Action cause and volition

Abstract

The aim of the thesis is to defend the view that mental entities like wants, desires etc., can be the causes of actions. In the introduction the problem of causal explanation of action is introduced, together with the main outline of the views of different philosophers who are opponents of the causal theory of action. It includes a short introduction to the arguments produced by the opponents of the causal theory of action, and an outline of the project of the thesis. Chapter I is concerned with the question as to whether causal explanation is synonymous with mechanical explanation. In this connection R.S. Peters' view is discussed Chapter II is concerned with the traditional theory of volition as a causal explanation of action. In part I, the question of whether all actions are preceded by an act of will is discussed in the context of G. Ryle's criticism of the concept of volition. In part II, the question of the empirical identifiability of an act of will is discussed, together with the views of W. James, G.N.A. Vesey and R.A. Imlay on the matter. Chapter III consists of the defence of the view that wants, desires etc., can be the causes of actions. In Chapter IV the question of the indescribability of desires, wants etc., without reference to actions is discussed with special reference to A.I. Melden. Chapters V and VI sure concerned respectively with the Humean contention that a cause must be an event, and that a causal explanation needs a generalisation. Chapter VII concentrates on the question whether reason-action statements are incorrigible and therefore not causal. In conclusion, I have given a short summary of the outcome of the various arguments discussed in the thesis.