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

ABSTRACT

Traditionally, the conflict over the question what is the role of proper names in ordinary language has centred around two proposals: a sense-reference account, where the meaning of a name is given by some favoured description of the bearer, or a designatory account, where the bearer is the meaning of the name. There is a predisposition towards the former account, largely apparent ease in dealing with a supposedly central question: what is the role of "Pegasus" in the sentence "Pegasus does not exist".

If we consider some more standard cases of proper names two facts are clear: speakers use a name from one occasion to the next with one and the same meaning, and what two men may know of a particular individual may not be the same thing. These facts not only undermine the traditional accounts but they also prohibit a uniform account of all names, bearerless or otherwise, in terms of the bare intentions of speakers irrespective of what populates the universe.

These failures indicate the need for a different approach to the issue. The search for a direct answer to the question "what is the meaning of a name", prescribed by a sense-reference approach, should be replaced by seeking the conditions which must be satisfied

by someone who knows the contribution a name makes to determining the truth grounds of statements. The role of standard proper names can then be explained without appeal to something which is the meaning; and further an account of why "Pegasus" is still with us can be given, which explains our intentions on the matter without unduly detracting from an ontology of middle sized hardware.

CHAPTER I - The Conflict about Sense

CHAPTER II - The Designatory View

CHAPTER III - The Meaning of a Name

CHAPTER IV - Existence and Fiction

CHAPTER V - Incorrectness in Names

Chapter I

THE CONFLICT ABOUT SENSE

1. Introduction

More often than not, proper names name objects. So much is clear. But the connection between a proper name and the object it names is unclear. How does a proper name come to be tied to an object? Many philosophers have thought that this connection should be explained in terms of the sense of a proper name. The issue of whether or not a proper name is tied to its bearer through sense has become a battle ground for the dispute over the role of proper names.

It is perhaps surprising that the dispute should have concentrated upon this issue, for in an obvious sense it is clear that proper names do have sense. Those who will allow talk of sense to enter into discourse at all, will at least accept that two sentences which make statements with different truth conditions have different senses. The sense of a constituent of a sentence is then at least partly given by the contribution it makes to the truth conditions of the statement made by the sentence. Proper names, as constituents of sentences which make statements, undoubtedly affect the truth

grounds of the statements made. The truth conditions of the statements "Napoleon won the Battle of Waterloo" and "Wellington won the Battle of Waterloo" are different. It follows that proper names have sense. What then could be under dispute when it is asked whether or not proper names have sense?

The question under dispute is not whether a proper name has a significant role to play in a sentence: the dispute concerns the question whether or not a proper name performs its function in virtue of some descriptive content to which the name is tied, which gives (descriptive) sense to the name. To keep this distinction between the sense of proper names clear, I will call the sense which proper names have in virtue of their role in naming an object, the meaning of a proper name. Proper names because they name objects affect truth grounds of statements and therefore have meaning. I will call the search for some descriptive content of proper names, which will explain how the name performs its role, the search for the sense of a proper name. Now it is possible to ask the question non-trivially, do proper names have sense.[1]

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[1] The terms "meaning" and "sense" have enjoyed a somewhat indiscriminate use between these notions. The use of "sense" adopted here approximates to Frege's use of the term, when he speaks of the sense of genuine proper names in "On Sense and Reference". Our use of "meaning" approximates to his use of "sense" in the Grundgesetze. I.32. This terminological distinction is justified by the need at least to leave open the question of whether Frege's two uses of "sense" are the same, and by the unavailability of other terms to do justice to our notion of "sense". (e.g. "connotation", see Chapter II).

How does a name pick out one object rather than another? It is clear that the only way one object can be differentiated from another is via the properties which it instantiates. Therefore it might be thought that a proper name picks out one object rather than another through a tie with some true descriptions of the object it names. These descriptions would then give the sense of the name. Now there is of course doubt as to which are the crucial descriptions. Should we concentrate on essential descriptions, that is descriptions which must be true for the object to be that object, or some set of descriptions which are commonly accepted as true of that object, or descriptions which just happen to spring to my mind when the proper name is used, or when I'm face to face with the bearer?

If we can give an answer to the question of which descriptions are suitable candidates for the sense of the name, then it is held that the field is clear for a move towards solution of two philosophical problems and at least an economical formulation of ontological problems. If a proper name is tied to its bearer through certain descriptions which are true of the object ~~which~~ and give sense to the name, then we can take advantage of Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions to explain without further trouble how to deny existence of e.g. Aristotle. Further, with the format of meaning given by sense and reference behind us, we might find a difference in

sense between names of the same object to explain true yet informative identity statements. Ontologically speaking we are left with just those objects over which, for the truth of our assertions, the variables of quantification must be allowed to range. Exploiting Quine's dictum that "to be is to be the value of a variable" we can forgo an interest in any possibly irreducible distinction between singular and general terms and put an end to metaphysical speculations about the nature of the simple elements which are the ultimate referents of these terms.

The opposite view is that a proper name is not related to its bearer through the mediation of descriptions which give the proper name a sense. A proper name has no sense, it is used to refer to an object. To ask the question how a name comes to refer to this object rather than another is to ask an unphilosophical if not unanswerable question. A proper name means its bearer. Some dispute may arise as to just what the relation of meaning between the name and its bearer is. Does a name stand proxy for, imitate, or resemble its bearer, or does it label the object named? Moreover it may look as if moving away from the sense-reference format will make it difficult to explain either how it is that "Pegasus doesn't exist" is true, or how true identity statements can be informative. But these difficulties should not obscure the attractions of the view that proper names don't have

sense. If statements about the world can be reduced to statements about bearers of names, then perhaps determinacy of sense can be guaranteed: there won't be two ways of negating the same proposition. Truth gaps are eliminated. And if a way can be shown for treating descriptions as names, then in all properly formed significant statements it will not be possible to introduce any complex descriptions which are not satisfied. The way is cleared to re-awaken concern with what there primarily is, with the hope of an ontological criterion which is more interesting than one of bare pragmatics. Finally, if such an account of names can be given, then it may be thought that we have a paradigm case on which to base an answer to the question how language hooks onto the world. Statements about the world may hook onto reality in the way that names hook onto objects.

This account does little more than suggest the ontological complexion and interests of the respective contestants in the conflict about the sense of proper names. Both views need consideration, although I think it can be shown that the first at least is false, and that the second needs radical transformation to explain the role of names. In this Chapter I will attempt to deal with some forms of the sense view. First two prolegomena.

It has often been thought that there are two equivalent ways of asking the question 'do proper names have sense.' One may ask, what

are the presuppositions of a referring use of a proper name, or one may ask, what do I know when I understand the use of a proper name. This confusion of two different questions dates at least from Mill, who says, "A name ..... denotes the subjects, and implies, or involves, or indicates, or as we shall say henceforth connotes the attributes."[1] Whether the attributes which are indirectly signified by a name (Mill's connotation) are implied, involved or indicated is a matter of some importance. But what is logically implied by the use of a proper name which refers to an object is not necessarily the same as what that use of the proper name might indicate for me. More formally the distinction between the presuppositions of a referring use of a proper name and the sense that a proper name has may be put as follows: it is possible to answer the sense question in the negative without implying at the same time a negative answer to the presupposition question. It is possible that a name does not have sense in the way of being tied to its bearer through descriptive content, nevertheless that the use of that name to refer to an object does presuppose certain conditions.[2] Both questions

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[1] J. S. Mill, System of Logic, Book I, Chapter 1, section 2.

[2] See for instance C. Kirwan, "On the Connotation and sense of proper Names". (Mind, October 1968), where he first attempts to answer the question whether proper names have sense in terms of whether their use presupposes descriptions of the object named. He shows that a name does indeed presuppose descriptions in the strongest way that it is possible to phrase this claim. However he concludes that it does not follow that a name has a sense.

are important to an account of proper names, but they require separate treatment. It is with the sense question that we are concerned, here, though a more precise formulation of this question must wait upon consideration of the claims which have been made as to what should constitute the sense of a proper name.

The second prolegomenon is to dismiss an attack which might be thought to undermine the whole enterprise of treating the question of whether names have sense as a serious question. As Plato pointed out in the Cratylus, naming is an action performed by human agents. The problem before us is not to explain names as the constituents of unchangingly true or false propositions which represent the ontological building blocks of some elementary states of affairs of a static Tractatus world. Names of themselves don't name or refer to objects, but speakers use names to refer to objects. Consequently it might be argued that there is no point in raising the question how names come to refer to objects. This question can only be asked in the context of how a speaker can use a name on a particular occasion to refer to some particular object.[1] And on any particular occasion a speaker may use the name "Aristotle" to refer to Aristotle, but, as in the notorious case of Dr. Spooner, he might use "Aristotle" to

[1] A more recent formulation of this view is given by L. Linsky, Referring. Also in "Reference and Referents" in Philosophy and Ordinary Language, Ed. Charles E. Caton.

refer to St. Paul. On this view there is no more reason to concentrate on the former case than the latter, or to look for a general account of the relationship between "Aristotle" and Aristotle. Now the premise of this attack is of course justified. We cannot consider names as constantly linked to their bearers independently of any speakers. However, this argument is insufficient grounds for the conclusion that nothing can be said of the relation between a name and its bearer in standard uses of the name. We need to consider the question what is the relationship between a name and what a speaker will standardly use that name to refer to. And whatever the answer to this question it must offer some explanation of what was odd about Dr. Spooner's use of "Aristotle" to refer to St. Paul. To argue that there is nothing general which can be said about the role names play in sentences which make true statements, is to treat the exceptional as the normal, when the task is to explain why the oddity is exceptional.

What then is the connection between a proper name, N_1, and the object, b_1, which it names?[1] The general form of the sense view is that something called "sense" mediates between N_1 and b_1. Sense, some form of description of b_1, is linked to b_1 through truth value and is linked to N_1 by being a part of a speaker's associations with

[1] N_1 is any (unspecified) proper name, and b_1 is respectively the bearer of N_1.

or knowledge of b_1. A distinction can be drawn between those versions of the sense view which hold that the description which gives the sense of the name is drawn from some commonly accepted facts about the bearer, and those versions which hold that the chosen description is based on the thoughts or associations which a speaker may have in relation to the bearer and the name. I will call the first "the objective sense view" and the second "the subjective sense view". The following two sections will consider why neither of these versions of the sense view can offer a satisfactory account of the role of proper names.

2. The Subjective Sense View

Two main proponents of the subjective version of the sense view are Hobbes and, in his later years, Frege.[1] For Hobbes a name is a mark which acts as a mnemonic device for its inventor who associates the sign with the thought he has of the object named. A mark attains the status of a name when it has been publicly accepted, "by common consent of those who use the same language",[2] as a sign of a thought of the object.

> A name is a word taken at pleasure to serve for a mark which may raise in our mind a thought like to some thought we had before, and which being pronounced to others, may be to them a sign of what thought the speaker had, or had not before his mind.[3]

It looks then as if Hobbes' view is that names are signs which signify, through association, a speaker's private thought, conception or image of a thing. This sign, in becoming publicly accepted, comes to signify to others the thought the speaker has, "... to signify and make known to others what we remember ourselves".[4]

It has become a matter of some dispute whether Hobbes' view was that the relation between a name and its bearer is identical with the causal relation he posits between a sign and a conception or thought.[5]

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1 G. Frege: "The Thought: a Logical Inquiry", Trans: A. & M. Quinton. Mind, 1956.
2 T. Hobbes. De Corpore, I.ii. (Ed. E. W. Molesworth.)
3 Idem.
4 Idem.
5 J. W. N. Watkins. Hobbes's System of Ideas.

First then let us consider the traditionally accepted view of Hobbes' theory, namely that the naming relation is the relation of sign to conception: that a name signifies, through mnemonic association, a thought.[1] We will then consider what account of names is open to Hobbes if these relations are not the same relation, if the naming relation is not a causal relation of sign to conception.

The traditional interpretation of Hobbes' view, that the name is a name of something in the mind, i.e. a thought, puts Hobbes in an untenable position. Here the sense of the name is the thought of the object which is connected to the name through the mnemonic character of the name. The sense of the name, the thought, and the object named are then one and the same thing. Now it is clearly not possible to treat a name as the name of a thought, since it was Napoleon who won the battle of Austerlitz, and not my thought of Napoleon. The associated thought may be the sense of the name, but it cannot be what the name names. Hence on these grounds alone we cannot hold that the relation between N_1 and b_1 is the relation between a sign and the thought or sense.

So let us abandon the traditional interpretation of Hobbes' view, and assume that he distinguished the relation of a name to its bearer from the relation of a sign to the thought. Hobbes' theory

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[1] This view of Hobbes' Theory is accepted by, for instance, Mill, and also Oakeshott in his commentary to Hobbes.

then is that a name names an object, and the sense of the name is the thought of the object, which is linked to the name through memory association. The relation between the name and its bearer then ceases to be directly causal, though a causal relation remains between both the name and its sense, and between the sense and the object. On this version the object named arouses a conception or thought of itself in the speaker's mind, and the thought arouses a sound or noise which is the name of the object. Thus the name is linked to the object through a thought, which is the sense of the name. Now is this second interpretation of Hobbes' view an improvement on the earlier version? Does it leave the causal relation far enough behind?

Now it is clear that if the importation of the notion of sense is to serve any purpose, it must at least be able to explain how the name continues to have the same sense from one occasion of its use to another. And it is far from clear how Hobbes' notion of sense can account for this. A distinction must be drawn between what it is to be the same thought, and what it is to be a thought of the same object. Now it is true that an object may arouse a thought of the same thing in many different speakers' minds, but that object does not necessarily arouse the very same thought for all speakers. One man's images, conceptions, associations with a given object will

differ from those entertained by another man. For Hobbes the thought aroused by the object gives us the sense of the name, so, under the condition that the sense of the name is the same for several speakers, the sense of the name cannot be given by the thought aroused since each speaker entertains different thoughts. But if the sense of the name is given by any thought, so long as it is a thought of one and the same object, then how does the thesis that the sense is the thought offer any explanation of the meaning of the name beyond the fact that the name constantly is used to name the particular object to which it has been assigned? If the sense of the name is not the thought itself, but the common factor of these thoughts - the object of the thoughts - then we cannot explain how N_1 picks out b_1 in virtue of its sense. For here the sense of the name is the bearer. Thus sense does not explain how a name is tied to its bearer. The sense thesis merely reiterates what is to be explained, that a name picks out its bearer.

And a similar difficulty arises for the connection between the name and the thought. If the thought, or sense, is to play an explanatory role in mediating between name and object, and thus accounting for the constant relation between a name and its bearer, it is required that the sense of the name be constant from one use to another. But the link posited by Hobbes between name and thought, namely memory

association, cannot ground an invariant connection such that a name may continue to have the same sense.

Psychology has not as yet offered any account of an inviolable connection between a word and a thought; there must always remain some element of contingency in memory such that a thought may not always remind a speaker of a word, nor a word always remind a speaker of a former thought. Similarly the name cannot, as Hobbes suggests, "be a sign to others of what thought the speaker had", since the connection between name and thought is neither objective nor public, but based upon private memory associations. The utterance of a name may or may not arouse the same associations in the minds of an audience.

Again we might argue that Hobbes does not require that the name be linked to the same thought, but merely to thoughts of the same object. But then for a name to have the same meaning, one occasion to another, the sense of the name becomes identical with the common object of these diverse thoughts, namely the bearer of the name. Here again sense cannot perform its intended role of explaining the connection between name and bearer. On this account Hobbes' thesis reduces to the assertion that a name is mnemonically linked to its bearer, and perhaps, given a sufficiently loose reading of "mnemonic", this assertion is correct, for we do often succeed in remembering

names of objects. But this thesis has little in common with any sense view which purports to explain the connection between name and bearer through a third mediating element, the sense.

The failure of memory to provide the strict relation between N_1 and its sense, or between a particular thought and b_1, suggests that the second interpretation of Hobbes' notion of the sense of a name cannot explain the connection between a name and its bearer. The "... common consent of those who use the same language ..." to accept a mark as a name cannot be given in a way which establishes the sense of the name, since social contract cannot dictate the contents of a speaker's memories.

Frege's position in The Thought raises similar problems. For Frege proper names do not name thoughts, as in the earlier version of Hobbes' theory. Statements about Napoleon are about Napoleon. The sense of the name, for Frege, is given by the thoughts which the speaker associates with the object named. Thus a description of b_1 which gives the sense of N_1 mediates between N_1 and b_1. On these grounds Frege holds that two speakers may use the same sentence to make a statement about b_1, but where these two speakers know different descriptions of b_1, they neither express nor even utter the same thought, although they use the same sentence. In Frege's example the sentence "Dr. Gustav Lauben has been wounded" makes a true state-

ment, but may express different thoughts when it is used for example by Dr. Lauben himself and when it is used by Rudolph Lingens, who is not personally acquainted with Dr. Lauben.[1]

At least two elements in this theory seem right. The truth value of the statement, whether asserted by Lauben or by Lingens, is the same: both men refer to the same man. It would also seem right to suggest that the same sentence may be understood in different ways by Lauben and Lingens. The two speakers know different facts about Lauben; each would use different identifying descriptions if asked to say whom he meant. But is Frege right in the conclusion that the two men express or utter different thoughts, or, in our terminology, that the name is used with different senses by Lauben and Lingens? How is it that the two men come to utter different thoughts when they use the same sentence to make the same statement?

Frege's explanation is that if we suppose that two men each know one fact about Dr. Lauben, which is not the same fact, then "... as far as the proper name 'Dr. Gustav Lauben' is concerned, they do not speak the same language, since, although they do in fact refer to the same man with this name, they do not know that they do so."[2] So, Frege argues, we should make this situation explicit and suppose that one of the two, S_1, uses the name 'Dr. Lauben' and the other, S_2,

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[1] G. Frege. Ibid (page 297)
[2] Ibid.

uses 'Gustav Lauben'. Thus the two men come to utter different thoughts because in reality they don't speak the same language; S_1 and S_2 are using two different names. It is possible then for S_1 to take the statement expressed by "Dr. Lauben has been wounded" as true, when he takes the statement expressed by "Gustav Lauben has been wounded" to be false. The thoughts expressed, since they can differ in truth value, are different.

On this account of the sense of a name it is unclear how any communication through proper names is successful. Whenever one speaker's knowledge of an individual does not happen to overlap with another speaker's knowledge, the sense of the name for the two speakers is different: one speaker fails to understand the name used by the other speaker. This explanation of the sense of a name, far from explaining how a name continues to pick out one and the same object, claims that when the name occurs in two sentences, which make the same statement, that the name is used with different senses. It seems that Frege has attempted to make a virtue of offering no answer to the very difficulty he should be trying to solve - the problem of how two speakers do mean by the same sentence something which <u>is</u> the same, even when both know very different facts about the bearer of the name they use. We cannot answer this question with the retort that in reality the speakers use different names and both

entertain distinct thoughts.

Furthermore, even on Frege's own account, it cannot be maintained that S_1, who knows the statement "Dr. Lauben has been wounded" to be true, can take the statement "Gustav Lauben has been wounded" to be false, since on Frege's account S_1 does not know the sense of the second name, or the thought which S_2 expresses. S_1 simply does not understand this sentence since by Frege's own admission he speaks a different language. To suggest that S_1 does grasp the thought that S_2 expresses, when he uses the different name, is to make the same mistake as Hobbes. It is to suppose that the link between the name and its sense is overt. But nothing in the name (sound or inscription) can inform the hearer of the thought the speaker associates with the name. An account of the meaning of a name via the notion of sense which stipulates that two speakers, who associate different thoughts with the individual named, in fact do not use the same name, is no account at all. Language which includes proper names would become private language with the additional drawback that you were never sure whether a sentence was in your private language or not.

This fundamental difficulty with Frege's theory arises around the nebulous status of the thought. The thought, or the sense a sentence may have for a speaker through his associations with the bearer of the name, is introduced to embody the clearly distinct

cognitive content which two people may associate with a name in a sentence, when it is the case that they know different facts about the bearer. But if this is the function of the thought, then it cannot be what is expressed or uttered in a sentence which uses the name. If, on the other hand, the thought is what is expressed by a sentence, then that sentence, which is used to make one statement, by many speakers, does not express literally the subjective associations of one speaker or another. The difficulty for Frege is to reconcile the subjective content of the thought with the objective content of the sentence.

Basically the theories of Frege and Hobbes face the same difficulty. In trying to answer the question how it is that N_1 always picks out b_1, they have attempted an explanation in terms of what a speaker understands by the use of the name. But the question must always arise, what is the connection between the name and what a speaker understands by that name? Both theories offer an explanation in terms of the subjective notion of what the speaker associates with the object named. But clearly associations must vary between speakers, and often for the same speaker on separate occurrences of the same name. The meaning of a name, on this account, cannot be constant. To explain meaning via the sense of a name, where sense is what a speaker understands by the name in terms of association, is similar to

explaining the meaning of the word 'fascist' in terms of a speaker's association perhaps with Germany, or the term 'horse' through its association for some speaker with the Derby. The Derby is not part of the meaning of 'horse', although it may in some sense be present to or apprehended by the speaker who talks of horses. It might be argued, as for instance Wittgenstein[1] held, that it makes no difference to the meaning of the name, if the sense differs between occurrences. But then how much is gained by the introduction of a notion of sense? If the notion of sense is to have any application towards explaining the meaning of N_1, or as constituting part of the meaning of N_1, we must at least require that the sense of the name is constant. There is surely no point in defining something called the sense of proper names, which allows that in every occurrence the proper name has a different sense. How can such a theory explain the relation between a name and its bearer which is constant? It explains nothing more than that each occurrence of N_1 is a different occurrence of N_1. Such a theory of sense cannot even explain the difference between two names which refer to the same object. To argue that the sense of a name is not constant between one occurrence and another, is either to

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[1] L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigation. (Trans: G. E. M. Anscombe. Oxford 1958) Section 79. Wittgenstein's difficulty here in finding an adequate fixed definition of the name should not be invoked as evidence for the view that a name behaves in the way he suggests 'a game' behaves. Fluctuations in 'definitional sense' of the name do not imply that the name may sometimes pick out one individual, other times another.

say that language is systematically ambiguous, so far as sense is concerned, though univocal with respect to reference, or it is to say that the inconstancy of sense does not imply systematic ambiguity. But if we take the latter course, then sense loses its place in an account of proper names. For this view admits that the subjective associations of the speaker with the object named are irrelevant to an account of the content of a sentence which has a name as a constituent.

This difficulty with the notion of sense of a proper name is perhaps tackled in the most radical way by Plato.[1] It could be argued that one constructive result of the Cratylus, specialised to what we should call proper names, is to show the impossibility of giving a sufficiently objective account of the sense of proper names. Basically, the problem is what is the link between the name and the description or sense? So far we have considered subjective accounts of this link: that the description linked with the name depends upon the associations of the speaker. Cratylus' view of proper names is that the link is objectively given by the name itself. A name is a vocal imitation of the object named, where the letters and syllables of the name show the essential nature of the object. The name then names an object, but it is also tied to the object in virtue of being a symbolic

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[1] Plato. Cratylus. (Tr: H. N. Fowler. London, 1926)

description of the object. The sense of the name, the essential characteristics of the object, is thus given objectively and constantly on all occurrences of the name. Cratylus' theory can be seen as a radical attempt to explain the connection between N_1 and b_1. If the essential properties of b_1 are given by predicates, ϕ, ψ, χ, then N_1 will be formed of those letters, or sounds, which represent these properties.

Cratylus' theory can be attacked on the grounds that it simply moves the same problem one step further back. If we argue that a name picks out its bearer through the fact that the letters in the name represent properties of the object, then an account must be given of the relationship between the letter and the property. Questions like "why should 'Napoleon' stand for Napoleon?" are converted into questions like "why should the letter lambda stand for softness?" And probably the only answer which can be given to the latter sort of question is that it is by convention that lambda stands for softness. But then why not say that 'Napoleon' stands for Napoleon by convention, and avoid the problems of determining Napoleon's essential characteristics?

But a more interesting argument can be raised against Cratylus' position. For the theory to succeed the name must become indistinguishable from the object it names. The name is an imitation of the object. But how can a name literally imitate, threaten to be confusible with,

a thing it imitates? We must say that the imitation is not such that the name becomes exactly like, or indistinguishable from the object. But how then do we explain that the imitation is an imitation of the object without importing certain conventions which explain how one thing can represent another? To change the terminology: the only satisfactory account of the link between a name and an object leads to the position that there are two objects which are quite the same. If we allow a difference to creep in between name and object (which we clearly must allow), then we must depend upon some sorts of convention to explain the link. But if we allow conventions to creep in, then why reject an account which explains the connection between proper name and object in terms of convention from the outset without the help of a doctrine of descriptive sense for proper names?

Theories which attempt to explain the link between name and bearer through a notion of some subjectively given descriptive import of the name in virtue of which that name picks out its bearer seem to reduce to one of two equally unsatisfactory positions. Sense is to be given either by the associated thoughts or by the common denominator of such associated thoughts, namely the bearer of the name. We have seen that on either view the introduction of sense is superfluous to the explanation of the link between name and bearer. On the first view, if sense is given by the associated thought of the bearer then

insofar as these associations are inconstant for different speakers they are useless as a basis for explanation of the constant connection between name and bearer. This was Frege's problem. Such associations could only qualify as giving the sense of the name if linked objectively to the name. But however objective this link, it must be grounded on some convention, as Plato shows, and if the link between name and its sense rests upon convention, then it is superfluous to import sense to explain this relation. And equally on the second view (one variety of Hobbes' Theory), if sense is taken to be the common denominator of all associated thoughts of the bearer, then the notion of sense fails to offer any explanation of what these theorists suppose to be necessary, an explanation of the relation between name and bearer. For sense no longer mediates between name and object in explaining how the name is connected to that object. Sense here reduces simply to the bearer of the name, which indicates that, insofar as the subjective sense view yields a constant relation between N_1 and b_1, sense, as the descriptive import of N_1, becomes quite superfluous. Subjective sense does not appear to add anything towards answering the question how a name has meaning, or how a name is linked to its bearer.

3. The Objective Sense View

Given these failings of the subjective sense view we can specify some conditions which must be satisfied by any theory which offers an explanation of how a name refers to its bearer through its sense. The connection between the name and the sense, we have seen, cannot rest upon associations of the speaker, nor, as Plato has shown, can the connection be found explicitly within the name itself. One attempt to solve the difficulty of giving a sufficiently objective sense, and to re-instate a sense view is to find a description of b_1 publicly accessible to any speaker and substitutable for b_1's name in all transparent contexts without change of truth value. I shall call the sense view that adopts this criterion of sense the 'objective sense view'.

The general form of the objective sense view may be put like this. We use names to talk about objects, but all we can know of an object must be expressed in terms of some descriptions of the object. If we know what we are talking about in using a proper name, then this cognitive content must be given in terms of descriptions of b_1. The sense of a proper name is given by this cognitive content. But since cognitive content may in general vary from one speaker to another, we must now concern ourselves only with that part of the cognitive content of a name which does not vary with each occurrence

of the name. It is a description which satisfies this condition of objectivity which will give the sense of the name, and thus explain the link between a name and its bearer.

Clearly in order to assess any such objective sense theory we need a test for the objectivity of the phrase which is a candidate to express the sense of the name and an adequate criterion is given by the principle that the phrase should be substitutable for the name both salva veritate and salva modalitate. More formally we may say that ϕ gives the sense of N_1, if and only if, in all sentence frames containing N_1 which make statements which are true or false, $(\exists x)(\phi x)$ can supplant N_1 both salva veritate and salva modalitate. On this criterion it is clear that the description "the one philosopher born in Stagira" for instance cannot give the sense of the name "Aristotle" since it cannot be substituted for the name in the sentence "Aristotle is the only philosopher born in Stagira" preserving the modality of the original statement.

Now the plain difficulty for the objective sense view set up in this way is to find a description which does give the cognitive content of the name and yet satisfies the objectivity criterion. It is clear that the cognitive content, or sense, must be limited to those descriptions of b_1 which are true. So as a first approximation for sense we might take the set of all true descriptions of b_1. But this

set of descriptions cannot give the sense of N_1 and satisfy the criterion, for the substitution of this set for the name would make all true statements about b_1 into trivial truths, which they are not. An account of the sense of a name must leave room for the fact that the question "Was Aristotle born in Stagira?" is a significant question. Thus the set of all true descriptions of b_1 cannot give us the sense of N_1.

Alternatively we might take Frege's suggestion in "On Sense and Reference"[1] and select just one of the true descriptions of b_1 as giving the sense of N_1. But which is the favoured description? Frege's (and Russell's[2]) suggestion is that the description selected should be one of the most commonly known facts about b_1. This will mean that the sense of a name may vary between occasions of use. For example, the sense of "Aristotle" for one speaker might be given by "Plato's disciple and the teacher of Alexander", for another by "Stagirite teacher of Alexander the Great".

But the favoured description theory makes it look as if, at least for some people, the statement "Aristotle was born in Stagira" is trivially true, whereas in fact the statement asserts a contingent truth of Aristotle. Frege attempts to deal with this problem by

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1 G. Frege. "On Sense and Reference." Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, Ed. P. T. Geach and M. Black (Oxford: 1952)

2 B. Russell. Problems of Philosophy. (London: 1912)

allowing that the sense of "Aristotle" may vary between contexts. Thus the sense of "Aristotle" may be given by the definite description ϕ, except in the context where ϕ is asserted of Aristotle, where the sense must be given by another definite description. He argues that these fluctuations in sense in the natural language are tolerable. But the difficulty cannot be avoided in this way. It is clear that the sense of a singular term cannot be determined by what is predicated of that singular term. We cannot for instance say that the sense of "horse" is to be given by "large quadruped with mane and flowing tail which neighs" except in the context where we wish to predicate of horses a similarity with donkeys, when "horse" is then stipulated to have the sense "beast ridden by man". If there is any point in talking about the sense of a proper name as well as the reference, then the sense cannot be allowed to vary according to what is asserted as true of the object named.

The fundamental problem with Frege's theory is the same as that encountered by the earlier mentioned theory that the sense of N_1 should be given by the totality of true descriptions of b_1. On both theories contingent statements become trivially true. What the objective sense theory needs is perhaps some description, ϕ, of which it is the case that it is true that b_1 is necessarily ϕ. This might tempt us to search for some essential description of b_1, a description such that

if b_1 is not $\emptyset$, then there can be no such thing as the bearer of N_1. Two possible descriptions might qualify under these conditions for the sense of N_1. We might take the description "named N_1" or, on the lines of Geach's theory of proper names[1], we might say that a covering or sortal concept for b_1 might do as the one predicate which b_1 necessarily has.

The first proposal falls down on several counts. It cannot be argued that the description, "named N_1", can give the sense of the name, N_1. This says no more than that the sense of a name is given by the fact that it is a name. But what it is to be a name of an object is exactly what sense is purporting to explain. Secondly why should the senses of "Aristotle" (The Stagirite) and "Aristotle" (the shipowner) be the same, when the senses of Napoleon and Buonaparte differ? But thirdly, if we say that "named N_1" is necessarily true of b_1, then this does not leave open the possibility of saying that the bearer of N_1 might have been called by the name N_2. It is only a contingent fact that for instance Aristotle was called "Aristotle", and not "Plato" at birth.[2]

Neither is the second attempt at finding an essential description of b_1 which will qualify for the sense of N_1 successful. The

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[1] P. T. Geach. Reference & Generality. (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1962). Mental Acts. (London: 1957).

[2] For further discussion of this theory see Chapter III.

covering concept for an identity statement of the form ($N_1 = N_1$) cannot be said to give the sense of N_1, since it only succeeds in differentiating objects of different sorts. Names of different objects of the same sort get the same sense. On this theory, although the sense of "Aristotle" and "Athens" are different, given respectively by "a man" and "a city", the senses of "Aristotle" and "Plato" are the same. It may be that Geach is right in suggesting that it is necessary for the user of a name to know the relevant covering concept,[1] but it cannot follow from this argument that the objective sense sought after by these sense theorists can be given by a description which fails to differentiate one bearer of a name from another. It may be that to deny that Aristotle is a man, is to deny that Aristotle is Aristotle. We cannot then conclude that this essential description of Aristotle gives the sense of the name. Nor on the substitution criterion of the objective sense view can the relevant covering concept be substituted for the name salva veritate. For the statement "a man taught Alexander" may be true when the statement "Aristotle taught Alexander" is false.

The requirements of the objective sense view seem hard to satisfy. No definite description which is contingently true of b_1 will pass the substitution criterion, yet no essential description which can differ-

[1] The role played by the sortal in the meaning of a name is further considered in Chapter III.

entiate the bearer of a name from another object is available. These seemingly insurmountable problems suggest that the search for the sense of the name must be conducted on less rigid lines than those dictated by any commitment to the view that names are merely shorthand descriptions. It is after all a unique convenience of names that they enable us to refer to objects without describing those objects. Rather than search for the favoured description which the name abbreviates, the objective sense view should perhaps be based upon a quite different approach to the connection between name and true descriptions of the bearer.

A recent exponent of such an approach is Searle[1]. He suggests that a name has sense in that it is logically connected, "in a loose sort of way" with characteristics of the object named, but the name is not shorthand for a particular description of the bearer. The question of which particular descriptions the name is tied to is left open. They include all descriptions which users of the name regard as essential established facts about the bearer. To use the name does not indicate which of these descriptions are true; referring uses merely presuppose "the existence of an object of whom a sufficient but so

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[1] J. R. Searle. "Proper Names". Mind 67 (1958). Also Speech Acts, (Cambridge: 1969). See also P. F. Strawson. Individuals. (London: 1959). and "Proper Names" (A symposium with C. Lejewski.) Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 1957, where Strawson again supports Searle's approach.

far unspecified number of these statements are true". "A referring use of a name does not ordinarily assert any of these uniquely referring descriptive statements, or even indicate which exactly are presupposed. The question of what constitutes the criteria for "Aristotle" is generally left open," and when the question does arise, "then it is we, the users of the name, who decide more or less arbitrarily what these criteria shall be".[1] It is just because these criteria are unspecified that a name is more than a shorthand description. "Names function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descriptions".

The real issue here is whether the introduction of a "loose logical connection" between name and descriptions can avoid the difficulties of earlier sense views. The theory at least appears to offer the possibility of a reconciliation between the advantages of the subjective and objective sense views. The connection between N_1 and its sense is loose in that the sense is not given by any particular description of b_1. Perhaps then we can yield to the attractions of the subjective account without falling foul of the substitutability test. At the same time the connection between N_1 and its sense is logical: some description is available for substitution for N_1 which might offer an explanation of how N_1 picks out b_1 on all occasions of

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[1] J. R. Searle. "Proper Names". Repr. Philisophy and Ordinary Language. (Ed.) C. E. Caton. p.159-160.

its use. The success of this theory then rests on how the notion of a "loose logical connection" can be filled out. Can this connection be sufficiently loose to by-pass difficulties of the substitutivity test, and at the same time sufficiently strict to fix upon which peg we are hanging our descriptions?

Searle's "loose logical connection" between N_1 and commonly attributed properties of b_1 might be interpreted in one of two ways. On the first stronger interpretation, the sense of the name is given by a set of descriptions of b_1: the inclusive disjunction of properties of b_1. The connection between N_1 and its sense is logical in that this set is substitutable for the name: the connection is loose in that the set is open ended. Thus if $\phi' \ldots\ldots \phi^n$ be the commonly accepted properties of b_1, then the sense of N_1 is given by "the one thing which $\phi' \vee \phi'' \vee \ldots\ldots \vee \phi^n$". But this rendering of Searle's view must encounter difficulty if we are to preserve the transitivity of the relation of meaning the same by a name. For if this set is the sense of the name, then must a speaker know the whole set of descriptions to know the sense of N_1? Surely not, for it is stipulated that the set is open ended. Then how many of the commonly accepted descriptions of b_1 should a speaker know? Where is the guarantee that one speaker will know the same set as another speaker? Yet if two speakers don't know the same set of descriptions, how can it be said that the two

speakers mean the same by the name? If, on this interpretation of Searle's view, it is at all clear what does constitute sense, then the theory seems prone to fall by the same attack as Frege's subjective sense view, where speakers with different associations with b_1 are forced to speak different languages.

A weaker interpretation of the "loose logical connection" would be that the sense of N_1 is not given by the set of descriptions, but rather by any one of the set of commonly accepted descriptions of b_1. Here the connection between N_1 and its sense is loose in that any one description in the set will do duty for the sense of N_1, logical in the sense that some one description drawn from the set can be substituted for N_1. Now it might be argued that on this interpretation Searle can preserve the transitivity of the relation of meaning the same by a name. Although the sense of N_1 might be given by any one of the descriptions in the set, the sense of the name does not vary from one occasion to another since any of these descriptions, which might give the sense, are members of the same set. But this argument fails for at least two reasons.

The unity of the inclusive disjunction of properties of b_1, any one of which on some occasion may give the sense of N_1, cannot explain the invariance in the meaning of N_1. To suggest that the meaning of N_1 is the same for all speakers because the sense of the name for

each speaker is given by some description drawn from the same set, is to make a similar mistake to one pointed out by Wittgenstein. It is like saying "'something runs through the whole thread - namely the continuous overlapping of those fibres.'"[1] The element which of course does run through the whole thread is, in this case, the object, of which all the descriptions in the set are commonly accepted as true. But this fact merely serves to underline what is obvious: that it is the bearer of the name which is crucial to the meaning of the name. The function of picking out an object cannot easily be reduced to describing that object.

But secondly this weaker interpretation of Searle's thesis falls down on the count that it is not clear that we even have a "continuous overlapping" of the fibres in the thread. The set after all is composed of "commonly accepted" descriptions of b_1. However, what is commonly accepted is not necessarily what is true. A commonly accepted description of Richard III is that he was the murderer of the Princes in the Tower, and this false description cannot overlap in the right way with other true descriptions of Richard III. The connection between a name and its bearer cannot be explained by one or many false descriptions of the bearer, nor can "commonly accepted" descriptions be an adequate criterion to ensure that the candidate for the sense of N_1

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[1] L. Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. (Tr: G. & M. Anscombe, Oxford: 1958). Section 67.

should pass the substitutability test. On this interpretation of Searle's thesis the inclusive disjunction which gives the sense of N_1 is too loosely connected with N_1 to explain how the meaning of the name can be constant between varying uses, and too loosely connected with b_1 to explain how the name continues to pick out just that object. It does not seem possible to specify adequately this notion of a loose logical connection between the name and its sense.

It seems then that Searle's theory does not succeed in reconciling the objective and subjective sense views. It does not seem possible to combine the logical requirement that the sense be substitutable for the name with both the objectivity test and the subjectivity of the descriptive content of a name for a particular speaker. But without satisfaction of the logical requirement of substitutivity what justification is there to suppose that sense helps to explain the meaning of a name at all? It may well be that Searle is right when he suggests that "the uniqueness and immense pragmatic convenience of proper names in our language lies precisely in the fact that they enable us to refer publicly to objects without being forced to raise issues and come to agreement on what descriptive characteristics exactly constitute the identity of the object". But this "looseness" in the descriptive content of a name cannot be accurately represented by Searle's theory of a logically loose connection between N_1 and sense. It is grounds for

the belief that the descriptive content of N_1, because variable and loosely defined, is in fact irrelevant to the meaning of a name.

The difficulty in finding a description which is the sense of the name has led to Quine's suggestion that we can always preserve the advantages of treating names as disguised definite descriptions through the introduction of a pseudo-predicate, which is the unanalyzable, irreducible attribute of "being b_1". Thus a proper name, for instance "Pegasus", can always be translated into an expression of the form $(\exists x)(Fx)$ where 'F' can be read as "Pegasises" or "is-Pegasus".[1] "Given any singular term ..... the proper choice of 'F' for translation of the term into $(\exists x)(Fx)$ need in practice never detain us."[2]

Quine's theory does not represent a version of the objective sense view. To replace "Pegasus" by $(\exists x)$(x-Pegasises) is ex hypothesi trivial. The predicate "Pegasises" is not designed to offer the sense of the name "Pegasus" or to explain how it is that the name picks out the object it does. Nor is Quine's proposed pseudo-predicate to be read as either "called 'Pegasus'" or "is identical with Pegasus". The deficiencies of these two predicates as interpretations of the

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[1] W. V. Quine. From a Logical Point of View (Cambridge, Mass: 1953) Methods of Logic (N.Y.: 1959) Word and Object (N.Y.: 1960).

[2] W. V. Quine. Methods of Logic pp.219.

predicate F in $(\exists x)(Fx)$ do not undermine Quine's suggestion.[1] Nor is it accurate to attack Quine's proposal as a theory which eliminates the possibility of an irreducible distinction between the role of general terms and that of proper names. As Quine says, "We can encourage a feeling for the reparsing by letting the epithet 'name' accompany 'Socrates' and its ilk into their new estate, thus saying that the category of names is not dissipated but only reconstrued as subordinate to that of general terms ..."[2] It is still open to those so inclined to offer an account of why the category of names is a category distinct from other subordinate categories within the general term denomination.

A rejection of either sense view is compatible with an acceptance of Quine's device for the reparsing of proper names. We may accept "it is not the case that there is something which Socratises" as an adequate translation of the negative existential statement "Socrates does not exist", but this brings us no nearer to understanding

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1 See for instance Geach. Mental Acts, page 68, where he argues against Quine's theory that a speaker could not have meant "Cerberises" as a predicate since such expressions as "here is another Cerberus" or "there are several Cerberuses" are not just false statements - they are excluded altogether in the language game played with "Cerberus". There is nothing impossible in the notion of a predicate exclusively true of one object, nor is it more difficult to explain the ambiguity of this irreducible predicate "Cerberises" than the ambiguity of the proper name "Cerberus" when there are two dogs so-called.

2 W. V. Quine. Word and Object, page 181.

how the name "Socrates" picks out the object it does. Equally the problem of negative existentials is only removed one stage further back. Instead of having to explain how the name "Pegasus" can have meaning when there is no such thing as Pegasus, we now have to explain the structure of this irreducible predicate; how does "Pegasises", which is true exclusively of Pegasus, have meaning when there is no such thing as Pegasus? Quine's proposal for reparsing names is not grounds for support of an objective sense view, but grounds for less concern at the failure of the sense views.

The meaning of N_1 cannot, it seems, be explained by a set of true descriptions of b_1 which is the sense, and is substitutable for N_1. In the next chapter then we will attempt to give an account of names which does not give an explanation of a name's function in terms of descriptive sense.

Chapter II

THE DESIGNATORY VIEW

1. Names without Connotation

The last chapter shows that the sense view cannot succeed in giving an account of how proper names have meaning. Three basic difficulties lie in the way of success. The first difficulty is how to preserve the transitivity of the relation "... means the same by ..." given the heterogeneity of properties which different speakers will use to make clear which particular they mean. The second difficulty is that if we ignore the subjectivity of the way each speaker picks out an object, and treat a name as an abbreviated description, then insofar as we preserve transitivity of identity we sacrifice, on substitution of the description for the name, the modality of some contexts. The only description which seemed adequate to deal with these two problems was a Quinean pseudo-predicate, which if successful leaves the naming relation unexplained. This third problem suggests that the approach of the sense view is fundamentally misconceived. To attempt to base an explanation on the Fregean Sense Reference model encourages us along a road which tends to assimilate the ways in which names and predicates introduce terms. But an explanation of the naming relation should perhaps begin from a

position which posits a radical difference between predication and naming. In the terminology of the Fregean model, we should consider whether the meaning of a proper name can be given simply by its reference, without any appeal to sense.

Traditionally Mill is held to be the main advocate of such a view. However, it is far from clear what it was that Mill was denying of proper names when he put forward the dictum that proper names have no connotation: that names are "unmeaning marks". The questions which need answering in Mill's account, are whether he was denying the right thing of proper names, when he said they lacked connotation, and what positive account of the role of names can be derived from his doctrine. The answer to this first question should help us to formulate what is wrong with the sense view.

Mill's theory breaks down into three theses.[1] A proper name serves to distinguish an object when spoken of. The name is connected to the idea we have of the object. The name itself is an unmeaning mark, in that it has no connotation and conveys no information about the object designated.[2] One might well wonder how these views could

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[1] J. S. Mill. A System of Logic (London, Longmans: 1961). Book I, Chapter II, 5.

[2] The term "designated" is adopted rather than "denoted", for the term "denotation" only serves to introduce confusion generated by the different uses it has been given by for instance Russell, Quine. c.f. Geach, Reference and Generality, page 56.

be consistent. They could only be consistent if an adequate account of the connection between name and idea can be given which will leave the name without sense, but equipped with powers to distinguish one object from another. Mill offers an explanation of this connection through analogy with the robber's mark in the Arabian Nights, where the robber, in order to distinguish one house from others, puts a mark on the house to be robbed. By analogy, in naming "we put a mark, not indeed on the object itself, but so to speak upon the idea of the object. A proper name is but an unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of the object ..."[1] This is an unsatisfactory explanation. In the case of the robber's mark, the mark is at best an abbreviated description in code. Morgiana's contribution is to crack the code. The analogy is not strict, for as Mill notes, the connection in one case is spatial, in the case of a name it is not. But then what is the connection? If it is the strict invariant connection, which it has to be for Mill, where the name is a symbol, or stands proxy for the idea, then how does the name come to designate the same object, since ideas of objects will vary from one man to another? It looks as if the name must be connected not to our ideas of the object, but what these ideas have in common, or to a generally accepted idea of the object. This move brings us back to the descriptive sense

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[1] J. S. Mill. Ibid. Page 22.

theories. Mill does not seem to have offered us an alternative account of how a name picks out its bearer.

Nor can we draw much from the thesis that the role of a name is to distinguish an object when it is spoken of. This thesis, for which Mill is not the sole advocate[1], is patently correct in one sense, that a name is used to identify, or pick out, which particular object is meant. But a name cannot distinguish one object from another. In fact it has been a subject of some regret to philosophers of language that the world is not composed of material objects each with a different name.[2] Clearly it is possible within the limited spatio-temporal context of a game of chess to name one pawn 'alpha' and another 'omega' but this will not help to distinguish these pawns from their indiscernible brethren the next time the game is set up. Objects are only distinguishable from others by their properties, and it is a part of Mill's thesis that to give a name to an object is not to mention a property.

On the positive side it does not seem that Mill has given us a designatory account of how names perform their role. Before attempting to give such an account, let us at least locate the bone of contention between Mill and the sense theorists in answering the more

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[1] For instance J. N. Keynes. Formal Logic (London: 1884)

[2] For instance Russell in the search for logically proper names; Wittgenstein in the search for simple names, especially in the Notebooks.

interesting question of what Mill was denying when he said that names have no connotation.

It is a mistake to suppose that Mill's view directly confronts the sense view. The notions of sense, in the sense reference theory, and of connotation, in Mill's theory, are quite distinct. As has been suggested, the nearest overlap between these two terminologies, at least for predicate expressions, seems to lie between Frege's reference and Mill's connotation. In Mill "white" connotes, or implies the attribute, whiteness, which would seem to be closest to the concept white, which is for Frege the reference of "white". However, holding Mill to his definition of "connotation" and specialising it to proper names, is he really denying that proper names have no connotation?

Mill states that proper names are non-connotative in that they "... strictly speaking have no signification:" ... "they do not indicate or imply any attribute as belonging to the individual named:" ... "that the name once given, names independently of the reason for which it might have been given, and that they are not dependent upon the continuing presence of any attribute in the bearer."[1] These statements all aim at saying the same thing, namely why the sense view is wrong, but each statement seems to fail in its explanation.

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[1] J. S. Mill. Ibid.

Mill offers us no explanation of "signification" which is less than "meaning" as we have used the term. It is quite clear that proper names, in that they plainly have a function in language, cannot be said to lack meaning.[1] It may be that "signification" is intended to be closer to "informative content", a catch-all phrase which some philosophers since have hoped would distill what is correct from Mill's account. For instance Ryle denies that proper names "convey information or misinformation".[2] He argues:

> From the information that Sir Winston Churchill was Prime Minister, a number of consequences follow, such as that he was the leader of the majority party in Parliament. But from the fact that yonder dog is Fido, no other truth about him follows at all.

But this cannot be correct. No information is conveyed by telling me that yonder dog is Fido, because I don't know who Fido is. From the fact that yonder man is Winston Churchill a lot of informational content is conveyed to us who know of him already. We have to know who Winston Churchill was to grasp the content, but equally, in Ryle's argument, we have to know what it is to be Prime Minister to catch

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[1] In the way we have introduced the term "meaning" for proper names, the question of a significant distinction between the function of proper names and the meaning of proper names does not arise (see for instance J. Xenakis "The function and meaning of names", Theoria 22, 1956). The oddity of the question "what does N_1 mean?" should not discourage us from accepting what is clear, that names have meaning and a function in that they make some contribution to truth conditions of statements made by sentences in which they occur.

[2] G. Ryle. The Theory of Meaning in British Philosophy in the Mid-Century. Ed. C. A. Mace (London: 1951). See Chapter III.2. for a fuller discussion of this objection.

the consequences. We don't know, without further guidance, what it is to be Fido. If we know the meaning of a name, the use of that name certainly conveys information. In this sense names have signification.

To say with Mill that a proper name implies no attributes of the bearer also seems false. It is clearly a necessary condition of naming an individual, that we should be able to pick that individual out and distinguish it from other individuals. This activity presupposes that the individual have some properties. Hence it is at least true to say that a proper name presupposes that the bearer has the attribute of having some properties, and that a proper name is dependent upon the fact that this attribute at least remains true of the bearer.[1]

Finally, we should agree with Mill that the "name once given is independent of the reason ... for which it may first have been assigned". No one would wish to dispute his classic example of the name "Dartmouth" which may continue to name the same place, when the town ceases to be at the mouth of the Dart. But there are many proper names where there is no apparent reason for the selection of one phoneme rather than another as a name. It cannot then be that Mill's thesis that proper

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[1] I do not want to suggest that this is the only attribute implied by a name. There are several other candidates, e.g. the attribute "called N_1". See also chapter III for relation between name and nominal essence.

names lack connotation should be reduced to this thesis: still less can this thesis express what is wrong with the sense view. It seems that Mill is saying something important and right, but we have yet to formulate what it is.

Campbell has recently proposed two tests, which taken together purport to formulate the condition that names do not fulfil their role in virtue of a sense.[1]

The two conditions, which are each sufficient and jointly necessary to N_1 being a proper name are:

I For any n, if (is an n) or (are n) is a predicable expression, then (n) is a proper name if and only if (n is not an n) or (n are not n) is not self-contradictory.

II For any n, if (is an n) or (are n) is not a predicable expression but it makes sense to attach a predicable expression to (n), and if (n) is not a quantifying expression, and if it is not impossible that a sentence of the form (n is $\emptyset$) should always be used to make the same statement, then (n) is a proper name.

Campbell's tests divide proper names into two classes, those which have descriptive import and can therefore form predicable expressions, and those which don't. The first test offers a criterion on which to judge if a predicable expression is a proper name, namely that it should not be self-contradictory to deny the descriptive import of a name of

1 R. Campbell. "Proper Names". Mind. July 1968.

the bearer of the name. It is not self-contradictory to deny that New College is a new college. The second class of proper names, those lacking descriptive import, are defined by exclusion as expressions which are not predicable expressions, quantifying expressions, demonstratives or pronouns.

I think it can be shown that the second condition does not provide a sufficient condition for a word to be a proper name, and further if condition II were successful, condition I would be unnecessary. In the second condition the phrase "and if it is not impossible that a sentence of the form (n is a ϕ) should always be used to make the same statement" is added to the condition in order to distinguish proper names from demonstratives and pronouns. But it fails to distinguish them in the right way. For it is a contingent matter whether a statement of the form "he ... ϕ ..." or of the form "this ... ϕ ..." can be used to make more than one statement. The matter depends upon how many things there are in the world which "he" and "this" might pick out. If it were the case that there was only one possible referent of a pronoun or demonstrative, this would not make either word into a proper name. Similarly it is a contingent matter whether or not a sentence of the form "n is ϕ" always makes the same statement. It depends upon how many individuals happen to be called by the same name. Names which have been assigned to more than

one individual are not any the less genuine names than names which happen to have been assigned to only one individual so far.

If this second condition had provided a sufficient condition for a word to be a name, why should the first condition be needed? The answer to this question lies in the basic distinction which Campbell draws between names which can form predicable expressions when conjoined with the verb "to be", and those which can't. This distinction may seem attractive in the light of examples such as "New College", and in the light of what Mill had to say about Dartmouth. However,this distinction between sorts of proper names is fundamentally misconceived, and consequently the first condition adds nothing to the second, and fails to formulate either Mill's doctrine or what was wrong with the sense theories.

It does not follow that because proper names may sometimes be said to have descriptive import, that they can occur as predicate expressions of the form "is an n" or "are n". The inclusion of the indefinite article in this predicate format is indicative of the error. For what is it to be "A Judas", "a Mary", or, in Frege's example, "a Vienna"? In these cases, the name has either ceased to be a name, but plays the role of attributing a property customarily associated with the object once named by that morpheme, (e.g. to be a Judas is to be a betrayer), or the expression "an n" is an abbreviation for "an f

called n" (e.g. a girl called "Mary"). The case of "New College" is deceptive since the morphemes which compose the name also happen to be predicate expressions in their own right. It is an important part of any designatory thesis that names cannot form predicate expressions. Campbell's division of proper names into two classes rests then on a mistaken notion of the role of names. Even taken apart from this difficulty the first condition cannot succeed. No criterion of what it is for a name to have descriptive import is offered. If "Judas" has descriptive import, then so perhaps do "Robert" and "Pegasus". If the only criterion for n having descriptive import is that "n is not an n" should make sense, then expressions such as "the Alps" are denied proper name status: "the Alps are the Alps" makes sense, but "the Alps are not the Alps" is self-contradictory. But it is not clear why "the Alps" should fail the test when "The Rocky Mountains" passes it.[1] Whatever Campbell's criterion for the descriptive import of a name, his condition does not seem to cover Mill's case of "Dartmouth", where the name refers independently of the reason for which it was first given, nor to cover the descriptions, suggested by the sense theories, which purported to give the name its sense.

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[1] I assume here that the inclusion of the definite article in the name is accidental. I see no explanation of why we say "The Thames" and not "The London". See C. Kirwan, On the Connotation and Sense of Proper Names, Mind. October 1968, for a similar view.

At least a part of the Mill doctrine could be formulated simply as:

1. $\sim (\exists \phi) \Box (b)(b \text{ is N's bearer} \rightarrow \phi b)$

If N_1 is a proper name then there is no description, ϕ, such that necessarily whatever is the bearer of N_1 is ϕ. This condition rules out the possibility that the name implies any attributes in the bearer.

However, if this approximates to Mill's theory it will not do as a formulation of what is generally wrong with the sense theories, for, as we have seen, our condition must leave room for some attributes of b_1 implied by N_1. What we need is a condition which rules out the possibility that there is a definite description of b_1 in virtue of which N_1 picks out b_1. This could be taken account of by:

2. $\sim (\exists \phi) \Box (b)(b \text{ is N's bearer} \leftrightarrow \phi b)$

If N_1 is a proper name, then there is no description ϕ such that it is a necessary and sufficient condition of being the bearer of N_1, that b_1 should be ϕ. Clearly some values of ϕ may trivialise this condition. It is for instance a necessary and sufficient condition of being the bearer of "Aristotle" that b_1 satisfy the description "identical with Aristotle", or the description, "the one thing most like Aristotle". However, condition 2 purports to specify what is wrong with the sense views. Values of ϕ must then be restricted to those descriptions of

b_1 which are possible candidates for the sense of N_1, and no description formed with an occurrence of N_1 could purport to offer the sense of N_1. That there is no trivialising value of ϕ other than a description formed via use of the name, is just what the condition sets out to formulate. Hence we need only add the rider to this condition, that values of ϕ be such that they do not include an occurrence of N_1. This rider will then ensure that values of ϕ are restricted to genuine candidates for the sense of N_1. Condition 2 then specifies what we have found wrong with the sense theories: namely that a name cannot be taken as an abbreviated description. At the same time this condition leaves open the possibility that certain attributes may be implied by the use of the name, and further that some speakers may have different associations with N_1 and may use N_1 to pick out b_1 on the basis of quite different information and interest concerning the bearer.

2. A Pure Designatory View

Mill failed to provide a positive account of how names fulfil their role which could qualify as a designatory view. Probably the purest form of such a theory is to be found in the early Russell, who held the thesis that the meaning of a proper name is the bearer of the name.[1] There is no question that this theory is wrong; as Ryle has pointed out,[2] the meaning of a name cannot be the bearer since when Jemima eats Ahab, Jemima does not eat a meaning. Meanings do not die with bearers of names.

It is well known that Russell was forced to take the view that if the meaning of a proper name was the bearer of that name, then there were no genuine proper names in our everyday language.[3] The most likely candidates, demonstratives, personal pronouns and names used by their bearers, enjoyed a guaranteed reference,[4] but failed to satisfy the requirement of a constant one to one correlation between the name and its bearer. There might then seem to be very little justification for considering Russell's view of proper names at all, given their irrelevance to notions of everyday language. If Russell's theory represents a pure designatory view then we have seen reason

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1 B. Russell. Principles of Mathematics (London: 1903)
2 G. Ryle. Theory of Meaning. (London, 1957)
3 B. Russell. Logic and Knowledge. Ed. R. C. March (London: 1956)
4 "Reference" here is used non-intentionally.

enough to reject this view without further argument. Nevertheless, two points are important. Firstly the possibility of a designatory approach to explain how proper names have meaning should not be rejected solely in virtue of the unacceptability of Russell's formulation of such a theory. There would seem to be something right in the designatory approach which must be drawn out. Secondly a designatory approach, in spite of its philosophical tradition, does not necessarily imply the metaphysical doctrines with which it has been associated.

Whatever formulation should be given of the designatory view, the theory basically is opposed to a single analysis of all singular referring expressions. Proper names cannot be assimilated into a pattern set by other singular referring expressions. Most referring expressions have meaning given by a set of linguistic conventions, or in virtue of a sense, which is such that the expressions can be used on different occasions to refer to different individuals. Proper names cannot be analysed in this way, for although the name "Mary" may pick out, on different occasions, several different individuals, this is not because there is something apart from their names which all people called "Mary" have in common. The statement "a man was watching the tennis" is true under the conditions that one of the men present was watching the tennis, but the truth conditions of the statement "Mary was watching the tennis" are not given by whether any one of those

present, called "Mary", was giving the tennis her attention.[1] The different individuals which can be picked out by a demonstrative, or a definite description, have at least more in common than the trivial condition that these individuals can be referred to by these expressions. It is this possibility of a basic distinction between sorts of referring expressions which the designatory view of proper names takes seriously. The possibility provides incentive to find an improved formulation of the designatory view which might avoid the problems found in Russell's formulation.

Many arguments have been put forward to suggest that not only are Russell's proper names not to be found in language, but that they could not be a part of language. Searle for instance has argued,[2] "It isn't that there just do not happen to be any such expressions: there could not be any such expressions, for if the utterance of the expressions communicated no descriptive content, then there could be no way of establishing a connection between the expression and the object". This argument cannot be successful in rejecting either Russell's logically proper names, or in rejecting the possibility of

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[1] See for instance Quine. Word and Object (p.182) on the "purport of uniqueness", where he says "one might well recognise uniqueness - anyway in the weak sense 'one at most ' - as implicit in the very meaning of certain general terms, viz. ones like 'Socrates'." But the weak sense of 'one at most' is clearly inadequate. As argued above (p.53) "a Mary" does not function like "one horse".

[2] J. Searle. Speech Acts. (Cambridge: 1969) p.93.

a designatory view. As we argued in Chapter I, it is no easier to explain a connection between a name and its sense, than it is to explain a connection between a name and its bearer. There is no reason why the connection between the expression "horse" and its descriptive content "quadruped with mane and tail" should be clearer than the connection between the name "Dobbin" and the particular horse to which the name has been assigned. General words are no closer to hieroglyphs than proper names, and even in the case of hieroglyphs an appeal to convention must still be made to explain why a particular should be represented in just that way. The selection of the phoneme "horse" to mean horse is just as arbitrary a matter as the selection of the phoneme "Dobbin" to name Dobbin. The connection is set up by fiat which only socio-anthropological or psychological theory might sometimes help to explain.

It is also argued, in support of the thesis that sense must be prior to reference, for words have meaning independently of what there is in the universe. On this view proper names cannot have meaning through designating their bearers, for their bearers may cease to exist though the names continue to have meaning.[1] It is not clear what such an argument amounts to. For a designatory view does not require that the bearer of a name be present in space time: the view does not

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[1] Idem.

encounter any special problems when, for example, Aristotle dies. What other sense can be given to the argument that language is independent of what is in the universe? To argue for the standard case of names that they have meaning by designating their bearers, rather than in virtue of a sense, may sometimes have seemed to open the road to timeless particulars as the bearers of names, but it does not presuppose any such theory of substance. To suppose that it does is to confuse the designatory approach with Russell's formulation of it, and the metaphysical use to which he put the theory. Surprisingly it seems we can separate both conflicting theories of the role of proper names from their traditional philosophical backgrounds. Just as the introduction of Quine's device of pseudo-predicates showed that a sense view was not a necessary condition for the employment of Russell's analysis of definite descriptions, so it also seems that a designatory view of names need not commit us to a theory of ontological simples.

It is clear then, if only on the basis of the intuitive appeal of a designatory view and the difficulties encountered by any sense view, that the possibility of a mode of reference, where sense is not prior to reference should be given a fairer run than it is likely to receive on Russell's formulation. Some arguments which seemed to militate against such a view are ineffective. Nevertheless there are

some notable pitfalls to be avoided in any reformulation. Although it may be obvious that the meaning of a name must be given by the assignment of that name to some object, it is by no means clear how the relation between the name and its bearer should be specified. To offer names sense and reference may, as suggested, be to over-specify the meaning of a name, but we have yet to give an adequate account. One thing at least is clear - that the meaning of the name cannot be the bearer. Secondly any formulation of the designatory view must provide some account of our intuitive conviction that bearerless proper names have meaning, and which explains how some statements of the form (Aristotle exists) at least appear to make true statements about the world. It is not enough, in explanation of our intuitions, to simply dismiss bearerless proper names as an inferior breed of referring expressions, which are not genuine proper names, and which should have no place in our language. What must be explained is why they do. But this explanation must wait upon an adequate account of how standard cases of proper names behave.

3. A Reformulated Designatory View

The theory to be formulated is that the meaning of a name is given not by the descriptive content or sense of a name but through the fact that the name designates the object it does. The question is what is the meaning of a name if it is not, as Russell suggested, the bearer of the name.

It is none too soon to ask the question what sort of a thing are we looking for in the search for the meaning of a proper name. So far we have presupposed an account of meaning along Fregean-Wittgenstein lines, that the meaning of a constituent of a sentence is given by the contribution made by the constituent to determining the truth conditions of the statement made by the sentence. As Frege says[1],

> The simple or composite names of which the name of a truth-value consists contribute to the expression of the thought. This contribution of each is its sense. If a name is a part of the name of a truth-value, then the sense of the former name is a part of the thought which the latter (name of a truth value) expresses.

Now it might be argued that this cannot constitute an adequate account of meaning. To explain the meaning of a word in terms of its contribution to determining truth conditions is to ignore much of

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[1] G. Frege. Grundgesetze. 1.32. (Frege's use of "sense" here can be read as "meaning" as we have used the term. See Chapter I.)

recent philosophy and with it what Austin has called the illocutionary force of statements. Furthermore Frege's account is known to confront difficulties in the case of propositions lacking a predetermined decision procedure.[1] However, there is no need at this point to consider the special case of proper names as they might occur in such undecidable propositions. Any theory which deals with this special set of propositions, or takes into account more than the semantics of statements, must imply some such account as the Fregean. For our purposes we can treat Frege's account as laying down minimum requirements for what it is to explain the meaning of a word.

On this basis it is clear that in looking for the meaning of proper names we need not be forced into the straight-jacket of finding definitional substitutes, or, should these fail, of opting with Russell for perhaps what seemed the only possible alternative; objects themselves. It is equally important to recognise that the search for the meaning of proper names is not carried out in the void. We are not confronted with linguistic items, names, which must be correlated with what there is; rather we are confronted with names which are used significantly by people in certain linguistic acts. This apparently trivial and obvious point has an important implication.

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[1] M. Dummett. "Truth". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society. 1958-9.

The meaning of a word is to be thought of in terms of a speaker who uses an expression to mean ..x.., where whatever is meant, i.e. x, does not have a transparent occurrence. In the statement "S uses expression N_1 to mean ..x.." the argument place of x is an opaque context. We are not necessarily looking for something which is the meaning of the name. To explain how a name has meaning, or how it performs its function in language, does not presuppose that we should have found something which is what N_1 means. An account of N_1's contribution to the truth conditions of a statement does not necessarily require that there is a direct answer to the question "what is the meaning of N_1 in sentence S?" It may be possible to fill out N_1's contribution to truth conditions without the help of a statement of the form "..x.. is what N_1 means", where x occurs transparently. This points the way to a reformulation of the designatory view which I hope to show avoids the difficulties which confronted Russell.

Let us replace Russell's dictum with another: that to know the meaning of a name is to know which object the name names. This reformulation seems to provide the elements of a solution to many of the problems which an account of proper names must confront. Firstly it is clear that this formulation of Russell's doctrine avoids the difficulty of a Fido-Fido reference theory, where the meaning of the name becomes intersubstitutable with the object itself. The

introduction of "knowing" into the dictum creates an opaque context which prohibits any equation between meaning and the bearer of the name. Jemima does not eat meanings simply because every mouse she gets has a proper name. Secondly it is clear that this is not simply a trivial evasion of Ryle's objection. The move which avoids Ryle's attack leaves open the possibility of giving a designatory account of such negative existential statements, as for example "Ossian does not exist". For on this formulation of the designatory view it is at least not obvious that knowing which object N_1 names necessarily commits us to the existence of what is named. It is not obvious that a statement cannot be true without it being the case that there is such a thing as b_1. At least the behaviour of non-standard cases of bearerless names remains an open question. We can safely concentrate on the standard cases, without having to foot any ontological bill.

It can be argued that this dictum, unlike Russell's, leaves the notion of naming totally unexplained. In its present form the dictum needs further explanation. It must be explained in particular how the meaning of any particular name can be elucidated and what it is to make clear which object is named. There are many ways a speaker can make clear, on any occasion, which object he means. In most cases some definite description will be used, by means of which a speaker

can make his meaning clear. Part of the explanation of this dictum must consist in delimiting a set of possible descriptions by means of which the meaning of the name can be specified. On this account although the meaning may be specified in many different ways, it does not follow that when two speakers use the same name they mean different things by it. For the meaning is not to be equated with the way in which it can be given. Given an adequate delimitation of the set of descriptions by means of which the meaning may be specified, this designatory view will preserve the transitivity of identity of the relation "meaning the same by" without introducing the awkward problems which confronted the sense view where meaning was equated with some definite description - the sense - which was substitutable for the name.

This chapter has shown two things. Firstly, we have tried to see precisely where the sense view goes wrong. Secondly, we have seen the possibility of offering an alternative account through a designatory approach. This approach represents a move away from the Fregean Sense-Reference analysis of all singular referring expressions, but, as we have seen, it does not necessarily commit us to the metaphysical conclusions which its main advocate, Russell, may have drawn.

Nevertheless, the reformulation of Russell's theory in terms of

the dictum leaves much to be explained. In particular, there are three questions which need to be answered. First we must consider the question, What is a name? Or, more transparently, what is it to use one and the same name with one and the same meaning? Secondly how is the thesis that the meaning of a name can be given by appeal to some descriptions to be spelled out in a way which avoids the requirement of intersubstitutability? Thirdly what is the relation between the name and what is named? The answer to these questions, which we will discuss in the next chapter, should indicate how the theory based upon the dictum can explain the standard uses of proper names.

Chapter III

THE RELATION BETWEEN THE NAME AND THE NAMED

1. The Name

If it is the case that to know the meaning of a name, N_1, is to know which object N_1 names, then a proper name which serves on different occasions to pick out several different individuals, must either be a different name whenever it is used to name a different individual, or the name must be ambiguous. Now it is quite in order to say that several people share the same name, for instance "John Smith", but it is equally clear that when I say "John Smith attended the cricket" I refer only to one of the individuals called "John Smith", no matter how many John Smiths there were at the cricket, or whether you know which of these individuals I am referring to. The purported number of a name in any given use is not necessarily the same as the number of individuals to which the name has been assigned. It seems then that some account must be given which explains how a name picks out only one individual which leaves room for the possibility that several people share the same name. What are the identity conditions of a name? Are they to be given in terms of the identity of the individual picked out by the name,

or in terms of an identity of phonemes or inscriptions?

It is clear that any confusions which are generated by the difference between the number of individuals a name picks out and the number of individuals which share the same name, occur through an equivocation over the distinction between token and type. When we speak of several individuals sharing the same name, we have in mind a name-type, where the identity conditions are given in terms of the same noise, or the same mark. On the other hand, when we talk of the name "John Smith" picking out an individual, we have in mind a particular use of the name-type, a token. However this simple type-token classification needs further refinement to provide the account we need, for it ignores the fact that we can talk about a name type "T" of which this occurrence is a token. We can list possible name-types without using these name-types in referring positions, namely as tokens. It looks as if a two-fold type-token distinction is called for. Let us take an example which includes the requisite confusions:

> John Smith was a friend of Jack Robinson and John Smith, though John Smith was no friend of Jack Robinson.

To make this example clear let us assume that there is no possibility of friendship with oneself, and that the statement is not self-contradictory. Now in the sense in which we distinguished name-types

earlier, this example contains two, of which the following, "John Smith" and "Jack Robinson" are further tokens. In the example there are three tokens of the name-type "John Smith" and two tokens of the name-type "Jack Robinson". Let us call these tokens name-type tokens.

A second type-token distinction can be drawn with respect to the individuals designated. In the example the speaker refers to three individuals. Let us say the speaker uses three name-instances, of which "John Smith" in its first occurrence is a token of one name-instance, of which "John Smith" in its second and third occurrences are two tokens of a second name-instance, and "Jack Robinson" in its two occurrences are two tokens of a third name-instance.

Are names, in the sense in which we have attempted to give the meaning of a name, name-types, name-type tokens, name-instances, or tokens of name-instances? In this context, what is meant by a name cannot be either a name-type or a name-type token, for in neither of these senses does a name purport to pick out any individual. We might compile a list of the most fashionable English names. This list would consist of tokens of name-types, but neither the tokens nor the types have any meaning. The sense in which "name" is used in the context of the meaning of a name, is of a name-instance the tokens of which occur in sentences, not lists, and do purport to

designate individuals. Now if we ask the question in what sense do two individuals share the same name it is clear that what we are talking about is not name-instances, but name-types. It is now clear how the purported number of a name can differ from the number of individuals to which it has been assigned. The purported number of a name-instance need not necessarily be identical with the number of individuals to which the name-type has been assigned.

It is now possible to explain what it is for a name to be the same name. The identity conditions of a name-type are given by the phonemic identity of the name-type tokens. "John Smith" is the same set of phonemes, words or noises, as "John Smith". This is quite distinct from the identity conditions of a name-instance. Two tokens of the name-type "John Smith" may not be tokens of the same name-instance. The identity condition for the same name-instance is that the name-type tokens should be the same, and should be used to pick out, or at least to purport to pick out, one and the same individual. This account leaves room for the fact that "Napoleon" and "Buonaparte" are both tokens of different name-types and different name-instances. They are two different names (name-instances) with (I trust) the same meaning.[1] The account also allows that two occurrences of the name-

[1] This implies that, in Geach's example, the English "Warsaw" and the Polish "Warzawa" are also different name-instances. Although intuitively it may be more acceptable to say that one is a translation of the same name in Polish, it would be unclear where we are to draw the boundary. Intuition tells us that "Napoleon" and "Buonaparte" are different names. What does it tell us for "La Manche" and "The Channel"?

type "Pegasus" may be tokens of one name-instance, despite the fact that these tokens of the name-type do not pick out one and the same individual, but only purport to do so.

This account also provides an answer to the question of whether a name is a word. Now if a name (name-instance) is a word, then several problems arise which are difficult to answer. For instance, how many words is the name "Julius Caesar"? It would seem that the answer should be two. Yet when I pick out the same individual by the name "Caesar", in one sense I use the same name, and yet only one word. Furthermore, words are embedded in particular languages, and proper names do not seem to be, for I can talk of Ho Chi Ming without knowing a word of Vietnamese.[1] It would seem that a type-token distinction for words would find its parallel in the type-token distinction drawn between name-types and name-type tokens. But a name-instance is neither a word-type, nor a word-token. The word "pen" is a token of the word-type "pen". The ambiguity of "pen" does not give us two word-types. But the name-type "Cerberus" when multiply assigned to my dog and your cat gives two name-instances. On the type-token account given, a name (instance or type) is not a word although both function through tokens which are words. Some names, such as most names of people, function through a token which is composed of two words: the tokens of names of places tend to be single words.

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[1] P. Ziff, Semantic Analysis (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1960), makes the same point.

There is no way of distinguishing an occurence of a name-type token from a token of a name-instance. Both tokens are inscriptionally the same. It is the context of the occurence which enables us to distinguish whether the token is a token of a name-instance or of a name-type. The type-token account then provides an answer to the dispute as to whether Wittgenstein's dictum, that a name only has meaning in the nexus of a proposition, is true.[1] On this theory there must be some context for the occurence of the token which enables us to decide whether the token occurs as a name (name-instance) and has a meaning, or whether it occurs as a token of a name-type, where the name has no meaning. It follows that the "independent use" of names, advocated by Geach, cannot be independent of some context. Names do require "some immediate context of words, uttered or understood".[2] Wittgenstein's dictum, which stipulates a condition for his own brand of simple names, can it seems apply to proper names of ordinary language.

It seems then that the type-token account of what it is to be a name can provide an answer to the questions posed. It must also be able to deal with the objection that such a theory flagrantly disobeys Occam's Law. It could be argued that there is an unnecessary duplication of names; if a name is a name-instance, only the all-seeing eye of God can detect from the token occurences how many names are being used by a speaker. In the example given (p.70) without some

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1 L. Wittgenstein. Tractatus (London 1961) 3.3.
2 P. Geach. Reference and Generality (1st Edition: Cornell: 1962) p.26.

further information we cannot tell whether or not the statement is self-contradictory. We cannot tell from two indistinguishable tokens whether or not two individuals are named. Instead of multiplying names, why not say of all tokens of the same name-type that they are tokens of one name. Some names are ambiguous, namely those assigned to more than one individual, others, by coincidence, are univocal.

It can, I think, be seen in terms of our example that this retort would be misconceived. If we say of all tokens of the name-type, that each is a token of a name, which may or may not be ambiguous, then in our example we have two names, "John Smith" and "Jack Robinson", rather than three name-instances. But then a name becomes indistinguishable from a name-type. Now no account of what it is to be a name can afford to overlook the distinction between names as they occur in lists, and names as they are used by speakers in sentences. To accept a distinction between name-types and name-instances is to do no more than to recognise a use-mention distinction. To accept a distinction between name-type tokens and tokens of name-instances is simply to adhere to the evident position that neither name-types nor name-instances are words. If there is a distinction between the types, then there must also be a distinction between the tokens, whether or not this distinction can be recognised from the tokens themselves. This objection then has the appearance of a last

ditch defence of the so-called label-on-the-bottle theory of proper names which, having lost the bottle, (the object named) would at all costs retain the label with its spatio-temporal characteristics.

2. Specification of the Meaning of a Name

A basis for an explanation of how names have meaning has been suggested in the form of the dictum that to know the meaning of a name, N_1, is to know which object N_1 names. We have said further that the meaning of the name can be specified via an appeal to a set of descriptions, which are not however substitutable for the name. We must now consider this set of descriptions via which the meaning of the name may be given. What conditions must be satisfied for someone to be said to know the meaning of a name? First, two objections, which question the very nature of the enterprise, must be dealt with.

The first objection which might be raised against this theory is that it is unnecessary for a speaker or hearer to know which object is named for him to be said to understand a sentence which includes a proper name. The sole informative content which can be derived from any sentence S_1 which states that b_1 is ϕ (where ϕ is any predicate and b_1 is designated by its name N_1) is that something, called N_1, is ϕ. The sentence itself does not determine which individual called N_1 is in question. Furthermore, it is clear that I can understand sentences, or know what it would be like for the statements made by the sentences to be true, without knowing which individuals are named. For instance, I understand a newspaper report without

knowing anything more about the individuals named than what is said. (It is doubtful if I even know so much.) To understand the sentence "William drove into Oneapolis" I only need to know that "William" and "Oneapolis" are proper names, I do not have to know which individuals are named.

This objection is two-fold. On the one hand it raises the point that the dictum offered is intuitively unpleasing, since the name itself (the token of the name-instance) cannot tell us at a glance which individual is in question. On the other hand the objection raises the more serious criticism that the truth conditions of the statement made by a sentence predicating $\emptyset$ of the bearer of N_1 are simply to be given in terms of whether something, called N_1, is $\emptyset$.

With respect to the first leg of this objection it is indisputable that no guidance is to be found in the occurrence of the token as to which individual is in question. But then nor do we receive any guidance from the words themselves in, for example, the sentence "The chancellor stamped on the bank" which would indicate in which senses these words are to be taken. To require that a word should give guidance is to revert to the demand for a picture language. To argue that all a proper name contributes is "something called N_1" is parallel to the argument that what the word "blue" contributes to the

statement made by "x is blue" is merely that x has a property called "blue". But one would not want to argue on this basis that the word "blue" means no more than "said to be 'blue'", although it is true that from the words, and from my knowledge of grammar alone, this is perhaps the sole informative content of the sentence. The word "blue" no more tells me its meaning than does the name "Aristotle".

The intuitive appeal of this objection can be explained by an easy confusion of the conditions of use of a proper name with the conditions of knowing the meaning of a name. It is clear that a speaker can use a name in a sentence to make a true or false statement without himself knowing the meaning of the name or the truth conditions of the statement. Nor is this distinction by any means peculiar to proper names: it is always possible to ask whether something is ϕ, whether or not the questioner knows what it is to be ϕ. The use of a morpheme by a speaker does not guarantee that morpheme meaning. Yet a failure to do justice to this distinction may justify the theory that the sole informative content of N_1 is rendered by "something called N_1". If meaning, or here, informative content, is sought as the lowest common denominator of all occasions of uses of N_1, then it might be thought that "something called N_1" did give us the meaning of N_1. But it is clear that it is not this factor we are after in attempting an explanation of the meaning of a name.

Anything more substantial in this argument should show up in discussion of the second leg of the objection that the contribution to determining the truth conditions of the statement made by the sentence S_1 is given by the explanation ϕ is predicated of something called N_1. The obvious counter to this objection is to argue that these are the truth conditions only where there is no more than one thing called N_1, where any token of the name-type is in fact a token of only one name-instance. But this underestimates the force of the objection. The tokens in the sentence itself do not tell me which object is in question; this is indicated by the context of the utterance, not by the name. Where the context fails to indicate clearly which name-instance the token is a token of - i.e. which individual is in question - then the statement made by the sentence is indeterminate. The statement does not have clear truth conditions, whereas on the view which follows from the dictum, a case of indeterminacy is a case of not knowing the meaning of the proper name.

But this second leg of the objection is no easier to support. Firstly, it is clear that the contribution made by N_1 to determining the truth conditions of the statement made by the sentence S_1 cannot be given by "something, called N_1", for this renders the statement "Aristotle was called 'Aristotle'" a necessary truth, which it is not. Aristotle might as well have been called "Plato": the sugges-

tion that Aristotle was so-called may be pointless, but it is not self-contradictory.

Secondly, there are difficulties in accepting the thesis that where it is not clear from the context of which name-instance the token is a token, that the statement is indeterminate. The context itself may not include an individuating description such that it would render the statement made determinate in all circumstances. A speaker and his audience may well know of which name-instance the token is a token despite the fact that the descriptions of b_1 which can be drawn out of the context do not serve to individuate b_1. The only justification for accepting the view of the objection that a statement under these circumstances is indeterminate would be to insist on considering names independently of their use. That a speaker does not happen to specify a generally adequate individuating description which he knows uniquely identifies b_1, is not proof that he does not know which individual he means, nor is it proof that his statement is indeterminate.

Finally, this analysis of a proper name has curious implications for the truth conditions of existential statements made by any sentence S_2 of the form "Aristotle does not exist" (where Aristotle is designated by Aristotle). Clearly no context can provide an individuating description such that it renders such statements determinate, which is

compatible with the truth of the statement made by S_2. Hence this statement can never have the value true, except where it so happens that only one individual was ever called N_1. But patently this is not what is the trouble with these existential statements. The problem of giving the logical grammar of the statement "Cerberus does not exist" does not lie with the question how many dogs have been called "Cerberus".

Let us then return to the central question of how, given the dictum that to know the meaning of a name is to know what object N_1 names, the meaning may be specified. If the contribution which N_1 makes to the truth conditions of the statement is that it picks out b_1, it is clear that to know the meaning of the name we must be able to say which individual is picked out by N_1. Now if I am to know or to explain which object b_1 is, I must be able to give some true individuating description of the object designated by the name. For any particular bearer of a name there are a wide range of descriptions which might be adequate for this purpose. Whichever description is selected will depend on what the speaker knows about b_1, and what that speaker suspects his audience to know or to be least likely to misinterpret. No one description is central to making clear the meaning of the name, since the description offered is not constitutive of the meaning of the name. However the individual speaker may have his own favoured description, which he would normally offer, but

this fact no longer threatens the transitivity of identity of speakers meaning the same by the name. Nor does it threaten modality in relevant contexts. For the description is not the meaning of N_1, but is a way of specifying N_1's contribution to truth conditions. Thus the substitution test simply does not apply. The explanation of why a speaker selects one description rather than another lies now in the subjective realm of a speaker's proclivities, which, as we saw in relation to the theories of Hobbes and Frege in The Thought, is the only place it can lie.

Now it might be argued that this account of the meaning of a proper name raises the familiar problem of identification via descriptions.[1] If names require the backing of descriptions, and descriptions are, as it seems, irreducibly general, we have no guarantee that we can know any individuating description such that it might not be multiply satisfied. How then can a speaker know the meaning of a name if we cannot guarantee any individuating description of the bearer of the name?

It is clear that in response to this objection we must distinguish the question whether there is such a problem in non-demonstrative identification from the question whether, given the problem, it undermines the account of what it is to know the meaning of a name.

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[1] See for instance P. F. Strawson. Individuals (London: 1959)

Now in answer to this second question it is clear that within any given frame of reference, adequate to provide spatio-temporal co-ordinates, we can give individuating descriptions. It follows for instance from the maxim that no two individuals of the same sort can be in one place at the same time,[1] that to say of any f that it is in P_1 at T_1 is to give an individuating description of that f. Furthermore, our success in individuating indicates that we do have such frames of reference. Now the problem of identification is not the problem of how we can individuate within a given frame of reference, but rather how we can independently specify this frame of reference - independently of some other frame of reference. It is unnecessary to our purposes to dispute whether or not this is a genuine problem, for if it is, it is a problem of how to get started with identification, not how to go on. The account offered of proper names suggests how we can go on to pick out objects without employing directly the descriptions by which we individuate their bearers. The account neither presupposes a problem of identification, nor any particular solution to it.

It seems from the account given that what it is to know the meaning of a name must be distinguished from what it is to make clear to an audience what is meant by the name. A speaker who knows the

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[1] D. Wiggins. "On Being in the Same Place at the Same Time". Philosophical Review, January 1968.

meaning of a name may make clear to his audience which individual is meant by the name in diverse ways. He may it is true draw upon his set of true individuating descriptions of b_1. On the other hand he may appeal to some description which he knows to be false, but knowing that his audience believes this description true of the bearer. Given that both the speaker and the hearer both hold a body of beliefs which are true individuating descriptions of b_1, this method of making clear which individual is meant may be in practice successful. Equally, a speaker may appeal to a description which does not individuate the bearer, but within the limited frames of reference of his audience, this description may again be successful. For instance, a class of history pupils may know quite a lot about Caesar which includes individuating descriptions, however they might regard the salient description of this individual to be "an epileptic Roman general." This description may not individuate Caesar, nevertheless it might be successful in making clear to the class which individual was under discussion. And again it may be possible to make clear which individual is meant via a context-dependent, or story relative description, such as, "the man whom Jones was talking about". However this description does not itself purport to individuate the object meant. It merely serves to transfer the burden of specification onto Jones.

What is important about these examples is that they indicate

the distinction which must be drawn between hearer-identification, and speaker-identification. If a speaker is to know the meaning of a name, he must know some individuating descriptions of the bearer. He may not however know the same set as those known by his audience who may also know the meaning of the name. But if a speaker wants to make clear which individual is meant by the name to an audience, he may succeed via any description which serves to latch his set of descriptions onto those known by the hearer. To give the meaning of a name (to an audience which does not know the meaning) a speaker must appeal to a collection of true individuating descriptions. But to make clear which individual is meant, so long as both speaker and audience are in possession of some set of true individuating descriptions, the description offered, which succeeds in linking the two sets of descriptions,may be neither true nor individuating.

It follows from this distinction that it may be possible for two speakers to know the meaning of a name, and yet not to know that they know the same thing. Given a sufficient availability of true individuating descriptions of the bearer of the name, one set may not overlap with another. This possibility is hardly a surprising consequence, given the intentionality of the verb "to know", where notoriously it does not follow that if A knows that ϕa and $a = b$, that A knows that ϕb. But the possibility also indicates that making

clear to an audience which individual is meant by a name is neither a sufficient nor necessary condition of knowing the meaning of the name. What it is to know the meaning of a name is then not the same as the ability to identify what is meant to an audience: hearer-identification cannot ground speaker-identification.[1]

If, in order to know the meaning of a name, a speaker must know some set of individuating descriptions of the bearer, it follows that these descriptions must be known by the speaker to be true of one and the same object. We have also seen that an individuating description of a particular is available within a frame of reference, given the maxim that no two things of the same sort can be in one place at one time. I shall try to show that it follows from these conditions that if a speaker knows the meaning of a name, he must know what sort of object the bearer is.

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[1] An argument which more than supports this conclusion is given by B. Williams in "Mr. Strawson on Individuals", Philosophy 36, 1961.

3. The Role of the Sortal

It has been argued by Geach that the meaning of a proper name, and all its intelligible content, is given by a concept which provides a criterion of identity for the bearer of the name.[1] Geach's argument is that in order to use a proper name it must be possible to go on applying the name to the same thing. However, since "the same" is a fragmentary expression and has no sense unless we specify the same what, the concept, in accordance with which we can judge of the identity of what is named, must be a part of the meaning of the name. Furthermore, since the meaning of the name never includes anything about the individual peculiarities of its bearer, Geach argues that "... all the intelligible content that can be got out of the statement 'Smith committed seven burglaries, then Smith committed murder, then Smith was hanged' is '... a man committed seven burglaries, then the same man committed murder, and was then hanged'".[2]

The rider to Geach's thesis, that nothing is lost in cognitive content by the substitution of "the f" and "the same f" (where f is the concept providing a criterion of identity) for the repeated use of a name, should be rejected from the start. A hearer who knows which river the Thames is, and which cat Jemima is, will clearly lose

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[1] P. Geach. Mental Acts (London: 1957). Reference and Generality (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1962).

[2] Mental Acts, p.71.

something of the informative content of the statement "Jemima crossed the Thames" on substitution of Geach's proposed reading.[1] A hearer who is unacquainted with either individual might be seen to gain something of informative content. If he does not know the meaning of the names "Jemima" and "The Thames", in the way in which we have suggested that names have meaning, then it is unclear how he might know from the look of the sentence, that a cat and a river are at issue. It does not seem that the concept which provides a criterion of identity for what is named can exhaust the meaning of the name. The important question is what part does this sortal concept play in the specification of the meaning of a name. To know the meaning of a name, is it necessary to know the relevant sortal concept?

It is clear that different kinds of individuals have different identity conditions. For instance the same mountain will stay put in space and time, whereas the same man can shift around, at least in space. It is therefore necessary to know what kind of a thing an individual is before we can have any idea what it would be like for something to be the same thing. A truth-condition of the identity statement a = b is given by the spatio-temporal coincidence of a and b under some covering concept f. It makes no more sense to talk of identity statement "a = b", without this covering concept, than it

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[1] P. Geach. Reference and Generality. p.45.

does to suppose that an ostensive gesture accompanying the demonstrative "this" will pick out some object unless I make clear what sort of object is indicated. If we are to know what it is for an object to be identical with b, we must know what it is to pick out a and b, and to trace them through space and time to see if they do coincide. We can only do this if we know what sort of thing a is.

Now according to the dictum: to know the meaning of a name is to know which individual is named; and which individual is named, we have argued, may be specified via appeal to any one of a set of true individuating descriptions of one and the same individual, the bearer of the name. We can see from the above argument that to know what it is for several descriptions to be true of one and the same individual, we must know what individual that individual is. To make sense of identity questions about the individual we need to know the relevant covering concept. It follows then that to know the meaning of a name, we must have a criterion of identity for what is named.

There are two theses that this view does not commit us to, though it has been argued that it should. Firstly we are not committed on this account to Geach's own argument for the need for a covering concept to make sense of identity questions.[1] The need for a criterion of identity stands without appeal to the dubious thesis

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[1] P. Geach. Reference and Generality.

that x and y may be the same f, though not the same g. In fact, as Wiggins has shown the proof that for any material object there will be a concept under which an object will fall throughout its existence requires the falsity of Geach's thesis.[1] Secondly Geach's argument, that the sortal concept gives the meaning of the name, has sometimes been supported by the theory that to use a proper name we need to be able to re-identify the bearer. Now this theory would give us the conclusion we need, for whatever concept will provide a criterion of re-identification will also provide a criterion of identification. But the theory presupposes an unnecessarily restricted view of proper names. For it may not be a necessary condition of N_1 being a name that we should be able to re-identify b_1. Such a condition might be unwelcome since it would rule out the possibility of naming momentary particulars, or individuals which as a matter of fact cannot be re-identified.

It has been argued against the thesis that the relevant sortal concept must be a part of the meaning of the name, that although some classification of what is named must be known, it does not matter if this is the wrong classification. Campbell has for instance recently argued that although the words "thing", "object", "existent" etc., cannot serve as classifiers, any classification, including mis-

[1] D. Wiggins. Identity and Spatio-Temporal Continuity. (Oxford: 1967)

classification, is adequate for the successful assignment and subsequent application of the name. He argues that I can name an object which I see every morning trailing a red ribbon behind it, for the phrase "material object trailing a red ribbon behind it" can provide the requisite classification. Furthermore if I should discover that my classification of the object named is wrong, that the object I thought to be a man is found not to be a man, then, Campbell says:[1]

"... what has happened is that a better scheme of classification has been adopted. This new scheme is then read back into the earlier usages, and this would only be possible if what is now classified as a cassowary is the same X as what was earlier classified as a man, where X is to be filled in by some general classifying term".

Now it is not entirely clear what is a case of misclassification for Campbell, or how much misclassification is to count as classification. However to suggest that it does not much matter whether I classify a man as a cassowary or an orang-utan, so long as I can give some classification, is to undermine the theory from the start. For as we have seen the rationale for the theory that a sortal concept must be a part of the meaning of the name is that questions of identity about the bearer of the name make no sense without some criterion of identity, unless we know what sort of thing the bearer is. To

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[1] R. Campbell. "Proper Names" Mind. July 1968

classify a man as a cassowary is not to provide a criterion of identity for a man, for the covering concept cassowary does not make sense of the question what is it to be the same man. Consequently Campbell's suggestion that when a misclassification is discovered we can simply adopt the new scheme and read it back into the old is incoherent insofar as the object was genuinely misclassified in the first place. We cannot read the old scheme into the new for what was a cassowary cannot be the same X as what is a man, unless it is the case that the concepts cassowary and man are both subsumed under a further concept which provides an adequate criterion of identity for a man or a cassowary. But if there is such a concept, then there was no real misclassification in the first place. Where the object X, known to be a g at t_1, is misclassified as an f, at t, we have no way of making sense of the identity question "is X at t the same as X at t_1?", yet Campbell's suggestion of reading back into the old scheme requires that we can make sense of this question. On this view the phrase "material object trailing a red ribbon behind it" cannot provide the requisite criterion of identity for the object I see every morning. Boats and men can trail red ribbons, and stop to trail them. To make sense of an identity question with respect to either it is not enough to know that it is the sort of thing which can trail a red ribbon.

Campbell's suggestion of reclassification would seem incoherent,

and certainly must fail in providing grounds for the thesis that misclassification is some classification. Using the name may be compatible with misclassification, for as we have seen a speaker may use a name and not know the meaning of the name, but a condition of knowing the meaning of the name is that a speaker should know what kind of object the bearer is.

Chapter IV

EXISTENCE AND FICTION

1. An Objection on behalf of Vacuous Names

So far we have two conditions which must be satisfied by one who is said to know the meaning of a name. If a speaker knows which object N_1 names he must be able to make appeal to a set of true individuating descriptions of what is named. The unity of this set of descriptions is given by the condition that all its members are true of one and the same thing, what is named N_1. Hence the second condition which one who knows the meaning of N_1 must satisfy is that he must know what concept covers identity questions concerning what is named. It follows from these two conditions that it is not possible for one to know the meaning of a name which lacks a bearer. There are no true descriptions of Ossian[1], and by the same token, it is not true to say that Ossian is a man. The account of names given rules out the possibility of a uniform treatment of the standard case of proper names, those with bearers, and their lesser counterparts, those without.

Now it may well be thought that this result, if it is not in

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1 Macpherson is responsible for a fraud that there was a poet, called Ossian, who wrote a certain epic poem about St. Patrick.

conflict with some good reasons for thinking that a uniform account should be possible, at least presents some discrepancy with our common intuitions. Normally we tend to think that the phoneme "Pegasus" is a name, which has meaning, and that the sentence "Pegasus doesn't exist", though raising some problems of logical grammar, makes a statement about the world, which, furthermore, is true. It might then be thought to be a serious defect of the account which follows from the dictum that it does not allow bearerless proper names meaning.

How strong then are the reasons which may be adduced in support of our intuitive belief that bearerless names should be allowed meaning? The argument may be propounded in varying forms. It might be argued that there is a difference between saying "Ossian lived in Ireland" and "St. George lived in Ireland", which might suggest that the two names make some contribution to truth conditions; but how should this difference be characterised beyond the obvious feature that the two sentences differ inscriptionally? Alternatively it might be suggested that if we suppose the possibility that Homer did not after all exist, then the statement "Homer wrote the Iliad" is now false, but the statement must surely mean the same as when it was believed true. Again it is apparent that this argument cannot get off the ground since it begs the question in supposing that the statement is now false, whereas all that is allowed is that the statement

is not true.

Perhaps the strongest form of these arguments may be put as follows. Let p be the statement form "A exists", and q be the statement form "it is not the case that A exists". Let r be the statement form "A has property ϕ". Now to contend that proper names should not receive uniform treatment must imply either that the meaning of the name in contexts p and r is different, or that the meaning of the name in contexts p and q is different. If we say that the name means the same in p and q, but not in r, then we allow that the context of the occurence of the name determines the meaning of the name. If on the other hand we say that the meaning of the name is different in p and q, then we allow that the meaning of the name is not independent of the truth value of the statement, which is to contravene what Geach calls Buridan's law. Therefore it might seem that any account of proper names should offer a uniform treatment of names. But it is clear that this argument suffers the same difficulties as earlier less formalised versions. We need not be caught on the first prong of the argument since "exists" cannot be treated as a predicate. One of the matters under dispute is just how it should be treated in these contexts. Nor need the second prong of the argument be a serious threat, since it merely raises to the fore the need to specify Buridan's law in a way which can deal with, or at least exclude, cases where the sentence must make a true statement if the statement made is to

have truth conditions.

The case to be made in support of our intuitive belief that bearerless names have meaning may not seem strong. Nevertheless it would be unwise to dismiss our intuitions too swiftly. Following our intuition either the dictum and the account which follows must be wrong, or we must be able to offer at least some plausible account of why we should ever have thought that such names do have meaning.

If there is something wrong with the account given of proper names, then the fault must lie in one, or both, of two places. Either we must question the view that what it is for a name to have meaning is given by the contribution the name makes to determining the truth conditions, or we must question the account given of what it is to know which object a name names. The former does not seem open to attack, for it is difficult to see what approach could be taken towards meaning which did not include this factor as a central component. Consequently it would seem that the possibility of a uniform account of names which was consistent with our intuitions must lie in a reformulation of the account of what it is to know which object N_1 names. Is such a reformulation possible?

Now it might be thought that an account of knowing which object is named, which is neutral with respect to whether there is such an

object which might be given. To know which object is named might be thought of as the same enterprise as knowing which object a speaker has in mind when he uses the name. And clearly on this formulation of the dictum it is not required that a name have a bearer. A speaker may truly be said to have Pegasus in mind, without being committed to Pegasus' existence. But can we reformulate the original dictum in this way?

It might be argued that to make clear which object I have in mind, I may offer some description, "the ...Ø..." where the definite article indicates that it is just one individual which I intend to refer to. A hearer may or may not be satisfied with the description offered. If there is more than one thing which could answer to the description, then it must be possible to specify further which individual is meant. There is then a wide set of descriptions adequate to this purpose. Already we have seen that a false belief may be used to make clear which individual the speaker has in mind. Equally it seems that a speaker can appeal to a belief which was held, though it is now generally recognised as false. For instance to make clear which individual I mean when I use the name "Richard III", I might appeal to the well known description, now accepted as false of Richard III, "the man who murdered the Princes in the Tower". I can make clear the meaning of the name "Jesus" by appeal to the description

"the man who walked on water", whether or not Jesus did walk the water. Equally I can make clear which individual I mean by the name "Ossian" through the description that he was believed to have written an epic poem. No-one has to hold these beliefs for it to be the case that I can make clear which individual I mean. It does have to be the case that someone once held the description true of whatever is meant by the name. Now the fact that on this account when a speaker has specified the meaning of a name, we do not necessarily find ourselves in the position of one who can individuate a particular object, should perhaps not concern us. If, as has been suggested, the relation of meaning something by a name is intentional, with respect to indifference to existence, then it would be surprising if we found ourselves able to characterise this relation in a way which presupposed existence of what is named.

On this proposal for a speaker to know the meaning of a name, he must have at his disposal not a set of true individuating descriptions of the bearer, but a set of beliefs which are or were commonly held true of what is named. Now in any particular case if a speaker is to make clear which individual he means to an audience, he must offer some description which the latter believes true of what is meant by the name. This proposal then would attempt to distinguish the set of descriptions via which the meaning of a name in any particular

use can be made clear from a set of true individuating descriptions of the bearer, which could correctly individuate a particular object in the world. This correct set of descriptions would serve to answer the question which individual has the property ϕ, where the context is referentially transparent. But in the case of making clear which individual is meant by a name, we are concerned with the different question to which the answer is of the form "S means the individual which ...", where the 'object' meant is specified within an opaque context.

The proposal as it stands is of course incompatible with the second condition identified on the earlier formulation of the dictum, namely the condition that if a speaker is to know the meaning of a name he must know what concept f could cover identity questions concerning what is named. Any view which takes seriously the possibility of a uniform account of names cannot of course include this condition, since we do not know which is the right covering concept for questions of identity concerning Ossian, as it is neither true to say that Ossian is a man, nor true that he isn't. However, on the suggestion made here, this second condition of what it is to know the meaning of a name might be amended to read; that a speaker must know what would be the relevant covering concept if it were the case that what is named exists. The concept then which covers identity questions about what is named by

"Ossian" is the concept which Ossian would necessarily instantiate were it the case that Ossian existed. For the argument could be put that for there to be beliefs about Ossian these beliefs must be about one and the same man, just as beliefs about Aristotle are about one and the same man. Paradoxically on this view to know which object is meant by a name I do not need to know what b_1, the bearer, is, but what b_1 would be, if it were.

To what extent could this proposal, sketched above, offer a coherent account of what it is to know the meaning of a name? The first and most obvious attack which might be levelled at any such account, is that it is scarcely better off than the original position outlined by Frege in The Thought. If we base knowing the meaning of a name upon a set of commonly held beliefs, then how can the transitivity of identity of "meaning the same by N_1" be preserved? Now in one sense the proposal we have sketched is better off than Frege's position, for the belief which a speaker may offer in specification of what he means by the name, is not the meaning of the name, but a way of making clear what the meaning is. The meaning of the name is thus not identical with the beliefs a speaker may have about what is named. But it is clear that this retort does not tackle the basic objection to this form of proposal. The real difficulty encountered by this view, and it would seem any view which abandons a truth

condition on those descriptions via which the meaning of a name may be specified, is that it is not then possible to answer the question which object is meant by the name. It may look on the proposal as if such an answer is possible via appeal to beliefs. As we have seen it may be possible to make clear which individual is meant, or latch one set of descriptions onto a set known by another speaker by means of a false description. But this can only be successful in the case where both speaker and hearer have a set of true beliefs, which do serve to individuate what is meant. What I may happen to believe true of b_1 cannot be thought to individuate b_1 in a way sufficient to guarantee that the meaning of the name is the same. Beliefs, just insofar as they do not require an object of belief to exist, cannot individuate particulars. To suggest that individuation is unnecessary to knowing what object is named by N_1 is thus to question the basic premise that the meaning of a name must be given by its contribution to the truth conditions of the statement made. And this premise would seem unquestionably correct.

It might be thought that here the supporter of a uniform account of proper names might press for a move away from the meanings of words, towards a position which does not countenance meanings as such, but concerns itself with what speakers mean on any occasion of the use of a name. It might be argued that there are many words which we use in

communication, where although there may be correct definitions or meanings, we do not know what they are, nor do we need to know. Cases in question might be such words as "simultaneous", "blue", or "good", where understanding what is meant by these words does not seem to presuppose an ability to give the correct definition. Similarly with the case of proper names, it might be argued that the requirement of a truth condition on the descriptions via which the meaning of the name may be specified, is simply a requirement if we think that it must be possible to give the correct meaning of the name. This however should not be the object of our search when we seek to explain the use of proper names.

But again this move fails, for the opponent of a uniform account of proper names is neutral over the question of whether we need to posit such entities as meanings. He is merely concerned to give an account which explains how the meaning of the name is the same for different speakers. The supporter of a uniform account of names must find this impossible. For it seems that any account which purports to offer a uniform explanation of names must, in rejecting the truth condition, entertain naming as indifferent to existence of what is named. And if the account is successful it must be able to preserve the transitivity of identity of meaning the same by a name. Yet a condition of preserving transitivity is that we should be able to

make sense of the notion of intentional identity. It would seem that this is no easy problem.[1] For it remains a mystery how if S_1 believes that b_1 is ϕ and S_2 believes that b_2 is ψ, and they meant to refer to the same person, how we can make sense of this intention in the case where we have no independent individuating description of what it is they meant to refer to.

It looks then as if we must accept that a uniform account of both ordinary and vacuous names is not possible. But if our intuitions concerning "Pegasus" cannot be justified, they can at least perhaps be explained within the framework of our account of how the standard case of names - those lucky enough to have bearers - behave, and may be said to have meaning.

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[1] P. Geach. "Intentional Identity". Journal of Philosophy, October 1967.

2. Non-Existence

We have argued that the dictum does not permit a reformulation which might coincide with our intuitions in offering a uniform account of proper names. Let us then return to the original account offered of the dictum with respect to the standard cases of names. On this account to know the meaning of a name was to know which object N_1 named. To know which object N_1 named required the satisfaction of two conditions: firstly that a speaker should have at his disposal a set of true individuating descriptions of the bearer of the name; secondly that he should know what covering concept makes sense of identity questions concerning what is named. Given this account the long recognised problems of giving an analysis of such statements as "Pegasus does not exist" are still with us. What is needed is both some account of the logical grammar of such statements, and some explanation of our intuitive dislike for a theory which would reject bearerless names as expressions without meaning.

The difficulties which arise for the analysis of such statements as "Aristotle never existed" are well known. Any sentence S apparently of subject predicate form, such as "Pegasus does not exist" is deceptive, for it seems to say something about what is named "Pegasus", yet if what is named "Pegasus" doesn't exist, if the statement made by S is true, what can it be about? What is it that there is not?

Since Frege it has been widely agree that "existence" should be treated as a second order concept. Statements such as "A exists" then have the form: for some predicate ϕ, "ϕ is instantiated". Although as Russell has shown this analysis seems successful for definite descriptions, it is not clear how it can be applied to the case of names. For if condition 2 holds: if there is no description which can be substituted for a name in all contexts salva modalitate, then it would seem that Plato's problem of non-being is still with us. If on the other hand our only alternative to a sense view is a pure designatory view: that the meaning of N_1 is given by the bearer of the name, then a negative existential statement cannot be significant unless it is false. But there seems to be no doubt that a statement such as "Aristotle does not exist" is both significant and contingent.

Several ways out of the dilemma have been proposed, all of which seem more or less unsatisfactory. It has been suggested that the statement "Aristotle exists" should be analysed as "$(\exists x)(x = \text{Aristotle})$",[1] but this is unsatisfactory for the only thing which can satisfy the condition of being identical with Aristotle is Aristotle himself, and Aristotle is necessarily identical with Aristotle. This account offers no explanation of the very difficulty with which we are concerned: what it is to be Aristotle, if it is the case that

[1] For example in Quine: Word and Object.

Aristotle does not exist. To avoid the apparent paradox of A's non-existence, it has been argued that perhaps after all existence should be treated as a predicate, that "Aristotle exists" should be taken as saying that Aristotle is real, where "real" variously has the force of observable, in space time, capable of entering into causal relations etc.[1] But on this view it is not clear where the real could lie or what existence would be without reality. This suggestion seems scarcely distinct from a proposal to return to what Quine has called Wyman's slum, where we are to admit into our ontology a range of "entities" of unactualised possibilities. But, as Quine has pointed out, this over-populated universe introduces entities for which we can have no criterion of identity, no purpose, and weak grounds for excluding further unactualised impossibilities from our ontology.[2] The view that there must be two senses of "existence", one for Aristotle and another for Pegasus, has little to recommend it.

These difficulties have led to the view that we should cease our efforts to analyse the statement "A does not exist" as a first order statement, but attempt a meta-linguistic analysis where we analyse the statement as saying something about the name. Now this approach should not be dismissed on the grounds that negative

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[1] See A. Prior: "Two Senses of Existence", Analysis 17, 1957, who also suggests that Frege held a view like this.

[2] Quine, "On what there is" in From a Logical Point of View. p.16. Cambridge, Mass.: 1953.

existentials say something about the world. Semantic ascent does not presuppose that ontological controversy is a matter of words. Again, as Quine argues, "Translatability of a question into semantical terms is no indication that the question is linguistic".[1] However, there is a fundamental difficulty which confronts any meta-linguistic approach to this problem. A meta-linguistic analysis requires that the name be mentioned and not used, but then in our proposed analysis we cannot have a token of a name-instance. If the constituent of our analysis must be a token of a name type, then we are faced with the problem of specifying which particular name-instance is in question. It might be thought that this difficulty cold be avoided by the device of talking about the name (type) as it occurs in certain contexts. On these lines, the statement "Cerberus does not exist" might be analysed as for example "the name 'Cerberus' as it occurs in sentences such as 'Cerberus has two heads', 'Cerberus guards the gates of hell' etc. has not been assigned to any individual". But to ensure that we have not here denied existence of several other dogs called "Cerberus", we need to be sure that our list of statement forms exhausts all possibilities. But if we could be successful here, then the sense view would have succeeded in the first place. A meta-linguistic approach seems prohibited by the difficulty of specifying which object, of those named "Pegasus", is in question in the statement

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[1] Quine. Idem.

"Pegasus does not exist", and consequently cannot avoid the problems of analysing negative existentials as first order statements.

The problem seems paradoxical. If we are to give an analysis of negative existentials, as S_1, the name must occur in that analysis, since, by Condition 2, there is no description of b_1 available for substitution for N_1. But the name must occur in a referential position, otherwise it becomes impossible to make clear which object, called N_1, is in question. But if the name occurs referentially then the truth of the analysans presupposes the existence of what is named and therefore we can never truly deny existence of what is named.

In part this dilemma suggests its own resolution. What we need is an occurrence of the name in referential position where there is no existential presupposition. Now, any analysis in which the name occurs in an intentional context might satisfy this condition. On these grounds the statement made by, for example, "Aristotle does not exist" might be analysed as: "any statement of the form (Aristotle ϕ) is not true". So, to deny Ossian's existence is to say that there are no true statements which can be made of the form "Ossian ...ϕ...". This analysis as yet provides no explanation of our intuitions which beg a meaning for "Ossian", nor of the role which "Ossian" plays in this analysis. However, before we consider what additional account is

required to answer this question we should deal with an objection to the proposed analysis.

It may be argued against the proposed reading of the existential statement that through the use made of intentional contexts, we have simply deserted Wyman's slum in favour of a realm of intentional objects, which includes statements some of which are nonsense, as for example "Ossian Øs". The proposed analysis appears to force us to quantify over these statements. Clearly the identity conditions of statements are not coincident with the identity conditions of sentences. So it might be argued that instead of an "ontology" of real and unreal objects, we now have an "ontology" of statements which have truth conditions, and statements which don't.

This objection can be avoided, it seems, by a resort to Quine's formulation of propositional attitudes.[1] We do not need to posit statements as intentional objects, if we can analyse the proposed rendering of the existential claim in terms of some complex predicate which is true of some speaker. We might then reformulate the proposed analysis of the statement "Aristotle does not exist" as: "it is not possible that, if speaker S makes a statement of the form (Aristotle Øs) that S has made a true statement". $(S) \sim \Diamond (f(S) \rightarrow g(S))$, where 'f' and 'g' here have the values of complex predicates "makes a

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[1] W. Quine. Word and Object.

statement of the form .." and "makes a true statement" respectively. The proposed analysis of existential assertions turns out neutral with respect to the question of whether our ontology should include statements.

Given this account of existential assertions, it follows that the statement "Ossian ϕ" is neither true nor false, and furthermore that the name "Ossian" does not have meaning, in that it is not possible to answer the question which individual is meant by the name "Ossian". If this theory is right then we must be able to explain why we should ever have tended towards the belief that "Ossian" did have meaning. Some light may be cast on this question by looking first at the case of names which occur in fiction, for which a similar problem of meaning arises.

3. Names in Fiction

Any account of proper names occurring in fiction must take account of certain facts. Firstly it is clear that not all statements in fiction are nonsense.[1] Secondly many statements in fiction are neither true nor false. For example the truth value of the statement "Mr. Pickwick visited Rochester" will not be affected by the discovery that someone, by that name, enjoying some properties of obesity, paternalism, etc., is registered as visiting such a place at the relevant time. However, it is also clear that there is a difference between saying of, for instance, Hamlet, that he loved his mother, and of Oedipus, that he loved his mother. Insofar as this difference may not be entirely exhausted by inscriptional differences, it might be taken to suggest that these names have meaning. Now Dickens' propositions of the form "Pickwick is $\emptyset$" are, in what Moore has called an obvious sense of "about", about Mr. Pickwick,[2] though it does not seem that all our propositions about Mr. Pickwick are necessarily propositions about Dickens' propositions.[3] For after all we can

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1 See for instance R. Braithwaite in "Imaginary Objects", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 1933, where he argues that in fiction an author is trying to use names as both a variable and a constant. Since it is impossible for an expression to combine both of these roles, all fictional sentences must remain nonsense. (His argument suggests that authors are still wrestling with the problem, that we will not get sensible fiction until they have overcome it.)

2 G. Moore, "Imaginary Objects", ibidem. Moore's "obvious sense of about" is an intentional sense which Ryle (see 3) rejects.

3 G. Ryle, "Imaginary Objects", ibidem, for instance holds this view.

speculate on the characteristics of Mr. Pickwick, without feeling constrained to accept all Dickens' comments upon his character. Inquiries such as could Mr. Pickwick have taken the first coach to Rochester if he did not wake until midday, are certainly in order, and seem to have answers.

Now the problem is to give a coherent account of these facts. It seems then that although there are no truth conditions for the statement "Mr. Pickwick Ø" since, as we all know, Mr. Pickwick does not exist, there are truth conditions for the statement "Mr. Pickwick Ø" where it is explicitly governed by an operator such as "In the story by Dickens", or "in fiction". Furthermore although it is clear that these statements, which are explicitly governed by such an operator, are about what Dickens says of Mr. Pickwick, the truth conditions of these statements are not given by inscriptional identity. Whether the statement "In the book, Mr. Pickwick is obese" is true or false will not necessarily be judged on the grounds of whether Dickens actually writes, "Mr. Pickwick is obese"; it might be enough that he describes him as of unusually portly bearing, or even enough if we find that Mr. Pickwick has trouble getting through some gateway that another character has no difficulty with.

It seems then that in statements of the form "Mr. Pickwick Ø" which are not governed by any operator, the statement has no truth

conditions and the name "Mr. Pickwick" cannot be said to have meaning. On the other hand, where such a statement is governed by such an operator, then it seems the statement has truth conditions, and furthermore the occurrence of the name "Mr. Pickwick" within this statement plays some part in determining what these truth conditions are. Now this apparently odd result may be explained. Dickens, in writing Pickwick Papers supposes, or pretends that there is an individual called "Mr. Pickwick" who enjoys some specified properties. Within the bounds of this pretence, we know what it is to be Mr. Pickwick as opposed to Sam Weller, But in recognising this pretence, we know that the name "Pickwick" was not assigned to any object, that there is no such individual as Pickwick, and therefore that the name does not have meaning. Thus, only granted certain suppositions, and granted that we know these suppositions to be pretence, do we know the meaning of these names which occur in fiction. Thus we may suppose that we know the meaning of these names, despite the fact that in making such a supposition we know that we do not know the meaning - that these names have no bearers.

This explanation may appear mere sophistry, for it might be asked how can we suppose we know the meaning of these names: either we do or we don't. The answer to this question is that we don't. There is however a causal story which accounts for why we might have

thought we did: an account which distinguishes fictional names from such nonsense expressions as "Jabberwocky" or "tove". To know this causal story involves knowing that for instance "Pickwick" does not pick out an object. It also must involve knowing enough of Dickens' story to know the truth conditions of the statement "Dickens says Mr. Pickwick is obese". For, as we have argued above, the truth conditions of this statement are not given inscriptionally, by the occurence of this very sentence in Pickwick Papers. Rather the truth grounds of this statement lie in whether the man whom Dickens pretended existed, who in the story is described by the following predicates, $\phi_1 \ldots . \phi_n$, was also supposed, in the story, to be obese. Within the bounds of Dickens' story, "Pickwick" makes a contribution to truth conditions, for, so confined, the occurence of the name implicitly falls for us under an operator such as "in fiction", "in the story". When we discuss Dickens' character the effect of this operator is to make explicit that we are only supposing the name to have meaning, that we know it does not. In the case where no such operator is understood, our assertion presupposes that there is such an individual as Pickwick. But to make any statement with this presupposition concerning Pickwick is not to know the meaning of the name, it is to believe that the pretence is no pretence at all: that Dickens is describing the world.

If this account is coherent it must be able to deal with several obvious objections which should be raised. Firstly an objection might be made on the basis of our earlier discussion of an attempt at a uniform account of names. There it was argued, with some support from Geach, that a uniform account of names along the lines of the dictum was impossible since we could not make sense of the notion of intentional identity. For a name to continue to name the same individual it seemed that the bearer of the name must exist. But does not our account of fictional names presuppose the coherence of just this notion? Does our account not commit us to the possibility of Dickens talking about the same individual, Pickwick, when we can give no answer to the question what is it to be the same individual as Pickwick?

This objection misplaces the difficulty with the notion of intentional identity. No problem of intentional identity arises for Dickens in writing his story. Dickens can pretend that there is an individual, called "Pickwick", and that this same individual has the property $\emptyset$. Furthermore, all descriptions of Pickwick can be retailed under the operator "Dickens supposes there is an X, such that .... and that the same X is ....". The difficulty of being forced to quantify into intentional contexts only occurs when we move outside the context of a fictional operator. We only move outside these contexts when we misunderstand Dickens' activity.

Nor does this view commit us to an ontology of characters some of whom are fictional, others not. If we say that Mr. Pickwick is a fictional character, what this means is that there are certain works where a character called Mr. Pickwick is supposed to exist. That Dickens makes up his story, talks about Pickwick, etc., does not commit us to a set of unreal objects. Dickens' book is a part of our ontology, what Dickens talks about in the book is not.

But it might be thought that if we can avoid an ontology of fictional objects, we can only do so at the cost of admitting a curious range of meanings of names. For the explanation given seems to introduce expressions which have meaning, expressions which are nonsense, and a third class of expressions which have supposed meanings. However, this argument can only succeed at the cost of positing entities such as meanings. All that the explanation requires is that there can be expressions which are supposed to have meaning which is no more grounds for the claim that there are supposed meanings, than the view that some expressions have meaning is grounds for the claim that there are such entities as meanings.

Neither does this view commit us to the position of denying that "Mr. Pickwick" is a name, or finding exceptions to condition 2. Condition 2 stated that there was no description ϕ such that it is a

necessary and sufficient condition of being the bearer of the name, that b_1 is $\emptyset$. Now it might be thought that if we allow that "Mr. Pickwick" is a name, then this name is tied to certain descriptions given by Dickens. Although it seemed impossible to find any description which could be substituted salva veritate and salva modalitate for a standard proper name, in the case of "Mr. Pickwick" it might be argued that any of Dickens' descriptions of Pickwick would be inter-substitutable with the name. This argument however is to misinterpret Dickens' activity. We cannot in all contexts substitute a particular description for the name in the book, since Dickens' suppositions are not tautologies. We can no more substitute the description "author of The Physics" for the name "Aristotle" in "Aristotle wrote The Physics", than we can substitute the description "employer of Sam Weller" into Dickens' statement "Pickwick employed Sam Weller". It is part of a work of fiction that its pretence is based on analogy with the world. Dickens treats Mr. Pickwick as if he were an individual who existed, for this is part of the pretence, hence there is no description which Pickwick is supposed to instantiate which Dickens, through his other characters, cannot put in question.

Now the difference between "Ossian" and "Pickwick" is clear. Macpherson pretended that "Ossian" named some individual, just as Dickens pretends that "Mr. Pickwick" names someone. But in the case

of "Ossian" we have, at least in the past, been taken in by the pretence, whereas we probably were not taken in by Dickens' pretence. Insofar as we were taken in by Macpherson's fraud, we are under the illusion that we know the meaning of "Ossian". In fact we don't. When we become aware of how this name did get into discourse, when we recognise the pretence for what it is, we then know that we do not know the meaning of the name, but further, why we thought we did. We are now in a position to explain why, in the case of "Ossian", our intuition tells us that the name has meaning. The statement "Macpherson pretended that Ossian wrote the epic" is true, and is, in an intentional sense of 'about', about Ossian. But the only sense in which we can be said to know the meaning of "Ossian" is in explicitly recognising how it was wrongly supposed that anyone knew who Ossian was. That language allows us a way of sensibly reporting nonsense must not encourage us to believe that after all nonsense has sense.

The conspiratorial aspect of this account is not of course by any means a necessary ingredient. We do not for instance need to suppose the first worshipper of Apollo to have been a skillful writer of fiction, still less a deliberate deceiver of mankind. Names may be introduced into language through supposition, pretence or straightforward error.

This explanation of our intuitions conforms well with the odd feature of existential denials. It has often seemed curious that we should ever make such statements as "Homer did not exist", for it is unclear what might count as evidence for such a claim. Given that Homer did exist, it is purely contingent that we know so little about him. We might then feel unhappy with the conclusion that should we find other authors of the Iliad and the Odyssey, we would on that ground deny Homer's existence. Surely we would then have as little reason to claim his existence as to deny it, for we have nothing to say about him, since we would not know who he was. Why then should we make any existential claim at all? It would seem that the answer to this question is that we might want to make just such a claim as "Homer did not exist" when we have reason to believe that someone pretended that he did.

In conclusion then we may suggest that the difficulty of names such as "Ossian" is that we supposed, sometimes as a result of a pretence, that we knew the meaning of the name. In fact we don't. The purpose of existential assertions such as "Aristotle did not exist" is to draw attention to the pretence. This may explain the role that such a name plays in existential assertions, and these assertions may be analysed as the assertion that no true statement can be made about Aristotle.

Chapter V

INCORRECTNESS IN NAMES

1. The Naming Relation

So far we have considered what it is for a phoneme to be a name, and what it is for a name to have meaning. We must now consider the third question, what is the relation between a name and what it names. It has often been suggested that naming is intentional in that it appears to satisfy one or other of criteria which have been proposed for intentional verbs. It has been argued that one way in which this relation is intentional is that it is a success notion. It is therefore important to consider the question of how incorrectness in naming can occur: whether incorrectness in names is coincident with the cases of naming failures.

Now the most obvious sense in which it might be argued that naming is an intentional relation is that naming is indifferent to existence of a bearer. It is however important to see in what sense this claim may be justified. Campbell[1] has for instance argued that "a coherent account can be given of proper names which leaves open the question whether what is so named exists". This account is given

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[1] R. Campbell. "Proper Names". Mind. July 1968

by a condition proposed by Gardiner[1] which states that,

> A proper name is a word or group of words which is recognised as having identification as its specific purpose, and which achieves, or tends to achieve, that purpose by means of its distinctive sound alone, without regard to any meaning possessed by that sound from the start, or acquired by it through association with the object or objects thereby identified.

Campbell's two conditions, discussed in Chapter II, are designed to make this condition specific.

Now it is clear from the account we have given of the meaning of a name that it is not possible to give any coherent account of a name, which has identification as its specific purpose, without appealing to some set of true individuating descriptions of the bearer. The knowledge of such a set does presuppose the existence of the bearer of the name. Hence in one sense our account cannot vindicate Campbell's claim. However although it is not possible to explain or know the meaning of a name in a way which leaves open the question of the existence of the bearer, it does seem compatible with our account that a phoneme may be a name, despite the fact that that name has no meaning. Consequently in another sense Campbell's thesis may be justified. It is possible for a word to be a name, irrespective of whether what it names exists. Insofar as the criterion for intentionality given

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[1] A. Gardiner. The Theory of Proper Names. (Oxford: 1954)

by indifference to existence is concerned, naming is an intentional verb, in that a word may be a name if it behaves as a name, despite the fact that we cannot give a coherent account of the meaning of that name unless its bearer exists. This is merely to say that there are bearerless names. There is clearly no contradiction in the statement "Macpherson named Ossian as the author of the epic". "... names ----" therefore creates an opaque context in its second argument place, for it can be satisfied without there being any such thing as .... Naming is then intentional with respect to one common criterion.

But it has also been argued that naming is intentional in that it is a success notion, and further that any case of a naming failure is a case of incorrectness in naming. I think it can be shown that naming is not intentional in this sense, and that although there is room for incorrectness in naming on our account, a case of incorrectness in naming is not a case of a naming failure.[1]

It has been argued that naming is an intentional action in that a speaker tries, through his use of the name, to do something in which

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[1] The argument here tacitly implies a rejection of the thesis proposed for instance by J. O. Urmson in "Criteria of Intentionality" (in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, 1968) Relations which satisfy Chisholm's first criterion of intentionality, indifference to existence, do not necessarily all share the same feature of being success notions, or translatable into teleological statements. See for example L. J. Cohen's contribution to the same symposium.

he may or may not succeed. Kenny has for instance proposed such an intentional account of naming. He defines a name as "any simple symbol which is used with the intention of referring exclusively to a particular individual of a certain kind ...". Now on this account "referring" is defined via meaning, that "to refer to something is to be successful in meaning it". "Meaning", in its turn, is defined via referring, "If A intends by the word 'N' to refer exclusively to B, then A means B by 'N'. Only if B exists will A succeed in referring to B".[1]

There is an obvious circularity in this account which defines the two crucial notions of "meaning" and "referring" in terms of each other. As it turns out this leads to difficulties for Kenny. On his account the notions of intending to refer and succeeding in referring come to the same thing, which, it is clear, is unwelcome. For he says "If A intends by the word 'N' to refer exclusively to B, then A means B by 'N'". But to be successful in meaning something, that is for A to mean B by 'N', is to refer to something. Consequently the notions of intending to refer, and of referring, coincide. Kenny can avoid this coincidence by saying that when A uses the word 'N' to refer exclusively, he intends to mean, but does not necessarily succeed in meaning, B. But this leaves him in the unfortunate position of denying

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[1] A. Kenny. "Oratio Obliqua", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 1963.

meaning to bearerless proper names, since speakers don't succeed in referring to particular individuals, when they use these vacuous names, if referring is non-intentional as Kenny holds.

But this objection is unfair to Kenny for it ignores the purport of his theory. His intention is plain. In defining names in terms of referring, which he holds explicitly to be a success notion, he is attempting to introduce the possibility of names having a meaning which is dependent on their use to refer, whether or not they are successful in referring. The name then has meaning through purporting to refer. Some names do successfully refer, others fail. But of those which fail we have to explain what it is that they have failed to refer to which cannot be done unless "refer" is understood as an intentional notion. Yet if it is so understood, then there is no room for the notion of succeeding in referring. It looks then as if an account cannot be given of naming as a success action in terms of a speaker's intention to refer, for such an account requires a non-intentional reading of "referring" to explain naming as an intentional act, and an intentional explanation of "referring" to explain how the name has meaning.

If naming is to be explained as an intentional action, where a speaker, via the name, tries and may fail to do something, then in our account we will have to include the possibility of naming-failures,

where the speaker's intention is not fulfilled. Now it is important to see in what sense there can be cases of naming-failures. Campbell has suggested an account which gives rise to the possibility of naming failures,[1] as occurring where a word, intended to be taken as a token of a name by the speaker is not understood as such by the hearer. Campbell begins with the question how a word ever comes to be taken as a token for a name. He rejects the traditional view that a name comes to be a name through the establishment of some convention: a word does not become a name when it has been used enough times for it to be said that a convention has been established. For Campbell, what makes a word into a name is the interpersonal factor in naming. When on the first occasion I use the word "Tommy" in the utterance "Tommy, pass me that hammer", the question of whether or not I have used a name does not rest upon whether I have succeeded in establishing a convention or habit, still less on whether "Tommy" is the name of the individual addressed, but whether this individual recognises my intention to use the word as a name, or recognises my intention that the hearer take this word to be a proper name. When this intention is not recognised we have a case of naming-failure. On the other hand when my intention is recognised by the hearer, and he is able to use the word himself in the same way, then we have, on Campbell's account, a full-blown case of a proper name in use.

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[1] R. Campbell. "Proper Names". Mind 1968.

It is quite clear that in one perhaps trivial sense this account is right. Naming, or using a name, is an intentional action in the sense that the speaker has a purpose in using the name. Speakers do not usually engage in linguistic activity without some purpose in mind. In this sense every linguistic utterance is intentional. But this sense of 'intentional' is distinct from the claim that Campbell is here making for the intentionality of naming. On Campbell's account using a name becomes a success notion. A speaker has not used a name unless it is the case that a hearer recognises his intention that the hearer should take the word as a name. Now it seems to me that this view is fraught with difficulties. How many in an audience must recognise the speaker's intention for the word to be a fully blown use of a name? Can we not have a first occasion use of a proper name when the speaker is thinking to himself, or does he need to talk out loud, to himself, to get the word qualified as a name; if so, the criterion becomes no criterion at all, for this hearer should not have much difficulty in recognising the speaker's intention. It would seem clear that there are cases in which a speaker may use a name, when the audience does not know the meaning of the name used, but it would seem absurd to conclude that on such an occasion a name has not been used, or that he has failed to name anything. For the speaker to have the intention that the word should be a name requires already that the speaker know the meaning of the name. Consequently it seems that on

any formulation of this view we are going to have to say that the word is both a name, in that the speaker forms his intention, and not a name, since the speaker's intention is not recognised by the hearer. Again, on Campbell's version of naming, it does not look as if there are such things as naming-failures since their importation rests upon a theory of naming which makes naming a success word and naming does not seem to be intentional in this respect.

But it may well be asked what incorrectness can occur in names. For any successful account of names must leave room for the possibility of some incorrectness in names. Now on the theory of the dictum of Chapter II it would seem that a speaker can take any phoneme and assign it to any existent or non-existent, about which he holds certain beliefs, and that this is sufficient to constitute a fully fledged case of a name. Is there then no way in which a speaker who uses a name can go wrong, either in qualifying a phoneme as a name, or in using that phoneme as a name? The first of these questions, namely what it takes to qualify a word as a name, raises no interesting questions. Given that a set of conditions are satisfied by the speaker which permits the phoneme to be used as a name, then there is no further step to take to get that word qualified as a name. For example in the case of the name "Tommy" it is not necessary to appeal to a theory of conventions in language, or the creation of habits, to explain how "Tommy" can come

to name the person it does. "Tommy" is Tommy's name whether or not there is an audience which understands this name. Moore's difficulties with the question of how his wife may have succeeded in bestowing the non-habitual name "Bill" upon him only arise if Moore was unable to ask his wife whom she meant by "Bill".[1] The interesting question here is what are the conditions which must be satisfied by the speaker and the potential bearer if he is to use a word as a name. It is this question with which the dictum attempts to deal, and which will be discussed further in the next chapter.

Given that recognition by an audience of a speaker's intentions cannot be said to explain incorrectness in naming, let us see if a place for incorrectness cannot occur in the actual use of a name. Here it is clear that there is the possibility of incorrectness. A speaker may simply use the wrong name, by mistake. In the celebrated example of Dr. Spooner, who in his sermon used the name "Aristotle" when he meant to refer to St. Paul, quite clearly made a mistake. But it is not necessary to opt for an account of names which makes naming a success notion in order to explain this mistake. The mistake occurs because Dr. Spooner has used a name which is not the name conventionally assigned to that individual, and this mistake is corrected by his comment after his sermon that whenever he used the word "Aristotle" he meant to say "St. Paul". This mistake is like such other linguistic

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[1] G. Moore. Commonplace Book. Ed. Casimir Lewy. London 1962.

errors, as for instance where one says that something is red, whereas in fact one means it is green. The speaker has simply made a slip. Dr. Spooner could of course have said after the sermon that he used the name "Aristotle" to mean St. Paul, and although this might be odd, and certainly confusing, it would not be wrong. Consequently on the theory of the dictum there is no difficulty in explaining how it is possible for incorrectness in naming to occur. To use the wrong name has a straightforward sense for a speaker who understands what is meant by two names, and by mistake uses one name instead of the other. Where there already exists a convention, where a given name is conventionally accepted as having a given meaning, it lessens confusion to use that name. However this does not imply that to use a different word to mean the same thing is incorrect, but simply that the new name must be introduced, or its meaning explained. "Aristotle" is not the right name of Aristotle and "Hob" the wrong name. It is open to me to use any name I like, though it is simplest, where there is a convention, to use the conventionally agreed name.

2. Terms which are not Names

An account has been proposed of the role of names which suggests a way of dealing with some of the traditional problems commonly associated with proper names. This explanation cannot purport to offer a general account of names, for as yet no defining conditions, which might delineate a class of expressions which are names, have been established. The question arises: How fundamental are the conditions which have been observed from the behaviour of some standard names? How fundamental are they for a definitive account of what it is to be a proper name?

Clearly one approach towards an answer to this question is to consider how far the conditions we have observed can differentiate proper names from other singular terms. What guide do these conditions offer in deciding whether for instance "wisdom" is the proper name of the virtue, or "horse" the proper name of the species. Why after all is "three" not the proper name of the number three? And are the expressions which so concerned Russell, egocentric terms, proper names at all? Even if we have no answer to these questions, we might expect that the differences in the ways these terms designate should have some bearing on the centrality of the conditions which seem to describe the role of proper names.

One condition observed which does seem to take us some way towards differentiating names from other designating expressions is condition 2: this condition requires that there is no description of b_1, the bearer of a name, N_1, such that it is a necessary and sufficient condition of being N_1's bearer that b_1 satisfy that description. This condition picks up what appears to be a crucial condition of the behaviour of names, that they refer without describing, and it certainly differentiates names from both definite and indefinite descriptions. Neither the description "a man who climbed Everest" nor the description "the first man to climb Everest" can satisfy this condition. It would also seem that this condition must militate against the view that numbers are names of objects, for it is always possible to substitute in transparent contexts a description for a number expression, salva veritate and (provided we heed scope[1]) salva modalitate. For instance, for the expression "three" we can substitute the description "the immediate successor of two"; the question "is three the immediate successor of two?" has the required triviality, which we could not find in the case of names and descriptions of their bearers.[2]

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1 Cp. Smullyan. "Modality and Description", 1948. Journal of Symbolic Logic.

2 See generally P. Bernacerref (Philosophical Review 1965), who argues that in giving necessary and sufficient properties of numbers we are merely characterising an abstract structure, where the elements have no properties other than those relating them to other elements in the same structure.

It might also be thought that condition 2 is effective in differentiating names from personal pronouns and from such egocentric terms as "now" and "here". With these some definite descriptions, such as "the place where I am", and "at this time" (which give the sense of "here" and "how") do seem to be available for substitution. But these grounds for differentiation already raise doubt about how central condition 2 is for the status of being truly a name. Does condition 2 really give the basic reason why a name differs from egocentric terms? This doubt appears to be reinforced in the case of personal pronouns. Even if condition 2 can distinguish names from the first person pronoun it is less obviously successful in the case of third person pronouns. How are we to refute someone who insists that "he" is a proper name multiply assigned.[1] There are at least two further cases of singular terms where condition 2 is quite ineffective as a principle of differentiation: namely the case of demonstratives and the case of names of species or of universals.

This failure of condition 2 leads to two questions. First, is our confidence in the distinctions of grammar sufficient to incline us to find a principle of differentiation in these cases? Why should

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[1] This difficulty should not mislead us into taking the view that names cannot be distinguished from pronouns. It is clear that they can. For determinacy of reference a pronoun requires the support of an antecedent referring expression, or some ostensive gesture. This at least gives us cause to question Quine's view that "Pronouns are the basic media of reference: nouns might have been better named propronouns". (From a Logical Point of View, p.13).

we think these terms are not proper names? Secondly, if we do incline to the view that such terms are not proper names, then which of the multifarious ways in which they differ from proper names is the more central to the true principle of differentiation?

The case of demonstratives is of less importance for these two questions. For it would seem that a straightforward condition of differentiation is given by the fact that for any determinacy of sentence meaning, imbedded demonstratives must require something like the specification of a relevant sortal. And a relevant sortal cannot be treated as a part of the meaning of "this" as we found to be the case with names. It was necessary, in order to know the meaning of a name, that one know the relevant covering concept for identity questions concerning the bearer of the name. However, in the case of demonstratives a hearer cannot gather which individual is indicated by the speaker without some explicit or implicit specification which answers the question "this what?".

In the case of names of universals or names of species, there appears to be a range of apparently linguistic differences between the behaviour of such expressions and the behaviour of proper names. To consider the logical content of these differences is clearly a topic in itself. For our purposes it is enough to see to what extent some of the possible distinctions may undermine our faith in the centrality

of condition 2 to a general account of proper names.

At least two obvious differences in the behaviour of names of universals and species from the behaviour of proper names appear. The first is the asymmetry in their behaviour in negative existential contexts. An analysis of the statement "wisdom does not exist" can be given in terms of whether a certain concept is instantiated, whereas as we have seen for the standard case of proper names, "Mary does not exist" cannot be analysed as "there is no instance of Mary".[1] Secondly, we might draw upon a further argument of Strawson's to provide a second and important distinction between these expressions. Strawson argues that for identifying reference to particulars, a speaker must know some true empirical proposition to the effect that just one individual answers to a certain description. Whereas in the case of the introduction of universals into discourse there appear to be no such parallel conditions. The proposition "something is ϕ" is no more a sufficient condition than the proposition "nothing is ϕ" to the introduction of the term "ϕ-ness". Hence introduction of universals rests upon a tautology, whereas as we have seen, introduction of proper names into

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1 A similar argument has been put by Strawson in Individuals, and also in "Singular Terms and Predication", Journal of Philosophy 1961. The asymmetry noted is not undermined by the possibility of names which are shared names. See for example J. Woodger, Biology and Language (Cambridge: 1952). For Woodger still uses the classification of genuine proper names, for which this asymmetry still holds. Nevertheless the possibility of shared names does at least underline the difficulty in deciding whether names of universals are proper names.

significant discourse does not. An important consequence of this asymmetry is that proper names are undermined in a serious way if the bearer of the name does not exist, whereas this does not apply to a name for a universal. "Dragonhood is $\emptyset$" is true or false, irrespective of whether we find any dragons, whereas "Pegasus is $\emptyset$" lacks meaning and truth value.

These features of the behaviour of universal terms suggest the possibility of differentiation of such expressions from proper names, but they also raise the question whether the linguistic approach on the basis of condition 2 is not misguided. Both forms of asymmetry not only undermine our faith in condition 2 as a general principle of differentiation but also in the linguistic approach itself. They suggest the possibility of a more fundamental distinction between those terms grounded on a consideration of what can be named, rather than upon the question how do naming expressions behave. The need for such a different approach becomes all the stronger in the light of the weakness of the account which differentiated proper names from egocentric terms, such as "here" and "now". For here already it looked as though the real issue as to whether such expressions are names asks to be fought out on the level of what is named, rather than upon the linguistic features that these terms exhibit. Do these expressions name definite places and times? Should we not look for some more

fundamental condition of what it is to a proper name which is expressible in terms of the sorts of objects names pick out, and which will explain why condition 2 is effective insofar as it has appeared to be?

Now there have been many theories which attempt a general account of names from such a standpoint. Basically such theories begin from the premise that proper names are distinct from other designators in that they pick out determinate singular objects. Now clearly if this approach is to be successful it is necessary to give some coherent account of what it is to be a singular determinate object, or, what is more difficult, given the dummy nature of the term "object", what is it not to be singular and determinate?

Classically it has been argued that the force of "singular" is that a proper name names only one thing. But this explanation is either uninformative or false.[1] Given Frege's account of one, it would seem that anything which instantiates any predicate can, on this criterion, be a proper nameable. Surely the Alps are as much a singular instantiation of the concept, mountain range, as Aristotle is a single instantiation of the concept, man. To make more of this

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[1] Cf. R. Wollheim. "Thought and Passion", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1967-68, where he argued that considerations of uniqueness are either otiose or out of place as a criterion for definite referring expressions.

condition it seems we must import some restriction on what concepts proper nameables may instantiate. But clearly whatever sort of explanation we give here we will want to include the concept man, but it does not seem true to say that all proper names which name men, name just one man. For there seems no obvious reason why this should be, and furthermore there seem to be, on at least the capital letter criterion of proper names, some counterexamples. "The Dioscouri" seems to qualify as a name, and yet it undoubtedly names two men, Castor and Pollux.

Similar problems arise if we are to fill out the notion of "determinate". It is difficult to see what this notion can import for proper nameables beyond that they be something, or, that they instantiate some concept. And what is it to be something which is not determinate in this sense?

It is arguable that what is really intended by these theorists, who attempt to import the notion of singular and determinate objects to help delimit a class of proper nameables, is that what can be named must be the sort of object which is or could be in space and time. On the basis of standard cases of proper names such a thesis has at least intuitive appeal. But the difficulty is how to justify such a condition. It might be thought that a synthesis of the linguistic and

ontological approaches could be achieved by justifying this ontological view by appeal to the linguistic condition 2, for surely condition 2 could not hold of a name for any object which was not a material object, or a dependent of one, i.e. not in space and time. A name for an object which is not in space and time must be introduced via a definite description. Now in the case of names of material objects introduced first via definite descriptions we found that to deny the application of this description to the bearer was to talk nonsense in the case where that description is the only description available. We should no longer be in a position to know the meaning of the name. But in the case of names for objects which are not in space and time the situation is different. To deny the application of the original introducing description to the bearer of the name here does give us a contradiction. To put the point another way, any later descriptions which we might add to the set of true descriptions of the bearer of the name will be logically derivable from the set. Consequently a name of an object which is not in space and time will contravene condition 2.

But this conclusion is scarcely surprising, and in as much as it fails to surprise it fails to be helpful. For we have already argued that number expressions cannot be names since they will fail condition 2 in that there is some description which is substitutable for the

"name" in appropriate contexts. But in attempting to justify the view that names name spatio-temporal objects via condition 2 we have achieved no more than a reiteration of this conclusion. We have not found any independent condition which could explain the apparent coincidence of the ontological approach with the linguistic approach, or justify condition 2 itself.

It seems then that although condition 2 may pick up some essential feature of names, it cannot be generalised to provide a necessary and sufficient condition of what it is to be a proper name. If condition 2 gives only one sufficient condition of an expression's being a name, then it is possible that on specification of other sufficient conditions, condition 2 itself might be superseded. The question remains open as to whether there is not some more fundamental condition which could take up the slack left by condition 2, and account for its limited success. Until such a condition can be given it does not seem possible to specify less trivially than we have so far done what incorrectness can occur in names.

3. Conclusion

The account given of the role of names cannot be generalised to provide necessary and sufficient conditions of what it is to be a name. But this disappointment does not put in doubt the basic approach to an explanation of the role of names. Although we may not be in a position to set the limits to what terms are proper names, we are now in a better position to explain how those expressions in language which are proper names come to play a significant role. A name's contribution to the truth conditions of a statement rests on its function of picking out some individual. To know what contribution the name makes, or to know the meaning of a name, is to know which object the name names. The conditions which must be satisfied for a speaker to know which individual the name names are that he should have at his disposal some definite individuating descriptions of that individual which presupposes that he should know what sort of object it is that is named. Insofar as names have this function, they play a significant role, or may be said to have meaning. However the meaning of a name is no longer something which we need to find in the world in order to explain the role of a name. There is no direct answer to the question What is the meaning of a name, as there should have been had either the sense views or the designatory approach to the meaning of names succeeded. The virtue of our account is that neither a description of the bearer nor the bearer itself must be substitutable for the

name, if the name is to be said to have meaning.

Now this account which has been given of names does imply some stand upon the ontological disputes which divided those who disagreed over the function of names. The account which has followed from the dictum lands us neither with sense view theorists nor in the camp of those who supported a designatory view. However some of the advantages claimed by each faction may be appropriated in support of our approach.

Despite the fact that it seems that no consistent account of the sense view can be given, it is still open to us to employ Russell's theory of definite descriptions, supplemented by Quine's device of pseudo predicates, if we want a simple path to the quantification of negative existentials. But now it is possible to give some explanation of Quine's unanalysable irreducible predicate "Pegasises". We have then no reason to retract from a Quinean formulation of ontological questions, in terms of the values of our variables. But the account of names does suggest at least an exception to the general scheme for meaning explanations given by sense and reference. To suggest that a name both has a reference and a sense, would seem on this account to overspecify the role of the name. With the loss of this general scheme we dispense with the proposed Sense and Reference explanation of a supposed difference in truth value between the

statements "Hesperus is Phosphorus" and "Hesperus is Hesperus". But it is doubtful how great a loss is involved. On the view proposed here we cannot explain any difference in modality of these statements. But given the opacity of indirect speech it is questionable if this matters.[1]

The ontological position of the pure designatory thesis seems harder to reconcile with the proposed account of names. Proper names clearly do not name the simple indestructible elements of the world. Socrates' statement in the Theætetus, that "whatever is named in its own right has to be ... named without any other determination" can certainly not be applied to the bearers of proper names, for although it may be possible for a speaker to use a name without knowing any true description of what is named, the things which are named cannot be known, or talked about independently of the properties they may instantiate. The argument from the premise of the peculiar and ineliminable function of names to the ontological priority of the bearers of names, cannot, it seems, ground a Lockean doctrine of substance, or even provide support for the priority of material objects to our scheme of things. But the account given does reflect on the very reason for which many philosophers were predisposed towards simple names and their counterparts. The desire to eliminate the possibility

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[1] See P. Geach in Three Philosophers (Oxford: 1961) p.162.

of truth gaps via names, guaranteed of bearers, cannot be and is not satisfied by the case of everyday language proper names. Naming, we have seen, is intentional in the respect that a name which has no bearer can occur in language. Nevertheless, the occurence of truth gaps on the account given does acquire a different complexion. Subject-predicate sentences in which a proper name occurs only fail of a truth value where they lack a meaning. There are then for significant statements (made by such sentences) no truth value gaps. To this extent Wittgenstein's design for names in the Tractatus can be justified. But at the same time, if we have lost some remnants of the problem of non-being for the bearers of proper names, we have also lost the relevance that the bearers of names might have had to matters of ontology.

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