 500-1.
properly known and it was impossible to determine definitely which Indian nations belonged to Georgia, South Carolina should have the licensing of half the Indian traders in Georgia in return for the remainder licensed in Georgia being allowed to trade with the Indians in South Carolina. Traders were to give their securities in their respective provinces, and the punishment on those contravening the rules was to be inflicted in the province to which they belonged. William Stephens, then President of Savannah County in Georgia, was to be sent to Charleston to confer with the Assembly there and make an agreement to be submitted for the Trustees' approval. Thereupon South Carolina and the Trustees were to pass parallel Acts for settling the controversy finally to the satisfaction of all parties.¹

Neither party ever passed the proposed Acts, the traders of neither province paid much attention to the commissioner of the other province, and there were violations on both sides. Nevertheless, the trade was henceforward shared satisfactorily, if not always harmoniously, between the two colonies, but the bulk of the important trade with the Cherokees tended to pass to South Carolina while Georgia had to be content mainly with

that coming from the towns of the Upper Creeks.¹

The need to regulate the fur trade, however, continued throughout the colonial period, and under the royal government was accentuated by the problems associated with the trans-Appalachian country and with Indian rights. Many business firms in the colonies and the mother-country were engaged in the fur trade by the 1750s, and their prosperity depended on protecting the Indian rights of occupation. Hitherto little attempt had been made by the Board of Trade to supervise the traders' activities directly, the superintendents of Indian affairs in the colonies concerning themselves primarily with political relations. But by the end of the Seven Years War the Government realized that if it was to follow up its support of the Ohio Company, the dishonesty and lawlessness of the traders, which antagonized the Indians, would have to be stopped.²

In 1758 an Act was passed in Georgia to prevent private persons from trading with the Indians without licence or from purchasing lands off them. Anyone trading without a licence from the Governor or making an illegal purchase of land from the Indians was to be fined £1,000 sterling.³ This replaced the system of trade regulation that had been enacted during

¹ Corry, Indian Affairs in Georgia, pp.63-6. Meriwether, Expansion of South Carolina, p.223.
the Trusteeship, and it remained in force until the Revolution. It was not a success. The Indians trading with South Carolina often traversed the Georgia settlements to do so and sought their subsistence en route by plundering the plantations.\(^1\) Since offenders against the Act could not be arrested or held to bail but only served with a process to answer any action or information brought against them, they could easily evade its penalties by moving out of the province as soon as the process was served and before the courts could hear their cases, thus not only rendering the law nugatory but also putting the province to some expense in constantly beginning ineffectual actions. This led to an amendment in December 1759 by which justices of the peace in a district or parish were empowered to issue a warrant against an offender and exact a surety of £100 sterling for his appearance before the next general court.\(^2\) Traders continued, none the less, both to violate the law and to elude apprehension, and in February 1764 the General Assembly enacted that offenders who lacked the means to pay the prescribed fines were to suffer "corporal punishment by whipping not exceeding one hundred lashes and not less than fifty lashes". In March 1765 the amount of surety a justice of the peace might exact was raised to £150 sterling,\(^3\) but it is evident that the law was incapable of strict and effectual

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enforcement.

From the very beginning the principal centre of the traffic in Georgia had been in the fall line hills at Augusta, which Kennedy O'Brien, an Irish trader, had founded by the erection there of a well-furnished warehouse at his own expense, and where as early as 1739 about six hundred people had already been employed in exchanging wool and iron for skins and furs. By 1749 the firm of Harris and Habersham had entered the Indian trade and was beginning to send to the mother-country deerskins of considerable value, though the freighters at that period were greatly inconvenienced by the want of a good wharf. The colony's trade with the Indians grew steadily until the outbreak of hostilities with France in 1755. In that year 49,995 lbs. of deerskin were exported. The war brought about a diminution in the amounts exported, although much of the apparent decrease was due to the trade passing through Charleston instead of Savannah and being credited to South Carolina. But after 1762 the traffic increased sharply, exports rising to 273,460 lbs. in 1766 and reaching their zenith in 1768 with a figure of

4. Governor Wright said that nearly all deerskins shipped from South Carolina were from Georgia: Flippin, "Royal Government in Georgia", Ga. H.Q., IX, p.225.
These exports were of great importance to British manufacturers, and when, in March 1768, Georgia imposed an export duty on raw hides the Government disallowed it on the ground that it would raise the price of "an article of importation in such general use and of such consequence to the manufactures of this Kingdom."  

A colonial staple of value to the mother-country and one comparatively easy to raise was tobacco. From 1660 onwards its production in England had been forbidden, so that the colonies enjoyed a protected market, but it remained among the enumerated commodities until the end of the colonial period, and, as English tobacco consumption levelled off, the market was glutted and the selling price fell. Moreover, the plantations never entirely monopolized the English market, but had to compete with tobacco coming from the East Indies, Holland, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Turkey. Because the market was satiated the Trustees ignored the possibilities of tobacco in Georgia. Nevertheless, it had begun to flourish in the province before the War of

1. Aggregate of Georgia exports by the Savannah customs-comptroller, loc. cit. These figures do not always conform to those given by Governor Wright in his report to the Board of Trade in 1766 (Kings MSS. 205, ff.310-1), but they do conform with J. Campbell, A Political Survey of Britain (2v., London, 1774) II, p.655n., and average closely with those in Macpherson, Annals of Commerce, III, p.453, which run from October to October.


Independence, and 57,116 lbs. were exported to the United Kingdom in 1773, although this was only a tiny fraction of the total American exports of tobacco that year, which came chiefly from Virginia, Maryland and South Carolina.\(^1\) Not until after the Revolutionary War, when a regular system of warehouses and inspection encouraged production, did tobacco become a principal export commodity and the market crop of pioneer settlers in the Georgia back-country.\(^2\)

This development of tobacco production after the Revolutionary War was only temporary, for it was soon largely displaced by cotton, which had been introduced directly from the Bahama Islands into Georgia,\(^3\) where it found an admirable home in the light sandy soil of the islets bordering the seacoast. It took a long time, however, for cotton to become King in Georgia. It was planted there in 1734 from seed sent to the Trustees by Philip Miller of Chelsea;\(^4\) by 1738 it was being grown experimentally by the Salzburgers at Ebenezer, and

1. Holroyd, Observations on the Commerce of the American States, table I. This gives Britain's total imports of tobacco in 1773 as 100,472,007 lbs.


in 1740 William Stephens tried it in the little five-acre plot he cultivated not far out of Savannah.

I thought cotton deserved a place not too scanty (he wrote); at leastwise I would try whether it would turn to any account or not; for the West India cotton, which is perennial there, dies here every winter (as I have found) and the annual plant which will grow in this country, produces plenty enough; and the cotton is at least equal to the other if not better.¹

In 1741 a sample of Georgia cotton was taken to England, and the local fibre was used for clothing.²

But the Trustees would not encourage it because they had pinned their hopes on silk, wine and other articles. Its cultivation was not regarded as a commercial proposition by Britain at that time because Indian and Near Eastern cotton could be obtained cheaply from shippers in France, Ostend and Smyrna. Furthermore, as its manufacture in England was not then far advanced the demand was not great, and a better price could be obtained from indigo and rice. As a result, cotton cultivation in Georgia was very much neglected during the early period, and no change of attitude came with the change to the royal government. John Earle planted black seed cotton as a crop on Skidoway Island in 1767, and the aged Patrick MacKay planted some on Sapelo Island, the product at that time being normally purchased by the mercantile house of Smith and Gordon


for remittance to England. But production was very small indeed. In 1768 the province sent only 300 lbs. of cotton to Britain, compared with 3,000 lbs. sent from South Carolina and 43,350 lbs. from Virginia, and in 1771 the amount declined to 235 lbs. compared with 2,000 lbs. exported from South Carolina. Georgia's fields were never white with cotton bolls during the colonial period, but the forces of nature favoured the growth of cotton there, and by 1820, when Georgia was sixth on the list of the United States in the value of exports, it had become the staple produce.

Rice was already a staple commodity in Georgia by the time of the Revolution. The Trustees had realized the possibilities of rice but had decided its production was unsuitable for white labour, since colonial rice was grown in the malarial inland swamps where the nature and condition of the work were likely to impair the health of white people, labourers often having to work ankle-deep in mud or water. When Martin Bolzius, for example, became a rice planter in Georgia he buried four of his

2. Add. MSS. 15485, p.4.
five children in seven years. Although the Salzburgers had attempted rice cultivation in 1739 and 1740, lack of money had prevented the construction of a stamping-mill to make their rice merchantable. The admittance of negroes, however, and the security provided by the British occupation of Florida in 1763 assisted the growth of a rice industry, and crops were soon to be seen on both banks of the Savannah and along the Altamaha and Ogeechee Rivers. By 1765 James Habersham was able to produce seven hundred barrels of rice a year on his two plantations "without hurry and too much driving."

Rice was a valuable article to the mother-country, who required it mainly for re-export to northern Europe. American rice had the reputation of being the best in the world, but its enumeration at the beginning of the eighteenth century, with the heavy freight charges which increased its price by a third, had lost it the Portuguese market and resulted in the trade passing to Italian rice-growers. After 1730, however, South Carolina was allowed to export rice to any European port south of Cape Finisterre, and in 1735 this privilege was extended to Georgia. But the best markets were in Holland, Germany, the

4. 3 and 4 Anne, c.5.
6. 3 Geo. II, c.28. 8 Geo. II, c.19.
Caribbean and the Spanish Main, and the Acts did not include them. Agitation for permission for the two colonies to export rice to the Dutch, French and Spanish islands began in the 1740s, but nothing was done until 1763 when they were allowed to export to any part southward of them, the enumeration on markets north of Cape Finisterre remaining.¹

This did not appreciably quicken the growth of Georgia's rice exports, which had been going on steadily for several years. In 1755 exports of rice from Savannah totalled 2,299 barrels, about a fortieth of the total from Charleston. By 1762 exports from Savannah had multiplied nearly three and a half times, whereas those from Charleston showed a decrease, though it is possible that some of the exports from Savannah were produced in the contiguous parts of South Carolina. Thereafter both colonies increased exports rapidly, Georgia's more than doubling again by 1766, and in 1768 reached the number of 17,783 barrels, a seventh of the Charleston figure for that year.²

This rapid expansion of the rice industry in Georgia was inevitable once slave labour was instituted there, for it had long been the principal produce of neighbouring South Carolina,


² Aggregate of Georgia exports by the Savannah customs-comptroller, loc. cit. Cf. Kings MSS. 213, p.44, which gives higher but only approximate figures. The statistics for Charleston are taken from Kings MSS. 206, fo.29, List of exports from Charleston, 1747-86; Add. MSS. 15485 contains the figures for 1768-9; and from McCrady, History of South Carolina under the Royal Government, pp.389-91.
and its success there served as an example to the junior colony.

The Act of 1763 widening the area to which rice could be exported was intended to enable the colonies to retain markets gained in the French West Indies during the British war-time occupation of the islands. With the return of Martinique and Guadeloupe to France in 1763 this commerce became illegal because rice was an enumerated commodity, and so the Act, in effect, legalized a trade that had been running for some time. Even if the Act had not been passed, however, it cannot be doubted that this intercourse would have continued, for smuggling and evasion of the trade laws by the colonies were believed by the British Government to be rife and seriously reducing the royal revenue, although the extent of illicit traffic may not have been so great as was thought. Georgia participated in some forms of smuggling, but its share does not appear to have been very considerable. Regulation of the coastal trade was unsatisfactory, there were no preventive officers in the ports, royal vessels seldom visited there, and the various creeks above and below Savannah were convenient for smugglers, the ships generally lying at Tybee, which was far below and out of sight of the town. The ports were not


3. Add. MSS. 15484, fo.39.
situated immediately on the coast, and so vessels were able to run into the many rivers and inlets and land goods before coming in sight of the town. In 1773 Alexander Thomson, the collector, and William Brown, the comptroller, at the customs-house in Savannah, reported to Governor Wright that illicit trade was carried on chiefly by vessels from the West Indies which landed their sugar and coffee from small craft at night on the numerous uninhabited, tree-covered islands in the creeks near the towns. With the possible exception of tea, however, there was very little Asiatic or foreign European produce consumed beyond what was legally imported. On the whole, smuggling in colonial Georgia was of negligible proportions. In 1766 Wright knew of only once instance since he had been there, and although he admitted there might be small quantities of rum on board the vessels coming from Santa Croix, he reckoned the amount must have been trivial.

Among the commodities Britain valued from the colonies were indigo and dyewoods, and Georgia was not wanting in this respect. The mother-country had always looked to the forests of the New World for the dyes obtained from braziletto, fustic, madder, indigo and cochineal, and large quantities were imported from the Spanish and Portuguese possessions and also, at one

1. C.0.5/663, p.71.

2. Kings MSS. 205, fo.310.
time, from Jamaica. Indigo and dyewoods were enumerated, and the cultivation of indigo, in particular, had long been encouraged in the colonies. Early in the eighteenth century indigo had been replaced by sugar in the British West Indies, and Britain was obliged to resort more to the French islands. In 1734 Parliament allowed the free importation of indigo, and, after petitions from English clothiers and dyers urging its encouragement, in 1748 enacted a bounty of sixpence a pound on indigo from the American colonies, provided it was worth three-quarters as much per pound as the best French produce.

Thus indigo became an eligible commodity in the colonial economy, and it was said that its planters were able to double their capital every three or four years. It thrived in South Carolina after seeds were brought from Antigua in the early 1740s, and in 1748 it formed one tenth of the total value of that colony's exports. Production of indigo in the southern provinces, however, had the disadvantage that it could not be cut so often during the year as it could in the West Indies, while the indigo of the French islands was of much better quality, selling at four or five times the price of that produced in South Carolina. The product of the Spanish colonies was of even higher quality, that of Guatemala

1. 7 Geo.II, c.18. 21 Geo.II, c.30.
2. Schlesinger, Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, p.34.
being the best of its kind in the world. On the other hand, Georgia and South Carolina had the advantage over the West Indies that their indigo was grown by planters with surplus acres of high ground and the land devoted to its cultivation had previously been of little value, and was plentiful and cheap. Moreover, production of indigo in Jamaica had languished into unimportance at this time.

Some indigo grown in Georgia in 1750 was reported to have sold at a better price than the French product. The province's exports of indigo, nevertheless, were very small compared with those from South Carolina and fluctuated in remarkable fashion, especially before 1763, but after the war with France there was a steady enough rise. The average annual export of indigo from Savannah in the nine years before 1763 was only 8,149 lbs. compared with 472,040 lbs. from Charleston. Thenceforward its export increased, and the annual average in the nine years after 1763 was nearly double that of the earlier period.


3. Aggregate of Georgia exports by the Savannah customs-comptroller, loc. cit. The figures for Charleston are from Kings MSS. 206, fo. 29. According to Holroyd, Observations on the Commerce of the American States, table I, Britain imported 1,521,476 lbs. of indigo in 1773, of which 57,116 came from Georgia.
Among the minor products of Georgia in the colonial period may be mentioned potash, which the Trustees had intended should relieve Britain of dependence on Russia. The first experiments were made by Roger Lacy in the 1730s, but he quickly abandoned it when he found more profit could be obtained by sawing timber and splitting staves for the West Indies. Bricks were made near Savannah, Samuel Holmes in 1738 claiming to have made over 100,000 in under twelve months and all as good as bricks made in England. A pottery made common ware for most uses, and some of it was sent to South Carolina, while Andrew Duchee earned orders even from Lord Egmont for the ware he made from "a peculiar nostrum of his own". He was given encouragement by a bounty from the Trustees, and was enabled to build himself a dwelling-house with a large kiln adjoining and with two other large rooms, one for a workhouse and another for a storeroom. He was assisted by two apprentices and made pots, pans, bowls, cups and jugs for an easy local market.

In Frederica dates and limes, figs and melons, peaches, plums and pomegranates were grown in the orchards, and orange trees lined the spacious streets. Orange trees would not grow anywhere north of Amelia Island, but the inhabitants of

Savannah grew peaches and nectarines, nuts, several kinds of apples and, of course, a few grapes. Between 1734 and 1736 a bounty of one shilling was promised for every bushel of corn and peas and sixpence for every bushel of potatoes delivered at the store. In 1738 Oglethorpe promised a bounty of two shillings on every bushel of Indian corn and one shilling on every bushel of peas and potatoes. In 1739 the bounty on peas was raised to two shillings, but it was paid as the humour of the storekeeper directed, to wit, "wholly to a few, part to others, and to some nothing." Nevertheless, vegetables were grown on a small scale. A traveller in the province in 1765 saw "a cabbage from one root, which produced many heads and spread over a circumference of thirty feet. It has stood and seeded three years. The same garden produced a potato which weighed ten pounds and three-quarters."

The Georgia yam, a sweet potato now widely known for its flavour and marketed throughout the United States, was even in the colonial period growing to perfection on some of the pine-barren lands. At Mr. Brewington's plantation, about three miles south of Savannah, Captain Bernard Romans saw melons and cucumbers growing well and very good corn and rice being raised together. By 1747 both Indian corn and English


grain were being produced on several farms at Frederica, and between 1755 and 1772 the export of corn increased from 600 to 11,444 bushels.

In the early days there was a small herding industry, and the Trustees maintained a ranch at Ebenezer that served as an enclosure to which stock could be driven in the round-up. The first livestock would almost certainly have come from South Carolina, whose General Assembly in 1733 voted to furnish Oglethorpe with 105 head of black breeding cattle and twenty-five hogs, and in 1735 Oglethorpe purchased several hundred cattle on behalf of the Trustees for the settlement at Frederica. With encouragement from the mild climate and with the presence of good pasturage, cattle-raising soon proved to be remunerative and flourished in the uplands, as it did in South Carolina. The economy of the frontier and up-country came to be based on livestock, and by 1755 some livestock and livestock products were available for export. After 1763 great herds of cattle and hogs ranged along the upper Ogeechee and Savannah Rivers under the long whips of "cracker" herdsmen, while in the far south were herds a thousand strong or more. Messrs. Rea and Galphus of Georgia secured a contract in 1764-5 for supplying Pensacola with beef,

and did so by driving the cattle through the territory of the Creek Indians, but normally meat was barrelled and shipped abroad to Europe and the West Indies, one thousand being the average annual export of pork and beef in the years after 1763. The swamp country of the Midway district abounded in ducks, wild geese and turkeys, deer, rabbits, snipe, woodcock and quail, and in 1740 an expert fowler named Mr. Harris, whenever he went out with his gun near Savannah seldom failed to bring back wild turkey, curlews, rabbits, partridges, squirrel, ducks or geese and sometimes even venison, but that was more often obtained from the Indians. Another of the early settlers, young Philip Thicknesse, used to spend much of his time on a fertile piece of ground on the banks of a rapid creek, about four miles from Savannah, where he could shoot squirrels and wild fowl and, like Mr. Harris, obtain venison from the Indians.

Nevertheless, provisions generally had to be imported, for Georgia's own production of such commodities was hardly more than experimental. Oatmeal and wheat were imported from the United Kingdom in small, but increasing, quantities.

By 1765 Georgia was importing rum, sugar, molasses, flour, biscuits and coffee from the northern colonies and the West Indian islands. In 1771 imports through Georgia's ports included 3,461 gallons of molasses, 26,978 gallons of rum, over 1,188 cwt. of sugar, 10,530 bushels of salt and 637 negroes. The salt would have come chiefly from the northern provinces at double freight and an advanced price, for the import of salt directly from Spain, Portugal or England was not permitted at any time in the colonial period. It appears that less than one quarter of the number of negro slaves came by way of the West Indies, as was the practice for most of the continental importations at that time, and the majority came direct from the western coast of Africa, though payment for them was normally made to Great Britain.

Other imports included wine, fustic, hides, iron, mahogany, limes, sarsaparilla, Oriental calico and foreign wrought silk. All the colonies purchased large quantities of manufactured goods from the mother-country, and Georgia imported British woollens, linens, shoes, stockings, saddlery ware, haberdashery, cutlery, china, earthen and glass ware, axes, hoes, spades, nails, locks, hinges, wrought iron, brass,

copper, pewter, tin, oil, paint, gunpowder, shot and guns. Even so, Georgia's expanding exports after 1763 prevented trade with the mother-country from becoming unduly one-sided, and between 1764 and 1772 the value of imports from Britain exceeded that of exports thereto by less than £8,000.

By 1765 Georgia, as the youngest settlement on the American continent, could not be expected to have reached the levels of the other provinces, but the future was full of promise. One reason, indeed, for Georgia's early lack of zeal in the revolution against the mother-country may have been that it was just at that time beginning to increase in population and develop agriculture and commerce more rapidly. But the foundations of this promising future were not the result of the policy pursued by either the Trustees or the Government. The limited influence of statecraft had been made most apparent. The story of the growth of colonial Georgia's production and trade proved that natural resources and human needs were stronger factors than governmental policy in economic development.

That is not to say, however, that the restrictive commercial system which Britain operated during the eighteenth century had a great adverse effect on Georgia's progress.

1. Kings MSS.205, fo.309.
2. Rockingham Papers, R.61, ix, Tables showing value of exports and imports of each American colony, 1739-73.
It is difficult to believe the colony's trade or economic development would have been much further advanced by 1765 if more latitude had been permitted. It is now held that so far from harming or weakening the economy of the Americans rather did the system enable them to enjoy a relatively high degree of prosperity, and did not, in itself, provoke their Revolution. Certainly, Georgia had no reason to complain against it. The system brought the colony financial subsidies and encouragement of particular products. Its exports were given a guaranteed, if limited, market, and some defence against Indians and foreigners was provided by the home Government. Would progress have been swifter or better under different control? Undoubtedly not. No nation in the world before the nineteenth century believed in allowing dependencies to develop their resources in a free manner. The main criticism of the policy towards Georgia is not that certain goods were enumerated or manufactures discouraged or commerce confined, but that too much emphasis was laid for too long on the cultivation of what the mother-country thought desirable. From this criticism neither the Trusteeship nor the royal government is exempt.
CONCLUSION

The foregoing account of colonial Georgia between the years 1732 and 1765 has revealed three strands running through the pattern of British policy in that period. First, there was the commercial instinct of a trading people which judged colonies according to the value of their contribution to the imperial economy. There was much sound sense in this concept, and the attempt to establish a well-regulated, interdependent family of territories, with the United Kingdom as the business centre, was not altogether fallacious or discreditable. The error lay, as the example of Georgia clearly illustrates, not so much in the commercial system itself but in the concomitant principle of policy which tried to determine precisely what should be produced. Because an article was required it was assumed that it could be produced in the plantations; International Politics might decree the production of a particular commodity, but Geography, Climate, Nature and Economic Circumstances would not necessarily allow it.

Interwoven with the commercial strand was another, that of power. International competition is a strong influence upon the affairs of men and states, and in the eighteenth century the nations of western Europe neglected no opportunity
of seeking positions of advantage over their rivals. Thus, Georgia was valued as a barrier against French and Spanish expansionist tendencies in America, and became the object of Spanish hostility in consequence. The power policy of England is nowhere more clearly exposed than in the acrimonious debates that preceded the War of Jenkins's Ear.

Last and least, the pattern of policy had a thin charitable strand running through it. The relief of persecuted Protestants and of debtors and unemployed; the regulations designed to prevent intemperance, monopoly and unbridled exploitation of the Indian tribes; the attention paid to the dissemination of Christianity, among red men as well as white; the germination of the project in the minds of philanthropists and its appeal to the consciences of good men; all these elements combined to make charity an important part of the pattern of policy. Except, however, for the inception of the colony, the charitable aspect was of less weight than either the commercial or strategic, and in the matter of the formulation of policy was merely an influence, never a principle.

What constitutes a colonial policy and whether one existed in the eighteenth century remain questions of controversy among historians. But taking Georgia as a criterion, it can be said that two main principles determined the actions of the Government: commercial expansion in the direction of imperial self-sufficiency, and accession of power in the face of that foreign rivalry which the first principle was bound to provoke.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE.

Colonial Office Papers

The volumes listed C.O.5/636-712 constitute the most valuable body of source material available for the study of colonial Georgia. Some of it has been printed in the Colonial Records of the State of Georgia (q.v.), but a substantial number of the documents can only be found in the original. C.O.5/360-2 and C.O.5/400 show British policy on the southern frontier before 1732 as outlined in chapter I.

C.O.5/636-48, Original correspondence to the Board of Trade from the Trustees, Oglethorpe, the governors and others (1734-64).

C.O.5/653, Drafts of letters.


C.O.5/657, Miscellaneous papers (1733-83) largely supplemental to the preceding three volumes.

C.O.5/658, Letters from Governor James Wright.

C.O.5/666-9, Out-letters from the Trustees (1732-52).

C.O.5/670-1, Trustees' entry books of land grants, petitions, etc. (1732-52).

C.O.5/672-4, Letters from the Board of Trade (1752-81).


C.O.5/689-91, Minutes of the Council of the Trustees.


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C.O.5/360-2, Board of Trade papers on South Carolina (1725-33).

C.O.5/400, Commissions and instructions to South Carolina (1726-30).

Other volumes containing some material relating to Georgia include C.O.5/5, Secretary of State despatches and miscellaneous correspondence on colonial affairs (1733-48); C.O.5/43, Sec. of State miscellaneous papers; C.O.5/213, Sec. of State despatches to governors and commanders in North America; C.O.5/283, Verelst's observations on Britain's right to territory in America C.O.323/32, Abstracts of letters from governors to the Board of
Trade (1756-8) in which pp.37-90 are from Georgia; C.O. 324/37, Entry book of grants and warrants (1736-49); C. O. 388/40, Board of Trade commercial correspondence (1739-42).

State Papers

The Foreign series is necessary for the diplomacy of the period, and is especially important for the controversy with Spain leading up to the War of Jenkins's Ear.

The drafts of letters between Benjamin Keene in Spain and the Secretary of State in England are contained in S.P. 94/128 (July - Dec. 1737); 94/129 (1737); 94/130 (Jan. - May 1738); 94/131 (June - Dec. 1738); 94/132 (Jan. - Nov. 1738); 94/133 (Jan. - Aug. 1739).

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Privy Council Records

Important for all aspects of Government policy. They have been calendared, but for this thesis have been consulted in the original.

P.C.2/90-115, Privy Council registers (1727-71)
P.C.1/48-51, Unbound papers (1732-65)
P.C.1/5, Bundle 28 contains an account of the proceedings on the declaration of war against Spain (July - Nov. 1739).

Admiralty Records

Of only occasional interest, Georgia very seldom receiving specific attention, but the following volumes may be mentioned:

Adm. 1/3817-9, Letters from colonial governors. (1728-70)
Adm. 2/55-6, Orders and instructions (1736-40)

War Office Papers

Surprisingly little that bears directly on Georgia, and such as there is is normally reproduced among the Colonial Office papers. The following volumes are the most helpful:
The out-letters of the Secretary-at-War in W.O.4/36 (June 1740 - Aug. 1741); 4/43 (Dec. 1746 - Aug. 1747); 4/45 (May 1748 - Feb. 1749).
W.O.25/19-20, Commission books (1735-43)
W.O.25/133, Notification books (1735-40)

**Amherst Papers**

Contain some scattered information relative to Georgia during the war with France, 1755-63. The most valuable are:

W.O.34/34, Correspondence between the Governors of Maryland and Georgia and the Commander in Chief (1756-63)
W.O.34/35, Letters from the Governors of the Carolinas to the C. in C. (1756-63)

**Chatham Papers**

Useful for military and diplomatic affairs, especially volumes LXXXV and XCII. (Catalogued under the prefix 30/8).

**Newcastle Papers**

Invaluable for Government policy in general and useful also as a supplement to the State Papers for diplomatic affairs. The following volumes deserve special mention:

Add. MSS. 32692-4, Home correspondence (1739-40)
Add. MSS. 32794-32801, Diplomatic correspondence (1737-9)
Add. MSS. 32922, General correspondence (undated)
Add. MSS. 33006-9, Diplomatic correspondence (1726-48)
Add. MSS. 33028-30, Papers relating to America and the West Indies (1701-1802).

**Hardwicke Papers**

Contain much official correspondence which supplements that in the Newcastle Papers.
Add. MSS. 35406, Political correspondence (1723-40)
Add. MSS. 35421, Political correspondence (June 1761 - July 1762)
Add. MSS. 35893, Miscellaneous collection of military papers (1713-59)
Add. MSS. 35907-13, Reports and papers relating to America (1710-65).

Liverpool Papers

Of some use for commercial information.
Add. MSS. 38331-9, Official papers of the first Earl of Liverpool (1746-66)
Add. MSS. 38387, Papers relating to colonial trade (1763-5)

Kings MSS.

Of considerable use for trade and production and of general interest for the condition of all the colonies, Georgia included.

205, Reports on the state of the American colonies.
206, State of manufactures, mode of granting land, and fees of officers in America.
210, Volume One of De Brahm's survey of America.
213, Journal of an officer in the West Indies (1764-5)

Other Papers

Relevant documents are scattered throughout the Egerton, Sloane, Stowe and Additional MSS., of which a few may be noted:
Add. MSS. 14034, Collection of Board of Trade papers on the colonies.
Add. MSS. 15484, Description of North American ports (c. 1770).
Add. MSS. 15485, Account of shipping, imports, exports, their value and character of articles carried (1768-9)
Add. MSS. 22680, Miscellaneous papers relating to America (1739-72)
Add. MSS. 27857, (Francis Place Papers), Notes on North America.
Add. MSS. 29973, A short description of South Carolina by G. M. Johnston (1763)
Egerton MSS. 2694, Papers regarding French encroachments
Stowe MSS. 792, An account written by a Georgia ranger of Oglethorpe's proceedings (1740-2)

SOCIETY FOR THE PROPAGATION OF THE GOSPEL

The archives of the S.P.C. are an essential source for religious history and provide also much confirmatory data concerning the philanthropic origins of Georgia. The following volumes proved of special value:

Journals of Proceedings of the Society, Vols. V-XVI.
'B' MSS., Letters and reports of missionaries, Vols. V, IX, XII-XVIII.
The Minutes of the Meetings of the Trustees for Instructing the Negroes in the Christian Religion and establishing a charitable colony for the better maintenance of the poor of this Kingdom, and other good purposes, according to D'Allone's charity (21 March 1729 - 3 Dec. 1735).

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The calendars of the Privy Council registers and the State papers are convenient for reference and checking, but in the main the originals in the Public Record Office have been used. L. F. Stock's compilation of Parliamentary debates respecting North America is an invaluable guide, but in order that no side issues should be overlooked recourse has again been had to the originals.

Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, America and the West Indies, 1574-1736 (London, 1860-1953).
COLONIAL AND STATE DOCUMENTS

The published Colonial Records of Georgia comprise the most comprehensive body of printed material bearing specifically on Georgia. They are chiefly transcriptions from the C.O. series in the Public Record Office. The titles of the different volumes indicate their value, but particular mention must be made of the Journal of William Stephens (IV and Suppl.) which is a minute, often trivial, account of internal affairs in Georgia and a mine of information about the activities of the malcontents, 1737-40. Volume III is a complete statement of the financial circumstances of the Trusteeship. The documents on the slave trade edited by E. Donnan also include transcriptions from the C.O. series.

The colonial records of some of the other colonies contain some information relating to Georgia, especially those of South Carolina and New York.

(1755-74), XVIII, Statutes enacted by the royal legislature (1754-68). XXI-XXVI, Correspondence of the Trustees, Oglethorpe and others (1735-52).

Acts passed by the General Assembly of the Colony of Georgia, 1755-74 (Wormaloe, 1881)


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Documents relative to the Colonial History of the State of New York, ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (15 v., Albany, 1853-87)

Journal of the South Carolina Commons House of Assembly, 1736-42 (3 v., B. C. Historical Commission, 1951-3)

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE

There are several collections bearing in some measure on the subject. The Berkeley and Percival correspondence and Coram's letters are useful for the origins of Georgia, and Habersham's for local conditions at the end of the period. Montiano's give the Spanish viewpoint in the siege of St. Augustine. Pitt's are valuable for the strategy of the French and Indian War.

Bedford

Correspondence of John, Fourth Duke of Bedford, selected from the originals at Woburn Abbey, ed. Lord John Russell (3 v. London, 1842-6)

Belcher

The Belcher Papers (Collections of the Massachusetts Historical Society, Sixth Series, Vols. VI and VII)

Berkeley and Percival


Coram


Habersham

Keene

Private Correspondence of Sir Benjamin Keene, ed. A. Lodge (Cambridge, 1933)

Montiano

Letters of Montiano at the Siege of St. Augustine (Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, Vol. VII, pt. 1)
Of tremendous importance is the diary of Lord Egmont. One of the instigators of the Georgia project and the first president of the Trustees, Egmont was conversant with public affairs from early manhood and intimately acquainted with leading public figures, including Walpole. In his diary he kept a detailed record of all affairs concerning Georgia and made comprehensive reports of many Parliamentary debates. Inevitably, therefore, his diary has been used extensively as a prolific source of usually reliable information about Georgia's position in the counsels of the Government. Unfortunately it tends to peter out after 1741. A good source for affairs within Georgia in the late 1730s is Wesley's Journal, which naturally has a religious bent but also contains portraits of life and people in the colony.

Of the memoirs those of Philip Thicknesse are very entertaining though only the opening pages deal with Georgia. The memoirs by Coxe and Horace Walpole are useful in a general sense.

Travellers' accounts can often be misleading especially when they only touch on a place as did Bartram, Burnaby and MacSparren on Georgia. The best, fullest and most reliable account is that by Francis Moore of his voyage to Georgia in the late 1730s.

Egmont.

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BARTRAM, J.,

BURNABY, Andrew,
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MACSPARREN's America Dissected, being a full and true account of all the American colonies in sundry letters from a clergymen there (Dublin, 1753).

MOORE, Francis,

CONTEMPORARY WORKS DIRECTLY CONCERNING GEORGIA.

MARTYN, Benjamin,
An Account showing the Progress of the Colony of Georgia in America from its first establishment (London, 1741).
This is a systematic description of the development of the colony under the Trustees written by their secretary, and as such is of great importance.

"Reasons for Establishing the Colony of Georgia with regard to the trade of Great Britain the increase of our people, and the employment and support it will afford to great numbers of our own poor as well as foreign persecuted Protestants" (London, 1733), Collections of the Georgia Historical Society, Vol. I, pp. 203-38. This and the succeeding two tracts were published with the sanction of the Trustees in order to acquaint the public of their designs and attract contributors.


Some Account of the Designs of the Trustees for Establishing the Colony of Georgia in America. (London, 1732)

"An Impartial Inquiry into the State and Utility of the Province of Georgia" (London, 1741), Coll-
A Brief Account of the Establishment of the Colony of Georgia under General James Oglethorpe (1733), written probably by Martyn and intended to counteract the derogatory reports then being circulated about the colony's condition and progress.

A State of the Province of Georgia attested upon oath in the court of Savannah, 10 Nov. 1740 (London, 1742). A favourable view.

A New Voyage to Georgia by a young gentleman, giving an account of his travels in South Carolina (2nd edn., London, 1737) and A Description of Georgia by a gentleman who has resided there upwards of seven years and was one of the first settlers (London, 1741) are interesting but of little value for our purpose.

TAILFER, Patrick (et al.) A True and Historical Narrative of the Colony of Georgia in America from the first settlement thereof until the present period (Charleston, 1741) disparages the management of Georgia by Oglethorpe and the Trustees and emphasizes the backwardness of the province. Exaggerated and malignant but some of the criticism was valid.

A Brief Account of the Causes that have retarded the Progress of the Colony of Georgia in America, attested upon oath, being a proper contrast to a A State of the Province of Georgia attested upon Oath and other misrepresentations on the same subject (London, 1743). Probably written by Thomas Stephens and represents the views of the malcontents. Especially critical of Oglethorpe and the officers in Georgia.

Tracts and other Papers relating principally to the origin, settlement and progress of the colonies in North America from the discovery of the country to the year 1776, comp. F. Force (4 v., Washington, 1836-46). The first two volumes contain several of the aforementioned tracts.

A True Account of the Colonies of Nova Scotia and Georgia (Newcastle, c. 1780)


The works relating to the expedition against St. Augustine and the war with Spain are cited in the relevant footnotes in chapter III.

OTHER CONTEMPORARY WORKS

Several works throw light on the public attitude towards colonies, and also furnish useful information about the commercial aspects. The following may be mentioned as among the more helpful for the purposes of this thesis:


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POSTLETHWAYT, Malachy, Great Britain's Commercial Interest Explained and Improved (2nd. edn., 2 v., London, 1759)

ROMANS, Bernard, A Concise Natural History of East and West Florida (New York, 1775) Valuable for agriculture and commerce written by a man who had visited and studied Georgia.

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The London Magazine, Gentleman's Magazine and the Political State of Great Britain contain scattered letters and accounts referring to Georgia as well as useful reports on Parliamentary debates. The Annual Register, Historical Register, and the Grub Street Journal are of little direct interest.

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Historical Collections of Georgia, Containing the most interesting facts, traditions, biographical sketches, anecdotes, etc., relating to its history and antiquities, from its first settlement to the present time (3rd. edn., New York, 1855)

Statistics of the State of Georgia, including an account of its natural, civil and ecclesiastical history (Savannah, 1849)


ANDERSON, Adam,


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A Documentary History of American Industrial Society, Vols. I. and II, Plantation and Frontier, 1649-
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An Account of the Designs of the Associates of the late Dr. Bray (London, 1769). Confirms other material respecting the philanthropic origins of Georgia.

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Constitutional History of the First British Empire (Oxford, 1930)
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The Colonial Agents of the Southern Colonies (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1945)
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one of the earliest reformers of prison
included the life of his brother Charles
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CHATELAIN, Verne E., The Defenses of Spanish Florida, 1565-1763 (Washington, 1941)

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<th>Raw Sack (lbs.)</th>
<th>Total Value of Exports (lbs.)</th>
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Table of Exports from Georgia, 1775-72.
THE SIEGE OF ST. AUGUSTINE (1740)
THE SPANISH EXPEDITION AGAINST GEORGIA (1742)

River Altamaha
Mount Venture

St. Simons Island

Frederica
X Bloody Marsh

Fort St. Simon D

Jekyll Is.

o Fort St. Andrew

Cumberland Island

o Fort William

Amelia Is.

ATLANTIC OCEAN

SCALE

0 10 20 30 Miles
GEORGIA IN THE FRENCH AND INDIAN WAR.

[Map showing the regions of Georgia, including the locations of Shawnees, Cherokees, Upper and Lower Creeks, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Seminoles, and Apalachee Bay. The map also marks Forts Augusta, Moore, Argyle, Savannah, Tybee, and St. Simms among other places.]
Note: The figures are Fathoms at low Water upon the Bars specified on both the Draughts; and at high Water at Jekyll Bar there is 4 Fathoms Water and at Tybee Bar there is 4 1 Fathom Water, and over both Bars 40 Gun Ships may go and Anchor safely in both Sounds.

24 lb. 4 Fathoms is Six Feet.